I.

VOID MARRIAGES
General Rule:

Art. 4 of the Family Code: Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated Commented [1]:

in Article 35 (2).

1. Kinds of void marriages

(a) Effect of absence of requisites

Art. 35 of the Family Code:

The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the Commented [2]:
consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform
marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties Commented [3]:
believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to
do so;
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Commented [4]:
Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41; Commented [5]:

(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the Commented [6]:
identity of the other; and Commented [7]:

(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53. Commented [8]:

Art. 234 of the Family Code:

Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless Commented [9]:
otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of twenty.-one years. Commented [10]:

RA 6809:
Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the
Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 234.Emancipation takes place by the attainment of

majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of
eighteen years." Commented [11]:

Sec. 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed.
Sec. 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as
follows:

"Art. 236.Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the Commented [12]:
person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and Commented [13]:
responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by
existing laws in special cases.

"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of

twenty-one. Commented [14]:
"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or
responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below
twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code."

Sec. 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills, bequests, donations,
grants, insurance policies and similar instruments containing references
and provisions favorable to minors will not retroact to their prejudice.

Sec. 5. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in at
least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: December 13, 1989

————////—-////————
De Ca Commented [15]:

stro v. Assidao- De Castro

The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked; Other than for
purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity.—The Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to Commented [16]:
determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent.
The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. Thus, in Niñal v. Commented [17]:
Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (2000), we held: However, other than for purposes
of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination
of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court
may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. Commented [18]:
This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such
need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment Commented [19]:
declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code
connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.

Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential
to the determination of the case.—In Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, 351 Commented [20]:

SCRA 127 (2001), the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority
to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case being a
claim for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court may pass Commented [21]:

upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to

question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, Commented [22]:

testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering

such a marriage an absolute nullity. Commented [23]:

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any
of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable.—Under the Commented [24]:

Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential
requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear
from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a
marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they
presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more
than five years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of
the affidavit when she was asked during crossexamination, thus—ATTY. Commented [25]:

CARPIO: QBut despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living
together as husband and wife for the last five years on or before March 13,
1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct? AYes, sir.

Failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders the marriage void
ab initio.—The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere Commented [26]:

irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the
marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation
of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every
applicant’s name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no Commented [27]:

“scandalous cohabitation” to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at Commented [28]:

all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they
could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere
scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license Commented [29]:

requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders

their marriage void ab initio.

(b) Bigamous and polygamous marriages Commented [30]:

Art. 35 of the Family Code.

The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: Commented [31]:

Xxx (4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article
41; Commented [32]:

Art. 41 of the Family Code Commented [33]:

A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where Commented [34]:

there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions
of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be Commented [35]:

sufficient. Commented [36]:

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the

preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary Commented [37]:

proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive

death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of
the absent spouse.

b.1 Who may file and penalty

Art. 344 of the RPC Commented [38]:

Prosecution of the Crimes of Adultery, Concubinage, Seduction, Abduction,

Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness. — The crimes of adultery and Commented [39]:
concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the
offended spouse. Commented [40]:

The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including

both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall Commented [41]:
have consented or pardoned the offenders. Commented [42]:

The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall Commented [43]:
not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or
her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has Commented [44]:
been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may Commented [45]:
be. Commented [46]:

In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the Commented [47]:
marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the
criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The Commented [48]:
provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the co-principals,
accomplices and accessories after the fact of the abovementioned crimes.
Art. 349 of the RPC

Bigamy. — The penalty of prisión mayor shall be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings. Commented [49]:

b.2 Old and new rules on the need to declare the first marriage void

Old rule: No judicial decree needed to declare a void marriage

People v Mendoza

BIGAMY; MARRIAGE CONTRACTED DURING THE EXISTENCE OF THE

FIRST MARRIAGE is VOID AB INITIO; No JUDICIAL DECREE is
NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH ITS INVALIDITY.—A subsequent marriage
contracted by any person during the lifetime of his espouse is illegal and
void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish
its invalidity. A prosecution for bigamy based on said void marriage will not
lie.

New rule: Judicial decree is needed. Reasons. Commented [50]:

Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy

Facts:

 Karl Heinz Wiegel filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Lilia Wiegel (Petitioner LILIA) on the ground of LILIA’s Commented [51]:
previous existing marriage to Eduardo Maxion.
  LILIA admitted the existence of her prior marriage to Maxion but
claimed that their marriage was null and void because she and Maxion
were allegedly forced to enter said marital union.
 During pre-trial, the issue agreed upon by LILIA and Karl Wiegel was
the status of the first marriage (void or voidable?).
 LILIA contested validity of the pre-trial order and asked the court for an
opportunity to present evidence that: (1) 1st marriage was vitiated by
force exercised upon both her and Maxion and (2) Maxion, at the time
of their marriage, was already married to someone else.
 Hon. Sempio-Dy ruled against the presentation f evidence because the
existence of force exerted on LILIA and Maxion had already been
agreed upon.
 LILIA assailed Sempio-Dy’s Orders (compelling to submit the case for
resolution based on “agreed facts” and denying motion to present
evidence in her favor) through a Petition for Certiorari alleging
GADALEJ.

Proof that first marriage was vitiated by force, not necessary in an action for Commented [52]:

a declaration of nullity of marriage filed by the second husband; Reason.—

There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated
by force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so,
the marriage will not be void but merely voidable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and
therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is
clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her
first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Commented [53]:

Civil Code).

Introducing evidence about existing prior marriage, not necessary as the

first marriage though void, still needs a judicial declaration of such fact; Commented [54]:

Woman’s marriage to second husband void; Case at bar.—There is

likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage
of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a
marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial
declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still
be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage
with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner
and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.

Domingo v. CA Commented [55]:

Facts:

Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition

for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property. She Commented [56]:

did not know that Domingo had been previously married to Emerlinda dela
Paz in 1969. She came to know the previous marriage when the latter filed
a suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home from
Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto
cohabited with another woman and had been disposing some of her
properties which is administered by Roberto. The latter claims that
because their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance
is unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the
declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but
in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of properties
acquired during the marriage.

A marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact under
the. Family Code even for purposes other than remarriage.—Came the
Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on
the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.
Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked
for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in
law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

—In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage

is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her
marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of
the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot
be charged with bigamy.

—That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause

denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need
not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can
conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as
in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of
property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the
custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the
latters’ presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be
limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has previously
contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into
another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to
prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

Declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for the

liquidation of property, custody and support of children, etc. There is no
need of filing a separate civil action for such purposes.—Based on the Commented [57]:

foregoing provisions, private respondent’s ultimate prayer for separation of

property will simply be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner’s
suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary
civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family
Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the Commented [58]:

regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the

lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is
likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions
regarding the couple’s properties. Accordingly, the respondent court
committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court committed no
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss SP No.
1989-J.

VITUG, J., Concurring:

Certain effects of a valid marriage can flow out of a void marriage.—A void Commented [59]:

marriage, even without its being judicially declared a nullity, albeit the
preferability for, and justiciability (fully discussed in the majority opinion) of,
such a declaration, will not give it the status or the consequences of a valid
marriage, saving only specific instances where certain effects of a valid
marriage can still flow from the void marriage. Examples of these cases are
children of void marriages under Article 36 (due to psychological
incapacity) and Article 53, in relation to Article 52 (due to failure of partition,
delivery of presumptive legitimes of children and recording thereof following
the annulment or declaration of nullity of a prior marriage), conceived or
born before the judicial declaration of nullity of such void marriages, who
the law deems as legitimate (Article 54, Family Code). Commented [60]:

Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis

Respondent Isagani Bobis contracted a first marriage with Maria Dulce

Javier· Without having this annulled, he contracted a second marriage with
Imelda Marbella-Bobis on 1/25/1996 and allegedly a third marriage with
Julia Hernandez on 2/25/1998. Petitioner Imelda Bobis filed with RTC an
information for bigamy Sometime after, Isagani initiated a civil action to
annul first marriage b/c it was celebrated w/o marriage license. He then
filed motion to suspend proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy
invoking the pending civil case for nullity as a PREJUDICIAL QUESTION to
the criminal case. RTC granted motion to suspend; Petitioner Imelda filed
for motion for recon = denied · Petitioner, in this petition for review on
certiorari, argues that respondent should have first declared judicial
declaration of nullity before entering into the second marriage, inasmuch as
the alleged prejudicial question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is
no longer a legal truism pursuant to Art 40 of FC.

Bigamy; Family Code; Article 40 of the Family Code requires a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry.— Commented [61]:

Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration
of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this
is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the
validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the first marriage was
void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no
judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was
contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be
prosecuted provided all its elements concur—two of which are a previous
marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it
not been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage.

Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its

nullity, only competent courts having such authority.—Respondent’s clear Commented [62]:

intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and

thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for
bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an
adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family
Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by
simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent
marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of
the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a
requisite—usually the marriage license—and thereafter contract a Commented [63]:

subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on

the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render
nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v.
Relova: (P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to
such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond
question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk Commented [64]:

of being prosecuted for bigamy.

Elements.—People v. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246 (1935). The elements of bigamy

are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has
not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) that
he contracts a subsequent marriage; (4) the subsequent marriage would
have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. The exception
to prosecution for bigamy are those covered by Article 41 of the Family
Code and by PD 1083 otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines, which provides that penal laws relative to the crime
of bigamy “shall not apply to a person married x x x under Muslim Law”
where the requirements set therein are met.

The pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a

prejudicial question in a prosecution for concubinage or bigamy.—Parties Commented [65]:

should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage,
for the same must be submitted to the determination of competent courts.
Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void,
and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists. No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of
an element is, the intervention of the courts must always be resorted to.
That is why Article 40 of the Family Code requires a “final judgment,” which
only the courts can render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such
a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the
pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for
concubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil case for declaration of
nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question. This ruling applies here by
analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.

A marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before
any party can marry again, otherwise the second marriage will also be
void.—In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first
having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can
not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current
jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of
such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage
will also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its
nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar,
respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married
man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against
this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not
erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the
subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not
essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a
prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to
use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.

Teves v. People

On 26 November 1992, a marriage was solemnized between Cenon Teves

(Cenon) and Thelma Jaime-Teves (Thelma). After the marriage, Thelma left
to work abroad and would only come home to the Philippines for vacations.
In 2002, Thelma was informed that her husband had contracted marriage
with a certain Edita Calderon. Thelma then went to the National Statistics
Office and secured a copy of the Certificate of Marriage indicating that her
husband (Cenon) and Edita contracted marriage on 10 December 2001 in
Bulacan. In 2006, the uncle of Thelma, filed a complaint accusing petitioner
Cenon of bigamy. Petitioner was charged with bigamy under Article 349 of
the RPC on June 2006. However, during the pendency of the criminal case
for bigamy, the RTC of Caloocan City, rendered a decision dated May 2006
(one month before the case for bigamy was decided) declaring the marriage
of petitioner and Thelma null and void on the ground that Thelma is physically
incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations pursuant to
Article 36, Family Code. Said decision became final by a Certification of
Finality issued on 27 June 2006. Petitioner Cenon appealed before the CA
contending that the court a quo erred in not ruling that his criminal liability
had already been extinguished. Petitioner claims that since his previous
marriage was declared null and void, “there is in effect no marriage at all,
and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of.”
Petitioner further contends that the ruling of the Court in Mercado v. Tan is
inapplicable in his case because in the Mercado case the prosecution for
bigamy was initiated before the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed.
Petitioner says that in his case, the first marriage had already been legally
dissolved at the time the bigamy case was filed in court.

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; Where the absolute nullity of a previous

marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be
free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void.—It is evident therefore that petitioner has committed the crime Commented [66]:

charged. His contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of

the declaration of nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit. The Family
Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void.

The finality of the judicial declaration of the nullity of previous marriage of

the accused cannot be made to retroact to the date of the bigamous
marriage.—Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the
offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability
appends to him until extinguished as provided by law, and that the time of
filing of the criminal complaint (or Information, in proper cases) is material
only for determining prescription. The crime of bigamy was committed by
petitioner on 10 December 2001 when he contracted a second marriage
with Edita. The finality on 27 June 2006 of the judicial declaration of the
nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma cannot be made to retroact to the
date of the bigamous marriage.

Iwasawa v. Gangan
Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002 in
one of his visits to the Philippines. Private respondent introduced herself as
“single” and “has never married before.” Since then, the two became close
to each other. Later that year, petitioner came back to the Philippines and
married private respondent on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After the
wedding, the couple resided in Japan. In July 2009, petitioner noticed his
wife become depressed. Suspecting that something might have happened in
the Philippines, he confronted his wife about it. To his shock, private
respondent confessed to him that she received news that her previous
husband passed away. Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wife’s
confession and discovered that indeed, she was married to one Raymond
Maglonzo Arambulo and that their marriage took place on June 20, 1994.
This prompted petitioner to file a petition for the declaration of his marriage
to private respondent as null and void on the ground that their marriage is a
bigamous one.
Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; Annulment of Marriage; The
Supreme Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else,
what transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void from the beginning
as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines.—This
Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required
before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void from the beginning as
provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. And this is
what transpired in the instant case. As correctly pointed out by the OSG,
the documentary exhibits taken together concretely establish the nullity of
the marriage of petitioner to private respondent on the ground that their
marriage is bigamous. The exhibits directly prove the following facts: (1)
that private respondent married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the City of
Manila; (2) that private respondent contracted a second marriage this time
with petitioner on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there was no
judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage of private respondent with
Arambulo at the time she married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on July
14, 2009 and that it was only on said date that private respondent’s
marriage with Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved; and (4) that
the second marriage of private respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence
null and void, since the first marriage was still valid and subsisting when the
second marriage was contracted.

b.3 Contracting a bigamous marriage is a ground for disbarment

Terre v. Terre

Dorothy Terre was then married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo, her first
cousin. Atty. Jordan Terre successfully convinced Dorothy that her
marriage was void ab initio for the reason of public policy and that they are
free to contract marriage. They got married in 1977 where he wrote single
under Dorothy’s status. After getting Dorothy pregnant, Atty. Terre
abandoned them and subsequently contracted another marriage to Helina
Malicdem in 1986. Atty. Terre was charged with abandonment of minor
and bigamy.

A marriage contracted in good faith with woman already married is valid.

Hence, contracting a subsequent marriage with another woman would be
bigamous.—Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan
Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For
if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to
complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his
second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and
criminal in character.

An attorney who convinces a married woman to marry him, who abandons

her with child; and who contracts a second marriage is disbarred.—We
believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in
inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to contract a second marriage with
him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him
and supported him through law school, leaving her without means for the
safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a second marriage with Helina
Malicdem while his first marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was
subsisting, constituted “grossly immoral conduct” under Section 27 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than sufficient basis for
disbarment of respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to
the Bar in the first place. The Court will correct this error forthwith.

b.4 Subsequent rendition of judicial declaration of nullity of the first

marriage is immaterial

Mercado v. Tan

In April 1976, Dr. Vincent Mercado married Ma. Thelma Oliva. But in June
1991, Mercado married a second time. He married a certain Consuelo Tan.
In October 1992, Tan filed a bigamy case against Mercado.
In November 1992, Mercado filed an action to have his first marriage with
Oliva be declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code
(psychological incapacity).
In January 1993, the prosecutor filed a criminal information for bigamy
against Mercado.
In May 1993, Mercado’s marriage with Oliva was declared void ab initio.
Mercado now sought the dismissal of the bigamy case filed against him. He
contended that since his first marriage was declared void ab initio, there was
no first marriage to speak of, hence, his “second” marriage with Tan was
actually his first marriage.
Jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage has been characterized as “conflicting”; Under the
Family Code, a declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.—
Jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage has been characterized as “conflicting.” x x x x x x x x x
In Domingo v. CA, the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of
nullity was still necessary for the recovery and the separation of properties
of erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the affirmative, the Court declared: “The
Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on
the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense; in
fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is
also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage
is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity
of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be
charged with bigamy.”

Absent that declaration, Court holds that one may be charged with and
convicted of bigamy.—The statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and
Aragon—that there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void
marriage—has been cast aside by Article 40 of the Family Code. Such
declaration is now necessary before one can contract a second marriage.
Absent that declaration, we hold that one may be charged with and
convicted of bigamy.

By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting,

petitioner committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code.—Petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was
yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted
the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant
had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a
second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

Fact that he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the

first marriage was immaterial.—That he subsequently obtained a judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the
crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view
effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an
accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void
and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the
criminal case.

Antone v Beronilla

Myrna Antone alleged in her Affidavit-Complaint,filed in March 2007, that she

and Leo were married in 1978. However, Leo contracted a second marriage
with CecileMaguillo in 1991. The prosecution filed the Information in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a criminal case of Bigamy.
Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, Leo moved to quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
because his marriage with Myrna was declared null and void as of April 2007
and became final and executory on May 2007. Leo argues that since the
marriage had been declared null and void from the beginning, there
was actually no first marriage to speak of. Thus, absent the first marriage,
the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute the crime of bigamy.
The prosecution argued that the marriage of Myrna and Leo on 1978 was
not severed prior to his second marriage on 1991, for which bigamy has
already been committed before the court declared the first marriage null and
void on 2007.
The RTC sustained the motion to quash relying on Morigo v.
People. Similarly, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari.
Under the Family Code a subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of
the first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because, by then, the
crime had already been consummated.—The specific provision, which
reads: “ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such marriage void.” was exhaustively discussed in Mercado,
where this Court settled the “conflicting” jurisprudence on “the need for a
judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage.” After establishing
that Article 40 is a new provision expressly requiring a judicial declaration
of nullity of a prior marriage and examining a long line of cases, this Court,
concluded, in essence, that under the Family Code a subsequent judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case
because, by then, the crime had already been consummated. Otherwise
stated, this Court declared that a person, who contracts a subsequent
marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous one, is
guilty of bigamy.

b.5 Outcome of annulment of marriage has no bearing on accused’s

guilt or innocence in a bigamy case

Te v. CA

Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married on September 14, 1988. They did
not live together after marriage although they would meet each other
regularly. In 1989, Liliana gave birth to a girl. Thereafter, Arthur stopped
visiting her. In 1990, Arthur contracted a second marriage while marriage
with Liliana was subsisting. Liliana filed bigamy case against Arthur and
subsequently an administrative case (revocation of engineering license for
grossly immoral act) against Arthur and Julieta Santella (2ndwife of Arthur).
Arthur petitioned for the nullity of his marriage withLiliana.RTC and Board
rendered decision while the petition for annulment of first marriage
was pending.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of marriage has no bearing
upon the determination of the accused’s innocence or guilt in the criminal
case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted; The ruling in People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843
(1954) and People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957) that no judicial decree
is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio
has been overturned—the prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family
Code.—The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s
marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the determination of
petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all
that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage
be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Petitioner’s
argument that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be
resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings could
continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would
necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling in
People vs. Mendoza and People vs. Aragon cited by petitioner that no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is
void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found in Article 40
of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of petitioner’s
marriage to private respondent in September 1988. Said article states that
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes
of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or
voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding.

Tenebro v. CA

Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas in 1990. The

two lived together continuously and without interruption until the later part
of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously
married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter left the
conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going
to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another
marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint
for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with
Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He
further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared
void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged
for bigamy.

There is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract

needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the
validity of a marriage; The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists
does not invalidate the marriage, provided all the requisites for its validity
are present.–The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as
positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents
testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially
considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a
marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition
precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a
marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for
its validity are present. There is no evidence presented by the defense that
would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked
any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the
accused himself.
A declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s
penal laws are concerned.–Petitioner makes much of the judicial
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What
petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.

A marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is

automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an
argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy; Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.–As a Commented [67]:

second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of

petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas
would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s
psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during
the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
criminalizes “any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.” A plain reading of the law,
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of
contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.

Concurring Opinion:

The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family
Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their
consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal
(authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage
ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry
before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).–
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s
marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The
requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code
into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent
freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority
of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony
wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the
solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses). Under Article
5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or
upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38
may contract marriage.

The judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on the ground of

psychological incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it
does not negate the fact of perfection of the bigamous marriage.–Since
psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not relate to an
infirmity in the elements, either essential or formal, in contracting a valid
marriage, the declaration of nullity subsequent to the bigamous marriage
due to that ground, without more, would be inconsequential in a criminal
charge for bigamy. The judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity merely nullifies the
effects of the marriage but it does not negate the fact of perfection of the
bigamous marriage. Its subsequent declaration of nullity dissolves the
relationship of the spouses but, being alien to the requisite conditions for
the perfection of the marriage, the judgment of the court is no defense on
the part of the offender who has entered into it.

b.6 Is psychological incapacity a valid defense in bigamy?

Montanez v. Cipriano

On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores. On January 24,

1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married
Silverio V. Cipriano. In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa a
Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of
the latter’s psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the
Family Code. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, declared the
marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became
final and executory on October 13, 2003. On May 14, 2004, petitioner
Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage,
filed with the MTC of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for Bigamy against
respondent. Lourdes Cipriano alleged that her first marriage was already
declared void ab initio in 2003. Thus, there was no more marriage to speak
of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983. The prosecution
argued that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated when
respondent filed her petition for declaration of nullity. RTC ruled in favor of
respondent on the ground that both wedding were governed by the Civil
Code, and not the Family Code, hence, no judicial declaration of absolute
nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage

It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second

marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not
for the subsistence of the first marriage.―The elements of the crime of Commented [68]:

bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has
not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the
second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or
subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the
alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be
valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.

The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not
change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the
subsistence of the first marriage.―At the time respondent contracted the
second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet
been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not
change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the
subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged
of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged
were sufficiently alleged.

*** Clearly, the annulment of respondent’s first marriage on the ground of

psychological incapacity was declared only in 2003. The question now is
whether the declaration of nullity of respondent’s first marriage justifies the
dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her.

We rule in the negative.

In Mercado v. Tan, we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the

nullity of the first marriage was immaterial, because prior to the declaration
of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. And by
contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, the
accused committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code.

In Abunado v. People, we held that what is required for the charge of

bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the
second marriage is contracted.28 Even if the accused eventually obtained
a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the
first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled.

b.7 He who contracts marriage before the judicial declaration of the

first marriage assumes the risk of being charged with bigamy and
disbarment if he is a lawyer

Capili v. People

In September 1999, James Capili married Karla Medina. But then, just three
months later in December 1999, he married another woman named Shirley
Tismo.
In 2004, Karla Medina filed an action for declaration of nullity of the second
marriage between Capili and Tismo. In June 2004, Tismo filed a bigamy case
against Capili.
Before a decision can be had in the bigamy case, the action filed by Karla
Medina was granted and Capili’s marriage with Tismo was declared void by
reason of the subsisting marriage between Medina and Capili. Thereafter,
Capili filed a motion to dismiss in the bigamy case. He alleged that since the
second marriage was already declared void ab initio that marriage never took
place and that therefore, there is no bigamy to speak of.
The trial court agreed with Capili and it dismissed the bigamy case. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and remanded the case
to the trial court.

Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be
charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration
of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still
subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.—It is undisputed
that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was
contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first
marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on
September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the
bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private
respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second
marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of
petitioner for the crime of bigamy. Jurisprudence is replete with cases
holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy,
even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second
marriage was celebrated.

He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the

first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.—The Court
recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled that what
makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second
or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It
further held that the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is
so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

Perez v. Catindig

Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained
valid, the logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the
United States of America (USA) for the added security of avoiding any
charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside
Philippine jurisdiction.—From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that
the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the Dominican Republic
was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino
citizens at that time. He knew that he was still validly married to Gomez;
that he cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly
declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This
notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances
seriously taint Atty. Catindig’s sense of social propriety and moral values. It
is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage. It has also
not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez
in the USA. Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage
remained valid, the logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez
in the USA for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by
entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true, it matters
not that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains
that he resorted to various legal strategies in order to render a facade of
validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the
very least, so unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest degree.

The Supreme Court’s (SC’s) finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged not
on Atty. Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous marriage to
Gomez.—While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr.
Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot be considered a grossly
immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern showing his propensity
towards immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Court’s finding of
gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindig’s desertion of Dr.
Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.

The Supreme Court (SC) has held that disbarment is warranted when a
lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with
another woman who has borne him a child.—“The moral delinquency that
affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes
conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community, conduct for instance, which makes ‘a mockery of the inviolable
social institution of marriage.’” In various cases, the Court has held that
disbarment is warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and
maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who has borne him a
child.

b.7 Effect of divorce obtained abroad

Fujiki v. Marinay

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married

respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23
January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they
lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara).

Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were
married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse
from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family
court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara
void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in
the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage).”

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) RTC: dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment ·(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper
venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the
petition.

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil

status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a
foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws.—A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the
civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of
a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that “[l]aws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.”
This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the
Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by
Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it
exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does

not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a
new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.—A petition to recognize a
foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know
the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They
cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity
of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus,
Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact
according to the rules of evidence.

While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may,
however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry
when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.—Since
1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43 (1922), Philippine courts
have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign
citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence. Divorce
involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not
have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign
divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign
spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to

extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage.—Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine
courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides
that “[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.” In Republic v. Orbecido, 472
SCRA 114 (2005), this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second
paragraph of Article 26 which is “to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse” under the laws of his or
her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree
precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts
cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case
for divorce.

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage

between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment
nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy; If the foreign judgment is
not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated
— the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot
remarry.—The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a
marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino
spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the
ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws
of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the
Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated — the foreign spouse
can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.

b.9 SSS can investigate as to who are the persons entitled to benefits
in case of conflicting claims as a result of bigamous marriage

SSS v. Azote

In 1994, Edgardo submitted his SSS Form E-4 with his wife Edna and their
children as beneficiaries. When he died in 2005, Edna tried to claim the
death benefits as the wife of a deceased member but it was denied. It
appears from the SSS records that Edgardo had another set of SSS Form
E-4 in 1982 where his former wife Rosemarie and their child were
designated as beneficiaries. Edna did not know that Edgardo was
previously married to another woman. She then filed for a petition before
the SSS, and notice was sent to Rosemarie but she made no answer. The
SSC dismissed Edna’s petition because the SSS Form E-4 designating
Rosemarie and her child was not revoked by Edgardo, and that she was
still presumed to be the legal wife as Edna could not proved that Edgardo’s
previous marriage was annulled or divorced.

As a social security program of the government, Section 8(e) and (k) of

Republic Act (RA) No. 8282 expressly provides who would be entitled to
receive benefits from its deceased member.—As a social security program
of the government, Section 8(e) and (k) of the said law expressly provides
who would be entitled to receive benefits from its deceased member, to wit:
SEC. 8. Terms Defined.—For purposes of this Act, the following terms
shall, unless the context indicates otherwise, have the following meanings:
x x x x (e) Dependents – The dependents shall be the following: (1) The
legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member; (2) The
legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is
unmarried, not gainfully employed, and has not reached twenty-one (21)
years of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or
while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of
self-support, physically or mentally; and (3) The parent who is receiving
regular support from the member. x x x x (k) Beneficiaries – The dependent
spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent legitimate, legitimated or
legally adopted, and illegitimate children, who shall be the primary
beneficiaries of the member: Provided, That the dependent illegitimate
children shall be entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the share of the legitimate,
legitimated or legally adopted children: Provided, further, That in the
absence of the dependent legitimate, legitimated children of the member,
his/her dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to one hundred
percent (100%) of the benefits. In their absence, the dependent parents
who shall be the secondary beneficiaries of the member. In the absence of
all the foregoing, any other person designated by the member as his/her
secondary beneficiary.

Applying Section 8(e) and (k) of Republic Act (RA) No. 8282, it is clear that
only the legal spouse of the deceased member is qualified to be the
beneficiary of the latter’s Social Security Commission (SSC) benefits.—
Applying Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282, it is clear that only the legal
spouse of the deceased member is qualified to be the beneficiary of the
latter’s SS benefits. In this case, there is a concrete proof that Edgardo
contracted an earlier marriage with another individual as evidenced by their
marriage contract. Edgardo even acknowledged his married status when
he filled out the 1982 Form E-4 designating Rosemarie as his spouse.

Social Security Commission; Although the Social Security Commission

(SSC) is not intrinsically empowered to determine the validity of marriages,
it is required by Section 4(b)(7) of Republic Act (RA) No. 8282 to examine
available statistical and economic data to ensure that the benefits fall into
the rightful beneficiaries.—Although the SSC is not intrinsically empowered
to determine the validity of marriages, it is required by Section 4(b)(7) of
R.A. No. 8282 to examine available statistical and economic data to ensure
that the benefits fall into the rightful beneficiaries. As held in Social Security
Commission v. Favila, 646 SCRA 462 (2011): SSS, as the primary
institution in charge of extending social security protection to workers and
their beneficiaries is mandated by Section 4(b)(7) of RA 8282 to require
reports, compilations and analyses of statistical and economic data and to
make an investigation as may be needed for its proper administration and
development. Precisely, the investigations conducted by SSS are
appropriate in order to ensure that the benefits provided under the SS Law
are received by the rightful beneficiaries. It is not hard to see that such
measure is necessary for the system’s proper administration, otherwise, it
will be swamped with bogus claims that will pointlessly deplete its funds.
Such scenario will certainly frustrate the purpose of the law which is to
provide covered employees and their families protection against the
hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death, with a view to promoting
their well-being in the spirit of social justice. Moreover and as correctly
pointed out by SSC, such investigations are likewise necessary to carry out
the mandate of Section 15 of the SS Law which provides in part, viz.: Sec.
15. Non-transferability of Benefits.—The SSS shall pay the benefits
provided for in this Act to such [x x x] persons as may be entitled thereto in
accordance with the provisions of this Act x x x.

(c) Subsequent marriage upon reappearance of absent spouse and

effects

Art. 41 in relation to Arts. 42 to 44 of the FC:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a

previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of
the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions
of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the

preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of
the absent spouse.
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall
be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance
of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous
marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be
recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent
marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the
spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of
reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (n)
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the
preceding Article shall produce the following effects:
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination
shall be considered legitimate;
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the
case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the
community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in
favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty
spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the
donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said
donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse
who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such
designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall
be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate
succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said
marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and
testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by
operation of law.
Republic v. Cantor
Sometime in January 1998, Jerry F. Cantor left his wife Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor after
a violent quarrel. After more than four years of not seeing or hearing from Jerry, Maria Fe
filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband. She alleged that
she conducted a diligent search for her husband and exerted earnest efforts to find him.
The RTC granted her petition. Dissatisfied with the ruling, the OSG filed the present
petition for review on certiorari.
The Family Code was explicit that the court’s judgment in summary
proceedings, such as the declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code, shall be immediately final and
executory.—The Family Code was explicit that the court’s judgment in
summary proceedings, such as the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code, shall be immediately
final and executory. Article 41, in relation to Article 247, of the Family Code
provides: Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence
of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration
of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article
391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For
the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and
executory. [underscores ours] With the judgment being final, it necessarily
follows that it is no longer subject to an appeal, the dispositions and
conclusions therein having become immutable and unalterable not only as
against the parties but even as against the courts. Modification of the court’s
ruling, no matter how erroneous is no longer permissible. The final and
executory nature of this summary proceeding thus prohibits the resort to
appeal.
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must
be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years
and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was
already dead.—Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be
obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that
the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code,
there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive
death: 1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive
years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there
is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil
Code; 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3. That the present
spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and 4. That the
present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.

Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden
of proving the additional and more stringent requirement of “well-founded
belief” which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-
to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s
whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is still alive or is
already dead.—Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old
provision of the Civil Code which it superseded, imposes a stricter
standard. It requires a “well-founded belief” that the absentee is already
dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
We have had occasion to make the same observation in Republic v.
Nolasco, 220 SCRA 20 (1993), where we noted the crucial differences
between Article 41 of the Family Code and Article 83 of the Civil Code, to
wit: Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has
been shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to remarry.
Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the
Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be
no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally
considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is
presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family
Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as “well founded belief” that the
absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive
death can be granted. Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such
period required by the law), lack of any news that such absentee is still
alive, failure to communicate or general presumption of absence under the
Civil Code would not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise
that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the
burden of proving the additional and more stringent requirement of “well-
founded belief” which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper
and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the
absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent
spouse is still alive or is already dead.

The law did not define what is meant by “well-founded belief;” Its
determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis.—The law did
not define what is meant by “well-founded belief.” It depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak,
remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this
requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the
result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent
spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that
under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires
exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).

In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the

Family Code for the declaration of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the
degree of due diligence set by this Honorable Court in locating the
whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied with.—The
Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in nullifying their
marriage, has consistently applied the “strict standard” approach. This is to
ensure that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41
of the Family Code is not used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the
laws. Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts and should ensure
that the stricter standard required by the Family Code is met. In Republic of
the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.), we emphasized that: In
view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family
Code for the declaration of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree
of due diligence set by this Honorable Court in the above-mentioned cases
in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied
with. There have been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been
resorted to by parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their
alleged missing spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those
who cannot have their marriages xxx declared null and void under Article
36 of the Family Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief
because of the xxx summary nature of its proceedings.
Since marriage serves as the family’s foundation and since it is the state’s
policy to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution,
marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the
parties.—The application of this stricter standard becomes even more
imperative if we consider the State’s policy to protect and strengthen the
institution of marriage. Since marriage serves as the family’s foundation
and since it is the state’s policy to protect and strengthen the family as a
basic social institution, marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at
the whim of the parties. In interpreting and applying Article 41, this is the
underlying rationale — to uphold the sanctity of marriage. Arroyo, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals, 203 SCRA 750 (1991), reflected this sentiment when we
stressed: [The] protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and
the family in the preservation of which the State has the strongest interest;
the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind. In Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the following basic state
policy: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.

For purposes of remarriage, it is necessary to strictly comply with the

stringent standard and have the absent spouse judicially declared
presumptively dead.—The requisite judicial declaration of presumptive
death of the absent spouse (and consequently, the application of a
stringent standard for its issuance) is also for the present spouse’s benefit.
It is intended to protect him/her from a criminal prosecution of bigamy
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code which might come into play if
he/she would prematurely remarry sans the court’s declaration. Upon the
issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent spouse presumptively
dead, the present spouse’s good faith in contracting a second marriage is
effectively established. The decision of the competent court constitutes
sufficient proof of his/her good faith and his/her criminal intent in case of
remarriage is effectively negated. Thus, for purposes of remarriage, it is
necessary to strictly comply with the stringent standard and have the
absent spouse judicially declared presumptively dead.

VELASCO, JR., J., Concurring Opinion:

Declaration of Presumptive Death; View that whether or not one has a
“well-founded belief” that his or her spouse is dead depends on the unique
circumstances of each case and that there is no set standard or procedure
in determining the same.—I fully agree that whether or not one has a “well-
founded belief” that his or her spouse is dead depends on the unique
circumstances of each case and that there is no set standard or procedure
in determining the same. It is my opinion that Maria Fe failed to conduct a
search with such diligence as to give rise to a “well-founded belief” that her
husband is dead. Further, the circumstances of Jerry’s departure and Maria
Fe’s behavior after he left make it difficult to consider her belief a well-
founded one. To reiterate, Maria Fe’s alleged “well-founded” belief arose
when: (1) Jerry’s relatives and friends could not give her any information on
his whereabouts; and (2) she did not find Jerry’s name in the patients’
directory whenever she went to a hospital. To my mind, Maria Fe’s reliance
on these alone makes her belief weak and flimsy rather than “well-
founded.” Further, it appears that Maria Fe did not actively look for her
husband in hospitals and that she searched for Jerry’s name in these
hospitals’ list of patients merely as an afterthought. Moreover, it may be
sensed from the given facts that her search was not intentional or planned.
This may be noted from the fact that whenever Maria Fe went to a hospital,
she made it a point to look through the patients’ directory, hoping to find
Jerry. Verily, it is as if she searched the patient’s directory only when she
was in a hospital by coincidence.

View that it is the policy of the State to protect and preserve marriage.
Courts should be ever mindful of this policy and, hence, must exercise
prudence in evaluating petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse.—Were it not for the finality of the RTC ruling, the
declaration of presumptive death should have been recalled and set aside
for utter lack of factual basis. It is the policy of the State to protect and
preserve marriage. Courts should be ever mindful of this policy and, hence,
must exercise prudence in evaluating petitions for declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse. Otherwise, spouses may easily
circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage by simply agreeing that one
of them leave the conjugal abode and never return again.
Republic v. Orcelino-Villanueva

Edna and Romeo were married on December 21, 1978, in Iligan City.In
1992, Edna worked as domestic helper in Singapore while her husband
worked as a mechanic in Valencia City, Bukidnon. In 1993, Edna heard the
news from her children that Romeo had left their conjugal home without
reason or information as to his whereabouts. Thereafter, Edna took a leave
from work and returned to the country to look for Romeo. She inquired
fromher parents-in-law and common friends in Iligan City. Still, she found
no leads as to his whereabouts or existence. She also went to his
birthplace in Escalante, Negros Oriental, and inquired from his relatives. On
August 6, 2009, Edna ²led before the RTC a petition5to declare Romeo
presumptively dead under Article41 of the ±amily Code. During the trial,
Edna was presented as the lone witness. In its October 8, 2009 Order,6the
RTC granted the petition on the basis of her well-founded belief of Romeo's
death.

Declaration of Presumptive Death; The well-founded belief in the

absentee’s death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief
was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent
spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that
under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead.—Article 41 of
the Family Code provides that before a judicial declaration of presumptive
death may be granted, the present spouse must prove that he/she has a
well-founded belief that the absentee is dead. In this case, Edna failed. The
RTC and the CA overlooked Edna’s patent noncompliance with the said
requirement. The well-founded belief in the absentee’s death requires the
present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and
reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these
efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the
absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort (not
a mere passive one). Mere absence of the spouse (even beyond the period
required by law), lack of any news that the absentee spouse is still alive,
mere failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the
Civil Code would not suffice. The premise is that Article 41 of the Family
Code places upon the present spouse the burden of complying with the
stringent requirement of “well-founded belief” which can only be discharged
upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to
ascertain not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly,
whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.

Applying the standard set forth by the Supreme Court (SC) in the
previously cited cases, particularly Republic v. Cantor, 712 SCRA 1 (2013),
Edna’s efforts failed to satisfy the required well-founded belief of her absent
husband’s death.—Applying the standard set forth by the Court in the
previously cited cases, particularly Republic v. Cantor, 712 SCRA 1 (2013),
Edna’s efforts failed to satisfy the required well-founded belief of her absent
husband’s death. Her claim of making diligent search and inquiries
remained unfounded as it merely consisted of bare assertions without any
corroborative evidence on record. She also failed to present any person
from whom she inquired about the whereabouts of her husband. She did
not even present her children from whom she learned the disappearance of
her husband. In fact, she was the lone witness. Following the basic rule
that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof, the
Court cannot give credence to her claims that she indeed exerted diligent
efforts to locate her husband. Moreover, no document was submitted to
corroborate the allegation that her husband had been missing for at least
fifteen (15) years already. As the OSG observed, there was not even any
attempt to seek the aid of the authorities at the time her husband
disappeared. In Cantor, the present spouse claimed to have sought the aid
of the authorities or, at the very least, reported his absence to the police.
Yet, the Court denied her pleas.

c.1 Purpose of declaration of absence

Jones v. Hortiguela

FACTS: Marciana Escano and Arthur Jones got married in December 1914.
On January 10, 1918, Jones secured a passport. She never heard from him
again. In 1919, she filed for a proceeding to judicially declare Arthur missing.
On October 25, 1919, the court declared Arthur as an absentee with the
proviso that said judicial declaration of absence would not take effect until
six months after its publication in the official newspapers pursuant to Art. 186
of the Old Civil Code. In 23 April 1921, the court issued another order for the
taking effect of the declaration of absence, publication thereof having been
made in the Official Gazette and in "El Ideal." On May 6, 1927, Marciana
contracted a second marriage with Felix Hortiguela. When Marciana died
intestate, Felix was appointed as judicial administrator of the estate. Angelita
Jones, Marciana’s daughter from her first marriage, filed a case and alleged
that she is the only heir of her mother and that her mother’s marriage to Felix
was null and void on the ground that from April 23, 1921 (when the court
issued an order for the taking effect of declaration of absence & publication
thereof) to May 6, 1927 (her mother and Felix’s marriage) was below the 7-
year prescriptive period. With this, the marriage would be null and void and
would render her as the sole heir.

 For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have
the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of
absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code
has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For
the- celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that
the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at
the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not
know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is
generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at
the time of the celebration of the marriage (section III, paragraph 2,
General Orders, No. 68).

 In accordance with the foregoing legal provision, the absence of M.

E.'s former husband should be counted from January 10, 1918, the
date on which the last news concerning A. W. J. was received, and
from said date to May 6, 1927, more than nine years elapsed. Said
marriage is, therefore, valid and lawful.
  PRESUMPTION OF DEATH UNDER THE CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.—According to section 334, No. 24, of the Code of
Civil Procedure, a person not heard from in seven years is presumed
to be dead.

c.2 Requisites for declaration of presumptive death

Republic v. Granada

Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of Sumida Electric Company,

got married in 1993.
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down,
Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that
time, she did not receive any communication from her husband,
notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked
the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus
declared presumptively dead with the RTC Lipa City. On 7 February 2005,
the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued
that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed
to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead. The motion was
denied. The OSG then elevated the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no
jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was
a summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is immediately final
and executory and, thus, not appealable.
The appellate court granted Yolanda’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, the CA ruled that a
petition for declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family
Code is a summaryproceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is immediately final
and executory upon notice to the parties.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, the present
petition under Rule 45.
Declaration of Presumptive Death; Requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death under the Family Code.—The four requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death under the Family Code are as follows: 1.
That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or
two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger
of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code; 2.
That the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3. That the present spouse has
a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and 4. That the present
spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.

c.3 Instances and period to declare presumptive death

Republic v. Nolasco

Gregorio Nolasco, a seaman, met Janet Parker, a British, in a bar in

Liverpool, England. Thereafter, she lived together with Nolasco on his ship
for 6 months. When Nolasco’s contract expired, they returned to his
hometown in Antique. In 1982, the couple got married. His contract was then
renewed, thus, he had to leave his wife. In 1983, while working overseas,
Nolasco got a letter from his mother informing him that Janet gave birth to
their son and that she had left Antique. He asked permission from his
employer to return home so that he can look for Janet. In 1988, Nolasco filed
a petition to declare Janet presumptively dead. He testified that he exerted
every effort to look for her, but it proved to be fruitless. He even sent letters
to the address of the bar where the couple first met, but they were all returned
to him. He also inquired from their friends, but they had no news about Janet.
He also alleged that he had no knowledge of Janet’s family background and
that even after they were married, she still refused to disclose such
information. Nolasco also testified that he did not report the incident to
Philippine authorities. The RTC granted the petition. The CA affirmed.

Art. 41 of the Family Code has stricter requirements before absent spouse
may be declared presumably dead.—Under Article 41, the time required for
the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years; however,
there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the
spouse present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a
stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely
requires either that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the
absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code. The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes a "well founded
belief' that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of
presumptive death can be granted.

As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code: "1.
That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or
two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger
of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code; 2.
That the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3. That the present spouse has
a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and 4. That the present
spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee."

Arts. 390-391, NCC and Arts. 55 (1), 101 of the FC

Arts. 390 of the NCC:

After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the

absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for
those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the
age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in
order that his succession may be opened. (n)
Art. 391 of the NCC:
The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the
division of the estate among the heirs: otiteo
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane
which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of
the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been
missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances
and his existence has not been known for four years.
Art. 55(10) of the FC:
A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following
grounds:
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable
cause for more than one year.
Art. 101 of the FC:
If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with
his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition
the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property or for
authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community, subject
to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph
refer to marital, parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has
left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who
has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed
within the same period to give any information as to his or her
whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of
returning to the conjugal dwelling.
c.4 Exceptions when subsequent marriage will not be void

Bienvenido v. CAl

On October 3, 1942, Aurelio Camacho married Consejo Velasco. Twenty

years after, without his marriage being dissolved, he contracted another
marriage with respondent Luisita Camacho. In 1967, Aurelio met petitioner
Nenita Bienvenido, who he lived with from 1968 until at the time of his
death in 1989. Sometime in 1982, Aurelio bought a house and lot which
was registered in his name. 2 years after, he executed a deed of sale of the
property in favor of petitioner Nenita, the TCT was issued in her name.
After the death of Aurelio, respondent brought a petition before the RTC
seeking the annulment of the sale of the property of petitioner. Petitioner
answered and claimed that she and Aurelio purchased the property in
question using their joint funds and that she was a purchaser in good faith.
Exceptions when the subsequent marriage will not be considered void.—
Paragraph 2 mentions three cases when the subsequent marriage will not
be considered void: (1) when the absent spouse has not been heard from
for seven consecutive years and the present spouse has no news that
he/she is alive; (2) when, although he/she has been absent for less than
seven years, the absent spouse is generally considered to be dead and
believed to be by the spouse present; and (3) when he/she is presumed to
be dead after four years from the occurrence of any of the events
enumerated in Art. 391 of the Civil Code.

The first exception refers to the subsequent marriage of the abandoned

spouse and not the remarriage of the deserting spouse, after the period of
seven years has lapsed.—It has been held that the first exception refers to
the subsequent marriage of the abandoned spouse and not the remarriage
of the deserting spouse, after the period of seven years has lapsed. This
exception cannot be invoked in this case in order to sustain the validity of
Aurelio’s marriage to Luisita because apparently it was Aurelio who had left
his first wife. At the time of his second marriage to Luisita, he and Luisita
had already been living together as husband and wife for five years. In fact
the couple begot a child, in 1961, even before their marriage in 1962.

c.5 Rule and effect if absentee re-appears

SSS v. Jarque Vda. de Bailon

In 1955 Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz married in Barcelona, Sorsogon.

15+ years later, Clemente filed an action to declare the presumptive death
of Alice she being an absentee. The petition was granted in 1970. In 1983,
Clemente married Jarque. The two live together untile Clemente’s death in
1998. Jarque then sought to claim her husband’s SSS benefits and the
same were granted her. On the other hand, a certain Cecilia Baion-Yap
who claimed that she is the daughter of Bailon to a certain Elisa Jayona
petitioned before the SSS that they be given the reimbursement for the
funeral spending for it was actually them who shouldered the burial
expenses of Clemente. They further claim that Clemente contracted three
marriages; one with Alice, another with Elisa and the other with Jarque.
Cecilia also averred that Alice is alive and kicking and Alice subsequently
emerged; Cecilia claimed that Clemente obtained the declaration of Alice’s
presumptive death in bad faith for he was aware of the whereabouts of
Alice or if not he could have easily located her in her parent’s place. She
was in Sorsogon all along in her parents’ place. She went there upon
learning that Clemente had been having extra-marital affairs. SSS then
ruled that Jarque should reimburse what had been granted her and to
return the same to Cecilia since she shouldered the burial expenses and
that the benefits should go to Alice because her reappearance had
terminated Clemente’s marriage with Harque. Further, SSS ruled that the
RTC’s decision in declaring Alice to be presumptively death is erroneous.
Teresita appealed the decision of the SSS before the Social Security
Comission and the SSC affirmed SSS. The CA however ruled the contrary.

Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable as it was

contracted by the present spouse believing the absent spouse to be dead,
it is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the
absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the
subsequent marriage, while under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding
to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary as it is automatically
terminated by the recording of an affidavit of reappearance of the absent
spouse.—Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, it is
terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the
absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the
subsequent marriage. Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to
annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. x x x The termination of the
subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by the above-quoted provision of
the Family Code does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove
the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or
termination of the subsequent marriage.

If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent

marriage, either by affidavit or by court action, such absentee’s mere
reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent
marriage, will not terminate such marriage.—If the absentee reappears, but
no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or
by court action, such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made known
to the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such
marriage. Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a
presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues
inspite of the spouse’s physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or
she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent
marriage is terminated as provided by law.

Santos v. Santos

The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the

first spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse was terminated
when he or she was declared absent or presumptively dead.—The Family
Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of
terminating the subsequent marriage by mere reappearance. The filing of
an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse
that his or her marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he or
she was declared absent or presumptively dead. Moreover, a close reading
of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent
marriage by reappearance is subject to several conditions: (1) the
nonexistence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it
void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the
parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and
circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the
subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the fact of
reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined.

Mere reappearance will not terminate the subsequent marriage even if the
parties to the subsequent marriage were notified if there was “no step taken
to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by filing an affidavit of
reappearance or by court action.”—This court recognized the conditional
nature of reappearance as a cause for terminating the subsequent
marriage in Social Security System v. Vda. de Bailon, 485 SCRA 376
(2006). This court noted that mere reappearance will not terminate the
subsequent marriage even if the parties to the subsequent marriage were
notified if there was “no step . . . taken to terminate the subsequent
marriage, either by [filing an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by court
action[.]” “Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a
presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues
inspite of the spouse’s physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or
she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent
marriage is terminated as provided by law.”

A subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing “an action in court

to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of
dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.”—The provision on
reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the termination of
the subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was declared
presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in law. This court
had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent marriage may also be
terminated by filing “an action in court to prove the reappearance of the
absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the
subsequent marriage.”

(d) Psychological Incapacity under Art. 36 of the FC

Art. 39, 68-71, FC, RA 8533

Art. 39 of the FC:

The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage

shall not prescribe. (As amended by Executive Order 227 and Republic Act
No. 8533; The phrase “However, in case of marriage celebrated before the
effectivity of this Code and falling under Article 36, such action or defense
shall prescribe in ten years after this Code shall taken effect” has been
deleted by Republic Act No. 8533 [Approved February 23, 1998]).

Arts. 68 to 71 of the FC:

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. (109a)
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of
disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter
should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the
exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not
compatible with the solidarity of the family. (110a)
Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The
expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from
the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits
of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said
income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate
properties. (111a)
Art. 71. The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of
both spouses. The expenses for such management shall be paid in
accordance with the provisions of Article 70. (115a)
RA 8533: "AN ACT AMENDING TITLE I, CHAPTER 3, ARTICLE 39 OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE FAMILY
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 'IFYING THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
FOR ACTION OR DEFENSES GROUNDED ON PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY"

Section 1. Title I, Chapter 3, Article 39 of Executive Order No. 209,

otherwise known as theFamily Code of the Philippines, is hereby
amended to read as follows:

"TITLE I-MARRIAGE"

"CHAPTER 3 — VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES

"Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute 'ity of a
marriage shall not prescribe."

Sec. 2. Effectivity clause. — This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15)
days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: February 23, 1998

d.1 Definition of Psychological Incapacity

Pesca v Pesca

The petitioner and respondent were married and had four children. Lorna filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on
the part of her husband. She alleged that he is emotionally immature and irresponsible.
He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker. Whenever she tells him to stop or
at least minimize his drinking, her husband would hurt her. There was even a time when
she was chased by a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of their
children. The children also suffered physical violence. Petitioner and their children left
the home. Two months later, they returned upon the promise of respondent to change.
But he didn’t. She was battered again. Her husband was imprisoned for 11 days for
slight physical injuries. RTC declared their marriage null and void. CA reversed RTC’s
ruling. Hence, this petition.

“Psychological Incapacity,” Explained.—The term “psychological

incapacity,” as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, has been explained by the Court in Santos
and reiterated in Molina. The Court, in Santos, concluded: “It should be
obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most
importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself,
that the use of the phrase ‘psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr.
Artemio Balumad’s ‘Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and
their Parallels in Canon Law,’ quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association;
Edward Hudson’s ‘Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases’). Article 36 of
the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must
stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, ‘psychological incapacity’ should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.”

d.2 Characteristics of Psychological Incapacity

Santos v. CA

Leouel Santos, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo.
The two got married in 1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly
thereafter, by a church wedding. The couple lived with Julia’s parents at the
J. Bedia Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named
as Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a number of
things aside from the interference of Julia’s parents into their family affairs.
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouel’s pleas to
dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, she called her husband
and promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July
1989 but she never did. Leouel got a chance to visit US where he
underwent a training program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or
somehow get in touch with Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article
36 of the Family Code. He argued that failure of Julia to return home or to
communicate with him for more than 5 years are circumstances that show
her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by a) gravity, b) juridical

antecedence, and c) incurability.—Justice Sempio-Diy cites with approval
the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila
(Branch I), who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity
must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties, required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history
of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of

“psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensibility or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.—There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
“psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently
envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the
Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be “legitimate.”

d.3 Scope of psychological incapacity

Dedel v. CA

In 1966, David and Sharon married each other. They’ve had four children
since then. David then found out that Sharon is irresponsible as a wife and
as a mother because during the marriage Sharon had extra-marital affairs
with various other guys particularly with one Mustafa Ibrahim, a Jordanian,
with whom she had 2 children. She even married Ibrahim. David averred
that Sharon is psychologically incapacitated and David submitted the
findings of Dr. Dayan which shows that Sharon is indeed psychologically
incapacitated. Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-
Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that
she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even
bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with
petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage
like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are
indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.

Psychological Incapacity; There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of

the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to
the most serious cases of personality disorders.—x x x “psychological
incapacity” should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment
of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be “legitimate.”

d.4 Sec. 7 of Art. 36 of the FC must be interpreted on a case-to-case

basis
Republic v. Dagdag

Erlinda Matias married Avelino Parangan Dagdag and begot two children.
Avelino would disappear for months without explanation and attend to
drinking sprees with friends and return home drunk when with the family;
forced his wife to have sexual intercourse and if she resisted, would inflict
injure to the latter. He left his family again and never heard of him. Erlinda
was constrained to look for a job to fend for themselves. Erlinda then
learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped
from jail who remains at-large at date.Erlinda filed for judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code. The trial court rendered a decision declaring the
marriage void under Artcile 36 of the Family Code. The Solicitor General
appealed to the Court of Appeals raising that the lower court erred in
declaring the apellee's marriage to Avelino Dagdag null and void on the
ground of psychological incapacity of the latter, pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code, the psychological incapacity of the nature contemplated by
the law not having been proven to exist. However, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court

Psychological Incapacity; Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in

a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more
than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case, and in regard to
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to
say that no case is on “all fours” with another case.—Whether or not
psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts
of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts.
In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on “all fours” with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.

Yambao v. Republic
Petitioner Cynthia Yambao (hereinafter petitioner wife) filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of her marriage with respondent Patricio Yambao
(hereinafter respondent husband) after 35 years of marriage. She invoked
the ground of psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Petitioner wife alleged that since the beginning, her marriage with the
respondent husband had been marred by bickering, quarrels, and
recrimination due to the latter’s inability to comply with the essential
obligations to married life. She elaborated by saying that through all the years
of their married life, she was the only one who earned a living and took care
of the children and that respondent husband just ate and slept all day and
would spend time with friends. In addition, she claimed that respondent
husband would venture into several businesses but all of these failed.
Respondent husband was also a gambler. Petitioner wife also claimed that,
when their children were babies, respondent did not even help to change
their diapers or feed them, even while petitioner was recovering from her
caesarean operation, proffering the excuse that he knew nothing about
children. Later, respondent husband became insecure and jealous and
would get mad every time he would see petitioner talking to other people,
even to her relatives. When respondent husband started threatening to kill
petitioner, she decided to leave the conjugal abode and live separately from
him. She then consulted a psychiatrist who concluded that respondent was
indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
Respondent husband denied that he has refused to work. He claimed that
he had been trying to find a decent job, but was always unable to because
of his old age and lack of qualifications. He also claimed that he did not stay
long in the jobs he had because the same could not support the needs of his
family, and yielded benefits that were not commensurate to the efforts he
exerted. He had ventured into small businesses but they failed due
to various economic crises. Respondent further claimed that he was not, in
fact, contented with living with petitioner’s relatives since his every move was
being watched with eagle eyes. He also denied that he gambled. He alleged
that even without a steady source of income, he still shared in the payment
of the amortization of their house in BF Homes, Parañaque City. He also
denied that he threatened to kill petitioner, considering that there was never
any evidence that he had ever harmed or inflicted physical injury on petitioner
to justify the latter having a nervous breakdown. He further alleged that he
never consulted any psychiatrist, and denied that he was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

Court should interpret Article 36 of the Family Code on a case-to-case

basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.—
Preliminarily, the Court reiterates its recent pronouncement that each case
for declaration of nullity under the foregoing provision must be judged, not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections, or generalizations, but
according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals. Judicial understanding of psychological
incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the
particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even
canonical thought, and experience.

d.5 Art. 36 of the FC is not to be confused with a divorce law

Ochosa v. Alano

Bona’s illicit affairs with other men started at the onset of their marriage on
October 27, 1973, when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country
as an officer in the AFP. She continued her infidelity even when they lived
together at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City sometime in 1985, whenever Jose
was out of their living quarters.

In 1987, Jose was incarcerated in Camp Crame for rebellion for the alleged
participation of the failed coup d’etat. He heard circulation of rumors of Bona
getting caught having sex with his driver, Corporal Gagarin.

He got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona about the
rumors, which she and Gagarin admitted. Since then they were separated,
and their foundling, Ramona Celeste, stayed with Bona in Basilan until 1994
to live with Jose.
Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage between him and Bona J. Alano, based on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations of marriage.

Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, one of the witnesses, testified and

submitted a psychological evaluation report on Bona’s mental state. The
interviews she had with Jose and two of his witnesses brought her to the
conclusion that respondent was suffering from histrionic personality disorder,
and it was traceable to her family history.

On January 11, 1999, the dispositive portion of the trial court declared the
marriage of Jose and Bona void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity of the respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Court
finds that Bona’s illness exhibited gravity, antecedence, and incurability.

OSG appealed the said ruling to the CA, and the CA subsequently granted
the appeal and reversed the ruling of the trial court decision.

Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply
recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first place.—It is also
established in jurisprudence that from these requirements arise the concept
that Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it
simply recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first place
because the affliction—already then existing—was so grave and
permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had
assumed.

Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves.—We have stressed time and again that Article 36 of the
Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
the marriage.

d.6 Heirs cannot file a petition for annulment of marriage. Reason.

Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli

The heirs of Spouses Eulogio and Trinidad Medinaceli filed with the RTC,
an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita
D. Enrico, alleging that Eulogio and Trinidad were married in June 1962 and
begot seven children, herein respondents. On May 1, 2004, Trinidad died.
On August 26, 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor
of Lal-lo, Cagayan without the requisite of a marriage license.
Eulogio passed away six months later. They argued that Article 34 of the
Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been living
together for at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a
marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio. Respondents
posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the
latters death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely three months from the
date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio
could not have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. To
further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack
of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its
performance impossible.
In the Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together
as husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence,
they were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. She further
contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall
of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As
an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground
that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage.

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and

Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz.:
1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of
voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages—
such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the
spouses or by the State [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]—Only an
aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable
marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition
cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the
State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to
file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights
prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in
the regular courts.—The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal
Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the
following manner, viz.: 1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file
petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory
or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3,
paragraph a] Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for
annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of
the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not
have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have
only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can
only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of
a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the
State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. (Emphasis
supplied.)

d.7 Who may file a petition for annulment of marriage under Art. 45 of
the FC

Sec. 3, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC dated March 7, 2003 Commented [69]:

Sec. 3. Petition for annulment of voidable marriages. -
(a) Who may file. - The following persons may file a petition for annulment of
voidable marriage based on any of the grounds under Article 45 of the Family
Code and within the period herein indicated: chan robles virtual law library
(1) The contracting party whose parent, or guardian, or person exercising
substitute parental authority did not give his or her consent, within five years
after attaining the age of twenty-one unless, after attaining the age of twenty-
one, such party freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife; or the
parent, guardian or person having legal charge of the contracting party, at
any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one; chan robles
virtual law library
(2) The sane spouse who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any
relative, guardian, or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time
before the death of either party; or by the insane spouse during a lucid
interval or after regaining sanity, provided that the petitioner, after coming to
reason, has not freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife;
(3) The injured party whose consent was obtained by fraud, within five years
after the discovery of the fraud, provided that said party, with full knowledge
of the facts constituting the fraud, has not freely cohabited with the other as
husband or wife;
(4) The injured party whose consent was obtained by force, intimidation, or
undue influence, within five years from the time the force intimidation, or
undue influence disappeared or ceased, provided that the force, intimidation,
or undue influence having disappeared or ceased, said party has not
thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife;
(5) The injured party where the other spouse is physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the other and such incapability continues
and appears to be incurable, within five years after the celebration of
marriage;
(6) The injured party where the other party was afflicted with a sexually-
transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable, within
five years after the celebration of marriage.

(b) Where to file. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court.
d.8 Guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the FC

Republic v CA and Molina

The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the
respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of
psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year,
Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as
husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he
squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and
was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the
couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was
estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in
Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their
child. Since then he abandoned them.

Guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family

Code.—From their submissions and the Court’s own deliberations, the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the
Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and
the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation of the nation.” It
decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to
be “protected” by the state.

Ochosa v Alano

Bona’s illicit affairs with other men started at the onset of their marriage on
October 27, 1973, when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country
as an officer in the AFP. She continued her infidelity even when they lived
together at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City sometime in 1985, whenever Jose
was out of their living quarters.

In 1987, Jose was incarcerated in Camp Crame for rebellion for the alleged
participation of the failed coup d’etat. He heard circulation of rumors of Bona
getting caught having sex with his driver, Corporal Gagarin.

He got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona about the
rumors, which she and Gagarin admitted. Since then they were separated,
and their foundling, Ramona Celeste, stayed with Bona in Basilan until 1994
to live with Jose.

Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of

marriage between him and Bona J. Alano, based on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations of marriage.

Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, one of the witnesses, testified and

submitted a psychological evaluation report on Bona’s mental state. The
interviews she had with Jose and two of his witnesses brought her to the
conclusion that respondent was suffering from histrionic personality disorder,
and it was traceable to her family history.

d.9 Psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or

clinically permanent or incurable

Republic v CA and Molina

Root cause of psychological incapacity must be identified as a

psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.—The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological—not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.

Such incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable.—Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.

d.10 No requirement that the respondent should be personally

examined by a psychologist

Marcos v Marcos

Wilson Marcos and Brenda Marcos first met sometime in 1980 when both
of them were assigned at the Malacanang Palace, she as an escort of Imee
Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand
Marcos. They got married twice, first was on September 6, 1982 and on
May 8, 1983 and blessed with five children. After the downfall of President
Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in different
business ventures that did not succeeded. Due to his failure to engage in
any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence,
he would hit and beat her. He would also inflict physical harm on their
children. In 1992, they were already living separately. On October 16,
1994, when Brenda saw him in their house, she was so angry that she
lambasted him. Wilson then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her
and even on her mother who came to her aid. On October 17, 1994, she
and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister’s house. On
October 19, 1994, she submitted herself to medical examination at the
Mandaluyong Medical Center. Thus, petitioner filed for annulment of
marriage in the RTC assailing Article 36 of the Family Code. The court
ruled the respondent to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations. But the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
RTC because psychological incapacity had not been established by the
totality of the evidence presented. Hence, this appeal.

The guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be

declared psychologically incapacitated—what is important is the presence
of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological
condition, for indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.—In Republic
v. CA and Molina, the guidelines govern ing the application and the
interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the
Family Code were laid down by this Court as follows: x x x x x x x x x The
guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by
the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: “psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.”
The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause
may be “medically or clinically identified.” What is important is the presence
of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological
condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

Vinas v. Parel-Vinas

Glenn filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary
Grace. Glenn sought professional guidance and submitted himself to a psy
chological evaluation by Clinical Psychologist. The doctor found him as “am
ply aware of his marital roles” and “capable of maintaining a mature and he
althy heterosexual relationship.” On the other hand, Mary Grace’s personali
ty was assessed through the data gathered from Glenn and his cousin and
diagnosed her to be suffering from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder with
anti-
social traits. The doctor then concluded that Mary Grace and Glenn’s relati
onship is not founded on mutual love, trust, respect, commitment and fidelit
y to each other. Hence, Dr. Tayag recommended the propriety of declaring
the nullity of the couple’s marriage.

The lack of personal examination or assessment of the respondent by a

psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage.—The lack of personal examination or
assessment of the respondent by a psychologist or psychiatrist is not
necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. “If the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.”

d.11 Award of moral and exemplary damages is improper in an

annulment of marriage based on psychological incapacity

Buenaventura v. CA

Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage

on the ground that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated.
The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage entered into between
petitioner and respondent null and violation ordered the liquidation of the
assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a regular
support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to
modification as the necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of
the minor to his mother.

Petitioner appealed before the CA. While the appeal was pending, the CA,
upon respondent’s motion issued a resolution increasing the support
pendants like to P20, 000.
The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the
RTC decision. Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this
petition.

Ruling:

It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological

incapacity and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate
inability while at the same time considering the same set of acts as
willful.—The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the
petitioner after the marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity, and
therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as
willful and hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It is contradictory
to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence
beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the
same time considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the
petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral
damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral
damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the
marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with
malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully
concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in
this case.

d.12 Definition of dependent personality disorder

Halili v. Santos-Halili

Petitioner Lester Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent

Chona Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. He alleged that
he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a joke. After the
ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife. However, they
started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to
stop seeing respondent and started dating other women. It was only upon
making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not "fake."
Ruling:

In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder as

[a] personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and

submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and
frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by
others’ comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others
through a quest for overprotection.

Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood.

Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday
decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to
make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to
agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty
starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are
demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable
or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned.

d.13 Clinical features of a person with anti-social personality disorder

Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes

Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes

at the UP Diliman, in 1972 when they were both 19 years old. Petitioner
enjoyed respondent’s style of courtship which included dining out, unlike
other couples their age who were restricted by a university student’s
budget. At that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the
Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioner’s good impression of the respondent was
not diminished by the latter’s habit of cutting classes, not even by her
discovery that respondent was taking marijuana. On December 5, 1976,
petitioner and respondent got married. They lived with Ramon’s parents
and they were supported by them. They had a child which made their
financial difficulties worse. All the business ventures of Ramon were
unsuccessful and Socorro became the breadwinner of the family. To make
things worse, despite the fact that Socorro would undergo an operation for
removal of a cyst, respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and
simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested
that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room. They
tried to attend counseling sessions but nothing has changed. Sometime in
1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital
affair. RTC granted the petition. CA reversed. Hence, this petition.

“Patients with antisocial personality disorder can often seem to be normal

and even charming and ingratiating. Their histories, however, reveal many
areas of disordered life functioning. Lying, truancy, running away from
home, thefts, fights, substance abuse, and illegal activities are typical
experiences that patients report as beginning in childhood. x x x Their own
explanations of their antisocial behavior make it seem mindless, but their
mental content reveals the complete absence of delusions and other signs
of irrational thinking. In fact, they frequently have a heightened sense of
reality testing and often impress observers as having good verbal
intelligence.

x x x Those with this disorder do not tell the truth and cannot be trusted to
carry out any task or adhere to any conventional standard of morality. x x x
A notable finding is a lack of remorse for these actions; that is, they appear
to lack a conscience.”

d.14 Abandonment and sexual infidelity, not a ground for annulment

of marriage

Republic v. CA

Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites
solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The couple
was not blessed with a child due to Catalinas hysterectomy following her
second miscarriage. On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage, citing Catalinas psychological
incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations. Catalina did not
interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her share in
the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan. After
conducting an investigation, the public prosecutor determined that there
was no collusion between Eduardo and Catalina. Eduardo testified that
Catalina always left their house without his consent; that she engaged in
petty arguments with him; that she constantly refused to give in to his
sexual needs; that she spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors
instead of doing the household chores and caring for their adopted
daughter; that she squandered by gambling all his remittances as an
overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal
home in 1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her paramour.

Abandonment of Conjugal Home; Infidelity; Abandonment was not one of

the grounds for the nullity of marriage under the Family Code; Sexual
infidelity was not a valid ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code.—The only fact established here, which Catalina even
admitted in her Answer, was her abandonment of the conjugal home to live
with another man. Yet, abandonment was not one of the grounds for the
nullity of marriage under the Family Code. It did not also constitute
psychological incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal separation
under Article 55(10) of the Family Code. On the other hand, her sexual
infidelity was not a valid ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code, considering that there should be a showing that such
marital infidelity was a manifestation of a disordered personality that made
her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.

Mallilin v. Jamesolamin
Sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not, by themselves,
constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological
incapacity.—As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion
and abandonment do not, by themselves, constitute grounds for declaring a
marriage void based on psychological incapacity. Robert argues that the
series of sexual indiscretion of Luz were external manifestations of the
psychological defect that she was suffering within her person, which could
be considered as nymphomania or “excessive sex hunger.” Other than his
allegations, however, no other convincing evidence was adduced to prove
that these sexual indiscretions were considered as nymphomania, and that
it was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the term of psychological
incapacity embodied in Article 36. To stress, Robert’s testimony alone is
insufficient to prove the existence of psychological incapacity.
d. 15 Examples of psychological incapacity

Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA

Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the
celebration of their wedding, they proceed to the house of defendant’s
mother. There was no sexual intercourse between them during their first
night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have
their honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but Gina’s relatives
went with them. Again, there was no sexual intercourse since the
defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping on a
rocking chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they
slept together in the same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical
examination to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result
of the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of the
husband was kept confidential even the medicine prescribed. There were
allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his
residency status here in the country. Gina does not want to reconcile with
Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not want to
have their marriage annulled because he loves her very much, he has no
defect on his part and is physically and psychologically capable and since
their relationship is still young, they can still overcome their
differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical
examination and the result was there is not evidence of impotency and he
is capable of erection.

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is
"To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant
non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness
of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of
one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
Antonio v. Reyes

Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age
met in 1989. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married at
Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at Pasig in
December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months later. Reyes
persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other events or things. She even did
not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented to her
husband as adopted child of their family. They were separated in August
1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good in
November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his
marriage with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the
Family Code.

The root causes of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been

medically or clinically identified and proven by experts as perennially telling
lies, fabricating ridiculous stories and inventing personalities and situations,
of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her
actual occupation, income, educational attainment and family background,
among others.—The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity
has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court’s
decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start,
had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior “of peren[n]ially telling lies,
fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations,” of
writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her
actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background,
among others.

Ngo Te v. Yu-Te

Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering

organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Initially, he
was attracted to Rowena’s close friend but, as the latter already had a
boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena, which happened in
January 1996. It was Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward
refused bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence,
however, made him relent. They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month;
he, providing their travel money of P80,000 and she, purchasing the boat
ticket.

They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her

uncle’s house and Edward to his parents’ home. Eventually they got
married but without a marriage license. Edward was prohibited from
getting out of the house unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena
and her uncle. After a month, Edward escaped from the house, and stayed
with his parents. Edward’s parents wanted them to stay at their house but
Rowena refused and demanded that they have a separate abode. In June
1996, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives and they
then parted ways.

Declaration of Nullity; Judgments; In hindsight, it may have been

inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997), in
resolving all cases of psychological incapacity; The unintended
consequences of Molina has taken its toll on people who have to live with
deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly,
which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their
families, our basic social institutions—far from what was intended by the
Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be
bound by it.—In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to
impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of
psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by
the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was
sensitive to the OSG’s exaggeration of Article 36 as the “most liberal
divorce procedure in the world.” The unintended consequences of Molina,
however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant
behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like
termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our
basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina
has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it.
Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has
allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs,
narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of
marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of
the personality disorders of the said individuals.

Azcueta v. Republic

In 1993, after knowing each other for only two months, Marieta Azcueta and
Rodolfo Azcueta married each other. Their marriage was okay at first but
since Rodolfo cannot find any gainful employment, Marieta began nagging
him. In fact, it was Rodolfo’s mother who had to find an apartment room (near
the mother’s home) for the new couple to stay.
Marieta would bring Rodolfo newspapers hoping that the latter may find
employment. She would give him new clothes and money for him to use for
job interviews. One day Rodolfo informed Marieta that he already found a
jod. Marieta was so happy but later she found out that Rodolfo was not
actually employed and that every time Rodolfo would “go to work” he was
actually going home to his mother and the “salary” he was receiving was
actually coming from his mother. When confronted, Rodolfo cried like a baby
and explained to Marieta that he only did that so that she will not be nagging
him anymore.
At times also, when Rodolfo is drunk, he would become violent against
Marieta.
And in 1997, after four years of living together as husband and wife (and
childless at that, since Rodolfo also did not want to have sex), Marieta
decided to leave Rodolfo – but she was hoping that Rodolfo would follow her
which did not happen.
In 2002, Marieta filed a petition to have their marriage be declared void on
the ground that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated. Marieta presented
as expert witness Dr. Cecilia Villegas. Villegas did not personally evaluate
Rodolfo but based on her interview with Marieta, she concluded that Rodolfo
is inflicted with Dependent Personality Disorder (mama’s boy) as he was too
dependent on his mother so much so that he cannot decide for himself, she
explained
Rodolfo Azcueta is psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage suffering from a psychiatric classification as
Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy related
to masculine strivings.
xxx
Dependent Personality Disorder are (sic) those persons in which their
response to ordinary way of life are ineffectual and inept characterized by
loss of self confidence, always in doubt with himself and inability to make his
own decision, quite dependent on other people, and in this case, on his
mother.
xxx
The root cause of this psychological problem is a cross identification with the
mother who is the dominant figure in the family, the mother has the last say
and the authority in the family while the father was a seaman and always out
of the house, and if present is very shy, quiet and he himself has been very
submissive and passive to the authority of the wife.
xxx

In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of

marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on “all fours” with another case.—
In more recent jurisprudence, we have observed that notwithstanding the
guidelines laid down in Molina, there is a need to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. Each case must be judged, not on
the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on “all
fours” with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. With the advent of
Te v. Yu-Te (579 SCRA 193 [2009]), the Court encourages a
reexamination of jurisprudential trends on the interpretation of Article 36
although there has been no major deviation or paradigm shift from the
Molina doctrine.
One who is unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot
independently make decisions regarding even the most basic and ordinary
matters that spouses face everyday; one who cannot contribute to the
material, physical and emotional well-being of his spouse is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the meaning of
Article 36.—Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital
obligations embodied in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. As noted by
the trial court, as a result of Rodolfo’s dependent personality disorder, he
cannot make his own decisions and cannot fulfill his responsibilities as a
husband. Rodolfo plainly failed to fulfill the marital obligations to live
together, observe mutual love, respect, support under Article 68. Indeed,
one who is unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot
independently make decisions regarding even the most basic and ordinary
matters that spouses face everyday; one who cannot contribute to the
material, physical and emotional well-being of his spouse is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the meaning of
Article 36.

(e) Incestuous marriages

Art. 37, FC cf. Arts. 963-967 of NCC

Art. 37 of the FC. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void
from the beginning, whether relationship between the parties be legitimate Commented [70]:
or illegitimate: Commented [71]:

(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and Commented [72]:

(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. Commented [73]:

NCC
Art. 963. Proximity of relationship is determined by the number of
generations. Each generation forms a degree. (915) Commented [74]:

ART. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or
collateral.
A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants
and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons Commented [75]:
who are not ascendants and descendants, but who come from a common
ancestor. (916a) ARTICLE 965. The direct line is either descending or Commented [76]:
ascending. Commented [77]:

The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him.
The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends. (917)
ART. 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as there are
generations or persons, excluding the progenitor.
In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor. Thus, the child is
one degree removed from the parent, two from the grandfather, and three
from the great-grandparent.
In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then
descent is made to the person with whom the computation is to be made.
Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three from his
uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin, and so
forth. (918a)
ART. 967. Full blood relationship is that existing between persons who Commented [78]:
have the same father and the same mother. Commented [79]:

Half blood relationship is that existing between persons who have the same Commented [80]:
father, but not the same mother, or the same mother, but not the same
father. Commented [81]:

(f) Marriages against public policy Commented [82]:

Art. 38(6)of the FC:

The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of
public policy: Commented [83]:

(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter; Commented [84]:

Art. 80 of the FC:

In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the property

relations of the spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of Commented [85]:
the place of the celebration of the marriage and their residence.

This rule shall not apply: Commented [86]:

(1) Where both spouses are aliens; Commented [87]:

(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not
situated in the Philippines and executed in the country where the property is Commented [88]:
located; and
(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the
Philippines but affecting property situated in a foreign country whose laws Commented [89]:
require different formalities for its extrinsic validity.
Art. 246 of the RPC:

Parricide. — Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether Commented [90]:

legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his Commented [91]:

spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of Commented [92]:

reclusión perpetua to death. Commented [93]:

2. Who can invoke nullity

2.1 Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either
party Commented [94]:

Ninal v. Bayadog

Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out
of their marriage were born herein petitioners(ENGRACE NIAL for Herself
and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE, INGRID, ARCHIE &
PEPITO NIAL, JR.) . Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on
April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986,
Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage
license.
On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After Pepito’s death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito
to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity
of the second marriage would affect their successional rights. Norma filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action
since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment
of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand Marcos of the RTC said the Family Code was silent,
obscure and inefficient in resolving: a) petitioner’s cause of action, b) WON
Pepito’s second marriage was null and void and c) WON the plaintiffs are
stopped from assailing the validity of the 2nd marriage considering it was
dissolved by Pepito’s death. He ruled that the action should have been filed
before Pepito’s death.

Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left: as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.—The Code is silent Commented [95]:

as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable

and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid
until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab
initio is considered as having never to have taken place and cannot be the
source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free Commented [96]:

cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable Commented [97]:

marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while

a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages Commented [98]:

can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not
after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left
as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or Commented [99]:

defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the

action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but Commented [100]:

any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Commented [101]:

2.2 Must be filed by real party in interest Commented [102]:

Amor-Catalan v. CA

Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4,

1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States
of Americaand allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38
years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988. Two
months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent
Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan. Contending that said marriage was
bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage
with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and
Merope. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
cause of action as petitioner was allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it
was denied. Trial on the merits ensued.

A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must
be based on a cause of action.—True, under the New Civil Code which is
the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in the
Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate
“proper interest” can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of
marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action.
Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (2000), the Court held that the Commented [103]:

children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of the
marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their
successional rights.

2.3 Rationale of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and

Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz.:
1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of
voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages— Commented [104]:
such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the
spouses or by the State [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]—Only an
aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable
marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition
cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the
State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to
file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights
prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in
the regular courts.—The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Commented [105]:

Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal

Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the
following manner, viz.: 1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file
petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory
or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3,
paragraph a] Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for
annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of
the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not
have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have
only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can
only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of
a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the
State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. (Emphasis Commented [106]:

supplied.)

2.4 Must be filed solely by either husband or wife Commented [107]:

Carlos v. Sandoval

The spouses Felix Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate leaving 6 parcels
of land. In order to avoid to inheritance taxes, Felix, during his lifetime,
transferred to his son, Teofilo, lots 1, 2 and 3 with the condition that Teofilo
will transfer petitioner Carlos’ (another son of Felix) share. Parcel 4 was
registered in the name of Carlos.

Teofilo died intestate. Parcel 5 and 6 was registered in the name of the heirs
of Teofilo including herein respondents Felicidad Sandoval who was his
surviving spouse and son Teofilo Carlos II. Petitioner sues claiming that the
marriage between Teofilo and Felicidad was null and void for lack of
marriage license. Furthermore, petitioner contends that Teofilo Carlos II was
neither an adoptive or natural son of Teofilo Carlos.

Respondent submitted an affidavit of the justice of peace who solemnized

marriage and the certificate of live birth of Teofilo Carlos II wherein it was
stated that Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval are the parents. By virtue
of these documents, respondents move for summary judgment. Petitioner
also moved for summary judgment and presented as evidence the certificate
of the civil registrar attesting to the fact there is no birth certificate of Teofilo
II on record.

Declaration of Nullity of Marriages; Parties; Section 2(a) of the Rule on

Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file
a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.—Under the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule Commented [108]:

made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating: SEC. 2. Petition for

declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.—(a) Who may file.—A
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife. Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole
right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage.

2.5 Surviving spouse must be impleaded Commented [109]:

Ablaza v. Republic

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between his brother Cresenciano
and Leonila had been celebrated is void because there was no a marriage
license at the time the marriage was celebrated (the license was given a
week later). The marriage was in 1949. He insisted that his being the
surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him
to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death,
thereby making him a real party in interest. He also claims that he can
impugn the validity of the marriage because it was void, even if after the
death of his brother.

The surviving spouse must be impleaded in an action for the declaration of

nullity of a marriage since he or she is an indispensable party—such party’s Commented [110]:

absence renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want
of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present.—We note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the
late Cresenciano’s surviving wife, stood to be benefited or prejudiced by Commented [111]:

the nullification of her own marriage. It is relevant to observe, moreover,

that not all marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required a
marriage license for their validity; hence, her participation in this action is
made all the more necessary in order to shed light on whether the marriage
had been celebrated without a marriage license and whether the marriage
might have been a marriage excepted from the requirement of a marriage
license. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joined herein:
x x x under any and all conditions, [her] presence being a sine qua non for Commented [112]:

the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely “when an indispensable party

is not before the court [that] the action should be dismissed. The absence
of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null
and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
even as to those present.

3. Prescriptive period to file action for declaration of nullity Commented [113]:

Art. 39 of the FC:

The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage

shall not prescribe. (As amended by Executive Order 227 and Republic Act Commented [114]:

No. 8533; The phrase “However, in case of marriage celebrated before the
effectivity of this Code and falling under Article 36, such action or defense
shall prescribe in ten years after this Code shall taken effect” has been
deleted by Republic Act No. 8533 [Approved February 23, 1998]).

4. Procedure in actions for declaration of nullity Commented [115]:

a. Collusion, Art. 48 of the FC Commented [116]:

In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the

Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear
on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Commented [117]:

In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be

based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
a.1 Guidelines in the interpretation of Art. 48 Commented [118]:

Ancheta v. Ancheta
Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo Ancheta were married
on March 5, 1959 and had eight children. After 33 years of marriage the
petitioner left the respondent and their children. Their conjugal properties
were later separated through a court-sanctioned compromise agreement
where the petitioner got among others a resort in Cavite. When the husband
wanted to marry again, he filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of
psychological incapacity on June 5, 1995. Although he knew that the
petitioner was already residing at the resort in Cavite, he alleged in his
petition that the petitioner was residing at Las Piñas, Metro Manila, such that
summons never reached her. Nevertheless substituted service was
rendered to their son at his residence in Cavite. Petitioner was then declared
in default for failing to answer the said petition. Just over a month after it was
filed, the trial court granted the petition and declared the marriage of the
parties void ab initio.

Five years later, petitioner challenged the trial court’s order declaring as void
ab initio her marriage with respondent Rodolfo, citing extrinsic fraud and lack
of jurisdiction over her person, among others. She alleged that the
respondent lied on her real address in his petition so she never received
summons on the case, hence depriving her of her right to be heard. The
Court of Appeals dismissed her petition so she now comes to the Supreme
Court for review on certiorari.
Ruling:
Guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 48 of the Family
Code.—In the case of Republic v.Court of Appeals, this Court laid down the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code,
one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State: (8) The trial court must Commented [119]:
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the Commented [120]:
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
a.2 Investigation by prosecutor needed; purpose Commented [121]:

Tuazon v. CA

A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught

with the danger of collusion, hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration
of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
is ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing any
collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.—A grant of annulment of marriage or legal Commented [122]:
separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all
cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation,
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state
for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take
care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant
spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in
default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if
collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may
oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the
presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is
dubious and fabricated. Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 158, G.R. Commented [123]:
No. 116607 April 10, 1996
b. Confession of judgment not allowed, Art. 48 of the FC cf. Art. 2035 of Commented [124]:
NCC
Art. 48 of FC:
In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear
on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
Art. 2035 of the NCC:

No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: Commented [125]:

(1) The civil status of persons;

(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime.
c. The OSG represents government in hearings. Prosecutors are
deputized. Commented [126]:

Republic v. CA
The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the
respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of
psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year,
Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as
husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he
squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and
was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the
couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was
estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in
Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their
child. Since then he abandoned them.
Ruling:
Trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state.—The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the Commented [127]:
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within
fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 268 SCRA 198, G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
Malcampo-Sin v Sin
Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in
January 1987. Florence filed in September 1994, a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage. Trial ensued and the parties
presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. In June
1995, trial court dismissed Florence’s petition and throughout its trial, the
State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson filed with
the trial court a manifestation dated November 1994 stating that he found
no collusion between the parties, he did not actively participated
therein. Other than having appearance at certain hearings, nothing more
was heard of him.

The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the

defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as
well.—It can be argued that since the lower court dismissed the petition,
the evil sought to be prevented (i.e., dissolution of the marriage) did not
come about, hence, the lack of participation of the State was cured. Not so.
The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires
vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The
protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense
of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. This
is made clear by the following pronouncement: “(8) The trial court must
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095
(italics ours).” Malcampo-Sin vs. Sin, 355 SCRA 285, G.R. No. 137590
March 26, 2001
5. Effects of pendency of action for declaration of nullity Commented [128]:

Arts. 49, 198 of the FC

Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate
provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall
provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their
common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the Commented [129]:
moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent
with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also Commented [130]:
provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. Commented [131]:

Art. 198. During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of
marriage, and for declaration of nullity of marriage, the spouses and their
children shall be supported from the properties of the absolute community
or the conjugal partnership. After the final judgment granting the petition,
the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in
case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall
give support to the innocent one, specifying the terms of such order. Commented [132]:

I. VOIDABLE MARRIAGES Commented [133]:

1. Distinction between void and voidable marriages

1.1 Types of defective marriages
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas
Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen but now a naturalized Canadian,
married Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. He soon left to Canada after their
wedding due to work commitments. He returned to Philippines on April 2005
only to find out Daisylyn has an affair with another man. Gerbert returned to
Canada to file a divorce that took effect on January 2006.

Two years later, he found another Filipina and wanted to marry her in the
Philippines. He went to Pasig City Registrar's Office to register his Canadian
divorce decree but was denied considering that his marriage with Daisylyn
still subsists under Philippine law, that the foregin divorce must be
recognized judicially by the Philippine court.

Gerbert subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a judicial recognition

of foreign divorce but was subsequently denied since he is not the proper
party and according to Article 26 of the Civil Code, only a Filipino spouse can
avail the remedy.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages—void Commented [134]:
and voidable marriages—and in both cases, the basis for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or
at the time of the marriage; Divorce contemplates the dissolution of the lawful
union for cause arising after the marriage.—The Family Code recognizes
only two types of defective marriages—void and voidable marriages. In both
cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment
of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the
other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising
after the marriage. Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce
between Filipino citizens. Commented [135]:

2. Grounds for annulment Commented [136]:

Arts. 4, 5, 14, 45(1), 47(1), 35(1) of the FC cf. RA 6809

FC

a) Absence of parental consent

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the
marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)
Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under
any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract
marriage.
Art. 14. In case either or both of the contracting parties, not having been
emancipated by a previous marriage, are between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-one, they shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding
articles, exhibit to the local civil registrar, the consent to their marriage of
their father, mother, surviving parent or guardian, or persons having legal
charge of them, in the order mentioned. Such consent shall be manifested in
writing by the interested party, who personally appears before the proper
local civil registrar, or in the form of an affidavit made in the presence of two
witnesses and attested before any official authorized by law to administer
oaths. The personal manifestation shall be recorded in both applications for
marriage license, and the affidavit, if one is executed instead, shall be
attached to said applications.
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing Commented [137]:
at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled
was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage
was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person Commented [138]:
having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after
attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other
and both lived together as husband and wife;
Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following
persons and within the periods indicated herein:
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent
or guardian did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining
the age of twenty-one, or by the parent or guardian or person having legal
charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of
twenty-one;
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: Commented [139]:

(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the
consent of parents or guardians; Commented [140]:
RA 6809:
Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the
Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 234.Emancipation takes place by the attainment of

majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of
eighteen years."

Sec. 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed.
Sec. 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as
follows:

"Art. 236.Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the

person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and
responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by
existing laws in special cases.

"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of

twenty-one.
"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or
responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below
twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code."

Sec. 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills, bequests, donations,
grants, insurance policies and similar instruments containing references
and provisions favorable to minors will not retroact to their prejudice.

Sec. 5. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in at
least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: December 13, 1989

(b) Insanity Commented [141]:

Arts. 45(2), 47(2) of the FC

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing
at the time of the marriage:
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to
reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; Commented [142]:

Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following
persons and within the periods indicated herein:
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the same spouse, Commented [143]:
who had no knowledge of the other’s insanity; or by any relative or guardian Commented [144]:
or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of
either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining Commented [145]:
sanity;
Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay
Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to respondent Isabel’s Petition for Letters
of Administration over the estate of Cristina A. Suntay who had died without
leaving a will. The decedent is the wife of Federico and the grandmother of
Isabel. Isabel’s father Emilio, had predeceased his mother Cristina.
The marriage of Isabel’s parents had previously been decalred by the CFI
as “null and void.” Federico anchors his oppostion on this fact, alleging based
on Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel has no right to succeed by right of
representation as she is an illegitimate child. The trial court had denied
Federico’s Motion to Dismiss, hence this petition for certiorari. Federico
contends that, inter alia, that the dispositive portion of the the decision
declaring the marriage of Isabel’s parents “null and void” be upheld.

A void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all.—The Commented [146]:
fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that a void
marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void
marriages, with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for
under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are
called natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective of
whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad
faith. Commented [147]:

A voidable marriage is considered valid and produces all its civil effects.—A Commented [148]:
voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until
it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for
annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special Commented [149]:
contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express
provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out.
The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second
paragraph of Article 89. x x x Stated otherwise, the annulment of “the Commented [150]:
marriage by the court abolishes the legal character of the society formed by
the putative spouses, but it cannot destroy the juridical consequences which
the marital union produced during its continuance.”
(c) Fraud Commented [151]:

Arts. 45(3), 46, 47(3) of the FC:

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing
at the time of the marriage:
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to
in Number 3 of the preceding Article:
(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other
party of a crime involving moral turpitude; Commented [152]:

(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she
was pregnant by a man other than her husband; Commented [153]:

(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, Commented [154]:
existing at the time of the marriage; or
(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or
lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage. Commented [155]:

No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or

chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage. Commented [156]:

Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following
persons and within the periods indicated herein:
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party,
within five years after the discovery of the fraud; Commented [157]:

Arts. 1338-1344 of the NCC

ARTICLE 1338. There is fraud when, through insidious words or
machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induced to enter
into a contract which, without them, he would not have agreed to. (1269) Commented [158]:

ARTICLE 1339. Failure to disclose facts, when there is a duty to reveal

them, as when the parties are bound by confidential relations, constitutes
fraud. (n) Commented [159]:

ARTICLE 1340. The usual exaggerations in trade, when the other party
had an opportunity to know the facts, are not in themselves fraudulent. (n) Commented [160]:

ARTICLE 1341. A mere expression of an opinion does not signify fraud, Commented [161]:
unless made by an expert and the other party has relied on the former’s
special knowledge. (n)
ARTICLE 1342. Misrepresentation by a third person does not vitiate
consent, unless such misrepresentation has created substantial mistake
and the same is mutual. (n) Commented [162]:

ARTICLE 1343. Misrepresentation made in good faith is not fraudulent but Commented [163]:
may constitute error. (n) Commented [164]:

ARTICLE 1344. In order that fraud may make a contract voidable, it should Commented [165]:
be serious and should not have been employed by both contracting parties. Commented [166]:

Incidental fraud only obliges the person employing it to pay damages.

c.1. Concealment of pregnancy Commented [167]:

Aquino v. Delizo
Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the ground of
fraud against Conchita Delizo that at the date of her marriage with the
former on December 1954, concealed the fact that she was pregnant by
another man and sometime in April 1955 or about 4 months after their
marriage, gave birth to a child. During the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco
represent the state in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only Aquino
testified and the only documentary evidence presented was the marriage
contract between the parties. Delizo did not appear nor presented any
evidence.

CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioner’s complaint for annulment of marriage, which

was affirmed by CA thus a petition for certiorari to review the decisions.
CONCEALMENT OF PREGNANCY AT TIME OF MARRIAGE
CONSTITUTES FRAUD AS GROUND FOR ANNULMENT.—Concealment
by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by
a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for
Commented [168]:
annulment of marriage (Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3), New
Civil Code).
c.2 Non-disclosure of husband’s pre-marital relationship Commented [169]:

Anaya v. Palaroan

Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Palaroan

filed an action for annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his
consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The complaint was
dismissed and upheld the validity of the marriage and granting Aurora’s
counterclaim. While the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated,
Fernando divulged to her that several months prior to their marriage, he
had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his. According to her,
the non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret constituted fraud in
obtaining her consent. She prayed for the annulment of her marriage with
Fernando on such ground.

Non-disclosure of a husband's premarital relationship, not a fraud.—Non- Commented [170]:

disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not
one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for
annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of Article 86, Civil
Code. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital
lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the
marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent
was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in
which society, and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent Commented [171]:
being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees
with the rule or not.
c.3 Concealment of homosexuality Commented [172]:

Almelor v. RTC Las Pinas

Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad
(Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989 at the Manila Cathedral. Their
union bore three children.Manuel and Leonida are both medical
practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician. After eleven (11) years
of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Pinas City to annul
their marriage on the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated
to perform his marital obligations. Leonida averred that Manuels kind and
gentle demeanor did not last long. In the public eye, Manuel was the picture
of a perfect husband and father. This was not the case in his private life. At
home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably
meticulous, easily angered. Manuels unreasonable way of imposing
discipline on their children was the cause of their frequent fights as a couple.
Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish
affection Manuel has for his mother. Manuels deep attachment to his mother
and his dependence on her decision-making were incomprehensible to
Leonida.

Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexuality.
Her suspicions were first aroused when she noticed Manuels peculiar
closeness to his male companions. For instance, she caught him in an
indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller.
She also found several pornographic homosexual materials in his
possession. Her worse fears were confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed
another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales. When she
confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her
children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving
support to their children.
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to
prove Leonidas claim. Dr. del Fonso Garcia testified that she conducted
evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also
had a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with Ma.
Paulina Corrinne (the eldest child). She concluded that Manuel is
psychologically incapacitated. Such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it
existed even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable.
A marriage may be annulled when the consent of either party was obtained
by fraud, such as concealment of homosexuality; It is the concealment of
homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the
innocent party.—Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a Commented [173]:
homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his
marriage with Leonida. The law is clear—a marriage may be annulled when
the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, such as concealment of
homosexuality. Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by
preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of
his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife. It is the
concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates
the consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith
and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the marriage. Commented [174]:

(d) Alcoholism and perversion not grounds for annulment Commented [175]:

Hernandez v CA
Lucita and Marcio met in Philippine Christian University in Dasmarinas when
lucita was Marcio’s teacher for two consecutive semesters. Lucita was 5
years older than Marcio. They later on became sweethearts and eventually
got married. They also had a child. Lucita supported the family as her
husband continued studying, supported by his parents. The first few years of
their marriage went okay. But this eventually changed. Marcio had an extra-
marital relation with another student who was also married. When Lucita
discovered this, he asked Lucio to end it. He promised to but did not fulfill it
and left their conjugal home and child. After some time, he returned to Lucita
and she accepted him. However, his attitude worsened when he got
employed to Reynold Philippines, Inc. He engaged in extreme promiscuous
conduct during the latter part of 1986. As a result, private respondent
contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. Petitioner averred that on one
occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest child who
was then barely a year old. Private respondent is not close to any of their
children as he was never affectionate and hardly spent time with them. On
July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the RTC a petition seeking the
annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of
psychological incapacity. RTC and CA denied the petition. Hence, this case.

Private respondent’s alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or Commented [176]:

perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for
finding that he is suffering from a psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code.—Private respondent’s alleged habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from a
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must
be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality
which make private respondent completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private respondent’s Commented [177]:
youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court
held.
(e) Force, intimidation, and undue influence Commented [178]:

Arts. 45(4), 47(4) of FC

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing
at the time of the marriage:
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or
undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party
thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; Commented [179]:

Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following
persons and within the periods indicated herein:

(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party,
within five years from the time the force, intimidation or undue influence
disappeared or ceased; Commented [180]:

Arts. 1335-1337 of NCC

ARTICLE 1335. There is violence when in order to wrest consent, serious Commented [181]:
or irresistible force is employed. Commented [182]:

There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a Commented [183]:
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his Commented [184]:
person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse,
descendants or ascendants, to give his consent.
To determine the degree of intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the
person shall be borne in mind.

A threat to enforce one’s claim through competent authority, if the claim is Commented [185]:
just or legal, does not vitiate consent. (1267a)
ARTICLE 1336. Violence or intimidation shall annul the obligation, although
it may have been employed by a third person who did not take part in the
contract. (1268) Commented [186]:

ARTICLE 1337. There is undue influence when a person takes improper Commented [187]:
advantage of his power over the will of another, depriving the latter of a
reasonable freedom of choice. The following circumstances shall be Commented [188]:
considered: the confidential, family, spiritual and other relations between
the parties, or the fact that the person alleged to have been unduly
influenced was suffering from mental weakness, or was ignorant or in
financial distress. Commented [189]:

Art. 344, last par. Of the RPC:

In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the

marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the
criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The Commented [190]:
provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the co-principals,
accomplices and accessories after the fact of the abovementioned crimes. Commented [191]:

(f) Physical Incapacity/impotence Commented [192]:

Art. 45(5) of the FC:

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing
at the time of the marriage:
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the
marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be
incurable; Commented [193]:

Jimenez v Republic
Joel Jimenez, the petitioner, filed a petition for the annulment of his
marriage with Remedios Canizares on the ground that the orifice of her
genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ
for copulation. It has existed at the time of the marriage and continues to
exist that led him to leave the conjugal home two nights and one day after
the marriage. The court summoned and gave a copy to the wife but the
latter did not file any answer. The wife was ordered to submit herself to
physical examination and to file a medical certificate within 10 days. She
was given another 5 days to comply or else it will be deemed lack of
interest on her part and therefore rendering judgment in favor of the
petitioner.
Ruling:
PRESUMPTION OF POTENCY; HUSBAND'S LONE TESTIMONY
INSUFFICIENT.—The presumption is in favor of potency. The lone
testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual
intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them
together as husband and wife. Commented [194]:
Alcazar v. Alcazar
In August 2000, Rey Alcazar and Veronica Cabacungan married each other.
They lived together for three weeks thereafter, Rey went to Saudi Arabia to
work. In Saudi, Rey never communicated with Veronica despite Veronica’s
efforts to reach him. In March 2002, Rey returned to the Philippines but
instead of going home to Veronica, he went straight to his parents. He did
not even tell Veronica that he was coming home. Veronica had to learn of
his husband’s return from someone else. Veronica went to Rey’s parents but
Rey cannot be found there (hiding).
In August 2002, Veronica filed an annulment case against Rey. Initially, the
ground for annulment was based on paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family
Code or Rey’s failure to consummate the marriage. But later, the ground was
changed to psychological incapacity (Article 36).
During trial, Veronica presented Dr. Nedy Tayag as expert witness who
testified that Rey is suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD).
Rey was found by Tayag to be having a grandiose sense of self. He thinks
he is too important, too unique, and too special.
Also alleged in the complaint for annulment was Rey’s alleged sexual
infidelity because when he came home from abroad, it was said that he lived
with a certain “Sally” in his parent’s hometown.
Ruling:

Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to

copulate.[16]Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent inability on Commented [195]:
the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual
intercourse.[17] Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the part of the
husband or of the wife and may be caused by a physical or structural
defect in the anatomy of one of the parties or it may be due to chronic
illness and inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part from
psychophysical conditions. It may be caused by psychogenic causes, Commented [196]:
where such mental block or disturbance has the result of making the
spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage act.[18] Commented [197]:

f.1 Lack of cohabitation not a ground for annulment Commented [198]:

Villanueva v. CA
In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in Puerto
Princesa. In November 1992, Orly filed to annul the marriage. He claimed
that threats of violence and duress forced him to marry Lilia. He said that
he had been receiving phone calls threatening him and that Lilia even hired
the service of a certain Ka Celso, a member of the NPA, to threaten him.
Orly also said he was defrauded by Lilia by claiming that she was pregnant
hence he married her but he now raises that he never impregnated Lilia
prior to the marriage. Lilia on the other hand denied Orly’s allegations and
she said that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage and she
showed 14 letters that shows Orly’s affection and care towards her.
Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage.
Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the
spouses who can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate.—
As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that his
marriage should be annulled due to the absence of cohabitation between
him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a
marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of
the spouses who can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate.
The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the
perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack
of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Commented [199]:
Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee
on any of those grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.
(g) Marriage in jest Commented [200]:

Republic v. Albios
A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as
a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and
with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound; Marriages
in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent,
but for a complete absence of consent.―In ruling that Albios’ marriage was
void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage
by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but
entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual
marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not
be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a
purpose to enter into such a relation. It is a pretended marriage not
intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties
whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest
are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for
a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the
parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any
purpose. Commented [201]:

3. Who and when can one seek annulment of marriage Commented [202]:

Art. 47 FC:
Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following
persons and within the periods indicated herein:
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent
or guardian did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining
the age of twenty-one, or by the parent or guardian or person having legal
charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of
twenty-one;
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the same spouse,
who had no knowledge of the other’s insanity; or by any relative or guardian
or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of
either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining
sanity;
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party,
within five years after the discovery of the fraud;
(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party,
within five years from the time the force, intimidation or undue influence
disappeared or ceased;
(5) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured
party, within five years after the marriage.
Sec. 3, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
Sec. 3, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC dated March 7, 2003

Sec. 3. Petition for annulment of voidable marriages. - Commented [203]:

(a) Who may file. - The following persons may file a petition for annulment of
voidable marriage based on any of the grounds under Article 45 of the Family
Code and within the period herein indicated: chan robles virtual law library
(1) The contracting party whose parent, or guardian, or person exercising
substitute parental authority did not give his or her consent, within five years
after attaining the age of twenty-one unless, after attaining the age of twenty-
one, such party freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife; or the
parent, guardian or person having legal charge of the contracting party, at
any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one; chan robles
virtual law library
(2) The sane spouse who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any
relative, guardian, or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time
before the death of either party; or by the insane spouse during a lucid
interval or after regaining sanity, provided that the petitioner, after coming to
reason, has not freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife;
(3) The injured party whose consent was obtained by fraud, within five years
after the discovery of the fraud, provided that said party, with full knowledge
of the facts constituting the fraud, has not freely cohabited with the other as
husband or wife;
(4) The injured party whose consent was obtained by force, intimidation, or
undue influence, within five years from the time the force intimidation, or
undue influence disappeared or ceased, provided that the force, intimidation,
or undue influence having disappeared or ceased, said party has not
thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife;
(5) The injured party where the other spouse is physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the other and such incapability continues
and appears to be incurable, within five years after the celebration of
marriage;
(6) The injured party where the other party was afflicted with a sexually-
transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable, within
five years after the celebration of marriage.

(b) Where to file. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court. Commented [204]:

4. Procedure in actions for annulment; venue (for OFW) and the need
for an expert witness Commented [205]:

Art. 48 of the FC:

In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear
on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be
based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
Barcelona v CA

Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment

of Voidable Marriages; The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that
“expert opinion need not be alleged” in the petition is that there is also no
need to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity—only experts
in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to
determine the root cause of psychological incapacity.—Procedural rules
apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. The
obvious effect of the new Rules providing that “expert opinion need not be Commented [206]:
alleged” in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause
of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological
and behavioral sciences are competent to determine the root cause of
psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to
allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is
also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological
incapacity. Science continues to explore, examine and explain how our
brains work, respond to and control the human body. Scientists still do not
understand everything there is to know about the root causes of
psychological disorders. The root causes of many psychological disorders
are still unknown to science even as their outward, physical manifestations
are evident. Hence, what the new Rules require the petition to allege are
the physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity. Commented [207]:
Respondent Tadeo’s second petition complies with this requirement.
Office of the Court Administrator v Flores
In petitions for declaration of nullity of void marriages, the applicable rule is Commented [208]:
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as amended. In particular, Section 4 categorically
states the venue where a petition shall be filed.—In petitions for declaration
of nullity of void marriages, the applicable rule is A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as
amended. In particular, Section 4 categorically states the venue where a
petition shall be filed, to wit: SEC. 4. Venue.—The petition shall be filed in
the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the
respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of the
filling, or in case of a nonresident respondent, where he may be found in Commented [209]:
the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. Commented [210]:

5. Effect of pendency of action for annulment Commented [211]:

FC
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate
provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall
provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their
common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the Commented [212]:
moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent
with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also
provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent.
Art. 198. During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of
marriage, and for declaration of nullity of marriage, the spouses and their
children shall be supported from the properties of the absolute community
or the conjugal partnership. After the final judgment granting the petition, Commented [213]:
the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in
case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall
give support to the innocent one, specifying the terms of such order. Commented [214]:

Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be

exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
NCC
ARTICLE 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a
voidable marriage shall principally use the surname of the father. Commented [215]:

ARTICLE 370. A married woman may use: Commented [216]:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband’s Commented [217]:

surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband’s surname, or Commented [218]:

(3) Her husband’s full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is Commented [219]:

his wife, such as “Mrs.”

ARTICLE 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the
guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is Commented [220]:

the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and
surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former Commented [221]:

husband’s surname, unless: Commented [222]:

(1) The court decrees otherwise, or Commented [223]:

(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.

6. Effects of annulment Commented [224]:

Arts. 50-54, 43, 44, 86(3),99 of the FC:

Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article
43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which
are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. Commented [225]:

The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition Commented [226]:
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of Commented [227]:
the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless Commented [228]:
such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Commented [229]:

All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the Commented [230]:
conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. Commented [231]:

In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall Commented [232]:
be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common Commented [233]:
children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall Commented [234]:
be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by Commented [235]:
mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such
matters. Commented [236]:

The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the
enforcement of the judgment. Commented [237]:

The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way

prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the
death of either of both of the parents; but the value of the properties already
received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be
considered as advances on their legitime. (n) Commented [238]:

Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of
the children’s presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil
registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third Commented [239]:
persons. (n)
Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with
the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the Commented [240]:
subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or
absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and
executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the Commented [241]:
subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate. Commented [242]:

Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the

preceding Article shall produce the following effects:
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination
shall be considered legitimate; Commented [243]:

(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the Commented [244]:
case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse Commented [245]:
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the
community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in Commented [246]:
favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty
spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the
donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said
donee are revoked by operation of law; Commented [247]:
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse
who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such Commented [248]:
designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall
be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate Commented [249]:
succession.
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said
marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and Commented [250]:
testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by
operation of law.
Art. 86. A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the donor in
the following cases:
(3) When the marriage is annulled, and the donee acted in bad faith;
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates: Commented [251]:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse; Commented [252]:

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under
Articles 134 to 138.
(a) On remarriage Commented [253]:

Art. 40 of the FC:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. Commented [254]:

(b) On rights and obligations between former spouses Commented [255]:

Art. 198 of the FC:

During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of marriage,
and for declaration of nullity of marriage, the spouses and their children
shall be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership. After the final judgment granting the petition, the Commented [256]:
obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in Commented [257]:
case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall Commented [258]:
give support to the innocent one, specifying the terms of such order. Commented [259]:

(c) On the property regime of the marriage Commented [260]:

Arts. 50, 43(2), 102(4), 129, 138 of the FC:

Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article
43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which
are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of Commented [261]:
the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless Commented [262]:
such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Commented [263]:

All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the

conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall
be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the
preceding Article shall produce the following effects:
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the
case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of
the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited
in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the
guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent
spouse;
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following Commented [264]:
procedure shall apply:
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall Commented [265]:
constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband Commented [266]:
and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the
marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such
share provided in this Code. For purpose of computing the net profits
subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),
the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of
the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and
the market value at the time of its dissolution.
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the
following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the Commented [267]:
conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal Commented [268]:
debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal
partnership as an asset thereof. Commented [269]:

(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds
in the acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, Commented [270]:
the ownership of which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of
the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall Commented [271]:
be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties, in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall
thereafter be delivered to each of them. Commented [272]:

(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss
or deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to Commented [273]:
either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from
the conjugal funds, if any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute
the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless Commented [274]:
a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage
settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such
share as provided in this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered Commented [275]:
upon the partition in accordance with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which Commented [276]:
it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be
adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children
choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to Commented [277]:
have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case Commented [278]:
there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the
best interests of said children.
Art. 138. After dissolution of the absolute community or of the conjugal Commented [279]:
partnership, the provisions on complete separation of property shall apply. Commented [280]:
Valdez v. RTC
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5
children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted
hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody
of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they
prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the

procedure for the liquidation of common property in “unions without
marriage”. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint
affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
Ruling:

In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of Commented [281]:
the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions
of Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.—The trial court correctly Commented [282]:
applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case
may be, of the Family Code.
Buenaventura v. CA

In case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable

and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal
coownership.—Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a Commented [283]:
bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42
and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute
community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not
apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is
declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated,
partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
(d) Co-ownership results if marriage is void but parties have no legal
impediment to marry each other Commented [284]:

Barrido v. Nonato

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through

their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-
ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed
to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not Commented [285]:
participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed to the same jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care Commented [286]:
and maintenance of the family household.—The records reveal that Nonato
and Barrido’s marriage had been declared void for psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. During their marriage, however, the
conjugal partnership regime governed their property relations. Although
Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal
partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void
marriages on the spouses’ property relations. x x x This particular kind of
co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and
wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. It is clear,
therefore, that for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must
be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or
their marriage is void. Here, all these elements are present. The term
“capacitated” in the first paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal
capacity of a party to contract marriage. Any impediment to marry has not
been shown to have existed on the part of either Nonato or barring. They
lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife. However, their
marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Under this property regime, property
acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property
shall be considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party’s
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.
Efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are
regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one
who has no salary or income or work or industry.
(e) On presumptive legitimes/hereditary rights Commented [287]:

Arts. 50-53, 43(2) of the FC:

Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article
43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which
are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of
the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless
such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall
be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common Commented [288]:
children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall Commented [289]:
be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by
mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such
matters.
The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the
enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way
prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the
death of either of both of the parents; but the value of the properties already Commented [290]:
received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be
considered as advances on their legitime. (n)
Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the Commented [291]:
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of
the children’s presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil
registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third Commented [292]:
persons. (n)
Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with
the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the Commented [293]:
subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the
preceding Article shall produce the following effects:
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the
case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of
the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited
in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the Commented [294]:
guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent
spouse;
In relation to
Arts. 886 and 888 of NCC
ARTICLE 886. Legitime is that part of the testator’s property which he Commented [295]:
cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who Commented [296]:
are, therefore, called compulsory heirs.
ARTICLE 888. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists Commented [297]:
of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. Commented [298]:

The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of
illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided.
Art. 176 of the FC
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with
this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of
the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other
provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in
force.
Arts. 102 (5) and (6), 129(8) and (9) of the FC
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following
procedure shall apply:
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered
upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the
properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be
adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children
choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to
have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case
there in no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration
the best interests of said children.
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the
following procedure shall apply:
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered
upon the partition in accordance with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on
which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be
adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children
choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to
have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case
there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration
the best interests of said children.
Yu v. Reyes-Carpio
Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Caroline
T. Yu with the RTC of Pasig. Judge Suarez on May 30, 2006 issued an order
stating that Eric’s partial offer of evidence dated April 18, 2006 would be
submitted for resolution after certain exhibits have been remarked. But the
exhibits were only relative to the issue of the nullity of the marriage of Eric
and Caroline. On September 12, 2006, Caroline moved to submit the case
for resolution, considering that the incidents on custody, support, and
property relations (incidental issues) were mere consequences of the
declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage.
Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident on declaration of nullity
cannot be resolved without presentation of evidence for the incidents on
custody, support, and property relations. Eric added that the incidental
issues and the issue on declaration of nullity can both proceed and be
simultaneously resolved. RTC ruled in favour of Eric’s opposition.
Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that the case was re-
raffled to another branch presided by Judge Reyes-Carpio. While the case
was being tried by Judge Reyes-Carpio, Caroline filed an Omnibus Motion
seeking the strict observation by the said judge of the Rule on Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage as codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Commented [299]:
and that the case on the declaration on nullity be already submitted for
resolution ahead of the incidental issues, and not simultaneously. Eric
opposed this motion.
Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying that the main
cause of action is the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the incidental
issues are merely ancillary incidents thereto. Eric moved for reconsideration,
which was denied by Judge Reyes-Carpio. Eric then filed for certiorari with
the CA under Rule 65. CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Ruling:
Conversely, the trial court, or more particularly the family court, shall
proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of
common children, and delivery of their presumptive legitimes upon entry of
judgment granting the petition. And following the pertinent provisions of the
Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly
consistent with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code, contrary to what
petitioner asserts. Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code state:
“Article 50. x x x
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of
the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes,
unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous judicial
proceedings.
xxxx
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all
common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial
court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the
parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for
such matters.”
(f) On the status and custody of children
Arts. 54, 213, 164, 165 of FC:
Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or
absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and
executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the
subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be
exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are
legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the
sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate
children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized
or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by
them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the
civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child. (55a, 258a)
Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are
illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code.
Yu v. Yu
Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA, alleging
that his estranged wife, Caroline Tanchay-Yu, unlawfully withheld from him
the custody of their minor child, Bianca Yu. The petition included a prayer
for the award to him of the custody of Bianca.
Eric also filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and the
dissolution of absolute community of property before the Pasig RTC. The
petition also included a prayer for the award to him of the custody of
Bianca, subject to the final resolution by the CA of his petition for habeas
corpus. Because of this, the CA dismissed the petition for habeas corpus,
having been rendered moot and academic
By petitioner’s filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage before
the Pasig RTC he automatically submitted the issue of the custody of
Bianca as an incident thereof.—By petitioner’s filing of the case for
declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC he automatically
submitted the issue of the custody of Bianca as an incident thereof. After
the appellate court subsequently dismissed the habeas corpus case, there
was no need for petitioner to replead his prayer for custody for, as above-
quoted provisions of the Family Code provide, the custody issue in a
declaration of nullity case is deemed pleaded. That that is so gains light
from Section 21 of the “Rule on Declaration Of Absolute Nullity Of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages” which provides: Sec. 21.
Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children
and delivery of their presumptive legitimes.—Upon entry of the judgment
granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of
judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on
motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody, support of
common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied) Since this immediately-quoted provision directs the court taking
jurisdiction over a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage to resolve
the custody of common children, by mere motion of either party, it could
only mean that the filing of a new action is not necessary for the court to
consider the issue of custody of a minor.
(g) On the use of surnames
Arts. 370, 371, 364, 369 of the NCC:
ARTICLE 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband’s surname,
or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband’s surname, or
(3) Her husband’s full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his
wife, such as “Mrs.”
ARTICLE 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty
party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the
innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname.
However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband’s
surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
ARTICLE 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the
surname of the father.
ARTICLE 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable
marriage shall principally use the surname of the father.
Yasin v Judge, Shari’a District Court

The only name that may be changed is the true and official name recorded
in the Civil Register.—While it is true that under Article 376 of the Civil
Code, no person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority, nonetheless, the only name that may be changed is the true and
official name recorded in the Civil Register.
Bar Matter No. 1625- Josephine P. Uy-Timosa, July 18, 2006