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The Global
State of
Democracy
Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
iii
The Global State of Democracy 2017
Contents Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Contents
Foreword vi Chapter 3. Threats from within: democracy’s
Preface viii resilience to backsliding 68
Acknowledgements x 3.1. Introduction: democracy in decline 70
Abbreviations xii 3.2. Democratic backsliding: concepts and questions 73
Introduction xiii 3.3. Consequences of backsliding 77
3.4. Resistance to backsliding: a case for
democratic resilience 81
Chapter 1. The global state of democracy,
1975-2015 2 3.5. Conclusions and recommendations:
resistance to backsliding 85
1.1. Introduction: a systematic health check of 4
References 88
democratic progress and resilience
1.2. Challenges to democracy 6
Chapter 4. The changing nature of political
1.3. A first approximation: the spread and resilience
parties and representation 96
of electoral democracies 8
1.4. A broad and continuous understanding of 4.1. Introduction: representation under pressure 98
democracy 9 4.2. Challenges facing political parties 100
1.5. Assessing the state of democracy worldwide 12 4.3. The challenge of new parties and populism 106
1.6. A nuanced, long-term perspective on 4.4. The challenges of citizen engagement 109
democratic progress from 1975 to 2015 17 4.5. Resilient responses to the challenges
1.7. Conclusions: trendless fluctuations 27 of representation 112
References 30 4.6. Conclusions and recommendations:
overcoming challenges to parties 117
References 119
Chapter 2. Democracy’s resilience in
a changing world 34
2.1. Introduction: what makes democracy resilient? 36 Chapter 5. Money, influence, corruption and
capture: can democracy be protected? 124
2.2. Democracy imperilled: challenges, crises and
opportunities 38 5.1. Introduction: a world of scandals 126
2.3. Reaffirming democracy 43 5.2. Global challenges of money in politics 128
2.4. Resilient citizens: confronting problems and 5.3. Inadequacy of narrow political finance legal
perils of representation 45 frameworks 137
2.5. Resilient institutions: countering capture, 5.4. A holistic, fairness-oriented and integrity-
corruption and patronage 49 enhanced response 140
2.6. Resilient societies: reducing structural risks 51 5.5. Conclusions and recommendations:
2.7. Designing resilience: building better protecting democracy 146
democracies 54 References 149
2.8. Supporting resilience: regional and
international responses 56 Chapter 6. Mind the gap: can democracy
2.9. Conclusions and recommendations: counter inequality? 158
building more resilient democracies 59
6.1. Introduction 160
References 61 166
6.2. Understanding inequality and social exclusion
iv
International IDEA
First Edition 2017 Contents
6.3. Inequality and democratic resilience 168 ANNEX: THE GLOBAL STATE OF
6.4. Does democracy reduce inequality? 178 DEMOCRACY INDICES METHODOLOGY
6.5. The politics of inequality: factors that have
made a difference in promoting inclusion 181 A.1. Introduction 278
6.6. Conclusions and recommendations: A.2. Objective 278
addressing inequality 191
A.3. Conceptual distinctions 279
References 194
A.4. Criteria for indicator selection 281
A.5. Data sources 281
Chapter 7. Migration, social polarization, A.6. Aggregation 282
citizenship and multiculturalism 200 A.7. Scale 284
7.1. Introduction 202 A.8. The use of confidence intervals for comparisons
7.2. Migration patterns and global trends 205 across countries and over time 284
7.3. The impact of migration on democracy 207 A.9. Countries and regions 286
7.4. Emigrants as agents of democracy: A.10. Cautionary notes 287
how can democracies gain from emigration? 219 A.11. Global State of Democracy indices:
7.5. The migration debate: dilemmas for country scores per decade 288
policymakers 227 References 328
7.6. Conclusions and recommendations:
managing migration democratically 234
References 239
v
The Global State of Democracy 2017
Foreword Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Foreword
Recent media reports and public opinion polls have warned about the apparent growing
threats to democracy. They suggest, with pessimism, that democracy is in decline.There
are certainly reasons to be concerned.
All countries must address complex challenges International IDEA’s new publication,
that, whether originating within or outside The Global State of Democracy, offers a
of their borders, have a global reach: from comprehensive global analysis of the
food scarcity to conflict, from climate change challenges facing democracy and the policy
to terrorism and organized crime, and from options to tackle them. The text contrasts
populism to corruption. However, in my recent democratic reversals with longer-term
opinion, this is an incomplete overview positive trends, providing a nuanced fact-
of the problem. It is easy to lose sight of based perspective and proposing solutions to
the long-term gains the world has made in questions that are often overly politicized. The
maintaining democracy. By and large, public publication discusses complex, critical and
institutions today are more representative politically sensitive problems facing the world
and accountable to the needs and desires of today, such as how to provide migrants with
women and men of all ages. Over the past opportunities to participate politically in their
several decades, many states have become home and destination communities. It also
democratic and, notwithstanding obstacles addresses how money improperly influences
and some setbacks, most of them have the political system, the risks that rising
maintained that status. Today, more countries inequality levels pose to democracies and their
hold elections than ever before. Crucially, potential impact on future generations, and
most governments respect their international the strategies to create or strengthen inclusive
commitments to uphold fundamental rights, political instruments after conflict.
more individuals are able to freely cast their
votes, and civil society and its leaders can In addition, International IDEA provides
mobilize and engage in dialogue with political valuable insights on the important role women
leaders. All in all, democracy has produced a play in strengthening political institutions, how
domino effect, growing and spreading across young people can be engaged in politics, and
the planet. how innovations in technology and the media
are changing the way politics is done today.
Governments should build on this strong The publication contains a rich summary of
foundation in order to reduce the risk best practices and case studies from around
of backsliding towards authoritarianism. the world, focusing on the changing political
Regrettably, in too many cases electoral results dynamics of democracies traditionally defined
are not respected or institutions and rules as ‘consolidated’ and ‘emerging’.
are manipulated to keep leaders in power
indefinitely. This prevents citizens from The publication draws attention to both the
accessing the basic elements of freedom and positive and negative forces that influence
equality that democracy champions. democratic systems, and offers a useful set of
policy recommendations and options. While
vi
International IDEA
First Edition 2017 Foreword
there are no easy solutions, these ideas should ever before, International IDEA provides us
help all of us who are involved in building with key elements to analyse and suggestions
democratic societies to reinvigorate our to act on. This makes the publication
relations with our fellow citizens. exceptionally timely.
vii
The Global State of Democracy 2017
Preface Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Preface
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International
IDEA) is pleased to present the first edition of The Global State of Democracy. The
theme for this edition is ‘Exploring Democracy’s Resilience’.
When assessing International IDEA is the only and problem-solving approaches to support
the state of intergovernmental organization with a global democratic reform, and to inform policymakers
mandate solely focused on democracy and and democracy practitioners worldwide. This
democracy from
elections. With 30 member states from all first edition explores democracy’s resilience
1975 onwards, continents, International IDEA supports based on a detailed analysis of the impact of
the global and the development of stronger democratic the process of democratic backsliding on the
regional trend institutions and processes and fosters more quality of democracy as well as key challenges to
analysis based sustainable, effective and legitimate democracy democracy such as the crisis of representation,
on the GSoD around the world. the increasing influence of money in politics,
indices shows rising inequalities, migration and democratic
Support for democratic reform has become transitions in the wake of conflict.
an expansion of
more challenging since the founding of
democracy in all International IDEA in 1995. In contrast The times we live in warrant a critical analysis
parts of to the optimism of the 1990s, today’s of democracy’s strengths and weaknesses,
the world and democracy is influenced by the effects of and an open debate about what undermines
advances in key globalization, geo-political power shifts, the (and strengthens) democracy. As such, this
areas such as changing role and structure of (supra) national publication explores the health of the world’s
representation, organizations and institutions, and the rise of democracies, acknowledging that many regions
modern communications technologies. These and countries have recently seen reversals or
fundamental
developments are complicated by the dynamics declines in the quality of their democracy.
rights, checks of conflict and development, citizenship and When assessing the state of democracy from
on government state sovereignty, and increasing inequalities and 1975 onwards, the global and regional trend
and political marginalization of groups of people within and analysis based on the GSoD indices shows
participation between societies. Some of these dynamics and an expansion of democracy in all parts of
related challenges have contributed to a widely the world and advances in key areas such as
expressed view, particularly in the mainstream representation, fundamental rights, checks on
media, that democracy is in decline. government and political participation. The
data indicate that the state of democracy at the
Against this backdrop, this publication analyses global level in the last decade has been one of
global and regional democracy trends and trendless fluctuations—showing upturns and
challenges based on International IDEA’s newly downturns in certain regions and individual
developed Global State of Democracy (GSoD) countries, but with no clearly visible tendencies
indices, which capture global and regional of progress or decline.
democratic trends between 1975 and 2015. In
an effort to bridge the gap between academic This publication acknowledges that challenges
research, policy development and democracy to democracy persist at the regional and country
assistance initiatives, it offers recommendations levels, but contests the current pessimistic view
viii
International IDEA
First Edition 2017 Preface
that democracy is fragile and in decline. Instead, improving it: every generation must safeguard
it argues that democracy continues to be in and reclaim democracy. This means that looking
demand and has shown resilient properties over towards the future, channelling all our efforts
time given the challenges that characterize the to achieve progress towards the Sustainable
21st century, thanks to its inherent qualities of Development Goals requires a broad-based
adaptation, recovery, flexibility and innovation. recognition of the fact that democracy is core
to (and a wider enabler of ) the entire 2030
The analysis is based on International IDEA’s development agenda.
broad and inclusive definition of democracy,
which is underpinned by two fundamental I am grateful to all those who contributed
principles—popular control and political to making this first edition of The Global
equality. The Institute acknowledges that State of Democracy a reality. It is our hope at
there is no single and universally applicable International IDEA that this publication will
model of democracy, that democracy comes serve as a source of inspiration, reflection and
in multiple forms, and that these forms are guidance for a new generation committed to
in constant evolution. However, democracy’s making democracy stronger and more resilient.
advancement—and indeed its survival—is
never guaranteed. Democracy needs constant Yves Leterme
Secretary-General
care and protection, and there is no end to International IDEA
ix
The Global State of Democracy 2017
Acknowledgements Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Acknowledgements
We thank everyone who has been involved in this first edition of The Global State
of Democracy. This publication has benefited from contributions made by many
individuals at International IDEA, and from the input of members of the Institute’s
partner organizations.
Michael Coppedge, Professor in the Department Delia Ferreira Rubio, Author and Consultant,
of Political Science and Faculty Fellow at the winner of the 2011 Joe C. Baxter Award from the
Kellogg Institute of International Studies at International Foundation for Electoral Systems
the University of Notre Dame, Co-Principal
Investigator of the Varieties of Democracy Pippa Norris, McGuire Lecturer in Comparative
(V-Dem) project Politics at the Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, Australian Laureate Fellow
Carl-Henrik Knutsen, Professor in the and Professor of Government and International
Department of Political Science at the University Relations at the University of Sydney, Director of
of Oslo, Co-Principal Investigator of the the Electoral Integrity Project
Historical Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)
project External expert reviewers
Rainer Bauböck, Marcus Brand, Juris Gromovs,
Staffan Lindberg, Professor in the Department of Andreas Hirblinger, Barbara Jouan Stonestreet,
Political Science at the University of Gothenburg, Dana Landau, Todd Landman, Sarah Lister,
Director of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Soledad Loaeza Tovar, Augustine Magolowondo,
Institute Cynthia McClintock, Magnus Ohman, Sakuntala
Kadirgamar Rajasingham, Cheryl Saunders,
Gerardo Munck, Professor in the School of Christophe Speckbacker, Shahabuddin
International Relations at the University of Yaqoob Quraishi, Richard Youngs and Reuven
Southern California Ziegler.
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The Global State of Democracy 2017
Abbreviations Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Abbreviations
AAP Aam Aadmi Party (India)
AfD Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany)
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BFA Bayesian Factor Analysis
CDA Constitutional Drafting Assembly (Libya)
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EU European Union
GSoD Global State of Democracy
FN Front National (France)
FPTP First Past The Post
GRECO Group of States against Corruption
International IDEA International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IRT Item-Response Theory
MENA Middle East/North Africa
MP Member of Parliament
OAS Organization of American States
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAC Political Action Committee
PCME Program for Mexican Communities Abroad
PR Proportional Representation
RENAMO Resistência Nacional Moçambicana
(Mozambican National Resistance Party)
SDG Sustainable Development Goal
SoD State of Democracy
STV Single Transferable Vote
TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UKIP UK Independence Party
UN United Nations
WLB Women’s League of Burma
xii
International IDEA
First Edition 2017 Introduction
Introduction
Democratization processes over the last four decades have created many opportunities
for public participation in political life. More people today live in electoral democracies
than ever before. However, numerous countries grapple with challenges to democracy,
contributing to the perception that democracy is in ‘decline’ or has experienced ‘reversals’
or ‘stagnation’. Some of these challenges relate to issues of corruption, money in politics
and policy capture, inequality and social exclusion, migration or post-conflict transition
to democracy. Many leaders and democratic actors continue to manipulate democratic
processes and institutions, which often contributes to democratic backsliding in their
respective countries.
About this publication: definitions, and crises that present stress or pressure that
methodology and structure can lead to systemic failure. This publication
This first edition of The Global State of explores democracy’s resilience: its ability as a
Democracy explores current challenges to political system to recover, adapt and/or flexibly
democracy and the enabling conditions for address such complex challenges and crises.
its resilience.
Based on this definition, International IDEA
Definitions has constructed new Global State of Democracy
As an intergovernmental organization that indices (GSoD indices) based on its State of
supports sustainable democracy worldwide, Democracy assessment framework (a tool
International IDEA defines democracy as designed for in-country stakeholders to assess
a political system that is based on popular the quality of democracy). The indices were
control and political equality. One of the developed by International IDEA staff with the
Institute’s core principles is that democracy support of external experts and the supervision
is a universal value for citizens and a globally of an expert advisory board consisting of five
owned concept for which there is no leading experts in the field of democracy
universally applicable model. Democracy is an measurement. The GSoD indices examine
ideal that seeks to guarantee equality and basic 155 countries over the period 1975–2015 and
freedoms, empower ordinary people, resolve provide a diverse data set and evidence base
disagreements through peaceful dialogue, for analysing global and regional trends.
respect differences, and bring about political The GSoD indices data sets start in 1975
and social renewal without economic and social to ensure a high reliability and quality of
disruption. Hence, International IDEA’s broad secondary data sources.
concept of democracy encompasses more than
just free elections; it has multiple dimensions, Methodology
including civil and political rights, social and Both the indices and the analysis contained in
economic rights, democratic governance and this publication respond to the lack of analytical
rule of law. material on democracy building and the
quality of democracy at the global and regional
International IDEA’s broad understanding of levels; most studies focus on the national level.
democracy overlaps with features emphasized It strives to bridge the gap between academic
by different traditions of democratic thought research, policy development and democracy
associated with the concepts of electoral assistance initiatives. It is intended to inform
democracy, liberal democracy, social democracy policymakers and decision-makers, civil society
and participatory democracy. This concept organizations and democracy activists, policy
of democracy reflects a core value enshrined influencers and think tanks, and democracy
in article 21 of the Universal Declaration of support providers and practitioners.
Human Rights, that the ‘will of the people’
is the basis for the legitimacy and authority As an Institute-wide project, the publication
of sovereign states. It reflects a common employs a mixed methodology. It incorporates
and universal desire for peace, security and input from staff members across the
justice. Democracy reflects the fundamental headquarters and regional offices, including
ethical principles of human equality and the external contributors. It was peer reviewed by
dignity of persons, and is thus inseparable an editorial review board and a group of external
from human rights. substantive experts and practitioners. Building
on International IDEA’s regional presence
International IDEA defines resilience as the and expertise in the field of democracy, the
ability of social systems to cope with, innovate, publication draws on the Institute’s in-depth
survive and recover from complex challenges regional knowledge of democratic trends
xiv
International IDEA
First Edition 2017 Introduction
in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, Latin and stability. The chapter explores why
America and the Caribbean, the Middle East backsliding is a particular threat to democratic
and Iran, and North America. An overview values, human rights and the rule of law, and
of International IDEA’s geographical division highlights how it can be tackled with bottom-
of regions and countries can be found in up citizen support and existing systems of
the Annex. checks and balances.
The publication analyses the period between Chapter 4, ‘The changing nature of political
1975 (to coincide with the third wave of parties and representation’, evaluates some of
democratization) and 2017, and explores the the contemporary challenges of representation,
conditions under which democracy is resilient such as citizen movements, digital engagement
in different time spans and regions. It has and the decision-making powers that lie
adopted a modular approach: the chapters can outside national borders. It explores how such
be read independently, yet form an essential part conditions can weaken politicians’ ability to
of the publication as a whole. The publication deliver, and may erode the people’s trust in
analyses a number of key challenges to politics, and offers policy recommendations.
democracy, and explores the conditions under
which democracy is resilient to such challenges. Chapter 5, ‘Money, influence, corruption
and capture: can democracy be protected?’,
Structure stresses that money is a necessary ingredient
The chapters complement each other, both that enables democratic actors to perform
methodologically and empirically. The their tasks. When money is poured into a
publication is structured as follows: system that lacks sufficient transparency and
accountability, this may trigger suspicions of
Chapter 1, ‘The global state of democracy, corruption and malfeasance. Such a situation
1975–2015’, provides an overview of the may lead to policy capture by special interests,
democratic landscape stemming from global which can be detrimental to democracy and
and regional trends for the period 1975–2015, its legitimacy. This chapter examines the role
based on the GSoD indices. To capture recent of ‘big money’ in politics, and assesses whether
events there is a focus on trends for the period political finance regulations can adequately
2005–15. address its negative effects.
Chapters 2 to 8 provide qualitative analyses Chapter 6, ‘Mind the gap: can democracy
of the impact of the process of democratic counter inequality?’, highlights some of the
backsliding on the quality of democracy, and difficulties in discerning the relationship
key challenges and crises affecting democracy. between economic inequality and democracy.
They also explore policy options conducive to Given the rising trends of economic inequality
enabling democracy’s resilience. and social exclusion, the chapter explores how
democracy can deliver under such conditions,
Chapter 2, ‘Democracy’s resilience in a particularly for youth.
changing world’, explores current challenges
and crises that impact democracy based on Chapter 7, ‘Migration, social polarization,
International IDEA’s definition of democracy’s citizenship and multiculturalism’, analyses
resilience and its characteristics. the impact of migration on democracy
with a focus on citizenship rules, voting
Chapter 3, ‘Threats from within: democracy’s rights, representation and political parties.
resilience to backsliding’, reviews the concept of It showcases how well countries politically
‘democratic backsliding’ and its effect on other integrate immigrants, and how this relates
aspects of democracy, as well as development to their quality of democracy, as well as the
xv
The Global State of Democracy 2017
Introduction Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
potential and controversies surrounding the determine the rules of the new state, who can
political engagement of emigrants and their participate in that state and the nature of the
role as agents of democracy. It highlights levers of that participation.
key dilemmas of the migration debate for
policymakers, and suggests policy approaches The Annex describes how International
to tackling the migration challenge. IDEA’s GSoD indices methodology was
constructed. It contains snapshots of indices
Chapter 8, ‘Inclusive peacebuilding in conflict- data from 1975 to 2015 on the state of a
affected states: designing for democracy’s selection of countries’ democracies based on
resilience’, examines post-conflict inclusion International IDEA’s definition of democracy
mechanisms in three key transitional and attributes of its resilience.
processes: constitution-building, rebel-to-party
transformation and electoral system design. It Each chapter is accompanied by a resource
highlights that these processes are some of the guide that provides further background
most fundamental in state-building, as they reading.
xvi
International IDEA
First Edition 2017 Introduction
xvii
Chapter 1
Chapter
4
International IDEA Chapter 1
First Edition 2017 The global state of democracy, 1975–2015
This chapter discusses some of the current IDEA’s broad understanding of democracy Democracy faces
challenges for democratic progress and resilience, measured by the GSoD indices: Representative many challenges,
and then assesses the global state of democracy. Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks on and the resilience
It first provides a brief overview of democratic Government, Impartial Administration and
of democracy
trends based on a dichotomous, purely electoral Participatory Engagement. The conclusion
understanding of democracy, and subsequently brings together the findings and discusses how
cannot be taken
by a more elaborate and fine-grained overview they should affect assessments of the global state for granted
of trends in the five dimensions of International of democracy.
BOX 1.1
Overview: International IDEA’s new GSoD indices measure different aspects of democracy during the period
1975–2015 in 155 countries around the world.
Definition: Democracy is defined as popular control over public decision-making and decision-makers, and
political equality between citizens in the exercise of that control.
Attributes of democracy: The indices measure five main attributes of democracy, which contain a total of 16
subattributes. They tap into five features emphasized by various traditions of democratic thought that are
associated with the concepts of electoral democracy, liberal democracy, social democracy and participatory
democracy:
Sources: The data rely on a range of sources, including expert surveys, standards-based coding by research
groups and analysts, observational data and composite measures on 98 indicators.
Units of observation: The GSoD data set includes country–year data for 155 countries that have at least
1 million inhabitants. In the calculations of regional and global averages, the scores are not weighted by
population size.
Scales: All indices range from 0 (lowest democratic achievement) to 1 (highest democratic achievement);
0 generally refers to the worst performance in the whole sample of country–years (covered by a particular
index), while 1 refers to the best country–year performance in the sample.
Aggregation: The construction of indices relies mainly on item response theory modelling and Bayesian factor
analysis. In a few cases, the aggregation is calculated by taking the mean or multiplying various indicators.
Further details about the GSoD data set and associated indices can be found in Skaaning, S-E., The Global
State of Democracy Indices Methodology: Conceptualization and Measurement Framework (Stockholm:
International IDEA, 2017), <http://www.idea.int/gsod>.
5
Chapter 1 The Global State of Democracy 2017
The global state of democracy, 1975–2015 Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Autocracies, 1.2. Challenges to democracy democracy promotion (Chou, Pan and Poole
including several The current landscape of democracy around the 2017; Tansey 2016; Whitehead 2014).
major regional world is influenced by many complex processes,
such as the dynamics of economic growth Therefore, there is a need to evaluate whether
powers, are
and inequality, violent conflict (including democracy is indeed in retreat at the global
developing and terrorism), the innovation and the spread of new and regional levels, or whether it is generally
refining counter- technologies, geopolitical power shifts, migration resilient and able to withstand such challenges.
strategies to and climate change (Ercan and Gagnon 2014; Some observers contend that several decades
democracy Grugel and Bishop 2014; Merkel 2015). Many of remarkable improvement in the state of
promotion democracies face major challenges, including democracy since the mid-1970s were followed
decreasing and changing forms of political by a slowdown or halt in democratic progress
engagement (McCaffrie and Akram 2014), low (Levitsky and Way 2015; Lührmann et al. 2017;
levels of trust in political institutions (Dalton Møller and Skaaning 2013b; Schmitter 2015).
2004; van der Meer 2017), dissatisfaction with Others claim that there has been a significant
the performance of democracy (Norris 2011; decline in the global level of democracy for more
Stoker 2006), support for populist movements than a decade, and note clear signs of a reverse
(Mudde 2016), and undemocratic forms of wave of democratization (Diamond 2016; EIU
government (Norris 2011). 2017; Klaas 2016; Kurlantzick 2014; Puddington
and Roylance 2017; Rich 2017).
It is difficult to create resilient, high-quality
democracies (see e.g. Diamond 2015; However, such negative perceptions of the state
Fukuyama 2015; Haggard and Kaufman 2016; of democracy are often based on unbalanced
Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2014; Møller accounts with a biased focus on recent
and Skaaning 2013a). Electoral manipulation, negative examples, or rely on data sets that
corruption and restrictions on fundamental lack transparency and are constructed using
human rights—such as physical integrity, questionable procedures (see Coppedge et al.
freedom of expression, fair trials and gender 2011; Munck 2009). Moreover, although such
equality—are found in all corners of the worries about a general democratic decline
world. Although many countries have achieved have become more frequent and prominent
democratic progress, others have experienced in recent years, they are not new (see Merkel
democratic backsliding—that is, government 2010, 2015). People are generally too
efforts to undermine the political institutions pessimistic when assessing progress in human
that sustain democracy, such as independent development because they are predisposed
media, academic institutions and courts to think things are worse than they are, and
(Bermeo 2016). they overestimate the likelihood of hardship
(Norberg 2016). This deep-seated negativity
Democracy still has a relatively strong standing bias (see Ito et al. 1998; Rozin and Royzman
as the most legitimate form of government, but 2001) is reinforced by the media’s tendency to
it is continuously being questioned, and the view focus on crises and negative events rather than
that non-democracies can face current challenges positive developments (Altheide 2002; Niven
better than democracies is at times given 2001; Soroka and McAdams 2015).
serious credence (see, e.g., Bell 2015; Brennan
2016). Many countries that lack relatively free, The popular notion that democracy is regressing
regular elections have governments that are could still be valid, but there appears to be a
engaged in state propaganda and the spread of current tendency to focus too heavily on the
misinformation (Herpen 2015; Simon 2015; past and to exaggerate and oversimplify current
Treisman 2017). Furthermore, autocracies, negative examples, while overlooking positive
including several major regional powers, are developments (see Carothers and Youngs 2017;
developing and refining counter-strategies to Levitsky and Way 2015). Against this backdrop,
6
International IDEA Chapter 1
First Edition 2017 The global state of democracy, 1975–2015
this chapter offers an empirical analysis, based of the third wave of democratization? What
on new data, of the following questions: Has patterns are displayed by various dimensions
the global state of democracy declined over and subdimensions of democracy? How do
the past ten years? What have been the major the different regions of the world fare? Box 1.2
global trends in democracy since the beginning presents the key findings.
BOX 1.2
An overview of the global state of democracy: key gradual improvement, to steep progress around 1990, to another
period of gradual improvement, to relative stability after 2005.
findings, 1975–2015
Gender equality has gradually increased in all regions, but at
different speeds and starting at different levels.
• There has been much global progress in almost all aspects of
democracy since 1975, but the positive trends have flattened out • The Checks on Government dimension (capturing Effective
since the mid-1990s. The current global state of democracy is Parliaments, Judicial Independence and Media Integrity) has
one of trendless fluctuations. This means that there are upturns shown substantial improvement since 1975. Progress seems
and downturns in individual countries, but no broad tendencies to have come to a halt, as most countries had similar levels of
of progress or decline, and signifies democratic steadiness at checks on government in 2015 as they did in 2005. There are
the highest level in world history. still notable differences in the extent to which such checks are
exercised in various regions, largely following patterns similar to
• The majority of electoral democracies established after 1975 those for representative government.
have survived, and almost none of the more established
electoral democracies have experienced reversals. Since 2005, • The global average of the Impartial Administration dimension
there have been 24 democratic reversals and 39 democratic (covering Absence of Corruption and Predictable Enforcement)
transitions. While some countries became electoral democracies demonstrates no significant change between 1975 and
for the first time, most of the recent transitions to democracy 2015. Corruption and predictable enforcement are as big a
happened in countries with previous democratic experience. problem today as they were in 1975. Implementing the rule
of law in public administration tends to be difficult to change
• The number and proportion of countries that are considered in the short and medium terms. This could partially explain
electoral democracies have increased during the period. In the dissatisfaction with democracy seen in many electoral
1975, competitive elections determined government power in democracies emerging after 1975.
as few as 46 countries (30 per cent); this number had grown to
132 (68 per cent) by 2016. One-third of countries are still under • Opportunities for—and the realization of—Participatory
autocratic rule. Engagement have generally gained ground, as reflected in each
of the four subdimensions related to citizen involvement (Civil
• In the period 1975–2015 substantial global progress was made in Society Participation, Electoral Participation, Direct Democracy
four out of five dimensions emphasized by International IDEA’s and Subnational Elections). A global increase in civil society
comprehensive definition of democracy (i.e. Representative participation reflects the fact that restrictions on civil society’s
Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government and right to organize have been lifted. Autonomous groups now
Participatory Engagement), while the global level of Impartial generally have better working conditions than before, although
Administration has changed little since 1975. some countries still uphold (and in some cases have even
increased) restrictions on civil society organizations. A global
• Positive trends in the Representative Government dimension increase in electoral participation in national elections mainly
can be seen in all subdimensions (Clean Elections, Inclusive reflects the replacement of non-electoral regimes with electoral
Suffrage, Free Political Parties and Elected Government) and regimes. Yet turnout has decreased in several countries with
all regions. However, stark regional differences remain. On longer traditions of regular, competitive elections. There has
average, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and North been a slight increase in the availability and use of direct
America have higher degrees of representative government than democracy mechanisms. However, they are rarely implemented
countries in Africa, Asia and the Pacific and, especially, the in any region. Opportunities to participate in free and fair
Middle East and Iran. Many countries have formal democratic subnational elections have increased substantially, with
institutions, but substantial deficiencies in democratic considerable variations between regions.
practices.
• The different aspects of democracy take time to develop.
• The Fundamental Rights dimension has witnessed global They are subject to political negotiations, compromises and
progress since 1975 in all of its subdimensions (Access to Justice, institutional reform processes. Changes are sometimes abrupt
Civil Liberties and Social Rights and Equality). Developments in and characterized by major events that demarcate sudden and
social rights and equality follow a positive, linear trend, while clear democratic progress or regress, while at other times they
the trend for access to justice and civil liberties has gone from are more gradual.
7
Chapter 1 The Global State of Democracy 2017
The global state of democracy, 1975–2015 Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Global number and percentage of electoral democracies and share of world population living in electoral democracies,
80%
1975–2016
190
180
170 70%
160
150
60%
Number of electoral democracies
140
130
120 50%
110
100 40%
90
80
70 30%
60
50 20%
40
30
10%
20
10
0 0%
2000
2008
2006
2009
2002
2004
2005
2003
2007
1980
1988
1986
1989
2001
2010
1990
1998
2016
1996
1982
1999
1984
2012
2014
1994
1992
1983
1985
1987
2013
1978
1993
2015
1995
1976
1979
1997
1981
1977
2011
1991
1975
Number of electoral democracies % of electoral democracies % of global population under electoral democracy
Notes: The percentage of electoral democracies is affected by the fact that more independent countries emerged during the period. The figures for population size used to calculate the share of
the global population living in electoral democracies are taken from the World Development Indicators and Gapminder.
8
International IDEA Chapter 1
First Edition 2017 The global state of democracy, 1975–2015
in the share of electoral democracies from Moreover, when electoral democracies turn A closer look at
42 per cent to 55 per cent when several autocratic, they often democratize again after the last ten years
Eastern European and sub-Saharan African a few years (Bermeo 2016), as in the Central reveals that there
countries transitioned to democracies. African Republic, Georgia, Haiti, Honduras,
is little evidence
Since then, there have been more electoral Madagascar, Mali and Nepal. Thailand has
democracies than autocracies globally, and experienced four democratic transitions and
of a substantial,
the largest share of the world’s population four reversals since 1975. Many of these global decline
has resided in electoral democracies. countries seem to lack sufficient democratic in democracy.
resilience to avoid such cycles of regime change. Instead, the
A closer look at the last ten years reveals that Yet based on a narrow focus on the prevalence number
there is little evidence of a substantial, global and resilience of electoral democracies, the of electoral
decline in democracy. Instead, the number evidence does not support the existence of a
democracies has
of electoral democracies has increased. The global, large-scale democratic regression. The
patterns are virtually identical if the sample is question is whether this still applies when
increased
restricted to the 155 countries covered by the undertaking a broad and continuous analysis
GSoD indices. of the global state of democracy.
Almost one-third of countries are still under 1.4. A broad and continuous
autocratic rule, including major regional understanding of democracy
powers with large populations such as China, Assessing the state of democracy requires
Egypt, Russia and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the employment of a more comprehensive
there have been 24 democratic reversals understanding of democracy than what is
since 2005 in countries such as Fiji, Mali, captured by dichotomous, electoral measures.
Niger and Thailand. This strongly indicates International IDEA (Beetham et al. 2002;
that some new democracies are not resilient. Beetham et al. 2008; Landman 2008)
Yet, it is important to keep in mind that advocates a comprehensive definition in its
democratization has always involved a mixture State of Democracy (SoD) framework, which
of gains and losses (Møller and Skaaning is a tool designed for in-country stakeholders
2013a: Ch. 5). These reversals do not add to assess the quality of democracy. The GSoD
up to a global decline. With the exception of indices build on a revised version of the
Venezuela, no countries with over 40 years of SoD conceptual framework to facilitate a
continuous electoral democracy have suffered multifaceted and nuanced understanding
from democratic reversal, and the majority of the global and regional contours of
(56 per cent) of electoral democracies created democratic developments (Skaaning 2017).
after 1975 have not experience any reversals,
such as Benin, Indonesia, the Republic of International IDEA (Beetham et al. 2008:
Korea, Senegal, and most countries in Latin 10–11) defines democracy as ‘popular control
America and the Caribbean and Eastern over decision-makers and political equality
Europe. Moreover, 39 democratic transitions of those who exercise that control’. The
have taken place since 2005. Some countries, democratic ideal ‘seeks to guarantee equality
such as Bhutan and Tunisia, became electoral and basic freedoms; to empower ordinary
democracies for the first time. Most of people; to resolve disagreements through
the transitions to democracy happened in peaceful dialogue; to respect difference; and
countries with previous democratic experience, to bring about political and social renewal
such as Honduras, Mali, Nepal and Sri Lanka. without convulsions’ (Landman 2008: 17).
When restricting the sample to the countries
covered by the GSoD indices, there have been Hence, democracy is understood in broader
32 democratic transitions and 22 reversals terms than just free elections, and has multiple
since 2005. dimensions. They overlap with features
9
Chapter 1 The Global State of Democracy 2017
The global state of democracy, 1975–2015 Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
FIGURE 1.2
parties
Free polit
Cle ns
t
d
tio
en
an
go lecte
nm
e c
el
ver
E
Su lec
bn tio
ss
e
at ns
ce ce
Ac usti
io
sentative
Repre
na
j
l
to
Dir government
dem ect
ocr
ac y
Civil
engage tory
Fu rights
nt
ties
nda
liber
me
a
Electora
Particip
mental
l
particip
ation
Democracy Socia
l rights
ociety Popular control and and eq
Civil s ualit y
ic ipation political equality
part
en n
p
Im
ad
in arti s Eff
o
ck
t
pa ecti
m
le
ist al
rat Che ernm rlia ve
ab t me
ict en
ed cem
ion gov nt
r
P or
f
en
ind
Jud nde
ep
ici nce
corr ce of
e
on
al
integrity
upti
Media
en
Abs
10
International IDEA Chapter 1
First Edition 2017 The global state of democracy, 1975–2015
of them (fair trials and civil liberties) relate to the concept of liberal democracy, which
to the concept of liberal democracy, while the prescribes that the exercise of power must be
third (social rights and equality) relates to the rule abiding and predictable. This dimension
concept of social democracy. has two subdimensions: absence of corruption
and predictable enforcement.
Checks on Government measures the effective
control of executive power. It has three Participatory Engagement concerns the extent
subdimensions that are related to the concept to which instruments for political involvement
of liberal democracy: judicial independence, are available, and the degree to which
effective parliament and media integrity. citizens use them. It is related to the concept
of participatory democracy and has four
Impartial Administration concerns how subdimensions: civil-society participation,
fairly and predictably political decisions are electoral participation, direct democracy and
implemented, and thus reflects key aspects subnational elections.
of the rule of law. This dimension is related
FIGURE 1.3
0 2000 miles
0 2000 4000 km
Notes: Darker shades indicate high scores and light shades reflect low scores. Austria is light due to the lack of data on this dimension. Fundamental Rights
0 1
Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Fundamental Rights Index).
11
Chapter 1 The Global State of Democracy 2017
The global state of democracy, 1975–2015 Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Since these dimensions, and their respective Even in what many consider to be the
subdimensions, reflect a broad definition of modern world’s first electoral democracy—
democracy (see Annex and Skaaning 2017), the United States—there are long-standing
the indices capture many aspects of popular and noteworthy shortcomings, including
control and political equality that go beyond low turnout rates, manipulation of electoral
the presence of free elections. Moreover, it is districts (gerrymandering), skewed funding
assumed that the more the respective dimensions of political campaigns and unequal access to
are fulfilled, the more democratic a political justice (e.g. Braml and Lauth 2011; Dahl 2003;
system is. Accordingly, the different aspects of Norris 2017). Studies of democracy and power
democracy can be fulfilled to varying degrees. distribution in the Scandinavian countries—
Figure 1.3 illustrates this point and depicts often praised as blueprint democracies—have
variations in the extent to which different also identified a number of shortcomings.
countries safeguard fundamental human rights. These include the indirect translation of
For example, Mongolia, Senegal and Uruguay material resources (large businesses and interest
performed better on this parameter than their organizations) into political influence, and
neighbours, as indicated by the darker green. biases regarding who participates in elections
and joins political parties (under-representation
1.5. Assessing the state of democracy of young people, relatively poor people with
worldwide low levels of education and ethnic minorities)
Scholars have long debated the extent to (Østerud and Selle 2006; Togeby et al. 2003;
which free elections, civil liberties, horizontal Petersson 1991).
accountability, the rule of law and popular
participation follow parallel trends, and These examples underline the importance of
whether some of these features are harder to assessing degrees of democracy and degrees of
achieve than others (e.g. Fukuyama 2015; change when identifying patterns of progress
Møller and Skaaning 2011, 2014; O’Donnell and regress in democracy trends over the last
2010). Studies have emphasized that even ten years (e.g. Diamond 2016; Levitsky and
though many countries in Africa, Asia and Way 2015; Merkel 2010; Møller and Skaaning
the Pacific, Europe, and Latin America and 2013b). Far from all democratic improvements
the Caribbean have successfully introduced and setbacks are abrupt. Not all changes are
relatively free elections, their democracies are characterized by major events that demarcate
in many cases deficient regarding checks on sudden and clear democratic progress or
government, respect for fundamental rights regress. For example, it took struggles over
or impartial administration (e.g. Merkel et al. several generations, temporary setbacks and
2006; O’Donnell 2007; Zakaria 2003). adjustments before countries such as Costa
Rica, France, Germany, Japan, Sweden and the
The number of hybrid or ‘grey-zone’ USA reached their current levels of democracy.
regimes has also increased since 1975. These The different aspects of democracy take
regimes have formal democratic institutions, time to develop, and are subject to political
primarily multiparty elections, but substantial negotiations, compromises and institutional
deficiencies persist regarding the integrity reform processes. These factors are essential for
of elections or in other dimensions (Collier cultivating a well-functioning democracy.
and Levitsky 1997; Diamond 2002; Merkel The GSoD indices provide a nuanced
2004; Morlino 2012). Some of them barely perspective on democratic developments by
meet the criteria for electoral democracies, identifying varying degrees of change on the
while electoral integrity in others is so low multiple dimensions of democratic governance.
that they are more accurately described as Ultimately, the descriptive comparison of
multiparty electoral autocracies (Levitsky global and regional trends can indicate the
and Way 2010; Schedler 2013). circumstances under which various aspects of
12
International IDEA Chapter 1
First Edition 2017 The global state of democracy, 1975–2015
democracy move in the direction of (or away Figure 1.4 demonstrates that most countries’ The GSoD
from) the democratic ideals they represent. performance did not change substantially on indices provide
Since democracy is a multifaceted concept, the the Representative Government dimension: a nuanced
framework does not collapse all the scores for those placed on the diagonal received the
perspective on
the different dimensions into a single score. same score in 2005 and 2015. The countries
showing the largest declines are Bangladesh,
democratic
In addition, all overviews based on the GSoD Burundi, Syria, Thailand and Turkey. The developments
indices only use countries as the main unit of most substantial improvements can be seen by identifying
measurement (i.e. large and small countries in Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, varying degrees
are weighted equally). Additional analyses (not Guinea, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Nepal, of change on
shown) demonstrate that the global trends largely Nigeria, Sudan and Tunisia. the multiple
remain the same if countries are assessed based on
dimensions
their population, although some of the upturns Note, however, that none of the cases with
tend to be less pronounced and the levels a bit substantial increases are close to the level of
of democratic
lower, because large countries have, on average, the best-performing cases, such as France and governance
undergone fewer democratic changes and are Uruguay. Tellingly, Myanmar has recently
somewhat less democratic in most dimensions. experienced significant liberalization and
a democratic opening (Barany 2016), but
A nuanced, short-term perspective on there are still problems with voter registration
democratic resilience from 2005 to 2015 and violence. In Angola, where election quality
This section uses the GSoD indices to determine is even lower, the improvement is due to the
how many countries experienced substantial fact that no elections were held between
positive or negative changes in the five the onset of civil war in 1992 and 2008
dimensions of democracy from 2005 to 2015. (KAS 2008).
FIGURE 1.4
1.0
0.9
2015 - Representative Government
0.8
0.7
Nigeria
0.6 Tunisia
Myanmar Kyrgyzstan
Pakistan Turkey
0.5 Nepal
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Guinea
Angola Bangladesh
0.4 Haiti Sudan
Burundi
0.3 Thailand
0.2
0.1
Syria
0.0
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Africa Asia & Europe Latin America Middle East North America
the Pacific & the Caribbean & Iran
Notes: The vertical interval from the dots to the diagonal signifies the scale of the change from 2005 to 2015. Countries above the diagonal have improved
their scores, while those below have regressed. Countries placed directly on the diagonal have kept the same score. The cases demonstrating the largest
changes are labelled with the country names.
13
Chapter 1 The Global State of Democracy 2017
The global state of democracy, 1975–2015 Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Many of the While the Fundamental Rights dimension unchanged between 2005 and 2015.
countries that demonstrates even greater stability, some According to Figure 1.5, those experiencing
have exhibited countries—Burundi, Mauritania, Thailand, the most significant losses were Burundi,
Turkey, Ukraine and Yemen—demonstrate Ecuador, Macedonia, Nicaragua, Thailand and
the most progress
substantial regression. Several of these have Turkey. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas under
in checks on recently experienced fierce political struggles the leadership of President Daniel Ortega have
government in the form of coup attempts, harassment gradually undermined control of the executive,
have also made of opposition members or civil wars. Major which signifies a partial return to their style
progress in improvements have been made in Libya, of rule in the 1980s (Shifter 2016; Thaler
the other Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Tunisia. 2017). Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s concentration
dimensions However, although the fall of Muammar of power, appointment of loyal supporters
Gaddafi’s regime in 2010 led to an improvement in the courts and public sector media, mass
in civil liberties, the civil war in Libya is currently detention of critics and dismissal of critical
pulling the country in the opposite direction public employees (including many university
(HRW 2017). Despite recent gains, the other professors) in Turkey has also made many
cases mentioned also leave considerable room international headlines. The decreases in checks
for further improvements, as indicated by the on government under the former VMRO-
countries shaded light green in Figure 1.3. DPMNE government in Macedonia (Gjuzelov
2015) and under the former president of
The general trend concerning checks on Ecuador, Rafael Correa (Conaghan 2016;
government (i.e. the effective control of Fleischman 2016), are less well known. Many
executive power) reinforces the pattern of the countries that have exhibited the most
described above. Most countries’ levels of progress in checks on government have also
checks on government remained relatively made progress in the other dimensions. They
FIGURE 1.5
1.0
0.9
2015 - Checks on Government
0.8 Tunisia
0.7
Nepal
Libya
0.6 Kyrgyzstan
Togo
0.5 Myanmar
Macedonia Turkey
0.4 Ecuador Thailand
0.3 Burundi
Nicaragua
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Africa Asia & Europe Latin America Middle East North America
the Pacific & the Caribbean & Iran
Notes: The vertical interval from the dots to the diagonal signifies the scale of the change from 2005 to 2015. Countries above the diagonal have improved
their scores, while those below have regressed. Countries placed directly on the diagonal have kept the same score. The cases demonstrating the largest
changes are labelled with the country names
14
International IDEA Chapter 1
First Edition 2017 The global state of democracy, 1975–2015
FIGURE 1.6
0 2000 miles
0 2000 4000 km
Notes: Darker shades indicate high scores and light shades reflect low scores.
Impartial Administration
0 1
Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Impartial Administration Index).
To summarize, for the first four dimensions, and right, respectively, of the red dotted lines.
scores have not changed significantly in the This finding applies to all four subdimensions.
large majority of countries since 2005, and
substantial negative changes have generally One of the most interesting findings from this
been outweighed or at least balanced by positive overview is that civil society participation has
changes in other countries. increased significantly in several African and
Asian states, such as Côte D’Ivoire, Liberia,
Since the subdimensions of participatory Myanmar, Nepal and Tunisia. In most of
engagement (i.e. Civil Society Participation, these cases, the improvements reflect the fact
Electoral Participation, Direct Democracy that severe restrictions on the rights of civil
and Subnational Elections) capture different society to organize have been abandoned, and
phenomena, the GSoD indices do not aggregate autonomous groups now have better working
them into a single index as is the case in the conditions than before. Other countries,
other four dimensions. The subdimensions such as Albania, Azerbaijan, Serbia, Turkey
are depicted separately in Figure 1.7, which and Thailand, have been characterized by the
illustrates that most countries had rather similar opposite trend. The most obvious negative
scores in 2005 and 2015. Few countries have tendency is the relatively large drop in electoral
undergone substantial negative and positive turnout in quite a few countries, including
changes, as indicated by the low bars to the left Bangladesh, Cyprus, Greece, Guinea and the
FIGURE 1.7
5
0
-0.75
-0.70
-0.65
-0.60
-0.55
-0.50
-0.45
-0.40
-0.35
-0.30
-0.25
-0.20
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
Change in Score
Notes: The red dotted lines indicate a substantial change defined as 0.1 points on the scale ranging from 0 to 1, i.e. 10 per cent of the scale range. The left side of the scale (negative scores) il-
lustrates declines, and the right side (positive scores) gains in the respective subdimensions. The heights of the bars indicate how many countries are characterized by the different intervals of
change between 2005 and 2015.
Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Civil Society Participation Index, Electoral Participation, Direct Democracy, Subnational Elections Index).
16
International IDEA Chapter 1
First Edition 2017 The global state of democracy, 1975–2015
USA. Yet, these downturns are balanced out The underlying data linked to the
globally by major upturns, which are often subdimensions of representative government
related to the introduction or reintroduction of indicate that universal suffrage is close to
elections, as in Angola, Myanmar and Nepal, being achieved in a large majority of countries,
among others. and that the great majority of governments
in the sample are formally accountable to
1.6. A nuanced, long-term the electorate via elections. Many countries
perspective on democratic progress do well on the formal criteria related to
from 1975 to 2015 universal suffrage and elected offices, which
To further analyse the global state of democracy, are now mentioned in the great majority
an overview of long-term trends associated with of constitutions and legislation around the
the different dimensions and subdimensions world, including those of most autocracies.
of democracy is also needed. The number of Yet the empirical evidence indicates that
electoral democracies was nearly constant at formal institutions are relatively easy to
a relatively low level (fluctuating between 35 introduce, and do not necessarily have a
and 45) from 1950 to 1975, and pessimism significant impact if the incumbents control
flourished due to democratic reversals in the opposition and manipulate elections.
Latin America and the Caribbean and several
failures to introduce democratic government Nonetheless, since 1975 elections have become
in the many newly independent countries more common as well as cleaner (i.e. less fraud,
(Møller and Skaaning 2013a). The explosion manipulation and irregularities), and political
in electoral democracies in the aftermath of parties are facing fewer barriers to organizing
the third wave of democratization beginning and participating in elections. However, many
with the Carnation Revolution in Portugal countries still have room to improve the
in 1974 (Huntington 1991) is demonstrated quality of their elections and their treatment of
above. However, the variances in degree within opposition parties. There is a gap between the
different dimensions have yet to be documented
during this period.
FIGURE 1.8
17
Chapter 1 The Global State of Democracy 2017
The global state of democracy, 1975–2015 Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Since 1975 states doing best in representative government in relatively free multiparty elections replaced
elections have (such as Costa Rica and Sweden, which scored military dictatorships, one-party regimes and
become more close to the maximum of 1 on the scale in racial oligarchies in many countries, such as
2015) and most other states. Many countries Ghana, Senegal and South Africa.
common as
severely violate the principle of representative
well as cleaner, government, which means that the third wave However, stark regional differences remain.
and political of democratization has had less impact on The countries in North America, Europe and
parties are facing this core dimension of democracy than many Latin America and the Caribbean generally
fewer barriers hoped for—and expected—in the late 1980s fulfil the criteria for representative government
to organize and and early 1990s (Fukuyama 1992; Lijphart to a higher degree than those in the Middle
participate in 2000; Carothers 2002). East and Iran, Africa, and Asia and the Pacific.
While quite a few countries in the Middle East
elections
The global trends mask a variety of are monarchies without multiparty elections,
developments at the regional and country Asia and the Pacific and especially Africa have
levels. By the mid-1970s, representative many hybrid regimes. In such regimes, the
governments were largely restricted to a small formal criteria for representative government
group of countries in North and West Europe, are fulfilled by holding multiparty elections,
North America and Oceania, although but there are substantial problems regarding
exceptions included Botswana, Costa Rica, electoral integrity, media working conditions,
India and Japan. Democratic institutions opposition parties and checks on government
and practices in other parts of the world were (Cheeseman 2015; Diamond 2008; Norris
then introduced (in some cases reintroduced) 2015; Rakner and van de Walle 2009). These
with the third wave of democratization. regimes tend to have a strong incumbency bias,
Democratic systems are now found in which undermines the integrity of elections by
countries with more diverse combinations creating an uneven playing field for political
of socio-economic development, culture, competition (Levitsky and Way 2010) and
national unity and state capacity. sometimes results in electoral violence or
deepens existing conflicts and polarizations.
The positive trend in the Representative
Government dimension has manifested itself Some countries in Latin America and the
in all regions (see the Annex for details about Caribbean, such as Venezuela, and post-
the regional division of countries used in this communist Europe face similar problems.
publication). Europe experienced some early Nonetheless, these parts of the world have seen
improvements when Greece, Portugal and the largest positive change since 1975. The
Spain introduced free elections in the 1970s. average score of representative government for
Thereafter, the Americas experienced a steep Latin America and the Caribbean more than
growth pattern due to democratic openings doubled from about 0.30 in 1975 to almost
in, for example, Argentina, Brazil, Honduras 0.70 in 2015. Figure 1.9 shows that these
and Peru, followed by a less steep but still increases are reflected in all subdimensions of
significant upward trend in Asia and the Pacific representative government. Universal suffrage
in the 1980s, when the Philippines and the has become the official norm in all countries of
Republic of Korea introduced democratic the region. Moreover, almost all countries in
reforms. Dramatic changes then took place in the region have multiparty elections; Cuba is
Europe when communist regimes collapsed in a consistent exception. Electoral malpractices
1989–91 and were replaced by electoral regimes have also been reduced in Latin America and
with free elections in many countries, such as the Caribbean, and political party freedoms
the Baltic States, Bulgaria and Hungary. In have increased. Nonetheless, improvements
the early to mid-1990s, African countries saw came to a halt in the mid-1990s, and there is a
major improvements. Governments selected notable distance between the regional average
18
International IDEA Chapter 1
First Edition 2017 The global state of democracy, 1975–2015
for Latin America and the Caribbean and the FIGURE 1.9
scores of the best-performing countries in the
region, such as Chile and Uruguay. Representative Government subdimensions: Latin America and the
Caribbean, 1975–2015
Fundamental Rights: gradual
improvements, continued threats 1.0
Individual human rights in the form of access 0.9
to fair trials and civil liberties, as emphasized 0.8
by liberal theories of democracy, and social 0.7
rights and equality, as emphasized by theories 0.6
of social democracy, are important to ensure 0.5
effective popular control and political equality. 0.4
Thus, a well-functioning democracy must have 0.3
a set of fundamental rights that is continuously 0.2
protected. The regional trends illustrating respect 0.1
for fundamental rights (see Figure 1.10) are very
0.0
similar to those for representative government. 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
North America and Europe generally perform
better than Africa, Latin America and the Clean Elections Inclusive Suffrage
Caribbean, while the Middle East and Iran Free Political Parties Elected Government
shows the poorest achievement. However, most
regions have experienced positive trends since Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Clean Elections Index, Inclusive Suffrage Index, Free Political Parties Index, Elected
Government Index).
1975; Latin America and the Caribbean have
experienced the greatest changes. Country
scores in the region began at a very low level and FIGURE 1.10
now rank in an intermediate position among the
regions. Economic growth and redistribution Fundamental Rights: regional trends, 1975–2015
policies in several Latin American and Caribbean
countries have positively influenced social rights 1.0
and equality (Osueke and Tsounta 2014), 0.9
whereas the end of civil wars in Central America 0.8
(El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua) and the 0.7
Andean region (Colombia, Peru) has improved 0.6
access to justice and civil liberties. Unfortunately, 0.5
other types of violence related to drug trafficking 0.4
and urban crime are very frequent in this region 0.3
(UN 2014). 0.2
0.1
Citizens still face extreme violations of 0.0
fundamental civil and political rights in 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
countries such as the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea and Turkmenistan (e.g. Africa Asia & the Pacific Europe
personal integrity, freedom of expression and Latin America & the Caribbean Middle East & Iran North America
fair trial). However, it has become increasingly
Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Fundamental Rights Index).
common for governments to use more selective,
targeted, and less violent and comprehensive
repression (Bermeo 2016; Levitsky and Way
2010; Schedler 2013). This includes legislation
that is presented as legitimate, harmless and in
19
Chapter 1 The Global State of Democracy 2017
The global state of democracy, 1975–2015 Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
It has become the interest of the common good, but which The picture is even more diverse at the country
increasingly is used to gradually silence critical voices and level. Some countries, such as Cuba, the
common for undermine the opposition, as has happened Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Eritrea,
in Russia, for instance (Treisman 2017). Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Turkmenistan, engage
governments
These tactics are more sophisticated than in severe violations of virtually all democratic
to use more outright censorship or imprisoning or killing rights. In other countries, such as Guatemala,
selective, opposition members, and thus are sometimes Myanmar and Sri Lanka, it is mostly selected
targeted, and more difficult to identify. social groups (distinguished by identity, class
less violent and or gender) that have ‘low-intensity democratic
comprehensive In other parts of the world, problems with citizenship’. In these cases, members of groups
repression fundamental rights are more closely related that comprise persons disadvantaged due to
to social inequality and a lack of resources. In ‘age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, economic
This includes
many developing countries, large portions of and migration status’ (UN 2016: 1) do not
legislation that the population lack access to basic education, obtain the services and treatment from public
is presented health care and social security. Various forms of authorities to which they are entitled as citizens
as legitimate, discrimination and disparity in the distribution (MRG 2016). This type of exclusion limits, by
harmless and of economic and other types of resources are definition, the extent to which disadvantaged
in the interest linked to ‘low-intensity citizenship’ (where a and marginalized groups can participate in
of the common state is unable to enforce its laws and policies political life.
among selected social groups, distinguished by
good, but
identity, class or gender), which O’Donnell The exclusion of citizen groups in different
which is used to (1993: 1361) describes in relation to many domains affects their voting behaviour. While
gradually South American countries. This concept refers these groups may not be subjected to formal
silence critical to a situation in which individuals and groups limits on voting or electing the political
voices and lack recognition and resources, and are thus leadership, social and economic exclusion
undermine the disempowered to gain political influence. may influence their ability to participate in
opposition Accordingly, they fall short of achieving full political life, which indicates that exclusions
democratic citizenship (i.e. equality in political and inequalities in different domains tend to
and legal matters). reinforce each other (UN 2016).
FIGURE 1.11
Fundamental Rights, Access to Justice, Civil Liberties and Social Rights and Equality: global trends, 1975–2015
2000
2000
2005
2005
2005
1980
1980
1980
2010
2010
2010
1990
1990
1990
1985
1985
1985
2015
2015
2015
1995
1995
1995
1975
1975
1975
Notes: The light-shaded bands around the lines demarcate the 68 per cent confidence bounds of the estimates.
Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Access to Justice Index, Civil Liberties Index and Social Rights and Equality Index).
20
International IDEA Chapter 1
First Edition 2017 The global state of democracy, 1975–2015
The GSoD indices do not show steep, global the judiciary and public media organizations, Gender equality
declines in the three key components of so that it could make ‘friendly’ management has gradually
fundamental rights: access to justice, civil appointments and adapt editorial policies increased in all
liberties, and social rights and equality (see to make them more sympathetic to the
regions, but at
Figure 1.11). However, the data indicate that government. In Hungary, Prime Minister
developments in social rights and equality Victor Orbán and his Fidesz Party have
different speeds
are on a different track than access to justice undermined the autonomy of public media, and starting at
and civil liberties, as they follow a positive, research institutions and the judiciary through different levels.
linear trend. The other subdimensions follow new regulations and appointment procedures. In relative terms,
a pattern like representative government—a much progress
gradual increase, growth between 1985 and Looking at subregions is one way to apply has been made,
1995, and then relative stability in the global a disaggregate perspective on developments;
but in absolute
average. However, there is a dip in civil another is to focus on one of the five
liberties at the very end of the period. It is not subcomponent indices for civil liberties or
terms, women
statistically significant, but could be a warning one of the three subcomponent indices for hold far from
sign that deserves to be taken seriously. social rights and equality included in the an equal share
GSoD data set. Among the latter is the of seats in
Subregional differences regarding gains in Gender Equality Index. Figure 1.12 shows parliaments
fundamental rights over time are noteworthy. that gender equality has gradually increased and cabinets
For example, Europe has large subregional in all regions, but at different speeds and
differences in access to justice. A small gradual starting at different levels. North America and
improvement in north and western Europe is Europe have seen positive trends, however
paralleled by southern European countries, obstacles to gender equality remain, particularly
which are still at a lower level, after a sudden rise related to equal pay and representation in
in the late 1970s when authoritarian regimes leadership positions in both the private and
ended in Greece, Portugal and Spain. A decade public sectors. In the regions with lower levels
later, Eastern European citizens’ access to justice
improved due to the collapse of communist FIGURE 1.12
regimes. Yet access to justice improved more in
East-Central European countries compared to
Gender Equality: regional trends, 1975–2015
post-Soviet European countries.
1.0
The gap between European subregions in 0.9
citizens’ access to justice mirrors similar gaps 0.8
between these subregions in most other aspects 0.7
of democracy. It continued to widen until most
0.6
countries in East-Central Europe joined the
0.5
European Union in 2004 or 2007. Since then,
0.4
national political elites do not seem to have
0.3
been able (or willing) to improve the situation.
0.2
attempted to undermine civil liberties as well 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
2015). After the Law and Justice Party won Latin America & the Caribbean Middle East & Iran North America
the 2015 national elections in Poland, it Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Gender Equality Index).
political allies. The problems have continued political systems, which undercut the mandate
and in some respects increased since Nicolás and influence of parliamentary institutions
Maduro took over the presidency from Chávez to perform their law-making and supervising
in 2013, such as the recent attempts to strip roles. Recent events in sub-Saharan Africa,
the opposition-led National Assembly of its post-communist Europe and South America
few remaining powers (Sabatini 2016). signal that this dimension requires attention
(Bogaards and Elischer 2016; Dawson and
Frequently used means to concentrate power Hanley 2016; Luna and Vergara 2016).
and silence critics include the abuse of libel and
tax laws, excessive restrictions on public access In relation to the Checks on Government
to administrative and political documents, subdimensions, Figure 1.14 focuses on Africa,
and biased appointments of judges, members which had the lowest levels from the outset.
of media boards and public officials (Huq and Nonetheless, the African trends on effective
Ginsburg forthcoming; Levitsky and Way parliament, judicial independence and media
2010; Ottaway 2003). Yet attempts to curb integrity are quite representative of the trends
opposition and secure power are not always found in other regions (not shown). The scores
successful. President Compaoré was forced out indicate that, in relative terms, media integrity
of power by extensive demonstrations in 2014, has experienced the largest positive change,
and in the following year Maithripala Sirisena followed by more effective parliaments. The data
won the presidency in Sri Lanka and kept his indicate that the level of judicial independence
promise to roll back some of the authoritarian has hardly changed. Nonetheless, although
measures and power concentration introduced parliaments and particularly the media provide
by his predecessor, Mahinda Rajapaksa more checks on African governments today
(DeVotta 2016; Dibbert 2016). than in the past, the average performance
on these features is relatively low compared
These attempts can be understood by revisiting to more established democracies in Canada,
the challenge of weak institutions and the Denmark and the United Kingdom.
strong focus on the executive branch in some
FIGURE 1.14
2000
2000
2005
2005
2005
1980
1980
1980
2010
2010
2010
1990
1990
1990
1985
1985
1985
2015
2015
2015
1995
1995
1995
1975
1975
1975
Notes: The light-shaded bands around the lines demarcate the 68 per cent confidence bounds of the estimates.
Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Effective Parliament Index, Judicial Independence Index and Media Integrity Index).
23
Chapter 1 The Global State of Democracy 2017
The global state of democracy, 1975–2015 Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
0.7
The two subindices linked to impartial
administration, namely predictable enforcement
0.6
and the absence of corruption, show that
0.5
the world averages are quite stable for both
0.4
components. Their developments since 1975
0.3
mirror each other: a small decline in the absence
0.2 of corruption (that is, an increase in corruption)
0.1 is observed at the same time as a slight increase
0.0 in predictable enforcement. However, these
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 changes have not yet been significant enough
to warrant strong conclusions. At the regional
Africa Asia & the Pacific Europe level, this tendency applies to Africa and Asia
Latin America & the Caribbean Middle East & Iran North America and the Pacific, but not to Europe, or to Latin
Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Impartial Administration Index). America and the Caribbean. Studies have shown
that there is considerable global variation in
24
International IDEA Chapter 1
First Edition 2017 The global state of democracy, 1975–2015
the impartiality of public administrations, and dimension, because they reflect fundamentally
that ineffective and corrupt institutions tend to different aspects of participation. Figure 1.16
persist (Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi therefore provides separate information
2009; Rothstein 2011; Dahlberg, Linde and about four participatory mechanisms. At
Holmberg 2015). the global level, the scores for the different
subdimensions of participatory engagement
Participatory Engagement: global all show progress. Mechanisms of direct
progress, but room for expansion democracy are available and have been used
According to supporters of participatory more often in the last decade than in previous
democracy, vibrant democracy requires active decades. Interpreting this trend, however,
citizen participation—during and between requires taking into account that direct voting
elections—as well as national representative is sometimes misused to control citizens from
institutions and fundamental rights. Politically the top down rather than to represent them
engaged citizens must also be involved in different from the bottom up (Altman 2011). Free and
phases and levels of political agenda setting and fair subnational elections at the regional and
decision-making. local levels have become more widespread.
Civil society participation has also been on
The GSoD indices framework does not combine the rise, and electoral participation in national
the scores into an overarching index for this elections has increased overall.
FIGURE 1.16
Civil Society Participation, Electoral Participation, Direct Democracy and Subnational Elections: global trends,
1975–2015
2000
2005
2005
1980
1980
2010
2010
1990
1990
1985
1985
2015
2015
1995
1995
1975
1975
Notes: The band in light red around the line for Civil Society Participation demarcates the 68 per cent confidence bounds of the estimate (see the Annex). No confidence intervals are included for
the three other subdimensions because they are based on observational data.
Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Civil Society Participation Index, Electoral Turnout indicator, Direct Democracy indicator and Subnational Elections Index).
25
Chapter 1 The Global State of Democracy 2017
The global state of democracy, 1975–2015 Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
At the global These trends are related to the positive government activities that restrict the ability
level, the scores developments in representative government and of autonomous civil society organizations to
for the different fundamental rights that have enabled citizens contribute to the functioning of political
to participate more in public life (Bernhard systems (CIVICUS 2016; Roth 2016).
subdimensions
et al. 2017). In centralized, non-electoral or
of participatory one-party autocracies, citizens generally face The trends for civil society engagement largely
engagement all more obstruction and fewer opportunities mirror those of representative government:
show progress for participation than in the more open gradual improvement until 1989, then a
multiparty regimes that have become the norm sudden and relatively steep increase, followed
today in most parts of the world. However, by fading gradual improvement or stability.
some countries, such as Algeria, Azerbaijan, The regions also experienced sequential
Bangladesh, Egypt, Hungary, Kazakhstan, improvements: first Latin America and the
Russia and Turkey, have over the last five Caribbean, then Asia and the Pacific, and
to last ten years experienced a ‘shrinking of then Europe and Africa after the end of the
civil society space’—that is, an increase in Cold War. Yet, while there are large regional
FIGURE 1.17
0 2000 miles
0 2000 4000 km
Notes: Darker shades indicate high scores and light shades reflect low scores. Direct Democracy
Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Direct Democracy indicator). 0 1
26
International IDEA Chapter 1
First Edition 2017 The global state of democracy, 1975–2015
differences in representative government, the The opportunity for citizens to participate in The opportunity
differences between regional participatory free and fair subnational elections has increased for citizens to
engagement scores are less pronounced. While substantially in Europe as well as Latin participate in
more traditional, institutionalized civil society America and the Caribbean. The levels in Asia
free and fair
participation continues to play a critical role, and the Pacific and especially Africa and the
such as in Mongolia (Fish and Seeberg 2017), Middle East and Iran are lower, and progress
subnational
citizens around the world are also using other has been slower and smaller in these regions. elections has
forms of participatory engagement, which are The developments largely reflect national- increased
often loosely based on informal networks and level trends in respect to the principles of substantially
civil resistance movements, facilitated by new representative government. However, there are in Europe as
social media (Shirky 2011). some exceptions, where subnational elections well as Latin
either do not take place or are substantially
America and the
The data show that turnout in national less free and fair than national elections,
elections follows similar patterns in Africa, such as in Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico
Caribbean. The
Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and and South Africa (Behrend and Whitehead levels in Asia
the Caribbean, with increases mostly due to 2016; McMann 2017). The reasons for this and the Pacific
replacing non-electoral regimes with electoral include geographical challenges related to and especially
regimes. Since not all electoral regimes are organizing subnational elections, the degree Africa and the
electoral democracies, changes in electoral of ethnic diversity of country populations and Middle East and
turnout do not necessarily signify democratic variations in subnational autonomy among
Iran are lower,
upturns or downturns. In Europe, the federal states.
downward trend in national election turnout
and progress has
rates is partly driven by some of the more 1.7. Conclusions: trendless been slower and
established democracies, including France, fluctuations smaller in
Switzerland and the UK, where electoral The global state of democracy has improved these regions
participation has decreased over the last considerably since 1975, and there has
40 years. The relatively new electoral not been a significant global decline since
democracies in East Europe have experienced 2005, as shown in Figures 1.16 and 1.18.
an even more rapid decline in turnout Long-term progress has been observed in
levels. However, there are exceptions (e.g. four of the five dimensions covered by the
the Scandinavian countries), where electoral GSoD indices: Representative Government,
participation has remained high. Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government
and Participatory Engagement; Impartial
The availability (and use) of direct democracy Administration has not shown significant
mechanisms has increased slightly in all progress at the global level. This finding could
regions. Yet they started from very low levels, help explain some of the widespread public
and they are still not a prominent feature dissatisfaction and disappointment with
of democracy in any region. Asia and the democracy in many countries. Corruption,
Pacific represents the lowest regional average discrimination and ineffectiveness make
and Europe the highest (see Altman 2017). citizens feel that democracy does not deliver
Lithuania, New Zealand, Romania, Slovenia, the basic services and equal treatment that they
Switzerland, Uruguay and Venezuela are request, and the human rights to which they
exceptions: to a relatively large degree they are entitled.
provide and use such mechanisms, as shown
in Figure 1.17. Caution is needed when The global trends cover significant variation
interpreting direct democracy scores, since at the regional level. All regions except North
governments in countries that do not meet America (which was at a high level from the
the criteria for electoral democracy sometimes outset) experienced significant improvements
abuse referendums to strengthen their rule. in most areas; Latin America and the Caribbean
27
Chapter 1 The Global State of Democracy 2017
The global state of democracy, 1975–2015 Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
have exhibited the most progress, while the view that democracy is extremely fragile and
Middle East and Iran has lagged in most areas. In generally in decline. Indeed, it is unsurprising
Europe, first southern European countries and that the initial scale and pace of post-Cold War
then former communist countries have driven democratization was not sustained, as this was
the positive trend, but the latter group has also an exceptional period (Møller and Skaaning
experienced some setbacks. Africa and Asia and 2013a: 89).
the Pacific have made substantial achievements,
but most countries in these regions still show It is therefore not surprising (although many
moderate to large deficits on the dimensions had expected and hoped for more) that overall
compared to the best-performing countries. progress has slowed for many aspects of
democracy since the mid-1990s. The empirical
Positive trends are found in all major world overview suggests that the current global state
regions, and over the past ten years democracy of democracy is one of trendless fluctuations—
has been quite resilient. For some aspects of upturns and downturns in individual countries,
democracy, more gains than losses have been but with no broad tendencies of decline or
achieved at the country level. For others, areas progress (see Box 1.3).
of decline have largely been balanced by areas
of improvement. The findings presented in Trendless fluctuations represent a trend in
this chapter thus challenge the pessimistic themselves—the continuity of democracy at the
FIGURE 1.18
Representative Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government and Impartial Administration: global trends,
1975–2015
2000
2005
2005
1980
1980
2010
2010
1990
1990
1985
1985
2015
2015
1995
1995
1975
1975
Notes: The light-shaded bands around the lines demarcate the 68 per cent confidence bounds of the estimates.
Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Representative Government Index, Fundamental Rights Index, Checks on Government Index and Impartial Administration Index).
28
International IDEA Chapter 1
First Edition 2017 The global state of democracy, 1975–2015
29
Chapter 1 The Global State of Democracy 2017
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Aarhus University Press, 2003) Journal of Democracy, 10/2 (2014), pp. 11–14
Transparency International (TI), Overview of Zakaria, F., The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy
Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Madagascar, at Home and Abroad (New York: W.W. Norton &
2014, <https://www.transparency.org/files/ Company, 2003)
33
Chapter 2
Chapter
2 Democracy’s resilience
in a changing world
Chapter 2 The Global State of Democracy 2017
Democracy’s resilience in a changing world Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Democracy’s resilience
in a changing world
Democracy has grown impressively from the 1970s to the 2000s. Yet in 2017, despite
democracy’s long-term resilience, it appears to be fragile in many countries. From
new populist movements that threaten the rights of minorities to the stark challenges
of corruption and state capture, democratic institutions are vulnerable to setbacks,
the erosion of rights and the manipulation of electoral processes. Concerns about
democracy’s health have raised an important question: What makes democracy more
resilient? This chapter explores the global state of democracy by exploring the conditions
for its resilience. How can citizens resist illiberal or autocratic regimes? When do
checks and balances among institutions prevent state capture and backsliding? How
can structural risks to democracy in underlying social and political relationships be
reduced? Can democracy be designed to be more resilient? What roles do outsiders
play in protecting democracy from peril when it is under threat? The chapter concludes
with a set of recommendations for building more resilient democracies to face these
challenges and to weather the crises that lie ahead.
(1) Everyone has the right to take uniquely in various countries (Beetham et
part in the government of his country, al. 2008; Held 2006). Modern analysis must
directly or through freely chosen account for the wide variation in the norms,
representatives, (2) Everyone has institutions and processes that collectively
the right of equal access to public comprise today’s democracies that goes far
service in his country, (3) The will beyond traditional theories of liberalism or
of the people shall be the basis of the social democracy; democratic variation requires
authority of government; this will careful, close-in analysis of how local models
shall be expressed in periodic and reflect or detract from broad democratic values
genuine elections which shall be by (Youngs 2015).
universal and equal suffrage and shall
be held by secret vote or by equivalent The gaps between the international norms of the
free voting procedures. ‘right’ to democracy and its implementation,
particularly in elections, are often at odds with
Democracy reflects the fundamental ethical the realities of managed elections, in which the
principles of human equality and the dignity rules of the game are biased. Participation is
of persons, and is thus inseparable from often managed and the playing field is unfair,
human rights (Beetham et al. 2008). Its core and the results at times are fraudulent and lack
principles are manifested in different ways: credibility, resulting in ‘flawed or failed contests’
the institutions, processes and elements of that ‘can undoubtedly wreck fragile progress’
democracy such as electoral systems or arrays (Norris 2014: 3). Democratic rights are often
of institutions have grown organically and overlooked in the localized political realities of
Resilience is the property of a social system to cope with, survive and recover from complex challenges and crises.
The characteristics of a resilient social system include flexibility, recovery, adaptation and innovation.
37
Chapter 2 The Global State of Democracy 2017
Democracy’s resilience in a changing world Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Resilient state ‘capture’, particularly in countries with value: it can contribute over time to peace and
social systems abundant export-valuable natural resource security and to development goals; democracy
are flexible, commodities. Some citizens have turned to and inclusive, accountable governance are at
extremist political solutions, which threaten the centre of virtuous cycles of human progress.
adaptable,
the foundations of human rights, democracy
innovative and peace that have characterized the post- Section 2.4 explores the challenge of populism
and can World War II international system. and the resilient responses of citizens who defend
recover from democracy when it is threatened. Section 2.5
challenges or Yet democracy shows considerable signs of explores dimensions of institutional resilience:
crises resilience. Resilience is defined as a political when political systems provide checks and
system’s ability to cope with, survive and balances that advance accountability in politics.
recover from complex challenges and crises Section 2.6 examines policies that reduce the
that present stress or pressure that can lead to underlying structural risks that can undermine
systemic failure. Resilient social systems are democracy, particularly ethnic diversity and
flexible (able to absorb stress or pressure), can gender- and class-based inequalities. The
recover from challenges or crises, adaptable argument that democracy can be designed to
(can change in response to a stress to the be resilient is discussed in Section 2.7, which
system), and innovative (able to change in explores these issues in societies that are deeply
order to more efficiently or effectively addresses divided and conflict affected. Section 2.8
the challenge or crisis). For further information evaluates resilience through external support:
on International IDEA’s definition of resilience when international actors (such as regional and
see the Background Paper accompanying this international organizations) or transnational
chapter, Democracy and Resilience: Conceptual civil society act in concert to help safeguard and
Approaches and Considerations (Sisk 2017). promote democracy within countries. Section
2.9 concludes with a set of recommendations
This chapter explores the relationship between for future efforts to build more resilient
democracy and resilience to inform ways to democracies worldwide.
build democracies that are more resilient. It
focuses particularly on current events in 2016– 2.2. Democracy imperilled:
17, complementing the analysis of International challenges, crises and opportunities
IDEA’s Global State of Democracy (GSoD) The 21st century offered promise as rapid
indices that cover the period 1975–2015. This technological innovations helped bring
current analysis explores in more depth critical unparalleled development and continued gains
issues that raise questions about democracy’s in democracy, fundamental rights and prosperity.
resilience, including the ways that devoted Yet, in 2017 the world is fragmented, conflicted
citizens, strong institutions, cohesive societies, and under threat from global challenges such as
and international support contribute to its climate change, migration and widening socio-
ability to survive and thrive. economic inequality—the effects of which
undermine social cohesion, put peace at risk,
Section 2.2 presents an overview of the current and threaten to reverse hard-won 20th-century
global context: democracy under threat and the gains in all world regions. It is a tenuous
causal explanations of complex, globally related moment for democracy. New challenges, if
challenges that lead to social polarization, not adequately addressed, endanger democracy
political capture and democratic crises. in today’s complex world. The contemporary
Resilience in democracy is explored in two global, regional and country-specific landscape
distinct contexts: (a) turbulent (and sometimes of democracy has rapidly evolved in recent years,
indirect) transitions to democracy and (b) raising questions about democracy’s ability to
recent setbacks in established democracies. thrive amid recent challenges and crises. What
Section 2.3 affirms that democracy has inherent challenges threaten democracy today?
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International IDEA Chapter 2
First Edition 2017 Democracy’s resilience in a changing world
Democracy faces polarization undermines the social cohesion over a constitutional crisis, giving rise to an
challenges in necessary for democracy to function well; intractable political crisis; in 2016 and 2017
Western Europe. observers of Germany worry about the fragile crises erupted in the Democratic Republic of
centre coalition that has represented modern the Congo (DRC), Gabon and Zimbabwe
For example,
German democracy (Grimm 2016). The over executive manipulations to retain power
polarization narrowly approved ‘Brexit’ referendum in beyond constitutional term limits. In Ethiopia,
undermines the June 2016 in the United Kingdom to leave protests have erupted along ethnic lines, causing
social cohesion the European Union has raised concerns an ongoing state of emergency with continued
necessary for about the ability of a razor-thin majority to concerns about the country’s vulnerability to
democracy make decisions that deeply affect the lives more widespread crisis (Jeffrey 2016). Power
to function of all citizens. Snap elections in June 2017 plays by presidents often lead to violent protests
demonstrated the stability of democracy in the and cycles of repression, as in Burundi where
well; observers
UK when the government went ahead with an intractable ‘third-term’ claim by President
of Germany polls in the wake of terrorist attacks. Pierre Nkrunziza precipitated near state failure
worry about the (ICG 2016).
fragile centre Echoing global concerns about restrictions on
coalition that civil society (Mendelson 2015), in countries In Asia and the Pacific, democracy remains
has represented such as Azerbaijan, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, uneven as countries such as China and Viet
modern German Russia and Slovakia there has been a rollback Nam enjoy continued economic progress
of independent organizations, free media under one-party systems; in 2016, Viet Nam
democracy.
and freedom of opposition (Shekhovtsov transitioned to new leadership through an
The narrowly and Pomerantsev 2016). Events in Hungary election by delegates of the country’s ruling
approved ‘Brexit’ and Poland have raised concerns about their Communist Party. The Philippines—which
referendum democratic consolidation: economic stress has transitioned to democracy following its ‘People
in June 2016 combined with exclusivist views of social and Power’ revolution of 1983–86—has been
in the United political identities to elect strongly ideological subjected to a rollback of rights and freedoms
Kingdom governments (Rovni 2014). In January 2017, justified by a populist war on drugs in search
protestors in Romania took to the streets in of order and security (Teehankee 2016).
to leave the
several cities for weeks to express anger over a Opposition parties in Afghanistan, Bangladesh,
European Union government decree that would have weakened Cambodia, the Maldives, Malaysia, Pakistan
(EU) has raised accountability laws for government officials and Thailand have called into question the
concerns about (Lyman and Gillet 2017). These protests won validity of electoral processes and boycotted
the ability of considerable concessions from the embattled or refused to accept the results; this pattern
a razor-thin government, yet some worried whether the indicates the weakness of democracy in the
majority to masses can sustainably serve as a check on region (UNDP 2015).
corruption (Voluntiru and Tintariu 2017).
make decisions
Patterns in Latin America suggest that
that deeply Democracy is also being tested in other democracy has become the nearly universal
affect the lives of regions. In Africa, democratization is evolving norm in this region, which is enjoying its most
all citizens rapidly as a generation of leaders associated in-depth democratic consolidation to date
with independence is likely to be replaced soon (except for Cuba and Venezuela) (see Mujal-
by a new generation. For example, in Angola, Leon 2011 on Cuba). The region has seen the
South Africa and Zimbabwe the strength of expansion of rights for indigenous persons and
multiparty democracy will be tested for possible groups, and rights of sexual orientation. Yet
alternations in ruling regimes for the first observers argue that democracy in the region
time since independence. Uganda has tightly remains a troubled system of governance
controlled elections, and opposition parties given the persistence of economic inequality
have been restricted or impeded. Conflict (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2014). El
erupted in Burundi from 2015 through 2017 Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico
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International IDEA Chapter 2
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Migration migration-related pressures, and have seen gave a stunning rebuke to the 25-year ruling
is a serious violence against immigrants. African National Congress—ousting it in
transnational the major municipalities of Johannesburg
Among the most difficult and challenging global and Tschwane/Pretoria—over frustrations
challenge to
problems with local effects is ensuring security about the lack of service delivery, corruption
democracy that and combating terrorism; many governments and persistent inequality that continues to
has led to social justify restrictions of rights and freedoms with reinforce social differences entrenched during
polarization, the need to prevent terrorism. Increasing terrorist apartheid. In April 2017, protests erupted
xenophobia and attacks have had deleterious effects on democracy, nationally calling for the removal of President
anti-immigrant most notably in relation to the restrictions on Jacob Zuma, who was accused of graft and
movements in freedoms associated with responses to terrorist economic mismanagement.
events (Chenoweth 2013; Large 2006).
many countries
There are concerns in South Africa, Venezuela
In many contexts, however, discontent with and Zimbabwe that democracy has failed to end
democracy stems from the internal challenges poverty or to deliver security. Weak or corrupt
found in local-level economic, demographic governance by democratically elected regimes
and social contexts. In many societies, has often failed to address the needs of people
persistent socio-economic inequality and living in poverty. In turn, social inequalities and
marginalization destabilize the political process marginalization can lead to local crises, conflict
and support for institutions: democracy and violence. Armed conflict has been on the
does not appear to change the challenges of rise around the world in the last decade, with
everyday life for people living in poverty or enduring threats to human security (Dupuy et
those who face other social disadvantages. In al. 2016; Marshall and Cole 2014; Petterson
South Africa’s local elections of 2016, voters and Wallensteen 2015).
FIGURE 2.3
When democratic rights erode: civil liberties in Ethiopia, Hungary, Thailand, Turkey and
Venezuela, 2005–15
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Notes: This graph shows the trends in civil liberties in Ethiopia, Hungary, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela from 2005–15. The y-axis shows the score and
the x-axis the years. Scores in the y-axis range from 0 to 1. Higher scores indicate greater respect for civil liberties.
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International IDEA Chapter 2
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Figure 2.3 illustrates the demonstrable declines within society; it is the basis of sustainable Violence is
in civil liberties in Hungary, Ethiopia, Thailand, peace within countries. While authoritarian especially
Turkey and Venezuela over the last decade, governments may be ‘resilient’, they do so at the damaging to
as borne out by the GSoD indices. When cost of human rights. For years, scholars have
democracy.
political, economic or social challenges are argued that democracy generally contributes
inadequately addressed, they increase the risk to international peace—the ‘democratic peace
Recurrent crises
of crisis escalation with local—and sometimes theory’ holds that democracies rarely, if ever, go negatively
global—implications. Crises in democracies to war with other democracies—and can enable affect women’s
include succession struggles, state failures an internal ‘democratic peace’: democracies are participation
or lapse of government authority, election- less likely to experience internal social conflict in politics, and
related or other political violence or threats that can escalate to civil war (Gleditsch and election-related
of violence, terror events aimed at disrupting Hegre 1997; Russet and Oneal 2001).
violence is often
social cohesion, or direct violence between the
state/police and the opposition. Violence is In addition to its intrinsic value, democracy has
deliberately
especially damaging to democracy. Recurrent enduring instrumental utility for development perpetrated to
crises negatively affect women’s participation in and peace (Sen 1999a, 1999b). It facilitates depress women’s
politics, and election-related violence is often the equality of citizens’ voices, and thus allows participation in
deliberately perpetrated to depress women’s for the expression of interests and preferences voting, running
participation in voting, running for office, and the free flow of information, both of for office, or
or involvement in public decision-making or which are essential elements of development.
involvement in
political life (IFES 2015). The sustainability of the social contract within
countries is assured through inclusion, while
public decision-
2.3. Reaffirming democracy participation in governance is undergirded making or
It is now vital to reaffirm democracy as a by the protection of fundamental rights. political life
value system for governance and as a form of Policy practice in international organizations
government. Ruling regimes typically profess has evolved since the founding of the UN
their commitment to democratic principles, and the modern Bretton Woods system to
and to universal human rights, as a system of recognize that goals such as development and
laws, institutions and practices through which growth, prevention of conflict, and broadening
state authority is legitimized. According to participation, dignity, equity and sustainability
International IDEA’s Voter Turnout Database must be pursued simultaneously. Democratic
(2016), 186 countries held legislative elections governance provides the normative framework
in the period 2011–15, with nearly 3.37 billion through which policies to address these
voters. More countries have the basic framework issues are ‘formed and executed’ (Asher et al.
of democratic institutions and processes now 2016: 80).
than ever before. In the 21st century, state
legitimacy originates from democratic processes UN Sustainable Development Goal 16
that empower the state to provide security and (SDG16) builds on the premise that ‘governance
deliver services (ostensibly, further enhancing matters’: it states that peaceful and inclusive
its legitimacy) (OECD-DAC 2010). societies are central to achieving all other
development goals. SDG16’s promotion of
Democracy’s long-term utility: peace and ‘peaceful and inclusive societies’ and ‘effective,
prosperity accountable, and inclusive institutions’ reflects
There is increasing consensus that democracy— a commonly accepted understanding that
as an enduring set of values and principles and democracy, peace and development outcomes
as a form of government—is a fundamental are inherently intertwined, and that reducing
building block of human progress. Democracy violence, delivering justice and combatting
is a form of non-violent conflict management corruption are all essential to achieving
that can reconcile divisions and contention sustainable development (Jandl 2017).
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Democracy’s resilience in a changing world Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Democracy is Democracy is seen as an institutional and vulnerable to falling into downward spirals of
a form of non- enduring means of resolving and preventing conflict, economic crises, and ‘states of fragility’
violent conflict social conflict, and thus democratic governance (OECD-DAC 2016).
contributes to peace, which in turn contributes
management
to development opportunities (Brown 2003). Of the countries involved in the 2010–11
that can Greater inclusivity over time contributes Arab Uprisings, only Tunisia has managed
reconcile to democratic accountability: democracy to make progress towards transforming from
divisions and introduces a culture of equality that empowers authoritarianism to democracy. Libya, Syria and
contention historically marginalized people; inclusion helps Yemen are still plagued by the consequences of
within society; create the ‘demand side’ necessary for creating civil war: human flight, food insecurity, lack of
it is the basis of the will for the state to respond on the ‘supply medicine, the suspension of education and the
side’. The key to democracy’s contribution collapse of livelihoods; in turn, they are caught
sustainable peace
to development is its ability to non-violently in a web of regional rivalries along sectarian and
within countries manage conflict as a first-order priority, global geopolitical lines (Cordesman 2016).
and subsequently to extend and improve Thus, while in the long run democracy is both
government services over time. Democracy, intrinsically and instrumentally beneficial for
peace and development work together over acquiring security and prosperity, transitions
the long term to provide a virtuous cycle of from authoritarianism to democracy are fraught
progress even as patterns and progress vary by with peril and threats of complete state failure.
context. Cross-cutting civil society engagement
in democratic transitions has been found to be Democracy’s relationship with economic
associated with a reduced risk of terror attacks development (which appears to contribute
in a cross-country analysis (Pospieszna 2015). to sustainable peace) is more contested, in
both the scholarly literature and in practice.
Vicious cycles of state fragility reflect how Although many studies have investigated this
poor, captured or violently contested control link, some have found no direct relationship
over political power is at the heart of violence, between democracy and development, as non-
development reversals and humanitarian democratic countries can have high economic
catastrophes that violent conflict creates growth rates; research on a direct, linear,
(UNDP 2012; World Bank 2011). State immediate relationship between democracy and
fragility is caused by ‘vicious’ cycles of poor development is inconclusive (Rocha Menocal
governance, poverty, corruption and inequality, 2007). Others argue that modern inclusive
and episodes of social violence, which are democratic politics and competition for citizen
mutually reinforcing. Some observers argue support can induce the creation of public goods
that such fragility is more likely to be found in that facilitate the development of a middle
‘partial’ or grey-zone democracies, ‘competitive class. In this way, democratic politics responds
authoritarian regimes’ or hybrid democracies to citizen interests through the provision of
than in autocratic states, which can be stable basic needs such as a reliable system of market
(Brownlee 2007; Levitsky and Way 2010). regulation, financial regulation, education and
Countries in turbulent transitions from health care, and infrastructure. (Acemoglu et
authoritarian rule are especially vulnerable al. 2014; Stasavage 2005; Halperin, Siegle and
to crises such as constitutional disputes or Weinstein 2005; Leftwich 2005). Indeed, many
election-related violence and potentially people today associate democracy as much with
reversion to authoritarian rule. Events such as their own personal welfare as with the voice,
communal conflict, election-related violence or avenues for expression, that democratic
or state repression have been statistically shown institutions and practices provide. The most
to be more common in periods of political important relationship between democracy
transition and change (Goldstone et al. 2010). and development may be their ‘co-evolution’ in
During crises of transition, countries are the long run (Gerring et al. 2012).
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International IDEA Chapter 2
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Backsliding
Po
ion RE SPONSE S
s t-
t at
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UNTABILIT Y
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2.4. Resilient citizens: confronting Human Rights Watch’s 2017 annual report State fragility
problems and perils of representation notes a deterioration in human rights around is caused by
Data on declining confidence in political the world, which is linked to a shared ‘vicious’
parties show that less than 20 per cent of ‘politics of fear’ (HRW 2017). Human rights
cycles of poor
the population in EU member states had monitors such as Amnesty International
favourable opinions of political leaders and (2017) have recently noted that: ‘Seismic
governance,
political parties (European Commission political shifts in 2016 exposed the potential poverty,
2014). In Latin America and the Caribbean, of hateful rhetoric to unleash the dark side of corruption
a 2011 study of public attitudes showed that human nature… more and more politicians and inequality,
trust in political parties was between 20 per call themselves anti-establishment and and episodes
cent in the lowest-scoring country (Paraguay) wield politics of demonization that hounds, of social
and only 40 per cent in the highest-scoring scapegoats and dehumanizes entire groups of
violence, which
country (Mexico) (Corral 2011). This decline people to win the support of voters’ (HRW
of confidence in parties reflects the overall 2017) citing ‘a global pushback against
are mutually
trend that representation is under stress. Social human rights’. A common thread in many of reinforcing
movements mobilized by populism lack the these contexts has been populism—appeals
‘inter-mediation’ mechanisms linking society by demagogic political elites who claim to
to democratic institutions that political stand for the common person and advocate
parties have historically provided, together illiberal (that is, against fundamental rights)
with political leaders’ ability to effectively perspectives that offer romantic and often
moderate and reach consensus across unattainable visions of society. Populist
political divides. movements are complex, and may have
positive implications for democracy by giving
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Chapter 2 The Global State of Democracy 2017
Democracy’s resilience in a changing world Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
The decline of voice to those aggrieved in society at elites in January 2017 prompted mass protests in
confidence in and the establishment, but they can also Washington, DC, including the now-historic
parties reflects the seize control of governments and implement ‘Women’s March’ by 470,000 people—three
unworkable social policies. Populism appears times as many as attended the inauguration
overall trend that
to be especially dangerous when it is paired (Wallace and Parlapiano 2017). The vote
representation with unchecked majoritarianism in winner- was further marred by ongoing allegations of
is under stress. take-all systems (Mudde 2015). foreign interference in the US election and
Social movements the ties between the Trump campaign and
mobilized by ‘Illiberal’ democracy: the challenge of Russia, as well as alleged Russian hacking
populism lack the populism of electoral administrators in 31 of the 50
‘inter-mediation’ In the USA and Western Europe in particular, US states (Berkowitz, Lu and Vitkovskaya
the underlying causes of populism include 2017). There are public concerns that the
mechanisms
cultural concerns about the erosion of identity Trump presidency continues to undermine
linking society and territoriality, job insecurities from a the US democratic and constitutional order.
to democratic rapidly changing economic environment, These events highlight the vulnerability of the
institutions that and anti-immigrant attitudes triggered by the world’s longest-standing democracy to social,
political parties threat of terrorism. Austria, France, Germany, economic and cultural drivers of nationalism
have historically Greece, Italy and Spain have experienced a that can undermine democracy’s principles.
provided, rise in populism in the form of widespread
mobilization for resistance to moderate, Comparative public opinion research in the
together
centrist or established political elites from both USA and elsewhere provides evidence of a
with political sides of the political spectrum (Judis 2016). broader public concern about the efficacy of
leaders’ ability Populism in these contexts is generally driven democratic institutions in both emerging and
to effectively by class-based alienation intertwined with long-standing democracies even as most people
moderate and virulent identity politics, even as debates swirl in all regions surveyed considered personal
reach consensus over whether cultural backlash or economic and press freedoms to be very important (Pew
across political dislocation best explain the phenomenon Research Center 2015). Social movements
(Inglehart and Norris 2016). have historically been critical to pressuring
divides
regimes to democratize. At the same time,
Populism has serious consequences for the growth of populist citizen movements
democracy. When extreme ethnic nationalist underscores the widespread discontent with
populists prevail, minorities often see threats governments and governance worldwide,
to their safety and economic livelihoods, leading to new forms of engagement.
especially vulnerable ethnic minorities and Populism presents a paradox: it involves
migrants. Populism and nationalism have heightened citizen participation, but often in
generated concerns about whether democratic an exclusive, ideologically extreme manner,
processes can withstand social forces driven by or in a call for action that disregards rights—
undercurrents of exclusion and nationalism. particularly those of minorities.
In the USA, a minority coalition of voters
(46 per cent of the popular vote) elected Narrowly construed populism undermines,
populist, nationalist billionaire Donald J. rather than creates, the social capital needed
Trump as president. Trump lost the overall for today’s complex, multicultural societies.
popular vote to rival Hillary Clinton by 2.9 According to a broad literature on social
million votes (in the aggregate popular vote, cohesion, when citizen engagement cuts across
48.2 per cent to 46.1 per cent), but prevailed divisions within society, and is organized
in the Electoral College, a feature of US around national platforms focusing on
democracy by which the president is elected security and development, it is more likely
by the number of delegates won in the 50 to support democracy than those that are
states (Crieg 2016). Trump’s inauguration primarily exclusivist, nationalistic or ethnic in
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International IDEA Chapter 2
First Edition 2017 Democracy’s resilience in a changing world
orientation (Jensen 2010). Policymaking needs (Paxton, Hughes and Green 2006). While Populism
to be able to manage the politics of inclusive networked domestic and international has serious
groups through innovative approaches that women’s movements have played a key role in consequences
place a premium on broad-based stakeholder advancing demands for democracy, women’s
for democracy.
participation, ensuring inclusive institutions, coalitions that pressed for initial transitions
accountable processes and outcomes, and to democracy have been difficult to sustain
Populism and
citizen engagement throughout the policy cycle (Baldez 2003). nationalism
(OECD 2015). have generated
When elites do not rely on the masses for concerns
Popular commitment to inclusive support, demands for democracy are less about whether
democracy common. This can occur, for example, democratic
Broad economic and social processes continue when state revenue is derived from primary
processes can
to drive the demand for democracy. Increased commodity exports, such as oil, or when anti-
access to education, rising incomes, and democratic elites can buy support through
withstand social
improved communication and urbanization patronage and clientelism, or enforce their forces driven by
have facilitated the development of the rule coercively with the support of a well- undercurrents
middle class and contributed to the popular compensated military (Geddes 2009; Haber of exclusion and
demand for democracy. In bargains between and Menaldo 2011). nationalism
elites and the masses, democracy emerges as
an ‘equilibrium’ or middle ground. The more The presence of a strong civil society is critical to
people understand how democracy works, democracy’s resilience. In many places, popular
the more they tend to believe it is the best
form of governance (Cho 2014). Public BOX 2.2
opinion surveys have found little appetite
for authoritarianism among Asian youth:
those growing up in democratic regimes in Non-violent civil resistance: factors for success
the region have a more favourable view of
democracy and expect it to continue (Dalton During the 2010–11 Arab Uprisings Arab Uprisings, when Time magazine named
‘The Protestor’ as its Person of the Year, scholars came to the remarkable
and Shin 2014). Restive movements for conclusion that between 1900 and 2006, non-violent civil resistance struggles
democracy in Hong Kong have symbolized were more than twice as likely as violence to be effective at advancing
youth demands for democracy beyond the democracy (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Evaluating data on violent and non-
violent protests from around the world, and the effectiveness of such protests
semi-autonomous province.
in achieving citizen aims, they found that non-violent social movements were
more likely to involve higher rates of participation and to facilitate more durable
Pathways to democracy may be driven by and peaceful democracies. Violent insurgencies were equally unlikely to
citizen beliefs in and attitudes towards political achieve their goals. These findings shed light on how non-violent citizen action
can form the basis of democratic resilience.
rights and liberties drawn from other contexts
or from the diffusion of international norms Drawing on early scholarly and activist work on non-violent resistance, popular
(Koesel and Bunce 2013). Some argue that the non-violent protests for change have been successful when they:
increasing demand for women’s participation
• are large enough not to be ignored or easily suppressed, and when crowds
in governance is driven in part by the global are diverse and cross-cut generations, ethnicity, classes, genders and
spread of norms about women’s political geographies;
equality. Following the 1979 Convention on • remain deeply dedicated to maintaining non-violent principles, even in the
face of violent resistance by the state or other social groups;
the Elimination of Discrimination against
• use flexible and innovative techniques, including a variety of non-violent
Women (CEDAW, known as the Beijing methods beyond on-the-street protests including lower-risk tactics such as
Platform), women’s political empowerment sick-outs and stay-aways, boycotts or legal petitions; and
increased globally due to both internal drivers • appeal to economic and business elites, civil servants and especially
military forces who may shift loyalties toward non-violent democratic
(economic and social gains for women secured
opposition rather than support an incumbent autocrat losing their grip
at the domestic level) and international on power.
pressures to increase women’s participation
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0.8
more likely to endure over time. Civil society
0.7
can be resilient even where it is suppressed and
0.6
subject to severe restrictions. Some human
0.5 rights activists argue that civil society has
0.4 proven to be resilient even in countries such
0.3 as Iran (Bouroman 2007). Box 2.2 explores
0.2 the characteristics of successful non-violent
0.1 resistance.
0.0
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Electoral cycles may generate rotations in ruling coalitions, which is important The rule of law, access to justice, and a strong,
for flexibility in resilience —incorporating new public demands, interests independent, capable and efficient judicial
and political actors into the political system. The more flexible, open and
system are critical elements of a resilient
adaptive the electoral process is, the more the overall system of governance
can adapt to changing social, economic and demographic changes within democracy. An important factor is democratic
society. Over time, electoral processes may become entrenched to favour control of the armed forces and security
the dominant political actors. Some scholars, whose work has focused on sectors, and their professionalization under
post-democratization Africa, have developed compelling theories of electoral
the civilian control of constitutionally elected
processes unfolding as a set of nested ‘games’ by which transitions to
democracy occur. Each iteration of the game (or electoral process) furthers authorities. The transition processes in many
the consolidation of the democratic rules: voters and citizens become more third-wave democracies involved a sequential
mobilized, organizations and institutions become more vested, ‘blatant (and at times turbulent) process of extensive
failed manipulation of election outcomes’ are identified and the costs of
authoritarian repression increase (Lindberg 2009, 2015).
security sector reform and transitional justice;
the military in some countries—such as Egypt,
Sierra Leone appears to reinforce these findings on elections and adaptive Myanmar and Sri Lanka—kept the autocratic
resilience. In 2018, it will hold its fourth round of national elections since it
emerged from civil war in 2002. The capacities of the Electoral Commission
regimes in power and became major economic
appear to have strengthened in each previous electoral cycle; indeed, the stakeholders (Mani 2010).
chairwoman of the commission, Christina Thorpe, has won several international
awards for her work to strengthen the commission. The UN administered the
Electoral processes can help adapt and
2002 elections, and the 2007 elections were the first to be held in a peaceful
environment and fully managed by the National Electoral Commission and strengthen democracy over time. Independent,
the Political Party Registration Commission in concert with the UN (Jinadu autonomous and professional electoral
2012). The 2012 elections were given overall high marks by observers, which management bodies are critical, since their
concluded that the polls were ‘conducted with a high degree of transparency’
mandate is to protect the procedural credibility
and that ‘very few cases of election-related violence were reported across the
country’ (Carter Center 2013). of democratic processes. The longer a country
has experienced successful electoral cycles, the
These electoral cycles strengthened the legitimacy of institutions: compliance
with Sierra Leone’s 2008 Anti-Corruption Act was an important element in the
more the electoral process has been shown to
2012 elections, as the issue was in prior rounds of elections since the civil war. ‘adapt’ to social conditions and thus becomes
increasingly resilient (see Box 2.3).
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judiciaries. 0.7
0.6
networks. International IDEA’s Funding of Notes: This graph shows the global level trends from 1975–2015 for Effective Parliament, Judicial Independence
and Media Integrity. The y-axis shows the score and the x-axis the years. Scores in the y-axis range from 0 to 1.
Political Parties and Election Campaigns: Higher scores indicate a higher performance on a given attribute.
A Handbook on Political Finance identifies Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Effective Parliament Index, Judicial Independence Index, Media Integrity Index).
In divided, conflict-affected countries such as Nepal, the introduction of Scholars and practitioners have pointed to a set of
democracy creates unique challenges. Democracy provides a way to move
towards structural equality. Where spatial or ‘horizontal’ social inequalities
paradoxes and dilemmas relating to democracy
motivate armed rebellion and civil war (Murshed and Gates 2005), democratic in conflict-affected countries as they transition
processes help manage and resolve inter-group grievances. For example, after from war to democracy (OECD-DAC 2015).
the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) signed a
Leaders in such countries in effect exchange the
comprehensive peace agreement in 2006, a large consortium of domestic and
international civic groups (including International IDEA) engaged in extensive uncertainty of the battlefield for the uncertainty
post-conflict democratization efforts. This process focused on educating, of democratic electoral processes, which leaves
empowering and building inclusive local government institutions to guarantee post-war democracies vulnerable to elite capture
the inclusion of all previously marginalized groups in the constitution-making
(Jarstad and Sisk 2008). Other common
process, including marginalized caste groups such as the Dalit, indigenous
Janajati groups, Tharu and Madhesis ethnic groups, and women’s groups. challenges in post-conflict transitions are the
The democracy-promotion effort strategically focused on extending democracy transformation of rebel forces into mainstream
to the local level (‘devolution’) to address the deepest structural drivers of political actors, the often deeply divided nature
civil war.
of civil society, managing electoral processes,
New social problems emerged with this opening of the political space, constitution-making, transforming security
particularly in intensive identity-based political mobilization. Such ethnic institutions and transitional justice, building
mobilization created an ‘inclusion dilemma’ (Bogati et al. 2017). The spread
of democracy increased demands from identity-based groups not only
state capacity for service delivery, and addressing
for participation in the constitution-making process, but, in many cases, the psychological and social wounds of war.
for greater local autonomy, constitutional protections and even ‘ethnic Thus, countries emerging from conflict face
federalism’. The outbreak of identity-based political mobilization ultimately
structural challenges and are especially prone
caused the collapse of the transitional Constituent Assembly and a long period
of government failure that, in effect, undermined initial efforts to redress deep to crises that threaten the re-emergence of
social divisions. widespread political violence and, potentially,
armed conflict.
Although a new constitution was finally created in 2015, Madhesi groups in the
Terai region rejected the final agreement on the internal or federal boundaries;
unrest rocked the region in 2016 and again in 2017, causing disruptions along Box 2.4 illustrates the turbulent nature of
the critical supply routes with India and further preventing the full realization Nepal’s road from civil war to democracy, as
of peace in Nepal. Local elections unfolded in 2017 amid continued negotiation
over the thorny issues of local powers, decentralized functions and federal
ethnic mobilization has prevented the full
boundaries. consolidation of democracy even though a new
constitution was finally agreed in late 2015.
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Social polarization increases the risk of unbalanced countries of the Middle East and Broad measures
conflict and complicates the processes of Iran, and North Africa (Ncube and Anyanwu to enhance
coalition formation and interest aggregation 2012). Following transitions, democracies social inclusion
that are inherent to democracy. Around the must deliver in inclusive ways—assuring and protect
world, social polarization appears to have fundamental livelihoods and a marketplace
the vulnerable
significantly affected democracy’s ability based on fairness—to maintain credibility.
to manage conflict and to help realize Addressing structural inequalities requires are central to
effective approaches to controversial policy political will and the inclusion of poor, democracy’s
issues (Esteban and Schneider 2008). Some marginalized, or disadvantaged individuals resilience
institutional choices, such as certain forms or groups in democratic processes. Thus,
of list proportional representation, have been broad measures to enhance social inclusion
criticized as encouraging fragmentation of the and protect the vulnerable are central to
party system—termed ‘polarized pluralism’— democracy’s resilience: the ideal of political
especially during economic hard times (Pelizzo equality is undermined unless all in society
and Babones 2007). can access the resources necessary to meet
basic human needs.
Scholars have long argued that identity-
based conflict can be mitigated by designing In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the
the right types of democratic institutions CEDAW, which established a set of rights for the
for the context, for example by adopting advancement of women’s human rights towards
inclusive, proportional (or non-winner-take- gender equality, including representation in
all) electoral processes, decentralizing power governance. In the early 2000s, Millennium
and autonomy, and creating a strong regime Development Goal number 3 set targets for the
of minority rights (Lijphart 2004; Reynolds expansion of women’s representation, which
2011). However, there remains a strong debate is commonly achieved through the adoption
between those who advocate ethnic power of women’s quotas (Jones 2009). There is no
sharing as the best solution to the challenges single, one-size-fits all approach to designing
of democracy in divided societies versus democracy to enhance women’s participation;
those who recommend institutions to create International IDEA has produced a handbook
cross-cutting ethnic coalitions of moderate, to help relate the type of quota to the electoral
centrist parties that seek to transcend ethnic system to help define a ‘best-fit’ approach
divides (Reilly 2006). The immigration (Larserud and Taphorn 2007).
societies of Canada and the USA, which have
taken different philosophical approaches While women have enjoyed modest gains
to managing diversity stemming from new in representation, there is only a weak
identity cleavages in society, are sometimes link between representation and influence
juxtaposed as a ‘mosaic’ approach (in Canada) (Ballington and Karam 2005). The
vs. a ‘melting pot’ approach in the USA percentage of women in parliament has
(Peach 2005). increased from 11 per cent in 1995 to 23
per cent in 2017 worldwide, but this has
Redressing women’s exclusions not necessarily translated into improvement
and inequalities in the human rights of women, especially
Deeply ingrained inequalities are synonymous those from minority groups (UN 2015; IPU
with demands for access to livelihoods, n.d.). Women’s movements have been critical
reliable service delivery and corruption- components of democratization efforts, often
free governance. Inequality and a lack of working across lines of conflict, historical
economic opportunities, especially for youth, divisions and ethnic divides. Women have
were at the heart of demands for democracy been successful at uniting across social,
in the demographically and economically economic and political divides in civil society
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It is possible to make critical differences in democratic Perhaps the most extensive application of
to design a set transition processes. Yet in Chile, Brazil, East this perspective is found in the electoral
of rules—or Germany and Poland, women’s groups have system design literature, which argues that
struggled to maintain their momentum after a country’s electoral system must be chosen
institutions—
the transition (Baldez 2003). based on a close context assessment of goals
to engineer such as accountability, inclusivity and gender
specific desirable Advances in women’s representation have equality (Norris 2004). Concerning other
outcomes in been seen in countries emerging from conflict, specific institutions, there is widespread
democracies where transitional processes may give women debate in the scholarly literature over what
such as the opportunity to mobilize and make gains types of institutions produce more resilient
inclusivity, more in representation and influence (Hughes democracies. Research on institutional design
and Tripp 2015). There is more widespread helps inform policy-related debates to help
meaningful
involvement of women in many post-conflict countries choose the ‘right’ institutions to create
representation or countries, such as Nepal, Rwanda and South more inclusive electoral processes (Reilly 2006;
accountability Africa, than in countries with similar levels Reilly and Nordlund 2008). Outside actors
of development that have not experienced such as bilateral development organizations,
conflict. Yet this surprisingly high level of transnational civil society and international
women’s representation in these post-conflict organizations often provide guidance on
countries may not be fully inclusive, and suitable institutions for a country’s context.
women may not necessarily have a strong
influence over policy outcomes (Berry 2015). Designing institutions during
Research has shown that when women have transitional times
greater rights, societies and states are more Scholars have identified ‘creative tension’
secure (Hudson 2007/8). between international actors, scholars
and national actors in designing resilient
2.7. Designing resilience: building institutions to promote peaceful, democratic
better democracies politics (Bastian and Luckham 2003).
The effectiveness of quotas in elections Outsiders bring ‘models and methods’, while
or within political parties for expanding local actors provide contextual knowledge
women’s participation affirms that elements and can better anticipate the effects of various
of democracy can be designed to achieve design approaches in invariably complex
desirable outcomes. But can democratic local circumstances. The principal concern is
institutions be designed to make democracy whether (and how) democracy can be designed
itself more resilient? Scholars of institutions to be resilient. The answer to this question may
have argued that it is possible to design a set involve an assumption that in some situations,
of rules—or institutions—to engineer specific such as conflict-affected countries where
desirable outcomes in democracies such as the UN has a strong presence, outsiders will
inclusivity, more meaningful representation or impose designs, but that institutional models
accountability. The ‘constitutional engineering’ will follow principles of national or local
approach, pioneered by the eminent Italian ownership. In February 2017, the UN Mission
political scientist Giovanni Sartori (1997), in Colombia, together with the government,
assumes that considerations such as presidential announced a new multi-sponsor peacebuilding
system design, electoral system design, or trust fund to support innovative and adaptive
the delimitation of internal boundaries and approaches to accessing justice, community
decentralized governance (such as in federal security and local governance in the country’s
systems) can promote specific desirable most conflict-affected (often remote) regions
outcomes in democratic systems (stability, (UN News Centre 2016). This approach
inclusion or ethnic politics). encourages broader democratic ownership of
transformative processes.
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While countries with long-established democratic translated into specific institutional designs for There are
institutions may rely on informal and more consensus-oriented democracy through arguably
innovative approaches to institutional comparative knowledge, the use of appropriate no single,
adaptation and redesign, transitional processes experts, understanding pre-existing institutions,
standardized
from authoritarian rule or civil war have and sequencing the pathways of reform and
offered opportunities to engage in innovative change (such as electoral processes) in a careful,
‘best’ forms
institutional design that makes democracy calibrated manner (Reynolds 2011). of institutions
more resilient. Institutions, once in place, often or models for
create their own incentives for endurance. International influence on the design of more resilient
Choosing the right institutions for the right institutions chosen during democratization democracies;
context, at the right moment, can yield ‘increasing (such as during constitution-making processes) innovation
returns’ in the coming years; institutional design occurs through internal decision-making
entails adapting
at such critical or ‘conjunctural’ moments sets that is aided by persuasion and knowledge
the stage for subsequent politics through ‘path transfer from international actors. Innovative
and adopting
dependency’ (Pierson 2000). approaches, such as the creation of the Mediation rules and
Support Unit for the UN’s top mediators, mechanisms that
Constitution-making processes have been appear to be an effective way to bridge the gap are appropriate
one method of revisiting the fundamental between the theory of institutional design and to the context
ground rules of democracy and building more its application in inevitably complex contexts. and the aim they
inclusive, and thus resilient, institutions.
are designed to
Institutional design in these contexts involves Informal institutions in multicultural
choosing the most fundamental structures of contexts
achieve
a political system in a manner that ensures The challenge of migration reflects the urgency
inclusivity, proportionality, and the influence of of innovatively designing new institutions to
minorities and marginalized groups in politics. address contemporary challenges in modern
Among the most critical choices are the design democracies. Migration is a global issue that has
of presidential and parliamentary institutions, strong local effects. In some contexts, migrants’
electoral systems, political party regulations, integration has not been well managed through
federalism and decentralization measures, existing institutions and policies, particularly
and special institutions to address particularly in the social sphere; migrant communities
contentious issues such as language, education often live in parallel, separate communities
and minority rights. to those of host-country citizens. Such social
distance between communities has led to a
There are arguably no single, standardized rise in anti-immigrant movements, vigilantism
‘best’ forms of institutions or models for and extremist political parties. Nationalism
more resilient democracies; innovation entails in response to migration has led to increasing
adapting and adopting rules and mechanisms securitization, exclusion and marginalization,
that are appropriate to the context and the which in turn worsens the problem of status
aim they are designed to achieve. For example, deprivation and fear by targeted minority
while proportionality is a critical principle communities. How might institutional design
for building more resilient democracy, it can help alleviate such problems?
be manifested in electoral systems in many
ways. Thus, it may be best to think in terms Newly designed institutions and processes
of principles to inform institutional design may be needed for political systems to adapt
during transitions, such as proportionality, to the social changes brought by migration—
decentralization, and proliferating points of increasing demographic diversity—if they are
power and authority, and multiplying points to be resilient over time. First and foremost,
of interaction, bargaining and mutual problem permanent migrants and their communities
solving. These principles can in turn be must be integrated into the broader
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New, innovative community, as well as the regional and national engagement (for example, in civil society or in
avenues of voice, social fabrics. Social integration requires the marketplace) and designing programmes
representation economic integration: economic exchange and and initiatives to build on them. From inter-
interdependency often facilitates tolerance, as faith dialogues to ‘environmental peacebuilding’
and participation
mutual interests and understanding develop (which focuses on a common interest in
are needed to across group lines. The guarantee of fundamental environmental sustainability), social cohesion
open cultures freedoms is vital: when migrants are permanent programmes have been applied in many diverse
and institutions ‘second-class’ citizens, integration falters and countries as a core approach to building the
to allow these frustration builds. Such has been the case of the societal base upon which democratization—
communities to Palestinian migrants in Lebanon, where close and the ‘extension’ of the state to the local
be heard cooperation and interaction at the local level level—can occur.
is critical to maintaining local peace even as the
lack of citizenship is an enduring injustice to Examining social dynamics as the basis of
Palestinian refugees. Like in Lebanon, in some overcoming division and fragility is a very
situations informal institutions emerge to open useful complement to formal statebuilding
lines of dialogue and mechanisms for economic and democratization efforts with local
integration and service delivery in the absence initiatives (Marc et al. 2013). For example, in
of formal mechanisms and feasible pathways to conflict-affected countries the proliferation of
citizenship (Yassin, Stel and Rassi 2016). peacemaking and peacebuilding institutions
at various levels (which are sometimes
Building resilience in multicultural contexts, overlapping and mutually reinforcing) can
whether for migrants or across ethnic and help build resilience by providing multiple
other identity-based divides, requires thinking avenues in which to address grievances or
beyond traditional democratic institutions disputes before they escalate into violence
and processes of adaptation and reform (Wolff (Odendaal 2013).
2011). New, innovative avenues of voice,
representation and participation are needed For the long term, a more coherent global
to open cultures and institutions to allow institutional framework is needed to establish
these communities to be heard. Approaches a more effective and humane system of
to engaging with migrants and their managing migration. Until then, steps need to
communities are also applicable to addressing be taken to combat xenophobia and facilitate
the challenges of exclusion, disadvantage and migrants’ economic, social, and political
marginalization in today’s ‘post-globalization’ integration and rights. Measures to design a
societies. Addressing exclusion is critical more resilient approach include considering
for developing sustainable approaches to voting rights for migrants at the local level,
citizenship consistent with international reforming citizenship laws to clarify and
human rights norms. International rights law facilitate pathways to naturalization, engaging
defines forced population transfers as a crime with diaspora communities and leaders (e.g.
against humanity, and provides additional religious leaders), and expanding opportunities
protection for particularly vulnerable migrants for external voting so that migrants have
such as refugees. political rights in their countries of origin
(Ellis et al. 2007).
Strengthening social cohesion has become
a critical conceptual and practice-oriented 2.8. Supporting resilience: regional
approach to designing formal and informal, and international responses
direct and indirect approaches to building trust Although responses can be uneven, outsiders
within societies (Jensen 2010). Social cohesion regularly act to support democracy within
approaches emphasize analysing the nexus countries. Democracy building has emerged
and networks of cross-group coordination and as a significant global ‘regime’ or set of
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International IDEA Chapter 2
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negotiated international norms, rules and methods that are coercively imposed on local Building resilient
best practices, mechanisms for international contexts (e.g. through force or conditionality) democracies
monitoring and observation, and ‘reactions that do not fit. Local contexts may feature requires a
to non-compliance’ together with initiatives political fragmentation, weak state capacity,
continuing focus
and efforts to build or develop local capacities restricted space for civil society, ethnic and
through development assistance. Democracy religious division and intolerance, institutional
on reacting
building is closely related to the international logjams and disempowered citizens (Carothers to democratic
global human rights regime, since democracy 2016). International democracy builders have crises when they
promotion norms and the post-World War II been criticized for placing too much emphasis occur. Equally,
human rights regime developed concurrently on electoral processes, and neglecting the outsiders seeking
(Farer 2004). The UN’s role in democracy need for political pluralism and strong rule- to help safeguard
building has increasingly focused on the of-law institutions, and for paying insufficient
democracy
intersections between democracy and human attention to the realities of local power
rights, democracy and conflict prevention, and dynamics; the concept of ‘good governance’
internally need a
democracy and development. has been described as under-appreciating local long-term vision.
realities (Grindle 2017). The focus on
While there is no definition of or universal international
agreement on democracy in international law, The focus on international democracy building democracy
it is enshrined as a principle in a myriad of has turned to the critical role of regional building has
covenants, charters, and norms of global and organizations. At the forefront of norms
turned to the
regional international organizations. International to safeguard democracy are the evolving
solidarity and common action to ‘protect’ ‘automatic’ regional reactions to changes of
critical role
democracy are equally essential to its definition. power, as seen in the Economic Community of regional
In many regional organizations, democracy of West African States (ECOWAS) response to organizations
is a fundamental ground rule of international the Gambia crisis mentioned below.
cooperation, which is at times—and often
unevenly—enforced in reaction to breaches The Organization of American States (OAS)
of these norms, such as electoral misconduct ‘Santiago Commitment’ of 1991 paved the
(Donno 2013; Montero et al. 2016). way for regional organizations to play a role
in safeguarding democracy. It called on the
Democracy assistance at a crossroads OAS to initiate immediate action if there is
International and regional organizations work an ‘interruption’ in democracy within any
to define, promote, monitor and—at times— member state (Montero et al. 2016; Pevehouse
enforce democracy norms in many different 2005: 130). The 2001 OAS Inter-American
ways. Building resilient democracies requires Democratic Charter was a landmark norm to
a continuing focus on reacting to democratic safeguard democracy through such ostensibly
crises when they occur. Equally, outsiders automatic regional responses; it identifies
seeking to help safeguard democracy internally the conditions under which the OAS would
need a long-term vision: if democratic resilience intervene to protect democracy in the region.
is primarily an internal (or endogenous) quality, During the 2016 Venezuelan constitutional
it must develop organically from within. crisis, some members of parliament in that
At the same time, the growth and science of country sought to invoke the charter to
public administration has developed extensive trigger an OAS intervention; Pope Francis
professionalized knowledge and best practices instead stepped in to help mediate the crisis
in the area of impartial governance. (Herrero and Malkin 2016). After the failed
mediation attempt, Venezuela’s multifaceted
A principal concern about international economic, political and social crisis deepened
democracy-building efforts is their efficacy, in April 2017 over a decision by the Supreme
particularly when outsiders have models and Court—widely seen as loyal to the ruling
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Participation Nicolás Maduro administration—to assume international community debates about lifting
in regional the powers of Congress. Anti-‘dictator’ protests targeted sanctions against the country for prior
surged and turned violent as police clashed restrictions on democracy. While the OSCE’s
organizations
with protestors across the country. Office of Democratic Institutions and Human
and initiatives Rights determined that the 2015 polls were
may represent a OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro called better than previous electoral cycles—including
critical avenue in March 2017 to suspend Venezuela’s the fact that two opposition candidates won
for inculcating membership over the regime’s unwillingness seats in the 110-member parliament—they
democratic norms to hold new elections. However, the body found ongoing restrictions and procedural
within countries; could not agree as some member state friends irregularities (OSCE 2017). In 2016, the
of the embattled Venezuelan regime blocked EU and several states elsewhere eased some
embeddedness
the suspension (Oré 2017). The OAS has been sanctions against Belarus.
in regional an arena of fierce debate over proposed US
organizations sanctions against the Maduro administration. Safeguarding democracy regionally:
may have a For its part, the Venezuelan Government crisis response, long-term vision
safeguarding and its regional supporters have pursued a Crisis response measures for safeguarding
effect for strong anti-imperialist narrative in relation democracy vary widely, and successful
democracy to the legitimacy of Maduro’s proposed new interventions such as the crisis management
constitution, the country’s economic free in the Gambia are by no means uniform
fall and related humanitarian crisis, and the either within the region or globally. As UN
conflict between protestors and the police that Special Representative of the Secretary-
killed 70 in early 2017. The Vatican proposed General Mohammed Ibn Abbas observed,
new elections as a way out of the crisis (Esteves former President Yahya Gammeh ‘didn’t have
2017). In July 2017, the disputed election to too many friends’ (Searcey 2017). Coercive
Venezuela’s Constituent Assembly led to an regional and global reactions to democratic
opposition boycott and public protests. backsliding remain uneven, both in terms of
regional spread and the types of responses.
Regional and subregional organizations such
as the OAS, the Organization for Security and Electoral mediation is a critical area of overall
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), ECOWAS, international (and often regional) engagement
the Commonwealth, the Southern African to safeguard democracy (Kane and Haysom
Development Community and the Association 2016). Regional and subregional organizations
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Africa, for example, increasingly partner
Parliamentarians for Human Rights Forum with local civil society electoral mediators in
have played a variety of roles in helping to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),
safeguard and protect democracy in times Lesotho and Kenya to promote subregional
of peril in defence of regional democratic and continental norms that unconstitutional
norms. Indeed, participation in such regional seizures of power are replaced with multiparty
organizations and initiatives may represent elections (Shale and Gerenge 2017). In the
a critical avenue for inculcating democratic Democratic Republic of Congo’s constitutional
norms within countries and embeddedness in crisis of 2016–17, as in Venezuela, the local
regional organizations may have a safeguarding bishops of the Catholic Church stepped
effect for democracy; there has been learning in to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the
within and across regional organizations constitutional crisis created by the delay of
on how best to act collectively to defend elections in 2017.
democracy (Cordenillo and Gardes 2013). For
example, OSCE election monitoring of the Building more resilient democracy requires
October 2015 presidential and parliamentary immediate responses when democracy is in
elections in Belarus was critical to informing crisis, complemented by long-term efforts
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Building Curbing corruption and state capture: pro-poor service delivery, especially at the
more resilient accountability local level, where the state often directly
democracy • Combat the influence of money in politics provides services and public goods. Re-
through holistic, integrity-oriented approaches dedication to local governance capacities
requires
that shift the culture of politics from personal to deliver essential services such as energy,
immediate enrichment and rent seeking to public service water and sanitation is needed to reduce
responses when and trust. Such approaches and networks poverty and thereby decrease the structural
democracy should work domestically and globally to risks for democracy related to inequality.
is in crisis, understand, share, uncover and confront •
Take innovative approaches to engaging
complemented illicit networks through regional information non-citizen communities by creating social
by long-term sharing, close engagement between state integration programmes to prevent the
actors and community-based organizations, alienation and radicalization of non-
efforts to build
and market-based assessments of the local citizens, supplemented by limited or local
local capacities conditions that enable illicit networks to voting rights and structured community-
for safeguarding infiltrate government. level dialogue to give marginalized
democracy • Adopt new mechanisms to give meaning to communities representation and voice.
transparency such as so-called sunshine
provisions, which allow easy access to Deepening and expanding participation
government information and technology- • In conflict-affected contexts, building resilience
based reporting systems to track donations into transitional institutions, such as constitution-
to parties, candidates and civil society making bodies and the new state, and emphasize
organizations. Laws and accountability continued negotiation and consensus-oriented
processes should be extended to improve policymaking. Methodologies for social
transparency from national- to local-level assessment and cultivation of representation
politics, where capture and corruption in all segments of society are needed to
may also be entrenched. Countries with improve the quality of participation in
high natural resource export revenues post-conflict contexts.
have become more resilient by adopting • Ensure that civil society can participate in
wealth-sharing institutions and procedures and perform their watchdog function in
for government and citizen participation relation to government decision-making
in global governance regimes such as processes to enable long-term democratic
the Extractive Industries Transparency resilience. Preventing backsliding in
Initiative or the Convention on the democracy requires a resilient civil society,
International Trade in Endangered Species. strong institutions, unending resolve and,
at times, bold action. A resilient democracy
Democracy that delivers: an inclusive, requires citizen commitment to balancing
capable state ostensibly powerful institutions. Safeguarding
• To reduce inequality, a renewed focus on local democracy requires reinvigorating civil
governance service delivery and optimizing society participation, so that citizens acting
public services is needed. There must be clear equally with the powerful can ensure the
electoral and political incentives to adopt popular control of governance.
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67
Chapter 3
Chapter
TABLE 3.1
Country (region) Democratic backsliding Type of democratic Analysis period Analysis period
event year backsliding event (GSoD indices) (perception surveys)
Notes: The starting year for the analysis period (perception surveys) is the year prior to the event year for which data are available in the perceptions survey; the final year is the most recent
one for which data are available in the perceptions survey.
Sources: Bermeo, N., ‘On democratic backsliding’, Journal of Democracy, 27/1 (2016), pp. 5–19; Ginsburg, T., Melton, J. and Elkins, Z., ‘On the evasion of executive term limits’, William & Mary
Law Review, 52 (2011), pp. 1807–69, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1683594>.
72
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First Edition 2017 Threats from within: democracy’s resilience to backsliding
The analysis compares the sample to a control Costa Rica (Latin America 1995–2015 1996–2015
group of countries (with comparable human and the Caribbean)
development and historical connections) in
Ghana (Africa) 1999–2015 1999–2014
which these trends did not occur (see Table
3.2). While they may have experienced India (Asia and the 1995–2015 1995–2012
democratic setbacks during those periods, Pacific)
they did not experience a backsliding event as
Romania (Europe) 1991–2015 1995–2012
defined above. The starting point of the analysis
corresponds to the years of data availability in South Africa (Africa) 1999–2015 1999–2014
the survey sources. The same years were used
for the analysis of the GSoD indices data and Republic of Korea (Asia 1995–2015 1996–2010
and the Pacific)
the perception surveys to ensure homogeneity.
Slovenia (Europe) 1991–2015 1995–2011
Section 3.2 explores six types of democratic
backsliding, focusing on the three most Uruguay (Latin America 1995–2015 1995–2015
frequently observed in the modern era. Section and the Caribbean)
3.3 examines the effect of modern backsliding Notes: Regarding the analysis period for the GSoD indices, all countries within each region have the same start-
on the quality of democracy, while Section 3.4 ing year. These periods also cover the entire span in the sample countries for each region starting with the first
event. Regarding the analysis period for the perception surveys, the measurement aggregates scores from the
explores the relationship between backsliding source surveys for their questions ‘is democracy your preferred system of government?’ and ‘is it good having a
democratic political system?’
and public support for democracy. Section 3.5
presents conclusions and recommendations. Sources: World Values Survey, ‘Wave 6: 2010–2014’, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp>; Afro-
barometer 2016; Latinobarometro 2016.
For additional information on the concepts
discussed in this chapter see Measuring Public
Support for Democracy: A Resource Guide imminently restore constitutional democracy;
(Schwertheim 2017). (e) executive aggrandizement, whereby elected
executives gradually weaken constraints on
3.2. Democratic backsliding: concepts their power and increase institutional obstacles
and questions to political opposition; and (f ) the strategic
Bermeo (2016) distinguishes between six types manipulation of elections. Bermeo concludes
of backsliding: (a) a classic coup d’état, in which that the first three forms of backsliding are
a sitting executive is ousted by the military or becoming rarer, and that the latter three
other state elites; (b) an executive coup, in persist or have increased in frequency; for
which a freely elected executive seizes power this reason, this chapter refers to the latter
unilaterally by suspending the constitution and three as modern backsliding.
establishing a rule-by-decree dictatorship; (c)
election day vote fraud; (d) a promissory coup, Instigators of modern backsliding manipulate,
which is framed as a defence of democracy and rather than abolish, democratic mechanisms
accompanied by a promise to hold elections and and institutions—for example by changing
73
Chapter 3 The Global State of Democracy 2017
Threats from within: democracy’s resilience to backsliding Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
TRADITIONAL
DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING
TRADITIONAL
DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING Election-day voter fraud
Coups d'état
cy Dem
ocra ocra
cy
Dem
MODERN
DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING
MODERN
DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING Executive aggrandizement
Strategic manipulation
of elections
74
International IDEA Chapter 3
First Edition 2017 Threats from within: democracy’s resilience to backsliding
Constitutional rules provide constraints on Electoral laws were changed to significantly restrict the ability to alter the
those in power; their existence assumes that current power structure. Constituencies were redefined to favour candidates
executive leaders may seek to usurp public of the ruling party, and new legal provisions ensured that the votes from
compensatory lists would go to the winning party (Schepple 2014a, 2014b).
power for personal or partisan gains. Electoral
The Electoral Commission was also populated with loyal party members.
rules, which are a subset of constitutional
rules, provide the means for individuals and The public media company, officially an independent outlet, was placed
groups to compete for access to power through under government control and regulation, which impeded impartial,
analytical or critical assessments of its policies (Howard 2014; Sipos 2015).
the currency of public support. Both are
The independent press was forced to censor itself following enormous fines
prime targets for those seeking to weaken the and the loss of state-sponsored advertisement, while a national media
democratic system, but the modern backslider and telecommunications agency was established to exercise wide-ranging
seeks to manipulate, rather than abolish, them censoring and sanctions to prevent any negative press coverage of the
government (Freedom House 2016).
(Bermeo 2016).
Thus, without breaking any laws and with no election day fraud, Fidesz
Constitutional rules are changed either subverted the system through both executive aggrandizement and
electoral system manipulation to significantly roll back Hungary’s
through the constitutionally prescribed
democratic progress.
procedure for amendment or by appealing
to a popular base to replace the constitution.
Abolishing or extending executive term limits
is often a key feature of backsliding. Modern
75
Chapter 3 The Global State of Democracy 2017
Threats from within: democracy’s resilience to backsliding Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
ac y Dem
ocr ocra
cy
Impartial
Dem Electoral participation
NO EFFEC T
Public order
administration Direct democracy DECRE A SE
DECRE A SE NO EFFEC T
Participatory
engagement Subnational elections
Representative NO EFFEC T
government Civil society participation
DECRE A SE NO EFFEC T
Social rights
and equality
Fundamental DECRE A SE
rights
DECRE A SE
Checks on
government
DECRE A SE
76
International IDEA Chapter 3
First Edition 2017 Threats from within: democracy’s resilience to backsliding
-0.007
-0.019
3.3. Consequences of backsliding -0.025
equality, and public order). indicate the change in the control countries. A substantial change is defined as 0.1 points on the scale ranging
from 0 to 1, and 0 to -1, i.e. 10 per cent of the scale range. Negative scores illustrate decline, and positive scores
indicate gains. The height of the bars indicates the score change between the event years and 2015.
Implications for the quality of democracy Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Representative Government Index, Fundamental Rights Index, Checks on Government
Index, Impartial Administration Index).
Do democratic backsliding events—as defined
in Section 3.2—always decrease the quality of
a country’s democracy, particularly with respect the control countries (presented in Table 3.2).
to representative government, fundamental These data therefore suggest that there is some
rights, checks on government and impartial correlation between the overall deterioration of
administration? Figure 3.1 compares the GSoD these democratic attributes and the democratic
indices scores of the study sample and control backsliding events described in this chapter.
group in these four attributes.
The fifth attribute of democracy, Participatory
All four dimensions of democracy Engagement, shows a different trajectory.
(Representative Government, Fundamental Figure 3.2 illustrates that none of the four
Rights, Checks on Government and Impartial subattributes used to measure participatory
Administration) on average stagnated or engagement (civil society participation,
declined in the aftermath of the democratic electoral participation, direct democracy
backsliding incidents (detailed in Table 3.1). and subnational elections) suffered a
Importantly, this shows a trend reversal in those significant comparative change after countries
countries, since before the incidents the four experienced democratic backsliding. While
attributes were improving. Those reversals were there was a reversal compared to before the
not part of a broader trend: these attributes of backsliding events, the trends seem to have
democracy improved or remained unchanged in followed the broader patterns observed among
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Chapter 3 The Global State of Democracy 2017
Threats from within: democracy’s resilience to backsliding Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
0.1
Another interesting finding is the extent to
which impartiality in the administration
0.0
0.009 0.008 0.009 changed after backsliding, particularly as
-0.006-0.006 0.000
-0.034
it relates to corruption and the predictable
-0.1 -0.088
enforcement of public authority. Figure 3.3
illustrates an average comparative decrease
-0.2 in the predictable enforcement of public
Civil Society Electoral Direct Subnational authority after the backsliding events of 0.03,
Participation Participation Democracy Elections compared with complete stagnation in the
control countries. By contrast, backsliding
Sample before event Sample after event Control
seems to have had no significant effect on
Notes: The country selection for the sample and control countries, as well as the starting years of analysis for each,
are detailed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, and span until 2015. The green bars indicate the change in the sample countries
corruption levels in the sample countries
before the events, the blue bars indicate the change in the sample countries after the events, and the orange bars (Figure 3.3). This trend also applies to non-
indicate the change in the control countries. A substantial change is defined as 0.1 points on the scale ranging
from 0 to 1, and 0 to -1, i.e. 10 per cent of the scale range. Negative scores illustrate decline, and positive scores backsliding countries, which indicates that
indicate gains. The height of the bars indicates the score change between the event years and 2015.
resilient democracies are able to resist setbacks
Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Civil Society Participation Index, Electoral Participation, Direct Democracy Index, Sub-
national Elections Index).
in curbing corruption fuelled by democratic
backsliding events.
In addition, there may be a relationship Sample before event Sample after event Control
between democratic backsliding and a
Notes: Data on public order aggregates the following indicators: (a) internal conflict, (b) major episodes of political
decline in development. Figure 3.5 illustrates violence, (c) conflict incidence, (d) intrastate war, (e) monopoly on the use of force and (f) conflict intensity. The
that backsliding depressed these countries’ country selection for the sample and control countries, as well as the starting years of analysis for each, are de-
tailed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. The green bar indicates the change in the sample countries before the events, the blue
performance in social rights and equality (the bar indicates the change in the sample countries after the events and the orange bar indicates the change in the
control countries. A substantial change is defined as 0.1 points on the scale ranging from 0 to 1, and 0 to -1, i.e. 10
extent to which basic welfare and social and per cent of the scale range. Negative scores illustrate decline, and positive scores indicate gains. The height of the
bars indicates the score change between the event years and 2012.
political equality are realized) by nearly half, on
average, compared to before the incidents and Sources: Political Risk Services (n.d.); Marshall (n.d.); UCDP (n.d.); Correlates of War Project (n.d.); Bertelsmann
Stiftung (n.d).
to control countries.
Legitimacy is important at the international Sample before event Sample after event Control
level: regional organizations have responded to
the increasing occurrence of coups by asserting Notes: The country selection for the sample and control countries, as well as the starting years of analysis for each,
that ‘unconstitutional transfers of power’ are detailed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, and span until 2015. The green bar indicates the change in the sample countries
before the events, the blue bar indicates the change in the sample countries after the events and the orange bar in-
warrant sanctions, including the suspension dicates the change in the control countries. A substantial change is defined as 0.1 points on the scale ranging from
0 to 1, and 0 to -1, i.e. 10 per cent of the scale range. Negative scores illustrate decline, and positive scores indicate
of membership until constitutional rule is gains. The height of the bars indicates the score change between the event years and 2015.
reinstated (OAS 2001; AU 2007; ECOWAS Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Social Rights and Equality Index).
2001). It is harder for regional organizations
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Chapter 3 The Global State of Democracy 2017
Threats from within: democracy’s resilience to backsliding Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
to sanction modern backsliders who formally elections provide both an opportunity for
comply with their own constitutions, such contest—however diminished—and a rallying
as Hungary’s Viktor Orbán (Choudhry and point for the opposition. The endpoint of
Bisarya 2014; Hedling 2014). modern backsliding is thus not full-scale
authoritarianism, but weakened democracy in
Since modern backsliders must obey the which ‘even if the cards are stacked in favour
formal rules of the game, they leave open of autocratic institutions, the persistence of
avenues in which to challenge their power meaningful democratic institutions creates
(Bermeo 2016). While they may violently arenas through which opposition forces may—
crush dissent and political opposition, they and frequently do—pose significant challenges’
must also continue to hold elections. Therefore (Levitsky and Way 2002). Boxes 3.3 and 3.4
BOX 3.3
Modern backsliding and resistance efforts: the ‘Chavista’ majority in Congress could appoint many political
authorities, including judges and the authorities in charge of
the case of Venezuela
electoral institutions (Tanaka 2006: 47–77).
Between 1958 and 1993 Venezuela’s democracy was perceived President Chávez enjoyed broad electoral support, which
as relatively stable and highly institutionalized. While there legitimated his mandate in practice. He and his party won the
were threats of backsliding during that period, serious signs of 1998, 2000, 2006 and 2012 presidential elections; the 2000, 2005
erosion began in 1993, when Rafael Caldera, an old establishment and 2010 congressional elections; the 1999 referendum to call a
figure, was elected president as an independent candidate. In Constituent Assembly and later approve the new Constitution; the
1998, Hugo Chávez, a political outsider and former soldier who 2004 presidential recall referendum; and the 2009 referendum
attempted a coup d’état against former President Carlos Andrés to allow the re-election of all authorities without restrictions.
Pérez in 1992 (García Marco 2017), became president due to a The president nonetheless lost the 2007 referendum that tried to
severe economic crisis and divisions within the main parties change the Constitution to declare Venezuela a socialist state and
(Corrales and Penfold 2011). extend the president’s term limit, a defeat he accepted (Jiménez
and Hidalgo 2014).
In the 1998 election, President’s Chávez’s party, the Movement of
the Fifth Republic (Movimiento de la Quinta República) received After Chávez’s death in 2013, President Nicolás Maduro, his
20 per cent of the vote and 35 seats in the Lower House (Molina political successor, won the 2013 election. Some level of
2002: 227). The president began his administration with high democratic resistance materialized in the 2015 parliamentary
approval ratings (The Economist 1999), which gave him the elections, when the opposition party, the Democratic Unity
political power to call for a referendum to elect a National Roundtable (Mesa de Unidad Democrática), won a majority of
Constituent Assembly responsible for writing a new constitution 109 out of 167 seats (BBC News 2015b). Unfortunately that led
(Greste 1999). The referendum passed with more than 80 per to a counter-reaction. The Supreme Court, controlled by the
cent of the votes (El Mundo 1999). In the Constituent Assembly government’s political supporters, attempted to seize the National
election held a few months later, the majoritarian electoral Assembly’s powers, leaving a weakened legislature (Krauze 2017).
system enabled President Chávez, with 66 per cent of the In addition, subnational elections scheduled for December 2016
vote, to control 95 per cent of the seats (121 of 128). Thus his were suspended without justification, several political opponents
‘Chavism’ movement was able to draft a constitution without were killed or jailed (Lozano 2017), and a National Constitutional
having to make concessions to the opposition. On 15 December Assembly was elected to redraft the Constitution in what the
1999 the new constitution was approved in a referendum with opposition considers an attempt by President Maduro to avoid
more than 70 per cent of the votes (El Mundo 1999). elections he would likely lose (Casey 2017). However, the election
of the Consitutional Assembly has not been widely recorgnized by
A few days later the Constituent Assembly dissolved all other the international community or internally by the opposition, amid
public authorities, including the Congress, the Supreme Court allegations of electoral tampering (BBC News 2017e; Semana 2017;
of Justice and all state Legislative Assemblies (Méndez la Smith-Spark and D’Agostino 2017; The Guardian 2017).
Fuente 2007: 115–47), thus disrupting the country’s power
balance and the autonomy of democratic institutions. The The government has managed to curtail the resistance to limit
national and local elections of July 2000 further opened the these democratic reversals, notably internally by the judiciary (led
door for President Chavez to build an almost absolute authority by the general prosecutor) and externally by the Organization of
with few institutional counterweights, all within existing American States (OAS)—through a series of political manoeuvres
constitutional and electoral frameworks. After Chávez was re- (El País 2017; Lafuete and Meza 2017). Violence and intimidation
elected with 60 per cent of the vote, and his party obtained more have not silenced protesters (Sanchez and Armario 2017). The
than 48 per cent of the congressional seats (Molina 2002: 227), people remain the defenders of Venezuela’s democracy.
80
International IDEA Chapter 3
First Edition 2017 Threats from within: democracy’s resilience to backsliding
3.4. Resistance to backsliding: a case Modern backsliding and resistance efforts: the case of Sri Lanka
for democratic resilience
Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected president of Sri Lanka in 2005 in the
Is democratic backsliding correlated with midst of a civil war and lost his seat in the 2015 elections following
declining popular support for democracy? accusations of human rights violations and corruption, as well as ‘executive
Two classic essays on democracy provide aggrandisement’. The civil war lasted nearly three decades and claimed an
estimated 100,000 lives. It ended with a government victory in May 2009
opposing visions of popular sentiments within
(Insight on Conflict 2013).
backsliding regimes: De Tocqueville’s passages
on ‘soft despotism’ in Democracy in America In September 2010, the Parliament approved a constitutional change that
(De Tocqueville 2003 [1835]) and Vaclav allowed President Rajapaksa to seek an unlimited number of terms and gave
the central government control over independent bodies such as the police,
Havel’s The Power of the Powerless (1992). the judiciary, the Electoral Commission and the National Human Rights
Commission (HRW 2016). In January 2013, Rajapaksa orchestrated the
De Tocqueville posits that citizens have impeachment of a Supreme Court justice after she overruled one of his
family’s patronage schemes (Aneez and Sirilal 2013). After nine years of
competing desires—to be free, and to have
increasingly autocratic rule, President Rajapaksa and his family controlled
a leader—that they balance by electing a nearly all aspects of the Sri Lankan state. The cabinet appointed in
despotic leader who dictates public policy 2007 was one of the largest in the world, with 52 ministers and deputy
based on his or her whims, but returns to the ministers (BBC News 2007).
In countries citizens have a key role to play. The fuel decline in support for democracy. Figure 3.6
experiencing that ignites collective and institutional action illustrates how people’s positive regard for
democratic against state abuses, in this case democratic democracy in the sample and control countries
backsliding, starts with the citizen. The media changed in the subsequent surveys with
backsliding,
typically pays attention when people mobilize, respect to the situation before and during the
people’s positive and institutions pay attention when the media backsliding events.
perception reports on those concerns (World Bank 2017:
of democracy 241). People’s perceptions of democracy in A possible explanation for this contrast is that
as a system of the aftermath of democratic backsliding thus people may better appreciate what they do not
government have the potential to shape their actions against have. In this case, democratic backsliding would
increased backsliding, which is a crucial element of seem to make citizens realize that democracy is
democracy’s resilience. preferable to other types of government, while
in places where democracy has not suffered
In countries experiencing democratic as much, people might take it for granted.
backsliding, people’s positive perception of While drawing causal explanations is beyond
democracy as a system of government increased this survey, the critical finding for democracy
(on average by more than 8 per cent), while assistance providers is that, in nearly all cases,
control countries experienced an average democratic backsliding does not indicate a
FIGURE 3.6 decline in popular support for democracy,
but actually the opposite. The findings
People’s change in their positive perception of democracy further suggest that resistance to democratic
backsliding is emerging from within those
10.0% countries—Havel’s greengrocers.
8.4%
8.0% While US President Donald Trump’s election
does not fully meet the criteria of democratic
6.0% backsliding in this chapter, people from both
parties, scholars and the media sounded
Percentage change
BOX 3.5
Democratic resilience through civil society: limit media access to Parliament (Amnesty International 2017b:
298). These actions, together with other bills that extended the
the case of Poland
state’s right to monitor citizens and limited citizens’ freedom
of assembly, ignited mass protests in Warsaw and other main
Poland’s peaceful transition to democracy, consolidation of
cities. Thousands of women gathered in the streets dressed in
democratic institutions and successful integration into the EU
black to protest highly restrictive draft anti-abortion legislation.
have contributed to a sense of national pride and admiration
This ultimately led to a rolling back of the bill (Borys 2016), but
by other countries yearning for a similar transformation.
other repressive measures continued igniting protests in 2017.
After decades of oppression from its Soviet-backed regimes,
Notably, a new draft bill intended to end the terms of members
Poland showed the world that civil society, trade unions and
of the National Council of the Judiciary and give Parliament
regular citizens could make a difference by uniting forces in
powers to choose most of its new members, while a new draft
their demand for democracy, human rights and an improved
law would have allowed Parliament to appoint Supreme Court
quality of life. Seen by many as the musterkind among
judges and put courts under increased government control (Al
the countries that joined the EU in 2004, Poland seemed
Jazeera 2017). Protesters and EU criticism over the proposed
at the time to be on a steady road to economic growth,
legislation managed to put enough pressure on the government
political stability and democratic consolidation (Ekiert and
to block them. However, one additional law allowing the justice
Soroka 2013).
minister to appoint and remove senior judges was ratified
In recent years political developments have increasingly (Reuters 2017).
raised concerns, causing observers to question whether
Polish democracy is temporarily diverging from its path or if a Following the Polish tradition of historical civic movements,
democratic U-turn has commenced. Since its election with an such as the Workers’ Defense Committee and the Committee for
absolute majority of seats in 2015, the ruling Law and Justice Social Self-defence in the 1970s (Lipski 1985) and Solidarity in
Party has pursued changes to the country’s checks and balances the 1980s, the Committee for Defence of Democracy (KOD) was
system. Just a few months after its election, the government formed in direct response to the perceived degradation of the
passed bills that reduced the authority of the Constitutional Polish democracy (KOD 2017).
Court and its ability to oversee Parliament, manoeuvred the
appointment of the Constitutional Tribunal justices and limited The KOD quickly rose to become a nationwide movement,
the court’s constitutional review powers. Other laws were uniting citizens in protests against government decisions that
passed enabling the government to bring public media under were deemed unlawful, which limited civil liberties, undermined
state control by appointing the heads of public TV and radio, as democracy and opposed EU principles (Eriksson 2016). Through
well as civil service directors (BBC News 2016). The European its independence from any political party (and its clear refusal
Commission expressed its concerns about what it perceived to become a party), as well as its active media and social
as being ‘a systemic threat to the rule of law in Poland’, and media presence and inclusive and decentralized organization,
urged the Polish Government on two consecutive occasions the KOD soon became the representative of an urban and well-
to reverse its decisions, guarantee the independence of the educated middle class (Eriksson 2016). Although not yet fully
Constitutional Tribunal and comply with the EU’s democratic supported by the largely conservative, rural communities, the
requirements (European Commission 2016). KOD continues to grow as a political force in Poland, showing
the government and the world that just as democracy was once
In December 2016 there was deadlock in Parliament when attained through citizen organizations, it might be safeguarded
opposition parties besieged the chamber after being excluded in the same way.
from the budget voting, following their protests of a decision to
initial stages of what appears to be executive the country’s existing constitutional and legal
aggrandizement, while even authoritarian structures. While constitutional and electoral
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe must mechanisms that should safeguard the delicate
still hold elections, and allow some forms of balance of power within the state are subject
political competition and protest to legitimize to manipulation during backsliding, they still
his stay in power. help limit power grabs (Global Commission
on Elections, Democracy and Security 2012).
Checks and balances: limiting For example, Gambian President Yahya
democratic erosion caused by Jammeh was ousted in January 2017 after
executive aggrandizement two decades in power when he lost his bid for
Modern democratic backsliding involves the re-election (BBC News 2017a). His attempt
excessive expansion of executive power within to stay in power was met with troops from
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Chapter 3 The Global State of Democracy 2017
Threats from within: democracy’s resilience to backsliding Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Democracy’s Most modern backsliders want to avoid the grounds for further research. For example,
resilience is political costs of descending into complete the variation in the effects of backsliding in
bolstered not authoritarianism; they seek, at most, a hybrid different dimensions of democracy, and the
regime that maintains some elements of different regional patterns observed in this
as an inherent
constitutional democratic governance, such respect, suggest areas for more targeted and
characteristic as political parties, elections or independent tailored responses to threats to democracy. For
of democratic courts. This, in turn, leaves opportunities for example, the greater impact of backsliding
governance, but democratic bounce-back, not least because—as on civil liberties than on participatory
because it is an the data show—backsliding does not depress engagement might—with more detailed
important shared participatory engagement. More importantly, research—provide actionable insights into
international backsliding is accompanied by an increase in how best to protect democratic societies under
support for democracy as the preferred political threat. Recommendations on confronting and
value
system. The findings on public perceptions resisting backsliding follow.
of democracy in the aftermath of backsliding
suggest that the idea of democracy is well Democracy assistance providers
entrenched around the world; when it is taken • Avoid conflating democratic backsliding with
away, rather than giving up on democracy, a decrease in support for democracy. The
citizens feel more attached to it than ever. data show that the opposite is true, which
indicates the importance of maintaining the
Thus, democracy’s fragility should—and support of the international community,
must—be acknowledged as a cause for constant particularly in cases at risk of, or at the
vigilance and support, but its resilience is also onset of, backsliding. This can be critical in
clear to those who choose to look for it. This supporting local resistance.
resilience is rooted not only in the details of • Look beyond democratic transitions, and
institutional design, systems of representation focus increasingly on democratic consolidation
or legal protections for minorities, but in the as well as democratic success stories. Some
very idea of democracy as a form of legitimate countries have shown themselves to be
rule. This idea has become a norm to such an susceptible to backsliding, so prevention,
extent that would-be authoritarians are often sustainability and long-term approaches
forced to submit themselves to constitutional are key to cementing resilience.
rule and elections, which although they may
rig, still provide risks to the ruling regime. Opposition political parties and civil
society organizations
As modern backsliding is not an all- •
Rapidly organize, mobilize and raise
encompassing overturning of the democratic awareness when there are signs of shrinking
order, it leaves open avenues to contest civic space. While modern backsliding
power. These may be through constitutional takes place gradually, civil spaces
institutions designed to check power, such as might rapidly reduce. In addition,
courts or electoral institutions, or through other sometimes the most technical aspects of
elements of democratic society, such as political backsliding may not be of interest to (or
parties and the media. The slide may not always understood by) the general public. These
be permanent, and societies are often resilient include manipulating the appointment
to backsliding. As would-be backsliders must mechanisms for courts or changes in
continue to hold elections, and do so without electoral laws.
complete ownership of the state, there are • Monitor the integrity of elections. Make sure
opportunities for democratic bounce-back. the government abides by international
electoral principles and that the media
Finally, the variances within the data are accurately reports on instances of electoral
important, and should provide interesting malpractice. Importantly, rally civic
86
International IDEA Chapter 3
First Edition 2017 Threats from within: democracy’s resilience to backsliding
action to prevent electoral violence and More regular monitoring of constitutional Even fully
demand actions that protect the role of governance is needed to reaffirm the norms consolidated
non-incumbents. on transfers of power or government democracies
• Remain organized and seek dialogue with change. Some regional organizations are
are at risk of
moderate elements of the governing power more advanced than others in developing
during backsliding. Strategic long-term their role in safeguarding constitutional
backsliding, and
interparty dialogue might help all sides democracy, and more dialogue and even the most
to reach compromises and change the exchange of experiences among regional authoritarian
country’s democratic culture, rather than organizations could be beneficial (see regimes cannot
focusing on a one-off political crisis. Wiebusch 2016). fully extinguish
•
Invest in conducting regular monitoring the yearning for
Policymakers of constitutional governance. While some
democracy
• Safeguard constitutional protections for milestones may clearly tilt the balance
political minorities and the opposition, as against democracy in a country, backsliding
well as the more traditional mechanisms of can also take place in small doses over a long
separation of the branches of government period of time. International monitoring is
and independent accountability therefore needed to reaffirm the norms on
institutions. Political pluralism is just transfers of power or government change.
as important as institutional checks and • Foster intraregional dialogue among
balances. member states on good practices to safeguard
• Invest in building a professional, independent constitutional democracy. Building a
and competent electoral management common understanding of the basic
body (EMB) with a robust mandate to standards and principles for constitutional
administer elections that are transparent democracies with which all governments
and merit public confidence. The selection must comply would make it harder
of the EMB’s leadership is crucial to ensure for would-be backsliders to threaten
its independence. their country’s democracies. Crucially,
building these common principles would
Regional organizations facilitate the monitoring role of regional
• Build on existing systems of sanctions to develop organizations to look beyond compliance
accompanying formal monitoring systems with mere formal constitutional and
related to unconstitutional transfers of power. electoral norms.
87
Chapter 3 The Global State of Democracy 2017
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Chapter 4
Chapter
4
The changing nature of political
parties and representation
Chapter 4 The Global State of Democracy 2017
The changing nature of political parties and representation Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Politicians around offer new ways of interaction and alternative Monetary Fund, the European Union and the
the world are policies, or anti-establishment rhetoric and European Central Bank have made many of
accused of being populist strategies. these decisions. By giving power to unelected
‘out of policy officials, the politics of decision-making on
Section 4.5 assesses the responses to the financial issues has moved away from national
control’ because
challenges of representation and provides democratic accountability.
they cannot recommendations on how to tackle them.
influence policies The chapter argues that while political parties As a result, politicians around the world
as much as their are notionally appropriate conduits of citizen are accused of being ‘out of policy control’
voters would like, representation, they must present clear (Leterme and van der Staak 2016) because
and they cannot political visions that give political expression they cannot influence policies as much as
respond to voters to unaddressed interests in society; root out their voters would like, and they cannot
corruption and restore integrity; attract and respond to voters beyond the extent that their
beyond the
groom skilled, electable leaders; and give influence allows. Some argue that politicians
extent that their citizens more influence (as some new types of are signing away their rights to multi-
influence allows parties are doing). The chapter discusses five national companies through broad free trade
case studies relating to democratic resilience: agreements, such as the Transatlantic Trade
the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) in India, the and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between
Labour Party in the United Kingdom, engaging the USA and the EU and the Trans-Pacific
younger voters in Europe, the renewal of Partnership between a number of Pacific
the party system in Spain, and the use of Rim countries. Some believe that such moves
referendums around the world. only benefit wealthy cosmopolitan elites that
have no interest in advancing the welfare of
4.2. Challenges facing political ordinary citizens.
parties
Politicians must either oversell themselves
The challenge of results: dealing with during elections and sweet talk voters
crises and policy control afterwards when their policies prove unfeasible,
Since the 2007–08 global financial crisis, or attempt to take back the powers that have
both emerging and established democracies been transferred to the supranational level.
have struggled to provide clear-cut solutions Politicians in Europe are increasingly using
and policies to curtail multiple problems the latter approach, as the Brexit referendum,
that are international in nature and severely objections to the Comprehensive Economic
challenge the status quo. Just as financial and Trade Agreement, and increased border
crises in Latin America and the Caribbean control have shown. In other European
and East Asia in the 1990s played a part in countries the opposite occurred: voting to join
shaking up politics and party systems, these the EU entailed voting to transfer power from
current crises have placed similar pressure national legislatures to Brussels. If the people
on European parties to adapt and change. As perceive a gap in democratic representation
mounting debt added pressure to eurozone and feel they have insufficient ability to
economies, governments also had to deal with influence decision-making at the EU level,
the rising influx of refugees and migrants, they may feel disillusioned.
and security threats, all crises at arguably
their highest levels since World War II. An The challenge for political parties is to offer
international consensus emerged on how to a strong political vision that provides real
tackle the financial crisis, and supranational choices, and to explain these problems to
bodies overruled national governments such as voters in clear and understandable language
Greece when they disagreed. Technocrats and that conveys the underlying complexities.
civil servants at the World Bank, International Populist politicians often offer unilateralist
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International IDEA Chapter 4
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Citizens’ sense of
exclusion, particularly among
marginalized groups
Populism
CHALLENGES
RESPONSES
Restoring Democratizing
trust decision-making
and simple solutions, to portray a controlled advancements have also increased the amount
policy sphere that they claim to be able to of information available to the public to
directly influence. Yet operating in an isolated scrutinize politicians’ words and deeds (e.g.
sphere of influence does not create more jobs, through Freedom of Information legislation
stronger economies or greater security. Many in a number of countries), which has increased
of today’s global threats ignore borders: their vulnerability to corruption scandals
economic crises, international terrorism and and has the potential to enhance integrity
refugee flows highlight how interconnected and transparency. Citizens’ lack of trust in
today’s world is; handling these issues parties is exacerbated by the (conscious and
requires countries to work together. unconscious) exclusion of women and young
people from decision-making positions and
The challenge of trust and inclusion party hierarchies.
Citizens expect their governments to do more
to deliver better results. Yet their elected Declining confidence in parties
representatives have lost some control over A wide variety of societal barometers from
policies as power is transferred to technocrats around the world indicates that political
at home or to supranational institutions. parties are among the least trusted institutions
Representatives are less trusted to deal with in society. Figure 4.1 shows that the level
the pressing issues of the day. Technological of trust in political parties in all regions at
FIGURE 4.1
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Notes: All figures showing regional averages of World Values Survey data are based on all the countries included in the sample for a particular wave. Thus,
1994–98 is based on 52 countries, 1999–2004 on 37 countries, 2005–09 on 57 countries, and 2010–14 on 58 countries.
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International IDEA Chapter 4
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least until 2014, except for Asia and the Marginalization of women and youth Although
Pacific and Europe, has stagnated or declined A healthy, resilient democracy is based on women’s
since 1994. While the base level of trust in inclusiveness, which political parties and representation
political parties in Asia and the Pacific is representative institutions are in a key position in legislatures
higher than in other regions, trust in parties to safeguard. Yet parties are finding it harder
is lower compared to other institutions. The
has more than
to sustain an atmosphere of inclusiveness,
Asian Barometer shows that political parties particularly as women and youth are largely doubled over the
in East Asia, in particular, are not highly excluded from representative institutions. last 22 years—
trusted; levels of trust have stagnated or are Although women’s representation in from 11 per cent
in decline (Chang, Weatherall and Wu 2015). legislatures has more than doubled over the in 1995 to 22
More recent surveys by the Latinobarometer last 22 years—from 11 per cent in 1995 per cent in 2015,
seem to confirm the long-standing low level to 22 per cent in 2015, and 23.5 per cent and 23.5 per cent
of trust in Latin America: 20 per cent in in 2017 (IPU 2015, 2017)—at this pace it
in 2017—at this
1995 and 16 per cent in 2016 declared to will take 40 years to reach equal numbers
have high or some trust in political parties of men and women in legislatures. Women’s pace it will take
(Latinobarómetro 2016) access to legislatures is highest in the Nordic 40 years to reach
countries, at around 40 per cent, but progress equal numbers of
Trust in parties erodes when there is evidence of is particularly slow in Asia. Women from men and women
corruption, a failure in the delivery of services, minority groups represent 11 per cent of in legislatures
the emergence of anti-establishment rhetoric, the world’s population, yet account for only
or a lack of inclusion and responsiveness to 2 per cent of its legislators. Parties’ persistent
citizens’ demands. It can also reflect a more marginalization of women undermines their
sophisticated and critical way of thinking empowerment and weakens democracy’s
among citizens, and thus represent a positive resilience (IPU 2015, 2017).
incentive to reform.
Younger generations are insufficiently
Citizen trust is broken when politicians represented in party membership, leadership
make lofty campaign promises or ‘fact-free’ and legislatures. Their marginalization
statements that are spun by a biased media from, and decreasing trust in, traditional
in polarized public debates. This took place party politics is of particular concern, as
in Latin America and the Caribbean in the young people can make or break future
1980s, 1990s and 2000s, and most recently models of representation. According to
in the 2016 landmark Brexit referendum World Values Survey data from 2010–14,
and the 2016 US presidential campaign. The only 43.6 per cent of those aged 18–29
democratic premise that citizens can make reported that they ‘always’ vote (versus
informed choices has been brought into 59.1 per cent of the total population), and
question in the era of ‘post-truth politics’ only 4.1 per cent were active members of
(Davies 2016; Hochschild and Einstein a political party (5 per cent total average)
2015; The Economist 2016). The decline in (UN 2016). The World Values Survey data
trust can also be linked to corruption. For also revealed that youth party membership
instance, in a 2014 EU opinion poll, only 3 was particularly low in Europe and South
per cent of citizens reported trusting political America (1.8 and 1.5 per cent were active
representatives to deal with corruption members, respectively). In Europe, this
cases (European Commission 2014b). In seems consistent with 2015 Eurobarometer
Brazil, Pakistan and the Republic of Korea, survey findings that the majority of young
corruption scandals have driven senior people held political parties in low regard,
politicians out of office. and did not want to join them or any
other political, societal or professional
organization (European Commission 2015).
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23.5%
in 2017
11%
in 1995
Global youth party membership 2010–2014 Global youth voting habits 2010–2014
18-TO-29-YE AR-OLDS TOTAL POPUL ATION 18-TO-29-YE AR-OLDS TOTAL POPUL ATION
Global eligibility ≠ Global voting age Parliaments without young representatives globally
65%
Sources of data: IPU (2016)
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International IDEA Chapter 4
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The low voter turnout among young people saw 71 per cent turnout among first time
during the European Parliamentary elections voters (aged 18–24) (Ipsos 2017a), and 66
in 2014 serves as an illustrative example per cent in the second round (Ipsos 2017b).
(see Box 4.2). This represents a slight decline from the 73
per cent and 72 per cent in the two rounds
Estimates of youth voter turnout at more of the 2012 French presidential elections,
recent, highly contested, polls in Europe respectively (Roudet 2013: 2, 4). The 2017
show a mixed picture. For example, turnout general election in the Netherlands may have
figures for voters aged 18–24 in the United seen a further decline in the number of youth
Kingdom have increased from 43 per cent in willing to turn out to vote (Ketelaar 2017).
2015, to 60 per cent in 2016 and 67 per cent
in 2017 (Burn-Murdoch 2017), while 66 per A survey of 126 parliaments by the Inter-
cent and 61 per cent of Spanish voters aged Parliamentary Union carried out in 2014
under 35 turned out in the polls in 2015 and and 2015 shows unsurprising levels of youth
2016, respectively, up from 58 per cent in representation in legislatures: 65 per cent
2011 (Camas García 2017). The first round of legislatures have eligibility ages higher
of the 2017 French presidential elections than the minimum voting age (IPU 2016).
BOX 4.2
Participation of young people in European less important than, national elections. More often, the electorate
sees EP elections as an extension of debates on national issues
Parliament elections: addressing the challenge
rather than a vote on European integration and decision-making.
of trust and inclusion While successive treaty reforms since the mid-1980s have increased
the EP’s power and status in the EU institutional architecture, they
Turning out to vote is the most emblematic means of participating in have not been accompanied by increased citizen participation,
the democratic process. Low turnout rates are often interpreted as a including that of young people. The relationship between abstract
signal of dissatisfaction with the political decision-making process. policies and their local impact is not always clear. Some efforts have
In Europe, electoral turnout has been declining in both national been made to make the work of the EU and the European Commission
and European Parliament (EP) elections, although four EU member more accessible to European citizens, yet political parties could do
states have compulsory voting (Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece and more to offer space for young people to engage in policy debates.
Cyprus). In 2014, turnout for the EP elections reached its lowest
point ever (43 per cent, down from 62 per cent in 1979) despite the Given European demographics, political parties do not pay sufficient
fact that the number of EU member states has steadily increased attention to youth issues, and when young people’s interests are
over the years (European Commission 2014a). The participation of included, political parties and institutions often view them as a
young people (aged 18–24, Austria 16–24) in EP elections follows homogenous group. Manifestos of European political parties do not
this trend: only 28 per cent cast ballots in the 2014 poll (EP 2014: 9). sufficiently capture the concerns of young people (Bouza 2014: 17),
who tend to be preoccupied by socio-economic matters, such as
Young people who voted in the 2014 EP elections stated that they access to employment and education. However, it would be wrong
did so due to their ‘duty as a citizen’ (39 per cent), because ‘you to assess young people’s involvement in political life based only on
always vote’ (26 per cent) and to ‘support the political party you feel their participation in traditional and institutional politics or on their
close to’ (21 per cent) (EP 2014: 31). The young people who did not turnout at elections. This is because there is a disconnect between
vote explained their decision as a ‘lack of trust or dissatisfaction their preferred forms of political activism, involvement in political
with politics in general’ (15 per cent), ‘not interested in politics life and means of communication on the one hand, and those
as such’ (21 per cent) or ‘their vote has no consequences or vote employed by political parties on the other (Dezelan 2015: 3).
does not change anything’ (10 per cent) (EP 2014: 61). The fact
that many young people feel their vote does not matter, or express According to projected patterns, electoral turnout will decline in EP
a lack of interest in politics, shows that political parties must do elections given demographic changes in the electorate. However,
more to reach out to youth and engage them in their programmes collective efforts—and the application of innovative measures by
and policies. political actors and institutions at the national and pan-European
levels—can increase young people’s participation in political life
There is a perception that the EP lacks democratic legitimacy, and in Europe. At a minimum, this would delay the declining turnout
that it does not reflect the will of European citizens, including young trend and promote intergenerational equity, which will further
people. Many citizens perceive EP elections as secondary to, and strengthen democracy.
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The changing nature of political parties and representation Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
In Latin Almost one in three unicameral or lower political party landscape in more stable party
America and parliamentary chambers and 80 per cent systems such as in Colombia, Mexico and,
the Caribbean, of upper parliamentary chambers have no most recently, Chile.
members under the age of 30. This age group
a surge of new
comprises just 2.1 per cent of parliamentarians In Europe, political challengers grew stronger
parties and in lower or unicameral houses globally, and after the 2007–08 global financial crisis, as
leaders has North America, Latin America and the traditional parties failed to keep up with rapid
emerged since Caribbean, and Europe are the only regions that economic and cultural changes in society. Over
the early 1990s exceed these figures, with 3.4 and 3.1 per cent, the last four decades, economies in Europe have
in response respectively. Increasing youth representation shifted from industrialized to service based
to popular generally involves lowering the eligibility (with the sharing economy and digital mega-
age, and adopting quotas and proportional companies innovating lifestyles); occupational
frustration with
representation systems (IPU 2016). roles have transformed, and there are growing
corruption and inequalities between the traditional working
the mishandling 4.3. The challenge of new parties and and professional classes. These developments
of the economy populism have disrupted the social configurations that
and the When parties are perceived to have lost their provided the traditional support bases for
subsequent policy focus, as well as the trust of the electorate, mainstream political parties (e.g. churches
economic crises and party systems fail to adequately represent and unions) (Kalyvas 1996; Bartolini 2000;
different groups in society, electoral support Arzheimer 2006). A recent opinon survey,
that deepened
will tilt towards new parties and leaderships. conducted in ten EU member states, shows
poverty and Electoral challengers to the party establishment that few political parties in Europe enjoy
inequality in their have been ubiquitous across regions in third- widespread appeal, with the exception of
countries wave and longer-established democracies some established parties in Western European
alike. These challengers have often successfully countries that suffered less economically in the
given political expression to real or perceived years since the euro crisis (Stokes, Wike, and
economic, social or cultural grievances. Manevich 2017).
Challengers have come from both the left
and the right, but have generally exploited a Cultural changes have transformed societal
common set of contexts and sentiments to gain values. Some argue that ‘the unprecedented
influence and use different methods to come global economic growth of the 1960s, which
to power. raised living standards, increased education,
and greatly expanded the urban middle class’
In Latin America and the Caribbean, a surge of (Huntington 1991: 13). However, others
new parties and leaders has emerged since the argue that a ‘country’s experience with
early 1990s in response to popular frustration democracy enhances self-expression values’
with corruption and the mishandling of the rather than the other way around (Dahlum
economy and the subsequent economic crises and Knutsen 2017). When basic human
that deepened poverty and inequality in needs are largely met, support has increased
their countries. In dealing with these crises, for ‘left-libertarian parties such as the Greens
governments faced the challenge of acting with and other progressive movements advocating
both responsibility and responsiveness, but too environmental protection, human rights,
often delivered on just one at the expense of and gender equality’ in Western societies
the other (either plain austerity or spending (Inglehart and Norris 2016). Yet like any
largesse), or none. Their failure paved the way revolution, this progressive shift has prompted
for the rise of new parties and leaders that a backlash, ‘especially among the older
triggered the collapse of the party systems in generation, white men, and less educated
Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. Similar people, who react against the erosion of
frustrations have prompted the renewal of the familiar and reassuring traditional norms and
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International IDEA Chapter 4
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actively reject the rising tide of progressive fight against corruption and indiscipline (e.g. Populism can
values’ (Inglehart and Norris 2016: 2). the unorthodox methods and actions of the be defined as a
leader of the Party of the Revolution Chama mix of a divi-
Amid this complex breeding ground for the Cha Mapinduzi in Tanzania).
sive rhetoric
rising challengers, new parties and leaders
espouse anti-establishment tactics to connect The Western European and US variants of
that pits ‘the
with voters. Some do so within the limits populism are characterized by three features: people’ against
of democratic pluralism, often assailing the ‘anti-establishmentism’, ‘authoritarianism’ ‘the elite’. When
establishment for economic problems or and ‘nativism’ (Mudde 2007; Inglehart and in office, populist
corruption, while others choose the flip side of Norris 2016: 5). Nativism in particular is politicians seek
it—populism. Populism can be defined as a mix difficult to place on the left–right ideological to undermine
of a divisive rhetoric that pits ‘the people’ against spectrum, which many argue no longer
democratic
‘the elite’. When in office, populist politicians adequately describes the political spectrum.
seek to undermine democratic pluralism and New political battle lines are drawn between
pluralism and
the checks and balances on government, which ‘open versus closed’, ‘globalist versus the checks and
they perceive as obstructing the realization of nationalist’ or ‘anywheres versus somewheres’; balances on
the ‘will of the people’ (Mudde 2016). populist politicians most often advocate the government,
latter (Edsall 2017; Goodhart 2017). which they
Populism is neither new nor exclusive to well- perceive as
established democracies. It has appeared in Populist parties and movements have been on
obstructing
several regions in the last 30 years. In South the rise since the 1970s in Europe (see Figure
America, president Evo Morales, as well as 4.2). The National Front (Front National, FN)
the realization
former presidents Hugo Chávez, Alberto in France and the Coalition of the Radical Left of the ‘will of the
Fujimori, and the Kirchners, used populist (Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás, Syriza) in people’
tactics, while in South East Asia President
Rodrigo Duterte gained support in the 2016 FIGURE 4.2
Philippines presidential election by blaming
the country’s condition on the leadership of
Average vote share for populist parties in North and West Europe
the mainstream political parties. Elements of
populism have also been integral to African
12.0%
politics, although their shape and form have 10.5%
been constantly shifting. Most countries on the 10.0% 9.1%
continent adopted multiparty politics in the
8.0% 7.3%
1990s, which was marked by the emergence
of populist mobilizations by political actors 6.0%
4.4%
seeking to carve out a niche for themselves
4.0%
against better-established competitors. The
mobilization of ethno-regional and religious 2.0%
identities accompanied the introduction
0.0%
of populist positions on issues such as
redistribution, socio-economic rights and 1975-1984 1985-1994 1995-2004 2005-2016
justice into politics. More recently, populist Mean Populist Party Vote %
pressures have built up around land issues (e.g.
the actions taken by the Zimbabwe African Notes: This graph shows the average vote-share percentage of populist parties from 1975–2016 in North and West
Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland,
National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) UK). It illustrates that the average vote share for populist parties in these regions has more than doubled since
1975, and that from 2005 through 2016 the average populist vote reached over 10 per cent. Note that this repre-
in Zimbabwe), the pursuit of the ‘will of the sents average populist party support: it is not distributed evenly across countries or parties. This average includes
populist parties such as the Swiss People’s Party, which received 29.4 per cent of the vote in the 2015 Swiss fed-
people’ and the empowerment of the black eral election and the British National Party, which gathered only 1.1 per cent of the vote in the 2014 EP elections.
majority (as exemplified by the Economic Sources: Parliaments and Governments (2016); Inglehart and Norris (2016).
Freedom Fighters in South Africa), and the
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Chapter 4 The Global State of Democracy 2017
The changing nature of political parties and representation Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Greece have both experienced rapid growth. challenges) as traditional parties, they seem to
The FN increased its vote share from 10.4 be more innovative. For instance, they blur
per cent in 2007 to 21.3 per cent in the first the distinction between members and non-
round of the 2017 French presidential elections members, and lower the (financial) bar to
(Ministère de l'Intérieur 2007; 2017). Similarly, joining the movement. These new political
Syriza’s vote share grew from 4.6 per cent in the ‘movements’ (many shun the term ‘party’) rely
2009 parliamentary elections to 16.8 per cent more on direct citizen engagement, for example
in 2012, and 35.6 per cent in 2015 (Ministry through social media and other digital tools,
of Interior 2015). By 2016, populist parties had than on traditional party gatherings. They are
entered coalitions in 11 European countries effective at mobilizing citizen participation
(Inglehart and Norris 2016). Most importantly, and rewarding members with a strong sense
they showed that reshaping politics did not of political representation (Stokes 2015). This
require winning parliamentary seats (e.g. as new leadership tends to speak, dress and live
shown by the Brexit referendum in the UK). differently from their competitors, which
leads to a higher sense of public confidence
Political movements that grow out of citizen than that bestowed on traditional politicians.
protest and stand out for their anti-establishment Their direct engagement with citizens, as well
rhetoric are another rising phenomenon. Over as their unorthodox policies and calls for
the past ten years, these movements have systemic change, mean that many of them are
most often transformed into political entities considered populists.
when their political goals required a hold on
legislative power. From Italy to Spain, from Political movements are located across the
the UK to the USA, and from Brazil to India, ideological spectrum. In Europe, while the
political outsiders have become involved in left is occupied by Podemos in Spain or
political establishments using new means to the Pirate Party (Píratar) in Iceland, the far
win elections and gain access to political party right is represented by the AfD in Germany
systems. Their campaigns use methods that (see Box 4.3), the Golden Dawn (Laïkós
may disturb the normal functioning of society Sýndesmos—Chrysí Avgí) in Greece, and the
in order to make a political point (see Tilly and Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid,
Tarrow 2006). PVV) in the Netherlands. In the middle are
political movements such as the Citizens party
Although some of these new formations largely (Ciudadanos) in Spain, the ‘Forward!’ party
operate in the same manner (and face the same (En Marche!) in France, and the Save Romania
BOX 4.3 Union party (Uniunea Salva i România, USR)
in Romania. Yet others, such as the Five Star
Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle, M5S) in Italy,
Alternative für Deutschland combine far-left social policies with anti-EU
stances that are also popular among right-wing
The Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany, AfD) political party parties. Importantly, many have responded to
was created in 2013, and has taken reactive positions to the Eurocrisis and
the refugee crisis. The party has also campaigned against what it calls the
the lack of policy alternatives that established
‘Islamification of Germany’. It has formed an alliance with the Freedom–Civil parties offer and fulminate against the
Rights Party for More Freedom and Democracy. The AfD party chairwoman, international institutions, globalized economy
Frauke Petry (who has since quit the party), has likened the party to the
and international interdependence that curtail
Sweden Democrats and True Finns parties, as well as France’s Front National,
among others (Connoly 2016). As of spring 2017, few Germans saw the AfD in a these policy alternatives, as described above.
positive light (Stokes, Wike, and Manevich 2017). However, exit polls following Interestingly, support for Eurosceptic parties
Germany's most recent federal elections, held on 24 September 2017, showed does not automatically translate into support
that the AfD was expected to enter parliament as the country's third-largest
party, demonstrating the extent to which German voters stand behind the AfD's
for leaving the EU. A 2017 public attitudes
call for alternative policies. survey found that in France, 54 per cent of
those expressing a favorable opinion about the
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International IDEA Chapter 4
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National Front still prefer to stay in the EU. which is creating horizontal rather than vertical
The same applies to Germany, where 69 per spheres, with no hierarchies: everyone decides,
cent of those with a positive view of the AfD and no one rules. Furthermore, politicians’
want Germany to remain in the EU (Stokes, whereabouts, behaviour and decisions have
Wike, and Manevich 2017). become more quickly visible to the greater
public—and can be influenced more directly.
4.4. The challenges of citizen For instance, voter research shows that 46
engagement per cent of youth in Europe regard social
Party membership numbers reflect how citizens networks as progress for democracy, because
relate to traditional party politics. Overall, party they allow everyone to take part in public
membership has declined since 1994 in Asia debates (EP 2016: 4). Digitalization, however,
and the Pacific, Europe, Latin America and the poses both opportunities and threats to citizen
Caribbean, and North America, and in Africa participation and representation. Those left
since 2005. In contrast, in the Middle East and outside of traditional representation because
Iran, and North America, party membership of their youth, disability, sex or minority
appears to be on the rise (see Figure 4.3). In status can benefit from these new avenues of
the period 2010–14, party membership was at meaningful engagement and exert influence
around 14 per cent globally, only one-third of from outside parties. Citizens who are less
which was active (UN 2016). Political party connected to the digital age—including older,
membership in 27 countries of Europe, the poorer or less-educated individuals—may feel
birthplace of some of the oldest parties in the excluded from (and less represented by) parties
world, was 4.7 per cent on average by the end
of the 2000s (van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke FIGURE 4.3
2012), and fell to 2.4 per cent during 2010–14
(UN 2016: 70). Membership in political parties as a percentage of the population,
1994–2014
However, not all parties have lost members, and
some efforts to attract new members have been 60%
successful. Membership of the Conservative
Party, the Labour Party and the Liberal 50%
Political parties are updating their internal Latin America & the Caribbean Middle East & Iran North America
Political parties that increasingly engage in online decision- questions were on issues including financial
are updating their making. Since online participation can be reform, independence, EU membership or
internal cultures easily manipulated, political parties must an aspect of integration, international trade,
embrace ethical forms of online engagement immigration, taxation, civil and political
and operational
while maintaining offline contact. rights enshrined in constitutions, peace
structures to
treaties, and political and electoral reform.
match the Leaders have recently deferred some decisions to However, as Box 4.4 describes, political elites
increase in online the citizens themselves. There has been a slight who use referendum outcomes to further their
and street-based increase in the global use of direct democracy political agendas can also use direct democracy
interactions instruments since 1975 (GSoD indices 2017: strategically.
and decision- 5.3). The worldwide use of referendums,
one of the best-known direct democracy An increase in protests challenges the
making. Digital
instruments, has increased significantly over accountability of representative institutions,
technologies time: from up to 410 referendums in the some of which have grabbed global headlines
enable citizens period between 1945 and 1972, to as many in recent years. Their names refer to the
to voice their as 1,846 national referendums between 1972 squares they occupy (Tahrir in Cairo, Taksim
opinions much and 2015 (Topaloff 2017). Between 2015 in Istanbul, Euromaidan in Ukraine) or the
more directly and 2017 countries as diverse as Colombia, colours and symbols that unite them (yellow
than before Côte d’Ivoire, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the umbrellas in the 2014 Hong Kong protests,
Netherlands, Sudan, Switzerland, the UK, pink hats in the 2017 Women’s March). This
Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela and ‘march of protest’, as The Economist introduced
Zambia used referendums to make decisions it in 2013, has moved the realm of politics
or influence decision-making. Referendum increasingly to the streets (Cordenillo and van
FIGURE 4.4
der Staak 2014).
United States
60%
Germany Language, and Tone Project registered an
50%
increase in the intensity of protest between
40% 2012 and 2015 to levels similar to those of the
30% late 1980s (World Economic Forum 2016).
Protests do not only help resist authoritarian
20%
Yemen Turkey governments; they are an increasingly popular
10% Kuwait Jordan
and legitimate form of expressing political
Egypt Azerbaijan
0% Qatar Uzbekistan opinions in evolving democracies. Comparing
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 data from the GSoD indices with data on
Social Rights and Equality (GSODI) citizen participation through petitions,
boycotts, demonstrations, strikes and other
Africa Asia & the Pacific Europe
forms of protest from the 2010–14 wave of the
Latin America & the Caribbean Middle East & Iran North America
World Values Survey shows that countries with
higher levels of social rights and equality also
Notes: This graph shows the relationship between social rights and equality and protest participation. It illustrates
that there is a slight positive correlation, which means that in countries with a higher level of social rights and have a citizenry that more actively protests (see
equality, there tends to be a higher percentage of the population that have engaged in some type of protest activ-
ity. Pearson's correlation coefficient results: n = 57, r =.612, p-value <.005. Figure 4.4). This suggests that countries with
Sources: GSoD indices 2017 (Social Rights and Equality Index); World Values Survey (Wave 6) questions V85–V89.
stronger and healthier democracies also have
higher levels of protest participation.
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International IDEA Chapter 4
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BOX 4.4
Referendums: keeping politics out of direct rejected with a 44 per cent turnout rate. The government interpreted
it as a victory nonetheless, as 98 per cent of those who had voted
democracy—addressing the challenges of citizen
supported its stance. For these reasons, the Venice Commission
engagement and populism (2007) has advised against using any form of thresholds.
Few recent democratic developments have better reflected the The second reason for controversy and disillusionment are the many
tension between citizen participation and citizen representation than unintended outcomes that referendums tend to bring about. In 2016,
the rise in popular referendums. In 2016 alone, referendums brought prime ministers in the UK and Italy tied their political futures directly
about political shock waves from Italy to the UK and from Hungary to referendums on other matters. Conversely, in the Dutch and Irish
to the Netherlands. Each has sparked discussion about whether EU constitution referendums of 2005, elected leaders largely ignored
referendums give citizens more voice, or provide politicians a tactical the outcomes when they found that citizens had voted against an
instrument for political manipulation. How politicians formulate international treaty mainly to voice dissatisfaction with domestic
(and subsequently implement) direct democracy legislation will government policy. Therefore, it seems that referendums tend to
increasingly determine the relationship between citizens and their provide the right answer to the wrong question. Likewise, the 2016
elected leaders. referendum on the peace agreement in Colombia was very narrowly
defeated amid a low turnout of 37 per cent. Some modifications were
Many prominent referendums have taken place recently. In 2016 and made to the peace agreement, after which the government signed
2017, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Hungary, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, the new deal without another referendum.
Turkey, Venezuela and Zambia all held referendums with significant
political impact. However, the referendums that may have affected The third reason for citizen disillusionment with referendums is
the global debate over citizen participation and representation the that elected politicians can use them strategically to further their
most were those held in established democracies with long-standing political agendas. For instance, political parties can initiate optional
party systems. For instance, referendums struck down government- referendums to take contentious issues out of an election campaign,
backed positions in the UK over EU membership, in Denmark over or to demonstrate popular support for a government position.
opt-ins to EU legislation, in the Netherlands on the approval of British Prime Minister David Cameron tried to do the latter when he
the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, and in conditioned a Brexit referendum on a general election victory for his
Italy over reform of the Senate. Many people have therefore come party. The 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum was a successful
to see referendums as the best tool for angry citizens to whip their attempt by the ruling party to strengthen the position of the ruling
politicians back into line. president and to extend his term. Such a tactical use of referendums
by political parties to cement their power runs contrary to the
However, when looking more closely, many referendums have purposes of direct democracy. In practice, mandatory referendums,
worked ambiguously to return power to the citizen. Instead of being invoked automatically when very important political issues are
a corrective force of representative politics, referendum outcomes debated, may avoid political manipulation more effectively than
have often created confusion over what citizens are asking for, and optional referendums, which are held according to the whim of
have led to further disillusionment among citizens for three reasons. politicians.
First, a wide variety of direct democracy instruments is too often What future do referendums have in established democracies?
lumped together under the catch-all term ‘referendum’. In practice, Many new political movements, and even some established parties,
some are citizen initiatives, while others are government-initiated are now openly campaigning for the introduction of mandatory
referendums. Some are optional, and others are mandatory. Some referendums in an attempt to regain citizens’ trust. Switzerland
are advisory, while others are binding; some have high and others offers a good example of how representative and direct democracy
low thresholds. All of these design factors affect how politicians support each other.
interpreted and adhered to a referendum outcome. There is a general
need to strengthen public understanding of the exact mandate of the In addition, to avoid citizen disillusionment with referendum
referendum used in order to avoid disillusionment with its outcomes. outcomes, politicians should be clearer about the decision-making
authority that is devolved to citizens directly, and the authority that
Thresholds in particular can blur the discussion. In the Netherlands remains with elected politicians. In practice, they should avoid
in 2016, a citizens’ initiative that just cleared the low 30 per cent treating advisory referendums as de facto binding, or adopting a
turnout threshold forced the government to reluctantly reverse its policy based on a referendum with a turnout below the threshold.
position on an EU trade deal with the Ukraine. In Hungary soon Finally, politicians should realize that the tactical use of referendums
afterwards, a referendum condemning the EU asylum quota was can delegitimize representative democracy and be politically risky.
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Parties need to be able to make decisions technologies are being introduced to keep up
and implement them. However, this is with the country’s political newcomers (see
becoming increasingly difficult, as key areas of Box 4.5). Traditional parties often argue that
decision-making such as public finances and the only guarantee of realistic and consistent
immigration are transferred away from their policies and political professionalism (in both
sphere of influence to decision-making bodies parliament and government) are broad-based
dominated by non-elected technocrats inside membership parties, supported by fee-paying
and outside the country. Recent referendums
in Greece, Hungary and the UK addressed BOX 4.5
citizens’ perceptions that unaccountable
and unelected civil servants in Brussels
were deciding on their behalf. This trend is Spain: crisis, protest and technology renewing the party
illustrated by the likely setbacks in negotiations system—addressing the challenge of citizen engagement
for free trade agreements, such as the ongoing
An important element of resilience in representative democracy is finding new
negotiations on the TTIP between the EU and ways for citizens and political parties to interact. Spain provides an example of
the USA. Furthermore, the increased control extreme pressure on a party system that managed to transform itself.
along Europe’s borders due to the Syrian The recession triggered by the financial crisis in 2007–08 nearly caused the
collapse of the Spanish economy, and created a seismic shift in the party
refugee crisis has prompted some to call for system. From the end of authoritarian rule in 1977 until the crisis, Spain had
the dismantlement of free movement within operated as a bipartisan system. In nearly half of the elections since then, one
the Schengen Area. Yet, as discussed previously, of these two parties won an absolute majority and could rule on its own. When
they did not, a few key regional parties could break any deadlock in Parliament
while unilateralist approaches to such issues
by siding with the party in government. During the recession citizens took to
may seem appealing, in the long run closing the streets to demand a response to the crisis. The social unrest was based on
countries off from the world makes it harder a perception that politics—and political parties in particular—were not doing
to address transnational problems. Skilled enough to protect the population from the worst effects of the crisis. Corruption
scandals started to emerge almost weekly, and involved mostly the two main
leaders must communicate these complex
parties, some of their former high officials and their internal party finances. A
messages to the electorate in an engaging and significant portion of the population started to identify the political class as
understandable way. one of the three main problems affecting the country (CIS n.d.). In response to
these sentiments, new political movements emerged.
Addressing policy challenges without In 2011, a diverse group of (mostly young) people known as Indignados (the
compromising ideology ‘indignant’) camped out in central Madrid to protest the economic situation,
Populist parties thrive in policy vacuums, when political elites and austerity measures, as well as to criticize young people’s
lack of access to education, employment or training. The movement defined
traditional parties allow them to offer one-sided
the most important political cleavage as elites versus the people, rather than
(populist) narratives. By engaging with citizens, left versus right. It used technology to extend the debate and discussion
traditional parties can disrupt the vacuum and online, which served as the basis for political change. The movement sparked
offer compelling policy alternatives. As an an increase in political engagement and debate, and the formation of two
new parties. A group of university professors launched Podemos (‘We can’) in
example of a policy vacuum, Syrian refugees
January 2014, which captured the Indignados spirit. Less than five months later,
featured prominently in Slovakia’s 2016 the party won 1.2 million votes in the European elections using technology to
elections, even though the country only had consult widely with the population. A Catalonia-based party also came onto the
330 asylum applicants in 2015 (Eurostat)— national stage during this time on an anti-corruption and regeneration platform.
The ‘Citizens’ (Ciudadanos) party innovatively used social and traditional media
considerably fewer than other EU countries. to quickly reach the whole country. New technologies helped the new parties
carve out their own space in the political arena, and the old parties followed.
Some established political parties are adopting
After the two new parties obtained substantial shares of the vote in the
the traits and practices of their successful
2016 general election alongside the two main traditional parties, a coalition
populist rivals. Traditional parties are most government was formed. As Spain continues to struggle with the consequences
effective when they can combine their strengths of the economic crisis, its party system has renewed. It now includes more
to formulate public policies and recruit new actors, which has enhanced its ability to more accurately represent society
and become more oriented towards dialogue. The country is also now at the
political leaders with the capacity to mobilize
forefront of using technology to engage citizens and to increase feedback and
citizens and articulate their interests in accountability.
clear-cut and bold terms. In Spain, modern
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Political parties in India and Spain have For a more in-depth analysis of different electoral systems see the Resource
introduced software to make their donations Guide accompanying this chapter, Elections, Electoral Systems and Party
Systems: A Resource Guide (Sisk 2017).
visible online in real time and thus win voters’
trust. Meetup has become a common (and free-
of-charge) instrument for parties in Italy and the
Netherlands to bring citizens together for small, BOX 4.8
and sometimes larger, informal gatherings and
debates. Social media such as Twitter, Facebook,
YouTube and personal blogs have become a DemocracyOS: redesigning democracy’s operating system
mainstay of any politician seeking interaction
Frustrated by the high entry costs and obstacles to influencing decision-
with constituents. Politicians are increasingly making, in 2012 a small Argentinian start-up designed a new operating system
realizing that technology is a two-way street: it to facilitate more open and participatory democracy. DemocracyOS is an open-
should not only ‘mobilize the masses’ but also source platform that users can access on their personal devices, including
smartphones, tablets and computers (Finley 2014).
allow the masses to ‘mobilize politics’.
The software has three functions. First, it informs users of every bill presented
There are, however, also serious risks involved in their Congress or Parliament in almost real time, and in their own language.
in the use of ICT by political parties. In the It is available in 15 languages, and presents information using everyday terms
that all citizens can understand. Second, the platform facilitates debate among
2016 US and 2017 French presidential citizens, using verified user accounts to ensure the quality of debate. Third, it
elections, senior politicians’ email accounts allows users to vote—signalling to their (local or national) representative how
were hacked and leaked to the media. Since they want them to vote on or handle particular bills (Scaturro 2014).
the cybersecurity of political parties and
DemocracyOS has been used worldwide. In 2012 the Argentinean start-up
candidates often falls outside the mandate of morphed into the Net Party (Partido de la Red), on the platform that their
electoral authorities, these actors are often seen representative would only make decisions informed by the DemocracyOS
as the weakest link in safeguarding elections software; it fell short of winning a seat in the national Congress. In 2013
Tunisian civil society used the tool to debate the national constitution (Chao
against hacking. Second, social and other
2014), and federal and municipal governments in Mexico, Spain and three US
digital media are used increasingly to spread states have adapted the tool for their own use. It also continues to facilitate
misinformation. In 2016, the US presidential direct engagement with voters in Argentina: in 2014, ‘all 350 bills introduced in
elections and the Brexit referendum were the Buenos Aires city legislature were debated on the platform’ (Serna 2015),
bringing local citizens closer to their representatives.
influenced by misinformation that originated
from (or was endorsed by) political parties
and candidates.
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The changing nature of political parties and representation Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Political parties should use technology to in the Netherlands (Van Reybrouck 2013;
facilitate their existing functioning, not to ColaM 2016; G1000 n.d.).
replace substantive debate and face-to-face
interactions. In order to avoid a growing digital As mentioned in Box 4.8, parties such as the
divide they should pay equal attention to offline Net Party in Argentina base their mobilization
innovations that stimulate citizen engagement, strategy exclusively on open-source software.
such as the broad citizen forums in Belgium The open primaries that many of France’s
and the Netherlands known as the G1000 traditional parties have introduced, as well as
and G500, respectively. The G1000, which the latest leadership election for the British
first met in Brussels in 2011, gathered one- Labour Party, are examples of efforts to
thousand randomly selected citizens to discuss attract like-minded individuals by increasing
the major challenges of democracy in Belgium, the incentives to join parties through
while the G500, a political youth organization decentralizing the power to elect leaders
founded in 2012, seeks to advance their youth and candidates. However, such attempts
agenda through established political parties to broaden citizen engagement in internal
BOX 4.9
The British Labour Party: a mainstream party While Kinnock did not personally succeed in bringing Labour
into government, the party improved its standing in subsequent
reinventing itself—addressing the challenge of
elections. In 1987, Labour’s share of the vote increased to 30.8 per
new parties and results cent, and in 1992 to 34.4 per cent. Kinnock resigned after Labour lost
the 1992 elections, and was replaced by John Smith. After Smith’s
As an old mainstream party, the British Labour Party has reinvented death in 1994, Tony Blair became leader. The defeat in 1992 was
itself in the past and is now in the process of doing so again (O’Hara interpreted as a signal that the electorate had broadly accepted
2016). Between 1979 and 1997, the party went from losing power many of Thatcher’s policies. The implication was that in order
(after being in government since 1974) and then losing subsequent to win, Labour would have to move closer to the centre and court
elections in 1983, 1987 and 1992 to eventually rebuilding and ‘Middle England’ voters (Matthijs 2011: 153). This approach involved
reinventing itself, and returning to government in 1997. Similarly, developing a ‘third way’ between socialism and neoliberalism—a
after losing seats in every election since 2001, it bounced back in the reformed welfare state (Matthijs 2011: 157). Many see Blair’s success
2017 elections with an increased number of seats. in removing ‘Clause 4’ of the Labour Party Constitution—which
committed it to national ownership of industries—as one of the
In 1979, the UK was facing difficult economic circumstances. The 1973
biggest symbolic steps of reform (Radice 2010: 84). Labour’s 1993
oil crisis had forced it to temporarily adopt a three-day working week
party conference adopted a policy to increase the number of female
to conserve energy (Worthington 2014), and in 1976 it was forced
MPs. The policy was a success: the number of female MPs increased
to ask the International Monetary Fund for a bailout loan. Strikes
from 60 in 1992 to 120 in 1997 (Keen and Apolostova 2017). Labour
by multiple trade unions during the winter of 1978–79 had further
won the 1997 general election by a landslide, gaining 43.2 per cent
effects on the economy. The electorate, tired of almost a decade of
of the votes and a majority of 179 MPs.
turbulent economic times, expressed a desire for change in the May
1979 general elections by voting the Conservative Party, led by Prime
Through a concerted effort to reinvent itself and relate to the
Minister Margaret Thatcher, into power. The election result plunged
everyday lives and concerns of the British people, Labour came back
the Labour Party into disarray and triggered bitter arguments over its
from the brink of irrelevance to rebuild itself and regain power in
purpose and future course. The party split in 1981 when a group of
1997. Its experience shows that the democratic system was resilient
MPs left to form the Social Democratic Party. The following general
enough to enable the party to reshape itself and become relatable to
election, in 1983, saw Labour’s worst result since 1918: it received a
the broader electorate. In 2017, the party faced a similar challenge.
mere 27.6 per cent of the vote and the Conservative Party increased
In the past, it had always chosen to engage with the parliamentary
its majority to 144 MPs.
system and seek power through representation in the House of
Following the 1983 election, Michael Foot resigned as leader of the Commons. Yet in 2017 some supporters of Jeremy Corbyn, the party
Labour Party and was succeeded by Neil Kinnock, who sought to leader, argued that extra-parliamentary activities were perhaps more
make the party electable again by appealing to a broader electorate. important (Williams 2016). Contrary to all initial polling figures, Labour
The party reformed its internal rules, which gave the leadership more galvanized its support in the 2017 general elections, with a 9.6 per cent
latitude to pursue centrist policies. Within the party, Kinnock pushed increase in the vote share. Age played a critical role in this election
for less reliance on trade unions, acknowledging that the party had result: the swing to Labour was mainly among people under the age of
been electorally damaged in the past by being perceived as too close 44 and highest of all among 25–34 year olds, which is the biggest age
to the unions (Matthijs 2011: 143). gap seen in UK elections since the 1970s (Ipsos Mori 2017).
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International IDEA Chapter 4
First Edition 2017 The changing nature of political parties and representation
party affairs blur the difference between In spite of these challenges, parties remain Parties remain the
members and non-members, which could the key conduit to deliver policies that benefit key conduit to
fundamentally change the way parties are the population. Parties with a coherent deliver policies
funded, as well as how they behave and make political vision are better equipped to deal
that benefit the
decisions. One caveat is that in some primary with complex crises, and can better transmit
systems, small but forceful minorities may be these ideas to the electorate. This requires
population.
able to exercise disproportionate influence in parties that do not shy away from discussing Parties with a
selecting candidates or leaders. Nevertheless, sensitive topics: otherwise, these can be coherent political
many parties have few alternatives: they face captured by populist voices. In addition, vision are better
serious pressure to adopt these innovations parties need to restore the electorate’s equipped to deal
if they want to keep up with a new type of trust: focusing on addressing corruption with complex
competitor—political movements. from within, increasing their inclusiveness
crises, and can
and democratizing their decision-making
Democratizing decision-making does not processes are low-hanging fruits for parties to
better transmit
guarantee that political parties become more re-engage with their citizens and reinvigorate these ideas to the
supportive of democracy and have better their bases. electorate
chances of getting elected. The reforms in
the British Labour Party in the 1990s were To address the challenges posed by the
successful to the extent that they struck a changing nature of political representation,
balance between giving members a greater say political parties, democratic institutions and
in party deliberations and leaving room for civil society should consider the following
leaders to compromise and reach out to non- recommendations.
members (see Box 4.9). The primaries ahead
of the 2017 French presidential election did Political parties
not improve the party candidates’ chances of • Communicate a strong political vision and
winning the presidency. offer fresh and innovative programmes to
address current issues.
4.6. Conclusions and • Create alternative forms of citizen
recommendations: overcoming engagement through alternative forms of
challenges to parties membership, such as associate members or
This chapter highlighted four key challenges supporters.
that both old and new political parties face • Carefully consider the use of direct democracy
in the changing political landscape, which instruments such as referendums. Strengthen
includes handling multifaceted crises such public understanding of the exact mandate
as global economic crises, international of the referendum and be clearer about
terrorism and refugee flows. Parties must the decision-making authority devolved
also restore citizens’ sense of inclusion, to citizens, and the authority that remains
particularly those from marginalized with elected politicians.
groups, in decision-making processes. • Remain responsive to the electorate
Most importantly, as anti-establishment between elections by rethinking parties’
challengers pursue alternative avenues of communication strategies, and updating
political action, traditional parties are forced parties’ internal cultures and operational
to adapt their methods and policies without structures to match the increase in online
alienating their supporters. Above all, and street-based interactions and decision-
populist politicians threaten the democratic making.
values that enable political pluralism. • Encourage an atmosphere of pluralism and
The chapter finally addressed new ways of inclusiveness by engaging and establishing
interaction between parties, their members links with a wide range of ideologically
and the electorate. compatible social organizations, social
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movements and interest groups. Focus on as online policy formulation, voting and
engaging with women and young people. fundraising.
• Address the root causes of distrust by • Increase the transparency of information
pledging full transparency of party finances, about elected representatives including
strictly regulating conflicts of interest, and providing access to transparent financial
implementing sound anti-corruption policies data about political campaigns and
and internal party democracy mechanisms parties as well as the financial interests of
• Ensure that leaders and democratically elected representatives.
representatives reflect the demographics of the • Ensure that broader parts of society are
society by mentoring and recruiting more franchised by introducing measures to
women and young people into key roles that ensure that women and young people can
lead to leadership positions. Parties should engage politically. Consider strengthening
also have women’s and young people’s civic education and lowering the voting age.
chapters and caucuses, promote the use
of digital engagement tools, improve the Civil society
gender balance in the leadership and use • Engage with political parties to translate
all-women’s shortlists. public pressure into policies and engage
• Expand citizen engagement at all levels with the legislative and executive branches
by using digital tools such as interactive of government through political parties.
websites and apps. This includes reaching • Call for more transparency and constructive
out to members and non-members for help democratic debate.
in undertaking traditional party tasks such
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International IDEA Chapter 4
First Edition 2017 References
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elections/2016/01/how-jeremy-corbyns-labour- Singh, K. P., ‘Modi’s loss, a warning to all’, New York
faring-elections-so-far>, accessed 26 March 2017 Times, 13 February 2015, <http://www.nytimes.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and com/2015/02/14/opinion/modis-loss-a-warning-
Development (OECD), Financing Democracy: to-all.html>, accessed 24 March 2017
Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns Stokes, B., ‘The rise of nontraditional, Eurosceptic
and the Risk of Policy Capture (Paris: OECD, 2016) parties’, in Stokes, B., Faith in European Project
Ortiz, I., Burke, S., Berrada, M. and Cortes, H., World Reviving (Pew Research Center, 2 June 2015),
Protests 2006–2013 (New York: Initiative for Policy <http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/02/chapter-
Dialogue and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2013) 4-the-rise-of-nontraditional-eurosceptic-parties/>,
Politico, ‘Kinnock, the passionate moderniser whose accessed 11 July 2017
reforms sparked a revolution’, 31 October 2001, Stokes, B., Wike, R., and Manevich, D., ‘Post-Brexit,
<http://www.politico.eu/article/feature-kinnock- Europeans More Favorable Toward EU’, Pew
the-passionate-moderniser-whose-reforms- Research Centre, 15 June 2017, <http://www.
sparked-a-revolution/>, accessed 11 July 2017 pewglobal.org/2017/06/15/few-political-parties-
Power, G., Global Parliamentary Report: The Changing in-europe-have-widespread-appeal/>, accessed
Nature of Parliamentary Representation (Inter- 3 August 2017
Parliamentary Union and United Nations Suri, K. C., Political Parties in South Asia: The Challenge
Development Programme, 2012), <http://www.ipu. of Change (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2007),
org/gpr-e/media/index.htm>, accessed 13 April <http://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/
2017 political-parties-south-asia-challenge-change>,
Sisk, T., Elections, Electoral Systems and Party Systems: accessed 1 August 2017
A Resource Guide (Stockholm: International IDEA, Tilly, C. and Tarrow, S., Contentious Politics (New York:
2017), <http://www.idea.int/gsod> Oxford University Press, 2006)
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Topaloff, L., ‘Elite Strategy or Populist Weapon?’, Van Reybrouck, D., Against Elections, the Case for
Journal of Democracy, 28/3 (July 2017), pp. 127-40 Democracy (London: Penguin Random House,
United Nations (UN), World Youth Report: Youth Civic 2013)
Engagement (New York: UN, 2016) Williams, A., Corbyn and the Future of Labour: A Verso
Valladares, J., Sample, K. and Van der Staak, S., Report (London: Verso, 2016)
‘Implications for action: enablers, triggers, World Economic Forum, The Global Risks Report 2016
lockers and agents of programmatic parties’, (Cologne/Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2016)
in N. Cheeseman et al., Politics Meets Policies: World Values Survey, ‘Data analysis tool, Wave 6:
The Emergence of Programmatic Political Parties 2010–2014’, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
(Stockholm: International IDEA, 2014), <http:// WVSOnline.jsp>, accessed 11 April 2017
www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/politics- Worthington, D., ‘Looking back on the three day week’,
meets-policies-emergence-programmatic- New Historian, 12 December 2014, <http://www.
political-parties>, accessed 1 August 2017 newhistorian.com/looking-back-three-day-
Van Biezen, I., Mair, P. and Poguntke, T., ‘Gone, going, week/2405/>, accessed 11 July 2017
one: decline of party membership in contemporary
Europe’, European Journal of Political Research,
51/1 (2012), pp. 24–56
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123
Chapter
5
Chapter 5
Money, influence,
corruption and capture: can
democracy be protected?
Scandals involving money in politics have affected countries in every region of the
world, from Argentina to France to the Republic of Korea. These events fuel distrust
in democratic institutions and actors, and undermine the integrity of the political
system by making the policy process vulnerable to capture. While money is a necessary
component of political life, big money provides a disproportionate advantage to a selected
few, and creates an uneven playing field for women and marginalized communities.
Furthermore, current policies that are intended to provide a counterweight often fall
short: they have a limited scope, and the institutions that are supposed to enforce them
are marred with constraints, while political parties face little accountability. A wider,
holistic approach is needed to better equip democratic political institutions to resist
the negative influence of money, to empower citizens and to encourage accountability.
This chapter explores how democracy can be protected from the pernicious influence of
money in politics, using case studies on Peru, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
Policy responses oversight agencies and regulators, as well as and organize supporters. This is particularly
to the negative civil society organizations, journalists and important for new parties or those competing
influence of activists, and—most importantly—corporate against incumbents. Yet it can also impede fair
and individual donors. Effective responses must participation by those with limited access to
money in
implement innovative instruments—especially financing. When the costs to compete in politics
politics should by civil society organizations, journalists and are high, access to the required funds severely
seek to protect activists—to improve the accountability of restricts who can compete. Women, youth and
public policy money in politics. minority groups often have much lower levels
using strategies of funding. For example, in many countries,
that address The text is organized as follows. Section 5.2 women in politics are often considered
corruption and discusses the main challenges money poses less qualified than their male counterparts
to democratic politics, with a focus on how (Quintero-Benavidez and Cardoso-García
promote the
unequal access to funding undermines a level 2013), which hinders women’s capacity
effective oversight playing field in political competition. It also to access public networks for fundraising
of elected officials looks at how political finance can serve as a (International IDEA and NIMD 2017;
and political conduit for corruption and policy capture, Ballington and Kahane 2014). Only 13.3 per
parties. and the impact it can have on public trust in cent of countries provide direct public funding
politics and politicians. Section 5.3 examines to political parties that is contingent on gender
the weaknesses of narrow and isolated political equality among candidates, and 86.5 per cent of
finance legal frameworks, while Section 5.4 countries have no legislation offering financial
presents the framework for an alternative advantages to encourage gender equality within
holistic, integrity-enhanced approach. Section parties (International IDEA Political Finance
5.5 presents conclusions and recommendations. Database). A lack of finance is also one of the
A broader discussion of anti-corruption and top obstacles preventing people from minority
all the elements of the proposed integrity- and indigenous groups from accessing politics
enhanced system are beyond the scope of the (IPU and UNDP 2010: 16–17).
chapter. For additional information on anti-
corruption initiatives see the Resource Guide US elections receive considerable attention,
accompanying this chapter, Innovations in not least because of the exorbitant amounts
Anti-Corruption Approaches: A Resource Guide of money spent in each cycle. The 2012 and
(Schwertheim 2017). 2016 presidential races, for example, cost more
than USD 2 billion each (Open Secrets 2017).
5.2. Global challenges of money in India’s elections are also notoriously expensive.
politics Table 5.1 presents the campaign spending by
The presence of big money in politics poses risks Members of Parliament (MPs) compared to
to all politicians equally. It is one of the most GDP per capita in that country, and illustrates
critical threats to the resilience of representative the prohibitively high costs of competing in
institutions, particularly political parties. elections. The average amount spent by an
There are three interconnected challenges— MP in the 2014 parliamentary elections was
unequal access to funding that undermines 50 times higher than the average per capita
a level playing field in political competition, GDP. In the constituency of Assam, the ratio of
political finance that often serves as a conduit campaign expenditure to GDP per capita was
for corruption and policy capture, and money 109:1. Political parties in India provide very
in politics that affects public trust in politics little financial support to their candidates; only
and politicians. those with access to large amounts of funding
can run for office.
Undermining a level playing field
Money enables political participation as it helps Illicit actors can also buy votes, and use
candidates reach constituents, spread ideas money to sustain patronage and clientelistic
128
International IDEA Chapter 5
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1 2 3
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Chapter 5 The Global State of Democracy 2017
Money, influence, corruption and capture: can democracy be protected? Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
TABLE 5.1
Campaign spending by members of parliament compared to gross domestic product per capita in India, 2014
Candidate Constituency Spending (USD) GDP per capita (USD) Ratio of campaign
expenditure to per
capita GDP
Specific candidates
Notes: GDP per capita based on data from 2013 and 2014. Spending figures as reported.
Sources: Association of Democratic Reforms and National Election Watch 2014; Government of India 2014.
Money can systems (Briscoe and Goff 2016a: 42; World this situation was rather stable; afterwards
also disempower Bank 2017: 78). Patronage systems reward there was a deterioration in the way people’s
the majority by supporters with jobs or government benefits socio-economic position influenced their
because of their affiliations or connections, overall power until the early 2000s. The
giving greater
regardless of their qualifications. In clientelistic situation is also critical in Asia and the
opportunities to a systems, voters are encouraged to exchange Pacific, as well as Africa. In the latter, after
few, well-funded their political support for favours (Falguera, slight improvements between the early 1980s
actors Jones and Ohman 2014). and early 1990s, the distribution of power
and wealth has stagnated. The Latin America
Money can also disempower the majority by and the Caribbean region is currently doing
giving greater opportunities to a few, well- better, but progress has not been constant;
funded actors (World Bank 2017: 62). Figure from the late 1970s to the early 1990s it made
5.1 illustrates how power is distributed by important improvements, but afterwards it
socio-economic position (i.e. the level of stagnated. In Europe, the situation was quite
political influence wealthy people enjoy positive and relatively stable until the early
compared to those of average and lower 1990s; there was a steep decline in the early
income) to favour the richest segments of post-Cold War period until the early 2000s,
society, particularly in the Middle East and and has declined again in recent years.
Iran. Between the early 1980s and late 1990s
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International IDEA Chapter 5
First Edition 2017 Money, influence, corruption and capture: can democracy be protected?
setting ceilings on political party spending, Africa Asia & the Pacific Europe
implementing transparency measures, and Latin America & the Caribbean Middle East & Iran North America
providing public funding to candidates and
parties. Proponents of these strategies warn Notes: This graph shows the trends in how power is distributed by socio-economic position over time by region.
of the pervasive economic incentives created The y-axis shows the score (0 to 1) and the x-axis the years. Higher scores indicate lower political influence of
wealthy people.
by leaving politics at the mercy of economic
Source: V-Dem, Power Distributed by Socio-economic Position.
interests, such as corporations as well as illicit
and international actors that are even less
preoccupied with policies that benefit local results, which favours established parties over Some countries
stakeholders (OECD 2016). newcomers or small parties (Falguera, Jones justify reducing
and Ohman 2014). Using public funding to regulations with
One of the most common political finance decrease politicians’ dependence on private
the argument that
regulations is the provision of public funding donors also risks tilting the balance to the
(Norris, van Es and Fennis 2015): 120 countries other side if parties become over-dependent
they undermine
provide direct public funding to political on state support, and thus less interested in basic rights. On
parties either for campaigns or on a regular being responsive to the public and managing the opposite side
basis (International IDEA Political Finance their resources wisely. Furthermore, if parties of the debate are
Database). In all OECD countries except are perceived as wasting taxpayers’ money, the those advocating
Switzerland, political parties receive direct public may lose further trust in them. If public an increase in
public funding (OECD 2016). There are also funding is provided but private funding is
regulations and
matching systems, such as in Germany, where unlimited, the overall amount spent may rise,
state funds are disbursed based on the parties’ and wealthy donors will maintain influence
financing limits
capacity to attract small private donations over politicians (Casal Bértoa et al. 2014: 355–
(Casas-Zamora and Zovatto 2016: 31–32). 75). The levels of public funding must also be
Public funding can help level the playing high enough to be meaningful. Thus, a balance
field, for example by reducing dependency on must be reached between public and private
private funding and making funds available funding in efforts to limit the perverse effects
to opposition parties. State resources to of money in politics (Council of Europe 2001).
parties can be earmarked to promote greater
gender balance in political participation or to Furthermore, it is important to limit
support youth mobilization. However, funds expectations about what public funding can
are often provided based on previous electoral achieve. While it may be an important way
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Chapter 5 The Global State of Democracy 2017
Money, influence, corruption and capture: can democracy be protected? Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
FIGURE 5.2
Public Campaign Finance correlated by Absence of Corruption in 1975, 1985, 1995, 2005, 2010 and 2015
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
Notes: This graph illustrates changes in the relationship of public campaign financing and the absence of corruption from 1975–2015. Both variables have a scale that runs from 0 to 1: higher
scores indicate a higher absence of corruption and a higher level of availability of public campaign finance, respectively. Pearson’s correlation coefficient results in 1975: n = 130, r = .315, p-value
<.005. Pearson’s correlation coefficient results in 2015: n = 154, r = .489, p-value <.005.
Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Absence of Corruption Index); V-Dem, Public Campaign Finance.
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BOX 5.2
Policy and state capture: protégés or lucrative government contracts awarded to them as further
opportunities for graft’ (Omilusi 2016: 39–40).
‘godfatherism’ in Nigerian politics
In Nigeria, a corrupt and wealthy few have shaped policies, captured In some cases, written contracts are signed between political
state institutions and hijacked political processes for over a decade. godfathers and politicians seeking sponsorship. For example, in
Since many aspirants to political office cannot raise the necessary Anambra State in southern Nigeria, a contract was signed in 2003
resources on their own, they seek ‘sponsorship’ from wealthy and between former People’s Democratic Party National Board of Trustees
powerful individuals known as ‘political godfathers’. Godfathers have member, Chris Uba, and Chris Ngige, a gubernatorial candidate for the
the power to select both the candidates and the winners (Ibrahim party. The terms of their relationship were spelled out in the contract
2013). They finance campaigns and use violence and corruption to and ‘declaration of loyalty’ that referred to Ngige as the ‘administrator’
manipulate national, state or local political processes in support of and to Uba as the ‘leader/financier’ (Lackey and Dufka 2007). If such
their favoured politicians. For example, in 2003 a political godfather contracts or verbal agreements are violated, godfathers can use the
paid armed gang leaders NGN 3–10 million (USD 23,000–77,000) to state apparatus or armed gangs to enforce them. When Ngige violated
disrupt elections in Port Harcourt in favour of Governor Peter Odili. The the terms of his contract after he won the election, he was kidnapped
ensuing violence prevented many from voting, and helped Odili win by armed state police officers and forced at gunpoint to sign a letter of
the election (Lackey and Dufka 2007). resignation (Lackey and Dufka 2007).
In return for their sponsorship, godfathers capture government Public officials who owe their positions to political godfathers incur
institutions to serve their own interests, including generating a debt that they are expected to repay throughout their tenure in
patronage for other protégés. Godfathers reign in all spheres of office, which negates the principles of responsive, accountable and
society: government, the private sector, academia, legal systems and transparent governance (Lackey and Dufka 2007). The capture of
religious institutions (Abudillahi and Tunde 2013). ‘They demand a power and influence by a corrupt elite has undermined the foundations
substantial degree of control over the governments they help bring of democratic governance and prevented millions of Nigerians from
into being, not in order to shape government policy, but to exact direct helping to select political leaders and policy decisions (Abudillahi and
financial “returns” in the form of government resources stolen by their Tunde 2013; Chukwuemeka 2012).
FIGURE 5.3
Large donations can also result in policy
capture, for example if less-affluent politicians
seek financing from large (and sometimes Representative Government correlated by Absence of Corruption, 2015
illicit) external donors, including organized 1.0
criminals, to be able to stand as a viable 0.9
candidate (Briscoe, Perdomo and Uribe 0.8
Absence of Corruption (GSODI)
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Chapter 5 The Global State of Democracy 2017
Money, influence, corruption and capture: can democracy be protected? Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
The strength Globalization has facilitated international Political donations, corruption and policy
of democratic banking transactions and strengthened capture appear to be particularly linked to
international corporations, which have the extractive industries (especially oil, gas
systems and
blurred ownership structures and interests and forestry exploitation) and government
political party in influencing national and local politics. activities such as public procurement and
systems can affect Subsidiaries of multinationals often place deep service delivery (e.g. water and education)
the amount of roots in communities, providing jobs and, in (OECD 2016). Countries that rely on natural
influence some cases, even delivering social programmes resource rents as an important contribution
corporations have for long periods of time. This creates a complex to their GDP tend to feature higher levels
in resource-rich network of relationships and interests, and blurs of corruption (Skaaning 2017; World Bank
the lines between foreign and national control. 2016). Multinational companies often pressure
countries
the authorities in resource-rich countries to
Countries often enact limits or bans on foreign adopt lax regulations for extractive industries
donations to political parties and candidates in (Moore and Velasquez 2012).
order to protect their sovereignty by curbing
the influence of foreign interests in politics: The strength of democratic systems and political
63.3 per cent of countries ban donations party systems can affect the amount of influence
from foreign interests to political parties, corporations have in resource-rich countries.
and 48.9 per cent prohibit foreign donations For instance, Ghana’s party system is relatively
to candidates (International IDEA Political established, and politics are mainly dominated
Finance Database). While bans or limits by political party competition (World Bank
on contributions are common in political 2016). While the system has its weaknesses—
finance regulations, there are many schemes for example, there is relatively little oversight
to circumvent such restrictions (OECD of the ban on corporate donations—Ghana has
2016). The Panama Papers, for example, made a robust commitment to strengthening
have shown that money from a wide range of public governance in the oil sector, most
sources influences politics in many corners of prominently by passing the Petroleum Revenue
the globe (The Guardian 2016). For instance, Management Act, 2011 (Act 815) and a
Ukraine is currently investigating a money- 2015 amendment that establishes important
laundering network linked to high-level parameters for transparency and accountability,
politicians including parliamentarian Ihor which is considered a best practice in Africa
Kononenko. The money laundering, which (Roe et al. n.d.: 28–29).
allegedly took place through Austrian banks,
involved ‘sales of uranium, gas and titanium, Uganda’s democratic and political party
inter alia to Russian arms firms through system, by contrast, is weak. While a 2005
businesses registered in Mr Kononenko’s referendum introduced a multiparty system,
name’ (European Parliament 2016). Similarly, President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni’s party
the Panama Papers scandal revealed that dominates the political landscape; he has
Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif failed been in power since 1986 (Hitchen 2017).
to disclose assets, prompting a Supreme Court Corruption and human rights abuses
investigation that eventually forced him to further exacerbate the country’s democratic
step down (Ahmed and Khan 2017). The challenges (World Bank 2016). Therefore,
Panama Papers had already forced another while accepting corporate contributions
prime minister to resign; they revealed that to individual candidates is risky in Ghana
in 2016 Iceland’s Prime Minster Sigmundur (Kumah-Abiwu 2017: 9–10), it arguably
David Gunnlaugsson had hidden money poses a lower threat than contributions to
in tax havens, which led to accusations of parties in Uganda, where corruption from
conflicts of interest (Erlanger, Castle and national and international corporations is
Gladstone 2016). more likely to thrive in a one-party system.
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International IDEA Chapter 5
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Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Absence of Corruption Index and Media Integrity Index).
FIGURE 5.5
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Africa Latin America & the Caribbean Asia & the Pacific Middle East & Iran Europe North America
Notes: This graph shows the trends in the level of freedom of expression and media integrity over time by region. The y-axis shows the score (from 0 to 1) and the x-axis the years: higher scores
indicate higher freedom of expression and media integrity, respectively.
Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Freedom of Expression Index and Media Integrity Index).
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Chapter 5 The Global State of Democracy 2017
Money, influence, corruption and capture: can democracy be protected? Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
The work of investigative journalists is Similarly, Javier Valdez, renowned for his
dangerous: 74 were killed in 2016, 21 of relentless denunciation of corruption and
them while reporting, and 53 were murdered organized crime activities in Mexico, was
or deliberately targeted (Reporters without murdered in May 2017 (Lauría 2017). Such
Borders 2016: 5). The Middle East and Iran episodes intimidate reporters and suppress
top the list, followed, respectively, by countries coverage of corruption. David Kaye, UN
in South America, Asia and the Pacific and Special Rapporteur on the promotion and
Africa (UNESCO 2016: 3). The situation is protection of the right to freedom of opinion
especially troubling for journalists reporting and expression, argues that ‘governments
on corruption or policy capture (Reporters often fail to provide measures of protection
Without Borders 2016). Out of the more and accountability that can deter attacks on
than 1,200 journalists killed between 1992 journalists. In addition to physical violence
and 2016, approximately 20 per cent were and attacks, journalists also face a range of
investigating corruption. The Philippines, punitive measures that threaten their well-
Brazil, Colombia and India, respectively, being and livelihood’ (UN 2016: 16). The
were the four most dangerous countries for media’s work in fighting corruption is also
journalists at that time (Radsch 2016). In halted by the corruption that media outlets
Guatemala, for example, El Periódico has and journalists face themselves (Uribe
denounced cases of blatant corruption linked Burcher and Villaveces-Izquierdo 2013;
to organized crime over more than a decade. White 2015).
José Rubén Zamora, one of its reporters,
was kidnapped and found badly beaten and Lack of trust in politics and politicians
left for dead in 2008; the perpetrators have Corruption and policy capture generally affect
not yet been identified (Goldman 2015). people’s level of trust in politicians, which
FIGURE 5.6
in turn affects political participation more
broadly (Arkhede Olsson 2014). Figure 5.6
shows that these two tend to be particularly
Trust in politicians correlated by Absence of Corruption, 2014
linked in Latin America and the Caribbean,
6.0
Singapore and to a lesser degree in Africa. This trend
Norway
Finland New Zealand is also present in Europe, but mostly in
5.5
Switzerland Sweden countries with low levels of corruption.
Public Trust in Politicians (WEF)
Netherlands
5.0
Germany Canada Denmark Trust in politicians does not seem to be driven
4.5 United Kingdom
Japan Belgium by perceptions of corruption in Asia and
4.0 Tajikistan
Austria
the Pacific.
3.5
Azerbaijan United States
3.0
Cameroon The loss of trust in politicians among youth is
2.5 Cambodia
Burundi Yemen particularly harmful to democracy, as this may
Chad
2.0
Angola
Nigeria shape long-term social attitudes towards these
1.5 Venezuela
institutions. A closer examination of a sample
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
of countries confirms the relationship between
low levels of public trust in politicians and other
Absence of Corruption (GSODI)
areas of government. Guatemala, the Philippines
Africa Asia & the Pacific Europe and Uganda have very low levels of trust in
Latin America & the Caribbean Middle East & Iran North America all four areas included in Table 5.2—public
trust in politicians, judicial independence,
Notes: This graph shows the relationship of average public trust in politicians and absence of corruption. The trust in
politicians’ variable is scored from 1 to 7, but the graph only displays the minimum and maximum scores, which are 1.34 favouritism in decisions of government officials,
and 6.16, respectively. The absence of corruption subattribute has a scale that runs from 0 to 1, with a higher score indi-
cating a higher absence of corruption. Pearson’s correlation coefficient results: n = 130, r = .552, p-value <.005. and irregular payments and bribes awarding
Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Absence of Corruption Index); Schwab and Sala-i-Martín 2015.
public contracts. Meanwhile, New Zealand
and Sweden show favourable ratings in all
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International IDEA Chapter 5
First Edition 2017 Money, influence, corruption and capture: can democracy be protected?
TABLE 5.2
Notes: Scores are scaled from 1 (lowest level of trust) to 7. The survey asks people: ‘In your country, how would you rate the ethical standards of politicians?’: 1 is ‘extremely low’ and 7 ‘extremely high’.
categories. As such, these data indicate how provided during elections disguised as political
these elements are intertwined and need to be donations from smaller companies (Brandt,
understood holistically. Affonso and Macedo 2016). In June 2017 the
scandal reached President Michel Temer when
5.3. Inadequacy of narrow political Prosecutor General Rodrigo Janot accused him
finance legal frameworks of accepting a BRL 500,000 (USD 150,000)
Adopting narrow political finance frameworks bribe (Al Jazeera 2017).
does not necessarily result in better reporting,
more effective auditing and verification The limited effectiveness of political finance
of political finance data, or even higher regulations is related to five main factors: (a) the
compliance with the law. People often buy backlash generated by overly strict reporting,
votes and provide bribes disguised as donations (b) the constraints faced by oversight agencies,
with the expectation that they will benefit (c) the limited scope of the regulations, (d) the
from favourable state decisions, legislation, weak accountability of political parties and (e)
friendly appointments and even contracts the lack of political will. Each of these factors is
(Ohman 2014). The scandal in Brazil involving described briefly below.
petroleum corporation Petrobras and several
congressmen and politicians demonstrates Backlash against overly strict reporting
this pattern. According to General Prosecutor One of the obstacles that may contribute to the
Rodrigo Janot, Petrobras paid bribes to ineffectiveness of political finance regulations
political parties and parliamentarians who is the potential backlash against overly strict
were responsible for nominating candidates reporting requirements. This can happen when
to senior positions and allocating salaries such measures are expected to have a visible
within Petrobras. Some of the bribes were impact on curbing corruption more broadly.
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Chapter 5 The Global State of Democracy 2017
Money, influence, corruption and capture: can democracy be protected? Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
However, as Figure 5.7 illustrates, even though the Registrar of Political Parties. For example,
there seems to be a positive correlation between during the country’s general elections in 2013,
countries with low levels of corruption and Uhuru Kenyatta of the Jubilee Alliance and
the disclosure of campaign donations, the Raila Odinga from the Coalition for Reforms
introduction of these systems since 1975 has and Democracy were estimated to have used
not significantly decreased corruption levels. more than KES 10 billion combined (USD
96.71 million), which was not included in the
These types of requirements might also create party audit reports (Kamau 2016).
pervasive incentives for opaqueness. For
instance, including caps on political finance can Constraints faced by oversight agencies
promote the under-reporting of candidates’ and Oversight agencies’ unclear mandates, reduced
parties’ expenditures. Casal-Bértoa et al. (2014: capacities and lack of political independence
355–75) refer to political actors disguising may also weaken political finance regulations
or under-reporting private donations in their (Doublet 2011: 33–46). For instance, Abdul
financial declarations as ‘electoral backlash’. This Gani Patail, the Malaysian Attorney General,
behaviour ultimately promotes further corrupt was removed from office after leading an
and criminal activities. In Kenya, scandals in investigation involving Prime Minister Najib
2016 suggest that political parties and candidates Razak, who allegedly received USD 700 million
ran parallel accounts that were not disclosed to in his private accounts from the debt-laden state
FIGURE 5.7
Disclosure of campaign donations correlated by Absence of Corruption in 1975, 1985, 1995, 2005, 2010 and 2015
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
Notes: This graph shows how the relationship of disclosure of campaign donations and the absence of corruption changed from 1975–2015. Both variables are scaled from 0 to 1: higher scores
indicate a higher absence of corruption and a higher level of campaign disclosure requirements, respectively. Pearson’s correlation coefficient results in 1975: n = 130, r = .417, p-value <.005.
Pearson’s correlation coefficient results in 2015: n = 154, r = .615, p-value <.005.
Sources: GSoD indices 2017 (Absence of Corruption Index); V-Dem, Disclosure of Campaign Donations.
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International IDEA Chapter 5
First Edition 2017 Money, influence, corruption and capture: can democracy be protected?
for violations of political finance regulations. finance expenditure is well regulated and
Fines, forfeiture of money or property, and monitored (International IDEA Political
prison are the most common punishments. Finance Database), the regulation of
Less common sanctions include the loss of donations is less robust. For example, there
public funding, suspension of political party is no limit on the amount an individual can
registration and restrictions on future election contribute to a candidate, no ban on corporate
participation (International IDEA Political and trade union donations to political parties
Finance Database). or candidates, and no ban on anonymous
donations to candidates (International IDEA
However, such sanctions can only dissuade Political Finance Database).
corruption to a certain extent. Most of the
sanctions are directed at individuals, which Despite these limitations, political finance
places little responsibility for enforcement regulations play a key role in regulating
on the parties (International IDEA Political the access of private interests to political
Finance Database). Fines tend to be low power. However, they need to be part of a
in relation to the benefits that corruption broader enabling environment that promotes
generates (Casal-Bértoa et al. 2014: 355–75). transparency, protects the work of civil society,
For example in Guatemala, fines range from and regulates public contracting and the
USD 15–125 (Briscoe, Perdomo and Uribe appointment of public officials and judges. As
Burcher 2014). In France, breaches of private such, policies that seek to prevent or mitigate
donation regulations, including accepting these threats should consider the broad range
money from banned funding sources or of actors, institutions and modalities involved
surpassing spending caps, are sanctioned with in the relationship between money and politics
a maximum fine of EUR 3,750 (USD 3,988) (OECD 2016), including young people as key
and a one-year prison sentence (OECD 2016). actors in changing societal attitudes towards
corruption (One Young World 2016).
Moreover, it can be difficult to implement
sanctions against parties (Ambarkhane 2016: 5.4. A holistic, fairness-oriented and
51). For example, in Peru the National Office integrity-enhanced response
for Electoral Processes (Oficina Nacional de Current policy discussion on the best approach
Procesos Electorales, ONPE) sanctioned seven to dealing with money in politics points
political parties from 2010–16 after they to the need to understand political finance
failed to disclose their financial information. regulations as part of a wider effort to protect
According to the law, those parties should political integrity. Their effectiveness improves
have lost their public funding (ONPE 2016; when combined with efforts to ‘rethink
El Peruano 2015). Yet since parties do not bank and tax secrecy norms, parliamentary
receive public funding in Peru due to budget immunity principles and regulations against
constraints, the ONPE sanctions were money laundering, among many other rules
never implemented. that lie on the periphery of the field of political
finance’ (International IDEA et al. 2015).
Lack of political will
Appropriate and sufficient measures to curb This approach reflects a growing awareness of
the negative effects of money in politics the complexity of the role of money in politics
are only effective when there is sufficient (OECD 2016), and the need for appropriate,
political will. In South Africa, civil society responsive regulatory instruments. This would
organizations have urged Parliament to adopt contribute to the resilience of democracies,
the Promotion of Access to Information Act making them flexible and adaptable to address
since 2005, which would require reporting the emerging challenges that money poses to
private donations. In India, while political politics as discussed in section 5.2.
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BOX 5.3
Peru: a multi-stakeholder approach to dealing with as well as data concerning people accused of, investigated, or
sentenced for links with illicit actors and activities. The database
money in politics
was designed to help identify funding patterns and trends used by
Peruvian political parties, as well as donors who become providers
In the months leading up to Peru’s 2016 presidential election, a
to the state after their preferred party takes office.
coalition of local and international actors—primarily politicians,
journalists, business people and civil society organizations— This multi-stakeholder strategy also included coordinating efforts
coordinated their work to increase awareness of the risks that illicit with Transito [transit] and ‘Carmen’, artistic associations that
networks pose on politics. link the scenic arts with political affairs. They held short plays to
raise awareness and disseminate information about corruption,
The national media was a key force in highlighting the need for such illicit money and politics. Young artists organized public displays
coordination. The radio is the most consumed form of communication and produced a brief theatre play titled ‘I, Messiah’, which was
nationwide as it reaches the whole territory, including rural areas. performed for a month (Carmen Comunicaciones 2017).
The strategy thus involved the country’s main group of broadcasting
stations—RPP, which includes the news radio station with the The awareness efforts targeted first-time voters aged 18 to 25, who are
highest ratings nationwide, music stations, a TV channel and a web traditionally harder to reach. Engaging TV Cultura, an association of
platform—reaching out to more than 6 million viewers (RPP Noticias social communicators, was therefore key to spreading the message
n.d.). Brief segments were developed to highlight the risks of links among this segment of the population. They distributed an animated
between politics, corruption and money from illicit activities—such series called ‘Ana Liza’ through social media, which analysed
as illegal logging, illegal mining and drug trafficking. organized crime, how these networks operate, why they infiltrate
politics and their broader impact on society (TV Cultura 2016).
Another key actor involved in these awareness efforts was OJO
Público [public eye], a watchdog journalist group in Peru that While it is too soon to assess the full extent of these efforts, the
developed the Fondos de Papel [Paper Funds] website (OJO Público coordination of such a varied group of actors increased the impact
n.d.). The platform facilitates the crosschecking of information of each action and connected the traditionally narrow approach to
regarding contributors to political parties and electoral campaigns, dealing with money in politics to broader anti-corruption work.
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Money, influence, corruption and capture: can democracy be protected? Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Conflict of interest and Internal party Rule of law and access Asset recovery
disqualification democracy and to justice mechanisms
regulations financial accountability
systems Civil society, media Corporate social
Anti-bribery tools and whistle-blower responsibility policies
Interparty dialogues protection mechanisms
Public procurement and code of conduct Lobbying regulations
processes agreements Electoral monitoring
and oversight systems
Immunity and
indemnity regulations
private financial interests in the USA and salaries are low compared to other sectors of
abroad (Yourish, Griggs and Buchanan 2017). society, which may exacerbate the problem.
While US presidents are not subject to the Some experts argue that making public
general rules concerning conflicts of interest, sector salaries more competitive may hamper
and President Trump has taken limited steps this type of petty corruption, particularly in
to remove himself from his organization’s relatively poor countries (Foltz and Opoku-
daily operations (Rushe 2017), he has been Agyemang 2015; de Haan, Dietzenbacher and
criticized for still profiting from his businesses Le 2013; Quah 2002: 516).
and for not creating a blind trust or otherwise
selling off his businesses (BBC News 2017a; Other measures related to public officials’
Surowiecki 2017). Critics point out that behaviour include disqualification and
this is a violation of the US Constitution; incompatibility provisions and clear rules for
numerous lawsuits have been filed against the public contracting and general mechanisms
president, including from a non-governmental to fight the abuse of state resources (Ohman
organization called Citizens for Responsibility 2011; Venice Commission 2013). Additional
and Ethics in Washington (Venook 2017), as solutions include obligations to report
well as a group of congress people together suspicions of corruption or to declare and
with the Constitutional Accountability recover assets, and anti-bribery mechanisms.
Center (Toobin 2017). For example, the OECD Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
However, conflicts of interest often take place in International Business Transactions (OECD
on a smaller scale. In many countries where 2011) is ‘the first and only international anti-
corruption is most widespread, public officials’ corruption instrument focused on the “supply
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side” of the bribery transaction’ (OECD n.d.). money in politics. Some countries have already The instruments
Political parties and candidates taken important steps to create digital reporting that regulate
The instruments that regulate these actors’ systems (software or online based) that allow political parties
behaviour traditionally centre on political political actors to disclose their finances in a
and candidates’
party regulations, chiefly political party finance more timely, reliable and intelligible fashion
frameworks, as well as mechanisms that (International IDEA 2016). Australia, Estonia,
behaviour should
promote internal democracy and accountability Finland, the USA and the UK have well- include sanctions
to protect political organizations from murky established online political finance reporting that not only
interests. These mechanisms should include systems, while Colombia, Georgia, India and target individuals
sanctions that not only target individuals but Moldova have taken important steps towards but parties’
parties’ responsibility to vet their own members adopting internet-based reporting technologies responsibility
and candidates. Colombia’s Constitution, (Jones 2017, forthcoming).
to vet their own
for example, was amended in 2009 to make
political parties and movements liable when Oversight actors
members and
endorsing candidates previously convicted Mechanisms used by oversight actors include candidates
of crimes linked to organized crime activities general transparency frameworks that ensure
(Perdomo 2014: 75).
BOX 5.4
In parallel to increasing parties’ and candidates’
responsibility, mechanisms should be in
place to facilitate their internal vetting and New forms of political funding through online platforms and
accountability procedures. The disclosure crowd sourcing
of political finance data is an important part
of these instruments. Figure 5.7 shows that Globally, politicians are becoming increasingly adept at harnessing
communication technology by using ‘crowdfunding’ to raise donations for
in 2015, disclosure of campaign donations their campaigns. Crowdfunding relies on small donations from many people
was positively correlated with lower levels of to finance a project, such as a political campaign. Candidates reach out
corruption. to their constituencies, typically via social media platforms, email or SMS.
Asking their supporters for either a one-off or regular donation, individuals
can choose to pay via SMS, apps, or online payments such as PayPal or credit
Information should be publicly accessible, and cards. Crowdfunding therefore lowers the barriers to financially supporting
disclosed in a timely and reliable fashion, as candidates for the everyday citizen and engages individuals. A donation is a
well as presented in intelligible and searchable pledge of political support, and plays on candidates’ social capital and tech
skills.
formats (Pfeiffer and Speck 2008). Access to
data helps watchdog organizations all over Most famously, US President Barack Obama raised USD 631 million from small
the world cross-check financial data and donors in his 2012 presidential campaign, which was nearly three times the
monitor it for inaccurate reporting. Promoting amount of his competitor, Mitt Romney (Pricco 2014). Crowdfunding also
provides an alternative funding mechanism for new political parties and
transparency and open data diminishes the candidates who lack established donor networks. In 2015 the Spanish party
risk that money will negatively affect politics Podemos (founded the previous year) used crowdfunding to help secure 69 of
(Granickas 2014). Social media has created 176 seats in Parliament (El Mundo 2015).
new avenues for combating corruption and
Anti-corruption movements and citizen watchdogs praise crowdfunding, which
policy capture in general (Enikolopov, Petrova has the potential to re-engage citizens with politics and increase funding
and Sonin 2016; Bekri et al. 2011), especially transparency and accountability (Wills 2012). In 2017 the Indian party Peoples’
in political finance (Shah 2016). In Mexico, Resurgence and Justice Alliance announced its crowdfunding campaign to run
in the local Manipur elections on a platform of greater transparency in local
social media may even be more effective than
and national political finance (The Times of India 2017). Similarly, in the 2016
traditional media at revealing corrupt practices Ghanaian presidential elections, civil society actors pushed the crowdsourcing
and incentivizing accountability (Ramírez platform ‘ActionGhana’. By collecting donations from within the country
Plascencia 2015: 36–45). and abroad, the campaign addressed Ghana’s lack of public finance and
candidates’ consequential reliance on anonymous donations. The challenger
candidate, Nana Akufo-Addo, built on this call for transparency by leading an
New technologies can also facilitate crowd active crowdsourcing campaign and won the election (Bonsu 2016).
sourcing (see Box 5.4), as well as reporting on
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access to information or internal and external facilitate law enforcement and judiciary
audits of state institutions (see, for example, activities to fight corruption and the undue
the experience of GRECO in Box 5.5); influence of money (both legal and illegal)
instruments to enable oversight agencies in politics (Uribe Burcher 2017). Indeed, in
and the judiciary to fulfil their independent Brazil many important political figures have
roles; and tools to promote civil society and been brought to justice, most prominently as
journalist participation and control. These part of the ‘Lava Jato’ case, which resulted in
mechanisms facilitate spaces for dialogue while the incarceration of Sérgio Cabral, the former
protecting their work and accepting criticism. governor of Rio de Janeiro (2007–14) for
They also include whistle-blower protections, corruption and money laundering (Martín
which are particularly important given their 2017). Similarly, the ‘Odebrecht’ corruption
instrumental role in detecting corruption such case, involving one of the largest construction
as bribery, abuses of public office and fraud firms in Latin America and the Caribbean,
(UNODC 2015). In addition, whistle-blowers has prosecuted more than 70 company
BOX 5.5 executives (Gallas 2017), and several public
servants—including former presidents and
congressmen (7días 2017; CNN 2017;
Pursuing a holistic approach through peer review—the case of Ecuavisa 2017; Mejía Huaraca 2017), while
GRECO the ‘Mensalao’, a votes-for-cash scandal that
exposed how politicians abused their offices
The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), an intergovernmental group
to buy favourable decisions on behalf of the
of 48 European countries and the USA, was created in 1999 within the Council
of Europe (GRECO 2017a). GRECO’s main task is to monitor states’ compliance government, resulted in numerous senior
with the Council of Europe’s anti-corruption standards through a process of politicians serving prison time (BBC News
mutual evaluation and peer pressure. GRECO evaluators conduct onsite visits 2013; Lopes 2017b; The Economist 2013).
and draft reports about the status of member countries’ compliance with
the standards and the extent to which they are effectively implemented. The
reports are subsequently reviewed by all member states and adopted by the The actions of whistler-blowers are also
GRECO plenary. The compliance procedure follows up on the progress made, directly linked to the pivotal role of the media
and countries are invited to send follow-up reports on what they have done to in curbing corruption. Cases of organized
comply with the recommendations.
criminal networks’ influence over politics in
While GRECO is not solely focused on money in politics, the theme has Latin America and the Caribbean are often
featured prominently in its activities. Since 2000 it has conducted four revealed by social organizations or investigative
rounds of reviews, on topics including ‘independence, specialization and
journalists (Perdomo 2014: 236). Thus, the
means available to national bodies engaged in the prevention and fight
against corruption’, ‘links between corruption, organised crime and money UN Office on Drugs and Crime has supported
laundering’, political party financing and preventing the corruption of MPs the efforts of investigative journalists to fight
(GRECO 2017b). corruption, as their work is key to reducing
and preventing these types of crimes, and to
Despite having to navigate inherent political sensitivities, GRECO has
maintained a credible system, partly because most of its reports are public showing citizens how corruption affects their
and all countries are treated equally. GRECO also has a clear mandate to daily lives (UNODC 2014).
monitor, which gives it access to relevant actors that other organizations
might not have. Its focus on mutual evaluation and peer pressure is based
on a shared political will to fight corruption and standards (some of which
For example, in Guatemala a series of scandals
are binding) that member states have agreed to, including ‘common rules involving President Otto Pérez Molina in
against corruption in the financing of political parties and election campaigns’ a large corruption network led to massive
(Council of Europe 2003). Because the media and academics use GRECO
protests that resulted in his resignation
reports, member states are encouraged to show progress and adhere to its
recommendations. (Ahmed and Malkinsept 2015). Investigative
journalists, civil society and international
Organizations in other regions have incorporated similar anti-corruption organizations such as the International
peer review mechanisms. For example, the Organization of American States
launched the Mechanism for Follow-up on the Implementation of the Inter-
Commission against Impunity in Guatemala
American Convention against Corruption in 2013 (OAS 2016). (Comisión International contra Impunidad
en Guatemala, CICIG) played a key role in
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BOX 5.6
Evolving approaches to political finance regulation in office. Establishing the necessary legal and institutional frameworks
has taken time, and achieving substantial progress in investigating
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
and prosecuting high-profile cases of political corruption has been
slow (PACE 2017). Technical deficiencies in the functioning of the
The funding of political parties and election campaigns in Eastern
first electronic asset declaration system, combined with attempts by
Europe often produces a perverse public–private financial cycle
some political groups in Parliament to undermine the system, have
in which oligarchs and oligarchic parties can fuse economic and
caused many national anti-corruption watchdogs and Ukraine’s
political power. Three examples illustrate these challenges. First, a
international allies to question the leadership’s commitment
November 2014 corruption scandal in Moldova amounted to 12 per
to combating political corruption. In Georgia, amid past reports
cent of the country’s GDP. Dubbed ‘the theft of the century’, USD
of the politically motivated use of campaign finance legislation
1 billion was funnelled from the country’s banks and disappeared
and sanctions (Corso 2012), amendments to the legal framework
to foreign shell companies. Two people (a former prime minister
regulating party and campaign finance in 2013 forced the State Audit
and the country’s richest businessman) were implicated. Second,
Office, which monitors the role of money in politics, to seek court
in neighbouring Ukraine, five businessmen operating in a grey area
decisions to request the source of party assets or impose sanctions
of overlap between business and politics were estimated in 2015 to
(NDI 2013: 6). However, at least partially due to this procedure, the
possess a combined wealth of USD 11.5 billion (The Economist 2015).
OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission noted a lack of timely
Much of their money was amassed through government contracts
actions to address campaign finance violations in the 2016 election
and privatization schemes, induced by their direct or indirect
(OSCE/ODIHR 2016a: 6–7, 2016b: 2, 8–9).
involvement in politics (Wilson 2016). Third, in Georgia’s increasingly
politicized media environment, the 2016 re-election of the political
Third, oversight agencies are insufficiently independent from
party Georgian Dream, created by billionaire businessman Bidzina
incumbent governments, which increases the likelihood that
Ivanishvili in 2012, was partly attributed to mass publicity. Several
political finance legislation will be used for politically motivated
influential private TV stations gave the party positive coverage,
prosecutions or the protection of private interests. For example,
including Georgian Dream Studios, owned by Ivanisvhili’s son. As a
in March 2016 Ukraine’s public prosecutor resigned amid media
sign of Georgian Dream’s financial might, the party bought about 75
reports of politically involved businesspeople hindering anti-
per cent of the total paid advertisement during the 2016 pre-election
corruption efforts (Kyiv Post 2016). Criticism that Georgia’s
campaign period (OSCE/ODIHR 2017: 17).
political finance oversight agency, the State Audit Office, lacked
independence triggered legal and institutional reforms in 2016 to
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine each have a history of entanglement
ensure its independence and impartiality. Civil society reporting
between the private sector and politics that has made corruption
subsequently became much more focused on detecting political
more difficult to combat. Through oligarchs, forms of corporate
corruption and the lack of enforcement of existing laws.
corruption such as bribery and tax evasion have become intertwined
with political corruption, which relies on illegal donations and vote
In an attempt to address these challenges, since 2013 Georgia,
buying as well as ‘the use of state and public sector powers and
Moldova and Ukraine have all passed new political finance
resources by incumbent politicians or political parties to further
legislation with a broader and more holistic scope. Each has also
their prospects of election’ (International IDEA Political Finance
introduced more varied anti-corruption efforts, such as laws that
Database). Oligarchic parties have infiltrated and influenced
oblige MPs and other senior officials to declare their personal assets.
parliaments and ministries, as well as state prosecutors, audit
In Ukraine and Georgia this is done online to make the information
offices and central banks due to three main weaknesses in how
more accessible to watchdogs and the public. Second, despite their
these countries have attempted to combat such corruption.
numerous oversight agencies, these countries are making progress
towards improving coordination, for instance between oversight
First, anti-corruption efforts in Eastern Europe have long been agencies that are responsible for political finance monitoring and
insufficiently integrated, perhaps most importantly in legislation. state agencies such as courts and tax agencies, and sometimes
Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova lack unified political finance laws. private sector banks. Third, political finance oversight is catching up
GRECO has called for Georgia to establish a more uniform legal with digital advancements. All three countries are in the process of
framework (GRECO 2015). Ukraine had to amend seven different launching online digital reporting and public disclosure systems for
acts when reforming its political finance legislation in 2015 (Venice political party or candidate finances. Political parties will use these
Commission and OSCE/ODIHR 2015). to submit information about their incomes and expenditures in order
to allow watchdogs to better monitor this information. Georgia has
Second, anti-corruption institutions have often been fragmented. integrated its political finance database with the civil registry, and
In 2014–16, Ukraine established an anti-corruption bureau, a intends to link it to the social security, pensions and tax registries.
corruption prevention agency and an agency for tracing assets Moldova has integrated its political finance databases with the state
derived from corruption, while also relying on the state bureau population register, and is in the process of incorporating the tax
of investigation and the specialized anti-corruption prosecutor’s inspectorate and banking database as well.
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Chapter 5 The Global State of Democracy 2017
Money, influence, corruption and capture: can democracy be protected? Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Whistle-blower Guatemala’s call for accountability (Goldman havens or relatives to prevent their goods from
protections are 2015). In South Africa, reports of state capture being seized (Perdomo 2015). This practice
particularly (Bhorat et al. 2017) and allegations that illustrates the need for tools to discourage and
President Jacob Zuma allowed the wealthy combat money laundering and to facilitate the
important given
Gupta family to exercise undue influence confiscation of assets.
these actors’ led to widespread protests and calls for his
instrumental resignation (Al Jazeera 2016). 5.5. Conclusions and
role in detecting recommendations: protecting
corruption such In recent years new technological advancements democracy
as bribery, abuses have prompted collaboration between hackers, Corrupt practices and public scandals
of public office activists and journalists to demand increased undermine trust in democracy. Citizens believe
transparency from politicians and business politicians are looking to enrich themselves
and fraud
actors. For example, the International and protect their own interests, while groups
Consortium on Investigative Journalists with access to fewer financial resources
coordinated reporting on the Panama Papers. cannot participate on an equal footing. Thus,
This approach has proven effective at diffusing citizens feel disenfranchised, disillusioned
the personal risk to any individual journalist and distrustful of political organizations and
while enabling reporters to cover hazardous associate money in politics with bribery, fraud
topics. Media outlets should provide staff and and various crimes. Yet the fact that scandals
freelancers with preventive security training come to light in the first place is a sign of a
and post-assignment debriefings, following the robust and resilient democracy, especially as
example of the Committee to Protect Journalists’ scandals are often the catalyst for reform.
Journalist Security Guide (Smyth 2012).
The institutional approach to curtailing the
Donors negative role of money in politics has focused
Encompassing legal and illegal actors, mostly on regulating the political finance of
including organized criminals, donor parties and candidates. The most common
regulations target the various avenues through methods of regulation include providing
which corrupt politicians commonly launder public funding for political participation,
embezzled money, mainly in financial havens limiting expenditures or donations to
(Briscoe, Perdomo and Uribe Burcher 2014; political organizations and campaigns, and
Markovska and Adams 2015: 165–81). The promoting the transparency of political
experience of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine finance. Regrettably, unintended results of
is telling in this regard (see Box 5.6). Also, implementing some of these regulations have
in Nigeria from 2000 to 2013, over US undermined their credibility and generated an
7 trillion in illicit flows from corruption intense debate regarding their efficiency. For
and embezzlement transited the country, example, providing public funding to political
according to Attorney General and Minister of parties might encourage less constituent
Justice Abubakar Malami (Nnochiri 2016). In engagement and more centralized political
2014 and 2015 a series of scandals involving organizations, and not necessarily limit
illicit campaign financing to parties across private donors’ influence over politicians.
the political spectrum prompted a reform of Even when political finance regulations
Chile’s political financing regime and oversight include sanctions, they are often insufficient
system (Pascale 2015). Guatemala’s use of a or improperly enforced. Most importantly,
pre-trial mechanism, which notifies public difficulties in implementing these laws due
officials suspected of corruption or other to a lack of resources or independence from
crimes that they will soon undergo a formal oversight agencies are also a challenge: a lack
investigation, encourages suspected criminals of enforcement destroys the credibility of the
to quickly transfer their properties to financial regulations, and undermines respect for the
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International IDEA Chapter 5
First Edition 2017 References
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157
Chapter 6
Chapter
Written by and the Pacific, and Africa. While the Arab states
Alina Rocha Menocal3 have not been immune to momentous political
change, only one of the countries affected by the
We must work together to ensure the 2010–11 Arab Uprisings, Tunisia, seems to have
equitable distribution of wealth, embarked on a democratic path.
opportunity and power in our society.
Considerable progress has also been achieved
—Nelson Mandela, President of South Africa,
globally in improving the well-being of those
1994–99 (1996)
most in need, as captured by the Millennium
Development Goals, and the Sustainable
6.1. Introduction Development Goals (SDGs) that have since
There has been significant global political and replaced them. Since 1990, almost 1.1 billion
socio-economic transformation over the last 30 people have been lifted out of extreme poverty
years. Since the 1980s, there has been a remarkable (World Bank 2016). Significant strides have
shift in political systems all over the world. A wave been made in areas including maternal deaths,
Alina Rocha Menocal is a
of democratization which started in Portugal deaths from curable diseases such as polio and
3
0.4
ones. Since 2008, there has been a broad- Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Basic Welfare Index).
Inequality facts
Wealth concentration
1.1
BILLION
8 PEOPLE OWN AS MUCH
WEALTH AS THE POOREST
HALF OF THE WORLD'S
have been lifted out of
POPULATION
extreme poverty since 1990.
Sources of data: World Bank (2016)
Lack of access
Poverty risk
has shifted
162
International IDEA Chapter 6
First Edition 2017 Mind the gap: can democracy counter inequality?
8 (Oxfam 2017). This concentration of wealth, There are ongoing debates about how much Inequality
which has been likened to ‘the greatest reshuffle inequality is appropriate or even desirable can create
of individual income since the Industrial within a society, for example to maintain an imbalances
Revolution’ (Milanovic 2016), might even be incentive structure and to recognize different in voice,
underestimated because of assets hidden offshore levels of talent and effort. However, the chasm
representation,
(Shaxson, Christensen and Mathiason 2012). between rich and poor in some countries has
become so wide that there is now consensus opportunity
There are growing pockets of people who across the board that persisting inequality and access that
are poor, marginalized and consistently ‘left represents a structural and institutional risk disenfranchise
behind’, and who have been excluded or to the deepening and resilience of democracy. segments of
overlooked by ongoing progress—even in This concern is now even evident among the population,
countries such as China and India, which have international financial institutions such as and under-
enjoyed sustained periods of economic growth. the World Bank (World Bank 2016) and the
mine trust in
People living in poverty are chronically less International Monetary Fund (Lagarde 2014),
likely to have access to education, health, and which for a long time tended to prioritize democracy
other crucial services and opportunities, which the promotion of growth through structural
affects their life chances and wellbeing (Oxfam adjustment, under the assumption that such
2017; UN 2015). According to the World growth would trickle down and help to
Bank, ‘[t]he poorest children are four times less combat poverty, while inequality itself rarely
likely that the richest children to be enrolled registered as a problem.
in primary education in developing countries’
(World Bank 2016: 17). While the effects of There are good reasons to be concerned
inequalities, exclusion and discrimination about the rise of inequality and its effect on
are felt in many corners of society, they are democratic resilience. Inequality, and the fears
particularly prevalent among young people: of social decline and exclusion it generates,
poverty risks have been shifting from the feeds social polarization and the shrinking of
elderly towards youth over the past few decades a vital moderate centre. It also severely skews
(OECD 2011, 2014; Glassco and Holguin political voice and representation towards those
2016). with resources and power. This generates and
perpetuates elites with outsized influence over
The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable shaping policy and decision-making processes;
Development and regional equivalents provide this (im)balance of power determines the
a crucial opportunity to harness action at both prospects for development and how progressive
the domestic and international levels to combat and equitable they are, including in the crucial
inequality. The SDGs offer an ambitious and area of state performance and social services
compelling framework to foster more resilient provision. Over the long term, inequality can
states and societies. They include specific goals create imbalances in voice, representation,
related to ‘ending poverty, in all its forms, opportunity and access that disenfranchise
everywhere’ and ‘reducing inequality’ as well segments of the population, and undermine trust
as tackling marginalization and responding in (and support for) democracy (Oxfam 2017).
to the needs of all groups, including children, This kind of alienation and disaffection can
women and girls, people with disabilities and also increase support for extremism and violent
older people (Stuart et al. 2016). However, conflict. In the face of increasingly concentrated
there is also broad agreement that these inequalities (whether real or perceived),
goals cannot be achieved without addressing moderates in political ideology and strategy
persistent inequalities, particularly those lose ground as those aggrieved come to believe
affecting young people (World Bank 2016; that the abuse of power by those with extreme
Stuart et al. 2016; Glassco and Holguin 2016; wealth or privilege needs to be countered by
Oxfam 2017). equally strong positions and strategies.
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How?
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The people can become more inclusive and resilient over social groups (Lustig et al. 2017). It is thus
most likely to time is ultimately a contextual question. economic, political, social and cultural in
be left behind nature, and it is shaped through a dynamic
by development A comprehensive assessment of processes process of interaction and contestation
of change towards greater inclusion is between state and society over the distribution
are those who
beyond the scope of the chapter. Instead, of power and resources. Patterns of inequality
face multiple it explores some of the factors, variables and social exclusion are entrenched in the
overlapping or and relationships that are likely to foster underlying institutional arrangements and
‘intersecting inclusive development and reduce inequalities ‘rules of the game’ that underpin a given social
inequalities’. within a democratic context, drawing on and political system. ‘Horizontal’ inequalities
These include both academic and policy-oriented research are perpetuated when certain groups are
young people on democracy and inequality, the politics systematically excluded, discriminated
of development, and institution-building, against and disempowered on the basis of
including democratization and state-building. defined economic, social, political, cultural,
territorial, and other characteristics or shared
Section 6.6 outlines the key conclusions identity. These processes of inequality and
emerging from the analysis and provides exclusion are sustained, reinforced and
recommendations for actors at both the reproduced over time and space through
domestic and international levels to engage political and social institutions (both formal
more effectively in efforts to tackle inequality and informal), economic structures and
and promote more inclusive development in relations, legal frameworks, and behaviours
order to help strengthen democratic resilience. that are embedded in (or reflect) prevailing
For additional information on the concepts political structures, power relations, and
explored in this chapter see Democracy and social and cultural attitudes and values
Inequality: A Resource Guide (Cox 2017). (Bermeo 2009; Stewart 2010; Lustig et al.
2017). Apartheid South Africa (Marx 1998),
6.2. Understanding inequality and Liberia under Americo-Liberian rule, and the
social exclusion oligarchic and discriminatory regimes that
Inequality is complex and highly contested— ruled in many countries across Latin America
and comes in many different forms. While and the Caribbean (Bolivia, Ecuador and
the international development field often Guatemala) for much of the 20th century
focuses on economic inequality, which is (Yashar 1998) are powerful examples of
usually measured in terms of deficits in how patterns of institutionalized inequality
income and assets as they relate to individuals produce and reproduce themselves over time.
or households, inequality encompasses many
other dimensions and categorizations as well. The people most likely to be left behind by
These include inequality before the law in development are those who face multiple
terms of basic political and socio-economic overlapping or ‘intersecting inequalities’ (Paz
rights and freedoms, inequality of access and Arauco et al. 2014), which reinforce and
opportunity, inequality in essential capabilities exacerbate each other, and endure (O’Neil
(such as the ability to be healthy, educated or and Piron 2004; Stewart 2010; Paz Arauco
socially integrated), inequality of outcomes et al. 2014). Women represent an important
and distribution of resources, inequality in cross-section of marginalized groups. For
the distribution of power, and inequalities in example, Dalit women are among the
social standing. most disadvantaged, discriminated against
and vulnerable groups in India due to the
Inequality is an individual as well as a interaction of class, caste and gender, while
collective phenomenon: it exists between indigenous women in Latin America and the
individuals and households as well as between Caribbean face discrimination and exclusion
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on the basis of gender and class, as well as that income inequality is rising in most
ethnicity. OECD countries (OECD 2015).
Young people all over the world are also These trends are even more pronounced
confronted with intersecting forms of systemic among young women, who face additional
discrimination, and are thus particularly barriers such as social norms, conventions
vulnerable. Clearly, youth (and women) are and stereotypes (child marriage, parenthood,
not homogeneous groups, and certain young machismo) that limit their access to
people are more affected by inequality and education and the labour market, truncate
exclusion than others. However, inequality their ability to claim and exercise their
and exclusion profoundly undermine rights, and constrain their possibilities to
young people’s opportunities to engage engage and participate in political processes.
economically, socially and politically, and As Glassco and Holguin explain, ‘[w]omen
to exercise (or even secure) full citizenship. still earn far less than men for comparable
Inequality also severely limits social work, and women lack control over income
mobility—the prospect that over the course and wealth. Systemic discrimination against
of a lifetime, a young person will be able to women and girls is both a cause and result of
work his or her way into a better economic the inequalities that drive poverty, and can
situation. As a recent Oxfam report has be exacerbated by class, ethnicity and age’
noted, ‘[i]nequalities between generations (2016: 10). See Box 6.2 for a discussion of
have grown at an alarming rate over the past how inequalities in education are exacerbated
few decades, paralleling the rise in the gap by gender.
between rich and poor’ (Glassco and Holguin
2016: 4). For instance, youth are consistently BOX 6.2
over-represented among the unemployed,
and experience uneven and unequal access to
services (for example, health and education) Intersecting gender inequalities and education
(OECD 2014). Social and economic
inequalities in early life also increase the risk Education is a key arena in which inequalities intersect to affect an
individual’s ability to exploit the available opportunities. Mutually enforcing
of lower earnings, lower standards of health experiences of structural disadvantage and discriminatory practices have been
and lower skills in adulthood. Parents’ degree shown to lead to lower levels of educational attainment and to sustain social
of political involvement and level of education exclusion and restricted life chances. This is especially true for women, who
also influence the political participation of also face gender-based discrimination and exclusion. Despite progress at all
levels of education provision and significant strides towards gender equality
youth: parents pass on advantages such as —as school enrolment rates for girls are rising, particularly at the primary
political awareness, access to community level—millions remain excluded from school.
and educational opportunities, and most
Girls’ exclusion from education is due to a variety of factors that vary according
importantly, support for their children’s
to the level of education (primary, secondary or tertiary), region or subject
educational attainment (Flanagan and studied, and geographic and socio-economic divisions. In Nigeria, the
Levine 2010). In 2016, the United Nationas interaction of ethnicity, geographical location, poverty and gender results in
International Children’s Emergency Fund only 12 per cent of poor Hausa girls from rural areas attending school (Paz
Arauco et al. 2014).
(UNICEF) cautioned that ‘if income or
family background strongly predict children’s Demographic and health surveys in many countries consistently show that
life chances, and if income inequality is girls from the poorest-quintile households are much less likely to complete
widening in most rich countries, that will primary school. Those born into poverty are in a highly disadvantaged
starting position, which directly affects their ability to exploit any limited
exacerbate inequality in children’s outcomes, opportunities. In addition, while the numbers of children out of school have
raising important questions about fairness declined globally (and the share of girls in this total has fallen from 58 per cent
for children’ (UNICEF 2016: 34). A key in 1999 to 54 per cent in 2010), girls from the poorest households remain the
least likely to attend school (Paz Arauco et al. 2014).
question is whether equality of opportunity
will be further affected in the future, given
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Inequality 6.3. Inequality and democratic less equitable manner across society. A more
undermines resilience equitable distribution of resources and power
the prospects There has been much debate in both academic attenuates polarization and distributional
for stable and and policymaking circles about the relationship conflict, tempers class struggle, and fosters
between inequality and democracy. Evidence moderation and more tolerant and gradualist
sustainable
from the existing literature suggests that views of politics among the population at
democratic inequality has no clear effect on regime change: large (Levin-Waldman 2016; Karl 2000;
governance an authoritarian regime will not break down Bermeo 2009).
because it hollows and lead to democratization on the basis of
out much of inequality alone; nor will a highly unequal Building the kind of democratic political culture
the substance democracy collapse because of inequality in which all relevant players accept democracy
of the formal (Knutsen 2015; Houle 2009). However, how as ‘the only game in town’ (Przeworski 1991)
wealth is distributed across the population has proven extremely difficult. As the discussion
and informal
fundamentally affects the quality of democratic below illustrates, inequality makes this challenge
institutions that governance and undermines the sturdiness and even more daunting. Among other things, it
give democracy resilience of a democracy (Houle 2009). skews the provision of crucial services away from
meaning those who need them most (including young
and foster its Above all, democratic resilience requires the people). Inequality also erodes social cohesion,
resilience evolution of a political culture in which the distorts political voice and representation,
commitment to democracy is grounded on its jeopardizes the legitimacy of democratic
intrinsic or normative value (i.e. democracy is institutions, and can feed violence and armed
seen as good in its own right), and not simply conflict. As such, inequality undermines the
on its instrumental value (i.e. what it can prospects for stable and sustainable democratic
deliver) (see Box 6.3). Inequality is central to governance because it hollows out much of
the question of democratic resilience because the substance of the formal and informal
it profoundly affects the ability to foster this institutions that give democracy meaning and
kind of supportive democratic culture (Karl foster its resilience. The contrasting experiences
2000). Democracy is more easily maintained, of Venezuela and Costa Rica capture these
and will prove more resilient, when wealth challenges vividly (see Box 6.4).
and privileges are distributed in a more or
BOX 6.3
As Sen (1999) and others have argued, democracy as a system of governance has strong intrinsic value: in
principle, democracy provides voice and basic freedoms (e.g. freedom of assembly and free press) that allow
people to pursue their goals and aspirations, and to seek redress to any injustices (Stiglitz et al. 2009).
Through these freedoms, citizens in democracies can also expect that, in principle, policy decision-making
processes are inclusive, participatory, broadly representative of different societal interests, transparent and
accountable. While this does not always happen in practice, in theory a democratic system can be corrective
to public policy: ‘it can ensure the accountability of officials and public institutions, reveal what people
need and value, and call attention to significant deprivations’ (Stiglitz et al. 2009). This can help reduce the
potential for conflict and encourage consensus building.
Following Sen’s tradition, in order to attain fundamental freedoms (which in turn are integral to one’s
wellbeing and quality of life), it is crucial to ensure participation in one’s development through open and
non-discriminatory democratic processes, to have a say without fear, and to speak up against perceived
injustices and wrongs (Sen 1999; Stiglitz et al. 2009).
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BOX 6.4
Venezuela and Costa Rica: contrasting trajectories under attack, and political parties that can represent and channel
citizen demands have effectively been all but eviscerated. Ordinary
Venezuela was once one of the oldest and most established Venezuelans took to the streets to protest hyperinflation, rising
democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as one crime and murder rates, and allegations of corruption. In December
of the wealthiest countries in South America. In the 1970s, it was 2015, the opposition won a majority in parliamentary elections by
also considered a relatively equal society by regional standards a landslide. However, the government moved swiftly to curtail the
(Hausmann and Rodriguez 2014). Today, however, after nearly two National Assembly’s powers including the controversial election
decades of the 'Bolivarian' revolution led by President Hugo Chávez of a new Constituent Assembly to redraft the constitution in July
until his death in 2013 and continued under his successor President 2017 (Broner 2017). The political crisis has continued to deepen,
Nicolás Maduro, democratic institutions have been thoroughly punctured by ongoing economic chaos, state repression, deadly
hollowed out, and the country’s economy is in ruins. protests, contested elections and a lack of credible mechanisms to
mediate conflict and (potential) violence between various actors in
Venezuela’s economic and political collapse from the 1980s state and society (The Economist 2017).
onwards cannot be attributed to a single factor, and inequality itself
was not a causal determinant from the start. However, as a variety of Costa Rica provides a useful counterexample. Historically, it has
analysts have argued, the country’s downward spiral over the past been less well off economically than Venezuela, but over the past
two decades illustrates the noxious effect that inequality can have two decades it has experienced steady economic growth. Costa
on democratic resilience and state–society relations more broadly Rican democracy, which is one of the most established in Latin
(The Economist 2017; Hausmann and Rodriguez 2014). America, has also proven remarkably resilient over time (Sada
2015). It has been able to weather multiple economic crises (in the
Venezuelan democracy emerged in 1958 as the result of a pact mid-1980s, and now more recently) without any of the problems
negotiated among political elites who agreed to alternate political experienced by Venezuela and without jeopardizing its stability
power between two parties, Acción Democrática and the Partido and sustainability. The resilience of its democratic regime can be
Social Cristiano. This pact was sustained through the redistribution attributed to its ability to maintain a relatively egalitarian social
of oil rents. As oil prices declined in the 1980s, Venezuela system in which the gap between rich and poor is less stark than in
experienced a dramatic fall in oil revenues. As economic growth Venezuela. ‘The roots of that system date back to at least the 1940s,
severely contracted, the political pact broke down. The weakened when elite divisions combined with organized popular demands led
and fragmented political party system lost its capacity to foster to a progressive pro-reform coalition committed to democracy and
cooperation and collective action through the late 1980s and broad-based development’ (Rocha Menocal 2015a). Some scholars
1990s. Venezuela's acute economic recession gave rise to growing have argued that the foundations of Costa Rica’s commitment to
inequalities and disparities that helped to fuel social conflict, and economic equality were laid much earlier, in the relatively equal
contributed to the implosion of the political system (Hausmann and small farmer economy of the colonial period that differentiated
Rodriguez 2014). Costa Rica, which was not rich in natural resources, from the
mining centres of Bolivia, Mexico and Peru and set in motion a very
As Venezuelans of all classes lost purchasing power during 20 years different developmental trajectory (Yashar 1997).
of stagnation and repeated devaluations, economic conditions
worsened, and income inequalities between the rich and the poor This led to the emergence of the Partido Liberación Nacional
became more pronounced. President Chávez came to power in 1999 (formerly the Partido Social Démocratica, formed in 1951), which
in an election that reflected society’s increasing polarization and came to power in 1953 and played a key role in weakening the power
disenchantment with traditional parties and ‘politics as usual’. In of land-holding elites and dismantling the army. By challenging
many ways, President Chávez had broad appeal as a forceful anti- traditional elites in this way, the party created the political space
corruption, anti-party leader who would put government in order. in which to press for political and economic reform, including
He galvanized the lower classes and the disenfranchised against redistributive policies, land reform and the creation of an inclusive
a political establishment that had failed to alleviate distributional welfare state (financed by drastic increases in sales and income
conflicts with promises to make their lives better. taxes) (Yashar 1997). Since then, established political parties have
represented and protected the economic interests of both the elites
A key element of Chavismo ideology is that the state should and ordinary people, which has helped to prevent polarization.
support social welfare programmes for its citizens. For instance, Over time, distributional conflicts have not been severe, thanks to
revenues from Venezuela’s significant oil reserves were invested an inclusionary social welfare system, and the Costa Rican state
in programmes designed to reduce poverty, improve education, has performed reasonably well in delivering human development
and strengthen social justice and social welfare. However, power (Sada 2015). Social polarization and class conflict have largely been
became increasingly centralized and unaccountable. As the military avoided in favour of moderation, accommodation and a balance of
gained ascendency, the autonomy of the legislative and judiciary class power that is supportive of democracy.
branches of government was trampled. Civil liberties have been
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A government’s Inequality, social provision and delivery able to pay for them (Paz Arauco et al. 2014).
ability to A government’s ability to perform key functions Elites often opt out of public services: they
perform key and provide essential services is crucial to build their own schools and hospitals, and live
democratic resilience. The state’s responsibility in walled neighbourhoods (Karl 2000). Those
functions
goes deeper than simply establishing and who are poor and marginalized often lack
and provide maintaining services. It needs to ensure that access to basic services, social protection and
essential services those services can be adequately paid for (e.g. justice. Inadequate or biased service provision
is crucial to through progressive taxation and international can increase social tensions, exacerbate patterns
democratic assistance), as well as guarantee that they are of of exclusion, and generate further alienation
resilience high quality and adhere to democratic principles. and resentment, especially among marginalized
groups. For example, the proliferation of
Citizens closely associate their perceptions of vigilante justice in impoverished rural areas in
the state with the state’s ability to deliver public countries such as Guatemala and South Africa
goods and to enable development and prosperity. resulted from a complex set of factors linked to
Services—including clean water and sanitation, the increasing precariousness of peasants’ lives
health care, education, welfare safety nets, job (especially those in indigenous communities),
generation, security and access to justice— fundamental concerns about (in)security and
represent visible and tangible connections between violence at the hands of both state and non-
the state and the population, and, under the right state actors, widespread corruption, inept
circumstances, they can help to strengthen state– formal judicial institutions and agents, and a
society relations and the quality of the social generalized lack of trust in the national police.
contract (Nixon, Mallett and McCullough 2016; Inequalities and exclusion are particularly
Mcloughlin 2015). In principle, service provision pronounced among young people, who today
helps to ensure the well-being of the population are worse off and more marginalized than
and to prevent citizens from falling into poverty, previous generations. In the developed world,
especially among the most vulnerable and younger generations are for the first time in
marginalized segments of society, including almost a century expected to be poorer than
young people. As such, state performance and their parents. Governments have responded
service delivery can play an important role in to the global financial crisis and economic
fostering more inclusive, legitimate and stable slowdown with cuts to social services and
institutions (Nixon, Mallett and McCullough provisions through processes often lacking
2016; Mcloughlin 2015). consultation and transparency. Young people
everywhere have thus disproportionately
Inequality, and the multi-dimensional exclusion experienced a loss of access and opportunities
it generates, skews social provision away from in health, education, employment and training,
those who are most in need of services. It creates and infrastructure (Oxfam 2016; UN 2016).
an enormous social distance between different Their prospects for social mobility have been
social groups—even if they often live in close severely curtailed, which has led to growing
proximity—which undermines the prospects frustration and resentment. Young people
for substantive interactions and shared believe governments have failed to effectively
experiences. The fire that engulfed the 24-storey address the challenges that affect them, which
Grenfell Tower public housing block in one of has made them question whether democracy is
London’s wealthiest boroughs on 17 June 2017, the most appropriate system of government for
which claimed more than 80 lives and displaced their country (Sisk 2017). The resulting crisis
hundreds of residents who lost everything, has fuelled youth-led online and street protests
is a particularly stark example of this social and demonstrations, from food riots in Mexico
distance. Such patterns result in fragmented in 2007, to the Occupy movements that took
systems of social provision and justice that only place in developed countries from 2011–13
deliver good-quality services to those who are (UN 2016).
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Democracy’s inability to deliver thus poses Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Inequalities
an enormous risk to democratic resilience, as Finland, Jamaica, Mauritius, Mongolia, and exclusion
illustrated by the rise of Chavismo in Venezuela Norway, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, are particularly
and the spiral towards authoritarianism that Taiwan and Uruguay (EIU 2016; Houle
pronounced
has engulfed it, especially under President 2009). Brazil and South Africa, however, are
Maduro (see Box 6.4). In Mali, disapproval deeply unequal—and the resilience of their
among young
of government performance between 2002 democratic institutions is constantly being people, who
and 2008 eroded popular commitment to tested. So how and why does (in)equality today are worse
elected government; citizens concluded that contribute to democratic resilience? off and more
the country’s inept and corrupt rulers were marginalized
incapable of delivering key services, which Inequality generates dynamics that undermine than previous
led to the collapse of parts of the political social cohesion and the fabric and social capital
generations
system in 2012 (Bratton and Gyimah-Boadi that hold a society together (see Box 6.5 for
2015). Likewise, although Ghana has been an example from the USA). It also profoundly
consistently praised for its relative democratic hinders collective action in ways that transcend
resilience (see Box 6.8), ‘swelling budget narrow identities (IDB 2008). Democracies
deficits, frequent electricity blackouts, and are more resilient and function better when
slowing economic growth have fuelled public ties of trust and reciprocity bind citizens to
resentment’ (Bratton and Gyimah-Boadi each other and to the state (World Bank 2011;
2015), which contributed to the opposition’s Marc et al. 2013). Such ties should be multiple,
victory in the 2016 elections. In South Africa, overlapping and cross-cutting, rather than
deepening frustration with democracy’s based on narrower identities that link people
inability to deliver for people who are poor and together with others who are primarily like
marginalized, and to overcome the patterns of them along one key dimension such as kinship,
inequality entrenched under apartheid, led to family, religion or class (Varshney 2001). This
a stunning electoral defeat in 2016 of the 25- is particularly true where relations between
year ruling African National Congress in major citizens have been fractured by conflict and
municipalities. Such frustrations are most
damaging and destabilizing when disapproval
BOX 6.5
of a particular government becomes associated
with the state itself because this jeopardizes
confidence in the democratic system beyond
Inequality and democratic resilience in the United States
the government that may be in power.
As Toqueville noted in the 19th century, democracy in the USA thrived because
Inequality and social cohesion it was based on an exceptionally egalitarian social and economic structure
of small landholders (Karl 2000). Material equality produced egalitarian
While transitions to democracy have taken
sentiments, which formed the basis for the principle of equal citizenship:
place in countries with varying levels of ‘since people’s economic circumstances, educational backgrounds, and
economic development, there is a growing everyday experiences were so similar, they were able to reach and sustain
consensus that a certain level of prosperity collective choices through majority rule’ (Karl 2000). However, current levels of
inequality have led to societal polarization and a decline in moderate political
may be needed to ensure its sustainability views, which are crucial to democratic resilience (Levin-Waldman 2016; Karl
and resilience (Carothers 2002; Houle 2009; 2000; Bermeo 2009; UNDP 2013).
Karl 2000; Rocha Menocal 2012). However,
The USA is currently the most unequal democracy in the developed world.
the way in which wealth and prosperity are
President Donald Trump successfully exploited the grievances of those who
shared among the population may have felt ‘left behind’, especially among the less privileged white working class,
greater influence on fostering the appropriate to win the 2016 election. The election also reflected an important overlap
conditions for democratic resilience than levels of class, gender and race politics that has been brewing in the US political
system for the past few decades. (Perceptions of ) inequality interacted with
of wealth as such. Indeed, some of the sturdiest
identity, which encouraged political leaders to focus on issues of difference
democracies across both the developed and the and immigration to rally popular support (Caryl 2016).
developing world also tend to be more equal:
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In theory, all violence, and where a sense of social cohesion opportunity had become more pronounced
citizens in a or common identity has been defined in narrow (2000: 150); if anything, this problem has
democracy are and exclusionary terms. worsened since.
equal before the
This weakening of the social fabric as a result Societies characterized by entrenched and
law. However, of entrenched inequality is particularly overlapping inequalities can become fragmented
unequal political pronounced among youth, in both less- and polarized, which makes it difficult to achieve
systems severely and more-established democracies. Socio- political consensus for social and redistributive
undermine the economic inequalities limit the opportunities policies and recourse to justice. In countries as
principle of ‘one for young people to engage in political diverse as Colombia, the Philippines, South
person, one vote’, processes and institutions, and thus exacerbate Africa and the USA, inequality and differences
marginalization and disenfranchisement and in access, opportunity and power have enabled
and not all voices
lead to frustration, disillusionment, alienation, elites to exert disproportionate influence over
count equally a loss of trust and credibility in political government. Through capture, corruption and
processes and institutions, as well as a weak the unchecked infusion of money in politics,
commitment to democracy—all of which some wealthy people in these countries have
threaten the resilience of democracies. been able to leverage their resources to bend
laws to their bidding, enfeeble courts, violate
Inequality, political voice and rights, buy off politicians and political parties,
representation intimidate or control the media, and run
In theory, all citizens in a democracy are equal roughshod over constitutions and contracts
before the law. However, unequal political (Levin-Waldman 2016). Their power and
systems severely undermine the principle of access have also enabled them to shape
‘one person, one vote’, and not all voices count policymaking processes and the rules of the
equally. Karl identified the ‘slow strangulation game more generally in ways that protect their
by insidious oligarchy’ as the primary danger own interests, and to block policies that would
to democracy as gaps in wealth, access and seek to equalize wealth or promote concern for
the wider public good (Levin-Waldman 2016;
BOX 6.6 Scheve and Stasavage 2017). This further
undermines the state’s interest in (and capacity
to provide) quality education, health, security
The endurance of elite power in Guatemala and other essential services.
The peace process that ended Guatemala’s armed conflict in the 1990s was
very inclusive and comprehensive. The negotiations included a wide variety In many countries in Latin America and the
of stakeholders, including the rebels who had lost the military battle as well Caribbean, powerful elites have consistently
as indigenous groups, women’s organizations and religious leaders (as well
sought to block reforms and initiatives that
as other, less progressive, groups such as landed elites). The ensuing peace
accords were extraordinary in terms of their ambition to redefine the basis of affect their core economic interests, such as
the state and the social contract binding the state and society. control of key resources such as land and oil,
and change has often been the product of
Yet more than two decades on, underlying power relations have remained
broadly intact; until very recently, the political system was underpinned by the
intense confrontation between competing
agreement (tacit or explicit) to preserve elite privileges. This understanding forces. For example, Brazil, Colombia,
seems to have been shaken by ongoing investigations by the UN-backed Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru are in
International Commission against Impunity, which was established to
the midst of fraught processes of contestation
dismantle criminal networks with ties to politicians and the security forces.
Accusations of grand corruption at the highest levels of government triggered over the existing rules of the game. Different
weeks of unprecedented mass protests that eventually forced President actors are pitted against each other as they try
Otto Pérez Molina to step down in 2015. President Pérez Molina, who has to redefine power relations and address the
since been arrested, is a former special forces soldier and feared ex-leader
of a military intelligence unit accused of numerous abuses of power (Rocha
root causes of inequality and conflict, often in
Menocal 2015a). the face of entrenched opposition from vested
interests (see Box 6.6).
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favoured a small group of national elites linked Constructive linkages between the state and society are minimal, because the
to global economic interests (see Box 6.7). state’s needs can be fulfilled without Angolan labour, taxes or consumption.
The country’s elite has thus had no interest in promoting more equitable
In many democracies, especially across the growth or ensuring that the population as a whole thrives. International
demand for reliable sources of minerals and oil has helped sustain the
developing world, the state has become Angolan state and perpetrate existing power dynamics (Thorp et al. 2012).
particularly susceptible to the influence and
penetration of organized crime (Perdomo International initiatives such as the ‘Publish What You Pay’ campaign and
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative represent efforts to increase
2015). For example, the infiltration of ‘dirty
transparency and accountability in the extractive industries, which could help
money’ into political processes—especially increase equality in Angolan society. However, this would require domestic
election financing—jeopardizes the resilience political elites to foster a more sectorally diverse development, and to demand
of democracy because it undermines the (and implement) effective monitoring.
High levels of powerful individuals and groups have exercised disadvantaged by public policy (UN 2016).
inequality can outsized influence in shaping the terms of the The millennial generation is much less likely
put democratic debate (especially through the media) and than older cohorts to be interested in electoral
driving an agenda seeking to turn the UK into politics and to vote in national elections.
governance under
a tax haven that would disproportionately According to a World Values Survey sample
considerable stress benefit them (MacShane 2017). of 33 countries, close to 44 per cent of young
by undermining adults aged 18 to 29 ‘always vote’, compared
the legitimacy of Inequality and legitimacy of political to almost 60 per cent of all citizens, and young
state institutions institutions people are consistently less likely to vote than
Trust in state institutions is essential for older generations across different regions
political stability and compliance with the law. in both the developed and the developing
High levels of inequality can put democratic world (UN 2016: 70). This trend can also
governance under strain by undermining the be observed in political party membership,
legitimacy of state institutions (Stewart 2010). which has seen sharp declines over the past
This legitimacy can be threatened if state policies few decades, particularly among young people.
are biased and exclusionary; if state authorities This disengagement from formal democratic
do not respect, protect and fulfil human rights or processes and institutions is problematic
uphold the rule of law equally across the board; because it robs youth of crucial representation
or if significant segments of the population mechanisms and opportunities to voice their
are excluded from power and decision-making concerns. For example, in 2015, people under
processes. This robs institutions of the ‘immune 30 made up only 1.9 per cent of the world's
system’ needed to maintain their resilience over 45,000 members of parliament (MPs) (IPU
time and to channel challenges and conflict 2016: 15). More than 80 per cent of the world’s
peacefully (World Bank 2011). upper houses of parliament have no MPs under
30, and young male MPs outnumber their
Quantitative analysis demonstrates that in 40 female counterparts in every age group (IPU
democratic systems, inequality ‘is the single 2016). Low voter turnout can lead to a vicious
largest determinant of democratic support’, cycle of political disengagement: if young
and higher levels of inequality consistently people do not vote, they are more likely to be
reduce citizen support for democracy across ignored by politicians and policymakers, which
the board (Krieckhaus et al. 2014). Despite leads to greater disillusionment among younger
considerable democratic advancements, citizens (UN 2016).
especially in the area of elections, inequality
generates a sense of collective public frustration Youth are not necessarily apathetic. Protests
about what democracy can deliver, and what and demonstrations have become important
can be achieved through formal political avenues of political expression. Young people
institutions and processes. When there is a have been at the forefront of many emerging
widespread feeling that key institutions, such political movements, many of which have
as political parties and the judiciary, cannot be focused on issues related to inequality. From
trusted or are not adequately representative, the Occupy movements to the Indignados
political participation often takes place in Spain and the #Yo Soy 132 in Mexico,
outside formal institutional channels (Rocha they have delivered piercing critiques of the
Menocal et al. 2008). This leads to the further political establishment and the extent to
de-institutionalization of fragile democratic which wealth and privilege have rewritten
structures and increases the appeal of populist the rules of the system, shifted ever more
and/or authoritarian alternatives. economic risk to youth and excluded youth
from influencing the policies that affect their
Young people around the world feel lives (Oxfam 2016). Young people have also
disillusioned with mainstream politics and been engaged in a number of peacebuilding
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and other community engagement initiatives correctness (e.g. protection of LGBT rights Young people
(UN 2016). Advances in technology and social and multiculturalism) (see also Box 6.5). have been at the
media have facilitated mobilization among forefront of many
young people, which has enabled them to In countries ranging from Turkey to Venezuela,
emerging political
connect in ways that were unimaginable a few populists have come to power through
decades ago. Indeed, digital activism—from elections but have increasingly displayed
movements,
networked social movements to ‘hacktivism’, authoritarian tendencies, centralized power many of which
or political activism through hacking—is and control, and undermined or bypassed have focused on
one of the fastest-growing forms of youth accountability mechanisms from other issues related
civic engagement (UN 2016). However, the branches of government, media or civil society to inequality
challenge from a democratic governance (see Box 6.4). Despite their contempt for
perspective remains serious: there is still a crucial institutions of democratic governance,
profound disconnect between youth politics however, these leaders have thus far proven
and electoral politics. As the diverging paths of highly effective at appealing to people living
two Arab Uprising countries, Egypt and Tunisia, in poverty and maintaining popular support.
illustrate, informal political activism is not an The election of President Trump in the USA
effective substitute for the institutionalized and the British Brexit vote demonstrate that
politics of parties, elections and governments established and resilient democracies are not
that are vital to democratic resilience. immune to these populist challenges (Lustig
et al. 2017).
Moreover, a large proportion of young
people who have engaged in political protests Inequality, violence and armed conflict
and movements has come from middle- Inequality can be a leading driver of social
income or more economically advantaged polarization and violent conflict. Social
backgrounds. For those from less privileged exclusion—and the entrenched patterns
backgrounds, the lack of effective political of political, economic and social forms of
representation can feed radicalization, as inequality that sustain it—are crucial factors
illustrated in the global rise of religious and associated with violence (DFID 2005; Stewart
political extremism. 2010). Political instability and violence are
more likely to emerge, and are more difficult to
The rise or resurgence of populism and tackle, in societies where economic growth and
nationalist and anti-immigrant discourse social policies have reduced poverty without
in many democracies that are both more addressing objective or perceived interpersonal
established and emerging (e.g. the Philippines, and regional disparities (World Bank 2016).
Turkey, France, the UK and the USA, Widening inequality within developing
respectively) is driven by the fact that even countries, often characterized by profiteering
where economic growth has increased, its from domestic and international actors,
benefits have not been equally shared (Plattner including major global corporations, threatens
2012; The Economist 2014; Caryl 2016). social stability (UNDP 2013). Nigeria is a
While many factors contribute to the rise of prime example, with tensions and conflict
populism, including xenophobia and ‘fear emerging around competition over control of
of difference and social change’ (Beauchamp natural resources (Schultze-Kraft 2017).
2017), there also seems to be an important
overlap of class politics and identity politics. Socio-economic inequality leads to higher
Those who tend to be attracted to far-right incidences of violence and instability
movements, for example, are less educated among young people in particular, and
and poorer, and deeply resent processes such strongly increases the likelihood that youth
as immigration and the imposition of what will join radical or extremist groups (UN
they perceive as ‘liberal’ values and political 2016). While the stereotype of youth as
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Socio-economic the exclusive perpetrators of violent crime relations between different groups in state and
inequality is certainly overblown, in settings ranging society have been fractured by conflict and
leads to higher from Colombia and Guatemala to South violence. Where elites have used exclusionary
incidences of Africa and the Democratic Republic of the nation-building as a rallying mechanism for
Congo (DRC), poor, unemployed youth selective incorporation and mobilization,
violence and
are disproportionately involved in violent based, for example, on narrowly defined
instability among and organized crime, or become child group identities, this has led to biased state-
young people in soldiers who are often manipulated, hired or building processes that have provided fertile
particular, coerced by adults (Higginson et al. 2016). ground for the outbreak of violent conflict
and strongly For example, gangs in both the developed and demands for change. Examples include
increases the and the developing world (e.g. the USA and the struggle against apartheid rule in South
likelihood that the UK, and El Salvador, Honduras and Africa; the rise of the indigenous population
Guatemala, respectively) often serve as a against the Americo-Liberian elite in Liberia;
youth will
means of overcoming extreme disadvantage or the north-south conflict in Sudan and the
join radical or marginalization, and a source of identity and persistent conflict in South Sudan; the
extremist groups belonging (Higginson et al. 2016). In conflict rise of the Maoist rebellion in Nepal; and
zones, youth are often drawn to violent groups exclusion along race, class and gender lines
for protection (Oxfam 2016). in Guatemala and Peru (and more generally
across Latin America and the Caribbean)
Inequality can generate violence and conflict (Rocha Menocal 2015a). Many third-wave
because it breeds resentment and exacerbates democracies emerged in reaction to this kind
other ‘root’ causes of conflict, and undermines of exclusion, which also played a role in the
cross-cutting social, political and economic 2010–11 Arab Uprisings. Yet democratic
capacities that are needed to inhibit the resilience remains at risk where exclusionary
escalation of (violent) conflict. This is structures and dynamics have not been
especially the case when inequality is group adequately addressed or have mutated into
or identity based. Horizontal inequalities other forms of exclusion, such as in Egypt,
along political (e.g. ethnic) divisions are Guatemala and South Africa.
the most pernicious, and are exacerbated
when coupled with other dimensions Political settlements that are grounded in
(Stewart 2010). Similarly, political exclusion an inclusive nation-building project—or an
compounded by economic inequality ‘imagined community’ that can transcend more
increases the probability of conflict— narrowly defined identities—tend to be more
especially when the excluded groups are stable and resilient over time (Anderson 1983).
relatively poorer than the country average These kinds of political settlements, which
(Cederman et al. 2013). Thus, social groups may involve very few actors and elites at the
that feel unequal and suffer from multiple top, help to promote social cohesion and more
disadvantages based on who they are or are productive relations between state and society
identified as may mobilize against the state because they incorporate the population at
and its ruling elites in an effort to challenge large in a shared sense of national destiny.
existing political understandings and Despite Niger’s numerous democratic
arrangements. challenges, it has managed to mitigate some
of the most pervasive catalysts for conflict—
The extent to which elites have been able crime and violence—partly through a set
to develop or sustain a collective vision of a of policies that aims to politically involve
shared national project or common destiny some of the most excluded groups, including
with society as a whole has had an important the Tuareg people (Perdomo and Uribe
effect on how inclusive the developmental Burcher 2016).
trajectories have been, especially where
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BOX 6.8
Ghana: a resilient democracy that can deliver? expectations about service delivery and the provision of health
and education have made these sectors electoral battlegrounds,
Over the past three decades, Ghana has experienced one of the and have been crucial in lowering their costs and expanding access
world’s most successful transitions to multiparty democracy, and it to them.
is one of the few democracies emerging from the 1980s onwards that
has taken root. Its democratic resilience is no small achievement, Another example is Ghana’s oversight committees in Parliament,
especially given its multi-ethnic setting. which have the right to subpoena, supervise and monitor
government decisions, particularly in the health and education
Between 1992 and 2016 Ghana held seven elections, and power has sectors, thereby opening up policy formulation to the public and the
been transferred from the government to the opposition on three country’s thriving think tanks. Their hearings have attracted growing
occasions, most recently in 2016. The provision of basic services, audiences since they began to be televised. The media in Ghana
especially health and education, has improved dramatically. In have also been instrumental in pushing for increased accountability
2003, it became one of only a handful of non-OECD countries to and improved service delivery.
provide free and universal health coverage (under the National
Health Insurance Scheme), and between 1998 and 2008 child Of course, despite this remarkable progress, democracy in Ghana
immunization rates soared from 19 per cent to 70 per cent (Rocha is far from perfect, and there are still many challenges to address.
Menocal 2015b). In 2007, it became the first country in sub-Saharan The political system remains extremely centralized—including very
Africa to make pre-primary education compulsory, and the number strong formal presidential powers—which makes key accountability
of kindergartens doubled between 2001 and 2011. mechanisms (especially from Parliament) very weak. There is still
evidence of clientelism and corruption. Election campaigns tend to
Ghana’s progress in political voice, health and education is partly focus on short-term objectives, even if they are oriented towards the
rooted in how its state–society relations have evolved over time and provision of public goods. This makes political elites less willing
the nature of political competition, as well as its post-independence to undertake more fundamental reforms over the long term, and
socio-economic transformation (Rocha Menocal 2015b). The country there are ongoing concerns about the (financial) sustainability of
has a long history of tolerance and accommodation. State formation many popular policies that have been introduced. Making the state
processes and state–society relations based on the promotion of accountable through increased democratic space remains a key
social cohesion and a unified ‘Ghanaian identity’ emerged early challenge.
on, and a social contract linking the state and citizens has been an
integral part of its state- and-nation-building project from the start. Since politics is about the contestation of power and resources, these
Leaders and both formal and informal institutions have fostered conflicts for power are likely to be endemic. The crucial difference is
inclusion in ways that transcend narrower ties based on kinship that in resilient democracies, this competition is channelled through
or ethnicity (Rocha Menocal 2015b). In addition, an expanding a pre-established and publicly accountable framework, and through
urban and increasingly educated middle class has been actively peaceful mechanisms. Processes of change are complex, and not
engaged in political processes and is committed to the country’s always pretty: some of the dynamics prevalent in Ghana do not look
democratic values. any better in more established democracies (such as the USA). If the
ultimate definition of democracy is ‘institutionalized uncertainty’, as
There is also evidence that various elements of Ghana’s newly renowned political scientist Adam Przeworski (1991) has defined it,
established democracy have reinforced or even accelerated then Ghana seems to be on a good (enough) path, at least for now.
progress on health and education over the past 10 years (Rocha
Menocal 2015b). For example, research and analysis undertaken by However, challenges lie ahead. While Ghana’s democracy so far
the Overseas Development Institute’s Development Progress project has proven that it can deliver, despite challenges and limitations,
suggests that clientelism—the exchange of goods and services for as discussed earlier in this chapter, there have been growing signs
political support—does not determine who people vote for in Ghana; of popular dissatisfaction with the government’s capacity to deliver
they want their MPs to deliver public and collective goods. This on services such as electricity and core functions such as economic
research has found that voting preferences in Ghana are primarily growth. Addressing these shortcomings is important, as otherwise
driven by the performance of elected representatives, among both there may be risks to Ghana’s relative democratic resilience
educated urban middle classes and poorer rural areas. Citizens’
Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire both transitioned well-being. The two countries have similar
to formal electoral democracy at the economic structures, ethnic compositions
beginning of the 1990s, but Ghana has and horizontal inequalities (Langer 2008),
maintained a much more resilient (if still as well as severe socio-economic horizontal
struggling) democratic system, and has inequalities between the North and South.
been able to deliver on key dimensions of Yet, while Ghana historically avoided
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any major national conflict, Côte d’Ivoire Importantly, the ability or need to build an
experienced civil war between the North and inclusive sense of collective identity that
the South from 2002–07. Despite similar socio- can help to reduce the salience of horizontal
economic inequalities, Ghana has consistently inequalities and promote development that is
been politically inclusive, as described in Box more broadly shared across narrowly defined
6.8, and has consciously sought to respect identities is not exclusive to democracies. This
and protect different cultures and religions process of building political systems grounded
(Langer 2008). The government’s commitment in an inclusive nation-building project was
to provide basic services has remained in also central in the experiences of Malaysia,
place under democratic rule (Lenhardt et al. the Republic of Korea and Taiwan before
2015; see also Box 6.8). While Côte d’Ivoire their respective transitions to democracy,
also followed an inclusive policy under the where the very issue of national survival was
rule of President Félix Houphouët-Boigny at stake (Rocha Menocal 2017). Here too the
(1960–93), Northerners became increasingly dilemmas and trade-offs have been palpable:
excluded politically, economically and socially. processes of incorporation were highly
These horizontal inequalities triggered a civil selective, and political voice was considerably
war, but have not become politically salient curtailed. Nevertheless, all three countries
in Ghana as a rallying point for conflict proved extraordinarily successful in other
(Langer 2008). areas, namely in promoting development
and inclusive growth, which then eased the
Contemporary Rwanda has also developed a way towards democratic transitions that
strong and widely shared vision for the future have proven relatively resilient, if not always
that is partly rooted in a reinvented sense of perfect (Rocha Menocal 2017).
nation that considerably downplays (or even
denies) the importance of group-based identities 6.4. Does democracy reduce
(Lemarchand 2008). However, its trajectory is inequality?
more controversial from a democratic resilience
perspective, and it helps to highlight the often Democracy and inequality: no automatic
fraught, nonlinear and complex nature of relationship
change. The country has made a remarkable The positive correlation between wealth,
transition from the genocidal violence that democracy and equality is one of the strongest
engulfed it two decades ago, and forging this and most enduring relationships in the
inclusive vision of a Rwandan nation has been social sciences (Acemoglu and Robinson
an essential component of that. However, 2011; Haggard and Kaufman 2009). Well-
while Rwanda is a formal democracy, progress established and wealthy democracies tend to
on inclusive democratic processes (e.g. how be better governed (Acemoglu and Robinson
decisions are made) has been much more 2011), which helps explain the tremendous
limited. Power remains highly centralized enthusiasm that the post-Cold War wave of
in the hands of President Paul Kagame, and democratization generated about the prospects
dissenting voices are very much curtailed for transformation and progressive change.
(Bouka 2014). The 2017 elections reflect this, There were great hopes of ‘the end of history’
where the official results suggest that President (Fukuyama 1992), and that the spread of
Kagame won with 99 per cent of the vote, democracy would foster prosperity. Improved
but observers commented on the oppressive governance and greater inclusion and equality
political environment, people’s fear of criticising were expected to follow (Carothers 2002;
the government, and the use of violence and Levy 2014).
harassment to intimidate opposition parties
(Baddorf 2017). In theory, there are compelling reasons
to assume that democracy, by its nature,
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should reduce inequality: it is intended to has noted, ‘[i]n the history of the growth of
be a political system that provides popular European welfare states, elites were persuaded
control over public decision-making based to give up privileges or to accept higher rates
on political equality. So, on average, most of taxation only by the threat of revolution,
voters should be in favour of redistribution or else they were weakened or even physically
from the rich, as the rich are likely to be in eliminated by violent conflicts’ (2011: 88).
the minority (Meltzer and Richard 1981).
In principle, this redistributive tendency Democracies—especially less established
constitutes its main threat to elites (Acemoglu ones—confront many different challenges
and Robinson 2014). to their attempts to promote equality. Even
though in principle democracy is intended to
Yet the expansion of formal democracy has change the formal distribution and exercise
coincided with patterns of inequality that of power in society, policy outcomes and
have proven stubbornly persistent or have inequality also depend on the informal
become more pronounced (Plattner 2012; institutions and power relations underpinning
Fukuyama 2011)—even in a context of steady a political system (Acemoglu and Robinson
(and sometimes spectacular) rates of growth 2014; World Bank 2017), and those may not
among a variety of emerging economies, at be aligned with efforts to address inequality.
least until recently (Bermeo 2009; Lustig
et al. 2017). The reality is thus much more While democratic decision-making processes
complex: formal political equality before the are intended to be more participatory
law does not in itself lead to equality in other and inclusive, this does not mean they are
realms, and democracy does not automatically automatically more effective at promoting
reduce inequality. and sustaining growth or tackling economic
inequality. Kurt Weyland’s (1996) analysis
On the contrary, the struggle to promote of the striking failure of the first three
greater equality has historically been much democratically elected governments in
more contentious and disruptive. According Brazil to enact badly needed redistribution
to Walter Scheidel (2017), mass violence (e.g. reforms provides a powerful illustration of
the disintegration of the Roman Empire or just how poor the developmental outcomes
total revolution as in Russia and China) and of a democracy characterized by too much
catastrophes such as the Black Death, rather fragmentation and too many competing
than democratic politics, have acted as ‘the interests can be. Similarly stark is the case of
great equalizers’. Successful episodes of land the USA, with its persistent struggles to enact
reform have required a degree of authoritarian progressive reforms in several policy areas,
coercion: land reforms that dismantled from migration to healthcare.
prevailing hierarchical social structures in
Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan The reality is complex: formal political
‘were imposed on them by the USA, which
equality before the law does not in
uncharacteristically used its authority as an
occupying power to bring about significant
itself lead to equality in other realms,
social change’ (Fukuyama 2011). Elsewhere and democracy does not automatically
in Asia and the Pacific, such as in Malaysia reduce inequality
and Singapore, the spectre of socialism and
communism, or genocidal ethnic conflict, Developing countries that have transitioned
helped form coalitions that could mitigate to (formal) democracy since the 1980s have
those threats while addressing the critical enacted a variety of reforms intended to
needs of the population through redistribution promote process-based inclusion, such as new
policies (Slater 2010). And as Fukuyama constitutions (e.g. Colombia, Guatemala,
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Mind the gap: can democracy counter inequality? Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Kenya, Nepal and South Africa), elections Indeed, under a democratic regime, public
(see Box 6.9), and anti-corruption and authorities are intended to engage with a
transparency policies. However, such efforts wider range of actors when deciding on and
on their own have often proven insufficient implementing policy (World Bank 2008),
to alter existing power relations and redefine and this creates more ‘veto players’ (vom Hau
underlying political settlements along more 2012). Greater access to the state also means
inclusive lines. For example, while electoral that the bureaucracy can more easily become
quotas have played an instrumental role in politicized, which may hamper development
increasing participation, there are ongoing and investment over the long term (Bardhan
debates about whether more representation 2005). The need to respond to a variety of
increases women’s influence in the political newly empowered societal actors might also
arena or reduces gender-based inequalities stretch states’ organizational capabilities to
(O’Neil and Domingo 2017). their maximum, leading to incoherence and
fragmentation (World Bank 2008).
BOX 6.9
It is the natural tendency of democratic
systems to fragment, diffuse and divide power
Can elections reduce inequality? among many different stakeholders at various
levels (Dahl 1971), thereby making decision-
As the most visible and well-established mechanism for citizens to exercise making processes more time consuming;
their voice and hold elected officials to account, elections hold tremendous
this tendency has increased the appeal of
promise to make political systems more inclusive, reduce inequality, promote
the redistribution of power and resources, foster legitimacy and deepen the authoritarian development models in some
quality of democratic governance. However, on their own, efforts to increase quarters (Halperin, Siegle and Weinstein
participation through elections do not necessarily reshape the political order 2005; Leftwich 2008; Reilly 2013). Many so-
along more inclusive and equitable lines, or foster state legitimacy. Elections
called developmental states (i.e. committed to
therefore have considerable limitations.
development; see Evans 1995) that have been
Elections and electoral systems can spark violent conflict, especially when relatively more successful at fostering shared
they generate ‘winner-takes-all’ dynamics that raise the stakes of political prosperity have been non-democratic. These
competition. This is, for example, the case in first-past-the post contests,
in which the candidate with the most votes is elected. They can also further
include the Republic of Korea and Taiwan
harden group-based identities, which can make collaboration and compromise prior to their transition to democracy as part of
difficult, as critics of proportional representation systems, in which posts are the third wave, as well as contemporary China
proportionally allocated according to a party’s share of the vote, have also
and Viet Nam (Rocha Menocal 2017).
cautioned.
As illustrated by the examples of Kenya in 2007 and again in 2017, as well However, not all authoritarian regimes are
as the precariousness of the Lebanese political system, and Egypt in the developmental and committed to greater equity
aftermath of the 2010–11 Arab Uprisings, these problems can be especially
and shared prosperity. Nor do states need to be
treacherous where elites exploit ethnicity, religion or other fault lines of
conflict to attract support. In addition, elections tend to be associated with authoritarian to foster greater inclusion. While
increased clientelism and corruption. Money in politics, whether legitimate or there have been several ‘anti’-developmental
‘dirty’, has done much to pervert the exercise of political voice and the process or non-developmental authoritarian states in
of democratic representation, in both developed and developing countries.
Organized crime’s infiltration of politics has had a pernicious effect on local
Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America
and national democratic institutions across Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Caribbean, several countries—
the Baltic States and beyond (see Perdomo and Uribe Burcher 2016). including Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Costa
Rica (see Box 6.4), Ghana (see Box 6.8), India,
The relentless pressure to contest and win elections in democracies generates
incentives and interests among politicians that often conflict with efforts to Mauritius and South Africa—have shown
reduce inequality. The short-term politicking (i.e. activities geared towards that, however flawed and limited, democracy
cultivating political support to win elections, etc.) that arises during electoral and democratization can help orient the state
cycles inhibits a longer-term focus on the broader public good, and can limit
government officials’ ability to make tough decisions that might be necessary
towards inclusion and redistribution. Yet, as
for a redistributive development strategy (Rocha Menocal 2017). many of these examples attest, promoting
(shared) development in a democratic context
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introduces distinct challenges that should not hollow and ineffective, yet the regimes have Putting in place
be overlooked, just as authoritarian settings remained unable or unwilling to deliver on participatory and
face challenges of their own (Fritz and Rocha some of the crucial needs and expectations of representative
Menocal 2007). their populations. In other words, political democratic
systems have not become more inclusive either
institutions will
Pressures to deliver in terms of process beyond perfunctory forms
One of the greatest challenges that incipient or or in terms of outcomes. This helps explain
not result in
weak democracies confront is that expectations why many of the democratic systems that have popular support
to deliver remain extremely high and are emerged over the past three decades remain for a political
often unrealistic. As such, the commitment to so vulnerable (Rocha Menocal 2015a). The system if it
democracy tends to be much more instrumental question of how these democracies can more does not deliver
(based on what it can deliver) than principled effectively function and deliver to improve the expected goods
(based on the processes and values it embodies) wellbeing of their populations in ways that are
and services,
(Barbara 2016; see also Box 6.3). For instance, more inclusive, equitable and fair has never been
surveys covering countries in Africa, Asia and more urgent. The following section examines
especially among
the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, different factors that have enabled democratic young people
and the Middle East and Iran consistently reveal political systems to tackle inequalities.
that respondents care most about whether their
governments ‘deliver the goods’ in areas such 6.5. The politics of inequality: factors
as economic management, growth stimulation, that have made a difference in
job creation, health, education and security promoting inclusion
(Fukuyama 2011; Bergh et al. 2014; Bratton
and Gyimah-Boadi 2015). Corruption is a Challenges to redistributive reform
central part of this story, since it has such a Policymaking is not purely technical; it is also
large impact on people’s satisfaction with their political in nature. Thus, who is included in
governments and their perceptions of its overall the bargaining process (and where the power
performance. Surveys and other research lies in that process) fundamentally affects
suggest that people tend to support democracy, the substance of policies that are adopted
but concerns about political freedoms, rights and how they are implemented. The entry
and democracy as an intrinsic value remain barriers and the distribution of power among
decidedly secondary (Bergh et al. 2014). In actors—including policymakers, bureaucrats,
other words, citizens tend to assess a state’s civil society groups, the private sector and
legitimacy based on its performance and the individual citizens—determine who gets to
governments’ ability to deliver on key needs participate in the policy arena, and whose voices
and expectations, rather than on democratic are heard. Actors’ bargaining power emanates
rights and processes such as elections (Chang, from multiple sources, including social norms,
Chu and Welsh 2013). formal rules, control over resources and the
ability to mobilize others. In highly unequal
A crucial implication is that, all else being societies, the capacity of different actors to
equal, putting in place participatory and influence decision-making tends to be uneven,
representative democratic institutions will not which reinforces inequality (Lustig et al. 2017;
result in popular support for a political system if World Bank 2017).
it does not deliver expected goods and services,
especially among young people. As the fate of A key challenge in all countries, including
many of the Arab Uprising countries acutely democracies, is how to harness collective action
demonstrates, many democracies that are among elites, as well as between elites and
struggling to become more resilient face a dual broader social groups, to promote inclusive
challenge: formal institutions of participation, development. Where power is less centralized,
representation and inclusion have remained equity-enhancing policy change is less likely.
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Policymaking Since redistribution efforts are likely to The persistent failure to address the
is not purely face strong opposition from established problems associated with the highly unequal
technical; it is elites, a broad coalition of societal support distribution of land in Guatemala (which
and determined, coherent state action is date back almost two centuries and were
also political in
often necessary for success (Grindle 2007; a major root cause of the country’s 30-year
nature. Thus, Haggard and Kaufman 2004). Where formal internal conflict) is a powerful example of
who is included institutions are weak and ineffective, or co- how competing interests can thwart reform
in the bargaining exist uneasily with informal institutions (and (see Box 6.6). Likewise in Colombia, high
process are thus often infiltrated by personalized levels of inequality and extremely unequal
fundamentally interests), this can be very difficult to achieve. patterns of land distribution have served as
affects the major drivers of the 50-year conflict. While
The proliferation of interests, which is a peace agreement has recently been signed
substance of
often exacerbated by clientelistic politics, between the Colombian Government and the
policies that encourages fragmentation within the state country’s largest guerrilla group (the Fuerzas
are adopted and society, and obstructs the emergence Armadas Revolucionarais de Colombia,
of a united front of potential beneficiaries FARC), the agreement’s implementation
of progressive reform. Patronage (i.e. the faces steep challenges given that some of
dispensation of favors or rewards such as its components include land redistribution
public office, jobs, contracts, subsidies or and other issues that clearly clash with the
other valued benefits in exchange for political interests of some elites who are opposed to
support) also undermines the internal unity the agreement. Likewise, elites in Nepal have
and coherence of the state, which therefore thwarted progressive reform after feeling
cannot impose reforms that benefit broader ‘threatened when the poor begin using their
sections of the population over the objections larger numbers to seek equal rights and
of elites (see the discussion below on elites’ redistributive policies’ (Lawoti 2014: 143).
commitment to tackling inequality). A multi-
country study—involving Ecuador, Ghana, These examples point to a great democratic
Guatemala, Honduras, Nigeria, Pakistan and paradox: inequality undermines democracy’s
Thailand—found that throughout the 2000s, sustainability and resilience, yet some of
electoral competition was often dominated by the most obvious and direct ways to address
patronage parties with close ties to economic inequality are likely to prove extraordinarily
elites or the military establishment (Haggard difficult to undertake under a democratic
and Kaufman 2009). Since few parties, interest framework, and would contradict key
groups or social movements represented the principles of democracy (Plattner 2012).
interests of the poor in these countries, elites Nonetheless, a variety of democratic
did not feel compelled to intervene in favour of countries in the developing world have
progressive change. managed to promote more inclusive forms
of development and reduce inequality
Proponents of reforms to promote greater without resorting to violence. It is arguably
equity and inclusive development thus face unrealistic to expect that inequality will ever
a hard task: for policies to be formulated be banished in a democratic system. It is also
and implemented, reformers need to sway not necessary to wait for thorough structural
all relevant decision-making institutions and socio-economic or political transformation
players who have the power to derail such to reduce marginalization (Norton et al.
efforts. Those who oppose more redistributive 2014; Carothers 2007). Within a democratic
reforms only need to gain support from a context, the nature and pace of change
limited number of these institutions and may also be more gradual, iterative and
players to block change (Weyland 1996; cumulative: different steps may build on
Keefer 2011). one another. Even if the trajectory of change
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remains far from linear, while there is always Policies and initiatives targeted at vulnerable Within a
a possibility that there will be setbacks and or marginalized groups have also helped democratic
difficult tensions and dilemmas that need reduce inequality, especially those that focus context, the
to be addressed (Carothers 2007; World on intersecting inequalities over time (Paz
nature and pace
Bank 2016). Since change takes time, formal Arauco et al. 2014). For example, social
democratic frameworks and institutions protection programmes (which include
of change may
may provide crucial entry points to push social assistance, social insurance and labour also be more
for further reforms that can eventually give market instruments) have all had positive gradual, iterative
democracy greater substance and help it impacts. These programmes aimed to and cumulative:
become more resilient (Stokke and Törnquist increase household expenditure on food and different steps
2013). In some cases, even small changes other basic needs, better diets, improving may build on
may have a big impact on complex systems access to health care and education
one another
(Walby 2007). (particularly family investment in girls’
education), reducing child labour, as well
The question is, how? While answers to as improving household productivity and
this question must be country specific, labour market participation (Stuart et al.
accumulated research on the politics of 2016). (Conditional) transfer programmes
development has articulated some key insights
about the complex nature of transforming BOX 6.10
states and societies along more inclusive
lines, and highlighted several crucial factors
that have made a difference (e.g. Booth 2012; Progress in universal health provision
Putzel and Di John 2012; Hickey, Sen and
There are multiple examples of substantial progress towards universal health
Bukenya 2014; Rocha Menocal 2017). These
care among low- and middle-income countries. Thailand’s Universal Coverage
are outlined below. Scheme, launched in 2002, enhanced equity by bringing a large uninsured
population under the umbrella of a national programme, which greatly
Policies reduced catastrophic health payments among the poor and improved access
to essential health services. Within a year of its launch, the scheme covered 75
Sound policymaking has been important per cent of the population, including 18 million previously uninsured people.
in enabling progress to combat poverty
and inequality. For example, some of the In Cambodia, efforts to achieve more comprehensive access to health services
‘best performing’ low- and middle-income were achieved through health equity funds. The funds are multistakeholder
initiatives in which non-governmental organizations reimburse public health
countries in fostering shared prosperity facilities for treating poor patients, which largely eliminated prohibitive fees
include Brazil, Cambodia, Mali, Peru and improved the quality of care by supplying cash incentives for staff and
and Tanzania; each has combined sound facilities to serve patients. According to the World Bank (2016: 137):
macroeconomic management with thorough
As of 2013, health funds covered more than 2.5 million people in 51 of
sectorial policies (World Bank 2016). Policies Cambodia’s 81 districts, supporting more than a million health centre
intended to improve the coverage and consultations. Between 2000 and 2015, the under-5 mortality rate in
quality of education, expand the coverage Cambodia fell from 108 to 29 deaths per 1,000 live births, one of the
most rapid rates of decline in the world. Direct public provision networks
of public health care, and enhance market
in China, Colombia, Mexico and Thailand effectively cover everyone not
connectivity, emerge as recurring factors in covered by existing social health insurance mechanisms. Brazil and
a variety of different analyses that explore Costa Rica have unified government-run health insurance and the public
how inequality can be addressed, though provision network into a single health system that aims to
cover everyone.
the policies take different shapes and forms
in different settings (Stuart et al. 2016; Paz Most of these countries have defined an explicit benefits package—which is
Arauco et al. 2014). Box 6.10 highlights legally mandated in Colombia and Thailand—while others simply guarantee
some of the progress different countries a minimum package of services, as in Chile. Indonesia, Tunisia, Turkey
and Viet Nam have expanded their programmes to poor populations, while
have made in the provision of universal
programmes in Argentina, Ethiopia, India, Kenya and Peru have focused
health care. exclusively on maternal and child health among the poor (World Bank 2016).
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Context-specific such as Bolsa Família in Brazil (see Box for women and other marginalized groups
factors that drive 6.11), Chile’s Solidario-Programa Puente, have become more common in political
marginalization Familias en Acción-FA in Colombia, Bono de processes (including elections but also in
need to be Desarrollo Humano-BDH in Ecuador, Red government more generally), and countries
Solidaria in El Salvador and PROGRESA- ranging from Bolivia to Canada to India have
factored into
Oportunidades in Mexico, are all examples of experimented with various other initiatives.
social protection such initiatives. They have been credited with Even severely conflict-affected countries
programme helping to reduce marked inequalities across have sought to increase the participation of
objectives, Latin America and the Caribbean (Lustig marginalized groups. In Nepal, for example,
design and et al. 2017) and have led to considerable the interim constitution of 2007 provided a
implementation, experimentation in countries in other legal basis for minority rights, granted equal
and linkages regions based on similar ideas and principles status to women and men while acquiring
(including Indonesia and South Africa). citizenship, and criminalized discrimination
between social
on the basis of caste and class. As a result of
protection and Emerging research suggests that the context- new quotas for members of lower castes and
other sectors are specific factors that drive marginalization women in the civil service, the police and
crucial need to be factored into social protection the army, women held one-third of seats in
programme objectives, design and the Constituent Assembly formed in 2008,
implementation, and that linkages between including traditionally marginalized Tarai
social protection and other sectors are crucial. Dalit women (Paz Arauco et al. 2014). As of
For example, programmes targeted at women November 2015, 29 per cent of Constituent
that use an integrated approach to address Assembly members were women (176 out of
their social and economic vulnerabilities 598) (Stuart et al. 2016).
through raising awareness on women’s rights
and transferring cash can support women’s However, sound policies are not sufficient
economic empowerment and start to to address inequalities. One of the most
dismantle discriminatory social norms (Stuart important lessons emerging in development
et al. 2016). policy circles over the past two decades is that
the politics of policies—rather than the policies
Some countries have implemented affirmative themselves—are fundamental in shaping
action policies and measures to redress their implementation and effectiveness,
intersecting inequalities. For example, quotas and determining what kinds of policies are
feasible in the first place (Booth 2012; Putzel
BOX 6.11 and Di John 2012; Levy 2014; Hickey et al.
2014; Rocha Menocal 2017; World Bank
2017). Institutions reflect power dynamics;
Bolsa Família the fundamental power distribution in the
The Bolsa Família (BF) programme in Brazil focuses on making existing social political system and the underlying rules of
services available to the poorest and hardest-to-reach households in the the game (both formal and informal) shape
country. The programme, which was created in 2003 under the administration
how institutions work and how inclusive,
of President Lula (Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva), combined and scaled up a variety
of previous initiatives under a simple concept: providing poor families with effective and representative they are (Rocha
small cash transfers in return for keeping their children in school and attending Menocal 2017; Hickey et al. 2014; Putzel
health centres regularly for preventive care. As of 2015, BF covered 48 million and Di John 2012; Khan 2010; North, Wallis
people, or about a quarter of the country’s population (Munk School of Global
Affairs and University of Toronto 2016).
and Weingast 2009). The following section
explores the political and institutional factors
The programme, widely considered successful, is credited with helping to that need to be taken into account in order
tackle extreme poverty and improving school attendance, and has been praised
for playing an important role in Brazil’s remarkable progress in reducing
to better understand whether (and how) to
inequality (Munk School of Global Affairs and University of Toronto 2016). address inequalities.
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State capacity and its linkages the quality of democratic governance and State capacity,
with society reducing inequality have been embraced as understood
While it has become fashionable in certain central goals in the global arena to foster more as capable
circles to underestimate the significance of peaceful and resilient states and societies, these and impartial
the state, the state remains a leading factor two processes may not always be mutually
administration
in promoting and securing development reinforcing.
outcomes that are more inclusive and that is protected
broadly shared. The state is the entity with Both democracy and the reduction of from state
the mandate, capacity and legitimacy to inequality need effective and capable states capture for
redistribute wealth and resources (Leftwich to underpin them. Much current thinking private, personal
2008; Törnquist and Harriss 2016). All on democratization, especially within the or patronage
successful post-World War II examples of international development community, gains, is essential
long-term inclusive development have been continues to assume that today’s emerging
to democratic
in countries with high levels of state capacity democracies are built on the foundations of
(vom Hau 2012; Hickey et al. 2014). coherent, functioning and fully capable states resilience
(Carothers 2002, 2007; Fukuyama 2005;
In the so-called East Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Levy 2014). Thus, most of the literature
the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and Singapore), presupposes that a reasonably effective state
for example, the state oversaw and led a process exists before a democratization process starts.
of equitable and rapid economic growth and
radical socio-economic transformation from However, many democratizing countries are
the 1960s to the 1990s. More recently, China also attempting to build effective, capable
and Viet Nam have been used as important states to begin with. The key question in this
examples of this trend, though they have not context should not be one of sequencing (e.g.
reduced inequality to the same extent. These whether to postpone democratization reforms
states all have the institutional capacity and indefinitely until a fully functioning state is
autonomy to promote development goals in place), but rather of better understanding
without being ‘captured’ by particularistic how different reforms intended to promote
interests, while remaining embedded in state-building on the one hand and
society through a concrete set of social ties democracy strengthening on the other hand
that binds the state to society and provides can reinforce each other more gradually
institutionalized channels for the continual in a ‘co-evolutionary’ manner (Carothers
negotiation and renegotiation of goals and 2007). A crucial implication of this is that
policies (Evans 1995). efforts to promote democratic resilience
should not only focus on establishing and
State capacity, understood as capable and strengthening democratic systems, but also
impartial administration that is protected on increasing awareness of how such efforts
from state capture for private, personal or affect state capacity, service delivery and other
patronage gains, is essential to democratic dimensions of governance, such as corruption.
resilience. While many countries that have As with the relationship between democracy
promoted inclusive development and reduced and inequality, the relationship between
inequality across the developing world have democratization and the building of effective
been authoritarian, Botswana, Brazil, Ghana, and capable state institutions can be fraught
India and South Africa are more complex with tensions—as the case of contemporary
examples of the push and pull of progress and Rwanda vividly illustrates—and it is essential
setbacks in both democracy and inequality. As to recognize these tensions and dilemmas
Brazil and South Africa vividly demonstrate, so they can be better addressed (Paris and
democratization and democratic deepening Sisk 2008).
pose distinct challenges. While strengthening
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in social movements that had long protested Moreover, strong programmatic parties can be States seem to
against social and economic inequalities, the damaging for a polity if they produce ideological be more likely
Partido dos Trabalhadores in Brazil was until polarization that reduces the potential for to pursue and
very recently a coherent, well-organized and compromise between political actors (Galston implement
institutionalized vehicle for collective action, 2010). This can lead to deadlock over
policies that
as is the PAIS Alliance Political Movement legislation or rapid alterations in government
in Ecuador. These parties have played an policies, both of which can destabilize the promote more
instrumental role in shaping government economy and society. The nature of the current inclusive and
incentives to adopt policies that foster more political environment in countries such as the equitable
inclusive and participatory development. USA helps to illustrate this danger (see Box development
Curiously, often non-democratic systems, such 6.5). More clientelist appeals may therefore be over the long
as China and Viet Nam, are likely to exhibit necessary to defuse social tensions and provide term where
more institutionalized ruling parties than continuity of policies in certain circumstances.
institutionalized
democratic ones, as in South East Asia.
However, across much of the developing world, political parties
The evidence surrounding the assumption political parties are preoccupied with winning are in place
that programmatic parties (i.e. parties that elections for their political survival. Their
generate policy, mobilize support, and govern concern for the public good is at best secondary
predominantly on the basis of a consistent and (vom Hau 2012). Factors such as the maturity
coherent ideological position) deliver better and of the political system and the nature of political
more inclusive outcomes remains inconclusive. competition and electoral systems are likely to
While strong clientelism has been found to be affect the developmental or more personalistic
associated with a slight reduction in economic approach of political parties and the role they
growth, there is no marked association between can play in shaping political settlements that
programmatic politics and higher growth are more or less inclusive (Kitschelt et al. 2012;
(Kitschelt et al. 2012). Similarly, clientelism Cheeseman et al. 2016; Carothers 2006).
does not seem to be associated with a reduction
in human development indicators, and it may Coalition building
help improve some, such as life expectancy A key challenge in countries across both the
and literacy; other research points in different developing and the developed world is how to
directions (Kitschelt et al. 2012). The crucial harness collective action to overcome common
point is that ‘programmatic’ versus ‘clientelistic’ challenges. Stakeholders’ ability to influence
party categories are rarely as mutually exclusive developmental patterns depends not only on
as such labelling might suggest. Parties are what they seek to achieve, but also on their
likely to combine targeted clientelistic appeals relative power and the institutional context
with universal provision pledges, and vice versa in which decisions are made. Where elites
(Kitschelt et al. 2012; Cheeseman et al. 2016). perceive a zero-sum game in which change to
The Congress Party in India, for example, relies promote more inclusive institutions results
on patron–client relationships to mobilize in a relative loss of wealth and privilege or a
support, but also pursues a coherent, policy- challenge to established power relations, there
based agenda. In addition, a recent study on will be strong incentives to divert or block even
Brazil, India, Ukraine and Zambia suggests the best-intentioned policies.
that the existence of one or two programmatic
political parties is usually insufficient to drive Building coalitions—at both the domestic
the ‘programmatization’ of a party system and international levels—is essential for
(especially if such parties do not win power), enacting reforms. Collective action can
and programmatic and non-programmatic threaten development where it leads to or
parties tend to co-exist (Cheeseman et reinforces predatory behaviour by a tightknit
al. 2016). group of elites (as happened in Zimbabwe, for
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A key challenge example). However, it can prove positive, and ethnic and racial interests towards a shared
in countries even decisive, where it evolves into a process national goal, which has helped transform the
across both the of bargaining around issues of broader public country in a relatively short period of time
interest and where there are opportunities for a (Sebudubudu and Molutsi 2009). This grand
developing and
wide range of state and non-state stakeholders coalition ‘enabled the new state to take control
the developed at different levels—subnational, national, of key resources such as land, minerals, wildlife
world is how to regional, global—to participate. and ultimate political authority across the
harness collective country without alienating, antagonizing or
action Ruling elites in Botswana played a crucial role even abolishing traditional institutions as some
in forging a ‘grand coalition’ committed to a African countries did in the post-independence
common development agenda that could cut era’ (Sebudububu and Molutsi 2009: 6).
across narrow divides. This coalition brought
together a constellation of diverse regional, The remarkable transformation of the
Colombian city of Medellín can in part be
BOX 6.12
explained by the effectiveness of coalitional
politics. Until the early 1990s, the city had
Medellín: a story of transformation been marred by violence and characterized by
deep-rooted inequality and marginalization.
Over a period of two decades, Medellín, Colombia’s second-largest city Within a broader context of important
and home to the drug cartel led in the 1980s and 1990s by Pablo Escobar,
experienced a remarkable transformation. While in 1991 it was named the most
national and global transformations that were
violent city in the world, by the 2010s it had managed to reduce its homicide underway at the time (such as the constitution-
rate by 90 per cent, and is now widely considered a pioneer of inclusive urban making process), a coalition incorporating a
development (Mclean 2014).
wide constellation of actors came together.
The roots of Medellín’s marginalization and insecurity lay in a combination of These included traditional political elites,
factors that enabled many violent actors to become powerful: inequality and business leaders, new political leaders and
exclusion, and the wider political and financial instability caused by Colombia’s
parties, community organizations and social
continuing civil war and the recession of the 1980s. The Medellín cartel, the
military, paramilitaries and militias competed forcefully for the right to provide movements. That coalition was able to open
‘security’, and violence became the ‘common sense’ way of getting things done. up new spaces for collective action that were
instrumental in harnessing reform efforts
A confluence of international, national and local influences created an enabling
political climate for the ‘Medellín miracle’. It involved the interactions of power, (Mclean 2014) (see Box 6.12).
politics and coalitions of political actors galvanized by crisis (Mclean 2014).
A combination of factors enabled critical junctures to become progressive The strength of collective action also depends
spaces for change in Medellín. At the international level, influences such as
on the incentives and interests of the groups
global capital, international development organizations and the US war on
drugs put different kinds of pressures on the economic and political system concerned. ‘Elites’ are often not homogeneous,
in Medellín and Colombia more broadly. Legislative landmarks such as and conflicts and fractures across types of elites
Colombia’s 1991 Constitution brought about formal institutional changes at the (e.g. political versus economic, old versus new),
local and national levels that were important in opening up arenas of political
contestation and enabling new actors to participate. Coalition-building was
within elites (e.g. across ethnicity, region or
also instrumental. At the national level, there was a commitment to addressing ideology) and at different levels (local, national,
the violence in Medellín, while at the local level there was a hunger for change. international) are likely to emerge (Pritchett
This enabled a variety of stakeholders, from elites to radical groups, to unite
and Werker 2012). The same can be said of the
behind a shared agenda for reform that they perceived to be in their own
interest, if for different reasons. ‘private sector’, both national and international
(Pritchett and Werker 2012). Such differences
Bold, strategically placed infrastructure projects that aimed to reduce
in interests, incentives, social and political
inequality and promote inclusion were commissioned from internationally
acclaimed architects. Schools, public libraries and parks were created, and alignments, ideas and affinities can weaken
transport networks were extended to considerably reduce the commuting times groups that are opposed to change (Khan
from poor neighbourhoods to the city centre. In 2013, Medellín won the Urban 2012) and make it more difficult to bring
Land Institute’s ‘Innovative City of the Year’ award. It was also selected to host
together coalitions to pressure state actors and
the UN-HABITAT 2014 World Urban Forum on Urban Equity in Development
(Mclean 2014). other leaders to pursue shared interests (Rocha
Menocal 2015a; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992).
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For instance, groups that have traditionally been and the tensions that these processes have Social
excluded from (or marginal to) policymaking generated—are crucial to understanding the mobilization
processes (e.g. poor people in rural and urban content of their policies. These two examples and sustained
areas) may gain salience by partnering with suggest that social movement mobilization
bottom-up
better-off groups that have more leverage. More can help exert influence and pressure on
privileged groups can be persuaded to support governments to implement progressive social
pressures can
policies and programmes to make growth policies and strengthen their commitment to also help achieve
more inclusive if they perceive such changes as civil society participation, a key element of substantive
being essential to achieving or protecting their resilient democracies. Crucially, the kinds of transformations
interests, avoiding widespread social unrest linkages and alliances that social movements towards greater
or ensuring their survival. For example, Río can build with political parties is essential to inclusion and
de Janeiro and Nairobi have made progress determining their effectiveness—and vice versa
shared prosperity
in eradicating slums and strengthening local- (see the discussion on political parties above).
level governance processes in efforts to address
urban neglect and unrest (Jones, Cummings Some of the policies and programmes that the
and Nixon 2014). recent and current governments in Brazil and
Ecuador have adopted also respond to long-
Social mobilization term demands for increased participation from
Social mobilization and sustained bottom- social movements. In Brazil, governments have
up pressures can also help achieve substantive enacted such policies because social movements
transformations towards greater inclusion have represented historical political allies of the
and shared prosperity. Social movement Partido dos Trabhaldadores (Workers' Party).
mobilization can thus serve as both a Ecuador’s government has implemented more
threat factor and an incentive (via electoral inclusive measures because these movements were
consequences) for democratically elected well organized and mobilized at the forefront of
governments. In Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and protest movements that have brought down
Nepal, for example, social mobilization has three governments, and have demonstrated their
played a crucial role in shaping both political capacity to mobilize nationwide support for the
trajectories and policymaking. These countries government and for specific political leaders
have all had movement-based governments (including former President Rafael Correa and
at some point. While they were grounded in current President Lenín Moreno).
different discourses or narratives (e.g. class
based in Brazil and Ecuador, and ethnically Bolivia has also made considerable progress
based in Bolivia and Nepal), they all shared a in tackling intersecting inequalities (despite
strong national political project based in part the still-high rates of poverty) largely due to a
on values of social justice and a commitment long process of mobilization by the indigenous
to greater equality, with a special focus on those population. A critical milestone was the election
who were marginalized, excluded or otherwise of coca advocate and native peasant leader Evo
left behind (Paz Arauco et al. 2014). Morales as president in 2005, followed by the
adoption of a new Constitution a few years
The inclusive and redistributive policies later. As in Ecuador, the rewriting of Bolivia’s
adopted by Brazil and Ecuador have been either Constitution represented the culmination of
the result of long-standing demands of social years of mobilization of indigenous groups for
movements or the interpretation by left-wing the recognition of their rights—mobilization
governments of what movements have asked that became increasingly politicized with the
for (Hevia-Pacheco and Vergara-Camus 2013). affirmation of formal democracy in those
The willingness or need of these governments countries. Subsequent legislation has led to the
to cooperate with social movements in policy implementation of different affirmative action
design, implementation and monitoring— measures and to electoral reforms establishing
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Ideas are a key special indigenous constituencies in the profound effect on shaping inequalities and the
ingredient of Pluri-national Assembly and indigenous local resilience of democratic institutions. Without
politics, and are governments. Bolivia has experienced reduced shared myths to bind societies together, the risks
inequalities on all indicators during 1998– of fragmentation, polarization, culture wars and
important in
2008, with gains particularly visible for rural violence increase dramatically (Stevens 2017).
shaping thinking, residents. However, the divide between ethnic Yet the Medellín ‘miracle’ was based in part on
behaviour and groups, demonstrated by the persistently low the ability to generate a common narrative about
outcomes about education outcomes for the minority Quechua, poverty and marginalization as root causes of the
inclusion and remains significant (Paz Arauco et al. 2014). violence and conflict besetting the city. As has
exclusion, and been discussed, Ghana (see Box 6.8), a multi-
how much Power of ideas and national narratives ethnic country that has proven remarkably
Within international development assistance peaceful and stable over time, especially
inequality ought
circles, relatively little attention has been paid compared to other countries in West Africa (and
to be tolerable to the importance, or even power, of ideas in beyond), is another good example of the power
shaping development trajectories (Hudson and of ideas in shaping inclusive narratives.
Leftwich 2014). Yet ideas are a key ingredient of
politics, and are important in shaping thinking, International factors
behaviour and outcomes about inclusion and While institutional transformation is clearly
exclusion, and how much inequality ought to driven from within, international factors
be tolerable. Ideas and norms also influence also matter. Regional and global drivers and
the nature and quality of interactions between dynamics can play important roles in informing
different elites and their followers, and across (or shaping) internal reform processes, and
different groups in state and society (Hudson influencing the incentives and dynamics of
and Leftwich 2014). domestic actors to support democratic resilience
and the quality of democratic governance;
The fight for progressive social change also inequality is an important component of that.
calls for changes in attitudes and values For example, transnational networks promoting
towards excluded groups. Values and beliefs human rights, women’s empowerment, and
are central to the discussion of prospects for transparency and accountability have harnessed
inclusion and exclusion in at least two ways. collective action at the international and global
The first is state legitimacy. As noted above, levels, which in turn influences domestic politics
legitimacy and associated concepts of fairness and debates (Keck and Sikkink 1999). Other
are socially constructed (Mcloughlin 2015), global governance and transnational networks
and people base their judgements about what is in the areas of health and education have also
acceptable and tolerable on their beliefs about had an important role in setting expectations
how decisions are made, and not necessarily and generating more incentives for government
on objective criteria or ‘universal absolutes’ to deliver, especially in aid-dependent
(Mcloughlin 2015; Hudson and Leftwich countries. More recent global mobilization and
2014). Crises of legitimacy occur when norms outrage at the massive increases in inequality—
(e.g. about inequalities) are either violated epitomized by movements such as Occupy and
or change, and these can destabilize, if not international campaigns on the need to cap
unravel, the rules of the game underpinning executive pay, make tax avoidance more difficult
political systems (McLoughlin 2015). and put greater pressure on tax havens—have
helped to place inequality at the centre of
Second, the power of ideas is also central to both domestic and international policymaking
discussions of who is included in (and excluded agendas. International commitment to
from) state- and nation-building processes. As values such as democracy and human rights
discussed earlier in the chapter, the narrow or has also been significant in harnessing
broad sense of nation built in a country has a democratization processes, at least on paper.
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Global commitments such as the Millennium internal political and power dynamics, but More recent
Development Goals and the more ambitious rather how they should design their engagement global
and broader agenda for transformation and interventions, based on a sound assessment mobilization
embedded in the SDGs, which make specific of the multiple dilemmas and trade-offs
and outrage at the
commitments to promote inclusion and tackle involved (Yanguas 2017).
inequalities, can also encourage reform at the
massive increases
domestic level. International donor efforts International development organizations can in inequality
to use democracy- or development-related make a useful, and perhaps even indispensable, have helped to
incentives and conditionalities to encourage a contribution towards helping internal state and place inequality
greater focus on education and health outcomes societal actors overcome institutional obstacles at the centre of
in partner countries have also had an impact, to transformation along different dimensions. both domestic
although such approaches may not always work. As discussed above, many of the challenges
and international
associated with promoting more inclusive
However, many other international factors development and reducing inequality are
policymaking
have helped to undermine the commitment to not technical or even financial, but political. agendas
democratic governance and a more inclusive Some of the biggest constraints take the form
agenda within different countries. For instance, of unresolved processes of contestation and
foreign intervention during the Cold War failed collaboration. Often, cooperation proves
proved important in supporting the kinds of impossible because there is a lack of trust, or
authoritarian regimes that emerged in Asia because incentives are not aligned. For instance,
(Rocha Menocal 2017). China casts a particularly the short-termism that electoral politics
long shadow as an alternative, non-democratic generates among would-be developmental
model for development, given its size, power and leaders in poor countries—especially those that
the extraordinary developmental transformation are ethnically fragmented and have weak and
it has brought about (Reilly 2013). A variety ineffective institutions—tends to contribute
of mechanisms and practices enable domestic to a focus on narrow interests (e.g. winning
actors, especially elites, to engage in tax elections) rather than to greater accountability
avoidance, or to skew the benefits of economic or a concern for the broader public good over
growth to benefit well-placed stakeholders at the long term. International development
home and abroad. And of course, organized actors may have a fundamental role to play
crime has done much to heighten inequalities, in building trust, nudging incentives and
warp the quality of democratic governance and interests, and seeking to facilitate and broker
test democratic resilience. spaces for collective action, while also focusing
on tackling ‘global drivers of bad governance’
International development actors can more explicitly (TWP CoP 2015; Booth and
significantly influence the political and Unsworth 2014).
power dynamics of the countries in which
they engage, even if they are reluctant to 6.6. Conclusions and
recognize this important political role. recommendations: addressing
International development assistance has a inequality
political impact, which may either be positive The growing rise in the gap between those
(harnessing domestic pressures for change) or who have and those who are left behind
negative (reinforcing political inequalities or poses a genuine threat and structural risks to
undermining the conditions for reform). If the quality of democracy and its long-term
this influence, however unintentional, is not resilience. Inequality undermines social and
well understood, well-intentioned programmes political cohesion and exacerbates polarization
may generate unintended consequences that and resentment. It perverts political voice,
undermine longer-term objectives. Thus the giving outsized influence to those with means
question is not whether donors influence and resources, or the right status. This skews
191
Chapter 6 The Global State of Democracy 2017
Mind the gap: can democracy counter inequality? Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
and share more knowledge about lessons social programmes as a form of patronage
learned (World Bank 2016). that they can use to build political
machines, which can generate clientelism
National and local policymakers and corruption (Fukuyama 2011).
• Use social and economic policies to rectify
intersecting social, political and economic The international community
inequalities and soften the sharp edges of • Focus on inequality as an intersectional
economic inequality and social exclusion. phenomenon and prioritize its reduction,
These may include tax policy, education, rather than focusing solely on poverty reduction
health, unemployment, conditional cash and income levels. An intersectional
transfers, micro-credit and affirmative understanding of inequality also helps
action. The focus should be on young highlight the need for more collective and
women and men in particular to help holistic approaches to the problem.
break vicious cycles of intergenerational • Be mindful of the political context and
inequalities. adapt approaches and interventions to tackle
• Identify and address not only the technical but inequalities to contextual realities. Develop
especially the political constraints on effective a sharper understanding of how efforts in
policy implementation by reforming laws one area (e.g. democracy support) may
and other formal institutions necessary affect those in another (e.g. state-building),
to deal with inequalities and seeking and recognize the tensions, trade-offs
to influence the incentives, behaviours, and dilemmas involved. This may require
practices and values of key strategic actors thinking and working on a range of
and stakeholders. Pay particular attention issues—from service delivery, citizen
to how the formal and informal spheres participation and governance reforms, to
interact, and whether they complement economic development and promoting
each other or pull in different directions. inclusion—in different ways, focusing not
• Harness redistributive coalitions that can on ‘best practice’ but rather on ‘best fit’.
capitalize on domestic and international • Focus on revitalizing and reinventing more
pressures to address inequality as a policy vigorous links between states and societies to
priority. help give democracies renewed vigour and
• Be mindful of the potential side effects and resilience.
unintended consequences of social policies • Support international cooperation to fight
intended to redress inequality, and find against tax avoidance and capital flight by
a balance between competing aims. For requiring country-by-country reporting,
example, there may be different perceptions promoting transparency and information
of how much inequality a society is willing exchange, and imposing unitary taxes on
to tolerate based on the trade-offs involved, capital.
while politicians catering to voters may see
193
Chapter 6 The Global State of Democracy 2017
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Chapter 7
Chapter
7
Migration, social polarization,
citizenship and multiculturalism
Chapter 7 The Global State of Democracy 2017
Migration, social polarization, citizenship and multiculturalism Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Migration, social
polarization, citizenship
and multiculturalism
Fuelled by globalization, climate change and state failure, and due to its transnational
nature, migration poses fundamental challenges to democratic societies on both the
national and local levels, particularly in cities. It challenges the nation state and, by
extension, policy areas that represent core components of state sovereignty, including
citizenship. Large migration flows strain democratic institutions’ capacity to effectively
integrate migrants into society, and call into question the extent to which governments
should enable migrants’ political participation and integration. Migration affects
governments’ ability to deliver public services. Public debate and concerns about
migration, including whether multiculturalism ‘works’, showcase the polarization of
societies and policymakers’ dilemmas in the search for adequate responses. Migration
also affects democratic institutions and processes in migrants’ countries of origin, as
citizens abroad seek to influence politics at home. This chapter assesses the democratic
dividend of migration for destination and origin countries, and how policymakers
can effectively address public concerns on migration while also reaping the benefits
of inclusive and multicultural integration policies. It features case studies on Canada,
Chile, Germany, Myanmar, South Africa, Tunisia and the United Kingdom.
Written by
Nathalie Ebead and Paul McDonough4
7.1. Introduction
Migration is often at the centre of public
One significant litmus test of debate, especially during election campaigns.
In some countries, party platforms increasingly
the strength and resilience of the
promise to expel migrants or to restrict their
democratic system as we know it— entry. In others, a perceived government failure
meaning open and responsible to address concerns over migration has led to
government founded on tolerance, xenophobic violence or civil unrest. Yet many
respect for human rights and the countries acknowledge the economic benefits
rule of law—is how global people of migration and the increasing need for skilled
movement will be managed. migrants to support their economies.
well as European Union countries, sparking curb increased migration flows. Migration has
global and regional debates about fair burden played a fundamental role in elections and
sharing and how countries can cope with referendums, as showcased by the electoral
increasing migration flows. Other countries, success of populist parties and leaders,
such as Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Namibia particularly in Europe and the United States.
and South Africa, have been long-term hosts to In Australia, migration policy has focused on
economic migrants as well as refugees fleeing facilitating skilled and unskilled migration, but
war and conflict in Africa. has restricted the arrival of significant numbers
of asylum seekers. Canada has adopted a
In Europe, governments and political parties multicultural immigration policy, traditionally
across the spectrum have increasingly resorted accepting many migrants and refugees.
to restrictive migration policies in a bid to
BOX 7.1
Migration terms Irregular migrant: A foreign national with no legal resident status
in the country in which they reside, a person violating the terms
Asylum seeker: A person who seeks safety from persecution or of their status so that their stay may be terminated, or a foreign
serious harm in a country other than his or her own and awaits national working in the shadow economy, including those with
a decision on an application for refugee status under relevant a regular residence status who work without registering to avoid
international and national instruments. taxes and regulations.
Diaspora: A community of individuals living together on the Migrant: Any person who has moved across an international border
same territory and sharing the conviction or belief of belonging away from their place of birth or habitual residence other than for
(themselves or their families) to another territory with which they short-term travel.
maintain regular relations. They are not tourists or short-term
visitors. Migrant background: All persons with one migrant parent.
Alternatively, migrant background may refer to persons with one
Emigration: The act of departing or exiting from one state with a parent born outside the country of current long-term residence.
view to settling in another.
Migrant flows: The number of people migrating within a specific
First- and second-generation migrant: Any person who has time frame.
immigrated to a new country and been naturalized, or the children
of such an immigrant. The term second generation may refer to Migrant stocks: The total number of persons born in a country
either the children or the grandchildren of such an immigrant. other than that in which they reside, or a country’s foreign-born
population.
Immigrant policies: Government policies regulating pathways to
social, economic and political integration. Refugee: A person who, ‘owing to a well-founded fear of
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership
Immigration: The process by which non-nationals move into a of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the
country for settlement. country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country’ (article
Immigration policies: Government policies that aim to regulate 1(A)(2), Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; article 1A(2),
entry into and permission to remain in a country, including border 1951 as modified by the 1967 Protocol). In addition to the refugee
control. definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention, article 1(2) of the 1969
Organization of African Unity Convention defines a refugee as any
Internally displaced person: A person or groups of persons who person compelled to leave his or her country ‘owing to external
have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously
places of habitual residence, in particular because of (or in order disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country
to avoid) the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized or origin or nationality’. Similarly, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration
violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made states that refugees also include persons who flee their country
disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized ‘because their lives, security or freedom have been threatened
state border (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, UN Doc by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts,
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2.). massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which
have seriously disturbed public order’.
203
Chapter 7 The Global State of Democracy 2017
Migration, social polarization, citizenship and multiculturalism Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Migration affects Due to its transnational nature, migration can enable and encourage migrants’ political
governments’ poses fundamental questions to democracy. participation. Migration affects governments’
ability to deliver Discussions about migration, and by ability to deliver public services, which poses
association about multiculturalism, illustrate challenges to democratic accountability and
public services,
the polarization of societies and the dilemmas highlights the need for a combined local,
which poses policymakers face in the search for adequate national and global governance response.
challenges to responses. Migration can also affect democratic
democratic institutions and processes in countries of origin, Migration affects many economic and political
accountability as citizens abroad seek to influence politics at aspects of democracy. This chapter focuses on
and highlights home. Box 7.1 defines some of the terms used the democratic dividend from migration and
the need for a in discussions about migration. the enabling factors that support democracy (see
Box 7.2). It argues that democratic institutions
combined local,
Migrants are increasingly becoming political can approach migration challenges to democracy
national and actors who can influence the quality of by enacting policies that do not solely rely on
global governance democracy in both destination and origin traditional formal political structures and the
response countries. The upsurge in migration flows has notion of the nation state. The key principle
strained the capacities of democratic institutions for migration policy is inclusiveness—creating
to effectively integrate migrants into society, and resilience in the democratic system by allowing
has generated calls to examine how governments different voices to be heard, and harnessing
different ways to manage discontent and the
BOX 7.2
need for change. Democratic institutions can be
enhanced by local initiatives that have successfully
included migrants in political life, and link
Flexibility and resilience in democracy: making the most of
these lessons to international and regional
migration
governance frameworks. This can open space
Resilient democracies can tackle migration through multicultural policies that for new approaches to political advocacy, and in
favour the inclusion of migrants and provide political benefits for societies. the long run enable democratic institutions and
Governments need to adapt state capacities related to migration policymaking processes to respond to migration challenges in
and—particularly in countries with high immigration rates and immigrant-
friendly policies—work to reduce the potential backlash from citizens with
a sustainable and resilient manner.
negative perceptions of immigration. Political parties can adopt flexible and
inclusive approaches at the national and local levels to increase minority This chapter analyses the challenges posed
representation, adopt targets for migrant representation and increase
by migration to democracy, focusing on the
candidate representation to enable effective migrant political participation.
political integration of legal immigrants and
Adopting policies that facilitate migrants’ naturalization can increase their the political engagement of the diaspora. It
participation in governance processes and thus contribute to inclusion, for does not address the impact of irregular or
example by reducing the administrative burden and timelines for obtaining
undocumented migrants, due to the lack of
citizenship. Democratic institutions can design policies that aim to empower
migrants to decide how they participate in public life, rather than defining reliable data. The economic and social impact
policies based on ‘citizenship as nationality’. To strengthen democracy, of immigration and emigration, as well as an
especially in countries with high or increasing proportions of migrants, analysis of push and pull factors in relation
policymakers can also consider granting voting rights—particularly at the local
level—as a pathway to citizenship.
to migration, are beyond the scope of this
chapter. Section 7.2 provides an overview of
Migrants’ integration and sense of belonging can be enhanced with the global migration patterns and trends. Section
support of civil society and local community-based initiatives such as local
7.3 focuses on how migration challenges and
migrant associations, technology-based integration solutions and urban
diversification. On a global level, migrant inclusion could be facilitated by affects democracy by assessing how politically
enhancing international migration governance systems and through better inclusive countries are of immigrants; it
regional cooperation to share burdens and implement migration protection provides insights based on the Global State
regimes. The United Nations New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants
as well as the process to develop a Global Compact on Migration and Refugees
of Democracy (GSoD) indices and Migration
are important first steps. Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) data. Section
7.4 discusses the role that emigrants play as
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agents of democracy and the potential gains to Migration flows have increased since 1990 in all Over the last 45
democracy from emigration, with a focus on regions, particularly from developing countries years, the number
enabling the engagement of the diaspora in to developed countries. While most of this is of people living
political life. voluntary migration, forced migration has risen
outside their
dramatically: over 20 million persons are now
Section 7.5 highlights policy dilemmas recognized as refugees, the majority having
country of origin
resulting from migration, and Section 7.6 fled persecution or conflicts in Afghanistan, has almost tripled
analyses the policy implications of (and possible Somalia and Syria (UNHCR 2015). from 76 million
approaches to) tackling migration challenges to 244 million
to democracy—that is, how political party
systems and governments in destination and
origin countries can address problems related BOX 7.3
to migration. Section 7.8 provides a set of
conclusions and policy recommendations. The
chapter discusses how democracies respond to The gender dimensions of migration
migration challenges using case studies chosen
to showcase regional examples as well as good As of 2015, women and girls made up 48 per cent of the global migrant
population (UNHCR 2015). Female migrants face different challenges than their
practices in relation to policy approaches. For male counterparts. They are often confronted with multiple and intersecting
additional information on the issues discussed forms of discrimination on the grounds of sex, ethnicity, nationality, class
in this chapter see Migration, Multiculturalism and other bias, in addition to their status as migrants. This can significantly
undermine their human rights as well as their ability to participate effectively
and Democracy: A Resource Guide (Sisk 2017).
in the host country’s social, economic and political life.
7.2. Migration patterns and The range of challenges faced by migrant women derives from their legal status
global trends in the host country. For instance, women migrating under family reunification
programmes may often depend on their husbands legally, economically
Migration is not a new phenomenon, but its scale
and socially. In other cases, migrant women may depend on their employer,
has increased with the rising global population. especially when they migrate for economic purposes in a designated sector
Push factors that make people leave their home (e.g. domestic workers in certain countries) (Sohoon and Piper 2013; ILO
country include limited job opportunities, 2008). In addition, migrant women are vulnerable to sexual and gender-
based violence, including rape, sexual exploitation, domestic violence and
political instability, human rights violations, female genital mutilation. Other factors that may hinder their integration and
conflicts and wars, state failure, and climate empowerment involve religious influences, patriarchal traditions, and cultural
change or natural disasters. Important pull practices that may exclude them from public and political life (UNHCR 2013).
factors that influence their choice of destination
In this context, migration systems should consider the vulnerabilities and
include family migration and co-ethnic specific needs of migrant women. This requires adopting gender-sensitive
immigrant groups, prospects for an increased policies that facilitate their access to information, employment and public
standard of living in terms of job opportunities services such as healthcare and education as a key part of the integration
process. Furthermore, language learning programmes and information
and public service delivery, as well as politically
campaigns are essential for empowering migrant women and making them
stable countries that guarantee fundamental aware of their human, civic and political rights. Targeted policies and
freedoms and encourage individual choice programmes that encourage the active participation of migrant women in civic
in education, career, gender roles and sexual and political life, including voting and standing as candidates in national and
local elections, are also crucial for their integration into the host society and
orientation, and place of residence. to ensure that the interests of their communities are effectively represented
(European Women’s Lobby 2007).
By late 2015, migrants accounted for over 3 per
Civil society and grassroots organizations can play an important role in
cent of the world’s population. Over the last
empowering migrant women through capacity-building initiatives and
45 years, the number of people living outside mentorship programmes that help them develop leadership skills and realize
their country of origin has almost tripled their potential as decision-makers and agents of change (OSCE 2014). For
from 76 million to 244 million (IOM 2015a). example, the New American Leaders Project trains first- and second-generation
migrants living in the USA in political leadership at the state and local levels,
However, the proportion of migrants as a
recognizing that ‘democracy is stronger when everyone is represented and
share of the world’s population has remained everyone participates’ (Dyogi and Bhojwani 2016).
relatively stable since 1990 (UN 2016).
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Migration, social polarization, citizenship and multiculturalism Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Migration patterns
Among voluntary migrants, the START 2016 ∙ 80% of migrants are between
largest numbers come from India, 15 million the ages of 15 and 64
Mexico and Russia. Most tend to refugees
stay close to their countries of ∙ Approximately 50% of
origin (except for significant voluntary migrants are
1.5 million new women
Sources of data: UNHCR (2016a: 52), UNHCR (2016a: 52), IOM (2015a) & IOM (2015b)
seekers worldwide, raising the total living in London, New York and
Sources of data: UN (2015)
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Since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011, handle migration may affect citizens’ levels of Inclusion—
there have been more refugees than at any time trust in these institutions. that is, how
since World War II, tragically highlighted by well societies
the high number of people risking and losing Inclusion—that is, how well societies politically
politically
their lives. In 2016, more than 5,000 persons integrate immigrants—is a key factor when
died crossing the Mediterranean Sea, the assessing how migration affects democracies, as
integrate
highest annual total ever reported (UNHCR well as the conditions under which democratic immigrants—is a
2016b). About 1.5 million persons were systems can respond to these challenges in a key factor when
recognized as refugees worldwide or applied for resilient manner. How well countries integrate assessing how
asylum in the first half of 2016; the majority immigrants into the political system depends migration affects
had fled Syria (UNHCR 2016a: 3–4). The on a number of factors, including (a) the democracies,
greatest concentrations were in or near the ease with which countries enable immigrants
as well as the
Middle East; Turkey hosted the most refugees and subsequent generations of immigrants
(2.8 million) under its temporary protection to naturalize or become citizens; (b) whether
conditions under
regime (UNHCR 2016a: 8). countries allow migrants to vote or stand which democratic
as a candidate in national or local elections; systems can
7.3. The impact of migration (c) immigrants’ voter turnout; (d) whether a respond to these
on democracy country’s policies facilitate political integration challenges in a
Recent studies of the impact of migration (i.e. how inclusive a country’s policies are resilient manner
on democracy have examined three areas: of immigrants); (e) how well immigrants
(a) public concerns about immigration, are represented in a country’s key political
(b) migration levels and (c) the quality of institutions such as the parliament, political
governance and migrant integration policies parties and local councils, and whether other
(McLaren 2010). First, public perceptions consultative bodies exist; and (f ) the challenge
of migration challenge notions of national that anti-immigrant parties pose to democracy.
identity and shared societal values when public This section analyses each of these factors
policies divide the population into native- in turn.
born inhabitants and newcomers (Huysmans
1995: 60). This affects how well democracies Immigrants and the pathway to citizenship
integrate newcomers and create social cohesion Citizenship is an important incentive
or multicultural societies. Such perceptions for integration and removes barriers for
may affect the public’s willingness to support immigrants to participate in political life. It
policymakers, depending on whether citizens provides full civic and political rights and
trust that politicians and political institutions protection against discrimination, which can
are able to handle the migration challenge help increase immigrants’ sense of belonging
(Miller and Listhaug 1990: 358). Indeed, and willingness to participate. A 2012 study
many studies have concluded that immigration comparing the political participation of
disrupts political and social cohesion and foreign-born and native-born residents of
identities (Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior European countries, and citizens versus non-
2004; Lahav 2004; Ivarsflaten 2006; Gibson citizens, found that native-born and foreign-
2002; Fetzer 2000; Espenshade and Calhoun born citizens demonstrated similar overall
1993), and that migrant integration policies in levels of participation in political activities
turn affect public attitudes towards migrants, (Just and Anderson 2012). Among the foreign
and thus political trust (Weldon 2006). born, citizenship significantly increased
Second, migration levels may affect citizens’ political participation, especially with regard
attitudes towards migrants and their trust in to ‘less institutionalized political acts’ (Just
political institutions, and citizens’ belief that and Anderson 2012: 496). This effect was
political institutions can handle the migration greatest among immigrants who grew up
challenge. Third, how well political institutions in relatively undemocratic countries (Just
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Migration, social polarization, citizenship and multiculturalism Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
and Anderson 2012). For this reason, it is heritage or ‘blood’ (ius sanqunis) or the country
important to assess whether countries enable of birth (ius soli). They also regulate the
immigrant naturalization, given that the path conditions under which citizenship is granted,
to citizenship can include many obstacles, including language proficiency, citizenship or
from lack of documentation to highly integration tests, economic and criminal record
discretionary decision-making procedures. requirements, costs, as well as legal guarantees
Citizenship can be acquired automatically and discretionary decision-making powers.
(mainly at birth) or upon application. Lastly, these rules regulate whether countries
Naturalization is defined here as the non- allow dual citizenship (see Section 7.4).
automatic acquisition of citizenship by an
individual who was not a citizen of a particular Many countries require citizenship tests as
country by birth, requiring an application by part of the naturalization process, including
the immigrant and an act of granting by the Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, the
host country (OECD 2011). Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the
USA (OECD 2011). The introduction of these
The rules governing the acquisition of tests has decreased the number of citizenship
citizenship vary widely: countries have the applicants, however their impact on immigrants’
exclusive authority to regulate the terms under integration remains unclear (OECD 2011).
which immigrants can obtain citizenship. Similarly, most countries have language
Citizenship rules regulate eligibility criteria requirements, which indicate an applicant’s
such as residence requirements or whether willingness to integrate; Sweden does not have
citizenship is acquired based on parental such a requirement (OECD 2011).
TABLE 7.1
Citizenship based on ius soli Citizenship based on ius Ease of naturalization for adults
(e.g. birthplace) sangunis (e.g. parental
heritage)
Europe Belgium, Germany, Greece, Automatically granted Transparent, accessible procedures; 32 states (all EU mem-
Ireland and Portugal (with ber states, Croatia, Iceland, Moldova, Norway, Switzerland)
restrictions)
Africa More than half the countries Automatically granted Procedures exist, however effective implementation is
with restrictions; absolute lacking. Chad, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Uganda (requires
ius soli in Chad, Lesotho and 15–20 years), Central African Republic (35 years), Democratic
Tanzania Republic of the Congo and Egypt (presidential decrees are
required).
Latin All countries Automatically granted Transparent, accessible procedures; short legal residency
America required (Chile, Colombia, Venezuela 5 years; Brazil 4 years;
and the Peru, Argentina and Bolivia 2 years), with some form of citi-
Caribbean zenship test. Many countries also allow a fast-track process
if the applicant comes from a Spanish, Portuguese, Latin
American or Caribbean state.
Asia and Uncommon (Cambodia, Main form of acquiring Procedures generally exist, however are often difficult, and
the Pacific Hong Kong, Malaysia, citizenship subject to several restrictions and obligations
Thailand)
Sources: Bauböck and Goodman (2010); Feere (2010); Davidson and Weekley (1999); Manby (2010).
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In countries with inclusive citizenship policies, reasons for migration, and whether countries The change in
immigrants are more likely to opt for citizenship allow dual nationality. Immigrants from naturalization
(Huddleston et al. 2015). For example, developing countries are more likely to trends is linked
Ireland, Portugal, the UK, the Nordic States naturalize and are more affected by restrictive to migration
and the Benelux countries have more inclusive immigration policies (Huddleston et al. 2015;
flows; however
citizenship policies than Austria, Switzerland OECD 2011). Similarly, refugees, women and
or the Baltic States (Huddleston et al. 2015). immigrants with high levels of education are there is a time
While Bulgaria and Hungary have very high more likely to naturalize (OECD 2011). lag, which means
naturalization rates, these are not related to that countries
immigrants but to co-ethnics living abroad who Naturalization can be a useful (political) should focus
benefit from special naturalization privileges integration tool for immigrants. One way to on long-term
(Huddleston et al. 2015). In Australia, Canada, encourage migrants to participate in political residents if they
New Zealand and the USA—all countries life on a par with natives and increase their
wish to encourage
with high naturalization rates—immigrants sense of belonging is to promote inclusive
obtain residence permits upon entry and are naturalization policies that allow dual naturalization
encouraged to naturalize at the end of an initial nationality (Dumbrava 2010; Blatter 2011).
settlement period (OECD 2011). This policy Nevertheless, naturalization rates may remain
approach towards immigrants encourages low if overall migration policy does not support
them from the outset to think of themselves naturalization (North 1987; Bloemraad 2006;
as ‘future citizens’, compared to the (European) Jones-Correa 2001). Issues such as identity,
approach that requires ‘proof of integration’ plans to return or fear of social rejection by the
before naturalization takes place. host community may also prevent migrants from
naturalizing (Hyde, Mateo and Cusato-Rosa
The change in naturalization trends is linked 2013). While naturalization does not necessarily
to migration flows; however there is a time lag, impose an identity or promote homogeneity or
which means that countries should focus on exclusivity (especially if multiple nationalities
long-term residents if they wish to encourage are possible), in practice it may do so, due for
naturalization. Naturalization rates based on example to requirements to renounce previous
long-term residence nevertheless vary: Canada nationalities or attend integration courses
(89 per cent of men and 90 per cent of women), and exams (Joppke 2010; Pedroza 2015).
Sweden (79 and 80 per cent, respectively), Naturalization policies alone may not be able
and the Netherlands (72 and 73 per cent, to redress the disenfranchisement of migrants
respectively) have relatively high naturalization when migrations tend to be temporary.
rates. In Luxembourg (12 per cent of men and
13 per cent of women), Switzerland (28 and 40 Since international law says little about the
per cent, respectively) and Germany (35 and impact of migration on the composition of
36 per cent, respectively) fewer immigrants the population that enjoys voting rights, it is
naturalize (OECD 2011). Given the increased important to analyse this aspect.
migration flows, there is nevertheless a rising
trend towards restricting the acquisition of Immigrants and voting rights
citizenship, including in countries such as A core principle of democracy is universal
Australia, Canada and the USA (OECD 2011). suffrage. Since the 18th century, barriers to
Other contextual factors in addition to the the right to vote and to stand as candidates
openness or restrictiveness of citizenship have been removed or lowered. At the same
policies influence whether immigrants become time, the idea of representative democracy
citizens. These include whether immigrants was based on the congruence of territory,
originate from developing counties, their citizenry and government. Globalization has
length of settlement in their host countries, challenged the requirements of citizenship
whether there are family ties or humanitarian and residence: citizens may be disenfranchised
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Migration, social polarization, citizenship and multiculturalism Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
There is a trend due to migration. Notwithstanding academic seven years. In Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay the
in an increasing controversies on the relationship between residence requirements for national franchise
number of naturalization policies and immigrant are five and 15 years, respectively (Bauböck
integration (Huddleston and Vink 2013), key 2005; Arrighi and Bauböck 2016).
countries to link
obstacles to immigrants’ political participation
immigrants’ local include their lack of electoral participation and Granting voting rights to immigrants is
voting rights country approaches to naturalization. controversial, given that voting is traditionally
to residency, seen as a feature of citizenship. Whether
while national Host countries permit immigrants to citizenship is defined as the compilation of
voting rights are participate in elections to varying degrees. civil, social and political rights or as a status
rarely granted In the last 50 years more than 50 countries of full membership in a polity, there is a trend
have held parliamentary debates at different in an increasing number of countries to link
to immigrants
levels (local, provincial and national) about immigrants’ local voting rights to residency,
before extending voting rights to migrants after a while national voting rights are rarely granted
naturalization certain period of residence. More than 30 to immigrants before naturalization (Bauböck
countries have reformed their electoral laws 2005). In some regions such as Latin America
and even constitutions to enable non-citizen and the Caribbean, democratization has been
residents to vote (Pedroza 2015). Non-citizen linked to the extension of voting rights to
voting rights exist, or are provided for in non-citizens, although it remains a politically
constitutions without having been applied or sensitive issue. With the exception of Chile and
implemented, in 64 democracies (Blais et al. Uruguay, democratization in South America
2001; Earnest 2004; Waldrauch 2005). The has indirectly contributed to immigrant
largest group of countries to allow non-citizens voting rights because government policies
to vote is the EU. After 3–5 years of residence, were sympathetic to migrants’ rights and
non-citizen residents may stand as candidates allowed immigrants to mobilize for suffrage,
in local elections in 11 EU countries, vote often having previously been prevented by
locally in 15, regionally in five and nationally authoritarian regimes (Escobar 2015, 2017).
in three (certain groups in Portugal and the In Myanmar, non-citizens, such as Rohyngya
UK). Outside the EU, Norway, Iceland and Muslims, were ‘white card holders’ who had
eight Central and South American countries the right to vote until the November 2015
including Belize, Chile, Ecuador and Venezuela elections, when that right was withdrawn,
have the same purely residence-based local preventing them from taking part in the
franchise (Bauböck 2005; Arrighi and Bauböck country’s first democratic elections. In Japan,
2016). However, almost 10 million non-EU foreigners are only allowed to participate in
adults are disenfranchised in 13 EU countries some local referendums, but are not granted
(Huddleston et al. 2015). The same is true for local voting rights (Huddleston et al. 2015).
resident non-citizens in Canada, Japan, Turkey
and USA. According to 2013 MIPEX data, in Whether extending voting rights to resident
the USA this affects 21.9 million people or 7 per non-citizens improves democracy remains
cent of the population, and 4.8 million people empirically unproven. Electoral systems
in Canada or 10 per cent of the population and the socio-political context influence
(Huddleston et al. 2015). the implementation of more inclusive
voting rights. Some argue that the political
The Nordic countries and Ireland grant the inclusion of residents improves governance
most inclusive local voting rights in Europe, through more genuine representation and is
while outside the EU the most democratically an obligation of democratic governments, as
inclusive country granting national voting rights laws and policies apply to both citizens and
is New Zealand (Huddleston et al. 2015; MIPEX residents (Munro 2008). Conversely, concerns
2015). Malawi grants national franchise after surround the granting of voting rights to
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Political Participation and Access to Nationality (MIPEX) Different factors influence voter turnout,
Notes: This graph shows the relationship between the GSoD indices Representative Government attribute (y-axis) including the political socialization of
and the averages of the MIPEX political participation and access to nationality indicators (x-axis). The higher a
country scores on both axes, the more politically inclusive it is for immigrants and the higher the quality of its rep-
immigrants and their socio-economic status.
resentative government. Pearson’s correlation coefficient: n = 35, r =.567, p-value <.005. Immigrants’ willingness to engage politically in
Sources: GSoD indices 2017 (Representative Government Index), MIPEX 2014 (Political Participation and Access to their host societies requires a genuine interest
Nationality).
in doing so. If political parties and governments
aim to engage with as large a segment of the
FIGURE 7.2 electorate as possible, their strategies need to
address general voter scepticism that political
parties and governments can tackle challenges
Participation and Access to Nationality by Checks on Government,
such as migration regardless of whether a voter
2014
is a migrant or a native.
1.0
Denmark Australia
Sweden
Political integration of immigrants
0.9 Switzerland France
In addition to facilitating naturalization
Checks on Government (GSODI)
Norway
Estonia United Kingdom
Lithuania Germany Finland
0.8 Poland Slovenia United States Netherlands Portugal and granting voting rights, a country’s
Belgium New Zealand
Latvia Austria Japan Italy Canada
Ireland
legislative and political system must be open
0.7 Slovakia Czechia
Bulgaria Croatia
Cyprus Greece
Spain
to immigrant political integration in order to
0.6 Romania
Hungary
Republic of Korea
facilitate immigrants’ inclusion and ability
to engage in the political life of their host
0.5 countries.
Turkey
0.4
To assess whether there is a correlation between
0.3 a political system’s openness to immigrants’
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 political integration and the quality of
Political Participation and Access to Nationality (MIPEX) its democracy, three International IDEA
GSoD indices attributes (Representative
Notes: This graph shows the relationship between the GSoD indices Checks on Government attribute (y-axis) and
the averages of the MIPEX political participation and access to nationality indicators (x-axis). The higher a country Government, Checks on Government and
scores on both axes, the more politically inclusive it is for immigrants and the higher the quality of its checks on
government. Pearson’s correlation coefficient: n = 35, r =.619, p-value <.005. Fundamental Rights) were compared to the
Sources: GSoD indices 2017 (Checks on Government Index), MIPEX 2014 (Political Participation and Access to Nationality).
MIPEX political participation and access to
nationality scores.
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indicators over the time period 2004–14, Sources: GSoD indices 2017 (Fundamental Rights Index), MIPEX 2014 (Political Participation and Access to Nationality).
Data show that support. By contrast, the low MIPEX the Democratic and Republican parties grapple
political systems political participation/access to nationality with the impact of immigrant votes, which
that are open or scores and medium GSoD indices scores influences their electoral campaigns and results.
for immigration-restrictive countries such Latino voters have been vital to Democrats’
inclusive in terms
as Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland and victories in congressional and presidential
of their political Romania reflect the fact that these countries elections, and their influence is increasing as
integration of only offer basic opportunities for integration, they become a larger share of the US electorate
immigrants tend with limited migrant political participation (Oakford 2014). Since 2012, the number of
to score high in and difficult pathways to citizenship. In eligible Latino voters has increased to 27.3
key attributes Romania, it should also be noted that million, accounting for 12 per cent of all
of democracy emigration exceeds immigration. While the voters in 2016 (Krogstad 2016), with second-
GSoD indices quality of democracy scores are generation immigrants driving the increase
quality
high for Canada, Spain, Switzerland and the (Oakford 2014). Millennials make up 44 per
USA, they have mid-range scores for MIPEX cent of Latino eligible voters (Krogstad 2016).
political participation/access to nationality In 2016, of the 57 million Latinos living in the
indicators, reflecting their restrictive policies USA, a record 27 million were eligible to vote,
on voting rights for immigrants and a almost half of whom were young millennials.
lack of consultative bodies (in the case of This is the largest increase of any group during
Canada) and pathways to citizenship (in the this time frame. The Latino share of the overall
US case). Japan scores high on the GSoD voter turnout was higher in 2016 (11 per cent)
indices quality of democracy scores but than in 2012 (10 per cent) or 2008 (9 per cent)
low on the MIPEX political participation/ (Krogstad and Lopez 2016).
access to nationality indicators, reflecting
its restrictive policies on immigrant voting Political parties and parliaments as well as local
rights and political participation. Despite councils face the challenge of integrating the
recent reforms in refugee and asylum policies, interests of an increasingly diverse population
Turkey scores low on both the GSoD quality due to the effects of migration. As the main
of democracy indices and the MIPEX political representatives of the people in political decision-
participation/access to nationality indicators, making processes, parties should strive to reflect
reflecting an unfavourable legal framework the interests of all citizens (Kemp et al. 2013).
for the integration and political participation
of immigrants as well as a difficult path to While data are lacking on whether political
citizenship or even legal residence. parties reflect the diversity of their populations,
minority groups are usually under-represented
The political integration of immigrants through (Bloemraad 2013). In Sweden, 9.5 per cent of
citizenship access and political participation national MPs have an immigrant background,
rights benefits democratic societies and helps compared to only 5.7 per cent in Germany
create the conditions for strong and resilient and 1.3 per cent in Portugal—and less than 1
democracies. Political parties and governments per cent in Italy, Ireland and Spain (Dähnke
should adopt strategies and policies that et al. 2014: 12–13). Canada elected its most
promote the inclusion of immigrants to tackle diverse Parliament in 2015 (Woolf 2015).
the migration challenge. Box 7.5 explores the role of parliaments in
developing policies that affect migrants.
Immigrant representation in key political
institutions and consultative bodies Immigrants remain under-represented at the
Political parties in some countries—especially local level, even though there tend to be more
those that have granted local voting rights councillors with an immigrant background at
to immigrants—realize they cannot ignore the municipal level and in cities, and parties
immigrants’ issues and concerns. In the USA, nominate a substantial number of minority
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Many political parties allow immigrants to individual interactions rather than institutional
hold positions within their party structure, structures. Overall, political parties could
including on candidate lists (Htun 2004), and be more effective at attracting people from
some have created incentives for immigrants to immigrant backgrounds (Dähnke et al. 2014).
politically engage with them through special
forums or campaigns. Many of these structures Electoral systems and the cultural context
are informal and weak, and depend on affect the level of minority representation in
BOX 7.6
political institutions (Ruedin 2013; Togeby
2008; Dancygier et al. 2015; Sobolewska
2013). The size of an electoral district affects
Case study on inclusive political parties in Germany the likelihood that under-represented groups
will be elected, as this defines how many
Although foreign permanent residents constitute almost 50 per cent of candidates parties can field in an election.
Germany’s immigrant population, only citizens have the right to vote in federal
Similarly, a low formal threshold (or no
elections (Basic Law, article 20(2)). In a series of decisions in 1990, Germany’s
Constitutional Court ruled that enfranchising foreigners would require revising threshold) can increase the representation
the citizenship law to facilitate naturalization. German reunification, along of under-represented groups, particularly
with the migratory consequences of the democratization processes in Eastern in proportional representation systems
Europe and the former Soviet Union, presented an opportunity for reform. In
1992, the citizenship law was revised to introduce naturalization as a right for
(Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2005; Larserud
foreigners who had lived in Germany for 15 years, but fell short of introducing and Taphorn 2007). In countries with
the territorial principle: immigrant children born in Germany still had to apply proportional representation electoral systems,
for German citizenship. In 1999, the Citizenship Act introduced ius soli for
such as the Netherlands, candidate selection
children born in Germany to immigrant parents with eight years of residency
and entitled immigrants to citizenship after eight years if they complied with methods influence the representativeness
two key integration requirements—adhering to the laws of the German state of the candidate list, including candidates’
and learning its language; this resulted in 905,000 naturalizations from 2000 relative positions on the list, which can
to 2005.
increase their chances of being elected. Parties
There was the potential for a significant increase in the number of naturalized that have more positive views on migration
citizens, since 68.6 per cent of the German immigrant electorate had been and integration tend to have to higher shares
in the country for more than eight years and thus qualified for citizenship of ethnic minorities, and place them higher
under the 1999 law. Thus political parties in Germany revised their strategies
to mobilize immigrant support to appeal to immigrant voters’ interests, and
on candidate lists (Lubbers and Van der Zwan
by increasingly nominating immigrant candidates on party lists or preventing 2016). In addition, if a party’s candidate
their defection (Claro da Fonseca 2011). selection system is more inclusive, the relative
position of ethnic minority groups is higher.
The 1999 Citizenship Act did not go far enough to increase the representation
of one of Germany’s key minorities, the Turks, in the Bundestag. The Turkish Parties that have strong internal support
minority in Germany had been affiliated with the Social Democratic Party systems for ethnic minorities tend to have a
(SDP) since the 1960s, with support for the Greens rising in the 1980s. Turkish higher share of ethnic minorities (Lubbers
candidates in the Left Party were successful in the 2005 elections, followed
and Van der Zwan 2016). In majority systems
by the further diversification of German political parties fielding Turkish
candidates in the 2009 elections, including the SDP, the Greens, the Left and such as in Colombia, Hungary, India, Jordan,
the Free Democratic Party. Even though the Turkish minority remains under- New Zealand, Niger and Pakistan, seats are set
represented in the Bundestag, it has a higher political representation than aside in the legislature for under-represented
Muslims in Britain or France (Aktürk 2010).
groups (Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2005). Box
Despite a general understanding among traditional German political parties, 7.6 examines the inclusiveness of political
particularly since the 2000s, that immigration has had a positive impact on parties in Germany.
Germany, in particular for the economy as a result of gaining skilled labour, the
idea of increasing inclusiveness and multiculturalism has been controversial.
Particularly after reunification, EU expansion and the recent refugee crisis in In the context of tackling the migration
Europe, there has been a rise in xenophobic violence, nationalism and the challenge, a party’s agenda and views on
establishment of anti-immigrant political parties such as the AfD (see Box 4.3) migration—regardless of where it stands on the
and movements such as the Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of
political spectrum—seem to influence whether
the West (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes,
Pegida), and the passage of restrictive asylum legislation. immigrants are represented in political party
structures, whether they can stand for election
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and whether they have a realistic chance of representatives can be elected by immigrants or Political parties
winning due to their relative position on a other organizations or be publicly appointed have applied
party’s candidate list. The level of support that (EU FRA 2017). different
a party provides to immigrants also matters.
strategies to
Political parties’ inclusiveness thus affects the The challenge of anti-immigrant parties
representation of immigrants. Parties that have Concerns over immigration have reinvigorated increase minority
positive views on migration should therefore right-wing populist parties and leaders in representation,
evaluate the inclusiveness of their candidate countries such as Germany (Otto and Steinhardt including
selection processes and strengthen their internal 2014), Denmark (Gerdes and Wadensjö bolstering
party support structures to ensure migrants are 2008), Austria (Halla, Wagner and Zweimüller their profile
appropriately represented. 2013), Finland, France, the Netherlands, within ethnic
Sweden, Australia and the USA (Mayda, Peri
communities,
Countries may include immigrants in decision- and Steingress 2016). Many parties across the
making processes through consultative bodies, political spectrum increasingly use the media to implementing
even if they do not grant them formal voting communicate the narrative of an out-of-touch recruitment
rights or facilitate their inclusion in political political elite versus the people, and an ‘us drives to
parties. In the EU, ten countries (Belgium, versus them’ mentality based on ethnocentric encourage
Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, identities and xenophobia (Greven 2016). ethnic minority
Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain) have representatives to
established formal consultative bodies between Fuelled by the refugee crisis resulting from the
stand for election
immigrants and government bodies (EU ongoing Syrian civil war, Europe has experienced
FRA 2017). increased support for the revitalization of and adopting
nationalist, anti-immigrant political parties numerical targets
Consultations with immigrants can take many that promote Islamophobia. These parties have for minority
different forms and operate on different levels. For been on the rise in Austria, France, Germany, candidates
example local government authorities, including Italy and the UK, as well as in the traditionally
cities and municipalities in Belgium, Denmark, liberal Netherlands and the Nordic states, and
Estonia, Greece, Italy Latvia, Luxembourg and have secured significant parliamentary blocs in
Sweden have established dialogue platforms several countries. Other nations have seen the
among citizens and immigrant or ethnic minority rise of nationalist street movements such as the
associations, consultative bodies, and elected English Defence League or France’s Muslim-
representatives from each municipality, and baiting Bloc Indentitaire. Nationalist and right-
research institutions focusing on immigration- wing parties gained significantly at the ballot
related issues to enhance integration at the box in 2015 in Austria, Denmark, Finland and
local level. These dialogue sessions (called Switzerland (Recknagl 2015). In 2016, far-right
Strengthening Integration Dialogue Platforms) Freedom Party candidate Norbert Hofer received
have addressed topics such as voting in the general strong support in the first round of the Austrian
elections and the challenges and opportunities presidential elections, while the right-wing
to improve facilities and living conditions in populist parties Law and Justice, and Fidesz,
their municipalities (EU FRA 2017). In Italy, 14 govern in Poland and Hungary, respectively. In
regional councils, 48 municipal councils and 19 France, National Front candidate Marine Le
provincial councils have immigrant consultative Pen has gained support from the white working
bodies (EU FRA 2017). class and the unemployed to reach the second
round of the presidential election in May 2017,
The composition and selection modalities of in which she was defeated.
these consultative bodies varies: typically, the
largest immigrant groups are represented, In addition, mainstream parties increasingly
depending on their self-organization and the accommodate the rhetoric of anti-immigrant
extent of their networking abilities. Immigrant parties during election campaigns, adding
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Migration, social polarization, citizenship and multiculturalism Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Whether it is the fuel to anti-immigrant public attitudes since the rise of former candidate for prime
size of the foreign and affecting political party platforms. For minister, Pauline Hanson, who campaigned
population in a example, in France, measures have been taken against Asian immigrants in 1990, it did
to reduce access to citizenship, so that children not gain traction at the ballot box (Pearlman
country or the
of immigrants no longer gain citizenship 2015). Citizens’ views on migration, and their
size and speed of at birth, but at the age of 18, and only once resulting voting behaviour, are challenging
migration flows they prove themselves to be ‘well assimilated’ the core values of democratic projects such as
that leads to a rise (Demos 2017). the EU, as demonstrated by the UK’s ‘Brexit’
in populist parties referendum, which was influenced by the issue
is still debated While the trend of rising public support for of migration in the context of freedom of
nationalist anti-immigrant political parties is movement within the EU (see Box 7.7).
evident in Europe and the USA, particularly
after the 2016 election of populist President Migration fuelled by globalization thus affects
Donald Trump, in other regions it has not been democracy by increasing public support for
as marked or as successful. While Australia saw (particularly right-wing) populist parties and
the launch of the anti-immigrant Australian their anti-immigrant agendas. Whether it is
Liberty Alliance in 2015, which represented the size of the foreign population in a country
the first resurgence of right-wing sentiment or the size and speed of migration flows that
leads to a rise in populist parties is still debated.
BOX 7.7 A controversial 2016 study suggests that there
is a tipping point of immigration that leads to
electoral support for right-wing populist parties
The influence of migration perceptions on the ‘Brexit’ in Europe: as the percentage of immigrants
referendum approaches approximately 22 per cent of the
general population, the percentage of right-
A slim majority of UK voters chose to leave the EU in June 2016 in what has
become known as the ‘Brexit’ referendum. The three most decisive issues for wing populist voters exceeds 50 per cent—the
voters were the economy (21 per cent), sovereignty (17 per cent) and immigration threshold for forming a government (Podobnik,
(20 per cent) (Swales 2016). These issues had a strong impact on voting Jusup and Stanley 2016). The data furthermore
behavior: the majority of those who said immigration (88 per cent) or sovereignty
(90 per cent) were the most important issues voted to leave, compared to a
suggest that the greater the percentage of
small minority who said the economy was more important (Prosser, Mellon voters in favour of right-wing populist parties
and Green 2016). Almost 50 per cent of the British population believed in compared to the percentage of immigrants, the
2016 that immigration negatively affects the economy, according to the British
lower their tolerance of immigrants (Podobnik,
Social Attitudes survey (Versi 2016). ‘Leave’ voters believed that immigration
had negatively affected Britain, and felt that Brexit would lower immigration, Jusup and Stanley 2016). By contrast, other
positively influence the economy and strengthen security (Swales 2016). studies show that it is not the percentage of the
foreign population in a country that invigorates
Before the referendum, polls indicated that immigration had become voters’
right-wing populism, but rather the speed
top priority, which prompted the Leave campaign to adopt more anti-immigrant
rhetoric (Taylor 2016). Several leading Conservatives made anti-immigrant and size of immigration flows (Demos 2017;
statements; then-Prime Minister David Cameron referred to refugees as a Guibernau 2010).
‘swarm’ (BBC News 2015). Boris Johnson, who was then mayor of London,
portrayed Turkish people as a threat to the UK due to their geographic proximity
to Syria and Iraq. The leader of the nationalist UK Independence Party (UKIP),
There have been positive examples of the
Nigel Farage, alleged during his campaign that immigrants would overwhelm public voting for pro-immigrant political
Britain. One of UKIP’s posters featured the image of a mass of migrants parties or leaders who advocate inclusive and
traveling by foot with the header ‘breaking point’ (Versi 2016). Both parties
fair migration policies, such as the election of
found strong support among their members for a Leave vote: 98 per cent of
UKIP voters and 58 per cent of Conservatives voted to leave (Swales 2016). The Sadiq Khan as mayor of London in 2016 (see
Leave campaign attracted voters concerned about migration who were unaware Box 7.8).
of its long-term positive effects on the economy: 95 per cent of those who voted
Leave were anti-immigrant and economically not well off. The Leave campaign
better tapped into public concerns, providing more clarity about the potential
A European study from 2010 found that public
impact of Brexit on immigration and independence. concern about immigration is one cause of
citizens’ lack of trust in political institutions
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in particular the spread of the internet and implications. For instance, a study conducted
communication technology, has made it easier in Cabo Verde showed that returnees demand
for migrants to stay informed and connected greater accountability from their government if
to politics in their home countries. This has their host country had high-quality governance,
transformed their ability to participate in their and that returnees were able to influence their
home countries’ political life and influence their home countries more than emigrants can from
democratic institutions and political leadership. host countries (Batista and Vincente 2011).
A study conducted in Mexico found evidence
Diaspora and reintegrating emigrants may thus that migration to the USA contributed to
act as a bridge between origin and destination democratization in Mexico by significantly
countries, and in their home countries as increasing the probability of an opposition
‘agents of democracy’ and a reconciling force party winning a municipal election (Pfutze
to overcome political trauma. Their actions and 2014). In Mali, returnees increased electoral
views can affect society’s attitudes regarding the participation and helped spread the idea of
perception of freedom, tolerance of differences, the need for increased political participation
human rights, governance and political practices among non-migrants in Mali, which enhanced
in their countries of origin (see Box 7.9). democracy (Chauvet and Mercier 2014). In
Moldova, emigration to Western countries
The evidence suggests that there is a democratic decreased support for the Communist Party,
dividend from emigration (Rapoport 2016; which contributed to the establishment of
Lodigiani 2016); migrants act as agents of new and more democratic political parties
democracy, which has important policy (Mahmoud et al. 2014). In Georgia, Latvia and
Lithuania, returning members of the diaspora
BOX 7.9 joined the national political leadership. In
India, returnees have influenced political
elites by reshaping political understandings,
The Myanmar diaspora as agents of democratization norms and expectations, and have contributed
to political stability and the resilience of the
With approximately 5 million migrants, Myanmar’s diaspora is among the
most diverse and populous in South East Asia, comprising economic migrants,
country’s democracy by encouraging political
refugees and political exiles (Williams 2012; Egreteau 2012). It has played an elites to accept marginalized social groups into
active role in promoting democratic reforms from their host countries. political life (Kapur 2010).
For instance, in 1999 migrant women from different ethnic and religious
backgrounds founded the Women’s League of Burma (WLB), an umbrella Home countries can greatly benefit from
organization based in Thailand that aims to raise awareness on gender issues reintegrating emigrants, especially those who
and enhance the participation of women in the peace and democracy-building were forced to leave but can return post-conflict.
processes. The WLB has been engaged in advocacy and capacity-building
While abroad, if host societies allowed them
activities to politically empower Myanmar’s women (Hedström 2013). Following
the historic 2015 general elections, the WLB joined with other civil society the opportunity, migrants may have increased
organizations focusing on women’s issues to establish the Alliance for Gender their skills, wealth, and political interest and
Inclusion in the Peace Process, a Myanmar-based organization that works to capacities. They may have been able to stand
advance the role of women in the ongoing peace process.
as candidates in municipal elections and have
In a similar way, many migrants who had fled the country for political reasons gained significant political experience that
remained politically active in their host countries and decided to return home they can apply to their home country. The
after the country’s democratic opening. For example, Aung Moe Zaw is the
diaspora may have formed civic associations or
founder and editor of a media outlet (The Irrawaddy) that covers news in
Myanmar and other South East Asian countries. Founded in 1993 by Myanmar even political groups preparing to reintroduce
migrants residing in Thailand, The Irrawaddy opened an office in Myanmar in democracy in the event that their home country
2012 (The Irrawaddy n.d.). Aung Moe Zaw, chair of the Democratic Party for a New begins a democratic transition. In some cases,
Society, returned to Myanmar in 2012 and reregistered the party in the run-up to
the 2015 general elections. Although the party did not win any seats, it remains
the diaspora plays a key role in raising awareness
active in the political scene (Long 2015). about the political situation in their home
countries, and mobilizing foreign governments
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and the international community to advocate Dual nationality can exist from birth or be The evidence
democratic reforms there (Koinova 2009; acquired. Dual nationality by birth is generally suggests that
Williams 2012; Egreteau 2012). accepted by countries, often with an obligation there is a
to choose upon reaching the age of majority,
democratic
Given the potential influence of the diaspora whereas the acquisition of another nationality
on the political life of their home countries, usually entails a requirement to make a choice
dividend from
the following section analyses how countries or the automatic loss of one. Numerous emigration;
encourage or facilitate their political engagement. international conventions (such as the 1930 migrants act
It explores (a) whether countries allow emigrants Hague Convention, the Council of Europe as agents of
to retain citizenship and accept dual citizenship, Convention of 6 May 1963 on the Reduction democracy,
(b) whether countries allow emigrants to vote in of Cases of Multiple Nationality and on which has
national elections, (c) voter turnout of emigrants Military Obligations, the Council of Europe
important policy
and (d) how well emigrants are represented in Convention on Nationality, of 6 November
key political institutions such as parliaments 1997) regulate the issue of dual nationality,
implications
and political parties or other consultative bodies. with a preference expressed in initial documents
for the principle of having one nationality
Citizenship and emigrants only. This principle, however, did not take into
An important consideration for many emigrants account the reality of the existence of multiple
is whether they can retain their original nationalities between countries, leading to the
citizenship when they naturalize as immigrants stipulation that any person who acquires the
in their host countries. Many countries accept nationality of a signatory state will automatically
dual nationality, especially if giving up the origin lose his/her former nationality. This automatic
country nationality has negative consequences clause posed problems of application, and led
for emigrants who have maintained ties to their to a prevailing position in law and in practice
host countries (OECD 2011). that allows multiple nationalities as long as the
following principles are respected: the right
FIGURE 7.4
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
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Chapter 7 The Global State of Democracy 2017
Migration, social polarization, citizenship and multiculturalism Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Since 1975 every to a nationality, and avoiding the arbitrary Expanding external voting for emigrants?
region of the deprivation of a nationality and statelessness. Migrants from democracies as diverse as Cabo
world has seen Verde, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Since 1975 every region of the world has seen Lebanon, Mali, Mexico and the Philippines
a substantial
a substantial increase in the share of countries are influencing electoral politics, civic
increase in the offering dual citizenship. In 2015, dual engagement and patterns of governance by
share of countries citizenship is most commonly accepted in remaining involved in political institutions and
offering dual countries in Latin America and the Caribbean democratic processes in their home countries.
citizenship. This (91 per cent), North America (100 per cent), Returning emigrants can play a key role in
40-year trend Europe (76 per cent), the Middle East and democratic transitions, such as in Myanmar or
shows that dual Iran (90 per cent), and Africa (63 per cent), during the independence era of South Sudan.
but even at the lowest rate, in Asia and the
citizenship is
Pacific (57 per cent), a majority of countries As with voting rights for immigrants, allowing
becoming the offer dual citizenship. This 40-year trend emigrants to vote is controversial, as it lets
norm shows that dual citizenship is becoming the citizens influence politics in their origin
norm (MACIMIDE Global Expatriate Dual countries without necessarily being affected
Citizenship Database 2015). by the election results or government policies
(Lopez-Guerra 2005; Rubio-Marin 2006).
Whether or not countries should grant or Some argue that allowing dual citizens to vote
permit dual citizenship is controversial. Such in two countries weakens the ‘one person one
controversies touch on legal issues such as vote’ principle. Others assert that globalization
military conscription and tax liability that may has led to overlapping jurisdictions, and that
arise out of administrative conflicts, and on expatriate voters have a sufficient stake in their
socio-political debate around the question of home country to justify the right to participate
granting multiple voting rights to migrants in politically (Spiro 2006). Modern democracies
both host and origin countries. thus tolerate many loyalties and affinities
(local, regional, religious, civic, political, etc.)
BOX 7.10 that are not incompatible with loyalty to the
nation state (Martin 2003). Box 7.10 explores
the issue of voting from abroad in the context
Voting from abroad: the Tunisian diaspora of Tunisia.
Although Tunisian migrants were granted the right to vote in 1989, after the
2010–11 Arab Uprisings, Tunisian civil society and migrant organizations Voting from abroad is arguably necessary
actively advocated reforms to the regulation of out-of-country voting (Lafleur to preserve the basic right to vote, as most
2015). The 2011 electoral law stipulates that Tunisian citizens residing abroad countries do not permit non-citizens to vote
have the right to vote in and stand for national elections. According to the
in national elections. It can, however, raise
law, the diaspora is represented by 18 MPs in the form of reserved seats,
or approximately 8 per cent of seats in Parliament. Given that France hosts political and practical concerns. Politically,
approximately 54 per cent of the Tunisian diaspora, 10 out of 18 diaspora it may be difficult for emigrants to connect
MPs are elected to represent Tunisian migrants residing in France. Three MPs to issues relevant to a constituency in their
are elected from Italy, one from Germany, two from the Arab world, and the
remaining two are from the Americas and the rest of Europe. Out-of-country
home country; therefore, some states, such
voting takes place over three days, during which registered voters can cast their as the Dominican Republic, France, Italy,
ballots in Tunisian embassies and consulates. Diaspora MPs are to return to Portugal and Tunisia, set aside parliamentary
Tunisia for one week per month in order to represent their constituents.
seats to represent citizens living abroad.
Although generally low, the turnout of diaspora voters for the 2011 elections for Practical concerns include enabling timely
the Constituent Assembly was 29.2 per cent, which was considered remarkably and secure voting; requiring in-person
high, given that voter turnout within Tunisia was 51.2 (Jaulin 2013a, 2013b). voting at consulates can alleviate these,
Hence, out-of-country constituencies represent an important electoral stake,
and election campaigns abroad involve all the main political parties, as well as
but at the cost of reduced turnout due to
migrants’ associations, civil rights and religious organizations (Jaulin 2016). inconvenience (European Commission for
Democracy through Law 2010). In post-
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conflict situations, diaspora networks and The EU is the largest group of countries that Many countries
civic organizations are key to enabling allows emigrant voting (except for Cyrpus, extend voting
expatriate political engagement. The effect Greece, Ireland and Malta). The USA, rights to non-
is magnified when diaspora organizations Canada and several European states (Austria,
resident citizens,
also maintain a presence in the country of Germany, Italy and Luxembourg) have
origin (Brinkerhoff 2008). increased accessibility through ballots sent by
although
mail. Central and South American countries technical and
Granting emigrants the right to vote is a (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, administrative
discretionary act, as no international law Honduras, Peru and Venezuela) require their constraints can
legally obligates states to maintain voting citizens to vote at a consulate or embassy in pose barriers to
rights for emigrants. Many countries extend their country of residence. Some countries, actual voting.
voting rights to non-resident citizens, such as Israel, require emigrants to travel to
Laws in 146
although technical and administrative their country of citizenship to vote on election
constraints can pose barriers to actual day (Bauböck 2005). The Philippines requires
out of 206
voting. Laws in 146 out of 206 democracies a planned return in the foreseeable future as a democracies allow
allow non-resident citizens to vote from condition for absentee voting. non-resident
abroad (International IDEA Voting from citizens to vote
Abroad Database 2015). Of these, 48 Seventeen countries—including six in Europe from abroad
apply expatriate voting to only one type of (Croatia, Estonia, France, Italy, Portugal and
election, while most allow it for two or more Romania), six in Africa (Algeria, Angola,
types. The most common practice—in 43 Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique
countries—is to allow external voting for and Tunisia) and five in Latin America and
three or more types of elections; 43 countries the Caribbean (Colombia, the Dominican
allow external voting in presidential and Republic, Ecuador, Haiti and Panama)—
legislative elections (International IDEA allow their citizens abroad to participate in
Voting from Abroad Database 2015). some electoral processes and to elect their own
representatives to Parliament. This reinforces
In Europe and Asia emigrant voting is more external voters’ links with the national political
commonly allowed than elsewhere (86 per community, enabling the promotion of their
cent and 77 per cent, respectively). Latin own legislative agenda and intervention in
America and the Caribbean and Oceania political decisions from an overseas viewpoint
are the most restrictive, with just over half (Collyer 2014).
(53 per cent each) of countries allowing
emigrants the right to vote in some type Refugees have traditionally been among the last
of election. Globally, the right to vote is marginalized groups to become enfranchised.
predominantly granted for elections at the There is no standard international practice on
national level, with more countries allowing promoting the political rights of refugees; there
expats to vote for the legislature (33 per cent) are regional variations in resource allocation,
than at the presidential level (22 per cent). practice and institutional leadership. For
In Oceania, Europe and North America it is example, refugee enfranchisement was written
more common to allow emigrants to vote in a into the 1995 General Framework Agreement
referendum. Emigrants are rarely granted the for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the
right to vote in subnational elections. Only Dayton Agreement), and subsequent 1996
29 countries grant expats this right. This balloting for Bosnia Herzegovina covered
practice is most common in Europe refugees in 55 countries, while in Liberia
(24 countries) and Oceania (four countries) in 1997 there were no out-of-country
(International IDEA Voting from Abroad enfranchisement opportunities or organized
Database 2015). repatriation (Navarro, Morales and Gratschew
2007). Nevertheless, refugees and the
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Migration, social polarization, citizenship and multiculturalism Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Refugees have international organizations charged with they expect voters will support the incumbent.
traditionally been their protection face obstacles to their ability Examples include Turkey and Hungary, where
among the last to realize full political participation rights, both President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and
including intimidation, physical obstacles, and Prime Minister Victor Orbán strongly targeted
marginalized
a lack of access to election and civic information emigrant voters in the 2017 and 2014 elections,
groups to become pertaining to their home country. In other respectively.
enfranchised. cases, refugees’ disenfranchisement may stem
There is no from financial, transparency and logistical Nevertheless, there is no clear correlation
standard constraints that prevent the electoral authorities between external voting provisions and
international from reaching out to the refugee population or countries’ political or socio-economic features.
practice on ensuring ballot secrecy and transparency (Grace While the third wave of democratization
and Fischer 2003). has generally spread expatriate suffrage
promoting the
since the 1990s, the evidence is mixed. New
political rights of A non-territorial conceptualization of the democracies in South America enfranchised
refugees ‘nation’ is one of the reasons countries facilitate emigrants, while African countries did not,
expatriate voting, but often extensions of voting often because expatriates supported opposition
rights to citizens abroad have occurred in the parties. Countries that have granted voting
context of democratic transitions, most notably rights to expatriates include well-established
in South America and Southern Europe, democracies as well as emerging or restored
where authoritarian governments had caused ones, and even countries that cannot be
an exodus of citizens who remained away for classified as democratic (Navarro, Morales and
decades and would not immediately return. Gratschew 2007).
When political participation in these countries
was newly defined, citizens abroad were often Does granting voting rights to emigrants
granted full rights. Furthermore, colonial state strengthen democracies in origin countries?
traditions affect legislation on external voting in Some argue that it represents a step towards
Africa; former French and Portuguese colonies enhanced democracy because it removes
have enfranchised expatriate citizens, while residence requirements, while others argue that
former British colonies have been reluctant franchise expansion can rupture the long-term
to do so. Studies have found a correlation democratization process (Caramani and Grotz
between the size and nature of the emigrant 2015). A recent study focused on Europe and
population and the extent to which countries the Americas concluded that expatriate voting
restrict voting rights for expatriates. The larger rights depend on citizenship of the respective
the population abroad, the more political state at the national level, and on residency at
elites worry that external voters can influence the local level. This means that there are patterns
election results (Caramani and Grotz 2015). of franchise expansion, however they are
For this reason, some African states with ‘contained’ by the level at which emigrant voting
comparatively large numbers of emigrants, such is permitted (Arrighi and Bauböck 2016).
as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria
and Uganda, prohibit it. When the opposition The effects of voting rights on democracies
parties in Zimbabwe proposed allowing the depend on many factors, including the socio-
diaspora to vote, the Electoral Commission political context and the electoral systems through
stated that it was not opposed to the proposal, which these rights are implemented, as well as
but lacked ‘funding for the necessary logistical the proportion of citizens among expatriates, and
arrangements’ (News24 2016). If migration accessibility and participation rates.
involves refugees, external voting rights are
granted when their support is needed, often Voter turnout of emigrants
following a change of regime. Conversely, some When emigrants are granted voting rights, they
governments encourage emigrant voting when have the potential to influence closely fought
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elections. In the 2017 French presidential voters. Emigration voting is costly and reduces Where emigrant
election, 2.6 per cent of French nationals the benefits of the act of voting. In addition, voting is
living overseas were registered to vote. In the the ease with which emigration voting can permitted, rates
first round of the polls, Emmanuel Macron take place influences turnout (Kostelka 2017),
of registration
won 24 per cent of the vote, while Marine Le such as legislation governing external voting,
Pen received 21.3 per cent of the vote. Macron or the location of polling stations, ease of
and turnout are
won the first round by about 1 million votes, access to information and voter registration usually lower
giving the 1.3 million French nationals eligible logistics (Navarro, Morales and Gratschew than they are
to vote overseas powerbroker potential (Lui 2007). These factors speak to states’ ability to in country.
2017). Other examples include the close first organize elections and voters’ ability to make However, the size
round of the 2016 presidential elections in use of them. In Southern Africa, low literacy of the diaspora
Austria, during which Austrian expatriates levels among migrants, poor consular and
also affects
made up 1 per cent of registered voters. postal facilities, and basic communication
While these numbers are low, postal ballots, and transportation infrastructures hinder
emigrant voter
which include expatriate voters, had the the effectiveness of external voting rights turnout,
potential to decide the first round of Austria’s and reduce turnout rates among emigrants as large diasporas
presidential elections (The Guardian 2016). (Caramani and Grotz 2015). can motivate
During the 2017 Constitutional Referendum political parties to
in Turkey, voter turnout of Turkish citizens Although emigrant voting rates are normally mobilize
living abroad in countries such as Germany, lower than those of natives due to the costs
emigrants
Austria, France and the Netherlands increased involved, the size of the diaspora also affects
compared to Turkey’s 2014 presidential emigrant voter turnout, as large diasporas can
election. In Germany, voter turnout reached motivate political parties to mobilize emigrants.
48.7 per cent among eligible Turkish voters Thus, if the size of the diaspora increases, the
(YeniSafak 2017). In Cabo Verde (2006) and emigrant voting rate is likely to rise as well. At
Romania (2009), emigrant votes overturned the same time, the overall origin country voter
the challenger’s majority in presidential turnout decreases (Kostelka 2017).
elections. In Italy (2006), emigrant votes were
the decisive factor that led to the centre-left To support democracy, origin country
coalition’s defeat of the incumbent government policymakers need to consider the potential of
(Turcu and Urbatsch 2015). emigrant political participation in their home
countries given general trends of declining
Nevertheless, where emigrant voting is voter turnout.
permitted, rates of registration and turnout
are usually lower than they are in country, Political representation of emigrants
such as in Italy, the Philippines, Senegal, Spain in key political institutions and
and Sweden. Conversely, in some countries, consultative bodies
despite declining numbers of persons voting Most countries (67 per cent) allow and
from abroad, the percentage of emigrants facilitate emigrant voting in national elections
that actually votes remains high. In Bosnia by assigning votes to an electoral district,
and Herzegovina, for example, although the for example from their previous residence
absolute number of registered external voters (Navarro, Morales and Gratschew 2007).
is dropping as citizens return, their turnout However, only 13 countries have reserved seats
has remained at approximately 80 per cent or ‘special representation’ for non-resident
since the early 2000s (Navarro, Morales and citizens in their parliaments—Algeria, Angola,
Gratschew 2007). Cabo Verde, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador,
France, Italy, Mozambique, Panama, Portugal,
There are some factors that particularly Romania and Tunisia. Angola and Panama,
influence low voter turnout among external however, do not implement this legislation
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There is evidence (Sundberg 2007; EUDO Citizenship National financial bridge between these countries and
that migration Elections Database 2017). Some argue that Morocco, with Moroccan remittances among
to countries with special representation is a good way to include the most important in the world (Cesari
emigrants because it facilitates their voting but 2013). In 1990, under the patronage of King
higher levels of
limits their influence by weighting their votes Hassan II, Morocco created the Foundation
female political differently than those of the native population for Moroccans Living Abroad to promote
empowerment (Collyer 2014); others argue that such systems economic and cultural cooperation with the
increases the violate the principle of treating votes equally diaspora. This foundation, in cooperation
share of women (Bauböck 2007). When compared to registered with the International Organization for
in parliaments in votes, emigrant votes may count more. At Migration, established an Observatory of
origin countries the same time, special representation can the Moroccan Community Living Abroad to
contribute to the stability of electoral systems provide information for the government on
(Venice Commission 2011). migration management issues. In 2010 the
flow of international remittances to Africa was
There is evidence that migration to countries USD 18 billion, which represents 5 per cent
with higher levels of female political of global remittances (UNDP 2011). Fourteen
empowerment increases the share of women other African countries—including Ethiopia,
in parliaments in origin countries (Lodigiani Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal,
and Salomone 2012). Women’s diaspora Tanzania and Uganda—have set up diaspora-
organizations and activists have played a related institutions and ministries. The African
significant role in capacity building and Union Commission has created the African
furthering female political empowerment to Citizens Directorate to deal with overarching
increase women’s political participation in issues in the relationship between overseas
their home countries. Examples include the diaspora and origin-country governments
successful advocacy efforts of the South Sudan (Mohamoud 2009).
Women’s Empowerment Network created by
US-based Sudanese migrants and the Liberian Another example is the work of the Program
peace activist Leymah Roberta Gbowee. for Mexican Communities Abroad (PCME)
(Gutierrez 1997, 1999). The PCME was
Most countries do not allow emigrants to established in 1990 to increase communication
vote in mayoral or local council elections. between US citizens of Mexican origin, resident
Exceptions include Australia, Austria, Canada, non-citizen Mexicans and the government
Cyprus, Italy, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand of Mexico; promote Mexican identity and
and Uruguay, although local non-resident group cohesion among Mexicans living in the
citizen voting rights are among those tied to USA; and strengthen the Mexican community
additional varying residence requirements, a abroad as a political agent in the USA. As a
requirement to return to the origin country to result, the Mexican community in the USA
vote or civil servant status (EUDO Citizenship has become more cohesive and active in the
Database 2015). last decade (DeSipio 1996). Migrants in the
USA have mobilized around the same issues as
Many origin countries wish to retain ties to those of the PCME, especially since 1994, and
their citizens abroad, given that they can be have responded to issues in Mexico, including
a valuable source of remittances or political policies related to dual citizenship, and the
influence in the destination country (Itzigsohn right to vote in Mexican elections from abroad
2000; Bauböck 2003). At the same time, many (DeSipio 1996).
origin countries want to retain some political
control over the diaspora. For instance, the India connects with its diaspora communities
Moroccan diaspora is dispersed to more than through annual meetings such as the Pravasi
100 countries and has developed a robust Bharatya Divas, which marks the contribution
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of the diaspora to India’s development and is (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Russia,
sponsored by the Ministry of External Affairs Saudi Arabia, Spain, United Arab Emirates,
of the government of India, the Federation of UK and USA), opinions about migration are
Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, divided (Esipova, Ray and Pugliese 2015). In
Confederation of Indian Industry, and the seven of these countries (Australia, Canada,
Ministry of Development of the North Eastern France, Germany, Saudi Arabia, the United
Region of India. Arab Emirates and the USA), majorities
believe immigration should be increased or
Armenia, which has one of the largest stay the same, while more than half of the
diaspora communities (7.5 million diaspora respondents in the remaining three (Russia,
population, versus 2.5 million living in Spain and the UK) say immigration levels
Armenia) spread over more than 100 should decrease. In Europe, people have
countries, has an established model policy more negative attitudes towards migration
system coordinated by the Ministry of compared to other world regions, although
Diaspora. Mechanisms include the ‘Hayastan’ there are marked differences in attitudes
All-Armenian Fund, headed by the president between countries. People under 44 are more
of the republic, which coordinates the aware of immigration and more likely to
diaspora’s financial assistance to Armenia. favour increasing immigration levels: about
Once every three years the ministry organizes one in four (24 per cent) favour increasing
the Armenia-Diaspora Conferences to discuss immigration levels, compared to 17 per
issues of national concern (President of the cent of those aged 65 and older. This ‘youth
Republic of Armenia n.d.) effect’ exists in most receiving regions and
countries, except Russia (Esipova, Ray and
7.5. The migration debate: dilemmas Pugliese 2015; IOM 2015a). According to
for policymakers data from the Gallup World Poll from more
Migration is a controversial topic that poses than 140 countries between 2012 and 2014,
fundamental and difficult dilemmas for younger and more-educated people tend
policymakers in democratic institutions. It has to view migration more favourably, with
become increasingly politicized, as it involves the exception of Russia (Esipova, Ray and
a country’s national identity and therefore Pugliese 2015), where government policy
evokes nationalist sentiments, which are aimed to increase immigration, despite 70
combined with political parties’ tendencies to per cent of survey respondents saying they
define their identity by taking tough stances desired lower levels. Poorer and less-educated
towards migration and multiculturalism people generally tend to have more negative
(Kivisto 2002). Migration can raise economic views about immigration than younger, well-
concerns, as particularly during times of educated, financially secure and ethnically
relatively high unemployment, citizens may mixed people (Ford 2012). A comparison
see immigrants as unfairly obtaining scarce of attitudes in four Asian countries found
social benefits, or competing with natives greater public knowledge and high levels of
for jobs. Lastly, migration has increased tolerance of migrant workers in the Republic
citizens’ worries about security and safety, of Korea and Singapore than in Malaysia and
especially when immigrants are alleged to be Thailand. The former two offer jobs with
perpetrators of (or to have links to) terrorism. higher pay and prestige to citizens, while
All three of these factors—security, culture, in the latter two citizens are more likely
and social welfare or jobs—shape attitudes to work alongside immigrants in manual
towards migrants. labour; Malaysia and Thailand have longer
land borders and are thus more accessible
According to 2015 World Gallup poll data, in to unauthorized immigrants (Tunon and
the top ten migration destination countries Baruah 2012).
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In Russia, Spain and the UK, more than half say immigration
levels should decrease.
24% 17%
Sources of data: Esipova, Ray and Pugliese (2015); IOM (2015a)
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Hostility towards immigrants and anti- become an easy target of public scapegoating. Hostility
immigrant discourse tend to increase ahead of In both absolute and percentage terms, very towards
elections. For example, nearly 46 per cent of news few immigrants have perpetrated terror attacks immigrants and
articles, from both tabloids and broadsheets, in Europe or North America, compared to anti-immigrant
framed migration as a threat and migrants those committed by native-born citizens
discourse tend
as actual or potential ‘villains’ in the months (Belgioisio 2017).
leading up to the 2015 general election in the to increase
UK (Crawley, McMahon and Jones 2016) and In response to public concerns, many countries ahead of
the 2017 presidential election in France. This are increasing their border control capacities elections
risks a feedback loop in which politicians— and have stepped up their security screening of
such as US President Donald Trump—use refugees admitted via asylum or resettlement
anti-immigrant rhetoric to drum up hostility programmes. In contrast to their counterparts
(often with the help of some media outlets) and in Europe and the USA, South American
gain votes. Once elected, they use their office to politicians and civil servants stress the
further institutionalize this hostility. Whitaker inefficacy of restrictive responses to migration
and Giersch (2015) analysed attitudes and the universality of migrants’ rights
towards immigration in 11 African states, based on the principles of support for open
and found that ‘opposition to immigration borders, an understanding of migration as a
is more likely in more democratic countries fundamental right and the non-criminalization
in Africa which have high immigration rates of irregular migration (Acosta 2016).
and are more ethnically diverse, in countries Argentina’s 2004 Migration Law and Ecuador’s
with dominant party systems, and when 2008 Constitution go so far as to stipulate a
individuals are surveyed close to a national ‘human right to migrate’ (Aracazo and Freier
election’. Threats to the smooth functioning 2015). However it must be noted that these
of democratic institutions and processes countries are migrant-origin countries and not
arise out of political and social polarization, traditional migrant-destination countries.
securitization, exclusion, and marginalization In Argentina, cultural perceptions and
or discrimination by narrowly defining ‘the underlying power structures effectively limit
nation’. Media coverage of migration also the political integration of immigrants.
influences national and local voting behaviour.
In many destination countries, public concerns In some countries, arguments against
and attitudes towards migration significantly admitting immigrants focus on the need
influence government policies, party agendas to preserve the national culture. Concerns
and electoral campaigns. Native populations over cultural threats rarely address the fact
react negatively to an influx of immigrants that some states thrive when embracing
through anti-immigrant protests, vigilante multiculturalism as a basic principle, as is
groups and mainstream parties’ adoption the case with Canada and Australia. Other
of restrictive policies. For example, the states, such as France and Germany, instead
immigration ban ordered by US President espouse integration based on assimilation and
Trump in January 2017 attempted to bar equality. Countries with lower population
Syrian refugees indefinitely and to block entry densities, such as Australia, Canada and the
into the USA for 90 days for citizens of seven USA, that place greater emphasis on openness
predominantly Muslim countries: Iran, Iraq, to (and the integration of ) newcomers appear
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. to be able to develop resilience and the ability
to absorb more immigrants as a proportion
The rise of terrorist organizations claiming to of total inhabitants (Alsenia, Harnoss and
be motivated by Islamic beliefs has contributed Rapoport 2013; Legrain 2006; IOM 2004).
to Islamophobia in many countries; migrants Box 7.11 discusses South Africa’s approach to
and refugees, particularly Muslims, often asylum seekers.
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BOX 7.11
South Africa’s migration management efforts some politicians have aligned with their native-born constituents
and against immigrants. For example, in December 2016 the mayor of
South Africa, a multicultural society with progressive asylum laws, Johannesburg categorized all irregular immigrants as ‘criminals’ who
received the highest number of asylum applications in the world would not be tolerated. In addition, he stated that once in power,
between 2006 and 2012. Its generous refugee admission policy, his Democratic Alliance Party would make sure that immigrants could
coupled with inefficient implementation and a lack of legal channels not enter the country without permission (Mashengo and Malefane
for economic migrants, led asylum seekers to remain in the country 2016). While not explicitly linking his remarks to the mayor’s, the
for years with work permits but without a resolution of their asylum home affairs minister assured the public that the new Border
claims (Iams Wellman and Landau 2015). A 2016 green paper that Management Agency aimed to prevent irregular entry, rather than
presented the government’s strategy for integrating the newly keep foreigners out (Herman 2016). In 2008 and 2015 South Africa
established Border Management Agency into an overall migration experienced xenophobic violence, with a wave of lootings, killings
management plan cited the EU’s Dublin system as a model regional and displacement (Iams Wellman and Landau 2015). Violence broke
approach to assigning responsibilities for refugees (Department of out during an anti-immigrant march in Pretoria in February 2017; the
Home Affairs of the Republic of South Africa 2016). Notwithstanding next month a civil society coalition (the Coalition of Civics Against
this initiative, there have been ongoing controversies related to Xenophobia) staged a peaceful countermarch (Mohapi 2017; De
political attitudes towards immigration in 2017. Villiers 2017). The organizers stated that, with the support of local
residents, as well as immigrants, embassies and neighbouring
Although the government’s efforts have sought to manage migration countries, the march was the start of a series of civil society events
while maintaining South Africa’s high standards of human rights, to combat xenophobia (Sakhile 2017).
FIGURE 7.5
How well or badly would you say the current government is handling
the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: Managing immigration?
27% 6% 68%
Notes: The Afrobarometer in South Africa measures attitudes for South African citizens over the age of 18. Fielding occurred from 13 August to
21 September 2015 with the survey being available in SeSotho, SePedi, Afrikaans, SeTswana, Tshivenda, Xhosa, Zulu and English. n = 2,400, MoE +/- 3%.
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Public attitudes towards immigration in cost child care, for example, enables parents People’s attitudes
South Africa in 2015 show an almost even to join the labour force (UNDP 2009: 85). towards
split of positive and negative attitudes towards Studies of Thailand and Hong Kong found that immigration are
migration. An overall majority of the public even large increases in immigration have very not necessarily
believe that the government is managing little effect on overall wages or employment.
related to their
migration unsatisfactorily. While International
IDEA’s GSoD indices data show that South Similarly, the net fiscal effects of migration are perceptions
Africa’s scores on representative government, not large—an estimated +/- 1 per cent of GDP of their country’s
fundamental rights, checks on government (UNDP 2009: 88). While some immigrants, economic
and impartial administration have remained particularly refugees, require short-term public conditions
relatively stable since the end of apartheid in support in the form of housing, health care,
1995, impartial administration and checks on education and administrative processing, there
government have seen a decline since 2008 is no conclusive evidence that, on average,
and 2011, respectively. either refugees or voluntary migrants consume
more in social services than they pay in taxes.
People’s attitudes towards immigration are Initial costs include administrative overheads
not necessarily related to their perceptions and integration programmes. First-generation
of their country’s economic conditions. economic migrants and refugees who are not
According to 2015 Gallup World polling data, admitted into immigration programmes tend
adults who live in countries with the highest to need support, while subsequent generations
unemployment rates are the most negative become significant net contributors to the
towards immigration. Nearly half of adults in public treasury if they are well integrated into
countries with unemployment rates over 15 the labour market. Since many of the initial
per cent believe immigration should decrease. costs fall on local authorities, undercounting of
However, in several countries in Africa and
elsewhere around the world, there is no (or FIGURE 7.6
very little) difference in attitudes towards
immigration based on the state of the national South Africa—attributes of democracy
economy, such as Bangladesh, Belgium, Iraq,
Israel, Jordan, Malta, the Philippines, the 1.0
Republic of Korea, Uzbekistan and Venezuela
0.9
(Esipova, Ray and Pugliese 2015).
0.8
0.7
Economic concerns over immigration often
0.6
focus on immigrants taking scarce jobs or
0.5
requiring public support. However, it is
0.4
not clear that such concerns are warranted.
0.3
Assuming that jobs occupied by immigrants
0.2
would otherwise go to natives depends on
0.1
the ‘lump of labour fallacy’—the idea that an
0.0
economy contains a fixed number of jobs and
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
that workers are interchangeable from one job to
the next. Empirical studies show that increased Representative Government Fundamental Rights
immigration has only small net effects on Checks on Government Impartial Administration
overall employment and wages. The relative mix
Notes: This graph shows the changes in trends in South Africa for Representative Government, Fundamental
of skills in the immigrant versus native labour Rights, Checks on Government and Impartial Administration. The y-axis shows the score and the x-axis the years.
Scores in the y-axis range from 0 to 1. Higher scores indicate a higher performance on a given attribute.
forces is a key factor. In Europe, low-skilled
Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Representative Government Index, Fundamental Rights Index, Checks on Government
migrant labour tends to increase opportunities Index, Impartial Administration Index).
for local workers, since the availability of low-
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migrants and unexpected migration flows can Former British Prime Minister David
result in fiscal shortages in countries where local Cameron questioned the UK’s longstanding
spending is supported centrally on a per capita policy of multiculturalism in 2010–11,
basis (UNDP 2009: 88). Some highly skilled arguing that some young British Muslims
or entrepreneurial immigrants create enough were drawn to violent ideology because they
wealth through tax contributions, spending found no strong collective identity in Britain
their own income, or creating new jobs and (Green and Staerklé 2013; UNHCR 2015).
establishing businesses—such as Google,
Yahoo and Tesla—to produce significant The virulent French debate on headscarves
economic gains for native citizens. States exemplifies the fear that immigrants threaten
with well-developed immigration systems can national values that pervades the public
expect per-immigrant costs to remain steady, discourse in many countries. The terrorist
even as the number of immigrants increases; attacks in New York and Washington, DC
Canada and Sweden appear to be successful in in 2001; in Madrid and London in 2005;
this regard (Bonin et al. 2008). However, a lack in Brussels and France in 2015; the Boko
of comparable data hampers efforts to perform Haram attacks in Nigeria; Al-Shabab attacks
cost–benefit analyses of the economic impacts in Kenya in 2015; and Islamic State attacks
of migration (Bonin et al. 2008). in Iraq, Egypt, Syria and Yemen in 2015
(Alpert 2015) have led to calls for increased
Policymakers and political leaders—such immigration and border control, and fuelled
as US President Trump—have reacted to backlashes and retaliatory violence against
concerns about immigration by proposing immigrants.
solutions such as building walls to keep
migrants out, or externalizing borders and Many countries that used to have a strong
establishing camps in third countries. Some policy emphasis on multiculturalism, such
countries, notably Czechia, Hungary and as Australia, the Netherlands and Sweden,
Poland, have refused to admit refugees in line have shifted to requiring more ‘adaptation’,
with agreed EU quotas. Hungary has enacted ‘sharing of values’ and ‘integration’ from
particularly restrictive policies towards immigrants, often under pressure from rising
asylum seekers, including the establishment far right parties. Other European countries
of refugee camps against the background of that had once considered multiculturalism
a particularly nationalistic anti-immigrant are now adopting coercive ‘civic integration’
stance taken by its leadership. policies, such as Austria and Germany (Green
and Staerklé 2013; Joppke 2007). Conversely,
Other countries have adopted multiculturalist in Canada, multicultural immigrant policies
integration policies with regard to migration, have made the political process more inclusive
such as Australia, Canada and Sweden. Other (Kymlicka 2010a), and united immigrants
examples of pluralistic societies include and minorities to identify with, and feel pride
India, the UK and the USA (Buzzle n.d.). Yet in, their new country.
multiculturalism has increasingly come under
pressure (Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul Policy implications: approaches to
2008) and there has been a growing global migration challenges
backlash against multiculturalism in public Migration policies must be based on the rule
opinion, political discourse, immigration of law and equal access to justice, particularly
policy and political theory (Castles and Miller ensuring access to impartial assessments of
2009). In 2010–11, German Chancellor asylum claims. Legitimate and democratic
Angela Merkel stated that ‘multiculturalism governments have the right to make the laws
has utterly failed’, with ‘immigrants needing and rules that govern immigration as well as
to do more to integrate in German society’. to enforce them. Even a restrictive immigration
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policy that limits entry can be implemented To respond to migration effectively, host Even a restrictive
in accordance with the rule of law and other country governments should enforce immigration
democratic principles if the country does so immigration policy and rules through policy that limits
fairly, transparently and in compliance with competent institutions and based on accurate entry can be
human rights norms. data. Many countries struggle to equip their
implemented
national and local institutions with the
Democratic dialogue can help promote tolerance necessary resources, and to enact a legislative in accordance
of immigrants and counter inaccurate public framework and guidance on competencies to with the rule of
beliefs about immigration, as well as enhance the ensure that migration policy can be enforced law and other
legitimacy of government policies. In Argentina, fairly and in line with human rights and democratic
immigration is recognized as a fundamental right democratic principles. To ensure safe and principles if
in the Constitution, while the federal immigration orderly migration, government institutions the country
law guarantees immigrants equal treatment, non- and agencies need to provide clear and
does so fairly,
discrimination, and access to educational, medical accessible information regarding immigration
and social services (Hines 2010). laws and policies, as well as reliable and publicly transparently and
The constructive involvement of immigrant available data about migration flows (EIU in compliance
and host communities in the planning and 2016). This will facilitate a better-informed with human
implementation of public policies can help measurement of the impact of migration rights norms
engage citizens and improve decision-makers’ on countries. Such data can form the basis
understanding of communities’ needs. In of a public debate to set realistic priorities
addition, dialogue platforms and participatory regarding migration policy. In addition,
policymaking contribute to building social governments should invest in research on the
cohesion and trust among immigrant and host nexus between migration and democracy.
communities, as they are both offered the space
to interact and understand each other’s views and Learning from local initiatives
concerns. The inclusion of less-skilled and less- Many cities are forming partnerships between
educated migrants is important in this regard. migrants, local governments and civil society
to manage migration by increasing mobility
Creating opportunities for people to meet and social diversity. Except for citizenship
and interact in common spaces—such acquisition, the inclusion of migrants is
as workplaces, political parties, schools, facilitated locally, including provision of
neighbourhood facilities and public transport language courses, civic education, access to
systems—can help create a collective national health services and ensuring public safety.
identity, while respecting the diversity of National governments can strengthen their
group identities. Public institutions and capacity to deal with migration by learning
governments have an important role to play in from successful local examples.
creating such spaces that are sensitive to (and
promote) diversity (Buzzelli 2001; Hansen Forming social networks within cities furthers
and Pikkov 2008; Wong 2010). Similarly, migrants’ integration and helps build resilient and
programmes that foster partnerships and democratically inclusive societies. Cities today link
social and civic engagement can contribute local urban social cohesion to economic growth
to building social capital in and across and global competitiveness (Schwedler 2011).
communities; governments may consider The participation and inclusion of migrants
providing public funding to such initiatives in their host cities is an indispensable part of
(Hyman, Meinhard and Shields 2011). Since building stable, open and vibrant communities
cities and municipalities can play a significant (IOM 2015b). Cities have a key role to play in
role in fostering social cohesion, governments community building and in supporting social,
can particularly learn from local-level cultural, economic and political participation at
engagements. the local government level.
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National Local governments influence social capital every child—regardless of their legal status—
governments can indirectly through policies and programmes the right to go to school and to provide access
strengthen their designed to increase social inclusion, such as to public services for all people. These laws
capacity to deal transportation and recreational services, and were passed years ahead of the national 2004
to create common spaces. Local governments Immigration Law, but needed the national law
with migration
should thus work to strengthen community to facilitate implementation (IOM 2015b).
by learning organizations that represent the interests
from successful of diverse communities (Saloojee 2005; Decisions that influence migrants and refugees
local examples. Richmond and Saloojee 2005; Hyman, are often taken by local governments, civil
Forming social Meinhard and Shields 2011). For example, society and the private sector. Enabling migrant
networks within several US cities guarantee equal access to participation in public decision-making processes
cities furthers all types of services for immigrants and during planning processes can contribute to
natives, while in Canada cities implement enhancing their skills, access to services and
migrants’
a strict policy of non-discrimination and a sense of community. For example, the US
integration and inclusion (Sisk 2001). Canada’s approach to city of Portland, Oregon, practices inclusive
helps build multiculturalism is discussed in more detail in neighbourhood-level development planning,
resilient and Box 7.12. while Amsterdam promotes heterogeneous
democratically neighbourhoods as a way of achieving social and
inclusive societies Some cities in Europe (such as Athens, Berlin, economic inclusion (Bosswick, Lüken-Klaßen
Bilbao and Dublin) and Asia (Fuzhou in China, and Heckmann 2007).
as well as Singapore and a network of cities in
Japan) are forming institutional structures 7.6. Conclusions and
with the support of national authorities to recommendations: managing
harness the diverse interests of migrants and migration democratically
further inclusive cooperation. Berlin, Dublin Given the transnational nature of migration,
and Lille are establishing partnerships with effective policy approaches to maintaining a
migrant associations to promote citizenship and resilient democratic system must be designed
political participation among migrant groups. around long-term goals that combine national
Participatory budgeting (i.e. community and local approaches with cooperation in
members directly deciding how to spend regional and global governance structures. In
part of the public budget) is being used to this way, policy approaches to migration will
finance municipal inclusion policies in over consider its non-territorial implications for
1,700 local governments in more than 40 national politics.
countries, especially low-income countries
where municipal budgets remain low despite One of the key approaches to tackling
decentralization (IOM 2015b). the migration challenge is to address the
disconnect and reduced trust between citizens
Therefore neighbourhood and community and political institutions and governments, in
councils, along with e-democracy and order to encourage public attitudes towards
participatory budgeting, enable local authorities immigration to lead to better governance.
to consolidate civil engagement. Urban
inclusion policies often take a more pragmatic To maximize the benefits of migration, the
approach than migration governance at the naturalization of resident non-citizens can
national level by promoting the positive impacts be facilitated by reducing the administrative
of differences on competitiveness and social burden and time required to obtain
cohesion, and creating initiatives to fill gaps in citizenship. In the period before immigrants
central governance and policies on migration. become citizens, migrants’ integration and
For example in Buenos Aires, Argentina, sense of belonging can be enhanced with the
legislation was drafted with the aim of giving support of civil society and local community-
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BOX 7.12
Factors of success and their impact on democracy: and ethnic and religious minorities into the country (Kymlicka 1998,
2010b; Banting, Courchene and Seidie 2006; Bloemraad 2006).
Canada’s multicultural immigration policy
Immigrants and native-born Canadians mutually identify and accept
each other to a high degree, with a strong probability that immigrants
Canada is the only country in the world that enshrines multiculturalism
to Canada will acquire citizenship. Intermarriage and proficiency in
in its constitution, which gives this policy a high degree of legal
Canada’s official languages is common in Canada. The probability that
security, making it more difficult to rescind. Since 1971 it has pursued
Canadian immigrants will vote, join a political party or seek political
a multicultural immigration policy that encourages a vision of Canada
office is higher than for immigrants to the USA, Europe or Australia
based on the values of equality and mutual respect with regard to race,
(Kymlicka 1998; Howe 2007). There are more foreign-born citizens and
national or ethnic origin, colour and religion. One of its key objectives is
Canadian-born minorities elected to Parliament in Canada than in other
to promote the full and equitable participation of migrants and to remove
Western countries, both in absolute numbers and in proportion to their
barriers to such participation. In 2016, Canada took in approximately
percentage of the population (Adams 2007).
300,000 migrants, of whom 48,000 were refugees. Annual immigration
accounts for roughly 1 per cent of the country’s current population of 36
million (Foran 2017). Since 2006, Canada has naturalized over 1.5 million Immigrants to Canada, regardless of their religious affiliation,
new citizens (Huddleston et al. 2015). Cities such as Vancouver, Calgary, increasingly share the country’s liberal-democratic norms, including
Toronto, Ottawa and Montreal are some of the most diverse in the world. the protection of homosexual and women’s rights (Soroka, Johnston
and Banting 2007). According to a survey conducted by Focus Canada
The Canadian population supports immigration and wants migrants in 2006, 83 per cent of Canadians agree that Muslims make a positive
to become citizens; approximately 85 per cent eventually do (Foran contribution to Canada (Adams 2009), suggesting that the country
2017). Canada’s migration policy has its critics, who maintain that has been less affected by the global surge in anti-Muslim sentiments
multiculturalism threatens national cohesion and contributes to and the resulting polarization of ethnic relations experienced in many
ghettoization (Bissoondath 2002; Wong 2010). Others argue that ‘as European countries (Kymlicka 2010b).
is the case in England, France, and other democracies, national unity
in Canada is increasingly threatened by the growing atomization of While Canada does not grant national or local voting rights to
our society along ethnic lines’ (Gregg 2006; Bennett-Jones 2005). The immigrants before they become citizens, it does encourage immigrants
Conservative Party has called for the deployment of Canada’s army to participate in civic life and, before becoming citizens, to actively
to detain potential refugees from crossing the border and for a new engage with civil society to develop lasting relationships in their
law to prevent asylum seekers from being eligible for refugee status communities. Canada is one of the few major destination countries that
determination hearings if they cross the border illegally (Freeman 2017). does not have established immigrant-led consultation bodies. However,
when immigrants arrive, they do so as permanent residents and quickly
In contrast to countries that are pursuing, or have introduced, ever more become full citizens. The Canadian model of integration is thus based
restrictive immigration policies in the last five years, particularly in on the assumption that all immigrants can (and will) rapidly become
the wake of the rise of populist parties, Canada deliberately strives to citizens after 3–4 years, spending their first years in the country focused
keep its borders open. In 2015, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau on employment and settlement. According to 2011 data, 92 per cent of
highlighted this longstanding policy as ‘Canada’s strength’ because it immigrants became citizens after 10+ years in Canada (OECD 2014).
is not taken for granted, and is based on shared fundamental human This is one of the highest naturalization rates in the world, alongside
rights values and policies that aim to balance individual and collective Australia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and most Nordic countries
identity, as well as on economic policies that benefit Canada’s middle (Huddleston et al. 2015; MIPEX 2015). Canada’s traditionally quick and
class (Trudeau 2015). He even went so far as to refer to Canada as the clear path to citizenship is the strongest factor explaining its integration
‘first post-national state’, declaring that ‘there is no core identity, no success (Huddleston et al. 2015). Recently, however, it has become more
mainstream in Canada’ (Trudeau 2015). restrictive: permanent residents face longer waiting periods to become
naturalized, and there are increased restrictions and documentation
Besides having a strong political leadership that realistically burdens to attain citizenship, reunite dependent family members and
acknowledges the challenges of migration and works to implement secure equal residence (Huddleston et al. 2015).
a bold multicultural migration policy, why has Canada’s migration
policy worked, and how has it strengthened its democracy? History, Canada nevertheless leads the developed world in promoting rapid
geopolitics and its history as a heterogeneous country arguably play a labour market integration, non-discrimination and a common sense
role in this success, as well as the fact that its ‘open border’ policy is of belonging. Immigrants and citizens generally enjoy the same
subject to border control and passport checks. The country’s history as access, social rights and strong discrimination protections in a flexible
an immigration country may have favourably influenced public opinion labour market. Both low- and high-educated newcomers benefit from
about the benefits and usefulness of migration. In addition, Canadians increasing funds for settlement services, long-term language support,
seem to interpret ‘nationhood’ dynamically, based on a sense of and bridging and recognition procedures, depending on their economic
identity that encourages pluralism and embraces a diverse population sector and province. Federal and provincial support for cultural diversity
(Foran 2017). encourages immigrants to identify with Canada and contribute to civil
society, while helping society understand and respond to newcomers’
Canada’s multiculturalist policy has had diverse effects on its democracy specific needs related to the labour market, adult education, schools,
and social cohesion. It has helped successfully integrate immigrants the health system or the local community (Huddleston et al. 2015).
235
Chapter 7 The Global State of Democracy 2017
Migration, social polarization, citizenship and multiculturalism Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Democratic based initiatives. As the Canadian example helping to create the conditions for strong
institutions demonstrates, this can lead to a high level and resilient democracies. Governments
should thus of naturalization without necessitating an need to consider state capacities in relation
consider policies interim step of voting rights for non-citizens. to migration policymaking, and countries
Enfranchising resident non-citizen migrants with high immigration rates and immigrant-
that empower
is a possible (albeit controversial) approach to friendly policies must work to reduce the
migrants to increasing their political participation, but it potential backlash from citizens who have
decide how they sets a high political benchmark. Democratic negative perceptions of immigration by
participate in institutions should thus consider policies engaging in fact-based debates. In this way,
public life, rather that empower migrants to decide how they government institutions will be more capable
than participate in public life, rather than defining of providing quality services and integrating
defining policies policies based on citizenship-as-nationality migrants, which will strengthen the
or franchise-without-nationality models. accountability of political institutions with
based on
To strengthen democracy, especially in regard to voters who may have concerns about
citizenship-as- countries with high or increasing proportions the government’s ability to manage migration,
nationality of migrants, policymakers should consider in line with the notion that ‘democracy should
or franchise- granting voting rights—particularly at the deliver’.
without- local level—as a pathway to easier citizenship.
nationality This would better promote respect for Political parties in destination countries
models individuals’ choices than an approach that need to consider inclusive measures to enable
focuses on groups or ethnic nations. effective migrant political participation and
engage in fact-based political dialogue on
Origin countries may enjoy a democratic migration with the entire voting population.
dividend from emigration: migrants can A party’s agenda and views on migration—
serve as agents of democracy who diffuse regardless of where it stands on the political
democratic norms; returnees may increase spectrum—influence whether immigrants
demands for government accountability, help are represented in political party structures,
enhance the country’s electoral and political whether they can stand for election and
participation, and form new political parties. whether they have a realistic chance of winning
In addition to considering granting voting due to their ranking on a party’s candidate list.
rights to expatriates, origin countries should
empower returning migrants to engage Political parties that have migrant-friendly
politically in their countries, and should policies can thus consider making party
consult with their diaspora communities on statutes, electoral platforms and candidate lists
migration issues to encourage them to act as more inclusive, and can engage migrants with
goodwill ambassadors in destination countries a view to strengthening their representative
and to invest in the development of their base. They can also incorporate migrants’ views
home countries, potentially enhancing social in order to develop migration policies that
cohesion and cultural understanding. Origin benefit the country. Since political parties are
countries should thus accept other types of potential holders of legislative and governing
political participation and advocacy from powers, they play a key role in encouraging
their diaspora, for example through migrant immigrants to participate politically, to enable
associations or formal consultative bodies, them to become agents of democracy and
and provide them with the space to articulate sustain social cohesion (Dähnke et al. 2014:
their interests and views. 12–13).
Migration can be tackled through multicultural To effectively address the challenge posed by
policies that favour the inclusion of migrants migration to democracy and to strengthen
and provide political benefits to societies by democratic institutions, the following
236
International IDEA Chapter 7
First Edition 2017 Migration, social polarization, citizenship and multiculturalism
uphold related international law such as the mutual benefits of migrants to improve
the Global Compact on Migrants and cultural understanding, promote tolerance
Refugees. and integration, and facilitate the political
•
Enhance the governance of international participation of migrants in both origin
migration through greater regional and destination countries.
consultation and cooperation and more • International and regional consultative
effective dialogue between governments processes on migration should strengthen their
and global international organizations engagement with civil society, particularly
focused on key policy issues such as the migrant associations, to promote migrant
linkages between migration and democracy, integration and participation rather than
development, security, human rights and migration control. These processes should
trade. include representatives of academia,
• Expand cooperation mechanisms such as foundations and the private sector.
advisory or consultative bodies to reinforce
238
International IDEA Chapter 7
First Edition 2017 References
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Chapter 8
Chapter
8 Inclusive peacebuilding in
conflict-affected states: Designing
for democracy’s resilience
Chapter 8 The Global State of Democracy 2017
Inclusive peacebuilding in conflict-affected states: designing for democracy’s resilience Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Inclusive peacebuilding
in conflict-affected states:
designing for democracy’s
resilience
Countries emerging from armed conflict face a long and arduous road, characterized
by multiple obstacles as well as many opportunities. Steps taken in the immediate
post-conflict period have a tremendous impact on the country’s future. This chapter
recommends implementing targeted and active inclusion in peacebuilding processes in
order to activate and maintain consistent representative–constituent communication
channels, give voice to individuals and groups who identify ways to challenge traditional
notions of the democratic state, and facilitate broader access to the highest levels of
decision-making as a guiding principle in state- and democracy-building processes. It
recommends promoting such policies and practices in three key transitional processes:
constitution-building, electoral design and rebel-to-political-party transformation. The
chapter features case studies of Liberia, Nepal and Libya.
Written by
Sumit Bisarya, Carrie Manning,5 Victoria Perotti and
300,000 Liberians had died and more than
Seema Shah6 500,000 had been displaced. The country’s
GDP had fallen by over 90 per cent in less
Our experience has identified than two decades, one of the most striking
inclusivity and institution-building such drops in the world (Radelet 2007: 1–2).
Almost 70 per cent of the country still lives
as critical in preventing relapse into
below the poverty line of USD 1.90 per day
violent conflict and producing more (UNDP 2016).
resilient States and societies. Exclusion
is one of the most important factors The war particularly impacted women and
that trigger a relapse into conflict. children, and the various traumas they suffered
continue to haunt the country. All warring
—Ban Ki Moon, United Nations Secretary-General, sides used mass rape as a weapon of war
2007–16 (UN 2012)
during the conflict. Male child soldiers were
sometimes forced to rape their own mothers,
5
Carrie Manning is Professor,
Department of Political Science, 8.1. Introduction: imperatives of grandmothers and sisters as part of their
Georgia State University.
inclusivity initiation, and the victims were as young as
Seema Shah is an election
At the end of the second Liberian civil war in eight months old (Toral 2012). Child soldiers
6
girls were used in the conflict; the latter were peace agreement and took an active role in
primarily used as cooks, porters, sex slaves, and encouraging fighters to abide by disarmament
domestics for men and boys (Pan 2003). The rules. They also organized to provide
war also destroyed 70 per cent of the country’s transportation and childcare, and supervise
school buildings, and more than half of all market stalls, so that thousands of women
Liberian children were estimated to be out of working in the markets could register to vote in
school after the war: ‘A whole generation of the first post-conflict election. Groups such as
Liberians has spent more time at war than in those in the Women in Peacebuilding Network
school’ (Radelet 2007: 4). continued to push for women’s integration into
the economy, working to ensure sustainable
In 2003, as war raged, a group of women came peacebuilding (Bekoe and Parajon 2007). In
together to wage a nonviolent campaign for 2011, one of the group’s founders, Leymah
peace in response to former President Charles Gbowee, won the Nobel Peace Prize for
Taylor’s declaration that he would never mobilizing women ‘across ethnic and religious
negotiate with rebels and that he would sooner dividing lines to bring an end to the long war’
see the last soldier die than allow international (Cowell 2011).
peacekeepers in. Two female social workers and
a leader of Muslim women’s groups organized The Liberian case highlighted the critical
the Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace, importance of inclusion, which is also
which began to publicly and privately demand increasingly recognized in peacebuilding efforts.
peace. They held a ‘sex strike’, denying intimacy In Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict
to their partners until peace was achieved. In (UN 2012), the UN Secretary-General
public, the women utilized peaceful marches, underscored the importance of early emphasis
songs and sit-ins, and convinced President on inclusion in peacebuilding efforts, and calls
Taylor and rebel groups to engage in peace talks. on the international community to identify entry
points for inclusion. The transitional period
The women then travelled to the site of the in which reconstruction activities take place
negotiations in Accra, Ghana, where they offers opportunities to integrate this principle
continued to exert pressure for a peace deal. into the fundamental institutions and processes
In July, as violence escalated in Liberia, the that will serve as a basis for the newly born or
women in Accra staged a sit-in at the site of reborn state. Since an inclusive approach to
the negotiations. They linked arms, refusing peacebuilding processes implies the localization
to allow the delegates to leave without a final of peacebuilding efforts, it increases the local
settlement. When guards came to arrest the population’s ownership of the transition, thereby
women, one of the leaders threatened to making the peace more sustainable.
remove her clothing, an act that would shame
the men. The women were not arrested, and Acknowledging that the transition from war
they met with the chief mediator, who agreed to peace and democratic rule is a process and
to listen to their demands for peace. Three cannot necessarily be bound by any single
weeks later, President Taylor, who had been event, this chapter does not strictly define a
indicted for war crimes by the Special Court transitional period. Indeed, transitions are
for Sierra Leone, resigned and a peace deal was not necessarily completely peaceful. The
announced (Rennebohm 2011). signing of a peace deal does not mean that
the conflict is over in the minds of the people
This grassroots movement, which inspired or that the underlying problems have been
other women around the country and the sufficiently addressed. However, a transition
continent, continued its work into the post- signals that the primary warring parties have
conflict, transitional phase. The women acted shown a commitment to ceasing hostilities and
as watchdogs over the implementation of the rebuilding the state.
251
Chapter 8 The Global State of Democracy 2017
Inclusive peacebuilding in conflict-affected states: designing for democracy’s resilience Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
Active and This chapter discusses how political elites who create innovative channels of communication
targeted are managing the development of the new between decision-makers and constituents
inclusion ensures state can best integrate principles of inclusion at key institution-building moments. It
into the design of new political institutions demands more of the people, asking them to
that political
in the aftermath of violent conflict. Active provide input and feedback. It also requires
representatives and targeted inclusion, explained in detail more of decision-makers, who must work
value (and below, promotes stability and resilience in to engage people outside their core support
consistently seek) new democratic institutions by prioritizing groups. Targeted inclusion acknowledges the
constituents’ communication between political elites and importance of unconventional and contentious
views and voices, citizens as well as by giving voice to the most definitions of identity. It proactively encourages
and that they marginalized groups in society. This chapter people to speak from their own perspectives,
focuses on active and targeted inclusion and to allow those views to be part of the
incorporate these
mechanisms in constitution-building as well political debate, from which they may have
views into higher- as in the political settlement and the design of been traditionally excluded. Therefore active
level discussions electoral systems. These processes form some and targeted inclusion ensures that political
and decisions of the core elements of democratic resilience: representatives value (and consistently seek)
they lay the foundation for the rules of the constituents’ views and voices, and that they
new state, determine who can participate incorporate these views into higher-level
in that state and design the levers of that discussions and decisions. It also demands
participation (Reilly 2015). As such, they have that societies confront head on some of the
the power to determine the state’s resilience— potentially divisive issues that could most
the ability of its social systems to cope with, threaten the peacebuilding process, primarily
survive and recover from complex challenges by giving voice and access to groups that
and crises that have the potential to trigger challenge traditional, mainstream conceptions
systemic failure. Indeed, decisions made of the democratic state. Active and targeted
during the transition ‘can make an enormous inclusion gives the new state a chance to
difference to generations of ordinary people’ creatively define its own version of democracy,
(Maley 2006: 683). stability and peace. This kind of inclusion
helps build or ‘design’ democratic resilience
The resilience of democratic institutions by providing the state with a broad range of
depends primarily on their inclusiveness. diverse experiences, viewpoints and skills
When political institutions aim for active that can be used strategically to cope with,
and targeted inclusion, the resulting structures survive and recover from complex challenges
of authority and the citizenry at large are and crises that have the potential to lead to
better prepared to deal with the problems at systemic failure.
the heart of the conflict that may threaten
future stability. Active and targeted inclusion Section 8.2 of this chapter examines how
operationalizes the UN Secretary-General’s the dominant liberal peacebuilding model
definition of inclusion, which is ‘the extent has focused largely on a limited definition
and manner in which the views and needs of of inclusion, which is centred on traditional
parties to conflict and other stakeholders are notions of numerical representation, and
represented, heard and integrated into a peace the consequences of this approach. Sections
process’ (UN 2012: 11). It goes beyond the 8.3 and 8.4 review the use of post-conflict
quest for simple numerical representation of inclusion mechanisms in three fundamental
a broad array of interest groups to focus on state-building processes: constitution-building,
the communication necessary to facilitate rebel-to-party transformation, and electoral
inclusion and on the difficult questions of system design, using the case studies of Libya
identity formation necessary for long-term, and Nepal (Box 8.1). These sections argue
sustainable inclusion. Active inclusion aims to that active and targeted inclusion—which
252
International IDEA Chapter 8
First Edition 2017 Inclusive peacebuilding in conflict-affected states: designing for democracy’s resilience
Herzegovina, Timor-Leste and Rwanda were of clear growth. Only Croatia has maintained
cited as examples of the model’s weaknesses a clear upward trajectory in representative
and tendency to fail. government over time. Of course, a host of
factors other than peacebuilding missions have
Figure 8.1 shows how the countries with affected trends in representative government in
major peacekeeping missions (those deployed these countries.
for six months or more with at least 500
military troops) fared over time with regard to The ideological assumptions underlying
representative government, which is used here the liberal peacebuilding model, and its
as an indicator of electoral democracy. The practical application, have been vigorously
results are mixed. Cambodia, Central African debated. Sceptics have long pointed to the
Republic, Haiti and Liberia experienced inherently messy and conflictual nature of
periods of dramatic drops in representative democratization, arguing that it is difficult to
government, while Bosnia and Herzegovina, take on in a post-conflict environment, when
Timor-Leste, Macedonia, Namibia and stability is a priority (Wolff 2011: 1780). Critics
Tajikistan have maintained relative stability have also noted implementation problems,
over time. Still others have experienced periods such as peacebuilders’ lack of expertise in
FIGURE 8.1
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supporting state–society relations (Barnett and that coercive democratization is not a Over time it has
Zurcher 2009) and programmes’ tendencies successful strategy in most post-conflict become clear that
to work at cross-purposes and thus harm host situations (Ottaway 2010: 1–2). the post-Cold
states (Carothers 2006; Jarstad and Sisk 2008;
War peacekeeping
Paris and Sisk 2007; Uvin 2001). Peacebuilders also often have expansive powers,
which can quell true political participation as
model and
Further, the liberal peacebuilding model’s idea well as locally driven reforms (Chandler 1999; implementers’
of inclusion is often limited in scope, restricted Paris 2010: 343). Over time it has become clear tendencies to
to consultations with national elites at the that the post-Cold War peacekeeping model impose a one-
expense of subnational actors (Richmond and implementers’ tendencies to impose a one- size-fits-all
2011). Inclusion thus becomes limited to size-fits-all framework, especially one focused framework,
leaders who occupy the highest levels of the on national-level stakeholders, cannot produce
especially one
transitional state. the necessary conditions for durable peace.
focused on
National and local actors determine the Inclusion and resilient states national-level
outcomes of all liberal peacebuilding As policymakers continue to confront the stakeholders,
activities because they must decide challenges associated with rebuilding conflict- cannot produce
whether . . . to engage in them or sustain ravaged states, they must think about how to the necessary
them . . . National and local ownership modify the prevailing liberal peacebuilding conditions for
are therefore integral to peacebuilding model to make targeted and active inclusion
durable peace
outcomes. That said, the focus of most more of a central priority. In 2012, the UN
bilateral and multilateral donors on direct secretary-general noted the importance of
engagement with the state privileges inclusivity and institutional design.
national ownership…The organizational
routines that require agreement by the Our experience has identified inclusivity
state therefore detract from ownership by and institution building as critical in
other members of society, often leading preventing relapse into violent conflict
to the empowerment of an illiberal state and producing more resilient States and
(Campbell 2011: 100). societies. Exclusion is one of the most
important factors that trigger a relapse
The focus on national elites is often into conflict. Almost all cases that have
compounded by peacebuilders’ privileging avoided such a relapse have had inclusive
of international ‘experts’, which creates a political settlements, achieved either
significant gap between local needs and through a peace agreement and subsequent
national policy direction. processes or because of inclusive
behaviour by the party that prevailed
Countries where interventions take in the conflict. An early emphasis on
place are forced by the international inclusion is therefore essential. A closely
community to adopt a democratic system related objective is to strengthen formal
of government regardless of existing and informal institutions, including to
conditions and/or citizens’ preference. restore core governance functions and
They are quickly put through the formal equitable service delivery. Inclusivity
steps expected to make democracy a and institution-building are also critical
reality, usually beginning with elections. to domestic accountability systems, help
This process of democratization to restore the social contract, and lay a
supposedly complements any previous more reliable foundation for the State’s
peace agreement, helping to stabilize engagement with the international
the country and consolidate the peace. community (UN 2012: 2).
A growing body of evidence suggests
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Inclusive peacebuilding
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The 2015 review by the High-Level Independent the important role of women in the prevention Including
Panel on Peace Operations acknowledged and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, former rebels
the importance of inclusivity and broadening peacebuilding, peacekeeping, humanitarian in the political
decision-making ownership, and criticized its response and in post-conflict reconstruction. settlement of
past failure to reach out to (and work with) It emphasizes women’s unique strengths
actors beyond the national government. Going
the transitional
and ability to effect change, and stresses the
forward, the review recommended: importance of their equal participation and process has
full involvement in all efforts to maintain and proven to be
‘[I]nclusive national ownership’… promote peace and security (UNSC 2000). critical to both
whereby the national responsibility to Inclusion does more than bring diverse groups long-term peace
drive and direct efforts is broadly shared into decision-making processes. It can also and democratic
by the national government across all key help promote broadmindedness in society and resilience. The
social strata and divides, across a spectrum increase social tolerance. Inclusive, consensual
of political opinions and domestic actors,
consensus is that
systems promote mutual respect and tolerance,
including minorities. This implies and help facilitate deliberation (Kirchner, giving former
participation by community groups, Freitag and Rapp 2011: 210). Such tolerance is combatants
women’s platforms and representatives, essential for developing societal resilience, and a voice in
youth, labour organizations, political makes it easier for people to adjust to change. their political,
parties, the private sector and domestic This may be especially true for democracies, economic and
civil society, including under-represented where the freedoms of speech and expression social destiny
groups (UN 2015b: 21). can expose controversial issues. Mutual
lowers the
tolerance and respect help societies listen to and
Scholarly research supports these calls for provide space for contentious views without chances of a
inclusion. Including former rebels in the falling apart or resorting to violence. recurrence of
political settlement of the transitional process violence
has proven to be critical to both long-term Including actors beyond the principal
peace and democratic resilience. The consensus conflict parties has often been beneficial for
is that giving former combatants a voice in peacebuilding and transition processes. Such
their political, economic and social destiny inclusion can take place through a variety
lowers the chances of a recurrence of violence of modalities beyond official negotiations,
(Toft 2010: 10), and thus allows more time for including inclusive commissions, problem-
democratic institutions to stabilize and win solving workshops or consultations
the public’s trust. Some evidence suggests that (Paffenholz 2014).
including former combatants in new political
institutions increases the likelihood that a Limits of inclusion
democratic process will lead to the creation Regardless of the context, finding the right
and strengthening of democratic institutions balance of inclusivity in post-conflict settings
(Hoddie and Hartzell 2003). Including ex- can be challenging. Some groups may be
combatants through broad participation legitimately excluded from peace negotiations,
and shared or diffused responsibility has for example if the population believes the group
been effective in Colombia, El Salvador and has sacrificed its right to participate because
Guatemala (Travesi and Rivera 2016; Herbert of past abuses. Inclusivity can also decrease
2013; Stanley and Holiday 2002). efficiency: when broad inclusivity involves
many ministries or organizations, decision-
It is also important to bridge other divides making and progress might be slow or costly
and integrate representatives who can offer (World Bank 2011: 124; ZIF 2015).
subnational, minority, class, gender and age
perspectives (ZIF 2015; UN 2015a). UN Since it is impossible to include every single
Security Council Resolution 1325 reaffirms constituency in decision-making processes, the
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Inclusive World Bank emphasizes context-dependent, its legitimacy, and therefore its stability and
constitution- ‘inclusive enough’ coalitions. These coalitions resilience.
building processes should prioritize groups that offer political
legitimacy, financial and technical resources, Inclusive constitution-building processes are
are more likely
and that will continue to press for deep more likely to produce a resilient constitution
to produce institutional reforms, such as business, labour, that will result in an enduring constitutional
a resilient and women’s groups and other elements settlement (Elkins, Blount and Ginsberg 2009)
constitution of civil society (World Bank 2011: 124). and decrease the likelihood of a return to
that will result Indeed, the joint Peace and Development conflict (Widner 2005). This section outlines
in an enduring Advisors programme, established by the the challenges of inclusive constitution-
constitutional UN Development Programme and the UN building in terms of representation in the
Department of Political Affairs in 2004, has constitution-making body and offers practical
settlement and
demonstrated success in supporting local- suggestions for those interested in active and
decrease the level dialogue and infrastructures for peace targeted inclusion.
likelihood of a (UNDP-DPA 2015). Aiming to build local
return to conflict and national capacities for conflict resolution Defining ‘we the people’
and prevention, the programme has worked Thomas Paine described a constitution as ‘not
with a national network of female mediators the act of its government, but of the People
in Burundi, and youth dialogue platforms in constituting its government’ (Paine [1791]
Ukraine (UNDP-DPA 2015: 7–10). 1999). However, the people cannot decide
until someone decides who ‘the people’ actually
The following two sections discuss how the three are (Jennings 1956). In many ways, this is also
transitional processes of constitution-building, the most critical decision, as it can affect the
rebel-to-political party transformation and substantive output of the constitution-making
electoral system design can integrate active process (i.e. the text) as well as the procedural
and targeted inclusion principles, and legitimacy of the process, and thus the sense of
address the challenges related to its practical broad ownership of the resulting constitution
implementation. (Hart 2003).
Constitutions, however, are made in the name was elected based on equal representation of To satisfy the
of all the people, and are intended to last for the three main regions, despite vastly different demands of
generations. Therefore, the stakes involved in population sizes (see Box 8.2). subnational
constitution-building processes are higher than
societies, targeted
those related to ordinary electoral processes, In these contexts, to satisfy the demands of
and thus the demands for inclusion are stronger. subnational societies, targeted inclusion in
inclusion in
constitution-building processes must be based constitution-
Inclusion through representation on a concept of ‘we the peoples’, participating building processes
Inclusion through representation presents as equal partners, even if the communities must be based on
opportunities for inclusivity along two have unequal numbers and even if some of a concept of ‘we
dimensions: horizontal inclusion (or targeted the subnational identities are contentious. the peoples’,
inclusion), which seeks to give voice to The implications for political equality are
participating as
as many of the principal societal groups troubling from an orthodox liberal democratic
as possible, including non-mainstream, standpoint, but where the resulting logic
equal partners,
contentious groups, and vertical inclusion (or of horizontal inclusion accurately reflects even if the
active inclusion), which aims to involve the the shared socio-historical conceptions of communities
broader citizenry beyond the elites selected to citizenship and political community as have unequal
conduct negotiations. Both dimensions should experienced by the broader public, it is likely numbers and
be considered when designing post-conflict to increase the legitimacy of the constitution- even if some of
constitution-building processes. building process.
the subnational
Horizontal inclusion Lastly, if the legitimacy of the constitution-
identities are
In societies divided by violent conflict, defining making body is to be based on its reflection of contentious
‘the people’ is often a highly contentious process the collective self-perceptions of the broader
that can take several forms. In many ways, society, special measures may be required to
the decision about how society is represented ensure the inclusion of groups that would
in the constitution-making body will reflect otherwise be under-represented, such as women.
an existential dilemma over the nature of the In Tunisia, the electoral law for the National
political community being founded: is it a Constituent Assembly required vertical parity
community of a single group of citizens, or in the party lists, but not horizontal parity
several groups? across constituencies. Therefore, many parties
did not include women at the tops of their
One approach is to view the constituents’ power lists; thus while female candidates represented
as the combined will of all individuals, which 50 per cent of the total, only 27 per cent of
can be approximated through proportional the elected assembly members were women
representation (PR) electoral systems. The (Inclusive Security 2017).
2011 Tunisia National Constituent Assembly
was elected on this basis. However, Tunisia is Vertical inclusion
a relatively ethnically homogenous state. The Regarding vertical inclusion, the central
challenge of horizontal inclusion becomes question is how to ensure that the elite pact at
particularly vexing in more heterogeneous the centre of the constitution-making process
states, especially those that can be classified has the broadest possible societal base. Some
as plurinational states (i.e. comprised of more have suggested that the optimal process of
than one discrete nation) (Tierney 2007). For designing a Constituent Assembly should be
example, some view the 1867 founding act hourglass shaped: broad inclusion at the outset,
of modern Canada as a covenant between its in a national debate during elections to the
English- and French-speaking communities assembly, and broad inclusion at the end, in
(Tierney 2007). A more recent example is Libya, the form of a popular referendum. In between
where the Constitutional Drafting Assembly vertical inclusion would be limited, as delegates
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BOX 8.2
Libya’s constitutional crisis drafting exercise, leaving two seats vacant throughout the process (St
John 2016; Eljarh 2014). Moreover, a 12-member Working Committee of
Constitution-building in the post-2011 Libyan transition has been the CDA prepared the latest draft of the constitution, but the committee’s
characterized by serious mismanagement. At the start of the process, there failure to include representatives of the Tuareg and Tebu communities
was great hope for an inclusive and broadly representative constitution. Yet prompted their boycott of the CDA. Additionally, before the most recent
over time it has become clear that minority communities that experienced draft constitution was released in February 2016, 11 members of the Working
deep cultural and political marginalization under Colonel Muammar Committee from the western region of Libya accused the group of dividing
Gaddafi’s rule continue to be relatively sidelined. This situation has the country and then boycotted the proceedings (Ibrahim 2016). By the time
undermined the legitimacy of both the Constitutional Drafting Assembly the draft constitution was released, minority and historically marginalized
(CDA) and the draft constitution. communities were barely represented.
Background and context International best practice related to constitution drafting emphasizes the
While Libyan society is dominated by an Arabic-speaking majority of Arab- need to ensure sufficient time, opportunity and transparent procedures
Berber ancestry that makes up approximately 90 per cent of the population, for consultations. It is also important to ensure that marginalized groups
the country is also home to several minority groups. While it is difficult are guaranteed adequate opportunity to participate; the CDA does not
to obtain up-to-date Libyan demographic data, Berbers, also known as appear to have done so (ICJ 2015: 18–19). While the CDA held several town
Amazigh, are thought to be the largest minority group, constituting 4–10 per hall meetings, civil society groups pointed out that there was insufficient
cent of the population (Minority Rights n.d.; UK Home Office 2016: 8). Other notice to guarantee high levels of participation; the meetings were often
minorities include black Africans (6 per cent) and Tuareg and Tebu (1 per attended only by elites and offered little chance for discussion because they
cent combined) (UK Home Office 2016). often took the form of lectures. Moreover, certain parts of the country were
not visited because of security concerns (ICJ 2015: 19). The International
Under President Muammar Gaddafi, who ruled from 1969 to 2011, pan- Commission of Jurists observed that ‘the CDA made little active effort to seek
Arabism was the dominant ideology. Gaddafi’s belief in the need for unity out the views of marginalised populations. The CDA also did not engage
across the Arab world and the indivisible nature of Arabism and Islam institutions that arguably were specifically mandated to assist such as the
resulted in serious and severe restrictions on the lives and rights of the National Council for General Liberties and Human Rights’ (ICJ 2015: 19). Civil
country’s non-Arab groups. For instance, it was illegal for Berbers to give society organizations that represented the interests of minority groups and
their children non-Arab names, and those who participated in cultural women also submitted reports and proposals to the CDA for consideration;
celebrations abroad were arrested upon their return (IRIN 2012). The Amazigh few of their recommendations were included (ICJ 2015: 19–20).
language and script were forbidden, and those who promoted Berber culture
and/or heritage were at risk of death (Lane 2011). Some Tuaregs, especially The CDA’s February 2016 final draft was surrounded by controversy. It was
those who settled in Libya 40 or 50 years ago (as opposed to hundreds of issued in violation of its own rules of procedure, as it did not enjoy a two-
years ago), were denied ‘family booklets’, which served as the main proof thirds majority of support within the assembly. In addition to disagreements
of citizenship and were required to apply for jobs and bank loans, and about proposed decentralization structures and the choice of parliamentary
to purchase property. Most critically, they were unable to claim Libyan or versus presidential systems of government, the draft constitution has
any other citizenship (IRIN 2012). Unsurprisingly, minority populations been severely criticized by minority groups. The Coalition of Libyan Human
today tend to be economically disadvantaged. Their neighbourhoods were Rights Organizations warned of human rights deficiencies: ‘If adopted in its
marginalized under Gaddafi, and lacked infrastructure and struggled to current form the draft would likely undermine fundamental human rights
receive state assistance (IRIN 2012). Members of the Berber community in Libya for generations to come due to the weak protections afforded to
were at the forefront of the uprising against the Gaddafi regime. certain vulnerable groups such as women and ethnic, religious and political
minorities’ (Lawyers for Justice in Libya 2016). The coalition warned that the
Constitution-building draft lacks comprehensive protections of equality and non-discrimination. It
After President Gaddafi’s fall, Berbers and Libya’s other minority also called for more explicit guarantees of the right to religious freedom and
communities expected official recognition of their identities as well as full protection of ethnic, political, cultural and religious minorities, and persons
rights and liberties. Some Berbers cited a new constitution that guaranteed with disabilities from discrimination. The draft was further criticized for the
their rights as one of their primary demands (Lane 2011). There was thus way in which it ‘authorizes and enshrines gender discrimination’ (Lawyers
much hope surrounding the CDA, which started work in April 2014 and for Justice in Libya 2016). Finally, the draft constitution proclaims that Libya
published a final draft in April 2016. is a part of the Arab world, which is likely to cause concern among the
country’s non-Arab minorities (Ibrahim 2016).
Unfortunately, the CDA did not manage to effectively or holistically represent
Libyan society, in part because only two of its 60 seats were reserved for Overall, the CDA has failed to produce a broadly legitimate constitution.
each of the Berber, Tebu and Tuareg communities, referred to as the Although there are several contentious issues in the latest draft, the
‘three cultural components’ (Carter Center 2014). Since Berbers alone are absence of minority representation within the process and the draft’s failure
estimated to constitute about 10 per cent of the population, this community to address minority groups’ fundamental concerns are particularly alarming.
felt that it should have received at least six seats. Despite their demands, The way in which the CDA addresses various groups’ criticisms and concerns
the minority groups also failed to win veto power on issues most critical to will determine the future of the country’s constitutional order. In July 2017,
them, including national identity markers such as the name and identity amid protesters storming the CDA building, the draft constitution was
of the state, as well as flag, anthem and language rights. In response, the approved, setting the stage for parliament to approve a national referendum
Berber community boycotted the election to the CDA as well as the entire (Musa 2017).
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should be removed from the polarizing process. In this way, the vertical inclusion
tendencies of public debate that might prove could be visualized as several hourglasses
non-conducive to compromise and consensus. standing on top of each other, as the process
The referendum would provide a ‘downstream repeatedly opened out for public engagement,
constraint’, which would prevent the elites from and narrowed again for deliberation and
making a deal too far from the preferences of negotiation among the delegates. While it
their constituents, or the public at large (Elster is debatable whether the various rounds of
2012). comments had a substantial effect on the
final text, such iterative broadening of vertical
This analysis is based mainly on the French inclusion can provide not only the benefit of
National Constituent Assembly of 1789 and continuous public engagement in the process,
the US Constitutional Convention of 1787. and therefore increased public ownership;
While this thinking applies to many current it can also help negotiations by providing
constitution-building processes, modern norms delegates with more information regarding
of democratic representation and the divided the positions of their constituents, and of the
society implications of post-conflict transitions public as a whole.
require a more nuanced approach to process
design, and to vertical inclusion. Second, the participatory process in Chile,
which took place throughout 2015 and 2016,
The predominant mechanism for vertical was remarkable in its use of deliberative settings
inclusion in constitution-building processes for public consultations. Public consultations
is active in the sense that it seeks regular, had previously consisted of a town hall meeting
consistent input from the people, largely in which members of the public were given the
through public consultations. However, many opportunity to voice their desires and concerns
doubt the value of such public participation, to a member of the constitution-making body
contending that ‘there is not even a scintilla or its staff. Most recently, in 2016, a series
of evidence that it improves the durability of meetings at the district, provincial and
or the democratic content of constitutions’ national levels were held following a broad
(Diamond et al. 2014). Critics of popular civic education process. The meetings were
participation as a means of vertical inclusion facilitated to focus on issues and concepts, and
predominantly argue that it is not productive used small groups to encourage deliberation
for two reasons. First, there is a view that and discussion. While expectations may have
secret, elite negotiations as an essential element been unrealistically raised in terms of how
of constitution-making can be jeopardized by recommendations from these meetings would
too much openness and transparency. Second, be used, the use of informed, deliberative
there is a notion that public consultations are discussions is a valuable lesson learned for
likely to be at best superficial, and at worst future participatory processes.
potentially damaging by generating unrealistic
expectations of how the public’s views might be Vertical inclusion beyond elections and
incorporated into the text. referendums has become a widespread norm.
The question for designers of constitution-
While there might be some validity to these building processes is therefore not whether to
criticisms, two recent examples of more include public consultations, but how to ensure
thoughtful structuring of public participation they can be an effective means of meeting
show signs of leading to more effective citizens’ evolving expectations. Including
vertical inclusion. First, in Kenya—and to a different groups in the constitution-building
less structured degree in Tunisia—the public process gives a wide range of actors a stake in
received iterative drafts of the constitution for the final constitutional settlement, making it
comment at various stages of the negotiating more likely that more people will abide by the
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The question constraints of the new constitutional order and families (Otis 2017). Second, participating
for designers of seek to protect it from potential violations. A in elections can help legitimize a group’s
constitution- stable constitutional order, in turn, contributes armed struggle by portraying it as a fight for
to long-term democratic resilience by representation and accountability, rather than
building processes
channelling conflict through rules agreed to by just power. Third, elections offer significant
is therefore all sides, providing certainty and predictability domestic and international visibility, which
not whether to in terms of how power is to be allocated, and can help reassure opposition parties that
include public constraining majoritarian impulses. the government will deliver on its promises.
consultations, Fourth, elections often bestow resources on
but how to 8.4. Peacebuilding through elections parties, from both the state and international
ensure they can and political parties donors (Matanock 2012; Zürcher et al. 2013).
Former rebel groups play an important role One study found that between 1990 and
be an effective
in post-conflict transitional periods, and 2009, rebel leaders chose to form parties 54
means of meeting their decisions about whether (and how) to per cent of the time; these parties contested
citizens’ evolving participate in electoral politics can have far- elections and regularly won seats in national
expectations reaching consequences for the resilience of legislatures (Manning and Smith 2016).
both the new state and the democratic system
as a whole. In many cases, these rebels form the Yet the inclusion of former rebels in the
political parties that represent the interests of structures of power comes with risks to
the formerly aggrieved parts of the population. democratic legitimacy. When there are parts or
Evidence shows that, all else equal, including aspects of the conflict that remain unresolved,
former rebels in the peacebuilding process inclusion may inadvertently demonstrate to
makes a recurrence of conflict less likely, in splinter groups that they will also eventually
both the short and long term (Marshall and be included if they take up arms again. This
Ishiyama 2016: 1020; Call 2012: 4). Yet the issue may be compounded by the proliferation
transformation process is challenging: it requires of small arms and the vested interests of those
significant adjustments and capacity building, who gained financially from the conflict.
and if rebels do not feel it is worthwhile to Once former rebels attain formal power, they
participate in the new political process, they may end up remaining there long after they
may cast doubt among their supporters about are relevant, essentially ‘freezing’ the power
the legitimacy of the new system, or even structure. There is also the danger that warring
return to the battlefield. Nor will the inclusion groups may end up being over-represented
of former rebels always enjoy the broad support relative to other segments of the population.
of society, which can jeopardize the system’s Indeed, the design of inclusive institutions
long-term legitimacy. must strike a careful balance between giving
voice to those who were formerly aggrieved
Ex-rebel party leaders enter the political and to those who now risk marginalization,
process tentatively, full of doubts about simply because attention is so focused on
whether the rules of democratic politics those most intimately involved in the conflict.
will be enforced, and whether they and/or
their parties will benefit. Former rebels have Rebel groups also face considerable challenges
four types of incentives to form parties and and risks by becoming political parties.
participate in electoral politics. First, they Meaningful transformation requires significant
may suffer from ‘battle fatigue’ and be eager attitudinal and behavioural changes, which
to abandon a life of war for a more stable take time (De Zeeuw 2007: 11–19; Ishiyama
political process. In Colombia, for example, and Batta 2011; Lyons 2005; Manning 1998).
the seven months since the signing of the ‘State building requires not just new institutions
peace deal have seen a baby boom for former that channel politics in more productive
FARC rebels, who are happy to be able to start directions, but deep and long-lasting social
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transformations that permit groups embittered municipal or council seats gain access to a Former rebels’
by violence to accord legitimacy to a new state regular salary, visibility and a possible platform participation
in ways that previously proved elusive’ (Lake for further political advancement. They may lends legitimacy
2016: 17). also gain leverage with regard to the central
to democratic
party hierarchy, as electoral participation
The process of developing ideological platforms and victory can bring resources to the party
institutions,
and policy direction and choosing candidates and individual members. These individuals and over time,
can also expose unresolved questions or fault may therefore develop a stake in continued their continued
lines within the party and provoke significant participation in democratic processes and participation
internal conflict. Which candidates represent institutions; targeted inclusion policies will can result in
the party’s ideals and stand a chance of seek to convince them of the benefits of modifications and
winning? Who gets to choose the candidates? the new system. In the long run, these new
adjustments that
Should the party choose ‘sons of the soil’ who politicians’ participation creates more resilient
are well known in their constituencies, or those (and legitimate) institutions. Former rebels’
reflect the needs
who are most likely to stick to the party line participation lends legitimacy to democratic and demands of
once in office? What is the best strategy for the institutions, and over time, their continued their parties and
electoral system in use? participation can result in modifications constituents
and adjustments that reflect the needs and
Contesting elections can also change and demands of their parties and constituents.
destabilize internal party hierarchies and
organizations. Parties have different internal For example, in Mozambique, former members
constituencies—the ‘professional politicians’ of the National Resistance Party (Resistência
at the central level, mid-level party officers, Nacional Moçambicana, RENAMO) were
those elected to represent the party in public elected to Parliament. RENAMO’s MPs have
office, committed party supporters who disregarded the party leader’s calls to boycott
strongly identify with the party and what it Parliament over alleged electoral fraud in part
stands for, and voters. Parties need the support because they rely on their salaries (Hanlon
of each of these groups to succeed, and it can 2017). The party leadership has not enforced
be challenging to balance their priorities and such calls because the state provides the party
concerns while strategizing at the broader level with a subsidy based on its representation in
to contest elections. Once in office, elected Parliament.
representatives often develop a stake in their
individual success that outweighs their loyalty If enough former rebels participate in
to the party. This can sharpen internal divisions democratic politics, it can increase internal
and empower new groups within the party to party democracy and make the new party
challenge the leadership. stronger over the long term. For example, in
El Salvador, the Farabundo Martí National
Despite the risks of including former rebels in Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí
the transition, successful transformation results para la Liberación Nacional, FMLN) mayors
in benefits for the party and the state, which are elected after the war faced pressure from local
discussed in the next section. constituents to make immediate improvements
in public service delivery; their ability to deliver
Rebel-based parties and resilience these services helped them win votes in the
Including rebels in post-conflict transitions next election. Mayors also found common
can help build a more resilient state in several cause with one another, and in some cases
ways. First, rebels-turned-politicians often worked across party lines to address the needs
realize that participating in electoral politics of their municipalities. Within the FMLN,
can be more worthwhile than returning to these mayors banded together to challenge
the battlefield. Politicians who win legislative, the party’s ‘orthodox’ wing in ways that led to
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If enough former greater internal democracy and improved the Electoral institutions
rebels participate party’s competitiveness vis-à-vis other parties Political institutions are especially critical
in democratic (Manning 2008). in post-conflict environments (Wolff 2011:
1778), when former adversaries are assessing
politics, it can
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, similar dynamics the potential shape and character of a new
increase internal were observed in some areas, particularly state, evaluating the roles they could play in
party democracy within the Croatian Democratic Union that state and deciding how much faith they
and make the of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hrvatska have in the ability of the new rules of the game
new party demokratska zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine, to address their grievances. Thus it is critical to
stronger over the HDZ BiH) in western Herzegovina. While choose the most appropriate electoral system
long term some party officials sought to boycott (Sisk and Reynolds 1998), since this choice
elections in the early 2000s to protest usually has a profound effect on a country’s
sanctions imposed on their leader by the future political life. Electoral systems, once
UN High Representative for Bosnia and chosen, usually persist, as political interests
Herzegovina, subnational party officials solidify around, and respond to, the incentives
pushed for participation, arguing that the they generate. Rules about who can compete,
party would otherwise be excluded from the range of choices voters have, how votes
politics. These officials were concerned about translate into seats, and the likelihood of
the party’s fate as well as their own; they gaining representation will influence actors’
depended on public office for their livelihood willingness to participate in elections and their
and their reputation, which could provide faith in the system’s legitimacy.
them with other positions or advantages in
the future (Manning 2008). These findings The choice of electoral systems
resonate with broader comparative work on Since elections are often perceived as one of
democratization in single-party regimes in the most fundamental aspects of democracy,
Mexico or Taiwan (Eisenstadt 2007; Rigger citizens should have faith that the electoral
2001). These dynamics merit further study in system will guarantee that their interests
the post-conflict context. will be represented. The three main types of
electoral systems are plurality/majority, PR
Thus ex-combatants often find that it is and mixed (Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2005).
worthwhile to participate in democratic Some research indicates that PR’s ability to
politics, and their participation can help include a broader cross-section of society in the
promote the legitimacy and resilience of legislature may have more limited utility for
democracy in post-conflict states. So how long-term peace and stability than previously
can transitional agreements be designed to conjectured. Majoritarian systems, which
convince former rebels that participation in incentivize consensus-based politics, may work
democratic politics is worth the risk? This better in conflict-affected countries because
depends in part on the choice of electoral they encourage elites to build support outside
system design, which can determine who of their traditional voter bases by moderating
gains access to the legislature and, perhaps their policies. PR systems, by contrast, may
more critically, how much access previously institutionalize the kind of fragmentation that
marginalized groups have to executive office led to conflict in the first place.
and other senior positions in the new state. As
explained in the following section, decision- The choice of electoral system can affect a
makers must strike a balance between broad country’s long-term stability and bolster its ability
short-term inclusion, which may be critical for to deal with shocks and crises in four ways. First,
confidence building, and more meaningful, electoral systems influence politicians’ behaviour
targeted long-term inclusion. and strategy. Some majoritarian systems
reward moderation, for instance, and can have
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significantly different outcomes from those that gives third-party candidates little chance of The choice
provide a stage for more extremist views (Reilly winning. In closely contested elections, voters of electoral
2002: 156). Second, electoral systems have who cast their ballots for third-party candidates system can
the power to either ease or exacerbate conflict are often seen to have wasted their votes or to
affect a
(Horowitz 1985; Benoit 2004: 369). Supporters have helped one of the major parties (Krugman
of consociationalism, a governance model based 2016). In PR systems, however, some argue country’s long-
on power sharing between elites from different that the perception that fewer votes are ‘wasted’ term stability and
social groups, argue that PR is the best option provides greater incentives for turnout (Norris bolster its ability
for deeply divided societies, because it produces 1997: 305). to deal with
proportional outcomes, facilitates minority shocks and crises
representation and treats all groups equally Based on the logic of inclusion discussed
(Lijphart 2004: 100). above, for many years scholars assumed that
electoral systems that prioritized power sharing
In post-conflict settings, PR systems, which and facilitated a ‘place at the table’ for a wide
aim to ensure that the number of seats won spectrum of groups were best suited to divided
corresponds to the proportion of votes societies. This belief is based on the assumption
received, are the most popular. Their guarantee that groups that are included in the national
of inclusion for a wide variety of groups has legislature feel they have a voice and are
made such systems one of the most attractive therefore not motivated to rebel (Goati 2000;
options for states seeking to increase broad Selway and Templeman 2012: 1545; Bogaards
participation, including women’s representation 2013: 74). This assumption is most relevant
(Larserud et al. 2005). PR systems are often in post-conflict countries: the consensus is
part of a wider set of institutions that forms that making institutions more accessible to
the basis of consociationalism. Consociational minority groups is critical to long-term peace
systems give various subnational groups (Alonso and Ruiz 2005: 1) and to establishing
significant autonomy and representation in and maintaining broad public faith in the value
the national legislature. They can also include of democracy. Therefore, many scholars long
parliamentarism, a grand coalition government, assumed that majoritarian systems were less
segmental autonomy, a proportional electoral conducive than PR systems to fostering long-
system and a minority veto (Selway and term stability, peace and democracy, especially
Templeman 2012: 1545). in post-conflict states (Selway and Templeman
2012: 1544). When the electoral system is
Third, the choice of an electoral system specified in a peace agreement, it is always PR,
determines the degree to which representatives either on its own or as part of a mixed system
feel accountable to their constituents. (Bogaards 2013: 79).
For example, under closed-list systems,
parliamentarians may feel more accountable Proportional versus majoritarian systems
to party leaders than they do to voters. PR systems, however, are not a panacea for
Majoritarian systems, however, may foster a divided societies. In fact, critics point out
closer link between representatives and voters that PR systems replicate societal divisions
(Rocha Menocal 2011: 2). Fourth, electoral within the national legislature, since they offer
systems can influence the public’s faith in no incentives to broaden policy platforms
government. In majoritarian systems, it is or appeal to non-traditional supporters.
easy to feel that votes are ‘wasted’ because PR elections often result in ‘coalitions of
a candidate can win with just over 50 per convenience’ that are not based on a common
cent of the vote, leaving nearly half of the ideology or longer-term goals (Horowitz
population feeling unrepresented. The issue of 2012: 26). While majoritarian systems tend to
wasted votes is frequently raised in American favour groups that are numerically dominant,
elections: the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system some also provide incentives for candidates to
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Preferential moderate their policies and stances in order representatives needed preference votes to win
systems—known to win support from outside their traditional seats (Mitchell 2008: 14).
as ‘centripetal’ bases. Some majoritarian systems incentivize
political moderation and are more likely to Some studies question the logic of inclusion
systems due to
produce consensus between rivals (Horowitz and its relationship to democratic stability
their aim to pull 2012: 26). Vote pooling, which requires and peace. For instance, PR does not always
parties toward politicians to gain votes from their own facilitate the inclusion of marginalized groups
moderate, supporters as well as those of their rivals, may and minorities, which in turn promotes peace
compromising be one of the best options for encouraging and long-term democracy. Some research shows
policies— have moderation and consensus (Horowitz 2012: that ethnic groups win more seats and do better
the unique ability 28). For example, the single transferable overall under majoritarian systems than in PR
vote (STV) allows voters to rank candidates systems (Alonso and Ruiz 2005: 14; Reynolds
to encourage the
in multi-member districts. The winner is the 2011: 115). Moreover, and perhaps more
formation and candidate with the most votes above the quota, surprisingly, some evidence suggests that higher
strengthening but the surplus votes are then transferred to levels of parliamentary representation do not
of a core of voters’ second, third and other choices. automatically moderate ethnic conflict. One
‘moderate middle’ study found that parliamentary representation
sentiment within These preferential systems—known as has no significant effect on the level of ethnic
the electorate ‘centripetal’ systems due to their aim to pull rebellion, primarily because there are no
parties toward moderate, compromising guarantees that a particular group will have
policies—also have the unique ability to access to decision-makers or be able to block
encourage the formation and strengthening of decisions contrary to its interests (Alonso and
a core of ‘moderate middle’ sentiment within Ruiz 2005: 2, 14).
the electorate (Reilly 2002: 158). Such systems
give politicians electoral incentives to attract The evidence on the ability of PR systems to
votes from other groups. They also encourage create lasting peace is also mixed. While PR is
different actors to come together to make deals correlated with peace in some studies (Bogaards
on reciprocal electoral support, and to develop 2013: 80), in others it is linked to political
‘centrist, aggregative, and multi-ethnic political violence (Selway and Templeman 2012: 1558).
parties’ or coalitions of parties that can make Previous analysis has shown that PR has no
cross-ethnic appeals and present a diverse significant effect on decreasing violence in
range of policy options (Reilly 2002: 159). the most diverse societies; it has only been
‘Centrifugal’ systems, by contrast, push parties shown to reduce violence in homogenous
towards ideological extremes. Plurality-like rules societies (Selway and Templeman 2012: 1560).
can have a centripetal effect when the electoral Selway and Templeman also analyse other
rules positively bias parties in seat allocations, consociational institutions, and find that in
while non-proportional rules push parties into ‘highly divided’ countries that have just PR
more extreme positions because voters defect and parliamentarism, consociationalism is
from parties that expect fewer seats than their associated with more political deaths and riots
vote share (Calvo and Hellwig 2011: 39). (2012: 1563, 1565).
Unfortunately, centripetal systems are In the long term, then, legislative seats may not
uncommon. Sri Lanka uses the STV in attempts guarantee lasting peace or democratic resilience.
to ensure cross-ethnic support for its president, Societal groups that feel marginalized (or at risk
but preference votes have never been used of marginalization) want to be able to influence
because the candidates always receive more and access higher-level decision-making
than 50 per cent of the vote. In Ireland, the processes, particularly at the executive level.
STV has promoted moderation and inclusion. Broad inclusion (i.e. occupying opposition
In the 1998 legislative elections, 76 per cent of seats in the legislature) only goes so far towards
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BOX 8.3
Peacebuilding and inclusivity in Nepal A key commitment of the CPA was the establishment of an inclusive,
democratic, progressive and decentralized state ‘in order to address
Overview of the conflict (1996–2006) the problems related to women, Dalit, indigenous peoples, Janajatis,
Nepal is home to 125 caste and ethnic groups that have distinct Madhesi, oppressed, neglected and minority communities and
languages, cultures and religions. For many years, however, this backward regions in the remote mountain and plains regions by ending
diversity was neither respected nor reflected in the state apparatus and discrimination based on class, caste, language, gender, culture,
constitutional order. Until 2006, the country was known as ‘the only religion, and region’ (Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2006).
Hindu Kingdom in the World’, ruled by a Hindu dynasty that favoured
high-caste Hindu males to the detriment of indigenous peoples, women Inclusivity in the Constituent Assembly
and lower castes. Chronic caste and ethnicity-based discrimination, The first elections for Nepal’s 601-member Constituent Assembly
social exclusion, economic inequality and political grievances helped were held in 2008: 240 members were elected from single-member
fuel a long-running armed conflict (1996–2006) between the government constituencies via FPTP, 335 were elected using a closed-list PR system
and the Maoist Communist Party of Nepal (Gurung 2005; Bishwa 2007). from a single nationwide constituency, and 26 were appointed by the
Council of Ministers on the basis of consensus.
The Maoist party sought to abolish the semi-feudal structure of the state,
overthrow the Nepalese monarchy and establish a new democratic This election was a milestone, and was seen as a chance to guarantee
system. It mobilized traditionally marginalized groups, including that the constitution-making body, and subsequently the constitution-
Janajati (indigenous peoples outside the Hindu caste system) and Dalit making process, would be representative of Nepal’s diverse society.
people from the lowest-caste group, referred to as the ‘untouchables’ Several affirmative action measures were taken to ensure the
(Lawoti 2010; Gurung 2005), and fought for ethnic autonomy, participation of traditionally marginalized groups. For example, when
regional devolution and local governance, equality of languages, the submitting their candidate lists, political parties were required to
establishment of a secular state, the end of ethnic oppression, gender comply with quotas for women and traditionally marginalized groups.
equality, protection of the disabled and the adoption of a republican At least 50 per cent of the candidates on the PR lists were required
constitution (Gurung 2005). to be women, and women had to make up at least 33 per cent of the
total number of candidates for the PR lists and FPTP races combined.
The Maoists and the Government of Nepal signed the Comprehensive In Nepal, this level of female representation was unprecedented. In the
Peace Accord (CPA) in 2006. The agreement entailed a power-sharing past, women had, for instance, never compromised more than 6 per
arrangement between the mainstream parties and the Maoists that cent of the country’s parliamentarians (GIIDS 2017).
included the former rebels in the interim government. In parallel to
the peace process, historically marginalized groups such as women, Furthermore, in the PR lists, political parties were required to nominate
Madhesis (a majority Hindu group from the southern plains), Janajatis candidates from the following groups in accordance with their share of
and Dalits demanded political inclusion and equal representation in the population measured in the 2001 census: 37.8 per cent Janajatis,
government bodies (Carter Center 2014). Nearly half of the population 32.1 per cent Madhesis, 30.2 per cent ‘Others,’ 13 per cent Dalits, and
(49.6 per cent) had been excluded from FPTP elections from 1991 to 4 per cent from nine ‘backward regions’ with the lowest development
2008 (Vollan 2014: 261). index scores (an individual can belong to more than one such group,
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which results in a total of more than 100 per cent). With the exception The 2015 Constitution
of the gender quota requirements, PR lists that included 100 or In September 2015, nearly a decade after the signing of the CPA, 507
fewer candidates did not have to comply with the ethnic quotas. This out of 601 members of the Constituent Assembly voted in favour of the
exception initially only applied to party lists covering more than 20 new constitution, which established a secular, federal and democratic
per cent of the seats to be elected under the PR election. However, republic. In line with the spirit of the CPA, the constitution adopted
following complaints by Madhesi parties, this percentage was raised to the mixed electoral system used in the 2008 and 2013 Constituent
30 per cent (Carter Center 2008). Assembly elections in efforts to increase equality and inclusion.
Notwithstanding certain shortcomings related to the design and Some majority groups have successfully lobbied to reverse the ratio
implementation of this quota system (EU Election Observation of FPTP to PR seats, which has resulted in fewer PR seats (IFES 2016).
Mission to Nepal 2008; Carter Center 2008; Einsiedel, Malone and There is concern that the new system may result in fewer women
Pradhan 2012), women and marginalized groups made unprecedented and representatives of marginalized groups in the legislature. The
gains in political representation that would have been difficult to enforcement of these provisions has yet to be defined in electoral
achieve without quotas. These groups were guaranteed a minimum law, and it remained a point of contention between Nepal’s central
number of seats in the Constituent Assembly through the quotas government and representatives from marginalized groups as of late
applied to the closed-list PR race, and were fairly well represented in 2016.
the candidate lists of the Maoist party for the FPTP race and won in
a number of constituencies. The 2008 election resulted in the most Several discriminatory provisions continue to threaten the inclusive
inclusive legislative body in the history of Nepal, and one of the most spirit of the constitution, such as limits on the citizenship rights of
representative bodies in South Asia: women obtained 33.22 per cent Nepali women, the possible creation of electoral districts that favour
of the total number of seats, Madhesis 34.09 per cent, Janajatis 33.39 majority ethnic groups and limits on religious free speech. Such
per cent, Dalits 8.17 per cent, and representatives from backward provisions undermine the principles of inclusion that the constitution
(i.e. lowest in the development index) regions 3.83 per cent (Vollan sought to address, and have led to political unrest and protests in
2014: 259). Nonetheless, Hill castes were still represented far beyond the year since the promulgation of the constitution, in particular by
their share of the population, despite the existence of inclusiveness women’s groups and Madhesis (The Guardian 2015; ICG 2016). Without
measures (UNDP 2014). proper inclusion of these aggrieved groups, the long-term effectiveness
and resilience of the state are at risk. Similarly, there are ongoing
The 2008 election also led to an outstanding victory for the former disputes between major political parties and advocates of marginalized
rebels. The Maoists won 220 of the 575 elective seats (38.2 per cent), groups over the creation of provincial borders that would disadvantage
making it the largest party in the Constituent Assembly and the only one regional minorities in elections (Chen 2016). These provisions threaten
with enough seats to block the passage of articles. This historic victory the fragile trust that many Nepalis have in the state, and risk causing
completely altered the balance of power (International IDEA 2015). conflict and delegitimizing the new constitution.
However, it has been difficult to realize true inclusivity in Nepal. Due The road ahead
to the exception that was introduced for party lists with candidates Nepal’s legislative elections due in January 2018, will be the first to
making up less than 30 per cent of the contested seats, only 11 take place under the new constitution. Impressive advancements in
parties that nominated more than 100 candidates had to meet all inclusiveness have been made in the composition of Nepal’s Parliament
quota requirements. These parties won a total of 277 of the 335 PR since the CPA, and the 2008 and 2013 elections significantly increased
seats (Vollan 2008). Political parties were also allowed to allocate the the representation of marginalized groups. However, the successes
seats won in the closed-list PR race to any of the candidates on their remain fragile.
lists, not just those at the top. This gave them a 10 per cent margin of
flexibility with regard to implementing the gender and ethnic quotas. The adoption of the 2015 Constitution was followed by violent protests
Furthermore, a broad interpretation of the ‘other groups’ category by marginalized groups over a number of unresolved issues including
led many parties to include candidates from any group that was not the delimitation of provincial boundaries, the implementation of
included in the specific quotas, regardless of whether they belonged citizenship provisions perceived as discriminatory by women and
to a marginalized or minority group. Candidates from high castes Madhesi communities, and the implementation of federalism. There are
and privileged communities were included in this category, which further concerns about whether the mixed electoral system will be able
undermined the quota (EU Election Observation Mission to Nepal to facilitate more diversity in high-level offices and local governance
2008; Vollan 2008; Carter Center 2008). structures. Decision-making power still consistently rests with men from
upper castes, and therefore does not reflect the concerns of the wider
Furthermore, although women and marginalized groups made population. Societal acceptance of women and marginalized groups
significant gains in representation in 2008, this did not immediately in positions of power continues to lag behind the ideals described in
translate into access to the highest levels of decision-making power. the CPA and the Constitution. Democracy cannot be achieved without
Despite the Maoists' promise to include marginalized groups in the including representatives from the entire spectrum of Nepali geography,
government, no Dalits were included in the Cabinet for seven months ethnicity and society. Therefore the country’s lawmakers must ensure
after the former rebels won the election. Only after increasing complaints that the quotas and principles of equality and inclusiveness enshrined
from the Dalit community were two Dalit ministers appointed (Gelpke, in the 2015 Constitution are implemented in accordance with the needs
Khanal and Pyakurel 2012). of all groups in society, or risk regression of the democratic process.
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8.5. Conclusions and • F ind innovative ways to follow the lead of local Inclusion must
recommendations: inclusive stakeholders, including at the subnational go beyond
peacebuilding level. International donors have critical quotas; it must be
After more than 30 years of international support roles to play during transitions, meaningful and
peacebuilding, experts now recognize that but they should not always be in the lead.
a fundamental flaw in the dominant model
targeted.
Local and regional concerns must be
of peacebuilding is its lack of emphasis on addressed, and it is important to foster a
inclusion. Inclusion, however, must go beyond broad sense of ownership of the decisions
quotas; it must be meaningful and targeted. made during transitional periods. If people
Provisions to facilitate true inclusion do more feel they have a stake in the decisions, they
than ensure numerical representation; they are more likely to respect the rules and stay
provide access to decision-making and foster involved in the long term.
the growth of new, local stakeholders who are • Include issue-based civil society organizations
interested in the democratic process. in decision-making processes during the
transitional period. These organizations,
The processes of constitution drafting, rebel- which will push for fundamental reforms,
to-party transitions and electoral system design are more likely to prioritize the voices and
demonstrate how targeted and meaningful needs of ordinary citizens.
inclusion works in practice. Regular interaction
with constituents, access to decision-makers, Authorities in charge of elections
and careful nurturing of actors who are new and international election assistance
to the democratic process can lead to broad providers
public legitimacy and belief in new democratic • Provide continuous support for political
institutions. In the long term, this broad-based party development that targets various
‘buy-in’ can help prevent a return to violence party subgroups likely to be empowered by
and give political actors incentives to maintain participating in electoral politics. These
their participation in democratic politics; a include the party’s representatives in the
continuous commitment to democracy— national legislature, cabinet, local office,
despite sporadic shocks and emergencies—is candidates for these offices, and regional
the best example of a resilient democratic state. party leaders from areas of the country that
The following recommendations are targeted may have interests distinct from those of
at stakeholders at various stages of the post- party leaders in the capital.
conflict democratic transition process. • Help prepare party representatives to effectively
perform their duties. Conventional party-
Peace/transition negotiators building programming often includes
•
Develop and use a more comprehensive working with legislative representatives
definition of inclusion that takes into account to develop stronger links with their
more than simply the number of individuals constituencies and providing training in
and groups at the table. Effective inclusion how to analyse and prepare legislation. This
also requires a publicly legitimate selection will equip new party officials with the tools
process and legitimate representatives, and to be effective representatives.
for these representatives to have access to • Promote the inclusion of new parties’ leaders in
decision-makers. programming in ways that give them a stake
•
Integrate active and targeted inclusion in the system. Distrust is likely to be high
strategies into the design of all institutions, within parties, and programmes designed
so that they are the product of regular to support legislators or local elected
communication with the public and are officials may be viewed as threatening to
open to groups that challenge mainstream members of the party’s central hierarchy
conceptions of the democratic state. who are not in these bodies, for example.
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First Edition 2017 References
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Annex
Annex
A
The Global State of Democracy
Indices methodology
Annex The Global State of Democracy 2017
The Global State of Democracy indices methodology Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
The indices build on an elaborate conceptual For a full description of the GSoD indices
framework, which is rooted in International methodology see The Global State of Democracy
IDEA’s well-established State of Democracy Indices Methodology: Conceptualization and
(SoD) framework, which was originally Measurement Framework (Skaaning 2017).
designed as a tool for in-country stakeholders
to assess the quality of their democracy. A.2. Objective
It builds on a conceptual framework The objective of the GSoD indices is to provide
with two principles (popular control and systematic and data capturing trends at the
political equality), seven mediating values global, regional and national levels for different
(participation, authorization, representation, aspects of International IDEA’s comprehensive
accountability, transparency, responsiveness, understanding of democracy. The indices turn
solidarity) and four pillars (citizens, law a broad range of empirical indicators from
and rights, representative and accountable various data sets into measures of different
government, civil society and popular aspects of democracy (attribute, subattribute
participation, democracy beyond the state). and subcomponents) that can be used to
During the development of the GSoD evaluate the state of democracy at the global,
indices, the SoD conceptual framework was regional and national levels.
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The GSoD indices are used to track trends Figure A.1 presents an overview of the GSoD
in democratic development in International conceptual framework. It consists of five attributes,
IDEA’s Global State of Democracy publication. sixteen subattributes, five subcomponents of civil
They can also help stakeholders, including liberties, and three subcomponents of social
policymakers, researchers and civil society rights and equality. Separate GSoD indices are
actors, analyse trends related to different constructed for each attribute, subattribute
aspects of democracy and identify priority and subcomponent. The only exception is the
policy areas. Participatory Engagement attribute, which is
conceptually and empirically multi-dimensional,
A.3. Conceptual distinctions and there are no obvious ways to aggregate its
Rather than creating an overarching democracy subattribute. Accordingly, a combined index for
index that offers a single score for each country, this attribute has not been constructed.
the GSoD indices measure distinct aspects
of democracy, which are emphasized by one The concept of democracy has multiple
or more major traditions within democratic dimensions, each of which is associated with
thought. As such, the GSoD data set includes one or more of the predominant conceptions
separate, fine-grained indices and subindices of democracy found in the literature—electoral
related to five attributes: Representative democracy, liberal democracy, social democracy
Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks on and participatory democracy. Table A.1
Government, Impartial Administration and illustrates the overlaps between the conceptual
Participatory Engagement. framework underlying the GSoD indices and
the different traditions of democratic thought.
FIGURE A.1
parties
Free polit
Cle ns
t
d
tio
en
an
go lecte
nm
e c
el
ver
E
Su lec
bn tio
ss
e
at ns
ce ce
Ac usti
io
sentative
Repre
na
j
l
to
Dir government
dem ect
ocr
acy
Civil
engage tory
Fu rights
nt
ties
nda
liber
me
a
Electora
Particip
mental
l
particip
ation
Democracy Socia
l rights
ociety Popular control and and eq
Civil s ualit y
a rtic ipation political equality
p
en n
p
Im
ad
in arti s Eff
o
ck
t
pa ecti
m
le
ist al
rat Che ernm rlia ve
tab nt ion gov
me
e dic me nt
Pr orce
f
en
ind
Jud nde
ep
ici nce
corr ce of
e
on
al
integrity
upti
Media
en
Abs
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Annex The Global State of Democracy 2017
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TABLE A.1
The GSoD conceptual framework and predominant conceptions of democracy: a general overview of overlaps
2.2.2 Freedom of
X X X
Association and Assembly
2.2.4 Freedom of
X X X
Movement
Notes: Three subattributes (1.2 Inclusive suffrage; 5.2 Electoral participation; 5.3 Direct democracy) are measured using only one observable indicator each. However, 5.3 (direct democracy) is
a composite measure based on 12 variables.
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A.4. Criteria for indicator selection These 14 data sets represent four different types
The GSoD conceptual framework guides the of source data:
selection of indicators. These indicators rely • expert surveys, in which country experts
on various types of sources and are collected assess a particular issue in a country
from extant data sets compiled by different (V-Dem and ICRG);
organizations and researchers, described in • standards-based ‘in-house coding’ by
more detail below. The main priority when researchers and/or their assistants based on
selecting the indicators was to achieve a high an evaluative assessment of country-specific
level of concept–measure consistency, in order information found in reports, academic
to ensure that the indicators capture the core books and papers, reference works, news
meaning of each concept. articles, etc. (V-Dem, Polity IV, LIED,
CLD, NELDA and MFD);
The following criteria also guided the selection • observational data on directly observable
of indicators: features such as the ratio of women to
men in parliament, infant mortality rates
1. I ndicators should be produced using and legislative elections (V-Dem, LIED,
transparent and credible data-generating NELDA, Gapminder, FAO, UNESCO,
processes. GHDx and IPU); and
2. Indicators should have extensive coverage: • composite measures based on a number
they should include scores for at least of variables that come from existing data
140 countries from different regions, and sets rather than original data collection
for at least 30 years within the period (V-Dem, HRPS and LJIS).
1975–2015.
3. Multiple indicators should be selected for
TABLE A.2
each subattribute, especially if an adequate
observable indicator is not available.
4. The data sets from which the indicators are Data sets used to construct the GSoD indices
extracted should be updated regularly.
Data sets Data providers
All interested parties have full and free access
to the country-level data for all indices, Civil Liberties Dataset (CLD) Møller and Skaaning
downloadable from International IDEA’s
Food and Agriculture Organization FAO
website (International IDEA 2017b). With (FAO) statistics
the exception of three indicators from the
International Country Risk Guide (which Gapminder Gapminder
are subject to copyright regulations and
Global Health Data Exchange (GHDx) Global Health Data Exchange
limitations), all underlying indicators
extracted from various data sets are available Human Rights Protection Scores Fariss
on this page. (HRPS)
Annex
Women in Politics data (IPU) Inter-Parliamentary Union The Global State of Democracy 2017
The Global State of Democracy indices methodology Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
TABLE A.3
Aggregation rules for the creation of indices at the attribute and subattribute levels
1 Representative Government Bayesian factor analysis 1.1 Clean Elections Bayesian factor analysis
(free and equal access to of clean elections, free
political power) political parties and 1.2 Inclusive Suffrage NA (only one indicator)
elected government to
create contestation index; 1.3 Free Political Parties Item response modelling
thereafter, multiplication
of contestation and 1.4 Elected Government Item response modelling
inclusive suffrage
2 Fundamental Rights Bayesian factor analysis 2.1 Access to Justice Bayesian factor analysis
(individual liberties and 2.2 Civil Liberties First item response modelling or Bayesian
resources) factor analysis by subcomponents (i.e.
freedom of expression [BFA], freedom of
association and assembly [BFA], freedom of
religion [BFA], freedom of movement [BFA],
and personal integrity and security [IRT]).
Thereafter, Bayesian factor analysis of
subcomponent indices.
3 Checks on Government Bayesian factor analysis 3.1 Effective Parliament Item response modelling
4 Impartial Administration Bayesian factor analysis 4.1 Absence of Corruption Item response modelling
5 Participatory Engagement N/A (no obvious 5.1 Civil Society Bayesian factor analysis
way to combine the Participation
(instruments for realization multi-dimensional
of political involvement) subattributes) 5.2 Electoral Participation N/A (only one indicator)
Notes: Three subattributes (1.2 Inclusive suffrage; 5.2 Electoral participation; 5.3 Direct democracy) are measured using only
one observable indicator each. However, 5.3 (direct democracy) is a composite measure based on 12 variables.
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rate, life expectancy, literacy, kilocalories The indices are normalized to range from
per person per day, mean years of schooling, 0 (lowest achievement) to 1 (highest
educational equality and health equality can achievement). A score of 0 generally refers to
be comprehended by a single factor because the worst performance in the whole sample
all indicators capture a common underlying of country-years (covered by a particular
phenomenon (as indicated by high factor index), while 1 refers to the best country-
loadings and bivariate correlation coefficients), year performance in the sample. However, for
which can be interpreted as reflecting the a number of indices, 0 also has an absolute
provision of basic welfare. meaning as the lowest score that is theoretically
possible. For example, the suffrage and electoral
The BFA procedure, like IRT models, provides participation indices have substantively
point estimates for the latent dimension as well meaningful minimums and maximums: 0
as confidence intervals. BFA is used to combine refers to the full absence of inclusive suffrage
subcomponent scores into subattribute scores, or electoral participation, while 1 refers to
and then subattribute scores into attribute scores universal adult suffrage and 100 per cent voter
when the measures are expected to reflect the turnout in national elections, respectively. The
same latent concept, and when the indicators or subattribute indices capturing clean elections,
indices to be aggregated are highly correlated. elected government, direct democracy and
subnational elections also have substantively
Where the indicators/indices showed lower meaningful minimum values that refer to the
correlations and theoretical guidance suggested total absence of the features in question.
the benefits of doing so, the scores were
multiplied or averaged. Multiplication was A.8. Use of confidence intervals for
used to combine a contestation index (created comparisons across countries and
by using BFA on three subattributes: clean over time
elections, free political parties and elected The yearly scores for each country for most
government) with the inclusiveness subattribute indices are accompanied by uncertainty
to create the Representative Government index. estimates, which can be used to assess whether
Multiplication was also used to aggregate the differences between and within countries
indicators related to the presence and the over time are significant. The only exceptions
freeness and fairness of regional and local are 1.2 (inclusive suffrage), 5.2 (electoral
elections, respectively. Thereafter, the values turnout), 5.3 (direct democracy) and 5.4
for free and fair regional elections and for free (subnational elections) because these are based
and fair local elections were averaged. Table A.3 on observational data. These uncertainty
summarizes the aggregation procedures used to estimates in the form of confidence intervals
construct the indices at different levels. (margins of error) reflect the statistically
likely range for the country-year index scores
A.7. Scale based on the indicators employed. The GSoD
All indices offer nuanced scores in the form of indices confidence levels refer to one standard
interval scale measurement. This means that the deviation below and above the estimated score.
scores are graded, and that the numbers express This means that about 68 per cent of the ‘true’
a rank order and the exact differences between values would be found within these intervals.
the values. Nominal-level data only express that
some things are different, while ordinal scale Confidence intervals are only available
measurement rank orders phenomena, but the for indices based on multiple indicators.
distances between scores are not known, so one The more the underlying indicators are in
cannot, for instance, meaningfully calculate the agreement regarding the scoring (high-low) on
average without relying on rather demanding a particular aspect of democracy, the narrower
assumptions. the confidence levels are. If the confidence
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0.0
Figure A.2 illustrates the scores and related 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
confidence intervals for checks of government
Peru Venezuela
in Peru and Venezuela from 1990 to 2015. Two
kinds of comparison can be made based on this Notes: The light-shaded bands around the lines demarcate the 68 per cent confidence bounds of the estimates.
information: between-country differences in Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Checks on Government Index).
TABLE A.4
Region Countries
Africa
East Africa Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda
Central Africa Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Gabon,
Republic of Congo
Southern Africa Angola, Botswana¸ Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South
Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe
West Africa Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo
North Africa Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, South Sudan, Sudan, Tunisia
Central America and Mexico Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama
South America Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela
North America
East Asia China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Japan, Mongolia, Republic of Korea, Taiwan
South East Asia Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste,
Viet Nam
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Middle East and Iran Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen
Europe
East-Central Europe Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, German Democratic
Republic, Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia,
Slovenia
Eastern Europe/Post-Soviet Europe Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine
North and West Europe Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom
Note: Country names in this list do not represent the official position of International IDEA with regard to the legal status or policy of the entities mentioned. The list represents a
harmonization of often-divergent lists and practices.
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TABLE A.5
Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-)
Afghanistan 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.49 0.06 0.46 0.06
Albania 0.22 0.06 0.22 0.06 0.54 0.06 0.68 0.06 0.64 0.06
Algeria 0.00 0.06 0.26 0.06 0.43 0.06 0.42 0.06 0.42 0.06
Angola 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.47 0.06
Argentina 0.65 0.06 0.80 0.06 0.81 0.06 0.81 0.06 0.77 0.06
Australia 0.80 0.06 0.81 0.06 0.81 0.06 0.84 0.06 0.82 0.06
Austria 0.78 0.06 0.78 0.06 0.78 0.06 0.78 0.06 0.76 0.06
Bangladesh 0.34 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.61 0.06 0.60 0.06 0.45 0.06
Belgium 0.78 0.06 0.78 0.06 0.80 0.06 0.79 0.06 0.76 0.06
Benin 0.00 0.06 0.19 0.06 0.66 0.06 0.65 0.06 0.71 0.06
Bolivia 0.00 0.06 0.71 0.06 0.77 0.06 0.71 0.06 0.68 0.06
Bosnia and
- - - - 0.00 0.06 0.61 0.06 - -
Herzegovina
Botswana 0.63 0.06 0.64 0.06 0.66 0.06 0.66 0.06 0.66 0.06
Brazil 0.27 0.06 0.49 0.06 0.86 0.06 0.87 0.06 0.80 0.06
Bulgaria 0.24 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.72 0.06 0.72 0.06 0.73 0.06
Burkina Faso 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.51 0.06 0.59 0.06 0.70 0.06
Burundi 0.00 0.06 0.30 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.51 0.06 0.31 0.06
Cambodia 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.52 0.06 0.47 0.06 0.43 0.06
Cameroon 0.27 0.06 0.28 0.06 0.38 0.06 0.44 0.06 0.46 0.06
Canada 0.78 0.06 0.79 0.06 0.80 0.06 0.80 0.06 0.82 0.06
Central African
0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.49 0.06 0.41 0.06 0.44 0.06
Republic
Chad 0.27 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.38 0.06 0.38 0.06
Chile 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.76 0.06 0.84 0.06 0.81 0.06
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Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-)
China 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06
Colombia 0.65 0.06 0.64 0.06 0.67 0.06 0.68 0.06 0.70 0.06
Costa Rica 0.77 0.06 0.88 0.06 0.88 0.06 0.88 0.06 0.90 0.06
Côte d’Ivoire 0.24 0.06 0.26 0.06 0.42 0.06 0.51 0.06 0.61 0.06
Cuba 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.19 0.06 0.22 0.06
Cyprus 0.63 0.06 0.72 0.06 0.75 0.06 0.75 0.06 0.74 0.06
Czechia 0.25 0.06 0.28 0.06 0.83 0.06 0.83 0.06 0.80 0.06
Democratic People's
0.17 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.13 0.06
Republic of Korea
Democratic Republic
0.17 0.06 0.19 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.44 0.06
of the Congo (DRC)
Denmark 0.79 0.06 0.79 0.06 0.79 0.06 0.80 0.06 0.79 0.06
Dominican Republic 0.42 0.06 0.63 0.06 0.52 0.06 0.71 0.06 0.66 0.06
Ecuador 0.00 0.06 0.75 0.06 0.75 0.06 0.71 0.06 0.69 0.06
Egypt 0.33 0.06 0.38 0.06 0.36 0.06 0.34 0.06 0.36 0.06
El Salvador 0.36 0.06 0.46 0.06 0.64 0.06 0.66 0.06 0.74 0.06
Ethiopia 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.39 0.06 0.42 0.06 0.41 0.06
Finland 0.78 0.06 0.81 0.06 0.80 0.06 0.81 0.06 0.82 0.06
France 0.86 0.06 0.86 0.06 0.86 0.06 0.86 0.06 0.92 0.06
Gabon 0.27 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.39 0.06 0.40 0.06 0.47 0.06
Gambia 0.69 0.06 0.63 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.45 0.06 0.42 0.06
Ghana 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.50 0.06 0.71 0.06 0.68 0.06
Greece 0.82 0.06 0.81 0.06 0.83 0.06 0.83 0.06 0.80 0.06
Guatemala 0.31 0.06 0.43 0.06 0.59 0.06 0.64 0.06 0.74 0.06
Guinea 0.20 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.37 0.06 0.37 0.06 0.51 0.06
Guinea-Bissau 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.55 0.06 0.56 0.06 0.62 0.06
Haiti 0.21 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.56 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.43 0.06
Honduras 0.00 0.06 0.57 0.06 0.65 0.06 0.66 0.06 0.63 0.06
Hungary 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.78 0.06 0.78 0.06 0.74 0.06
India 0.60 0.06 0.67 0.06 0.70 0.06 0.69 0.06 0.70 0.06
Indonesia 0.40 0.06 0.34 0.06 0.33 0.06 0.74 0.06 0.71 0.06
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Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-)
Iran 0.19 0.06 0.26 0.06 0.30 0.06 0.36 0.06 0.36 0.06
Iraq 0.00 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.22 0.06 0.52 0.06 0.50 0.06
Ireland 0.79 0.06 0.80 0.06 0.80 0.06 0.80 0.06 0.82 0.06
Israel 0.77 0.06 0.73 0.06 0.74 0.06 0.73 0.06 0.70 0.06
Italy 0.83 0.06 0.83 0.06 0.82 0.06 0.84 0.06 0.81 0.06
Jamaica 0.68 0.06 0.69 0.06 0.71 0.06 0.77 0.06 0.78 0.06
Japan 0.81 0.06 0.80 0.06 0.81 0.06 0.83 0.06 0.80 0.06
Jordan 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.37 0.06 0.41 0.06 0.44 0.06
Kenya 0.38 0.06 0.33 0.06 0.46 0.06 0.58 0.06 0.62 0.06
Kuwait 0.22 0.06 0.21 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.46 0.06 0.47 0.06
Laos 0.30 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.17 0.06 0.18 0.06 0.19 0.06
Lebanon 0.57 0.06 0.46 0.06 0.45 0.06 0.57 0.06 0.54 0.06
Lesotho 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.68 0.06 0.72 0.06
Liberia 0.29 0.06 0.39 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.52 0.06 0.62 0.06
Libya 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06
Madagascar 0.32 0.06 0.32 0.06 0.65 0.06 0.61 0.06 0.53 0.06
Malawi 0.00 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.64 0.06 0.52 0.06 0.60 0.06
Malaysia 0.47 0.06 0.47 0.06 0.45 0.06 0.47 0.06 0.49 0.06
Mali 0.00 0.06 0.21 0.06 0.62 0.06 0.67 0.06 0.60 0.06
Mauritania 0.27 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.42 0.06 0.34 0.06 0.44 0.06
Mauritius 0.78 0.06 0.82 0.06 0.82 0.06 0.82 0.06 0.78 0.06
Mexico 0.34 0.06 0.46 0.06 0.54 0.06 0.74 0.06 0.68 0.06
Mongolia 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.70 0.06 0.70 0.06 0.69 0.06
Morocco 0.00 0.06 0.36 0.06 0.40 0.06 0.46 0.06 0.50 0.06
Myanmar 0.13 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.54 0.06
Nepal 0.00 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.48 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.51 0.06
Netherlands 0.81 0.06 0.81 0.06 0.81 0.06 0.82 0.06 0.83 0.06
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Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-)
New Zealand 0.81 0.06 0.82 0.06 0.82 0.06 0.80 0.06 0.81 0.06
Nicaragua 0.29 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.72 0.06 0.67 0.06 0.56 0.06
Niger 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.63 0.06 0.65 0.06 0.64 0.06
Nigeria 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.49 0.06 0.63 0.06
Norway 0.81 0.06 0.81 0.06 0.81 0.06 0.82 0.06 0.78 0.06
Oman 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.41 0.06 0.41 0.06
Pakistan 0.00 0.06 0.31 0.06 0.55 0.06 0.39 0.06 0.54 0.06
Panama 0.22 0.06 0.31 0.06 0.77 0.06 0.80 0.06 0.78 0.06
Papua New Guinea 0.51 0.06 0.51 0.06 0.51 0.06 0.51 0.06 0.52 0.06
Paraguay 0.30 0.06 0.32 0.06 0.61 0.06 0.66 0.06 0.68 0.06
Peru 0.00 0.06 0.73 0.06 0.51 0.06 0.78 0.06 0.75 0.06
Philippines 0.00 0.06 0.37 0.06 0.61 0.06 0.57 0.06 0.62 0.06
Poland 0.28 0.06 0.28 0.06 0.78 0.06 0.83 0.06 0.79 0.06
Portugal 0.56 0.06 0.76 0.06 0.76 0.06 0.81 0.06 0.81 0.06
Qatar 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06
Republic of Congo 0.20 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.58 0.06 0.40 0.06 0.40 0.06
Republic of Korea 0.35 0.06 0.47 0.06 0.72 0.06 0.81 0.06 0.73 0.06
Romania 0.22 0.06 0.22 0.06 0.59 0.06 0.64 0.06 0.70 0.06
Russia 0.19 0.06 0.19 0.06 0.53 0.06 0.47 0.06 0.43 0.06
Rwanda 0.00 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.32 0.06 0.38 0.06
Saudi Arabia 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06
Senegal 0.42 0.06 0.54 0.06 0.63 0.06 0.68 0.06 0.67 0.06
Serbia 0.19 0.06 0.21 0.06 0.47 0.06 0.62 0.06 0.63 0.06
Sierra Leone 0.36 0.06 0.21 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.57 0.06 0.61 0.06
Singapore 0.52 0.06 0.53 0.06 0.49 0.06 0.51 0.06 0.58 0.06
Somalia 0.00 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06
South Africa 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.71 0.06 0.77 0.06 0.73 0.06
Spain 0.23 0.06 0.82 0.06 0.82 0.06 0.82 0.06 0.77 0.06
Sri Lanka 0.65 0.06 0.59 0.06 0.64 0.06 0.61 0.06 0.66 0.06
Sudan 0.29 0.06 0.30 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.30 0.06 0.45 0.06
Swaziland 0.00 0.06 0.22 0.06 0.19 0.06 0.22 0.06 0.24 0.06
Sweden 0.85 0.06 0.85 0.06 0.85 0.06 0.86 0.06 0.85 0.06
Switzerland 0.81 0.06 0.81 0.06 0.81 0.06 0.81 0.06 0.82 0.06
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Syria 0.26 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.27 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.00 0.06
Taiwan 0.24 0.06 0.27 0.06 0.57 0.06 0.75 0.06 0.76 0.06
Tanzania 0.33 0.06 0.32 0.06 0.46 0.06 0.49 0.06 0.51 0.06
Thailand 0.52 0.06 0.47 0.06 0.59 0.06 0.64 0.06 0.33 0.06
Togo 0.00 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.46 0.06 0.46 0.06 0.51 0.06
Trinidad and Tobago 0.63 0.06 0.72 0.06 0.74 0.06 0.73 0.06 0.75 0.06
Tunisia 0.27 0.06 0.32 0.06 0.31 0.06 0.32 0.06 0.59 0.06
Turkey 0.66 0.06 0.54 0.06 0.68 0.06 0.70 0.06 0.56 0.06
Uganda 0.00 0.06 0.30 0.06 0.35 0.06 0.33 0.06 0.41 0.06
United Kingdom 0.81 0.06 0.80 0.06 0.80 0.06 0.91 0.06 0.83 0.06
United States 0.79 0.06 0.89 0.06 0.90 0.06 0.88 0.06 0.89 0.06
Uruguay 0.00 0.06 0.78 0.06 0.86 0.06 0.85 0.06 0.84 0.06
Venezuela 0.75 0.06 0.75 0.06 0.76 0.06 0.60 0.06 0.49 0.06
Viet Nam 0.34 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.26 0.06 0.25 0.06
Yemen 0.21 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.44 0.06 0.43 0.06 0.37 0.06
Zambia 0.28 0.06 0.28 0.06 0.57 0.06 0.53 0.06 0.62 0.06
Zimbabwe 0.03 0.06 0.41 0.06 0.45 0.06 0.37 0.06 0.48 0.06
Notes: ‘-’ indicates missing scores for a given year and country. CI = confidence intervals. Countries are not included in the data set before independence or after they have been dissolved. For
more details see The Global State of Democracy Indices Codebook (Tufis 2017a). The GSoD indices website provides the full data set along with a range of visualization tools that allow users to
explore these trends in depth. Visit <http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>.
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Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-)
Afghanistan 0.30 0.05 0.25 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.40 0.05 0.41 0.06
Albania 0.15 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.61 0.05 0.67 0.05 0.72 0.05
Algeria 0.43 0.05 0.44 0.05 0.46 0.05 0.47 0.05 0.50 0.05
Angola 0.19 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.33 0.06 0.42 0.05 0.43 0.05
Argentina 0.49 0.05 0.70 0.05 0.70 0.06 0.69 0.05 0.64 0.06
Australia 0.86 0.05 0.87 0.05 0.88 0.05 0.89 0.05 0.80 0.05
Bangladesh 0.39 0.05 0.45 0.05 0.51 0.05 0.51 0.05 0.44 0.05
Belgium 0.88 0.05 0.89 0.05 0.92 0.06 0.93 0.05 0.91 0.05
Benin 0.37 0.05 0.38 0.05 0.68 0.05 0.69 0.05 0.74 0.05
Bolivia 0.27 0.05 0.52 0.05 0.55 0.05 0.56 0.05 0.52 0.06
Bosnia and
- - - - 0.38 0.05 0.65 0.05 0.64 0.05
Herzegovina
Botswana 0.61 0.05 0.62 0.05 0.67 0.05 0.70 0.05 0.73 0.05
Brazil 0.26 0.05 0.47 0.05 0.67 0.05 0.68 0.05 0.66 0.05
Bulgaria 0.34 0.05 0.35 0.05 0.71 0.06 0.72 0.06 0.75 0.05
Burkina Faso 0.45 0.05 0.44 0.05 0.54 0.05 0.60 0.06 0.63 0.05
Burundi 0.32 0.05 0.39 0.05 0.44 0.05 0.44 0.05 0.32 0.05
Cambodia 0.00 0.05 0.24 0.05 0.40 0.05 0.42 0.05 0.43 0.05
Cameroon 0.32 0.05 0.43 0.05 0.53 0.05 0.52 0.05 0.50 0.05
Canada 0.80 0.05 0.85 0.05 0.86 0.05 0.86 0.05 0.83 0.05
Central African
0.32 0.05 0.38 0.05 0.41 0.05 0.42 0.05 0.40 0.05
Republic
Chad 0.28 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.33 0.05 0.33 0.05 0.36 0.05
Chile 0.23 0.06 0.28 0.05 0.70 0.06 0.77 0.05 0.71 0.05
China 0.20 0.05 0.40 0.05 0.40 0.05 0.41 0.05 0.41 0.06
Colombia 0.39 0.05 0.37 0.05 0.53 0.05 0.53 0.05 0.58 0.05
Costa Rica 0.70 0.05 0.73 0.05 0.86 0.05 0.87 0.05 0.86 0.05
Côte d’Ivoire 0.39 0.06 0.40 0.05 0.48 0.05 0.51 0.05 0.57 0.05
Cuba 0.28 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.31 0.05 0.32 0.05 0.37 0.05
Cyprus 0.59 0.05 0.64 0.06 0.68 0.06 0.76 0.05 0.80 0.05
Czechia 0.34 0.05 0.34 0.05 0.79 0.05 0.80 0.05 0.81 0.05
Democratic People's
0.07 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.05
Republic of Korea
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Democratic Republic
0.27 0.05 0.28 0.05 0.33 0.05 0.34 0.05 0.34 0.05
of the Congo (DRC)
Denmark 0.97 0.05 0.97 0.05 0.98 0.05 0.99 0.05 0.94 0.05
Dominican Republic 0.39 0.05 0.57 0.05 0.58 0.06 0.64 0.05 0.60 0.05
Ecuador 0.36 0.05 0.54 0.05 0.58 0.05 0.60 0.05 0.61 0.05
Egypt 0.41 0.05 0.46 0.05 0.45 0.05 0.37 0.05 0.28 0.05
El Salvador 0.15 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.45 0.06 0.52 0.05 0.49 0.05
Ethiopia 0.23 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.43 0.05 0.43 0.05 0.41 0.06
Finland 0.89 0.05 0.90 0.05 0.94 0.05 0.95 0.05 0.89 0.05
France 0.79 0.05 0.80 0.05 0.91 0.05 0.91 0.05 0.92 0.05
Gabon 0.39 0.05 0.41 0.05 0.55 0.05 0.55 0.05 0.62 0.05
Gambia 0.56 0.05 0.57 0.05 0.44 0.06 0.47 0.05 0.45 0.05
Ghana 0.35 0.05 0.31 0.05 0.65 0.05 0.74 0.05 0.65 0.05
Greece 0.68 0.05 0.78 0.05 0.81 0.05 0.82 0.05 0.83 0.05
Guatemala 0.13 0.05 0.12 0.05 0.29 0.05 0.41 0.05 0.47 0.05
Guinea 0.22 0.05 0.33 0.05 0.37 0.06 0.40 0.05 0.43 0.05
Guinea-Bissau 0.29 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.40 0.05 0.45 0.06 0.46 0.05
Haiti 0.25 0.05 0.26 0.06 0.43 0.05 0.46 0.06 0.46 0.05
Honduras 0.32 0.05 0.42 0.05 0.54 0.05 0.56 0.05 0.58 0.05
Hungary 0.42 0.05 0.44 0.05 0.77 0.05 0.76 0.05 0.70 0.05
India 0.46 0.05 0.57 0.06 0.58 0.05 0.58 0.05 0.58 0.05
Indonesia 0.32 0.05 0.32 0.06 0.33 0.05 0.61 0.05 0.57 0.05
Iran 0.36 0.05 0.29 0.05 0.35 0.05 0.39 0.05 0.39 0.05
Iraq 0.30 0.05 0.24 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.45 0.05 0.40 0.05
Ireland 0.78 0.05 0.82 0.05 0.87 0.05 0.88 0.05 0.86 0.05
Israel 0.67 0.05 0.69 0.05 0.70 0.05 0.70 0.05 0.69 0.06
Italy 0.73 0.05 0.82 0.05 0.84 0.05 0.84 0.06 0.84 0.05
Jamaica 0.55 0.05 0.59 0.05 0.64 0.05 0.64 0.05 0.67 0.05
Japan 0.85 0.05 0.85 0.05 0.86 0.05 0.87 0.06 0.83 0.05
Jordan 0.43 0.05 0.45 0.05 0.52 0.06 0.52 0.05 0.54 0.05
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Kenya 0.33 0.05 0.33 0.05 0.42 0.05 0.48 0.05 0.48 0.05
Kuwait 0.53 0.05 0.52 0.05 0.53 0.05 0.54 0.05 0.55 0.05
Laos 0.24 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.26 0.05 0.28 0.05 0.36 0.05
Lebanon 0.49 0.06 0.45 0.05 0.46 0.05 0.49 0.05 0.52 0.06
Lesotho 0.43 0.05 0.45 0.05 0.60 0.05 0.63 0.05 0.60 0.05
Liberia 0.35 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.37 0.05 0.58 0.05 0.60 0.05
Libya 0.27 0.05 0.27 0.05 0.28 0.05 0.28 0.05 0.40 0.05
Madagascar 0.35 0.05 0.36 0.05 0.46 0.05 0.46 0.05 0.47 0.05
Malawi 0.29 0.05 0.29 0.06 0.56 0.05 0.57 0.05 0.61 0.05
Malaysia 0.47 0.05 0.47 0.05 0.46 0.05 0.48 0.05 0.49 0.05
Mali 0.44 0.05 0.45 0.05 0.62 0.05 0.64 0.05 0.62 0.05
Mauritania 0.44 0.05 0.38 0.05 0.48 0.05 0.54 0.05 0.41 0.05
Mauritius 0.62 0.05 0.67 0.05 0.68 0.05 0.68 0.05 0.68 0.05
Mexico 0.42 0.05 0.45 0.05 0.48 0.05 0.52 0.05 0.53 0.05
Mongolia 0.33 0.05 0.33 0.05 0.68 0.05 0.65 0.05 0.66 0.05
Morocco 0.36 0.05 0.45 0.05 0.52 0.05 0.59 0.05 0.61 0.05
Mozambique 0.32 0.05 0.35 0.05 0.52 0.05 0.52 0.05 0.55 0.05
Myanmar 0.17 0.05 0.18 0.06 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.45 0.05
Nepal 0.30 0.05 0.33 0.05 0.52 0.05 0.47 0.05 0.60 0.05
Netherlands 0.86 0.05 0.87 0.05 0.89 0.05 0.90 0.06 0.88 0.05
New Zealand 0.77 0.05 0.83 0.05 0.84 0.05 0.88 0.05 0.87 0.05
Nicaragua 0.21 0.05 0.38 0.05 0.60 0.05 0.59 0.05 0.56 0.05
Niger 0.40 0.05 0.40 0.05 0.59 0.05 0.65 0.05 0.68 0.05
Nigeria 0.43 0.05 0.43 0.05 0.42 0.05 0.53 0.06 0.56 0.05
Norway 0.89 0.05 0.94 0.05 0.96 0.05 0.98 0.05 0.93 0.05
Oman 0.40 0.05 0.43 0.05 0.45 0.05 0.48 0.05 0.50 0.06
Pakistan 0.42 0.06 0.36 0.05 0.41 0.05 0.51 0.05 0.42 0.05
Panama 0.38 0.05 0.37 0.05 0.64 0.05 0.69 0.05 0.71 0.05
Papua New Guinea 0.54 0.05 0.54 0.05 0.54 0.06 0.55 0.05 0.53 0.05
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Paraguay 0.18 0.06 0.20 0.05 0.52 0.05 0.55 0.05 0.55 0.06
Peru 0.35 0.05 0.51 0.05 0.41 0.05 0.58 0.05 0.57 0.05
Philippines 0.30 0.05 0.31 0.06 0.58 0.05 0.57 0.05 0.57 0.05
Poland 0.38 0.05 0.41 0.05 0.79 0.05 0.79 0.05 0.80 0.05
Portugal 0.72 0.05 0.83 0.05 0.86 0.05 0.87 0.05 0.81 0.05
Qatar 0.39 0.05 0.40 0.05 0.43 0.05 0.46 0.05 0.45 0.05
Republic of Congo 0.31 0.05 0.26 0.05 0.47 0.05 0.39 0.05 0.40 0.06
Republic of Korea 0.42 0.05 0.49 0.05 0.73 0.05 0.77 0.05 0.76 0.05
Romania 0.34 0.05 0.34 0.05 0.63 0.05 0.67 0.05 0.69 0.05
Russia 0.26 0.05 0.28 0.05 0.57 0.06 0.48 0.05 0.45 0.05
Rwanda 0.45 0.05 0.48 0.05 0.42 0.05 0.50 0.05 0.57 0.05
Saudi Arabia 0.28 0.05 0.28 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.33 0.06 0.34 0.05
Senegal 0.53 0.05 0.61 0.05 0.62 0.05 0.65 0.05 0.69 0.05
Serbia 0.53 0.05 0.58 0.06 0.52 0.05 0.67 0.05 0.59 0.05
Sierra Leone 0.31 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.28 0.05 0.50 0.05 0.55 0.06
Singapore 0.54 0.05 0.55 0.06 0.57 0.05 0.60 0.05 0.59 0.05
Somalia 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.29 0.05
South Africa 0.29 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.70 0.05 0.72 0.05 0.69 0.06
Spain 0.40 0.05 0.83 0.05 0.84 0.05 0.85 0.05 0.84 0.05
Sri Lanka 0.60 0.05 0.52 0.05 0.52 0.05 0.51 0.05 0.63 0.05
Sudan 0.31 0.05 0.35 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.29 0.05 0.29 0.05
Swaziland 0.35 0.05 0.35 0.05 0.35 0.05 0.36 0.05 0.38 0.05
Sweden 0.90 0.05 0.93 0.05 0.95 0.06 0.95 0.05 0.88 0.05
Switzerland 0.84 0.05 0.85 0.05 0.92 0.05 0.93 0.05 0.91 0.05
Syria 0.20 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.26 0.05 0.16 0.05
Taiwan 0.42 0.05 0.51 0.05 0.72 0.05 0.80 0.05 0.81 0.05
Tanzania 0.54 0.05 0.55 0.05 0.57 0.05 0.56 0.05 0.55 0.05
Thailand 0.41 0.05 0.51 0.05 0.55 0.05 0.54 0.05 0.37 0.05
Togo 0.36 0.05 0.37 0.05 0.47 0.05 0.51 0.05 0.52 0.05
Trinidad and Tobago 0.71 0.06 0.69 0.05 0.69 0.05 0.71 0.05 0.71 0.05
Tunisia 0.48 0.05 0.48 0.05 0.49 0.06 0.49 0.05 0.72 0.05
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Turkey 0.50 0.05 0.42 0.06 0.48 0.05 0.56 0.05 0.41 0.05
Uganda 0.36 0.05 0.45 0.05 0.60 0.05 0.60 0.05 0.57 0.05
United Kingdom 0.79 0.05 0.85 0.06 0.85 0.05 0.88 0.06 0.82 0.05
United States 0.81 0.06 0.83 0.05 0.85 0.05 0.86 0.05 0.84 0.05
Uruguay 0.33 0.05 0.67 0.05 0.81 0.05 0.82 0.06 0.82 0.05
Venezuela 0.60 0.05 0.61 0.05 0.60 0.06 0.48 0.05 0.43 0.05
Viet Nam 0.31 0.05 0.31 0.05 0.41 0.05 0.47 0.05 0.54 0.05
Yemen 0.28 0.05 0.26 0.05 0.35 0.05 0.34 0.05 0.22 0.05
Zambia 0.46 0.05 0.46 0.05 0.57 0.05 0.59 0.05 0.60 0.05
Zimbabwe 0.23 0.05 0.50 0.05 0.51 0.05 0.38 0.05 0.45 0.05
Notes: ‘-’ indicates missing scores for a given year and country. CI = confidence intervals. Countries are not included in the data set before independence or after they have been dissolved. For
more details see The Global State of Democracy Indices Codebook (Tufis 2017a). The GSoD indices website provides the full data set along with a range of visualization tools that allow users to
explore these trends in depth. Visit <http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>.
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Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-)
Albania 0.23 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.61 0.06 0.64 0.05 0.65 0.05
Algeria 0.20 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.37 0.06 0.36 0.06 0.39 0.06
Angola 0.23 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.36 0.05 0.36 0.06 0.37 0.05
Argentina 0.51 0.06 0.59 0.06 0.59 0.06 0.60 0.06 0.60 0.05
Australia 0.82 0.06 0.89 0.06 0.89 0.06 0.89 0.06 0.91 0.05
Bangladesh 0.30 0.05 0.33 0.06 0.42 0.06 0.43 0.06 0.37 0.06
Belgium 0.71 0.05 0.71 0.05 0.77 0.06 0.81 0.06 0.79 0.05
Benin 0.23 0.05 0.24 0.06 0.62 0.06 0.64 0.06 0.64 0.06
Bolivia 0.21 0.06 0.51 0.06 0.52 0.06 0.59 0.06 0.49 0.06
Bosnia and
- - - - - - 0.49 0.06 0.50 0.05
Herzegovina
Botswana 0.60 0.05 0.63 0.05 0.64 0.06 0.65 0.06 0.63 0.06
Brazil 0.27 0.05 0.50 0.06 0.63 0.06 0.73 0.06 0.72 0.06
Bulgaria 0.15 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.72 0.06 0.68 0.05 0.74 0.06
Burkina Faso 0.39 0.06 0.33 0.06 0.42 0.06 0.47 0.05 0.57 0.06
Burundi 0.29 0.05 0.39 0.05 0.48 0.06 0.49 0.06 0.35 0.05
Cameroon 0.25 0.06 0.29 0.06 0.35 0.06 0.37 0.05 0.37 0.06
Canada 0.79 0.06 0.77 0.06 0.76 0.06 0.78 0.05 0.73 0.06
Central African
0.22 0.05 0.28 0.05 0.54 0.06 0.47 0.06 0.56 0.05
Republic
Chad 0.25 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.33 0.06 0.30 0.06 0.33 0.06
Chile 0.20 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.76 0.06 0.77 0.06 0.77 0.06
China 0.15 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.06
Colombia 0.54 0.05 0.54 0.06 0.63 0.06 0.61 0.05 0.64 0.06
Costa Rica 0.71 0.06 0.78 0.06 0.82 0.06 0.82 0.06 0.80 0.06
Côte d’Ivoire 0.25 0.06 0.25 0.05 0.43 0.06 0.53 0.06 0.50 0.06
Cuba 0.15 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.22 0.06
Cyprus 0.60 0.06 0.64 0.06 0.67 0.06 0.69 0.06 0.71 0.05
Czechia 0.21 0.06 0.22 0.06 0.77 0.06 0.78 0.06 0.72 0.06
Democratic People's
0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.06
Republic of Korea
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Democratic Republic
0.15 0.06 0.17 0.05 - - 0.41 0.06 0.43 0.06
of the Congo (DRC)
Denmark 0.92 0.06 0.93 0.05 0.94 0.05 0.94 0.06 0.88 0.06
Dominican Republic 0.30 0.06 0.46 0.06 0.42 0.05 0.47 0.06 0.44 0.06
Ecuador 0.33 0.06 0.53 0.05 0.56 0.05 0.55 0.06 0.37 0.06
Egypt 0.41 0.06 0.44 0.05 0.44 0.06 0.44 0.06 0.38 0.06
El Salvador 0.25 0.05 0.41 0.06 0.48 0.06 0.51 0.06 0.58 0.06
Ethiopia 0.29 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.34 0.05 0.34 0.05 0.34 0.06
Finland 0.84 0.05 0.85 0.06 0.89 0.05 0.88 0.06 0.79 0.05
France 0.73 0.05 0.77 0.05 0.74 0.06 0.77 0.05 0.88 0.06
Gabon 0.28 0.06 0.29 0.06 0.40 0.06 0.39 0.05 0.44 0.06
Gambia 0.48 0.05 0.48 0.06 0.30 0.05 0.35 0.06 0.32 0.06
Ghana 0.32 0.06 0.29 0.05 0.56 0.06 0.67 0.06 0.67 0.05
Greece 0.58 0.05 0.72 0.06 0.75 0.06 0.77 0.05 0.71 0.06
Guinea 0.10 0.06 0.20 0.05 0.34 0.06 0.35 0.05 0.38 0.05
Guinea-Bissau 0.24 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.47 0.05 0.50 0.06 0.53 0.05
Honduras 0.42 0.06 0.40 0.06 0.42 0.06 0.42 0.06 0.46 0.06
Hungary 0.25 0.05 0.28 0.06 0.67 0.06 0.69 0.06 0.61 0.06
India 0.53 0.06 0.66 0.05 0.68 0.05 0.67 0.06 0.62 0.05
Indonesia 0.25 0.06 0.21 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.58 0.06 0.61 0.05
Iran 0.30 0.06 0.37 0.05 0.41 0.05 0.46 0.06 0.45 0.05
Iraq 0.25 0.06 0.26 0.05 0.26 0.06 0.48 0.06 0.59 0.06
Ireland 0.73 0.06 0.72 0.05 0.73 0.05 0.74 0.06 0.74 0.06
Israel 0.72 0.06 0.71 0.06 0.72 0.05 0.72 0.06 0.65 0.06
Italy 0.67 0.06 0.69 0.06 0.72 0.06 0.71 0.05 0.75 0.05
Jamaica 0.58 0.06 0.58 0.06 0.59 0.06 0.65 0.06 0.65 0.06
Japan 0.78 0.06 0.78 0.06 0.79 0.05 0.79 0.06 0.70 0.05
Jordan 0.27 0.06 0.39 0.06 0.44 0.06 0.46 0.06 0.46 0.06
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Kenya 0.36 0.06 0.37 0.06 0.51 0.05 0.63 0.06 0.61 0.05
Kuwait 0.58 0.06 0.58 0.06 0.55 0.05 0.55 0.05 0.56 0.06
Laos 0.35 0.06 0.27 0.05 0.27 0.06 0.27 0.06 0.31 0.05
Lebanon 0.48 0.05 0.46 0.05 0.46 0.06 0.48 0.05 0.50 0.06
Lesotho 0.36 0.05 0.37 0.05 0.55 0.05 0.56 0.06 0.56 0.06
Liberia 0.41 0.06 0.33 0.06 0.45 0.06 0.62 0.05 0.58 0.05
Libya 0.16 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.60 0.06
Madagascar 0.36 0.05 0.33 0.06 0.56 0.05 0.45 0.06 0.49 0.06
Malawi 0.19 0.06 0.19 0.05 0.58 0.06 0.60 0.06 0.61 0.05
Malaysia 0.39 0.06 0.35 0.05 0.34 0.06 0.41 0.06 0.42 0.05
Mali 0.26 0.06 0.28 0.05 0.59 0.06 0.56 0.06 0.61 0.06
Mauritania 0.33 0.06 0.33 0.05 0.32 0.06 0.39 0.06 0.38 0.05
Mauritius 0.69 0.06 0.70 0.06 0.69 0.05 0.72 0.06 0.66 0.06
Mexico 0.25 0.06 0.31 0.05 0.44 0.06 0.58 0.06 0.55 0.06
Mongolia 0.26 0.05 0.27 0.06 0.65 0.06 0.61 0.06 0.58 0.05
Morocco 0.28 0.06 0.40 0.06 0.46 0.06 0.49 0.06 0.50 0.06
Mozambique 0.26 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.46 0.06 0.46 0.06 0.49 0.06
Myanmar 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.29 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.46 0.05
Nepal 0.33 0.06 0.39 0.06 0.63 0.05 0.39 0.06 0.63 0.06
Netherlands 0.79 0.06 0.84 0.05 0.84 0.06 0.84 0.06 0.81 0.06
New Zealand 0.71 0.05 0.75 0.06 0.76 0.06 0.80 0.06 0.78 0.06
Nicaragua 0.20 0.06 0.38 0.05 0.60 0.06 0.59 0.05 0.32 0.06
Niger 0.29 0.06 0.28 0.06 0.64 0.06 0.60 0.05 0.56 0.05
Nigeria 0.35 0.06 0.35 0.06 0.35 0.06 0.55 0.05 0.61 0.06
Norway 0.93 0.05 0.94 0.06 0.95 0.05 0.94 0.05 0.87 0.06
Oman 0.16 0.06 0.19 0.06 0.22 0.05 0.27 0.05 0.30 0.06
Pakistan 0.46 0.06 0.36 0.06 0.48 0.06 0.52 0.06 0.57 0.06
Panama 0.25 0.05 0.26 0.06 0.60 0.06 0.60 0.05 0.57 0.05
Papua New Guinea 0.57 0.06 0.57 0.06 0.57 0.06 0.58 0.05 0.59 0.06
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Paraguay 0.17 0.06 0.17 0.06 0.52 0.06 0.53 0.05 0.52 0.06
Peru 0.22 0.06 0.55 0.06 0.34 0.05 0.68 0.05 0.63 0.05
Philippines 0.23 0.06 0.27 0.06 0.63 0.05 0.61 0.05 0.66 0.06
Poland 0.29 0.05 0.29 0.05 0.71 0.05 0.75 0.05 0.75 0.06
Qatar 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.25 0.05
Republic of Congo 0.22 0.06 0.21 0.05 0.53 0.05 0.29 0.05 0.33 0.06
Republic of Korea 0.28 0.05 0.31 0.06 0.65 0.06 0.74 0.06 0.67 0.06
Romania 0.12 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.50 0.06 0.56 0.06 0.64 0.05
Russia 0.09 0.05 0.14 0.06 0.50 0.05 0.37 0.05 0.32 0.06
Rwanda 0.30 0.06 0.35 0.05 0.42 0.05 0.39 0.06 0.39 0.06
Saudi Arabia 0.19 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.24 0.06 0.26 0.05 0.24 0.05
Senegal 0.48 0.06 0.52 0.06 0.55 0.05 0.58 0.06 0.59 0.06
Serbia 0.29 0.06 0.33 0.06 0.32 0.05 0.58 0.05 0.50 0.06
Sierra Leone 0.33 0.05 0.30 0.06 0.29 0.06 0.47 0.05 0.47 0.05
Singapore 0.41 0.06 0.43 0.06 0.42 0.05 0.43 0.05 0.44 0.06
South Africa 0.41 0.06 0.49 0.06 0.64 0.05 0.70 0.06 0.65 0.06
Spain 0.35 0.06 0.80 0.05 0.80 0.06 0.81 0.06 0.70 0.05
Sri Lanka 0.57 0.06 0.49 0.05 0.49 0.05 0.46 0.05 0.56 0.06
Swaziland 0.28 0.06 0.34 0.06 0.32 0.06 0.34 0.06 0.37 0.06
Sweden 0.88 0.05 0.91 0.05 0.91 0.05 0.92 0.06 0.91 0.06
Switzerland 0.81 0.06 0.83 0.06 0.88 0.06 0.87 0.06 0.81 0.06
Syria 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.17 0.06
Taiwan 0.28 0.06 0.31 0.06 0.52 0.05 0.71 0.05 0.63 0.05
Tanzania 0.46 0.06 0.46 0.06 0.57 0.06 0.60 0.06 0.60 0.06
Thailand 0.43 0.05 0.41 0.06 0.57 0.05 0.56 0.06 0.37 0.06
Togo 0.18 0.05 0.15 0.06 0.35 0.06 0.35 0.06 0.49 0.06
Trinidad and Tobago 0.63 0.06 0.64 0.06 0.67 0.06 0.69 0.05 0.65 0.05
Tunisia 0.33 0.06 0.36 0.06 0.34 0.05 0.34 0.06 0.76 0.05
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Turkey 0.56 0.06 0.54 0.05 0.56 0.06 0.58 0.06 0.43 0.06
United Kingdom 0.78 0.06 0.78 0.06 0.81 0.06 0.83 0.05 0.87 0.06
United States 0.81 0.06 0.77 0.05 0.79 0.06 0.81 0.06 0.77 0.06
Uruguay 0.32 0.05 0.69 0.06 0.76 0.05 0.79 0.05 0.72 0.06
Venezuela 0.65 0.06 0.65 0.05 0.67 0.06 0.33 0.05 0.26 0.05
Viet Nam 0.31 0.06 0.31 0.05 0.34 0.05 0.34 0.06 0.40 0.05
Yemen 0.35 0.05 0.33 0.06 0.40 0.05 0.45 0.06 0.37 0.05
Zambia 0.32 0.06 0.32 0.06 0.54 0.05 0.58 0.05 0.53 0.06
Zimbabwe 0.43 0.06 0.42 0.06 0.41 0.05 0.40 0.06 0.44 0.06
Notes: ‘-’ indicates missing scores for a given year and country. CI = confidence intervals. Countries are not included in the data set before independence or after they have been dissolved. For
more details see The Global State of Democracy Indices Codebook (Tufis 2017a). The GSoD indices website provides the full data set along with a range of visualization tools that allow users to
explore these trends in depth. Visit <http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>.
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Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-)
Afghanistan 0.41 0.05 0.31 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.35 0.07 0.36 0.05
Albania 0.35 0.19 0.33 0.17 0.42 0.05 0.48 0.05 0.55 0.06
Algeria 0.41 0.09 0.39 0.06 0.35 0.07 0.35 0.05 0.38 0.05
Angola 0.31 0.08 0.29 0.07 0.28 0.04 0.25 0.07 0.28 0.07
Argentina 0.39 0.07 0.58 0.06 0.47 0.05 0.51 0.05 0.50 0.05
Australia 0.90 0.05 0.94 0.05 0.94 0.05 0.94 0.05 0.82 0.05
Bangladesh 0.35 0.04 0.31 0.06 0.38 0.05 0.33 0.07 0.31 0.04
Belgium 0.86 0.05 0.87 0.05 0.89 0.05 0.89 0.05 0.88 0.05
Benin 0.40 0.05 0.42 0.06 0.48 0.05 0.51 0.06 0.48 0.06
Bolivia 0.06 0.07 0.44 0.05 0.45 0.05 0.47 0.04 0.49 0.05
Bosnia and
- - - - 0.37 0.06 0.49 0.07 0.48 0.06
Herzegovina
Botswana 0.66 0.05 0.65 0.05 0.62 0.05 0.69 0.05 0.68 0.05
Brazil 0.30 0.08 0.40 0.05 0.60 0.05 0.57 0.05 0.59 0.05
Bulgaria 0.32 0.05 0.34 0.04 0.54 0.05 0.56 0.05 0.57 0.04
Burkina Faso 0.42 0.06 0.47 0.08 0.50 0.05 0.58 0.05 0.59 0.04
Burundi 0.30 0.12 0.42 0.11 0.43 0.06 0.32 0.05 0.25 0.06
Cambodia 0.27 0.18 0.34 0.08 0.29 0.05 0.29 0.06 0.23 0.05
Cameroon 0.36 0.06 0.27 0.06 0.31 0.06 0.27 0.06 0.28 0.05
Canada 0.76 0.04 0.82 0.04 0.81 0.05 0.82 0.05 0.83 0.05
Central African
0.16 0.05 0.31 0.07 0.33 0.05 0.28 0.07 0.32 0.05
Republic
Chad 0.30 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.15 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.13 0.06
Chile 0.30 0.13 0.38 0.09 0.69 0.05 0.70 0.06 0.66 0.05
China 0.24 0.15 0.42 0.05 0.42 0.05 0.42 0.05 0.41 0.05
Colombia 0.44 0.05 0.47 0.05 0.49 0.04 0.45 0.05 0.48 0.05
Costa Rica 0.63 0.05 0.66 0.05 0.74 0.05 0.70 0.05 0.72 0.05
Côte d’Ivoire 0.41 0.07 0.42 0.07 0.42 0.07 0.40 0.07 0.60 0.07
Cuba 0.26 0.07 0.28 0.07 0.28 0.06 0.28 0.06 0.29 0.06
Cyprus 0.59 0.05 0.62 0.05 0.64 0.05 0.74 0.06 0.70 0.05
Czechia 0.34 0.05 0.36 0.05 0.63 0.05 0.63 0.05 0.64 0.05
Democratic People's
0.22 0.05 0.24 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.12 0.05 0.17 0.05
Republic of Korea
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Democratic Republic
0.12 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.19 0.05 0.16 0.05
of the Congo (DRC)
Denmark 0.98 0.05 0.98 0.05 0.98 0.05 0.98 0.05 0.90 0.05
Dominican Republic 0.25 0.07 0.40 0.07 0.30 0.04 0.34 0.05 0.34 0.05
Ecuador 0.25 0.06 0.44 0.04 0.49 0.05 0.48 0.04 0.56 0.06
Egypt 0.34 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.26 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.31 0.06
El Salvador 0.16 0.08 0.15 0.09 0.40 0.05 0.42 0.05 0.47 0.05
Ethiopia 0.22 0.10 0.22 0.10 0.43 0.05 0.43 0.04 0.44 0.05
Finland 0.98 0.06 0.99 0.06 0.99 0.06 0.99 0.06 0.85 0.04
France 0.88 0.09 0.89 0.08 0.89 0.09 0.87 0.07 0.89 0.06
Gabon 0.37 0.06 0.38 0.06 0.46 0.10 0.44 0.09 0.58 0.09
Gambia 0.57 0.05 0.54 0.06 0.34 0.05 0.34 0.05 0.28 0.05
Ghana 0.35 0.05 0.37 0.05 0.46 0.07 0.50 0.06 0.47 0.06
Greece 0.52 0.05 0.61 0.07 0.63 0.07 0.62 0.08 0.57 0.05
Guatemala 0.17 0.07 0.13 0.09 0.36 0.05 0.42 0.06 0.40 0.05
Guinea 0.28 0.07 0.23 0.05 0.26 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.41 0.06
Guinea-Bissau 0.38 0.05 0.32 0.05 0.31 0.12 0.30 0.08 0.31 0.11
Haiti 0.16 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.43 0.09 0.31 0.05 0.36 0.05
Honduras 0.22 0.05 0.31 0.06 0.33 0.07 0.32 0.06 0.44 0.06
Hungary 0.52 0.05 0.52 0.05 0.72 0.05 0.70 0.05 0.60 0.05
India 0.40 0.08 0.52 0.05 0.52 0.05 0.53 0.05 0.53 0.05
Indonesia 0.24 0.05 0.17 0.05 0.18 0.05 0.44 0.05 0.45 0.05
Iran 0.48 0.05 0.36 0.06 0.46 0.05 0.45 0.05 0.46 0.05
Iraq 0.33 0.05 0.25 0.05 0.16 0.07 0.30 0.05 0.24 0.05
Ireland 0.72 0.05 0.76 0.05 0.77 0.05 0.78 0.05 0.78 0.05
Israel 0.67 0.05 0.67 0.04 0.67 0.05 0.66 0.04 0.65 0.04
Italy 0.63 0.05 0.64 0.05 0.64 0.05 0.63 0.05 0.66 0.05
Jamaica 0.60 0.05 0.56 0.05 0.58 0.05 0.61 0.05 0.65 0.04
Japan 0.80 0.05 0.81 0.05 0.81 0.05 0.81 0.05 0.78 0.05
Jordan 0.48 0.05 0.50 0.05 0.53 0.05 0.49 0.05 0.52 0.05
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Kenya 0.30 0.05 0.27 0.05 0.32 0.05 0.41 0.06 0.42 0.05
Kuwait 0.53 0.05 0.49 0.05 0.48 0.05 0.47 0.05 0.46 0.04
Laos 0.28 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.31 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.32 0.05
Lebanon 0.34 0.05 0.33 0.05 0.33 0.05 0.36 0.04 0.39 0.05
Lesotho 0.28 0.07 0.32 0.06 0.57 0.05 0.55 0.08 0.50 0.07
Liberia 0.33 0.05 0.25 0.05 0.17 0.04 0.36 0.06 0.36 0.05
Libya 0.17 0.06 0.18 0.06 0.19 0.06 0.18 0.05 0.24 0.08
Madagascar 0.37 0.06 0.35 0.04 0.40 0.05 0.41 0.06 0.29 0.05
Malawi 0.44 0.15 0.43 0.15 0.42 0.05 0.41 0.05 0.47 0.08
Malaysia 0.50 0.05 0.40 0.05 0.37 0.05 0.39 0.05 0.41 0.05
Mali 0.35 0.05 0.33 0.04 0.44 0.07 0.44 0.06 0.43 0.06
Mauritania 0.45 0.05 0.33 0.05 0.34 0.05 0.42 0.07 0.28 0.05
Mauritius 0.59 0.07 0.62 0.08 0.62 0.08 0.62 0.08 0.59 0.07
Mexico 0.35 0.04 0.40 0.05 0.45 0.05 0.51 0.05 0.45 0.06
Mongolia 0.51 0.13 0.51 0.13 0.60 0.05 0.55 0.06 0.50 0.05
Morocco 0.32 0.05 0.33 0.05 0.39 0.04 0.41 0.05 0.42 0.05
Mozambique 0.50 0.05 0.49 0.06 0.44 0.06 0.42 0.05 0.44 0.06
Myanmar 0.16 0.07 0.15 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.18 0.05 0.44 0.05
Nepal 0.29 0.05 0.33 0.05 0.46 0.08 0.41 0.07 0.45 0.06
Netherlands 0.83 0.05 0.83 0.05 0.85 0.05 0.84 0.05 0.82 0.07
New Zealand 0.84 0.06 0.85 0.06 0.85 0.06 0.85 0.06 0.84 0.06
Nicaragua 0.07 0.05 0.42 0.05 0.52 0.05 0.46 0.05 0.42 0.05
Niger 0.59 0.04 0.59 0.05 0.47 0.08 0.47 0.08 0.47 0.08
Nigeria 0.16 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.18 0.04 0.31 0.08 0.41 0.06
Norway 0.92 0.05 0.92 0.05 0.93 0.05 0.92 0.05 0.89 0.05
Oman 0.46 0.07 0.47 0.07 0.49 0.06 0.51 0.06 0.54 0.07
Pakistan 0.38 0.05 0.37 0.05 0.38 0.05 0.37 0.05 0.32 0.05
Panama 0.32 0.07 0.16 0.05 0.56 0.06 0.58 0.05 0.63 0.05
Papua New Guinea 0.37 0.05 0.38 0.05 0.38 0.05 0.37 0.05 0.37 0.05
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Paraguay 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.36 0.10 0.43 0.05 0.44 0.05
Peru 0.26 0.10 0.48 0.05 0.31 0.06 0.52 0.05 0.49 0.05
Philippines 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.46 0.05 0.45 0.05 0.47 0.05
Poland 0.52 0.06 0.51 0.06 0.67 0.05 0.66 0.05 0.62 0.05
Portugal 0.64 0.05 0.69 0.05 0.71 0.05 0.71 0.05 0.72 0.05
Qatar 0.37 0.06 0.37 0.05 0.41 0.05 0.45 0.05 0.40 0.05
Republic of Congo 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.43 0.05 0.28 0.05 0.29 0.06
Republic of Korea 0.43 0.05 0.49 0.05 0.75 0.06 0.77 0.05 0.64 0.06
Romania 0.21 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.38 0.05 0.40 0.05 0.49 0.05
Russia 0.29 0.07 0.29 0.07 0.36 0.06 0.35 0.06 0.32 0.05
Rwanda 0.46 0.05 0.46 0.05 0.46 0.05 0.58 0.06 0.63 0.05
Saudi Arabia 0.43 0.05 0.45 0.05 0.41 0.05 0.41 0.05 0.39 0.05
Senegal 0.57 0.06 0.56 0.06 0.57 0.06 0.56 0.05 0.64 0.05
Serbia 0.46 0.07 0.47 0.07 0.39 0.07 0.50 0.06 0.50 0.05
Sierra Leone 0.35 0.05 0.28 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.42 0.06 0.39 0.05
Singapore 0.74 0.07 0.81 0.06 0.80 0.06 0.82 0.06 0.81 0.06
Somalia 0.28 0.09 0.27 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.15 0.05 0.15 0.05
South Africa 0.36 0.07 0.40 0.06 0.60 0.05 0.60 0.06 0.56 0.05
Spain 0.49 0.06 0.86 0.05 0.87 0.05 0.86 0.05 0.83 0.05
Sri Lanka 0.53 0.07 0.47 0.07 0.49 0.05 0.44 0.04 0.56 0.05
Sudan 0.43 0.06 0.45 0.06 0.19 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.23 0.05
Swaziland 0.36 0.05 0.34 0.05 0.35 0.06 0.33 0.05 0.31 0.05
Sweden 0.87 0.06 0.88 0.06 0.88 0.06 0.88 0.06 0.82 0.06
Switzerland 0.89 0.05 0.90 0.05 0.93 0.05 0.98 0.06 0.85 0.05
Syria 0.32 0.05 0.31 0.05 0.33 0.05 0.32 0.05 0.15 0.05
Taiwan 0.44 0.05 0.51 0.05 0.66 0.05 0.70 0.06 0.65 0.04
Tanzania 0.62 0.08 0.56 0.07 0.54 0.05 0.48 0.05 0.47 0.05
Thailand 0.24 0.05 0.37 0.07 0.40 0.06 0.42 0.05 0.17 0.07
Togo 0.39 0.05 0.37 0.05 0.39 0.09 0.41 0.07 0.48 0.07
Trinidad and Tobago 0.63 0.04 0.58 0.05 0.58 0.05 0.59 0.05 0.58 0.06
Tunisia 0.48 0.05 0.49 0.05 0.37 0.05 0.36 0.06 0.58 0.05
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Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-)
Turkey 0.46 0.06 0.39 0.08 0.52 0.05 0.57 0.04 0.38 0.06
Uganda 0.04 0.05 0.16 0.09 0.48 0.05 0.43 0.05 0.43 0.05
United Kingdom 0.83 0.05 0.83 0.05 0.86 0.04 0.89 0.05 0.82 0.05
United States 0.77 0.05 0.76 0.05 0.80 0.05 0.79 0.05 0.80 0.06
Uruguay 0.18 0.18 0.71 0.07 0.76 0.05 0.77 0.05 0.77 0.05
Venezuela 0.50 0.05 0.49 0.05 0.49 0.05 0.30 0.06 0.19 0.05
Viet Nam 0.33 0.12 0.32 0.10 0.32 0.07 0.37 0.05 0.53 0.05
Yemen 0.62 0.11 0.51 0.07 0.20 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.13 0.05
Zambia 0.52 0.06 0.51 0.06 0.51 0.06 0.55 0.06 0.50 0.06
Zimbabwe 0.40 0.13 0.49 0.05 0.52 0.05 0.19 0.05 0.28 0.05
Notes: ‘-’ indicates missing scores for a given year and country. CI = confidence intervals. Countries are not included in the data set before independence or after they have been dissolved. For
more details see The Global State of Democracy Indices Codebook (Tufis 2017a). The GSoD indices website provides the full data set along with a range of visualization tools that allow users to
explore these trends in depth. Visit <http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>.
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Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-) Score CI (+/-)
Afghanistan 0.25 0.09 0.17 0.06 0.15 0.07 0.58 0.09 0.63 0.08
Albania 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.57 0.06 0.83 0.05 0.61 0.05
Algeria 0.27 0.11 0.27 0.11 0.59 0.05 0.49 0.07 0.47 0.07
Angola 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.52 0.12 0.57 0.10 0.51 0.08
Argentina 0.71 0.07 0.81 0.06 0.81 0.06 0.77 0.05 0.76 0.05
Australia 0.86 0.05 0.85 0.05 0.85 0.05 0.85 0.05 0.84 0.06
Bangladesh 0.50 0.12 0.65 0.13 0.57 0.09 0.57 0.09 0.63 0.11
Belgium 0.73 0.05 0.73 0.05 0.82 0.07 0.82 0.07 0.84 0.06
Benin 0.47 0.06 0.46 0.06 0.75 0.05 0.74 0.05 0.87 0.06
Bolivia 0.42 0.09 0.64 0.05 0.80 0.05 0.86 0.05 0.80 0.05
Bosnia and
- - - - 0.50 0.11 0.64 0.09 0.59 0.06
Herzegovina
Botswana 0.63 0.06 0.63 0.06 0.63 0.06 0.63 0.06 0.60 0.05
Brazil 0.38 0.08 0.64 0.11 0.74 0.05 0.78 0.06 0.77 0.05
Bulgaria 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.66 0.06 0.63 0.07 0.70 0.05
Burkina Faso 0.66 0.10 0.67 0.08 0.74 0.05 0.74 0.05 0.74 0.06
Burundi 0.27 0.08 0.30 0.10 0.50 0.06 0.57 0.05 0.52 0.07
Cambodia 0.06 0.05 0.26 0.06 0.60 0.05 0.53 0.06 0.57 0.09
Cameroon 0.28 0.05 0.35 0.05 0.51 0.05 0.55 0.06 0.61 0.05
Canada 0.74 0.05 0.80 0.07 0.80 0.07 0.79 0.07 0.81 0.05
Central African
0.19 0.07 0.43 0.05 0.55 0.05 0.54 0.05 0.57 0.06
Republic
Chad 0.23 0.06 0.22 0.07 0.55 0.11 0.51 0.10 0.61 0.11
Chile 0.18 0.09 0.21 0.06 0.58 0.08 0.67 0.06 0.70 0.07
China 0.10 0.06 0.29 0.10 0.37 0.06 0.46 0.06 0.38 0.08
Colombia 0.51 0.05 0.51 0.05 0.66 0.05 0.64 0.06 0.69 0.05
Costa Rica 0.74 0.06 0.81 0.05 0.83 0.06 0.82 0.06 0.83 0.05
Côte d’Ivoire 0.17 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.51 0.11 0.63 0.07 0.74 0.05
Cuba 0.20 0.05 0.24 0.07 0.20 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.24 0.08
Cyprus 0.56 0.05 0.61 0.05 0.69 0.05 0.76 0.05 0.75 0.07
Czechia 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.59 0.08 0.61 0.07 0.57 0.07
Democratic People's
0.03 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.05
Republic of Korea
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0.40 0.06 0.40 0.06 0.56 0.06 0.59 0.07 0.55 0.09
of the Congo (DRC)
Denmark 0.93 0.05 0.94 0.05 0.94 0.05 0.94 0.05 0.93 0.05
Dominican Republic 0.54 0.14 0.62 0.07 0.65 0.05 0.78 0.04 0.69 0.06
Ecuador 0.49 0.21 0.66 0.08 0.74 0.07 0.72 0.05 0.65 0.07
Egypt 0.46 0.10 0.49 0.05 0.49 0.05 0.53 0.05 0.45 0.09
El Salvador 0.54 0.13 0.55 0.13 0.63 0.06 0.67 0.08 0.67 0.08
Ethiopia 0.15 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.47 0.05 0.47 0.05 0.39 0.05
Finland 0.90 0.09 0.93 0.06 0.96 0.05 0.96 0.05 0.86 0.05
France 0.70 0.06 0.70 0.06 0.86 0.06 0.87 0.05 0.79 0.05
Gabon 0.24 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.61 0.10 0.61 0.10 0.75 0.06
Gambia 0.50 0.05 0.50 0.05 0.49 0.06 0.46 0.09 0.37 0.05
Ghana 0.53 0.07 0.50 0.09 0.78 0.05 0.80 0.05 0.67 0.06
Greece 0.51 0.11 0.68 0.05 0.72 0.05 0.76 0.06 0.84 0.05
Guatemala 0.50 0.08 0.37 0.05 0.71 0.09 0.64 0.05 0.70 0.05
Guinea 0.15 0.06 0.53 0.13 0.68 0.13 0.66 0.15 0.64 0.10
Guinea-Bissau 0.53 0.10 0.51 0.12 0.66 0.16 0.61 0.11 0.61 0.05
Haiti 0.38 0.08 0.45 0.11 0.43 0.05 0.51 0.07 0.51 0.07
Honduras 0.60 0.11 0.58 0.06 0.67 0.05 0.66 0.05 0.69 0.05
Hungary 0.23 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.59 0.05 0.57 0.05 0.56 0.06
India 0.50 0.05 0.75 0.05 0.80 0.05 0.81 0.05 0.65 0.06
Indonesia 0.32 0.06 0.32 0.05 0.32 0.05 0.73 0.10 0.82 0.05
Iran 0.34 0.12 0.38 0.06 0.46 0.05 0.52 0.05 0.45 0.05
Iraq 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.61 0.08 0.59 0.07
Ireland 0.71 0.09 0.72 0.08 0.74 0.07 0.73 0.07 0.84 0.05
Israel 0.61 0.05 0.78 0.06 0.83 0.05 0.71 0.06 0.66 0.07
Italy 0.76 0.05 0.73 0.05 0.77 0.05 0.77 0.06 0.70 0.06
Jamaica 0.71 0.05 0.71 0.05 0.69 0.05 0.72 0.05 0.71 0.06
Japan 0.72 0.08 0.72 0.08 0.68 0.06 0.67 0.06 0.64 0.07
Jordan 0.54 0.05 0.52 0.06 0.54 0.05 0.54 0.05 0.61 0.05
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Kenya 0.45 0.06 0.46 0.07 0.73 0.05 0.74 0.05 0.74 0.06
Kuwait 0.61 0.10 0.58 0.08 0.60 0.11 0.57 0.08 0.61 0.07
Laos 0.16 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.15 0.07 0.32 0.06
Lebanon 0.50 0.05 0.50 0.05 0.66 0.05 0.72 0.05 0.78 0.05
Lesotho 0.43 0.10 0.45 0.11 0.60 0.05 0.61 0.05 0.78 0.07
Liberia 0.62 0.05 0.49 0.08 0.69 0.09 0.77 0.06 0.83 0.06
Libya 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.64 0.05
Madagascar 0.30 0.07 0.29 0.08 0.51 0.05 0.52 0.05 0.55 0.06
Malawi 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.07 0.59 0.07 0.58 0.09 0.61 0.05
Malaysia 0.39 0.05 0.50 0.08 0.51 0.07 0.67 0.10 0.70 0.12
Mali 0.54 0.08 0.56 0.09 0.79 0.05 0.76 0.06 0.72 0.09
Mauritania 0.49 0.10 0.35 0.11 0.50 0.05 0.61 0.05 0.64 0.05
Mauritius 0.74 0.10 0.73 0.11 0.73 0.11 0.73 0.11 0.63 0.08
Mexico 0.27 0.10 0.43 0.05 0.56 0.05 0.63 0.05 0.61 0.05
Mongolia 0.22 0.09 0.22 0.09 0.67 0.08 0.75 0.12 0.73 0.08
Morocco 0.42 0.05 0.42 0.05 0.54 0.08 0.67 0.05 0.74 0.05
Mozambique 0.17 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.47 0.05 0.49 0.08 0.56 0.05
Myanmar 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.27 0.06 0.27 0.05 0.64 0.06
Nepal 0.43 0.05 0.52 0.07 0.72 0.06 0.77 0.11 0.76 0.10
Netherlands 0.84 0.05 0.68 0.07 0.70 0.09 0.69 0.07 0.65 0.08
New Zealand 0.80 0.05 0.70 0.05 0.71 0.05 0.72 0.05 0.78 0.05
Nicaragua 0.09 0.05 0.52 0.09 0.66 0.04 0.66 0.05 0.58 0.08
Niger 0.37 0.05 0.44 0.07 0.73 0.07 0.78 0.08 0.84 0.05
Nigeria 0.57 0.18 0.57 0.18 0.62 0.20 0.74 0.07 0.69 0.05
Norway 0.89 0.05 0.93 0.05 0.93 0.05 0.93 0.05 0.93 0.05
Oman 0.25 0.05 0.27 0.05 0.31 0.05 0.33 0.05 0.34 0.05
Pakistan 0.57 0.06 0.49 0.06 0.59 0.05 0.74 0.05 0.68 0.05
Panama 0.30 0.09 0.33 0.05 0.62 0.08 0.63 0.10 0.60 0.10
Papua New Guinea 0.58 0.12 0.61 0.08 0.64 0.09 0.64 0.09 0.56 0.06
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Paraguay 0.14 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.51 0.05 0.56 0.05 0.51 0.05
Peru 0.28 0.06 0.45 0.06 0.41 0.06 0.68 0.05 0.68 0.05
Philippines 0.30 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.81 0.06 0.82 0.06 0.81 0.05
Poland 0.13 0.08 0.25 0.05 0.71 0.05 0.72 0.05 0.66 0.06
Portugal 0.72 0.05 0.62 0.06 0.62 0.06 0.68 0.05 0.62 0.07
Qatar 0.20 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.23 0.08 0.21 0.07
Republic of Congo 0.29 0.06 0.33 0.05 0.76 0.09 0.59 0.09 0.66 0.06
Republic of Korea 0.19 0.05 0.29 0.06 0.69 0.05 0.75 0.06 0.69 0.06
Romania 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.56 0.05 0.58 0.05 0.62 0.05
Russia 0.06 0.15 0.08 0.17 0.63 0.08 0.44 0.05 0.42 0.05
Rwanda 0.37 0.05 0.37 0.05 0.56 0.12 0.63 0.10 0.61 0.06
Saudi Arabia 0.20 0.05 0.28 0.05 0.28 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.33 0.04
Senegal 0.58 0.07 0.65 0.05 0.78 0.05 0.78 0.06 0.81 0.05
Serbia 0.26 0.09 0.37 0.07 0.44 0.05 0.73 0.09 0.60 0.07
Sierra Leone 0.36 0.09 0.40 0.06 0.47 0.08 0.80 0.08 0.83 0.09
Singapore 0.45 0.05 0.49 0.07 0.49 0.07 0.49 0.07 0.50 0.08
Somalia 0.12 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.46 0.11 0.46 0.11 0.51 0.07
South Africa 0.52 0.09 0.57 0.09 0.82 0.05 0.80 0.05 0.73 0.06
Spain 0.20 0.14 0.64 0.08 0.64 0.08 0.64 0.08 0.69 0.08
Sri Lanka 0.56 0.06 0.59 0.08 0.64 0.09 0.61 0.07 0.78 0.08
Sudan 0.21 0.05 0.57 0.12 0.22 0.05 0.37 0.07 0.43 0.05
Swaziland 0.44 0.11 0.45 0.11 0.46 0.09 0.47 0.08 0.49 0.06
Sweden 0.95 0.06 0.95 0.06 0.94 0.05 0.94 0.05 0.90 0.05
Switzerland 0.88 0.09 0.88 0.09 0.88 0.09 0.88 0.09 0.85 0.10
Syria 0.14 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.15 0.05
Taiwan 0.30 0.05 0.43 0.06 0.70 0.05 0.84 0.06 0.82 0.06
Tanzania 0.24 0.11 0.33 0.09 0.64 0.05 0.63 0.05 0.64 0.05
Thailand 0.63 0.07 0.56 0.05 0.65 0.09 0.75 0.07 0.57 0.22
Togo 0.21 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.47 0.05 0.64 0.06 0.72 0.08
Trinidad and Tobago 0.74 0.05 0.76 0.05 0.81 0.06 0.79 0.05 0.80 0.05
Tunisia 0.49 0.09 0.48 0.08 0.52 0.05 0.44 0.05 0.77 0.13
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Turkey 0.89 0.07 0.49 0.11 0.64 0.07 0.79 0.05 0.54 0.09
Uganda 0.35 0.18 0.48 0.07 0.72 0.05 0.68 0.05 0.65 0.05
United Kingdom 0.77 0.05 0.74 0.07 0.84 0.10 0.87 0.07 0.83 0.06
United States 0.88 0.05 0.89 0.05 1.00 0.05 0.97 0.06 0.92 0.05
Uruguay 0.43 0.15 0.82 0.07 0.86 0.05 0.87 0.05 0.65 0.10
Venezuela 0.67 0.05 0.69 0.05 0.65 0.05 0.55 0.06 0.60 0.14
Viet Nam 0.42 0.05 0.43 0.05 0.55 0.06 0.55 0.06 0.48 0.06
Yemen 0.25 0.13 0.26 0.13 0.42 0.08 0.42 0.08 0.43 0.08
Zambia 0.47 0.05 0.56 0.08 0.84 0.06 0.75 0.05 0.68 0.10
Zimbabwe 0.34 0.05 0.59 0.05 0.76 0.11 0.56 0.11 0.53 0.10
Notes: ‘-’ indicates missing scores for a given year and country. CI = confidence intervals. Countries are not included in the data set before independence or after they have been dissolved. For
more details see The Global State of Democracy Indices Codebook (Tufis 2017a). The GSoD indices website provides the full data set along with a range of visualization tools that allow users to
explore these trends in depth. Visit <http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>.
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Democratic Republic
- - 0.86 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.56 -
of the Congo (DRC)
Denmark 0.88 - 0.86 - 0.82 - 0.81 - 0.80 -
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Kosovo - - - - - - - - 0.62 -
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Swaziland 0.00 - - - - - - - - -
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Notes: ‘-’ indicates missing scores for a given year and country. CI = confidence intervals. Countries are not included in the data set before independence or after they have been dissolved. For
more details see The Global State of Democracy Indices Codebook (Tufis 2017a). The GSoD indices website provides the full data set along with a range of visualization tools that allow users to
explore these trends in depth. Visit <http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>.
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Democratic Republic
0.35 - 0.21 - 0.10 - 0.17 - 0.13 -
of the Congo (DRC)
Denmark 0.24 - 0.20 - 0.41 - 0.29 - 0.24 -
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Kosovo - - - - - - - - 0.00 -
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Notes: ‘-’ indicates missing scores for a given year and country. CI = confidence intervals. Countries are not included in the data set before independence or after they have been dissolved. For
more details see The Global State of Democracy Indices Codebook (Tufis 2017a). The GSoD indices website provides the full data set along with a range of visualization tools that allow users to
explore these trends in depth. Visit <http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>.
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Democratic Republic
0.06 - 0.06 - 0.06 - 0.17 - 0.16 -
of the Congo (DRC)
Denmark 0.85 - 0.85 - 0.85 - 0.85 - 0.80 -
Georgia - - - - - - - - 0.36 -
German Democratic
0.11 - 0.11 - - - - - - -
Republic
Germany 0.92 - 0.92 - 0.92 - 0.92 - 0.80 -
Guatemala - - - - - - - - - -
Jamaica - - - - - - - - - -
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Kosovo - - - - - - - - - -
Kuwait - - - - - - - - - -
Libya - - - - - - - - - -
Macedonia - - - - - - - - - -
Malawi - - - - - - - - - -
Mauritius - - - - - - - - - -
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Qatar - - - - - - - - - -
Singapore - - - - - - - - - -
Slovenia - - - - - - - - - -
Timor-Leste - - - - - - 0.00 - - -
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Uruguay - - - - - - - - 0.80 -
Notes: ‘-’ indicates missing scores for a given year and country. CI = confidence intervals. Countries are not included in the data set before independence or after they have been dissolved. For
more details see The Global State of Democracy Indices Codebook (Tufis 2017a). The GSoD indices website provides the full data set along with a range of visualization tools that allow users to
explore these trends in depth. Visit <http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>.
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References Exploring Democracy’s Resilience
References
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Framework (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2017),
Assistance (International IDEA), The Global State of <http://www.idea.int/gsod>
Democracy 2017: Exploring Democracy’s Resilience Tufis, C., The Global State of Democracy Indices
(Stockholm: International IDEA, 2017a), <http:// Codebook (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2017a),
www.idea.int/gsod> <http://www.idea.int/gsod>
—, The Global State of Democracy Indices, 2017b, Tufis, C., The Global State of Democracy Indices:
<http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices> Technical Procedures Guide (Stockholm:
—, ‘Geographical definitions of regions and International IDEA, 2017b), <http://www.idea.int/
international organizations in The Global State of gsod>
Democracy’, Background Paper, 2017c, <http:// Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, Cautionary
www.idea.int/gsod> Notes [Version 7], 2017, <https://www.v-dem.net/
Skaaning, S-E., The Global State of Democracy Indices files/47/What%27s%20new%20log%20and%20
Methodology: Conceptualization and Measurement Cautionary%20Notes.pdf>, accessed 27 July 2017
328
About International IDEA
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International
IDEA) is an intergovernmental organization that supports sustainable democracy
institutions and processes worldwide. International IDEA acts as a catalyst for
democracy-building by providing knowledge resources and policy proposals, and
supporting democratic reforms in response to specific national requests. It works with
policymakers, governments, international organizations and agencies, as well as regional
organizations engaged in the field of democracy-building.
International IDEA brings this knowledge to national and local representatives who are working
for democratic reform, and facilitates dialogue in support of democratic change.
<http://www.idea.int>
Is democracy really in trouble, or do recent events simply signal a
temporary downward fluctuation?
The Global State of Democracy seeks to address the lack of analytical material on
democracy building and the quality of democracy internationally, and to bridge
the gap between academic research, policy development and democracy assistance
initiatives. It provides evidence-based analysis of the global state of democracy. It
introduces the new Global State of Democracy (GSoD) indices as a key evidence
base to inform policy interventions and identify problem-solving approaches to
trends affecting the quality of democracy. The target audience is policy- and decision-
makers, civil society organizations and democracy activists, policy influencers
such as the media and research institutes, as well as democracy support providers
and practitioners.
International IDEA
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Tel: +46 8 698 37 00
info@idea.int
www.idea.int ISBN: 978-91-7671-129-3