Philosophical Review

Geometry and Necessary Truth

Author(s): Raymond D. Bradley
Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Jan., 1964), pp. 59-75
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review
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 GEOMETRY AND NECESSARY TRUTH

M Y AIM in this paper is to reinstate a philosophical thesis

which once held the field but seems now to stand in need
of a champion: I mean the thesis that the sentences of pure
geometry in general, and those of pure Euclidean geometry in
particular, may be used to express necessarily true propositions.
In order to do so I shall try to dispose in turn of the following
three objections, each of which has won the allegiance of influential
philosophers and mathematicians:
(i) The sentences of a pure geometry do not assert anything
which is either true or false and therefore cannot assert anything
(a proposition) capable of being necessarily true (for example,
Nagel, Reichenbach, Hospers).
(2) Even if the sentences of pure Euclidean geometry do assert
propositions, these latter cannot be necessarily true since they
admit of contraries, in non-Euclidean geometries, which are
self-consistent (for example, Nagel, Reichenbach, Robinson,
Whittaker).
(3) Either (strong thesis) since the geometry of extragalactic
space has been found to be non-Euclidean, the propositions of
Euclidean geometry, far from being necessarily true, must be
contingent and false (for example, Whittaker); or (weaker
thesis) Euclidean geometry can be salvaged in the era of relativ-
ity theory only if we are prepared either to renounce certain
well-established laws of physics or to resort to purely ad hoc
hypotheses about the existence of universal forces (for example,
Nagel, Gasking).

Clearly the third sort of objection presupposes the success of the

second, while the second presupposes the failure of the first.
I begin, therefore, with the first, most radical, objection.

First Objection
"Pure geometry does not contain any propositions at all:
afortiori it does not contain necessarily true ones."

59
 RAYMOND D. BRADLEr

The plausibility of this objection, I contend, derives from a

specious account of the distinction between pure and applied
geometry. Consider, for instance, the way in which Nagel sets
up the distinction in his generally admirable book, The Structure
of Science.' He contrasts the task of the pure geometer who, he
tells us, "can ignore the meanings of specific geometrical terms
in the axioms and theorems of the system, replace those terms
with variables, and pursue the task of proving the theorems by
attending only to the logical relations between the resulting
statement-forms" (p. 220) with the task of the applied geometer
whose concern, he says, is to investigate the material truth
or falsity of those empirical statements which result when the
nonlogical terms in these uninterpreted statement-forms are
associated, by means of what Reichenbach has called "rules of
correspondence" or "co-ordinating definitions," with "definite,
empirically identifiable objects or relations between such objects"
(p. 222).2 In this way Nagel is led to identify pure geometry with
a subclass of the class of purely uninterpreted calculi and applied
geometry with a set of statements about the world, that is,
statements of physics. The argument then proceeds roughly
as follows.3 If we take a Euclidean sentence such as "The sum of
the interior angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles"
(the sort of sentence which I should want to say, following Ayer,4
expresses a necessary proposition) we need only ask: is it a sentence
of pure geometry, or is it a sentence of applied geometry? If it is
the former, then it cannot itself be necessary in the required
logical sense. It may, admittedly, be consequentiallynecessary-
that is, it may be the logically necessary consequence of certain
axioms or theorems, the consequent clause in a conditional
proposition asserting a deductive connection between antecedent
and consequent-but it cannot significantly be asked whether it is
itself a logically necessary proposition since, treated as part of a
strictly deductive system of pure geometry, it is only a statement-

1 E. Nagel, The Structure of Science(London, 196I).

2 H. Reichenbach, The Philosophyof Space and Time (New York, I95I).
3 For further examples see Reichenbach, op. cit., p. 5; and J. Hospers, An
Introduction
to PhilosophicalAnalysis(New York, I 953), I 2 I.
4 A. J. Ayer, Language,Truthand Logic (2nd ed.; London, I946), 82.

6o
 GEOMETRrAND NECESSARY TRUTH

form. If, on the other hand, the sentence is taken to be one which
results from the substitution in a statement-form of particular
interpretations for particular variables, then the sentence does
indeed express a proposition-something true or false-but in
this case the question of its truth value is a matter for empirical
investigation only since the sentence is not necessarily true under
every interpretation of its terms.
But this sort of argument will not do, for three main reasons.
(i) To begin with a purely formal point, it should be observed
that the objection has the form of a simple constructive dilemma
whose major premise is the disjunction "For any sentence S in
geometry, S is either a sentence of pure geometry or a sentence
of applied geometry." As such, the argument is valid only if
this disjunction is logically exhaustive. But is it? Not, I think,
on the interpretation which Nagel, Reichenbach, and Hospers
give us. For these philosophers, it will soon appear, operate
unwittingly with two different accounts of the pure/applied
distinction and, by conflating them, fail to satisfy the requirement
of logical exhaustiveness. It is clear that one might with logical
impeccability either (a) start from the notion of pure geometry
as a deductive system containing only uninterpreted statement-
forms and then derive the notion of applied geometry as a
deductive system in which the statement-forms have been given
some interpretationor other, or (b) start from the notion of applied
geometry as one in which the statement-forms have been given a
special kind of interpretation, namely a physical one, and then
go on to define pure geometry as one in which it is not the case
that the statement-forms are to be interpreted physically. But note
that, on the first account, it does not follow that an applied
geometry is a set of empirical statements whose material truth or
falsity is a contingent matter for physicists to determine: not all
interpretations of the statement-forms need be empirical ones.
Nor, on the second account, does it follow that in a pure geometry
the statement-forms have no interpretation whatever: again,
it is at least logically possible that the statement-forms should have
a nonphysical interpretation. It is because these philosophers
conflate the first-account definition of pure geometry with the
second-account definition of applied geometry that they make
 RAYMOND D. BRADLEY

these fallacious inferences. They treat the distinction between

pure and applied geometry as if it were equivalent to the dis-
junction "either an uninterpreted calculus or a branch of physical
science" and so are led to overlook the logical possibility of a
system of geometry whose sentences do not fall under either of
the disjuncts presented in the major premise of their argument.
Their argument, therefore, since it is formally defective, affords
no grounds whatever for their contention that the postulates
and theorems of pure-that is, nonphysical-geometry cannot
significantly be regarded as either true or false.5
But to say that their argument is fallacious is not, of course,
to say that their conclusion is mistaken. What I must now try to
show is that the existence of systems of "pure" (in the sense of
nonempirical or nonphysical) geometry whose sentences are either
true or false though not contingently so, is more than a mere
logical possibility.
(2) In order to establish this it will suffice, I think, to consider
briefly the system of geometry contained in Euclid's Elements.
It is clear, first of all, that since Euclid does not provide us with
any rules of correspondence for identifying the primitive terms
"point," "line," "straight line," and so forth, of his system with
empirically identifiable objects or configurations such as straight
edges or paths of propagated light, the axioms and theorems
presented in his Elements cannot be said to belong to physical
geometry in the sense in which we have agreed to use that term.
Are we to say, then, that his geometry is a purely uninterpreted
calculus whose primitive terms, axioms, and theorems have
no interpretation or meaning whatever? Hardly; for Euclid
prefaces the formal development of his system by a large number
of explicit "definitions" whose sole function it is to give these
primitive terms at least embryonic meaning by specifying certain
of the rules for their articulation with other expressions within
his system. In effect, he provides us not with empirical or semantic
coordinating definitions yielding contingent propositions, but

5 It is in this second-account sense of "pure," I think, that philosophers

like Ayer have wanted to defend the thesis that the propositions of pure
geometry are necessarily true. At all events, this is the sense I shall employ
hereafter.

62
 GEOMETRTAND NECESSARY TRUTH

rather, we might say, with conceptual or syntactical ones yielding

necessary propositions. And much the same can be said regarding
the subsequent axioms and theorems. As Nagel himself recognizes,6
a sentence like "The sum of the interior angles of a triangle
is equal to two right angles" stipulates certain of the conditions
for the application of the expression "triangle" within his system:
it functions as an implicit definition since no physical or imagined
configuration will count as a triangle unless it satisfies these
conditions. It does not assert the existence of Euclidean triangles
in the physical world but only that if anything is properly describ-
able as a triangle then it is also properly describable as a rectilinear
figure whose interior angle sum is equal to two right angles.
To the question, therefore, whether this sentence asserts anything
which can significantly be regarded as either true or false, the
correct answer is: it is true, and necessarily so, in virtue of its
status as an implicit definition of the system.
But for many philosophers there is a temptation to say with
Nagel that "by their very nature implicit definitions cannot be
characterized as true or false" (p. 262). Why should this be so?
I suspect it is because implicit definitions are commonly associated
with stipulations about the use of certain expressions. Ask yourself
why it is, for example, that the sentence about the interior angle
sum of a Euclidean triangle functions as an implicit definition
in Euclid's geometry. Because, we are inclined to answer, in that
geometry it is stipulatedthat nothing will count as an instance of a
triangle unless its interior angle sum is in fact equal to i 8o degrees.
And once we have said this, it seems to follow immediately that
an implicit definition cannot be characterized as a statement.
For when we say "Let us use 'triangle' to mean 'three-sided
rectilinear figure, and so forth,' " we are simply making a proposal,
not asserting something true or false. But there is a confusion
here. We need to distinguish between a proposal that we should
use certain expressions in certain ways and the subsequent use
of those expressions in accordance with that proposal. Implicit
definitions may result from the adopting of certain stipulations
but they are not themselves mere stipulations. Although a stipula-

6 Op. cit., p. 225.

63
 RAYMOND D. BRADLEY

tion is neither true nor false, the sentence which follows from its
adoption may well be. Indeed, these sentences-these implicit
definitions-are certifiable as necessarily true or false by reference
to just those rules for the use of their component expressions
which the so-called "stipulative definitions" enunciate.
I suspect, however, that there is another more powerful reason
which leads some philosophers to overlook the possibility of
sentences of nonphysical geometry functioning in the way I have
suggested. This is the temptation (to which symbolic logicians
and mathematicians so often succumb) to suppose that all
rigorously deductive inferences are purely formal ones. Now it is
true that Veblen's axiomatization of Euclidean geometry showed
that for the purposes of determining whether or not the theorems
are logically deducible from the axioms, the primitive expressions
"point," "between," and "congruent" may be replaced by
variables R1, R3 and R2 (respectively) with which no meanings
of any sort need be associated, for as a matter of logicalfact the
deductive relations between the axioms and theorems in his
system are purely formal ones. And it follows from this, as Nagel
points out,7 both that (a) "The task of the pure geometer is then
to ascertain which statement-forms 'T (R1, R3, R2)' are logical
consequences of the statement-form 'A (R1, R3, R2),' " and that
(b) "neither the pure geometer nor the physicist can investigate
the truth or falsity of the statement-forms 'A' and 'T.' for the
patent reason that, since they are not statements, it is not even
significant to ask whether they are true or false." But this should
not blind us to the fact that there are some deductive inferences
whose validity is not determined by formal considerations but
rather byjust those meanings of specific subject-matter expressions
which Nagel's pure geometer rejects as irrelevant. The inference
from "John is a bachelor" to "John is unmarried" is a case in
point; so too, I contend, is the inference from "This is a Euclidean
triangle" to "This is a figure with an interior angle sum of i8o
degrees." In such cases, we observe, our warrant derives from the
meanings or rules for the use of the expressions involved, not
from any statement-forms which the antecedent and consequent

Op. Cit., p. 22I.

64
 GEOMETRYAND NECESSARY TRUTH

clauses exemplify. And since each of the inferences is valid-not

indeed by formal criteria, but because it would be self-contra-
dictory to assert the premise and deny the conclusion-we are
entitled to say that the conditional statement whose antecedent is
the premise and whose consequent is the conclusion must be
a logically necessary truth. But this isjust to say that such sentences
as "If he is a bachelor then he is unmarried" and "If this is a
Euclidean triangle then its interior angle sum is equal to i8o
degrees," are necessary truths of a nonformalkind.8 It becomes
clear, then, that-although for the purpose of determining the
logical relations between the axioms and theorems of Veblen's
system it is in fact possible to dispense with meanings, since the
inferences are carried by the formal properties of the sentences,
so that it does not make sense to ask whether the statement-forms
concerned are true or false-when our concern is instead with
the logical status of these axioms and theorems themselves, their
subject-matter terms may not be irrelevant nor therefore need it be
absurd to inquire as to their truth value.
(3) It is worth making one further point against the first
objection as a whole. The argument is, in a sense, too strong.
For it would, if it were valid, conjure away not only the implicit
definitions of Euclidean-and, for that matter, of non-Euclidean
-geometry, but also the necessary truth of, for instance, the
proposition which "All bachelors are unmarried" is ordinarily
understood to express.
Thus, by parity of reasoning, we might argue that: (a) this
sentence clearly does not express a contingent proposition since
there is not only no experience which could count against it,
but also no conceivable state of affairs which could entitle us to
say "Some bachelors are married"; and that (b) when we treat
it as a pure statement-form "All x arey" in order to determine,
8 Perhaps the trouble stems at least in part from Nagel's (and others') use
of a purely formal criterion of necessity, viz. that the sentence concerned should
exemplify a statement-form which "formulates a necessary truth under every
interpretation of its primitive terms" (p. 223). Now certainly the above
sentences do not, by this criterion, state necessary propositions; but this
demonstrates only the inadequacy of a formal criterion since the first sentence
at least-"If he is a bachelor then he is unmarried"-would ordinarily be
regarded as a paradigm candidate for necessary truth.

65

S
 RAYMOND D. BRADLEY

let us say, its formal connections with other sentences in a syllo-

gism, it "cannot be regarded as either true or false, and afortiori
neither as necessarily true nor as necessarily false" (p. 223).
In short, if the argument were valid, it would leave such
sentences with no status at all vis-a-visthe necessary/contingent
distinction. And it would lead to the surprising conclusion that it
is impossible for certain sentences to be given a use such that
they come to express necessary propositions.

SecondObjection
"The propositions of pure Euclidean geometry cannot be
necessary truths since they admit of contraries which are self-
consistent."
This objection is one which usually arises concerning the logical
status of one particular proposition of Euclidean geometry-the
so-called "parallels" postulate or axiom. Logically speaking,
this need not be so: the issue could arise over the logical status
of any proposition, axiom, or theorem of Euclidean or, for that
matter, of non-Euclidean geometry. But there are interesting
historical reasons why the controversy has centered about the
fifth postulate rather than any of the others. For this postulate
has seemed to many geometers to be less "self-evident" than
the others in Euclid's Elementsand so to stand in need of some
sort of justification. The most fruitful of the many attempts to
demonstrate its necessity have been those which have sought
to prove, by reductioad absurdumarguments, that the denial of
the fifth postulate would lead to theorems which were inconsistent
with the other so-called "absolute" axioms of Euclidean geometry.
Thus, in spite of the failure of countless attempts to establish
the dependence of the fifth postulate on these other axioms, the
formal exercise of working out the implications of alternative
axiom sets has led to the development of non-Euclidean geometries
which, as Sir Eric Whittaker puts it, "have as good a claim to
acceptance from the point of view of logic."9
The issue at stake, then, may safely be allowed to turn upon the
outcome of the question: are the non-Euclidean "contraries" of

9 FromEuclidto Eddington(Cambridge, 1949), p. 3'.

66
 GEOMETRrAND NECESSART TRUTH

the parallel axiom self-consistent or not? Right at the outset,

however, we need to be on our guard against confusing this
question with another, similar one. For there is a difference
between asking whether the apparent denials, in non-Euclidean
geometry, of the Euclidean postulate that there exists one and
only one parallel to a given straight line through a point outside it,
are by themselvesself-consistent, and asking whether their conjunction
with other axioms of Euclid's set is self-consistent. I suspect that
when mathematicians and philosophers claim, as they often do,
that the non-Euclidean "contraries" of Euclid's parallel axiom
are self-consistent, they are answering, in a very misleading way,
only the second of these questions: that is, I suspect that they
are simply asserting elliptically something which is evidently
true, namely that from the conjunction of these apparent con-
traries of the fifth axiom with the other axioms of Euclid's set
one can develop a system of geometry which is internally self-
consistent. But from this there follows no more than the un-
contentious claim that the fifth axiom is not derivable from the
others but is independent of them. Their claim does not in any
way go to show that the fifth axiom may itself be denied self-
consistently, that is, is only contingently true or false.
The second objection, therefore, properly construed, amounts
to the thesis that the parallel axiom cannot be necessarily true
since it admits of non-Euclidean contraries which are in themselves
self-consistent. Against this I shall argue that (a) these supposed
contraries are not real or logical contraries of Euclid's parallel
axiom or that (b) if they are, then they are not self-consistent.
Let us take the second alternative first. Consider the three
sentences:
E: "The interior angle sum of a triangle is equal to two right
angles."
L: "The interior angle sum of a triangle is equal to less than two
right angles."
R: "The interior angle sum of a triangle is equal to more than
two right angles."

The first sentence, E, belongs to Euclidean geometry where

it is a logical consequence of the fifth axiom; the second, L,

67
 RAYMOND D. BRADLEY

belongs to the hyperbolic geometry of Bolyai and Lobachewsky

in which Euclid's parallel axiom is replaced by one of its syn-
tactical contraries, namely that there is more than one parallel
to a given line through a point outside it; and the third, R,
belongs to Riemann's parabolic geometry which results when we
replace Euclid's axiom with another of its syntactical contraries,
namely that there do not exist any straight lines which are parallel
to a given straight line.
Now, by hypothesis, we have first to assume that L and R
really are, as they appear to be, logical contraries of E, and then
to determine whether as such they are self-consistent. It will not
require many words to show that they are not. For it is a necessary
condition of their being genuinely inconsistent with E that the
expression "triangle" should have the same meaning in L and R
as it does in E. What is this meaning? Well, as we have already
seen, the sentence, E, functions as an implicit definition laying
down certain of the conditions for the employment of the expres-
sion "triangle" in Euclidean geometry. Thus in E, the term
"triangle" is to be understood as meaning "three-sided rectilinear
figure whose interior angle sum is equal to two right angles."
If, then, we substitute for "triangle" in the sentences L and R
its Euclidean definition (and this, remember, is required if L
and R are genuine contraries of E) then we derive the self-
contradictory propositions:
L': "The interior angle sum of a (three-sided rectilinear figure
whose interior angle sum is equal to two right angles) is equal
to less than two right angles"; and
R': "The interior angle sum of a (three-sided rectilinear figure
whose interior angle sum is equal to two right angles) is equal
to more than two right angles." The penalty of insisting that L
and R are logical, not just syntactical, contraries of Euclid's
parallel axiom is that they then become self-contradictory. It is
surprising, therefore, to find that many philosophers and mathe-
maticians of distinction write as if Euclidean and non-Euclidean
systems were really inconsistent with each other.10 One seems
10 For examples, see: Reichenbach, Op.Cit., p. 4; Nagel, op. Cit., p. 237;
Whittaker, Op.Cit., p. 3I; Robinson, "Necessary Propositions," Mind, LXVII
(1958), 298.

68
 GEOMETRY AJD NECESSART TRUTH

forced to assume that these philosophers are either not alive to

the distinction between syntactical and logical contrariety or else
that they do not perceive the consequences of the view which they
so unambiguously endorse.
Now there are several grounds for saying that, despite appear-
ances and the contrary assurances of so many authorities, there is
no real inconsistency between the axiom sets of Euclidean and
non-Euclidean geometries.
In the first place, the appearance of inconsistency does not
outlast our efforts to show that non-Euclidean statements such
as L and R are not self-contradictory. For it is then forced upon
us that these statements are not true under a Euclidean inter-
pretation of the expression "triangle" but only under the inter-
pretation which this expression has in the relevant non-Euclidean
systems. Each sentence can properly be said to be true only
within the definitional framework of its corresponding geometry.
This point may be made clearer by employing the distinction
between object and metalanguages. Thus, when we make the
language-relativity of each of the sentences E, L, and R quite
explicit by rewriting them, respectively,
E: " 'The interior angle sum of a triangle is equal to two right
angles' is a true statement in Euclidean geometry";
L: " 'The interior angle sum of a triangle is equal to less than
two right angles' is a true statement in Lobachewskian geom-
etry"; and
1R:" 'The interior angle sum of a triangle is equal to more than
two right angles' is a true statement in Riemannian geometry,"
there is no longer even the appearance of incompatibility between
them.
The same conclusion may be reached independently by
considering the ways in which geometers have sought to establish
the consistency of the axiom sets of non-Euclidean geometry.
Since it is evident that any set of true statements must be self-
consistent, one method that has been employed is that of finding
an interpretation of the variables occurring in the non-Euclidean
axioms which will convert them from mere statement-forms
into a set of true statements. Thus Lobachewsky's axiom set was

69
 RArMOND D. BRADLET

shown by Beltrami to be consistent since it could be interpreted

so as to yield statements about lines and curves on certain saddle-
back surfaces which are demonstrably true in Euclidean geometry.
Similarly, a relative proof of the consistency of Riemann's
postulates may be given by converting them into theorems of
Euclidean spherical geometry. It follows that these non-Euclidean
systems are at least as consistent as Euclidean geometry. And the
upshot of this "mapping" of non-Euclidean onto Euclidean
geometry is that the sentences L and R are found to be trans-
latable into the following assertions, respectively:
L": "The angle sum of a Euclidean figure bounded by the
arcs of circles orthogonal to a fixed circle is less than two right
angles by an amount proportional to the area of the figure"; and
R": "The angle sum of a spherical triangle is greater than two
right angles by an amount proportional to the area of the
triangle."
But L" and R" are in no way inconsistent with the assertion
made by E: on the contrary, they, like E, are provable within
Euclidean geometry.

This conclusion derives further support from Nagel's claim

that this mapping procedure can be reversed, and that the systems
of Euclidean, Lobachewskian, and Riemannian geometry are
therefore formally intertranslatable. These three systems of pure
geometry, he tells us, are simply "three systems for codifying the
same things in different ways, or different things in the same
way" (p. 252). It is, he concedes, possible to regard them as
"alternative systems of rules for employing such terms as 'triangle,'
'circle,' 'distance' and the like" (p. 253). How he can reconcile
this way of regarding them with his claim elsewhere that
"Lobachewsky and Bolyai ... developed a system of geometry
which was based on a contrary of Euclid's parallel postulate"
(p. 237) he does not tell us. Indeed I should have thought it
obvious that if these alternative geometries are formally inter-
translatable they cannot contain logical contraries of one another.
To sum up. Against the second objection to my thesis I have
argued:

70
 GEOMETRTAND NECESSART TRUTH

(i) that the objection cannot be sustained simply by showing

that non-Euclidean systemsof geometry are formally self-consistent
since this establishes only the independenceof the fifth postulate
from the others in Euclid's axiom set;
(ii) that if these non-Euclidean statements were genuinely incom-
patible with those of Euclidean geometry then they would not
be self-consistent; and
(iii) that, anyway, the fact that a relation of translatability (if
not intertranslatability) holds between the notations of the three
alternative geometries establishes beyond all shadow of doubt
that the alleged incompatibility is only apparent rather than
real.
I turn now to the final main objection.
Third Objection
Strong version."The propositions of Euclidean geometry are not
only contingent but may in fact be false since it may yet be
discovered that extragalactic geometry is non-Euclidean."
Weak version. "Euclidean geometry can be salvaged in the era
of relativity theory only at the expense of either modifying well-
confirmed laws of physics or of resorting to purely ad hoc hy-
potheses about the existence of universal, that is, nondifferential,
forces."

The stronger thesis is well illustrated by a passage from Sir

Eric Whittaker's book From Euclid to Eddington. There, after
arguing in the manner we have just been considering, that
Euclid's geometry is not a system of necessary truths, he proceeds:
"The question then arises, which ... is the geometry of the actual
universe; and this question can be settled only by observations
involving the most remote bodies that are within the present
scope of astronomical science" (p. 3I). Not only does he envisage
the possibility of physical discoveries coming into conflict with
the propositions of Euclidean geometry but, in such an event, he
assumes that there could be only one possible outcome, namely,
that we should abandon Euclidean geometry in favor of one
of its non-Euclidean rivals. Indeed, many physicists and philos-
ophers go even further and claim that extragalactic geometry

7'
 RAYMOND D. BRADLET

has in fact been found to be Riemannian and that the theorems

of Euclidean geometry hold only with approximation for the
limited world of ordinary human experience.
The weaker, more sophisticated thesis holds that in the event
of a conflict between Euclidean geometry and physical theory,
not just one but two possibilities would present themselves:
we might eitherabandon Euclid or abandon our physical theories
(though there is usually a strong suggestion that the former
would always be preferable)."1
Now the first point that needs to be made in reply is that neither
version has any plausibility whatever if it is construed as asserting
that the system of pure, nonphysical, Euclidean geometry might
be found to conflict with present or future physical discoveries.
For pure Euclidean geometry is, as we have seen, a system of
a priorilogically necessary propositions saying nothing about our
actual world which would enable us to distinguish it from any
other possible world. I do not say, please note, that being necessary
truths these propositions say nothing or give no information
about our world (period), for if we leave it at that we invite all
the old problems about how it is that logic and pure mathematics
can have application to the actual world; but rather that being
necessarily true they give us no information whichwoulddifferentiate
our actualworldfrom otherlogicallypossibleworlds.Indeed I hold
that pure Euclidean geometry is necessarily true in so far as it
states what this and any otherpossibleworldmust be like, namely,
that anything which satisfies its axioms must also satisfy its
theorems. It cannot be falsified, then, by any discovery that the
configurations of physical objects in our actual world are thus or
thus, for such discoveries would show only that these configura-
tions fail to satisfy Euclid's axioms.
Plainly, therefore, if the objections are to have any force at all,
they must be construed as asserting the possibility of a conflict
between physical discoveries and some physical interpretation
or other of Euclidean geometry.
But there are, I shall now argue, good reasons for denying

11 See, for instance: Nagel, op. Cit., p. 264; D. Gasking, "Mathematics and
the World," in A. Flew (ed.), Logic and Language(Oxford, I953), ii, 221.

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that any such conflict as that envisaged between our observations

and a system of applied geometry need ever arise.
In the first place, the alternative systems of metrical geometry
are, as we have already seen, formally intertranslatable. But it
follows from this that no set of observations or experiments could
ever establish one geometry at the expense of another. Suppose,
for example, that we have set up certain rules of correspondence
for the physical interpretation of one of these non-Euclidean
geometries, and that our observations and experiments confirm,
in some sense or other, the hypothesis that the resultant physical
geometry is the geometry of actual space. Will this entitle us to
say that Euclidean geometry has no physical application, or that
it misdescribes the structure of our actual world? Plainly not,
for it is a consequence of what we have called the "formal inter-
translatability" of these alternative geometries that any physical
interpretation whatever can be described equally well in any
of these languages. If any single physical geometry has appli-
cation within the physical world via a particular set of co-
ordinating definitions, then the rules for the formal intertrans-
latability of the alternative geometrical notations guarantee
that every other geometry also has application within the world
via these same co-ordinative definitions.
Now if this argument is sound, it not only disposes of the strong
version of the third objection but creates difficulties for the weak
version, too. Thus I find it hard to see how, if the alternative
geometries are notationally intertranslatable, there could ever be
empirical grounds for preferring one geometry to another, or
how therefore we could ever be forced to decide between aban-
doning, let us say, Euclidean geometry and modifying our
physical laws. But let this pass. There are other grounds, I shall
now argue, for disputing this weaker thesis.
Suppose that someone, who resolutely defends the thesis that
Euclidean geometry is universally applicable within the physical
universe, gives an operational or co-ordinating definition of
"straight line" as "path of a ray of light." And suppose, further,
what is frequently asserted to be an empirical fact, that optical
triangles of extragalactic dimensions are consistently found to
have angle sums greater than two right angles, then the claim

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is that although he couldstill insist on the applicability of Euclidean

geometry, he could do so "only by maintaining that the sides
of stellar triangles are not really Euclidean straight lines" and by
adopting an ad hoc hypothesis that "the optical paths are deformed
by some fields of force."12 I shall argue to the contrary that in
order to defend his Euclid, our geometer neednot alter his physics
or introduce ad hoc hypotheses. The alternative is not far to seek.
For there is no intrinsic reason, as I see it, why he should give
Euclidean geometry one application or physical interpretation
rather than another. True, given that he is wedded to a particular
set of co-ordinative definitions-including the identification of
straight lines with light rays-he might well, in the circumstances
envisaged, suppose that he was faced with only the two options
of either abandoning Euclid or changing his physics. But unless
there is some overriding reason (and why should there be?) for
retaining that particular set of co-ordinating definitions, he can
always, I submit, avoid both these alternatives by the simple
expedient of changing his co-ordinatingdefinitions; and this simply
amounts to saying that we can always assign a different description
within the language of Euclidean geometry to the same set of
physical facts, that we can always guarantee that Euclidean-or
any other-geometry has physical application via some set or
other of coordinating definitions. Thus, in order to account
for the apparent "deformations" of the sides of stellar triangles,
we need not resort to ad hoc hypotheses about universal forces
but need only alter our co-ordinating definitions in the following
way: in our original co-ordinative definition, "Euclidean straight
line" = Df "path of a light ray," we simply substitute for the
explicandum the expression "great circle on a Euclidean sphere."
And in this way we are able to account for the fact that stellar
triangles have angle sums greater than two right angles without
in any way altering our physics or abandoning the language of
Euclidean geometry. Not only is the derivative statement "The
angle sum of a spherical triangle is greater than two right
angles by an amount proportional to the area of the triangle" a
theorem provable in Euclidean geometry, but it suffices also

12 Nagel, Op. Cit., p. 263.

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 GEOMETRYAND NECESSARY TRUTH

to describe the empirically ascertained properties of stellar

triangles.
Let me conclude by putting the arguments of this paper into
some sort of perspective. My chief concern has been to determine
the logical status of the propositions of both pure and applied
Euclidean geometry vis-a-vis the necessary/contingent distinction,
though the conclusions I have reached hold also of the proposi-
tions of non-Euclidean geometries, pure and applied. There are,
then, two sorts of sentence whose logical status I have tried to
settle-the sentences of pure geometries and the sentences of
applied geometries. As to the first, I began by arguing that, if
by "pure geometry" we mean "nonphysical geometry" and not
just an uninterpreted calculus, then it is perfectly proper to
inquire whether on certain nonphysicalinterpretations of the pure
statement-forms, the sentences assert anything true or false.
Next I argued that, in these uses, the sentences of pure Euclidean
geometry assert propositions whose logical status is that of neces-
sary truths; that to say this is in no way incompatible with saying
also that the corresponding propositions of pure non-Euclidean
geometries are also necessarily true, since, appearances notwith-
standing, these propositions are logically consistent with the
propositions of Euclidean geometry; and finally, that, being
necessary, the propositions of pure Euclidean geometry are
unfalsifiable by any physical observation or experiment whatever.
As for the sentences of applied geometry, Euclidean and
non-Euclidean, I have tried to show that, though the propositions
they are used to express via co-ordinating definitions are not
logically necessary truths, they may nevertheless be made empiri-
cally incorrigible since any new experience can always be accom-
modated either by altering our conventions for their empirical
interpretation or by appealing to the established conventions
for their notational intertranslatability.
RAYMOND D. BRADLEY
AustralianNational University

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