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G.R. No.

L-24742 October 26, 1973 Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa
Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss,
dated 30 March 1964, as well as an Opposition to Petition for Appointment of
ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners,
Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964. On 10 April 1964, the Cebu court issued
vs.
an order holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss "until
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO,
after the Court of First Instance of Quezon City shall have acted on the petition
LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO,
for probate of that document purporting to be the last will and testament of the
CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ, respondents.
deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco."3 Such order of the Cebu court deferring to
the probate proceedings in the Quezon City court was neither excepted to nor
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA- sought by respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu court nor did
G.R. No. 34104-R, promulgated 21 November 1964, and its subsequent Resolution they challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate
promulgated 8 July 1964 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. courts.

The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow: Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to
Dismiss, dated 10 April 1964, opposing probate of the will and assailing the
On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors' jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain petitioner's petition for
Hospital, Manila. He was survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their two probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the
(2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc.
residing at 69 Pi y Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his children No. 2433-R. Said respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed
of the first marriage, respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue.
Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and
Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu. In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss,
giving as a principal reason the "precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate
On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator)1 respondent proceeding."4 The said court further found in said order that the residence of the
Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the court of first late senator at the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa
instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R), alleging among other things, that the late Heights, Quezon City. The pertinent portion of said order follows:
senator died intestate in Manila on 25 February 1964; that he was a resident of
Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left real and personal properties in Cebu On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the
and Quezon City. On the same date, the Cebu court issued an order setting the opposition and motion to dismiss reads as follows: "that since the
petition for hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all the decedent Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco was a resident of the City of
heirs and interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof at LA Cebu at the time of his death, the aforesaid petition filed by Rosa
PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Cebu. Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March 1964 was not filed with the proper
Court (wrong venue) in view of the provisions of Section 1 of Rule
The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new and 73 of the New Rules of Court ...". From the aforequoted allegation,
modified one released on 13 March 1964, in view of the fact that the petition was to the Court is made to understand that the oppositors do not mean
be heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of the said Cebu court. On the same date, to say that the decedent being a resident of Cebu City when he
a third order was further issued stating that respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition died, the intestate proceedings in Cebu City should prevail over
for the appointment of a special administrator dated 4 March 1964 was not yet the probate proceedings in Quezon City, because as stated above
ready for the consideration of the said court, giving as reasons the following: the probate of the will should take precedence, but that the
probate proceedings should be filed in the Cebu City Court of First
Instance. If the last proposition is the desire of the oppositors as
It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet understood by this Court, that could not also be entertained as
regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding, the requisite proper because paragraph 1 of the petition for the probate of the
publication of the notice of hearing not yet having been complied will indicates that Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the time of his
with. Moreover, copies of the petition have not been served on all death was a resident of Quezon City at 69 Pi y Margal. Annex A
of the heirs specified in the basic petition for the issuance of (Last Will and Testament of Mariano Jesus Cuenco) of the petition
letters of administration.2 for probate of the will shows that the decedent at the time when
he executed his Last Will clearly stated that he is a resident of 69
In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of the Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and also of the City
Cebu petition) herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with the court of Cebu. He made the former as his first choice and the latter as
of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the deceased's last will and his second choice of residence." If a party has two residences, the
testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving one will be deemed or presumed to his domicile which he himself
widow and executrix in the said last will and testament. The said proceeding was selects or considers to be his home or which appears to be the
docketed as Special Proceeding No. Q-7898. center of his affairs. The petitioner, in thus filing the instant
petition before this Court, follows the first choice of residence of On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of
the decedent and once this court acquires jurisdiction of the respondents (petitioners therein) and against the herein petitioner, holding that:
probate proceeding it is to the exclusion of all others.5
Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the
Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City court's settlement of the estate of a deceased person, covers both testate
said order of 11 April 1964 asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over the probate and intestate proceedings. Sp. Proc. 2433-R of the Cebu CFI
proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court was denied on 27 April 1964 and a having been filed ahead, it is that court whose jurisdiction was
second motion for reconsideration dated 20 May 1964 was likewise denied. first invoked and which first attached. It is that court which can
properly and exclusively pass upon the factual issues of (1)
whether the decedent left or did not leave a valid will, and (2)
On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing for
whether or not the decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of
probate of the last will of the decedent was called three times at half-hour intervals,
his death.
but notwithstanding due notification none of the oppositors appeared and the
Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the hearing in their absence.
Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in
the Cebu CFI (Special Proceeding 2433-R), it follows that the said
As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City court
court must exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI,
noted that respondents-oppositors had opposed probate under their opposition and
in which the petition for probate was filed by the respondent Rosa
motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
Cayetano Cuenco (Special Proceeding Q-7898). The said
respondent should assert her rights within the framework of the
(a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of
law; another court.

(b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13,
and influence on the part of the beneficiary or some other persons 1964, Judge Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI, acting in Sp. Proc.
for his benefit; 2433-R, stated that the petition for appointment of special
administrator was "not yet ready for the consideration of the
(c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or Court today. It would be premature for this Court to act thereon,
that the testator acted by mistake and did not intend that the it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this
instrument he signed should be his will at the time he affixed his proceeding ... . " It is sufficient to state in this connection that the
signature thereto.6 said judge was certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction
over the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the
moment a petition is filed, but only to the exercise of jurisdiction
The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the notice of in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all events,
the hearing had been duly complied with and that all the heirs had been duly jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and does not
notified of the hearing, and after receiving the testimony of the three instrumental depend on the pronouncements of a trial judge.
witnesses to the decedent's last will, namely Atty. Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A.
Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the notary public, Atty. Braulio A. Arriola, Jr.,
who ratified the said last will, and the documentary evidence (such as the The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as follows:
decedent's residence certificates, income tax return, diplomatic passport, deed of
donation) all indicating that the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding and
Quezon City, as also affirmed by him in his last will, the Quezon City court in its directing the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
said order of 15 May 1964 admitted to probate the late senator's last will and IX, Quezon City, and the respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to
testament as having been "freely and voluntarily executed by the testator" and refrain perpetually from proceeding and taking any action in
"with all formalities of the law" and appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his Special Proceeding Q-7898 pending before the said respondent
estate without bond "following the desire of the testator" in his will as probated. court. All orders heretofore issued and actions heretofore taken by
said respondent court and respondent Judge, therein and
Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to connected therewith, are hereby annulled. The writ of injunction
probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof, respondents filed a heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement
special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with as to costs.
respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as case CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the
Rizal court from proceeding with case No. Q-7898. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of respondent
Court of Appeals, dated 8 July 1965; hence the herein petition for review
on certiorari.
The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate court It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his
erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court ordering estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue.
it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with the testateproceedings and annulling This was lucidly stated by the late Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa vs. Co Ho9 as
and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of follows:
the decedent's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix
thereof without bond in compliance with the testator's express wish in his
We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in
testament. This issue is tied up with the issue submitted to the appellate court, to
probate cases the place of residence of the deceased is regarded
wit, whether the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
as a question of jurisdiction over the subject-matter. But we
discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate
decline to follow this view because of its mischievous
proceedings filed with it, in pursuance of the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964
consequences. For instance, a probate case has been submitted in
expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate
good faith to the Court of First Instance of a province where the
proceedings that it (the Quezon City court) should first act "on the petition for
deceased had not resided. All the parties, however, including all
probate of the document purporting to be the last will and testament of the
the creditors, have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco" - which order of the Cebu court respondents
court and the case is therein completely finished except for a
never questioned nor challenged by prohibition or certiorari proceedings and thus
claim of a creditor who also voluntarily filed it with said court but
enabled the Quezon City court to proceed without any impediment or obstruction,
on appeal from an adverse decision raises for the first time in this
once it denied respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion to dismiss the probate
Court the question of jurisdiction of the trial court for lack of
proceeding for alleged lack of jurisdiction or improper venue, to proceed with the
residence of the deceased in the province. If we consider such
hearing of the petition and to admit the will to probate upon having been satisfied
question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial
as to its due execution and authenticity.
court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole
proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents which
The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in law in have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same
issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with case will have to be commenced anew before another court of
the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, the same rank in another province. That this is of mischievous
particularly its admission to probate of the deceased's last will and testament and effect in the prompt administration of justice is too obvious to
appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No.
deceased testator's express wish, for the following considerations: — 48206, December 31, 1942) Furthermore, section 600 of Act No.
190, 10 providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be
settled in the province where he had last resided, could not have
1. The Judiciary Act7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First
been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate court
Instance over "all matter of probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the
over the subject-matter, because such legal provision is contained
other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court lays down the rule of venue, as
in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and,
the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to prevent conflict among the
as we have said time and again, procedure is one thing and
different courts which otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so,
jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney-General
the Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of jurisdiction
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
— Act No. 136, 11Section 56, No. 5 — confers upon Courts of First
The cited Rule provides:
Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the
place of residence of the deceased. Since, however, there are
Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the many courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject-
Court of First Instance in the Province in which he resides at the matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased
the Court of First Instance of the province in which he had estate. person shall be settled is properly called "venue".
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends
the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.
on the place of residence, of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance
jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)8 of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts."
A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between courts of decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance
equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction — indicates that the court with whom the petition with the testator's testamentary disposition.
is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order
to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental 12 with facts analogous to the present case 13 is authority against
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the respondent appellate court's questioned decision.
decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent
obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their
In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings
minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that
over intestate proceedings in this wise:
the decedent died intestatemay be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of
the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the
second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect
last will. the distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in
accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance
with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the
2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a
settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in
motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance
accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate
its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
its action on the petition for probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu court's
take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.
order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court,
Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate
then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition
proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that
which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of
the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of
jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by
the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that
its act of deference, the Cebu court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the
state an administrator had already been appointed, the latter
question between the parties whether the decedent's residence at the time of his
being required to render final account and turn over the estate in
death was in Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu
his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This
City as claimed by respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline
however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the
to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the
alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall
Quezon City court, unless the latter would make a negative finding as to
continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear
the probate petition and the residence of the decedent within its territory and
indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority
venue.
over intestate proceedings. 14

3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without
The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in this case,
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of
the Quezon City court) although opining that certain considerations therein "would
the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court.
seem to support the view that [therein respondent] should have submitted said will
for probate to the Negros Court, [in this case, the Cebu court] either in a separate
Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under pending Special Proceeding No. 6344," 15 thus:
Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate of the
decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the
court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule
Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the
of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and
Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter
coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not
the proper venuetherefor.
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it
and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely
Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of
a waivable procedural defect, and, in the light of the
said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion,
and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to raise such
Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to
court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the existence of
hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961
appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed
in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was resolution on the basis of ample evidence to be submitted in the
served with notice of the existence (presence) of the alleged last ordinary course of procedure in the first instance, particularly in
will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its view of the fact that the deceased was better known as the
probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Senator from Cebu and the will purporting to be his also gives
Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special Cebu, besides Quezon City, as his residence. We reiterate that this
Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on matter requires airing in the proper court, as so indicated in the
April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special leading and controlling case of Borja vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et
Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to al., G.R. L-7792, July 27, 1955.
intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all the
proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling the Manila
In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of
Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed
the intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to the testate proceedings filed
but also to admit said will to probate more than five months
with the Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court to determine
earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him
the residence of the decedent and whether he did leave a last will and testament
now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the
upon which would depend the proper venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu or
will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had
Quezon City. The Quezon City court having thus determined in effect for both courts
in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his
— at the behest and with the deference and consent of the Cebu court —
negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court is
that Quezon City was the actual residence of the decedent who died testate and
not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court
therefore the proper venue, the Borja ruling would seem to have no applicability. It
even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net
would not serve the practical ends of justice to still require the Cebu court, if the
result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some
Borja ruling is to be held applicable and as indicated in the decision under review, to
other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the
determine for itself the actual residence of the decedent (when the Quezon City
present where the objection against said proceedings is raised too
court had already so determined Quezon City as the actual residence at the Cebu
late. 16
court's behest and respondents have not seriously questioned this factual finding
based on documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court should likewise determine
5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City Quezon City as the actual residence, or its contrary finding reversed on appeal, only
court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of the will then to allow petitioner-widow after years of waiting and inaction to institute the
duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was corresponding proceedings in Quezon City.
the first choiceof residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and
domicile therein — with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court —
7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is taken
could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the original case. The
into consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the petition for allowance of
last paragraph of said Rule expressly provides:
a will must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such "jurisdictional facts" in probate
proceedings, as held by the Court in Fernando vs. Crisostomo 18 " are the death of
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left
shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal his estate in such province."
from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)
This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that
"(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as a pre-
The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the requisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the whole world, and
record" could probably be properly invoked, had such deference in comity of the when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody,
Cebu court to the Quezon City court not appeared in the record, or had the record even against the State. The probate of a will by a court having jurisdiction thereof is
otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken cognizance of the petition before it conclusive as to its due execution and validity." 19 The Quezon City court acted
and assumed jurisdiction. regularly within its jurisdiction (even if it were to be conceded that Quezon City was
not the proper venue notwithstanding the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to
it,) in admitting the decedent's last will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as
6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the late
executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's action should not be set aside by a
senator, the appellate court while recognizing that "the issue is a legitimate one"
writ of prohibition for supposed lack of jurisdiction as per the appellate court's
held in reliance on Borja vs. Tan 17 that.
appealed decision, and should instead be sustained in line with Uriarte, supra,
where the Court, in dismissing the certiorari petition challenging the Manila court's
... The issue of residence comes within the competence of action admitting the decedent's will to probate and distributing the estate in
whichever court is considered to prevail in the exercise jurisdiction accordance therewith in the second proceeding, held that "it must be remembered
- in this case, the Court of First Instance of Cebu as held by this that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court
Court. Parenthetically, we note that the question of the residence even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to
of the deceased is a serious one, requiring both factual and legal have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction." As
stressed by Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa, supra, "the mischievous effect in the 10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not
administration of justice" of considering the question of residence as affecting the act without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in declining to take
jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all cognizance of the intestate petition and instead deferring to the testateproceedings
over again the same proceedings before another court of the same rank in another filed just a week later by petitioner as surviving widow and designated executrix of
province "is too obvious to require comment." the decedent's last will, since the record before it (the petitioner's opposition and
motion to dismiss) showed the falsity of the allegation in the intestate petition that
the decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that respondents never
8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of the
challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order of 10 April
decedent's relatives gets first to file a petition for settlement of the decedent's
1964 deferring to the probate proceedings before the Quezon City court, thus
estate, then the established jurisprudence of the Court that Rule 73, section 1
leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of deference) to exercise
provides only a rule of venue in order to preclude different courts which may
jurisdiction and admit the decedent's will to probate.
properly assume jurisdiction from doing so and creating conflicts between them to
the detriment of the administration of justice, and that venue is waivable, would be
set at naught. As between relatives who unfortunately do not see eye to eye, it For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted
would be converted into a race as to who can file the petition faster in the court of without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the decedent's
his/her choice regardless of whether the decedent is still in cuerpo presente and in will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in accordance with its
disregard of the decedent's actual last domicile, the fact that he left a last will and testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled doctrine that the provisions of
testament and the right of his surviving widow named as executrix thereof. Such Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule of venue, not of jurisdiction.
dire consequences were certainly not intended by the Rule nor would they be in
consonance with public policy and the orderly administration of justice.
Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order
of May 15, 1964 admitting the will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix
9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under all the thereof, and said court concededly has jurisdiction to issue said order, the said
applicable rules of venue, and despite the fact that the Cebu court (where order of probate has long since become final and can not be overturned in a special
respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed an intestate petition in the Cebu court earlier civic action of prohibition.
by a week's time on 5 March 1964) deferred to the Quezon City court where
petitioner had within fifteen days (on March 12, 1964) after the decedent's death
11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its
(on February 25, 1964) timely filed the decedent's last will and petitioned for letters
supervisory authority over all inferior courts, 22 it may properly determine, as it has
testamentary and is admittedly entitled to preference in the administration of her
done in the case at bar, that venue was properly assumed by and transferredto
husband's estate, 20 would be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go
the Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice and in avoidance of
all the way to Cebu and submit anew the decedent's will there for probate either in
needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the testate
a new proceeding or by asking that the intestate proceedings be convertedinto
estate of the decedent (with the due deference and consent of the Cebu court) and
a testate proceeding — when under the Rules, the proper venue for
its admission to probate of his last will and testament and appointment of
the testate proceedings, as per the facts of record and as already affirmed by the
petitioner-widow as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the decedent's
Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent and petitioner-widow had
express will and all its orders and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it
their conjugal domicile.
be approved and authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had
and to repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court only to
It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to revert once more to the Quezon City court should the Cebu court find that indeed
be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance therewith, and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the strength of
and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to incontrovertible documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal
require her to spend much more time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon residence of the decedent.
City to the Cebu court everytime she has an important matter of the estate to take
up with the probate court.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari and prohibition with
It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule 73, preliminary injunction originally filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-
section 2, 21 since petitioner's marriage has been dissolved with the death of her G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered dismissed. No costs.
husband, their community property and conjugal estate have to be administered
and liquidated in the estate proceedings of the deceased spouse. Under the
appealed decision, notwithstanding that petitioner resides in Quezon City, and the
proper venue of the testate proceeding was in Quezon City and the Quezon City
court properly took cognizance and exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the
deference in comity and consent of the Cebu court, such proper exercise of
jurisdiction would be nullified and petitioner would have to continually leave her
residence in Quezon City and go to Cebu to settle and liquidate
even her own community property and conjugal estate with the decedent.
G.R. No. 124715 January 24, 2000 Subsequently, Rufina Luy Lim filed a verified amended petition9 which contained the
following averments:
RUFINA LUY LIM, petitioner,
vs. 3. The late Pastor Y. Lim personally owned during his lifetime the following
COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA CORPORATION, SPEED business entities, to wit:
DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE MARKETING
CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY, INC. respondents.
Business
Address:
Entity
May a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and be included in
the inventory of the estate of a deceased person?
xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner disputes before us through the instant petition for review on certiorari, Alliance Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF Homes,
the decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 18 April 1996, in CA-GR SP No. Marketing, Inc. Parañaque, Metro Manila.
38617, which nullified and set aside the orders dated 04 July 19952 , 12 September
19953 and 15 September 19954 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch xxx xxx xxx
93, sitting as a probate court.
Speed
910 Barrio Niog, Aguinaldo
Distributing
Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate Highway, Bacoor, Cavite.
Inc.
is the subject of probate proceedings in Special Proceedings Q-95-23334, entitled,
"In Re: Intestate Estate of Pastor Y. Lim Rufina Luy Lim, represented by George xxx xxx xxx
Luy, Petitioner".1âwphi1.nêt
Auto Truck TBA 2251 Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon
Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed Corp. City.
Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action Company are corporations
formed, organized and existing under Philippine laws and which owned real xxx xxx xxx
properties covered under the Torrens system.
Active
Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF Homes,
Distributors,
On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving Parañaque, Metro Manila.
Inc.
spouse and duly represented by her nephew George Luy, fried on 17 March 1995, a
joint petition5 for the administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim before the xxx xxx xxx
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Action 100 20th Avenue Murphy,
Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the inventory of Company Quezon City or 92-D Mc-Arthur
the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion6 for the lifting of lis pendens and Highway Valenzuela Bulacan.
motion7 for exclusion of certain properties from the estate of the decedent.
3.1 Although the above business entities dealt and engaged in
In an order8 dated 08 June 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch business with the public as corporations, all their capital, assets
93, sitting as a probate court, granted the private respondents' twin motions, in this and equity were however, personally owned by the late Pastor Y
wise: Lim. Hence the alleged stockholders and officers appearing in the
respective articles of incorporation of the above business entities
Wherefore, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to lift, were mere dummies of Pastor Y. Lim, and they were listed therein
expunge or delete the annotation of lis pendens on Transfer Certificates of only for purposes of registration with the Securities and Exchange
Title Nos. 116716, 116717, 116718, 116719 and 5182 and it is hereby Commission.
further ordered that the properties covered by the same titles as well as
those properties by (sic) Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 613494, 363123, 4. Pastor Lim, likewise, had Time, Savings and Current Deposits with the
236236 and 263236 are excluded from these proceedings. following banks: (a) Metrobank, Grace Park, Caloocan City and Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City Branches and (b) First Intestate Bank (formerly
SO ORDERED. Producers Bank), Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation and in other banks
whose identities are yet to be determined.
5. That the following real properties, although registered in the name of The issue precisely raised by the petitioner in her petition is whether the
the above entities, were actually acquired by Pastor Y. Lim during his corporations are the mere alter egos or instrumentalities of Pastor Lim,
marriage with petitioner, to wit: Otherwise (sic) stated, the issue involves the piercing of the corporate veil,
a matter that is clearly within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court and
not the Securities and Exchange Commission. Thus, in the case of Cease
Corporation Title Location vs. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 483, the crucial issue decided by the regular
court was whether the corporation involved therein was the mere extension
xxx xxx xxx of the decedent. After finding in the affirmative, the Court ruled that the
assets of the corporation are also assets of the estate.
k. Auto Truck TCT No. 617726 Sto. Domingo TBA
Corporation Cainta, Rizal
A reading of P.D. 902, the law relied upon by oppositors, shows that the
q. Alliance Marketing TCT No. 27896 Prance, Metro Manila SEC's exclusive (sic) applies only to intra-corporate controversy. It is
simply a suit to settle the intestate estate of a deceased person who,
during his lifetime, acquired several properties and put up corporations as
Copies of the above-mentioned Transfer Certificate of Title and/or Tax his instrumentalities.
Declarations are hereto attached as Annexes "C" to "W".
SO ORDERED.
xxx xxx xxx
On 15 September 1995, the probate court acting on an ex parte motion filed by
7. The aforementioned properties and/or real interests left by the late petitioner, issued an order13 the dispositive portion of which reads:
Pastor Y. Lim, are all conjugal in nature, having been acquired by him
during the existence of his marriage with petitioner. Wherefore, the parties and the following banks concerned herein under
enumerated are hereby ordered to comply strictly with this order and to
8. There are other real and personal properties owned by Pastor Y. Lim produce and submit to the special administrators, through this Honorable
which petitioner could not as yet identify. Petitioner, however will submit to Court within (5) five days from receipt of this order their respective records
this Honorable Court the identities thereof and the necessary documents of the savings/current accounts/time deposits and other deposits in the
covering the same as soon as possible. names of Pastor Lim and/or corporations above-mentioned, showing all the
transactions made or done concerning savings/current accounts from
January 1994 up to their receipt of this court order.
On 04 July 1995, the Regional Trial Court acting on petitioner's motion issued an
order10 , thus:
xxx xxx xxx

Wherefore, the order dated 08 June 1995 is hereby set aside and the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to reinstate the SO ORDERED.
annotation of lis pendens in case said annotation had already been deleted
and/or cancelled said TCT Nos. 116716, 116717, 116718, 116719 and Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari14 , with an urgent prayer
51282. for a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, before the Court of Appeals
questioning the orders of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a probate court.
Further more (sic), said properties covered by TCT Nos. 613494, 365123,
236256 and 236237 by virtue of the petitioner are included in the instant On 18 April 1996, the Court of Appeals, finding in favor of herein private
petition. respondents, rendered the assailed decision15 , the decretal portion of which
declares:
SO ORDERED.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant special civil action
On 04 September 1995, the probate court appointed Rufina Lim as special for certiorari is hereby granted, The impugned orders issued by respondent
administrator11 and Miguel Lim and Lawyer Donald Lee, as co-special administrators court on July 4, 1995 and September 12, 1995 are hereby nullified and set
of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, after which letters of administration were accordingly aside. The impugned order issued by respondent on September 15, 1995 is
issued. nullified insofar as petitioner corporations" bank accounts and records are
concerned.

In an order12 dated 12 September 1995, the probate court denied anew private
respondents' motion for exclusion, in this wise: SO ORDERED.
Through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, herein petitioner Rufina provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the
Luy Lim now comes before us with a lone assignment of personal property, estate or amount of the demand does not
error16 : exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in Metro
Manila where such personal property, estate or amount of the
demand does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
The respondent Court of Appeals erred in reversing the orders of the lower
(P200,000), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
court which merely allowed the preliminary or provisional inclusion of the
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs, the amount of which
private respondents as part of the estate of the late deceased (sic) Pastor
must be specifically alleged, Provided, that interest, damages of
Y. Lim with the respondent Court of Appeals arrogating unto itself the
whatever kind, attorney's, litigation expenses and costs shall be
power to repeal, to disobey or to ignore the clear and explicit provisions of
included in the determination of the filing fees, Provided further,
Rules 81,83,84 and 87 of the Rules of Court and thereby preventing the
that where there are several claims or causes of actions between
petitioner, from performing her duty as special administrator of the estate
the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint,
as expressly provided in the said Rules.
the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all
the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action
Petitioner's contentions tread on perilous grounds. arose out of the same or different transactions;

In the instant petition for review, petitioner prays that we affirm the orders issued xxx xxx xxx
by the probate court which were subsequently set aside by the Court of Appeals.
Simply put, the determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters of
Yet, before we delve into the merits of the case, a review of the rules on jurisdiction probate depends upon the gross value of the estate of the decedent.
over probate proceedings is indeed in order.
As to the power and authority of the probate court, petitioner relies heavily on the
The provisions of Republic Act 769117 , which introduced amendments to Batas principle that a probate court may pass upon title to certain properties, albeit
Pambansa Blg. 129, are pertinent: provisionally, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or
should not be included in the inventory.
Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
"Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as In a litany of cases, We defined the parameters by which the court may extend its
follows: probing arms in the determination of the question of title in probate proceedings.

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise This Court, in PASTOR, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,18 held:
exclusive jurisdiction:
. . . As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the
xxx xxx xxx probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the
value of the estate exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is
in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000);
We reiterated the rule in PEREIRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS19 :
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be
Sec. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows: included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate court.
However, the court's determination is only provisional in character, not
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action which
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. — may be instituted by the parties.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
Further, in MORALES vs. CFI OF CAVITE20 citing CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE21 , We made
an exposition on the probate court's limited jurisdiction:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate
proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of
It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings . . . . In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a
whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to property covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence
to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be
properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is
the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as
If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named
administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action in the title. . . .
for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the
probate court cannot do so.
A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong compelling evidence was ever
presented by petitioner to bolster her bare assertions as to the title of the deceased
Again, in VALERA vs. INSERTO22 , We had occasion to elucidate, through Mr. Justice Pastor Y. Lim over the properties. Even so, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, "The
Andres Narvasa23 : Property Registration Decree", proscribes collateral attack on Torrens Title, hence:

Settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), xxx xxx xxx
acting as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has
no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. — A certificate of title
claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant
shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or
and all other parties having legal interest in the property consent,
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate
court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby
prejudiced, the reason for the exception being that the question of whether In CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE, where similarly as in the case at bar, the property
or not a particular matter should be resolved by the court in the exercise of subject of the controversy was duly registered under the Torrens system, We
its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g. categorically stated:
probate, land registration, etc.), is in reality not a jurisdictional but in
essence of procedural one, involving a mode of practice which may be . . . Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in
waived. . . . the possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer
certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent
. . . . These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and
Torrens title is not in the decedent's name but in others, a situation on excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the
which this Court has already had occasion to rule . . . . (emphasis Ours) estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession
and ownership of the property. . . .
Petitioner, in the present case, argues that the parcels of land covered under the
Torrens system and registered in the name of private respondent corporations Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the Late
should be included in the inventory of the estate of the decedent Pastor Y. Lim, Pastor Y. Lim are in the possession of and are registered in the name of private
alleging that after all the determination by the probate court of whether these respondent corporations, which under the law possess a personality separate and
properties should be included or not is merely provisional in nature, thus, not distinct from their stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil
conclusive and subject to a final determination in a separate action brought for the of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of
purpose of adjudging once and for all the issue of title. private respondents should stand undisturbed.

Yet, under the peculiar circumstances, where the parcels of land are registered in Accordingly, the probate court was remiss in denying private respondents' motion
the name of private respondent corporations, the jurisprudence pronounced for exclusion. While it may be true that the Regional Trial Court, acting in a
in BOLISAY vs., ALCID 24 is of great essence and finds applicability, thus: restricted capacity and exercising limited jurisdiction as a probate court, is
competent to issue orders involving inclusion or exclusion of certain properties in
the inventory of the estate of the decedent, and to adjudge, albeit, provisionally the
It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting
question of title over properties, it is no less true that such authority conferred upon
to support her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have
by law and reinforced by jurisprudence, should be exercised judiciously, with due
a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with
regard and caution to the peculiar circumstances of each individual case.
incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in
the law itself, which of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as
a mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly registered under the Torrens
deceased persons. . . . system in the name of private respondents, and as such were to be afforded the
presumptive conclusiveness of title, the probate court obviously opted to shut its
eyes to this gleamy fact and still proceeded to issue the impugned orders.
By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the probate court in effect acted in utter Further, the test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil
disregard of the presumption of conclusiveness of title in favor of private of corporate fiction is as follows: 1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock
respondents. Certainly, the probate court through such brazen act transgressed the control, but complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and business
clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence on this matter. practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to this
transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own; (2) Such
control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to
Moreover, petitioner urges that not only the properties of private respondent
perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and
corporations are properly part of the decedent's estate but also the private
unjust act in contravention of plaintiffs legal right; and (3) The aforesaid control and
respondent corporations themselves. To rivet such flimsy contention, petitioner
breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of. The
cited that the late Pastor Y. Lim during his lifetime, organized and wholly-owned the
absence of any of these elements prevent "piercing the corporate veil".32
five corporations, which are the private respondents in the instant case.25 Petitioner
thus attached as Annexes "F"26 and "G"27 of the petition for review affidavits
executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao which among others, contained Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all
averments that the incorporators of Uniwide Distributing, Inc. included on the list of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for
had no actual and participation in the organization and incorporation of the said disregarding the fiction of separate corporate personalities.33
corporation. The affiants added that the persons whose names appeared on the
articles of incorporation of Uniwide Distributing, Inc., as incorporators thereof, are
Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the
mere dummies since they have not actually contributed any amount to the capital
wrong-doing must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be presumed.34
stock of the corporation and have been merely asked by the late Pastor Y. Lim to
affix their respective signatures thereon.
Granting arguendo that the Regional Trial Court in this case was not merely acting
in a limited capacity as a probate court, petitioner nonetheless failed to adduce
It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct from
competent evidence that would have justified the court to impale the veil of
that of the persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the
corporate fiction. Truly, the reliance reposed by petitioner on the affidavits executed
persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal indebtedness of its
by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao is unavailing considering that the aforementioned
stockholders or those of the entities connected with it.28
documents possess no weighty probative value pursuant to the hearsay rule.
Besides it is imperative for us to stress that such affidavits are inadmissible in
Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality evidence inasmuch as the affiants were not at all presented during the course of the
distinct and separate from its stockholders or members. In the same vein, a proceedings in the lower court. To put it differently, for this Court to uphold the
corporation by legal fiction and convenience is an entity shielded by a protective admissibility of said documents would be to relegate from Our duty to apply such
mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to the persons comprising it. basic rule of evidence in a manner consistent with the law and jurisprudence.

Nonetheless, the shield is not at all times invincible. Thus, in FIRST PHILIPPINE Our pronouncement in PEOPLE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. LEONIDAS35 finds
INTERNATIONAL BANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS29 , We enunciated: pertinence:

. . . When the fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an Affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally
illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in
circumvention of statutes, the achievement or perfection of a monopoly or writing the affiant's statements, which may thus be either omitted or
generally the perpetration of knavery or crime, the veil with which the law misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is
covers and isolates the corporation from the members or stockholders who deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason,
compose it will be lifted to allow for its consideration merely as an affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiant
aggregation of individuals. . . . themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.

Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see through the protective As to the order36 of the lower court, dated 15 September 1995, the Court of Appeals
shroud which exempts its stockholders from liabilities that ordinarily, they could be correctly observed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93 acted without
subject to, or distinguishes one corporation from a seemingly separate one, were it jurisdiction in issuing said order; The probate court had no authority to demand the
not for the existing corporate fiction.30 production of bank accounts in the name of the private respondent corporations.

The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced when a WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby
corporation is just but the alter ego of a person or of another corporation. Where DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals which nullified
badges of fraud exist, where public convenience is defeated; where a wrong is and set aside the orders issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, acting as a
sought to be justified thereby, the corporate fiction or the notion of legal entity probate court, dated 04 July 1995 and 12 September 1995 is AFFIRMED.SO
should come to naught.31 ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976 In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of
administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance of
Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding
the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern
Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl, petitioners,
Luzon.
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and
AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents. On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for
the Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This
supplemental petition modified the original petition in four aspects: (1) the
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976
allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was
elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner, last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the
vs. names of Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G.
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAÑO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as
Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, respondents. heir in the original petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and
that she has expressly renounced her preferential right to the
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that
"resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the regular administratrix. The admission
the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means. of this supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the
Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special administrator is reason, among others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the Court of
sought to be reviewed. First Instance of Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at the
beginning because the original petition was deficient.

On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and
letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter supplemental petitions for letters of administration, raising the issues of
alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of
Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as special
and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the administratrix.
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973,
even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion. praying for authority to take possession of properties of the decedent
allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure cash advances
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
1973, contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation
administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special administratrix, viz., "to
petition for letters of administration has been served upon all persons making an inventory of the personal and real properties making up the
interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in the state of the deceased."
proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving
spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order,
special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of
Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973, appointing
appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the
and as regular administratrix after due hearing. supplementation petition of May 18,1973.

While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition,
Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has
Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3)
raised in the motion for reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that her Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to inherit
appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.
incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest
against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to
administratrix and as officer of the court.
substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, reasoning that the said
Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the court that she is a full-blooded they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal
sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction;
the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no relation. (d) appointment, qualification and removal of special administratrix; and
(e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks and papers and effects
in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one,
Association, Inc.
to enjoin the special administratrix from taking possession of properties in
the hands of third persons which have not been determined as belonging to
Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the special administratrix for acting On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying
outside her authority and against the interest of the estate; and still Preciosa B. Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July
another, filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the 19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three questioned orders: one,
petition for want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue. directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special
administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and final liquidation of
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion
sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her the corresponding amount due the
of Virgina G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia.
estate; another, directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule
Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the powers of the
two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the estate; and another,
special administratrix are those provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the
directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of title in his
Rules of Court, 1subject only to the previous qualification made by the court
possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with the
that the administration of the properties subject of the marketing
word "single" or "married to Amado Garcia."
agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association should remain with the latter; and that the special
administratrix had already been authorized in a previous order of August During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C)
20, 1973 to take custody and possession of all papers and certificates of before Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of
title and personal effects of the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his death was
Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the residence
Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months before his
ordered to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that
without any qualifying words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death,
appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the issue and that he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the
of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, first district of Laguna.
denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the appointment of
Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the failure of
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a
Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for letters of administration
special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction
in the place of residence of the decedent at the time of his death was
before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily
cured. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to
to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the
the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by
Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the alternative, to vacate the
praying to be appointed as special and regular administratrix of the estate.
questioned four orders of that court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974,
denying their motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to dismiss the criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among
to clarify or reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of others, of jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974,
previous court order limiting the authority of the special administratrix to directing the delivery of certain properties to the special administratrix,
the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also asked for the resolution Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.
of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of action, and also
that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her motions to
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling
substitute and remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed for.
the proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the
Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first,
denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and remove the special
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G.
administratrix, and the second, holding that the power allowed the special
Fule forthwith elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case
administratrix enables her to conduct and submit an inventory of the
was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.
assets of the estate.

However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the
Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a
foregoing orders of November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as
petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On February 10, 1975, Preciosa Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if
B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as special administratrix of he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the office. exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as
it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of
his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
Ericta of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the
jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to letters of
Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of the proceedings
administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands
therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975. She manifested,
that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the existence of
however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the
jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the
decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings before the Court
necessary facts, such as death, the name and last residence of the
of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final,
decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where
it being the subject of a motion for reconsideration.
this is relied upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration, as
next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings intestate and his last residence within the country are foundation facts
before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of the final upon which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate
outcome of the case pending before the Court of Appeals. This rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time
notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an of his death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on
"Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations." the court to grant letters of administration. 3

On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the
Question Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention that location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule
the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying the motion indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It
for reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that the parties had could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter,
already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is still pending because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with
before the Court. procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is
another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is not
Ericta, issued an order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the
Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments were for the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if
benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law,
of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally.
Laguna. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that
the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a
12,1976. strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a the parties. 5
petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the
proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance
Paño from further acting in the case. A restraining order was issued on jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the
February 9, 1976. deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the
country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place where
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in
in G.R. No. L-42670 for the reasons and considerations hereinafter stated. settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does
not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely
constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
properly considers the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba,
settled as "venue." 6 Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was
at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for
Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it
Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is
refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death?
that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the
We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual
Revised Rules of Court states: "When improper venue is not objected to in a motion
residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides,"
to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had
like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the
reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix,
light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the
Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or
application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
venue assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a
Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.
mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse,
Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the
residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction
proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." 8 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its 4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9Residence simply requires including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator
must be more than temporary. 11 was only proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The
new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and such appointment is
now allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the
administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among
residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original
themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not
petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Calamba,
lies in the probate court. 15 That, however, is no authority for the judge to become
Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G.
partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to
Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila,
rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based on reason, equity,
leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places
justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and legal
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the
principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into
petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of
account in the appointment of a special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the
venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the
judge to consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular
deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he
administrator in appointing a special administrator. After all, the consideration that
also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary,
overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the
Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate presented by
estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow would have the right of
Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other papers, the last
succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her
residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision,
share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not
Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically
more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of
alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna."
kin. The good or bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than
the naked ownership of a property. 18
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G.
Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of
Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the
the late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that
decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G.
Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a
Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by
mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any successional rights. 19 On this
Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue,
point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of
Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased's residence
special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such
certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the Marketing
appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator
Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning over the
is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine who are entitled to share in
administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters
the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8,
heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the
1973, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna
court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of
distribution. 21The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a
Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8,
1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to
Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the
Constitutional Convention for the First District of Laguna filed on September 1,
1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced
with these documents and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,
Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late
Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24

5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of
Appeals, 25 this Court under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may
properly decree that venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and
transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of justice and avoidance of
needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of
special administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and authorized and the
Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the case
and instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.

6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975,
granting the "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by
Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670,
and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to her as special administratrix
the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate obligations is hereby
upheld.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R.
No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 92436 July 26, 1991 On 21 October 1967, when the heirs of Gavino Reyes executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Exh. "D") based on the aforestated subdivision
plan (Exh. "6"), the lot that was intended for Rafael Reyes, Sr., who was already
MARIA VDA. DE REYES, EFREN REYES, ELVIRA REYES-TIMBOL, ERLINDA
deceased, was instead adjudicated to his only son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr. (the
REYES-VALERIO, ERNESTO REYES, ELIZABETH REYES, ALEX, RAFAEL II,
predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners herein). Private respondent Rosario
EMELINA and EVELYN, all surnamed REYES, represented by their mother,
Martillano signed the deed in representation of her mother, Marta Reyes, one of the
MARIA VDA. DE REYES, petitioners,
children of Gavino Reyes.
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES DALMACIO GARDIOLA and
ROSARIO MARTILLANO respondents. As a result of the Extrajudicial Settlement, OCT RO-255 was cancelled and in lieu
thereof, several transfer certificates of title covering the subdivided lots were issued
in the names of the respective adjudicatees. One of them is TCT No. 27257 in the
Assailed before Us in this appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
name of Rafael Reyes, Jr. covering Lot No. 1-A-14. The Transfer Certificates of Title
the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 11934,
were, however, kept by one Candido Hebron. On 10 January 1969, some of the
promulgated on 20 October 1989,1 reversing the decision of 1 October 1986 of
heirs of Gavino Reyes filed a case of Annulment of Partition and Recovery of
Branch 21 (Imus, Cavite) of the Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region in
Possession before the Court of First Instance of Cavite City, which was docketed
Civil Case No. RTC-BCV-83-17 entitled Maria vda. de Reyes, et al. vs. Spouses
therein as Civil Case No. 1267. One of the defendants in said case is herein private
Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano, and Spouses Ricardo M. Gardiola and
respondent Rosario Martillano. The case was dismissed on 18 September 1969, but
Emelita Gardiola,2 and the resolution of 1 March 1990 denying the petitioner's
Candido Hebron was ordered by the trial court to deliver to the heirs concerned all
motion for reconsideration.
the transfer certificates of title in his possession.3

As culled from both decisions and the pleadings of the parties, the following facts
After obtaining the Transfer Certificate of Title for Lot No. 1-A-14 from Hebron,
have been preponderantly established:
pursuant to the aforesaid order in Civil Case No. 1267, petitioners herein, as
successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., filed on 14 March 1983 with the Regional
During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of approximately 70 Trial Court the above-mentioned Civil Case No. RTC-BCV-83-17 against private
hectares, more or less, located at Sangayad, Ulong-Tubig, Carmona, Cavite. He respondents (defendants therein) for recovery of possession or, in the alternative,
sought to bring said land under the operation of the Torrens System of registration for indemnification, accounting and damages. They allege therein that after "having
of property. Unfortunately, he died in 1921 without the title having been issued to definitely discovered that they are the lawful owners of the property," (Lot No. 1-A-
him. The application was prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes, who was the 14), they, "including Rafael Reyes, Jr., during his lifetime, made repeated demands
administrator of his property. to (sic) defendants to surrender the possession of and vacate the parcel of land
belonging to the former, but defendants refused to vacate and surrender the
In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs (Exh. possession of the said land to herein plaintiffs;" the last of the demands was
"6"). In the subdivision plan, each resultant lot was earmarked, indicated for and allegedly made on 8 October 1982. They further allege that they have been
assigned to a specific heir. It appears therein that two lots, one of which is Lot No. I deprived by said defendants of the rightful possession and enjoyment of the
A-14 (Exh. "6-A"), were allotted to Rafael Reyes, Sr., one of Gavino's children. Per property since September 1969 — which coincides with the date of the order in Civil
testimony of Juan Poblete, the children thereafter secured tax declarations for their Case No. 1267.4
respective shares.
In their answer, private respondents deny the material averments in the complaint
In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino, the original and assert that they are the owners of the lot in question, having bought the same
certificate of title for the whole property — OCT No. 255 — was issued. It was, from Rafael Reyes, Sr., that the issuance of TCT No. 27257 is null and void, for such
however, kept by Juan Poblete, son-in-law of Marcelo Reyes, who was by then sale was known to Rafael Reyes, Jr.; that they have been in possession of the
already deceased. The heirs of Gavino were not aware of this fact. property and have been paying the land taxes thereon; and that petitioners are
barred by prescription and/or laches.5

On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area of 23,431
square meters, more or less, to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola (Exh. "5"). Petitioners amended their complaint on 21 March 1985 to implead as additional
According to the vendee, this parcel corresponds to Lot No. 1-A-14 of the defendants the spouses Ricardo M. Gardiola and Emerita Gardiola, on the basis of
subdivision plan aforestated. The deed of sale, however, did not specifically mention the following claims:
Lot No. 1-A-14. The vendee immediately took possession of the property and
started paying the land taxes therein. xxx xxx xxx

In 1945 or thereabouts, Juan Poblete "revalidated" the original Certificate of Title. 9. Meanwhile, during the presentation of the defendants spouses Dalmacio
As reconstituted, the new title is OCT (0-4358) RO-255 (Exhs. "4" to "4-A"). Gardiola and Rosario Martillano's evidence the former testified that they
mortgaged the subject land to the Rural Bank of Carmona Inc. For their Private respondents appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals which
failure to redeem the mortgage the same was foreclosed by the bank. docketed the appeal as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 11934. In its decision of 20 October 1989,
the respondent Court of Appeals formulated the issues before it as follows:
10. However, within the period of one(1) year from such foreclosure the
questioned land was redeemed by the original defendants' son in the I
person of Ricardo M. Gardiola, who was knowledgeable/aware of the
pendency of the above captioned case. The corresponding redemption was
Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring that the property of the
effected through a deed of conveyance, . . . .6
late Gavino Reyes consisting of 70 hectares was partitioned only in 1967 by
his grandchildren after discovery of the existence of OCT No. 255 and that
The prayer of the amended complaint now contains the alternative relief for no actual partition was made in 1936 by the decedent's children.
indemnification for the reasonable value of the property "in the event restitution of
the property is no longer possible."7
II

In its decision of 1 October 1986,8 the trial court concluded that petitioners' "title
Whether or not the lower court erred in concluding that the parcel of land
over the subject property is valid and regular and thus they are entitled to its
sold by the appellees' predecessor-in-interest, the late Rafael Reyes, Sr. to
possession and enjoyment," and accordingly decided thus:
appellant Dalmacio Gardiola was not the same parcel of land under
litigation.10
WHEREFORE, the defendants or anyone acting for and in their behalf are
hereby ordered to relinguish possession or vacate the property in question
and resolved such issues, thus:
which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 in favor of the
plaintiffs.
On the first issue, We believe that the lower court committed a reversible
error when it declared that the landed estate of the late Gavino Reyes was
All other claims and/or counterclaims of the parties relative to this case are
partitioned only in 1967 by the latter's grandchildren; and that no actual
dismissed for lack of proper substantiation.
partition was made in 1936 by the decedents' (sic) children. The evidence
on record bears out the existence of a subdivision plan (Exh. 6) which was
The conclusion of the trial court is based on its finding that (a) there is no evidence not controverted nor denied by the appellees. In like manner, the lower
that the heirs of Gavino Reyes entered into any written agreement of partition in court itself recognized the fact that the property of the late Gavino Reyes
1936 based on the subdivision plan; (b) there is no identity between Lot No. 1-14-A consisting of 70 hectares was surveyed and subdivided in 1936 as
and the land sold to private respondents by Rafael Reyes, Sr., or otherwise stated, evidenced by the said subdivision plan (Exh. 6). With the existence of a
the description of the latter as indicated in the deed of sale (Exh. "5") does not tally subdivision plan, and from the uncontroverted testimony of appellants'
with the description of the former; and (c) moreover: witness, We can only infer that at least an oral partition, which under the
law is valid and binding, was entered into by the heirs of Gavino Reyes
regarding his properties in 1936. As held in a long line of decisions,
Granting, arguendo, that the sale made by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to the
extrajudicial partition can be done orally, and the same would be valid if
defendants covered the land in question — Lot No. 1-A-14 — and that
freely entered into (Belen v. Belen, 49 O.G. 997, March 1953). The reason
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 was obtained by means of fraud,
for this is because a partition is not exactly a conveyance for the reason
the claim of the defendants over the said property is already barred. Action
that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the other but
for reconveyance prescribes in four (4) years from the discovery thereof. If
rather a confirmation by them of their ownership of the property. It must
there was fraud, the defendant could have discovered the same
also be remembered that when Gavino Reyes died on March 7, 1921, his
in 1967 when the partition was made in as much as defendant Rosario
property was admittedly not yet covered by a torrens title, as it was only in
Martillano was a party to that partition. Let us grant further that the
1941 when said properties were brought into the application of the torrens
issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 to Rafael Reyes, Jr.
system. With this factual milieu, it can also be concluded that his heirs
created a constructive or implied trust in favor of the defendants, again,
have indeed settled, subdivided and partitioned Gavino Reyes' landed
the claim of the defendants is also barred. From 1967 to the filing of their
estate without formal requirements of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court when a
answer (let us consider this as an action for reconveyance) to this case
parcel of land is covered by a torrens title. As told earlier, the Subdivision
sometime in July, 1983, a period of about sixteen (16) years had already
Plan (Exh. 6) undisputedly showed on its face that the 70 hectares of land
elapsed. Prescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on implied or
belonging to the late Gavino Reyes was subdivided and partitioned by his
constructive trust is ten (10) years.
children in 1936. On this score, the partition of the said property even
without the formal requirements under the rule is valid as held in the case
The trial court further held that the continued possession by private respondents, of Hernandez vs. Andal, 78 Phil. 176, which states:
which it found to have started in 1943, did not ripen into ownership because at that
time, the property was already registered, hence it cannot be acquired by
xxx xxx xxx
prescription or adverse possession.9
Moreover, in the Deed of Sale dated December 3, 1943 (Exh. 5) executed could have easily indicated Lot No. 1-A-14" is bereft of merit under the
by Rafael Reyes, Sr. in favor of appellant Dalmacio Gardiola, the land sold foregoing circumstances. Interestingly enough, the appellees never denied
therein was described as "na aking minana sa aking ama." This alone the identity of the subject lot during the hearing at the lower court. What
would confirm the contention of the appellants that there was already an they were denying only was the sale made by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to
actual partition (at least an oral partition) of the property of Gavino Reyes appellant Dalmacio Gardiola which does not hold true because of the
in 1936. As aforestated, the presence of the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) is an document denominated as Deed of Sale (Exh. 5).11
(sic) evidence of such partition which appellees failed to controvert not to
mention the fact that the lower court itself recognized the existence of said
It concluded that the trial court erred when it ordered the private respondents or
plan, in the same manner that it concluded that the property was already
anyone acting in their behalf to relinquish the possession or vacate the property in
surveyed and actually subdivided in 1936 (page 3, pars. 3 and 4,
question. It thus decreed:
Decision).

WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment is ordered REVERSED and SET ASIDE


From the foregoing considerations it is evident that the Deed of
and a new one is rendered declaring appellants to be the lawful owners of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Exh. D) executed by the grandchildren
the lot identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257. No
of the late Gavino Reyes in 1967 is of no moment considering that the
costs.12
property subject of the partition in the deed was already partitioned in
1936 by the children of Gavino Reyes. It is for this reason that the lots
supposedly inherited by the grandchildren named in the deed of 1967 were Their motion to reconsider the above decision having been denied by the Court of
the same lots inherited and given to their respective fathers or mothers in Appeals in its resolution of 1 March 1990,13 petitioners filed the instant petition on 6
1936 while the land was not yet covered by the torrens system. Hence, in April 1990 after having obtained an extension of time within which to file it.
the case of Rafael Reyes, Sr., the land inherited by him was two (2) parcels
of land known as Lots Nos. 1-A-3 and 1-A-14 described in the Subdivision The petition does not implead original new defendants Ricardo Gardiola and Emelita
plan of 1936 (Exh. 6), which were the same parcels of land allegedly Gardiola.
inherited by Rafael Reyes, Jr. from Gavino Reyes in representation of his
father, pursuant to the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate for which
TCT No. 27257 was issued. As ground for their plea for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
petitioners allege that said court has decided questions of substance in a way not in
accord with law or applicable jurisprudence when it held that "the deed of
Coming to the second issue, the lower court likewise erred when it extrajudicial settlement of estate (Exh. "D") executed by the grandchildren of the
concluded that the parcel of land sold by appellee's predecessor-in-interest late Gavino Reyes in 1967 is of no moment considering that the property subject of
to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola was not the same parcel of land under the partition was already partitioned in 1936 by the children of Gavino Reyes." In
litigation. It must be pointed out that the identity of the parcel of land support thereof, they claim that (a) TCT No. 27257 covers two parcels of land; the
which the appellees sought to recover from the appellants was never an lot described in paragraph 1 thereof is owned by petitioners and that ownership was
issue in the lower court, because the litigants had already conceded that confirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 79882, hence, the Court of Appeals should have
the parcel identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257 was the same affirmed the decision of the trial court; (b) private respondent Rosario Martillano
parcel of land identified as Cadastral Lot No. 1228 and 1235 described in was a party to the extrajudicial settlement of estate which was duly registered in
Tax Declaration No. 4766. Despite this admission, however, the lower court the Registry of Deeds in 1967; said registration is the operative act that gives
declared that "as described in the deed of sale (Exh. 5), the land's validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land and also constituted
description does not tally with the description of Lot No. 1-A-14, the land in constructive notice to the whole world. The court cannot disregard the binding effect
litigation." As correctly pointed out by the appellants however, the thereof Finally, the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals that private respondents
discrepancy in the description was due to the fact that the description of are the lawful owners of the lot in question "militates against the indefeasible and
the land sold in the Deed of Sale was expressed in layman's language incontrovertible character of the torrens title,"14 and allows reconveyance which is
whereas the description of Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257 was done in not tenable since the action therefor had already prescribed, as stated in the
technical terms. This was so because, when Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold the decision of the trial court.
property in dispute to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola on December 3, 1943,
the only evidence of title to the land then available in so far as Rafael
Reyes, Sr. was concerned was Tax Declaration No. 4766, because at that In the resolution of 7 May 1990, We required respondents to comment on the
time, neither he nor appellant Dalmacio Gardiola was aware of the petition. But even before it could do so, petitioner, without obtaining prior leave of
existence of OCT No. 255 as in fact TCT No. 27257 was issued only in the Court, filed on 29 May 1990 a so-called Supplemental Arguments in Support of
1967. Consequently, the land subject of the Deed of Sale was described by The Petition For Review On certiorari15 wherein they assert, among others, that: (a)
the vendor in the manner as described in Tax Declaration No. 4766. the findings of facts of respondent Court are contrary to those of the trial court and
However, the description of the land appearing in the Deed of Sale (Exh. 5) appear to be contradicted by the evidence on record thus calling for the review by
was exactly the same land identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in the Subdivision this Court;16 (b) it also committed misapprehension of the facts in this case and its
Plan (Exh. 6) of 1936. Accordingly, the assumption of the lower court that findings are based on speculation, conjecture and surmises; (c) private respondents'
"if the land sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. was the one now in litigation, he
attack on petitioners' title is a collateral attack which is not allowed; even if it is filed a motion for the reconsideration of the resolution of 20 August 1990.19 b) This
allowed, the same had already prescribed and is now barred. motion was denied in the resolution of 1 October 1990.20 c) On 17 November 1990,
petitioners therein, through the same lawyers, filed a Motion For Leave Of Court To
Refer Case To The Honorable Supreme Court En Banc And/Or Motion For
It was only on 15 June 1990 that private respondents filed their Comment.17 We
Reconsideration21 wherein they specifically admit that said case and the instant
required petitioners to reply thereto, which they complied with on 8 August
petition have "identity and/or similarity of the parties, the facts, the issues raised,"
1990.18 A rejoinder was filed by private respondents on 29 August 1990.
even going to the extent of "graphically" illustrating where such similarities lie.22 d)
This motion was denied in the resolution of 28 November 1990. Copy thereof was
We gave due course to the petition on 19 September 1990 and required the parties furnished the attorneys for petitioners.23 e) Entry of judgment had already been
to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda which they complied with. made therein and a copy thereof was sent to petitioner's counsel per Letter of
Transmittal of the Deputy Court and Chief of the Judicial Records Office dated 20
Attached as Annex "A" to private respondent's Memorandum, which was filed on 10 December 1990.
December 1990, is the Resolution of this Court (Third Division) of 20 August 1990 in
G.R. No. 92811 entitled Spouses Artemio Durumpili and Angustia Reyes vs. The What comes out prominently from the disquisitions of the parties is this simple
Court of Appeals and Spouses Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano, which also issue: whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error
involves the property of Gavino Reyes, the partition thereof among his children in in setting aside the decision of the trial court.
1936, and the extrajudicial settlement in 1967.
We find none. The reversal of the trial court's decision is inevitable and unavoidable
In said resolution, this Court held: because the legal and factual conclusions made by the trial court are unfounded and
clearly erroneous. The Court of Appeals was not bound to agree to such conclusions.
. . . The partition made in 1936, although oral, was valid. The requirement The trial court erred in holding that: (a) there was no partition among the children
in Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the of Gavino Reyes in 1936 since there is no written evidence in support thereof; yet,
creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over it admits that there was a survey and subdivision of the property and the
immovable property must appear in a public instrument is only for adjudication of specific subdivision lots to each of the children of Gavino; (b) the
convenience and not for validity or enforceability as between the parties land sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondents is not identical to Lot No. 1-A-
themselves. [Thunga Hui vs. Que Bentec, 2 Phil. 561 (1903)] The 14, the lot specified for and adjudicated to Rafael Reyes, Jr. in the partition
subsequent execution by the heirs of the Extrajudicial Partition in 1967 did agreement; and (c) if the land sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent
not alter the oral partition as in fact the share pertaining to Angustia Reyes Dalmacio Gardiola is indeed Lot No. 1-A-14 and that TCT No. T-27257 was obtained
corresponded to that previously assigned to her father. Considering that through fraud, the remedy open to the vendee was an action for reconveyance,
Angel Reyes sold this property to Basilio de Ocampo who, in turn, sold the which should have been brought within four (4) years from the discovery thereof in
same to respondents, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the latter 1967 when the Extrajudicial Settlement was executed since private respondent
lawfully acquired the property and are entitled to ownership and possession Rosario Martillano, wife of Dalmacio, was a party thereto.
thereof.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children of
In answer to the charge of private respondents that petitioners deliberately failed to Gavino Reyes in 1936, although oral, was valid and binding. There is no law that
cite this resolution, the latter, in their reply-memorandum dated 15 March 1991 and requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be valid.24 In Hernandez vs. Andal,
filed three days thereafter, allege: supra, this Court, interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, held that
the requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for
its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the
Our failure to mention the aforementioned resolution before this Honorable heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as
Court is not deliberate nor with malice aforethought. The reason is that to constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition
date, we have not yet received any resolution to our Motion For Leave of not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when there are
Court To Refer Case To The Honorable Supreme Court En Banc. Moreover, no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such rights are
we honestly feel that the resolution that will be issued therein will not be involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for
applicable to the case before this Honorable Court's Second Division. It distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law.
should be mentioned that in the Durumpili case before the Third Division, There is nothing in said section from which it can be inferred that a writing or other
the Court of Appeals relied on the alleged confirmation of the sale executed formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral
by Angustia Reyes, while in the Reyes case before this Second Division, partition is valid.
there was no sale that was executed by the petitioners Reyes' predecessor-
in-interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr.
Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the reason why oral partition
is valid and why it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds: partition among heirs or
The foregoing claim is not supported by the rollo of G.R. No. 92811, which reveals renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real
the following: (a) On 18 September 1990, petitioners therein, represented by De property for the reason that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the
Lara, De Lunas and Rosales, who are the lawyers of petitioners in the instant case,
other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property by the heir The participation of private respondent Rosario Gardiola in the Extrajudicial
renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance. Settlement did not place private respondents in estoppel to question the issuance of
TCT No. T-27257. As correctly maintained by private respondents, she signed it in
representation of her deceased mother, Marta Reyes, a daughter and an heir of
Additionally, the validity of such oral partition in 1936 has been expressly sustained
Gavino Reyes. She did not sign for and in behalf of her husband, Dalmacio Gardiola,
by this Court in the Resolution of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No. 92811.25
vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr.

But even if We are to assume arguendo that the oral partition executed in 1936 was
The same did not operate to divest the vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr. in
not valid for some reason or another, We would still arrive at the same conclusion
the estate of Gavino.1âwphi1Petitioners, as mere successors-in-interest of Rafael
for upon the death of Gavino Reyes in 1921, his heirs automatically became co-
Reyes, Jr., son of Rafael Reyes, Sr., can only acquire that which Rafael, Jr. could
owners of his 70-hectare parcel of land. The rights to the succession are transmitted
transmit to them upon his death. The latter never became the owner of Lot No. 1-A-
from the moment of death of the decedent.26 The estate of the decedent would then
14 because it was sold by his father in 1943. The issuance of TCT No. T-27257 in
be held in co-ownership by the heirs. The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of
the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr., in so far as Lot No. 1-14-A is concerned, was clearly
his share or interest in the property subject to the condition that the portion
erroneous because he never became its owner. An extrajudicial settlement does not
disposed of is eventually allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-
create a light in favor of an heir. As this Court stated in the Barcelona case,28 it is
ownership. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:
but a confirmation or ratification of title or right to property. Thus, since he never
had any title or right to Lot No. 1-14-A, the mere execution of the settlement did
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and not improve his condition, and the subsequent registration of the deed did not
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may even substitute another person in create any right or vest any title over the property in favor of the petitioners as
its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of heirs of Rafael Reyes, Jr. The latter cannot give them what he never had
the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be before. Nemo dare potest quod non habet.
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.
There is one more point that should be stressed here. Petitioners' immediate
predecessor-in-interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr., never took any action against private
In Ramirez vs. Bautista,27 this Court held that every co-heir has the absolute respondents from the time his father sold the lot to the latter. Neither did
ownership of his share in the community property and may alienate, assign, or petitioners bring any action to recover from private respondents the ownership and
mortgage the same, except as to purely personal rights, but the effect of any such possession of the lot from the time Rafael Reyes, Jr. died. As categorically admitted
transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon the partition of by petitioners in their complaint and amended complaint, it was only in or about
the property. September 1969 when, after the delivery of TCT No. 27257 by Candido Hebron to
them, that they definitely discovered that they were the owners of the property in
In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio question. And yet, despite full knowledge that private respondents were in actual
Gardiola is his share in the estate of his deceased father, Gavino Reyes. It is the physical possession of the property, it was only about thirteen and one-half (13 1/2)
same property which was eventually adjudicated to his son and heir, Rafael Reyes, years later that they decided to file an action for recovery of possession. As stated
Jr., represented in turn by his heirs-petitioners herein-in the extrajudicial settlement earlier, the original complaint was filed in the trial court on 14 March 1983. There
of 1967. was then absolutely no basis for the trial court to place the burden on private
respondents to bring an action for reconveyance within four (4) years from their
discovery of the issuance of the transfer certificate of title in the name of Rafael
In respect to the issue as to whether the property sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. is Reyes, Jr.
identical to Lot No. 1-14-A, the trial court based its conclusion that it is not, on his
observation that the description of the former does not tally with that of the latter,
moreover, if Rafael did intend to sell Lot No. 1-14-A, he should have specifically The instant petition then is without merit.
stated it in the deed since at that time, the property had already been partitioned
and said lot was adjudicated to him. In addition to the contrary findings and WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the petition with costs against
conclusion of the respondent Court on this issue to which We fully agree, it is to be petitioners.
stressed that Rafael had this property declared for taxation purposes and the tax
declaration issued was made the basis for the description of the property in the
SO ORDERED.
deed of sale. Upon the execution of the deed of sale, vendee — herein private
respondent Dalmacio Gardiola — immediately took possession of the property. This
is the very same property which is the subject matter of this case and which
petitioners seek to recover from the private respondents. The main evidence
adduced for their claim of ownership and possession over it is TCT No. T-27257, the
certificate of title covering Lot No. 1-14-A. They therefore admit and concede that
the property claimed by private respondent, which was acquired by sale from Rafael
Reyes, Sr., is none other than Lot No. 1-14-A.
G.R. No. 198680 July 8, 2013 The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied
on August 31, 2011 due to the counsel’s failure to state the date on which his
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was issued.14
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON,
CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y.
PEÑALOSA, PETITIONERS, Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-
vs. 2246,15 sought direct recourse to the Court through the instant petition.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.
The Issue Before the Court

This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City,
The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the
Branch 59 (RTC), through a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state
Rules of Court, raising a pure question of law. In particular, petitioners assail the
a cause of action was proper.
July 27, 20112 and August 31, 20113 Orders of the RTC, dismissing Civil Case No. T-
2246 for lack of cause of action.
The Court’s Ruling
The Facts
The petition has no merit.
On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins, filed a complaint
4

for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E. Ypon" another.16 It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by
(Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246.5 In their complaint, they alleged the allegations in the complaint.17 In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a
that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct,
leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for.18Accordingly, if the allegations
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.6 Claiming to be the sole furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should
heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the
the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their defendants.19
subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7 to the
prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in- As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs
interest.8 therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same,
prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the latter’s favor be
by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would
(c) a certified true copy of his passport.9 Further, by way of affirmative defense, he consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the
claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding
fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by the real special proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title
parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan
declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.10 v. CA,21 the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of
who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding
for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or
The RTC Ruling
possession, as in this case:

On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order,11 finding that
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed
deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an
that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in
ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property.1âwphi1 This
a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration,12 this did
must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership.
not mean that they could already be considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs.
The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of
Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is
heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made
Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory heir – through the documentary
in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court,
evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage contract between
a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special
dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport.13
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be
made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.

In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of
heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil
action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated
its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be
ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for
the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this
Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a
decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in
this case, was for the recovery of property.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the
determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as
when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial
court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the
RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon,23 or when a special proceeding
had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot
be re-opened.24

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to
exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order
to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the
dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the
same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to
the proper appreciation of the questions before it.25 Thus, concordant with
applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an
ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil
Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the
RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein discussed, be
threshed out and determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the
foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 is
hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to any subsequent proceeding to determine
the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights concomitant therewith.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 177066 September 11, 2009 SO ORDERED.4

JOSELITO MUSNI PUNO (as heir of the late Carlos Puno), Petitioner, On appeal, the CA ordered the dismissal of the complaint in its Decision dated
vs. October 11, 2006. According to the CA, petitioner was not able to establish the
PUNO ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by JESUSA PUNO, Respondent. paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno since his birth certificate was prepared
without the intervention of and the participatory acknowledgment of paternity by
Carlos L. Puno. Accordingly, the CA said that petitioner had no right to demand that
Upon the death of a stockholder, the heirs do not automatically become
he be allowed to examine respondent’s books. Moreover, petitioner was not a
stockholders of the corporation; neither are they mandatorily entitled to the rights
stockholder of the corporation but was merely claiming rights as an heir of Carlos L.
and privileges of a stockholder. This, we declare in this petition for review on
Puno, an incorporator of the corporation. His action for specific performance
certiorari of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated October 11, 2006 and
therefore appeared to be premature; the proper action to be taken was to prove the
Resolution dated March 6, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86137.
paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno in a petition for the settlement of the
estate of the latter.5
The facts of the case follow:
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution6 dated
Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an incorporator of respondent Puno March 6, 2007.
Enterprises, Inc. On March 14, 2003, petitioner Joselito Musni Puno, claiming to be
an heir of Carlos L. Puno, initiated a complaint for specific performance against
In this petition, petitioner raises the following issues:
respondent. Petitioner averred that he is the son of the deceased with the latter’s
common-law wife, Amelia Puno. As surviving heir, he claimed entitlement to the
rights and privileges of his late father as stockholder of respondent. The complaint I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
thus prayed that respondent allow petitioner to inspect its corporate book, render JOSELITO PUNO IS ENTITLED TO THE RELIEFS DEMANDED HE BEING THE HEIR OF
an accounting of all the transactions it entered into from 1962, and give petitioner THE LATE CARLOS PUNO, ONE OF THE INCORPORATORS [OF] RESPONDENT
all the profits, earnings, dividends, or income pertaining to the shares of Carlos L. CORPORATION.
Puno.2
II. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT FILIATION OF
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner did not have the JOSELITO PUNO, THE PETITIONER[,] IS NOT DULY PROVEN OR ESTABLISHED.
legal personality to sue because his birth certificate names him as "Joselito Musni
Muno." Apropos, there was yet a need for a judicial declaration that "Joselito Musni
III. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT JOSELITO MUNO AND
Puno" and "Joselito Musni Muno" were one and the same.
JOSELITO PUNO REFERS TO THE ONE AND THE SAME PERSON.

The court ordered that the proceedings be held in abeyance, ratiocinating that
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT WHAT
petitioner’s certificate of live birth was no proof of his paternity and relation to
RESPONDENT MERELY DISPUTES IS THE SURNAME OF THE PETITIONER WHICH
Carlos L. Puno.
WAS MISSPELLED AND THE FACTUAL ALLEGATION E.G. RIGHTS OF PETITIONER AS
HEIR OF CARLOS PUNO ARE DEEMED ADMITTED HYPOTHETICALLY IN THE
Petitioner submitted the corrected birth certificate with the name "Joselito M. Puno," RESPONDENT[’S] MOTION TO DISMISS.
certified by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila, and the Certificate of Finality
thereof. To hasten the disposition of the case, the court conditionally admitted the
V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THEREFORE ERRED I[N] DECREEING THAT
corrected birth certificate as genuine and authentic and ordered respondent to file
PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO INSPECT THE CORPORATE BOOKS OF
its answer within fifteen days from the order and set the case for pretrial.3
DEFENDANT CORPORATION.7

On October 11, 2005, the court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
The petition is without merit. Petitioner failed to establish the right to inspect
reads:
respondent corporation’s books and receive dividends on the stocks owned by
Carlos L. Puno.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering Jesusa Puno and/or Felicidad
Fermin to allow the plaintiff to inspect the corporate books and records of the
Petitioner anchors his claim on his being an heir of the deceased stockholder.
company from 1962 up to the present including the financial statements of the
However, we agree with the appellate court that petitioner was not able to prove
corporation.
satisfactorily his filiation to the deceased stockholder; thus, the former cannot claim
to be an heir of the latter.
The costs of copying shall be shouldered by the plaintiff. Any expenses to be
incurred by the defendant to be able to comply with this order shall be the subject
of a bill of costs.
Incessantly, we have declared that factual findings of the CA supported by the books of the corporation. Section 63 of the Corporation Code provides that no
substantial evidence, are conclusive and binding.8 In an appeal via certiorari, the transfer shall be valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded
Court may not review the factual findings of the CA. It is not the Court’s function in the books of the corporation.16 During such interim period, the heirs stand as the
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to review, examine, and evaluate or weigh the equitable owners of the stocks, the executor or administrator duly appointed by the
probative value of the evidence presented.9 court being vested with the legal title to the stock.17 Until a settlement and division
of the estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are held by the administrator or
executor.18 Consequently, during such time, it is the administrator or executor who
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
is entitled to exercise the rights of the deceased as stockholder.
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand
in the preparation of the certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to
record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person.10 As Thus, even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in this case to establish that he
correctly observed by the CA, only petitioner’s mother supplied the data in the birth is the son of Carlos L. Puno, he would still not be allowed to inspect respondent’s
certificate and signed the same. There was no evidence that Carlos L. Puno books and be entitled to receive dividends from respondent, absent any showing in
acknowledged petitioner as his son. its transfer book that some of the shares owned by Carlos L. Puno were transferred
to him. This would only be possible if petitioner has been recognized as an heir and
has participated in the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
As for the baptismal certificate, we have already decreed that it can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not of the
veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s paternity.11 Corollary to this is the doctrine that a determination of whether a person, claiming
proprietary rights over the estate of a deceased person, is an heir of the deceased
must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of
In any case, Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code enumerate the persons
settling the estate of the latter. The status of an illegitimate child who claims to be
who are entitled to the inspection of corporate books, thus —
an heir to a decedent’s estate cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action, as in
a case for the recovery of property.19 The doctrine applies to the instant case, which
Sec. 74. Books to be kept; stock transfer agent. — x x x. is one for specific performance — to direct respondent corporation to allow
petitioner to exercise rights that pertain only to the deceased and his
The records of all business transactions of the corporation and the minutes of any representatives.
meeting shall be open to the inspection of any director, trustee, stockholder or
member of the corporation at reasonable hours on business days and he may WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals
demand, in writing, for a copy of excerpts from said records or minutes, at his Decision dated October 11, 2006 and Resolution dated March 6, 2007 are
expense. AFFIRMED.

xxxx SO ORDERED.

Sec. 75. Right to financial statements. — Within ten (10) days from receipt of a
written request of any stockholder or member, the corporation shall furnish to him
its most recent financial statement, which shall include a balance sheet as of the
end of the last taxable year and a profit or loss of statement for said taxable year,
showing in reasonable detail its assets and liabilities and the result of its
operations.12

The stockholder’s right of inspection of the corporation’s books and records is based
upon his ownership of shares in the corporation and the necessity for self-
protection. After all, a shareholder has the right to be intelligently informed about
corporate affairs.13 Such right rests upon the stockholder’s underlying ownership of
the corporation’s assets and property.14

Similarly, only stockholders of record are entitled to receive dividends declared by


the corporation, a right inherent in the ownership of the shares.151avvphi1

Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become


stockholders of the corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the
deceased as shareholder of the corporation. The stocks must be distributed first to
the heirs in estate proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks must be recorded in
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007 Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that
letters of administration be issued to her.
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs. On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent. by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue
and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent
has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007 Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry
Lee.
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs. On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent. Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial
court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994
aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of the Regional her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went
1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they
bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed
lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph
Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v.
Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Romillo, Jr. 14
Felicisimo.
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to
he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo
State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family
Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6 Code.

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the
Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with case.
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his
death on December 18, 1992. On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for
reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the
and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting
petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the
docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof. resolution of said motion.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994.
death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order
Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and
spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that law on which it was based.
the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at
₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable
inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. reason to sustain the individual view — sweeping statement — of Judge
Arcangel. Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy
of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny
what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective
express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the
position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file
Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity
the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the
to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the
arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his
deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June
14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving
spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
deceased. x x x 33
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected
governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have
been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34
which were
was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because denied by the Court of Appeals.
her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the
decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on
valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also
certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition
ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied
which was granted. 36
because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27
of Judge
subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time
Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28
of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that
pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the City, 38"residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent
orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person
dispositive portion of which states: can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his
domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna.
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24,
1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and
for further proceedings. 29 bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage
to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively
applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the
marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of
term "place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the
Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or
administration.
actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence
or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in
Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether
administration was properly filed in Makati City. respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry
respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings The petition lacks merit.
in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the
marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court
Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to
of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia
contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –
Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the
residence – as contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for purposes of
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in
"residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject
of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature –
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for
the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code,
"domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20,
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other
1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this
words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
to rule in the affirmative.
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and
also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce
is required though; however, the residence must be more than obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under
temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied) Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their
conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the
validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the
properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile."
The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because
they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
"residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As
venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton,
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
one has the intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under
the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical "The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when
consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a
place and domicile in another. wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the
nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in
Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s
deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him,
period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation
Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala
Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s
children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling cards 49 stating As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should
that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be
Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
Laguna."
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa has to be considered still marriedto private respondent and still subject to
for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to
petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
served.54 (Emphasis added) Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court xxxx
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held Legislative Intent
that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his
Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent
of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the
would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is longer married to the Filipino spouse.
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van
Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case
case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.
of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between
a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a
divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a
cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59In Garcia v.
Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law
Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
already established through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance
legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed,
intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the
to wit:
community, relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual
and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any
Brief Historical Background good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while
the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse
obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No.
209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 26 thereof states: Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is
void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this
Court’s rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive
may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the
law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent
Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now
of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way
provides:
as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable
part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the to render justice.
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure,
there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same,
in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may
between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed. be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79
thereof also provides in part:
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the
law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of
cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as
of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a known to the petitioner: x x x.
policy that goes beyond them."
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the
xxxx estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or
contingent. 75
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and
perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this
Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a
Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the
warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the
was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage
justice. 69 with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision
governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly
wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It
obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have
provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to
In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their
prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the
Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and
portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
proven. 77
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which
the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the
authenticated by the seal of his office. 71 cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took
effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this
provision as follows:
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in
California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the
annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who
their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in
must be alleged and proved. 73 proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the
extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent
proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of
presumed to be equal.
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo.
xxxx
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the
petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual
during their cohabitation. contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined
by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions
must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of
the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x
x 81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife
of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of
the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals


reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court
which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which
dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013 In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of
Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that
the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER
position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as
QUIAZON, Petitioners,
hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision reads:
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE
QUIAZON, Respondent. Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any
disqualification or incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of
administration over the estate of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised
to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by this Court of a bond
Rules of Court, primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision rendered by the
in the amount of ₱100,000.00 to be posted by her.9
Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1the decretal portion
of which states:
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November
2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed
validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to
Decision dated March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the
prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a
Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas City are AFFIRMED in toto.2
common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City,
from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue
The Facts of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion
reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon
(Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth The Issues
Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992. Resolution on the following grounds:

On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO
mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND THEREFORE, THE
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.3 In her Petition docketed as PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH
SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been THE RTC OF LAS PIÑAS;
conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry
each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA
impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was
GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE
bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage
TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise,
among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate
of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE
Eliseo left real properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS
₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the OF ADMINISTRATION.12
dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late
father’s estate.
The Court’s Ruling

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with
We find the petition bereft of merit.
her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of
administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted
that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province
Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of
improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for
Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in
of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was
be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any
of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.22 It must
Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and
first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the
so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the
his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death
that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:
record. (Emphasis supplied).
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left
"residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for
of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes.
and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13Even where the statute uses may attack a void marriage.24
word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence"
It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and
and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
it cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."15In other
marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even
words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.25
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.17 Venue for
ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights
meaning.18 As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence
nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be
resides therein with continuity and consistency.19 questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally
by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted
heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void
for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of
marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage
Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during
does not extinguish such cause of action.
his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las
Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in
the said city. Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia, we now
proceed to determine whether or not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for
being bigamous.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the
entry in Eliseo’s Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they
insist his estate should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous
considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of his death, the contents marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than
thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the
Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said
husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the certification from
consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of the National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists does
properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the not diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the
ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the
extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be found in the National Archive,
untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac given the interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in the absence
with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners’ of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and
submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter
the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27
appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.21
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that Elise has In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the
not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration. distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the
overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo,
the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons
decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the
who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed
administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts
named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or of the estate are satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s
fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an
interested party within the purview of the law.
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7
and willing to serve; August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, SO ORDERED.
or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the
death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one
or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be


granted to such other person as the court may select.

Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of
Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:

Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of


administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as
known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and
residences of the creditors, of the decedent;

(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration.

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the


estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose
relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate
as distributees.28
G.R. No. 128314 May 29, 2002 Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be revived.8 After the
parties submitted the names of their respective nominees, the trial court designated
Justice Carlos L. Sundiam as special administrator of the estate of Ignacio Jao Tayag
RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner,
and Andrea Jao.9
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.
On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was denied, to
wit:
Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and
Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The decedents
left real estate, cash, shares of stock and other personal properties. A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued separately in
1988 and 1989, respectively, confirm the fact that Quezon City was the
last place of residence of the decedents. Surprisingly, the entries appearing
On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of
on the death certificate of Andrea V. Jao were supplied by movant, Rodolfo
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, over the
V. Jao, whose signature appears in said document. Movant, therefore,
estate of his parents, docketed as Special Proceedings No. Q-91-8507.1Pending the
cannot disown his own representation by taking an inconsistent position
appointment of a regular administrator, Perico moved that he be appointed as
other than his own admission. xxx xxx xxx.
special administrator. He alleged that his brother, Rodolfo, was gradually dissipating
the assets of the estate. More particularly, Rodolfo was receiving rentals from real
properties without rendering any accounting, and forcibly opening vaults belonging WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court DENIES for
to their deceased parents and disposing of the cash and valuables therein. lack of merit movant’s motion to dismiss.

Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper SO ORDERED.10
venue.2 He argued that the deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City either
during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths. The decedent’s actual residence
Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed
was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother used to run and operate a
as CA-G.R. SP No. 35908. On December 11, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered
bakery. As the health of his parents deteriorated due to old age, they stayed in
the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Rodolfo’s residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City, solely for the purpose
of obtaining medical treatment and hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted documentary
evidence previously executed by the decedents, consisting of income tax returns, WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion of the
voter’s affidavits, statements of assets and liabilities, real estate tax payments, court a quo having been shown, the petition for certiorari is hereby
motor vehicle registration and passports, all indicating that their permanent DISMISSED. The questioned order of the respondent Judge is affirmed in
residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga.1âwphi1.nêt toto.

In his opposition,3 Perico countered that their deceased parents actually resided in SO ORDERED.11
Rodolfo’s house in Quezon City at the time of their deaths. As a matter of fact, it
was conclusively declared in their death certificates that their last residence before Rodolfo’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in the
they died was at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City.4 Rodolfo himself even assailed resolution dated February 17, 1997.12 Hence, this petition for review,
supplied the entry appearing on the death certificate of their mother, Andrea, and anchored on the following grounds:
affixed his own signature on the said document.

I
Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding the
decedents’ residence on the death certificates in good faith and through honest
mistake. He gave his residence only as reference, considering that their parents RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A
were treated in their late years at the Medical City General Hospital in Mandaluyong, WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY
Metro Manila. Their stay in his house was merely transitory, in the same way that TO THE APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY RENDERED BY THIS HONORABLE
they were taken at different times for the same purpose to Perico’s residence at COURT.
Legaspi Towers in Roxas Boulevard. The death certificates could not, therefore, be
deemed conclusive evidence of the decedents’ residence in light of the other II
documents showing otherwise.5
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RULING OF THIS
The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF EUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO, 100 PHILS.
position.6 Both failed to comply, whereupon the trial court ordered that the petition 593, WHICH CLEARLY INTERPRETED WHAT IS MEANT BY RESIDENCE IN
be archived.7 SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
III The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PHYSICAL PRESENCE IN A
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
PLACE AT THE TIME OF DEATH IS DETERMINATIVE OF DECEDENT’S
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in
RESIDENCE RATHER THAN THE INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO
the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANOTHER PLACE.
(underscoring ours)

IV
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of
administration granted in the proper court located in the province where the
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING BY ANALOGY THE RESIDENCE decedent resides at the time of his death.
CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 2 OF RULE 4 FOR THE PURPOSE OF SERVING
SUMMONS TO A DEFENDANT IN A PERSONAL ACTION TO THE RESIDENCE
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et
CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 FOR THE PURPOSE OF
al.,14 where we held that the situs of settlement proceedings shall be the place
DETERMINING VENUE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF A
where the decedent had his permanent residence or domicile at the time of death.
DECEASED.
In determining residence at the time of death, the following factors must be
considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to choose and freedom of
V choice; (b) physical presence at the place chosen; and (c) intention to stay therein
permanently.15 While it appears that the decedents in this case chose to be
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE ENTRY OF physically present in Quezon City for medical convenience, petitioner avers that
PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE RESPECTIVE DEATH they never adopted Quezon City as their permanent residence.1âwphi1.nêt
CERTIFICATES OF THE DECEDENTS RATHER THAN THE OVERWHELMING
EVIDENCE SHOWING THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO The contention lacks merit.
ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at bar. The decedent
VI therein, Andres Eusebio, passed away while in the process of transferring his
personal belongings to a house in Quezon City. He was then suffering from a heart
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL ailment and was advised by his doctor/son to purchase a Quezon City residence,
AS AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH CAN NOT BE MORE PERSUASIVE THAN which was nearer to his doctor. While he was able to acquire a house in Quezon
THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH City, Eusebio died even before he could move therein. In said case, we ruled that
PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY. Eusebio retained his domicile --- and hence, residence --- in San Fernando,
Pampanga. It cannot be said that Eusebio changed his residence because, strictly
speaking, his physical presence in Quezon City was just temporary.
VII

In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR petitioner’s Quezon City residence. Petitioner failed to sufficiently refute
CERTIORARI DESPITE THE CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF respondent’s assertion that their elderly parents stayed in his house for some three
THE TRIAL COURT IN INSISTING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF SP. to four years before they died in the late 1980s.
PROCEEDING NO. Q-91-8507.13

Furthermore, the decedents’ respective death certificates state that they were both
The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be had --- in residents of Quezon City at the time of their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner
Pampanga, where the decedents had their permanent residence, or in Quezon City, himself who filled up his late mother’s death certificate. To our mind, this
where they actually stayed before their demise? unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least, petitioner recognized his deceased
mother’s residence to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states: entry in Ignacio’s death certificate, accomplished a year earlier by respondent.

Where estate of deceased persons be settled. – If the decedent is an The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were thus
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or properly considered and presumed to be correct by the court a quo. We agree with
an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and the appellate court’s observation that since the death certificates were accomplished
his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he even before petitioner and respondent quarreled over their inheritance, they may be
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign relied upon to reflect the true situation at the time of their parents’ death.
country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents’ residence at the records, or where he maintains extensive personal and business interests. No
time of death, over the numerous documentary evidence presented by petitioner. generalizations can thus be formulated on the matter, as the question of where to
To be sure, the documents presented by petitioner pertained not toresidence at keep records or retain properties is entirely dependent upon an individual’s choice
the time of death, as required by the Rules of Court, but to permanent and peculiarities.
residence or domicile. In Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals,16 we held:
At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates between
xxx xxx xxx the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as venue in ordinary civil actions and venue in special proceedings. In Raymond v.
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides", like Court of Appeals19 and Bejer v. Court of Appeals,20 we ruled that venue for ordinary
the terms "residing" and "residence", is elastic and should be interpreted in civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As
the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is thus defined, "residence", in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with
73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather continuity and consistency.21 All told, the lower court and the Court of Appeals
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the correctly held that venue for the settlement of the decedents’ intestate estate was
word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile properly laid in the Quezon City court.
in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 is AFFIRMED.
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in
its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in SO ORDERED.
a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary.17

Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that the decedents have
been living with petitioner at the time of their deaths and for some time prior
thereto. We find this conclusion to be substantiated by the evidence on record. A
close perusal of the challenged decision shows that, contrary to petitioner’s
assertion, the court below considered not only the decedents’ physical presence in
Quezon City, but also other factors indicating that the decedents’ stay therein was
more than temporary. In the absence of any substantial showing that the lower
courts’ factual findings stemmed from an erroneous apprehension of the evidence
presented, the same must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.

Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in Rule 4,


Section 2,18 on ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which applies
specifically to settlement proceedings. He argues that while venue in the former
understandably refers to actual physical residence for the purpose of serving
summons, it is the permanent residence of the decedent which is significant in Rule
73, Section 1. Petitioner insists that venue for the settlement of estates can only
refer to permanent residence or domicile because it is the place where the records
of the properties are kept and where most of the decedents’ properties are located.

Petitioner’s argument fails to persuade.

It does not necessarily follow that the records of a person’s properties are kept in
the place where he permanently resides. Neither can it be presumed that a person’s
properties can be found mostly in the place where he establishes his domicile. It
may be that he has his domicile in a place different from that where he keeps his
G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005 was in the United States and there was no information on his address or the date of
his return to the Philippines.12 Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to
respondent Florence S. Ariola.
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA, respondents. On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer13 and alleged
that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto.
Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to
Court which seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated May
the petitioner under the joint agreement.
30, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48831 affirming the dismissal2 of the petitioner’s
complaint in Civil Case No. 18909 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 63. On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC of Makati
City, Branch 63.14 Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a decision was
subsequently rendered by the court dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The
The antecedent facts are as follows:
decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:

On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of
Santibañez entered into a loan agreement3 in the amount of ₱128,000.00. The
merit.15
amount was intended for the payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford
6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son,
Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the
payable in five equal annual amortizations of ₱43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibañez was
every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985. pending, as the sum of money being claimed was an obligation incurred by the said
decedent. The trial court also found that the Joint Agreement apparently executed
by his heirs, Edmund and Florence, on July 22, 1981, was, in effect, a partition of
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan
the estate of the decedent. However, the said agreement was void, considering that
agreement,4 this time in the amount of ₱123,156.00. It was intended to pay the
it had not been approved by the probate court, and that there can be no valid
balance of the purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose
partition until after the will has been probated. The trial court further declared that
Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K.
petitioner failed to prove that it was the now defunct Union Savings and Mortgage
Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said amount
Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its assets and liabilities. The court also agreed
in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also signed a
to the contention of respondent Florence S. Ariola that the list of assets and
Continuing Guaranty Agreement5 for the loan dated December 13, 1980.
liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank did not clearly
refer to the decedent’s account. Ruling that the joint agreement executed by the
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.6 Subsequently heirs was null and void, the trial court held that the petitioner’s cause of action
in March 1981, testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch against respondent Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.
7, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 2706. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of
the heirs, was appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case to the Court of
decedent.7 During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs,
Appeals (CA), assigning the following as errors of the trial court:
Edmund and his sister Florence Santibañez Ariola, executed a Joint
Agreement8 dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves
and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund 1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT
and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of (EXHIBIT A) SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities9 was PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN
executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the PROBATED.
FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD
WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE
Demand letters10 for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union PROCEEDING.16
Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and
refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint11 for sum
The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the deceased had
of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the
passed to his legitimate children and heirs, in this case, Edmund and Florence; the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil Case No. 18909. Summonses
unconditional signing of the joint agreement marked as Exhibit "A" estopped
were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he
respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she cannot deny her liability under the said RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE
document; as the agreement had been signed by both heirs in their personal PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ ON THE STRENGTH OF THE
capacity, it was no longer necessary to present the same before the probate court CONTINUING GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER-
for approval; the property partitioned in the agreement was not one of those APPELLANT UNION BANK.
enumerated in the holographic will made by the deceased; and the active
participation of the heirs, particularly respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the present
V.
ordinary civil action was tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate the claim in the estate
proceedings.
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM OF ₱128,000.00 AND
DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE AMOUNT OF ₱123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the money claim
ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS BOUND THEMSELVES JOINTLY
of the petitioner should have been presented before the probate court.17
AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE LATE DEBTOR EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ IN FAVOR
OF PETITIONER UNION BANK.19
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held that the
petitioner should have filed its claim with the probate court as provided under
The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to the
Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It further held that the partition
heirs as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; there was thus no need for the
made in the agreement was null and void, since no valid partition may be had until
probate court to approve the joint agreement where the heirs partitioned the
after the will has been probated. According to the CA, page 2, paragraph (e) of the
tractors owned by the deceased and assumed the obligations related thereto. Since
holographic will covered the subject properties (tractors) in generic terms when the
respondent Florence S. Ariola signed the joint agreement without any condition, she
deceased referred to them as "all other properties." Moreover, the active
is now estopped from asserting any position contrary thereto. The petitioner also
participation of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the case did not amount to a
points out that the holographic will of the deceased did not include nor mention any
waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, viz.:
of the tractors subject of the complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit of the
said will. The active participation and resistance of respondent Florence S. Ariola in
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial the ordinary civil action against the petitioner’s claim amounts to a waiver of the
Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. right to have the claim presented in the probate proceedings, and to allow any one
of the heirs who executed the joint agreement to escape liability to pay the value of
the tractors under consideration would be equivalent to allowing the said heirs to
SO ORDERED.18
enrich themselves to the damage and prejudice of the petitioner.

In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors to the CA:
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and appellate
courts failed to consider the fact that respondent Florence S. Ariola and her brother
I. Edmund executed loan documents, all establishing the vinculum jurisor the legal
bond between the late Efraim Santibañez and his heirs to be in the nature of a
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT solidary obligation. Furthermore, the Promissory Notes dated May 31, 1980 and
AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT. December 13, 1980 executed by the late Efraim Santibañez, together with his heirs,
Edmund and respondent Florence, made the obligation solidary as far as the said
heirs are concerned. The petitioner also proffers that, considering the express
II. provisions of the continuing guaranty agreement and the promissory notes executed
by the named respondents, the latter must be held liable jointly and severally liable
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID thereon. Thus, there was no need for the petitioner to file its money claim before
PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ UNTIL AFTER the probate court. Finally, the petitioner stresses that both surviving heirs are being
THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED. sued in their respective personal capacities, not as heirs of the deceased.

III. In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintains that the
petitioner is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim
Santibañez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate court. She
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD points out that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement there was
WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE already an existing probate proceedings of which the petitioner knew about.
PROCEEDING. However, to avoid a claim in the probate court which might delay payment of the
obligation, the petitioner opted to require them to execute the said
IV. agreement.1a\^/phi1.net
According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in declaring that themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was
the agreement was null and void. She asserts that even if the agreement was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late father’s holographic will
voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been covering the said tractors.
subjected to the approval of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or
third parties. Furthermore, she had not waived any rights, as she even stated in her
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction
answer in the court a quo that the claim should be filed with the probate court.
over all the properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose
Thus, the petitioner could not invoke or claim that she is in estoppel.
of them in any way without the probate court’s approval is tantamount to divesting
it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow.26 Every act intended to put an end
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not signed any to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition,
continuing guaranty agreement, nor was there any document presented as evidence although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
to show that she had caused herself to be bound by the obligation of her late father. transaction.27 Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the
nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is
imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that
The petition is bereft of merit.
part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to
determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent.28 In the instant case, there is no
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the partition in showing that the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the
the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs’ decedent. When it was executed, the probate of the will was still pending before the
assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) whether the court and the latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus,
petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the deceased.1awphi1.nét for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves the
three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to and creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased.
determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered.20 The The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs’ assumption of the
said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution indebtedness of the decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint
of the estate.21 agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto "have agreed to divide
between themselves and take possession and use the above-described chattel and
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as
until after the will has been probated: herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp."29 The
assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that
each heir shall take possession and use of their respective share under the
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they
will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each
it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not
right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be
authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the given any force and effect.
capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities
which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.22
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent.l^vvphi1.net The
petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of
properties embraced in the will.23 In the present case, the deceased, Efraim the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Santibañez, left a holographic will24 which contained, inter alia, the provision which
reads as follows:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred;
exceptions. — All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract,
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for
after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money
preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children. against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise
they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an
provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have executor or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already
escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he may commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the
acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to
so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other
agreement25 executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the
amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed
though the claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present
value.
SO ORDERED.

The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is
mandatory.30 As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:31

… This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by
informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him
to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be
allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the
affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees,
legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition
of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate
as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.32

Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent
Florence S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The
documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the
continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim
Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with
the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the
decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course,
subject to any defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court
had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to
delve into the matter further.

We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not sufficiently
shown that it is the successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank
to which the FCCC assigned its assets and liabilities.33 The petitioner in its complaint
alleged that "by virtue of the Deed of Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed
by and between First Countryside Credit Corporation and Union Bank of the
Philippines…"34 However, the documentary evidence35 clearly reflects that the parties
in the deed of assignment with assumption of liabilities were the FCCC, and the
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of Bancom Philippine
Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the petitioner’s participation therein as a party be
found. Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial evidence was presented during
trial to show that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in fact, petitioner Union
Bank of the Philippines. As the trial court declared in its decision:

… [T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff failed to
prove or did not present evidence to prove that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is
now the Union Bank of the Philippines. Judicial notice does not apply here. "The
power to take judicial notice is to [be] exercised by the courts with caution; care
must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt upon
the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative." (Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).36

This being the case, the petitioner’s personality to file the complaint is wanting.
Consequently, it failed to establish its cause of action. Thus, the trial court did not
err in dismissing the complaint, and the CA in affirming the same.
G.R. No. 134100 September 29, 2000 On February 26, 1991, the lower court rendered judgment after trial, ordering
petitioner and the Manuel spouses to pay private respondent the unpaid balance of
₱50,600.00 plus attorney's fees in the amount of ₱10,000.00 and the costs of the
PURITA ALIPIO, petitioner,
suit.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO G. JARING, represented by his Attorney-
In-Fact RAMON G. JARING,respondents. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court erred
in denying her motion to dismiss. In its decision4 rendered on July 10, 1997, the
appellate court dismissed her appeal. It held:
The question for decision in this case is whether a creditor can sue the surviving
spouse for the collection of a debt which is owed by the conjugal partnership of
gains, or whether such claim must be filed in proceedings for the settlement of the The rule that an action for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon must be
estate of the decedent. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in the dismissed when the defendant dies before final judgment in the regional trial court,
affirmative. We reverse. does not apply where there are other defendants against whom the action should be
maintained. This is the teaching of Climaco v. Siy Uy, wherein the Supreme Court
held:
The facts are as follows:

Upon the facts alleged in the complaint, it is clear that Climaco had a cause of
Respondent Romeo Jaring1 was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in Barito,
action against the persons named as defendants therein. It was, however, a cause
Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a period of five years ending on
of action for the recovery of damages, that is, a sum of money, and the
September 12, 1990. On June 19, 1987, he subleased the fishpond, for the
corresponding action is, unfortunately, one that does not survive upon the death of
remaining period of his lease, to the spouses Placido and Purita Alipio and the
the defendant, in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules
spouses Bienvenido and Remedios Manuel. The stipulated amount of rent was
of Court.
₱485,600.00, payable in two installments of ₱300,000.00 and ₱185,600.00, with
the second installment falling due on June 30, 1989. Each of the four sublessees
signed the contract. xxx xxx xxx

The first installment was duly paid, but of the second installment, the sublessees However, the deceased Siy Uy was not the only defendant, Manuel Co was also
only satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance of ₱50,600.00. Despite named defendant in the complaint. Obviously, therefore, the order appealed from is
due demand, the sublessees failed to comply with their obligation, so that, on erroneous insofar as it dismissed the case against Co. (Underlining added)
October 13, 1989, private respondent sued the Alipio and Manuel spouses for the
collection of the said amount before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Dinalupihan,
Moreover, it is noted that all the defendants, including the deceased, were
Bataan. In the alternative, he prayed for the rescission of the sublease contract
signatories to the contract of sub-lease. The remaining defendants cannot avoid the
should the defendants fail to pay the balance.
action by claiming that the death of one of the parties to the contract has totally
extinguished their obligation as held in Imperial Insurance, Inc. v. David:
Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her husband,
Placido Alipio, had passed away on December 1, 1988.2 She based her action on
We find no merit in this appeal. Under the law and well settled jurisprudence, when
Rule 3, §21 of the 1964 Rules of Court which then provided that "when the action is
the obligation is a solidary one, the creditor may bring his action in toto against any
for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final
of the debtors obligated in solidum. Thus, if husband and wife bound themselves
judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
jointly and severally, in case of his death, her liability is independent of and
manner especially provided in these rules." This provision has been amended so
separate from her husband's; she may be sued for the whole debt and it would be
that now Rule 3, §20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
error to hold that the claim against her as well as the claim against her husband
should be made in the decedent's estate. (Agcaoili vs. Vda. de Agcaoili, 90 Phil.
When the action is for the recovery of money arising from contract, express or 97).5
implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which
the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on June 4,
instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment
1998.6 Hence this petition based on the following assignment of errors:
obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided
in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.
A. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
APPLYING CLIMACO v. SIY UY, 19 SCRA 858, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT
The trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that since petitioner was
THE PETITIONER WAS NOT SEEKING THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE
herself a party to the sublease contract, she could be independently impleaded in
AGAINST REMAINING DEFENDANTS BUT ONLY WITH RESPECT TO THE
the suit together with the Manuel spouses and that the death of her husband merely
CLAIM FOR PAYMENT AGAINST HER AND HER HUSBAND WHICH SHOULD
resulted in his exclusion from the case.3 The Manuel spouses failed to file their
BE PROSECUTED AS A MONEY CLAIM.
answer. For this reason, they were declared in default.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN spouse is not even a de facto administrator such that conveyances made by him of
APPLYING IMPERIAL INSURANCE INC. v. DAVID, 133 SCRA 317, WHICH IS any property belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of the mass of
NOT APPLICABLE BECAUSE THE SPOUSES IN THIS CASE DID NOT BIND conjugal partnership property is void.12
THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT
JARING.7
The ruling in Calma v. Tañedo was reaffirmed in the recent case of Ventura v.
Militante.13 In that case, the surviving wife was sued in an amended complaint for a
The petition is meritorious. We hold that a creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse sum of money based on an obligation allegedly contracted by her and her late
of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of money husband. The defendant, who had earlier moved to dismiss the case, opposed the
chargeable against the conjugal partnership and that the proper remedy is for him admission of the amended complaint on the ground that the death of her husband
to file a claim in the settlement of estate of the decedent. terminated their conjugal partnership and that the plaintiff's claim, which was
chargeable against the partnership, should be made in the proceedings for the
settlement of his estate. The trial court nevertheless admitted the complaint and
First. Petitioner's husband died on December 1, 1988, more than ten months
ruled, as the Court of Appeals did in this case, that since the defendant was also a
before private respondent filed the collection suit in the trial court on October 13,
party to the obligation, the death of her husband did not preclude the plaintiff from
1989. This case thus falls outside of the ambit of Rule 3, §21 which deals with
filing an ordinary collection suit against her. On appeal, the Court reversed, holding
dismissals of collection suits because of the death of the defendant during the
that ¾
pendency of the case and the subsequent procedure to be undertaken by the
plaintiff, i.e., the filing of claim in the proceeding for the settlement of the
decedent's estate. As already noted, Rule 3, §20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil as correctly argued by petitioner, the conjugal partnership terminates upon the
Procedure now provides that the case will be allowed to continue until entry of final death of either spouse. . . . Where a complaint is brought against the surviving
judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein will then be spouse for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal
enforced in the manner especially provided in the Rules for prosecuting claims [partnership], any judgment obtained thereby is void. The proper action should be
against the estate of a deceased person. The issue to be resolved is whether private in the form of a claim to be filed in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
respondent can, in the first place, file this case against petitioner. deceased spouse.

Petitioner and her late husband, together with the Manuel spouses, signed the In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the spouses,
sublease contract binding themselves to pay the amount of stipulated rent. Under there is no liquidation of the conjugal partnership. This does not mean, however,
the law, the Alipios' obligation (and also that of the Manuels) is one which is that the conjugal partnership continues. And private respondent cannot be said to
chargeable against their conjugal partnership. Under Art. 161(1) of the Civil Code, have no remedy. Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court, he may apply
the conjugal partnership is liable for ¾ in court for letters of administration in his capacity as a principal creditor of the
deceased . . . if after thirty (30) days from his death, petitioner failed to apply for
administration or request that administration be granted to some other person.14
All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the
cases where she may legally bind the partnership.8 The cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals in support of its ruling,
namely, Climaco v. Siy Uy15 and Imperial Insurance, Inc. v. David,16 are based on
different sets of facts. In Climaco, the defendants, Carlos Siy Uy and Manuel Co,
When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal partnership was automatically
were sued for damages for malicious prosecution. Thus, apart from the fact the
dissolved9 and debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the settlement of estate
claim was not against any conjugal partnership, it was one which does not survive
proceedings in accordance with Rule 73, §2 which states:
the death of defendant Uy, which merely resulted in the dismissal of the case as to
him but not as to the remaining defendant Manuel Co.
Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. ¾ When the marriage is
dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be
With regard to the case of Imperial, the spouses therein jointly and severally
inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate
executed an indemnity agreement which became the basis of a collection suit filed
or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the
against the wife after her husband had died. For this reason, the Court ruled that
conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of
since the spouses' liability was solidary, the surviving spouse could be
either.
independently sued in an ordinary action for the enforcement of the entire
obligation.
As held in Calma v. Tañedo,10 after the death of either of the spouses, no complaint
for the collection of indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal partnership can
It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of conjugal partnership of
be brought against the surviving spouse. Instead, the claim must be made in the
gains, an obligation entered into by the husband and wife is chargeable against
proceedings for the liquidation and settlement of the conjugal property. The reason
their conjugal partnership and it is the partnership which is primarily bound for its
for this is that upon the death of one spouse, the powers of administration of the
repayment.17 Thus, when the spouses are sued for the enforcement of an obligation
surviving spouse ceases and is passed to the administrator appointed by the court
entered into by them, they are being impleaded in their capacity as representatives
having jurisdiction over the settlement of estate proceedings.11Indeed, the surviving
of the conjugal partnership and not as independent debtors such that the concept of 2. That the total lease rental for the sub-leased fishpond for the entire period of
joint or solidary liability, as between them, does not apply. But even assuming the three (3) years and two (2) months is FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT-FIVE THOUSAND SIX
contrary to be true, the nature of the obligation involved in this case, as will be HUNDRED (₱485,600.00) PESOS, including all the improvements, prawns,
discussed later, is not solidary but rather merely joint, making Imperial still milkfishes, crabs and related species thereon as well all fishing equipment,
inapplicable to this case. paraphernalia and accessories. The said amount shall be paid to the Sub-Lessor by
the Sub-Lessees in the following manner, to wit:
From the foregoing, it is clear that private respondent cannot maintain the present
suit against petitioner.1âwphi1 Rather, his remedy is to file a claim against the A. Three hundred thousand (₱300,000.00) Pesos upon signing this contract; and
Alipios in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of petitioner's husband or,
if none has been commenced, he can file a petition either for the issuance of letters
B. One Hundred Eight-Five Thousand Six-Hundred (₱185,6000.00) Pesos to be paid
of administration18 or for the allowance of will,19 depending on whether petitioner's
on June 30, 1989.
husband died intestate or testate. Private respondent cannot short-circuit this
procedure by lumping his claim against the Alipios with those against the Manuels
considering that, aside from petitioner's lack of authority to represent their conjugal Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely joint. Since the obligation of the
estate, the inventory of the Alipios' conjugal property is necessary before any claim Manuel and Alipio spouses is chargeable against their respective conjugal
chargeable against it can be paid. Needless to say, such power exclusively pertains partnerships, the unpaid balance of ₱50,600.00 should be divided into two so that
to the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of the decedent's estate and not each couple is liable to pay the amount of ₱25,300.00.
to any other court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Bienvenido Manuel and Remedios Manuel
Second. The trial court ordered petitioner and the Manuel spouses to pay private are ordered to pay the amount of ₱25,300.00, the attorney's fees in the amount of
respondent the unpaid balance of the agreed rent in the amount of ₱50,600.00 ₱10,000.00 and the costs of the suit. The complaint against petitioner is dismissed
without specifying whether the amount is to be paid by them jointly or solidarily. In without prejudice to the filing of a claim by private respondent in the proceedings
connection with this, Art. 1207 of the Civil Code provides: for the settlement of estate of Placido Alipio for the collection of the share of the
Alipio spouses in the unpaid balance of the rent in the amount of ₱25,300.00.
The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one and the
same obligation does not imply that each one of the former has a right to demand, SO ORDERED.
or that each one of the latter is bound to render, entire compliance with the
prestations. There is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so
estates, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.

Indeed, if from the law or the nature or the wording of the obligation the contrary
does not appear, an obligation is presumed to be only joint, i.e., the debt is divided
into as many equal shares as there are debtors, each debt being considered distinct
from one another.20

Private respondent does not cite any provision of law which provides that when
there are two or more lessees, or in this case, sublessees, the latter's obligation to
pay the rent is solidary. To be sure, should the lessees or sublessees refuse to
vacate the leased property after the expiration of the lease period and despite due
demands by the lessor, they can be held jointly and severally liable to pay for the
use of the property. The basis of their solidary liability is not the contract of lease or
sublease but the fact that they have become joint tortfeasors.21 In the case at bar,
there is no allegation that the sublessees refused to vacate the fishpond after the
expiration of the term of the sublease. Indeed, the unpaid balance sought to be
collected by private respondent in his collection suit became due on June 30, 1989,
long before the sublease expired on September 12, 1990.

Neither does petitioner contend that it is the nature of lease that when there are
more than two lessees or sublessees their liability is solidary. On the other hand,
the pertinent portion of the contract involved in this case reads:22

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