ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL COGNITION

Why Susie Sells Seashells by the Seashore:

Implicit Egotism and Major Life Decisions
Brett W. Pelham, Matthew C. Mirenberg, and John T. Jones
State University of New York at Buffalo

Because most people possess positive associations about themselves, most people prefer things that are
connected to the self (e.g., the letters in one’s name). The authors refer to such preferences as implicit
egotism. Ten studies assessed the role of implicit egotism in 2 major life decisions: where people choose
to live and what people choose to do for a living. Studies 1–5 showed that people are disproportionately
likely to live in places whose names resemble their own first or last names (e.g., people named Louis are
disproportionately likely to live in St. Louis). Study 6 extended this finding to birthday number
preferences. People were disproportionately likely to live in cities whose names began with their birthday
numbers (e.g., Two Harbors, MN). Studies 7–10 suggested that people disproportionately choose careers
whose labels resemble their names (e.g., people named Dennis or Denise are overrepresented among
dentists). Implicit egotism appears to influence major life decisions. This idea stands in sharp contrast to
many models of rational choice and attests to the importance of understanding implicit beliefs.

What role do people’s thoughts and feelings about themselves
play in their important day-to-day decisions and behaviors? Con-
temporary research on the self-concept suggests many answers to
this question. For example, the desire to maintain positive feelings
about the self appears to influence things as diverse as whether
people derogate those who criticize their governments (Pyszczyn-
ski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997, 1999), whether people sabotage
the performance of others when playing a game (Tesser & Smith,
1981), what people find rational (Kunda, 1990), and what people
find humorous (Wills, 1981). Like people’s social beliefs and
behavior, people’s beliefs about themselves are also influenced
by the desire to view the self favorably. Most people have
mostly favorable beliefs about themselves (see Crocker & Ma-
jor, 1989; Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985; Miller & Ross,
1975; Paulhus & Levitt, 1987; Taylor & Brown, 1988; but cf.
Kruger, 1999).
In short, a great deal of evidence suggests that the motivation to
feel good about the self plays a role in a wide variety of important
social behaviors. To our knowledge, however, very little research
on the self-concept addresses whether self-evaluation plays an
Brett W. Pelham, Matthew C. Mirenberg, and John T. Jones, Depart-
ment of Psychology, State University of New York at Buffalo.
We thank Mauricio Carvallo, Joanne Davila, Tracy Dehart, Curtis
Hardin, Sandra Murray, Shirley Owens, Mike Ross, and the participants
of the 2000 Ontario Symposium for their insightful comments on this
research.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Brett W.
Pelham, State University of New York, University at Buffalo, Park Hall—
Department of Psychology, Buffalo, New York 14260-4110. E-mail:
brettpel@acsu.buffalo.edu
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2002, Vol. 82, No. 4, 469 – 487
Copyright 2002 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0022-3514/02/$5.00
important role in major life decisions. For example, only a handful
of studies have examined whether self-regulation processes influ-
ence people’s choice of relationship partners. Moreover, for prac-
tical reasons, most of these studies have examined attraction to
strangers in the laboratory rather than attraction to long-term
relationship partners (Huston & Levinger, 1978; but cf. Murray,
Holmes, & Griffin, 1996; Swann, Hixon, & de la Ronde, 1992).
We thus know relatively little about whether self-evaluations or
self-concept motives influence important decisions such as where
people choose to live and what people choose to do for a living.
Is there any reason to believe that self-evaluation shapes impor-
tant life decisions? Consider the decisions of (a) choosing a city or
state in which to live and (b) choosing a career. At first blush, it
might seem that these decisions are largely independent. That is,
there would appear to be no unifying psychological thread that
connects a person’s taste in cities and career tracks. This does not
mean that these important decisions are completely unrelated.
Consider the dentist who is offered jobs in Milwaukee and in
Phoenix. She might choose the job in Phoenix— either because it
offers her greater professional rewards or because it offers her the
promise of milder winters. Such obvious connections aside, how-
ever, it might be asking quite a bit of a single self-evaluative
mechanism to predict people’s taste in both hometowns and
occupations.
Implicit Egotism
Or would it? Research in implicit social cognition suggests that
many mundane judgments and behaviors are influenced by potent
and pervasive unconscious motives. For example, Greenwald and
Banaji (1995) argued that the desire to feel good about the self
permeates a wide range of social judgments. As an example,
DOI: 10.1037//0022-3514.82.4.469

469
470 PELHAM, MIRENBERG, AND JONES
students’ evaluations of instructors’ teaching skills tend to be more
favorable when instructors give more lenient grades. Presumably,
this is true because instructors who give students high grades
satisfy students’ desires for favorable feedback. That is, uncon-
scious self-enhancement seems to bias students’ evaluations of
their instructors’ teaching skills. As noted previously, researchers
have long assumed that people have a basic desire to feel good
about themselves (Allport, 1961; James, 1890/1950). What sets
recent research on self-enhancement apart from a great deal of
earlier research is the contemporary assumption that many self-
enhancing social cognitions occur automatically or unconsciously
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Hetts, Sakuma, & Pelham, 1999;
Jones, Pelham, Mirenberg, & Hetts, 2002; Paulhus & Levitt, 1987;
Pelham & Hetts, 1999; Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990;
Pyszczynski et al., 1997, 1999).
Research on unconscious self-enhancement— or what we call
implicit egotism—suggests that people’s positive automatic asso-
ciations about themselves may influence their feelings about al-
most anything that people associate with the self. For example,
research on the mere ownership effect shows that giving people
objects such as pens or keychains causes people to evaluate these
object more favorably than they would otherwise (Beggan, 1992;
Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990; Van Boven, Dunning, &
Loewenstein, 2000). If people instantly acquire positive feelings
about objects once these objects become part of the self, it stands
to reason that people should develop deep and abiding affections
for objects that are chronically associated with the self. In support
of this idea, research on the name letter effect (Kitayama &
Karasawa, 1997; Nuttin, 1985, 1987) shows that people like the
letters that appear in their own names quite a bit more than they
like letters that do not. This effect occurs for all of the letters in
people’s names, but it is particularly pronounced for people’s first
and last initials. This presumably unconscious self-enhancing bias
has been documented in at least 14 countries (e.g., Greece, Japan,
Spain, the United States).
Although a high level of exposure to the letters that occur in
one’s own name probably plays a role in the development of the
name letter effect (see Zajonc, 1968), it seems unlikely that the
name letter effect is determined exclusively by mere exposure
(Nuttin, 1987). Consider a recent study of unmarried Japanese
college students conducted by Kitayama and Karasawa (1997).
These researchers observed the strongest evidence for the name
letter effect for the first letter of women’s first names and for the
first letter of men’s last names. They explained this gender differ-
ence by noting that there is a very strong expectation that Japanese
women will change their family names when they marry. Thus,
although there is no reason to assume that men and women differ
in their level of exposure to their first versus last initials, women
appear to have more positive feelings about the specific name
letters that they know they will hold onto for their entire lives.
Kitayama and Karasawa also found that people preferred numbers
that were in their birthdays to numbers that were not. Moreover, in
the case of the birthday numbers that do not overlap with birthday
months (13–31), the magnitude of the evaluative bias associated
with birthday numbers was slightly larger than the magnitude of
the name letter effect. Because people are exposed to their birthday
numbers much less often than they are exposed to their names, this
further suggests that people’s elevated liking for objects that are
associated with the self is not simply an affective consequence of
mere exposure. Instead, like the mere ownership effect, the
name letter effect appears to qualify as a form of implicit
egotism (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Nuttin, 1987). The essen-
tial idea behind implicit egotism is that people should prefer
people, places, and things that they associate (unconsciously)
with the self.
Although examples of unconscious self-enhancement have been
documented for a variety of judgments and decisions, virtually all
of the past research on unconscious self-enhancement simply
documents the existence of positive associations to the self (but see
Greenwald & Banaji, 1995, for some exceptions). For instance,
whereas existing research leaves little doubt that people like the
letters in their own names, we know of no previous research
examining behavioral consequences of the name letter effect. To
our knowledge, the closest thing to this is Miller, Downs, and
Prentice’s (1998) finding that people are nicer than usual to strang-
ers who happen to share their birthdays. In particular, Miller et
al.’s participants played more cooperatively than usual with a
bogus interaction partner (in a prisoner’s dilemma game) when
they thought they and their partner had the same birthday (see also
Finch & Cialdini, 1989). If people truly prefer the specific letters
that appear in their own names, then we might expect people to
prefer physical or social objects that either contain or are repre-
sented by these same letters. For example, consider the case of a
hypothetical person named Steve Spencer. If the name letter effect
has implications for important social behaviors, it might not be too
far-fetched to expect Steve to prefer to vacation in Sarasota rather
than Miami, to choose to study stereotyping rather than attitudes,
or to find himself collaborating with colleagues named Steven Fine
(or Clyde Steele) rather than Russ Lazio. Although Steve would
probably be unaware of the affective basis of his judgment, some-
thing about names such as Sarasota, stereotyping, and Steele
should just feel good (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Lewicki, 1985;
Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Staats & Staats, 1957, 1958).
In this article, we present evidence from a wide range of archival
studies that examined two different behavioral consequences of
implicit egotism: (a) choosing a city or state in which to live and
(b) choosing a career. Because the name letter effect lends itself
particularly well to archival research using public records (e.g.,
telephone directories, memberships in professional organizations),
we focus primarily on behavioral consequences of the name letter
effect in this research. However, we assume that many other forms
of implicit egotism (e.g., the preferences people have for their
birthday numbers, implicit in-group bias) also have important
consequences for day-to-day decisions. In the present studies, we
made use of public records to identify people by their names or
initials. We then examined whether people with specific kinds of
names or initials (e.g., people named Dennis) gravitated toward
specific places in which to live (e.g., Denver) or specific occupa-
tions (e.g., dentistry). Because past research suggested that the
name letter effect is stronger for men’s last names and for wom-
en’s first names, we took this into account wherever it was perti-
nent. On the whole, however, we hoped to show that the name
letter effect has important behavioral consequences for men and
women alike. In our first study, we tested the idea that the positive
associations people have for the letters in their names influence the
city in which people choose to live.
 IMPLICIT EGOTISM IN MAJOR LIFE DECISIONS 471

Study 1 highly significant, ␹2(1) ⫽ 38.25, p ⬍ .001. As shown in the lower

half of Table 1, the results for men were also highly consistent with
Method predictions. Just as Jacksonville seems to have been disproportion-
In Study 1, we analyzed social security death index (SSDI) records ately inhabited by Jacks, Philadelphia seems to have been dispro-
available at a genealogical Web site (http://www.Ancestry.com). The portionately inhabited by Philips, ␹2(1) ⫽ 202.05, p ⬍ .001.
searchable database available at this Web site is frequently updated and Because all of the names used in Study 1 are common European
was generated from U.S. government records in May of 2001. These American names, it is difficult to attribute these findings to an
records include the more than 66 million deceased Americans who pos- ethnic confound. It is even more difficult to attribute these findings
sessed social security numbers at their time of deaths. These SSDI records to an age confound. In fact, to begin with the women, an exami-
and their associated search engine are ideal for the present purposes nation of the birth dates of all of the decedents of Virginia Beach
because they (a) are highly comprehensive, (b) allow searches based on
and Milwaukee indicated that the average resident of Milwaukee
either first or last names, and (c) allow searches based on a person’s last
was noticeably older than the average resident of Virginia Beach
known city or state of residence prior to death. Although it is not possible
to download these data, the search engine that is a part of this Web site (as indicated by a greater ratio of people born in 1990 versus
places no restrictions on the number of hits it returns (e.g., it makes it 1950). The small difference in the ages of the two female names
possible to determine exactly how many people named Gladys or Ezekiel used in Study 1 worked in opposition to this city–age confound.
have died in the United States since the beginning of the social security Specifically, the name Mildred is slightly younger than the name
system). Virginia. The same was true for the male names. Whereas the
In Study 1, we first identified the 40 largest cities in the United States. decedents of Philadelphia appear to have been somewhat older, on
We then consulted the 1990 census to identify all of the common (top 100) average, than the decedents of Jacksonville, Philip turns out to be
male and female first names that shared a minimum of their first three a slightly younger name than Jack.
letters with any of these city names. Because the popularity of different
Although the results of Study 1 suggest that implicit egotism
first names varies with age, we selected the two qualifying European
may play a role in people’s choice of a hometown, these results are
American female names that we could match most closely for age (based
on the relative proportion of deceased people born in 1900 and 1950 who open to a highly plausible alternate explanation. Although it is
had these first names). We then repeated this procedure to produce the two possible that people gravitate toward places that remind them of
most closely age-matched male names. The resulting name– city combina- themselves, it is also possible that the places in which people live
tions for women were Mildred–Milwaukee and Virginia–Virginia Beach. serve as primes that influence the names that parents give to their
The resulting combinations for men were Jack–Jacksonville and Philip– children. To new parents living in Georgia, for example, baby
Philadelphia. To generate the data for Study 1, we created two separate names such as George or Georgia may simply be more accessible
2 ⫻ 2 name– city tables, one for women and one for men. We expected that than more attractive alternatives such as Brett, John, or Matthew.
the women and men whose first names resembled the name of a specific Although this priming effect would be interesting in its own right,
city would be over-represented among the deceased residents of that
it has little to do with implicit egotism. In Study 2, we attempted
specific city.
to rule out this alternate explanation by focusing on surnames
rather than first names. Because laboratory research has shown that
Results and Discussion surname letter liking is typically lower than first name letter liking,
The results for women appear in the upper half of Table 1. As we suspected that surname effects might be smaller than first name
shown in Table 1, women named Mildred and Virginia did seem effects. In light of this expectation, we sampled U.S. states rather
to gravitate toward cities that resembled their first names. The than large cities. If people with surnames that resemble specific
association between name and place of residence for women was state names disproportionately populate these states, we can be
relatively confident that the owners of these surnames (or, at a
minimum, at least one of their ancestors) chose to live in these
specific states.
Table 1
Likelihood of Living in a City as a Function of One’s First
Name (Study 1) Study 2
First name: Women Method
City Mildred Virginia Total Study 2 was an expanded version of Study 1. However, in an effort to
Milwaukee 865 (806) 544 (603) 1409 generalize our findings to a wide range of surnames, we conducted sur-
Virginia Beach 230 (289) 275 (216) 505 name searches based on the first few consecutive letters of each of the state
Total 1095 819 1914 names we sampled (rather than searching for one specific surname per
state). We began by identifying an electronic telephone directory that was
First name: Men ideal for the present purposes, namely the WorldPages directory (http://
www.Worldpages.com). This directory will return as many as 2,000 hits in
Jack Philip Total a specific U.S. or Canadian city, state, or province. We chose eight large
U.S. states on the basis of population. Specifically, on the basis of 1990
Jacksonville 436 (288) 111 (259) 547
census data, we identified the eight most populous U.S. states that had
Philadelphia 968 (1116) 1153 (1005) 2121
Total 1404 1264 2668 one-word names. (We eliminated states with two-word names because,
with very few exceptions, people do not have two-word surnames. In
Note. Expected values (rounded to the nearest whole number) appear in addition, the first word in most two-word state names is more peripheral to
parentheses. the state name than is the second word.) We selected the initial letter strings
472 PELHAM, MIRENBERG, AND JONES

for these searches by beginning with the first four letters of each state name
in our list. When a four-letter string (e.g., Geor for Georgia) yielded too
many hits to be listed by the search engine, we added the next consecutive
letter(s) in the state name to narrow the search. When a four-letter string
yielded no or very few hits (e.g., Ohio), we deleted letters from the end of
the string, one at a time, to maximize number of hits realized. For example,
we used Ohi (which fit within the 2,000 hit limit for all eight states) rather
than Oh (which often exceeded the limit). Thus, in the case of every state
in our list, we generated an initial surname letter string set that (a) matched
each state name as well as possible and (b) maximized search size on the
basis of the 2,000 hit constraint.
The only exception to this procedure occurred for Pennsylvania. Penn
yielded too many hits, and Penns yielded almost none. Our solution was to
add y rather than s to Penn, yielding Penny. The two most obvious alternate
solutions to this problem (either dropping Pennsylvania altogether or
adding the final letter a rather than the next consecutive letter y to Penn)
yielded findings slightly stronger than those reported herein. Because this
directory occasionally yielded hits that appeared to be clubs, institutions or
businesses (e.g., Florida, Gators) rather than people (e.g., Florian, David)
we eliminated all such noisy hits within each state. Incidentally, the SSDI
search engine used in Study 1 was not appropriate for Study 2 because it
only allows searches based on exact names (rather than the first few letters
of a name).
to be Latino, it is extremely difficult to attribute the large effects
observed for these two states to a confound involving Latino
versus European names.
In short, despite the risks associated with drawing causal infer-
ences from passive observational findings, we suggest that the best
explanation for the findings of Studies 1–2 is that people are
attracted to places that resemble their own names. Furthermore,
although creative readers might be able to generate additional
criticisms of these findings, alternate explanations based on eth-
nicity seem relatively implausible, and alternate explanations
based on reverse causality (i.e., priming) no longer seem plausible
at all.
Because these findings challenge traditional assumptions about
how people make major life decisions, critics may still wish to
reserve judgment. One could argue, for example, that many of the
surnames that were likely to have been generated in Study 2 were
rather unusual. The results of Study 1 notwithstanding, are the
examples of implicit egotism documented in Study 2 limited to
highly unusual names? Do such findings generalize to people’s
choice of cities rather than states? Study 3 was designed to address
these questions.

Results and Discussion Study 3

The results of Study 2 are summarized in Table 2. For five of the
eight state–name pairs, the results were weakly to strongly in the
predicted direction; for one of the pairs, the observed frequencies
were very close to the expected frequencies; and for two pairs
(Pennsylvania and Ohio), there were modest reversals. The find-
ings for Ohio are likely a product of sampling error. This may be
true of Pennsylvania as well. For instance, if one conducts a search
based on names beginning with Penna, the results for Pennsylva-
nia look much more reasonable (112.8 expected vs. 135 observed
hits). Regardless of one’s preferred interpretation for any reversals,
the overall name–state matching effect (with the reversals aver-
aged in) was highly significant. The expected number of surname–
state matches was 1,584.4 (16.64%), and the observed number of
matches was 1,890 (19.86%), ␹2(1) ⫽ 70.71, p ⬍ .001. It is worth
noting that the states we sampled in Study 2 provide some excel-
lent controls for potential ethnic confounds. For example, because
exactly 32% of the residents of both Texas and California happen
Method
Study 3 was patterned directly after Study 2. Thus, Study 3 also focused
on surnames and also made use of the WorldPages electronic telephone
directory. In Study 3, however, we focused on the eight largest Canadian
cities rather than the eight largest U.S. states. More specifically, we
identified the eight largest predominantly English-speaking metropolitan
areas in Canada. We excluded Montreal and Quebec to avoid an English–
French ethnic name confound (e.g., if a disproportionate number of French
names began with Mont, including Montreal in our list could falsely inflate
our findings). Precisely the same design and same sampling procedure used
in Study 2 yielded eight sets of 3- or 4-letter surname strings, one string
corresponding to the first 3– 4 letters of each city in the list. Needless to
say, initial strings such as Edm (Edmonton), Ham (Hamilton), and Lon
(London) yielded surnames that were quite a bit more common than those
typically generated in Study 2 (see Table 3 for the complete set of cities
and letter strings). As in Study 2, we deleted any hits that did not appear
to refer to people. Careful readers will notice that the surface differences in

Table 2
Likelihood of Living in a Specific State as a Function of One’s Surname (Study 2)

Surname initial letter string

State Cali Texa Flori Illi Penny Ohi Michi Georgi Total

California 929 (760) 10 357 155 299 66 153 264 2,233

Texas 350 34 (7) 170 68 451 31 65 76 1,245
Florida 737 3 471 (358) 95 293 18 68 218 1,903
Illinois 328 0 172 67 (63) 100 21 52 107 847
Pennsylvania 463 4 266 201 265 (302) 3 118 151 1,471
Ohio 188 0 130 40 264 2 (12) 16 110 750
Michigan 145 2 182 67 147 8 87 (44) 74 712
Georgia 98 1 42 20 135 3 24 35 (39) 358
Total 3,283 54 1,790 713 1,954 152 583 1,035 9,519

Note. States are listed in order of population. For the diagonal frequencies, in boldface type, expected values
(rounded to the nearest whole number) appear in parentheses.
 IMPLICIT EGOTISM IN MAJOR LIFE DECISIONS 473

the sampling procedures of Studies 2 and 3 merely reflect the fact that
Study 3 focused on cities rather than states. Because city populations are
noticeably smaller than state populations, the same procedure used in
Study 2 typically generated three-letter rather than four-letter strings in
Study 3 (making Study 3 more conservative than Study 2).
Results and Discussion
Like their American counterparts, these Canadian residents
tended to reside in places that resembled their surnames. As
illustrated in Table 3, this was true for seven of the eight name–
city pairs. The only exception to the surname– city matching rule
occurred for the name– city pair Cal–Calgary. Perhaps a few of
these Calgarians went missing after visiting American relatives in
California (see Table 2, column 1). Alternately, perhaps it was
satisfying enough for them merely to live elsewhere in Canada.
Nonetheless, for the sample as a whole (Calgarians included), the
overall surname– city name matching effect was highly significant
(2,497 observed versus 2,178 expected matches), ␹2(1) ⫽ 52.99,
p ⬍ .001. Thus, even when it comes to the more run-of-the-mill
surnames that were typically generated in Study 3 (e.g., Edmunds,
London, Winters), people seem to prefer places that resemble their
surnames. Although the absolute magnitude of this matching effect
was not very large (about 15% above the chance value), this
seemingly small effect is not negligible. For example, this effect
size is about three times the effect size that corresponds to a
casino’s long-run advantage in a game of roulette. It thus seems a
safe bet that people are attracted to places whose names resemble
their own first or last names (see Prentice & Miller, 1992).
Although Studies 1–3 suggest that implicit egotism plays an
important role in where people choose to live, critics have noted
that Studies 2 and 3 do not provide irrefutable evidence that people
actually moved to the states or cities that resemble their surnames.
Unless people routinely change their surnames to match the names
of the places in which they live, we do not consider this is a very
compelling criticism. Nonetheless, it should go without saying that
it would be nice to have direct evidence regarding people’s move-
ment from one city or state to another. In Study 4, we attempted to
gather such evidence by taking advantage of the fact that SSDI
records include not only the state in which decedents lived at the
time of their demise but also the state in which they lived when
they were issued their social security cards.
Because the large majority of deceased Americans obtained
social security cards as adults, it is important to note that SSDI
records do not typically indicate where people were born (the
social security system did not exist until 1935). This means that
SSDI records cannot typically distinguish a person who moved to
a state as an adult from a person who was born in that state.
However, they can be used to document moves among those who
happened to move after receiving their social security cards. In
other words, studying people who changed residences as adults
constitutes a very conservative test of our hypothesis. With this in
mind, we attempted to identify a very large sample of participants
in Study 4. We did so by focusing on relatively common first
names and looking at the residents of U.S. states rather than cities.
Study 4
Method
In Study 4 we focused on states in the Southeastern U.S. This sampling
strategy was purely pragmatic. Relative to states in all other regions of the
U.S., Southeastern states are disproportionately likely to have names that
strongly resemble common person names (e.g., Georgia was named after
King George). After identifying all Southeastern states with one-word
names, we consulted census records to identify all of the common male and
female names that shared a minimum of their first 3 letters with these
Southeastern state names. When more than one name matched a state
name, we chose the most common name. This procedure yielded four
name–state pairs for both women and men (e.g., Florence–Florida,
George–Georgia; see Tables 4 and 5). Because we sampled multiple names
for both women and men, we were unable to match names directly for age
as we had done in Study 1. However, the very large sample size of Study 4
allowed us to control for age directly in supplemental analyses to be
described below. In addition, the large sample size available for Study 4
allowed us to perform two separate sets of analyses: (a) preliminary
analyses based simply on where people lived at the time of their deaths and
(b) more focused analyses based on the subset of people who moved to the
states in our sample as adults. To determine the number of people who
moved to a specific state as adults, we simply subtracted (a) the total
number of people with a specific first name who received their social
security card in that state and also died while living in that state from (b)

Table 3
Likelihood of Living in a Specific Canadian City as a Function of One’s Surname (Study 3)

Surname initial letter string

City Tor Vanc Ott Edm Cal Win Ham Lon Total

Toronto 836 (611) 61 178 165 1646 1116 1923 914 6,839
Vancouver 114 21 (19) 38 48 316 322 467 192 1,518
Ottawa 104 24 52 (50) 37 303 240 553 217 1,530
Edmonton 111 23 85 54 (48) 377 361 576 193 1,780
Calgary 177 47 86 82 409 (528) 535 904 304 2,544
Winnipeg 150 20 82 45 259 338 (287) 508 157 1,559
Hamilton 98 22 45 23 238 236 527 (434) 176 1,365
London 81 22 50 46 328 289 480 260 (201) 1,556
Total 1,671 240 616 500 3,876 3,437 5,938 2,413 18,691

Note. Cities are listed in order of population. For the diagonal frequencies, in boldface type, expected values
(rounded to the nearest whole number) appear in parentheses.
474 PELHAM, MIRENBERG, AND JONES
the total number of people with a specific first name who simply died while
living in that state (regardless of where they were born). As a concrete
example, if (a) 100 men named George received their social security cards
in Georgia and also died while living in Georgia and (b) a total of 150 men
named George died while living in Georgia, it seems like a safe bet (barring
errors in social security records) that 50 men named George moved to
Georgia. Needless to say, the strongest evidence for implicit egotism would
be evidence that people actually moved to states resembling their first
names.
Results and Discussion
Preliminary results. The preliminary results of Study 4 were
highly similar to the results of Studies 1–3. First of all, as sug-
gested by the frequencies in the diagonals of Table 4, women
disproportionately inhabited states that resembled their first names.
In fact, this was strongly true for all four of the name–state pairs.
Whereas the total number of expected (chance) name–state
matches was 19,859, the observed number was 28,530, or about
44% more than the chance value, ␹2(1) ⫽ 9,375.74, p ⬍ .001. The
results for men are summarized in Table 5. In the case of men, the
results were weaker but still highly significant. On the whole, men
were about 26% more likely to live in states resembling their
names than they should have been by chance, ␹2(1) ⫽ 2,862.00,
p ⬍ .001. Thus, Study 4 provided a large scale, highly systematic
replication of the findings of Studies 1–3.
Some readers may worry that confounds involving age or eth-
nicity could be responsible for the findings of Study 4. For in-
stance, if the average resident of Florida is older than the average
resident of Georgia, and if women named Florence tend to be older
than women named Georgia, this could potentially account for the
findings of Study 4. We addressed this age confound by limiting
the analyses of Study 4 to women and men born during exactly the
same year. As a representative example, in one such analysis, we
focused exclusively on people born in 1920. Despite a dramatic
reduction in sample size, the name–state matching effect remained
highly significant for both women and men, both ps ⬍ .001. Thus,
an age confound cannot explain these findings. We also conducted
several analyses to address potential ethnic confounds. For exam-
ple, we conducted five separate replications in which we limited
our searches to people who all had the same European American
surname—more specifically, one of the five most common Amer-
ican surnames (Smith, Johnson, Williams, Jones, or Brown). We
continued to observe robust name–state matching effects for both
Table 4
Likelihood of Living in a Specific Southeastern State as a Function of One’s First Name
(Study 4: Preliminary Results for Women)
State Florence Georgia
Florida 13,145 (9,641) 1,920
Georgia 2,591 2,202 (1,103)
Louisiana 2,646 926
Virginia 3,861 1,298
Total 22,243 6,346
Note. For the diagonal frequencies, in boldface type, expected values (rounded to the nearest whole number)
appear in parentheses.
women and men when we compared people who had different first
names but the same surnames, both ps ⬍ .001. Although this
sampling procedure does a good job of eliminating many ethnic
confounds (e.g., it largely eliminates people of French, German, or
Visigothic ancestry), it does not eliminate every possible ethnic
confound. In particular, many African Americans (e.g., Venus
Williams, James Brown) have one of these five highly common
surnames. On the other hand, unless (a) some of these first names
are more common than others among Blacks as opposed to Whites,
(b) some of these Southeastern states have noticeably larger Black
populations than others, and (c) these demographic differences
happen to coincide perfectly with the forename–state pairs we used
in Study 4, it is not easy to attribute these findings to any obvious
ethnic confounds. Nonetheless, to address this possibility more
directly, we conducted a number of auxiliary analyses. To briefly
summarize these findings, the results of Study 4 are still extremely
robust when one only compares states with very similar propor-
tions of Black and White residents (e.g., Georgia and Louisiana).
Finally, these results appear to apply to the living and breathing as
well as the dearly departed. In two different follow-up studies in
which we made use of online electronic phone books (e.g., World-
Pages.com) rather than SSDI records, we observed clear replica-
tions of the name–state matching effect—whether we sampled
people with any surname at all or people with any of the five most
common U.S. surnames.
Results for interstate immigrants. Preliminary analyses clearly
showed that people disproportionately inhabited states that resem-
bled their names. But did these residents actually move to these
states? More focused analyses indicated that they did. The results
for women who migrated from one state to another after receiving
their social security cards are summarized in Table 6. For all four
name–state pairs, the findings strongly supported our predictions.
On average, women were about 18% more likely to move to states
resembling their first names than they should have been based on
chance, ␹2(1) ⫽ 1,037.57, p ⬍ .001. Furthermore, for the two
states that happened to match women’s names perfectly (Georgia
and Virginia), this effect was noticeably larger than usual (36%
higher than the chance values). The results for men are summa-
rized in Table 7. As was the case in the preliminary analyses, the
focused results for men were weaker than the results for women.
Findings were weakly to moderately supportive for three of the
four name–state pairs. On average, men’s migration rates to cities
First name
Louise Virginia Total
8,820 8,822 32,707
5,335 2,985 13,113
4,303 (3,175) 2,054 9,929
5,671 8,880 (5,940) 19,710
24,129 22,741 75,459
 IMPLICIT EGOTISM IN MAJOR LIFE DECISIONS 475

Table 5
Likelihood of Living in a Specific Southeastern State as a Function of One’s First Name
(Study 4: Preliminary Results for Men)

First name

State George Kenneth Louis Virgil Total

Georgia 13,697 (12,261) 1,477 1,642 855 17,671

Kentucky 11,390 2,092 (1,636) 2,214 1,736 17,432
Louisiana 9,100 1,045 5,775 (2,665) 397 16,317
Virginia 16,629 2,261 2,332 597 (1,068) 21,819
Total 50,816 6,875 11,963 3,585 73,239

Note. For the diagonal frequencies, in boldface type, expected values (rounded to the nearest whole number)
appear in parentheses.

resembling their names exceeded the chance value by only about
4%. Nonetheless, because of the large sample size, this small
overall name– city migration effect for men was still highly sig-
nificant, ␹2(1) ⫽ 19.93, p ⬍ .001. As noted earlier, this test for
adult migration is an extremely conservative test. Presumably,
many of the women and men in the preliminary analyses also
migrated to the states in which they died (but did so before
receiving their social security cards).
Likely Moderators of Implicit Egotism
The results of Study 4 strongly suggest that when it comes to
people’s first names, implicit egotism is more pronounced among
women than among men. This finding is consistent with published
laboratory research on the name letter effect (Kitayama & Kara-
sawa, 1997; S. L. Koole, 2001, personal communication) as well as
with our own recent laboratory research on name letter prefer-
ences. Women typically like their first names and first initials more
than men do. To the degree that this gender difference proves to be
replicable, it would strengthen our confidence in the conclusion
that name letter preferences per se are responsible for people’s
attraction to places that resemble their names. In the case of
Study 4, even if one focuses on the female name–state pairs that
bear a less striking resemblance to the states with which they were
paired, it appears that our findings were stronger for women than
for men. Nonetheless, it might be useful to gather additional data
on the moderators of implicit egotism. Along these lines, we
conducted several systematic pilot studies suggesting that, in ad-
dition to gender, the distinctiveness or statistical uniqueness of
people’s names may also moderate the strength of behavioral name
letter matching effects. For example, to eliminate any variation in
how closely people’s first names matched state names (e.g., the
name Georgia matches Georgia better than the name Florence
matches Florida), we identified the 8 most common first names
(other than Georgia and Virginia) that matched state names ex-
actly. These eight names (generated based on their population
frequencies) ranged from those that readers might vaguely recog-
nize as potential first names (e.g., Florida, Washington) to those
that were extremely obscure (e.g., Arizona, Tennessee). This study
revealed that people were a full 68% more likely to live in states
bearing their first names than they should have been based on
chance. Other pilot studies with even more distinctive names
yielded even more dramatic results.
If unusual names such as Nevada or Tennessee do an unusually
good job of discriminating their owners from every Tom, Dick,
and Harry they may encounter, then it seems likely that people
with highly unusual names feel a stronger sense of ownership for
their names. If distinctiveness, like gender, proves to be a robust
moderator of our findings, it would further strengthen our inter-
pretation of our findings. In addition, additional evidence that
people with distinctive names show stronger than usual name letter
preferences would also argue against a mere exposure interpreta-
tion of our findings. By definition, it is people with highly com-

Table 6
Likelihood of Moving to a Specific Southeastern State as a Function of One’s First Name
(Study 4: Results for Women)

First name

State Florence Georgia Louise Virginia Total

Florida 10,062 (8,810) 1,033 5,608 6,706 23,409

Georgia 777 346 (184) 1,118 987 3,228
Louisiana 386 185 506 (402) 467 1,544
Virginia 1,349 336 1,469 2,077 (1,603) 5,231
Total 12,574 1,900 8,701 10,237 33,412

Note. For the diagonal frequencies, in boldface type, expected values (rounded to the nearest whole number)
appear in parentheses.
476 PELHAM, MIRENBERG, AND JONES
Table 7
Likelihood of Moving to a Specific Southeastern State as a Function of One’s First Name
(Study 4: Results for Men)
State George Kenneth
Georgia 3,592 (3,520) 722
Kentucky 2,570 526 (518)
Louisiana 2,024 411
Virginia 5,314 964
Total 13,500 2,623
Note. For the diagonal frequencies, in boldface type, expected values (rounded to the nearest whole number)
appear in parentheses.
mon rather than highly unusual names who are more frequently
exposed to their own names. Study 5 was designed to provide
further evidence regarding the potential moderators of implicit
egotism. Study 5 also made use of an even more exhaustive
sampling strategy than the one employed in Study 4, as well as an
arguably more sophisticated data analytic strategy. The novel
analytic approach we adopted in Study 5 allowed us to test our
hypotheses for a great number of names without having to generate
an extraordinarily large (e.g., 35 ⫻ 35 ⫽ 1,225 cell) matrix of
names and places of residence.
Study 5
Method
In Study 5, we sampled every U.S. city whose name begins with Saint
followed by a person name (e.g., St. Anne, St. Helen, St. Louis, St. Paul).
There are 35 such city names. Because of duplicate city names in different
states, however, there are about 80 individual cities with such names.
Because we searched for complete first or last names (rather than letter
strings) in Study 5, we made use of the same SSDI database used in
Studies 1 and 4. As noted earlier, SSDI records are extremely comprehen-
sive. Because this search engine places no limit on the number of hits it
returns, it also allows for national base-rate calculations of the frequency of
different specific first or last names. Thus, for instance, one can use this
tool to determine the exact proportion of deceased Americans whose first
or last name was Louis. This search engine also allows one to specify the
city in which a person was living at the time of his or her death. Thus, for
instance, one can determine the exact proportion of deceased residents of
St. Louis whose first or last name was Louis.
In Study 5, we exhaustively sampled all of the “Saint” cities in the U.S.
and compared (a) the proportion of deceased residents from each city
whose first name was the same as that city name with (b) the proportion of
deceased Americans who possessed that same first name. For example, we
were able to determine whether the deceased residents of St. Louis were
disproportionately likely to be named Louis (relative to all other Ameri-
cans). We repeated this analysis for all 35 of the Saint city names. In the
first such analysis, we searched for first names only (regardless of sur-
name). In the second such analysis we searched for last names only
(regardless of first name).
Results and Discussion
The entire list of names used in Study 5 appears in column 1 of
Table 8. Column 2 of Table 8 lists the proportion of deceased
Americans in the SSDI database who possessed each of the first
First name
Louis Virgil Total
657 204 5,175
527 299 3,922
699 (476) 118 3,252
1,022 198 (309) 7,498
2,905 819 19,847
names listed in column 1. Column 3 lists the proportion of de-
ceased Americans who lived in a given Saint city who possessed
this same first name. Column 4 lists the (deceased) population for
each Saint city. Finally, column 5 lists the effect size (in the form
of an odds ratio) for each name– city pair in the list. In interpreting
these odds ratios, it is important to note that many of the cities
were sufficiently small (or the names sufficiently rare) that the
expected number of residents who possessed that Saint name was
less than a single person. For instance, the seemingly troubling
odds ratio of 0 to 1 for women named Agatha living in St. Agatha
is not very disappointing. This is because the expected number of
women named Agatha living in this very small city was less than
1/50th of a person (0.0167 women). City–name combinations that
yielded expected values of at least 5.0 (meaning that at least 5
people with that first name should have resided in that specific
city, based on base rates) are printed in bold. Ten of these 15 odds
ratios were greater than 1.0. What, then, were the overall results
for first names in Study 5?
Beginning with the results for women, expected values dictated
that 308.8 of the 45,908 women sampled should have resided in
cities named after Saints who happened to share their first names.
The actual number of women who showed this name– city match-
ing effect was 445, which is 44% greater than the chance value,
␹2(1) ⫽ 41.97, p ⬍ .001. The results for men told a weaker but
highly significant version of this same story. On the basis of
expected values, 3,476.0 out of 594,305 men should have lived in
Saint cities bearing their first names. The actual number of men
who did so was 3,956, which is 14% greater than the chance value.
Because of the extremely large sample size for men, this value was
also highly significant, ␹2(1) ⫽ 58.63, p ⬍ .001. A test comparing
the women’s name– city matching rate (144% of the expected
value) against the name– city matching rate observed for the men
(114%) indicated that the gender difference favoring women was
highly significant, ␹2(1) ⫽ 25.1, p ⬍ .001. In short, averaging
across the residents of all of these cities, both women and men
gravitated toward Saint cities whose names included their own first
names, and this tendency was particularly pronounced among
women. These findings greatly increase our confidence in the
gender differences observed in Study 4.
Presumably, the fact that these city names paired people’s exact
first names with the positive word Saint may have contributed to
their appeal. At the same time, these findings might be especially
 IMPLICIT EGOTISM IN MAJOR LIFE DECISIONS 477

Table 8 Saint (first) name after whom their hometown was named. The
Likelihood of Living in a “Saint” City as a Function of One’s actual number of matches was 128, which is 55% greater than the
First Name (Study 5) chance standard, ␹2(1) ⫽ 24.97, p ⬍ .001.
We also conducted a supplemental analysis of all people whose
Proportion Proportion City surname included the word Saint (e.g., Mimi de Saint Aubin,
Name U.S. names in city population OR
Matthew Saint). We then compared (a) the proportion of people in
Women the U.S. whose surname included the word Saint with (b) the
1. Agatha .000091 .0000000 183 0.00
proportion of people living in any Saint city (e.g., St. Paul, St.
2. Anne .001305 .0000000 1,703 0.00 Cloud) whose surname included the word Saint. Whereas there
3. Bernice .001381 .0000000 133 0.00 should have been 242.4 matches on the basis of chance, the actual
4. Clair .000155 .0003153 25,376 2.03 number of matches was 290, ␹2(1) ⫽ 9.35, p ⫽ .003. Thus, people
5. Helen .009068 .0106762 1,405 1.18
6. Marie .004591 .0059749 5,021 1.30
were disproportionately likely to inhabit a Saint city when their
7. Mary .022972 .0339013 11,504 1.48 surname included the word Saint. Like the primary analysis in-
8. Rose .004141 .0034305 583 0.83 volving surnames, this supplemental finding is not susceptible to
any alternate explanations involving either unconscious priming or
Men
conscious veneration of specific Saints. Like the strong first-name
9. Anthony .002508 .003858 1,296 1.54 findings we observed in the supplement to Study 4 (the study
10. Augustine .000084 .000000 13,057 0.00 involving first names such as Florida and Tennessee), the strength
11. Bernard .001523 .001600 1,250 1.05
12. Charles .014408 .015509 21,343 1.08 of the primary surname matching effect in Study 5 may be
13. David(s) .004549 .002035 2,948 0.45 grounded in the fact that the surnames we sampled were statisti-
14. Elmo .000126 .000000 1,083 0.00 cally rare (in this particular case, rare as surnames).
15. Francis .002432 .004752 2,315 1.95 To gain further insight into whether more distinctive names are
16. Gabriel .000148 .000000 276 0.00
17. George .014347 .012532 6,942 0.87 associated with stronger name letter preferences, we conducted a
18. Henry .006720 .033755 474 5.02 meta-analysis of our individual results for first names. To be sure
19. Ignace .000007 .000000 1,328 0.00 that this analysis was based on reliable estimates of effect sizes for
20. Jacob .001111 .005319 376 4.79 a given name, we limited the analyses to name– city combinations
21. James .020204 .015049 10,499 0.74
22. Joe .002471 .005117 2,345 2.07 that yielded expected frequencies of at least five names (the names
23. John(s) .029861 .022749 5,187 0.76 appearing in bold in Table 8). Because pilot studies suggested that
24. Joseph .013665 .008143 36,349 0.60 the distinctiveness effect might apply primarily to men, and be-
25. Leonard .002038 .002132 469 1.05 cause there were only three female name– city combinations that
26. Louis .004168 .006206 358,699 1.49
27. Mark(s) .000679 .000000 113 0.00
yielded expected values of at least 5.0, we limited this meta-
28. Martin .001477 .000000 77 0.00 analysis to male names. In this analysis, we simply correlated the
29. Matthew(s) .000536 .001037 1,928 1.94 effect size (i.e., the odds ratio) associated with each name with the
30. Michael .003717 .013210 757 3.55 objective frequency of that name (the proportion of Americans
31. Paul .005469 .005445 119,736 1.00
32. Peter .002414 .002956 2,706 1.22
having that name). This analysis indicated that the tendency for
33. Stephen(s) .001221 .000549 1,823 0.45 people to live in cities resembling their first names was notably
34. Thomas .007796 .013746 873 1.76 stronger for the least common first names, r(10) ⫽ ⫺.545, p ⫽
35. Vincent .001080 .000000 56 0.00 .034 (one-tailed). An alternate approach to this analysis would be
to categorize each individual participant according to the fre-
Note. Names in boldface type have expected frequencies greater than 5.0.
Proportion U.S. names ⫽ proportion of deceased Americans in the Social quency of his or her name and then examine whether the city–
Security Death Index who possessed the first name; Proportion in city ⫽ name matching effect was stronger for less common names. It
proportion of deceased persons who lived in that particular “Saint” city and should go without saying that such an analysis would yield a
possessed that first name; OR ⫽ odds ratio.
dramatically lower p value because the number of observations for
that analysis would be the total sample size associated with
prone to an alternate explanation based on priming (or a conscious these 12 names rather than the number 12 (for 12 names).
analogue thereof). In particular, the same parents who adore Saint The findings of Study 5 add some punch to the idea that
Mary or Saint Louis enough to move a city bearing that Saint’s name-letter preferences influence people’s choice of a place in
name might also name one of their sons or daughters after the same which to live. These findings further suggest that when it comes to
beloved Saint. Of course, it is not clear why such a priming effect first names, name-letter preferences (a) are stronger for women
should hold more strongly for female than for male names. None- than for men and (b) are stronger for unique as opposed to highly
theless, it would be reassuring to see that the results of Study 5 common names. Each of these findings increases our confidence in
generalized to surnames as well as first names. the conclusion that our findings truly reflect implicit egotism (in
As it turns out, all 35 of these Saint names exist as surnames as the form of behavioral name letter preferences). Taken together,
well as first names (though in much lower frequencies as sur- these supplemental findings involving gender and distinctiveness
names). Were people disproportionately likely to inhabit Saint also suggest that there is more to name letter preferences than mere
cities when their surnames were the same as the names appearing exposure. Finally, the robust surname findings for Study 5 further
in the city names? Yes. Base-rate calculations indicated that there suggest that the name letter preferences we observed are not
should have been 82.6 residents whose surnames matched the merely priming effects in disguise.
478 PELHAM, MIRENBERG, AND JONES

Another Systematic Replication sequences of implicit egotism to an alternate self-evaluative bias.

At the risk of boring some readers, it is worth noting that we
have conducted several other systematic replications of our name–
residence matching effects. For example, in a recent replication,
we made use of an exhaustive national telephone directory (the
U.S. Telephone & Address Listings Page at Ancestry.com) to
focus on exact surname– city-name matches that should be difficult
to explain in terms of any obvious confounds. In particular, we
consulted census records to identify the five most common sur-
names that happen to be place names commonly used in city
names. These surnames, in order of frequency, were Hill, Park,
Beach, Lake, and Rock. People were disproportionately likely to
live in cities featuring place words that happened to be their
surnames. The observed number of matches in this study (1,351)
exceeded the chance value (976) by more than 38%, p ⬍ .001.
To summarize thus far, Studies 1–5 strongly suggest that people
are attracted to places that resemble their names. We have sug-
gested that these preferences constitute examples of implicit ego-
tism. However, advocates of explicit egotism might take issue with
this explanation. Perhaps people consciously gravitate toward
places that remind them of themselves (a possibility that, in some
ways, is more intriguing than the explanation we have offered).
We believe there is a big difference between being aware of one’s
behavior (“My name is Paul, and I am moving to St. Paul”) and
being aware of the basis for one’s behavior (“I am doing so
because of the positive associations I have about my name”).
Nonetheless, the argument that implicit egotism is responsible for
the findings of Studies 1–5 would be strengthened by evidence that
more subtle self-relevant associations influence where people
choose to live. In Study 6 we attempted to gather such evidence by
extending our hypotheses to include an alternate implicit prefer-
ence. Specifically, if people possess positive implicit associations
to the numbers in their birthdays (Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997;
Miller, Downs, & Prentice, 1998), then it might not be too far-
fetched to expect people to gravitate toward cities whose names
prominently feature these birthday numbers. For example, people
born on March 3rd (03/03) and June 6th (06/06) might be attracted
to cities such as Three Rivers, Michigan, and Six Mile, South
Carolina, respectively. From a theoretical perspective, support for
this prediction would extend our research on the behavioral con-
From a methodological perspective, examining whether people’s
birthdays influence major life decisions constitutes an ideal natural
experiment on implicit egotism. Because the exact date of a
person’s birth is essentially a random outcome, this date should be
uncorrelated with individual differences such as age, gender, and
ethnicity.
Study 6
Method
Study 6 made use of the same SSDI records examined in Studies 1, 4,
and 5. These records were ideal for the purposes of Study 6 because they
allow searches based on (a) decedents’ exact date of birth as well as (b) the
specific city in which decedents lived at the time of their deaths. Further-
more, this search engine allows comprehensive searches that include one-
word portions of a city name. Thus, if one searches for cities named two,
this search engine will return hits from any U.S. city whose name includes
the word two (e.g., Two Harbors, Two Oaks). Study 6 focused on all U.S.
cities whose names began with the numbers 2– 8, inclusive. Typical city
names included Two Harbors, Minnesota; Three Forks, Montana; and Five
Points, Alabama. Although there were a few cities whose names contained
numbers higher than the number 8 (there are no cities, incidentally,
containing the word one), these cities had extremely small populations,
making them uninformative. Moreover, adding them to the analysis does
not change our findings. To simplify our analysis and to make certain that
our participants would have a preference for only one birthday number, we
focused on participants born on the same numbered day and month (02/02,
03/03, 04/04, etc.). Our list of usable birth dates thus ranged from Febru-
ary 2 to August 8. To create the data for Study 6, we created a 7 ⫻ 7 matrix
that included every possible combination of the seven birthdays and the
seven sets of city names. We filled in the cells for this 7 ⫻ 7 matrix by
determining the number of people with each birth date who lived in each
set of cities that corresponded to each number. We expected that, on
average, people whose birthday numbers corresponded to the prominent
number in each city name would be over-represented among the (deceased)
residents of that specific city.
Results and Discussion
The complete 7 ⫻ 7 frequency matrix for Study 6 appears in
Table 9. As illustrated in Table 9, the observed frequency in each

Table 9
Likelihood of Living in a Specific City as a Function of One’s Birthday (Study 6)

Birthday

City February 2 March 3 April 4 May 5 June 6 July 7 August 8 Total

Two 22 (17.67) 12 22 16 14 9 24 119

Three 27 40 (28.58) 25 22 32 22 30 198
Four 7 6 11 (7.72) 10 4 8 6 52
Five 4 2 2 3 (2.49) 2 3 2 18
Six 5 4 2 4 7 (4.04) 5 1 28
Seven 1 5 3 2 6 3 (2.99) 5 25
Eight 6 1 7 10 5 8 8 (7.05) 45
Total 72 70 72 67 70 58 76 485

Note. “City” represents the number in a city name that begins with a number (e.g., Two Harbors, Minnesota;
Three Oaks, Michigan). For the diagonal frequencies, in boldface type, expected values appear in parentheses.
 IMPLICIT EGOTISM IN MAJOR LIFE DECISIONS
of the seven diagonal cells exceeded the expected value based on
chance pairings. That is, for every possible birthday– city set
combination, people were disproportionately likely to have lived in
a city whose name prominently featured their birthday number (at
least by a very small margin). Whereas the overall percentage of
chance matches between birth date and city name should have
been 14.5%, the observed percentage of matches was 19.4%,
which is about 33% more than the chance value, ␹2(1) ⫽ 9.13, p ⫽
.003. It thus appears that people are attracted to cities whose names
activate their positive associations regarding their birthday num-
bers. Although we obviously do not know how these people would
have explained their decision to live in a specific city, it seems
extremely unlikely that many of these people set out on a con-
scious trek for a city whose name reminded them of their birth-
days. In light of the nearly random ways in which people come to
possess their specific birthdays, it is also difficult to imagine any
compelling alternate accounts of these findings.1
Thus far, we have shown that the positive associations people
have about both the letters in their names and the numbers in their
birthdays appear to influence a very important life decision,
namely where people choose to spend their lives. In the remaining
studies of this report, we focus on another important life deci-
sion—what people choose to do for a living. It is worth noting in
advance that the universe of possible careers that resemble peo-
ple’s names is dramatically smaller than the universe of possible
places of residence that fit this same bill. This fact, combined with
the scarcity of public databases that include information about
people’s names and careers, makes archival studies of implicit
egotism and career choice inherently difficult to conduct. None-
theless, the same logic that dictates that people should prefer to
live in places whose names resemble their own names also dictates
that people should be attracted to careers whose names resemble
their own names.
Because we were unable to locate any large databases that
provided records of people’s names and careers (for multiple
careers), our interest in implicit egotism and career choice neces-
sitated a change in analytic strategy. In the studies that follow, that
is, we had to examine one or two careers at a time. We began our
assessment of career choices by focusing on whether people’s first
names predicted whether they were dentists or lawyers. Of course,
few people ever make a specific choice between these two partic-
ular careers. However, comparing the proportion of people with
different first names who choose these two different careers allows
for a simple and direct test of our hypothesis
Study 7
Method
We searched for dentists and lawyers by consulting the official Web
pages of the American Dental Association (http://www.ada.org/directory/
dentistsearchform.html) and the American Bar Association (http://lawyers.
martindale.com/aba). These sources proved to be very useful because they
provided comprehensive national directories of the official members of
these two professional organizations (though they only allowed searches on
a state by state basis). Each of these directories also allowed for searches
based solely on people’s first names, and neither directory placed limits on
the number of hits they allowed for a specific search. We began this search
by consulting 1990 census records. Using these records, we attempted to
identify the four most common male and female first names that shared a
479
minimum of their first three letters with the names of each of these two
occupations. However, we had to relax our three-letter criterion from Law
to La for all of the female names (and for three of the four male names)
because there were no names that qualified using the stricter criterion.
The 16 names we generated in this fashion included the female names
Denise, Dena, Denice, Denna, Laura, Lauren, Laurie, and Laverne and the
male names Dennis, Denis, Denny, Denver, Lawrence, Larry, Lance, and
Laurence. We expected that people with names such as Dennis or Denise
would be overrepresented among dentists, and people with names such as
Lawrence or Laura would be overrepresented among lawyers. Because the
lawyer search engine produced a great number of false alarms involving
last or middle as opposed to first names, we carefully cleaned the data
generated by this search engine to limit hits to true first name hits (no such
problem occurred for the dentist search engine). Finally, to make manage-
able the task of cleaning the lawyer data, we limited both searches to the
eight most populous U.S. states (California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas).
Results and Discussion
The results for women in Study 7 are summarized in the left-
hand portion of Table 10. Relative to female lawyers, female
dentists were quite a bit more likely to have names that began with
the letters Den, ␹2(1) ⫽ 4.72, p ⬍ .05. The comparable results for
men are summarized in the right-hand portion of Table 10. Though
the results for men were also in the expected direction, they fell
short of significance, ␹2(1) ⫽ 2.14, ns. Although we expected that
women might show more pronounced name-letter preferences than
men, we did not expect men to show such weak effects.2
In light of the small effect sizes observed in Study 7, critics
might be concerned that these findings were driven by only one or
two of the names we sampled or that they were an artifact of a
specific comparison between dentists and lawyers. We conducted
several analyses to address these concerns, and they all supported
the idea that these findings are a product of implicit egotism. For
example, in one such analysis, we sampled dentists in all 50 U.S.
states and assessed whether dentists were more likely than the
average American to possess names such as Dennis, Denis,
Denise, or Dena (the two most common male and female names in
our lists). In this supplemental analysis, we compared (a) the
number of dentists with each of these four specific names with (b)
the number of dentists who had the two European American names
that were most similar in frequency to each of these specific
names. For example, according to 1990 census records, the names
1
The name– city matching effect observed in Study 6 occurred in a
weaker but significant form in an alternate analysis that included partici-
pants born on the 2nd through 8th day of any month of the year. This is a
very weak test of the name– city matching hypothesis because for 11 out
of 12 of the participants in this analysis, the month number associated with
their birthday conflicts with the day number associated with their birthday.
2
Although both of these online directories allowed searches by first
name only, the lawyer search directory sometimes returned hits that in-
cluded the searched-for name when it proved to be a middle name or a
surname. When the first name we searched for showed up as a middle
name, we included the name on our list because we saw no evidence of any
systematic bias in which of our names were first versus middle names.
However, we deleted names from our tally when the searched-for name
proved to be a surname because we observed that some first names turned
up as surnames more often than others. Our results do not differ meaning-
fully if we exclude all hits that involve middle names.
480 PELHAM, MIRENBERG, AND JONES
Table 10
Likelihood of Being a Dentist Versus a Lawyer as a Function of
One’s First Name (Study 7)
Women Men
Occupation Den names La names Den names La names
Dentist 30 (21.4) 64 (72.6) 247 (229.7) 515 (532.3)
Lawyer 434 (442.6) 1512 (1503.4) 1565 (1582.3) 3685 (3667.7)
Note. For each cell of the design, expected values appear in parentheses.
Each name set is collapsed across the four most common names fitting that
criterion. The complete set of names used in Study 7 were Denise, Dena,
Denice, Denna, Laura, Lauren, Laurie, Laverne, Dennis, Denis, Denny,
Denver, Lawrence, Larry, Lance, and Laurence.
Jerry, Dennis, and Walter respectively ranked 39th, 40th, and 41st
in frequency for male first names. Taken together, the names Jerry
and Walter have an average frequency of 0.416%, compared with
a frequency of 0.415% for the name Dennis. Thus, if people named
Dennis are more likely than people named Jerry or Walter to work
as dentists, this would suggest that people named Dennis do, in
fact, gravitate toward dentistry. This is the case. A nationwide
search focusing on each of these specific first names revealed 482
dentists named Dennis, 257 dentists named Walter, and 270 den-
tists named Jerry. The odds ratio corresponding to this effect is
1.83 to 1, p ⬍ .001. We conducted identical analyses for the names
Denis, Denise, and Dena. Although the sample sizes were much
smaller for these remaining names, the odds ratios for these names
also supported our hypotheses. These odds ratios were 1.75 to 1 for
Denis (vs. Vance and Jarrod), 2.50 to 1 for Denise (vs. Beverly and
Tammy), and 1.71 to 1 for Dena (vs. Therese and Candy). Inci-
dentally, we did not conduct a comparable set of analyses for
lawyers because (a) the lower reliability of the lawyer search
engine for first names would have required an extraordinary
amount of data cleaning (i.e., removing middle and last names
from the results, one case at a time) and (b) the lawyer search
engine, unlike the dentist search engine, only allows searches on a
state by state basis. Critics with large amounts of time on their
hands are invited to conduct these analyses for themselves.
The results of Study 7 thus provide additional evidence for the
idea that implicit egotism plays a role in major life decisions.
Although the methods used to address this question in Study 7
differed slightly from those used in Studies 1– 6, observant readers
may have noticed that the supplemental analyses presented in
Study 7 are extremely similar to the primary analyses introduced in
Study 5 (the “Saints” study). One desirable feature of this approach
is that it can be used to make inferences about people’s career
choices even when one only has access to the names of people
working in a single occupation. In Study 8, we made use of this
approach to see if people whose first names began with the letters
Geo would be disproportionately represented among published
professional geoscientists.
Study 8
Method
Study 8 was conducted using the bibliographic search tool GeoRef
(http://georef.cos.com), which contains highly exhaustive records of sci-
entific publications in the geosciences (e.g., geology, geophysics, geo-
chemistry). Unlike most other widely used bibliographic search tools (e.g.,
PsycINFO), this search tool generates individual researcher names rather
than individual citations (papers). This is important because search tools
that generate individual citations will yield many redundant hits. In
Study 8, we examined whether people named George or Geoffrey (the two
most common American first names beginning with Geo) were dispropor-
tionately likely to be published in the geosciences. We did not include
additional names in the list because there simply are no such usable names.
We consulted 1990 census data to identify the four European American
male first names that were most similar in overall frequency to these two
target names (using an expanded version of the procedure described in the
supplemental portion of Study 7). The control names for George were
Daniel, Kenneth, Donald, and Mark. The control names for Geoffrey were
Pete, Randolph, Jonathon, and Bennie. Because this search tool does not
allow searches by first name only, we had to specify a last name for each
search. We selected the eight most common U.S. surnames and paired each
of the eight surnames with each set of five first names. Doing so had the
additional advantage of controlling, in part, for potential ethnic confounds.
In the interest of brevity we collapsed (a) across the two target names
(George and Geoffrey), (b) across the eight control names, and (c) across
the eight surnames.
Results and Discussion
On the basis of the observed frequencies for the eight control
names, there should have been 65.5 geoscientists named George or
Geoffrey in Study 8. The observed number was 93, or about 42%
more than the expected value, ␹2(1) ⫽ 4.58, p ⬍ .05. To assess the
generality of this effect, we conducted an identical analysis for the
three most common male first names that began with the letters Ge
(recall that we exhausted the entire list of names beginning with
Geo). Although the results for these three names (Gerald, Gene,
and Gerard) were all in the predicted direction, the sample size for
each of these names was very small. For instance, the base-rate
(control name) calculations for Gerard indicated that there should
have been a total of 1.75 geoscientists named Gerard in this
database. In reality there were 4. Thus, this name yielded an
impressive effect size and an equally unimpressive sample size.
In light of this problem, we conducted an additional analysis
based on first initials rather than first names (while still using the
eight most common U.S. surnames). First, we consulted 1990
census data for male first names to determine which letter (i.e.,
which initial) provided the closest frequency match for the letter G.
This proved to be the letter T. In 1990, about 8.2% of all American
men had first names that began with G, and about 8.9% had first
names that began with T. Because the large majority of the
scientists listed in the GeoRef index are male, the census estimates
for male names probably provide the best estimate of the propor-
tion of geoscientists who should be expected to have first names
that begin with G versus T. Nonetheless, we examined census data
for female first names as well. The percentage of female names
beginning with G was 1.8%, and the percentage beginning with T
was 1.4%. As a stringent indicator of expected frequencies for the
initials G and T, we thus weighted the male and female percentages
equally. On the basis of this estimate, 5.07% and 5.24% of all
American first names should begin with G and T, respectively.
To be certain that these same values held for adults with the
same eight highly common surnames that were included in
Study 9, we consulted the same WorldPages telephone directory
we used in Studies 2 and 3. We then randomly sampled three U.S.
 IMPLICIT EGOTISM IN MAJOR LIFE DECISIONS 481

states (Ohio, Massachusetts, and Minnesota), searching each state could then be conducted to identify all of the roofing companies in the
for people with each of the eight surnames and each of the two same city. We searched for hardware stores and roofing companies in
initials (G and T). This search yielded totals that corresponded the 20 largest U.S. cities (on the basis of 1990 census data). The names of
almost perfectly with the estimates based on census data. Specif- these cities appear in Table 11. Because we did not anticipate a large
number of hits for these searches, we collapsed first and last initials into a
ically, collapsing across these three states (and the eight sur-
single analysis and pooled our results across the 20 cities. We searched
names), there were 12,510 people whose first initial was G
only under hits that appeared under H and R in the alphabetical lists, and
and 12,995 people whose first initial was T. It thus seems very safe we were careful to exclude potential hits that appeared to be the names of
to assume that among Americans with the eight common surnames streets, towns, or suburbs (e.g., Hollywood Hardware). Examples of hits
sampled in Study 9, G is a slightly less common first initial than that we treated as valid indicators of names include HL Campbell Hard-
is T. We thus averaged these two estimates (census and phone ware, Harris Hardware, Rashid’s Roofing, H & T Roofing, and Ray &
book records) to determine our expected values for geoscientists Roy’s Roofing (counted once). Examples of hits that we excluded from the
having these two initials. Relative to the base rates for Americans search include Hardware Mart, Highland Hardware (on Highland Avenue),
in general, these geoscientists were much more likely to have first and Roof Roofing (because a phone call to the owner indicated that his
names that began with G as opposed to T (at a rate of 177 to 128), company was named after his barking dog). We coded ambiguous hits
(Hyd-Mech Hardware, Hec Roofing) as half a hit and rounded downward
␹2(1) ⫽ 9.85, p ⬍ .001. Because the standard of comparison in
to the nearest whole number in each city (thus it took two ambiguous hits
Study 8 was people with exactly the same surnames as these
in the same category in a given city to be counted). There were very few
geoscientists, it is more difficult than it would be otherwise to of these ambiguous hits, and our results do not change if we exclude them
attribute this finding to an ethnic confound. In addition, because from the analysis. Finally, because almost all of these businesses appeared
this effect involved people’s first initials rather than the first three to be owned by men, we did not code or analyze for gender.
letters in people’s names, it seems unlikely that these people would
have realized the connection between their names and their ca- Results and Discussion
reers. In short, no matter how we analyzed these data, we found
that people whose first names begin with G, Ge, or Geo gravitated As we expected, people’s initials were good predictors of
toward the geosciences. whether they worked in roofing or hardware. As shown in the
Although the results of Study 8 strengthen our confidence in the upper half of Table 12, hardware store owners were about 80%
findings of Study 7, an obvious limitation of Studies 7 and 8 is more likely to have names beginning with the letter H as compared
that, collectively, they focus on only three specific career choices. with R. In contrast, roofers showed the reverse pattern. They were
Do people’s names have implications for other kinds of careers? In about 70% more likely to have names beginning with R as com-
an effort to address this question, we conducted Study 9. In this pared with H. This association between people’s initials and their
study, we examined whether people’s first or last initials were occupations was highly significant, ␹2(1) ⫽ 10.58, p ⬍ .001.
associated with whether they worked in the hardware business or Because we tabulated these data on a city-by-city basis, it was easy
the roofing business. to determine whether the roofers in a specific city were more likely
than the hardware store owners in that same city to have names
Study 9 that began with the letter R. This was the case in 17 of the 20 cities.
Although the results of Study 9 supported our predictions, an
Method alternate explanation for these results is based on the fact that we
In Study 9 we identified owners of hardware stores versus roofing were not able to search for these two businesses by the actual
companies whose first or last names began with the letters H versus R. We names of the business owners. Instead, we searched businesses
did so by using Yahoo’s Internet Yellow Pages (http://www.yp.yahoo. whose names began with H or R and then examined these hits to
com), a search directory that yields alphabetically sorted listings for spe- identify those that involved people’s names. It is thus plausible that
cific businesses or companies in specific U.S. cities. For example, a single an equal number of people with the initials H and R go into
search using this directory could be conducted to produce an alphabetical hardware and roofing respectively. Instead of reflecting an attrac-
listing of all of the hardware stores in Buffalo, New York. A second search tion to careers that resemble one’s name, the disproportionate
number of matches we observed between people’s initials and their
businesses could merely reflect people’s preference for alliteration.
Table 11 For example, if Hector Ramirez opened up both a hardware store
The Twenty Largest U.S. Cities in 1990 (the Search Pool and a roofing company, it is plausible that he might choose to
for Study 9) name his two businesses Hector’s Hardware and Ramirez’s Roof-
ing. In short, people’s love of alliteration rather than their love for
Rank City Rank City
themselves might be the real reason behind these findings. Of
1. New York, NY 11. San Jose, CA course, if people have a powerful preference for alliteration, they
2. Los Angeles, CA 12. Baltimore, MD should take advantage of other opportunities to provide their
3. Chicago, IL 13. Indianapolis, IN places of employment with highly alliterative labels. We tested this
4. Houston, TX 14. San Francisco, CA alternate hypothesis by conducting three supplemental analyses to
5. Philadelphia, PA 15. Jacksonville, FL
6. San Diego, CA 16. Columbus, OH see if people gravitated toward alliteration in naming their busi-
7. Detroit, MI 17. Milwaukee, WI nesses. We began by searching for hardware stores and roofing
8. Dallas, TX 18. Memphis, TN companies in the eight largest U.S. cities that began with the letters
9. Phoenix, AZ 19. Washington, DC H and R (e.g., Houston, Honolulu, Raleigh, Rochester). We then
10. San Antonio, TX 20. Boston, MA
focused on whether people were more likely to name their busi-
482 PELHAM, MIRENBERG, AND JONES
nesses after the city in which they lived when it lead to alliteration
(e.g., “Honolulu Hardware”) than when it did not (“Honolulu
Roofing”). Because very few people gave their businesses the
names of the cities in which they lived, we supplemented this
analysis by examining whether the participants in our 20 original
cities ever named their businesses after the streets on which they
were located (e.g., Halsted Hardware on South Halsted Street).
Neither of these analyses yielded any support for the alliteration
hypothesis. In fact, the trends in both analyses were weakly in a
direction opposite that predicted by the alliteration hypothesis.
Finally, as a third test of the alliteration hypothesis, we recoded the
business names from our original 20-city search pool by focusing
on business names that began with the letters H versus R but did
not designate people’s names (e.g., Handyman Hardware, Hilltop
Roofing, Regency Hardware, Rainbow Roofing). The results of
this analysis appear in Table 13. Though weakly in the direction
predicted by the alliteration hypothesis, these results fell well short
of significance, ␹2(1) ⫽ 0.39, p ⫽ .535. In short, a variety of
alternate analyses yielded little support for the alliteration hypoth-
esis. Nonetheless, it would be useful to devise a test of implicit
egotism and career choices that more convincingly ruled out this
alternate explanation. To do this, and to provide a replication
of our career findings that applied to women, we conducted
Study 10.3
Study 10
Method
The design of Study 10 was very similar to the design of Study 9. Like
Study 9, for example, Study 10 made use of an electronic telephone
directory (http://www.switchboard.com/bin/cgidir.dll). This directory
proved to be ideal for Study 10 because it allows searches using any
number of consecutive words or letters that begin a business name. For
example, a search for “Kathy’s K” might yield informative hits such as
“Kathy’s Kite Shop” or “Kathy’s Kayak Kompany.” Thus, after (a) sys-
tematically choosing a set of names and (b) adding an apostrophe, an s, and
a single follow-up letter to each name, a researcher can log all of the hits
returned in such searches and then code the hits for whether they constitute
valid business names of interest. The flexibility of this search tool also
makes it possible to control directly rather than indirectly for alliteration.
We did so in Study 10 by capitalizing on the fact that some female first
names have the same initial vowel sound despite the fact that they begin
with different letters. In particular, quite a few female names that begin
with the sh sound begin with the letters Ch rather than Sh. As a concrete
example, if Sheryl is more likely than Cheryl to own a seashell shop, it is
difficult to crack this fact up to alliteration. In Study 10, we consulted 1990
Table 12
Likelihood of Owning a Hardware Store or a Roofing Company
as a Function of One’s First or Last Initial (Study 9)
First or last initial
Business H R
Hardware 42 (27.56) 26 (31.44)
Roofing 45 (50.44) 76 (57.56)
Note. Expected frequencies appear in parentheses. Because of the very
small number of women in this sample, we did not break down the results
by gender.
Table 13
Likelihood of Naming a Hardware Store or a Roofing Company
Using Non-Self-Referent Words Beginning With H Versus
R (Study 9)
First or last initial
Business H R
Hardware 27 (23.85) 22 (22.15)
Roofing 32 (32.15) 33 (29.85)
Note. Expected frequencies appear in parentheses.
census data and identified the four most common female first names that
began with the letter pairs Ch and Sh. Of course, we skipped names that did
not fit our criterion for pronunciation (e.g., Christine). The eight names we
generated in this fashion were Cheryl, Charlotte, Charlene, Cheri, Shirley,
Sharon, Sherry, and Shannon. Thus for instance, we searched for busi-
nesses beginning “Cheryl’s C” as well as for those beginning “Cheryl’s S.”
Two coders were trained to code each hit in this set of searches for
whether it truly constituted a business that began with the letter S or C. Hits
involving adjectives that began with S or C (e.g., Cheryl’s Creative Arts,
Sherry’s Superb Diner) were coded as false alarms. However, when a
business name following an adjective constituted a true hit (e.g., Char-
lotte’s Classic Catering, Cheri’s Super Subs) the adjective was ignored, and
it was counted as a regular hit. Along similar lines, in cases in which an
adjective was an inherent part of the product or service being sold (e.g.,
Charlotte’s Classical Music) this was also counted as a true hit. Finally,
because the owners of beauty salons often gave their businesses names that
began with S (Sherry’s Salon, Shannon’s Snip & Shear) as well as C
(Cheri’s Clip n Curl, Charlene’s Classy Cuts), entries that appeared to refer
to beauty salons were also coded as nonhits. Otherwise, supportive findings
might reflect name letter labeling effects rather than name letter career
choices (see Mirenberg & Pelham, 2001). Typical examples of business
names that were counted as hits included Café, Candles, Catering, Clothes
Closet, Sewing, Shoes, Snack Shop, and Sweets. Finally, identical hits
produced in the same city or area code were counted only once—to avoid
counting chain stores as multiple hits. Coders were kept blind to the names
of business owners by replacing the names with arbitrary code numbers.
Interrater agreement was high (␣ ⫽ .89). Results were averaged across the
two raters, rounded to the nearest whole number, and summed across each
of the four female first names (within each of the two categories of
business names).
Results and Discussion
The results of Study 10 are summarized in Table 14. As shown
in the left-hand column of Table 14, about 23% of women whose
names began with Ch appeared to own businesses beginning with
the letter S. In comparison, about 39% of women whose names
3
We replicated the findings of Study 10 in numerous informal pilot
studies as well as in two highly systematic studies, one involving first
names and one involving surnames. For example, in one study involving
surnames we arbitrarily chose computer shops and travel agencies as the
target businesses and then generated owner names by sampling the four
most common American surnames beginning with the letters C (Clark,
Carter, Campbell, and Collins) and T (Taylor, Thomas, Thompson, and
Turner). People whose surnames began with C were slightly more likely to
be in the computer business (e.g., Campbell’s Computer Repair), and
people whose surnames began with T were quite a bit more likely to be in
the travel business (e.g., Thompson’s Travel).
 IMPLICIT EGOTISM IN MAJOR LIFE DECISIONS
Table 14
Likelihood of Owning a Business Beginning With the Letter C
Versus S as a Function of One’s First Name (Study 10)
First name
Initial letter of
business name Ch names Sh names
C 55 (46.25) 145 (153.75)
S 16 (24.75) 91 (82.25)
Note. Expected frequencies appear in parentheses.
began with Sh appeared to own such businesses. This association
between name and business type was significant, ␹2(1) ⫽ 6.17,
p ⫽ .013. Thus, even when we eliminated alliteration as an
alternate account for our findings, we found that the women in
Study 10 gravitated toward businesses that began with the same
letter as their first names. We realize that there could be unforeseen
risks associated with our use of telephone listings. For example,
just as it is possible that some people who endorse positive
statements on self-esteem scales do not possess high self-esteem,
it is possible that some of these businesses sampled in Study 10
were not truly owned by the women whose names were featured in
their titles. In spite of their potential limitations, however, we
believe that Studies 9 and 10 provide a useful complement to the
more methodologically rigorous Studies 7 and 8. In other words,
we feel that the most parsimonious explanation for all of our
studies involving careers is that implicit egotism plays a role in a
wide range of career choices. Nonetheless, it should go without
saying that, given the limited amount of data we were able to
amass regarding career choices, our confidence regarding implicit
egotism and career choices is much lower than our confidence
regarding implicit egotism and people’s choice of a place in which
to live. At a minimum, future studies should examine the most
likely moderators of these findings. Like our findings regarding
where people live, for example, our findings regarding careers
should be moderated by gender as well as by the distinctiveness of
people’s names.
General Discussion
The present studies provide some novel insights into the role of
the self-concept in major life decisions. In particular, the positive,
and presumably unconscious, associations people have about
themselves seem to influence at least two major life decisions:
where people choose to live and how people choose to make a
living. In light of these findings, critics of research on implicit
social cognition would be hard-pressed to argue that implicit
self-concept processes have no consequences for important deci-
sions. Moreover, although our research on implicit egotism is in its
early stages, we have already uncovered additional evidence for
the consequences of implicit egotism. For example, we recently
found that people are attracted to other people whose names
resemble their own (Pelham, Jones, Mirenberg, & Carvallo, 2002;
Jones & Pelham, 2001). For example, Jones and Pelham (2001)
found that people’s contributions to political election campaigns
were influenced by the names of Presidential candidates. More
specifically, during the 2000 presidential campaign, people whose
483
last names began with B and G were more likely to contribute to
the election funds of Bush and Gore, respectively.
How Representative Are the Present Findings?
Taken as a whole, we feel that our findings provide solid
evidence for the existence of implicit egotism. In contrast to this
view, avid fans of random sampling might argue that it is difficult
to place great confidence in the present findings. From this per-
spective, researchers who fail to use random sampling have no
assurances that their findings apply to the general population of
people about whom they would presumably like to make infer-
ences. Although we sampled names systematically in this research,
we obviously did not sample them randomly. From our perspec-
tive, random sampling is a methodological tool that, like any other
tool, is well suited to some problems and poorly suited to others.
Applying this logic to the present research, one would have to
randomly sample an extraordinarily large number of people in the
hopes of happening across a sizable number of people with sur-
names such as Califano or Texada. However, it is people with
precisely such names who provided the ideal tests of our hypoth-
eses (see Mook, 1983, for related arguments). Readers who are
concerned about whether our results apply to people in general
might be happy to learn that when it comes to studies of implicit
egotism and interpersonal attraction, we have been able to use truly
exhaustive sampling techniques. For example, in a study of im-
plicit egotism and marriage, Pelham et al. (2002) identified every
woman who gave birth to a baby in the state of Texas in 1926. As
a group, these women were married to men who shared their
(maiden) surname initials at a rate that exceeded chance pairing by
more than 40%. Moreover, because this effect also held strongly
for people with Latino surnames, this surname-matching effect
cannot be attributed to ethnic matching. We observed this same
finding in two large samples of rural Southerners (taken from
entire counties in Georgia and Florida), in a set of exhaustive,
statewide California mortality records, and in exhaustive sets of
statewide marriage records from both Georgia and Alabama. In
fact, we have yet to locate a large sample of marriage records in
which we did not observe this effect. In our larger samples, we also
observed a small but highly significant first name matching effect
that paralleled the much stronger surname matching effect. More-
over, unlike the present studies, which focused mainly on contem-
porary samples of European Americans, our studies of relationship
choices yielded support for implicit egotism in a wide variety of
cultural and ethnic groups (e.g., rural Southerners, Californians,
Latinos) and across historical periods ranging from the early 1800s
to the turn of the 21st century.
Of course, we are not arguing that concerns regarding sampling
(including random sampling) are completely irrelevant to this
work. For example, a polite take on one reviewer’s critique of this
article is that even the most well-intentioned researcher could have
conducted a very large number of archival studies, selectively
presenting only the studies that happen to support his or her
hypothesis. Of course, there is nothing to prevent laboratory ex-
perimenters or survey researchers from doing similar things in
their research (Rosenthal, 1963). Nonetheless, the relative ease of
conducting archival research should probably exacerbate this par-
ticular concern. There are several reasons that we do not think this
concern is applicable to the present report. First, we always chose
484 PELHAM, MIRENBERG, AND JONES
our sampling techniques on an a priori basis. Second, we sampled
systematically and often exhaustively. Third, we repeatedly repli-
cated our primary findings. Fourth, in several studies we observed
support for theoretically derived moderators of our basic findings.
Finally, for what it is worth, we have never observed a meaningful
reversal of our effect. The numerous pilot studies that we do not
report here consisted of a great deal of supportive and highly
significant (albeit typically less systematic) studies, combined with
a few directionally supportive but nonsignificant replications (typ-
ically involving relatively small samples). From a meta-analytic
perspective, we feel very confident that we have identified a
meaningful and replicable effect.
The Potency of the Self-Concept
By suggesting that implicit egotism is an important determinant
of what people like, the findings of this report also attest to the
pervasiveness and potency of the self-concept. It is well estab-
lished that people’s consciously reported beliefs about themselves
influence a wide variety of important behaviors (e.g., how people
explain their successes and failures, how long people persist on a
difficult task; Anderson, 1984; Bandura, 1982; Taylor & Brown,
1987). However, we suspect that existing research has only begun
to scratch the surface of how people’s implicit associations about
themselves influence their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). By suggesting that people’s associ-
ations about the letters in their own names influence major life
decisions, the present results thus suggest the intriguing possibility
that many of the routes through which the self-concept influences
behavior may be unconscious or implicit (Spalding & Hardin,
1999).
The Potency of the Cognitive Unconscious
The findings of this report also attest to the validity and impor-
tance of a growing body of research on implicit social cognition.
In the past two decades, an increasing number of studies have
begun to suggest that a great deal of self-regulation and social
information processing occurs unconsciously (Banaji & Hardin,
1996; Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Devine, 1989; Dijksterhuis
& van Knippenberg, 1998; Epstein, 1990, 1994; Fazio, Jackson,
Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Higgins,
Rholes, & Jones, 1977; Kihlstrom, 1987; Pyszczynski et al., 1999;
Wegner, 1994; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). Some of the
most intriguing studies of implicit social cognition suggest that
people’s behavior is not always under their own control. For
example, Bargh et al. (1996) found that college students who had
been subliminally primed to think about old people walked more
slowly than usual. Along the same lines, Dijksterhuis and van
Knippenberg (1998) found that people who had recently been
primed to think about soccer hooligans rather than college profes-
sors answered fewer questions correctly on an intellectual task.
Priming effects such as these appear to be most pronounced when
people are unaware of the priming stimulus (either because it was
presented subliminally or because people have had time to forget
about it; Bargh, 1992; Strack, Schwarz, Bless, Kubler, & Wanke,
1993). At the same time, another potent lesson of recent research
on implicit social cognition is that unconscious processes some-
times “have their way” in people’s thoughts and behaviors even
when people consciously try to override them (Wegner, 1994;
Wegner & Bargh, 1998; Wegner, Ansfield, & Pilloff, 1998).
As intriguing as these recent laboratory findings are, critics
could argue that they merely represent experimental curiosities
that have no consequences for important daily decisions. It would
be comforting to think so because the possibility that unconscious
processes influence important day-to-day decisions can be as dis-
turbing as it is intriguing. In other words, the idea that much of
what we think, feel, and do is unconsciously determined raises
doubts about some of our most cherished assumptions concerning
personal choice and free will. The current findings add fuel to this
epistemological flame by suggesting that even major life decisions
are not immune to the kinds of unconscious biases that have been
repeatedly demonstrated in the laboratory. If decisions as impor-
tant as where we live or whom we fall in love with are under the
control of factors as subtle and capricious as whether our parents
named us Denise or Laura, then this suggests that the feelings of
control and personal choice that we experience when we make
major life decisions are partly illusory (Dennett, 1991; Gilbert,
1993; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Skinner, 1971; Wegner & Bargh,
1998).
Of course, the findings of this report only suggest that uncon-
scious processes influence major life decisions if we assume that
our participants were typically unaware of the basis of the major
life decisions we examined. Though we obviously have no way of
knowing what people were thinking when they made these major
life decisions, we think that in the case of the large majority of our
findings, people were extremely unlikely to have been aware of the
basis for their decisions. Statements such as “I became a lawyer
because of the positive associations I have about the letter L,” or
“I took a job in Buffalo because my first name starts with B”
simply do not appear in the list of culturally accepted truisms for
why people make important life decisions (Nisbett & Wilson,
1977). Although we consider it well established that people some-
times know exactly why they do what they do (Quattrone, 1985),
the research presented herein suggests that there are also times
when people are completely clueless. In support of the idea that
name letter preferences are truly implicit, Koole, Dijksterhuis, and
van Knippenberg (2001) recently found that name-letter prefer-
ences disappeared when people were asked to think carefully about
their reasons for liking particular letters. Of course, this is one of
the signatures of implicit social cognition. It is often disrupted by
conscious information processing (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995;
Wilson & Schooler, 1991).
Having said this, we hasten to add that making major life
decisions on the basis of implicit egotism is not necessarily irra-
tional. If people feel good when they are exposed to the letters that
appear in their own names, then there may be an important sense
in which it is highly rational for people to succumb to what Nuttin
(1985) called “narcissism without gestalt awareness.” Whereas the
mythological Narcissus was so pathologically drawn to his own
reflection that it led to his downfall, the more subtle pleasures that
people derive from exposing themselves to the letters in their own
names seem less likely to lead to self-destruction. As Woody Allen
once noted, it may be unduly harsh to criticize people for engaging
in acts of self-love. Specifically, Allen noted, “Don’t knock mas-
turbation; it’s sex with someone I love.” To paraphrase Allen, why
should we be so critical of the particular form of narcissism
identified in this research? From this perspective, falling prey to
 IMPLICIT EGOTISM IN MAJOR LIFE DECISIONS
implicit egotism merely consists of being attracted to that which
reminds us of the one person most of us love most dearly.
There is also some empirical reason to believe that people are
likely to be highly satisfied with the judgments and decisions that
they make on the basis of automatic affective associations. In
particular, Wilson and Schooler (1991) asked some participants to
think carefully about the reasons for decisions that they would
normally be expected to make on the basis of their intuitions or
“gut feelings.” For example, in one study they asked some partic-
ipants to think carefully about their reasons for liking or disliking
a variety of different jams. Wilson and Schooler found that intro-
spection about reasons typically compromised the quality of peo-
ple’s decisions. In one study, jam tasters who thought carefully
about the reasons for their preferences agreed less than usual with
expert jam tasters. In another study, students who thought carefully
about reasons before choosing specific classes were later less
satisfied with these classes. These findings suggest that it would be
unwise to equate decisions based on implicit associations with
irrational or ineffective judgments. If decisions make people feel
good in the long run, then it would be best to regard these decisions
as rational.
Implicit Egotism or Mere Exposure?
Just as we have assumed that the findings of this report reflect
implicit processes, we have also assumed that they constitute a
form of egotism—that is, a bias based on people’s positive asso-
ciations about the self. To our knowledge, there is only one
competing theory that might seem to account for the findings in
this report. In particular, just as Zajonc’s (1968) mere exposure
effect is loosely consistent with many of Nuttin’s original labora-
tory findings, it is also loosely consistent with the present findings.
There can be little doubt, that is, that people are disproportionately
exposed to the letters that appear in their own names. At the same
time, given the enormous amount of exposure that fluent readers
have to all the letters in the alphabet, it seems clear that most
people are exposed to highly common letters of the alphabet (e.g.,
E, S) much more often than they are exposed to the letters in their
own specific names. Nonetheless, the preference that most people
have for the letters that appear in their own names appears to be
quite a bit more pronounced than the preference that most people
have for the most common letters in their own alphabets (Nuttin,
1987; Hoorens & Nuttin, 1993). In addition, and in keeping with
the findings of Kitayama and Karasawa (1997), our findings sug-
gested that when it came to people’s first names, name letter
effects were stronger for women than for men (see also Mirenberg
& Pelham, 2001, who found that this gender difference is reversed
for people’s surnames). This finding, too, suggests that there is
more to the name letter effect than mere exposure. Of course, our
finding that implicit egotism is stronger (at least among men) for
people with less common names also suggests that there is more to
implicit egotism than mere exposure.
Finally, more definitive evidence that name letter effects may
constitute a form of self-enhancement comes from a recent study
by Jones, Pelham, Mirenberg, and Hetts (2002). Jones et al. as-
sessed participants’ global self-esteem and then exposed some
participants to a self-concept threat (writing about a personal flaw).
After being exposed to this threat, participants who were high in
global self-esteem displayed particularly pronounced name letter
485
preferences. Moreover, in each of two nonthreatening control
conditions, there was no association at all between people’s self-
esteem and their name letter preferences. If name letter effects
were simply mere exposure effects in disguise, there is no reason
that they should become more pronounced for people high in
self-esteem under self-threatening conditions. Koole, Smeets, van
Knippenberg, and Dijksterhuis (1999) also found that name letter
preferences are sensitive to psychological threat manipulations.
Koole et al. found that people’s liking for their initials was in-
creased when people were allowed to engage in self-affirmation
after a failure manipulation (presumably, being allowed to self-
affirm is the rough experimental equivalent of being chronically
high in self-esteem). Like Jones et al.’s findings, Koole et al.’s
findings suggest that there is more to the name letter effect than
mere exposure. Although we think it is likely that mere exposure
plays some role in people’s name letter preferences, we believe
that implicit egotism provides the most parsimonious explanation
of the total body of research on the name letter effect.
Other Likely Moderators of Implicit Egotism
In addition to gender and the distinctiveness of people’s names,
it seems likely that several other important social and cognitive
factors might moderate the strength of people’s behavioral name
letter preferences. One likely moderator is suggested by research
on self-verification (Swann, 1987, 1996; Swann, Pelham, & Krull,
1988). Self-verification theory is grounded in the assumption that
some people harbor well-developed negative thoughts and associ-
ations about the self. From this perspective, the reason that we
observed supportive findings in this research is that the large
majority of people happen to possess positive associations about
themselves. Thus, most people should be attracted to people,
places, and things that remind them of themselves. However, when
it comes to the minority of people who possess truly negative
associations about themselves, it is conceivable that these people
might actually steer away from stimuli that remind them of them-
selves (but cf. Swann, Hixon, Stein-Seroussi, & Gilbert, 1990).
Clearly, this would be an interesting direction for future research.
In addition, even if one assumes that all people possess predom-
inantly positive associations about themselves, this does not guar-
antee that people will always gravitate toward people, places, and
things that resemble their names. After all, the people, places, and
things to which people could conceivably gravitate often have an
inherent (or conditioned) valence of their own. A great deal of
research in implicit social cognition (e.g., Fazio et al., 1987, 1995;
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) suggests, albeit indi-
rectly, that people who have positive associations about the self
might be less attracted than usual to negative stimuli that happen
to resemble their names. We thus suspect, for example, that be-
havioral name letter preferences would be stronger than usual for
especially desirable places in which to live, for more prestigious
careers, and for more attractive or successful people. Hypotheses
such as these await future scrutiny. As a hypothetical example, a
person named Kruglinski should be especially interested in the
writings of a famous philosopher named Kierkegaard. However,
unless this person happened to possess unusually conservative
political views, we would not expect this person to be particularly
attracted to the philosophy of the Ku Klux Klan.
486 PELHAM, MIRENBERG, AND JONES
Summary
The findings of this report stand in sharp contrast to many of the
assumptions that both scientists and lay people have typically
made about major life decisions. For example, these findings raise
serious questions about whether people are fully in control of their
own behavior. Nonetheless, the idea that people make major life
decisions on the basis of unconscious decision rules does not
necessarily mean that people are irrational. Instead, the specific
form of implicit egotism identified in this research may represent
an unconscious route through which people create social worlds
that typically make them feel good. Such speculations aside, the
most important implications of these studies may be the most
obvious: there may be much more in a name than most people
realize. To paraphrase an anonymous author of tongue twisters,
this research offers some new insights into why some people might
find it more satisfying than others to sell seashells by the seashore.
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Received June 10, 2000
Revision received September 6, 2001
Accepted September 9, 2001 䡲