Volume Z Issue 80

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Self-
of WbrldltUa fl
Once Gernany had demonstrated the new pace of annouted,
warfare, most belligerent nations began to develop fully
mechanized divisions. Field, gttns were moutted on tank
chassis and a new generation of armowed fighting vehicles
was born. Self-propelled guns assumed ever-increasing
importance duilng the war, and today have largely
supplante d t owe d artille ry.
Self-propelled artillery was very much a product of the type of warfare
that evolved during World War II: before lg39 self-propelled artillery
scarceiy existed (apart from a few trlal weapons), but by 1943 it was used
by all the combatant nations. The sudden rise of this new form of weapon
can be attributed almost entrrely to the impact of the battle tank on
tactics, for warfare no longer took place at the speed of the marchlng
soldier and the scouting horse, but at the speed of the tank. Tanks
swarmed all over Poland, France and eventually the Soviet Union, and
the only way that the supporting arms, including the artillery, could keep
up with them was to become equally mobile,
Many of the early self-propelted artrllery platforms were simply con-
versions of existing tanks to mount artillery pieces, but the measure of
conversion varied wldely, Some were scarcely more than lash-ups' to
meet a hasty requirement or built locally to suit a particular task, Others
were carefully designed from the outset and may be regarded
virtually new products. But two distlnct trends can be discerned in the
way self-propelled artillery was used in actron. One school regarded
mobile artillery as a simple adjunct to existing artillery doctrines, and
this school designed and used the self-propelled platforms to deliver'
tndrrect supporting fire in the usual way. The other school regarded the
mobile gun as a form of close-range direct-fire weapon to be used in
close support of armour, and this school was responsible for the assault
Arguably the most famous self-
propelled gun of WorldWar II was
the Stumgeschiitz IIL Entering
service in I 940, it served throughout
the war in a bewildering multitude
variants, but its aggressive low
silhouette often led to its being
employed as a cut-price tank.
gnrn, Today both types of weapon are extant, but the modern accent is c:
the indirect-fire weapon rn the West and the close-support assal:lt gun _::
+L^ F^^+
LIIY LdsL,
Only a selection of the many types of self-propeiled artillery &a:
proliferated between 1939 and 1945 can be found in this study. $rce
tmportant types have been omrtted, while some 'one-offs' have bee::
inciuded to demonstrate the variety of design concepts that were
as attempted, The number and approaches of the different designs came:c
be enormous before 1945 but only relatively few models actually founi
their way into actton, Most of them are covered here,
AnMZ is seen inaction'somewhere in Europe'during the harshwinter of
I944.-5. This vehicle is typical of the period,-being liberaily cluttered with extra
equipment and ration packs, buttheAAmachin-e-gunis manned and the crei
arewellprotected againsttheweather as they sewe the j0i-mm(4. j-in)
howitzer.

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i

iilal-,]8
,.11i|81-,r'
' l!- fr'* s..i.],, 6ll,,,.de ls4,ill
reI ITH gg auf Geschiitzwasen
The German infantry battalions each
had a small artillery complement of
four 7.5-cm (2,95-in) light howitzers
and hvo 15-cm (5,9-in) infantry howit-
zers for their own local fire support
The 15-cm howitzer was known as the
schwere Infantrie Geschiitz 33 (sIG 33,
or heavy infantry gnrn) and was a very
useful and versatile weapon, but it was
heaw and the only 'equipment' allo-
cated to most infantry formations for
the mgvement of the weaPons were
horse teams, Thus when an increasing
degree of mechantzation began 1o
filter through the German army the slG
33 was high on the list for considera-
tion.
The first form of mobile sIG 33 was
used during the French camPaign of
Mav 1940, It was one of the simPlest
anci most basic of all the German self-
propelled equipments, for it consisted
of ndthing more than a sIG 33 mounted
eomplete with carriage and wheels on
to a turretless PzKpfw I light tank as the
I5-cm sIG 33 auf Geschiitzwagen I
Ausf B, fumoured shields were Pro-
vided for the crew offour, and that was
that, It was not a very satisfactory con-
version as the centre of gnavity was
rather high and the chassis was over-
ioaded. Moreover, the armour protec-
tion was not good, and so in 1942 the
PzKpfw II was the subiect for conver-
sion. This lS-cm sIG 33 auf Geschiitz-
wagen II ausf C SdKfz l2l conversion
had the howitzer mounted low in the
chassis, and was so successful that dur-
inq 1943 a version with a lengthened
hu-ll was produced as the l5-cm sIG 33
auf Fgst ?zKpfw II (Sf) VerHnget.
The ex-Czech PzKpfw 38(t) was also
converted to act as a slG 33 carrier, In
1942 the flrst of a series of vehicles
known collectively as the lS-cm sIG 33
(Sf) auf PzKpfw 38(t) Bison SdKfz 138
were ptoduced, The first series had
the sIG 33 mounted forward on the hull
top behind an open armoured suPer-
stiucture, and this weapor:/vehicle
arrangement proved to be so success-
ful tha-t it was formalized in 1943 by the
production of a new version. This was a
iactory-produced model rather than a
convelsion of existing tanks and had
m fiHln"
Even as early as 1939 it was obvious
that the days ofthe little PzKpfw II tank
were numbered, for it lacked both
armament and armour, However, it
was in production and quite reliable,
so when the need arose for self-
propelled artlllery the PzKpfw II was
Seiected to be the carrler for the 10,5-
cm (4. I3-in) leFH 18 field howitzer. The
conversion of the tank hull to carry the
howitzer was quite straightforward, for
the howitzer was mounted behind an
open topped armoured shield towards
the rear of the hul and the area where
the twret had been was armoured
over and the space used for ammuni-
tion stowage, Maxrmum armour thick-
ness was 18 mm (0.7 in).
The result was the self-Propelled
howitzer known as the Wespe (wasp)
though its full offlcial designation was
rather more cumbelsome: IeFH I8/2
auf Fgrst Kpfw II (Sf) SdKfz 124 Wespe,
but to everyone it was just the Wespe
1: was a very Popular little self-
propelied weapon that soon gained for
::selJ a reputation for reliability and
rrobility. The first of them were based
One of the tirstGerman selt-
pr o pelled conver sions was the
mounting of a 15-cm slG 33 infantrY
howitzer onto thehullof aPzKPfw I
lighttank.
the vehicle engine mounted forward
(instead of at the rear as originally lo-
cated) this entailing the movement of
the fighting compartment to the hull
rear. this was the SdKfz I38/l (SdKfz
for Sonder Kraftfahrzeug, or special
vehicle) and it was this vehlcle that was
retained as the Gerrnan army's stan-
dard slG 33 carrier until the end ofthe
war, The SdKfz 138/l had a crew offour
men including the driver, and 15 shells
were carried on the vehicle. There
was no room for more because the
fighting compartment was rather res-
tricted for space,
There was one other sIG 33 self-
propelled version, this ttme on a
Pzfbfw ill
chassis. This l5-cm sIG 33
auf PzKpfw III appeared ln 1941 and
used a large box superstructure on a
PzKpfw III to house the sIG 33, This
proved to be rather too much ofa good
thing, for the chassis was really too
larqe for the weapon which could be
easlly carried by lighter vehicles' Thus
production never qot properly under
way, being terminated after onlY 12
conversions had been made, These
vehicles were used in action on the
Eastern Front,
All the slG 33 self-propelled equip-
ments were used for their original role,
i,e, the direct fue-support of infantry
units in the field, Perhaps the most suc-
cessful of these self-propelled car-
riaoes were the Bison and the later
Sdffz 138/L over 370 of the vehicles
were produced, and they were still in Taken from a German newsreel, this protection and s tow ag e was
productton in late 1944. shotclearly shows how high and minimal, but it provided the
awlcward the mounting of the I 5 - cm G erm ans w ith an indic a tion of what
howitzer really was on the PzKpfw I would be required in future.
Specification ciassrs. The crew had only limited
SdKfz I38/l
Type: self-propelled tnfantry-support petrol engine developing I I 1,9 kW Performance: maximum road sPeed
howitzer (150 hp) 35 krn/h (21,75 mph); maximumroad
Crew:4 Dimensions: length 4,835 m ( 15 ft range 185 km (115 miles); fording
Weisht: I1500 kg (25 353 lb) 10,4 in); width 2, 15 m (7 ft 0,6 in); heisht 0,9 14 m (3 ft)
Powerplant: one Praga 6-cYlinder 2,4 m (7 ft I0,5 in) Armament: one I S-cm (5,9-in) howitzer
on the PzKpfw II Ausf F chassis and
went into action on the Eastern Pront
duriner 1943. On this front they were
used by the divisional artillery batter-
les ofthe Panzer and Panzergnenadier
divisions, They were usually orga-
nized into batteries of six howitzers
withup to five batteries to anlbleilung
(battalion).
The Wespe was so successful in tts
artillery support role that Hitler himself
made an order that all available
PzKpfw Il chassis production should
be allocated to the Wespe alone, and
the many other improvised weaPons
on the PzKpfw ll chassis were droP-
ped or thetr armament diverted to
other chassis, The main WesPe con-
struction centre was the Famo plant in
Poland, and there production was so
rapid that by mid-1944 682 examples
had been built, Some time around that
The SdKfz I 24 Wespe was a PurPose-
built carrier tor a I 05-mm howitzer
based on the chassis of the P zKpfw I I
Iight tank. It was first used during
1 942 and had a crew of five.
 Wespe (continued)
date manufacture of the Wespe
ceased, but not before 158 had been
completed without howitzers; these
vehicles had the gap in the armour
plate for the howitzer sealed off, the
space behind the armour berng used
for resupply ammunition needed by
batteries in the front line,
A typical Wespe went into action
carrying its crew of five, includtng the
driver, and 32 rounds of ammunition, A
Wespe battery was completely
mobile, although some of the vehicles
were soft-skinned trucks for carrying
ammunltion and other supplies, The
forward obseruers were usually car-
ried in light armoured vehicles
although some batteries used ex-
Czech or captured French tanks for
thts purpose, Fireorderswere relayed
back to the battery by radio, and fiom
the battery fire command post the
orders were further relayed to the gun
positions by land lines, The howitzer
carried on the Wespe was the stan-
dard 10,5-cm leFH 18 as used by
towed batteries (althouqh most were
Hummel
The self-propelled artillery vehicle
that became known as the
(bumble bee) was a hybrid combinr
components of the PzKpfw IIl a
PzKpfw IV tanks into a new vehrcle
known as the .Geschtitzwagen IIVIV.
The first of these hybrids was pro-
duced during 1941 and used a leng-
thened PzKpfw IV suspension and run-
ning gear combined with the final
drive assemblies, track and transmis-
sion of the PzKpfw 11i, Onto this new
hull was built an open superstructure
formed wrth light armour plates, and
h\to types of weapon were mounted,
Vehicles intended for use as tank des-
troyers mounted a version of the BB-
mm (3,46-in) anti-tank gun, but veh!
cles intended for use as self-propelled
artillery 4ounted a special version of
the l5-cmr(5.9-in) FH 1B field howitzer.
The FH 18 vehicle was the 15-cm
Paruerfeldhaubitze l8M auf GW IIVIV
SdKfz 165 Hummel, and it formed the
heavy field artillery element of the
Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions
from 1942 onwards, The ordnance was
known as the Panzerfeldhaubitz lB/1,
and could fire a 43,S-kg (95.91b) pro-
jectile to a range of 13325 m (14,572
yards), The flrst howitzers produced
for the self-propelled role were fltted
wrth large muzzle brakes, but experi-
ence demonstrated that these were
nct really necessary and were accor-
Cingly left off later production ver-
scrs, Maximum armour thickness was
5C mm (1,97 in),
The Hummel had a crew offlve, in-
:luding the driver who sat in an
arnoured position forward, The provi-
of an armoured compartment for
=:ldnver
':-e alone was considered a lux-
"{i Ln war-productton terms, but in-
s=ad of ehminating this feature the de-
made the whole thing cheaper
=;:ers
:l enlarging the armoured position
employing more flat steel plates,
=:
l:; more internal space was pro-
l.:iei
for one of the crew members,
T:= Hummel could carry only lB
-::-:s of ammunition so m6re hdd to
:€ -<=pt nearby and brought up when
:s:€ssary. Trucks were often of lrttle
.:e-':e ::r thls task, so by late 1944 no
Fs 'i-- i50 Hummels were produced
Self-Propelled Guns of World War II
fitted with muzzle brakes) and so used
the same ammunition. They also had
the same range of 10675m (11 675
yards),
Specification
Wespe
Type: self-propelled field howitzer
Crew:5
Weisht: 11000 kg(24,251 lb)
Powerplant: one Maybach O-cylinder
petrol engine developing 104.4 kW
(140 hp)
Dimensions: length 4,81 m ( 15 ft 9,4 in);
width 2,28 m (7 ft 5,75 in); heisht 2,3 m
(7 ft 6,6 in)
Performance: maxrmum road speed
40 km/tr (24 85 mph); road range
220 km ( 137 miles); fording 0.8 m (2 ft
Z,5 in)
Armament:one 105-mm (4, 13-in)
howitzer and one 7,92-mm (0,31-in) This shot oI a Wespe on the move Notehow small thevehicle actually
MG34 machine-oun shows thatthe top of the fighting was compared to the stature of the
compar tment w as open bu t gun crew in the compartment.
protection was provided at the rear.
Above: The Hummel (bumbld bee)
was a purpose-built German vehicle
that used components from both the
PzKptw III and IV. Used on all fronts,
il was a successfu I weapon that
remained in production until the war
ended. I t had a.crew of fivd.
without the howitzer and the divided
front armour piates replaced by a sing-
le plate. These vehicles were used as
ammunition carriers for the Hummel
battenes, By late 1944 no less than 666
Hummels had been produced and the
type remained in production until the
end of the war, They proved to be
useful and popular weapons, and were A battery of four Hummels stand demonstrates that the Luttwaffe. had
used on all fronts, Special versions with ready for action on a Fussjan steppe
wider tracks known as Ostkette were in 1942, fftec,losenessof theguns
air superiority at this time, othervise
produced for use during the winter and.the overall lack of concealment
the guns would have been much
more d.lspersed and camouIlagd,.
months on the Eastern Front, and the
open superstructures were often co- room for the crews to serve the gun, Powerplant: one Maybach V-12peuci
vered with canvas tarpaulins to keep and the carriage gave the howitzerthe engine developing i97,6 kW (265 hpl
out the worst of the weather, The gnrn desired mobility to enable them to
crew generally lived with the vehicle, keep up with the Panzer divisions,
Dimensions: length 7, 17 m (23 ft 6.3 ::l
width2,B7 m(9 ft 5 in); heishr 2.8i r:
so many Hummels were festooned not (9 ft 2.6 in)
only with camoullage of all kinds but Performance: maxrmum road soeec
also with bed rolls, cooking pots and Specification 42 kn/h(26 t mph); roadrangeiZts n:
ttems of personal krt, Hummel (134 miles); fording 0,99 m (3 ft 3 url
The Hummel was one of the Ger- T'ype: self-propelled homtzer Armament: one lS-cm (5,9-rn) hc$tzer
mans' best examples of purpose-built Crew:5 andone 7,92-mm
self-propelled artrllery. It had plenty of Weisht:24000 kg (52,911 lb) Qnln
(0. i3-rn)machine.
In the wake of the lightning conquests af 1939-40, the German
army's demands for self-prapelled artillery soon outstripped
factory production. With typical ingenuity, the Getmans
utilizdd the mass of fanks they had captured to produce a
series of un u sual improvis ation s.
ln n-rany ways the German army's heady successes of 1940 and 1941 were a
long-teirn hi:adache for the natron's war planners ..They had not envisaged a
Eur"opean war breaking out before 1943 at the earliest, and both the German
JtmejO torces and defe"nce industry were badly placed when war began in 1939
Hiiteis politrcal gambles at last prbduced a re'ai war when he invaded Poland in
Sepie*ber 1935. but the huge successes of the.G-eiman armed forces dis-
tra[ted from the fact that th-ev were ll-ptepared for the type of Biitzkrieg
emptoyeO by tire German general staff . l\,4any weapons were qu te simplrT 'not up
to the iasks asked of them, and there were never enough weapons ertner rn tne
field or in reserve. Many of the major vlctories gained by Gerrnany between
1939 and 1941 were produced as much by their enemies' unpreparedness and
lack of cohesion as by the tactics and equipment of the German ar'med forces.
A1l this was to be'revealed oenerally once the Germans began 10 lose the
strategic initiative in 1942, but
-by
then many of the r faulis were seltapparenl.
They quite simply lacked the equipment necessarv to arm the ever"growrng
nurnb,jr of theii divislons. and the shortages ranged from everyday items like
lelephone wire to heavy weapohs. This was part cularly true of atlillery,.for.in
t.qab most i{ not all of ihe Gbrman artillerv was strll towed, the bulk of it by
horses. The first Sfurngeschtjfze (assault guns) made their debut during ihe
Fiench campaign, but f5r artillery support of the fast-moving Panzer d visions
the German gunners had to rely on what was 1o be the first of a iong str ng ol
equipments ihat can only be descrLbed as 'lash-ups' ,
Ttie tirrt of these was'a marriage of the very useful 15-cm {5.9-in) slG 33
infantry support weapon with the chassis of the PzKpfw l.lrght tan k, The PzKpfw
i lracl b'een'designed for use only as a trainrng tank, but lt was sttll stound as a
Ironi-tine vehiclb in 1940 although lt was of very Iimited ccmbat use The
Germans just replaced theturret df this vehicie wrth a slG 33, complete with its
wheels and carriage; a thin armourshield was placed around the gun and that
*ri ,t; tt..,rs, ti',ey Fad something that could keep up,with the tanks, and the first
item of German self-propelled artil ery was in the treld.
-t
l:.e conversion of captured French LarrAine tracked vehicles to carry the
3=rnan slG 33 l1-cm infantry howitzerwas so successfuJ lfiat the resu/f
: t, ii t ta"aard German vehiile known as the S dKfz 3 5 I I' I t had a crew of
1 the usuai way and r6placed by a fixed turret mounting a 10 5-cm leFH 18. Th s
::;:, tncluding
"" the driver.
- : - .a atte'n01wasnotaqreatsJCcess, buLserved'orsomeyears llwas
:i : '.: , ..-pra"C by more fd.rnal oesigns, rnost oi whrch ate desc;hed inn
=' - .,..ut brrapa it'Jrom the self-propeiled German equipmentsdiscussed
.:- j, ti:ere were many mole thai deserve mention. Few of them were
-l ::
' :es,gns in the sense that they passed through the Lrsual stringent
, :. .' .:s-: -q staqes. lnstead Lhey wete 'nocl.ed logether by un ts rr 1ne
:-l : : -- ' de ihemielves with locafdefence or support weapons'
, ., .u \.\'as the result of two main factors. One has alrbady been men-
' . : : -,^^:lv the inability of Germany's defence industries to supply weapons
.t -,-:1.at n the quantities reciuired; after 1941 the demands of the
- ;" :'^'. r.e:e such'that it alone was allocated nearly all of the pioduction
, j-:.,'-: s.I demanded more and more produce The otherfronts had totakewhat
.1.,, --s::..,rve wlth what they could themselves, and this was
=, '
. .' . :--: alcng the Atlantic Wall once the Eastern Front campargns-were
-: -:: . .. -a,. tne second factor arose: in such theatres the German forces
. . -'-' : ::'."i li what they could get The new production rnaterial wen'tto
. :.,'.-- :':-: and noth no could be spared for what were seen as purelY
defensive iornrat:ons sttrng aiong the coastal and internal defences oi:-.
occupred terr tores, t rr-as iiere tnat the atmosphere was rlght for the Gerr- =
lasn--p -o,lol sn
Fortunalelv for'.hem, the Germans had a rich stockpile with which to wc:'
The victones of 1940 had left ihem \ i rth p les of weapons and equipment oi :
kinds, and these vJere duly passed to the occupatron divisions in France ar:
'ot tle Fasterrr I roqL b,I lAal s'
elsewrere. lcms suc"r as tr-c(s v./ere Td?e-
left large numbers of guns, small arms and tanks that were usuaily qui:.
serviceible. Mu.ch of th6 captured French arrnour was o'f the 'tankette' type c-
consisted of heavrer tanks that had either inadequate arrnament or one-ma.
turrets that the Germans understandably did not want lo use. But very often the
hulls and chassis were good enough for further use ancl the 'lash'up' progran-
me started
As many of the German divisions ln France and the occupied countries hac
only horse-drawn artillery, they understandably wanted to increase rts mobilitv
bv il-re introductlon of seif-piodelled mountings, There was no chance that thev
would ever see shtny new Wespe or Btson weapons, so these divisrons initlateo
a programme that was to proriuce. some of the oddest sei{-propelled artiliery
carriales ever seen. Virtuaily every French and other vehicle were used as- the
carnales for German artillery pieces. The units in. France produced some of the
oddesl types, for they.had to hand a diversity of vehicles ranglng f rom ammun -
tion ca rriers to tanks. The Chenilette Lorraine; origlnally a small artillery tractor or
supply carner, was the smallest type arrd this was used to mount howitzers as
large bs 15 cm (5.9 in). One o{ these conversions involved the 15-cm sFH,13
Jieid howitzer datinq f rom World Wai l, and was considered so success{ul that
some of them end"ed uo rn North Africa. This was unusuaL. for most of the
lash-ups remained for stiictly local deployment. Not all ihe conversrons were for
artillery use only. Many old captured tank and other chassis had antr-tank guns of
one type or another; and many others were simply converted to turretless
arti.lerv Lractors or drnrr tl- t o^ ca'r'e's.
TheSdKfz 13811 Bisc;n was acanversianof theCzechSkodaPzKpfw 3B(t) to
carry the 15 cm slG 33 infantry hawitzer for the clase fire'support role. The
Bisan had the howitzer mounted forward; later PzKpfw 3B(t) conversions had
it mounted well to the rear with the engine iorward'
Apart from the antr-tank guns, the German 10.5-cm-(4 13-in) field howitzers
were among the main candidates for extemporized self-propuision The Frencr
tanks such-as the Hotchkiss H-39 wei-e often converted to carry the 10.5-crr
howitzer, and thetr iurrets were cafted off to be set rnto the concrete defences
of the Ailantic Wall. Perhaps the oddest-looking of all these conversrons vra:
that carried out using the French B1 bls as a basis. This had the turretlg1n olvqd li
m"Oe ine redultant p'roduct look both too high for coirfort and awkward to a-
extreme. But f or the German gunners lt was such monsters or nothing as far a:
sellpropelled artillery was concerned.
Frbnih armour was not the only source of conversions, Italy was anoth€-
source. but there conversions were fewer as the Germans simply pressed lni:
action anv ltalian weapons they could f ind. This usually me_antlhe various ltal a-
semoveitethat were not far rbmoved f rom the German StuG lll in armour ai:
The lash-ups were many and varjous. Not all of them concerned artillery'
11
rocket proieitors, flamethiowers and even command vehicles had their orrg : '
in local'conversions. Mortar carriers were another product
Apart from the Chenilette Lorraine conversion with the sFH 13, few of l:'
lash:ups saw servtce outside therr originai localities. There they were usec
th;ir driginal command and organization stlucture alongslde-the-other unc:'
verted tdwed artillery batteri€s.When rt came to the cru nch rn 1 944 f ew of th = - =
lash-ups presented iheir opponents wtth any trouLrle. lr4ost of them were vril-:
aeatfrltrabs f or their crewi,' but the even less welcome aliernative was 10 i:: -
the Allied wrth horse-towed weapons, German industry was unable tc':
-
lhem in anv way.
 reI rhe'waffentraser
The Waffentrager (literally weapons
carrier) was a novei concept for the
Germans when it was first mooted dur-
ing 1942, The idea was that the Waffen-
trager was to be not so much a form of
self-propelled artillery but a means ol
carrying an artiliery piece rn a turet
into action, where it would be re-
moved from the tank, emplaced, used
in action, and picked up again when no
Ionger required, The exact tactical re-
quirement for thrs arrangement is still
uncertain, for in 1942 the Panzer divi-
sions were still dictating mobrle war-
fare to all opponents and the need ior a
static artillery piece seems remote,
Be that as it may a series of eight
vehicles known generally as Heu-
schrecke IVB (locust) were produced
during i942, These vehicles were con-
verted PzKpfw IV tanks wrth a gantry
at the rear to lift off the turret mountingr
a 10,S-cm (4 13-in) light fleld howitzer,
The turret could be emplaced on the
ground for action or it could be towed
behind the vehicle on wheels carried
on the rear specifically for this pur-
pose;this arrangement allowed the
vehrcle to be used as an ammunition
carrier for the turet
The eight vehicles produced were
no dbubt used in action, for one ofthem
was captured and is now to be seen in
the Imperial War Museum in London,
but at the time no more were re-
quested, But by 1944 thlngs had
changed somewhat, The German
army was everwvhere on the defen-
sive and anything that could hold up
the advancinq Alhes was investigated,
The Waffentrager concept came with-
in this category, and more designs
were initiated, One was an interim de-
sign in which a normal field howitzer, a
10,5-cm leFH 18/40, was carried in an
armoured superstructure on top of a
modified Geschiitzwagren IIVIV (nor-
mally used for the Hummel), The
trowitzer could be fired from the vehi-
cle, but it was also designed to be re-
moved from the carrier using a block
and tackle and mounted on the ground
as a normal field piece once the
wheels and carriage trails had been
fitted, This design did not get far for it
was overtaken by a series of design
GERN,lANY
Karl series
The weapons known as Karl were ori-
ginally devised as anti-concrete
hreapons for the demolition of the
Maginot Ltne forts and other such for-
tfied locations, They were produced
I
Cwing the 1930s following a great deal
t
I
:i mathematical and other theoretical
s:udies carried out during the 1920s.
|- ',Vork on the actual hardware began
l''tring 1937, and the first equipment
-;;as ready by 1939,
The Karl series must be regarded as
:--inq the largest self-propelled artil-
-::-y weapons ever produced. There
;;:re two versions, One was the 60-cm
Morser Gerit 040 which mounted a 60-
::: (23,62-in) barrel and the other the
5.i-cm M6rser Gerit 041 which
:-:rnted a 54-cm (21,26-in) barrel.
-,:-: weapons flred special concrete-
;-=:lrng projectiles, The range of the
le:l: 040 was 4500 m (4,92 I yards) and
:-: :f the Ger2it 041 6240m (6,824
I--) Both could penetrate between
-: --r 3.5 m (8,2 and 11,5 ft) of con-
::=:= before detonating to produce
:-=-::im effect, These projectiles
Self-Propelled Guns of World War II
projects that were rn turn overtaken by
the end of the war,
These late- 1944 and early- 1945 Waf-
fentrdger all adopted the removable
turyet concept used rn the 1942 Heu-
schrecke IVB, They had a variety of
chassis, including both the modifled
PzKpfw IV and Geschiitzwagen IIVIV,
The artillery pieces involved ranged
from 10,S-cm to l5-cm (5,9-in) howit-
zers, One that got as far as model form
was to have carried either the 10,S-cm
or lS-cm howrtzer on a cruciform car-
riage that would have been used with
the '43' series of weapons had they
ever advanced further than the pro-
totype stage, These howitzers were
mounted in an open-backed turret,
and could be flred from the carrier or
from a ground mounting. They could
also be rowed behind the carrrer on
their field carriages, It was all rather
comphcated and overengineered as it
involved the use of ramps and wrn-
ches, and the concept was typrcal of
many that never got to the hardware The Heuschrecke was one of a lower the piece to the ground for
stage, But a few such equipments were number of e x perim e nt al G er man tiring. The Heuschreckewas the onhy
built only to be overtaken by the end of vehicles thatwere meant to carry an one of many similar designs to be
the war, being broken up or scrapped artillery piece to afiring site and then produced in any numbers.
tn the post-war years,
Specification
HeuschreckelVB
Type: sellpropelled howitzer carrier
Crew:5
Weight: 17000 ks (37,479 Ib)
Powerplant: one Maybach petrol
engine developing 140,2 kW (1BB hp)
Dimensions: length 5,90 m (19 ft 4,3 in);
width 2,87 m (9 ft 5 in); height 2,25 m
(7 ft 4,6 in)
Performance:.maximum road speed
45 km/h (28 mph); roadrange 250 km
(155 miles)
Armament:one 10,S-cm (4, 13-in)
howitzer
This Heuschrecke prototype wasone
in which a 1 05-mm field howitzer was
carried on a chassis produced from
PzKpfwlll and IV components in
order for it to be lowercd to the
ground when at the firing position.
The howitzer could be fired trom the
vehicleif required.
were massive items, The 60-cm shell
werghed no less than 2l70kg (4,784
1b), although a lighter version was also
used, The 54-cm shell weighed
1250ks (2,756 Ib),
Both Karl weapons were massive,
ponderous brutes, Although technical-
ly self-propelled, their mobility was Ii-
mited by their sheer weight and bulk
and the tracked carriaqes were meant
for only the most local of moves, For
long-distance travel they were carried
slung between special railway trucks,
Shorter moves were made by remov-
ing the barrel from the carriagTe and
placing both the barrel and the car-
riage on separate special trailers
towed by heavy tractors, Assembly
The Karl howitzers were intended to
smash the MaginotLine forts, but
were instead usedaga.msf ffie
Sevastopol defences and later
against Warsaw in I 944. They fired
special anti-concrete projectiles that
exploded onlywhen they had
pe ne tr ate d their targets.
Karl series (continued)
and break-down was carried out using
specral mobile gantrres, The whole
process was difficult to an extreme, but
the Karl weapons were not intended
for mobile warfare, They were pro-
duced to reduce fortresses and that
meant a long, planned approach to the
firing site, a slow rate of flre (the best
was one round every 10 minutes) and a
steady withdrawal once the fortress
had been reduced,
The Karls were too late for the Magi-
not Line, which fell along with the rest
of France in 1940, Their first real en-
gagement was the siege of Sevastopol
in exactly their designed role, Follow-
ing the successful end of that siege
more Karls were used duri.ng the War-
saw uprising when they were used to
demolish the centre of Warsaw and
crush the Polish underground fighters,
Bythenitwas 1944, Mostof theearlY
60-cm barrels had then been replaced
by 54-cm barrels, but Warsaw was
their last period in action, The increas-
ing mobile warfare of the last year of
the war gave the Karls no chance to
demonstrate their destructive powersl
Brummbdr
Despite their overall success, the StuG
tll assault guns were considered by
1943 as bein! too lightly armoured for
the assault role, and a new heavY
assault vehicle was required, The ex-
isting 15-cm (5,9-in) slG 33 self-
propelled equipments lacked the
armour protection required for the
close-support role and so, with the
PzKpfw IV tank graduallY bernq re-
placed by the Panther and Tiger tanks,
there was the chance to Produce a vehrcles were generally used in ones
purpose-built vehicle using the later
versions of the PzKpfw IV as a basis
The flrst examples of this new vehi
cle appeared during 1943 under the
designation Sturmpanzer IV Brumm'
bAr (grizzly bear), The Brummbdr
used a box structure formed from slop-
ing armour plates set over the front ofa
turretless PzKpfw IV, and moulted a
specially developed howitzer in a ball
mountino on lhe front plate, This howit-
,.t *as [nown as the Sturmhaubitze 43
and was a shortened version, onlY 12
calibres long, of the 15-cm slG 33,
fumour was provided all round (the
foontal armour being 100 mm/2,54 in
thlck), so the crew of five men were
well protected, Later stand-off side
armolu was added, and most vehicles
acquired a coating of Zimmerit plaster
paste to prevent maQlnetlc charges
being stuck on to the hull by close-in
tank killer squads, A machine-gnln was
mounted on the hull front plate on late
oroduction models, earlier verstons
:aving lacked this self-defence
,';eapon,
The roomy fighting comPartment of
re Brummbiir could accommodate uP
:: 38 rounds of lS-cm ammunition, The
:ommander sat to the rear of the howit-
:er using a roof-mounted periscope to
:elect targets, T\['o men served the
;;:r and handled the ammunition,
-,';:Je another acted as the gnrn layer,
l:e dlver normallY remained in his
sea: at the left front. Most targets were
provsion
=:.;aged with direct fire, but
-,'.'- made for indirect fire,
-ibout 313 Brummbdr vehtcles were
::::uced before the war ended, and
:.:s: appear to have been used in
:-:e:r support of Panzergrenadier and
-:::
and most were destroyed bY their
crews in the last stages of the war, Only
a few of the special PzKpfw IV
ammunition carriers produced to car-
ry projectiles for the Karls survived for
Allied intelligence staffs to examine. It
is possible that one example of the Karl
may survive as a museum piece in the
Sovret Union, but that is all,
Specification
Gerit04l
Type: self-propelled siege howitzer
Crew: not recorded
Weight: 124000 ks (273,373 lb)
Powerplant:one V- 12 Petrol engine
developins 894,8 kW ( 1,200 hP)
Dimensions: length of barrel6,24 m
(20 ft 5.7 in); lengthofcarriage 1 1,15 m
(36 ft 7 in); track 2.65 m (8 ft 8,3 in)
Performance: not recorded
Armamenti one 54-cm (21,26-in) The massive 60-cm and 54-cm KarI had to be carried to the tiring
howitzer/mortar howitzers were really fortification- positions by special trailers in pieces
smashing equipm ents, an d they had and assembJed on site.
only limited tactical mobility. They
infantry units, The vehicles moved for-
ward with the first waves of attacking
troops and provided fire to reduce
strongrpoints and smash bunkers. In-
fantrv had to remain close to prevent
enemy tank-killer squads from coming
too close to the Brummbiir vehicles,
which were always vulnerable to
close-range anti-tank weapons, espe-
ciallv as some of their side armour was
as tliin as 30 mm (1, tB in). Brummbdr
and twos split up along an area of
attack, As defensive weaPons theY
were of less use, for the short howitzer
had only a limited Performance
against armour as its prime mission
was the delivery of blast effect HE pro-
iectiles, One factor that restricted the
'Brummbdr's
overall mobility was its
weight, which gave the vehicle a
rather ooor ground-pressure'foot-
print': it was nippy enbugh on roads'
but across country rt could get bogged s e lf- pr opelled
M os t G em an the rcsufit was the heavily'armoured
down in soft ground, eguipmenfs ca rried only light B rummb 6r. T he B rummbdr w as
The Brummbiir was a well-liked armour, so when a call was made for often used for street fighting, as this
vehicle that often provided exactly the aspecial c/ose -support assault gun captured example shows'
degree of fire support required by in-
fantry formations, On the debit side it
was hearry, rather Ponderous and the
early examples lacked close-in pro-
tection. But they were well protected
against most weapons and they car-
ried a powerful howitzer.
Specification
Brummbir
Type: self-propelled heavy assault
howitzer
Crew: 5
Weioht 28200 kq (62,170 Ib)
Pow6rplant: one Maybach V- I 2 petrol
enqine developrns 197.6 kW (265 hp)
Dimensions:lehgth 5,93 m (19 ft 5 5 in);
width 2,88 m (9 ft 5,4 in); height 2 52 m
(B ft 3,2 in)
Performance: maximum road sPeed
40 km/h (24,85 k.m,/h); maximumroad
range 210 kn (130 miles); fording
T he B rummb dr was norm aLly used plasterJike substance known as
0,99 m (3 ft 3 in) lzimmerit' that prevented magnetic
Armament: one 15-cm (5,9-in) howitzer when infantry tank-killer squads
and one ortwo 7,92-mm (0,31-in) were likely to be encountered. It was charges from sticking to the hull'
therefore liberally coveredwith a
machine-gnrns
 M $l['*,ig"t
Stalingrad taught the German army intenor, Once inside overhead rails
Self-Propelled Guns of World War II

many lessons, not least of which was
that the Germans were ill-equrpped
for the art of close-quarter street
fighting, In typrcal fashion they de-
cided to meet any future urban warfare
requirements by a form of overkill by
using a super-heavy weapon that
would do away with the need for
house-to-house flghtinq by simply
blowing away any defended houses or
structures, This they decided to do
wtth a land versron of a naval weapon,
the depth charge.
In 1943 the Germans produced
version of the Tiger tank known by
several names rncluding 38-cm Sturm-
mdrser, Sturmparzer VI and Sturmti-
ger, Whatever the designation, the
weapon was a Tiger tank with the tur-
ret replaced by a large box-shaped
superstructure with a short barrel pok-
ing through the front sloped plate, This
barrel was not a gun but a 38-cm
(14,96-in) Raketenwerfer 6l rocket
projector of an unusual type, for it fired
a rocket-propelled depth charge that
weighed no less than 345 kq (761 lb),
As this projectrle was based upon the
design of a naval depth charge nearly
all the weight was high explosive; the
effect of this upon even the stoutest
structure can well be imagined, The
rockets had a maximum range of
5650 m(6, iBO yards), and the projector
barrel was so arranged that the rocket
efflux gases were diverted forward to
vent from venturi around the muzzle
ring. The Sturmtigrerwas exceptionally
well armoured, with I50 mm (5,9 in) at
its front and between B0 and 85 mm
(3,15 and 3,35 in) at the side,
The Sturmtiger had a crew of seven
including the commander, a fire
observer and the driver. The other
four men served the rocket projector,
Because of their massive stze, only 12
projectiles could be carried inside the
superstructure, with the possibihty of
one more inside the projector. Load-
inq the rockets into the vehicle was
helped by a small crane jib mounted
on the superstructure rear, and a small
hatch nearby allowed access to the
assrsted in the movement of the rock-
ets to and from their racks alongi each
side, and loadrng into the projector
was carried out using a loading tray.
Although the Sturmtigrer prototype
was ready by late 1943, it was not untrl
August 1944 that production of this
massive vehrcle got under way, Only
about l0 were ever produced, and
these were used rn ones and twos on
most ftonts but in situations where their
powerful armament was of little advan-
tage, Consequently most were soon
a either knocked out in action or simply
abandoned by their crews once their
fuel allocation had been used.
Used as they were in isolation and in
such areas as the North ltahan cam-
pargn, the hulks fascinated the Allies
who encountered them and many de-
tailed intelligence reports were writ-
ten on them. Most realized that the Above: This side shot of a Sturmtiger Below : Largest of all the German
Sturmtiqer was a highly specialized shows the large armoured close-support weapons was the
weapon that was simply pushed into superstructure, mounting the 38-cm Sturmtiger, carrying a 38-cm rocket
the field during the latter staqes of the ( I 4.9 6-in) rocket proj ector with the projector that fired a form of naval
war in the German effort to get any roof-mounted craneneeded to load depth charge to demolish buildings.
weapon into action. If the Sturmtigers the projectiles into the interior This example has been captured by
had been used as rntended for street through a hatch at the rear. Americantroops.
fighting, they would have been formrd-
able weapons, lnstead, by the time
they were reirdy the time of concen-
trated urban warfare had passed,
Specification
Sturmtiger
Type: assault gmn
Crew:7
Weisht 65000 ks (143,300 lb)
Powerplant: one Maybach V- 12 petrol
engiine developing 484,7 kW (650 hp)
Dimensions: lenqth 6.28 m (20 ft
7,25 in); width 3,57 m (11ft 8.6 in);
height 2.BS m (9 ft 4,2 in)
Performance: maximum road speed
40 lan/h(24.86 mph); roadrange
120 kn (75 miles); fordrng L22 m(4 ft)
Armament: one 38-cm (14,96-in) rocket
projector and one 7.92-mm (0,31-in)
machine-gun

g $ilrl*g"schiitz III
Following from its experiences rn
World War I, the German army saw
ihe need for an armoured mobile qun
irat could follow infantry attacks and
provide fire support and the firepower
:c h-rock out strongpoints and bunkers.
D'.nng the late 1930s such a gmn was
jeveloped using the chassis, suspen-
.-:n and runmng gear of the PzKpfw III
:::k. This armoured grun was known as
:: Sturmgeschiitz III though its formal
::signatton was Gepanzerte Selbst-
iahrlafette ftu Sturmgeschi.itz 7.5-cm
Karone SdKfz 142, (assault gn-rn model
: -rd it had the usual upper hull and
--:r=t of the tank replaced by a thick
:-apace of armour with a short 75-mm
: :--in) qun mounted in the front, This
' :noon was first issued for servrce rn
-:1: :StuG III Ausf A) and was soon
:- -:-,', ed by a whole series of vehicles
:--: gradually incorporated overall
-,: ;;:en
-:. ie:arl improvements, to the extent
the war ended in 1945 many
;r=:: s:ill in sewice on all fronts. The
- l= - :.:Cels were the StuG III Ausf B, C
=-: D -whrle the slightly improved
S;:G IIi Ausf E appeared in 1942.
- -,: :::arn change to the Sturmge-
III (or StuG IIl) series was a
schiitz
gradual programme oI upgunning.
The origrnal short 75-mm gun was an
U24 weapon (i,e. the length of the bar-
rel was 24 times the calibre) and had
limitations against many tarQrets except
at shofi ranges. Thus it was replaced
by longer gnrns with improved per-
formance, flrst an U43 (StuG III Ausf F)
and then an U4B gmn (StuG III Ausf G).
The latter Enrn also provided the StuG
III series with an antitank capability,
and thrs was in a way to the detriment
of the original assault-support concept,
for it was far easier to produce a StuG
than it was a tank, so many StuG IIIs
with i./48 guns were diverted to the
Panzer divisions in place of battle
tanks, Used as a tank-killer the StuG IIi
had rts moments, but rt lacked traverse
and adequate protection for the task. lt
had to be retained as such, however,
for German industry srmply could not
supply enough tanks for the Panzer di-
v$lons.
As an assault gun the StuG III series
was far more successful. Eventually
the type was upgunned to the stage
late in the war when many StuG ills
were armed with the powerful 10,S-cm
(4, 13-in) Sturmhaubitze, a specral
assault howrtzer produced for the StuG
III fiu l0.5-cm StuH 42 The first ofthese
was completed in 1943, but manufac-
ture of this variant was initially stow.
Instead the versron with the 75-mm l-,/
48 gmn was rushed off the production
lines for the Panzer divisions,
The StuG ili had a crew of four and
extra machrne-guns were often car-
ried behind a shield on the roof The
prolective mantlel tor the marn grun
underwent many changes before en-rt
ded up as a Saukopf (literally 'pig's
head') mantlet which proved very
good protection. More protection
agtainst short-range hollow-charge
warheads was provrded with the addi-
tion of Scrhifzen (literally 'skirts') along
both srdes, These were simply sheets
of stand-off armour to detonate the
warheads before they hit the vehicle
armour, and were used on many Ger-
man tanks after 1943.
As a close-rangre assault support
weapon the StuG III series was an ex-
cellent vehicle/weapon combination.
It was also reiatively cheap and easy to
produce, and in war-time German.;
that mattered a lot. Thereiore il-.i
senes was built in some numbers alid
numerrcally lt was one of the mosl u---
portant German armoured vehicles
Specification
StuGIIIAusf E
Type: assault gmn
Crew:4
Weight 23900 kq (52,690 lb)
Powerplant: one Maybach V- l2 pe:: -
engine developing 197.6 kW (265 rc
Dimensions: len g|h 6.77 m (22 it 2.5 :-
width 2,95 m (9 ft B in); height 2. 16 r:-
(7 ft 1 rn)
Performance: maximum speed
40 km/h (24.85 mph); road range
165 km(102miles); fordinqO B m 12 -.
7.5 in)
Armament:one 75-mm 12.95-rn, ;-:
and two 7,92-mm (0.31-rn) macl-r.=-
guns
 :,":.') _,1: r /;143
,tj": li

ff&ru,w it,i.r
r., I- i!
,,'. ] l-t' ffiwffiffiwm
l-1.:::;jgr.ncej tx.t a j{ilii lirleili,rr:1,'.. '1rri
Ie eTu.lf elri ef l f 'tl'r.r a;t .:i i.xl, i.i.r i.r, i. ::.i /i i..l a'.:,' :
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The Sturmgeschiitz in Action

Sturmgeschtitz ill

The Sturmgeschiitz Sdktz 142 was based on the

chassis of thePzKpfw III with thegunmounted in
the hull. The driver's stationwas unaltered from
that of the tank, but behind him now was a large
but cramped fighting compartment. I nitially fitted
with a short 75-mm (2.95-in) 9un, the F model
shown here was introduced in I 942 and carried a
Iong 7 1-mm weapon, significantly improving anti'
tank capahility. The G model with its 7 5-m L/ 48,
heavier armour and smoke dischargers,was
designed more as a tank destroyer than a self-
propelled gun. By contrast, as early as 1941
variants were in production mounting a 105-mm
(4.1-in) howitzer. Armoured skirtswere titted as
standardfrom 1943.

r590
H
tl
ra.-r

RTER sAQSr.i-:t..

T-,vo StuG III move forward in the Soviet Union in
i 944. They are armedwith long75-mm anti-tank
!runs and are ca rrying extra track links for added
protection. More protection comes from the stand-
off side plates lcnown as 'Schiitzen' (skirts) carried
to defeat close-range hollow charge anti-tank
warheads.
The GermanStuG III, seen
here armed with a long 75-
nn gun, was aclosefire-
supportversion of the
PzKpfwlll tankandwas
pr oduced in consider able
numbers, someft'mes
taking the place of battle
tanks in Panzer
formations. Itwas a
pow erfu I suppor t weapon
that usually fired over
open sights.
The trouble was that although the'introduc-
::.n of the StuGs made the figures look better,
-iey .i/ere no reai substitute for the tank, It
-ecked the full 360" gnrn traverse that was so
for armoured warfare, and in an
=ssential
.rnoured action it took too much time to move
-:.:c a firing position, whereupon it lacked the
to switch from one target to another with
"ciity
,<peed and ease. If it was in the right position at
::re correct time the StuG could knock out an
--:emy tank easily enough, but to get into that
place in a hurry often took too long, The only
-::igt-term result of this tnfusion of assault guns
'::c the Panzer divisions was that they lost a
lreat deal of their earher punch and fiqhting
eCge while offering the Nazi hierarchy a false
-::pression of combat capability, The new
tank/StuG formatlons could not have the
=:-xed'
of 'ail tank' formations, and the combat
-pact
lc.ential of the Germany army suffered as
:es,.r-lt.
With the Panzer divisions the StuGs were
::en forced to adopt their original role of close
1e support. An attack would commence with
-:i:.g-range (sometimes indrrect) flre, laid
l:-,',n by the StuG IIis' 7.5-cm guns on the posi-
_.ls to be attacked. This opening fire was
':s;.ally carried out rn concert wtth the forma-
-::::s towed or self-propelled artillery batter-
-:s As the attack moved forward the Stucs
::-lcwed ln the main body of armour, using
:er guns to reduce strongpoints such as bunk-
e:s cr defended houses and to lay down cover-
::g ire as the tanks and their motorized infantry
:::-,-ed up to their objectives. If enemy tanks
appeared the Stucs could adopt a tank-killer
role, though only if the target was to the front, If
an enemy tank appeared on a flank the StuGs
were often sittlng targets, for they infrequently
had time to turn the whole vehicle to brlng the
gnrn to bear before the enemy could open fire.
Moving into action in a StuG III cannot have
been a very pleasant experience. Like those of
most armoured vehicles, the interior of the
StuG III was cramped and uncomfortable,
Much of the interior of the main fightlng com-
partment was taken up by the breech of the
7,5-cm gun, Ammunition racks lined the lower
portlon of the white-parnted walls, while radios
and other black boxes occupied what was left
of the bulkhead space. The driver sat in hisown
position to the left front, most of the time peer-
ing through his armoured vision slrts and trying
to make out where he was going, Generally the
driver was gnrided by orders from the comman-
a
der, who sat under hrs cupola behind the driv-
er. When possible the commander kept hiS
hatch open and raised hls head for better vi-
sion, but in action and closed down he could
often see llttle more than the driver. The loader
sometimes aimed and fired the 7.92-mm (0 31-
in) machine-gnrn by controls from within the
vehicie, This machine-gun was an MG34 or
MG42, and when occasion allowed this was
usually used from behind a shield on the rooi
To the right of the commander sat the loader,
who had his own overhead hatch that was sel-
dom used in actloni he also had a small hatch tn
the rear wall through which spent cases were
despatched to avoid cluttering up the floor of
A StuG r's seen on the Eastern Front against a
distant target.In order to better obsewe the fire,
one of thegan crew is using the hull rooffor
obsewation. Note that the vehicle is equipped with
the wide 'Ostkette' tracks for use over snow and
soft to improve traction.
the interror, Just in front of the commander and
aimost in his lap sat the gnrn layer with his gnrn
controls, His outlook was limited to what he
could see through his sightlng devlces: a small
panoramic telescope was set in the roof for
laying indirect fire and a telescope was placed
in front for direct aiming,
Given the noise of the engine, the constant
jolting from the suspension, and the fumes and
smells of the gnrn and fueL life for the StuG
crews must have been very unpleasant, But
they could take heart from the fact that they at
least had more armour around them than most
of their tankborne colleagues, and that many
tank interiors were even more unpieasant and
cramped than that of the StuG II1.
When the war ended the StuGs were used
mainly by the Panzer formations. Some StuGs
had been produced specificaiiy for use by in-
fantry untts and fitted with 10,5-cm (4. l-in)
howltzers ln place of the guns. But iew of these
were burlt rn comparison with the StuG IIIs with
7.5-cm guns. By the time the war ended StuG III
carapaces were even being fitted to surplus
PzKpfw IV hulls By 1944 the PzKpfw IV was
consrdered to be well past its prime as a battle
tank, so the production line was converted to
produce yet more assault guns to join those still
trylng desperately to stem the advances of the
Allied and Red armies. By then the Allled tide
had grown to such an extent that not even
heavier self-propelled weapons could stop it,
but the StuG crews and thetr Panzer coileaglres
did their best right up to the end,
 E Type 4 HO-RO
The Japanese were behind in
armoured warfare development
thoughout all thelr World War II cam-
paigns, Their early military excursions
lnto China and Manchuna misled them
mto disregarding the need for heaqr
armowed vehicles, and instead they
concentrated on what were regarded
elsewhere as iight tanks and tankettes,
This approach was supported by the
state of Japanese industry, whrch was
still in a relatively early state of indust-
rial development and lacked large-
scale production capability. Thus it
was that the Japanese army fell way
behind in the development of self-
propelled artillery, and ultimately only
a smali number of equipments were
produced,
One of these was the Type 4 HO-RO,
a self-propelled howitzer that allied
the Type 38 150-mm (5.9-in) howitzer
with the Type 97 medium tank. The
conversion to the self-propelled role
was a straightforward design task in
'fihrch the howitzer was mounted in a
shreld which provided forward and
side armour protection while leavrng
the top and rear open; the side armour,
:: rs worth noting, did not extend even
ic the rear of the fighting compartment.
lhe howrtzer dated from 1905 and was
denved from a Krupp desrgn, It f,red a
35.9-kq (79,15-1b) projectile to a range
:f 5900m (6,452 yards), but most of
-.:lese weapons were so old
and worn
rat they had been withdrawn from
;:eneral use after about 1942. They had
a slow rate offire as a result of the type
:f breech mechanism employed, but
-rey were apparently thought good
::iough for the self-propelled role.
The chassis used for the Type 4 was
:e Tlpe 97 CHI-HA, a medrum tank
:yr Japanese standards and dating
:rm 1937, lt was a mobile enough
;ehicle, but showed a relative lack of
trevelopment in its thin armour, whrch
ras only about 25mm (1 in) thick on
-:e gun shield frontal armour, and in its
:-,-erall riveted construction. The use of
:lets in tank construction had else-
:t::ere long disappeared, but the
,=panese had no option but to retain
-:e method as they lacked any other
j::rn of construction capability.
They also lacked the abrlrty to pro-
:;:e the Type 4 HO-RO in anything
:::: small numbers, Even those.were
--::ually hand-built, with few preten-
f H*ou"nte da
l:e ltalian army was not far behind the
Jernans in realising the need for
r=sault gmns, and developed a string ol
;::rcles that outwardly resembled the
irman StuG III. These ltalian assault
t:::s were produced in appreciable
::nbers, for they were better
::::oured and in relative terms qulck-
:: :c produce than contemporary lta-
-:- :anks. But by the time significant
-::lcers had been issued Italy was
:iactively out of the war, and most of
:=e Itahan assault guns fell into Ger-
--:: hands,
-:e majorityof Italianself-propelled
;reapons, known as semorente,
-':':nted 75-mm (2.95-in) or 105-mm
{ -3-in) gmns and howrtzers of varying
since these were direct-
=:i..}s, butthe
i:::nounts ltalian artillery arm still
::fuired self-propelled artillery
ffi:apons to support the armoured
r:=ations, Accordingiy Ansaldo di-
Self-Propelled Guns of World War II
Above : The Type 97 mounted a shor t
TYpe 38 howitzer with limited range,
but the I apanese were never able to
produce the numbers required and
they were mainly used in ones and
twos as local fire-support weapons.
sions to mass production, Even then
the Japanese drd not concentrate on
the Type 4 HO-RO alone, for they also
produced a version known as the Type
2 mounting a 75-mm (2.95-in) gmn and
desigmed to double as a self-propelled
arttllery platform and a tank-killer.
Again oniy small numbers were pro-
duced.
The TYpe 4 HO-RO vehicles appear
not to have been organized into any-
thing larger than four-howitzer batter-
ies, No records survive of larger
formations, and most accounts refer to
these vehicles being captured or
knocked out ln ones or twos. Very
often they were assigned for island de-
fence in the amphibious campaign
ieading to the Japanese mainland, and
only a few were captured lntact.
Specification
?ype4HO-RO
Tlpe: self-propelled howttzer
Crew: 4 or 5
Weight: not recorded, but about
13600 ks (29,982 ]b) The Type 97 had its I 50-mm
howitzer meant to be used as a form of mobile
Powerplant: one V- l2 diesel mounted in place oI the turret field artillery but was normally used
developins 126.8 kW (170 hp) normally carried. The howitzer was as c/ose suppor t ar tillery.
Dimensions: lengrth 5.537 m (lB ft 2 in);
width 2.286 m (7 ft 6 rn); height to top of Performance: maximum road speed Armament: one I 50-mm (5, 9-ur)
shield 1.549 m (5 ft I in) 38 knr/h (23,6 mph) howitzer
L4g/40
The long, lean lines of the I talian
I 49/40 can be seen at the Aberdeen
Proving Grounds in Maryland, USA,
still lookingvery serviceable as a
modern artillery weapon despite the
Iack ofcrew protection and stowage
on the vehicle for ammunition and
otheritems.
vefied some of its precious develop-
ment facilities to desigm a powerful
artillery weapon that could be carried
on a trucked chassis. In the end Ansal-
do plumped for an existing weapon,
the long Canone da 149/40 modello 35,
and decided to place it on a much-
modifred Carro fumato M, 15/42 tank
chassis. The selectiori of these firvo
items of equipment was made in order
to produce as good a carriage/weapon
combination as possible, but the snagr
was that the italian army was already
Semovente da 149/40 (continued)

crying our for large numbers of both
the gun and tank. Italian industry qulte
simply could not keep up with the ex-
lsting demdnds and so the new self-
propelled weapon, known as the
Semovente da 149/40, erot offto a shaky
start,
The Semovente da i49/40 was a
completely unprotected weapon as
the long gmn barrel was placed on an
open mounting carried on the turret-
less tank chassis, The gnrn crew stood
in the open to serve the gnrn, which had
its trunnions mounted dght to the rear
to absorb some ofthe recoil forces pro-
duced on firing, It was late 1942 before
the flrst prototype was ready for pro-
longed flring trials, but even before
these were over ursuccessful attempts
were being made to start productton,
Before the lines could start rolling the
Italians surrendered to the Alltes, and
the Germans took over what was left of
the Italian economy, Thus the
Semovente da 149/40 prototype re-
mained the sole example of what
seemed to be a promising design. The
gun of the Semovente da i49/40 was
certainly a useful weapon: it could fire
a 46-kq (101.4-lb) projectile to a ranqe
of23700 m (25,919 yards), at which drs-
tance the lack ofprotection for the gmn
crew would have been of relatively
little importance.
The prototype survled the war, and
can now be seen at the Aberdeen Pro-
vrng Grounds in the USA. It still looks a
thoroughly modern piece of equip-
ment that would not be too out of place
in many modern gnrn parks.
Specification
semovente da 149/40
Type: self-propelled grun
Crew: (on gnrn) 2
Weishfl 24000 kg (52,911 lb)
Powerplant: one SPA petrol engine
developins 186,4 kW(250 hp)
Dimensions: length 6,60 m (21 ft 7,8 in);
width 3,00 m (9 ft 10 in); heisht 2,00 m
(6 ft 6,7 in)
Performance: maximum road speed
35 km,itr (21.75 mph)
Armament: one i49-mm (5,87-in) gun

LHii-zo
During the desperate days of 1941 the
Red Army lost so much materiel.that
Soviet planners were forced to list
mass production as their top priorlty,
and in order to cut down the numbers
of equipments being produced only a
few types were selected for future use.
One of these types was the superlative
ZIS-3 76.2-mm (3-in) qun, which was
not only an excellent field ptece but at
that period also a good anti-tank gun.
Thus when it was decided to adopt the
ZIS-3 in quantity the Red Army had a
very good weapon for the future, espe-
cially when the chance arose to make
the weapon a self-propelled one.
The events of 1941 had shown the
Red Army that rts light tanks were vir-
tually useless, and the type was sche-
duled for withdrawal from production
and sewice. A productron line was in TheSovietSIJ-76was awartime andrather rushedconversionot theT-70light tank tocarry a76-mmfield gun, and
exlstence for the T-70 light tank, atthoughitwas producedinlargenumbers itwas littleliked by its crews,whocalled itthe'Bitch'.
however, and it was decided to con-
vert the T-70 to take the 215-76 gnrn as a
hlghly mobiie anti-tank weapon. Thus
was born the SU-76 (SU for Samokftod-
naya Ustanovka, or self-propelled
mounting), The conversion to take the
76,Z-mm gnrn and 62 rounds of ammunl-
tion was a simple one, but the T-70
chassis had to be widened somewhat
and an extra road wheel was added to
take the extra weight. The first exam-
ples had the gnrn mounted centrally,
but later models had the gun offset to
the left. Maximum armour thickness
was 25 mm (0.98 in),
It was late 1942 before the first SU-
76s were produced, and it was mid-
1943 before they were in Red Army a wartime expedient vehtcle wiih no Dimensions: lengfth 4.BB m (16 ft 0. I in); SU-76s wait to take partin one of the
sewice in any appreciable numbers. crew comforts whbtsoever. Apart from width 2.73 m (Bft 11.5 in); height2, 17 m massive artillery actions that usually
By that trme the ZIS-3 gnrn had lost a few examples thalhad an armoured 17+l dih\ took place betore any maior Red
much of its edge aqainst the ever- rool the crew compartment of the SU Performance: maximum road speed Army action. The open structure of
thickening German tank armour, and 76 was open to the elements and the 45 km,h (28 mph); road range 450 km the SU-76 must have made life very
thus the Su-76 was gradually phased driver had to sit next to the hvin en- (280 miles); fording 0.89 m (2 ft l I in) uncomfortable for their crews under
over to the direct fire-support of Red gines with no intewening bulkhead. Armament: one 76.2-mm (3-in) qnrn and such conditions, as only tarpaulin
Army infantry formations. Some antr The Red Army knew the SU-76 as the one 7,62-mm (0,3-in) machine-gun covers were carried.
tank capability was retained when Sukamr (bitch),
new anti-armour ammunitton was in- Thus the SU-76 started life as a
fioduced, but by the end of the war the mobile antr-tank weapon and ended
SU-76 was being phased out ln favour up as an artillery support weapon, it
of vehicles with larger-calibre gnrns, was no doubt a very useful weapon in
Many SU-76s were pressed into other the latter role, but essentially it was a
roles by 1945. The usual processwas to hasty expedient rushed into produc-
remove the gn-rn and then use the vehi- tion at a time of desperate need. Sur-
cle as a supply and ammunition car- prisingly, the type may still be encoun-
rier, as an artillery tractor and as a light tered in odd pafis of the world.
armoured recovery vehicle, Some
were fitted with anti-arrcraft cannon.
After 1945 there were still many.SU-
76s to hand, and the Soviets handed
them on to many friendly nations in- Specification
cluding China and North Korea, with su-76
whom the type saw another bout of Type: self-propelled Qn;n
action during the Korean War that Crew:4
started in 1950, More went to some of Weisht: 10800 kg (23,810 kg) Red Army soldiers attack under the really means. By I 945 the SU-76 was
the Warsaw Pact armed forces, It ts Powerplant: two GAZ 6-cylinder petrol close supporting fire of SU-76 76-mm used almost exclusively in this role
doubtful that the new recipients wel- engines each developing 52,2 kW guns, providing a graphic ex amp le after being used atonepointas
comed the SU-76, for it was very much (70 hp) of what close-range artillery support mobile field artiL|ery.

l 594
f itu- tzz and,Isu-tsz
The flrst of the heavy Soviet self-
propelled artillery carrrages was the
SU-152, which first appeared in 1943,
just in time to take part in the tank
battles at Kusk. It was built onto a KV-Z
heavy tank chassis and was typical of
later World War II desigms in that the
tank chassis was taken virtually un-
changed and a large armoured box
was built on to the front of the hull, The
weapon was a 152-mm (6-in) M-1937
howitzer mounted in a large and heavy
mantlet on the front superstructure
plate and there were roofhatches, one
of which had provision for mounting an
ISU-l SZswere still in front-line
service in 1 956 when the Red Army
ruthlessly crushed the Hungarian
uprising. In the streets of Budapest
The SU-l 22 was a conversion of the
T-34 tank to accommodate a front-
mounted I 22-mm howitzer in a well-
armoured and we ll-slope d
superstructure. Itwas produced in
large numbers fot the close-suppott
role, but could beused for'stand-otf
artilleryfire.
The ISU- 1 52 was a straight{orward
anversionof an IS-2 tanktocarry a
I52-mm howitzer as a powerful
close-support artillery weapon; it
zvas also a powertulbnkkiller.The
howitzer was housed in a thick
supercEucture with dense frontal
armour that made it a difficult vehicle
lo btockout.
anti-aircraft machrne-gun. This first
vehicle was intended for use as much
as an anti-armour weapon as a heavy
assault weapon, for the Red Army
made no differentiation between anti-
tank and other weapons when it came
to tactics, The SU-152 relied upon
sheer projectile weight and power to
defeat enemy armour,
When the KV tank series was re-
placed in production by the IS series,
these too were used for the SU self-
propelled role,The conversion fol-
lowed closely that of the original SU-
152, and the lS-based conversion was
the lacko{ traverse proved a serious
disadvantage, The gan mechanism
was never modernized ; elevation
and loading were done by hand.
Self-Propelled Guns of World War II
originally known as the ISU-152. To the
average observer the SU-I52 and ISU-
152 were visually identical, but the
ISU-152 mounted a more modern
howitzer known as the ML-20S (with 20
rounds), technically a gun-howitzer
and a very powerful weapon, especial-
ly at the assault ranges favoured by
Red fumy tactics. The weapon was
protected by an armoured box made
up from sloping plates of thick armour,
wtth hand rails around the edge of the
roof for use by 'tank descent' infantry
who used the vehicles to carry them
into action, Maximum armour thick-
ness was 75 mm (2,95 in).
The ISU-152 was joined by the ISU-
122, a virhrally identical vehicle car-
rying a powerful 122-mm (4.8-in) Smn
known as the M-1931/4 or A-19S (with
30 rounds), the ordnance being a mod-
ification of the then-standard 122-mm
M-1931/37, though there was also
another gun known as the D-25S which
was ballistlcally identrcal to the A-19S
but differed in the way it was con-
structed. Numerically the ISU-122 was
less important than the ISU- i52, but the
An ISU-152 crosses ariver during the
latter stages of World War II. These
vehicles appeat to be catrying their
crew membets on the root, but in
action they would be carrying
squ ads of ' tank descen I' essa uJf
infantry instead, Note the size of the
howit zer's mu z zle br ake.
122-mm version was potentraill ''e
more powerfi:l weapon as it firec
higher-velocity projectile rha:- =
=e
heavrer 152-mm weapori, wtuch :el:ee
more upon shell werght for its eiec=
During 1944 and 1945 the ISU--:2
and ISU-I22 were rn the vangua:l ::
the Red Army advances througe Ce:-
many towards Berhn, Some of the i:s
Red Army units entenng Berlin -.,re:e
ISU-152 units, whrch used their ho'n::-
zers to blast away stongpoints at ciose
ranges and clear the way to 'Jre re-
mains of the city cenfie.
If the lSU weapons had a fault i: n?s
that they lacked intemal amm'rruE3:-
stowage space. Thus they had to h;ve
a virtual constant supply of ammunr:c:
brought foward by armoured carr:ers
which was often a hazardous undertak-
ing. But the massive weapon carnei
by the ISU vehicles was corsidered:c
be of great value in the direct suppcr:
of Red fumy tank and motorDed rdar-
try dlisions, and both types went on ro
be used for some years after the wa:
Specification
ISU-r22
Type: self-propelled assault grun
Crew: 5
Weighfi 46430 ks (102 361 lb)
Powerplant: one V-12 diesel
developins 387.8 kW (520 hp)
Dimensions: lengrth overall 9.80 m (32 1
1,8 ln) and hull 6,805 m (22 ft 3,9 rn)
width3,56 m(11 ftB,2 in); heisht2.52 n:
(8ft32in)
Performance: maximum road speeci
37 km/h (23 mph); road range 180 ls::
(l 12 miles); fording 1.3 m (4 ft 3.2 n)
Armament: one 122-mm (4, 8-rn) gun
and one 12, 7-mm (0. S-rn) machrneai::
Gunsof theAllies
Apart from Germany, the greatest
exponents of self-propelled artillery
were the Russr'ans, who produced
excellent vehicles in vast numbers. The
British had to start from scratch, as did
the USA, but the latter proved faster at
p r oducing a viable de s ign.
It may seem strange to regard the Allies and
the Sovlets separately for the years between
1939 and 1945, for from 1941 onwards they were
allied agarnst the common German foe; but
such was the isolation of the Soviet Union dur-
ing much of the war that the Sovrets can be
considered as being militarlly distrnct for most
praciical purposes. Soviet armour develop-
ment and its equivalent among the 'Atlantrc'
nations proceeded along entirely separate
lines, and from different motivating factors.
Thus although the Soviets and the Western
Allies both produced self-propelled artillery,
their products were qurte different,
To start with the Soviet standpoint, it must be
realized that armoured warfare had always fea-
tured large in Soviet long{erm planning, From
I9l7 onwards the Red Army had been re-
garded as the vanguard of the Revolutton and
the missionary element that was to take the
Soviet form of socialism to ali corners of the
earth, so it had to be equipped to carry through
the class struggle, Amongst other iactors, this
meant for the Red Army planners the use of
armoured warfare on a large scale, Over the
USSR's early years this armoured ideal was
sought but remained unrealized, for the simple
reason that the decades after the Revolution
were beset by international power struggles
and by the problems associated with the up-
grading of Soviet industry to a pltch where tt
could supply the weapons required for the
forthcoming struggle. These strictures had
several important results, One was a form of
tactical and design orthodoxy that would not
offend leaderJ sensibrlrties or demand so
many innovations that large-scale production
of hardware would be slowed, Instead a steady
programme of evolutionary development was
adopted, whereby one established design was
used as the basis for another, and mass produc-
tion was channelled to accept such changes
wrthout any major disruption of production tot-
als and norms, Thus Soviet armour designs
tended to be strictly orthodox and based on a
system of evolutionary change rather than a
succession of new designs, one after another,
Self-propelled artrllery had a place in Red
Army philosophy from tts earliest days, Soviet
milrtary leaders were thinking in terms oI tank
armies while planners in the West were tinker-
ing with cardboard tanks and small numbers of
tankettes, Fortunately for the West, Soviet in-
dustry was still in a formative stage durtng that
period, but by the end of the 1930s armour was
flowing from the newly-instttuted production
hnes in an increastng torrent, Among these
products were early attempts at self-propelled
artillery, Many of these early design efforts
were little more than destgn studtes, for as a
rule most Sovret tanks carried larger guns than
their Western counterparts, They were usually
srmple conversions oi existing tank chassis to
carry pieces of ordnance already in produc-
tion, Only one form of artillery on tracks got into
productron at this period and this demons-
trated, for all rts faults, the thinking that tnflu-
enced Sovret self-propelled artiilery design.
The weapon was the KV-Z, which was in
many respects a cross beiween a heavily-
armed tank and a close-support assault
weapon, The KV-2 carried a short l52-mm (6-
rn) howitzer in a large slab-stded rotating tur-
ret. Known to its crews as the 'dreadnought',
the KV-2 was intended to move forward with
other tanks and supply direct supporting f,re at
close ranges. This concept of heavy weapons
employed well forward was to recur in later
designs, and although later weapons were
sometimes capable of indirect frre, Sovlet self-
propelled artillery was generally used tn the
direct-fire role and at the close ranges that
demanded heavy protective armour for crew
and weapon survival,
The KV-2 was not a success as its awkward
and bulky turret made it an easy target during
its main period of action, the campai.gn follow-
ing the German lnvasion of 1941, During thts
invasion the Soviet Union lost nearly all its main
industrial base in European Russia, together
The crew of an SU- I 22 looks out for a potential
target. The thick armour of the I 22-mm howitzer
mantlet is evident, alongwith the rather rough (but
adequate) standard of finish of many Soviet
weapons. The howitzer used was a modification of
a standard tield piece.
with many sources of strategic raw materials
What industrial potential there that remarned in
Sovret hands was uprooted and shifted at enor-
mous physical cost to areas east of the Urals
where they were simply dumped and told to
resume production, This disruption ied to a
drastic intensification of production priorities
and arms: a stringent programme of choosing
only a relatrveiy few end producis was im-
posed so that industry could concentrate on
massive production of those alone; no djversion
was possible. Ammunrtion supply followed the
same lines to the extent that only a few calibres
were selected for front-hne use, so that produc-
tion and logistic supply were made as easy as
possrble, In the field of armour the same policy
was followed, although existing production
vehicles and lines were retained, Thus the KV
tank series remained in manufacture and the
T-70 liqht tank lines were revised to produce
the far more useful SU-76, but the main concen-
tration was on the new T-34 tank, which also
became the basis for one ol the Red Army's
most important self-propelled artillery
weapons,
This was the SU-122, a T-34 tank altered to
carry a 1.2Tmm (4 8-in) howitzer rn a well-
sloped superstructure, It could be produced
with relatrve ease on the T-34 lines, and it gave
the Red Army armoured formations a powerful
fire-support weapon, The SU-122 was used in
exactly the same way as the earlier KV-Z: well
forward with the front waves of attackinq tanks
(usually T-34s) to blast away strongpoints or
anything else that stood rn the way ol the adv-
ance, If an SU-122 broke down it could take
parts from any drsabled T-34 tank, and if
ammunition ran out more could be picked up
from any 122-mm howitzer battery rn the vicin-
itv,
The SU-122s were usually organized within
regiments that contained two SU-122 batteries
and two SU'76 batterres, The SU-76 was orlgi-
nally intended to be a stop-gap anti-tank
weapon mounting a 76-mm (3-in) gun, but in-
creases in German tank armour gradually rele-
gated it to the close-support role, The SU-76
An M I 2 chacked securely in place with the rear
firing spadelowered. The US Armywas reluctant
ta take theMl2 into service atfirst, butitproved to
be invaluable, leading to the many later American
desr'gns. The Ml2 remained in service until 1945,
mainlyinEurope.

A parade-ground shot of an early M7,
recognizable by the three-piece hull front- later
.node/s used a on e-piece casting. The boxes on the
tull in front of the driver's position were for spare
track links.
had one thinq in common, and
=C the SU-122
-j-at'ivas that they made no concessions what-
:.:ever to crew comfort or convenience. Their
::ews went into action in vehrcles that were
::rghly but adequately finished and rnslde or
::nind armour that was usually poorly venti-
--.ed, cramped and generally uncomfortable.
-
-::le consideration was given to access to
-:::..nunition ]ockers or to ease of handlinq, as
:-= overwhelming need for mass produciion
,:--Ce such apparent luxuries unthinkable,
This trend contrnued with the SU-152 on the
:,-,- tank chassis (mounting a 152-mm/6-in
:-:-,';itzer) and the later ISU-i52 (and rts close
::'jnterpart the ISU-122) based on the IS tank
::assis. The ISU-122 was produced mainly be
:=:se there were stocks of 122-mm hrgh-
:.:-ccity guns ready to hand.
,rvlth these few vehicle and weapon com-
:-::ations the Red Army carried the war into the
--=art of Germany by 1945, None of the vehlcles
-:C in the self-propelled artillery role was
::-'.:hrng other than a modification of a vehicle
.'-eady in mass production, and the number of
--es was kept as small as overail production
:-.-5 Were enormous,
The WesternAllies
3i contrast with the Soviets, the Western
-:--es were ill-organized for war, A long lapse
:- .: political thinking that regarded future wars
== al best unlikely led their treasuries into re-
--=rng only hmrted defence fundrng, and as a
:=::1t very little armoured warfare deveiop-
:-::-: was carried out in erther the USA or the
----:ed Krngdom during the I920s and 1930s.
-:-: Britrsh army did make a tentative stab at
::','eloping self-propelled artillery with the
:-:::i Guns dunng the late 1920s, but the effort
-.r::e lo nothlng when the money ran out. What
,--:: became the Western Alhes did make
;==: sleps towards mechanizatton, to the point
,"',-=le the httle BEF that went to France in 1939
r--:re only fully-mechanized component olall
-lhed lorces facing Germany But the artil-
-:
.::-- -,', as strll towed, albeii behind mechanized
'.:: r::rs, Self-propelled artrliery dld not feature
-- .' in the armies of 1940, apart from a few
-,'-::- j War I weapons still in use by the French,
Self-Propelled Guns of World War II
A Bishop is seen in action during the latter stages
of its operational career, close loJVap/es. The gun
number is passing ammunitionintothe gun turret
The campaign of May t94O changed all thaL
The Panzer drvisions swept across France and
demonstrated the catastrophic arrrval of a new
concept of warfare, based on the tank, But if the
future pace of warfare was to be dictated by
the tank, it was abundantly clear that all other
arms had to keep up with them, and that in-
cluded the arljllery. For the Bntrsh army during
the days after Dunkrrk sheer survrval and re-
equipment were the paramount factors, and
matters such as new forms of artrllery had to
walt.
The USA started war production for the Bnt-
ishand French dunngearly 1940, butthe natron
deluded itself that it could remain aloof from
events across the oceans until Peari Harbor
rnflicted the awful truth, The USA then perforce
entered the war, and the world's miqhtiest in-
dustrial nation swung into action almost over-
nrght. Within weeks tank and weapon factories
were being burlt all over the nation, even
though it had not been decided what form or
type of weapons were to be produced rn them,
Before long new types oltank were flowing off
the brand-new lines, though it soon became
obvrous that good as some of these new de-
signs were, they lacked any form of longterm
design or tactical experience for guidance: by
1941 the Soviet Union and Germany were
already mass-producing tanks from scratch,
whereas the USA was at the stage of virtually
hand-buildrng test prototypes Thus compared
with many contemporary German or Soviet de-
signs, some ol the early American equipments
were underqunned and overengineered, but
they had the priceless advantage that they
were available in potential masses.
The first Allied attempi aL self-propelled
artillery came from the USA, where World War
I 75-mm (2 95-rn) guns were placed on half-
tracks and rushed into service of a sort,
although none saw other than limited action. A
Britrsh equivalenr (:n awkwardness rf not
cahbre) was the odd 25-pdr Bishop, which
equalled many of the later German lash-ups in
strange appearance and lack of tactical utility,
as when it was first mooted no one could de-
crde if it was to be a heavy-gun tank or self
propelled artillery, The Btshop was the only
type of Bntish self-propelled artillery to see
alter taking itfrom ammunition limbers, one of
which can be seen intheforegroundand normally
towed behind the vehicie when on the move.
service before the end of the war, for thereai:er
the Brrtrsh gunners relied on the output of Ser-
tons from the Canadian factories and numbers
of American weapons, especially the Ml
known to the British as the Priest.
The M7 was the outcome of an earlier Amer-
ican programme in whrch a 105-mm (4 l3-rr.
howitzer was placed on a halftrack and desig-
nated Tl9, (The earlier 75-mm haiftrack was
the T12 ) These saw service durrng the T\-rr-
sian campaign, in which they were joined i:i-
the MZ Priest. Burlt on the M3 medium tan-<
chassis (and later the M4) the M7 was a grea:
success and carried a 105-mm howitzer
Although rt had been manufactured using a:-
existing chassis, the M7 used spare productic:
potential as it appeared at a time when the lv1:
was belng phased out, and it dlifered in ma::-;
ways from its Sovret equivalant,
First there was the taciical role that the lvi-
was supposed to play: whereas the Sovre:
weapons were supposed to produce direc:
close-up supporting flre, the M7 and the la:el
Allied designs were designed to act as tru.,,-
mobile pieces of fleld artillery for long-range
lndirect fire, and as such played no direct pa:.
in assault or close combat, Nerther drd the_.'
have an anti-tank role, although if a targei pre-
sented itself lt was usually engaged, Thus .&e
armour ol the M7 was much hghter than :he
essential carapaces of the Soviet assault gurs
The M7 and lts close Canadran counterpart had
oniy lght front and side armour and no ove:-
head cover at all,
The M7 was lust one of many American sel-
propelled artillery designs, A hsting ol all :re
prototypes and trial models produced by :re
Amerrcans would cover pages, and fe'* c-
them ever got past the 'one-off stage. But ihe-,-
all had one thing in common, apart from ::ie
purely anti-tank versions, rn that they were a
intended only for the indirect fire roie. The-;
were nearly all superbly produced and de:a--
engineering reached down as far as crew cc=-
forts, So there cannot be any close compars::-
between Soviet and Western desigrs. :ie-.-
were the results of dilierent concepts of pl:-
duction thrnking, and in the end were r-rsed :::
wholly different tactical purposes.
ftl 3[ho"
During early 1941 the British Purchas-
ing Commission in Washrnqton asked
the Americans if the M7 Priest could
be altered to allow it to carry the British
25-pdr (87.6-mm/3.45-in) gun-
howitzer, While the Bntlsh appreci-
ated the amenities of the M7 Priest, it
had the major disadvantage of mount-
ing a 105-mm (4, I3-in) howitzer that
was not a standard British weapon
calibre at that time, The Americans
accordingly produced the MZ with the
25-pdr and named it the T51, but at the
same time announced that there was
no, way that they could produce it in
quantity as they had their production
hands fuIl already, The British accor-
dingly looked around and noted that
the Canadians had set up a production
line for the Ram tank, a type that was
soon to be replaced by the .American
M3 and M4, The Ramwas accordingly
altered to accommqdate the 25-pdr,
and thus was born the Sexton.
The Sexton used the overall layout of
the M7 Priest, but many changes were Above: The Sexton mounted the
introduced to suit British require- British 25-pdr gun and was a well-
ments. These included the movement Eked and reliable vehicle thal served
of the driver's posltion to the right- on for many years afler World War II
hand side, The Sexton lacked the pro- with many armies, I t is still used by
nounced 'pulpit' of the M7, but the India.
fighting compartment was left open
with only a canvas cover to provtde Position Officer command vehicle;
weather protection for the crew, The there was usually one of these to a
Sexton hadbqrew of six, and much of battery. In post-war years some Sex-
the interior wab taken up with lockers tons were handed over to nations such
irr ammunitron and some of the crew's as ltaly who preferred the 105-mm
personal kit; more stowage was pro- (4,13-in) howitzer; in this instance the
vided in boxes at the rear. Maximum 2S-pounders were replaced with Ger-
armour thickness was 32 mm (1,25 in), man 105-mm howitzers,
The 25-pdr gnrn-howrtzer was car-
ried in a special cradle produced by Specification
the Canadians specifically for the Sex- Sexton
ton, This allowed a traverse of 25" left Type: seif-propelled cnrn-howitzer
and 40' right, which was very useful for Crew: 6
the anti-tank role (18 AP rounds) but in Weisht 25855 kg (57,000 lb)
the event the Sexton had little need of Powerplant: one Continental 9-
this faciiity, Instead it was used almost cylinder radial piston engine
exclusively as a field artillery weapon Ilu'sSexton is n ow a preserved Wiltshire. I t originally came trom developing298.3 kW (400 hp)
(87HE and smoke rounds) supporting 'runner' maintained by the Royal Portugal, where it was sent during Dimensions: Ieng'th 6, 12 m (20 ft.1 in);
the armoured divisions in North $est S chool of Ar tillery at Lar khill, theyears after 1945. width 2.72 m (8 ft I I in)t height 2,44 m
Europe from 1944 onwards, There (8 ft 0 in)
were several variations, all of theih rn- llable cn:n and weapon comblnation There were a few in-service Performance: maximum road speed
corporating the production changes that proved so successful that many variants ofthe Sexton, some being con- 40,2 krn/h (25 mph); road range 290 km
progresslely introduced on the lines are still in use in odd corners of the verted to 'sl'vim' for possible use on (180miles); fording 1.01 m(3 ft4 in)
of the Montreal Locomotive Works at world to this day. The British army D-Day, but none appear to have been Armament: one 25-pdr gnrn-howitzer,
Sorel. Production continued there until . used the type until the late I950s, and used in this role on the day. A more two unmounted 7.?-mm (0,303-in) Bren
late 1945, by which time 2, 150 Sextons one is presewed as a museum piece al common conversion was the replace- Guns and (on some vehicles) one
had been manufactured. the Royal School ofArtillery at Larkhill ment of the gun-h0r,\ntzer by extra rnap pintle-mounted 12, 7-mm (0. S-in)
The Sexton was a well-liked and re- in Wiltshire, tables and radios in the Sexion Gun Browning machine-gnrn

The British Wnners nicktaned the

iitz priest American M7 the'Priest' after seeing

=
Experience gained with l05-mm (4, 13-
in) howitzers mounted on halftracks
enabled the US Army to dectde that it
the' puMt' that housed the I 2.7 - mm
m achine gun f or AA d eten ce.

wouid be better if the howitzer was

mounted in a fully. tracked car-
riage,and accordingly an M3 medium
tank chassis was modified to take such
a weapon, The M3 chassts was con-
siderably reworked to provide an
open-topped superstructure with the
howitzer mounted in its front, The de-
velopment vehicle was known as the
T32, and following trials which added a
machine-gnrn molnting to the right-
hand side of the fighting compartment,
lhe vehicle was adopted for sewice as
the Carriage, Motor, I05-mm Howitzer,
Itfil. Maxmum armour thickness was
25.4 mm (l in),
The first production examples were
for the US Army, but many were soon
diverted to the l,end-Lease program-
me for the Allies, among them the Bril

1598
MZ Priest (continued)
tsh Army. The British soon named the
M7 the Priest, legend having it that the
prominent machine-gun mountrng
gave the impression of a pulprt, The
British gnrnners adopted the M7 with
alacrity, and the type first went into
action with them at the 2nd Battle of El
Alamein in October 1942, The British
asked for 5,500 MZs to be produced for
tlieir use alone by the end of 1943, but
ts order was never completed in full,
The flgnrre nonetheless provides an in-
Crcation of the success of the MZ with
:he British gLlnners, They appreciated
'.he space and mobility of the carriage
and also the extra space for personal
stowage, The one snag was the howit-
zer, which was not a standard British
Army typer thus ammunition (stowage
was provided for 69 rounds on each
-rehicle) had to be supplied separately
:br the M7 batteries, which made for a
consrderable logistic complicatron,
This was not resolved until the first
Sextons with the 25-pdr weapons be-
gan to be issued in 1944, Until that time
:he British M?s were used all through
:he ltalian campaign, and some were
landed in Normandy in June Ig44
'-;:ough they were soon replaced by
:extons,
The M7 then began a new service
€ Sarriage, Motorn
155-mm Gun, M40
The first 155-mm (6.I-in) self-
oropelled gnrn produced in quantity by
'ie Americans during World War II
ivas the M12, a design originally
k'rown as the T6 and built on to a con-
';erted M3 medium tank chassis, In-
:jally this weapon was not considered
:cr service as it used an obsolescent
World War I ordnance that had be-
come available once the type's origin-
aI carnages had become too worn for
:rrther use, However, once accepted
seryice, they gave good perform-
=r
ance although it was agreed that a new
:rdnance was requrred if a long-term
7,'eapon was to be procwed,
Startrng in December 1943 a new
-,';eapon/carriage combination was in-
::1ated, The €un was the 155-mm MIAI
<nown as the 'Long Tom' (with
:cunds) and the carriage was based on
:e chassis of the M4A3 medium tank,
:ough much widened and fitted with
:ie latest high volute suspenSion
springing, The englne was moved
:cm the rear to a new forward posi-
:cn, and to absorb some of the recoil
a spade was added to the rear;
=rces
'i.rs latter could be raised for travell-
-::9. A working platform under the
creech was also provided. The gnrn
--ad a range of 23514 m (25,715 yards)
:::d fired a projectile weighing 43.
.35 Ib), which made it a very usetul
trcunterbattery and long-range bom-
weapon. Maximum armour
=rdment
---:ckness was 12.7 mm (0,5 in)
The development of this Carriage,
Motor, 155-mm Gun, M40 took rather
-:lger than expected, so it was not
'::trl January 1945 that the first produc-
:on examples rolled off the lines, They
rere rushed across the Atlantic in time
:: see the end of the war in Germany.
An MZ in action in the Ardennes,
I 945, with the open fighting
compartment covered by a tarpaulin
to keep out the worst of the bitter
weather. The tank obstacles behind
the M7 are part of the infamous
Siegtried Line defences that in the
event were taken withou t too mu ch
trouble,
career in a revised formr the howitzers
were removed and the hulls were
used as armoured personnel carriers
nicknamed Kangaroos, This soon be-
came a normal fate for unwanted MZs,
and the idea soon spread to ltaly.
The US fumy also made wide use of
the M7, although productlon for the US
Army was not a constant process. After
1942 MZ production proceeded in fits
and starts. At one stage the origrnal M3
chassis was replaced by the later
M4A3 Sherman chassis, and these M7s
were knovrn by the designation MTBL
After 1945 large numbers of M7s
were handed over to other countries,
and some remain in use to thjs day in
such nations as Brazil and Turkey, The
I05-mm howitzer is still a standard
weapon all over the world, and thus the
MZs continue to flre a 14,97-kg (331b)
shell to a range of 11430m (12,500
20
M40s took part in the bombardment of
Koln and the short campaigninq after
this. Behueen January and May 1945 no
less than 31 I M40s were built, and pro-
duction continued after the war, The
M4O was to see its most concerted use
durinq the Korean conflict, where it
proved to be an excellent weapor/car-
riage combination,
On the M40 there was no protection
for the crew as the type was desigmed
for use so far behind the front line that
I kg none would be necessary, The M40
had a crew of eight, and there was
provisron on the carriage for their
weapons and kit. The same carriage
was also used to mount a 203-mm (8-in)
howitzer, but this rlersion (the Car-
riage, Motor, 8-in Howitzer, M43), was
not used in gneat numbersj only 48
were built.
After 1945 M40s were distnbuted to
many other armies. The British Army
accepted a number and used them for
Self-Propelled Guns of World War II
yards), Throughout their sewice life
the M7s have always showed outstand-
ing reliability, and have demonstrated
their ability to cross all types of rougrh
terrain,
Specification
M7
Type: self-propelled howitzer
Crew:5
Weight: 22967 kg (50,ma b)
Powerplant: one Continental 9-
some years, More were used by na-
tions such as France, with whom the
type saw extensive service in Indo-
China,
There was one vadant of the M40,
the T30 Cargo Carrier. As its designa-
tion lmplies, it could be used as a
general supply carrier though tts nor-
mal deployment was for the ammuni-
tion supply of M40 batteries, Not many
were built as most of the manufactunng
potential was concentrated on produc-
ing gnrn carriers.
One of the main claims to import-
ance of the M40 was that it paved the
way for the current generation of self-
propelled weapons, It was produced
at a time when nuclear warfare was
just making its debut, and the need for
protection against this new battle
hazard was particularly noticeable on
the M40 with its open fighting platform,
The type was therefore used exten-
sively for trials and experlments de-
cylinder radial piston engine
developins 279,6 kW (375 hp)
Dimensions: Iength 6,02 m (19 ft 9 in):
width 2,BB m (9 ft 5,25 in) height 2.54 m
(B ft 4 in)
Performance: maximum speed
4l,B kmih (26 mph); maximumroad
range 201 km ( 125 miles); fording
1,219 m (4 ft)
Armament:one 105-mm (4, 13-in)
howitzer and one 12,7-mm (0.5-in)
machine-gun
Although the M40 arrived on the
scene later in the war, itwas one of
'the best of
allwartime self-propelled
equipments and went on to a long
post-war career./f used lfie cfiassrs
of theM4 tankasa basis.
signed to provide protection for the
crew. The M40 proved beyond doubt
that the only proper protection comes
from an armoured turret, and most
modern self-propelled weapons now
use such an arrangement,
Specification
M40
Tlpe: self-propelled gnrn
Crew:B
weishr 37195 ks (82,000 Ib)
Powerplant: one Continental 9-
cylinder radial piston engine
developrng 294,6 kW (395 hp)
Dimensions: length overall9,04 m (29 i
B in)andhullonly6,65 m(21 ft 10 in);
width 3. 15 m (10 ft 4 in); height 2.84 rn
/O ft I ih\
Performance: maximum speed
38,6 km/h (24 mph); range 161 hl(103
miles); fording L067 m (3 ft 6 in)
Armament:one 155-mm (6, I-in) gun
I lc3
ffi tirnop
The vehicle that became knovrn as the
Bishop was conceived at a time when
25-pdr batteries in the North A-frican
desert were perforce used as anti-tank
weapons and were taking a terrible
poundinq as a result. It was decided to
place the 25-pdr on a mobile carriage
to increase protection for the gun
crews, and it was soon clear that the
Valentine infantry tank would make a
good basis for such a conversion, Un-
forh:nately the exact role of this grun/
tank combination was uncertain from
the start, The tank exponents saw it as
a variant of the heavy-gmn tank theme,
while the gunners wanted a self-
propelled carnage. These arguments
were never really solved, and the re-
sult was something of a compromise
even thoueth the gunners won in the
end.
The Valentine 25-pdr emerged as a
straightforward conversron (officially
the Mounting, Valentine, 25-pdr Gun
Mk I on Carrier, Valentine, 25-pdr
Glm, Mk I) the usual turret being re-
placed by a much larger turret mount-
rng the 25-pdr, Thts new turret was
fixed, and was a large slab-sided de-
sigm too large for battlefield conceal-
ment and too small to allow much room
inslde for the gn-m crew, The turret de-
sigm also had one major disadvantage
for the gnrnners in that it restricted the
elevation of the barrel and thus cur-
tailed range to only 5852 (6,400 yards)
wluch was a considerable reduction
from the normal 12253m (13,400
yards). The only way to increase this
performance was the tedious and tacti-
cally-hamperinql construction of earth
rarnps up which the vehicle could be
dnven to increase the elevation angle.
T?averse was also severely restricted,
to a maxrmum of 4" to each side, Inter-
nalammunition stowage was 32 rounds
but more could be carried in a limber
towed behind the vehicle, Armour
varied in thickness from B mm
(0,315in) to 60 mm (2,36 in),
The 25-pdr Valentine went into ac-
hon in North Africa during the latter
Below: The Bishop was an early
British attempt to produce self-
propelled artillery by placing a 25-
pdr Wn onto aValentine tank
cfiassrs. The gun was mounted in a
frxed turret with only limited
elevation and the resultwas not a
succest bejngr replaced in seruice
by the P r ies t as soon as posst'b/e.
-:-J
stages of the campaign in that theatre,
by which time the 25-pdr was no 1on-
ger in use as an anti-tank gmn, so the
vehicles were used as self-propelled
artillery wrth no distractron and the
Royal Artillery learned a lot from their
use, The type was eventually named
Bishop, and it went on to be used in
Sicily and Italy during the opening
stages of that campaign, Throughout
these campaigrns the Brshop demons-
trated all its several drawbacks, but
also provrded an rndication of the
potentral of self-propelled artillery for
rt was the first British self-propelled
weapon to see actlve service, The
need for supporting loQdstics was more
than emphasized, as was the need for
improved radio links with forward
observers.
Above: A Bishop on the ranges with
the gun detachment commander
outside the fixed turret, as there was
room for only two gunners inside.
The fixed turret restricted the barrel
elevation and thus range.
The Bishop also demonstrated
things to avoid in future designs. The
most obvious one was for the gmn to
have its full range of movement if it was
to be of any use; addrtionally, more
room was needed to seffe the gmn, for
the turret of the Bishop was cramped
and ill-ventilated, More rnternal
ammunitron stowage was needed and
the carrier had to be fast enough to
keep up with tanks, Bernq an infantry
tank, the Valentine chassis was too
Above: This Bishop in 'factory' state
clearly shows the high and bulky
outline ol the fixed turret mounting
the 25-pdr gun. As this was a'first
Above : Ammunition s toc kta king
takes place on a Bishop with the
projectiles laid out on the engine
covers for counting. The Bishop
could carry only 32 rounds internally,
slow to keep up with the armoured
formations.
A1l these things were put right when
the gmnners were issued numbers of
MZ Priests. The gmnners took to the
Priest with a will, and before long the
Bishops had been discarded, They
may have been less than perfect, but
they taught the gunners a lot and the
Bishop has the distinction of being the
British Army's first self-propelled artil-
attempt' design there was confusion
as towhether the Bishopwas a heavy
gun tank or a self-propelled gun, but
in the end the gunner's view prevailed.
as space inside the fix e d turret w as
cramped. The projectiles are 25-pdr
HE shells, the normal round fired,
although smokecould also he
canied.
Specification
Bishop
Type: self-propelled gn-rn-howitzer
Crew: 4
Weisht: 7911 kg (i7,440 lb)
Powerplant: one AEC 6-cYlinder
diesel developing 97,7 kW (131 hP)
Dimensions: lenqth 5,64m (lBft 6in)
width 2,77 m (9 ft I in); height 3,05 m
(10 ft)
Performance: maximum road sPeed
24km/h (15 mph); road range 177 kn
(110 miles); fording 0.91 m (3 ft)
Armament: one 25-pdr (87, 6-mm/3, 45-
in) gmn-howitzer