Volume 9 Issue 103

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@ Aerospace P"ubtishing Ltd 1985
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Ray Hutchins
Richard Hook der of British Land Forces during the
Falklands campaign.

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 lnfcntrg Support
Wbclpons ol
Wbrld Wbr ll
In the mobile batflefields of World War II, infantry could not
count on any artillerylurr.ittobe close enoughto givesupport
in case of trouble, One solution to the problem was to g;ive the
infantry their own artillety, hut the most cost-effective
method depended upon a weapon as old as gutrpowder - the
mottar.
Throughout World War II the standard infantry support weapon used in
most armies was the mortar, Some armies tended to combine the hght
weight and plunging fire of the mortar with the more direct approach
and heavier firepower of the infantry gun or howitzer, and there were
even some infantry support weapons (such as the odd ltttle Japanese
\pe 92 battalion gmn) that could be sard to combine the attributes of gnrn
and mortar, One factor that wrll be seen to be important throughout thts
study is the number of real1y small-callbre mortars that were used
during World War IL These lightweight mortars were used rtght down to
infantry squad level, enablingr the squad to provlde its own local fire
support, This was a form of weapon that rose to prominence during
World War II, for although the mortar was evolved durrng World War I it
never reached the level of control that could extend right down to the
individual squad, This concept has been maintained since I945, and
today provrdes the infantry with a powerful extension of its offensive and
defensive range,
One weapon that rose to prominence during World War II but has
iaded out since is the rnfantry gmn or howitzer. In the aftermath of World
ii
csi;i: $
L .:'
4
WaffenSS infantry in action use a
I 0 - cm N ebelwerfer 35. Originally
intended to be a smoke-laying
mottar, thisweapon had a calibre ol
I 05 mm (4. I 3 in) and was an
enlargedversion of the orthodox
B-cm Granatwerfer 34. I t was often
used tofire HE bombs aswell as
smoke.
War I it seemed to be a good idea to many armies to provide the::
tnfantry unrts wrth integral artillery fire support, but provrding the infar:-
try with special artrllery weapons was rather extravagant in resources
and manpower. The artillery piece has never been a true infan:r,'
weapon, for it is far too demandlng in handhng manpower, however
small and light it rs made, Even before the end of World War II the heav ,-
mortar was replacing the infantry gnrn, and since 1945 the rnfantry giLr-
has faded completely from the modern tactical scene, The mortar is no-,',
the dominant infantry support weapon, supplemented here and there b,'
recoilless weapons and mrssiles, but infantry seem to preier the mortar
overall, The weapon was, and still is, portable, has range and firepower
to a degree that the soldiers of World War I could not have imagined
and remains completely under the control of the infantry that it supports
just as it did during World War IL
June 194 I , and a German mottat ctew opetate their 9-cm schwere
Granatwerfer 34 out of a Soviet farmyard. German mortar crews were
extremelywell trained, and could provide accurate and rapidly-aimed fire on
the request of the infantry, forward observers giving full target information.
u*a
*:'g
-j,=,.5
$:::--------------:r::t:i.r.i.':
,-.-.:, "i'"'., :n=1..+-sr':::d$F
il Houi"t light mortars
-ie Red Army used mortars of all
cnds in great numbers throughout
,ri orld War IL In general they were
sci:nd and reliable weapons that were
much heavier than their coun-
-.ually elsewhere, but were cores-
:erparts
:cndrngly very robust,
During the I930s the Soviet arms de-
sigmers closely followed trends else-
;here, and thus developed several
;.pes of light infantry mortars with a
:alibre of 50 mm (1.97 in), After deal-
-::g for a short while wrth one desigm
:at could be used as a 37 mm (1,46 in)
barrel for a weapon that could also be
';sed as an entrenching tool, the main
nodels settled down into a sedes that
ccmmenced with the 50-PM 38, desig-
:ated S-cm Granatwerfer 205/I(r) by
:e Germans, This was a conventional
iesigrn that used etas vents at the base
:i the barrel to vary the range; the
barrel was held rn its bipod at either of
:,',,o fixed angles, Thrs model soon
proved drfficult to produce, so it was
:eplaced by the 50-PM 39, or S-cm
Granatwerfer 205/2(r) to the Germans,
',';hrch omitted the gas vent feature and
-sed instead normal bipod elevatron
::ethods. While this model was effec-
:,'e enough, it was strll thought to be
:oo diftcult to produce and was in its
.:rn replaced by the 50-PM 40, This
-r;as designed for mass production on a
lrand scale and the bipod legs and
aaseplate were srmply pressed steel
:lmponents, The bipod had a simple
novel method of barrel levelling
=d rn service it proved reliable and
a::d
-erul, even though the range was
s:mewhat restricted, There was one
:iher model in this calibre, the 50-PM
41 or S-cm Granatwerfer 200(r) to the
irmans, that dispensed with a bipod
a:d used instead a barrel yoke
a:ached to a large baseplate. A gas
-,-e:lnqi system was also used, but not
USSR
r20-HM 38
'[AeSc-;e! 82-PM
many were made as productron con- 37 hadacalibreol
centrated on the 50-PM 40, Many of the 82 rn (3.228 in)andwasaclose
50-PM 40s produced fell into German desgr:n re,awe of theFrenchBrandt
hands and they too used them on a m oriai's. Ii e Soylefs in lro duced a
largTe scale under the desigmation 5- cir cuJar fuse pl a te an d u s e d recoil
cm Granatwerfer 205/3(r). sprrnErs benreen the bipod and
While the 50-mm mortars were used barrel to rd.uce recoiJ forces on the
at company or squad level, the batta- laying an d sig h ting arr angements.
lion mortars had a calibre of 82 mm
(3,228 in). There were three models in
this family, the 82-PM 36 which was a
direct copy ofthe Brandt mle 2713 I and
lnown to the Germans as the 8.2-cm
Granatwerfer 274/l(r), the 82-PM 37
which was a revised model with recoil
springs to reduce firing loads on the
bipod and designated 8.2-cm Granat-
werfer 214/2(r) by the Germans, and
the 82-PM 4L The last was a much
revised model that made extensive
use of stampings to ease production,
and was called the 8.2-cm Granatwer-
fer 274/3(r) by the Germans. The short
bipod was so arrangied that wheels
could be added to the ends for hand-
towing, and this feature was taken one
step turther with the 82-PM 43, which
used an even simpler bipod to ease
towing, one that is still in use today,
There remains one further 'ltght'
monar to mention, This was a special-
ized 107-mm (4,21-in) mountain war-
fare mortar known as the I07-PBHM 38, Specification Weight: in action 45 kq (99,2 lb)
or 10.?-cm Gebirgsgnanatwerfer 328(r) 50-PM40 Elevation: +45'to +85"
to the Germans. It was an enlarged Calibre:50 mm(1.97 in) Traverse: 5" to l0o variable
version of the B2-PM 37, and was used Lenqths: barrel 0,63 m (24,8 in); bore Maximum range: 3 I 00 m (3, 390 yards)
with a liqht limber for horse traction. 0.533 m(20.98 in) Bombweight: 3,4 kg (7,5 lb)
Alternatively the mortar could be Weight: in action 9,3 kg (20,5 lb)
broken down into loads for pack trans- Elevation: 45' or 75' fixed IO?-PBHM38
port, Firrng could be by the normal Traverse: 9" or 16" 107 mm (4,2I in)
'drop' method or by means of a trigger. Maximum range: BO0 m (875 yards)
Calibre:
Lengths:barrel 1.5? m(61,8 in); bore
This mountain version saw extensive Bombweight:0 85 kq (1 874 lb) t,4 m (55,12 in)
use during World War I1 and it is still in Weight: in action 170.7 kg (376 1b)
use to this day, not only with the Sovtet 82-PM4l Elevation: +45'to +80"
army but with many nations under Calibre:82 mm (3,228 in) Traverse:6"
Soviet influence. Lenqths: barrel 1.32 m (51.97 in); bore Maximum range: 6314 m (6,905 yards)
1,225 m (48,23 in) Bombweight:B kg (17,64 lb)
impressed by the firepower of the 120-
HM 38, Being on the receivingr end of
the weapon's efficiency on many occa-
sions, they had good reason to note the
power of the bomb's warhead and they
decided to adopt the design for lhem-
selves, In the short term they srmply
used as many captured examples as
they could, under the designation 12-
cm Granatrrerfer 378(r), but they then
went one better and copred the design
exactly for production in Germany.
This was known to them as the l2-cm
Granatwerfer 4Z(LZ-cmGrW 42) and it
was widely issued, even takrng the
place of infantry gnrns with some infan-
try formations. Thus the same weapon
was in use on both sides during the
fiqhtinq on the Eastem Front,
The usual bomb fired by the 120-HM
38 on both sides was the HE round, but
smoke and chemical rounds were pro-
duced (although thankfully the latter
were never used), The rate of fire
could be as high as l0 rounds per mi-
nute, so a battery of four of these mor-
A Red Army mortar battery uses
120-HM 38s in actioninthe
C au ca s i an hills during S eptembe r
I 942. The layer is using the mortar's
simple sight to lay the mortar while
the ammunition crew members
stand by to load the heavyHE bombs.
120-HM 38 (continued)
tars could lay down considerable
alnounts of fire in a very short period,
Over a period of action the baseplates
drd have a tendency to 'bed in', making
relaying necessary, but this was par-
hally eliminated by introduction of the
120-HM 43 which used a springloaded
shock absorber on the barrel-bipod
mounting, It is this version, which was
otherwise unchanqed from the origin-
al, that is most likely to be encountered
today, Over the years some changes
have been made to the ammunition,
whrch now has a longer range than the
wartlme equivalent, and another
change is that many modern versions
are now carried on various types of
self-propelled carriage,
Specification
120-HM38
Calibre: 120 mm (4.72 in)
Lenqths: barrel 1,862 m (73.3 in); bore
i,536 m (60,47 in)
Weight: in action 280. I kg (617 Ib)
Elevation: *45oto *B0o
Traverse:6'
Maximum range: 6000 m (6,562 yards)
Bombweisht: HE 16 ks (35,3 lb)
ffi brdnance, ML 2-inch Mortar
The first of the Brltish 2-in (50.8-mm)
mortars appeared in 1918, but it was
not in service for long being rendered
obsolete in 1919, It was not until the
1930s that the notion ofreintroducing a
light mortar for use at platoon or sguad
level was put forward, and as there
was no 'history' of the development of
such small mortars in the UK at that
tLme it was decided to run a selection
competition between the offerings
foom various armaments manufactur-
ers. The result was a flood of models
ftom a number of concerns, and after a
series of trials one was selected,
The winner was a design from the
Spanish manufacturer ECIA, In its ori
smal form this weapon was thought
suitabie for improvement, and the ex-
tra fr:rther work was carned out in the
UK, leading to fuI1 production during
1938, The first production version was
the Ordnance, ML, 2-inch Mortar Mk II
(ML for muzzle loading), but this was
only the flrst of a lonq string of marks
and sub-marks, ln basrc terms there
-Jvere two types of 2-inch Mortar, One
was the pure infantry version, which
-.vas a simple barrel with a small base-
plate and a trigqrer mechanism to flre
.re bomb after loadinq, The second
:j,pe was meant for use on Bren Gun or
-mversal Carriers and had a much lar-
Jer baseplate and a more complicated
::nirig system, if required the carrier
-,-ersion could be drsmounted for
;:und use and a handle was supplied
::: thrs purpose. However, between
-:-ese two types there were at the least
-i Crfferent variants, with differences
- barrel length, sightinq arange-
:::=rts and production variations.
-- ---=re were even special verstons for
:q: by the Indran Army and by air-
:,:=e drvrsions.
-:
;-:::rons
go with thrs array of weapon
there was an equally daunt-
" ; :a-nqte of types of ammunition, The
;-- comb fired by the 2-inch Mortar
-l-5 :iE. but smoke and flares were
led. the latter berng partrcularly
-:,=-:- :br tarQlet illumination at night,
:--.-:-; a trigger firing mechanism the
T=::,:: could be used at angles close
Left: The Soviet 120-HM 38 was one of
ffiemosl successfuI mortar designs
of World War I I, and was even copied
direct by the Germans for their own
use. It combined heavy firepower
and mobility and often replaced
support artillery with some
formations. It wassr'mple and easy to
usein action, andfired aheavyHE
bomb.
Above:The 120-HM 38 is seen on its
wheeled travelling carriage, from
which themortar couldbe rapidly
and easily emplaced. The wheeled
carriagewas olten coupled to a
Iimber that carried some
ammunition. So successful was lft is
mortar design that it is still in
production.
parti-
to the horizontal, a factor that was
cularly usefi:l in house{o-house com-
bat, The bombs were normally carried
in tubes, each holding three, and
arranged in handy packs of three
tubes. The normai 2-inch Mortar team
consisted of two men, one carrytng the
mortar and the other carryinq the
ammunition.
The 2-inch Mortar is still around, The
Britrsh army uses rt for flring flares and
other pyrotechnics pending the ser-
vice debut of the new Light Mortar,
and many other nations keeP the
weapon 'on the books'. These daYs the
only version likely to be encountered
is the infantry model with its small
baseplate, the carrier version having
lonq since passed away,
Specification
z-inch Mortar Mk II* * *
Calibre:2 in (50,8 mm) A 2-inchMortar team of theRoyalScofsFusjlr'ers in action during lateJune
Lengrths: barrel 0.665 m (26,2 in); bore 1 944 during an attack on Norrey-en-Bessin. The small size of the mortar
0,5065 m(i9.94 in) means thaf most of it is hidden behind the mortar gunner, demonstrating how
Weight: 4, 1 ks (9 ]b) easy the mortar was to conceal and use in action at close ranges .
Ma:rimum range: 457 m (500 Yards)
Bombweight: HE 1,02 kg (2,25 lb)
A drill book demons tr a tion of the
loading of a Z-inchMortar.As the
Ioader drops the bomb into the
muzzle, he taps the firer on the back
to order him to pull the trigger lever Soldiers of the lst Battalion, The Hampshire Regiment, in action in Sici-: ::.
via a cord lanyard. The model is the 1943, using a 2-inch Martar. The mortar gunner is operating the trigge: le','e:
Carrier versionwith the large at the base of the baftel to actually fire the bomb while his par lner obse.;es
baseplate. thefallof thebomb.
ffi brdr,"r,ce, ML Mortar, 3 inch
The first 3-in (76,2-mm) mortar was the
original Stokes Mortar that was fust
used in March 1917, This version re-
mained in use for many years after
World War I, and as funds for weapon
development were sparse between
the wars it remained in service virtual-
ly unchangted for some years, Howev-
er there was some wotk carried out on
the basic design to the point at which it
was decided during the early 1930s
that the Ordnance, ML Mortar, 3 inch
would be the standard infantry support
weapon, This was the Mortar, 3 inch
Mk II, the weapon that was used by the
army when World War il broke out in
September 1939, This Mk II had
nurnerous chanqes from the oriqnal
World War I Mk I, especially tn the
ammunition which used many of the
features of the French Brandt design
innovations,
It was not lonq after the start of the
war when it was noticed that although
the Mk II was a sturdy and reliable
weapon, it lacked the range ofmany of
its contemporaries. The early versions
had a rangre of only some 1463 m (1,600
yards), whrch compared badly with
the 2400 m (2 625 yards) of its German
equivalent, the B-cm GrW 34, A long
series of experiments and trials using
new propellants rncreased this range
to 2515m (2,750 yards), which over-
came many of the origrnal drawbacks,
but these new propellants took time to
get into the hands offront-ltne troops,
so at times many German and Italian
mofiars were used by British troops,
especially during the North African
campargns.
Apart from the ammunttion changes
other alteratrons were made to the The 3-inch Mortarwas the standard
basic desigm. Later marks were equip- inlantry supportweapon of the
ped with a new basepjate design and Britkh and Commonwealth armies in
improved sighting arrangements, and World W ar I I, but it generally lacked
there was even a specral version (Mor- r ang e compare d to weapons in
tar, 3 inch Mk V) developed for use in seruice elsewhere . During the war
the Far East, but only 5,000 of them gr adu al atnmunition changes
wete made and some were used by improved the range, and the3-inch
the airborne divisions, The usual Mortar was a handy and popular
method of gettrng the weapon tnto ac- weaponinaction.
tron was pack carriage in three loads
by men, but the mechanized battallons
carrred thelr weapons on spectally-
equipped Universal Carriers, On
these the mortar was carried on the
back ofthe vehicle ready to be assem-
bled for normal grround use; lt was not
fired from the Carrier. The Carrier also
had stowage for the ammunition,
When dropped by parachute the bar-
rel and bipod were dropped in one
container, Another contarner carried
the baseplate whtle yet another con-
tainer held the ammunition,
The ammunition for the familY was
largely confined to HE and smoke,
although other payloads such as illumi-
nants were developed, By jugqhng
with the propelling charge increments
and barrel elevation angles it was
possible to d-rop a bomb as close as
114m (125 yards) away, a useful fea-
ture in close-quarter combat,
Somehow the weapon never
achieved the respect that was given to
its opponents, but once the original
range shoficomings had been rec-
tified it proved to be a sound enough Specification Weight: inaction 57.2 kq (126 Ib)
weapon that remained in service with Mortar, 3-inch Mk II Elevation: +45"to +80'
the British army until the 1960s, It is Calibre:3 in (76,2 mm) Traverse: I 1"
used by some of the smaller ex- Lengths: overall 1.295 m (5 t tn); barrel Maximum range: 25 15 m (2, 750 yards)
Commonwealth armies, 1.19 m (46,85 in) Bomb weiqrht: HE 4,54 kg (10 lb)

Soldiers of the Black Watch are seen in action with their 3-inch Mortar near A British 3-inch Mortar team provides fire support against German positions
Herouvillette inNormandy duringJune 1944. The mortar is carefully across lft eRiver Maas during the bitter weather of January I 945.
emplaced in a purpose-dug pit, with adequate space for the mortar and crew This team appears to have a lengthy fire mission, judging from the pile oI
andwith camouflage netting handy for concealment. mortar bomb containers stacked ready to hand.

o rdnance, SB .z-inch Mortar

changed to convert the new weapon
into a healry mortar firing conventional
HE bombs for issue to Royal Artillery
batteries, Thus the new mortar be-
came the Ordnance, SB 4.2-inch Mor-
tar (SB for smooth-bored).
The 4,2-inch Mortar was produced
al a time when the Brrtish defence in-
dustry was fully stretched and produc-
tion facilities of all kinds were in short
Supply, This was particularly notice-
able in the production of the bombs,
for the designers wanted them to have
forged bodies to reduce weight and to
produce a better ballistic shape, At
that time the required forging facilities
were not available, so the bomb
bodies had to be cast, This resulted in
a maximum range of only 3018 m (3,300
yards) as opposed to the requlred
4023 m (4,400 yards). These bombs
had to be used for they were all that
could be made at the time pendingrthe
introduction of a new design with a
streamlined body. Again, these had to
be manu-factured usrng cast iron but
they did manaqe a ranqe of 3658 m
(4,000 yards), By that time HE bombs
were the main projectile used, but the
original smoke function had not been
entirely forgotten and some smoke
bombs were produced,
The 4.2-inch Mortar was fauiY heftY
to move around, so the usual method o:
gettrng it into action was to tow It usmQi
a Jeep or other light vehicle, The base-
plate and the barreJ./bipod were sc
arrangTed that they could be easil1
lifted up onto a small wheeled moun:- I
Ordnance, SB 4.2-inch Mortar (continued)
ing. Once on site they could be lo-
wered from the mounting and the bar-
rel and bipod quickly assembled.
When carried on a Universal Carrier
thilgs were even simpler. The base-
plate was simply dropped off the back,
the barrel was inserted and the bipod
shoved into place, and firing could
start almost at once. Getting out of ac-
tion was just as rapid, Thls led to the
4.2-inch Mortar being viewed with
some suspicion by the troops that re-
lied upon rts firepower support, While
they valued rts supporting fire they
l<new that as soon as a 4.z-lnch Mortar
battery was brought.into action nearby
would be offagain before the incom-
rt
mg counterbattery fire ftomthe enemy
arrled, By that time the 4.2-inch Mor-
tar battery would be some distance
away, leaving the units close to theu
former position to receive the fire
meant for the battery.
The 4,2-inch Morta-rs were widely
used by the Royal Artillery, many fleld
reglments having alternatlve gn:n or
ffi US-** Infantry Howitzer Mk II
At some point during 1942 a decrsion
was made to produce a light hovntzer
for use by British infantry battalions but
atthat time the infantry themselveshad
not been consulted: perhaps the plan-
ners were rnfluenced by the use of
infalfi artillery in nations such as Ger-
many and the USA. In order to con-
sewe production facilities it was de-
clded that the new weapon would in-
corporate features from a number of
existing weapons, The barrel was to
be machined from a 94-mm (3.7-in)
antiaircraft gun liner, the breech
ntechanrsm would come from the 25-
pdr f,e1d gun and the recoil system and
:radle came from 6-pdr anti-tank glun
Tmponents, To srmphfy matters the
rew weapon would fire the same
as the old 3,7-inch Pack
=r,rnunition
::rwitzer and the ciose-support howit-
-s fitted in some tanks. The term 95-
urm Infantry Howitzer was applied to
-:e project, 95 mm denoting the differ-
:*:es from other similar weapons,
lhe 95-mm Infantry Howitzer was
of the success stones of World
=: one
-fi- lI. The resultant amalgamation of
-:-Donents from various weapons
:-ed to a new welded steel box car-
:,=;e looked rather odd, and so it
:=:ed out to be once it was fired. The
i-;,:: recoil system was simply not up
ic --:: :ask of absorbing the recoil loads
:equently broke, The wheel track
=:
-qi ploved to be too narrow, leading
t ::;r:rstabilrty, Prolonged firing also
rrr';ed that the overall construction of
te l.r-apon, desi€rned for pack trans-
:r:i:-- lO loads, was such that compo-
le:s :culd be shaken loose. No doubt
:rr:= ievelopment could have elimin-
tnp: of these defects, but by the
lE€ ="ry
:e-y emergred the weapon was
erLrr*:r -:r production.
i T-=s at this point that the inJantry
m=:: into the programme, They
xm:-r=:l'm
:mounced that they did not
qr,ar:r -:€ Teapon. They had not been
m:L{-i3i at any stage and considered
:A€-kesft 3.7-rn (94-mm) howitzer
ilEs fo,be a mountain weapon
=ealrt
m :r ras frs t introduced during
d$'rric'trarl, butwas laterused as a
&mr' -:ac& fi ona tz er in World W ar I I.
Infantry Support Weapons of World War II
4,2-inch Mortar complements, The 4.2-
inch Mortar was used wherever British
troops sewed from late 1942 onwards,
and the weapon was still in use during
the Korean War, in which itwas used to
tackle targets situated on reverse
slopes behind hills or in valleys,
Specification
4.2-inchMortar
Calibre: 106.7 mm(4,2 in)
Lengths: barrei 1,73 m (68. I in); bore
1.565m(616in)
Weight: in action 599 kg (1,320 1b)
Elevation: +45'to +80'
Traverse: I0"
Maximum range: 3749 m (4, 100 yards)
Bomb weight:9.07 kg (20 Ib)
A 4.2-inch Mortar fkes on German
positions in the foothills of Mount
Etna in Sicily during'l 943 . The crew
are protecting their ears against the
considerable muzzle blast. The
amount of dust stirred up could
reveal amortar position in action.
that they already had qurte enough Specification Elevation: -5"to *30o
weapon types within their battalions, 95-mm InfantryHowitzer Traverse: B'
and there simply was not enough man- Calibre:94 mm (3,7 in) Muzzlevelocity:330 m (1,083 ft) per
power to deal with a howitzer as well. tengths: barrel 1.BB m (74.05 in); bore second
This finaily killed off the 95-mm Infan- 1.75 m (69 in) Maximum range: 5486 m (6,000 yards)
try Howitzer project altogether, and Weight: in action954,8 kg (2, 105 ]b) Projectile weight I 1,34 ks (25 lb)
the majority of the numbers produced
were never even issued, They were
simply scrapped after the war and to-
day only one remains,
Only two projectiles were produced
for use with this weapon, HE and
smoke, There were plans for an anti-
tank HEAT projectile, but that was an
offshoot of the 95-mm tank howitzer
prognamme, and mention can be found
of a flare sheli, These projectrles were
to be flred using a three-charge sys-
tem.
The entire 95-mm Inlantry Howitzer
project now seems almost like a text-
book example of how not to QIo about
weapon design, No doubt the weapon
could have been developed to the
point of sewiceability, but the recoil
system was such a source of troubles
that it now seems doubtful if it would
ever have worked properly. Perhaps
the biggest mistake in the entire pro-
ject was going ahead with design and
development without even troubling to
find out if the intended operator really
wanted the final product,
The expertmental 9 5 -mm ( actu ally
3.7 - in/ 9 4-mm) I nf antry H owit zer
undergoes toop trials in ltaly in
1944. Formed from various parts of
existing we apons, this intantry
howitzer was not a great success and
the infantry did not pailia)laily want
it, so the weapon was never acceptd
for fuL[- scale service.
 45/5 modello 35 'Brixia'
To the little 45/5 modello 35 'Brixia'
must go the prize for being the most
overdesigrned and overengineered
mortar of World War II. Qurte why the
desrgners of the modello 35 went to
such lengths to introduce needless
complexrties to a light support mortar
with a very limited performance and a
relatively ineffectrve projectile is now
difficult to fathom, but the result was
issued to the ltalian armed forces in
large numbers.
In thrs weapon's designation the
term 45/5 indicates the calibre of
45 mm (1.77 in) and the lengith of the
barrel in calibres, i,e. 5x45 mm
(actually it was marginally longer),
Such a small calibre could encompass
only a small bomb that weighed
mere 0,465 kg (1.025 corres-
1b), u,rth a
pondingly small explosrve payload.
The barrel was breech{oaded: oper-
ating a lever opened the breech and
closing it fed a propelling cartddge
from a magazine holding 10 cartridges,
A trigger was used to fire the bomb,
and to vary the range a gas port was
opened or closed to vent off some of
the propellant gases, If this was not
enough there were also complex
elevation and traverse controls.
The barrel of the modello 35 was
located in a folding frame arrangement
that rested against a carrier's back us-
ing a cushion pad to ease the load
agarnst the body, In use thrs frame was
unfolded in such a way that the firer
could then sit astride the weapon if
required. In action the modello 35
could manage a fire rate of up to about
10 rounds per minute, and rn trained
hands the vfeapon was qulte accwate,
But even when they landed right on
target the small bombs were relatlely
ineffective, mainly as a result of the
small payload that often resulted in
a lian formations, There was even an in-
erratic and ineffective fuagrmentation.
The modello 35 was rurdely used by
the ltalian armed forces, mainly at pla-
toon levei. AII Italian soldrers were
trained in its use, some of them while
still in one or other ofthe Italian youth
movements, which were rssued with
an equally complex but even less
effectrve version of the modello 35, this
trme in 35-mm (1,38-in) calibre, These
weapons were meant only for training,
usually flring inert bombs,
The ltalians were not the oniy users
of the modello 35. There were times
during the North A-frican campaigms
when the Afrika Korps found itself us-
ing the thrngrs, usually for logistical
reasons when serving alongside lta-
struction manuai wrrtten in German for
this very purpose, the German de-
srgnation of the weapon being 4.5-cm
Granatwerfer 176(i),
It seems almost certain that the lta-
lian soldiers found to their cost the
hmrtations of the modello 35 and re-
tained the ,.nleapon in service for the
simple reason that there was iittle
chance ofltalian industry berng able to
produce anything better in the then
foreseeable future, Hanng expended
so much development time and pro-
duction effort into getting the modello
35 into the hands of the troops, the
limited ability of the ltalian defence
industries would have required too
much trme to design, develop and pro-
duce yet another weapon, So the Ita-
Iian soldiers simply had to make do
with what they were given; no doubt
many of them thought it was not much.
Specification
45/5 modello 35
Calibre:45 mm (1,77 in)
Lengrths: barreI0.26 m (10,2 in); bore
0.24I m(9,49 rn)
Weight:inaction 15.5 kq(34, 17 ]b)
Elevation: * 10o to *90"
Traverse:20'
Maximum range: 536 m (586 yards)
Bomb weisht: 0.465 ks (1,025 lb)

The I talian 45/ 5 modello 35' Brixia'

mortarwas one of themost
complicated mortar designs ever
produced. lt used a lever-operated
breech mechanism and fired tiny
0.465-kg ( 1.025Jb) bombs.

CERI\,4ANY

S-cm leichte Granatwerfer 36

German weapon desrgners between
the world wars were presented with
virtually a clean slate onwhich to work
as Germany gradually rearmed duringt
the early 1930s. Thus when a requtre-
ment was issued for a light infantry
mortar for ssue at squad level, the de-
signers at Rheinmetall-Borsig AG de-
cided not to follow the usual barre7
baseplate/bipod form but instead
evolved a design in which the barrel
was permanently secured to the base-
plate and the bipod was vrrhrally eli-
mrnated in favour ofa monopod devtce
frxed to the baseplate, The result was a
rather complex little weapon with a
calibre of 50mm (1,969in) that was
ioown as the S-cm leichte Granatwer-
fer 36 or leGrW 36 (light grenade-
Iauncher model 1936) that was first
rssued for use during 1936,
The leGrW 36 was in rnany ways a
prime example of the German's gener-
al love of gadgetry in weapons, It had
ali manner of them from the traverse
ccntrols burlt onto the baseplate to a
;ery complicated but completely un-
:recessary telescopic sight, This sight
';as very much a designer's attempt to
:*-ake the weapon as perfect as possi-
:ie and ensure accuracy, but the
:a:rges at which the lrttle IeGrW 36 was
-ed were such that a simple [ne
p:,rted on the barrel was all that was
:-eeded and the sight soon went out of
p::Cuction dwing 1938,
lhe weapon could be carried by
::= nal using a handle on the base of
:e barrel. For all its small size the
-:3:W 36 was rather heavy, weighing
-= kg (30,81b). Thus in action one man
:-:r :: carry it. with another carrylng
--:,= ilrrrumtion in a steel box, In action
::: baseplate was placed on the
-:-i and all barrel adjustments
were made using coarse and fine con- Specification Weight: in action 14 kq (30.8 lb)
trol knobs, Firing was carried out using IeGrW36 Elevation: +42"to +90"
a tigger. Only HE bombs were fired, Calibre: 50 mm(1,969 in) Traverse:34"
Whlle the designers felt rather Lengrths: barrel0.465 m (t8.3 in); bore Maximum range: 520 m (569 yards)
proud of their achievement in the 0,35 m (13,78 in) Bomb weight: 0,9 kg (1.98 ]b)
leGrW 36, the soldiers were not so en-
thusiastic, They felt that the leGrW 36,
quite apart from the weight problem,
was simply too complicated and the
bomb not worth al1 the trouble in-
volved, The bomb weighed only 0.9 kg
(1,98 lb) and the maxmum ranqe was a
mere 520 m (569 yards), On top of this
the weapon took time to produce, and
was costly in raw material terms and
other resources, Such a situation could
not last once the war was under waY,
and by 1941 the leGrW 36 was out of
production, Those that had been
manufacured were gradually with-
drawn from front-line sewice in favour
of something better, being passed on
to second-line and grarrison units,
Many were used by units manninq the
Atlantic Wall as part of the beach de-
fences. Some were passed on to the
Italian army,
Overall the leGrW 36 was not one of
the German weapon desiqners' best
efforts. They allowed a small weapon
to become far too complex and costly
to justify the result, and the German
army was astute enouqh to realize the
fact and so went on to employ more
useful weapons,
The |-cm IeGRW 36 was one of the
standard German army light mortars
of theearlywaryears, butitwas too
complex and ex pens ive for w artime *.{
production and its performance was l
not outstanding. Here one is being ;
loaded while the layer adiusts the
complicated fire controls on the l;ll::r'$l
heavy base plate and yoke.
 GERMANY
8-cm schwere Granatwerfer 34
The German army's 8-cm schwere
Granatwerfer 34 or 8-cm sGrW 34
3eavy crenade{auncher model 1934)
;a:ned for itself an enviable reputation
among Allied front-line soldiers for tts
accuracy and rate offlre. The weapon
fras encountered everywhere the
German anny was in action, for the
sCrW 34 was one of the Germanarmy's
sandard weapons in use ftom 1939
Cght through to the last days of World
lVar iI. It was a Rheinmetall-Borsig AG
product, but was in truth a Germanic
:evision of the Brandt mle 27131 and
even used the same calibre of B I 4 mm
. predelermined height the bomb ex-
{3.2 rn).
Despite its reputation there was no-
'iurg remarkable reqarding the de-
s.gn of the sGrW 34. Much of the re-
spect it gained as a weapon should
instead have gone to the thorouqh
iraining and efficiency of the men who
used it, for throughout the war the Ger-
man mortar crews seemed always to
have an edge over their rivals. They
became experts at getting their sGrW
34s rr and out of action rapidly and by
careful use of plottlng boards and
other fire-control a:ds, they were able
to obtain maximum accuracy from
theLr fire.
The sGrW 34 was strarqhtforward in
design and very well made. It was con-
sequently very robust and could be
broken down into three loads for man-
pack carrying; more men had to carry
the ammunition, A special version ex-
isted for use from SdKfz 250/7 half-
tracks, Severai centres were con-
The shape of theS-cm sGrW 34 bomb canbeclearly seenhere asitisfte/d
redy tor 1o adinginto the mu z zle. The bomb weighed 3. 5 kg (7.7 2 lb) and
M multiple tail frns to provide stability in tlight. The layer is making fine
tr'arerse adlus tnents using the simple sight mounted on the bipod.
Infantry Support Weapons of World War II
cerned with productron of the weapon, The German 9-cm sGrW 34
and even more were involved in mak- was greatly respected by
ing the ammunition for the range of the Allies,who came to
bombs that could be fired ftom the fear its accuracy and rapid
sGrW 34 was wlde. There were the rate offire, but itwas not
usual HE and smoke bombs, but ia- an outstanding design and
novations included iliuminating and muchof thepraiseit
target,marking bombs for use in asso- earned was mainly due to
ciatioh with ground-attack aircraft. the careful and thorough
There, was even a special 'bouncing trainingof the mortat
bomU.'known as the B-cm Wurfgrranate cfews.
39 that was pushed back up into the air
after ithad struck the gnound. Thrs was
done:using a tiny rocket motor, and at a
ploded to scatter its fragrments over a
much,wider area than would be the
case.wrth a conventional ground-
detonated bomb, Again, this was a
typical German weapon innovation
that was really too expensrve and un-
reliable for greneral use and the num-
bers produced were never large, One
extra bonus for the sGrW 34 was that it
could:'fire a wide range of captured
ammunition, although usually wrth
some loss ia ranqe performance,
For airborne use a special shor-
tened version of the sGrW 34 was de-
veloped rn 1940. This was the kurzer
Granatwerfer 42, usually known as the
Stummelwerfer, This was issued in
quantity from about 1942 onwards, but
saw little use by airborne forces and
instead became a replacement for the
little S-cm leGrW 36, It fired the same
ammunition variety as the sGrW 34 but
the range was reduced by more than
ha1f.
Specification
sGrW34 Elevation: +40'to +90'
Calibre: BI.4 mm (3.2 in) Traverse: 9' to 15" variable with
Lengths: barrel 1, 143 m (45 rn); bore elevation
I,033 m (40,67 in) Maximum range: 2400 m (2,625 yards)
Weight: in action 56.7 kg (125 lb) Bomb weight: 3.5 ks (7 72 lb)
Right: A German army 9-cm sGrW 34
crew. The pear-shaped bomb is
beingintroduced into themuzzle to
fall down onto the tked firing pin to
fire the propellingcharge and
propel the bomb to a maximum
range of 2400 m (2,625 yards).
Below: A propaganda photogrraph of
an8-cm sGrW 34in action, clearly
showing the elevation, traverse and
levelling controls on the bipod. The
crew member on the right is holding
the bipod toprovide anextra
measure of stability onfiring.
re! TIH;* leichte Infantrieseschtit z rB
One of the many tactical lessons
leamed by the German army during
World War I was that each infantry
battahon should have a measure of
artil1ery support available to it at all
times. This led to the introduction of
light infantry guns to each infantry
battalion, and it was appreclated that
special llght gmns would be particular-
ly useful for the role. Thus during the
l92Os one of the flrst priorities of the
then severely-restricted German
weapons rndustry was the develop-
ment of a light inlantry gmn, or leichte
Infantriegeschiitz. A 75-mm (2.95-in)
design was produced by Rheinmetall-
Borsiq as early as 1927 and was issued
for service in 1932, It was usually
lrrown as the 7.5-cm leIG 18, or 7.5-cm
leichte Infantriegeschiitz 18.
The first examples had wooden-
spoked wheels. while later versions
rntended for use by motorized forma-
tions had metal disc wheels with rub-
ber tyres. The lelG l8'had an unusual
breech-loading mechanism: operating
a lever opened not the breech but in-
stead moved the entire barrel section
upwards in a square shpper to expose
the loading chamber. This system was
yet another example of German de-
sigm rnnovation simply for its ovm sake,
for the mechanism offered no real
advantage over conventional systems
of the period, and has been used in no
artillery design srnce, The rest of the
gun was orthodox enough, and in ac-
tion it proved to be sturdy and reliable
although hanng only a limited range,
as a result mainly of the short barrel, In
common with most other artrllery de-
signs of the period, the leIG lB was
supposed to have an anti-tank capabil-
ity usrng a hollow-charqre warhead
projectile, but this was not very effec-
tive and was little used.
There were two variants of the basic
lelG 18, One was a version specrally
developed for use by mountain war-
fare units and known as the leichte
Gebirgs Infantriegeschi.itz 18 or leGe-
bIG l8 (iight mountain infantry gnrn
model 1B), This was developed from
1935 onwards and was basically an
ordrnary lelG 1B that could be broken
down into l0 loads for pack transport
on mu-les or light vehicles, To save
weight the ordinary box trail was re-
placed by tubular steel trail legs, and
EI THi* schwere Infantrieseschiit z g3
Mlnen the German army issued its tn-
fantry gmn requirements during the
eariy 1920s, two types ofweapon were
requested. One was to be a 75-mm
(2,95-rn) gun and the other a l5-cm
(5.87-rn) howitzer to act as a heavier
ccLnterpart to the light gnrn, Deveiop-
nent of this heavy weapon com-
nenced in 1927 at a leisurely pace, so
-irat it was not finally approved for ser-
-;ce r.rntii 1933, Even then it was 1936
before the f,rst examples came oil the
crcduchon lines and they were then
-ssaed at the rate oftwo to each infantry
c.atta-lion,
To confr-:se matters somewhat this
-:-cm howitzer was actually desig-
:::ed as a gn-n, i,e. I5-cm schwere In-
fanrriegeschiitz 33 or lS-cm sIG 33 (15-
::::eavy mfantry gnrn model 1933), It
r.s cieflnitely a howitzer, however,
,----r a shorr barrel set on a heavy box-
:--lei camaqe, Early examples had
:::s<ed steel wheels with metal rims
the shield became an optional extra.
The leGebIG lB turned out to be
heavier than the original but the pack
load feature made it much more suit-
able for its intended role. It was meant
to be a temporary measure for the
mountain warfare units until pwpose-
burlt mountain guns could be de-
veloped and produced, but in the
event those produced remained in
sewice until the war ended,
There was also a special versiori of
the lelG IB developed for airborne
forces and known as the 7.5-cm leIG
l8F, the F indicating Fallschirmjdger,
or parachutist, This could also be
broken down into loads, but this time
only four for paradropping in special
containers. This version had small met-
al wheels, no shield and tubular trail
legs. Only sx were produced as by the
time they were ready thef intended
role had been assumed by the recoil-
less gmn,
Specification
leIG 18
Calibre: 75 mm (2,95 in)
Lengths: gnrnoverall 0,9 m (35.43 in);
barrel 0,884 m (34.8 in)
Weight: in action 400 kg (BB2 lb)
for horse traction, but later examples
intended for use with the motorized
formations had wheels with rubber
rims, Once again Rheinmetall-Bdrsiql
was responsible for the basic desigm
(although production was carried out
by several other manufacturers), and
for once no gimmicks were intro-
duced, the design of the siG 33 beingr
straightlorward and orthodox. If any-
thing it was too orthodox for the infan-
try gunners, for the adherence to stan-
dard design meant that the slG 33 was
really too heavy for the tnfantry role. It
required a large horse team to drag
the weapon, and once the slG 33 was
emplaced it was a slow and hard task
to move it out, Some attempts were
made before 1939 to ltqhten the heavy
carriage by the use oflight alloys, but
these were in overall short supply and
earmarked for the Luftwaffe so the
heavy desigrn had to be tolerated,
Throughout the war most sIG 33s
A 7.5-cm lelG 18 is loaded, an unusual procedure where operation of the
breech lever raised the rear end of the harrel upwards in a slipper to expose
the chamber; the breech hlockremained fixed. This gun has spoked wheels
for horse traction, while later models had metal wheels with rubber tyres.
Elevation: - 10" to + 73"
12"
Traverse: Thecrewof a7.1-cmlelG 18in
Muzzle velocity: 210 m (689 ft) per training during early 1940. Note the
second relatively small size of the round
Maximumrarge:3550 m (3,BB2yards) beinghanded totheloadeL and the
Projectile weight: HE 5,45 kg or 6 kg way one crew member is kneeling on
(12or13,21b);hollowcharge3kg theendofthetrailtoprouideextra
(6,6 lb) weight for stability on tiring.
jectiles. In use these proved to be less
were towed by horse teams, although
trucks or halftracks were used than flrl1y effective, for even a normal
whenever possible. Even with a trac- 150-mm HE shell stnlong a tank could
tor rt was still a job to handle the be effective and a lot less trouble to
weapon in action, and it was not until manuiacture and issue, But for really
the sIG 33 was placed upon a tracked strong targets the slG 33 could fire a
self-propeiled chassis that the weapon muzzle{oaded stick bomb known as a
could give its fuIl poteritial. It was then Stielgrranate 42, Thrs had only a short
much more appreciated as a powerfirl range and was gnrided by fils towards
support weapon flring a wide array of its tarqet, which was usually a block-
projectiles, Most of the tracked chassis house, bunker or some other strong-
used for the self-propelled role were point.
old tank chassis that were no longet
large or powerful enough for Specification
armoured warfare; in fact the very first sIG33
attempt to mount asIG 33 on a PzKpfw I Calibre:149, I mm (5,87 in)
hull resulted in the very first German barrel i.65 m (64.9 in)
Lengrth:
self-propelled artilIery weapon, and Weight:inaction U50 kg(3,BSB lb)
this was used during the 1940 cam- Elevation: 0" to *73'
pargn in France. Traverse: ll.5'
As with all other weapons of its era, Muzzle velocity: 240 m (787 ft) per
the sIG 33 was supposed to have an second
anti-tank capability and was accot- Maximum range: 4700 m (5, 140 yards)
dingly issued wrth hollow-charge pro- Proiectile weisht HE 38 kq (83.8 lb)
 The slG 33 in Action
In 19 17 the German army re-introduced light artillery to the infantry battalions,
significantly increasing their firepower and tactical flexibility. These battalion guns
were so successful that the post-war German armyordered a series of purpose-
built weapons which were to serve them well in World War II , although their
function was eventually usurped by heavy mortars.
During the years after World War 1 the small
qeneral staff of what was allowed to remain of
rhe German army carried out a great deal of
what is now termed tactical analysis, using the
mass of reports and other data collected durlng
ihe battles oi the 'Great War'. Out of these
patient siftings came many indications of future
iactlcs and of the direction weapon design
should follow, and in neariy every case some-
*,hing was done to implement these flndings,
One conclusion that was followed up was the
need for the infantry battalion to have its own
rrtegral artiliery fire support, the manpower to
handle these weapons coming from within the
battaiion itself. Thts would enable the infantry
battalion to supply some measweof its own fire
support outside that usually provided by artil-
1ery batteries, and with some measure of speed
of response that remote batteries could not
always supply.
TWo weapons were requested, One was a
75-mm (2.95-in) gnrn, while the otherwasto be a
heavier howitzer with an undetermined
calibre, At that period, in the wake of the Ver-
sarlies Treaty, the only armaments concern that
could deal with the request ryas Rheinmetall-
Borsiq AG of Diisseldorf, Krupp belng forbld-
den to produce small-calibre artilleryweapons
under the terms of the treaty, Rheinmetall de-
cided to produce an entirely orthodox howit-
zer, but as the size was still uncertain pro-
totypes were to be produced with calibres of
105 mm (4.14 in) 150 mm (actually I49 1 mm/
5 87 in) and 210 mm (8.27 in). Only the latter
I
I
I
two prototypes were actually made, and when
the staff planners saw the bulk and weight of
the intended weapons declded to go for the
I50-mm version,
That was in 1927, and production began at a
slow pace. This howitzer was not formally
accepted for service until 1933, and lt was 1936
before the troops actually laid their hands on
the first exampies, Much of thls delay was
caused by the priority glven to other weapon
programmes by the planners and by the fact
that there were some resewations regarding
the weight of the chosen deslgn. At one point
some consideration was given to the possibiirty
of a split-traii carriagte, but in the end the ori-
ginal box trail design was adopted, The
weapon was designated the l5-cm schwere
Infantriegeschiitz 33, or l5-cm slG 33.
The 15 cm sIG 33 was allocated to German
army infantry divisions, There they were
grouped together with the smaller 7,5-cm IG
18s in the infantry howitzer company, often
knov,n within the division as the 13th Company.
Within this company the 4th Platoon (or Zug)
was equipped wlth two slG 33s, The platoon
was commanded by a junior officer with five
NCOs in support, The firll piatoon complement
was 33 men, although this was not always
achieved and the numbers varied according to
whether the divrsion was mechanized or not.
Between them these 33 men formed the man-
power to operate the sIG 33s in action. If the
division was a horse-drawn formation (which
most of them were, especially when the slG 33
was first issued), each weapon was towed by a
team of six horses driven by three men, More
men sat on a limber that was used to connec:
the team to the weapon. Men not mth the
horses or the gmns were used to form a sma[
headquarters and fire-control section, whjle
the rest were scattered among the formatiors
they supported to radio or telephone back
target information, The latter were not always
necessary, for in some of the better-trained
divisions the infantry'could themselves pro-
duce fire orders and target data,
Once at the firingt position the horses were
led away to the rear. If the unit was mechanized
the type of tractor could vary widely. It was
supposed to be one of the various types of
halftrack tractors, but in practice these were in
such short supply that very often trucks had to
be used, The types and condition of some of
these could be quite variable, especially by
the end of 1941 when captured French and
Soviet equipment was ln widespread use, Ths
tractor equipment had to be kept quite close to
the firing position, not only to get the weapon
and the firing team out of action in a hurry if the
situation demanded lt, but in order for the crew
to keep a close eye on it anything left un-
attended on the battlefleld was likely to be
commandeered for some other purpose, The
tractor/truck also carried some of the ammuni-
tion, which was another reason flrr keeping it
close by the howitzer.
I |-cm sIG 33s of a motorized infantry unit are seen
in actionon the EasternFront.Thewheels of these
weapons have rubber tyres, denoting thatthey
weie towedby someform of mechanized tractor'
The standing soldier on the nearestgrun is holding
the propellantcharge caseready to load behind
the shell in the breech.
ls-cm schwere
lnfantriegeschult 33

The I S-cm slG 33 was produced in two main sewice versions, for horse-drawn traction (shown here) with
steel-rimmedmetalwheels or for mechanizedtractionwithrubber-tyredwheels' Both typeswere
othetwisesimilar andwerehighly efficient andbattle-worthyweapons thatprovedtobe tooheavyfor
their infantry role, as they were t6o bulky to be moved quickly under front-line conditions. In action t!e1
ha,d agoodi-angd GZOO'mtS,l4Tyards)iormostfire support.tasks, andfired auseful38'kg(83.9-lb)HE
shell, bowerful enough to destroy most battlefield strongpoints.
Infantry Support Weapons of World War II
sIG 33 in Action
In the eariy stages of Worid War II few of the
slG 33s were used by mechanized divisions, so
the horse was the usual method of traction,
Getting the slG 33 in and out of action was thus a
hard task, for the weapon usually had to be
manhandled over the final stages of positioning
which often requrred the labour of more than
the six-man team alone, But once in action the
slG 33 proved to be an excelient weapon.
Although labelled as a qLrn it was actuaily a
howltzer using a slx-charge propellant system
that could be varied (to suit the range and the
type of target) by producing dlrect or plunging
fire. The normal rate of flre was slow but
steadyr four rounds per minute was considered
the norm as the projectile and the charge case
had to be loaded by hand. The usual projectile
was an HE shell known as the In-fantrieGranate
33 or 38, the two differing only in detail. This
had a bursting charge of TNT or amatol
weighlng 8 29 kg (18 28 Ib), which was enough
to produce a really powerful burst and damage
even heavy structures. Smoke projectiles were
also fired and for anti-tank use there was a
hollow-charge projectile. However, the car-
riage of the slG 33 did not lend itself to anti-tank
warfare, so these hollow-charge warheads
were more often used against concrete struc-
hrres such as blockhouses or bunkers.
Attempted weight reduction
For atl its effectiveness the sIG 33 was really
too heavy for lts infantry-orientated roie, Va-
rious belated attempts were made to reduce
carriage weight by rncorporating some light
alloys, including the productlon of an allJight-
alloy carriage, but to no avail, It was 1939 be-
fore these weight-reductron projects were im-
plemented and by then the forthcoming war
shortages were already casting their shadows.
Aluminium and other slmilar iight metals were
raw materials that the German economy could
not supply iavishly, and all stocks were ear-
marked for the Luftwaffe. Thus the orlginal
steel carriage remained in production, though
with some small modifications as the war prog-
ressed, One change brought replacement of
P.ed Army soldiers examine apair of 15-cm slG 33 infantry howitzers, with the soldierin the background
a'teldng a rammer for some destructive purpose. Note the heavy carriage and large breech of the
a,eapoi in theforeground. Many of theseweaponswerelosttotheenemy, as theywere toodifficultto
_ :_
The crew of a 11-cm slG 33 undergoes training in 1938. The layer is adjusting the dial sight, while two
members of the crew prepare to traverse the heavy carriage using a lever over the trail spade (which is
notdugin, as itwould be in action).Thisweaponis fittedwith steel-rimmedwheels.
the origrnal steel-rimmed traction wheel type
by a llghter version, somettmes with wooden
spokes, but this had solid rubber tyres which
iightened the load but Ilttie,
It was only when the sIG 33 was placed upon
a self-propeiled carriage that its fuIl combat
potential could be achieved. Starting in 1940 all
manner of AFVs were used to carry the slG 33,
most of them conversions of captured vehicles
or German tank chassis that were no longer
being produced as battle tanks. In this way the
PzKpfw I, II and III all acted as slG 33 carrlers,
and the ex-Czech PzKpfw 38(t) chassis was
another that was used, Some of these conver-
sions were produced as standard models: the
slG 33 carriers from the PzKpfw 1l and PzKpfw
38(t) lines came into this cateEtory, Most of
those whrch used captured French tank chas-
sis were produced only in small numbers,
although one based on the Lorraine ammuni-
tion carrier chassis was bullt in iarge numbers
and became a'standard' German army vehicle.
Manpowerreduction
The use of self-propelled carriages for the
slG 33 also brought about a reduction in front-
line manpower requirements, and after 1943
this was an important consideration for the Ger-
man army. Men were stril needed to look after
the vehicles but the large numbers of men
previously required to lead and look after the
horses could now be used for other purposes.
But rt should be stressed that.many units re-
tained their horses until the very end of the war.
Many garrison and second-line units retained
their horses througrhout every layer of their
organizations and were consequently slow in
response and manoeuvre compared with the
mechanized formations.
But after 1943 the slG 33 was no longer such
an important weapon, Its usefulness had come
to be overshadowed by the rntroduction of 120-
mm (4,72-1n) Sovret mortars into the German
army. The effectiveness of these large mortars
had so rmpressed the Germans that they
promptly turned round any that they could cap-
ture and used them against their former own-
ers, The Germans then went one better and
started to produce drrect coples. These I20-
mm mortars were gradually issued to new units
in place of the slG 33 The mortars proved
to be much easier to handie, and their large
bombs were often only marginally less effec-
tive than the slG 33 projectiles. They were
also much cheaper and easier to produce, and
after 1943 that was important to the German
economy,
The slG 33 was one of the last true infantry
gn:ns, Since 1945 they have faded from the
tactical scene and the healry mortar reiqns
supreme in their place,
 SWEDEN
Bofors 75-mm Model 1934
The Bofors 75-mm Model 1934 was orr-
grinally designed by AB Bofors as a
mountain Enrn and was piaced on the
market in the 1920s. At that tlme the
artillery markets around the world
were awash wrth the swplus of World
War I, but there was a small demand
for specialized weapons and the
Bofors 75-mm (2.95-in) qun fell into this
category, As with all products from the
Bofors plant at Karlslcoga, the 75-mm
gunwasvery well made from the flnest
materials, and used a sound and well
considered design, And it was just
what was required by one European
nation, the Netherlands.
One would have thought that the iast
thing a nation as well endowed with flat
terrain as the Netherlands would have
wanted was a mountain gun, but the
Dutch needed the gun not for service
at home but away on the other side of
the world in the Dutch East Indies, At
that time the Netherlands maintained a
sizeable force of troops in the islands
that now make up much of Indonesia,
ard as the terrain is either very over-
grown or mountainous some form of
pack artillery was required, The
Bofors gun was apparently just what
was needed and a batch was duly ac-
quired. The Bofors gun could be
broken down lnto eight loads, carried
in special harnesses by mules, but for
normal towing a four-horse team was
'rsed wrth a further srx mules carrying
ammunition and other bits and pieces;
ihe gmnners themselves had to walk,
These guns were still in use when
World War Il reached the Pacific, and
,'.rith the Japanese invasion the qlrns
lad a briefperrod of action before fall-
l:el/etlrer/ands army used their BoforsTS-mm Model 1934 howitzers in the
i . i :n Easf /ndje s, where they were carried into action in pack load s c arried
:.; ": uies. lVole how brakes were applied to this carrier mule as it moved
::-,c':r a sleep s/ope carryingthewheels andpartof the carriage trails.
: -tiS
monars
ing into Japanese hands. Their new
masters used the gmns for their own
pwposes until the ammunition stocks
ran out, and by 1945 few were left.
Some of these Bofors 75-mm gnrns
were sold to Turkey in the years lead-
ing up to World War I1, but the main
customer was another unlikely client
for a mountain gun. This time the recr-
pient was Belgnum, for which a special
version was produced as the Canon de
75 moddle 1934, This time the qun was
for use by the Belgran troops based
along the borders in the Ardennes re-
gion, but as this area was reasonably
well provided with roads and tracks,
there was no need for the full pack
mrnate low-flyrng enemy aircraft at
night so that light anti-aircraft weapons
could deal with them; the round had
other uses as well,
From the M2 the Americans de-
veloped their 60-mm Mortar Ml9,
which can be regarded as the US
equivalent of the British Z-inch Mortar,
which it closely resembled. Not many
Ml9s were produced, and of these
most went to airborne formations,
The standard battalion mortar of the
US Army was another Brandt licence-
Infantry Support Weapons of World War II
transport facility, Instead the moddle
i934s were produced as 'one-piece'
weapons wlth the only feature de-
signed to save towing lenglh being a
section of the box trail that could be
folded upwards on tow, Unlike the
Dutch gmns, the Belgian models were
intended for towing by light tracked
tractors and were delivered with rub-
ber-tyred steel disc wheels.
The Belgian guns had little chance
to shine, for when the Germans in-
vaded in May 1940 they passed rapidly
through the regnon where these gnms
were based, Thus the Bofors gmns pas-
sed into German hands, but as the
numbers rnvolved were few the Ger-
ANetherlands army BoforsTS-mm (2.95-in)Model 1934 howitzer is ready ior
action in the D utch E as t I ndies dur ing I 9 4 L The J ap anes e army overw h e Lm ed,
thk Dutch colony during early 1942 and tookover many of these howitzers for
their own local use until the war ended.
built product, yet one more variation of
the mle 27l3i deslgn, The Americans
produced their version as the 8l-mm
Mortar M I, and with some slight altera-
trons to suit local production methods tt
was manu-factured throughout World
War II, One odd American piece of
equipment used with this weapon was
a small hand cart onto which the mortar
and rts ammunttion could be loaded,
TVro men were all that were required
to tow thrs handy little carrier, known
as the Hand Cart M6A 1. Other carners
The Bofors 75-mm Model I 934 was
purchased by anumber of nations i:
World W ar I I, including B elgnum an d
the Netherlands. The German annv
even purchased some during the
mid- 1930s for use as mountain gans.
The Model 1934 could be broken
down into a variety of pack loads. or
could be towed by alight tractor.
mans made no use of this 7.5-cm
Gebirgshaubitze 34 and the capru:-:
weapons were simply scrapped.
Specficatron
Model34
Calibre:75 mm (2.95 in)
Lengths: piece overall l.B m (70.87 ;-,
barrel 1.583 m (62,32 in)
Weight: in actron 928 kg (2,0461b)
Elevation: - l0' to + 50"
Traverse: B"
Muzzle velocity:455 m (1,493 ft) per
second
Maximumrange:9300 m (10, 171ya:c.
Projectile weight: 6.59 kg ( I 4.53 k l
included mu]es, for wlLic: a s:.=:--
harness set was densed ::. :=::.:::
the most universally useo -,','*- -:-: l.'
halftrack carrier foom ';:-:: -:.= -'.!-
mortarcouldbe fued v,-':-- -. i-- : - :
to dismount the weap:: 1: ,'. :j .-:
case on such vehrcles l-. -:.= :--:
Universal Carrier ft:- -;--.- -. . i j::-
vice lrfe lhe Ml rena-;.=t'.-.- -:. --
chanqed, A specral l-=:::- -.- ..-..-
tube was densed r- -:---'r--- -:--. -
but rt was Ltile Lse: :-.r .. .r: -
shonened versLon r.:.'.:. -. := l.-l
USmortars (continued)
Universal' and of which much was ex-
pecied, was not accepted for service
on a large scale,
Perhaps the best known of a1l World
War Il American mofiars was the 4.2-
inch Chemical Mortar, the marn reason
for its fame probably being that it is still
ir service with the US fumy, As with its
Bntrsh counterpart, it was devrsed to
be a mortar firing smoke projectiles
(hence the Chemical Mortar desigma-
tron), but it was not long before it was
realized that HE bombs would be very
efective as well. It was a cumbersome
and large weapon with a massive and
heavy baseplate (that was later re-
piaced by much [ghter desierns), and
the barrel was rifled to fire bombs that
closely resembled conventional artil-
1ery projectrles, The rifling made the
4,2-rnch Chemrcal Mortar very accu-
rate, and the projectiles were much
heavier than their smooth-bore
equivalents. In action they were often
used as infantry support weapons, but
many were issued to smoke screen
units. The one major drawback to the
4.2-inch Chemical Mortar was rts
weight and bulk, It was not an easy
weapon to deploy and to overcome
thrs various self-propelled carriages
were devised for it.
Specification
M2
fb-** Pack Howitzer
=
In the aftermath of World War I the
1920 Westervelt Board recommended
the desigm of a new 75-mm (2.95-in)
hght howrtzer for use in mountain war-
fare and as a general-issue pack howit-
zer. This was one of the proposals that
was actually pursued at the time, for by
1927 the 75-mm Pack Howitzer Ml had
been standardized; some later pro-
duction chanqes altered the desiqna-
tion to the MIAI. The howitzer was
mounted on a camage of ingeruous
desigm that could be easily broken
down into sx loads, and the box trail
was perforated to save weight, The
howitzer itself could be broken down
for pack transport, and was so
arranged that the barrel was held in a
trough and kept in place by a cover
along the top: this gave the weapon a
dishnctive appearance. Traverse was
effected using a screw mechanism
directly on the axle, so the cradle had
to carry only the elevation mechanism,
The first MlAls were mounted on
the Carriage Ml, which was lntended
tbr animai traction and so had wooden-
spoked wheels, The lntroduction of
necharuzed tractlon 1ed to the adop-
ron of the Carriage MB, which used
r,rbber-tyred metal wheels, This little
:cwitzer became one of the first Allied
arbome artillery weapons, for it was
-ssued to nearly every Allied airborne
::rmation, including the Bntish air-
b:me divisions, But rt should not be
that the Ml carriage went out
=cught
:i ashion: many were produced dur-
-:g World War II for issue to Allied
::raies such as the Chinese, who used
howiEer in some numbers.
=eOn either carriage the little MlAl
r';- a popular and very useful weapon.
-: ;ras a thoroughly modern design,
=-d. i:: acton it was easy to sewe and
be used to provide fire support
=ld
1: ralges up to 8925 m (9,760 yards),
lo,sllite its light weight some conver-
TheAmerican60-mm
MortarMI9wasa
muchsimplified
ve$ionof the60-mm
Mortar M2, and used a
simple baseplate and
no bipod. Itwas used
mainly byAnterican
airborneforces andby
a few infantry units, but
its effective rangewas
onlyaboutS20 m(350
yards) and itwas not
very accurate, being
hand-held.
Calibre: 60 mm (2,38 ln) Above: A 4.2-in Chemical Mortar is
Lengrth: barrel 0,726 m (28.6 in) seen in action on Arundel Island
Weight: in action 19,05 kg (42 ]b) during the Solomons campaign. Note
Elevation: +40'to +85' the stackof bombsfor thismortar
Traverse: 14" and how the shape resembles that of
Ma:<imum range: lB 15 m ( 1,985 yards) a conventional artillery proj ectile.
Bombweight: I 36 kg(3 1b)
MI ChemicalMortar
Calibre: B 1.4 mm (3.2 in) Calibre: 106,7 mm (4.2 in)
Lengrth:barrel 1,257 m (49,5 in) Lengrth:barrel I.019 m (40, i in)
Weight: in action 6 1.7 kg ( 136 lb) Weight: in action 149,7 kg (330 lb)
Eleyation: +40"to +85" Elevation: +45'to +59'
Traverse: l4o Traverse:7o
Maximum range: 3008 m (3,290 yards) Maximum range: 4023 m (4,400 yards)
Bomb weight: 3, 12 kq (6.87 ]b) Bombweight: 14,5 ks (32 lb)
MIAI
The 75-mm (2.95-in) Pack Howitzer M I A I on Carriage MB
was one of the Al,fies'mosf successful light weapons of the
type. I t was a pack howitzer that could be readily adapted
{or paradropping, andwasused by bothBritish and
American airborne units in I 944 and I 945 . Some are still
inusetothkday.
slons to the self-propelled role were
made (some being mounted on half-
tracks) and it was just as successful in
that role. One role for which the MlAl
was not much used appears to be
mountain warfare, There were few
campargns where mountain warfare
was necessary for the Allies, v,rth the
possibie exception of that in YuQtosia-
via, There partisan troops were
trained in the use of the MlAl by Brit-
ish oftcers, and the partisans appear to
have made good use of them during
the latter staqes of therr war of self-
liberation.
It was as one of the first Allied ar-
borne artrllery pieces that the MlAl
will probably be best remembered, It
was used at Arnhem when some were
landed from General Aircraft Hamilcar for mountain warfare were instead A US Army light howitzer hattery
giiders, but the howitzer could aiso be used in the flooded flatlands of the trains with a 75-mm (2.95-in) Pack
broken dovm into ntne loads for para- Scheldt estuary. Howitzer, attired in an odd unitorm
dropping, intended for use by expeditionary
Not ali MlAls had suchan adventur- forces in tropical climates. Dating
ous life, Many were used simply as from ] 936, this howitzer has early-
infantry support weapons or as pack Calibre:75 mm (2,95 rn) p attern M 8 carriage spoked wheels.
artillery in the dense jungles of the Far Lengrths: piece 1,321 m (52 in); barrel
East, The MlAl was light enough to 1.194 m (47 in) Muzzle velocity: maxmum 3Bl m
take part in the initial stages of ampht- Weight: complete 587.9 kg (1,296 lb) (1,250 ft) per second
bious assaults such as that on Wai- Elevation: -5'to +45' Maximum range:8925 m (9,760 yards)
cheren in 1944, when howitzers meant Traverse:6' Projec{ile weight: 6, 24 I kg ( 13, 76 Ib)
 TheBattle ol Kohima Below: In order to takeKohima, itwas essential
The war in Burma, fought in sodden rain forests, precipitous mountains and that the Japanese take Imphal quickly for use as a
torrentialrivers,wasunlike anyof theother campaignsof WorldWar II.Theepic supply base. However, 4 Corps held out,
preventing the concentration of J apanese forces
struggles of the XIV Army to defeat the Japanese ){V army are epitomized by the aroundKohima.These troops from the 23rd Indian
battleforKohima. Division are attacking Nungshigum, north of
Imphal.

I fought at Kohima!'
There can be few men alive today who can
nake this claim, lor the bones of many rest r$Si* ?
liere still and the health of the majority who
hved to reach home must have been affected 'U
by their ordeal; but whoever they are and It
whether their skin be white, brown or yellow
Jrey should be accorded respect, for they *I
lived through a conflict comparable only with H
Stalingrad or Cassino in World War II or with *i
Mort Homme at Verdun in World War L It was a
fight to the death,
The events which led to the battle began on
tJre night of 7 March 1944 when ]:ieutenant-
General R, Mutaguchi, commanding the
Japanese l5th Army, launched Operation 'U-
Go', throwing his divisions across the Chindwin
river in an attack somewhat grandiloquently
Cubbed 'The March on Delhi'. The first stage of
ihis was to be the isolation and then capture of
'jre vast stores and administration centre which
-ie British had built up at Imphal,
Chindwincrossing
Diversionary attacks were launched to the
south of Imphal, but apart from the main assault
cn the depot the most important step was the
nove by the 3lst Division under Lieutenant-
3eneral K. Sato, which crossed the Chindwin
rn 15 March and drove towards the small set- the settlement. Some idea of the size of his task (streaming back from forward positions where
jement of Kohima wlth its Naga village, its is revealed by the fact that although the dis- they had been both observrng and attemptingr
:natdan on which the detachment of Assam tance on the map was only 120 km (75 miles), to delay Sato's advance) and the farthful, tena-
Lrlles drilled, its rernforcement camp in which his men had actually to march nearly 320 km cious and extraordinarily couragteous Naga
soldiers returning from leave or hospital awa- (200 miles) their weapons, ammunition and villagers, One vrtal British formatron of whici
-:ed their next move forward, its District Com- supplies belng carried on muies, elephants the first Japanese arrivals remained for some
bungalow with its terraced garden and oxen, of which the first and last categories time in ignorance, however, was a battery c:
=:ssioner's
rnd tennrs court, and its vital tactical position were regarded as meat on the hoof. It is a 3.7-rn (94-mm) howitzers sited on the reverse
:cmmanding the only road along which British tribute to the Japanese soldrers and their com- slope of a hill at Jotsoma 3 2 km ( 2 miles) to the
:einforcements and supplies could reach Im- mander that their forward units reached the west of Kohima, manned by Indian gunners c-
;ra1 from the rallheads ln Manipur. northern outsklrts of Kohima at 04.00 on the
Sato's orders, to be carrred out with the morning of 5 Aprrl. The Naga village on Kohima ridge was captured
::nost haste, were to drive his infantry batta- They found facing them a hastily-organized during theJapanese offensive in early April, and
-:rs and their accompanying gnrns of the 3lst defence perimeter manned at that moment by retaken by the |th Brigade ofthe 2nd British
l,lcuntain Artrllery Regiment in three columns some I,500 men, mostly of the 4th Royal West Division during the encircling operation a month
=:ross the countryside between the river and Kents augmented by men of the Assam Rifles later.

&
-th.e
Battle of Kohima

:e 161st Indian Bngade, of whrch the 4th oithe stubborn infantry defence, arded by asto- Kents, the survivors of the Assam Rifles and
l-rueen's Own Royal West Kents were one nishingly accurate frre from the howitzers at those of the composite companres formed from
r,aliahon and the l/]st Punjabis and the 4/7th Jotsoma, whlch broke up their formations as the reinforcement depot dragged themseives
i.alputs the other two, These battalions were soon as they assembled accompanied the out through the grisiy evidence of their ordeals
:r.vrnQt down from Dimapur to join the de waves all the way forward to the defences, and and the men of the Royal Berkshire Regiment
-3nce liarrred the survivors as soon as they were and the Durham Lrght Infantry took their
Withrn hours
-:panese of arrrval the men cf the ordered back places,
SBth Regrment were givrng proof of But the battle was by no means over. On the
.ierr ferocity, anrl the Royal West Kents of their British delay Britrsh srde, brgades of the Znd Division were
s:ubbornness, The Japanese swept around And on the followrng day reinforcements for pouring down the road lrom Dimapur, while on
l.rhrma from the Naga village to jarl Hrl] and on the hard-pressed Brltrsh got through to jotsoma the Japanese side more and more of Sato's 3lst
.:re nrght of 6 April, strengthened as more of and began planning to blast their way through Divisron were being deployed, and as there
.:rerr compatriots arrived, succeeded in taking the last 3.2km (2 miles) Thrs was to prove was physrcally not enough room in the Kohima
',','r rnore of the features insrde the defence appalhnqiy difflcult and a necessary delay of24 area ior two whole di;isrons to operate encrr.c
:.nneter known as D,l,S, and F.S.D But their hours almost fatal, for durrng that night the ling moves were attempted by both sides
.::acking units were annihrlated on the next Japanese blasted F,S.D. wtth every shell and through the appaliinqly difficult country around
::rrining by the counterattack of the Royal mortar bomb their weapons could frre; the Kohima, This was such that a rate of movement
"iest Kents, perimeter began to dtstntegrate, the f S.D. of 1.6 km (1 mile) per day against no enemy
Ilorlrever, by nornr more and more of Sato s positron and neighbouring Kukri Piquet rvas opposition came to be accepted as the norm
.- O in'an ry and rhen gunners were coming lost, and when on 27 Aprrl rain began falling wrth a
--c and he himself was conficlent of success 1B Aprtl, the British at Jotsoma
But at 08.00 on werght and ferocity vrhich none of the troops on
',',.hin 48 hours though seven days later this and the surrounding area repheC with a devas- either side had ever experienced before,
:::fl.ience was waning. On the night of 13 tating bombardment of the same krnd and movement became aimost impossible and di-
:-pril massed attacks by wave after wave of under its protection the rehef of the onginal arrhoea and dysentery took an even greater
:ieering assault troops foundered on the rock garrison was carried out The Royal West toll than bullets and shrapnel.
And all the trme, on the central Kohima
'lheJapanesepridedthemseivesontheferociousnessoflJrejrinfantryassaults,butinthefaceoftough Ridge the kernel of the battle was belng
'..lrposifjon theirfanaticalaflacksledloseverecasualties.Herethejapanesecftargeftasalmostoverruna fought The Durhams fought off an attack on
irittsh position at Kahima. Such assaults were aften only halted at point-blank range, and, in"the savage
Garrison Hill which cost SAto such hlgh casual-
:iose-quarter fighting which followed, grenades, sub-machine guns and even bayonets and entrenching ties that he orclered a cessaiion of nigftt attacks,
',:.:ols hecame the primeweapons.

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 trnfantrySupport Weapons of World //a: i.

ind he sent a caustic signal to Mutuguchi com-

ciairring of the time the latter was taking to
lapture Imphal, and also of the total lack of
support or supplies coming through to hrm at
Kohlma.
Reinforcernents
Now it was becoming a battle of logrstrcs,
tnd the British were winning it, only were ItJot
supphes flowing down from Dimapur, but also
nore mountain artrllery, and even mobile arttl-
-eryrntheformof tanks, Andbythe endof April 'I ..
I
,:i.,3: lrtrri,
.r;e 2nd Dorseishires had been-rn frghting their
,vay inio Kohima towards the District Commts- -j3sq.
s.oner's bungalo'w, and reached the edge of
.he tennis court, This now became tlre scene of :-*: :,
ir almost Pyrrhic conflict &". l.4i*iil*aa
The opposing forces were separated by less
'tan 22 m (25 yards), but the Japanese had got
.rere earlier and, great diggers always, had
:urrovred deep into the terrace whlch rose at
.ne far end, and also under a big water-tank
.','hich dominated the area, No one could move
:.cross the open area in daylight, and Dimapur
::ores were astonished by the continual de-
:rands for gym shoes for nrght patrollingl But
.rcugh these proved effective, the battle drag-
,red on wrth ever-increasing ferocrty, and it
.'.'as not until the middle of May, when a single
.arLk managed the tortuous route up the Dtstrtct
lcmmrssioner's dririe and began blasttng the
'rpanese
bunkers, that the British could claim
--,.en 'the first set'. ABritish machine-gun enjoys a commanding
pcssition overlooking a Burmese hill village.
Clearings could be open killing graunds in the
early stages of a jungle battle, but after prolonge':
action large areas offarestwere destrayed,
creating a shattered, alien landscape remintsce:.:
of the battlefields of WorldWar L
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The Battle of Kohima

Gurkhas in Burma man their 3-in mottar. Mortars

proved valuable in the jungle, the high trajectory
being an advantage when operating under the Like themortar, the infantry packgunprovedof value inBurma. Designed to be loaded onmulehack, on
canopy, as normal artillery would have very thegrounds thatanytvhere amancango amule canusuallyfollow (unlikewheeledor trackedvehicles),
restricted arcs offire. theJapaneseTS-mm infantry gun had arangeof 7000 m (7,650yards).

But more tanks arrived (of l49th RAC) and his radio and ordered his men to retire. livrng on grass and roots, therr clothing and
more infantry; and during May the men of the Thls the Japanese soldiers reluctantly did, boots in tatters, using canes or their broken
Manchesters, the Royal Scots, the Royai Nor- desperately fighting off the clutches of the now rifles as crutches, is an epic of endurance and
:clks, the Worcesters, the Queen's Own all-encircling British and firing off the last of courage whrch no soldier will ever decry, cer-
3ameron Highlanders and the Royal Welch therr mortar bombs and shells, And the story of tainly not the equally valorous men who fought
:,,:sriiers came up to help the men already in their aqonizing walk back to the Chlndwin, them,
Kchrma, amid their ordeal of shell and bomb-
i:'.irst and the incessant chatter of rifle and
:rachine-gnrn, facrng the almost unbeltevable
-ravery and ferocity of the Japanese soldiers.
Nothing was coming up for them: Muta-
T:chi's attack on Imphal was biocked by the
garrison ihere, and far from sending help up to
Sa:o he had demanded the release to him of
:re of Sato's battalions, All Sato received dur-
::g the entire campaign were words of empty
encouraqtement, orders which he was unable
:-- obey and promises of victory at Imphal
',',-lch were never kept; and all the time hts
:::en were sacrificing their lives, for as usual
:-:ne ol them allowed themselves to be iaken
pnsoner and there was nothing for the wound-
ed io do but to dle; and Sato's strength was
:^ing.
By the end of May Sato knew that he could
:-:: take Kohima, and further sacrifice was
!,:urtJess. After an angry exchange of signals
'n-,n Mutagmchi, in one of which he pointed out
:at since crossing the Chindwin his force had
:::eived not a single bullet or grain of rice, let
=r::ie any reinforcements, he senl off his last
--;ry;rbe ('The tactical abillty of 15th Army
S:== lies below that of cadets.'), closed down
The eventual failure oftheJapanese offensive at
Kohima sealed thefate of theJapanese army in
Burma, andfromJune 1945 theywere
remorselessly pushed backby a triumphantXlV
fumy. Despiteits importance, the strugglefor
Burma has offen been overshadowed by events
nearer to home, earning the eventualuictors the
itJe of 'The Forgotten Army'.
 JAPAN
Infantry Support Weapons of World War'II
50-mm ligrht mortars
-here were tvuo main types of 50-mm
.-.97-in) mortar in service with the
_apanese army dunng World War IL
lcth of them could be regrarded more
:s gnenadeJaunchers than real mor-
:ars as they used projectiles that were
-i1le more than finned hand Qrrenades,
rd they were mainly used as squad
,';eapons for purely local support.
The first version to enter service was
-re Type I0, which entered service in
-921, It was a simple smooth-bore
,'reapon that fired its grenade by
reans of a trigger mechanism, An
adjustable gas vent was provided to
nve variations in range. The Type 10
:nginally fired HE grenades, but with
-re introduction of the later model it
,vas used more and more to fire
pyrotechnic grenades for target illu-
inination and similar purposes, The
nain drawback of the Type l0 was its
-lmited range, which was only some
-60 m (175 yards), a factor that gave
:rse to development of the second
',veapon in this class, the Type 89.
By 1941 the Type 89 had al1 but re-
placed the Type 10 in sewice and dif-
:ered from it in several respects, one
;eing that the barrel was rifled instead
:f smooth-bored. The other main
:hangre was the elimination of the pre-
',-ious gas vent system in favour of a
:lng pin that could be moved up and
jown the barrel: the higher the firrng
pin was up the barrel the shorter the
:esultant range. The Type 89 mortar
ired a new series of grenades to an The J apanese 50-mm ( L97-in)
:fective range of 650m (711 yards), G ren ade D ischar ger TTpe I 0 w as
,';hich was a substantlal increase over
-:at possible with the Type 10, Gre-
first produced in I 92 I and later :'
replaced by the improved TYpe 89. *rX
:.ades developed for the Type 89 in-
:luded the usual HE, smoke, signalling
:rd flares, Development of this
With a limited range ( 180 m/ 175
yards), it remained a light and handy
weapon that could fire a range of H E,
,1 g
-,';eaponreached the point where a smoke and llare grenades. ? -a'
,. I
:pecial version for use by airborne
rrops was produced. Normally both ing against a leg would result in im-
:-e Type 10 and Type 89 could be mediate injury, The recorl of these little
:-smantled for carrying in a special weapons was considerable and the over a shoulder while still carrying a How not to do it. For some reason the
-:ather case, baseplate had to be held against the normal load and the resultant increase Americans decided that the small
The main version encountered by ground or something really substan- in squad firepower was appreciable, spadebasep/a te oI theJapanese
---: Allies was the Type 89. Somehow, tia1, Aiming was rudimentary for there especially when using the longer- grenade dischargers enabled a
:-: word spread among the Allies that were no sigthts other than a hne range Type 89, soldier to fire them from the thigh or
--.:se little mortars were 'knee' mortars marked on the barrel, but in a short knee (hence']<nee mortars'), but
=:1
j the name stuck, Exactly how many time almost any soldier could learn to Specification anyone attempting this inevitably
:-:ir:red thighs this completely mis- use the weapon fairly effectively, The Type 89 ended upwith a broken leg, for the
-=:drng nickname caused among un- mortar was light and handy in action, Calibre: 50 mm (1,97 in) recoil {orces were considerable.
::,:red users is now imposstble to de- but the grenade was somewhat on the Lengrths: overall 0,6 1 m (24 in); barrel
-=:::ne, but attemptlng to fire either of light side, What really mattered was 0,254 m (10 in) Maximum range: 650 m (71 1 yarci.-
::-ie mofiars with the baseplate rest- that any soldier could carry one slung Weight: 4.65 kg (I0,25 lb) Grenadeweight:0,79 kg(l 74 Ul

JAPAN

70-mm Battalion Gun Type 92

poned on cranked axles that could be
turned through 180' to lower the
silhouette of the gnrn when occasion
demanded, Although it was a small
weapon, the Type 92 required a crew
of 10 men, most of these being used for
manhandling or carrying the gmn and
actingt as ammunition suppliers. In ac-
tion the maximum number required
was only five,
The \pe 92 fired the usual HE pro-
jectiles alonq with smoke and shrapnel
for close-ranqe use agarnst personnel
rn the open There was also a rather
A team of Japanese Army gunners
tows aType 92 BattalionGun over
rough ground in the Aleutian Islands.
The team are using special towing
harnesses and ar e c ar rying wicker
back- p acks con taining ammunition
and spares for the gun. In action the
gun weighed only 2 I 2.47 kg (468 lb).

A
70-mm Battalion Gun Type 92 (continued)
-::effective armour-piercing projectile.
Itre maxrmum range was rather short,
being only some 2745 m (3,002 yards),
and the effective range was only about
ralfthat, but as the TYpe 92 had onlY
','ery srmple sights andwas rarelyused
agamst targets other than those clearly
visrlcle, thrs mattered but little in ac-
tron. The Tlpe 92 was certainly used
'well forward, Its drrect or plungnng fire
could be very effective, in both de-
ience and attack, and some Allied re-
ports speak of the Tlpe 92 being used
in the same manner as a mortar. One
operational method that was de-
veloped to a fine art by the Japanese
for the Tlpe 92 was harassing fire in
jrinqle warfare. A small team would
draq or carry the Type 92 forward, fire
off a few rounds at a known target and
then move hastily on to a new fire post-
hon or out of the area altogether. A
sngle gn:n could keep large bodies of
Allied soldiers awake and alert bY
such simple tactics.
Although labelled as a gmn, the Type
89 Lrsed a variable propellant charge
system and could be flred in the upper
register (i.e, above an elevation angJle
of 45') to drop projectiles onto targets
as close as 100 m (109 yards) away, On
target the HE projectiles were very
destructive, and the shrapnel shell
often proved to be very efective in
breaking up massed infantry attacks
such as those sometimes used by the
E irfifni"t Brandt de 8I mm moddle
Even though the Stokes Mortar of
World War I estabhshed the overall
design shape and form of the modern
mortar, it was still a very rudimentary
weapon, The Stokes Modar was little
more than a prpe supported on a sim-
ple foame and sitting on a base plate to
take the recoil forces, The French
Brandt company changed all that in the
years alter World War I by a carefui
redesign and drastrc improvement in
the type of bomb flred. At first sight the
Brandt-inspired modifications were
difrcult to detect for the overall form of
the Stokes design remained, but the
urprovements were there neverthe-
less, One of the first was that the new
Brandt mode1, introduced as the Mor-
tier Brandt de 8I mm modele 27 in 1927
and updated again in 1931 as the mod-
dle27/37 to take advantage of ammuni-
ion improvements, was in the overall
handrness of the weapon,
Settingup the orignal Stokes Mortar
cften took time, but the redesignof the
Brandt bipod was such that it could be
set up on any piece of gnound; the
levellmg of the sights was easily car-
ied out by the bipod leg destgn, on
-r;luch only one leg needed to be ad-
'.xted, The sights were clamped to a
position close to the muzzle, one that
-,r;as convenient for the layer to peer
trough wrthout having to stand over
::re weapon, and slight changes of
laverse were easrly made using a gtood enough to be used tn its manY
s:lew mechanism on the sight brack-
3: But the main changes carne with the
:::rnunition, The early grrenades ofthe
S::kes Mortar were replaced by well-
s:aoed bombs that not only carried
::::ie explosive payload but had a
:::-:ch grreater range, In fact Brandt
p::duced a wide range of morlar
i.::::os for its mle 26131, but they fell
:::: three marn brackets, First there
:.;:s cne v'rth an HE payload, and this
The little J apanese 70-mm (2.7 56-in) B attalion Gun T'ype 92 looked rather odd,
but it was a highly successful weapon that combined mobility with firepower .
I t could be use d to provide direct or indirect fire, and it cou ld be easily
manhandled by a team of men.
Chinese army. There was even a ver- tion to its size, range and projectile Weight: in actron 212,47 kq (468,4 lb)
sion ofthe TYpe 89 developed for use weight, Many are still prized as Elevation: - 10" to +50"
in some experimental tanks, but only a museum pleces. Traverse:90'
few of these (known as the Type 94) Muzzle velocity: i9B m (650 ft) per
were actually produced, Specification second
The Type 92 was a small arti1lery Type 92 Maximum range: about 2745 m (3,000
piece but it often had an eflect on its Calibre: 70 mm (2,756 in) yards)
enemies that was quite out of propor- Length: barrel 0 .622 m (24.5 in) Projectile weight: HE 3.795 kq (8.37 lb)
27/gl
The F rench B randt I 1 -mm ( actu
.4-mm/3.2-in) moddle 27/31 was
81
one of the most influential mortar
ally
was used as the standard bomb. Then designs ofils gen eration; many
there was a bomb that was hvrce the WorldWar II morfarssucfi as fftose
werght ofthe standard, but which had a used in America and Germany were
shorter range. The third type of bomb greaily influenced by its overall
used was smoke, Within these three desigm. Several French versions
categtories came numerous marks and existed, but the 'classic' torm is
sub-marks; for instance various col- shownhere.
owed smokes were available,
The mle 2l/31 greatly influenced
mortar designs from the moment itwas
announced. Within a few years the mle
27l31 was being either licence-
produced or simply plagiarized all
over Europe and elsewhere, The mor-
tar's calibre, 81,4 mm (3,2 in), became
the virtual European calibre for infan-
try mortars and nearly every infantry
mortar in use during World War Il had
some feature or other derived from the
mle 27/BI, and many were direct
copies. This influence was wtde
enough to encompass the standard
mortars of Germany, the USA, the
Netherlands, China and even the
USSR. All of these nations made their
own alterations and innovations, but
the resultant weapons were all basr
cally the mle 27/3I at heart even if the
mle 26/31 was in its h.un derived from
the Stokes Mortar.
The Brandt influence suwives to thts
day, although the weapons ofthe cur-
rent generation of Bl-mm mortars out-
range the m1e 2716 l by a factor ofnear-
ly six, But the mle 27l3I was more than
forms throuethout World War Il and for
years after it.
Specification
MortierBrandt de 8 I mm mle 2713 I
Calibre: B 1,4 mm (3.2 in)
Lengths: barrel 1,2675 m (49.9 in); bore
1, 167 m (45,94 in) Elevation: +45" to +80' l9O0 m (2,078 yards); heavy bomb
Weights: rnaction 59,7 kg (131,6 lb); Traverse: B" to 12' variable wtth 1O0Om(1,094yards)
barrel20,7 ks (45,6 lb); bipod 18.5 kg elevation Bomb weight: standard 3.25 kg
(40.8 1b); base plate 20,5 kg (45,2 ]b) Maximum range: standard bomb (7.165 1b); heaw6.9 ks(15 2l]b)
Armed Forces of the World

WbrsclwPqct Pa,r,Z

Poland
.he independence of Poland was finally recognized
cy the Treaty oJ Versailles n 1 91 9, but just 20 years
ater invasion and conquest of the country by Ger
nany led to the outbreak of World War ll. The Ger-
-nan eastward advance of '1 939 was complemented
cy a Soviet westward advance. When the Soviet
Jnion finally entered World War ll Polish units were
'ormed to fight the Germans, although many Poles
rad escaped to the West soon after the German
nvasion of Poland to f ight with the French and Brit-
sh. After the end of the war none of the Poles who
1ad fought with the Western Allles were allowed to
o n the new Polish army, which was organized,
:rained and equipped alonq Soviet lines.
Today Poland is the home of the Soviet Northern
Group of Forces, compris ng an army HO and the
2Oth and 38th Tank Drvisions. ln time of war with
\ATO, Poland would play a vital role as most of the
'ernforcements {rom the Soviet Union would have
:o pass through the country to reach East Germany.
Poland has the largest armed forces in the War'
saw Pact other than those of the Soviet Union itself,
:nd the Polish forces are considered by many to be
:ne best, with considerable amounts of new equip-
nent issued in recent years.
The Polish armed forces have a total strength of
323,000, of whom 185,000 are conscripts. ln the
3rmy; air force and internal security forces con-
:cripts serve two years, whrle in the navy and spe-
: al services they serve three years. Reserves for
-re armed forces total some 500,000.
assault division (the 7th), three artrllery brigades, Poland is the largest of the Soviet Union's Warsaw
Polish Army one ariillery and three anti-tank regiments, four sur- Pact allies, and its armed forces use a mixture of
face-to-surface missile brigades with 'Scud' m s- Soviet and indigenous equipment. The 25I
Poland is divided into three mrlrtary districts
f,omerania, Silesia and Warsaw), and the army has I 22-mm selt-propelled gun seen here was
siles and one air-defence brigade. The last has introduced in the 1970s, being fitst observed at a
total strength of 210,000 officers and men, of seven regiments with 54-6 'Gainfuls' and two with
'
,', nom about 155,000 are conscripts. There are five SA-B'Geckos'.
Polish parade in July 1 974.

:,nk divisions (the 5th, 1Oth, .1 1rh, 16th and 20th),
: ght motorized rifle divisions (the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th,
:.r,91h,'1 2th and 1sth), one airborne division lthe
a:1, stationed near Czech border), one amphibious
Army equipment includes 3,400 T-54lT-55 MBTs,
100 or more T-72 MBTs, 100 or more PT-76 light
tanks, 800 FUG and BRDM-2 4x4 amphibious scout
cars, 800 BMP-1 MlCVs, and 2,500 0T-62 and OT-
64 armoured personnel carriers. Artil ery includes
150 1 52-mm (6-in) M 1937 gun/howitzers, 500 122-
mm (4.8-rn) D-30, M1938 and 2S1 howitzers (with
the last being self-propelled), 130 152-mm
tV 1943(D-1) howitzers, 250 multiple rocket-
launchers rncluding the 122-mm BM-21, 140-mm
(5.5-in) BM-l4 series, '140-mm WP-B and 240-mm
(9 45-in) BM-24. There is also a variety of anti-tank
guns and other older artillery held in reserve. Sur-
face-to-surface launchers consist of 36 for the
'Scud' and 51 for the FROG series; these can be
fitted wlth a variety of warheads, including tactical
nuclear in Soviet control. ATGWs include the AT-3
'Sagger', AT-4 'Spigot' and the old AT-1 'Snapper',
plus recoilless rifles and B5-mm (3.35-ln) D44 and
100-mm {3.9-rn) T-12 guns. Anti aircraft weapons
include SA-4 'Ganef', 54'6 'Gainful, SA-7 'Grail',
SA-B 'Gecko' and SA-9 'Gaskrn' sur{ace-to-air mis-
siies, plus 23-mmZU-23,57-mm 5-60, B5-mm KS-
'1
2 and 100 mm KS-'1 9 towed anti-aircraft guns, as
well as 23-mm ZSU-23-4 and 57-mm ZSU-57-2 self-
propelled anti-aircraft grns.

The Polish air force is equipped with nearly 700

combat aircraft organized along Soviet lines. Air
defence is still entrusted to about 350 late model
MiG-21s, seen here in natural metal finish- It is
believed that the first squadrons of their
replacements, MiG-2Ss, have recently become
operational.
Armed Forces of the World
The country is self-sufficient in small arms pro-
duction, and produced the Soviet T-55 MBT until
1982. lt is now tooling up to make the T-72 MBT.

Polish Air Force

The Polish air force has a total strength of 91,000
officers and men, of whom 30,000 are conscripts,
and has just under 700 combat aircraft. There are 1 1
air-defence squadrons with 400 Mikoyan-Gurevich
MiG-21 series fighters, 1B fighter/ground-attack
squadrons (12 with 150 MiG-l 5s, three with 35
Sukhoi Su-7s and three with 35 Su-20s), six recon-
naissance squadrons with the lViG-21RF, llyushin
ll-28 and LIM-6, two transport regiments with about
30 aircraft, and three helicopter regiments. The last
have '100 Mil Mi-2, 12 Mi-4,25 lVi-B and over 20
Mi-24 helicopters. There are also some 300 training
aircraft including the Polish-built TS-Bs and TS-1 1s.
For almost 20 years Poland has built the Mi-2 (NATO
reportrng name 'Hoplite') light helicopter for the Above: Although most of the I 60-strong force has Below: OT-62As of the Polish amphibious assault
home and export markets, and by 1985 is believed now beenreplaced bySukhoiSu-20s, some Su-ZBs division come ashore from a'Polnocny'class LCT
to have produced some 4,000 examples, of which still soldier on. I n keeping with Soviet military during an exercise on the Baltic coast. The 0T-62 is
perhaps half have been supplied to the Soviet Un- philosophy, the Polish air force r's seen as a tactical a Czech development of the Soviet BTR-50 and
force to augment army artillery. features a more powerful engine, and full NBC
o1 protection. Itentered Polish service in 1966.
-he Polish air force also controls three air-def ence
divisions, which have some nine SAM regiments
covering 50 sites with 400 launchers for SA-2
'Guideline' and SA-3'Goa' missiles.

Polish Navy
The Polish navy has a strength of 22,000 officers
and men, 5,000 of. them conscripts. Warships in-
clude four'Whiskey' class conventional sub-
marines, one 'SAM Kotlin' class AA destroyer, 13
'Osa l' fast attack craft (missile), five 'Obluze' class
oatrol craft, one 'Oksywie' class patrol craft, eight
'Modified Obluze'class large patrol craft, nine
'Gdansk' class large patrol craft, eight 'Wisla' class
torpedo boats,'14'Pilica' class patrol craft, 2l'KB'
class coastal patrol craft, 12 'Wisloka' class coast
patrol craft, 12 'Krogulec' class coastal minesweep-
ers, 12 'f -43' class ocean minesweepers, 23 'K B'
m nesweeping boats, 23 'Polnocny' class LCTs
cased on a Soviet design), three 'Marbut' LCMs
and 1 5 'Erchstaden' class LCPs. ln addition there are
rlany training ships, intellrgence craft, recovery
snips, survey craft and auxiliaries. Some of these
snips, such as the 'Wisloka', 'Gdansk' and 'K B'
-rits, are manned by the interior border troops. ters including Ml-2, Ml-4 and Mi-B types.
The navy also has some 2,000 men in coastal Para-milltary forces include the Citizens' Militia
Below: Polish infantry are armed with the PMK, a
leience and a similar number in naval aviation. The with a total strength of 350,000, lVinjstry of the Polish copy of the Soviet AK-47 assault rifle. Poland
3iter includes an attack regiment with three squad- lnterior Border Troops with a strength of 161,000 has also exported theweapon to Bulgaria. The
'ons of MiG-'l 7s, one reconnaissance squadron with and lnternal Defence Troops with a strength of PMK comes in both solid andfoldingbuttversions,
t,'i G-17s and ll-28s, and two squadrons of helicop- 58,000 officers and men. and differs litUe from the Soviet original.