Analysis
After The Constitutional Court Ruling:
Summary: As the dust begins to
settle in the aftermath of the con-
stitutional court’s surprise decision
not to ban the ruling Justice and
Development Party (AKP), the most
pressing question in the Turkish
capital, Ankara, is what impact it will
have on the country’s prime
minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Will the pragmatic Erdoğan, who
restored economic and political
stability during his first term in
office, reemerge? Or will the
confrontational Erdoğan, who
stubbornly refused to reach out
to his secular opponents after his
big win in the July 2007 election
prevail? The answer will largely
determine whether Turkey can put
the past year’s turbulence behind it
and move on.
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Whither Tayyip Erdoğan and the AKP?
by Amberin Zaman*
ANKARA — As the dust begins to settle
in the aftermath of the constitutional
court’s surprise decision not to ban the
ruling Justice and Development Party
(AKP), the most pressing question in the
Turkish capital, Ankara, is what impact
it will have on the country’s prime
minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Will the pragmatic Erdoğan, who
restored economic and political
stability during his first term in office,
reemerge? Or will the confrontational
Erdoğan, who stubbornly refused to
reach out to his secular opponents
after his big win in the July 2007
election (and thereby prompted the
latest crisis, some argue) prevail?
The answer will largely determine
whether Turkey can put the past year’s
turbulence behind it and move on.
Opinion is sharply divided. Here are
two potential scenarios.
The Chastened Erdoğan Scenario
Proponents of this scenario argue that
Erdoğan is a political chameleon who,
learning from past mistakes, has an
infinite capacity for improvisation
and reinvention. They point to his
earlier clash with the pro-secular
*
Amberin Zaman has been the Turkey correspondent for The Economist since 1999. She has also been a regular contributor to the
Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and the Daily Telegraph of London. The views expressed here are those of the author and
do not necessarily represent the views of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF).
establishment when he was elected
mayor of Istanbul in 1994 from
the overtly Islamist—and now
defunct—Welfare Party. An Islamic
cleric by training, Erdoğan was
stripped of his mayoral seat in 1997
and spent a brief stint in jail for
reciting a nationalist poem at a
public rally that was deemed to incite
religious hatred. It was a turning
point. A chastened Erdoğan ditched
the Islamists and founded the AKP in
2001, saying he no longer believed in
mixing religion with politics. When
the AKP romped to single rule in 2002,
Prime Minister Erdoğan vowed to lead
Turkey into the European Union, and
embarked on a blizzard of reforms
that shamed EU leaders into opening
membership talks with Turkey in 2005.
His transformation from Islamist
ideologue to pro-Western democrat
seemed nearly complete.
But then the increasingly confident
Erdoğan made a string of embarrassing
gaffes: he called Israel a “terrorist state,”
referred to Sunni militants in Iraq as
“martyrs,” and sought to criminalize
adultery. Faced with a public outcry
at home and criticism abroad, he then
backed down. Prime Minister Erdoğan
Analysis
became the first Islam-rooted prime minister to visit Israel.
With his blessing, Turkey became the principal hub for
non-combat materiel flown to
American troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. The adultery bill
was hastily scrapped. Optimists, therefore, have ample
justification to claim that Erdoğan does learn from his
mistakes.
In fact, some sources close to the AKP leader predict that
Erdoğan will make a fresh round of gestures to appease
his pro-secular opponents. He may begin by reshuffling
his cabinet. A likely casualty would be Huseyin Celik, the
controversial education minister who is accused of inserting
Islam into school textbooks. More importantly, Erdoğan
may reach out to the opposition when drafting a new
constitution to replace the authoritarian document drawn
up by the generals following the 1980 coup. His failure to
do so last year, when he floated a draft document, unleashed
the tensions that culminated in the prosecutor’s case to
outlaw the AKP.
Prime Minister Erdoğan’s statements in the wake of the
Constitutional Court’s decision suggest that he is ready
to espouse a more conciliatory stance. He promised
to remain faithful to secularism and to pursue EU
membership. Nothing new there. What is new, is Erdoğan
said he would take into account the court’s written opinion
about the AKP’s alleged anti-secular activities when
charting a fresh course. It is the closest he has come to
admitting a degree of responsibility for his party’s travails.
As one Western diplomat put it: “He’s gotten the message
that calming tensions is what is needed at this time.”
The Triumphal Erdoğan Scenario
Others aren’t so sure. They argue that Erdoğan is unlikely
to be tamed by his latest run-in with the pro-secular
establishment. In this view, the court’s decision will have only
reinforced the prime minister’s sense of invincibility. Sources
close to Erdoğan have long complained of an increasingly
authoritarian streak. The prime minister brooks no dissent,
they say, and scolds associates who dare to express it. He
rules the AKP with an iron fist.
2
“Prime Minister Erdoğan’s
statements in the wake of the
Constitutional Court’s decision
suggest that he is ready to espouse
a more conciliatory stance.”
The skeptics note Erdoğan had promised to reach out to
all Turks, “including those who didn’t vote for me,” during
his victory speech following the 2007 elections. Yet, he
failed to reassure his critics when he rammed through a
constitutional amendment earlier this year that would have
allowed girls to wear the Islamic headscarf at universities.
(The amendment was subsequently struck down by the
Constitutional Court.) Many on the secular side insist the
law should have included explicit provisions guaranteeing
the right of women to remain uncovered, if they so choose.
Should he opt to once again thumb his nose at the
secular establishment, Erdoğan may be emboldened by
the fact that not a single AKP lawmaker defected in the
face of the closure case against the party. A triumphal
Erdoğan may give in to the temptation to indulge his
more ideological impulses and reward his Islamist base for
sticking with him. Such a scenario, would pose great risk
for Turkey as it grapples with an economic slowdown, a
resurgent PKK, difficult negotiations with the European
Union, and a series of complex foreign policy problems
including Iraq, Cyprus, and Armenia.
Conclusion
Chastened or not, Erdoğan remains the only credible
political leader in Turkey today. Opinion polls consistently
suggest that he is vastly more popular than any of his
pro-secular rivals. Despite occasional statements that call
into question his commitment to secularism, there is no
real evidence that Erdoğan seeks to introduce Shariah
rule. Prime Minister Erdoğan’s excesses are best explained
Analysis
“Chastened or not, Erdoğan
remains on the only credible
political leader in Turkey today.”
by the lack of a credible opposition—secular or
otherwise—to the AKP. It is this absence of political
alternatives that encourages non-political actors, such as
the country’s hawkish generals, to fill the vacuum. Unless
the opposition comes up with fresh faces and, more
importantly, new ideas, they are bound to be trounced
yet again in mayoral elections scheduled to be held next
year. The AKP will thus emerge even stronger. Just how
this will effect Erdoğan’s behavior is anyone’s guess.
Amberin Zaman, Correspondent, The Economist
Amberin Zaman has been the Turkey correspondent for The Economist
since 1999. She has also been a regular contributor to the Washington
Post, the Los Angeles Times, and the Daily Telegraph of London.
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