(2) The second argument posited by petitioner is also without
NEGROS ORIENTAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE v. SECRETARY
OF DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
GR No. 143616 2001-05-09
Facts:
1. Employees of the petitioner organized themselves into a
local chapter of the Philippine Agricultural Commercial and
Industrial Workers' Union - Trade Union Congress of the
Philippines (PACIWU-TUCP).
2. The private respondent-union submitted its charter
certificate and supporting documents on the same date.
3. PACIWU-TUCP filed a petition for certification election on
behalf of the NORECO 1 chapter
4. PACIWU-TUCP alleged in its petition that it had created a
local chapter in NORECO 1 which had been duly reported to
the DOLE Regional Office. It was further averred therein that
NORECO 1 is an unorganized establishment
5. The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition;It appears in the
records of this Office that the petitioner has just applied for
registration. Accordingly, it has not yet acquired the status of
a legitimate labor organization.
6. The appellate court ruled that the said chapter is deemed
to have acquired legal personality as of December 4, 1997
upon submission of the documents required under the
Omnibus Rules for the creation of a local chapter.
Issues:
1. WON the respondent failed to appeal on time to the
Secretary of Labor
2. WON the CA erred in favoring the formation of the Union
despite the existence of supervisory employees in the rank
and file union of the respondent PACIWU-NACUSIP Noreco 1
chapter;
3. WON the court of appeals erred in allowing certification
elections when all the members of the union are members of
the cooperative."
Ruling:
(1) The first contention was correctly resolved by the Court of
Appeals.
The allegation of late filing is bare, it does not even specify
the material dates, nor furnish substantiation of the said
allegation. The Court of Appeals noted that the original
record does not disclose the actual date of receipt by the
private respondent of the order of the Med-Arbiter
dismissing the petition for certification election, and hence it
"cannot conclude that the Med-Arbiter's Decision had already
become final and executory
merit
The issue was raised for the first time in petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration of the Decision of the Secretary of Labor
dated July 13, 1998 which set aside the Order of the Med-
Arbiter dated December 23, 1997 dismissing the PACIWU-
TUCP's petition for certification election.
in the cited case of Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation v.
Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union, 268
SCRA 573, the employer, since the beginning opposed the
petition indicating the specific names of the supervisory
employees and their respective job descriptions. In the
instant case, movant not only belatedly raised the issue but
miserably failed to support the same.
Hence, between the belated and bare allegation of movant
that "there are supervisory and confidential employees in the
union" vis-à-vis the open and repeated declaration under
oath of the union members in the minutes of their
organizational meeting and the ratification of their
Constitution and By-Laws that they are rank and file
employees, we are inclined to give more credence to the
latter.
In the instant case, there is no persuasive evidence to show
that there are indeed supervisory and confidential employees
in appellant union who under the law are disqualified to join
the same."
(3) The questioned ruling therefore of public respondent Pura
Ferrer-Calleja must be upheld in so far as it refers to the
employees of petitioner who are not members or co-owners
of petitioner.'
Not only did movant fail to show any proof that anyone of
the union members are members or co-owners of the
cooperative. It also declared that not all members of the
petitioning union are members of the cooperative".
The public respondent found that petitioner failed to show
any proof that any member of the private respondent was
also a member or co-owner of the petitioner-cooperative.
Hence the members of the private respondent could validly
form a labor organization.
More important, the factual issue is not for the Court of
Appeals to resolve in a petition for certiorari.
Again,the core issue raises a question of fact that the
appellate court correctly declined to resolve in the first
instance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Principles:
1. Court of Appeals cannot be expected to go over the list of Court has also declared that in so far as it involves
alleged supervisory employees attached to the petition cooperatives with employees who are not members or co-
before it and to pass judgment in the first instance on the owners thereof, certainly such employees are entitled to
nature of the functions of each employee on the basis of the exercise the rights of all workers to organization, collective
job description pertaining to him. As appropriately observed bargaining, negotiations and others as are enshrined in the
by the said court, the determination of such factual issues is Constitution and existing laws of the country.
vested in the appropriate Regional Office of the Department
of Labor and Employment and pursuant to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, the Court should refrain from resolving
such controversies. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does
not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to
resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence.

2. Whether the inclusion of the prohibited mix of rank-and-

file and supervisory employees in the roster of officers and
members of the union can be cured by cancellation of
registration under Article 238 et seq. of the Labor Code vis-à-
vis Rule VIII of the Omnibus Rules, or by simple inclusion-
exclusion proceedings in the pre-election conference,

The fact remains that the determination of whether there

are indeed supervisory employees in the roster of members
of the rank-and-file union has never been raised nor
resolved by the appropriate fact finding body, and the
petition for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals cannot
cure the procedural lapse.

It bears notice that unlike in Toyota Motor Philippines Corp.

vs. Toyota Motor Philippines Corp. Labor Union where the
objection that "the union was composed of both rank-and-file
and supervisory employees in violation of law" was promptly
raised in the position paper to oppose the petition for
certification election, and this objection was resolved by the
Med-Arbiter, this issue was belatedly raised in the case at bar
and was sought to be ventilated only before the Court of
Appeals in the petition for certiorari. Time and again, this
Court has ruled that factual matters are not proper subject
for certiorari.

4. "An employee of a cooperative who is a member and co-

owner thereof cannot invoke the right to collective
bargaining" it failed to mention... the proviso provided by
the Supreme Court in the same decision:

`However, in so far as it involves cooperatives with

employees who are not members or co-owners thereof,
certainly such employees are entitled to exercise the rights
of all workers to organization, collective bargaining,
negotiations and others as are enshrined in the constitution
and existing laws of the country.

5. "The petitioner is indeed correct in stating that employees

of a cooperative who are members-consumers or members-
owners, are not qualified to form, join or assist labor
organizations for purposes of collective bargaining, because
of the principle that an owner cannot bargain... with himself.
However, the petitioner failed to mention that the Supreme
METROLAB INDUSTRIES v. MA. NIEVES ROLDAN CONFESOR,
GR No. 108855, 1996-02-28
Facts:
1. Private respondent Metro Drug Corporation Employees
Association-Federation of Free Workers (hereinafter
referred to as the Union) is a labor organization representing
the rank and file employees of petitioner Metrolab
Industries, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Metrolab/MII)...
and also of Metro Drug, Inc.
2. The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between
Metrolab and the Union expired. The negotiations for a new
CBA, however, ended in a deadlock.
3. And so the Union filed a notice of strike against Metrolab
and Metro Drug Inc. The parties failed to settle their dispute.
4. The Secretary of Labor and Employment, , issued an
assumption and issued an order resolving all the disputed
items in the CBA and ordered the parties involved to execute
a new CBA and enjoining any strike or lockout.
Furthermore the Companies and the Metro Drug Corp.
Employees Association - FFW are likewise directed to cease
and desist from committing any and all acts that might
exacerbate the situation.
5. However on various dates Metrolab lay off workers which
prompted the Union an injunction o the Secretary of Labor.
6. Acting Labor Secretary Nieves Confesor issued a resolution
declaring the layoff of Metrolab's rank and file workers illegal
and ordered their reinstatement with full backwages
.Issues:
1. Whether or not public respondent Labor Secretary erred in
declaring the subject layoffs instituted by Metrolab illegal on
grounds that these unilateral actions aggravated the conflict
between Metrolab and the Union who were, then, locked in a
stalemate in CBA negotiations.
2. The public respondent ravely abused her discretion in
including executive secretaries as part of the bargaining unit
of rank and file employees.
Ruling:
1. Metrolab argues that the Labor Secretary's order enjoining
the parties from committing any act that might exacerbate
the dispute is overly broad, sweeping and vague and should
not be used to curtail the employer's right to manage his
business and ensure its viability.
We cannot give credence to Metrolab's contention.
This Court recognizes the exercise of management
prerogatives and often declines to interfere with the
legitimate business decisions of the employer. However, this
privilege is not absolute but subject to limitations imposed
by. exercise of managerial prerogatives is not unlimited. It is
circumscribed by limitations found in law, a collective
bargaining agreement, or the general principles of fair play
and justice
The case at bench constitutes one of the exceptions. The
Secretary of Labor is expressly given the power under the
Labor Code to assume jurisdiction and resolve labor disputes
involving industries indispensable to national interest.
That Metrolab's business is of national interest is not
disputed. Metrolab is one of the leading manufacturers and
suppliers of medical and pharmaceutical products to the
country.
Metro lab's management prerogatives, therefore, are not
being unjustly curtailed but duly balanced with and
tempered by the limitations set by law, taking into account
its special character and the particular circumstances in the
case at bench.
As aptly declared by public respondent Secretary of Labor in
its assailed resolution:... xxx xxx xxx.
MII is right to the extent that as a rule, we may not interfere
with the legitimate exercise of management prerogatives
such as layoffs. But it may nevertheless be appropriate to
mention here that one of the substantive evils which Article
263 (g) of the Labor Code seeks to curb... is the exacerbation
of a labor dispute to the further detriment of the national
interest. When a labor dispute has in fact occurred and a
general injunction has been issued restraining the
commission of disruptive acts, management prerogatives
must always be exercised consistently with the statutory
objective
2. Metrolab insists that the subject layoffs did not exacerbate
their dispute with the Union since no untoward incident
occurred after the layoffs were implemented.
We find no compelling reason to overturn the findings of the
Secretary of Labor.
The Secretary of Labor ruled, thus:
Protest against the subject layoffs need not be in the form
of violent action or any other drastic measure. In the instant
case the Union registered their dissent by swiftly filing a
motion for a cease and desist order. Contrary to petitioner's
allegations, the Union strongly condemned the layoffs and
threatened mass action if the Secretary of Labor fails to
timely intervene:
Metrolab and the Union were still in the process of resolving
their CBA deadlock when petitioner implemented the
subject layoffs.
As a result, motions and oppositions were filed diverting the
parties' attention, delaying resolution of the bargaining
deadlock and postponing the signing of their new CBA,
thereby aggravating the whole conflict.
3. We, likewise, find untenable Metrolab's contention that
the layoff of the rank-and-file employees was temporary,
despite the recall of some of the laid off workers.
If Metrolab intended the layoff of the workers to be
temporary, it should have plainly stated so in the notices it
sent to the affected employees and the Department of
Labor and Employment.
There is no circumstance at all from which we can infer an
intention from MII not to sever the employment relationship
permanently. If there was such an intention, MII could have
made it very clear in the notices of layoff. But as it were, the
notices are couched in a language so uncertain that the only
conclusion possible is the permanent termination, not the
continuation, of the employment relationship.
4. The SECOND ISSUE raised by petitioner merits our
consideration.
Metrolab, maintains that executive secretaries of the
General Manager and the executive secretaries of the Quality
Assurance Manager, Product Development Manager, Finance
Director, Management System Manager, Human Resources
Manager, Marketing Director, Engineering Manager,
Materials Manager and Production Manager, who are all
members of the company's Management Committee should
not only be exempted from the closed-shop provision but
should be excluded from membership in the bargaining unit of
the rank and file employees as well on ground that their
executive secretaries are confidential employees, having
access to "vital labor information."
We concur with Metrolab.
Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility
to join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial
employees, jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to
confidential employees or those who by reason of their
positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a
fiduciary manner to managerial employees and hence, are
likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential records.
IN BULLETIN PUBLISHING CO., INC. VS. HON. AUGUSTO
SANCHEZ
this Court elaborated on this rationale, thus:... x x x The
rationale for this inhibition has been stated to be, because if
these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated
with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty
to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The
Union can also become company-dominated with the
presence of managerial employees in Union membership."
GOLDEN FARMS, INC. VS. FERRER-CALLEJA,
This Court explicitly made this rationale applicable to
confidential employees:
This rationale holds true also for confidential employees such
as accounting personnel, radio and telegraph operators, who
having access to confidential information, may become the
source of undue advantage. Said employee(s) may act as a
spy or spies of either party to a collective bargaining
agreement. This is especially true in the present case where
the petitioning Union is already the bargaining agent of the
rank-and-file employees in the establishment. To allow the
confidential employees to join the existing Union of the rank-
and-file would be in violation of the terms of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement wherein this kind of employees by the
nature of their functions/positions are expressly excluded."
And in the latest case of Pier 8 Arrastre & Stevedoring
Services, Inc. vs. Roldan-Confesor
Upon the other hand, legal secretaries are neither managers
nor supervisors. Their work is basically routinary and clerical.
However, they should be differentiated from rank-and-file
employees because they are tasked with, among others, the
typing of legal documents, memoranda and correspondence,
the keeping of records and files, the giving of and receiving
notices, and such other duties as required by the legal
personnel of the corporation. Legal secretaries therefore fall
under the category of confidential employees.
5. In the case at bench, the Union does not disagree with
petitioner that the executive secretaries are confidential
employees. It however, makes the following contentions:...
xxx xxx xxx.
There would be no danger of company domination of the
Union since the confidential employees would not be
members of and would not participate in the decision making
processes of the Union.
The Union's assurances fail to convince. The dangers sought
to be prevented, particularly the threat of conflict of
interest and espionage, are not eliminated by non-
membership of Metrolab's executive secretaries or
confidential employees in the Union. Forming part of the...
bargaining unit, the executive secretaries stand to benefit
from any agreement executed between the Union and
Metrolab. Such a scenario, thus, gives rise to a potential
conflict between personal interests and their duty as
confidential employees to act for and in behalf of
Metrolab. They do not have to be union members to affect
or influence either side.
Finally, confidential employees cannot be classified as rank
and file. As previously discussed, the nature of employment
of confidential employees is quite distinct from the rank and
file, thus, warranting a separate category. Excluding
confidential employees from the rank and file bargaining unit,
therefore, is not tantamount to discrimination.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is partially

GRANTED. The resolutions of public respondent Secretary of
Labor dated 14 April 1992 and 25 January 1993 are hereby
MODIFIED to the extent that executive secretaries of
petitioner Metrolab's General

Manager and the executive secretaries of the members of

its Management Committee are excluded from the
bargaining unit of petitioner's rank and file employees.

Principles:

.(I)n the collective bargaining process, managerial employees

are supposed to be on the side of the employer, to act as its
representatives, and to see to it that its interest are well
protected. The employer is not assured of such protection if
these employees themselves... are union members. Collective
bargaining in such a situation can become one-sided. It is the
same reason that impelled this Court to consider the position
of confidential employees as included in the disqualification
found in Art. 245 as if the disqualification of confidential...
employees were written in the provision. If confidential
employees could unionize in order to bargain for advantages
for themselves, then they could be governed by their own
motives rather than the interest of the employers. Moreover,
unionization of confidential employees for... the purpose of
collective bargaining would mean the extension of the law to
persons or individuals who are supposed to act "in the
interest of the employers. It is not farfetched that in the
course of collective bargaining, they might jeopardize that
interest which they are duty-bound to protect.
 TUNAY NA PAGKAKAISA NG MANGGAGAWA SA ASIA
BREWERY v. ASIA BREWERY
GR No. 162025, 2010-08-03
Facts:
1. Respondent Asia Brewery, Inc. (ABI) entered into a
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), effective for five (5)
years from August 1, 1997 to July 31, 2002, with Bisig at
Lakas ng mga Manggagawa sa Asia-Independent (BLMA-
INDEPENDENT), the exclusive bargaining representative of
ABI's rank-and-file employees.
2. Subsequently, a dispute arose when ABI's management
stopped deducting union dues from eighty-one (81)
employees, believing that their membership in BLMA-
INDEPENDENT violated the CBA
(QA Sampling Inspectors/Inspectresses and Machine Gauge
Technician who formed part of the Quality Control Staff.
Twenty (20) checkers are assigned at the Materials
Department of the Administration Division, Full Goods
Department of the Brewery Division and Packaging Division.
The rest are secretaries/clerks directly under their
respective division managers.)
BLMA-INDEPENDENT claimed that ABI's actions restrained
the employees' right to self-organization and brought the
matter to the grievance machinery.
3. The parties eventually agreed to submit the case for
arbitration to resolve the issue of "[w]hether or not there is
restraint to employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization."
4. Voluntary Arbitrator sustained the BLMA-INDEPENDENT
after finding that the records submitted by ABI showed that
the positions of the subject employees qualify under the
rank-and-file category because their functions are merely
routinary and clerical.
5. On appeal, the CA reversed the Voluntary Arbitrator
6. BLMA-INDEPENDENT filed a motion for reconsideration. In
the meantime, a certification election was held on August
10, 2002 wherein petitioner Tunay na Pagkakaisa ng
Manggagawa sa Asia (TPMA) won. As the incumbent
bargaining representative of ABI's rank-and-file employees
claiming interest in the outcome of the case, petitioner filed
with the CA an omnibus motion for reconsideration of the
decision and intervention, with attached petition signed by
the union officers. Both motions were denied by the CA.
Issues:
Whether or not the mentioned employees should be
excluded from the bargaining unit.
Ruling:
1. Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the
ineligibility to join, form and assist any labor organization to
managerial employees, jurisprudence has extended this
prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason
of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or
act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and
hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential
records
In the present case, the CBA expressly excluded "Confidential
and Executive Secretaries" from the rank-and-file bargaining
unit, for which reason ABI seeks their disaffiliation from
petitioner.
2. Petitioner, however, maintains that except for Daisy
Laloon, Evelyn Mabilangan and Lennie Saguan who had been
promoted to monthly paid positions, the following
secretaries/clerks are deemed included among the rank-and-
file employees of ABI.
Respondent insisted they fall under the "Confidential and
Executive Secretaries" expressly excluded by the CBA from
the rank-and-file bargaining unit.
3.
WE THUS HOLD THAT THE SECRETARIES/CLERKS,
NUMBERING ABOUT FORTY (40), ARE RANK-AND-FILE
EMPLOYEES AND NOT CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEES.
However, perusal of THE JOB DESCRIPTIONS OF THESE
SECRETARIES/CLERKS reveals that their assigned duties and
responsibilities involve routine activities of recording and
monitoring, and other paper works for their respective
departments while secretarial tasks such as receiving
telephone calls and filing of office correspondence appear to
have been commonly imposed as additional duties.
Respondent failed to indicate who among these numerous
secretaries/clerks have access to confidential data relating
to management policies that could give rise to potential
conflict of interest with their Union membership. Clearly,
the rationale under our previous rulings for the exclusion of
executive secretaries or division secretaries would have little
or no significance considering the lack of or very limited
access to confidential information of these secretaries/clerks.
5. CONSEQUENTLY, WE HOLD THAT THE TWENTY (20)
CHECKERS MAY NOT BE CONSIDERED CONFIDENTIAL
EMPLOYEES UNDER THE CATEGORY OF QUALITY CONTROL
STAFF WHO WERE EXPRESSLY EXCLUDED FROM THE CBA OF
THE RANK-AND-FILE BARGAINING UNIT.
With respect to THE SAMPLING INSPECTORS/INSPECTRESSES
AND THE GAUGE MACHINE TECHNICIAN, there seems no
dispute that they form part of the Quality Control Staff who,
under the express terms of the CBA, fall under a distinct
category. But we disagree with respondent's contention that
the twenty (20) checkers are similarly confidential employees
being "quality control staff" entrusted with the handling and
custody of company properties and sensitive information.
Again, the job descriptions of these checkers assigned in the
storeroom section of the Materials Department, finishing
section of the Packaging Department, and the decorating and
glass sections of the Production Department plainly showed
that they perform routine and mechanical tasks preparatory
to the delivery of the finished products. No evidence was
presented by the respondent to prove that these daily-paid
checkers actually form part of the company's Quality
Control Staff who as such "were exposed to sensitive, vital
and confidential information about [company's] products"
or "have knowledge of mixtures of the products, their
defects, and even their formulas" which are considered
`trade secrets'.
6. There is no showing in this case that the secretaries/clerks
and checkers assisted or acted in a confidential capacity to
managerial employees and obtained confidential information
relating to labor relations policies. And even assuming that
they had exposure to internal business operations of the
company, respondent claimed, this is not per se ground for
their exclusion in the bargaining unit of the daily-paid rank-
and-file employees.
inhibition for managerial employees because if allowed to be
affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of
their loyalty in view of evident conflict of interests and the
Union can also become company-denominated with the
presence of managerial employees in the Union
membership.[15] Having access to confidential information,
confidential employees may also become the source of undue
advantage. Said employees may act as a spy or spies of either
party to a collective bargaining agreement.
2. Confidential employees are defined as those who (1) assist
or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to persons who
formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in
the field of labor relations. The two (2) criteria are
cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be
considered a confidential employee - that is, the confidential
relationship must exist between the employee and his
supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the prescribed
responsibilities relating to labor relations.

7. Petitioner argues that respondent's act of unilaterally

stopping the deduction of union dues from these employees
constitutes unfair labor practice as it "restrained" the
workers' exercise of their right to self-organization

For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be

shown that ABI was motivated by ill will, "bad faith, or
fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, and, of
course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings or grave
anxiety resulted x x x"[28] from ABI's act in... discontinuing
the union dues deduction from those employees it believed
were excluded by the CBA. Considering that the herein
dispute arose from a simple disagreement in the
interpretation of the CBA provision on excluded employees
from the bargaining unit, respondent cannot be said to have
committed unfair labor practice that restrained its employees
in the exercise of their right to self-organization, nor have
thereby demonstrated an anti-union stance.

HEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated

November 22, 2002 and Resolution dated January 28, 2004 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55578 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The checkers and
secretaries/clerks of respondent company are hereby
declared rank-and-file employees who are eligible to join the
Union of the rank-and-file employees.

Principles:

1. The rationale for their separate category and

disqualification to join any labor organization is similar to the
 SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION—
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT
Vs.
SAN MIGUEL PACKAGING PRODUCTS EMPLOYEES UNION—
PAMBANSANG DIWA NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO
GR No. 171153, 2007-09-12
Facts:
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) which upheld
the Certificate of Registration of respondent SAN MIGUEL
PACKAGING PRODUCTS EMPLOYEES UNION PAMBANSANG
DIWA NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (SMPPEU PDMP);
1. Petitioner is the incumbent bargaining agent for the
bargaining unit comprised of the regular monthly-paid rank
and file employees of the three divisions of San Miguel
Corporation (SMC) It had been the certified bargaining agent
for 20 years from 1987 to 1997.
2. Respondent is registered as a chapter of Pambansang
Diwa ng Manggagawang Pilipino (PDMP).
3. Petitioner filed with the DOLE-NCR a petition seeking the
cancellation of respondent's registration and its dropping
from the rolls of legitimate labor organizations.
4. In its petition, petitioner accused respondent of
committing fraud and falsification, and non-compliance with
registration requirements in obtaining its certificate of
registration. It raised allegations that respondent violated
Articles 239(a), (b) and (c)[10] and 234(c)[11] of the Labor
Code.
Moreover,petitioner claimed that PDMP is not a legitimate
labor organization, but a trade union center, hence, it cannot
directly create a local or chapter.
5. DOLE-NCR issued an Order dismissing the allegations of
fraud and misrepresentation, and irregularity in the
submission of documents by respondent.
The Regional Director further ruled that respondent is
allowed to directly create a local or chapter. However, he
found that respondent did not comply with the 20%
membership requirement and, thus, ordered the cancellation
of its certificate of registration and removal from the rolls of
legitimate labor organizations.
6. Respondent appealed to the BLR
While the BLR agreed with the findings of the DOLE Regional
Director dismissing the allegations of fraud and
misrepresentation, and in upholding that PDMP can directly
create a local or a chapter, it reversed the Regional
Director's ruling that the 20% membership is a requirement
for respondent to attain legal personality as a labor
organization.
7. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals. In its decision
the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the Decision of
the BLR ruling as follows:
In Department Order No. 9, a registered federation or
national union may directly create a local by submitting to the
BLR copies of the charter certificate, the local's constitution
and by-laws, the principal office address of the local, and the
names of its officers and their addresses.
Under the rules we have reviewed, there is no need for
SMPPEU to show a membership of 20% of the employees of
the bargaining unit in order to be recognized as a legitimate
labor union.
Issues:
Whether or not the honorable court of appeals committed
reversible error in ruling that private respondent is not
required to submit the number of employees and names of
all its members comprising at least 20% of the employees in
the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate.
Ruling:
There is merit in petitioner's contentions.
A perusal of the records reveals that respondent is registered
with the BLR as a "local" or "chapter" of PDMP
Hence, respondent was directly chartered by PDMP.
1. Petitioner insists that Section 3 of the Implementing Rules,
as amended by Department Order No. 9, violated Article 234
of the Labor Code when it provided for less stringent
requirements for the creation of a chapter or local. THIS
COURT DISAGREES.
Article 234 of the Labor Code provides that an independent
labor organization acquires legitimacy only upon its
registration with the BLR:
Any applicant labor organization, association or group of
unions or workers shall acquire legal personality and shall be
entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to
legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate
of registration based on the following requirements:
(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;
(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal
address of the labor organization, the minutes of the
organizational meetings and the list of the workers who
participated in such meetings;
(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty
percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit
where it seeks to operate;
(d) If the applicant union has been in existence for one or
more years, copies of its annual financial reports; and
(e) Four (4) copies of the constitution and by-laws of the
applicant union, minutes of its adoption or ratification, and
the list of the members who participated in it. (Italics
supplied.)
This Court, in the landmark case of Progressive Development
Corporation v. Secretary, Department of Labor and
Employment, declared that when an unregistered union
becomes a branch, local or chapter, some of the
aforementioned requirements for registration are no longer
necessary or compulsory.
Whereas an applicant for registration of an independent
union is mandated to submit, among other things, the
number of employees and names of all its members
comprising at least 20% of the employees in the bargaining
unit where it seeks to operate, as provided under Article 234
of the Labor Code and Section 2 of Rule III, Book V of the
Implementing Rules, the same is no longer required of a
branch, local or chapter.
The intent of the law in imposing less requirements in the
case of a branch or local of a registered federation or
national union is to encourage the affiliation of a local union
with a federation or national union in order to increase the
local union's bargaining powers respecting terms and
conditions of labor.
2. Anent the foregoing, as has been held in a long line of
cases, the legal personality of a legitimate labor
organization, such as PDMP, cannot be subject to a
collateral attack. The law is very clear on this matter.
Article 212 (h) of the Labor Code, as amended, defines a
legitimate labor organization as "any labor organization duly
registered with the DOLE, and includes any branch or local
thereof." On the other hand, a trade union center is any
group of registered national unions or federations organized
for the mutual aid and protection of its members; for
assisting such members in collective bargaining; or for
participating in the formulation of social and employment
policies, standards, and programs, and is duly registered with
the DOLE in accordance with Rule III, Section 2 of the
Implementing Rules.
The Implementing Rules stipulate that a labor organization
shall be deemed registered and vested with legal
personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of
registration. Once a certificate of registration is issued to a
union, its legal personality cannot be subject to collateral
attack. It may be questioned only in an independent
petition for cancellation.
PDMP was registered as a trade union center and issued
Registration Certificate No. FED-11558-LC by the BLR on 14
February 1991. Until the certificate of registration of PDMP is
cancelled, its legal personality as a legitimate labor
organization subsists. Once a union acquires legitimate
status as a labor organization, it continues to be recognized
as such until its certificate of registration is cancelled or
revoked in an independent action for cancellation. It bears to
emphasize that what is being directly challenged is the
personality of respondent as a legitimate labor organization
and not that of PDMP. This being a collateral attack, this
Court is without jurisdiction to entertain questions indirectly
impugning the legitimacy of PDMP.
3. This Court reverses the finding of the appellate court and
BLR on this ground, and rules that PDMP cannot directly
create a local or chapter.
Article 234 now includes the term trade union center, but
interestingly, the provision indicating the procedure for
chartering or creating a local or chapter, namely Article 234-
A, still makes no mention of a "trade union center."
Also worth emphasizing is that even in the most recent
amendment of the implementing rules,there was no mention
of a trade union center as being among the labor
organizations allowed to charter.
This Court deems it proper to apply the Latin maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it
may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to
other matters. Such is the case here. If its intent were
otherwise, the law could have so easily and conveniently
included "trade union centers" in identifying the labor
organizations allowed to charter a chapter or local.
Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded
therefrom. Therefore, since under the pertinent status and
applicable implementing rules, the power granted to labor
organizations to directly create a chapter or local through
chartering is given to a federation or national union, then a
trade union center is without authority to charter directly.
4. In sum, although PDMP as a trade union center is a
legitimate labor organization, it has no power to directly
create a local or chapter. Thus, SMPPEU-PDMP cannot be
created under the more lenient requirements for chartering,
but must have complied with the more stringent... rules for
creation and registration of an independent union, including
the 20% membership requirement.
Principles:
1. A LEGITIMATE LABOR ORGANIZATION is defined as "any
labor organization duly registered with the Department of
Labor and Employment, and includes any branch or local
thereof." The mandate of the Labor Code is to ensure strict
compliance with the requirements on registration because a
legitimate labor organization is entitled to specific rights
under the Labor Code, and are involved in activities directly
affecting matters of public interest.
2. REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS ARE INTENDED to afford
a measure of protection to unsuspecting employees who may
be lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions
whose sole purpose is to control union funds or use the labor
organization for illegitimate ends. Legitimate labor
organizations have exclusive rights under the law which
cannot be exercised by non-legitimate unions, one of which is
the right to be certified as the exclusive representative of all
the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit for
purposes of collective bargaining. The acquisition of rights by
any union or labor organization, particularly the right to file a
petition for certification election, first and foremost, depends
on whether or not the labor organization has attained the
status of a legitimate labor organization.
3. The PROCEDURE FOR REGISTRATION OF A LOCAL OR
CHAPTER OF A LABOR ORGANIZATION is provided in Book V
of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, as amended by
Department Order No. 9 which took effect on 21 June 1997,
and again by Department Order No. 40 dated 17 February
2003. The Implementing Rules as amended by D.O. No. 9
should govern the resolution of the petition at bar since
respondent's petition for certification election was filed with
the BLR in 1999; and that of petitioner on 17 August 1999.
4. The applicable Implementing Rules enunciates a two-fold
procedure for the creation of a chapter or a local. The first
involves the affiliation of an independent union with a
federation or national union or industry union. The second,
finding application in the instant petition, involves the direct
creation of a local or a chapter through the process of
chartering.
A duly registered federation or national union may directly
create a local or chapter by submitting to the DOLE Regional
Office or to the BLR two copies of the following:
(a) A charter certificate issued by the federation or national
union indicating the creation or establishment of the
local/chapter;
(b) The names of the local/chapter's officers, their addresses,
and the principal office of the local/chapter; and
(c) The local/chapter's constitution and by-laws; Provided,
That where the local/chapter's constitution and by-laws is the
same as that of the federation or national union, this fact
shall be indicated accordingly.
All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified
under oath by the Secretary or the Treasurer of the
local/chapter and attested to by its President.
The Implementing Rules stipulate that a local or chapter may
be directly created by a federation or national union. A duly
constituted local or chapter created in accordance with the
foregoing shall acquire legal personality from the date of
filing of the complete documents with the BLR.The issuance
of the certificate of registration by the BLR or the DOLE
Regional Office is not the operative act that vests legal
personality upon a local or a chapter under Department
Order No. 9. Such legal personality is acquired from the
filing of the complete documentary requirements
enumerated in Section 1, Rule VI.
5. DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 9 DEFINES A "CHARTERED
LOCAL" as a labor organization... in the private sector
operating at the enterprise level that acquired legal
personality through a charter certificate, issued by a duly
registered federation or national union and reported to the
Regional Office
SECTION 2. A new provision is hereby inserted into the Labor
Code as Article 234-A to read as follows:
ART. 234-A. Chartering and Creation of a Local Chapter. A
duly registered federation or national union may directly
create a local chapter by issuing a charter certificate
indicating the establishment of the local chapter. The chapter
shall acquire legal... personality only for purposes of filing a
petition for certification election from the date it was issued a
charter certificate.
The chapter shall be entitled to all other rights and privileges
of a legitimate labor organization only upon the submission of
the following documents in addition to its charter certificate:
(a) The names of the chapter's officers, their addresses, and
the principal office of the chapter; and
(b) The chapter's constitution and by-laws: Provided, That
where the chapter's constitution and by-laws are the same as
that of the federation or the national union, this fact shall be
indicated accordingly.
The additional supporting requirements shall be certified
under oath by the secretary or treasurer of the chapter and
attested by its president. (Emphasis ours.)
6. The mandate of the Labor Code in ensuring strict
compliance with the procedural requirements for registration
is not without reason. It has been observed that the
formation of a local or chapter becomes a handy tool for the
circumvention of union registration requirements. Absent
the institution of safeguards, it becomes a convenient device
for a small group of employees to foist a not-so-desirable
federation or union on unsuspecting co-workers and pare the
need for wholehearted voluntariness, which is basic to... free
unionism. As a legitimate labor organization is entitled to
specific rights under the Labor Code and involved in activities
directly affecting public interest, it is necessary that the law
afford utmost protection to the parties affected.

SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER CHEMICAL
SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN PHILIPPINES FOR
EMPOWERMENT
v. CHARTER CHEMICAL,
GR No. 169717, 2011-03-16
Facts:
1. Samahang Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical Solidarity of
Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms
(petitioner union) filed a petition for certification election
among the regular rank-and-file employees of Charter
Chemical and Coating Corporation (respondent company)
with the Mediation Arbitration Unit of the DOLE
2. Respondent company filed an Answer with Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that petitioner union is not a
legitimate labor organization because of failure to comply
with the documentation requirements set by law, and (2) the
inclusion of supervisory employees within petitioner union.
3. MED-ARBITER'S RULING DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIFICATION ELECTION.
The Med-Arbiter ruled that petitioner union is not a
legitimate labor organization because the Charter Certificate,
"Sama-samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi at Authorization," and
"Listahan ng mga Dumalo sa Pangkalahatang Pulong at mga
Sumang-ayon at Nagratipika sa Saligang Batas" were not
executed under oath and certified by the union secretary and
attested to by the union president as required by Section 235
of the Labor Code[
The Med-Arbiter further held that the list of membership of
petitioner union consisted of 12 batchman, mill operator and
leadman who performed supervisory functions.
4. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT'S RULING:
In favor of respondent company dismissing petitioner union's
appeal on the ground that the latter's petition for
certification election was filed out of time.
However the DOLE found that petitioner union complied with
the documentation requirements of the Labor Code and that
the evidence was insufficient to establish that there was an
illegal mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in
its membership. Nonetheless, the petition for certification
election was dismissed on the ground that another union
had previously filed a petition for certification election
seeking to represent the same bargaining unit in
respondent company.
The DOLE reversed its previous ruling. It upheld the right of
petitioner union to file the subject petition for certification
election because its previous decision was based on a
mistaken appreciation of... facts.
5. COURT OF APPEAL'S RULING
In nullifying the decision of the DOLE, the appellate court
gave credence to the findings of the Med-Arbiter that
petitioner union failed to comply with the documentation
requirements under the Labor Code. It, likewise, upheld the
Med-Arbiter's finding that petitioner union consisted of both
rank-and-file and supervisory employees.
Issues:
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction
1. In granting the respondent [company's] petition for
certiorari in spite of the fact that the issues subject of the
respondent company['s] petition was already settled with
finality and barred from being re-litigated.
2. In holding that the alleged mixture of rank-and-file and
supervisory employee[s] of petitioner [union's] membership
is [a] ground for the cancellation of petitioner [union's] legal
personality and dismissal of [the] petition for certification
election.
3 in holding that the alleged failure to certify under oath the
local charter certificate issued by its mother federation and
list of the union membership attending the organizational
meeting [is a ground] for the cancellation of petitioner
[union's] legal personality as a labor organization and for the
dismissal of the petition for certification election.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
THE ISSUE AS TO THE LEGAL PERSONALITY OF PETITIONER
UNION IS NOT BARRED BY THE JULY 16, 1999 DECISION OF
THE DOLE.
The July 16, 1999 Decision of the DOLE never attained finality
because the parties timely moved for reconsideration.
THE CHARTER CERTIFICATE NEED NOT BE CERTIFIED UNDER
OATH BY THE LOCAL UNION'S SECRETARY OR TREASURER
AND ATTESTED TO BY ITS PRESIDENT.
In San Miguel Foods-Cebu B-Meg Feed Plant v. Hon.
Laguesma, the Court ruled that it was not necessary for the
charter certificate to be certified and attested by the
local/chapter officers. While this ruling was based on the
interpretation of the previous Implementing Rules provisions
which were supplanted by the 1997 amendments, we believe
that the same doctrine obtains in this case. Considering that
the charter certificate is prepared and issued by the national
union and not the local/chapter, it does not make sense to
have the local/chapter's officers x x x certify or attest to a
document which they had no hand in the preparation of.
In accordance with this ruling, petitioner union's charter
certificate need not be executed under oath. Consequently, it
validly acquired the status of a legitimate labor organization
upon submission of (1) its charter certificate, (2) the names of
its officers, their addresses, and its principal office and (3) its
constitution and by-laws[26]-- the last two requirements
having been executed under oath by the proper union
officials as borne out by the records.
THE MIXTURE OF RANK-AND-FILE AND SUPERVISORY
EMPLOYEES IN PETITIONER UNION DOES NOT NULLIFY ITS
LEGAL PERSONALITY AS A LEGITIMATE LABOR
ORGANIZATION.
The petitioner union failed to present any rebuttal evidence
in the proceedings below after respondent company
submitted in evidence the job descriptions of the aforesaid
employees. The job descriptions indicate that the aforesaid
employees exercise recommendatory managerial actions
which are not merely routinary but require the use of
independent judgment, hence, falling within the definition of
supervisory employees under Article 212(m)[30] of the Labor
Code.
Nonetheless, the inclusion of the aforesaid supervisory
employees in petitioner union does not divest it of its status
as a legitimate labor organization.
In Dunlop, in which the labor organization that filed a petition
for certification election was one for supervisory employees,
but in which the membership included rank-and-file
employees, the Court reiterated that such labor organization
had no legal right to file a certification election to represent a
bargaining unit composed of supervisors for as long as it
counted rank-and-file employees among its members.
It should be emphasized that the petitions for certification
election involved in Toyota and Dunlop were filed on
November 26, 1992 and September 15, 1995, respectively;
hence, the 1989 Rules was applied in both cases.
But then, on June 21, 1997, the 1989 Amended Omnibus
Rules was further amended by Department Order No. 9,
series of 1997 (1997 Amended Omnibus Rules). Specifically,
the requirement under Sec. 2(c) of the 1989 Amended
Omnibus Rules - that the petition for certification election
indicate that the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees
has not been mingled with supervisory employees - was
removed.
Instead, what the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules requires is
a plain description of the bargaining unit.
THEN CAME TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS INT'L. GOLF CLUB, INC.
V. TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS EMPLOYEES UNION-PGTWO in
which the core issue was whether mingling affects the
legitimacy of a labor organization and its right to file a
petition for certification election. This time, given the altered
legal milieu, the Court abandoned the view in Toyota and
Dunlop and reverted to its pronouncement in Lopez that
WHILE THERE IS A PROHIBITION AGAINST THE MINGLING OF
SUPERVISORY AND RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES IN ONE
LABOR ORGANIZATION, THE LABOR CODE DOES NOT
PROVIDE FOR THE EFFECTS THEREOF. Thus, the Court held
that after a labor organization has been registered, it may
exercise all the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor
organization. Any mingling between supervisory and rank-
and-file employees in its membership cannot affect its
legitimacy for that is not among the grounds for cancellation
of its registration, unless such mingling was brought about by
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Article 239
of the Labor Code.
More to the point is Air Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of
Labor Relations, which involved a petition for cancellation of
union registration filed by the employer in 1999 against a
rank-and-file labor organization on the ground of mixed
membership: the Court therein... reiterated its ruling in
Tagaytay Highlands that the inclusion in a union of
disqualified employees is not among the grounds for
cancellation, unless such inclusion is due to
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the
circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) and (c) of Article
239 of the Labor Code.
THE LEGAL PERSONALITY OF PETITIONER UNION CANNOT BE
COLLATERALLY ATTACKED BY RESPONDENT COMPANY IN
THE CERTIFICATION ELECTION PROCEEDINGS.
Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, an
employer is a mere bystander to any petition for certification
election; such proceeding is non-adversarial and merely
investigative, for the purpose thereof is to determine which
organization will represent the employees in their collective
bargaining with the employer. The choice of their
representative is the exclusive concern of the employees; the
employer cannot have any partisan interest therein; it cannot
interfere with, much less oppose, the process by filing a
motion to dismiss or an appeal from it; not even a mere
allegation that some employees participating in a petition for
certification election are actually managerial employees will
lend an employer legal personality to block the certification
election. The employer's only right in the proceeding is to be
notified or informed them
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The March 15, 2005
Decision and September 16, 2005 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58203 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The January 13, 2000 Decision of the Department of
Labor and
Employment in OS-A-6-53-99 (NCR-OD-M-9902-019) is
REINSTATED.
Principles: The right to file a petition for certification election
is accorded to a labor organization provided that it complies
with the requirements of law for proper registration. The
inclusion of supervisory employees in a labor organization
seeking to represent the bargaining unit of rank-and-file
employees does not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor
organization.
 ST. JAMES SCHOOL OF QUEZON CITY vs. SAMAHANG
MANGGAGAWA SA ST. JAMES SCHOOL OF QUEZON CITY
GR No. 151326, 2005-11-23
Facts:
1. The Samahang Manggagawa sa St. James School of Quezon
City ("Samahang Manggagawa") filed a petition for
certification election to determine the collective bargaining
representative of the motor pool, construction and
transportation employees of St. James School of Quezon
City ("St. James")
2. There were 149 eligible voters and 84 voters cast their
votes.
3. St. James filed a certification election protest challenging
the 84 votes. St. James alleged that it had 179 rank and file
employees, none of whom voted in the certification
election. St. James argued that those who voted were not its
regular employees but construction workers of an
independent contractor, Architect Conrado Bacoy
4. MED-ARBITER ruled that at the time of the certification
election, the 84 voters were no longer working at St. James.
It also ruled that since the construction projects have ceased,
some of the workers were no longer entitled to vote in the
certification election.
5. Samahang Manggagawa appealed to THE SECRETARY OF
LABOR. The DOLE reversed the ruling. The DOLE ruled that
Samahang Manggagawa seeks to represent the non-
academic personnel or the rank and file employees from
the motor pool, construction and transportation
departments, and not all the rank and file employees of St.
James.
The DOLE ruled that the list submitted by St. James contained
only the administrative, teaching and office personnel of the
school.
Issues:
St. James questions the validity of the formation of the labor
union and the validity of the certification election.
Ruling:
THE PETITION HAS NO MERIT.
The Validity of the Formation of the Labor Union
St. James may no longer question the validity of the
formation of the labor union.
The Med-Arbiter recommended the cancellation of the union
registration. DOLE Regional Director IV Romeo Young
("Director Young") adopted the Med-Arbiter's
recommendation and cancelled Samahang Manggagawa's
union registration.
The BLR reversed Director Young's Decision the Court of
Appeals dismissed St. James' petition and affirmed the BLR's
Decision. The Court of Appeals ruled that the construction
workers are actually St. James' regular employees in its motor
pool, construction and transportation departments. The
Court of Appeals also ruled that Architect Bacoy is a labor-
only contractor and thus an agent of St. James, which is the
real employer.
This Court denied the petition for St. James' error in the
choice or mode of appeal
The Validity of the Certification Election
According to St. James, the certification election was
conducted without quorum.
WE CANNOT SUSTAIN THE ARGUMENT.
St. James has five campuses the Philamlife and Scout Alcaraz,
Quezon City campuses which are pre-schools; the Parañaque
City and Calamba, Laguna campuses which offer elementary,
secondary and college education; and the Tandang Sora,
Quezon City campus which offers elementary and secondary
education.
The members of Samahang Manggagawa are employees in
the Tandang Sora campus. Under its constitution and by-
laws, Samahang Manggagawa seeks to represent the motor
pool, construction and transportation employees of the
Tandang Sora campus. Thus, the computation of the quorum
should be based on the rank and file motor pool,
construction and transportation employees of the Tandang
Sora campus and not on all the employees in St. James' five
campuses.
Section 2, Rule XII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules provides:
Section 2. Qualification of voters; inclusion-exclusion
proceedings.
All employees who are members of the appropriate
bargaining unit sought to be represented by the petitioner at
the time of the certification or consent election shall be
qualified to vote. A dismissed employee whose dismissal is
being contested in a pending case shall be allowed to vote in
the election.
In case of disagreement over the voters' list or over the
eligibility of voters, all contested voters shall be allowed to
vote. However, their votes shall be segregated and sealed in
individual envelopes in accordance with Section 9 of these
Rules.
The motor pool, construction and transportation employees
of the Tandang Sora campus had 149 qualified voters at the
time of the certification election. Hence, the 149 qualified
voters should be used to determine the existence of a
quorum. Since a majority or 84 out of the 149 qualified
voters cast their votes, a quorum existed in the certification
election.

St. James further alleges that the names of the 84 voters are
not on the list of its rank and file employees. On this score,
we sustain the factual finding of the DOLE that the list
submitted by St. James consists of its administrative, teaching
and office personnel. These administrative, teaching and
office personnel are not members of Samahang
Manggagawa.

HEREFORE, we DENY the petition.

Principles:
Section 13, Rule XII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code ("Omnibus Rules") provides:

Section 13. Proclamation and certification of results by

election officer; when proper.

Upon completion of the canvass there being a valid election,

the election officer shall proclaim and certify as winner the
union which obtained a majority of the valid votes cast under
any of the following conditions:
a) No protest had been filed or, even if one was filed, the
same was not perfected within the five-day period for
perfection of the protest;

b) No challenge of eligibility issue was raised or even if one

was raised, the resolution of the same will not materially
change the result.

For this purpose, the election officer shall immediately issue

the corresponding certification, copy furnished all parties,
which shall form part of the records of the case. The winning
union shall have the rights, privileges and obligations of a
duly certified collective bargaining representative from the
time the certification is issued. The proclamation and
certification so issued shall not be appealable.
National Union of Bank Employees v. Philnabank Empoyees
Association G.R. No.174287
FACTS:
Philippine National Bank (PNB) used to be a government-
owned and controlled banking institution established under
The 1986 Revised Charter. Its rank-and-file employees, being
government personnel, were represented for collective
negotiation by the Philnabank Employees Association
(PEMA), a public sector union.
In 1996, the Securities and Exchange Commission approved
PNB’s new Articles of Incorporation and By-laws and its
changed status as a private corporation. PEMA affiliated with
petitioner National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE), which
is a labor federation composed of unions in the banking
industry, adopting the name NUBE-PNB Employees Chapter
(NUBE-PEC). NUBE-PEC was certified as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the PNB rank-and-file employees. A
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) was subsequently
signed between NUBE-PEC and PNB covering the period of
January 1, 1997 to December 31, 2001.
Pursuant to Article V on Check-off and Agency Fees of the
CBA, PNB shall deduct the monthly membership fee and
other assessments imposed by the union from the salary of
each union member, and agency fee from the salary of the
rank- and-file employees within the bargaining unit who are
not union members.
Moreover, during the effectivity of the CBA, NUBE, being the
Federation union, agreed that PNB shall remit P15.00 of the
P65.00 union dues per month collected by PNB from every
employee, and that PNB shall directly credit the amount to
NUBE’s current account with PNB.
Following the expiration of the CBA, the Philnabank
Employees Association-FFW (PEMA-FFW) filed a petition for
certification election among the rank-and-file employees of
PNB. The petition sought the conduct of a certification
election to be participated in by PEMA-FFW and NUBE-PEC.
While the petition for certification election was still pending,
two significant events transpired – the independent union
registration of NUBE- PEC and its disaffiliation with NUBE.
With a legal personality derived only from a charter issued by
NUBE, NUBE-PEC, under the leadership of Mariano Soria,
decided to apply for a separate registration with DOLE.
Thereafter, the Board of Directors of NUBE-PEC adopted a
Resolution disaffiliating itself from NUBE, because the latter
has miserably failed to extend and provide satisfactory
services and support to the former in the form of legal
services, training assistance, educational seminars, and the
like.
PNB informed NUBE of PEMA’s letter and its decision to
continue the deduction of the P15.00 fees, but stop its
remittance to NUBE effective July 2003. PNB also notified
NUBE that the amounts collected would be held in a trust
account pending the resolution of the issue on PEMA’s
disaffiliation.
NUBE replied that it remains as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the PNB rank-and-file employees; by signing
the Resolution (on disaffiliation), the chapter officers have
abandoned and committed an act of disloyalty to NUBE-PEC
and the general membership
ISSUE: Whether or not there was an effective disaffiliation?
RULING: Yes there is a valid disaffiliation from
NUBE. Whether there was a valid disaffiliation is a factual
issue. It is elementary that a question of fact is not
appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
A local labor union is a separate and distinct unit primarily
designed to secure and maintain an equality of bargaining
power between the employer and their employee-members.
A local union does not owe its existence to the federation
with which it is affiliated. It is a separate and distinct
voluntary association owing its creation to the will of its
members.
The mere act of affiliation does not divest the local union of
its own personality, neither does it give the mother
federation the license to act independently of the local union.
It only gives rise to a contract of agency where the former
acts in representation of the latter.
The purpose of affiliation by a local union with a mother
union [or] a federation is to increase by collective action the
bargaining power in respect of the terms and conditions of
labor. Yet the locals remained the basic units of association,
free to serve their own and the common interest of all,
subject to the restraints imposed by the Constitution and By-
Laws of the Association, and free also to renounce the
affiliation for mutual welfare upon the terms laid down in the
agreement which brought it into existence.
Also, there is no merit on NUBE’s contention that PEMA’s
disaffiliation is invalid for non-observance of the procedure
that union members should make such determination
through secret ballot and after due deliberation, conformably
with Article 241 (d) of the Labor Code, as amended.
Conspicuously, other than citing the opinion of a "recognized
labor law authority," NUBE failed to quote a specific provision
of the law or rule mandating that a local union’s disaffiliation
from a federation must comply with Article 241 (d) in order to
be valid and effective.
Granting, for argument’s sake, that Article 241 (d) is
applicable, still, We uphold PEMA’s disaffiliation from NUBE.
First, non-compliance with the procedure on disaffiliation,
being premised on purely technical grounds cannot rise
above the employees’ fundamental right to self-organization
and to form and join labor organizations of their own
choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining. Second, the
Article nonetheless provides that when the nature of the
organization renders such secret ballot impractical, the union
officers may make the decision in behalf of the general
membership.

Consequently, by PEMA's valid disaffiliation from NUBE, the

vinculum that previously bound the two entities was
completely severed. As NUBE was divested of any and all
power to act in representation of PEMA, any act performed
by the former that affects the interests and affairs of the
latter, including the supposed expulsion of Serrana et al., is
rendered without force.
Also, in effect, NUBE loses it right to collect all union dues
held in its trust by PNB. The moment that PEMA separated
from and left NUBE and exists as an independent labor
organization with a certificate of registration, the former is no
longer obliged to pay dues and assessments to the latter;
naturally, there would be no longer any reason or occasion
for PNB to continue making deductions.

On the other hand, it was entirely reasonable for PNB to

enter into a CBA with PEMA as represented by Serrana et al.
Since PEMA had validly separated itself from NUBE, there
would be no restrictions which could validly hinder it from
collectively bargaining with PNB.
 LEGEND INTERNATIONAL RESORTS LIMITED v. KILUSANG
MANGGAGAWA NG LEGENDA,
GR No. 169754, 2011-02-23
Facts:
1. KML filed with the Med-Arbitration Unit a Petition for
Certification Election. KML alleged that it is a legitimate labor
organization of the rank and file employees of Legend
International Resorts Limited (LEGEND)
2. LEGEND moved to dismiss the petition alleging that KML is
not a legitimate labor organization because its membership is
a mixture of rank and file and supervisory employees in
violation of Article 245 of the Labor Code.
3. KML argued that even if 41 of its members are indeed
supervisory employees and therefore excluded from its
membership, the certification election could still proceed
because the required number of the total rank and file
employees necessary for certification purposes is still
sustained. KML also claimed that its legitimacy as a labor
union could not be collaterally attacked in the certification
election proceedings but only through a separate and
independent action for cancellation of union registration.
Finally, as to the alleged acts of misrepresentation, KML
asserted that LEGEND failed to substantiate its claim.
RULING OF THE MED-ARBITER
The Med-Arbiter rendered judgment dismissing for lack of
merit the petition for certification election. The Med-Arbiter
found that indeed there were several supervisory employees
in KML's membership.
RULING OF THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DOLE
The Secretary of DOLE rendered its Decision granting KML's
appeal thereby reversing and setting aside the Med-Arbiter's
Decision.
RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
KML alleged that the Decision dated March 26, 2002 of the
Bureau of Labor Relation denying LEGEND's petition for
cancellation and upholding KML's legitimacy as a labor
organization has already become final and executory, the
Court of Appeals rendered its Decision finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Secretary
of DOLE.
RULING:
The petition is partly meritorious.
LEGEND has timely appealed the
March 26, 2002 Decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations to
the Court of Appeals.
We cannot understand why the Court of Appeals totally
disregarded LEGEND's allegation in its Motion for
Reconsideration that the March 26, 2002 Decision of the
Bureau of Labor Relations has not yet attained finality
considering that it has timely appealed the same to the Court
of Appeals and which at that time is still pending resolution.
The Court of Appeals never bothered to look into this
allegation and instead dismissed outright LEGEND's motion
for reconsideration.
THE CANCELLATION OF KML'S CERTIFICATE OF
REGISTRATION SHOULD NOT RETROACT TO THE TIME OF ITS
ISSUANCE.
LEGEND claims that KML's petition for certification election
filed during the pendency of the petition for cancellation and
its demand to enter into collective bargaining agreement with
LEGEND should be dismissed due to KML's lack of legal
personality
It is well-settled rule that `a certification proceedings is not
a litigation in the sense that the term is ordinarily
understood, but an investigation of a non-adversarial and
fact finding character.
Thus, the technical rules of evidence do not apply if the
decision to grant it proceeds from an examination of the
sufficiency of the petition as well as a careful look into the
arguments contained in the position papers and other
documents.
In Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano, we also held
that "The Pendency Of A Petition For Cancellation Of Union
Registration Does Not Preclude Collective Bargaining."
That there is a pending cancellation proceedings against the
respondent Union is not a bar to set in motion the mechanics
of collective bargaining. If a certification election may still be
ordered despite the pendency of a petition to cancel the
union's registration certificate x x x more so should the
collective bargaining process continue despite its pendency.
The rationale for this is that at the time the respondent
union filed its petition, it still had the legal personality to
perform such act absent an order directing a cancellation."
Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, it is clear that a
certification election may be conducted during the pendency
of the cancellation proceedings. This is because at the time
the petition for certification was filed, the petitioning union is
presumed to possess the legal personality to file the same.
There is therefore no basis for LEGEND's assertion that the
cancellation of KML's certificate of registration should
retroact to the time of its issuance or that it effectively
nullified all of KML's activities, including its filing of the
petition for certification election and its demand to
collectively bargain.
 THE LEGITIMACY OF THE LEGAL PERSONALITY OF KML
CANNOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED IN A PETITION FOR
CERTIFICATION ELECTION.

This is categorically prescribed by Section 5, Rule V of the

Implementing Rules of Book V, which states as follows:
SEC. 5.[51] Effect of registration. - The labor organization or
worker's association shall be deemed registered and vested
with legal personality on the date of issuance of its
certificate of registration. Such legal personality cannot
thereafter be subject to collateral attack but may be
questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation
in accordance with these Rules.

[T]he legal personality of a legitimate labor organization x x x

cannot be subject to a collateral attack. The law is very clear
on this matter. x x x The Implementing Rules stipulate that a
labor organization shall be deemed registered and vested
with legal personality... on the date of issuance of its
certificate of registration. Once a certificate of registration is
issued to a union, its legal personality cannot be subject to a
collateral attack. In may be questioned only in an
independent petition for cancellation in accordance with
Section 5 of Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules."

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is

PARTLY GRANTED.
 PHILIPPINE DIAMOND HOTEL v. MANILA DIAMOND
HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION,
GR NO. 158075, 2006-06-30
Facts:
1. The union, which was registered on August 19, 1996 before
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE),filed a
Petition for Certification Election before the DOLE.
2. The DOLE-NCR denied the union's petition as it failed to
comply with legal requirements, specifically Section 2, Rule V,
Book V
3. The union later notified petitioner of its intention to
negotiate, by Notice to Bargain, a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) for its members.
4. Acting on the notice, the Hotel advised the union that
since it was not certified by the DOLE as the exclusive
bargaining agent, it could not be recognized as such.
5. The union clarified that it sought to bargain "for its
members only," and declared that "[the Hotel's] refusal to
bargain [would prompt] the union to engage in concerted
activities to protect and assert its rights under the Labor
Code."The the union announced that its executive officers as
well as its directors decided to go on strike in view of the
management's refusal to bargain collectively, and thus called
for the taking of strike vote.
6. Petitioner thereupon issued a Final Reminder and Warning
to respondent
7.The union went on to file a Notice of Strike on September
29, 1997 with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB)
Conciliation conferences were immediately conducted by the
NCMB
8. In the conference held on November 20, 1997, the union
demanded the holding of a consent election to which the
Hotel interposed no objection.
9. However the next day, the union suddenly went on strike.
The following day, the National Union of Workers in the
Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN) joined
the strike and openly extended its support to the union.
10. At about this time, Hotel supervisors Vicente T. Agustin
(Agustin) and Rowena Junio (Rowena) failed to report for
work and were, along with another supervisor,Mary Grace U.
de Leon (Mary Grace), seen participating in and supporting
the strike.
11. Petitioner thus filed a petition for injunction before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
Mary Grace and Agustin were terminated prompting the to
file for an illegal dismissal.
12. The NLRC thus issued a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) directing the strikers to immediately "cease and desist
from obstructing the free ingress and egress from the Hotel
premises."
13. The service upon the strikers of the TRO notwithstanding,
they refused to dismantle the tent they put up at the
employee's entrance to the Hotel.
14. As then DOLE Secretary Cresenciano Trajano's attempts
to conciliate the parties failed, he, acting on the union's
Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction, issued an order
certifying the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration,
and directing the striking officers and members to return to
work within 24 hours and the Hotel to accept them back
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the
strike.
15. On petitioner's motion for reconsideration, then DOLE
Acting Secretary Jose Español, Jr., by Order of April 30, 1998,
modified the April 15, 1998 Order of Secretary Trajano by
directing the Hotel to just reinstate the strikers to its payroll,
the NLRC declared that the strike was illegal and that the
union officers and members who were reinstated to the
Hotel's payroll were deemed to have lost their employment
status. And it dismissed the complaints filed by Mary Grace,
Agustin, and Rowena as well as the union's complaint for ULP.
16. On appeal the Appellate Court finds no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC, and therefore affirms the
ruling of the NLRC as follows:
(1) that the strike is illegal;
(2) that the union officers lost their employment status
when they formed the illegal strike; and
(3) That the dismissal of Ms. Mary Grace U. de Leon, Vicente
C. Agustinand Rowena Junio is valid.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the strike was illegal
(2) Whether those ordered reinstated are entitled to
backwages
Ruling:
1. This Court finds the strike illegal.
Only the labor organization designated or selected by the
majority of the employees in an appropriate collective
bargaining unit is the exclusive representative of the
employees in such unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining.
The union (hereafter referred to as respondent) is
admittedly not the exclusive representative of the majority
of the employees of petitioner, hence, it could not demand
from petitioner the right to bargain collectively in their
behalf.
2. Respondent insists, however, that it could validly bargain
in behalf of "its members," relying on Article 242 of the
Labor Code.[39] Respondent's reliance on said article, a
general provision on the rights of legitimate labor
organizations, is misplaced, for not every legitimate labor
organization possesses the rights mentioned therein.Article
242 (a) must be read in relation to above-quoted Article 255.
On respondent's contention that it was bargaining in behalf
only of its members, the appellate court, affirming the NLRC's
observation that the same would only "fragment the
employees" of petitioner, held that "what [respondent] will
be achieving is to divide the employees, more particularly,
the rank-and-file employees of [petitioner] . the other
workers who are not members are at a serious
disadvantage, because if the same shall be allowed,
employees who are non-union members will be
economically impaired and will not be able to negotiate
their terms and conditions of work, thus defeating the very
essence and reason of collective bargaining, which is an
effective safeguard against the evil schemes of employers in
terms and conditions of work." This Court finds the
observation well-taken.
3. This Court notes that RESPONDENT VIOLATED ARTICLE 264
WHICH PROSCRIBES THE STAGING OF A STRIKE ON THE
GROUND OF ULP DURING THE PENDENCY OF CASES
INVOLVING THE SAME GROUNDS FOR THE STRIKE.
Further, the photographs taken during the strike, as well as
the Ocular Inspection Report of the NLRC representative,
show that the strikers, with the use of ropes and footed
placards, blockaded the driveway to the Hotel's points of
entrance and exit, making it burdensome for guests and
prospective guests to enter the Hotel, thus violating Article
264 (e) of the Labor Code which provides:
ART. 264 (e) No person engaged in picketing shall commit any
act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free
ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful
purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares. (Emphasis...
supplied)... the union officers should be dismissed for staging
and participating in the illegal strike, following paragraph 3,
Article 264(a) of the Labor Code which provides that ". . .[a]ny
union officer who knowingly... participates in anillegal strike
and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in
thecommission of illegal acts during strike may be declared to
have lost his employment status . . ."
An ordinary striking worker cannot, thus be dismissed for
mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof
that he committed illegal acts during a strike, unlike a union
officer who may be dismissed by mere knowingly
participating in an illegal strike and/or committing an illegal
act during a strike.
The appellate court found no convincing and substantial
proof, however, that the strikers-members of respondent
who participated in the illegal strike committed illegal acts.
The list failed to specifically identify the ones who actually
committed illegal acts, however. Such being the case, a
remand of the case to the Labor Arbiter, through the NLRC, is
in order for the purpose only of determining the respective
liabilities of thestrikers listed by petitioner.
ISSUE OF BACKWAGES
The general rule is that backwages shall not be awarded in an
economic strike on the principle that "a fair day's wage"
accrues only for a "fair day's labor." Even in cases of ULP
strikes, award of backwages rests on the court's discretion
and only in exceptional instances.
Jurisprudential law, however, recognizes several exceptions
to the "no backwages rule," to wit:
when the employees were illegally locked to thus compel
them to stage a strike;
[60] when the employer is guilty of the grossest form of ULP;
[61] when the employer committed discrimination in the
rehiring of strikers refusing to readmit those against whom
there were pending criminal cases while admitting
nonstrikers who were also criminally charged in court;
[62] or when the workers who staged a voluntary ULP strike
offered to return to work unconditionally but the employer
refused to reinstate them.
Not any of these or analogous instances is, however, present
in the instant case.
Principles:
1. Article 255 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 255. EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING REPRESENTATION AND
WORKERS' PARTICIPATION IN POLICY AND DECISION-MAKING
The labor organization designated or selected by the majority
of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit
shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such
unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. However, an
individual employee or group of employees shall have the
right at any time to present grievances to their employer.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
workers shall have the right, subject to such rules and
regulations as the Secretary of Labor and Employment may
promulgate, to participate in policy and decision-making
process of the establishment where they are employed
insofar as said processes will directly affect their rights,
benefits and welfare. For this purpose, workers and
employers may form labor-management councils: Provided,
That the representatives of the workers in such labor
management councils shall be elected by at least the majority
of all employees in said establishment. (Emphasis and 7. In Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union
underscoring supplied) (PTUC) v. Court of Industrial Relations,
2. This Court cannot overlook the events that transpired prior This Court made a distinction between two types of
to the strike that the Union staged on November 29, 1997. It employees involved in a ULP: those who are discriminatorily
is beyond argument that a conciliatory meeting was still dismissed for union... activities, and those who voluntarily go
scheduled to be held on December 1, 1997 before the NCMB. on strike even if it is in protest of an ULP. Discriminatorily
In this conciliatory meeting, petitioner Union could have dismissed employees were ordered entitled to backpay from
substantiated and presented additional evidences. the date of the act of discrimination, that is, from the day of
their discharge, whereas employees who struck as a
3. Thus, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Tiu
voluntary act of protest against what they considered a ULP
vs.National Labor Relations Commission:
of their employer were held generally not entitled to
"The Court is not unmindful of this rule, but in the case at bar backpay.
the facts and the evidence did not establish events [sic ]
8. Respondent urges this Court to apply the exceptional rule
leasta rational basis why the union would [wield] a strike
enunciated in Philippine Marine Officers' Guild v. Compañia
basedon alleged unfair labor practices it did not... even
Maritima and similar cases where the employees
bother tosubstantiate during the conciliation proceedings. It
unconditionally offered to return to work, it arguing that
is not enough that the union believed that the employer
there was such an offer on its part to return to work but the
committed acts of unfair labor practice when the
Hotel screened the returning strikers and refused to readmit
circumstances clearly negate even a prima facie [showing to]
those whom it found to have perpetrated prohibited acts
warrant [such a]... belief."
during the strike.
4. It is also evident from the records of the instant petition,
It must be stressed, however, that for the exception in
specifically from the Notice of Strike, that their principal
Philippine Marine Officers' Guild to apply, it is required that
ground for the strike was the "refusal of the Hotel
the strike must be legal.
Management to bargain collectively with the Union for the
benefit of the latter's members."
In the instant case, it is not disputed that the petitioner
UNION is not a certified bargaining unit to negotiate
acollective bargaining agreement (CBA) with private
respondent Hotel
6. It is doctrinal that the exercise of the right of private sector
employees to strike is not absolute. Thus Section 3 of Article
XIII of the Constitution, provides:
SECTION 3. x x x
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining and negotiations and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of
tenure, humane... conditions of work, and a living wage. They
shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Even if the purpose of a strike is valid, the strike may still be
held illegal where the means employed are illegal. Thus, the
employment of violence, intimidation, restraint or coercion
in carrying out concerted activities which are injurious to
the rights to property... renders a strike illegal. And so is
picketing or the obstruction to the free use of property or
the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, when
accompanied by intimidation, threats, violence, and
coercion as to constitute nuisance.
 STA. LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL CORPORATION v.
SECRETARY OF LABOR
GR No. 162355, 2009-08-14
Facts:
1. Confederated Labor Union of the Philippines (CLUP), in
behalf of its chartered local, instituted a petition for
certification election among the regular rank-and-file
employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation and its
Affiliates
2. Med-Arbiter ordered the dismissal of the petition due to
inappropriateness of the bargaining unit.
3. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union reorganized
itself and re-registered as CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial
Corporation Workers Association (herein appellant CLUP-
SLECCWA), limiting its membership to the rank-and-file
employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation.
4. [CLUP-SLECCWA] filed the instant petition. It alleged that
[SLECC] employs about 115 employees and that more than
20% of employees belonging to the rank-and-file category are
its members. [CLUP-SLECCWA] claimed that no certification
election has been held among them within the last 12 months
prior to the filing of the petition
5. SLECC filed a motion to dismiss the petition. It averred that
it has voluntarily recognized [SMSLEC] as the exclusive
bargaining agent of its regular rank-and-file employees, and
that collective bargaining negotiations already commenced
between them. SLECC argued that the petition should be
dismissed for violating the one year and negotiation bar
rules under pars. (c) and (d), Section 11, Rule XI, Book V of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
6. [CLUP-SLECCWA] filed its Opposition and Comment to
[SLECC'S] Motion to Dismiss. It assailed the validity of the
voluntary recognition of [SMSLEC] by [SLECC] and their
consequent negotiations and execution of a CBA. According
to[CLUP-SLECCWA], the same were tainted with malice,
collusion and conspiracy involving some officials of the
Regional Office.
And that it violated one of the major requirements for
voluntary recognition, i.e., non-existence of another labor
organization in the same bargaining unit.
The Med-Arbiter's Ruling
CLUP-SLECCWA's petition for direct certification on the
ground of contract bar rule.
The prior voluntary recognition of SMSLEC and the CBA
between SLECC and SMSLEC bars the filing of CLUP-
SLECCWA's petition for direct certification.
The Ruling of the Secretary of Labor and Employment
The Secretary found merit in CLUP-SLECCWA's appeal. The
Secretary held that the subsequent negotiations and
registration of a CBA executed by SLECC with SMSLEC could
not bar CLUP-SLECCWA's petition. CLUP-SLECC and its
Affiliates
Workers Union constituted a registered labor organization at
the time of SLECC's voluntary recognition of SMSLEC.
The Ruling of the Appellate Court
The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the Secretary and
quoted extensively from the Secretary's decision.
MSLEC's voluntary recognition was void and could not bar
CLUP-SLECCWA's petition for certification election.
Issues:
SLECC asserted that the appellate court commited a
reversible error when it affirmed the Secretary's finding that
SLECC's voluntary recognition of SMSLEC was done while a
legitimate labor organization was in existence in the
bargaining unit.
Ruling:
The petition has no merit.
CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union subsequently re-
registered as CLUP-SLECCWA, limiting its members to the
rank-and-file of SLECC. SLECC cannot ignore that CLUP-SLECC
and its Affiliates Workers Union was a legitimate labor
organization at the time of SLECC's voluntary recognition of
SMSLEC. SLECC and SMSLEC cannot, by themselves, decide
whether CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union
represented an appropriate bargaining unit.
The inclusion in the union of disqualified employees is not
among the grounds for cancellation of registration, unless
such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or
fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) to
(c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code.
Thus, CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union, having
been validly issued a certificate of registration, should be
considered as having acquired juridical personality which
may not be attacked collaterally. The proper procedure for
SLECC is to file a petition for cancellation of certificate of
registration of CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union
and not to immediately commence voluntary recognition
proceedings with SMSLEC.
Employer's Participation in a Petition for Certification
Election
We find it strange that the employer itself, SLECC, filed a
motion to oppose CLUP-SLECCWA's petition for certification
election. In petitions for certification election, the employer is
a mere bystander and cannot oppose the petition or appeal
the Med-Arbiter's decision. The... exception to this rule,
which happens when the employer is requested to bargain
collectively, is not present in the case before us.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition
Principles:
1. BARGAINING UNIT
The concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization
are different from, but related to, the concept of a bargaining
unit. We explained the concept of a bargaining unit in San
Miguel Corporation v. Laguesma, where we stated that:
A bargaining unit is a "group of employees of a given
employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body
of employees, consistent with equity to the employer,
indicated to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights
and duties of the parties... under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law."
The fundamental factors in determining the appropriate
collective bargaining unit are:
(1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine);
(2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as
substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of
compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual
Interests Rule);
(3) prior collective bargaining history; and
(4) similarity of employment status.
Contrary to petitioner's assertion, this Court has categorically
ruled that the existence of a prior collective bargaining
history is neither decisive nor conclusive in the determination
of what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit.
However, employees in two corporations cannot be treated
as a single bargaining unit even if the businesses of the two
corporations are related.
 KIOK LOY v. NLRC
GR No. 54334, 1986-01-22
Facts:
1. The Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa was certified by the
Bureau of Labor Relations as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Sweden
Ice Cream Plant.
2. The Union then furnished the Company with two copies of
its proposed collective bargaining agreement. At the same
time, it requested the Company for its counter proposals.
Eliciting no response to the aforesaid request, the Union
again wrote the Company reiterating its request for collective
bargaining negotiations and for the Company to furnish them
with its counter proposals. Both requests were ignored and
remained unacted upon by the Company.
3. Left with no other alternative the Union filed a "Notice of
Strike", with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground
of unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining all
attempts towards an amicable settlement failed, prompting
the Bureau of Labor Relations to certify the case to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory
arbitration.
4. After several postponements. The NLRC ruled that the
Company has waived its right to present further evidence
and, therefore, considered the case submitted for resolution.
The NLRC ruled that the respondent Sweden Ice Cream is
guilty of unjustified refusal to bargain, in violation of Section
(g) Article 248 (now Article 249), of P.D. 442, as amended.
5. Petitioner now comes before. Us assailing the aforesaid
decision contending that the National Labor Relations
Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in rendering the challenged decision.
6. Petitioner Company maintains that its right to procedural
due process has been violated when it was precluded from
presenting further evidence in support of its stand and when
its request for further postponement was denied.
Petitioner further contends that the National Labor Relations
Commission's finding of unfair labor practice for refusal to
bargain is not supported by law and the
Issues:
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit.
1. While it is a mutual obligation of the parties to bargain, the
employer, however, is not under any legal duty to initiate
contract negotiation. The mechanics of collective bargaining
is set in motion only when the following jurisdictional
preconditions are present, namely, (1) possession of the
status of majority representation of the employees'
representative in accordance with any of the means of
selection or designation provided for by the Labor Code; (2)
proof of majority representation; and (3) a demand to
bargain under
Article 251, par. (a) of the New Labor Code all of which
preconditions are undisputedly present in the instant case.
2. From the over-all conduct of petitioner company in relation
to the task of negotiation, there can be no doubt that the
Union has a valid cause to complain against its (Company's)
attitude, the totality of which is indicative of the latter's,
disregard of, and failure to live up to, what is enjoined by the
Labor Code - to bargain in good faith.
We are in total conformity with respondent NLRC's
pronouncement that petitioner Company is GUILTY of unfair
labor practice. It has been indubitably established that (1)
respondent Union was a duly certified bargaining agent; (2)
it made a definite request to bargain, accompanied with a
copy of the proposed Collective Bargaining Agreement, to
the Company not only once but twice which were left
unanswered and unacted upon; and (3) the Company made
no counter proposal whatsoever all of which conclusively
indicate lack of a sincere desire to negotiate.
3.With respect to the issue of due process, considering the
various postponements granted in its behalf, the claimed
denial of due process appeared totally bereft of any legal and
factual support.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
Principles:
1. Collective bargaining which is defined as negotiations
towards a collective agreement, is one of the democratic
frameworks under the New Labor Code, designed to stabilize
the relation between labor and management and to create a
climate of sound and stable industrial peace. It is a mutual
responsibility of the employer and the Union and is
characterized as a legal obligation.
So much so that Article 249, par. (g) of the Labor Code makes
it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse "to meet
and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the
purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages,
hours of work, and all other terms and conditions of
employment including proposals for adjusting any grievance
or question arising under such an agreement and executing a.
contract incorporating such agreement, if requested by either
party".
2. A Company's refusal to make counter proposal if
considered in relation to the entire bargaining process, may
indicate bad faith and this is specially true where the
Union's request for a counter proposal is left unanswered.
Even during the period of compulsory arbitration before the
NLRC, petitioner Company's, approach and attitude - - stalling
the negotiation by a series of postponements, non-
appearance at the hearing conducted, and undue delay in
submitting its financial statements, lead to no other
conclusion except that it is unwilling to negotiate and reach
an agreement with the Union. Petitioner has not at any
instance, evinced good faith or willingness to discuss freely
and fully the claims and demands set forth by the Union
much less... justify its opposition thereto.[10]
3. Herald Delivery Carriers Union (PAFLU) vs. Herald
Publications the rule had been laid down
That "unfair labor practice is committed when it is shown that
the respondent employer, after having been served with a
written bargaining proposal by the petitioning. Did not even
bother to submit an answer or reply to the said proposal.
This doctrine was reiterated anew in Bradman vs. Court of
Industrial Relations. wherein it was further ruled that "while
the law does not compel the parties to reach an agreement, it
does contemplate that both parties will approach the
negotiation with an open mind and make a reasonable effort
to reach a common ground of agreement''.
We agree with the pronouncement that it is not obligatory
upon either side of a labor controversy to precipitately accept
or agree to the proposals of the other. But an erring party
should not be tolerated and allowed with impunity to resort
to schemes feigning negotiations by going through empty
gestures.
 GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION v. CA,
GR No. 146728, 2004-02-11
Facts:
1. General Milling Corporation (GMC) employed 190
workers. They were all members of private respondent
General Milling Corporation Independent Labor Union, a
duly certified bargaining agent.
2. GMC and the union concluded a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) which included the issue of representation
effective for a term of three years.
3. a day before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent
GMC a proposed CBA, with a request that a counter-
proposal. However, GMC had received collective and
individual letters from workers who stated that they had
withdrawn from their union membership, on grounds of
religious affiliation and personal differences. Believing that
the union no longer had standing to negotiate a CBA, GMC
did not send any counter-proposal.
4. GMC wrote a letter to the union's officer stating that there
was no basis to negotiate with a union which no longer
existed, but that management was nonetheless always willing
to dialogue with them on matters of common concern
5. In answer, the union officers disclaiming any massive
disaffiliation or resignation from the union and submitted a
manifesto, signed by its members, stating that they had not
withdrawn from the union.
6. Unable to reach compromised agreement, the union filed a
complaint against GMC with the NLRC. The complaint alleged
unfair labor practice
7. The labor arbiter dismissed the case with the
recommendation that a petition for certification election be
held to determine if the union still enjoyed the support of the
workers.
8. The union appealed to the NLRC. NLRC set aside the labor
arbiter's decision and ordered GMC to abide by the CBA
draft that the union proposed for a period of two (2) years.
NLRC pointed out that upon the effectivity of Rep. Act No.
6715, the duration of a CBA, insofar as the representation
aspect is concerned, is five (5) years
9. All other provisions of the CBA are to be renegotiated not
later than three (3) years after its execution. Thus, the NLRC
held that respondent union remained as the exclusive
bargaining agent with the right to renegotiate the economic
provisions of the CBA.
10. On GMC's motion for reconsideration, the NLRC set aside
its decision.
It found GMC's doubts as to the status of the union justified
and the allegation of coercion exerted by GMC on the union's
members to resign unfounded.
11.Hence, the union filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals.
The petition is hereby GRANTED. The NLRC Resolution of
October 6, 1998 is hereby SET ASIDE,
Issues:
(1) Whether or not GMC guilty of unfair labor practice for
violating the duty to bargain collectively and/or interfering
with the right of its employees to self-organization, and
(2) Whether or not CA is correct in imposing upon GMC the
draft CBA proposed by the union for two years to begin from
the expiration of the original CBA.
Ruling:
1. On the first issue, Article 253-A of the Labor Code, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 6715, states:
ART. 253-A. Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Any
Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter
into shall, insofar as the representation aspect is concerned,
be for a term of five (5) years.
2. The law mandates that the representation provision of a
CBA should last for five years. The relation between labor
and management should be undisturbed until the last 60 days
of the fifth year. Hence, it is indisputable that when the union
requested for a renegotiation of the economic terms of the
CBA , it was still the certified collective bargaining agent of
the workers, because it was seeking said renegotiation
within five (5) years from the date of effectivity of the CBA.
3. The union's proposal was also submitted within the
prescribed 3-year period from the date of effectivity of the
CBA, albeit just before the last day of said period. It was
obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate
in good faith with the union. For refusing to send a counter-
proposal to the union and to bargain anew on the economic
terms of the CBA, the company committed an unfair labor
practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code
4. GMC's failure to make a timely reply to the proposals
presented by the union is indicative of its utter lack of
interest in bargaining with the union. Its excuse that it felt the
union no longer represented the workers, was mainly dilatory
as it turned out to be utterly baseless.
5. Did GMC interfere with the employees' right to self-
organization? The CA found that the letters between
February to June 1993 by 13 union members signifying their
resignation from the union clearly indicated that GMC
exerted pressure on its employees. The records show that
GMC presented these letters to prove that the union no
longer enjoyed the support of the workers. The fact that the
resignations of the union members occurred during the
pendency of the case before the labor arbiter shows GMC's
desperate attempts to cast doubt on the legitimate status of
the union. We agree with the CA's conclusion that the ill-
timed letters of resignation from the union members indicate ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. The following
that GMC had interfered with the right of its employees to procedures shall be observed in collective bargaining:
self-organization.
(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall
Finally, did the CA gravely abuse its discretion when it serve a written notice upon the other party with a statement
imposed on GMC the draft CBA proposed by the union for of its proposals. The other party shall make a reply thereto
two years commencing from the expiration of the original not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such
CBA? notice.
The Code provides: 4. Likewise, in Divine Word University of Tacloban vs.
Secretary of Labor and Employment, petitioner therein,
ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a
Divine Word University of Tacloban, refused to perform its
collective bargaining agreement.It shall be the duty of both
duty to bargain collectively. Thus, we upheld the unilateral
parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force
imposition on the university of the CBA proposed by the
and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement
Divine Word University Employees Union.
during the 60-day period [prior to its expiration date] and/or
until a new agreement is reached by the parties. We said further: That being the said case, the petitioner may
not validly assert that its consent should be a primordial
The provision mandates the parties to keep the status quo
consideration in the bargaining process. By its acts, no less
while they are still in the process of working out their
than its action which bespeak its insincerity, it has forfeited
respective proposal and counter proposal. The general rule
whatever rights it could have asserted as an employer.[16]
is that when a CBA already exists, its provision shall
continue to govern the relationship between the parties, Applying the principle in the foregoing cases to the instant
until a new one is agreed upon. The rule necessarily case, it would be unfair to the union and its members if the
presupposes that all other things are equal. That is, that terms and conditions contained in the old CBA would
neither party is guilty of bad faith. However, when one of the continue to be imposed on GMC's employees for the
parties abuses this grace period by purposely delaying the remaining two (2) years of the CBA's duration. We are not
bargaining process, a departure from the general rule is inclined to gratify GMC with an extended term of the old
warranted. CBA after it resorted to delaying tactics to prevent
negotiations.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED
5. Since it was GMC which violated the duty to bargain
Principles:
collectively, based on Kiok Loy and Divine Word University of
1. ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. The duty Tacloban, it had lost its statutory right to negotiate or
to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual renegotiate the terms and conditions of the draft CBA
obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously proposed by the union.
in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement
2. We have held that the crucial question whether or not a
party has met his statutory duty to bargain in good faith
typically turns on the facts of the individual case.There is no
per se test of good faith in bargaining.
Good faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the
facts.The effect of an employer's or a union's actions
individually is not the test of good-faith bargaining, but the
impact of all such occasions or actions, considered as a...
whole.
3. Under Article 252 abovecited, both parties are required to
perform their mutual obligation to meet and convene
promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement. The union lived up to this
obligation when it presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC
within three (3) years from the effectivity of the original CBA.
But GMC failed in its duty under Article 252. What it did was
to devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning the existence of the
union and the status of its membership to prevent any
negotiation.
 GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES v. GUAGUA NATIONAL
COLLEGES FACULTY LABOR UNION & GUAGUA NATIONAL
COLLEGES NON-TEACHING & MAINTENANCE LABOR UNION,
GR No. 204693, 2016-07-13
Facts:
1. GNC is an educational institution. On the other hand,
respondents Guagua National Colleges Faculty Labor Union
(GNCFLU) and Guagua National Colleges Non-Teaching and
Maintenance Labor Union (GNCNTMLU) were the bargaining
agents for GNC's faculty members and non-teaching and
maintenance personnel, respectively.
2. The parties concluded their Collective Bargaining
Agreements (CBA) without issue
The aforementioned CBAs applied to both GNCFLU and
GNCNTMLU without distinction.
3. Significantly, the 1994-1999 CBA has a "no-strike, no lock-
out" clause under Section 17 thereof which likewise
provides for mechanism for grievance resolution and
voluntary arbitration. This provision was considered carried
over in the subsequent CBAs.
4. On April 3, 2009, both GNCFLU and GNCNTMLU informed
the University of the former's intention to open the
negotiation for the renewal of the then existing CBA which
would expire on May 31, 2009. Which was received by GNC
on even date
5. GNC wrote respondents calling for a meeting... regarding
CBA negotiations. no agreement was reached except that
GNC would notify respondents of the next negotiation
meeting.
However, what respondents later received from GNC's... was
not a notice of meeting but a letter dated May 27, 2009
which, among others, stated that the "management is not
inclined to grant the economic/monetary-related proposals in
[respondents'] letter of April 3, 2009."
6. Several meetings and negotiations thereafter,
respondents submitted the agreed terms of the CBA which
already contained the revisions requested by GNC and the
P100,000.00 signing bonus for each union.
The document according to them was by then ready for
signing; respondents made several follow-ups with both Atty.
Sampang and Rodriguez of GNC regarding the signing of the
CBA but to no avail;
7. respondents received from Atty: Sampang, through a letter
GNC's counter-proposal.Respondents were surprised since
they thought all along that all matters, except for some
details on the signing bonus, were already settled.
8. This prompt the union to submit the case before the
NCMB and file a notice to strike
Again, the parties differ in their account of what transpired
before the NCMB .Respondents alleged that after several
mediation meetings, the parties finally agreed on the details
regarding the grant of signing bonus.
GNC, on the other hand, contended that during mediation
meetings with the NCMB, respondents submitted several CBA
drafts for its consideration.
9. GNC filed a Motion to Strike Out Notice of Strike and to
Refer Dispute to Grievance Machinery and Voluntary
Arbitration Pursuant to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. It invoked the "no-strike, no lock-out" clause and
the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration provision
of the parties' existing CBA which was carried over from their
1994-1999 CBA and the CBAs subsequent thereto
10. Since the NCMB had not yet acted upon GNC's Motion to
Strike Out Notice of Strike and to Refer Dispute to Grievance
Machinery and Voluntary Arbitration Pursuant to the
Collective Bargaining Agreement despite the looming strike of
respondents, GNC urged the Secretary of Labor and
Employment to assume jurisdiction over the dispute the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, after finding the subject
labor dispute as one affecting national interest, assumed
jurisdiction over the case; certified the same to the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for immediate
compulsory arbitration;
11. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION
11.1As to the charge of unfair labor practice on
account of its alleged bad faith bargaining and
violation of duty to bargain, GNC argued that the
same is belied by the fact that since the very
beginning, the parties were negotiating. This
continued during the mediation and conciliation
proceedings before the NCMB. And had not for
respondents' impatience which caused them to file a
notice of strike, such negotiations would have
progressed. To GNC, respondents' move of filing a
notice of strike was uncalled for and was only
intended to compel GNC to hastily concede to their
proposals. What respondents refused to see,
however, was GNC's critical financial status that
hindered it from readily agreeing with their
economic proposals.
11.2 When GNC filed their petition for assumption of
jurisdiction they prayed that:
The Secretary of Labor and Employment to order to enjoin
the intended strike, or to order the immediate return to work
of strikers if a strike has taken place, and thereafter direct the
parties to submit to the grievance machinery and voluntary
arbitration provisions of the CBA."
12. NRC’s ORDER denied GNC's plea to submit the dispute to
the parties' grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration.
Article 263 (g) does not encompass referral of the labor
dispute in an industry imbibed with national interest to
grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration. In the absence
of a timely reconsideration or proof that GNC had
exercisedavailable remedy in law, the Order now stands
beyond reproach.
The NLRC thus upheld its jurisdiction over the case,
(b) All cases between the same parties, except where the
certification order specifies otherwise, the issues submitted
for arbitration which are already filed or may be filed, and are
relevant to or are proper incidents of the certified case, shall
be considered subsumed or absorbed by the certified case,
and shall be decided by the appropriate Division of the
Commission.
Plaintly, our jurisdiction in this certified case extends to all
other issues between the parties so long as they are relevant
and germane in the resolution of the main labor dispute.
The intention of the law is an immediate and complete
resolution of a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to
the national interest. In this certified case, We are called to
exercise our judgment and adjudicate the labor dispute in
accordance with the Order of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. This Commission will not recuse from this
responsibility for want of jurisdiction.38
13. Anent the merits of the case, the NLRC held that based on
the totality of conduct of GNC, it was guilty of bad faith
bargaining and therefore committed an unfair labor practice.
This was on account of GNC's submission of a counter-
proposal despite the parties already having reached an
agreement regarding the terms of the CBA
14. The CA did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the
part of NLRC in issuing its assailed orders.
Issues:
Essential to the determination of the issue raised is the
resolution of the following:
(1) Whether the subject labor dispute should have been
ordered submitted to voluntary arbitration by the Secretary
of Labor and Employment pursuant to the parties' CBA and
not certified to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration;
(2) Whether GNC is guilty of bad faith bargaining and thus
violated its duty to bargain;
(3)Whether the final CBA draft submitted by respondents to
the NCMB was correctly declared to be the parties' CBA for
the period June 1, 2009 to May 31, 2014.
Ruling:
The Petition has no merit.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment correctly certified
the subject labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration.
GNC asserts that it is the voluntary arbitrator which has
jurisdiction over the grounds cited by respondents in their
notice of strike in view of Section 17 of the parties' 1994-1999
CBA.
GNC relies heavily on University of San Agustin. According to
it, the facts therein are similar if not identical to the facts of
the present case. Hence, the Court's ruling in the said case
squarely applies here.
It must be noted that under the facts of University of San
Agustin, the dispute between the parties primarily involved
the formula in computing the TIP share of the employees -
one which clearly arose from the interpretation or
implementation of the CBA.
Pursuant to Article 261 of the Labor Code, such a grievance
falls under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. Even if
otherwise, the dispute would still fall under the said
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 262 of the same Code since
the parties agreed in their CBA that practically all disputes,
including bargaining deadlock, shall be referred to grievance
machinery that ends in voluntary arbitration. It can safely be
concluded, therefore, that the clear showing of the voluntary
arbitrator's jurisdiction over the parties' dispute in University
of San Agustin is the underlying reason why the Court upheld
the CA's directive for the parties to proceed to voluntary
arbitration in accordance with their CBA. After all, it is the
declared policy of the State to promote and emphasize the
primacy of voluntary arbitration as a mode of settling labor or
industrial disputes.
Contrary to GNC's contention, however, there is a marked
difference between the facts of University of San Agustin and
of the present case which makes the ruling in the former
inapplicable to the latter. Unlike in University of San Agustin,
the main cause of the dispute between the parties in this
case, i.e., GNC's alleged commission of unfair labor practice,
did not arise from the interpretation or implementation of
the parties' CBA, or neither from the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies. Hence, it does
not fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators under
the aforementioned Article 261.
Xxxx Plainly, a charge of unfair labor practice does not fall
under the first three definition of grievance as provided
under their CBA. Neither can it be considered as embraced by
the fourth which at first blush, appears to be a "catch-all"
definition of grievance because of the phrase “any other
matter or dispute".
There is a need for an express stipulation in the CBA that
unfair labor practices should be resolved in the ultimate by
the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators June 1, 2009 to May 31, 2014. More than the fact that GNC is
since the same fall within a special class of disputes that are the erring party in this case, records show that the said draft
generally within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Labor is actually the final CBA draft of the parties which
Arbiter by express provision of the law. incorporates their agreements.
"Absent such express stipulation, the phrase 'all disputes' [or WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED.
"any other matter or dispute" for that matter should be
construed as limited to the areas of conflict traditionally
within the jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators
GNC engaged in bad faith bargaining and thus violated its
duty to bargain.
Here, the collective conduct of GNC is indicative of its failure
to meet its duty to bargain in good faith. Badges of bad faith
attended its actuations both at the plant and NCMB levels. At
the plant level, GNC failed to comply with the mandatory
requirement of serving a reply/counter-proposal within 10
calendar days from receipt of a proposal, a fact which by
itself is already an indication of lack of genuine interest to
bargain.
Then, it led respondents to believe that it was doing away
with the reply/counter-proposal when it proceeded to just
orally discuss the economic terms. After a series of
negotiation meetings, the parties finally agreed on the
economic terms which based on the records was the only
contentious issue between them.
In the days that followed, however, GNC ignored the follow-
ups made by respondents regarding the signing. It then
suddenly capitalized on the fact that it had not yet submitted
a reply/counter-proposal and thereupon served one upon
respondents despite the parties already having reached an
agreement.
It could not be any clearer from the above circumstances that
GNC has no genuine intention to comply with its duty to
bargain. It merely went through the motions of negotiations
and then entered into an agreement with respondents which
turned out to be an empty one since it later denounced the
same by submitting a reply/counter-proposal.
Furthermore the minutes of the meeting provides.
Xxxx “ so next time we will be on the signing”
The final CBA draft submitted by respondents to the NCMB
was correctly imposed by the NLRC as the parties' CBA for
the period June 1, 2009 to May 31, 2014.
In the cases of Kiok Lay, Divine Word University of Tacloban v.
Secretary of Labor and Employment, and General Milling
Corporation,[81] the Court unilaterally imposed upon the
employers the CBAs proposed by the unions after the
employers were found to have violated their duty to bargain
collectively
Here, the Court finds nothing wrong in the pronouncement of
the NLRC that the final CBA draft submitted by respondents
to the NCMB should serve as the parties' CBA for the period

SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA HANJIN SHIPYARD REP.
BY ITS PRESIDENT v. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS,
GR No. 211145, 2015-10-14
Facts:
1. Samahan, filed an application for registration of its name
"SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HANJIN
SHIPYARD" with the DOLE.
2. Respondent Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction Co.,
Ltd. Philippines (Hanjin) filed a petition with DOLE- praying
for the cancellation of registration of Samahan's association
on the ground that its members did not fall under any of the
types of workers enumerated in the second sentence of
Article 243 (now 249).
Hanjin opined that only ambulant, intermittent, itinerant,
rural workers, self-employed, and those without definite
employers may form a workers' association. It further
posited that one third (1/3) of the members of the
association had definite employers
3. The DOLE Regional Director ruled in favor of Hanjin as
stated in the Constitution and By-Laws of Samahan, was an
admission on its part that all of its members were employees
of Hanjin
4. The Ruling of the Bureau of Labor Relations
Before the BLR, arguing that Hanjin had no right to
petition for the cancellation of its registration. Samahan
pointed out that the words "Hanjin Shipyard," as used in its
application for registration, referred to workplace and not
as employer or company. It explained that when a shipyard
was put up in Subic, Zambales, it became known as Hanjin
Shipyard.
5. The BLR granted Samahan's appeal and reversed the
ruling of the Regional Director. It stated that the law clearly
afforded the right to self-organization to all workers including
those without definite employers. As an expression of the
right to self-organization, industrial, commercial and self-
employed workers could form a workers' association if they
so desired but subject to the limitation that it was only for
mutual aid and protection.
However the BLR directed the Samahan to remove the words
"Hanjin Shipyard" from its name.
6. Unsatisfied, Samahan filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 before the CA
7. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA rendered its decision, holding that the
registration of Samahan as a legitimate workers' association
was contrary to the provisions of Article 243 of the Labor
Code. It stressed that only 57 out of the 120 members were
actually working in Hanjin.
While the phrase in the preamble of Samahan's Constitution
and By-laws, "KAMI, ang mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin
Shipyard" created an impression that all its members were
employees of HHIC. Such unqualified manifestation which
was used in its application for. registration, was a clear proof
of misrepresentation which warranted the cancellation of
Samahan's registration.
It also stated that the members of Samahan could not
register it as a legitimate worker's association because the
place where Hanjin's industry was located was not a rural
area. Neither was there any evidence to show that the
members of the association were ambulant, intermittent or
itinerant workers.
ISSUES
I. Whether or not SAMAHAN could form a worker’s
association
II. Whether or not the order of removal of word Hanjin in
their name is correct
Ruling:
The petition is partly meritorious.
Right to self-organization includes right to form a union,
workers' association and labor management councils
More often than not, the right to self-organization
connotes unionism. Workers, however, can also form and join
a workers' association as well as labor-management councils
(LMC).
1. Right to choose whether to form or join a union or
workers' association belongs to workers themselves
In the case at bench, the Court cannot sanction the opinion
of the CA that Samahan should have formed a union for
purposes of collective bargaining instead of a workers'
association because the choice belonged to it.
The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily
includes the right to refuse or refrain from exercising the said
right. It is self-evident that just as no one should be denied
the exercise of a right granted by law, so also, no one should
be compelled to exercise such a conferred right. Also
inherent in the right to self-organization is the right to
choose whether to form a union for purposes of collective
bargaining or a workers' association for purposes of
providing mutual aid and protection.
Hanjin posits that the members of Samahan have definite
employers, hence, they should have formed a union instead
of a workers' association. The Court disagrees. There is no
provision in the Labor Code that states that employees with
definite employers may form, join or assist unions only.
The Court cannot subscribe either to Hanjin's position that
Samahan's members cannot form the association because
they are not covered by the second sentence of Article 243
(now 249)
Clearly, there is nothing in the foregoing implementing rules
which provides that workers, with definite employers, cannot
form or join a workers' association for mutual aid and
protection. Section 2 thereof even broadens the coverage of
workers who can form or join a workers' association. Thus,
the Court agrees with Samahan's argument that the right to
form a workers' association is not exclusive to ambulant,
intermittent and itinerant workers. The option to form or
join a union or a workers' association lies with the workers
themselves, and whether... they have definite employers or
not.
2.NO MISREPRESENTATION ON THE PART OF SAMAHAN TO
WARRANT CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION
Misrepresentation, as a ground for the cancellation
of registration of a labor organization, is committed "in
connection with the adoption, or ratification of the
constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the
minutes of ratification, the list of members who took part in
the ratification of the constitution and by-laws or
amendments thereto, and those in connection with the
election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, and
the list of voters.
The Court concludes that misrepresentation, to be a ground
for the cancellation of the certificate of registration, must be
done maliciously and deliberately. Further, the mistakes
appearing in the application or attachments must be grave or
refer to significant matters. The details as to how the alleged
fraud was committed must also be indubitably shown.
The records of this case reveal no deliberate or malicious
intent to commit misrepresentation on the part of Samahan.
The use of such words "KAMI, ang mga Manggagawa sa
HANJIN Shipyard" in the preamble of the constitution and
by-laws did not constitute misrepresentation so as to
warrant the cancellation of Samahan's certificate of
registration. Hanjin failed to indicate how this phrase
constitutes a malicious and deliberate misrepresentation.
Neither was there any showing that the alleged
misrepresentation was serious in character.
Misrepresentation is a devious charge that cannot simply be
entertained by mere surmises and conjectures.
Even granting arguendo that Samahan's members
misrepresented themselves as employees or workers of
Hanjin, said misrepresentation does not relate to the
adoption or ratification of its constitution and by-laws or to
the election of its officers.
3. Removal of the word "Hanjin Shipyard" from the
association's name, however, does not infringe on
Samahan's right to self-organization
According to Samahan, inherent in the workers' right to self-
organization is its right to name its own organization. It seems
to equate the dropping of words "Hanjin Shipyard" from its
name as a restraint in its exercise of the right to self-
organization. Hanjin, on the other... hand, invokes that
"Hanjin Shipyard" is a registered trade name and, thus, it is
within their right to prohibit its use.
As there is no provision under our labor laws which speak of
the use of name by a workers' association, the Court refers to
the Corporation Code, which governs the names of juridical
persons. Section 18 thereof provides:
No corporate name may be allowed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission if the proposed name is identical or
deceptively or confusingly similar to that of any existing
corporation or to any other name already protected by law or
is patently deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing laws.
When a change in the corporate name is approved, the
Commission shall issue an amended certificate of
incorporation under the amended name.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED
Principles:
1. The right to self-organization is not limited to unionism.
Workers may also form or join an association for mutual aid
and protection and for other legitimate purposes.
2. Collective bargaining is just one of the forms of employee
participation. Despite so much interest in and the promotion
of collective bargaining, it is incorrect to say that it is the
device and no other, which secures industrial democracy. It is
equally misleading to say that collective bargaining is the end-
goal of employee representation. Rather, the real aim is
employee participation in whatever form it may appear,
bargaining or no bargaining, union or no union. Any labor
organization which may or may not be a... union may deal
with the employer. This explains why a workers' association
or organization does not always have to be a labor union and
why employer-employee collective interactions are not
always collective bargaining.
3. To further strengthen employee participation, Article 255
(now 261)[51] of the Labor Code mandates that workers shall
have the right to participate in policy and decision-making
processes of the establishment where they are employed
insofar as said... processes will directly affect their rights,
benefits and welfare. For this purpose, workers and
employers may form LMCs.
A cursory reading of the law demonstrates that a common
element between unionism and the formation of LMCs is the
existence of an employer-employee relationship. Where
neither party is an employer nor an employee of the other,
no duty to bargain collectively would... exist.In the same
manner, expressed in Article 255 (now 261) is the
requirement that such workers be employed in the
establishment before they can participate in policy and
decision making processes.
4. In S.S. Ventures International v. S.S. Ventures Labor
Union, the petition for cancellation of certificate of
registration was denied. The Court wrote:
If the union's application is infected by falsification and like
serious irregularities, especially those appearing on the face
of the application and its attachments, a union should be
denied recognition as a legitimate labor organization.
Prescinding... from these considerations, the issuance to the
Union of Certificate of Registration No. RO300-00-02-UR-
0003 necessarily implies that its application for registration
and the supporting documents thereof are prima facie free
from any vitiating irregularities. Another factor which
militates against the veracity of the allegations in the
Sinumpaang Petisyon is the lack of particularities on how,
when and where respondent union perpetrated the alleged
fraud on each member. Such details are crucial for in the
proceedings for cancellation of... union registration on the
ground of fraud or misrepresentation, what needs to be
established is that the specific act or omission of the union
deprived the complaining employees-members of their right
to choose.
G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974
BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and
ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC., defendants,
ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION, defendant-
appellant.
Facts
Petitioner is, a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo, an
employee respondent company and a union member.
The union had with the Company a CBA containing a
closed shop provision.
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No.
875, prior to its amendment by Republic Act No.
3350, the employer was not precluded "from making
an agreement with a labor organization to require as a
condition of employment membership therein, if such
labor organization is the representative of the
employees." On June 18, 1961, however, Republic
Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an
amendment to — paragraph (4) subsection (a) of
section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but
such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization".
sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any
such labor organization". Republic Act No. 3350
merely excludes ipso jure from the application and
coverage of the closed shop agreement the
employees belonging to any religious sects which
prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor
organization. What the exception provides, therefore,
is that members of said religious sects cannot be
compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when
said unions have closed shop agreements with the
employers; that in spite of any closed shop
agreement, members of said religious sects cannot
be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs
on the sole ground that they are not members of the
collective bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that
the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional
provision on freedom of association, upholds and
reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said
religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still
leaves to said members the liberty and the power to
affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If,
notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of
said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor
union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to
their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do
so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does
the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may
the employer or labor union compel them to join.
Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the
constitutional provision on freedom of association.

Petitioner presented his resignation with the union.

The company notified Appellee and his counsel that
unless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory
arrangement with the Union, the Company would be
constrained to dismiss him from the service. This
prompted Appellee to file an action for injunction, in
the Court of First Instance of Manila to enjoin the
Company and the Union from dismissing Appellee
which was granted. The Union appealed directly to
this the Supreme Court.

Issue

Whether or not Republic Act No. 3350 prohibits and

bans the members of such religious sects that forbid
affiliation of their members with labor unions from
joining labor unions

Held

No. To that all-embracing coverage of the closed

shop arrangement, Republic Act No. 3350 introduced
an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the
Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: "but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious