Analysis
Turkey and the United States under
Summary: Strategically wedged
between Europe, the Caucasus,
and the Middle East, Turkey is a
key actor in the biggest foreign
policy challenges facing the new
U.S. administration: the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran’s
nuclear ambitions, and a newly
belligerent Russia.
As the world celebrates the
recent election of Barack Obama,
politicians in Ankara ponder what
this will mean for their country.
Obama’s foreign policy vision
suggests that Turkish fears are
overblown, and that there exists a
window of opportunity for reinforc-
ing a strategic partnership with the
United States in ways that can
positively impact the region, if
leaders on both sides show some
imagination and avoid pitfalls that
line the way.
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Barack Obama: Yes They Can
by Amberin Zaman*
ANKARA — As people across the globe
celebrated last week’s election of Barack
Obama, America’s first African-Ameri-
can president, locals in a remote village
in southeastern Turkey slaughtered 44
sheep to register their joy. “Obama will
usher in peace, unite the world,” they
declared before smearing sacrificial
blood on an image of Obama in keep-
ing with an age old rite to ward off evil
spirits. In Turkey’s capital city of An-
kara, though, the mood was rather more
subdued as Turkish leaders pondered
the meaning of America’s new president
for their country. Strategically wedged
between Europe, the Caucasus, and the
Middle East, Turkey is a key actor in the
biggest foreign policy challenges facing
the new U.S. administration: the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran’s nuclear am-
bitions, and a newly belligerent Russia.
Turkey’s interests have not always con-
verged with those of the United States.
This was never more evident than when
the Turkish Parliament refused to let
U.S. troops use Turkey as a launch-
ing pad to open a second front against
Saddam Hussein in March 2003. The
rebuttal unleashed a cycle of mutual
hostility and recrimination that is only
just beginning to ease.
Yet nothing alarms Turks quite as much
as the prospect that Obama will fulfill
his campaign promise to recognize
*
Amberin Zaman is the Turkey correspondent of The Economist and writes a weekly column for the Turkish daily Taraf. The views
expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the German Marshall Fund of the United
States (GMF).
the mass slaughter of the Ottoman
Armenians in 1915 as genocide. While
acknowledging the ground-breaking
nature of the U.S. presidential election,
it is from this narrow prism that many
Turks tend to weigh the pros and cons
of President-elect Barack Obama.
Will Obama stick to his promise to
Armenian-American constituents and
wreck Turkish-American relations for
good or, as in the past, will America’s
reliance on Turkey’s military coopera-
tion win the day? And what of the Iraqi
Kurds? Will a Democratic president be
more amenable to their irredentist im-
pulses? Obama’s foreign policy vision
suggests that Turkish fears are over-
blown, and that there exists a window
of opportunity for reinforcing strategic
partnership with the United States in
ways that can positively impact the
region provided leaders on both sides
show pluck and imagination and avoid
the pitfalls that line the way. Rather
than focus on parochial phobias, Turkey
should recognize the opening that the
Obama administration presents. After
eight years of Bush policies that have
alienated Turks across the political
spectrum, there is now leadership
in Washington that likely will share
Turkey’s multilateralist approach to
foreign policy headaches in its backyard
and beyond.
Analysis
The opportunities
The greatest opportunity for enhanced partnership between
Turkey and the United States lies in Turkey’s growing regional
role. Whether it be bringing together Syrians and Israelis,
Palestinians and Israelis, Iraq’s Shiites and Sunnis, or Afghanis
and Pakistanis, Turkey’s good offices and influence are increas-
ingly being called upon to help resolve long-running regional
conflicts. Until recently, Turkey’s freelancing had frequently
irritated Washington, such as when it invited Khaled Meshaal,
the radical Hamas leader, to Ankara in September 2005. By
contrast Obama, who has spoken about engaging rather than
isolating America’s antagonists, may find Turkey a useful
ambassador to lay the groundwork for dialogue, particularly
with Iran. Turkey will play a pivotal role in establishing new
and secure energy routes for Europe that bypass Russia. Turkey
can also do much to help with institution building in a post-
American Iraq.
The risks
The genocide time bomb ticks away
The prevailing wisdom in Ankara, Yerevan (capital of
Armenia), and Washington alike is that with U.S. President-
elect Barack Obama, U.S. Vice President-elect Joseph Biden,
and U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, no U.S. administra-
tion has been as predisposed to genocide recognition. A
congressional bill re-confirming what a growing body of
historians call incontrovertible fact was shelved at the last
minute in 2007 after the Bush administration convinced the
bill’s proponents that its adoption would put American lives
at risk; Turkey might have retaliated by denying access to
the Incirlik airbase—the main supply route for U.S. troops
in Afghanistan and Iraq. But the new lineup in Washington,
many argue, makes it less likely that realpolitik will prevail.
Mindful of such dangers, Turkey last year revived attempts
to make friends with Armenia and in September, Turkey’s
president, Abdullah Gül, became the first Turkish leader to
set foot in Armenia. Turkish and Armenian diplomats have
been quietly working on a deal to establish formal relations
and to re-open their common border, which was sealed by
Turkey after Armenia occupied a big slice of Azerbaijan
during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Turkey insists that
any deal with Armenia should allow for a commission of
historians to uncover what “really happened” in 1915.
After some initial wobbles, Turkey is said to be ready to re-
open the border and to go along with Armenia’s demands
2
“The greatest opportunity for
enhanced partnership between
Turkey and the United States lies in
Turkey’s growing regional role.”
that the proposed historical commission be addressed
within a broader set of bilateral issues. Turkey believes
that all of this should stave off genocide recognition by the
new U.S. administration. That is why hardliners within
the Armenian Diaspora seem bent on stopping Turkey
and Armenia from making peace. For all the conciliatory
noises coming out of Yerevan, some Armenian decision-
makers may believe that Obama’s victory means Armenia
can push for even greater concessions from Turkey. That
would be a gross miscalculation. For starters, if Obama
is serious about tackling Afghanistan and pulling out of
Iraq, then the United States will need Turkey more than
ever before. Incirlik will probably be one of the main exit
points for U.S. soldiers being rotated out of Iraq. Turkey
has some 1,500 troops in Afghanistan; more could be
tapped, though the Turks rule out any combat role. In-
deed, many predict that once in office Obama will be more
of a pragmatist than a liberal.
The new U.S. administration is therefore unlikely to make
the genocide resolution a priority. Secondly, Turkey will be
holding municipal elections in March. The nearer the polls
get the less likely it is that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s
increasingly hawkish prime minister, and his ruling Justice
and Development Party (AKP) will risk opposition calls
of treason by mending fences with Armenia. That is why
Obama’s transition team should coax Armenia into ac-
cepting Turkey’s offer before its too late. At the same time,
it should remind Turkey that the security card has its limits;
the longer Turkey and Armenia remain at odds, the more
likely it is that the genocide resolution will pass, and with it
an opportunity to curb Russian influence and to bring calm
and prosperity to the Caucasus.
Analysis
The Kurdish conundrum
One of the biggest reasons why Turks continue to dislike
America (not Americans) in large numbers1 is because they
believe that the United States is surreptitiously working to es-
tablish an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq that will
eventually comprise fat chunks of southeastern Turkey. The
“proof,” their argument runs, lies in the refusal by the United
States to take military action against some 5,000 rebels of the
separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) based in northern
Iraq. The suspicions persist even though the United States has
been providing the Turkish army with real time intelligence on
the PKK since November 2007, and has been allowing Turkish
fighter jets to strike PKK bases across the border.
It hasn’t helped that the PKK is mounting increasingly
audacious attacks, killing an ever-growing number of Turk-
ish soldiers each time. It would help for the new administra-
tion to call very publicly on the Iraqi Kurds to do more to
prevent the PKK from moving so freely in areas under their
control. At the same time, the notion that withdrawal from
Iraq means abandoning the Iraqi Kurds should be firmly
dispelled. Ankara’s recent overtures to the president of the
Kurdish regional government, Massoud Barzani, should be
encouraged, as should his efforts to peacefully disarm the
PKK. Yet, America’s intentions will remain in question so
long as it sits on the fence on a purportedly new separatist
Kurdish group, the Party for Free Life in Kurdistan (Pejak),
that is fighting for Kurdish autonomy inside Iran. It is an
open secret that Pejak and the PKK are one and the same.
Yet the U.S. Department of State does not label Pejak a
terrorist group as it does the PKK. Not surprisingly, Iran (a
country that in the past used to arm and shelter the PKK
in an effort to undermine Turkey) is now helping Turkey
hunt them down. The Obama administration would gain
much sympathy in Turkey if it were to call Pejak by its real
name—terrorists—and rouse the mettle to condemn their
mischief in Iran. Talk of U.S. double standards would sub-
side, Turkish-Iranian military cooperation would be nipped
in the bud, and Iran would have one less reason to believe
the United States is committed to overthrowing its regime.
Human rights
The conventional wisdom in Ankara has long held that the
Republicans are better for Turkey. They best appreciate
Turkey’s strategic value and are less bothered about its patchy
1
See http://www.transatlantictrends.org
human rights record than the Democrats. Obama should do
nothing to disabuse Turkey of this notion. Torture and other
violations are on the rise. The government seems to have lost
all interest in reforms tailored to win EU membership. And de-
spite earlier promises to do more for the country’s estimated 14
million ethnic Kurds, Prime Minister Erdoğan has done little
to improve their lot, and seems increasingly inclined to take his
cue from the generals. Kurds continue to be punished for using
their mother tongue and giving their children Kurdish names.
Long-promised economic development schemes have failed
to materialize. All of this has provided the PKK with a steady
stream of recruits. For many Kurds, Obama’s victory offered
hope that they too might break free from second-class status
some day. Unsurprisingly, the villagers who slaughtered sheep
to celebrate his success were Kurds.
Conclusion
The election of Barack Obama has provoked hope and
excitement across the world and the overwhelming majority
of Turks share those feelings. The opportunity to turn a fresh
page in Turkish-American relations has never been better.
The onus is on leaders in Turkey and the United States to rise
above their parochial interests and ensure that this historic
moment is seized.
Amberin Zaman, Correspondent, The Economist
Amberin Zaman has been the Turkey correspondent for The Economist
and writes a weekly column for the Turkish daily Taraf.
About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a
nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution
dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding
between North America and Europe. GMF does this by supporting
individuals and institutions working on transatlantic issues, by
convening leaders to discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes,
and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation can
address a variety of global policy challenges. In addition, GMF
supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. In
addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven
offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara,
and Bucharest.