Analysis
Don’t Legislate History
Summary: It is no great secret that
many people in Turkey did not favor
the election of Barack Obama as
the new U.S. President due to his
support of defining the tragic fate of
Ottoman Armenians during World
War I as “genocide.” American
foreign policy would greatly benefit
from Turkish assistance and coop-
eration beyond the obvious issues
of Iran, Iraq, and the Caucasus.
In the Turkish-Armenian relation-
ship, history is being used as a
political weapon to settle scores.
Turkey has shown great progress on
the path toward reconciliation, but
there are two more steps the Turk-
ish government could take to warm
the relationship once and for all.
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The perils of domestic expediency
by Soli Ozel*
It is no great secret that many in Turkish
government positions of influence and
responsibility did not favor the election
of Barack Obama to the U.S. presidency.
Turkey has a traditional preference for
the Republican foreign policy establish-
ment because it is presumed that it better
appreciates Turkey’s strategic impor-
tance. Obama’s position on the question
of Armenia played an important part in
this preference. Then-candidate and now
President-elect Obama is committed to
recognizing the tragic fate of Ottoman Ar-
menians during World War I as “genocide,”
as are Vice President-elect Joseph Biden and
newly appointed Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton. Nancy Pelosi, U.S. speaker of the
house, already unsuccessfully tried to pass
Resolution 106 in the House of Representa-
tives (HR106) last year. After warnings by
the Bush administration about the possible
consequences of such a move, including
the closing of Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base, the
bill was never brought to the floor because
members did not want to alienate Turkey at
that particular moment, potentially putting
in peril U.S. troops stationed in Iraq.
As I argued in my last On Turkey piece
“Committed to Change, or Changing Com-
mitments? Turkish-American Relations
Under a New U.S. President,” Turkey will
*
Soli Ozel teaches at Istanbul Bilgi University’s Department of International Relations and Political Science and is a columnist for the
Turkish daily Sabah. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the German
Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF).
be a potentially significant partner for the
United States as the Obama administration
puts its foreign policy priorities in place.
Most of the items topping the American
foreign policy and security agenda would
greatly benefit from Turkish assistance and
cooperation for resolution. The usefulness
of Turkey would go beyond the immedi-
ately obvious issues of Iran, Iraq, and the
Caucasus. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan , Turkish
prime minister, recently concluded an of-
ficial visit to India just a few days before the
atrocious terrorist attacks in Mumbai. The
Turkish press reported that the Pakistani
Prime Minister called his Turkish coun-
terpart Erdoğan following the Mumbai at-
tacks, asking Turkey to use its good offices.
Turkey already does this between Afghani-
stan and Pakistan. In Afghanistan, if the
Obama administration could find a way
out of the cul de sac in which NATO finds
itself, Turkey’s historical ties to that country
could afford it a prominent position in
the thankless task of nation-building. It is
worth noting, that in addition to troops, the
Turkish government and a Turkish com-
munity foundation are operating six female
schools in Afghanistan, and the Turkish
International Cooperation & Development
Agency (TIKA) has also invested in hospi-
tals and other facilities.
Analysis
Yet, as Ian Lesser draws attention to in his latest On Turkey piece,
“Turkey and the Global Economic Crisis,” the overload in the
Obama administration’s agenda may impede the consolidation of
a closer, more communicative, and coordinated policy between the
two partners. Domestic political pressures may create a situation
whereby Turkish-American relations would be derailed before
they have been firmly put back on the right track. The single most
important development would involve, not surprisingly, the contro-
versial issue of an Armenian Genocide Resolution. Equally critical
would be the U.S. President’s annual letter of April 24 defining what
happened to Ottoman Armenians as “genocide.”
Turkish-Armenian relations took a turn for the better in the wake
of the August 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia. Building on secret
talks in Geneva, Serzh Sargsian,the Armenian president in an op-ed
written for the Wall Street Journal, invited his Turkish counterpart
Abdullah Gül to Yerevan to watch a soccer game between the two
national teams. The “soccer diplomacy” paid off and the two sides
have come together on numerous occasions since September 6,
2008. The Turkish public was overwhelmingly in favor of warming
relations despite particularly provocative statements by the political
opposition in parliament.
Apart from the goal of having more influence as a regional power,
which necessitates open relations with Armenia, an important
reason for Turkey’s démarche was the desire to thwart the consid-
eration of another resolution. Amberin Zaman, in her piece “As
Turkey and Armenia inch toward reconciliation both sides talk the
talk, but can they walk the walk?”
reported that Turks showed remarkable flexibility on the matter,
such as the nature of the historians’ committee first suggested by
Prime Minister Erdoğan, and no longer insist on linking an amelio-
ration of relations between Ankara and Yerevan to the resolution of
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. A willingness to establish dip-
lomatic relations and/or open the border is quite apparent as condi-
tions mature. There is also little doubt that Armenia would benefit
immensely from such an opening both economically and politically.
Western interests would be well served if Armenia becomes a par-
ticipant in the politics of the South Caucasus once its conflict with
Azerbaijan is resolved and its relations with Turkey normalized.
Yet, on the Armenian side, there appears to be a hardening of the
position that belies the accommodating rhetoric. Reportedly, the
Armenian Diaspora, which is heavily invested in the labeling busi-
ness, warns Armenian authorities against selling out the national
cause just when, with such a sympathetic team in place, the long,
2
“The nature of the opening with
Armenia... and what the United
States stands to gain from it, ought
to be communicated to Congress
and the media.”
sought after goal of getting the resolution passed is within reach.
If the Diaspora has its way and the U.S. Congress passes a resolu-
tion acknowledging the events of 1915 as “genocide,” the Turkish
government would be under immense pressure to respond, possibly
with retaliation. Even if relations get back on track, as they eventu-
ally must, precious time in a critical period will have been wasted in
Turkish-American relations. Upon the passing of such a resolution
it would be impossible to continue the détente between Armenia
and Turkey, and the most likely outcome would be a hardening of
Turkish public attitudes, something the nationalist forces would be
delighted to exploit. As for the purported goal of such resolutions
around the world, namely that this would force Turkey to take a
critical look at its past, it will not materialize. In fact, a strong case
can be made for the adverse effect of such resolutions on the open-
ness of the debate concerning the Armenian question in Turkey.
Turkey should not stand still waiting for the Armenian Diaspora
to have its way and inflict damage, not only on Turkish-American
relations, but sell short the interests of the Republic of Armenia and
its citizens. The nature of the opening with Armenia, the political,
economic, strategic, and humanistic dimensions of this initia-
tive, and what the United States stands to gain from it, ought to be
communicated to the U.S. Congress and the media. Ankara ought
to make clear what it wishes to achieve with this opening and, if
the blockage stems from Yerevan, share this information with all
relevant parties. As relations improve, it would be a lot easier for
Armenians and Turks to deal with the ghosts of the past and reach
a common understanding on how to best approach this historical
record. Currently, history is being used by some in the Diaspora, by
Turkey-bashers around the world, and others as a political weapon
to settle scores. There is no doubt that this strategy is far from being
the best to achieve reconciliation between Turks and Armenians
that would open the way to dealing properly and honestly with a
Analysis

painful episode of their common history.

Soli Ozel, Lecturer, Bilgi University; Columnist, Sabah
Apart from its diplomatic openings and its efforts to communi-
Soli Ozel teaches at Istanbul Bilgi University’s Department of
cate to the American public and political class, in its reconciliatory
International Relations and Political Science. He is a columnist for the
approach toward better relations with Armenia, Turkey could take
national daily Sabah and is senior advisor to the chairman of the
one significant step. It is a matter of honor and decency for the
Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association. Additionally, he
Turkish government to go to the bottom of the assassination of the
is the editor of TUSIAD’s magazine Private View.
Armenian-Turkish journalist Hrant Dink. Dink, who believed that
Armenians were victims of genocide in 1915, fiercely opposed the
About GMF
politicization of and objected the passing of any legislation on the
matter. As a result, he was neither a favorite of the Armenian Dias- The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a
pora nor Turkish nationalists. Mounting evidence shows that this nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution
heinous murder took place because of the connivance, assistance, dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding
and, the outright participation of parts of the Turkish security between North America and Europe. GMF does this by supporting
establishment. This great believer of Armenian-Turkish reconcili- individuals and institutions working on transatlantic issues, by
ation can then be honored with a simple monument dedicated to convening leaders to discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes,
Turkish-Armenian friendship. and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation can
address a variety of global policy challenges. In addition, GMF
It is not the U.S. Congress’ business of legislating history, especially supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded
when a resolution such as HR106 does not stand on solid ground in 1972 through a gift from Germany, on the 25th anniversary of the
either historically or legally. There is also, of course, the matter of Marshall Plan, as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance,
whether states—many of which have plenty of skeletons in their GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In
own closets—should pass such judgments on other states. Turkey addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices
will ultimately deal properly with this history as its relations with in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and
Armenia are further normalized. Many of its independent scholars Bucharest.
came up with original research and interpretations that all but bur-
ied the official version on the deportation and elimination of Ana-
tolia’s Armenian population. They will continue to do good work
and inform their own public as well as the outside world. Turkey’s
future defense ministers, unlike Vecdi Gonul, who recently justified
the elimination of the Armenian population from Anatolia with
the expediency of homogenization of populations in the process of
nation-building, will express regret that the nation actually lost its
human richness during that bloody episode. Bullying Ankara will
not help the cause of either justice or historical truth.

In the meantime, to sacrifice the interests of the United States,

Turkey, and Armenia on the altar of domestic political expediency
would run counter to the deliberative and judicious style of doing
business that the President-elect has so far displayed.