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Cary J. Nederman
Journal of the History of Ideas, Volume 66, Number 1, January 2005, pp. 1-15
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Empire and the Historiography of
European Political Thought:
Marsiglio of Padua,
Nicholas of Cusa, and
the Medieval/Modern Divide
Cary J. Nederman
When did the Middle Ages end and modernity (or at any rate, early moder-
nity) begin? For the historian of political thought, no question about periodization
probably evokes more controversy or is more provocative than this one. Some
recent scholars, in effect, respond: Never! The long shadow cast by the mid-
twentieth-century Cambridge historian Walter Ullmann—still surprisingly vis-
ible, despite his supposedly waning influence—may perhaps be detected in
this trend.1 A teacher of or inspiration for many currently eminent historians of
political thought, Ullmann notoriously went to great pains to filter out of his
version of the history of political ideas reference to texts or doctrines that in-
conveniently revealed elements of discontinuity between late medieval and
early modern modes of thought.
Several of Ullmann’s successors have adopted an even more extreme ver-
sion of this historiography. Consider Brian Tierney’s comment in the conclu-
sion to his Wiles Lectures concerning the epoch between 1150 and 1650:
1
See Cary J. Nederman, “What is Dead and What is Living in the Scholarship of Walter
Ullmann,” Pensiero Politico Medievale, 2 (2004), 1-8.
1
Copyright 2005 by Journal of the History of Ideas, Inc.
2
Brian Tierney, Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought, 1150-1650 (Cam-
bridge, 1982), 105 (emphasis mine).
3
J. H. Burns, “Introduction,” The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700, ed.
Burns with Mark Goldie (Cambridge, 1991), 2, 3.
4
Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought (2 vols.; Cambridge,
1978), I, ix.
5
See Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights (Atlanta, 1997); Kenneth Pennington, The
Prince and the Law, 1200-1600 (Berkeley, 1993); and Francis Oakley, The Conciliarist Tradi-
tion: Constitutionalism in the Catholic Church 1300-1870 (Oxford, 2003).
6
See also Constantin Fasolt, The Limits of History (Chicago, 2004).
7
J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic
Republican Tradition (Princeton, 1975), 50.
8
Ibid., 53.
manist” thesis associated with the name of Hans Baron.9 Baron famously, if not
uncontroversially, asserted that the political crisis of Florentine governance in
1402 generated a rapid transformation of thought and practice that swept
throughout Europe and fundamentally altered the terms of public discourse.10
Baron’s argument entailed, then, the postulation of a profound break between
early modern and medieval conceptions of politics and the nature of political
life—in particular, concerning the active character of citizenship—to which
Pocock more or less wholly subscribed.
In a sense Pocock has returned to the postulation of historical and historio-
graphical discontinuity in the third and latest installment (titled The First De-
cline and Fall) of Barbarism and Civilization, the grand work that has mainly
occupied him for the last three decades.11 Pocock’s principal historiographical
project in the volume is the demonstration that the “Decline and Fall” trope
highlighted by Gibbon reflects a clearcut Renaissance invention arising from
the innovations (or perhaps renovations) of the Florentine civic humanist circle.
Pocock himself repeatedly invokes this claim in Part III (154-55) as well as
Part II (128-29) of The First Decline and Fall in order to identify “Decline and
Fall” as a standard for delineating “medieval political thought” from succeed-
ing modes of engaging in the enterprise of political theory. His major evidence
favoring this distinction is the widespread appropriation and application of the
theme of translatio imperii in the late classical and medieval periods, that is,
the notion of an unbroken continuity between past and present forms of univer-
sal human governance connected with Roman rule and its association with the
Respublica Christiana (98-100). In turn the postulation of a persisting link
between past and present mediated through a universal political institution was
replaced during the Renaissance by Decline and Fall, which viewed the Em-
pire as one more system of governance existing in time that follows a “natural”
pattern of change and eventual death. Thus, more explicitly than in his previ-
ous writings Pocock seeks in The First Decline and Fall to explicate the intel-
lectual differences between medieval and modern times that exemplify the great
divide inherited from Baron.
Adapting this approach to the wider historiographical field posed by the
medieval/modern distinction is a timely and useful one. Indeed, I share Pocock’s
evident suspicion that the continuities between medieval and early modern po-
litical thought have been overplayed in the hands of recent scholars (who have
been labeled neo-Figgisites12), including those cited in the first paragraph of
9
Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 55-58.
10
See James Hankins (ed.), Renaissance Civic Humanism (Cambridge, 2000).
11
J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, III: The First Decline and Fall (Cambridge,
2003).
12
See Cary J. Nederman, “Constitutionalism—Medieval and Modern: Against Neo-Figgisite
Orthodoxy (Again),” History of Political Thought, 17 (1996), 179-94.
the present essay, who render the categories of “medieval” and “modern” for
all intents and purposes meaningless when it comes to the analysis of the his-
tory of European political thought. In The First Decline and Fall, Pocock of-
fers compelling evidence that the “all-continuity-all-the-time” position is over-
drawn: medieval thinkers did see themselves as direct heirs to the Roman Em-
pire—hence, the widespread use of the translatio imperii theme—in a way that
at least some Renaissance thinkers (the important ones for Pocock) did not.
Pocock’s argument seems to me to swing the pendulum somewhat too far
in the other direction, however, by apparently recalling the specter of an Iron
Curtain between the “backward looking” medieval point of view (literally, hence
the obsession with the Empire) and the accomplishments of the Renaissance
civic republicans in introducing the new Decline and Fall perspective. He ad-
mits that, as a matter of historical record, “the translatio died hard if it died at
all, and persisted alongside many of the writings we shall consider as making a
transition to Decline and Fall” (144).13 Likewise, Pocock directly challenges
scholars who have found evidence in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries of
important republican themes that he and Baron identify specifically and ini-
tially in European history with “the Florentine humanism of the quattrocento
and cinquecento” (144). Looking backwards to Brunetto Latini, Ptolemy of
Lucca, and that supposed arch-republican Marsiglio of Padua, Pocock discov-
ers in all of them an abiding devotion to translatio imperii that in his view
comports ill with the robust republicanism (and connected introduction of De-
cline and Fall) of Bruni and company.
In what follows I propose to challenge the conceptual clarity and historical
accuracy of Pocock’s scheme. I examine textual evidence in order to offer rea-
sons why Pocock’s narrative concerning imperialism and republicanism re-
quires further elaboration in recognition of the complexity of the issues he
investigates. First, his employment of Marsiglio of Padua’s De translatione
Imperii without reference to the Defensor Pacis, of which it is explicitly de-
rivative, skews the meaning of Marsiglio’s specific use of that theme, in par-
ticular by imputing to it an unwarranted universalism. Second, fifteenth-cen-
tury thinkers who continued to employ the translatio imperii construct often
drew from it conclusions that were widely at variance with those that Pocock
believes to be central to the discourse. I illustrate this claim with reference to
Nicholas of Cusa’s De concordantia catholica. I conclude that Pocock’s strict
conceptual division between translatio imperii and Decline and Fall models
has an a priori character that often does not fit texts to which it should in prin-
ciple apply. In closing, I offer some attenuated reflections on why the limita-
13
Citing Thomas Izbicki and Cary J Nederman (eds.), Three Tracts on Empire (Bristol,
2000). See Werner Goez, Translatio Imperii: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Geschichtsdenkens
und der politischen Theorien im Mittelalter und in der frühen Neuzeit (Tübingen, 1958).
Marsiglio of Padua
Pocock places the theme of “universality” at the core of the translatio im-
perii perspective, whether in its imperialist or its papalist instantiations: “The
myth of the Roman empire, translated, universal and persisting to the end of
time, was still a necessary component of Latin Christian discourse” (145). Thus,
Marsiglio of Padua, writing in the 1320s in support of the cause of Ludwig of
Bavaria, king of the Germans and pretender to the imperial throne, found it
necessary to compose a treatise De translatione Imperii in order to bolster the
German’s cause against the papacy. The circumstances of Marsiglio’s involve-
ment with Ludwig should be mentioned here, particularly because some facts
are stated incorrectly in Pocock’s brief account of the historical background to
the treatise (145-46). (For instance, Pocock misstates that the date of Ludwig’s
expedition to Rome was 1327-28; it could not have been 1323, since Marsiglio
was still in Paris and had not yet completed his mater opus, the Defensor Pacis,
which was finished 24 June 1324.) Marsiglio probably wrote the De translatione
Imperii almost immediately after completing the Defensor Pacis, in the second
half of 1324 or 1325, when he was still resident in Paris. A thorough re-exami-
nation of the sources by the German historian Frank Godthardt has profoundly
altered what we know about the circumstances of Marsiglio’s departure from
Paris. There is no evidence that Marsiglio was hounded or subjected to any
charges on the basis of his authorship, which, despite common myth, was hardly
anonymous, since he peppers it with unmistakable references to himself (“son
of Antenor”) and to his known associates (Matteo Visconti). Rather, when
Marsiglio and his colleague John of Jandun departed Paris and took up resi-
dence with Ludwig, to whom the Defensor Pacis had been dedicated, there was
no panicked “flight,” no hint of danger. The best evidence points to a planned
and calculated decision to enter the service of Ludwig, an event which prob-
ably occurred around the time Marsiglio was writing De translatione Imperii,
and not 1326, the date universally ascribed in present scholarship. Even with
this departure, there seems to have been no hue and cry about the heretical
character of Marsiglio’s book, no immediate change in the eyes of the church.14
Given this highly charged political context, Pocock is correct to note that
Marsiglio had no intent to engage in historical writing in a later sense (150).
The treatise is pure polemic, a work meant to counter the standard claim (found
14
See Frank Godthardt, “Marsilius of Padua and John of Jandun at the Court of King
Ludwig of Bavaria: Exile or Destination?,” presented at the International Medieval Congress,
Leeds, 2002.
15
See the “Introduction” to Marsiglio of Padua, Writings on the Empire, ed. Cary J. Nederman
(Cambridge, 1993), xi-xiii; original Latin text in Colette Jeudy and Jeannine Quillet (eds.), Marsile
de Padoue: Oeuvres Mineures (Paris, 1979).
16
Marsiglio, Writings on the Empire, 66.
17
Ibid., 67.
Indeed, the German empire in the Defensor minor becomes a kind of test case
for the application of Marsiglio’s “generic” theory of the legitimate basis of
rulership.18 His only general comment on the question of the universality and
necessity of world empire comes in Chapter 18 of the first discourse of the
Defensor Pacis as an aside:
18
See Cary J. Nederman, “From Defensor Pacis to Defensor Minor: The Problem of Em-
pire in Marsiglio of Padua,” History of Political Thought, 16 (1995), 313-29.
19
Marsiglio of Padua, The Defensor of Peace, tr. Alan Gewirth, with an afterword and
updated bibliography by Cary J. Nederman (New York, 2001), 84-85.
20
See Antony Black, Political Thought in Europe 1250-1550 (Cambridge, 1992), 7-13.
Nicholas of Cusa
them by nature and to rule the others by these laws.”26 Consequently, Nicholas
posits a strict distinction between the wise few and the foolish multitude, which
dictates that the latter can play no direct role in their own rule. He says, “Al-
mighty God has assigned a certain natural servitude to the ignorant and stupid
so that they readily trust the wise to help them preserve themselves.”27 Reason
dictates the dominance of the few over the many, and thus the rule of a small
governing elite over the subjected masses.
If reason justifies government in general, then specifically imperial gov-
ernment derives from its superior, spiritual calling. Cusa constructs a hierarchy
of regimes stretching from the king of the Tartars, who “is the least worthy
because he governs through laws least in agreement with those divinely insti-
tuted,” through Islamic governance to Christian monarchs. On top of the pyra-
mid, “according to the standard of holiness of rule, I maintain that the authority
of the empire is the greatest.”28 He reasons that the chief purposes of all rulers,
and especially of Christian kings, are the maintenance of religion and the pro-
motion of eternal ends; all other goals of government are “subservient.” Thus,
“our Christian empire outranks the others, just as our most holy and pure Chris-
tian religion is highest in holiness and truth. And as every kingdom and prince
should care for his kingdom, so the Emperor should care for the whole Chris-
tian people.”29 Other Christian princes are therefore beneath the Roman Em-
peror and must submit to him in matters concerning the protection of Christ’s
church.30 Given Nicholas’s polemical intention to lend support to the efforts of
the Emperor Sigismund to intervene in the Council of Basel, he could hardly
have adopted any other position.31 It is the Emperor, in his view, to whom the
duty pertains to enforce conciliar decrees. Hence, imperial authority must ex-
tend to all Christian believers: “Because he is guardian of the universal faith
and the protector of universal statutes which could not be effectively executed
without a ruler over all, and since the universal statutes respecting the Chris-
tian faithful bind all faithful Christians to maintain and apply them, all are
subject to the emperor’s rule insofar as he is established to maintain those
directives.”32 Such a universal jurisdiction stems from the fact that “the whole
Christian people” transferred power to him to act as enforcer of canon law and
“guardian of the faith.”33 In these matters little room would appear to be af-
forded for national governments to exist as anything other than local agents of
the Emperor.
26
De concordantia catholica, tr. by Paul Sigmund, 98.
27
Ibid., 206.
28
Ibid., 237.
29
Ibid., 237-38.
30
Ibid., 239-39.
31
See Ibid., 250-67.
32
Ibid., 239-40.
33
Ibid., 239, 238.
Yet Cusa is careful to stipulate that the honor due to the Empire, and hence
its universalistic character, pertain only to its status and functions in the spiri-
tual realm. Previously in De concordantia catholica he had acknowledged that
political rule also naturally and necessarily involves non-religious functions
that properly pertain to Christian and non-Christian regimes alike.34 Natural
reason and the survival of the incompetent multitude demand the existence of
political order and communal law. In performing these duties, it seems, the
Emperor’s authority does not derive from God and the Christian people. How,
then, does any particular regime emerge to provide these services? He claims
that all people, even the most ignorant, are held to assent to the terms of their
governance both originally and on a continuing basis. According to Nicholas,
the “enslavement” of the ignorant to the wise does not undercut the voluntary
character of political arrangements. It may be true that “those better endowed
with reason are the natural lords and masters of the others but not by any coer-
cive law or judgment imposed on someone against his will.” This is because
human beings possess a natural equality in their power and freedom.
Since all are by nature free, every governance ... by which subjects are
compelled to abstain from evil deeds and their freedom directed to-
wards the good through fear of punishment can only come from the
agreement and consent of the subjects. For if men are equal in power
and equally free, the true properly ordered authority of one common
ruler who is their equal in power cannot be naturally established ex-
cept by the election and consent of the others, and law is also estab-
lished by consent.35
34
De concordantia catholica, 205-6.
35
Ibid., 98.
36
See Cary J. Nederman, “Rhetoric, Reason, and Republic: Republicanisms—Ancient, Me-
dieval, and Modern,” Renaissance Civic Humanism, ed. Hankins, 261-262.
37
Nicholas of Cusa, The Catholic Concordance, 208.
38
De concordantia catholica, 235.
39
Ibid., 235-36.
40
Ibid., 236.
41
Ibid., 260.
42
Nicholas of Cusa, The Catholic Concordance, 287.
43
Ibid., 287-88
44
Ibid., 289.
45
Ibid., 290.
46
Ibid., 291-95.
47
Ibid., 295.
48
Ibid., 295-96.
49
Ibid., 287.
Conclusion
50
Cary J. Nederman, Worlds of Difference: European Discourses of Toleraion, c.1100-
c.1550 (University Park, Penn., 2000), 89-95.
51
Cary J. Nederman, “Il Pensiero Politico Europeo tra l’Epoca Medievale e la Modernità: Il
Contributo Storico e Storiografico di Alessandro Passerin d’Entrèves,” Alessandro Passerin
d’Entrèves pensatore europeo, ed. Sergio Noto (Bologna, 2004), 135-51.
52
See Vickie Sullivan, “Introduction,” Machiavelli, Hobbes, and the Formation of a Lib-
eral Republicanism in England (Cambridge, 2004), 1-9, 22-27.
53
Nederman, “Rhetoric, Reason, and Republic,” 248-49, 268-69.
54
Janet Coleman, “Structural Realities of Power: The Theory and Practice of Monarchies
and Republics in Relation to Personal and Collective Liberty,” The Propagation of Power in the
Medieval West, ed. Martin Gosman, Arjo Vanderjagt, and Jan Veenstra (Gronigen, 1998).
55
Mikael Hörnqvist, Machiavelli and Empire (Cambridge, 2004).
56
Earlier versions of this essay were presented at the 2004 meeting of the Renaissance
Society of America in New York City and to the 2004 Texas Medieval Studies Association
meeting in Dallas. Thanks are due to the participants in these sessions, including John Pocock
himself, as well as to the anonymous reviewers for JHI for their suggestions.