G.R. No.
164457 April 11, 2012 To elucidate why the Prosecution’s hearsay evidence was unreliable and
ANNA LERIMA PATULA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
The crime of estafa was filed against Anna Lerima Patula, the saleswoman of
FootLucker’s Chain of Stores Inc. located in Dumaguete City. The information
charged her that she have collected and received the total sum of P131,286,97 from
several customers but she failed to deliver the said collection to the company but
instead wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted the proceeds of the sale to her own use and benefit.
On arraignment, she plead not guilty. So trial on the merits ensued.
The Prosecution presented 2 witnesses Lamberto Go who was the branch manager of
FootLucker’s and Karen Guivencan the auditor who was tasked by Lamberto Go to
invesitigate on the matter. The prosecution presented Exhibits B to YY which
represents private documents (ledgers and their derivatives) that contains the
balances of the customers.
The counsel for the defense interposed a continuing objection that Exhibits B to YY
and their derivatives are hearsay because the person who made the entries were not
themselves presented in court.
RTC rendered its decision finding her guilty of estafa. RTC denied petitioner’s MR.
ISSUE:
Whether the testimony of Guivencan is hearsay and therefore, inadmissible?
RULING:
The testimony of Guivencan is inadmissible for being hearsay.
Guivencan conceded having no personal knowledge of the amounts actually received
by petitioner from the customers or remitted by petitioner to Footlucker’s. This
means that persons other than Guivencan prepared Exhibits B to YY and their
derivatives, inclusive and that Guivencan based her testimony on the entries found in
the receipts supposedly issued by petitioner and in the ledgers held by Footlucker’s
corresponding to each customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of some of the
customers. Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on the entries
effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to validate and test the
veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence of petitioner’s misappropriation or
conversion through cross-examination by petitioner. The denial of that opportunity
rendered the entire proof of misappropriation or conversion hearsay, and thus
unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes of determining the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made to Section 36 of
Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to those facts
that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own
perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The personal
knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial
evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal
knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her
testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently
testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her
information.
The information cannot be tested because the declarant is not standing in court as a
witness andcannot, therefore, be cross-examined.
G.R. No. 136914 January 25, 2002
COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
LIANGA BAY AND COMMUNITY MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE,
INC., respondent.
FACTS: The petitioner is a domestic corporation principally engaged in the insurance
business while the respondent is a duly registered cooperative judicially declared
insolvent and represented by the elected assignee, Cornelio Jamero.
Sometime in 1989, the petitioner and the respondent entered into a contract of fire
insurance wherein the petitioner insured the respondent’s stocks-in-trade against fire
loss, damage or liability from June 20, 1989, 4PM to June 20, 1990, 4PM, for
P200,000.00.
On July 1, 1989, at or about 12:40 a.m., the respondent’s building located at Barangay
Diatagon, Lianga, Surigao del Sur was gutted by fire and reduced to ashes, resulting
in the total loss of the respondent’s stocks-in-trade, pieces of furnitures and fixtures,
equipments and records.
Due to the loss, the respondent filed an insurance claim with the petitioner under its
Fire Insurance Policy No. F-1397, submitting: (a) the Spot Report of Pfc. Arturo V.
Juarbal, INP Investigator, dated July 1, 1989; (b) the Sworn Statement of Jose
Lomocso; and (c) the Sworn Statement of Ernesto Urbiztondo.
The petitioner relied on the Sworn Statements of Jose Lomocso and Ernesto
Urbiztondo as well as the Spot Report of Pfc. Arturo V. Juarbal dated July 1, 1989,
more particularly the following statement therein:
xxx investigation revealed by Jose Lomocso that those armed men wanted to get can
goods and rice for their consumption in the forest PD investigation further disclosed
that the perpetrator are member (sic) of the NPA PD end… xxx
LLB4302 1
From such report, petitioner denied the claim as such loss was an excepted risk under
paragraph No. 6 of the policy conditions (mutiny, riot, military or popular uprising,
insurrection, rebellion, revolution, military or usurped power).
ISSUE: WON the CA failed to appreciate and give credence to the Spot Report of
Pfc. Arturo Juarbal and the Sworn statement of Jose Lomocso.
RULING: NO. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge, which means those facts which are derived from his perception.
Consequently, a witness may not testify as to what he merely learned from others
either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered
hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. Such is
the hearsay rule which applies not only to oral testimony or statements but also to
written evidence as well.
The hearsay rule is based upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and
reliability of hearsay evidence inasmuch as such evidence are not given under oath or
solemn affirmation and, more importantly, have not been subjected to cross-
examination by opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and
articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability on which
the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.
Thus, the Sworn Statements of Jose Lomocso and Ernesto Urbiztondo are
inadmissible in evidence, for being hearsay, inasmuch as they did not take the
witness stand and could not therefore be cross-examined.
There are exceptions to the hearsay rule, among which are entries in official records.
To be admissible in evidence, however, three (3) requisites must concur, to wit:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially
enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such
other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by
him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.
The third requisite was not met in this case since no investigation, independent of the
statements gathered from Jose Lomocso, was conducted by Pfc. Arturo V. Juarbal. In
fact, as the petitioner itself pointed out, citing the testimony of Pfc. Arturo Juarbal,
the latter’s Spot Report "was based on the personal knowledge of the caretaker Jose
Lomocso who witnessed every single incident surrounding the facts and
circumstances of the case." This argument undeniably weakens the petitioner’s
defense, for the Spot Report of Pfc. Arturo Juarbal relative to the statement of Jose
Lomocso to the effect that NPA rebels allegedly set fire to the respondent’s building
is inadmissible in evidence, for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements
contained in the said report, for being hearsay.
The said Spot Report is admissible only insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony
of Pfc. Arturo V. Juarbal since he himself took the witness stand and was available
for cross-examination. The portions of his Spot Report which were of his personal
knowledge or which consisted of his perceptions and conclusions are not hearsay.
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
The rest of the said report relative to the statement of Jose Lomocso may be
considered as independently relevant statements gathered in the course of Juarbal’s
investigation and may be admitted as such but not necessarily to prove the truth
thereof.
The petitioner’s evidence to prove its defense is sadly wanting and thus, gives rise to
its liability to the respondent under Fire Insurance Policy No. F-1397. Nonetheless,
we do not sustain the trial court’s imposition of twelve percent (12%) interest on the
insurance claim as well as the monetary award for actual and exemplary damages,
litigation expenses and attorney’s fees for lack of legal and valid basis.
G.R. No. 74065 February 27, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NERIO GADDI y CATUBAY, defendant-appellant.
FACTS: Nerio Gaddi y Catubay was accused of murdering Augusto Esguerra y
Navarro. According to the prosecution, at about 5:00 o’clock the afternoon of
December 11, 1981, at Novaliches, Quezon City, Ernesto Guzman saw appellant and
the victim drinking gin. The following day, appellant told Guzman that he killed his
Esguerra and dumped his body in a toilet pit. Guzman told appellant to surrender to
the police but eventually, the former was the one who reported the incident to the
authorities. Thereafter, as appellant was arrested, he confessed that he killed the
victim and led the policemen to the toilet pit in the backyard of Guzman where he
buried the body of Esguerra. They dug out the body and the same was identified by
Guzman, his wife, and Jose, the victim's brother. Pictures of the body were taken, the
statements of Guzman and Jose Esguerra were noted as well as the confession of
appellant. Clothes were also recovered from the pit and were later identified by
Guzman as those worn by appellant while he was drinking with the victim. On the
other hand, the defense, with appellant as its sole witness, stated that it was Guzman
who killed Esguerra because appellant allegedly left both of them to buy some liquor
and upon his arrival, Guzman told him that he killed Esguerra. Nevertheless, the trial
court still found appellant guilty.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ernesto Guzman’s testimony is hearsay
RULING: NO. A confession constitutes evidence of high order because it is
supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would
deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his
conscience. Proof that a person confessed to the commission of a crime is admissible
and is not a violation of the hearsay rule since the same prohibits a witness from
testifying as to those facts which he merely learned from other persons but not as to
those facts which he "knows of his own knowledge: that is, which are derived from
his own perception." Thus, while the testimony of a witness regarding the statement
made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the fact asserted in the
LLB4302 2
statement, is hearsay evidence, it is not considered as such if its purpose is merely to
establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement. In the
case at bar, when Guzman testified that the appellant admitted the killing to him,
there was no violation of the hearsay rule because Guzman was testifying to a fact
which he knows of his own personal knowledge; that the appellant told him that he
stabbed Esguerra and not to the truth of the appellant's statement.
Also, the testimony of Guzman on appellant's oral confession is considered as
competent evidence based on People v. Tawat which upheld the trial court's reliance
on an extrajudicial confession given, not to a police officer during custodial
interrogation, but to an ordinary farmer, as the basis for conviction. In the said case,
the Court ruled: “The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of
the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him.” The Rule is that "any
person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to
testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it. An
oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in
its substance." Proof of the contents of an oral extrajudicial confession may be made
by the testimony of a person who testifies that he was present, heard, understood, and
remembers the substance of the conversation or statement made by the accused.
However, since it was not proven that the crime was committed with treachery and
evident premeditation, the crime committed is only HOMICIDE and not murder.
A.M. No. MTJ-94-979 October 25, 1995
JUDGE EMERITO M. AGCAOILI, RTC-BRANCH 10, APARRI,
CAGAYAN, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ADOLFO B. MOLINA, MCTC, GONZAGA-STA. TERESITA,
CAGAYAN, respondent.
FACTS: Complainant judge Emerito Agcaoli charged respondent judge Adolfo
Molina by alleging that in conducting the preliminary investigation of the criminal
case “People of the Philippines v. Rolando Anama," for homicide, failed to exercise
utmost care in the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused, Rolando
Anama, as it was based merely on the statements of two witnesses who had no
personal knowledge of the commission of the offense charged. He averred that such
action was a clear violation of section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which
requires that before a warrant of arrest is issued, the judge must personally determine
the existence of probable cause from an examination under oath of the complainant
and his witnesses. Mere hearsay evidence cannot be the basis that probable cause
exists. There must be something more concrete.
Respondent admitted that he was the inquest judge in the preliminary investigation of
the above entitled case and finding the existence of probable cause, he ordered the
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
issuance of the warrant of arrest against the accused. He explained that since the case
was cognizable by the RTC, the Provincial Prosecutor's Office, which has the final
say and disposition on the existence of probable cause on cases cognizable by the
RTC should carry the brunt of the responsibility for erroneous finding of probable
cause. He argued that the proper remedy for a seemingly weak probable cause finding
is a reinvestigation.
RTC of Cagayan denied with finality the motion filed by Asst Provincial Prosecutor
for reconsideration of the order of then Presiding Judge Emerito Agcaoili and
dismissed the aforestated criminal case provisionally on grounds of absence of
probable cause against the accused.
In its report and evaluation, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that
respondent be admonished to be more careful in the determination of the existence of
probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest.
The Office of the Court Administrator found that that the complaining witnesses do
not have personal knowledge of the facts which became the basis of the filing of the
crime charged and of the issuance of the warrant of arrest. From the affidavits of the
affiants alone), it is very clear that they learned the killing of victim Virgilio Capa
from a certain Wilma Anama. Respondent Judge, however, on the basis of the said
affidavits, issued an Order directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest for the
temporary confinement of the accused. Thereafter, the warrant of arrest was issued on
the same day.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge can issue a warrant of arrest based on
the testimonies of the witnesses who had no personal knowledge of the commission of
the offense charged.
RULING: No. SC concurs with the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator.
Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the New Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a
warrant of arrest shall be issued only when the municipal trial judge conducting the
preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing in the form of
searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a
necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice. This is in conformity with the constitutional mandate that no
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce.
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
LLB4302 3
Although the foregoing provisions seemingly grant judges wide latitude and
unbridled discretion in determining probable cause, an elementary legal principle
must not be compromised — hearsay evidence cannot be the basis of probable cause.
The rules on evidence are explicit. A witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
perception. Hearsay evidence, therefore, has no probative value whatsoever.
In the case at bench, Wilma Anama, who apparently witnessed the alleged crime or
has personal knowledge thereof, was not summoned by respondent for investigation.
She could have been the key to determining whether or not Rolando Anama was the
probable perpetrator of the grisly killing.
Respondent cannot pass the blame and burden to the provincial prosecutor. The
determination of probable cause is a function of the judge and is not for the
provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes
this determination.
WHEREFORE, respondent judge is hereby REPRIMANDED for his failure to
comply with the pertinent rules on the issuance of a warrant of arrest, with a warning
that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
G.R. No. 138084. April 10, 2002
MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NAILS AND WIRES CORPORATION, respondent.
FACTS: PNWC insured its shipment of tons of steel billets with Malayan. The
shipment delivered was short. Hence, PNWC claimed insuramce. Malayan refused to
pay. PNWC filed a complaint for the said lost and/or delivered cargo
RTC – ruled in favor of PNWC
Malayan appealed to CA contending that: the trial court erred in rendering judgment
by default notwithstanding that issues were joined by petitioner’s filing of an answer;
in awarding damages to respondent based on unauthenticated documentary evidence
and hearsay; and in admitting documentary evidence which is irregular in nature and
not in accordance with the Rules of Court.
CA – Affirmed RTC – Ruled that: RTC did not abuse its discretion because
petitioner answered way beyond the prescribed period; Jeanne King, the witness of
PNWC, was a competent witness because she personally prepared the documentary
evidence and had personal knowledge of the allegations in the complaint.
MR – Denied; Hence, this petition.
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
Malayan’s contention: Jeanne King’s testimony was hearsay because she had no
personal knowledge of the execution of the documents supporting PNWC’s cause of
action, such as the sales contract, invoice, packing list, bill of lading, SGS Report, and
the Marine Cargo Policy; that even though King was personally assigned to handle
and monitor the importation of PNWC this cannot be equated with personal
knowledge of the facts; and that even though she personally prepared the summary of
weight of steel billets received by respondent, she did not have personal knowledge of
the weight of steel billets actually shipped and delivered.
ISSUE: WON the testimony of PNWC’s sole witness is hearsay
RULING: Jeanne King, who was assigned to handle PNWC’s importations,
including their insurance coverage, has personal knowledge of the volume of steel
billets being imported, and therefore competent to testify thereon. Her testimony is
not hearsay. However, she is not qualified to testify on the shortage in the delivery of
the imported steel billets. She did not have personal knowledge of the actual steel
billets received. Even though she prepared the summary of the received steel billets,
she based the summary only on the receipts prepared by other persons. Her testimony
on steel billets received was hearsay. It has no probative value even if not objected to
at the trial.
Petition is GRANTED.
Pp vs Franco
G.R. No. 118607 March 4, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULITO FRANCO y TIANSON, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
On August 9, 1991 at around 6:45 a.m., Angelo Tongko, then an employee of Dunkin
Donut located at Quintin Paredes [Street], Binondo, Manila, discovered the lifeless
body of Aurelio Cuya, a security guard of the said establishment. Upon discovery of
the lifeless body, Tongko informed his co-workers, who then reported the matter to
the police. Upon investigation by the police, the branch supervisor of Dunkin Donut
informed the police that the total sales of the establishment on August 8, 1991 in the
amount of P10,000.00 and which was allegedly kept in the safety locker in the same
place where the dead body was found, was missing. The supervisor of the security
agency where the victim was employed also informed the police that he suspected the
appellant as the culprit. Acting on this allegation by the supervisor, the police
proceeded to the place of appellant and were able to interview Maribel Diong
("Diong") and Hilda Dolera ("Dolera"). The police then tried to convince Diong and
Dolera, who allegedly told the police that appellant allegedly confessed to them that
he killed somebody in the evening of August 8, 1991. Diong and Dolera were not
LLB4302 4
presented in court to substantiate their affidavits. Based on the alleged statements of
Diong and Dolera, the police formed a team to apprehend the appellant who
allegedly had an agreement to meet Dolera (Exh. L). On August 10, 1991, appellant
was apprehended by the police in front of Jollibee Restaurant in Caloocan City.
Allegedly recovered from the appellant were the amount of P2,415.00 and one
handgun which was in his cousin's residence. Thereafter, appellant was brought to
the police headquarters where his confession (Exh. N) was taken on August 12, 1991
allegedly on his freewill and with the assistance of a lawyer. A booking and arrest
report was also prepared by Pat. Nestor Napao-it on August 12, 1991 (Exh. J). The
trial court convicted the appellant on the basis principally of his alleged extra-judicial
confession. Appellant JULITO FRANCO y TIANSON was charged with and
convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide. Appellant now interposes this
appeal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the conviction of the accused based on extrajudicial confession is
proper?
2. Whether or not testimony of Pat. Nestor Napao with respect appellant's alleged
separate confession/admission to Hilda Dolera and Maribel Diong is hearsay?
RULING:
1. No. We cannot stamp with approval the trial court's undue consideration and
reliance on this extra-judicial confession for, as the records reveal, the same was not
offered in evidence by the prosecution. Neither was its contents recited by the
appellant in his testimony. It was a grave error for the trial court, therefore, to have
considered the same, let alone be the basis of appellant's conviction. We thus
reiterate the rule that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. So fundamental is this injunction that litigants alike are corollarily
enjoined to formally offer any evidence which they desire the court to consider. The
offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties to the suit. From
the records, it appears that not a single person witnessed the incident. In fact, aside
from the testimony of police investigator Pat. Nestor Napao-it, none of the other
three prosecution witnesses, to wit: (1) Angelo Tongko — a Dunkin Donut employee
who testified to have found the body of Aurelio Cuya inside the supervisor's room of
the establishment in the early morning of August 9, 1991, 18 (2) Dr. Marcial Cenido
— the physician who autopsied the body of Aurelio Cuya, and who testified on the
cause of the latter's death; and (3) Teresita Cuya — the wife of Aurelio Cuya who
testified on the civil aspect of the case, over imputed, directly or indirectly, to the
appellant the commission of the crime.
2. Yes. With respect to the testimony of Pat. Nestor Napao-it, there is no dispute that
his testimony on the conduct of investigation is admissible in evidence because he
has personal knowledge of the same. However, his testimony on appellant's alleged
separate confession/admission to Hilda Dolera and Maribel Diong, which the trial
court invariably considered in its decision as establishing the truth of the facts
asserted therein, is hearsay. The evidence is one not of what the witness knows
himself but of what he has heard from others". And whether objected to or not, as in
this case, said testimony has no probative value. To repeat, the failure of the defense
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay, does not give such
evidence any probative value.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33,
convicting the appellant of the crime of robbery with homicide is REVERSED.
Appellant JULITO FRANCO y TIANSON is hereby ACQUITTED and his
immediate release from prison is ordered unless he is being held on other legal
grounds. No costs.
It is SO ORDERED.
US vs Zenni
RP vs Heirs
G.R. No. 146030 December 3, 2002
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF FELIPE ALEJAGA SR., represented by ROQUETA ALEJAGA,
FELIPE ALEJAGA JR., MARIA DULLA ALEJAGA, FELIPE ALEJAGA III,
ROQUETA ALEJAGA, JENNIFER ALEJAGA,
EVERETTE CAPUNDAN, AND LYNETTE ALEJAGA; THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ROXAS
CITY, respondents.
FACTS:
On December 28, 1978, [Respondent] Felipe Alejaga, Sr. filed with the District Land
Office, Roxas City, Free Patent Application No. (VI-2) 8442 covering a parcel of land
identified as Lot 1, Mli-06-000020-D, with an area of .3899 hectares, more or less
located at Dumolog, Roxas City (Exh. "A"; Exh "9"). It appears that on December 27,
1978, when the application was executed under oath, Efren L. Recio, Land Inspector,
submitted a report of his investigation and verification of the land to the District Land
Office, Bureau of Lands, City of Roxas. On March 14, 1979, the District Land Officer
of Roxas City approved the application and the issuance of Free Patent to the
applicant. On March 16, 1979, the patent was also ordered to be issued and the patent
was forwarded to defendant Register of Deeds, City of Roxas, for registration and
issuance of the corresponding Certificate of Title. Thereafter, Original Certificate of
Title No. P-15 Free Patent No. (VI-2) 3358 was issued to [respondent] by defendant
Register of Deeds. On April 4, 1979, the heirs of Ignacio Arrobang, through counsel
in a letter-complaint requested the Director of Lands, Manila, for an investigation of
the District Land Officer, Roxas City, and the Regional Office, Region VI, Iloilo City,
for irregularities in the issuance of the title of a foreshore land in favor of
[respondent]. Isagani Cartagena, Supervising Special Investigator, Legal Division,
Land Management Bureau (formerly Bureau of Lands) submitted his Report dated
April 17, 1989. The Chief, Legal Division, Land Management Bureau, Manila,
LLB4302 5
recommended to the Director of Lands appropriate civil proceeding for the
cancellation of Free Patent Title No. (VI-2) 3358 and the corresponding Original
Certificate of Title No. P-15 in the name of [respondent]. In the meantime,
[respondent] obtained a NACIDA loan under the Cottage Industry Guarantee and
Loan Fund by the defendant Philippine National Bank (hereinafter referred to as
PNB) executed in Cebu City in the amount of P100,000.00 on August 18, 1981. The
loan was secured by a real estate mortgage in favor of defendant PNB.
The promissory note of appellant was annotated at the back of the title. On April 18,
1990, the government through the Solicitor General instituted an action for
Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and Reversion against [respondent], the
PNB of Roxas City and defendant Register of Deeds of Roxas City covering Free
Patent Application (VI-2) 8442 of the parcel of land with an area of .3899 hectares
more or less located at Dumolog, Roxas City. On November 17, 1990, while the case
is pending hearing, [respondent] died. He was substituted by his wife Roqueta
Alejaga and his children, namely: Everette Alejaga, Lynnette Alejaga, Felipe
Alejaga, Jr., Maria Dulla Alejaga. Roqueta Alejaga, Jennifer Alejaga and Felipe
Alejaga III.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the statement made by Recio is considered as hearsay?
RULING:
No, it is considered as independently relevant statement. The report of Special
Investigator Isagani P. Cartagena has not been successfully rebutted. In that report,
Recio supposedly admitted that he had not actually conducted an investigation and
ocular inspection of the parcel of land. Cartagena’s statement on Recio’s alleged
admission may be considered as "independently relevant." A witness may testify as
to the state of mind of another person -- the latter’s knowledge, belief, or good or bad
faith -- and the former’s statements may then be regarded as independently relevant
without violating the hearsay rule. Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand
and opened himself to cross-examination, the Investigation Report he had submitted
to the director of the Bureau of Lands constitutes part of his testimony. Those
portions of the report that consisted of his personal knowledge, perceptions and
conclusions are not hearsay. On the other hand, the part referring to the statement
made by Recio may be considered as independently relevant. The doctrine on
independently relevant statements holds that conversations communicated to a
witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or
falsity, they were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not
secondary but primary, for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is
circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact. Since Cartagena’s testimony
was based on the report of the investigation he had conducted, his testimony was not
hearsay and was, hence, properly admitted by the trial court. Based on the foregoing
badges of fraud, we sustain petitioner’s contention that the free patent granted to
Felipe Alejaga Sr. is void. Such fraud is a ground for impugning the validity of the
Certificate of Title. The invalidity of the patent is sufficient basis for nullifying the
Certificate of Title issued in consequence thereof, since the latter is merely evidence
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
of the former. Verily, we must uphold petitioner’s claim that the issuance of the
Alejagas’ patent and title was tainted with fraud.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the RTC of Roxas City (Branch 15) dated October 27, 1993 is
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED
PP vs Medina
G.R. No. 127756-58. June 18, 2003
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BENJAMIN MEDINA, SR.
y PALANCIO, appellant.
FACTS:
The Evidence of the Prosecution:
The Spouses Cornelio Salvatierra and Virginia M. Basa had three children, namely:
Ma. Theresa, Shiela and Pajek. Their marriage failed and decided to live separately.
By March 1990, Virginia and Benjamin Medina began living together as husband and
wife together with Virginia’s children. Ma. Theresa regarded the Bejamin as her tatay.
At around noontime, Benjamin asked Ma. Theresa to accompany him to catch fish in
a creek by means of pante. Benjamin suddenly embraced her. He led her to a grassy
place and undressed her. He then raped her. After he satisfied his lust he threatened to
kill her, including her mother and sister. By 1994, around noontime. Ma. Theresa was
left alone in the house with Benjamin. He summoned her and asked her to help him
squeeze the pimple on his back. Suddenly, Benjamin took hold of Ma. Theresa’s
hands, pulled her and forced her to lie down on the wooden bed. Benjamin then raped
her again. In 1996, around noontime. Benjamin and Ma. Theresa were left alone in the
house. Ma. Theresa was in the kitchen when Benjamin suddenly grabbed her arms. He
then pulled her to the bedroom and made her lie down on the wooden bed. He then
sexually assaulted her again. Later that evening, Ma. Theresa was sleeping with
Shiela, when she was suddenly awakened by the Benjamin. And rape her.
While Virginia was doing laundry, Shiela told her that Benjamin had a nickname for
Ma. Theresa. That Benjamin called Ma. Theresa Tamis because her private part was
sweet. Virginia then asked Ma. Theresa if Benjamin did anything to her. It was only
then that Ma. Theresa narrated everything to Virginia. Thus, she instructed her
daughter to go to school as usual and to meet her in the street corner after class if she
and her sister could leave the house. But Ma. Theresa and Sheila could not leave
because Benjamin ordered Ma. Theresa to cook rice, and Shiela to catch fish at the
pretil. Unknown to Ma. Theresa, her mother had already told their neighbors what
Benjamin did. Their neighbor, Mang Araboy, arrived at their house armed with bolos,
LLB4302 6
pretending to gather kangkong. Benjamin was shocked when one of the visitors
grabbed him by the neck and demanded to know: "Is it true that you molested your
daughter?" The visitors then boxed Benjamin. The neighbors then brought Ma.
Theresa to the barangay hall where she met her mother. The rape incidents were
reported to the police authorities on August 7, 1996. On the same day, Ma. Theresa
gave her sworn statement to the police investigator.
The Evidence of the Appellant:
Benjamin denied having raped Ma. Theresa. He avers that it was his son from first
marriage, Benjamin, Jr. , who had consensual sexual relations with Ma. Theresa.
That Virginia was the jealous type. She suspected that he and Ma. Theresa had an
amorous relationship. That he saw Benjamin Jr. and Ma. Theresa having sexual
intercourse. Later, when he talked to Benjamin Jr., he said that he liked Ma. Theresa.
Therefore kept the matter to himself. In the evening of August 6, 1996, he and
Virginia had a violent quarrel. He told her that he was leaving her. Virginia was
enraged. She then instigated her young daughter Ma. Theresa to charge him with
rape, to get back at him for wanting to leave her.
In due course, the trial court rendered judgment finding the appellant guilty of four
counts of rape.
On appeal, Benjamin argues that the trial judge exhibited bias and partiality in favor
of the prosecution when he propounded leading questions to Dr. Ma. Lorraine de
Guzman requiring hearsay testimony. The Office of the Solicitor General, for its
part, contends that the questions propounded by the judge to the witness for the
prosecution were meant merely to expedite the proceedings and to clarify events
subject of her testimony.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dr. De Guzman’s testimony is hearsay?
RULING:
No. In this case, the appellant asserts that the trial judge propounded leading
questions requiring hearsay evidence to Dr. de Guzman, which in some way, helped
the prosecution build its theory of the case.
The Court believes that the questions propounded by the trial judge to Dr. de
Guzrnan were proper, the purpose of which was only to clarify certain aspects of the
testimony of the doctor in relation to the examination of the private complainant and
her report thereon and not really to help the prosecution build its case against the
appellant.
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
The questions of the trial judge do not call for hearsay evidence. The purpose of the
trial judge in propounding questions to the doctor was to elicit informations relayed to
her by the private complainant as the bases for the physical examination and not to
prove the truth of the said informations. In other words, the questions call for
independently relevant statements.
G.R. No. L-45470 February 28, 1985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RODRIGO SALAFRANCA
y BELLO, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS:
Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged with and tried for murder for the fatal
stabbing of Johnny Bolanon, and was ultimately found guilty of the felony by the
RTC of Manila on September 23, 2004. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed by the
CA through its decision promulgated on November 24, 2005. Salafranca has come to
the Court on a final appeal, continuing to challenge the credibility of the witnesses
who had incriminated him.
On July 31, 1993 Johnny Bolanon was stabbed near in Binondo, Manila; that after
stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran away; that Bolanon was still able to walk to the
house of his uncle Rodolfo B. Estaño in order to seek help; that his uncle rushed him
to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on their way to the hospital
Bolanon told Estaño that it was Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon
eventually succumbed at the hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving medical attention;
and that the stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then
still a minor of 13 years. As stated, Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded
arrest for a long period, despite the warrant for his arrest being issued. He was finally
arrested on April 23, 2003, and detained at the Manila City Jail. After trial, the RTC
convicted Salafranca of the crime of Murder with the presence of the qualifying
aggravating circumstance of treachery. On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings and
conclusions of the RTC citing the dying declaration made to his uncle pointing to
Salafranca as his assailant, and Salafranca’s positive identification as the culprit by
Mendoza. It stressed that Salafranca’s denial and his alibi of being in his home during
the incident did not overcome the positive identification, especially as his unexplained
flight after the stabbing, leaving his home and employment, constituted a
circumstance highly indicative of his guilt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dying declaration of Bolanon is admissible?
RULING:
LLB4302 7
Yes. It appears from the foregoing testimony that Bolanon had gone to the residence
of Estaño, his uncle, to seek help right after being stabbed by Salafranca; that Estaño
had hurriedly dressed up to bring his nephew to the Philippine General Hospital by
taxicab; that on the way to the hospital, Estaño had asked Bolanon who had stabbed
him, and the latter had told Estaño that his assailant had been Salafranca; that at the
time of the utterance Bolanon had seemed to be having a hard time breathing,
causing Estaño to advise him not to talk anymore; and that about ten minutes after
his admission at the emergency ward of the hospital, Bolanon had expired and had
been pronounced dead. Such circumstances qualified the utterance of Bolanon as
both a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae, considering that the Court has
recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after
the hacking incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the
res gestae either of which was an exception to the hearsay rule.
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay
character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur,
namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made,
the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that the declarant is
competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for
homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.
All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem
statement to Estaño, identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At
the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending death, having
sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according to Estaño, was then experiencing
great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital emergency room a
few minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours after the stabbing.
There is ample authority for the view that the declarant’s belief in the imminence of
his death can be shown by the declarant’s own statements or from circumstantial
evidence, such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by
the opinion of his physician. Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the
subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered
in this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim.
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible
in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur,
to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements
are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements
must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.21
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur
herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estaño, Bolanon was
referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then
on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and thus had no time to
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance about
Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the
startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as
the perpetrator.
G.R. No. L-45470 February 28, 1985
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GREGORIO LAQUINON, alias "JOLLY", defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
Accused Gregorio Laquinon was charged with the crime of murder for the killing of
Pablo Remonde.
Laquinon was found guilty as charged on the basis of a dying declaration related by
the deceased to barrio captain Sumama Buat just after the shooting incident.
On the night of the incident, Sumama Buat heard gunshots coming from the river
bank. He went to the place and found the victim lying on the sand and whose two
hands were tied at his back. Buat asked his name and the man answered “Pablo
Remonde”. Buat then the ante mortem statement of the victim and asked who shot
him the man answered that it was “Gregorio Laquinon”. Buat asked if the victim
would survive from the gunshot he sustained and the victim said “I do not know”.
Captain Buat reported the incident to the then Vice Mayor Biran who went to the
scene and asked the victim who shot him to which the victim answered “Gregorio
Laquinon”.
The victim was brought to the hospital where he was operated and later on died.
Despite the denials of the accused, the trial court found the him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
The accused then appealed to the SC praying for the reversal of the conviction on the
ground that the satatement attributed to the victim is inadmissible in evidence as an
ante mortem declaration because it was not executed under a consciousness of an
impending death.
ISSUE:
Whether the declaration of the victim is admissible in evidence as a dying declaration.
RULING:
No, the dying declaration of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as an
ante-mortem declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die
or not.
The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself in extremis, "at the
point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct," which is the sole basis for
admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule."
LLB4302 8
It may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae since the statement was made
immediately after the incident and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient
time to concoct a charge against the accused.
On the whole, the court is satisfied that the accused was responsible for the killing of
Pablo Ramonete.
PP vs Sabio
Dying Declaration
People vs Sabio
Facts:
On October 5, 1965, at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning, in Barrio Looc, Argao,
Cebu, Catalino Espina, 80-years old, single, owner of a small sari-sari store located
in his house was found on the second floor of his dwelling wounded on the forehead,
from which injury he died three days later.
When Camilo reached home, he saw "Ino" (the victim) lying wounded upstairs. He
was moaning and was able to speak only when bis head was raised.When Camilo
called the victim's name, the latter responded and told Camilo to fetch a policeman.
Patrolman Fuentes (a policeman assigned) asked the victim who had hacked him and
the latter answered that it was "Papu" Sabio, son of Menes According to said
Patrolman, the person referred to was the accused, who, as well as his parents, have
been known to the witness for the past three years.Patrolman Fuentes asked the
victim why "Papu" hacked him and the latter answered that "Papu" had demanded
money from him. Patrolman Fuentes also asked the victim how much money he had
lost but the latter was not able to answer that question. Sensing that the wound was
serious since it was bleeding profusely Patrolman Fuentes decided to take down the
statement of the victim. He detached a leaf from a calendar and wrote down on it the
questions he propounded as well as the answers of the victim. He then had it
thumbmarked by the victim with the latter's own blood as no ink was available.
Present at the time were Pedro Burgos, another police officer, and Camilo Semilla,
the grandnephew. Patrolman Fuentes himself and Pedro Burgos signed as witnesses.
The trial Court found the accused guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
The defense questions the admissibility of Exhibit "A" of the prosecution as an
antemortem statement arguing that there is no evidence showing that when the
declaration was uttered the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending
death; that, in fact, the victim had hopes of recovery or his first word to Camilo
Semilla was for the latter to fetch the police. Defense counsel argues further that
there are doubts as to when said Exhibit "A" was thumb-marked because, although it
was already in existence in the morning of October 5, 1965, as alleged by Patrolman
Fuentes, the accused was never confronted with the document when he was taken in
to custody by the police for the first time from the morning of October 5 to October
6, 1965, thereby implying that the document did not yet exist at that time.
Issue:
1. WON the declaration of the victim includes the crime of robbery
2. WON the statement of the victim is considered a dying declaration and be
admitted oppose to the argument of the defense.
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
Held:
1. Plainly, the evidence supportive of the charge of robbery is at best circumstantial
and does not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had carried away
personal- ty belonging to the offended party. There was no eyewitness to the alleged
robbery, nor was any part of the alleged missing object recovered. The consummation
of the robbery cannot be inferred nor presumed from the circumstance that the
accused was seen running "with his hands inside his shirt", or that the "barrio",
alleged to have contained cash amounting to about P8.00, was seen on the floor, open
and empty, or that the things and merchandise inside the house were in disarray.
The dying declaration of the victim which, in part, reads:
Q. Who slashed you and robbed you?
A. Rodulfo Sabio (Papu) the son of Menez from Lo-ok.
be admitted to establish the fact of robbery. The admission of dying declarations has
always been strictly limited to criminal prosecutions for homicide or murder 15 as
evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of death.
2. Yes. The seriousness of the injury on the victim's forehead which had affected the
brain and was profusely bleeding; the victim's inability to speak until his head was
raised; the spontaneous answer of the victim that "only Papu Sabio is responsible for
my death"; and his subsequent demise from the direct effects of the wound on his
forehead, strengthen the conclusion that the victim must have known that his end was
inevitable. That death did not ensue till three days after the declaration was made will
not alter its probative force since it is not indispensable that a declarant expires
immediately thereafter. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession
of death, in point of fact, that renders the dying declaration admissible. 17 Further, the
fact that the victim told his grandnephew Camilo Semilla to fetch the police, does not
negative the victim's feeling of hopelessness of recovery but rather emphasizes the
realization that he had so little time to disclose his assailant to the authorities. The
mere failure of the police to confront the accused cused with the antemortem
declaration the first time the latter was arrested and incarcerated from October 5 to
October 6, 1965, neither militates against the fact of its execution considering that it
was evidence that the police was under no compulsion to disclose.
PP vs Salison
Marturillas vs PP
PP vs Santos
G.R. No. L-28655 August 6, 1928
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUGENIO TOLEDO and SISENANDO HOLGADO, defendants.
EUGENIO TOLEDO, appellant.
FACTS: Sisenando Holgado and Filomeno Morales had disputes about the
occupation of certain land situated in the municipality of Pinamalayan, Province of
Mindoro. On the morning of June 15, 1927, the two men happened to meet. The
LLB4302 9
argument was renewed, and they agreed to fight. They did engage in a bolo duel with
a fatal result for Filomeno Morales, Sisenando Holgado was also seriously wounded
but was able to proceed to a neighboring house. From there Sisenando Holgado was
taken to the municipal building where he made a sworn statement before the
municipal president, in which he declared that only he and Filomeno Morales fought.
About one month later, Sisenando Holgado died from the wounds received in the
fight.
It was alleged that Toledo intervened in the duel that dealt a mortal blow to Morales.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statement executed by Holgado (a statement of fact
against penal interest) be admitted as evidence.
RULING: Any man outside of a court and unhampered by the pressure of technical
procedure, unreasoned rules of evidence, and cumulative authority, would say that if
a man deliberately acknowledged himself to be the perpetrator of a crime and
exonerated the person charged with the crime, and there was other evidence
indicative of the truthfulness of the statement, the accused man should not be
permitted to go to prison or to the electric chair to expiate a crime he never
committed.
The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is
that the extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best method of
serving this purpose. In other words, the great possibility of the fabrication of
falsehoods, and the inability to prove their untruth, requires that the doors be closed
to such evidence. So long therefore as a declarant is available as a witness, his
extrajudicial statement should not be heard. Where, however, the declarant is dead or
has disappeared, his previous statements, out of court, if not inadmissible on other
grounds, are the best evidence. But they are not rendered inadmissible by the mere
fact that the declarant is unavailable, — something else is necessary. One fact which
will satisfy this necessity is that the declaration is or was against the declarant's
interest, and this is because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his
own detriment.
[G.R. No. 111692. February 9, 1996]
ALEJANDRO FUENTES, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Alejandro Fuentes while attending a benefit dance at Dump Site
Agusan Del Sur called Julieto Malaspina and placed his right arm on the shoulder of
the latter saying, “Before, I saw you with a long hair but now you have a short hair”.
Suddenly petitioner stabbed Malaspina in the abdomen with a hunting knife.
Malaspina fell to the ground and his companions rushed to his side. Petitioner fled.
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
10
Before the victim succumbed to the gaping wound on his abdomen he muttered that
Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., stabbed him.
Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his cousin Zoilo Fuentes, Jr.,
alias “Jonie” who knifed Malaspina; that when the victim was killed he was
conversing with him; that he was compelled to run away when he heard that
somebody with a bolo and spear would “kill all those from San Isidro” because
“Jonie,” the killer, was from that place; that since he was also from San Isidro he
sought refuge in his brother’s house where he met “Jonie”; that “Jonie” admitted
spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina because after a boxing match before the
latter untied his gloves and punched him; that as there were many persons milling
around the house “Jonie” jumped out and escaped through the window; that he was
arrested at eight o’clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 while he was in a store in the
barangay. At the trial, Fuentes presents his uncle Felicisimo Fuentes to support his
defense that Zoilo alias Jonie was the killer of Malaspina. According to Felicisimo,
Zoilo confessed to him that he was the one who stabbed Malaspina.
The RTC found petitioner guilty. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Petitioner filed petition for review contending that the appellate court erred
when it held that petitioner was positively and categorically identified as the killer of
Malaspina, in affirming the judgment of conviction and in holding petitioner liable for
damages to the heirs of the victim.
Petitioner points that an alleged inconsistency between the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Alberto Toling and Honorio Osok to the effect that they saw
petitioner stab Malaspina on the right lumbar region, and the testimony of the
attending physician that the victim was stabbed on the left lumbar region.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the declarations made by petitioner’s uncle Felicisimo may
be admitted as evidence.
RULING:
No. One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to
declarations made against interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides
that “(t)he declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the
interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was
made so far contrary to declarant’s own interest, that a reasonable man in his position
would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received
in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons.”
The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded on necessity and
trustworthiness.
There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration
against interest: (a) the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration
LLB4302
must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must
render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.
In the instant case, we find that the declaration particularly against penal
interest attributed to Zoilo Fuentes Jr. is not admissible in evidence as an exception
to the hearsay rule. We are not unaware of People Toledo, a 1928 case, where Justice
Malcolm writing for the Court endeavored to reexamine the declaration of third
parties made contrary to their penal interest. In that case, the protagonists Holgado
and Morales engaged in a bob duel. Morales was killed almost instantly. Holgado
who was seriously wounded gave a sworn statement (Exh. 1) before the municipal
president declaring that when he and Morales fought there was nobody else present.
One (1) month later Holgado died from his wounds. While the Court was agreed that
Toledo, who reportedly intervened in the fight and dealt the mortal blow, should be
exonerated on reasonable doubt, the members did not reach an accord on the
admissibility of Exh. 1. One group would totally disregard Exh. 1 since there was
ample testimonial evidence to support an acquittal. The second group considered
Exh. 1 as part of the res gestae as it was made on the same morning when the fight
occurred. A third group, to which Justice Malcolm belonged, opined that the court
below erred in not admitting Exh. 1 as the statement of a fact against penal interest.
For all its attempt to demonstrate the arbitrariness behind the rejection in
certain cases of declarations against penal interest, the Toledo case cannot be applied
in the instant case which is remarkably different. Consider this factual scenario: the
alleged declarant Zoilo Fuentes Jr., a cousin of accused-appellant, verbally admitted
to the latter, and later to their common uncle Felicisimo Fuentes, that he (Zoilo)
killed the victim because of a grudge, after which he disappeared. One striking
feature that militates against the acceptance of such a statement is its patent
untrustworthiness. Zoilo who is related to accused-appellant had every motive to
prevaricate. The same can be said of accused-appellant and his uncle Felicisimo.
Secondly, we need not resort to legal rhetorics to find that the admission of such a
statement may likewise be, according to Wigmore, “shocking to the sense of justice.”
Let us assume that the trial court did admit the statement of Zoilo and on that basis
acquitted accused-appellant. Let us assume further that Zoilo was subsequently
captured and upon being confronted with his admission of guilt readily repudiated
the same. There is nothing, absolutely nothing, that can bind Zoilo legally to that
statement.
But more importantly, the far weightier reason why the admission against
penal interest cannot be accepted in the instant case is that the declarant is not
“unable to testify.” There is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally
incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His
mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under
this rule. For it is incumbent upon the defense to produce each and every piece of
evidence that can break the prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused. Other
than the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant and his uncle to the effect that
Zoilo admitted having killed Malaspina, the records show that the defense did not
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
11
exert any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness. Lest we be misunderstood, the
Court is always for the admission of evidence that would let an innocent declaration
of guilt by the real culprit. But this can be open to abuse, as when the extrajudicial
statement is not even authenticated thus increasing the probability of its fabrication; it
is made to persons who have every reason to lie and falsify; and it is not altogether
clear that the declarant himself is unable to testify. Thus, for this case at least,
exclusion is the prudent recourse as explained in Toledo -The purpose of all evidence
is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the extrajudicial and
unsworn statement of another is not the best method of serving this purpose. In other
words, the great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove
their untruth, requires that the doors be closed to such evidence.
G.R. No. 113685. June 19, 1997
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THEODORE
BERNAL, JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, accused-appellants
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Theodore Bernal, together with two other persons whose identities
and whereabouts are still unknown, were charged with the crime of kidnapping.
The prosecution has profferred sufficient evidence to show that, indeed, Bernal,
together with his two companions, abducted Openda, Jr. A certain Adonis Sagarino, a
childhood friend and neighbor of the victim, testified that he saw Bernal at the billiard
hall at about 11:00 a.m. with his two companions and overheard him dispatching one
of them to “Tarsing’s Store” to check if a certain person was still there. This person
later turned out to be Openda, Jr. He added that after the latter’s presence was
confirmed, the three men left the billiard hall. Minutes later, Openda, Jr., already
handcuffed, passed by the billiard hall with Bernal’s companions.
Equally important is the testimony of Roberto Racasa, who knew both Bernal and the
victim, the former being his neighbor and compadre. He narrated that he and the
victim were drinking at “Tarsing’s Store” on that fateful day when Bernal passed by
and had a drink with them. After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave, after which,
two men came to the store and asked for “Payat.” When Openda, Jr. confirmed that
he was indeed “Payat,“ he was handcuffed and taken away by the unidentified men.
Likewise, a certain Salito Enriquez, a tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr., testified that,
Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and Bernal’s wife Naty were having an affair.
One time, Naty even gave Openda, Jr. money which they used to pay for a motel
room. He advised Naty “not to do it again because she is a married woman.
Undoubtedly, his wife’s infidelity was ample reason for Bernal to contemplate
revenge.
ISSUE:
LLB4302
Whether or not Openda Jr.’s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship
with Bernal’s wife is admissible in evidence.
RULING:
Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the
perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence or facts from which it
may be reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be
sufficient to support a conviction. Openda, Jr.’s revelation to Enriquez regarding his
illicit relationship with Bernal’s wife is admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section
38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:
“Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. -- The declaration made by a person deceased,
or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the
declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant’s own interest,
that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he
believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-
in-interest and against third persons.”
With the deletion of the phrase “pecuniary or moral interest” from the present
provision, it is safe to assume that “declaration against interest” has been expanded
to include all kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal.
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to
wit: “(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact
against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration the
declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that
the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true.”
Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to
testify. His confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest,
since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence because no
sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.
GR No. 146556, April 19, 2006
DANILO L. PAREL, petitioner, vs. SIMEON B. PRUDENCIO, respondent
FACTS: A complaint for recovery of possession and damages was filed by
respondent Simeon B. Prudencio, alleging that he is the owner of a two-storey
residential house in Baguio City, out of his own funds, and declared under his name
for tax purposes. He only allowed Florentino and Susan Parel, petitioner's parents, to
move and occupy the second floor to supervise the on-going construction; and when
it was finished, he also allowed the children to transfer and temporarily reside
thereat.
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
12
As respondent is about to retire and needed the place, petitioner and his family
unlawfully entered and took possession of the ground floor.
Petitioner, however, stated that the ground floor belongs to his father while the upper
story belongs to respondent. Also, it was his parents who spent resources to improve
and construct the house as a co-owner, being an awardee of the land. The demand of
respondent to vacate the place attempts to deprive his parents of their rights as co-
owner of the said house.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that his
father was a co-owner of the subject two-storey residential house?
RULING:
No. Respondent had shown sufficient evidence to support his complaint for recovery
of possession of the ground floor of the subject house as the exclusive owner thereof.
He presented the affidavit dated September 24, 1973 executed by Florentino and
sworn to before the Assistant City Assessor of Baguio City, G.F. Lagasca.
The affidavit categorically declares that while Florentino is the occupant of the
residential building, he is not the owner of the same as it is owned by respondent who
is residing in Quezon City. It is safe to presume that he would not have made such
declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial to himself, as well as to
his children's interest as his heirs. A declaration against interest is the best evidence
which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. Moreover, during
Florentino's lifetime, there is no showing that he had revoked such affidavit, even
when a criminal complaint for trespass to dwelling had been filed.
Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 38. Declaration against interest. - The declaration made by a person
deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted
in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own
interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration
unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors in interest and against third persons. (32a)
The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence
notwithstanding they are hearsay is that the necessity of the occasion renders the
reception of such evidence advisable and, further that the reliability of such
declaration asserts facts which are against his own pecuniary or moral interest
G.R. No. 86302 September 24, 1991
CASIMIRO MENDOZA, petitioner,
vs.
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HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TEOPISTA TORING
TUÑACAO, respondents.
FACTS: The private respondent claimed she was the illegitimate daughter of
Casimiro Mendoza, but the latter denied her claim. He denied it to his dying day. The
trial court believed him and dismissed her complaint for compulsory recognition.
The appellate court did not and reversed the judgment of the court below. Now the
issue is before us on certiorari.
The complaint was filed by Teopista Toring Tufiacao, the herein private respondent,
alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was then
single, and defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana
Barrientos. She averred that Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by
treating her as such and according her the rights and privileges of a recognized
illegitimate child.
Casimiro Mendoza, then already 91 years old, specifically denied the plaintiffs
allegations and set up a counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees.
Amplifying on her complaint, Teopista testified that it was her mother who told her
that her father was Casimiro. She called him Papa Miroy. She lived with her mother
because Casimiro was married but she used to visit him at his house. When she
married Valentin Tufiacao, Casimiro bought a passenger truck and engaged him to
drive it so he could have a livelihood. Casimiro later sold the truck but gave the
proceeds of the sale to her and her husband. In 1977, Casimiro allowed her son,
Lolito Tufiacao, to build a house on his lot and later he gave her money to buy her
own lot from her brother, Vicente Toring. On February 14, 1977, Casimiro opened a
joint savings account with her as a co-depositor at the Mandaue City branch of the
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank. Two years later, Margarita Bate,
Casimiro's adopted daughter, took the passbook from her, but Casimiro ordered it
returned to her after admonishing Margarita. 1
->Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of Teopista because his father
Hipolito, Casimiro's brother, and his grandmother, Brigida Mendoza, so informed
him. He worked on Casimiro's boat and whenever Casimiro paid him his salary, he
would also give him various amounts from P2.00 to P10.00 to be delivered to
Teopista. Isaac also declared that Casimiro intended to give certain properties to
Teopista. 4
Casimiro himself did not testify because of his advanced age, but Vicente Toring
took the stand to resist Teopista's claim.
ISSUE: whether or not Teopista was in continuous possession of her claimed status
of an illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza.
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
13
RULING: YES, The trial court conceded that "the defendant's parents, as well as the
plaintiff himself, told Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, that Teopista was the
daughter of the defendant." It should have probed this matter further in light of Rule
130, Section 39, of the Rules of Court, providing as follows:
Sec. 39. — Act or declarations about pedigree. — The act or
declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to
the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage,
may be received in evidence where it occurred before the
controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree"
includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the
dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history
intimately connected with pedigree.
The statement of the trial court regarding Teopista's parentage is not entirely accurate.
To set the record straight, we will stress that it was only Isaac Mendoza who testified
on this question of pedigree, and he did not cite Casimiro's father. His testimony was
that he was informed by his father Hipolito, who was Casimiro's brother, and Brigida
Mendoza, Casimiro's own mother, that Teopista was Casimiro's illegitimate
daughter. 15
Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay
rule because "it is the best the nature of the case admits and because greater evils are
apprehended from the rejection of such proof than from its admission. Requisites for
pedigree:
1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.
2. The pedigree must be in issue.
3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is
in issue.
4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose.
5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose
pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such
declaration. 17
All the above requisites are present in the case at bar. The persons who made the
declarations about the pedigree of Teopista, namely, the mother of Casimiro, Brigida
Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were both dead at the time of Isaac's testimony.
LLB4302
The declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro,
which were the very issues involved in the complaint for compulsory recognition.
The declarations were made before the complaint was filed by Teopista or before the
controversy arose between her and Casimiro. Finally, the relationship between the
declarants and Casimiro has been established by evidence other than such
declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio
Mendoza, in which Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs. 18
The said declarations have not been refuted. Casimiro could have done this by
deposition if he was too old and weak to testify at the trial of the case.
If we consider the other circumstances narrated under oath by the private respondent
and her witnesses, such as the financial doles made by Casimiro to Brigida Toring,
the hiring of Teopista's husband to drive the passenger truck of Casimiro, who later
sold the vehicle and gave the proceeds of the sale to Teopista and her husband, the
permission he gave Lolito Tufiacao to build a house on his land after he found that
the latter was living on a rented lot, and, no less remarkably, the joint savings
account Casimiro opened with Teopista, we can reasonably conclude that Teopista
was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza.
We hold that by virtue of the above-discussed declarations, and in view of the other
circumstances of this case, 'reopista Toring Tufiacao has proved that she is the
illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza and is entitled to be recognized as such.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING
Teopista Toring Tuñacao to be the illegitimate child of the late Casimiro Mendoza
and entitled to all the rights appurtenant to such status. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 121027 July 31, 1997
CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO, respondents.
FACTS: Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse,
Martin, executed on September 15, 1986 an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement
adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute. On January 2,
1988, Martin Guerrero sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo.
Martin Guerrero died on October 25, 1988. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an
action for reconveyance on November 2, 1988, claiming that they are entitled to
inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation. Petitioners
want to inherit as the nephew and niece of the late Teodora Dezoller, as the former
are children of Teodora’s brother, Hermogenes.
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
14
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the
lone witness, with the following documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners’
filiation to their father and their aunt: a family picture; baptismal certificates of
Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller; certificatesof destroyed records of birth of
Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes Dezoller; death certificates of Hermogenes
Dezoller and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; certification of destroyed records of live
birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton
Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and place of birth of Corazon andRene Dezoller;
joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga attesting to the fact of marriage
between MartinGuerrero and Teodora Dezoller; and the marriage certificate of Martin
and Teodora Guerrero. Petitioners thereafter rested their case and submitted a written
offer of these exhibits to which a Comment was filed by herein private respondent.
Private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Evidence on the ground
that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora
Guerrero. On December 3, 1992, the trial court issued an order granting the demurrer
to evidence and dismissing the complaint for reconveyance. CA affirmed the decision
saying the evidence to prove filiation were inadmissible and insufficient.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo and the appellate court erred in rendering the
assailed decision as to petitioner’s legitimate filiation.
RULING: YES. It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court
have regrettably overlooked the universally recognized presumption on legitimacy.
There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder
morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in
wedlock are legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot
be attacked collaterally. Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to
his wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the
infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity
or expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in
exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of
these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy.
The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of
Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be properly controverted in the present action for
reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from the further consideration that private
respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. The
presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of petitioners unless and until
it is rebutted.
Ordinarily, when a fact is presumed, it implies that the party in whose favor
the presumption exists does not have to introduce evidence to establish that fact, and
in any litigation where that fact is put in issue, the party denying it must bear the
LLB4302
burden of proof to overthrow the presumption. The presumption of legitimacy is so
strong that it is clear that its effect is to shift the burden of persuasion to the party
claiming illegitimacy. And in order to destroy the presumption, the party against
whom it operates must adduce substantial and credible evidence to the contrary.
Where there is an entire lack of competent evidence to the contrary, and
unless or until it is rebutted, it has been held that a presumption may stand in lieu of
evidence and support a finding or decision. Perforce, a presumption must be
followed if it is uncontroverted. This is based on the theory that a presumption is
prima facie proof of the fact presumed, and unless the fact thus established prima
facie by the legal presumption of its truth is disproved, it must stand as proved.
Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to present countervailing
evidence to overcome the presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to evidence
instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth of such fact. Indeed, she
overlooked or disregarded the evidential rule that presumptions like judicial notice
and admissions, relieve the proponent from presenting evidence on the facts he
alleged and such facts are thereby considered as duly proved.
As regards the weight and sufficiency of the evidence regarding petitioner's
relationship with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, whose estate is the subject of the
present controversy, it requires a more intensive and extensive examination.
Petitioners' evidence, as earlier explained, consists mainly of the testimony of
Corazon Dezoller Tison, the baptismal, death and marriage certificates, the various
certifications from the civil registrar, a family picture, and several joint affidavits
executed by third persons all of which she identified and explained in the course and
as part of her testimony.
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between
the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically
declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a statement is considered a
declaration about pedigree (relevant to the present topic) which is admissible, as an
exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
(2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of
inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration;
and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the
commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before
any controversy has arisen thereon.
The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery
against a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant
himself or the declarant's estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common
relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some independent
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
15
proof of this fact. As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the
declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to
reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his
declarations to the property of some other member of the family.
We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one
instance where the general requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed.
Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself.
Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner
Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such
relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence
thereof, the reason being such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the
necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. 20 More importantly,
there is in the present case an absolute failure by all and sundry to refute that
declaration made by the decedent.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the
sole basis of the decedent's declaration and without need for further proof thereof, that
petitioners are the niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. As held in one
case, where the subject of the declaration is the declarant's own relationship to another
person, it seems absurb to require, as a foundation for the admission of the
declaration, proof of the very fact which the declaration is offered to establish. The
preliminary proof would render the main evidence unnecessary.
Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce the
same result. For while the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not
strictly conform to the rules on their admissibility, we are however of the considered
opinion that the same may be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to
interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged
inadmissible document is offered in evidence, otherwise, the objection shall be treated
as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive.
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and herein petitioners and private respondent are
declared co-owners of the subject property with an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and
three-fourths (3/4) share therein, respectively.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 93030-31 August 21, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALFREDO ALEGADO Y DELIMA, accused-appellant.
LLB4302
FACTS:
Two (2) counts of rape was filed against the accused Alfredo Alegado who was a
watchman of the town market. The information were filed by the victim Cristina
Villarosa who was at that time only eleven (11) years old. The defendant claimed
that the age of the victim was hearsay as there was not sufficient proof that was
introduce that Cristina Villarosa was indeed below 12 years old.
The prosecution presented Cristina Villarosa’s grandfather (maternal) to attest and
testify as the age of the victim. RTC convicted the accused for (2) counts of rape. On
appeal, appellant contends that Cristina was not below 12 years old.
ISSUE:
Whether the testimony of the grandfather as to the fact that the victim was born of
Sept 5, 1976 was or is considered hearsay?
RULING:
No. the testimony of the grandfather that Cristina was born on Sept 5, 1976 do not
constitute as hearsay evidence. It falls under the exceptions to the hearsay rule under
Sec 39 and 40.
Sec 40 – Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree –
The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect
to the pedigree of any of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness
testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity.
Pedigree includes relationship, family, genealogy, birth, marriage, death and dates
when the places where these facts occurred and the names of the relatives.
In the case of Lazatin v. Campos,:
Declarations in regard to pedigree, although hearsay, are admitted on the principle
that they are natural expressions of persons who must know the truth. Pedigree
testimony is admitted because it is the best that the nature of the case admits and
because greater evil might arise from the rejection of such proof than from its
admission.
In the present case, the applicability of Rule 130, Section 39 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence to prove the victim's age is beyond question. The said provision contains
three requisites for its admissibility, namely: (1) that there is controversy in respect
to the pedigree of any of the members of a family; (2) that the reputation or tradition
of the pedigree of the person concerned existed previous to the controversy; and (3)
that the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition regarding the pedigree of the
person must be a member of the family of said person.
As correctly submitted by the Solicitor General:
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
16
It is long-settled, that the testimony of a person as to his age is admissible although
hearsay and though a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth
as all the knowledge a person has of his age is acquired from what he is told by his
parents – he may testify as to his age as he had learned it from his parents and
relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of family tradition.
GRAVADOR VS MAMIGO
G.R. No. L-24989 July 21, 1967
PEDRO GRAVADOR, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
EUTIQUIO MAMIGO, THE DISTRICT SUPERVISOR OF BAYAWAN-STA.
CATALINA SCHOOL DISTRICT,
THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF NEGROS
ORIENTAL, THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS and THE
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, (all sued in their official and personal
capacities), respondents-appellants.
FACTS: The petitioner Pedro Gravador was the principal of the Sta. Catalina
Elementary School in Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental on August 15, 1964 when he was
advised by the then Superintendent of Schools Angel Salazar, Jr., through the
respondent Supervisor Teodulfo E. Dayao, of his separation from the service on the
ground that he had reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 according to his pre-
war records as a teacher in the public schools, including his Employee’s Record Card.
He was advised of his separation from service “effective immediately unless you can
show valid proof in the form of a baptismal or birth certificate that you are below 65
years of age today” (excerpt from the advice given).
On August 31, 1964 the petitioner wrote the Director of Public Schools, protesting his
forced retirement on the ground that the date of his birth is not November 26, 1897
but December 11, 1901. Attached to his letter was the affidavit, executed on July 26,
1962, of Lazaro Bandoquillo and Pedro A. Sienes both of Amlan Negros Oriental, in
which these two affiants declared that they knew that the petitioner "was born on
December 11, 1901, in the Municipality of Amlan formerly known as New Ayuquitan
Province of Negros Oriental, Philippines" because, "we were the neighbors of the late
spouses, NEPOMUCENO GRAVADOR and AGUEDA REGOROSA [petitioner's
parents], and we were present when said PEDRO GRAVADOR was born;
furthermore,we were also invited during the baptismal party a few weeks after the
birth of said PEDRO GRAVADOR."
***On July 6, 1967 the petitioner asked for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground
that the issues posed thereby had become moot with his retirement from the service on
December 11, 1966 and the payment to him of the corresponding retirement benefits.
We deem it necessary, however, to review the trial court's decision on the merits,
considering that the computation of retirement annuities is based among other things,
on the number of years of service of a retiree, and that payment of benefits already
made to the petitioner on the basis of December 11, 1901 as the date of his birth
would not exempt him from the obligation to make a refund should this Court
LLB4302
ultimately rule that he was actually born November 26, 1897, as the respondents
claim.
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in placing full reliance on the post-war records to
establish the date of birth of the petitioner.
RULING: NO. The court gave three cogent reasons:
1. As Moran states, although a person can have no personal knowledge of the
date of his birth, he may testify as to his age as he learned it from his
parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of a
family tradition.
2. The import of the declaration of the petitioner’s brother, contained in a
verified pleading in a cadastral case way back in 1924, to the effect that the
petitioner was then 23 years old, can not be ignored. Made ante litem
motam by a deceased relative, this statement is at once a declaration
regarding pedigree within the intendment and meaning of Section 33 of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
3. The parties are agreed that the petitioner has a brother, Constantino, who
was born on June 10, 1898 and who retired on June 10, 1963 with full
retirement pay. The petitioner then could not have been born earlier than
Constantino, say in 1897 as pre-war records indicate, because Constantino
is admittedly older than he.
G.R. No. 136247 & No. 138330. November 22, 2000
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANUEL LIBAN, accused-appellant.
FACTS: Leonarda, Nerissa, the 12- year old private complainant, and Hilda, all
surnamed Liban, were at their young age left by their mother in Caricaran, Sorsogon
under the custody of their father, herein accused-appellant, who would the strike,
pinch and bite them as they were disciplined. He still managed to rape Nerissa on
different occasions. On November 6, 1995, as Leonarda spent the night at their
aunt’s house, appellant arrived home drunk and asked for food from Nerissa but he
threw the food away and slapped her making her fall on her back. Appellant then
mounted her and proceeded with having carnal knowledge against the will of his
daughter who was crying in vain as appellant also threatened her by pressing a knife
on her. The following night, he raped her again. It was stated that appellant allegedly
raped her for 7 occasions in one year but the specific dates could not be remembered
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
17
by Nerissa. The last rape incident happened on October 15, 1996 when Nerissa found
herself tied and naked as she awoke. Her father mounted her again and had carnal
knowledge against her will. When the appellant had left, Leonarda found Nerissa and
untied her and told her that the same was done to her by their father. They decided to
stay in the house of their maternal aunts and took the 8 year-old Hilda away too for
fear that the same may be done to her. Leonarda later left for Manila and Nerissa told
the incident to her friend who advised to her see a doctor. The medical findings
revealed that Nerissa’s vagina was in a non-virgin state but with several lacerations
due to sexual intercourse. Nerissa later filed a complaint of rape against her father
docketed as Criminal Case 97-4363 and 97-4362. Nerissa’s testimony was
straightforward and she was able to convincingly narrate the ordeal she had been
through. She understood the impact of her filing of charges against her father as she
stated that it would be good for him because “he is eating his own children”. The
appellant denied the commission of such crime and contended the impossibility for
him to be physically present at the place where the rape was committed. In Criminal
Case No. 97-4362, appellant was acquitted since it would be impossible for rape to be
committed based on the circumstance that the feet of Nerissa were tied. However, in
Criminal Case No. 97-4363, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt and imposed the penalty of death.
ISSUE: WON the trial court gravely erred in imposing the death penalty upon
accused-appellant despite failure of the prosecution to prove the real age of the victim
RULING: YES. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as so amended by Section
11 of R.A. No. 7659, categorized as a "heinous" offense punishable by death the rape
of a minor by her own father. In order that this penalty would be imposed, it is
required that: 1) there is sexual congress without consent; 2) the offender is the father,
stepfather, ascendant, guardian or relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree of the victim or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and
3) the victim is under eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the
crime. Thus, the victim's minority must not only be (a) specifically alleged in
the information but must be also (b) established beyond reasonable doubt during trial.
Judicial notice of the issue of age, without the requisite hearing conducted under
Section 3, Rule 129, of the Rules of Court, is not considered as compliance with the
law. The birth certificate of the victim or any other documentary evidence, like a
baptismal certificate, school records and documents of similar nature, or credible
testimonial evidence, that can help establish the age of the victim should be
presented. While the declaration of a victim as to her age, being an exception to the
hearsay proscription, would be admissible under the rule on pedigree, the relative
weight of it is another matter. Corroborative evidence would still be necessary in
some cases.
Except for the sole testimony of the victim that she was ten years old at the time
of the first rape, nothing else was presented to ascertain the correct age of the victim.
The Court upheld the trial court’s decision of convicting the accused of rape but
the penalty must be reduced from the death to reclusion perpetua due to insufficiency
of proof on the qualifying circumstance of minority of the victim.
LLB4302

G.R. No. 138471. October 10, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANUEL PRUNA y
RAMIREZ or ERMAN PRUNA y RAMIREZ, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
An information for rape was filed against the accused Manuel Pruna y Ramirez or
Erman Pruna y Ramirez (hereafter PRUNA) for having succeeded to have sexual
intercourse with the offended party, Lizette Arabelle Gonzales, a 3-year-old minor
girl.
The prosecution presented five witnesses, whose testimonies can be summed up as
follows:
Jacqueline Gonzales, the mother of LIZETTE, testified that she was fetching water
from the artesian well located ten meters away from her house, while LIZETTE was
defecating at the back of the house of their neighbor Gloria Tolentino. Jacqueline
then carried her pail of water and went back to her house. Since LIZETTE was not
home yet, Jacqueline headed toward the place where the former was moving her
bowel. She looked for LIZETTE but did not find her. It was when Jacqueline was
already returning to her house that she saw LIZETTE from behind -- red-faced,
crying, and appeared to be very frightened. When asked where she came from,
LIZETTE answered that she was brought by a certain “Boy” to the grassy area at the
back of Gloria’s house where she was sexually molested. LIZETTE then pulled her
mother and led her to the house of PRUNA, which was about eight meters away
from their house. PRUNA, the only one known in their community as “Boy,” was
not there. Jacqueline forthwith requested her mother-in-law to report the matter to
the police, while Jacqueline and LIZETTE went to the Bataan Provincial Hospital.
Jacqueline further declared that at the time of the alleged rape, LIZETTE was 3 years
old, but at the time Jacqueline testified on 17 October 1995, LIZETTE was 4 years
old. LIZETTE’s last birthday was on 19 April 1995.
LIZETTE testified that she knew PRUNA whom he called “Boy.” She pointed to
him inside the courtroom. According to her, PRUNA laid her down in a grassy area
and inserted his penis into her vagina. When the presiding judge asked her whether
she knew that it is a sin to tell a lie, she answered in the affirmative.
Dr. Emelita Quiroz, conducted a complete physical examination on LIZETTE in
which she explained that the presence of sperm cells in the vaginal canal signified
that sexual intercourse and ejaculation had occurred on the person of the
patient. There was no laceration; but there was hyperemia, which means reddening
of the tissue around the vaginal opening. Among the causes of hyperemia is the
insertion of a hard object like penis and finger.
Teresita Magtagnob, the medical technologist who conducted the lab exam and
prepared the corresponding report, testified that sperm cells were found in the wet
smear specimen and urine taken from LIZETTE.
SPO2 Romeo D. Bunsoy, conducted an ocular inspection and investigation at the
alleged place of the incident and caused the place to be photographed, which showed
that the grasses were flattened. He inquired from the people in the neighborhood,
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
18
and one of them answered that he saw the minor being brought by PRUNA to the
place where the minor was found.
On the part of the defense, Carlito Bondoc and PRUNA took the witness stand.
Carlito testified that PRUNA could not have raped LIZETTE because he was in his
house from the time that LIZETTE was moving her bowel up to the time that her
mother went to the house of PRUNA. Carlito knew that PRUNA was at home
because the former was also in the latter’s house to have coffee.
PRUNA denied having raped LIZETTE. Appellant disputes the competency of
LIZETTE to testify by reason of her tender age, the hearsay testimony of Jacqueline
as to the alleged rape of her daughter, and in convicting him on dubious evidence.
Trial court convicted PRUNA of the crime of rape in its qualified form and sentenced
to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
ISSUES:
1. Whether LIZETTE was a competent and credible witness considering that
she was allegedly only 3 years old when the alleged rape occurred and 5
years old when she testified;
2. Whether Jacqueline’s testimony as to the declarations of LIZETTE is
hearsay;
3. Whether the failure of the prosecution to present Gloria Tolentino as a
witness is fatal;
4. Whether appellant’s guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt;
5. Whether the qualifying circumstance of minority has been duly proved as to
justify the imposition of the death penalty.
RULING:
1. LIZETTE’s Competency and Credibility as a Witness
As a general rule, when a witness takes the witness stand, the law, on ground of public
policy, presumes that he is competent. The court cannot reject the witness in the
absence of proof of his incompetency. The burden is, therefore, upon the party
objecting to the competency of a witness to establish the ground of incompetency.
Section 21 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence enumerates the persons who are
disqualified to be witnesses. No precise minimum age can be fixed at which children
shall be excluded from testifying. The intelligence, not the age, of a young child is
the test of the competency as a witness. It is settled that a child, regardless of age, can
be a competent witness if he can perceive and, in perceiving, can make known his
perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully the facts for which he
is examined.
In determining the competency of a child witness, the court must consider his capacity
(a) at the time the fact to be testified to occurred such that he could receive correct
impressions thereof; (b) to comprehend the obligation of an oath; and (c) to relate
LLB4302
those facts truly to the court at the time he is offered as a witness. The examination
should show that the child has some understanding of the punishment which may
result from false swearing. The requisite appreciation of consequences is disclosed
where the child states that he knows that it is wrong to tell a lie, and that he would be
punished if he does so, or that he uses language which is equivalent to saying that he
would be sent to hell for false swearing. A child can be disqualified only if it can be
shown that his mental maturity renders him incapable of perceiving facts respecting
which he is being examined and of relating them truthfully.
The question of competency of a child-witness rests primarily in the sound discretion
of the trial court. This is so because the trial judge sees the proposed witness and
observes his manner of testifying, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, as
well as his understanding of the obligation of an oath.
In this case, appellant failed to discharge the burden of showing her mental
immaturity. It can be gleaned that LIZETTE had the capacity of observation,
recollection, and communication and that she could discern the consequence of
telling a lie.
Indeed, a girl of such age as LIZETTE would not concoct a story of defloration;
allow the examination of her private parts; and undergo the expense, trouble,
inconvenience, and the trauma of a public trial unless she was in fact raped.
2. The Alleged Hearsay Testimony of Jacqueline Gonzales
Contrary to appellant’s contention, Jacqueline’s testimony that LIZETTE told her
that appellant laid her in the grassy area and inserted his penis into her vagina is not
covered by the hearsay evidence rule.
In the instant case, the declarant was sworn as a witness to the fact testified to by
Jacqueline. The appellant even cross-examined her. Moreover, the trial court had the
opportunity to observe her manner of testifying. Hence, Jacqueline’s testimony on
the incident related to her by her daughter cannot be disregarded as hearsay evidence.
Even assuming that the aforementioned testimony of Jacqueline is hearsay, its non-
admission would not save the day for the appellant. Such testimony is not
indispensable, as it merely serves to corroborate LIZETTE’s testimony that PRUNA
laid her down in the grass and inserted his private organ into hers.
Jacqueline’s testimony is proof of the victim’s conduct immediately after the rape. It
shows that LIZETTE immediately revealed to her mother the rape incident and the
identity of her defiler.
3. Non-Presentation of Gloria Tolentino as a Witness
It is undisputed that at the time the case was called for trial, Gloria had already
moved out of her residence and could not be found anymore. Her intended testimony
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
19
could be dispensed with, as it would only be corroborative of LIZETTE’s testimony
that Pruna brought her to a grassy area.
4. Sufficiency of the Prosecution’s Evidence Against Appellant
The following overwhelmingly establish the truth of the charge of rape: (a) the
spontaneity of the identification by LIZETTE of PRUNA as the rapist; (b) her
immediate revelation to her mother of the dastard act committed against her; (c) her
act of leading her mother to appellant’s house right after the incident; (d) the prompt
filing of the complaint before the authorities; (e) LIZETTE’s submission to medical
examination; (f) the hyperemia in her private part; and (g) the presence of sperm cells
in her vaginal canal and urine.
5. Sufficiency of Evidence of LIZETTE’s Minority and Propriety of the
Imposition of the Death Penalty
In order to remove any confusion, the following are the guidelines in appreciating age,
either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified
true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim
would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is
qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of
birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of
the victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s
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testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the
accused.[78]
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended
party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age
shall not be taken against him.
In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as a
baptismal certificate of LIZETTE, was presented to prove her age.
For PRUNA to be convicted of rape in its qualified form and meted the supreme
penalty of death, it must be established with certainty that LIZETTE was below 7
years old at the time of the commission of the crime
In view of the uncertainty of LIZETTE’s exact age, corroborative evidence such as
her birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other authentic document should be
introduced in evidence in order that the qualifying circumstance of “below seven (7)
years old” is appreciated against the appellant. The lack of objection on the part of
the defense as to her age did not excuse the prosecution from discharging its
burden. That the defense invoked LIZETTE’s tender age for purposes of questioning
her competency to testify is not necessarily an admission that she was below 7 years
of age when PRUNA raped her on 3 January 1995. Such being the case, PRUNA
cannot be convicted of qualified rape, and hence the death penalty cannot be imposed
on him.
WHEREFORE, RTC decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that
accused Ramirez is held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape, and not
qualified rape, and is sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim
Lizette Arabelle Gonzales the sum of P50,000 as moral damages in addition to the
indemnity of P50,000.
G.R. No. L-12993 October 28, 1918
RAFAEL J. FERRER, ET AL., plaintiff-appellants,
vs.
JOAQUIN J. DE INCHAUSTI, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
FACTS: Plaintiffs Rafael and Maria Angelina Ferrer filed a complaint praying for a
declaration that Rosa Matilde Viademonte, mother of the plaintiffs herein, had the
right to succeed to the inheritance left by Isabel Gonzales in the same proportion and
capacity as the other four children of the latter namely, Ramon, Rafael, Joaquin, and
Clotilde. The plaintiffs allege that they are the only legitimate heirs of Rosa
Viademonte and are entitled to receive the latter’s share, that is, one-fifth of the
estate left by Isabel Gonzales. They allege that Isabel was first married to Ramon
Martinez Viademonte and that their mother Rosa was the fruit of their relationship.
Isabel was then married Jose Joaquin de Inchausti, father of defendants herein.
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
20
Counsel for the plaintiffs sought to establish that Rosa Matilde Viademonte has been
treated and considered as a daughter of Isabel Gonzales and that on one occasion, the
said Gonzales remarked that the father of Rosa Matilde was Ramon Martinez de
Viademonte. Also, that Joaquin C. de Inchausti dedicated a picture to Rosa in the
following manner: “To my dear and unforgettable sister Rosa.” College records of the
latter at Collegio de Santa Isabel were shown to use establish filiation.
The defendants presented an entry in the notebook of Ramon Viademonte Jr. which
showed that true name of Rosa Matilde Viademonte was Rosa Matilde Robles, born
of unknown parents in September 1, 1952. Notwithstanding the arguments of the
plaintiff, Joaquin de Inchausti testified that one day he was assured by his half brother
Ramon Martinez Viademonte that Rosa Matilde was not his sister but a mere protégée
and that her true name was Rosa Matilde Robles and that on occasion the said brother
showed him the certificate of birth of which Exhibit 6 is a copy, which he took from
the parochial church.
ISSUE: WON Joaquin de Inchausti’s testimony and the diary accounts of Ramon
Viademonte Jr. are admissible to prove the filiation of Rosa Matilde Viademonte to
Isabel Gonzales
RULING: Yes. The provisions of section 298, No. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which provides that evidence may be given upon trial of monuments and inscriptions
in public places as evidence of common reputation; and entries in family Bibles or
other family books or charts; engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, as
evidence of pedigree. The law does not require that the entries in the said booklet be
made at the same time as the occurrence of those events; hence, the written
memorandum in the same is not subject to the defect attributed to it, The witness
Joaquin Jose de Inchausti declared affirmatively that the memorandum under
consideration has been written in the handwriting of his brother Ramon Martinez de
Viademonte, whose handwriting he was familiar with, and the testimony of this
witness contains some reference to a member of the family, now dead, and concerning
the family genealogy of the same.
Evidence adduced at the trial to prove the origin of the cause of action shows, in a
manner which leaves no room for doubt, that Rosa was not a legitimate daughter of
Isabel Gonzales and it follows that her children have no right to a part of the
hereditary property of Isabel Gonzales. In view of the fact that Ramon Martinez
Viademonte is now dead, the testimony of Joaquin Jose de Inchausti referring to the
said deceased is admissible as evidence of family tradition, for they are members of
the same family and consequently the conclusion is that Rosa Matilde is the same
Rosa Matilde Robles mentioned in Exhibit 6 and because she was born in 1952, in no
manner could she be a legitimate daughter of Ramon Viademonte and Isabel
Gonzales, whose marriage was dissolved in 1936 by the death of the husband.
G.R. No. 181258, March 18, 2010
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BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO, Petitioner, vs. ARHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ,
represented by her mother ARACELI LOPEZ, Respondent.
FACTS:
Arhbencel Ann Lopez (Arhbencel), represented by her mother Araceli Lopez
(Araceli), filed a Complaint with the RTC of Caloocan City for recognition and
support against Ben-hur Nepomuceno. Born on June 8, 1999, Arhbencel claimed to
have been begotten out of an extramarital affair of Ben-hur with Araceli; Ben-Hur
refused to affix his signature on her Birth Certificate; and that, by a handwritten note
dated August 7, 1999, Ben-hur nevertheless obligated himself to give her financial
support in the amount of P1,500 on the 15th and 30th days of each month beginning
August 15, 1999. Ben-hur countered that Araceli had not proven that he was the
father of Arhbencel; and that he was only forced to execute the handwritten note on
account of threats coming from the National People’s Army.
The trial court held that, Arhbencel’s Certificate of Birth was not prima facie
evidence of her filiation to Ben-hur as it did not bear Ben-hur’s signature; that Ben-
hur’s handwritten undertaking to provide support did not contain a categorical
acknowledgment that Arhbencel is his child; and that there was no showing that Ben-
hur performed any overt act of acknowledgment of Arhbencel as his illegitimate
child after the execution of the note.
On appeal by Arhbencel, the CA reversed the trial court’s decision, declared
Arhbencel to be Ben-hur’s illegitimate daughter. The appellate court found that from
Ben-hur’s payment of Araceli’s hospital bills when she gave birth to Arhbencel and
his subsequent commitment to provide monthly financial support, the only logical
conclusion to be drawn was that he was Arhbencel’s father; that Ben-hur merely
acted in bad faith in omitting a statement of paternity in his handwritten undertaking
to provide financial support.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Arhbencel has proved her filiation to Ben-hur?
RULING:
No. The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of
Rule 130:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to
him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the
controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
21
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history
intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or
tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of
any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon
be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family
bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the
like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still
has to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal
and written acts by the putative father.
Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be
made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative
father himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative father. A notarial
agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was
considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to
the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions,
together with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student
permanent record, a written consent to a father's operation, or a marriage contract
where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing. Standing
alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish
filiation. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the present case, Arhbencel relies, in the main, on the handwritten note executed by
petitioner. The note does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencel’s
filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of Article 172(2) vis-à-vis
Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate
filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the
parent concerned.
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to
support the child referred to in Herrera. For it is not even notarized. And Herrera
instructs that the notarial agreement must be accompanied by the putative father’s
admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. Here, however, not
only has petitioner not admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions. He has
consistently denied it.
The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her
Certificate of Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to petitioner, the latter
not having signed the same.
LLB4302
At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is petitioner’s handwritten undertaking to
provide financial support to her which, without more, fails to establish her claim of
filiation. The Court is mindful that the best interests of the child in cases involving
paternity and filiation should be advanced. It is, however, just as mindful of the
disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the
putative father’s legitimate family.
G.R. No. 124853, February 24, 1998
FRANCISCO L. JISON,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON,
FACTS:
Private Respondent Monina Jison (Monina) filed a Complaint against Petitioner
Francisco Jison (Francisco) for the recognition of an illegitimate child. She alleged
that Francisco was married to Lilia Lopez Jison but he impregnated Esperanza
Amolar, who worked as a nanny of Petitioner’s daughter. As a result, the Monina
was born. She also alleged that Petitioner supported her education until she became a
certified public accountant and even thereafter until she finished a Master’s Degree.
Francisco, however, refused to expressly recognize her.
Among the evidence that she presented were three letters of introduction written by
relatives of the Petitioner. The letters were drafted because she was preparing to
travel abroad, and they were intended to be submitted to the Vice Consul of the
United States to the Philippines. One of the letters expressly introduced her as a son
of the Petitioner.
The Trial Court dismissed Monina’s Petition and concluded that the evidence
introduced by Monina were inadmissible for being hearsay, increadulous, or self-
serving. The Trial Court did not decide on the admissibility of the letters.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the Decision of the Trial Court and
concluded that Monina was an illegitimate daughter of the Petitioner. This time the
letters were considered and based thereon, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
own relatives of the Petitioner recognized Monina as the daughter of the Petitioner.
To the mind of the Court of Appealls, the letters strengthened Monina’s claim that
she was the illegitimate daughter of the Petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the letters were admissible as evidence to prove Monina’s filiation
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
22
RULING:
The letters were not admissible to prove pedigree, but it may be admitted to prove her
allegation that Francisco’s relatives recognized her as the latter’s daughter.
While it is true that the authenticity of the letters were not contested, these were not
admissible to prove pedigree because (1) the relatives of the Petitioner were not
shown to be dead or unable to testify and (2) the relationship between Monina and the
authors of these letters were not shown by any document other than the letters. Under
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the relatives who were purported to be the
authors of the said letters must take the witness stand for the evidence to be admitted.
But even if they were presented as witnesses, the letters cannot be admitted. Section
40, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that “Entries in family bibles or other family
books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like may be received as
evidence of pedigree.” The letters were not within the scope of “and the like” because
they were not private documents constituting family possessions.
The Court affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals and concluded,based on the
other evidence, that Monina is an illegitimate daughter of Francisco.
A.M. No. 533, September 12, 1974
IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE,
FACTS:
Respondent Florencio Mallare (Florencio) was admitted to the Philippine Bar on
March 5, 1962. However, Acting Immigration Commissioner Martiniano Vivo filed a
Complaint praying that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys for being a
Chinese Citizen.
After an investigation conducted by the Legal Officer Investigator, the Court decided
that Florencio was Chinese because both of his parents were Chinese nationals. One
of the facts cited as a basis by the Court was the absence of proof that Ana Mallare
(Ana), Florencio’s grandmother, was an inhabitant of the Philippines continuing to
reside in the Philippines and was a Spanish subject on April 11 1899. The Court
declared him excluded from the practice of law.
After his Motion for Reconsideration was denied, Florencio petitioned for the re-
opening of the case and for new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence.
The evidence included (1) an entry in the registry of baptism of the Immaculate
Concepcion Church at Macalelon, Quezon where it showed that his father, Esteban
Mallare (Esteban), is the son of Ana Mallare, who was a Filipino Citizen; and (2)
testimonies of certain persons who had known his father Esteban and his grandmother
Ana, to prove that the latter was also a Filipino.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not Esteban Mallare is a Filipino Citizen
RULING:
Esteban Mallare is a Filipino Citizen.
The witnesses presented by Florencio, all of whom had personal knowledge of the
person, birth and residency of both Ana Mallare and Esteban, were all consistent in
testifying that Ana Mallare was a Tagalog who had continuously resided in the place,
and that Esteban, her son, was reputedly born out of wedlock. To the Court, these
declarations were admissible as evidence of the birth and illegitimacy of Esteban
Mallare. Common reputation was admissible as evidence of age, birth, race, or race-
ancestry, and on the question of whether a child was born alive. Unlike that of
matters of pedigree, general reputation of marriage may proceed from persons who
are not members of the family. The reason for the distinction was the public interest
taken on the question of the existence of marital relations.
Esteban Mallare, having been a natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipino Citizen, was
therefore himself a Filipino. The Court set aside its earlier decision and dismissed the
Complaint of the Acting Immigration Commissioner.
G.R. No. 146161, July 17, 2006
PEPITO CAPILA
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: An Information for robbery was filed against Petitioner Pepito Capila
(Capila), Dimas Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz) and four others, including two unidentified
persons. The Information alleged that the Capila and his co-accused conspired, by
means of force, violence and intimidation, to steal money in the amount of P1.3
Million and three (3) paltik amounting to P18,000.00 from Pilipinas Bank at a
Meralco Collection Office in Makati. The accused pleaded not guilty.
Among witnesses that they brought to the Trial Court was SPO4 Romualdo Maximo.
He testified that he arrived about ten minutes after the incident. He questioned two
employees of Pilipinas Bank, Ariel Arellano and Lani Imperio, both of whom went
that morning to the Meralco Collection Office to receive then deposit cash
collections. The two employees said that they could not identify the suspects. Dela
Cruz, upon inquiry from SPO4 Maximo, told the latter that the one of the robbers
was the Petitioner Capila, who was assigned as a security guard in the same Meralco
Collection Office. Dela Cruz was also then assigned as a security guard and both he
and Capila were employees of the Lanting Security and Watchman Agency.
However, Dela Cruz was not brought to the witness stand, and the Prosecution relied
heavily on the testimony of SPO4 Maximo. The Trial Court absolved Dela Cruz and
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
23
two others, but found Capila guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
He appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the Trial Court erred in admitting
in evidence the statement of Dela Cruz. He alleged that he was denied due process
because he was not given the opportunity to cross-examine Dela Cruz as his testimony
was not presented in court. The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the Trial Court,
ruling that Dela Cruz’s statement was part of the res gestae and therefore, the
testimony of SPO4 Maximo was an exception to the rule on hearsay evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of Capila beyond
reasonable doubt
RULING: The prosecution was able to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Res gestae refers to those exclamations and statements by either the participants,
victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during or immediately after the
commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were
made as spontaneous reactions or utterances inspired by the excitement of the
occasion, and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate. For the
admission of the res gestae in evidence, the following requisites must be met: (1) that
the principal act or the res gestaebe a startling occurrence; (2) the statement is
spontaneous or was made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise, and the
statement is made during the occurrence or immediately or subsequent thereto; and
(3) the statement made must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.
The above requisites for the application of the rule on res gestae were present in this
case. The principal act, which by any measure was undoubtedly a startling occurrence,
is the robbery of which petitioner is being charged. Immediately after the robbery,
Dela Cruz informed Ariel that one of the perpetrators was Capila. He likewise
reported at once the incident to the police and to the security agency. When
questioned by SPO4Maximo, Dela Cruz, who was still shocked, named Capila as one
of the robbers. His statements to Ariel and SPO4 Maximo were made before he had
the time and opportunity to concoct and contrive a false story.
G.R. No. 74740. August 28, 1992.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANILO
SANCHEZ, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: Spouses Elpidio and Julieta Nepuscua were residents of Longos, Calasiao,
Pangasinan. Julieta, her children and three grandchildren were evacuated to the house
of Elpidio’s sister, allegedly because Danilo Sanchez and Juanito Zamora were angry
with Elpidio since he reported the two to the police authorities for having cut, the
bamboo trees on a lot mortgaged to them. At midnight of 22 November 1982, while in
LLB4302
the other house, Julieta was awakened first by a burst of gunfire and then by the
barking of dogs from the direction of their house, which was about 150 meters. She
rushed to the window and saw their house on fire.
According to Julieta, at 4:00 o’clock in the morning of 23 November 1982, her
husband arrived at the other house and related to her that "on that evening of
November 22, 1982, Danilo Sanchez went up to the balcony of their house carrying
with him one bundle of rice hay which he then set on fire thus causing the burning of
their house.
However, Cpl. Demetrio Matabang of the Integrated National Police of Aguilar,
Pangasinan, testified that although Elpidio reported the burning of their house to the
police authorities of Calasiao, Pangasinan on 23 November 1982, the latter did not
mention the name of any suspect. Later Elpidio died.
An Information for arson was filed against Sanchez and Zamora, co-accused Zamora
could not be found. The trial court promulgated its decision finding the accused
guilty of the crime of Arson.
ISSUE: WON the statement of Elpidio to his wife is part of the res gestae.
RULING: NO. Res gestae means the "things done." It "refers to those exclamations
and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime, when
the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction
or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity
for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement."
The cases are not uniform as to the interval of time that should separate the
occurrence of the startling event and the making of the declaration. What is
important is that the declarations were voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly
and were made under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the idea of design
or deliberation.
The Court find the questioned statement of Elpidio Nepuscua to his wife to be
lacking in spontaneity and to have been given after he had the luxury of time to
concoct a story or fabricate an account. If indeed he was at his house at the time the
accused and the latter’s alleged companions came, there is no plausible reason may
justify or explain his nearly 4-hour delay in reporting the incident to his wife and
other members of his family. He could easily negotiate that distance in less than 5
minutes.
The shock and excitement it naturally produced was more than enough to propel his
feet to bring him to his family as soon as possible. It behooved Elpidio to relay the
tragic event to those dear to him without any delay; thus, his conduct cannot be
reconciled with human experience, ordinary habits of men and common sense.
Another badge of untrustworthiness attributable to the alleged statement given by
Elpidio to his wife is his deliberate suppression of the names of the "suspects" when
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
24
he reported the incident to the police authorities of Calasiao, Pangasinan in the
morning of 23 November 1982.
G.R. No. 172031. July 14, 2008.
JUANITO TALIDANO, petitioner, vs. FALCON MARITIME & ALLIED
SERVICES, INC., SPECIAL EIGHTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS, AND LABOR ARBITER ERMITA C. CUYUGA, respondents.
FACTS: Talidano was employed as a second marine officer by Falcon Maritime and
Allied Services, Inc. and was assigned to M/V Phoenix Seven. His 1-year contract of
employment commenced on 15 October 1996. He claimed that his chief officer, a
Korean, always discriminated and maltreated the Filipino crew. This prompted him to
send a letter-complaint to the officer-in-charge of the International Transport
Federation (ITF) in London, a measure that allegedly was resented by the chief
officer, which led to his dismissal on 21 January 1997. But he filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal on 27 October 1999.
Falcon Maritime countered that Talidano had voluntarily disembarked the vessel after
having been warned several times of dismissal from service for his incompetence,
insubordination, disrespect and insulting attitude toward his superiors. It cited an
incident involving Talidano's incompetence, as proof, it presented a copy of a fax
message, sent to it on the date of incident, as well as a copy of the report of crew
discharge issued by the master of M/V Phoenix Seven two days after the incident.
The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment favoring Falcon Maritime, but on appeal, the
NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. The CA also dismissed the appeal
based on technicality.
ISSUE: WON the fax messages constitute as res gestae.
RULING: NO.
The first fax message dated 18 January 1997 is reproduced below:
JUST RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM MASTER N C/OFFICER THAT
THEY DECIDED TO DISCHARGE 2/OFFICER AT OSAKA PORT.
DUE TO MIS-BEHAVIOUR N RESEST [SIC] TO OFFICIAL ORDER.
CAPT. HAD RECEIVED EMERGENCY WARNING CALL FROM
JAPAN BISAN SETO NAIKAI RADIO AUTHORITY THAT SHIP IS
INVADING OTHER ROUTE.
SO, HE WAS SURPRISED N CAME TO BRIDGE N FOUND 2/O NOT
CARRY OUT HIS WATCH DUTY.
MASTER SCOLD HIM ABOUT THIS N CORRECT HIS ERROR BUT
HE RESIST [SIC] THAT HE IS RIGHT AND THEN SAID THAT HE
WILL COME BACK HOME.
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 FURTHER MORE HE ASKED MASTER TO PAY HIM I.T.F. WAGE
SCALE.
MASTER N/CIO STRONGLY ASKED US HIS REPATRIATION WITH
I.E.U.
PLS. CONFIRM YOUR OPINION ON THIS HAPPENING.
The second fax message dated 20 January 1997 pertained to a report of crew
discharge essentially containing the same information as the first fax message.
Section 42 of Rule 130 40 of the Rules of Court mentions two acts which form part
of the res gestae, namely: spontaneous statements and verbal acts. In spontaneous
exclamations, the res gestae is the startling occurrence, whereas in verbal acts, the res
gestae are the statements accompanying the equivocal act. We find that the fax
messages cannot be deemed part of the res gestae.
To be admissible under the spontaneous statements, it is required that: (1) the
principal act be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the
declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements
must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances.
Assuming that Talidano's negligence — which allegedly caused the ship to deviate
from its course — is the startling occurrence, there is no showing that the statements
contained in the fax messages were made immediately after the alleged incident. In
addition, no dates have been mentioned to determine if these utterances were made
spontaneously or with careful deliberation. Absent the critical element of
spontaneity, the fax messages cannot be admitted as part of the res gestae of the first
kind.
Neither will the verbal acts apply, the requisites are: (1) the principal act to be
characterized must be equivocal; (2) the equivocal act must be material to the issue;
(3) the statement must accompany the equivocal act; and (4) the statements give a
legal significance to the equivocal act.
Talidano’s alleged absence from watch duty is simply a harmless act or at least
proved to be one. Assuming arguendo that such absence was the equivocal act, it is
nevertheless not accompanied by any statement more so by the fax statements
adverted to as parts of the res gestae. No date or time has been mentioned to
determine whether the fax messages were made simultaneously with the purported
equivocal act.
Furthermore, the material contents of the fax messages are unclear. The matter of
route encroachment or invasion is questionable. The ship master, who is the author
of the fax messages, did not witness the incident. He obtained such information only
from the Japanese port authorities. Verily, the messages can be characterized as
double hearsay.
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
25
G.R. No. L-53401 November 6, 1989
THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (First Division) LILIAN JUAN LUIS,
JANE JUAN YABES, VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA JUAN CARAG, and
PURISIMA JUAN, respondents.
FACTS:
Ilocos Norte was buffeted by a strong typhoon causing flooding in the area. After the
typhoon, when the water was beginning to recede, the deceased Isabel Lao Juan
proceeded towards her grocery store to check for merchandise which might have been
damaged. Together with her were Aida Bulong and Linda Estavillo, who walked
about 5-6 meters behind her.
While wading in the waist-deep flood, the deceased suddenly creamed “Ay” and
quickly sank into the water. The 2 girls attempted to help but they saw an electric wire
dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water.
The deceased’s son-in-law Ernesto came to rescue but turned his back while, at 4
meters away from the deceased, shouting that the water was grounded.
Antonio Yabes and Ernesto went to the City Hall to ask that it be requested that the
electric current be cut off. When the flood receded and the lights were out, the body of
the deceased was recovered about 2 meters away from an electric post.
Upon the request of the relatives, the body was examined by Dr. Jovencio Castro who
found an electrically charged wound on the left palm of the deceased and who
prepared the certificate of death stating that the cause of death was “circulatory shock
circulation”.
A claim for damages was then filed against the defendant Ilocos Norte Electric
Company. During the trial the witnesses presented for the plaintiffs were Dr. castro,
Linda Estavillo and Aida Bulong.
In defense, defendants sought to prove that the electric system of the INELCO did not
suffer any defect that might constitute hazard to life and property and that what
happened to the deceased was attributable only to herself. Moreover the testimonies of
Aida Bulong and Linda Estavillo were assailed as not part of res gestae and the
testinomies of the witnesses in relation to the shouts made by Ernesto during the
incident were hearsay.
The trial court ruled in favor of the INELCO. Private respondents appealed and the
CA reversed the trial court’s ruling and awarded damages.
ISSUE:
Whether the testimonies of the witnesses were properly admitted as part of res gestae.
Whether the shouts of Ernesto were only his mere opinion, were hearsay as to the
witnesses and hence not part of res gestae.
RULING:
Yes. For the admission of the res gestae in evidence, the following requisites must be
present:
(1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence;
LLB4302
(2) that the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise;
(3) that the statements made must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.
The witnesses Linda Estavillo and Aida Bulong were with the deceased during that
fateful morning. They were one in the affirmation that the deceased, while wading in
the waist-deep flood five or six meters ahead of them, suddenly screamed "Ay" and
quickly sank into the water. When they approached the deceased to help, they were
stopped by the sight of an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-
like fashion in the water. Ernesto dela Cruz also tried to approach the deceased, but
he turned back shouting that the water was grounded.
These bits of evidence carry much weight. The subject of the testimonies was a
startling occurrence, and the declarations may be considered part of the res gestae.
The statements made relative to the startling occurrence are admitted in evidence
precisely as an exception to the hearsay rule on the grounds of trustworthiness and
necessity. “Trustworthiness" because the statements are made instinctively, and
"necessity" because such natural and spontaneous utterances are more convincing
than the testimony of the same person on the stand.
II. NO. Even if Ernesto did not see the sinking of the deceased, his shouts were a part
of the res gestae. It may be true that Ernesto was not an actual witness to the instant
when the deceased sank into the waist-deep water, he acted upon the call of help of
Aida Bulong and Linda Estavillo with the knowledge of, and immediately after, the
sinking of the deceased. In this instance, the startling event had not yet ceased when
Ernesto entered the scene considering that the victim remained submerged.
Under such a circumstance, it is undeniable that a state of mind characterized by
nervous excitement had been triggered in Ernesto’s being as anybody under the same
contingency could have experienced. As such, the Court cannot exclude his shouts
that the water was grounded from the res gestae just because he did not actually see
the sinking of the deceased nor hear her scream "Ay."
Ernesto’s shouts were not mere opinion his shout were a translation of an actuality as
perceived by him through his sense of touch.
The fact that he was not presented to testify does not make the testimony of Linda
Estavillo and Aida Bulong hearsay since the said declaration is part of the res gestae.
Res Gestae
People vs Palmones
Facts:
Accused-appellants Anthony Melchor Palmones and Anthony Baltazar Palmones
were convicted by trial court of the crime murder.
The prosecution first presented Sonny Boy Redovan, a 28 year-old farmer who was
the nephew of the victim. He testified that when they rushed to the Kidapawan
Doctor’s Hospital and proceeded to the emergency room. Upon seeing his uncle, the
witness went near him and asked him what had happened to him. His uncle answered
that he had been waylaid. The witness then asked the victim who the perpetrators
were and the victim answered that it was "Juany and Tony Palmones" which were
the nicknames of the two accused-appellants. The prosecution next presented Dr.
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
26
Hazel Mark Aguayo who testified that he was the surgeon-on-duty on the day that
SP02 Mamansal was shot. He stated that before he operated on the victim, he
interviewed Mamansal and one of the questions he asked is whether the victim had
known who had shot him. He claimed that Mamansal told him that he did not know
who had shot him. He did not pursue this line of questioning further as he was told by
a companion of the victim that the area where the victim was shot was dark. He
testified that he operated on the victim at around 12:00 in the evening. He operated for
around four (4) hours but the victim developed cardio respiratory arrest at around 8:30
the following morning and thereafter, the victim died in the ward.
Defense interposed alibi as defense. The conviction of the 2 accused was based
largely on the alleged dying declaration of the victim made to 2 witnesses of the
prosecution and the apparent weakness of their defense.
Issue:
WON THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE ALLEGED DYING
DECLARATION OF ASIM MAMANSAL AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE
HEARSAY RULE. WON IT CAN BE CONSIDERED AS RES GESTAE
Held:
Yes. It is not considered as dying declaration nor res gestae.
In cases where an alleged dying declaration is sought to be admitted, it must be
proven that that the declaration was made "under a consciousness of impending death"
which means simply that the declarant is fully aware that he is dying or going to die
from his wounds or injuries soon or imminently, or shall have a complete conviction
that death is at hand, or there must be "a settled hopeless expectation."
In the instant case, it was not established by the prosecution that the statements of the
declarant concerning the cause and surrounding circumstances of his death were made
under the consciousness of impending death. No proof to this effect was ever
presented by the prosecution. It was not shown whether Sonny Boy Redovan or
Inspector Alexander Tagum ever asked the victim whether he believed that he was
going to die out of his injuries or any other similar question. Sonny Boy Redovan
claimed that he was able to talk with the victim for around an hour but the only thing
he revealed of their conversation was the alleged identification of the victim of his
two assailants.
While it is true that the law does not require that the declarant explicitly state his
perception that he has given up the hope of life , the circumstances surrounding his
declaration must justify the conclusion that he was conscious of his impending
death.In the instant case, it was not proven that the victim was ever aware of the
seriousness of his condition. As testified to by Dr. Mark Aguayo, the vital signs of the
victim, prior to his operation, were quite stable. Moreover, from the time the victim
was brought to the hospital at 10:30 p.m. until his operation at 12:00 midnight, he was
still able to talk intelligently with at least four (4) other persons on various matters.
The fact that his vital signs were strong and that he still had strength to converse with
these four (4) witnesses belie the conclusion that the victim was under the
consciousness of death by reason of the gravity of his wounds.
Neither may the alleged statements attributed to the victim be admissible as part of the
res gestae. Res gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or
LLB4302
immediately after the commission of a crime, when the circumstances are such that
the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.
In order to admit statements as evidence part of the res gestae, the element of
spontaneity is critical. The following factors have generally been considered in
determining whether statements offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have
been made spontaneously: (1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act
or transaction and the making of the statement; (2) the place where the statement was
made; (3) the condition of the declarant when he made the statement; (4) the
presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement
relative thereto; and (5) the nature and circumstances of the statement itself.
Tested against these factors to test the spontaneity of the statements attributed to the
victim, we rule that these statements fail to qualify as part of the res gestae. When
Mamansal allegedly uttered the statements attributed to him, an appreciable amount
of time had already elapsed from the time that he was shot as the victim was shot at
around 10:00 p.m. but he only uttered the statements attributed to him about 30
minutes to an hour later. Moreover, he allegedly made these statements not at the
scene of the crime but at the hospital where he was brought for treatment. Likewise,
the trip from the scene of the crime to the hospital constituted an intervening event
that could have afforded the victim opportunity for deliberation. These
circumstances, taken together, indubitably show that the statements allegedly uttered
by Mamansal lack the requisite spontaneity in order for these to be admitted as part
of the res gestae.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment dated 8 May 1998 of Branch 17
of the Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan, Cotabato is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accused-appellants Anthony Melchor Palmones and Anthony Baltazar
Palmones are ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless they
are being held for some other legal grounds.
PEOPLE VS PUTIAN
G.R. No. L-33049 November 29, 1976
FACTS:
Appellant Putian admits that on November 22, 1969 while Teodulo Panimdim was
attending a dance at Barrio Tabo-o, Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, he (Panimdim)
was stabbed in the left groin. As a result of that assault, Panimdim died five days
later at the provincial hospital.
In the evening of that day, November 22, while Patrolman Arturo Yap was passing
Barrio Tabo-o, he noticed a commotion at the back of the dance hall in that barrio.
He was informed that someone had been stabbed. He looked for the culprit. He found
Guillermo Putian behind the municipal building with a dagger and scabbard in his
possession . Yap investigated Putian. The latter denied that he stabbed Panimdim.
Yap arrested Putian and surrendered him to Jesus Gomonit, the guard at the
municipal hall.
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
27
Patrolman Yap then repaired to the clinic of Doctor Saceda where the victim, Teodulo
Panimdim, alias Doling, was brought for treatment. At the clinic, Yap wrote on a
piece of paper the victim's declaration.
Yap explained that Panimdim mentioned only a person named Guirmo and that he,
Yap, was the one who added the surname Putian in the statement Exhibit C. He
clarified that he wrote that surname because he knew of no other person called
Guirmo in that locality except Guirmo Putian, an alleged gambler.
One day after the stabbing, the victim was brought to the hospital. An operation was
performed on him. He died in the hospital on November 27, or five days after he was
assaulted. The attending physician certified that the victim had a stab wound in the
left groin which penetrated the abdomen and punctured the large intestine. Death was
due to "toxemia secondary to general peritonitis" . The doctor testified that the stab
wound could have been caused by the two-bladed dagger (punyal).
The slender evidence for the defense consists merely of the meager testimony of
Anacleto Taporco, who claimed to be a friend of Panimdim and a close friend of
Putian. Taporco declared that in the evening of November 22, 1969 he was in the
barrio dance hall together with appellant Putian, Olimpio Sitoy and Ramon Gimeno.
Panimdim was also there.
Taporco said that Panimdim, asked his permission to box Rogelio Opos. Taporco
allegedly advised Panimdim not to do so because boxing Opos would cause trouble in
the dance hall. Panimdim obeyed him but sometime later Panimdim again asked
Taporco that he be allowed to box Opos. Taporco dissuaded Panimdim and took him
outside the dance hall.
Afterwards, Taporco was allegedly informed that there was trouble. When he tried to
find out what the trouble was, he was informed that it was already patched up. During
that interval, Putian never left the dance hall.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statement of Panimdim is a part of res gestae.
HELD:
The court held that the declaration is not of a dying declaration because it was not
made under expectation of an impending death. However, although a declaration does
not appear to have been made by the declarant under the expectation of a sure and
impending death, and, for the reason, is not admissible as a dying declaration.
A declaration made by a person immediately after being wounded, pointing out or
naming his assailant, may be considered as part of the res gestae and is admissible in
evidence. A statement was given sometime after the stabbing while the declarant was
undergoing treatment at a medical clinic, where he had no time to concoct a falsehood
or to fabricate a malicious charge against the accused and no motive has been shown
as to why he would frame-up the accused would render the statement admissible as a
part of the res gestae.
PP vs LUNGAYAN
PP vs VILLARAMA
G.R. No. 178063 April 5, 2010
LLB4302
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
TIRSO SACE y MONTOYA, Accused-Appellant
FACTS: On September 9, 1999, at around seven (7) o’clock in the evening, AAA
was inside their house with her 10-year-old brother BBB and a nephew, who was
still a toddler, when appellant suddenly showed up. As admitted by appellant, he
came from a drinking spree that began at about eleven (11) o’clock in the morning.
AAA told appellant to leave and go home, but he did not heed her. Appellant then
made sexual advances on AAA. AAA was able to evade appellant when he tried to
embrace her, but appellant pulled a bladed weapon from his pocket. Sensing danger,
AAA ran upstairs to the second level of their house. Appellant followed AAA,
leaving BBB and the toddler in the first floor of the house. BBB heard appellant
ordering AAA to remove her clothes, otherwise, he will stab her.[5] Scared with the
turn of events, the two (2) children hid at the lower portion of the house for around
twenty (20) minutes, and came out only when CCC, the mother of AAA and BBB,
arrived.
CCC, together with her elder daughter DDD and a certain Abelardo Motol
(Abelardo), was on her way home when she and her companions heard AAA scream.
They hurried towards the house and searched it but found it to be empty. As they
searched further, appellant came out from somewhere in the kitchen area of the
house. They noticed that he was bloodied and he told them that he was chasing
someone. Appellant then joined in the search for AAA. Before long, Abelardo found
the lifeless body of AAA lying on the ground nearby. AAA was half-naked and she
appeared to have been ravished when they found her. Immediately, Abelardo called
the barangay officials and the police.
Barangay Kagawad Carmelita Mawac (Carmelita) and other barangay
officials and tanods, including Rafael Motol and Bonifacio Vitto, arrived. Upon
arrival, they noticed the bloodstains on appellant’s clothing. Carmelita asked
appellant what he did, but appellant denied any knowledge of what happened.
Carmelita then went to the half-naked body of AAA and again asked appellant why
he did such a thing to his cousin. At that point, appellant admitted to the
barangay officials and tanods that he was the one (1) who committed the crime.
He admitted that he raped and killed AAA.[6] Barangay Tanod Rafael Motol also
obtained the same confession from appellant when he interviewed him infront
of other people, namely, Abelardo, Carmelita, and Bonifacio Vitto, as well as
Arnaldo Mawac, Conchita and Iboy Serdeña, and Salvador and Julieta
Motol. Appellant was then photographed by the police and Maribeth, who at that
time had a camera on hand.
ISSUE: WON the admission of appellant areadmissible as evidence?
HELD: YES, the facts in this case clearly show that appellant admitted
the commission of the crime to the prosecution’s witnesses. According to their
testimonies, appellant admitted having raped and killed AAA. Their testimonies
were not rebutted by the defense. Appellant’s statements infront of the
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
28
prosecution witnesses are admissible for being part of the res gestae. Under
the Revised Rules on Evidence,[21] a declaration is deemed part of the res
gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the
following requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances. [22] All these requisites are
present in this case. Appellant had just been through a startling and gruesome
occurrence, AAA’s death. His admission was made while he was still under the
influence of said startling occurrence and before he had an opportunity to
concoct or contrive a story. In addition, he was still under the influence of
alcohol at that time, having engaged in a drinking spree from 1:00 p.m. to 7:00
p.m. that day. His confession concerned the rape and killing of AAA.
Appellant’s spontaneous statements made to private persons, not agents of the
State or law enforcers, are not covered by the constitutional safeguards on
custodial investigation and, as res gestae, admissible in evidence against him.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Tirso Sace y Montoya is DISMISSED and
the November 20, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR- H.C. No.
02324 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-49149 October 23, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
GREGORIO TAYLARAN alias “Goring” defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
Gregorio Taylaran was charged with crime of murder. He was convicted and
sentenced to life imprisonment and was ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Ofremia Atup in the sum of P 12,000 and to pay costs. Appealing to this Court,
appellant insists on his defense of accidental, not deliberate killing.
The case presents different version of evidence one is for the prosecution and
the other for defense. The evidence for the prosecution presented the testimonies of
Salvador Atup, policeman, Demetrio Basilad and Juanita Busalla. According to them,
Taylaran went to deceased Ofremia house to submit himself for treatment of his
snake-bite. While inside Taylaran suddenly drew his small bolo and stabbed the
deceased several times. After killing the deceased, accused proceeded to the house of
the son of the deceased for the purpose of killing him and his wife but accused did not
accomplish his purpose because the deceased's son refused to left him enter his house.
After that accused surrendered himself with his bolo to Demetrio, when asked why he
LLB4302
killed the deceased who was also his grandmother-in-law, accused answered
‘because she promised to kill me with a barang, hence I killed her first”.
On the other hand, the defense presented the testimonies of accused himself
and Elpidio Mendez. According to Taylaran, when he was bitten by a snake while
tending his carabao, he immediately proceeded to the house of his grandmother-in-
law Ofremia for treatment. The deceased then instructed him to open his snake-bite
with his bolo so that the venom can be drained out. While he was opening his snake-
bite with a bolo, he accidentally put out the light of a kerosene lamp. This prompted
the deceased to re-light said lamp. She banded her body down with her two hands
extended towards the floor to light said lamp. At the very time that deceased was
bending her body downward, accused lifted his right hand which was holding the
bolo upward, so that the point of the bolo accidentally hit deceased's right chest
penetrating the nipple and resulting in her death. Upon realizing that the deceased
was fatally wounded, accused asked for her forgiveness and after that he ran away.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the statements of the prosecution witness Basilad is
admissible as part of res gestae.
RULING:
It is extremely difficult to accept the accident version of appellant which he
purveyed without corroboration. More than one wound was found sustained by the
deceased, on different parts of the body. One single stroke could not have inflicted
all of them. The first wound could possibly have been accidentally inflicted, but the
other, wounds could not have been similarly inflicted if, as just pointed out, they did
not result from the first blow. Their locations preclude that a single blow produced
all the wounds. This fact robs the accident theory of appellant of any plausibility.
The explanation of appellant as to how the wounds other than that located
on the right chest was inflicted simply cannot inspire belief. In trying to succor the
old woman when she fell upon being hit accidentally with the point of the bolo, as
appellant alleged, he could not have kept on holding the bolo. He would have
dropped it instantly, as instinct would have made him do so. The infliction of more
wounds after the first was therefore deliberate and not by mere accident. It is,
likewise, hard to believe that a mere accidental hitting with the point of the small
bolo, and therefore not with so much force, would inflict a wound that is so fatal as
that sustained on the chest.
That the wounding was with intent to kill is reflected by appellant's
statement that he killed the old woman because she had allegedly promised to kill
him by "barang" or by witchcraft, which he gave upon surrendering to Pat. Demetrio
Basilad at the Municipal Building. It was just natural for appellant to explain to the
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
29
police why he was surrendering. For Pat. Basilad to testify on what appellant said on
this score is thus perfectly proper, and full credence must be accorded to him, being
obviously an impartial witness. It is not a matter of whether the statement is a part of
the res gestae to be admissible.
Appellant of course denies having made the admission, but in the light of the
other evidence of the prosecution, his denial is not convincing. As demonstrated
earlier, his accident theory of the killing merits not much credibility from the mere
fact that more than one wound was inflicted which could not have resulted from just
one blow. Repeated blows easily negates any claim of wounding by mere accident.
The fact that he was not allowed to enter the house of Juanita Busalla,
daughter of the deceased, when he went there directly from the old woman's house,
would show that he appeared, by his behavior or words, that he was dangerously in an
angry mood, which is indicative of being a deliberate killer rather than a sorrowful
and harmless penitent for a killing he has committed only by accident. As Juanita also
testified, when appellant was already in jail, he told her that he killed her mother
because of witchcraft, corroborating Pat. Basilad's testimony. It would, therefore, be
of no avail for appellant to contend that the court a quo erred in admitting appellant's
statement he made upon surrendering that he killed the deceased because the latter
intended to kill him by witchcraft as part of the res gestae. The testimony of both Pat.
Basilad and Juanita Busalla on the inculpatory statement of appellant is legally
admissible not because the statement is part of the res gestae, but for said witnesses
having heard appellant made the statement on their own perception.
BAYQUEN vs CA
G.R. No. 93851 March 6, 1992
MARK BAYQUEN, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
FACTS:
Wilfredo Boco and Mark Bayquen were charge of the crime of
Homicide.Bbeing then armed with gun and a bladed weapony attack, assault, shot and
hack or would TEOFILO ESTEPA, thereby inflicting upon him cardio respiratory
failure secondary to massive hemorrhage and gunshot wound injuring the heart, liver
and lung, which lead to the death of Teofilo Estepa. The trial court held them guilty.
Thus they appealed.
Petitioner faults the appellate court for upholding the trial court's reliance on
the sole testimony of Bernadette Estepa, the deceased's sister, who had pointed to
Wilfredo Boco and Mark Bayquen as the persons who "shot and stabbed" her brother
Bong Estepa, based on Bong's dying declaration. The petitioner believes that the ante-
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mortem statements should have been disregarded considering that they were revealed
14 days after Bong Estepa's death on July 24, 1984 or on August 8, 1984.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bernadette Estepa’s testimony based on Bong’s dying declaration is
admissible.
RULING:
In the recent case of People v. Eduardo Hernandez, the Court disregarded
the dying declaration or ante-mortem statements of the deceased Buenaventura
Mendoza, because the widow never divulged the same to the three police
investigators and the barangay councilman who came to the victim's house and
stayed for several hours, revealing the same for the first time only when she testified
at the trial.
In the same manner, Bernadette's excuse in the present case for not
divulging the dying declaration of her brother, Bong Estepa, was that she was afraid
because she was all alone since her parents, brothers and sisters were all abroad.
Strangely, however, this was not her attitude, when, in the morning of the incident,
she ventured out into the dark alone at 4:00 in the morning, walked down the stairs
despite the sound of two gunshots.
Nonetheless, granting her fears, We cannot understand why she still failed
to go to the police authorities upon arrival from Germany of her father and her
mother, brothers and sister, from the States. The physical presence of these persons
would have provided her the necessary moral support and would have shielded her
from feared reprisals.
Take the case of the father, Teofilo Estepa, Sr., who allegedly arrived July
28, 1984, and was informed by his daughter about this so called "dying declaration"
on July 30, 1984. A father's first impulse when his beloved son dies by the hand of
others is to see to it that justice is done and the culprits are apprehended. Yet, he
maintained a stoic silence and did not alert the police. This becomes more incredible
when the alleged assailants are just their close neighbors, one of whom resided in the
same barangay while the other in the adjoining barangay. Moreover, the accused
Wilfredo Boco, the best friend of the late Bong Estepa, had been visiting the remains
of his deceased companion and paying his respects during the vigil. What prevented
the family from making an anguished outcry and complain to the police that the
"killers" of their son were roaming at large while their son was about to be buried.
This is the natural reaction of a normal human being with normal emotions and
feelings. Unless the Estepa family claim to be abnormal, they cannot help but react
as ordinary human beings should and would given the same circumstances.
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
30
As between the spontaneous statements of Bernadette Estepa, therefore, and
those which she gave before the NBI two weeks after her brother's death, it is clear
that the former statements should be given weight and credence.
Contrary, therefore to Bong Estepa's dying declaration that he was "shot and
stabbed", Bong Estepa died of a single gunshot wound. He was not stabbed.
In giving credence to the dying declaration, the prosecution cites the damage
done to petitioner's motorcycle by both Bong Estepa and Wilfredo Boco (petitioner's
co-accused) as petitioner's motive for Killing Estepa. Although living in adjoining
barangays, however, petitioner and Estepa never got to know each other. It was only
because of the incident on July 23, 1984 when petitioner found his motorcycle lying
damaged on the street that petitioner got acquainted with Estepa.
Petitioner had shown himself to be law-abiding in seeking retribution for his
damaged motorcycle, by filing the corresponding complaint.
In sum, the prosecution's case rest entirely upon the identification of
petitioner and Wilfredo Boco made to Bernadette Estepa by the deceased Bong
Estepa. As We have pointed out earlier, however, considering the belated disclosure,
We are not inclined to give weight to the alleged dying declarations of Bong Estepa.
As the Chief Justice in the Hernandez case, pointed out: "The ante mortem statements
being thus relegated to limbo, . . . very little remains by way of evidence upon which
to rest a verdict of conviction" against petitioner.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of conviction rendered against petitioner is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioner is, on reasonable doubt, ACQUITTED
of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.
PALMER V. HOFFMAN
318 U.S. 109 (1943)
FACTS:
On the night of December 25, 1940, Mr. Palmer and his wife met an accident, which
lead to the death of his wife and left him injured.
Mr. Palmer sued the train company for its negligence - the train did not ring its bell,
blow its whistle, or have its lights on as were required by law.
The train company, represented by Hoffman, attempted to introduce a transcript of
statement made by the train's engineer two days after the said accident to the assistant
superintendent of the road and to a representative of the Massachusetts Public Utilities
Commission. The engineer died before the trial. Such statement was offered in
evidence by petitioners under the Act of June 20, 1936. They offered to prove (in the
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language of the Act) that the statement was signed in the regular course of business,
it being the regular course of such business to make such a statement.
Palmer objected on the grounds that the out of court statement was hearsay. Hoffman
argued that the statement was an exception to hearsay because it was an official
business record and made in the regular course of business.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the business record hearsay exception encompasses accident reports
that, although not the inherent nature of the business, are nonetheless recorded in a
routine manner?
RULING:
No, the signed statement of a railroad engineer, since deceased, giving his version of
a grade crossing accident in which the locomotive he was operating was involved,
and made two days after the accident, when he was interviewed by an official of the
company and a representative of a state commission, held not made "in the regular
course" of business within the meaning of the Act of June 20, 1936, and not
admissible as evidence.
The business of the petitioners is the railroad business. That business, like other
enterprises, entails the keeping of numerous books and records essential to its
conduct or useful in its efficient operation. Though such books and records were
considered reliable and trustworthy for major decisions in the industrial and business
world, their use in litigation was greatly circumscribed or hedged about by the
hearsay rule -- restrictions which greatly increased the time and cost of making the
proof where those who made the records were numerous.
PHILAMLIFE VS. CAPITAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION
[CA] 72 O.G. 3941 (1975)
FACTS: This is an appeal from the judgment of the CFI which ordered Capital to
pay PhilAm a certain sum of money. On July 21, 1960, PhilAm entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement with Capital and spouses Galang whereby the latter
parties agreed to pay the former a sum of money with interest in consideration of
PhilAm issuing a clearance in favor of the Galang spouses. The sum involved was
paid in full by Capital. However, it was also stipulated in the MOA that Capital will
also be liable to any obligation arising from unremitted premiun collection. On
March 19, 1963, PhilAm wrote Capital a letter advising it that the Galangs have
incurred additional accounts by way of unreported premium collections and
demanding payment thereof. The issue boils down to the question of whether Philam
has proved such unreported collections. In the action of PhilAm for the collection of
money, it presented Bacani, its chief of accounts to testify on a statement of account
showing the indebtedness of the debtors. Bacani, however, did not have personal
knowledge about how the account had arisen. His office merely computed the
charges based on debit memos received from other departments. The PhilAm
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
31
maintains that the statement is admissible because it was a matter of company routine
that charges for unremitted premiums are covered through the Accountant’s Control
Office as soon as they are discovered.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the statement of
account.
RULING: Yes. The statement of account could not be legally received in evidence.
Before entries in the course of business may be received, it must be shown that they
were made by a person who was in a position to know the facts therein stated. The
Court said that Bacani certainly did not have personal knowledge of the transactions
to which such entries refer. The rule also requires that the entries must have been
made by a person deceased, outside the Philippines, or unable to testify…. In this
case, Bacani is neither of those enumerated. To lend probative value to the entries
would be to countenance reception of self-serving evidence made without the
intervention of other parties involved.
G.R. No. 169606 November 27, 2009
BERNARDO B. JOSE, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAELMAR PHILS., INC. and MICHAELMAR SHIPPING SERVICES,
INC., Respondents.
FACTS: Michaelmar Philippines, Inc. (MPI) is the Philippine agent of Michaelmar
Shipping Services, Inc. (MSSI). In an undertaking dated 2 July 2002 and an
employment contract dated 4 July 2002, MSSI through MPI engaged the services of
Bernardo B. Jose, Jr. (Jose, Jr.) as oiler of M/T Limar. In connection with the
employment contract, Jose, Jr. signed a declaration stating the implementation of the
Drug and Alcohol Policy on board the managed vessels where all alcoholic beverages,
banned substances and unprescribed drugs including but not limited to the following:
Marijuana Cocaine Phencyclidine Amphetamines Heroin Opiates are banned from
Stelmar Tankers (Management) Ltd. managed vessels and that any seaman will be
instantly dismissed if they are found to have positive trace of alcohol or any of the
banned substances in any random testing sample.
Jose, Jr. began performing his duties on board the M/T Limar on 21 August 2002. On
8 October 2002, a random drug test was conducted on all officers and crew members
of M/T Limar at the port of Curacao. Jose, Jr. was found positive for marijuana. Jose,
Jr. was informed about the result of his drug test and was asked if he was taking any
medication. Jose, Jr. said that he was taking Centrum vitamins.
Jose, Jr. was allowed to continue performing his duties on board the M/T Limar from
8 October to 29 November 2002.
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On 29 December 2002, M/T Limar reached the next port after the random drug test
and Jose, Jr. was repatriated to the Philippines. When Jose, Jr. arrived in the
Philippines, he asked MPI that a drug test be conducted on him. MPI ignored his
request. On his own, Jose, Jr. procured drug tests from Manila Doctors Hospital,
S.M. Lazo Medical Clinic, Inc., and Maritime Clinic for International Services, Inc.
He was found negative for marijuana.
Jose, Jr. filed with the NLRC a complaint against MPI and MSSI for illegal dismissal
with claim for his salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment contract.
In her 18 June 2003 Decision, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. The Labor Arbiter held that the termination from employment was valid and
lawful.
In its 19 January 2004 Resolution, the NLRC set aside the Labor Arbiter’s 18 June
2003 Decision. The NLRC held that Jose, Jr.’s dismissal was illegal and ordered MPI
and MSSI to pay Jose, Jr. his salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment
contract. The NLRC held that the copy of the purported drug test result for
Complainant does not contain any signature, much less the signature of any of the
doctors whose names were printed therein. Verily, the veracity of this purported drug
test result is questionable, hence, it cannot be deemed as substantial proof that
Complainant violated his employer’s "no alcohol, no drug" policy. Moreover,
Respondents failed to accord Complainant due process prior to his dismissal. There
is no showing that Complainant’s employer furnished him with a written notice
apprising him of the particular act or omission for which his dismissal was sought
and a subsequent written notice informing him of the decision to dismiss him, much
less any proof that Complainant was given an opportunity to answer and rebut the
charges against him prior to his dismissal.
In its 11 May 2005 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the 19 January and 22
March 2004 Resolutions of the NLRC and reinstated the 18 June 2003 Decision of
the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals held that under legal rules of evidence, not
all unsigned documents or papers fail the test of admissibility. There are kinds of
evidence known as exceptions to the hearsay rule which need not be invariably
signed by the author if it is clear that it issues from him because of necessity and
under circumstances that safeguard the trustworthiness of the paper. A number of
evidence of this sort are called entries in the course of business, which are
transactions made by persons in the regular course of their duty or business. We
agree with the labor arbiter that the drug test result constitutes entries made in the
ordinary or regular course of duty of a responsible officer of the vessel.
ISSUES:
Whether or not (1) there is no just cause for his dismissal because the drug test result
is unsigned by the doctor, and (2) he was not afforded due process.
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
32
RULING: The Court is not impressed.
In the present case, Jose, Jr. did not show that the Court of Appeals’ ruling is violative
of any law or jurisprudence. Section 43, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 43. Entries in the course of business. — Entries made at, or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was
in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence,
if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of
duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
In Canque v. Court of Appeals, the Court laid down the requisites for admission in
evidence of entries in the course of business: (1) the person who made the entry is
dead, outside the country, or unable to testify; (2) the entries were made at or near the
time of the transactions to which they refer; (3) the person who made the entry was in
a position to know the facts stated in the entries; (4) the entries were made in a
professional capacity or in the performance of a duty; and (5) the entries were made in
the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
Here, all the requisites are present: (1) Dr. Heath is outside the country; (2) the entries
were made near the time the random drug test was conducted; (3) Dr. Heath was in a
position to know the facts made in the entries; (4) Dr. Heath made the entries in his
professional capacity and in the performance of his duty; and (5) the entries were
made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
The fact that the drug test result is unsigned does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that Jose, Jr. was not found positive for marijuana.
In the present case, the following facts are established (1) random drug tests are
regularly conducted on all officers and crew members of M/T Limar; (2) a random
drug test was conducted at the port of Curacao on 8 October 2002; (3) Dr. Heath was
the authorized physician of M/T Limar; (4) the drug test result of Jose, Jr. showed that
he was positive for marijuana; (5) the drug test result was issued under Dr. Heath’s
name and contained his handwritten comments. The Court of Appeals found that:
The tests administered to the crew were routine measures of the vessel conducted to
enforce its stated policy, and it was a matter of course for medical reports to be issued
and released by the medical officer. The ship’s physician at Curacao under whom the
tests were conducted was admittedly Dr. Heath. It was under his name and with his
handwritten comments that the report on the respondent came out, and there is no
basis to suspect that these results were issued other than in the ordinary course of his
duty. As the labor arbiter points out, the drug test report is evidence in itself and does
not require additional supporting evidence except if it appears that the drug test was
conducted not in accordance with drug testing procedures. Nothing of the sort, he
says, has even been suggested in this particular case.
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Article 282(a) of the Labor Code states that the employer may terminate an
employment for serious misconduct. Drug use in the premises of the employer
constitutes serious misconduct.
Jose, Jr. claims that he was not afforded due process. The Court agrees. There are
two requisites for a valid dismissal: (1) there must be just cause, and (2) the
employee must be afforded due process. To meet the requirements of due process,
the employer must furnish the employee with two written notices — a notice
apprising the employee of the particular act or omission for which the dismissal is
sought and another notice informing the employee of the employer’s decision to
dismiss.
In the present case, Jose, Jr. was not given any written notice about his dismissal.
However, the propriety of Jose, Jr.’s dismissal is not affected by the lack of written
notices. When the dismissal is for just cause, the lack of due process does not render
the dismissal ineffectual but merely gives rise to the payment of P30,000 in nominal
damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 11 May 2005 Decision and 5 August
2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83272 are AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that OSG Ship Management Manila, Inc. is ordered to
pay Bernardo B. Jose, Jr. P30,000 in nominal damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152636 August 8, 2007
CRISLYNDON T. SADAGNOT, Petitioner,
vs.
REINIER PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING, INC. and NEPTUNE
SHIPMANAGEMENT SERVICES, PTE., LTD. of SINGAPORE, Respondents.
FACTS:
Reinier Pacific International Shipping Inc. and Neptune Shipment Management PTE
LTD Singapore hired Crislyndon Sadagnot as 3rd officer of the vessel MV Baotrans.
The contract was for 10 months with a salary of $650. Sadagnot was ordered to
perform hatch stripping and deck work. Sadagnot refused as it was not related to his
duties as 3rd officer. Sadagnot alleged that because of his refusal, he was given
several negative reports and he was repatriated to the Philippines. Petitioner alleged
that he was prematurely repatriated and was not given opportunity to avail of the
company’s grievance procedure. Reinier and Neptune alleged that he was repatriated
for wilful disregarded of and failure to obey the Master’s lawful order which
constitutes insubordination.
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
33
NLRC found Reiner and Neptune jointly and solidarily liable to pay complaint.
Respondents (Reinier and Neptune) filed and appealed with NLRC. NLRC set aside
Labor Arbiter’s ruling. MR was denied by NLRC.
CA affirmed the ruling of NLRC and noted that repatriation was based on a report in
the logbook duly signed by the Master and Chief Officer – his acts constituted wilful
disobedience.
ISSUE:
CA erred in adopting the logbook entry as evidence of his misconduct?
RULING:
No. CA did not err. The ship’s logbook is the official record of a ship’s voyage which
its captain is obligated by law to keep. It is where the captain records the decisions he
has adopted, a summary of the performance of the vessel, and other daily events. The
entries made in the ship’s logbook by a person performing a duty required by law
are prima facie evidence of the facts stated in the logbook.
Petitioner failed to prove that the entry was fabricated by the Master. While petitioner
claimed that the Master entered untruthful reports in the logbook, he also admitted
that he did not obey the Master’s order and "even suggested that it would be better if
the hatch stripping shall be performed, as it should, by an able-bodied
seaman." Hence, we sustain the Court of Appeals in giving weight to the logbook
entry.
SECURITY BANK VS GAN
G.R. No. 150464 June 27, 2006
SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner,
vs.
ERIC GAN, Respondent.
FACTS: In 1981, respondent Eric Gan opened a current account with petitioner at its
Soler Branch in Santa Cruz, Manila. Petitioner alleged that it had an agreement with
respondent wherein the latter would deposit an initial amount in his current account
and he could draw checks on said account provided there were sufficient funds to
cover them. Furthermore, under a special arrangement with petitioner’s branch
manager then, Mr. Qui, respondent was allowed to transfer funds from his account to
another person’s account also within the same branch. Respondent availed of such
arrangement several times by depositing checks in his account and even before they
cleared, he withdrew the proceeds thereof and transferred them to the other account.
These transactions were covered by what were known as "debit memos" since
respondent had no sufficient funds to cover the amounts he transferred.
Later on, respondent purportedly incurred an overdraft or negative balance in his
account. As of December 14, 1982, the overdraft balance came up to P153,757.78.
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In 1991, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money against respondent to recover
the P297,060.01 with 12% interest per annum from September 16, 1990 until fully
paid, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit.
To prove its claim, petitioner presented Patricio Mercado who was the bookkeeper
who handled the account of respondent and recorded his transactions in a ledger.
Based on the ledger, the overdraft resulted from transfers of funds from respondent’s
current account to another person’s account. These transfers were made under the
authority of Qui. Respondent categorically denied that he ever authorized these
“funds transfers.”
ISSUE: WON the ledger cards and the testimony of Patricio Mercado constituted the
best evidence of the transactions made by the respondent relative to his account.
RULING: NO. Both the trial court and the CA found that petitioner failed to
substantiate its claim that respondent knowingly incurred an overdraft against his
account. We see no reason to disturb this finding.
The entries in the ledger, as testified to by Mercado were not competent evidence to
prove that respondent consented to the transfers of funds. These entries merely
showed that the transfers were indeed made and that Qui approved them. Neither can
we accept petitioner’s argument that the entries made by Mercado in the ledger were
competent evidence to prove how and when the negative balance incurred. Petitioner
invokes Section 43 of Rule 130 (Entries in the course of business).
Under this exceptions to the hearsay rule, the admission in evidence of entries in
corporate books required the satisfaction of the following conditions:
1. The person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to testify;
2. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they
refer;
3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
4. The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of
a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or religious; and
5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
The ledger entries did not meet the first and third requisites.
Mercado, petitioner’s bookkeeper who prepared the entries, was presented to testify
on the transactions pertaining to the account of respondent. It was in the course of his
testimony that the ledger entries were presented. There was, therefore, neither
justification nor necessity for the presentation of the entries as the person who made
them was available to testify in court.
Moreover, Mercado had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the entries,
particularly those entries which resulted in the negative balance. He had no
knowledge of the truth or falsity of these entries.
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
34
CA: There is good reason why evidence of this nature is incorrigibly hearsay. Entries
in business records which sprung from the duty of other employees to communicate
facts occurring in the ordinary course of business are prima facie admissible, the duty
to communicate being itself a badge of trustworthiness of the entries, but not when
they purport to record what were independent agreements arrived at by some bank
officials and a client. In this case, the entries become mere casual or voluntary reports
of the official concerned. To permit the ledgers, prepared by the bank at its own
instance, to substitute the contract as proof of the agreements with third parties, is to
set a dangerous precedent. Business entries are allowed as an exception to the hearsay
rule only under certain conditions specified in Section 43, which must be scrupulously
observed to prevent them from being used as a source of undue advantage for the
party preparing them.
G.R. No. 118464. December 21, 1998
HEIRS OF IGNACIO CONTI and ROSARIO CUARIO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA S. REYES as Attorney-in-Fact
of JOSEFINA S. REYES, BERNARDITA S. PALILIO, HERMINIA S.
PALILIO, REMEDIOS A. SAMPAYO, ILUMINADA A. SAMPAYO,
ENRICO A. SAMPAYO, CARLOS A. SAMPAYO, GENEROSO C.
SAMPAYO, MYRNA C. SAMPAYO, ROSALINO C. SAMPAYO, MANUEL
C. SAMPAYO, DELIA A. SAMPAYO, CORAZON C. SAMPAYO, NILO C.
SAMPAYO, and LOLITA A. SAMPAYO in her own behalf and as Attorney-in-
Fact of NORMA A. SAMPAYO, respondents.
FACTS: Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuario, were the
co-owners of a 539-square meter lot in Lucena City with a house erected thereon. On
March 17, 1986 Lourdes Sampayo died intestate without issue. Subsequently, private
respondents, all claiming to be collateral relatives of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo,
filed an action for partition and damages. The Spouses Conti refused to the partition
since private respondents failed to produce any document to prove that they were the
rightful heirs of Lourdes. As Ignacio later died, he was substituted as party-defendant
by his children. Lydia Sampayo Reyes, with her original copy of her birth
certificate indicating
therein that her father was Inocentes Reyes and her mother was Josefina Samp
ayo, testified that she was one of the nieces of Lourdes, as her mother was the only
living sibling of Lourdes. Baptismal certificates of the siblings of Lourdes were also
presented in lieu of the birth certificates because the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Lucena City had been razed by fire twice, thus all civil registration records were
totally burned. A photocopy of Manuel's birth certificate also showed that it was
issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Lucena, Tayabas.
On the other hand, petitioner Rosario Cuario Conti testified that the subject
property was co-owned in equal shares by her husband and Lourdes and that
petitioner’s family had been staying in the subject property since 1937. Her late
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husband paid for the real estate taxes of the property and spent for the necessary
repairs and improvements thereon because Lourdes agreed that she would leave her
share of the property to them. Rosario also stated that when Lourdes died her
remains were taken by her relatives from their house but it was only Josefina whom
she remembered.
The trial court declared private respondents as the rightful heirs of Lourdes
Sampayo and ordered the parties to submit a project of partition of the residential
house and lot for confirmation by the court. Such decision was also affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: WON the baptismal certificates presented by Lydia S. Reyes are admissible
RULING: YES. The Court considered the documentary and testimonial evidence
submitted as competent proofs that private respondents are collateral heirs of
Lourdes. They were also correct in asserting that they are co-owners of ½ pro-
indiviso share of the subject property by way of legal or intestate succession. Also,
according to Art. 172 of the Family Code, the filiation of legitimate
children shall be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws, in the absence of a record of birth or a parent’s admission of such
legitimate filiation in a public or private document duly signed by the parent. Other
proofs to such legitimate filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses and other
kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Thus, this
method of proving filiation may also be used in the instant case.
Public documents are the written official acts, or records of the official acts of
the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of
the Philippines, or of a foreign country. Thus, the baptismal certificates presented by
private respondents are public documents as the same are issued by parish priests
who continue to be the legal custodians of the parish records.
The admissibility of baptismal certificates offered by Lydia even without
the testimony of the officiating priest or the official recorder, was based on People v.
Ritter, citing U.S. v. de Vera (28 Phil. 105 [1914]), wherein it was stated that: “x x x
the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries made in the
course of the business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the
hearsay rule. The baptisms administered by the church are one of its transactions in
the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and recorded in the book of the church during
the course of its business.”
Although the baptismal certificates are evidence only of the administration of
the sacrament, it must be taken into consideration that there were four (4) baptismal
certificates in this case, which when taken together, show that Lourdes, Josefina,
Remedios, and Luis had the same parents. The same was corroborated Adelaida
Sampayo when she testified that as Lourdes and her brothers Manuel, Luis and sister
Remedios died, Josefina was only living sibling left. Thus, the said baptismal
certificates have acquired evidentiary weight to prove filiation.
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
35
G.R. No. 92740 March 23, 1992
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
JAIME M. RAMOS, NILDA RAMOS, ERLINDA ILANO, MILAGROS
ILANO, DANIEL ILANO AND FELIPA JAVALERA, respondents.
FACTS:
Plaintiffs Ramos et al.,are officers of the Negros Telephone Company who held
confirmed tickets for PAL Flight No. 264 from Naga City to Manila on September 24,
1985, scheduled to depart for Manila at 4:25 p.m.. Among the conditions included in
plaintiffs tickets is the following:
‘CHECK-IN TIME — Please check in at the Airport Passenger check-in counter at
least one hour before PUBLISHED departure time of your flight. We will consider
your accommodation forfeited in favor of waitlisted passenger if you fail to check-
in at least 30 minutes before PUBLISHED departure time.’
Plaintiffs claimed that they went to the check-in counter of the defendant's Naga
branch at least one hour before the published departure time but no one was at the
counter until 30 minutes before departure, but upon checking -in and presentation of
their tickets to the employee who showed up, their tickets were cancelled and the seats
awarded to chance passengers; plaintiffs had to go to Manila by bus, and seek actual,
moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees for breach of contract of carriage.
Defendant disclaimed any liability, claiming that the non-accommodation of plaintiff
on the said flight was due to their having check-in (sic) late for their flight.
Trial court rendered judgment finding defendant guilty of breach of contract of
carriage which was affirmed in toto by the CA.
ISSUE:
Can the Court of Appeals validity promulgate the questioned decision by the simple
expedient of adopting in toto the trial court's finding that defendant-appellant is liable
for damages on the sole issue of credibility of witnesses without considering the
material admissions made by the plaintiffs and other evidence on record that
substantiate the defense of defendant?
RULING:
No. SC reversed the lower courts decision.
LLB4302
It is an admitted fact that the private respondents knew of the required check-in time
for passengers. The time requirement is prominently printed as one of the conditions
of carriage on their tickets, i.e., that the airport passenger should check-in at least
one hour before published departure time of his flight and PAL shall consider his
accommodation forfeited in favor of waistlisted passengers if he fails to check-in at
least 30 minutes.
The aforequoted condition has always been applied strictly and without exception,
the station manager, however, may exercise his discretion to allow passengers who
checked-in late to board provided the flight is not fully booked and seats are
available. On September 24, 1985, flight 264 from Naga to Manila was fully booked
owing to the Peñafrancia Festiva. In addition, PAL morning flights 261 and 262 were
cancelled resulting in a big number of waitlisted passengers.
The evidence on record does not support contentions of the respondents, noting that
there were two other confirmed passengers (Capati and Go) who came ahead of the
private respondents but were refused accommodation because they were late.
The private respondents submitted no controverting evidence. As clearly manifested,
the intervening time between Capati and Go and the private respondents took only a
mere second. If indeed, the private respondents were at the check-in counter at 3:30
p.m., they could have been the first ones to be attended to by Araquel than Capati
and Go. They could have also protested if they were the earliest passengers at the
counter but were ignored by Araquel , check-in clerk, in favor of Go and Capati.
They did not.
It is likewise improbable that not a single PAL personnel was in attendance at the
counter when the check-in counter was supposed to be opened at 3:25 p.m. It must
be remembered that the morning flight to Manila was cancelled and hence, it is not
farfetched to believe that the PAL personnel then have their hands full in dealing
with the passengers of the morning flight who became waitlisted passengers.
It is significant to note that there were no other passenger who checked-in late after
the private. In the absence of any controverting evidence, the documentary evidence
presented to corroborate the testimonies of PAL's witnesses are prima facie evidence
of the truth of their allegations. The plane tickets of the private respondents, and
the passenger Manifest of Flight PR 264, (which showed the non-accommodation
of Capati and Go and the private respondents) are entries made in the regular
course of business which the private respondents failed to overcome with substantial
and convincing evidence other than their testimonies. Consequently, they carry more
weight and credence. A writing or document made contemporaneously with a
transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent to an issue, when admitted as proof
of those facts, is ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of greater probative
force than the oral testimony of a witness as to such facts based upon memory and
recollection.
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
36
Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable as against a written document that
speaks a uniform language.This dictum is amply demonstrated by the diverse
allegations of the private respondents in their complaint (where they claimed that no
one was at the counter until thirty (30) minutes before the published departure time
and that the employee who finally attended to them marked them late) and in their
testimonies (where they contended that there were two different PAL personnel who
attended to them at the check-in counter. Private respondents' only objection to these
documents is that they are self-serving cannot be sustained. The hearsay rule will not
apply in this case as statements, acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly
connected with the main transaction as to form a part of it, and which illustrate,
elucidate, qualify or characterize the act, are admissible as apart of the res gestae.
Based on these circumstances, we are inclined to believe the version of PAL. When
the private respondents purchased their tickets, they were instantaneously bound by
the conditions of the contract of carriage particularly the check-in time requirement.
The terms of the contract are clear. Their failure to come on time for check-in should
not militate against PAL. Their non-accommodation on that flight was the result of
their own action or inaction and the ensuing cancellation of their tickets by PAL is
only proper.
The petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No costs
G.R. No. 150780 May 5, 2006
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
FY SONS, INCORPORATED, Respondent.
FACTS: Nestle and FY entered into a distributorship agreement whereby Nestle
would supply its products for FY to distribute to its food service outlets. A deed of
assignment was also executed by FY in favor of Nestle assigning the time deposit of a
certain Calixto Laureano in the amount of P500,000 to secure FY’s credit purchases
from them. A SPA was likewise executed by Laureano authorizing the FY to use the
time deposit as collateral.
Nestle fined FY P20,000 for allegedly selling 50 cases of Krem-Top liquid coffee
creamer to Lu Hing Market, a retail outlet in Tarlac, which was proscribed by the
agreement. FY paid. Again, later on, Krem-Top liquid coffee creamer was sold to
Augustus Bakery and Grocery, an act again allegedly in violation of the agreement.
Petitioner imposed a P40,000 fine which respondent refused to pay.
Respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner, alleging bad faith. FY
said that Nestle made representations and promises of rendering support so FY was
lured into executing a distributorship agreement. Thereafter, FY alleged that Nestle
breached the distributorship agreement by committing various acts of bad faith such
as: failing to provide promotional support; deliberately failing to promptly supply
LLB4302
with the stocks for its orders; intentionally diminishing the sales by supporting a non-
distributor; and concocting falsified charges to cause the termination of the
distributorship agreement without just cause. When FY complained to Nestle about
the latter’s acts of bad faith, the latter terminated the agreement on the allegation that
FY did not pay its accounts. Nestle also seized FY’s time deposit collateral without
basis; penalized with monetary penalty for the concocted charge; and unilaterally
suspended the supply of stocks.
In its answer, Nestle interposed a counterclaim for P495,319.81 representing the
balance of respondent’s overdue accounts, with interest of 2% per month from the
date of default until fully paid, damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.
RTC of Makati – ruled in favor of FY
On appeal, Nestle presented Cristina Rayos as a witness since she was in charge of
the records and documents of all accounts receivables as part of her duties as credit
and collection manager and that she was the one who prepared the statement of
account on the basis of the invoices and delivery orders corresponding to the alleged
overdue accounts of FY.
CA – affirmed RTC; Nestle was not able to prove that respondent indeed had unpaid
accounts. Hence, this petition.
Nestle’s contention: Testimony of Rayos was an exception to the hearsay rule under
Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
Entries in the course of business. — Entries made at, or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received
as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional
capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty.
ISSUE: WON the testimony of the witness for the petitioner Cristina Rayos was an
exception to the hearsay rule
RULING: No. The provision does not apply to this case because it does not involve
entries made in the course of business. Rayos testified on a statement of account she
prepared on the basis of invoices and delivery orders which she, however, knew
nothing about. She had no personal knowledge of the facts on which the accounts
were based since, admittedly, she was not involved in the delivery of goods and was
merely in charge of the records and documents of all accounts receivable as part of
her duties as credit and collection manager. She thus knew nothing of the truth or
falsity of the facts stated in the invoices and delivery orders, i.e., whether such
deliveries were in fact made in the amounts and on the dates stated, or whether they
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
37
were actually received by respondent. She was not even the credit and collection
manager during the period the agreement was in effect. This can only mean that she
merely obtained these documents from another without any personal knowledge of
their contents.
The foregoing shows that Rayos was incompetent to testify on whether or not the
invoices and delivery orders turned over to her correctly reflected the details of the
deliveries made. Thus, the CA correctly disregarded her testimony. Furthermore, the
invoices and delivery orders presented by petitioner were self-serving. Having
generated these documents, petitioner could have easily fabricated them. Petitioner’s
failure to present any competent witness to identify the signatures and other
information in those invoices and delivery orders cast doubt on their veracity.
Petitioner next argues that respondent did not deny during the trial that it received the
goods covered by the invoices and was therefore deemed to have admitted the
same. This argument cannot be taken seriously. From the very beginning,
respondent’s position was that petitioner concocted falsified charges of non-payment
to justify the termination of their agreement. In no way could respondent be deemed
to have admitted those deliveries.
Petition is DENIED.
G.R. No. L-12986. March 31, 1966.
THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C. AFRICA and the
HEIRS OF DOMINGA ONG, petitioners-appellants, vs. CALTEX (PHIL.) INC.,
MATEO BOQUIREN and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents-appellees.
FACTS: On March 18, 1948 in the afternoon, a fire broke out at the Caltex service
station at the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while
gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the
opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire
spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties
and effects inside them. Their owners, among them petitioners here, sued respondents
Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of the station and
the second as its agent in charge of operation. Negligence on the part of both of them
was attributed as the cause of the fire.
The trial court and CA found petitioners failed to prove negligence.
ISSUE: WON reports submitted by (1) the fire department and (2) police officer may
properly be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule.
RULING: (1)NO and (2) YES.
There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned: (a) that the
entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to
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do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or
by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c)
that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1957] p. 398).
(1) The material facts recited in the reports of fire department, as to the cause and
circumstances of the fire were not within the personal knowledge of the officers who
conducted the investigation. Was knowledge of such facts, however, acquired by
them through official information? As to some facts the sources thereof are not even
identified. Others are attributed to Leopoldo Medina, referred to as an employee at
the gas station were the fire occurred; to Leandro Flores, driver of the tank truck
from which gasoline was being transferred at the time to the underground tank of the
station; and to respondent Mateo Boquiren, who could not, according to Exhibit V-
Africa, give any reason as to the origin of the fire. To qualify their statements as
"official information" acquired by the officers who prepared the reports, the persons
who made the statements not only must have personal knowledge of the facts stated
but must have the duty to give such statements for record.
The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule; the facts
stated therein were not acquired by the reporting officers through official
information, not having been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so.
(2) The foregoing report, having been submitted by a police officer in the
performance of his duties on the basis of his own personal observation of the facts
reported, may properly be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule
G.R. No. L-48727. September 30, 1982.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSEPH LEONES y
DUCUSIN alias JESSIE, defendant-appellant.
FACTS: Irene Dulay, a salesgirl in the store owned by Mr. & Mrs. Pepito Leones,
parents of the accused, at San Fernando, La Union where she resided. Accused
Joseph of having allegedly raped her one afternoon after he and his sister had forced
her to take three tablets which rendered her semi-conscious. Charged with rape in the
Court of First Instance, Joseph interposed the defense of denial and alibi. Medical
examination conducted on Irene about two or three hours after the alleged rape
disclosed healing lacerations of the hymen, absence of sperm cells and unclotted
blood at the vaginal cavity. On the other hand, Irene testified that on the date of the
alleged rape she was having her menstrual period. The trial court convicted the
appellant of rape. Hence, the present appeal.
ISSUE: WON the entires in official records should be given weight
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
38
RULING: YES. The clinical case record of Dulay's admission and confinement at the
Provincial Hospital of La Union, marked Exhibit "2", contain entries which totally
and completely belie the claim of the complainant that she was raped by the accused.
The entry written in the above clinical record when Dulay was admitted under the
item "Complaints" reads: Vaginal Bleeding, and below this entry appears the
Diagnosis — Healing lacerated wide at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock hymen. Assuming
that the victim was raped between 2 and 3 o'clock p.m., April 22, 1973 (the same day
she was admitted in the hospital), then the lacerations of the hymen at 2 o'clock and
10 o'clock would not have been described and indicated to be Healing in the clinical
case record. It would be described as "laceration fresh" or by similar words like
"bloody or new lacerations."
Citing from the book, Legal Medicine by Pedro P. Solis, M.D., Ll B., Medico Legal
Officer, NBI, We have the following comment on: "Healing time of laceration of the
hymen: Superficial laceration of the hymen may heal in two or three days. More
extensive tear may require longer time, usually seven to ten days.”
Since there was found laceration, wide, at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock of the hymen
which was then already healing on April 22, 1973, it follows reasonably that the
defloration occurred several days before, which may have happened when Irene
Dulay took a week-long vacation to her hometown in Pugo, La Union and there is
evidence that she had a suitor named Ferdinand Sarmiento who is from nearby Agoo,
La Union. And when she returned to the house of her employer in San Fernando, La
Union, she had already chest and stomach pains and a headache.
The written entries in the clinical case record, showing the date of her admission In
the hospital on April 22, 1973, her complaint of vaginal bleeding and the diagnosis of
"Healing lacerated wide at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock hymen" are prima facie evidence
of the facts therein stated, the said entries having been made in official records by a
public officer of the Philippines in the performance of his duty especially enjoined by
law, which is that of a physician in a government hospital (Rule 130, Sec. 38 of the
Rules of Court). However, Dr. Estioco who was the admitting physician was not
presented as a witness for the government.
TARAPEN VS PP
MANALO vs ROBLES
PP vs SAN GABRIEL
G.R. NO. 193261 April 24, 2012
MEYNARDO SABILI, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORENCIO LIBREA, Respondents
FACTS:
Petitioner Meynardo Sabili filed his COC for Mayor of Lipa City for the 2010
elections, he stated therein that he had been a resident of the City for 2 years and 8
months. Prior to the 2010 elections, it was undisputed that petitioner and his family
were then staying at his ancestral house in San Juan, Batangas.
LLB4302
Private respondent Florencio Librea (Librea) filed a ““Petition to Deny Due Course
and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing
Some Grounds for Disqualification” against him before the COMELEC. Citing
Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, private
respondent alleged that petitioner made material misrepresentations of fact in the
latter’s COC and likewise failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement
under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. Allegedly, petitioner falsely
declared under oath in his COC that he had already been a resident of Lipa City for
two years and eight months prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010 local elections.
The COMELEC declared petitioner as disqualified from seeking the mayoralty post
and cancelled his COC.
Among the evidence presented by petitioner Sabili was a Certification issued by
Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade (Honrade) that petitioner had
been residing in Brgy Pinagtong-ulan since 2007.
This evidence was brushed aside by the COMELEC on the ground that it was not
sworn to before a notary public and hence cannot be relied on.
Petitioner’s MR was denied, hence, this present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Certification issued by Captain Honrade was admissible in evidence.
RULING:
Yes. The Certification issued by Captain Honorade even without being sworn to
before a notary public would not only be admissible in evidence, but would also be
entitled to due consideration.
Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 44. Entries in official records.—Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated.
There are three (3) requisites to concur for entries in official records to be
admissible in evidence:
(a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially
enjoined by law to do so;
(b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such
other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated
by him, which facts must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.
As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government
Code to “keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay.” Regarding the
second requisite, we have explicitly recognized that “it is the business of a punong
barangay to know who the residents are in his own barangay.” Anent the third
requisite, the Barangay Captain’s exercise of powers and duties concomitant to his
position requires him to be privy to these records kept by the Barangay Secretary.
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
39
Accordingly, there is basis in faulting the COMELEC for its failure to consider
Honrade’s Certification on the sole ground that it was initially not notarized.
Assuming that the barangay captain’s certification only pertains to petitioner’s bodily
presence in Pinagtong-ulan, still, the COMELEC cannot deny the strength of this
evidence in establishing petitioner’s bodily presence in Pinagtong-ulan since 2007.
State of New Jersey vs. Lungsford
PNOC shipping vs. CA
PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs. COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 107518. October 8, 1998
FACTS: On the morning of September 21, 1977, M/V Maria Efigenia XV (of the
private respondent) was navigating the waters near Fortune Island in Nasugbu,
Batangas on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila when it collided with the vessel
“Petroparcel”, owned at that time by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC).The
Board of Marine Inquiry found the Petroparcel at fault for the collision and based on
this and after unsuccessful demands on petitioner, private respondent sued LSC and
Petroparcel captain Edgardo Doruelo for actual and compensatory damages.
During the pendency of the proceedings, PNOC Shipping Transport Corporation
acquired ownership of Petroparcel and replaced LSC in the trial.
CFI Caloocan ruled in favor of private respondent, awarding it: the sum of
P6,438,048.00 representing the value of the fishing boat with interest of 6% per
annum; P50,000 attorney’s fees and the cost of suit.
The basis of said amount was the testimony of the general manager of Maria Efigenia
Fishin Corporation,Edilberto del Rosario and several documentary evidence that
included: ownership certificate, price quotations, and invoices issued at the request of
Del Rosario.
CFI ruled that PNOC-STC was unable to contest such evidence with only the
testimony of its senior estimator Lorenzo Lazaro as sole witness and without any
documentary evidence.
On appeal, petitioner questioned the admissibility and competency of private
respondent’s documents as basis for damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the CFI
decision ruling that where a lower court is confronted with evidence which appears to
be of doubtful admissibility, the judge should declare in favor of admissibility rather
than of non-admissibility.
On appeal to the SC, petitioner argued, among other things, that the documents were
not sufficient evidence to support the extent and actual damages incurred by private
respondent. The price quotations were not duly authenticated and that the witness (Del
Rosario) did not have personal knowledge on the contents of the writings and neither
was he an expert on the subjects thereof.
CA argued that the documents were sufficient and exempt from the hearsay rule as
they are part of “commercial lists” defined in sec.45 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence in so far as they fall under the “or other published compilation” phrase of
the rule.
Section 45. Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence of statements of matters of
interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or
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other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any
relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged
in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein.
Issue:
WON the documents fall under the exception to the hearsay evidence rule under sec.
45 rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence and would therefore be competent
enough to establish the amount of actual and compensatory damages.
Ruling: With respect to the documentary evidence, the SC ruled in favor of the
petitioner PNOC-STC. For actual and compensatory damages, the injured party is
required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty
premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available.
Damages may not be awarded on the basis of on the basis of hearsay evidence.
The documents presented by private respondent were regarded as hearsay evidence.
Del Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of the documents as he was not
the author of them. He can only testify as to facts of his personal knowledge. As
such, the price quotations were considered ordinary private writings which under the
Revised Rules of Court should be proffered along with the testimony of the writers
thereof.
One of the exemptions to the hearsay evidence rule under Sec.37-47 of Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence is “commercial lists”.
However, the quotations do not fall under “other published compilation” mentioned
in the said exemption as they are not published in any list, register, periodical, or
other compilation. They are also not standard handbooks or periodicals containing
data of everyday professionals need and relied upon in the work of occupation. They
are merely letters responding to the queries of Del Rosario.
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, “where general words follow an enumeration
of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general
words are not to be construed in their widest extent but are to be held as applying
only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.
Because of the absence of competent proof of the actual damage suffered, SC
modified the CA decision and awarded the private respondent nominal damages
amounting to P2,000,000.00.
Meralco vs. Quisumbing
Schneider vs. Cessna
G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007
MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES,
INC., Petitioners,
vs.
MODESTO CALAUNAN, Respondent.
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
40
FACTS: Philippine Rabbit Bus driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and owner-
type jeep owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza.
the two vehicles collided. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear
left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then
fall on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive damage. The bus veered to the
left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision. By reason of such collision, a
criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging petitioner
Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical
Injuries. Subsequently on 2December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages
against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. Counsel for respondent prayed that
the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) of the testimonies of
respondentCalaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be
received in evidence in the civil case in asmuch as these witnesses are not available to
testify in the civil case.
ISSUE: WON the transcripts may be admitted in evidence.
RULING: YES. Petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies
of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos should not be
admitted in evidence for failure of respondent to comply with the requisites of Section
47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following
requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his
testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c)
the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on
different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is
the same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse party had an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case. Admittedly, respondent
failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the Rules for a
testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had
no opportunity to cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The criminal case
was filed exclusively against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLIs employee. The
cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly
speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their
employees. Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said
criminal case, the testimonies of the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground
that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility. It is elementary that an
objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered
in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to
object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to
the evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of
the law. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for
being hearsay, but on account of failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted
and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. Hearsay evidence
alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is made
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thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it
deserves. In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing
the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in
the criminal case when the same were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact,
the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted by both
petitioners. Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence the
TSN containing the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner
PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiff’s witnesses in the
criminal case should not be admitted in the instant case, why then did it offer the
TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given in the criminal case? It appears
that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it too. It cannot argue that the
TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal case
should not be admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of
the witness for the accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in
evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and
Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the testimony of
Ganiban would be unfair.
[PRIOR TESTIMONY]
G.R. No. L-22793 May 16, 1967
CARMELITA TAN and RODOLFO TAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and FRANCISCO TAN (alias Tan Uh Bak and Tan Seng Ka),
respondents.
FACTS:
The present is a suit aimed at establishing a children-to-father, illegitimate
relationship between petitioners and the principal respondent Francisco Tan, and to
compel the latter to support petitioners.
Petitioners, thru their mother Celestina Daldo as guardian ad litem, sued
respondent Tan in the Court of First Instance of Manila for acknowledgment and
support.
Petitioners after presenting oral and documentary evidence and were about
to rest their case. Daldo moved to dismiss the foregoing civil case upon the ground
that the parties had come to an amicable settlement, and prayed that the same be
dismissed with prejudice and without recourse of appeal. She made an affidavit
categorically stating that respondent Francisco Tan, defendant in Civil Case 26909,
"is not the father of my said minor children named Carmelita and Rodolfo (herein
petitioners) but another person whose name I cannot divulge"; and that she prepared
said affidavit precisely "to record what is true and to correct what misinterpretation
may arise in the future". RTC then moved to dismiss on based on the
abovementioned grounds.
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
41
After one year and eight months from the dismissal of the case. Petitioners,
this time thru their maternal grandfather Servillano Daldo as guardian ad litem,
commenced the present action before the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court (Civil
Case 00855) for acknowledgment and support, involving the same parties, cause of
action and subject matter. However, the court dismissed the case declaring that it is
res judicata. Upon motion for reconsideration, the court declared that petitioners’ were
the illegitimate children of Francisco Tan hence, Tan should support the minors. Tan
appealed to the CA assailing the admissibility of petitioners’ testimony at a former
trial. The CA favors Tan leading to the dismissal of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses at a former trial is
admissible as evidence in the subsequent trial.
RULING:
The controlling statute is Section 37, Rule 123 of the 1940 Rules of Court,
now Section 41, Rule 130, viz:
SEC. 41. Testimony at a former trial. — The testimony of a witness
deceased or out of the Philippines, or unable to testify, given in a former case
between the same parties, relating to the same matter, the adverse party
having had an opportunity to cross-examine him, may be given in evidence.
Concededly, the witnesses at the former trial were subpoenaed by the
Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court a number of times. These witnesses did not
appear to testify.
But are their testimonies in the former trial within the coverage of the rule of
admissibility set forth in Section 41, Rule 130? These witnesses are not dead. They
are not outside of the Philippines. Can they be categorized as witnesses of the class
unable to testify? The Court of Appeals, construing this term, held that "subsequent
failure or refusal to appear thereat [second trial] or hostility since testifying at the first
trial does not amount to inability to testify, but such inability proceeding from a grave
cause, almost amounting to death, as when the witness is old and has lost the power of
speech. (Griffith vs. Sauls, 77 Tex 630, 14 S.W. 230, 231; section 37 of Rule 123,
Rules of Court)."
Here, the witnesses in question were available. Only, they refused to testify.
No other person that prevented them from testifying, is cited. Certainly, they do not
come within the legal purview of those unable to testify.
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 Besides in the situation here presented, petitioners are not at all bereft of
remedy. They could have urged the court to have said witnesses arrested, punished
for contempt. After all, these remedies are in the statute books to help litigants in the
prosecution of their cases. Petitioners failed to avail of these remedies, went ahead
and submitted their case.
We note petitioners' argument that to follow strictly the law of admissibility
of testimony in former trials, is to permit party litigants to buy witnesses to dissuade
them from testifying again. Nothing extant in the record will as much as intimate that
respondent was responsible for the non-appearance of these witnesses. The danger of
tampering with witnesses is a problem that attends trials in many a time and in
number of imaginable situations. And, petitioners argument works both ways.
Because, witnesses at the former trial can be bought not to testify at the second trial,
in just the same way that they could have been bought to give their original
testimony. Solution of this problem lies elsewhere, not in the non-enforcement of
Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Ohio v. Roberts
448 U.S. 56 (1980)
Brief Fact Summary. Defendant, Herschel Roberts, was charged with forgery for
writing checks in the name of Bernard Isaacs. Defendant was able to question Isaac’s
daughter, Anita Isaacs, at a preliminary hearing, but she failed to appear for the trial.
Therefore the state introduced the record of the preliminary hearing as evidence.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Testimony from a preliminary hearing is admissible if the
declarant can not be produced for the trial, but the prior testimony should have
factors, such as a prior opportunity for questioning by a defendant’s counsel and
being under oath, to indicate the testimony is reliable and trustworthy.
FACTS:
Roberts was charged with forgery of a check and possession of credit cards
belonging to the Isaacs. At a preliminary hearing, Roberts counsel attempted to elicit
from her an admission that Anita had given Roberts the checks and the credit cards.
Anita denied this. At trial, Roberts argued that the daughter had given him the check.
The prosecution attempted to introduce the preliminary hearing testimony of
the daughter denying that she gave Roberts the check. Roberts argued that the
testimony could not be used because it was hearsay. The prosecution argued that the
testimony was not hearsay because under Ohio law, testimony from the preliminary
examination of a witness was admissible if the witness was not available at trial.
Roberts argued that since he did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the
witness at the trial, the testimony violated the Confrontation Clause of the 6th
Amendment. The Trial Judge found that the testimony was admissible. The Trial
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
42
Court convicted Roberts of forgery. He appealed on the grounds that the daughter's
testimony had been improperly admitted. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed. The
prosecution appealed. The Ohio Supreme Court found that Roberts had not had
sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the witness, and therefore the testimony was
not admissible.
ISSUE:
The issue is whether the preliminary hearing testimony by an unavailable witness is
admissible.
RULING:
The admission of the preliminary hearing testimony does not violate
Defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution.
The witness was unavailable, but the prosecution made a good-faith effort in trying to
locate her. There were also several factors that demonstrated the reliability of her
testimony such as Defendant’s counsel asked her leading questions at length during
the preliminary hearing.
The US Supreme Court found that:
1. The daughter was under oath and the environment was trial-like when she
testified at the preliminary hearing.
2. Roberts had the opportunity to examine the daughter and he used this
opportunity.
Therefore, the statements are considered reliability and even though the statement
does not fit under any of the exceptions to hearsay, it is still admissible under the FRE
807 residual exception.
The Court found that under the Confrontation Clause, the prosecution must
demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant and, that the hearsay has indicia of
reliability sufficient to justify dispensing with confrontation by showing 1) that the
testimony fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or that 2) the statement was
accompanied by particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
GR 133154, December 9, 2005
JOWEL SALES, petitioner, vs. CYRIL A. SABINO, respondent
FACTS:
Respondent Cyril A. Sabino filed an amended complaint for damages against, among
others, herein petitioner Jowel Sales, driver of the vehicle involved in the accident
which ultimately caused the death of respondent’s son, Elbert.
Before any responsive pleading could be filed, respondent, as plaintiff a quo, notified
the defendants that he will take the deposition of one Buaneres Corral before the
Clerk of Court, RTC- Pasig City. Such depositions were, in the course of trial, marked
as her Exhibits “DD” and “EE”, with submarkings. It formed part of the Formal Offer
LLB4302
of Exhibits. Also offered in evidence, as exhibit BB, is a certification from the
Bureau of Immigration attesting to the May 28, 1996 departure for abroad of
Buaneres Corral via Flight No. PR 658.
Petitioner opposed the admission of Exhs. “DD” and “EE” and even asked that they
be expunged from the records on the ground that the jurisdictional requirements for
their admission under Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, infra, were not
complied with. He also downplayed the evidentiary value of Exhibit “BB”.
The trial court admitted, among other evidence, respondent’s Exhibits “DD”, “EE”
and “BB”. The appellate court upheld the trial court and effectively denied due
course to and dismissed petitioner’s recourse, explaining, inter alia, that petitioner’s
active participation, through counsel, during the taking of subject deposition and
adopting it as his own exhibits, has thereby estopped him from assailing the
admissibility thereof as part of respondent’s evidence.
Thus, this instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the requirements of Section 4, Rule 24 (now Section 3) of the
Revised Rules of Court were satisfied by the respondent when it presented a
certification attesting to the fact that deponent has left the country but silent as to
whether or not at the time his deposition was offered in evidence is in the
Philippines?
RULING:
Yes. None of the conditions in Sec. 4, Rule 23 exists to justify the admission in
evidence of Sabino’s Exhibits “DD” and “EE”. Also, the certification merely proves
the fact of Corral having left the country on the date mentioned. It does not establish
that he has not returned since then and is unavailable to be present in court to
personally testify.
While depositions may be used as evidence in court proceedings, they are generally
not meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or
witness. Stated a bit differently, a deposition is not to be used when the deponent is
at hand. Indeed, any deposition offered during a trial to prove the facts therein set
out, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be
opposed and excluded on the ground of hearsay. However, depositions may be used
without the deponent being called to the witness stand by the proponent, provided the
existence of certain conditions is first satisfactorily established. 5 exceptions for the
admissibility of a deposition are listed in Section 4, Rule 23. Among these is when
the witness is out of the Philippines.
[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001]
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as
Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
43
CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES
FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA,
ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO,
JR., respondent.
[G.R. No. 146738. March 2, 2001]
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, respondent.
FACTS: It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-
taking, illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada
before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was
impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in
the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against
Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators,
sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against
Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire
prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his
vote against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined
the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that
he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency
was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo
took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President.
Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition
for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman
from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term
as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful
and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office.
ISSUE: Whether the use of the Angara diary to determine the state of mind of the
petitioner on the issue of his resignation violates the rule against the admission of
hearsay evidence.
RULING: The Angara diary contains statements of the petitioner, which reflect his
state of mind and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. It also contains
statements of Sec. Angara from which we can reasonably deduce petitioner’s intent to
resign. They are admissible and they are not covered by the rule on hearsay. Let it be
emphasized that it is not unusual for courts to distill a person’s subjective intent from
the evidence before them. This has long been a quiet area of our law on the evidence
and petitioner’s attempt to foment a belated tempest cannot receive our imprimatur.
Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the
President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided in Sec. 11,
LLB4302
Art. VII. We sustained this submission and held that by its many acts, Congress has
already determined and dismissed the claim of alleged temporary inability to govern
proffered by petitioner. If he feels aggrieved, he should have recourse to Congress
and not from courts. There is nothing in Sec.11 of the Constitution which states that
the declaration by Congress of the President’s inability must always be prior or
before the VP assumes the presidency. In the case at bar, special consideration
should be given to the fact that the events, which led to the resignation of the
petitioner happened at express speed and culminated on a Saturday. Congress was
then not in session and had no reasonable opportunity to act a priori on petitioner’s
letter claiming inability to govern. In case of Resignation of the President, it is not
disputed that the SC has jurisdiction to decide the issue. In case of inability to
govern, Sec.11 gives the Congress the power to adjudge the issue and the petitioner
himself submitted this thesis which was shared by the SC.
G.R. No. 179830 December 3, 2009
LINTANG BEDOL, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
FACTS: As Chair of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) for the province
of Maguindanao, the respondent [petitioner] discharged his official functions and
was able to ensure the PBOC’s performance of its ministerial duty to canvass the
Certificates of Canvass coming from the twenty two (22) city and municipalities in
the province.
At that time, respondent [petitioner] also was charged with the burdensome and
gargantuan duty of being the concurrent Provincial Elections Supervisor for the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan a neighboring province of Maguindanao.
Respondent [petitioner] Bedol failed to attend the scheduled canvassing of the
Provincial Certificates of Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao of which he is the
Provincial Election Supervisor which was slated on May 22, 2007.
On May 25, 2007, respondent appeared before the Commission, en banc sitting as
the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC) for the election of senators to submit the
provincial certificate of canvass for Maguindanao, pursuant to his functions as
Provincial Elections Supervisor and chair of the PBOC for Maguindanao. Due to
certain ‘observations’ on the provincial certificates of canvass by certain parties,
canvassing of the certificate was held in abeyance and respondent was queried on the
alleged fraud which attended the conduct of elections in his area.
He was already informed of the resetting of the canvassing for May 30, 2007, but
failed to appear despite prior knowledge.
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE
44
Respondent’s [petitioner] contention:
Bedol explained before the Task Force during its June 11, 2007 fact finding activity
that, while in his custody and possession, the election paraphernalia were stolen
sometime on May 29, 2007, or some fifteen (15) days after the elections. This was the
first time such an excuse was given by the respondent [petitioner] and no written
report was ever filed with the Commission regarding the alleged loss.
Due to absences in the next scheduled investigative proceedings and due to failure and
refusal to submit a written explanation of his absences, respondent [petitioner] was
issued a contempt charge by COMELEC.
Petitioner was later arrested by members of the Philippine National Police on the basis
of an Order of Arrest issued on June 29, 2007 by the COMELEC after petitioner
repeatedly failed to appear during the fact-finding proceedings before Task Force
Maguindanao.
Petitioner questioned the COMELEC’s legal basis for issuing the warrant of arrest
and its assumption of jurisdiction over the contempt charges. Nevertheless, he was
declared in contempt by COMELEC.
Petitioner, then, filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
COMELEC in the other assailed Resolution dated August 31, 2007.
ISSUES:
Main: Whether or not the initiation and issuance of contempt order is within the
constitutional powers of the COMELEC.
Relevant: Whether or not the newspaper clippings used by the COMELEC as
evidence is hearsay.
RULING:
Main: YES
Powers of COMELEC
The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as an adjunct to its
constitutional duty to enforce and administer all election laws, by virtue of the explicit
provisions of paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which
reads:
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Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx
(6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices.
The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative,
quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC
embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of election
laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative
power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws
and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by
Congress. Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and administration of
election laws. In the exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-
A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to
issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and
the Omnibus Election Code.
COMELEC in the challenged Resolution of August 7, 2007, it was not the mere
content of the articles that was in issue, but petitioner’s conduct when he allowed
himself to be interviewed in the manner and circumstances, adverted to in the
COMELEC Resolution, on a pending controversy which was still brewing in the
COMELEC. While petitioner claimed that he was misquoted, he denied neither the
said interview nor his picture splashed on the newspaper with a firearm holstered at
his side but simply relied on his objection to the hearsay nature of the newspaper
clippings. It should be stressed that petitioner was no ordinary witness or respondent.
He was under the administrative supervision of the COMELEC and it was incumbent
upon him to demonstrate to the COMELEC that he had faithfully discharged his
duties as dictated by law. His evasiveness and refusal to present his evidence as well
as his reliance on technicalities to justify such refusal in the face of the allegations of
fraud or anomalies and newspaper publication mentioned to the Contempt Charge and
Show Cause Order amounted to an implied admission of the charges leveled against
him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. No
costs. SO ORDERED.

Relevant: NO

Petitioner questions the probative value of the newspaper clippings published in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer on June 26, 2007 which showed a photo of him with a
firearm tucked to his side and his supposed exclusive interview. He claims that said
newspaper clippings are mere hearsay, which are of no evidentiary value.

True, there were instances when the Court rejected newspaper articles as hearsay,
when such articles are offered to prove their contents without any other competent
and credible evidence to corroborate them. However, in Estrada v. Desierto, et al.,
the Court held that not all hearsay evidence is inadmissible and how over time,
exceptions to the hearsay rule have emerged. Hearsay evidence may be admitted by
the courts on grounds of "relevance, trustworthiness and necessity." When certain
facts are within judicial notice of the Court, newspaper accounts "only buttressed
these facts as facts."

Another exception to the hearsay rule is the doctrine of independently relevant

statements, where only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the
truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply; hence, the
statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement
is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or
be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.

Here, the newspaper clippings were introduced to prove that petitioner deliberately
defied or challenged the authority of the COMELEC. As ratiocinated by the
EVIDENCE – HEARSAY RULE LLB4302
45