Human Rights Bad/ Ethnic Difference BadiSoft Power Bad

We aren't embracing the power of positive thinking

Soft Power Bad

Jran 1NC...1-4
Negotiations U.. .5-6
US Involvement Link..7-9
Escalation.. . 10
Turns soft power.. . 1 1
Aff ans ... 12-14

Human Rights Bad

US-China 1NC...15-18
Pressure Links.. .19-23
Rts K Rels.. .24
Uniqueness..25-27
China key to negots.. .28-29
Impacts.. .30-3 1
Chinese political stability turn.. .32
Aff ans..33-37

Ethnic ConflictsDA
Shell.. .38-41
US gets modelled.. .42-45 .
A2: No threshold.. .46
Impacts..47
Impact takeouts.. .48-50
SDI 2005 ~ 01 5
J& P o ~ N Fq 1 H W S OPower
~~
JVC
A. Talks between the EU and Iran are slow but will soon speed up

Xinhua General News Service July 13,2005

A top Iranian lawmaker said here on Wednesday that Iran is waiting for Europe's practical proposal on
the country's disputed nuclear issue, the official lRNA news agency reported."The European Union (EU)
has two months to come up with a practical plan about Iran's national nuclear program," Kazem Jalali,
Rapporteur of the Majlis (parliament) Commission on National Security and Foreign Policy, was quoted as
saying.Jalali's remarks came several weeks ahead of an expected end of a nearly two-month suspension
in the nuclear talks between Iran and the EU. Tehran's nuclear talks with the EUhad reached a deadlock
due to the uncompromising stances of the two sides for several months before they agreed to actually fieeze
the negotiations since late May.

Europe, the longtime broker of the Iranian nuclear issue, pressured Tehran to permanently halt its uranium
enrichment activities, which Tehran suspended in November 2004 to avoid a referral of its nuclear case to
the UN Security Council.

Iran turned down the EU demand, insisting that it could not give up legal rights

Iran's President-elect Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will come into power on Aug. 4, and it has been
expected that the nuclear talks will be resumed soon after.
JVC
B. Increasing US-EU relations weakens Europe's credibility with Iran- dooms
negotiations

Smeland, GSCP visiting fellow, 2004 p. http://www.gcsp.ch/e/about/News/Faculty-

articles/Academic-articles/Smeland.pdf(Sean P., "Countering Iranian Nukes..")

All of these proposals are more easily described than accomplished, and there is an important caveat to the
issue of transatlantic coordination vis-avis Iran. By working to coordinate policy with the United States,
the European Union runs the risk of appearing too much like the handmaiden of Iran'sprimary
adversary. If the European Union presents itself as too close to the United States, or appears to be
dominated by the United States, then Iran is unlikely to forego domestic uranium enrichment and
weapons capabilities out of a fear of renewed isolation. It is incumbent upon Brussels to avoid the
appearance of being a U.S. lackey and to continue to distinguish itself from the United States in its
perspective and disposition. FortunateIy (in this context), the continuing tensions over Iraq, as well as
ongoing differences of opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, provide evidence that the European
Union is charting its own course. For the purposes of credibilitv vis-avis Iran, it is necessary for the
European Union to continue to assert its independence from Washington while still maintaining its
overall partnership with the United States. It is also necessary for the United States to allow itself to be
influenced by the European Union in order to bolster the European Union's legitimacy and bargaining
power with Iran.
SDI 2005 (&- &A HR/Soft Power
JVC
C. Iranian nuclearization results in a preemptive Israeli strike drawing in the US

Salama and Ruster, Fellows @ CNS, 2004 p. http://cns.miis.edulpubslweeWO4O8 12.htm

(Sammy and Karen, "CNS: A Preemptive Attack on Iran's. ..")

In Israel, planning and rhetoric appear to have progressed quite a bit fur the^-131; it appears that
some in lsrael are seriously considering a preemptive attack similar to the June 1981 attack on
Osirak that destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactor.[4] Meir Dagan, the Chief of Mossad, told parliament
members in his inaugural appearance before the Israeli Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee
that Iran was close to the "point of no return" and that the specter of Iranian possession of nuclear weapons
was the greatest threat to Israel since its inception.[5] On November I 1,2003, Israeli Foreign Minister
Silvan Shalom said that Israel had "no plans to attack nuclear facilities in Iran."[6] Less than two weeks
later however, during a visit to the United States, Israel's Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz stated that "under
no circumstances would Israel be able to tolerate nuclear weapons in Iranian possession"[7] and just
six weeks earlier, Mossad had revealed plans for preemptive attacks by F-16 bombers on Iranian nuclear
sites.[8] This report will examine the following: The Iranian nuclear facilities most likely to be targeted
and their proliferation risk potential; the likely preemptive scenarios involving Israel o r the United
States; and the possible consequences of any preemptive action.
SDI 2005 HWSoft Power
JVC
D. Middle Eastern War goes nuclear

John Steinbach, Center for Research on Globalization, 2002 ("Israeli Weapons of Mass
Destruction: A Threat to Peace" - CRG)
http:llwww.globalresearch.ca~articledSTE203A.htm~

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has
serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, andeven the threat of
nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again, ... or should
any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable
except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current
President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42)
Russia and before it the Soviet union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is
widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite
images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43)
(Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U S . spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at
the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very
least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically
lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if
the familar pattem(lsrae1 refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed
soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)
SDI 2005
JVC
/,jCyo&b;a
J
.) (a
.) ,, HRISoft Power

EU-Iranian negotiations will succeed in the status quo

IRNA July 6,2005 p.L/N

Luxembourg FM : EU interested in continuing dialogue with Iran Brussels, July 6, IRNA Luxembourg-Iran
Iran's ambassador to the European Union, Belgium and Luxembourg, Ali Ahani, met Luxembourg Foreign
Minister Jean Asselborn Tuesday and reviewed Iran-EU relations during Luxembourg EU presidency
which ended on 30 June.

It was noted by the two sides that during the six-month period EU- -Iran relationship made positive strides,
Iranian diplomatic sources told IRNA in Brussels.

Ahani and Asselborn hoped that the EU-Iran negotiations on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) as
well as Iran's nuclear issue would reach desired results in favor of the both sides.Underlining Tehran's
positive role for regional stability, Asselborn said that the 25-member European bloc was interested to
continue its dialogue and engagement with Iran.

He referred to Iran's cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and noted that
finding access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes was a legal right of the country.Asselborn also
hoped that EU-Iran negotiations would resolve the nuclear issue.
JVC
Iran willing to stop enriching uranium- next European proposal key

AFX International Focus July 13,2005 p.L/N

TEHRAN (AFX) - Iran could change its nuclear policy, particularly its commitment to a freeze of ultra-
sensitive uranium enrichment activities, top negotiator Hassan Rowhani was quoted as saying.

'I think that nobody is hostile to the continuation of negotiations but differences are ~ o s s i b l eon the question
of the suspension, and it is possible that these differences are implemented,' Rowhani told the Shargh
newspaper.

Rowhani's comments were published the day after hardline president-elect Mahrnood Ahmadinejad vowed
'new measures' in the Islamic republic's approach to the nuclear crisis as well as its foreign policy.

Ahrnadinejad takes over from reformist President Mohammad Khatami on Aug 3, a sensitive juncture for
Iran in its negotiations with Britain, France and Germany.

The three European powers have promised to come up with an outline for a long-term accord by the end of
this month, and their proposal could make or break a lengthy diplomatic process aimed at easing
widespread fears Iran is seeking nuclear weapons technology.
SDI 2005
JVC
Iran suspicious of US infringement on nuclear talks

BBC Monitoring International Reports July 14, 2005 p. L/N

-
A. There is no doubt that the nuclear issue is the biggest topic in our foreign policy and is even thought to
be our most pressing issue of national security since the imposed war. Apart from the imposed war we have
not had any issue that has caused a major challenge to us like the nuclear dossier, both hom the viewpoint
of our national security and our foreign policy. From various aspects the nuclear dossier has been our most
important issue in the history of the Islamic Republic and in the history of Iran. This is because in the
nuclear dossier on the one hand we are facing an international body, which is the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) with 35 countries on its governing board. On the other hand we are facing the
entire Western front, including Europe and the United States. The issue is linked to a national desire for
progress and for advanced technology and is also linked to economic issues inside the country. On the other
hand because of the plots that the United States and other countries may hatch against us with regard to the
nuclear issue, the matter becomes linked with our national security and other security questions. Therefore
it is a very important, complex and sensitive dossier, which will affect our national destiny, national
security and the country's progress. The dossier can continue its process through the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. At one point, three or four months into the process of the dossier my own personal view was that it
would be best for the Foreign Ministry to pursue the issue but on the whole the officials in the country did
not approve this idea. So I continued with the dossier myself and it remained in the Supreme National
Security Council. In the future the dossier could remain in the Council or it could change its form and go to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, keeping in mind that at present the bulk of the responsibility for the
negotiations is with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs anyway. This means that it is the Foreign Ministry's
diplomats that cooperate with us, are active and take part in the negotiations. On the whole a major portion
of the dossier's load is on the shoulders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and our various embassies and
some of the load is the responsibility of the Atomic Energy Organization (AEO). Of course there are other
organizations and institutions that have responsibilities and for this reason the share of the responsibility is
with various organizations. The work was given to the Supreme National Security Council but I think that
at this particular point in time we have reached a certain stage when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can
take over the issue as a matter ofdourse. But in any case the leaders of the regime have to make a decision
on the issue and it is the future president and the future government that will have this responsibility. If
need be the current administration can canyon its work until the end of Mordad (August). The new
president will begin his responsibilities on the day of his confirmation, when he has his swearing-in
ceremony in the Majlis in front of all the deputies. From that time he has two weeks to introduce his
cabinet. Once the cabinet has been introduced the Majlis has one week to study the cabinet and then to
enter into discussions for votes of confidence. So if we assume that he is confirmed on 12 Mordad (August
3,2005) and if he then is sworn-in in the Majlis on the 13th (August 4), it is up to him to have his cabinet
ready and if the cabinet is ready to go, it can be introduced to the Majlis on that same day. If he is not
ready, he has two weeks. So we still have some time yet before the new administration starts its work.
Without a doubt the new president himself and the other leaders of the regime that have had a presence in
this dossier, who have been active, will have a role in the decision-making to see how they will guide the
issue. I am sure that our basic policy on the issue will not change. Anyone taking responsibility for the
dossier will continue our current policy. I am once again certain that all our officials are in favor of the
principle of talks - for us to continue our negotiations with the Europeans. But as to what the conditions
will be, what sorts of interpretations will the Europeans have and whether or not we will be able to continue
working with the Europeans or if the whole issue will reach a deadlock - these are discussions that depend
on a whole host of other issues that will affect our future activities and decisions.
SDI 2005 US LJU &-I, HRISoft Power
JVC
Newly minted conservative nuclear negotiator will not respond well to pressure tactics in
nuclear negotiations

World Markets Analysis July 07,2005 p.L/N

The head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and leading nuclear negotiator, Hassan
Rowhani, has resigned or is ready to resign according to conflicting Iranian reports. Earlier yesterday, the
country's official IRNA news agency cited an 'informed source' who claimed Rowhani had submitted his
resignation to outgoing President Mohammed Khatemi. Given Rowhani's 'pragmatic' posture, speculation
was rife that he would not continue in his post under the new government of conservative Mahmoud
Ahmedinejad. However, the spokesperson for the SNSC, Ah Aghamohamrnadi, immediately disowned the
news report telling Reuters it was 'a sheer lie ...Resigning at this time would be meaningless'. Compounding
the uncertainty, an unidentified source who is close to Rowhani then told Reuters that while the top
negotiator had not resigned, he would probably do so in the near future. 'It seems he is not ready to
continue this responsibility of heading nuclear negotiations] when the new president takes office. It is
doubtful that his policies will be acceptable to the new government's policies', the source said.

Significance: Rowhani's tenure as leading nuclear negotiator since October 2003 has proven successful,
given Iran's ability to maintain talks with the European Union (EU) despite pressure from the US to find
Iran in violation of international agreements. While the negotiations with the EU will resume next month,
the Ahmedinejad presidency is expected to take a far more sterner line: the president-elect has promised his
government will not cower under pressure. However, Rowhani made no secret of his support for
Ahmedinejad's rival in the election race, Ali Akbar Rafsanjani. With their competing political ideologies,
Rowhani may now pay the ultimate political price and hand over the nuclear role to a more conservative-
minded figure.
SD12005
JVC

Empirically the Europeans negotiate effectively with Iran; only the US can tank talks

Newsday (New York) November 17,2004 p.L/N

President George W. Bush, like it or not, may have to take Iran off the "Axis of Evil," at least provisionally,
and accept the agreement that the European Union has worked out to freeze Iran's nuclear weapons
program. It's not the best deal - far from it - but it's a significant step toward the goal-of preventing lran
from becoming a nuclear power.

After lengthy and pained negotiations, EU envoys have persuaded Tehran to suspend within a week all
uranium enrichment - a process necessary to the development of nuclear weapons. In exchange, the EU
offered a guarantee that United Nations sanctions would not be imposed on Iran for violating the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, unless lran breaks the deal. In addition, the EU offered expanded economic aid,
and agreed to help lran develop technology to produce nuclear power for peaceful civilian uses.

The pressure is now on Bush to go along with the European agreement, which falls considerably short of
hard-nosed U.S. demands for a permanent freeze and, ultimately, the scrapping of any nuclear activities
that could be used to make weapons - with the threat of stringent UN economic sanctions hanging like
Damocles' sword over Tehran.
SDI 2005 HR/Soft Power
JVC

Middle Eastern war escalates to massive nuclear exchange

Houston Space Society, 1997 p. http://www.houstonspacesociety.org/mad.html

ANY nuclear attack initiated by any party may well escalate out of control. It is widely accepted that Israel
has nuclear weapons. If Iraq or any other nation delivers a nuclear warhead to target on an Israeli city, the
response is likely to be immediate nuclear retaliation. If the warhead is delivered not by missile but by
terrorist activity, there is still some possibility o f nuclear retaliation. How the various nuclear powers o f the
world respond to a small scale nuclear war in the Middle East is certainly an interesting subject for
analysis. The possibility of such a small scale conflagration escalating into global thermonuclear war seems
very real.
SDI 2005 HR/Soft Power
JVC
A preemptive strike on Iran will undo US-European relations destroying our soft power
Gerecht, Fellow at AEI, March 1 2005 p.L/N
(Mark, "Europe Should Be Careful What It Wishes For..")
But this is not the direction we are going in. The odds are, M r Bush is not going to do Libya again. And the
French and Germans are not going to take America's advice. The two-decade old strategy o f Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani, the influential former president and the driving force behind Iran's nuclear weapons
programme, is soon likely to come to fruition. The Islamic republic will have successfully played divide
and conquer against the west. If this leads to a clerical A-bomb, or to a pre-emptive US strike amid a
chorus o f European outrage, the odds are good that the bonds holding the US and Europe together will
hrther fray. One day, perhaps after the EU lifts its arms embargo on China and France supplies
sophisticated radar and torpedo technology to Beijing, they will snap.
SDI 2005 HRISoft Power
JVC
Good US-EU relations key to preserve stability and peace in the Middle East

Hamilton, Director of Centre for Transatlantic Relations, 611 1/03 p.L/N

(Daniel, "Future of Transatlantic Relations")

If our efforts in these areas are ultimately to be successful, however, they must be part of more
comprehensive transatlantic strategies aimed at the modernization and transformation of the Greater Middle
East itself. A circle--with its center in Tehran- that has a diameter roughly matching the length of the
continental United States covers a region that encompasses 75 percent of the world's population, 60 percent
of its GNP, and 75 percent of its energy resources. The Greater Middle East is the region of the world
where unsettled relationships, religious and territorial conflicts, Gagile and failed regimes, and deadly
combinations of technology and terror brew and bubble on top of one vast, relatively contiguous energy
field upon which Western prosperity depends. Transformation of this region is the strategic challenge of
our time and a key to winning the campaign against terrorism. Choices made there could determine the
shape of the 2 I st century--whether weapons of mass destruction will be unleashed upon mass populations;
whether the oil and gas fields of the Caucasus and Central Asia will become reliable sources of energy;
whether the Arab world will meet the challenges of modernization and globalization; whether Russia's
borderlands will become stable and secure democracies; whether Israel and its neighbors can live together
in peace; and whether the great religions of the world can work together. This is a long term effort. We
cannot hope to transform this turbulent region into an area of democratic stability and prosperity soon. But
we can act more successfully together to defend common interests, to dampen the negative trends that are
gaining momentum, and to work with those in the region who seek to carve out areas of civil society where
the state does not intrude. Such an effort is far more likely to succeed if America and Europe were to pool
our energies and resources and pursue it together.
SDI 2005
JVC
US-EU relations key to solving terrorism

National Prospect April 2003 p.L/N

But the most striking and by far the most dangerous misperception afflicting Bush's approach to foreign
affairs concerns the war against transnational terrorism. Kagan asserts that Europe "has had little to offer
the United States in strategic military terms since the end of the Cold War." Widely shared inside the
administration, this view is based on the premise that the "end of the Cold War did not reduce the salience
of military power." Military power is just as central to American security today as it-was during the Cold
War -- that is what Kagan would have us believe. And after the Cold War, "European military incapacity"
means that our former allies have become almost wholly irrelevant to U.S. security. That is the assumption
behind this book and, presumably, behind the unfathomably cavalier attitude of the Bush administration
toward our European allies.

That this assumption is fallacious is the very least that might be said. The September 1 1 attacks were partly
planned, organized and financed in Europe. The Muslim diaspora communities into which terrorist cells
can invisibly blend remain the likeliest staging grounds for future al-Qaeda attacks on the United States. In
other words, Europe remains a hontline region in the war against terrorism just as it was in the war against
communism. As daily press reports also reveal, the European police have been acting in a perfectly
Hobbesian manner, arresting scores of suspected terrorists. In other words, despite his pose as a no-
nonsense realist, Kagan has apparently failed to realize the degree to which the contours of American
national security have been redrawn since 9-1 1. The home front and the foreign ii-ont have now been
disconcertingly blurred. National-security strategy must now operate in a domain where soldiering and
policing have become of coequal importance. This profound change helps us understand the erroneous
premise of Bush's foreign policy. In our new security environment, despite the prevailing cliche, the United
States is not the world's only superpower.

The war on transnational terrorism depends essentially on information gathering and policing, and in these
respects the Europeans are anything but security pygmies. Their capacities to respond effectively to today's
greatest security threats easily rival those of the United States. Europeans' linguistic skills and cultural
knowledge alone ensure that they can make indispensable contributions to U.S. security. They can perform
essential tasks of monitoring, infiltration, disruption and apprehension for which our own unrivaled military
machine is patently inadequate. Dismissing the "platitude" that the United States cannot protect itself
without European help, Kagan announces that "the United States can 'go it alone."' This is apparently the
thinking (if you can call it that) behind the administration's mindlessly denigrating remarks about Europe.
True, European leaders can sometimes be hypocritical and foolishly condescending. But let it pass. We
cannot afford, for the sake of a fiisson, to undermine American security by further poisoning relations with
capable allies in a time of unprecedented national peril.
 f
JVC
Iran plans to continue with nuclearization

AFX International Focus July 13,2005 p.L/N

While Iran agreed to suspend uranium enrichment in October 2003 and widen the li-eeze last year, officials
have voiced their determination to resume the dual-use activity -- the focus of suspicions the clerical
regime wants to acquire the bomb.

Iran claims it only wants to make atomic fuel for energy purposes and argues it has a right to do so as a
signatory of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, it has a track record of covering up its
activities and shopping illegally on the international black market.

Iranian negotiators also said in comments published Tuesday that the country would soon resume
enrichment and will reject any EU proposal that does not recognise the Islamic republic's right to do so.
SDT 2005 HIUSoft Power
JVC
A. US-Sino relations good now - Condoleezza Rice visit proves
Agence France Presse, 10 July 2005, pg: I/n

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice left Beiiing Sunday calling US-Sino relations positive and
reiterating Washington's view that China is not a threat, but raised concerns with China's leaders over
the country's military buildup, copyright violations and human rights.
Despite rows over Chinese textile exports, the surging US trade deficit with China and the Chinese
currency's inflexibility, Rice, who is on a four-nation Asian tour that takes her next to Thailand, said
relations were "complex" but good.
"There are many extremely positive elements. I still think that this relationship has a great
momentum. It still has more positives than negatives," Rice told a news briefing after meeting Chinese
leaders.

B. I . If the US increases rights to ease up its War on Terror it will increase rights pressure
on China
Gill, Director of China Studies @ CSIS, 2003 p.
-
http://~wv.~l0bal~olicy.0r~/nations/launder/re~ions/2OO3/O623china.htm
(Bates, "China in Transition")
I think we can expect some of these issues to become a bit more pressing, but largely on the backburner
for the time being. Proliferation is likely to b e a problem that is going to keep popping up, especially in
cases that are still ongoing, that China can be identified with to countries like Iran or North Korea, or others
who have been termed within the axis of evil. Taiwan is going to become a more pressing issue as their
elections approach in March o f 2004. I think we will be hearing a little bit more language coming from
Taiwanese politicians regarding the cross-Strait relationship, about the need for Taiwan to have a more
independent international stature. That interest has the potential to stir up the pot in US.-China-
Taiwan relations. The United States decided last month not to pursue an annual resolution in the UN
Human Rights Commission condemning China for its human rights record. That attempt has
perennially failed on the part of the U.S., nevertheless, it has always been a kind of thorn in the side
of the relationship, and this year, the United States decided not to pursue it. So that is an indicator
that even the human rights set of issues is again beinp pushed a little bit to the back in order to
pursue areas of common interest.
SDI 2005 (1@ Dh (dc H R I S O Power
~~
JVC
2. US human rights policy moves anger China- frays relations
Q i, Candidate @ Johns-Hopkins, 2005 p. I 1 1
Ph.D
(Zhou, "Conflicts Over Human Rights Between China and the US"), Human Rights
Quarterly 27.1
While the US takes pride in pursuing human rights abroad and strives for self-identity in its foreign policy,
many Chinese think that US human rights policy essentially uses the issue of human rights as an
excuse for the United States to intervene in other countries' domestic affairs and to advance its own
strategic goals.

In China, US human rights policy is generally called "human rights diplomacy." implying that US
promotion of human rights in China has an instrumental motivation, intended to consolidate US
power globally. "The human rights issue was taken by the US as a diplomatic tool to realize its
national interests," just as the "Ping-Pong diplomacy"26 was used by the Chinese leadership to deal with
its relations with the United States in the early 1970s.27 In recent Chinese publications, US human rights
policy is condemned, for instance, as "a tool for conducting 'peaceful evolution' in socialist countries . . . to
attain its long-range strategic goal: to impose on socialist countries its own values, ideology, political
standards, and development model, aimed at changing the nature of the Chinese socialist system."28
SDI 2005 HRISoft Power
JVC
C. ].Good US-Sino relations is key to stopping East Asia nuclear arms race because
Chinese pressure is necessary
Mead, 19 June 2005
(Walter Russell, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations,
http://www.cfi.org/pub8 1 92/walter~russell~mead/should~nukes~b100mmin -asia.php)

In part, this is a long-term strategy. From Washington's view, hooking a stagnating and increasingly
anxious Japan to a rising India would counterbalance China's growing power in Asia Australia also shows
signs of a heightened interest in India as China's influence expands, and Indonesia has historically been
wary of China. The Bush administration is weaving a strategic net that it hopes in time could persuade
China to keep its ambitions within reason.
Short term, the dizzying diplomatic activity in Asia aims to alter China's calculations about North
Korea's nuclear program. Beijing doesn't welcome nukes in Pyongyang. but it is reluctant to use
sanctions to raise the pressure on North Korea that could cause its next-door neighbor to collapse. That
would send waves of rehgees into Chinese tenitory and might be a pretext for a U.S. military presence on
its borders. In China's eyes, the risks of instability in North Korea may be greater than the costs of the
status quo.
The wild card in Washington's new Asia strategy is South Korea, where some opinion polls rank the U.S.
as a greater threat than Pyongyang. Like China, Seoul is more fearful of North Korean instability or a clash
with the U.S. than nukes to its north. Any sign of resurgent nationalism in Japan is likely to drive South
Korean public opinion closer to Beijing. Keeping South Korea on board is crucial for Washington.
The pressure on China continues. "If you had a nuclear North Korea, it iust introduces a whole
different dynamic," the U.S. ambassador to Japan recently said. "It seems to me that that increases the
pressure on both South Korea and Japan to consider going nuclear themselves."
Vice President Dick Cheney has made similar comments, as have prominent Japanese officials, including a
former foreign minister.
The idea -- not yet a threat -- is that unless North Korea dismantles its nuclear program, Japan, South Korea
and even Taiwan might go nuclear in the not-so-distant hture. The United States has intimated that
although it would not aid or support any nuclear proliferation, it would be unable to control its allies'
ambitions, just as China can't restrain North Korea's program.
Bush officials have repeated this message. China is the only country that can pressure North Korea
to give up its nukes. Only China has the carrots and sticks that the North Koreans respect. Without
China, no progress is possible. If North Korea stays nuclear, the region will respond in ways that
China will hate.
With China's and India's power growing, North Korea rattling its nukes, Japan becoming more
nationalistic and South Korea reconsidering its relations with the U.S., this once-stable part of the
world is in flux.
A nuclear arms race across East Asia would be hugely dangerous and destabilizing. F a r better that
the Bush administration convince China that the wiser course is to prevent a nuke race by telling
Pyongyang the time has come for a deal.
SDI 2005 HRlSoft Power
JVC
2. US military strike against North Korea would cause nuclear holocaust in East Asia
( ) Carpenter '03
(Ted, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/@briefs/fpb73.pdf)

I f the United States launched preemptive military strikes against North Korea's nuclear installations.
there would be a n assortment of grave risks. I t is not at all certain that the United States has
identified all of the installations, much less that it could successfully eradicate them. (Indeed, the
uncertainty about the number- or even existence-ofNorth Korean nuclear weapons illustrates the limits
of U.S. intelligence capabilities.) North Korea has had years to build installations deep underground.
Pyongyang's reaction to U.S. attacks would also be a matter of concern. It is unlikely that North Korea
would passively accept such a blow against its sovereignty. At the very least, Washington would have to
expect terrorist retaliation by North Korean operatives against U.S. targets overseas and, possibly, in
the United States itself. North Korea might even retaliate by launching fullscale militaw operations
against South Korea- a development that would put US. forces stationed in that country in
immediate danger. Indeed, in a worst-case scenario, there is a risk that mushroom clouds could
blossom above Seoul and Tokyo-or above U.S. bases in South Korea or Okinawa. It is not
coincidental that both South Korea and Japan are strongly opposed to a confrontational strategy on the part
of the United States.9 Even those American pundits and policy experts who are usually inclined to rattle
sabers seem strangely cautious in dealing with the current crisis. It is revealing that, in contrast to 1993 and
1994 when hawks both inside and outside the Clinton administration hinted darkly about the possibility of
preemptive strikes, almost no one today recommends that course. 10 (The only exceptions appear to be
analysts at the Heritage Foundation-and even their hawkishness is tentative.) 1 1 Given the potential for
disaster, one hopes that U.S. policymakers continue to spurn the military option.
SDI 2005
JVC
China doesn't like the western notion of universal human rights
( ) Moore '99
(Gregory, Assistant Professor of Political Science and East Asian Politics at Eckerd
College, http://www.du.edu/humanrights/workingpapers/papers/O8-moore-O9-OO.pd~

So from the Chinese perspective, fully conceding today to universalist notions of human
rights could bring great social, economic and political unrest to their country, and/or
could even mean the collapse of Chinese communism as we know it. The Chinese,
therefore, see the present human rights debate as the continued attemptby Westerners to
dominate them and reshape them into an image of the West, philosophically,
economically and politically. Yet the Chinese have always seen and continue to see
themselves today as hndamentally different from the West/the world, and quite capable
of choosing their own path to development. Consequently, they find it insulting that a
nation (the US) with so much injustice and so many double standards in its own history
(slavery, genocide of native populations, racism, CIA plots to overthrow governments,
etc.), should deem itself worthy of judging they, the Chinese, particularly as it concerns a
matter that according to the UN Charter falls within the purview of their own sovereign
authority.
SDI 2005
JVC
it)
', HRlSoft Power

Criticism of China's human rights record hurts US-Sino relations

Thai Press, 3 March 2005, pg: I/n

Section: Regional News - China condemned a US State Department report criticizing

China's human rights record, saying that the report was a blow to relations between the
two sides.
"We are very dissatisfied with this report and we protest it," Chinese Foreign Ministry
spokesman Liu Jianchao said at a regular press conference on March. I-, adding that the
United States should stop using double standards on human rights and stop interfering in
the internal politics of China under the pretext of human rights.
He said that "this kind of report will do nothing good for the improvement of bilateral
relations. It will do no good to improve mutual confidence in each other." The spokesman
said China has made important progress in human rights, in political and legal areas in
the past years, and that the protection of human rights had been written into the country's
constitution last year.
Liu said that China and the US differ on the definition of human rights and that the two
sides should carry out dialogue to narrow their differences. - VNA
SDI 2005 HRlSoft Power
JVC
US criticism of Chinese human rights record hurts relations
AP, 1 March 2005, pg: lln

China on Tuesday condemned a State Department report criticizing Beijing's human

rights record, saying the review was a blow to relations between the two countries.
"We are very dissatisfied with this report and we protest this report," Chinese Foreign
Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao said. "The United States should stop using double
standards on human rights and stop interfering in the internal politics of China under the
pretext of human rights."
He added: "This kind of report will do nothing good for the improvement of bilateral
relations. It will do no good to improve mutual confidence in each other."
The report, released Monday in Washington, said China continued to commit "numerous
and serious abuses," especially against writers, religious activists, dissidents and
petitioners.
The abuses, it said, included instances of extrajudicial killings, and of torture and
mistreatment of prisoners leading to numerous deaths in custody.
"Authorities were quick to suppress religious, political and social groups that they
perceived as threatening to government authority or national stability, especially before
sensitive dates such as the 15th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen massacre and other
significant political and religious occasions," according to the report.
The United States is likely to seek censure of China next month at the annual meeting of
the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva - a routine move by Washington,
although none of its proposals have been approved.
Liu defended China's record, saying that the protection of human rights had been written
into the country's constitution last year. The mention, however, was ambiguous and made
no reference to political freedom.
"In the past years, China has made important progress in human rights, in political and
legal areas," Liu said. "We are working to improve the human rights situation in China in
more fields to build a society that is harmonious and united."
The official Xinhua News Agency said the State Council, China's cabinet, will release its
own assessment of the United States' human rights record on Thursday in a report that is
"based on plenty of facts."
It will show "the bad records of the United States concerning the invasions into other
countries and the mistreatment of foreign inmates, as well as the bad records in the
aspects of life, freedom and personal security of U.S. citizens."
Liu urged dialogue between the United States and China to "narrow their differences."
The report also said Hong Kong's political autonomy, promised after the region's 1997
return to Chinese rule, was "tested severely" in 2004.
When the mainland's legislature ruled out universal suffrage in the next elections for
Hong Kong's chief executive last April, it "raised questions about the PRC's willingness
to permit Hong Kong to operate with a high degree of autonomy."
Liu dismissed the criticism, saying that "Hong Kong's affairs belong to China's internal
politics and ... criticism is not appropriate."
SDI 2005 HRISoft Power
JVC
China resents US human rights interlocution
Ph.D
Q i,Candidate @ Johns-Hopkins, 2005 p. 1 17
(Zhou, "Conflicts Over Human Rights Between China and the US"), Human Rights
Quarterly 27.1
With regard to the issue of national sovereignty and its relation to human rights, both the Chinese
government and the people believe that human rights are within China's own jurisdiction of sovereignty and
that other [End Page 1 181 countries have no right to interfere. China has always condemned the US
government for intervening in its internal affairs and for ignoring its national sovereignty when the latter
has pressured the former to improve its human rights record. Though most Chinese citizens believe there is
much to be done to improve their country's human rights, they also agree that it is not the business of the
United States or other Western countries to interfere. There is evidence that anyone in China who appeals
to Western countries for aid to go toward democratization efforts o r the advancement of human rights will
be treated with disdain by his fellow Chinese citizens.
SDI 2005 HRISoft Power
JVC
Rights promotion fails in China empirically
Q Ph.D
i,Candidate @ Johns-Hopkins, 2005 p. 123
(Zhou, "Conflicts Over Human Rights Between China and the US"), Hzrmar? Rights
Quarterly 27.1
The Chinese view of human rights, its opinion on sovereignty, and the Chincse government's practice of
human rights have caused conflicts behveen China and Western countries, especially the United States. But
many believe that the United States promotion of human rights in China has failed. "Not only has it failed
to achieve any significant improvement in China's human rights record, but, equally i-mportant, it has
damaged America's reputation in the eyes of many Chinese, including those who are committed to
reform."75 This is due to the US government's imposition of its own values and political institutions on the
Chinese.

Human rights criticism from the US destroys Us-Sino Relations

Financial Times March 4,2004 p.L/N
Colin Powell, US secretary of state, hinted strongly yesterday that the Bush administration would sponsor a
UN resolution this month criticising what it regards as "backsliding" in China's human rights record.

Mr Powell was speaking to a congressional committee shortly after the House of Representatives voted
402-2 in favour of its own non-binding resolution calling on the Bush administration to take action against
China at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva.

Last year the Bush administration declined to sponsor a resolution critical of China, citing progress in its
record. Although a diplomatic dispute is in the making, the Bush administration says its relationship with
China is mature enough to deal with the issue. Analysts in Washington said the tougher tone in the
administration's public remarks was also fuelled by growing concern at pressure on civil rights in Hong
Kong and tension with Taiwan.

China reacted angrily last week to the State Department's annual human rights report, which was strongly
critical of China's crackdown on political and religious dissent, sometimes using the international "war on
terror" as a pretext.
SDI 2005 HWSoft Power
JVC
Human Rights key to U.S.-Sino relations
( ) Moore '99
(Gregory, Assistant Professor of Political Science and East Asian Politics at Eckerd
College, http://www.du.edu/humanrights/workingpapers/papers/O8-moore-O9-OO.pd~

Human rights is an issue that definitively exemplifies the differences between the social,
cultural7economic and political systems of the world's most populous and the world's
most powerful nations, the People's Republic of China and the United States of America.
Former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping himself is said to have stated, "The human
rights issue is the crux of the struggle between the world's two social systems. If we lose
the battle on the human rights front, everything will be meaningless to us."] Recently,
students of Sino-American and international relations have published a number of
influential works describing what they see as America's "coming conflict with China," or
"the clash of civilizations" between the West and China, both cases in which it is argued
that the United States is destined to find itself if not at war with China in the near future,
then at least in a serious political standoff with China, perhaps a new Cold War.2 While I
think such pessimism is deterministic and unwarranted, the potential for serious conflict
between China and the United States is very real. Why is the human rights issue so
salient in Sino-American relations? Deng was right in the statement above, that the
"battle" over alternate visions of human rights has immense ramifications for China.
However, with the end of the Cold War and the liberalization of China's economy, I do
not see the "struggle" as being between two world systems as was the case during the
Cold War, but rather as being between "universal" or "Western" and alternative
paradigms of society, government and economy. As it regards human rights, the
"struggle".centers around an argument that human rights as defined in the UN documents
are universal, the Western position. An alternative view, posited by leaders in China,
Malaysia, and Singapore among others, is that human rights are not universal, but rather
can be defined only as being relative to local cultural, historical, and/or developmental
realities. If the Chinese government prevails in its bid to make human rights seen as
developmentally relative, which is the official Chinese view of human rights and will be
discussed below, they will be able to hold their heads high as they continue on their
current course of development, wherein individual rights are sometimes subsumed for the
"collective good" of economic development and the maintenance of order, the status quo,
and the Chinese Communist Party. If China bows to the universal interpretation of human
rights found in the UN's Universal Declaration in the sense that it be fully implemented
at present, it must make monumental changes in its social order, its legal system, and its
system of governance, acknowledging that the state must be absolutely and fully
accountable to the people it governs in every respect.
SDI 2005
JVC
North Korea talks continuing- the atmosphere is hopeful
Daily Yomiuri July 12 2005 p.L/N
Wu Dawei, China's vice foreign minister, who will head a Chinese delegation to six-nation talks on North
Korea's nuclear development program, said Monday that Beijing expects it will take some time to realize a
nuclear-6ee Korean Peninsula.
Speaking in an interview in Beijing with Kiichiro Harano, international editor of The Yomiuri Shimbun,
Wu said, "It would be impossible to have just one round of talks resolve every matter," indicating the
China-hosted framework should be kept intact beyond the next round to deal with the North Korean nuclear
issue.
His remarks followed North Korea's agreement with the United States on Saturday to return to the six-party
talks--last held in June last year--in the week beginning July 25.
Wu said China, which chairs the talks, had begun approaching the other participating countries--Japan,
South Korea and Russia--to set an exact date for their delegations to sit down together in Beijing.
The Chinese vice minister praised both Pyongyang and Washington for their efforts in reaching an
agreement. He added that the two sides appeared to have had a substantial exchange of views.
Wu said Tang Jiaxuan, one of China's five state councillors, who is scheduled to visit North Korea from
Tuesday, was expected to thoroughly discuss the nuclear issues with North Korean leader Kim Jong I1 and
other senior officials in Pyongyang.

North Korea negotiations going well

Washington Post July 10 2005 p.L/N
North Korea has agreed to return this month to six-nation talks aimed at eliminating its nuclear arsenal,
ending a year-long boycott, U.S. officials and the North Korean government said Saturday.

The agreement to restart the talks was reached at a rare dinner meeting here between a senior U.S. envoy
and his North Korean counterpart, held shortly before Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrived
Saturday night for talks with Chinese officials on the North Korean issue.

During the meal, Kim Gye Gwan, the North Korean deputy foreign minister, told Assistant Secretary of
State Christopher R. Hill that North Korea was willing to attend talks in Beijing the week of July 25,
according to a senior U.S. official traveling with Rice. In what U.S. officials took as an encouraging sign,
they reported that Kim said the purpose of the talks was the "denuclearization of the Korean peninsula" and
that North Korea intended to make progress at the negotiations.

Rice met with Chinese President Hu Jintao, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing and other Chinese officials
Sunday morning. She then was to fly to Phuket, Thailand, for a scheduled tour Monday of damage from
last winter's Indian Ocean tsunami. She then planned to return to East Asia for talks with Japanese and
South Korean officials, also focusing largely on the North Korean issue.

Rice, after meeting with Li, said China and the United States agreed that resumption of the talks "is only a
first step. The real issue now is to make progress at these talks."

Li added the two countries had a "shared goal -- a Korean peninsula that is fiee of nuclear weapons."

China has already announced that State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan -- a former foreign minister who also plans
to meet one-on-one with Rice -- will visit Pyongyang this week as Hu's personal envoy, apparently to
report on the discussions with Rice.
JVC
China is key to negotiations and they will be successful
Newsday July 12 2005 p.L/N
It's encouraging, and somewhat surprising, that North Korea has finally agreed to break the year-long
impasse over its nuclear weapons program and resume six-nation talks about eliminating it.

But that's at best a new starting point, not an assurance of Pyongyang's willingness to negotiate substantive
compromises to end its nuclear threat to the region. Given its past performances, with its penchant for stony
obduracy and peremptory withdrawals, no assumptions can be made about the course of talks now set to re-
start on July 25.

Still, there are reasons to believe that, this time, North Korea might be amenable to real negotiations, not
h i t l e s s and exasperating confrontations. The communiques fiom North Korea are far more conciliatory. In
them, Pyongyang accepts the view that Washington recognizes the North as a sovereign state, will not
invade it and will hold bilateral negotiations within the framework of the six-party talks also involving
China, South Korea, Russia and Japan.

Major sticking points until now were the Bush administration's reluctance to engage in one-on-one talks
with North Korea and Pyongyang's paranoia about a possible U.S. invasion, following the toppling of Iraq,
one of the other members of President George W. Bush's Axis of Evil.

In a revealing statement widely seen by diplomats as a sign of progress, North Korea said yesterday that it
does not need nuclear weapons if it is not threatened by the United States. But the most significant push
may come ffom mounting food shortages in North Korea, which threaten it with a return to famine. With
China its sole supplier of food aid, Pyongyang may succumb to generous offers of food and economic aid
fiorn the United States, South Korea and Japan. If so, the talks may turn into rice-for-nukes negotiations,
with China having played a major role behind the scenes. That would be the best bargain for all involved.
SDI 2005
JVC
Coercive inducements mean these negotiations with North Korea will succeed
NYT July 10 2005 p.L/N
her more than a year of stalemate, North Korea agreed Saturday evening to return to disarmament talks late
this month and pledged to discuss eliminating its nuclear-weapons program, according to senior Bush
administration officials.

The agreement was reached during a dinner meeting, with the Chinese as the hosts, that included
Christopher Hill, a former American ambassador to South Korea who has recently become the lead United
States negotiator to the talks, and Kim Kye Gwan, North Korea's deputy foreign minister, according to a
senior administration official traveling here with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

The official Korean Central News Agency also issued a statement from Pyongyang announcing the talks
would resume.

While the North Koreans have pledged many times before to return to the six-party talks -- the United
States, Japan, South Korea, China and Russia also sit at the table -- this is the first time they have actually
set a date: the week of July 25.

The Chinese have offered to be the hosts of the discussions, and "all the parties have agreed," said a senior
administration oficial traveling with Ms. Rice, who did not want to b e identified because Ms. Rice had not
yet made a formal announcement. Ms. Rice, who is beginning a four-nation tour of Asia, and Li Zhaoxing,
the Chinese foreign minister, plan to announce the agreement on Sunday morning.

American officials were clearly trying to lower expectations. "Frankly," one of the administration officials
said, "we just don't know" what will come of the talks, if they do take place as promised.

The long-awaited return to negotiations carries considerable diplomatic perils on all sides, and would take
place just as three European nations are scheduled to conduct talks with Iran about giving up critical
elements of its nuclear program.

American officials say North Korea's economic situation has continued to deteriorate, and they hope to use
that as leverage in the coming talks. T o increase the pressure, the Bush administration has put in p k c e
plans for a series o f coercive actions -- crackdowns on North Korean shipments of drugs, counterfeit
currency and arms -- that would probably be accelerated if the negotiations made no progress.

"We've made it clear they can't just come back and lecture us, like the last sessions," a senior administration
official in Washington said. "Either they get on the path to disarmament, or we move to Plan B."
SDI 2005 L L k HlUSoft Power
JVC
China key to successful North Korean negotiations- failed negotiations end the six party
format
The Straits Times July 1 1 2005 p.L/N
BElJlNG - NORTH Korea yesterday pledged to 'do its utmost' to resolve the impasse surrounding its
nuclear weapons programme at upcoming talks.

However, analysts cautioned that the new round of negotiations later this month is unlikely to be the last.

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, whose whirlwind tour of Asia is focused on the stalled nuclea~
talks, said Pyongyang's decision to return to the negotiating table is welcome news, but is 'only a start'.

Speaking to reporters yesterday after meeting top Chinese leaders in Beijing, Dr Rice said: 'It's not the goal
of the talks to have talks. It is the goal of the talks to have progress.

'The issue now for North Korea is to make the strategic choice to give up its nuclear weapons programme.
This is not just a concern of the United States. This is a concern of all of North Korea's neighbours.'

After being bogged down for over a year, the six-nation talks - involving the two Koreas, US, China,
Russia and Japan - will reconvene a fourth round of negotiations in Beijing in the week beginning on July
25.

The decision was made after Beijing brokered a secret meeting between Washington and Pyonyyang in the
Chinese capital on Saturday, media reports here said.

US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs Christopher Hill met North Korean Deputy Foreign
Minister Kim Gye Gwan, and reached the agreement to resume talks hours after Dr Rice touched down in
Beijing on Saturday.

A day later, Pyonyyang followed up with more conciliatory comments.

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman was quoted by the country's state news agency as saying:
'The resumption of the talks itself is important but the most essential thing is for...an in-depth discussion on
ways of denuclearising the Korean Peninsula to make substantial progress in the talks.

'North Korea will do its utmost for it.'

China has hosted three rounds of inconclusive talks to resolve the nuclear stand-off, which flared up in late
2002 when the US accused North Korea of violating a 1994 agreement not to operate a nuclear arms
programme.

Chinese President Hu Jintao yesterday said efforts to resolve the issue have gained 'good momentum' and
that China 'will continue to play a constructive role in seeking progress in the new round of six-party talks'

Security analyst Wang Xiangsui, however, said the fourth round of talks is unlikely to be the last as
substantial issues like Pyonyyang's demands for aid and security guarantees have yet to be hammered out.

North Korea has demanded security guarantees, energy assistance and an end to economic sanctions, but
the US has insisted that Pyongyang dismantle its nuclear weapons programme verifiably and irreversibly
before terms can be negotiated.

'A fourth round of talks provides fresh hopes but there are also hidden dangers as well,' said Professor Shi
Yinhong of the People's University.

If the new round of talks once again fails to make any substantial progress, Washington might be prompted
to abandon the six-nation format altogether and take up the issue with the United Nations.
SDI 2005 I, P J
r il- H ~ s o fPower
t
JVC
The six party talks are the only hope for successful North Korean disarmament; without
negotiations they will continue their arms buildup
washington pist February 13 2005 p.LI1.J
IF NORTH KOREA'S declaration of itself as a nuclear power was intended, as it seems to have been, to
shock the world and thereby pressure the United States into making unwarranted concessions, then the
Bush administration responded well by playing it down. The erratic Pyongyang regime, officials pointed
out, has made similar statements before. U.S. intelligence has credited the North with a couple of bombs for
a decade, and in the absence of a nuclear test, there's no way to know whether it has workable warheads.
The administration is also right to dismiss, again, North Korea's attempt to insist on bilateral negotiations
with the United States. The Bush administration's recruitment of China, South Korea, Japan and Russia for
"six-party" talks was its sole success on the Korean front in the past four years and should be preserved.
The latest declaration nevertheless underlined the distressing truth that as the threat fiom North Korea
grows steadily worse, the administration lacks an effective strategy to counter it.

One symptom of the problem is that the latest North Korean move took Washington and its allies by
surprise. They had expected the regime of Kim Jong I1 to grudgingly agree to a new round of the six-party
talks next month. It's possible, even probable, that the North wants to avoid delivering the answers it would
be asked for at those talks. These include its response to an eight-month-old U.S. offer of political and
economic concessions following the disclosure of its nuclear facilities, and an explanation of evidence,
recently supplied by a U S . envoy to the Asian governments, that North Korea supplied Libya with uranium
suitable for processing into bomb material. Unsatisfactory answers by Pyongyang would risk alienating not
only the Bush administration -- which anyway may not be willing to strike a deal with Mr. Kim -- but
China and South Korea, which have the ability to strangle the North by cutting off supplies of food and
energy or even to cause its collapse by opening their borders to refugees.

North Korea has been trying, with some success, to convince its neighbors that the United States is the
obstacle to progress because of its refusal to offer the North greater concessions. The Bush administration,
in turn, hopes to convince the Chinese and South Koreans that Pyongyang will never yield its nukes
without far greater external pressure -- pressure that only those countries, or the U.N. Security Council, can
effectively apply. In fact, a diplomatic success is hard to imagine without a little of both: more determined
action by North Korea's neighbors and an unambiguous decision by the Bush administration to settle for
detente with the North, rather than regime change.

Neither development seems likely. The Chinese leadership of Hu Jintao appears far more concerned with
suppressing any hint of political change at home than promoting it in North Korea. The leftist South
.Korean government, meanwhile, clings to a strategy of subsidizing Mr. Kim. Bush administration hard-
liners brandish the North's latest manifesto as proof that negotiations are a waste of time.

Meanwhile, according to U.S. intelligence estimates, North Korea probably continues to build weapons and
process nuclear material. It may be looking beyond Libya for new customers for such products. Maybe
there is no way to neutralize this threat, but the Bush administration needs to rethink its own failing policy.
SDI 2005 - dk @ H R I S O Power
~~
JVC
US attack on North Korea would result in massive death and destruction on the peninsula
( ) Speed and May '05
(Roger and Michael, affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at
Stanford University and Professor Emeritus in the Stanford University School of
Engineering http://www.thebulletin.ors/article.php?art~oh=maO5speed)

Consider the case of North Korea. After their 2003 summit, Bush and Japanese Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi stated bluntly that they "would not tolerate" a nuclear-armed
North Korea. If negotiations fail, the implication of the Bush doctrine i-s that the United
States might try to disarm North Korea of its nuclear weapons by a military strike.
Intermediate steps such as a blockade of North Korea appear more likely at the time of
this writing, but these are acts of war, and North Korea has stated it would construe them
as such. As a result, if negotiations break down, escalation is a clear possibility.
North Korea already has a stockpile of chemical and biological weapons and is thought to
have at least a few nuclear weapons. Locating North Korea's weapons could be very
difficult, if not impossible. At most, the United States might be able to strike at the
identified nuclear production reactor and reprocessing plant in Yongbyon and a number
of suspect military sites. In retaliation, North Korea has announced that it would unleash
a massive attack (which could be conventional, chemical, biological, and/or nuclear) on
South Korea and the U.S. troops stationed there.
North Korea has thousands of artillery pieces and hundreds of missiles that are within
striking range of the more than 10 million people in Seoul. To deter a U.S. preventive
war, the North could threaten (and execute if necessary) a retaliatory attack against Seoul.
Unless North Korea's firepower could be suppressed, the immediate consequences could
be devastating--hundreds of thousands in Seoul could be killed in a very short time.
To have a chance, the United States would probably want to procure hundreds of new
missiles with small nuclear weapons, maintain them on high alert, and maintain constant
s u ~ e i l l a n c of
e the area. Even then protecting Seoul would be difficult, since during the
initial U.S. attack most of North Korea's artillery might be iri hardened shelters. Even if
only 10 or 20 percent of the artillery and short-range missiles survived, Pyongyang could
still probably devastate Seoul. Since longer-range missiles in the rear might also survive,
a nuclear or chemical attack would not even have to rely on close-in artillery or missiles.
If North Korea does have some number of missile-deliverable nuclear weapons, it would
also have the option of using a few of these to destroy U.S. bases in South Korea and
Japan, or at least could threaten to do so. These are military targets that could legitimately
be attacked following a U.S. first strike. Disabling them would cripple U.S. capabilities
and hrther split the United States from its allies. A U S . preventive war posture, coupled
with the overt nuclear threat to North Korea posed by the U.S. nuclear posture, would
enhance both the plausibility and the likelihood of such a North Korea response.
Thus, even if the United States procured many new nuclear weapons and'rnissiles, a U.S.-
initiated war could still result in thousands of American and millions of Korean
casualties, massive destruction on the Korean Peninsula, and countless other serious
repercussions--though the United States might eventually prevail.
SDI 2005 HWSoft Power
JVC
Attack on North Korea would cause huge collateral damage
( ) Bennett '03
(Bruce, senior policy analyst at RAND,
http://www.rand.org/commentary/0l1403 SDUT.htm1)

Option two: If we choose the option of attacking North Korean nuclear production
capabilities - as President Clinton apparently considered in 1994 - we would likely cause
substantial collateral damage and radioactive fallout that could drift over South Korea,
Japan or China. We may be unable to locate all North Korean nuclear weapons for
attacks. North Korea might then feel compelled to use the remainder before losing them.
And of course, any military attack on North Korea might also kick off North Korean
retaliatory attacks or a wider war. This could put China in the difficult position of
choosing sides.

US strikes on North Korea would cause massive retaliation

( ) Blumenthal '05
(Dan, Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.228 17,filter.all/pub-detail.asp)

An immediate option for dealing with North Korea's nuclear program would be to
conduct surgical, preemptive strikes against North Korean facilities to eliminate the
nuclear threat. This option is all the more appealing when one considers America's
preponderance in intelligence gathering capabilities, stealth bomber aircraft, standoff
munitions, and bunker-busting bombs; however, the risks of such an attack far outweigh
the likely benefits. Since Israel preemptively destroyed the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor at
Tuwaitah in 198 1, would-be nuclear proliferators have taken a variety of concealment
measures in order to prevent the key components of their nuclear weapons manufacturing
process from being identified and targeted. North Korea, as the world's most closed
society, has been able to undertake significant measures in this regard, and the United
States has not even been able to successfully identify its uranium enrichment facilities, a
key component of its nuclear program. Thus, it is not clear that a preemptive, surgical
strike would be able to identifjr and destroy targets inside of the DPRKThere is also the
problem of how Pyongyang would react. North Korea has 70 percent of its 1,003,000
ground forces personnel deployed along the Demilitarized Zone boundary between the
two Koreas, including approximately 4,000 tanks and assault guns, and 2,500 armored
personnel carriers.[] 51 North Korea possesses some 100 No-dong missiles that could
strike civilian and military targets in Japan, possibly with WMD warheads.[l6] If the
DPRK leadership truly believed that it had nothing to lose, its Taep'o-dong 2 missile
force can strike the continental United States. In short, were North Korea to retaliate for
surgical strikes, it has great military capabilities with which to do so.
SDI 2005 HWSoft Power
/
JVC
Human rights agitation in China now is limited to politically inefficacious sorts
Elliott, Staff Writer, 2005 p. InfoTrac
(Dorinda, Time, "The Last Frontier.. ."
Should China be praised for its progress on human rights or criticized for its continued failings? Probably
both. According to human-rights monitor John Kamm, some 3,000 people are sentenced for nonviolent
political and religious offenses every year. And yet, China's people have gained room to maneuver,
especially in pursuit of their livelihood. That has set off shock waves--huge income disparities and
corruption--that could threaten party control. By official accounts, there were 58,000 protests in 2003, as
workers, peasants and even stock-market investors fought everything fiom corruption to overtaxation.
China can't stop the outbursts, but it won't let anyone use those grievances to challenge party rule.

Rapid transition to democratic Western style regimes of rights will topple the Party in
China
Gill,
- Director of China Studies @ CSIS, 2003 p.
http:ilwww.~lobalpolicy.or~/nations/launder/regions/2003/0623china.htm
(Bates, "China in Transition")
It does cut across the whole range of challenges. The Chinese leadership is facing a kind of double-edged
sword. On one hand, meeting the socio-economic and even political challenges that they face will demand
a greater degree of openness, a greater degree of transparency, accountability and acceptance of
responsibility, in order to gain the confidence of the citizenry, and also to implement the kinds of reforms
and adequate responses to these changes in the first place. But in doing all that, it is going to have in some
cases an undermining effect on the party itself, because it is going to call into question mistakes they have
made in the past, and those they will certainly make in the hture. It will force them to make tough
decisions in terms of staffing and in terms of leadership. It is going to force them to take on a kind of
meritocracy at the top, rather than leadership that is determined by other factors such as ideological purity
and relationships, or what is known is China as guanxi. So they have to walk this tightrope between these
two goods. It is a difficult choice between two good things, which makes it difficult. So far, I think the
Chinese leadership has done a pretty good job, but I think these challenges are only going to increase. It is
going to become a larger and larger set of tough decisions for the fbture.
SDI 2005 ( - J , /1/iL HRISoft Power
JVC
US already using democracy issues to pressure China
The Daily Telegraph July 11 2005 p.L/N
THE UNITED States upped its pressure on China yesterday, saying it was "concerned" over ~ t military
s
build-up and telling it to talk to its two btes noires - the Dalai Lama and the president of Taiwan.

On a visit to Beijing, Condoleezza Rice, the US secretary of state, did not shy away from the assertive tone
the Bush administration has recently taken towards China's communist leaders.

They were expecting thanks for persuading North Korea to rejoin talks on its nuclear weapons programme,
a decision it announced on Saturday. But Miss Rice suggested there were no results yet to celebrate and she
denied retracting her assessment of North Korea as an "outpost of tyranny".

She also said: "There is no doubt that we have concerns about the size and pace of the Chinese military
build-up, and it's not just the Pentagon. I've made clear to people this is a view held by the US
govenunent."

She said that this did not mean China was a "threat"

But she added: "We just take note of the fact that there is a significant military build-up going on . . . that
we have concerns about the military balance." The Bush administration came to power saying it regarded
China as a "strategic competitor", its most likely rival for world leadership in the 2 1st century.

This critical stance was shelved after the events of September 2001 in favour of co-operation against
Islamic extremists.

But the administration's more recent focus on spreading democracy has put China squarely in its sights
once again.

The administration was also offended by a decision by China to pass an anti-secession law threatening to
invade Taiwan if it,declared independence.
 HRISofi Power
JVC
China already reforming human rights policies
Elliott, Staff Writer, 2005 p. InfoTrac
(Dorinda, Time, "The Last Frontier.. ."
To anyone who has followed China, it's an incredible scene. Not long ago, it would have been
unimaginable for Wang to so openly criticize the government or to arm herself with the law--and all while
sipping a cappuccino. True, Wang hasn't found justice yet. But compared with the repression of the past,
when complainers went to jail and the Communist Party controlled every aspect of life, China can be
exhilaratingly free. The Chinese can do virtually anything today, from finding a job to singing karaoke in
sparkling brothels to organizing to protect the environment. If you stood on a street comer and cursed the
leaders, passersby might think you were nuts, but you might not even be arrested.
SDI 2005 P.t/sd.rl ,?
HR/SofiP~wer
JVC
Chinese human rights reforms inevitable
Elliott, Staff Writer, 2005 p. InfoTrac
(Dorinda, Time, "The Last Frontier.. ."
Will a freer economy lead to more Geedom? Optimists believe that a growing middle class will push for
legal protections--and, eventually, political change. The cities of Beijing, Shanghai and Chongqing already
have hired an independent pollster to find out what the people think of their governance. Sure, there's a
long way to go. Wang, the evicted Shanghai resident, can't even find a lawyer to take up her case. That may
be because more than 400 lawyers have been detained since 1997 in connection with defending clients.
"This country is far fiom having rule of law," says Mo Shaoping, China's leading human-rights lawyer.

China's leaders, ever conscious of history, argue that stability must come first. "If you haven't been through
the Cultural Revolution, you don't know what human rights means," says Sun Chao, a Shanghai official
who is pushing for transparent government. "In my compound, people were jumping off the rooftops."
Given that legacy, Sun goes on, "China is developing human rights faster than any country in the world."
Taiwan and South Korea, of course, survived for decades as dictatorships even as they opened up their
economies. But as more Chinese like Wang start demanding their rights, the government may learn to
adapt. "History was pushed forward by people like me," says Wang. After all, look at Taiwan and South
Korea today: they are both democracies.
 HRISoft Power

US-Sino relations good because of Chinese economic development

People's Daily Online, 1 1 July 2005,
http://englishl .peopIe.com.cn/200507/1 l/eng2005071 1-1 95438.html
Rice said China is now in a transition period. A rising China will be an active force on
the international political stage. The US-China relations have made great progresses in
the past years and the bilateral economic and trade cooperation is healthy and energetic.
China and the US have carried out effective cooperation in a wide range of fields and the
two countries have common concerns on many international and regional issues. Some
frictions between the two countries do not mean that the US views china as a threat.
China, with rapid economic growth, is making contributions to the world economy.
China's economic development is a good thing.
 SDI 2005 HR/Soft Power
JVC
, China is open to pressure to reform human rights
Huang, Margaret, March 2001
Program director for Asia and the Middle East at the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights
hap://www.rfkmemoriaI.org/CENTEWHwmggChinaaArtce him

During the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. officials viewed China as an important counterweight
to the power and influence of the Soviet Union. The primary U.S. objective-to contain the
Soviet threat-took precedence over any concerns about repression or human rights
violations in China. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, Washington policymakers
have struggled to redefine a strategic framework for the U S . relationship with China.
Under the Clinton administration, there was a lot of talk about the importance of human
ri$ts, but many Clinton foreign policy initiatives emphasized opening China's economy
to U.S. companies more than enhancing human right protections. With the new
administration, there is an opportunity to revise U S . policy to more effectively address
human rights concerns. Equally important, as China bids to host the 2008 Olympics,
Beiiing may be more responsive to international pressure to improve its human rights
record.
 SDI 2005 HFUSofi Power
JVC
A. US human rights policies are modeled globally

Mertus, 2004 [ ~ & eA., Professor of Law Ohio Northern, ~ a i t a n dSwitch: Human Klmts ana U.S. Foreign

I T h i s book is about the future of human rights

- in U.S. foreign
-
policy. Many fear that the era of human rights ended the day
terrorists turned jet planes into weapons of destruction and flew
them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.' Or, many
believe, human rights ended shortly after September 11, 2-
--
when the United States retaliated with u ~ l ~ _ t _ e r a policies
v d a t i o n of international standards, under th5assumption%t
list in

they could establish the rules=-e-- -

rest of the w o ~ d ~ s a g r e e ,
b; in a waF&at may be slightly confusing for the reader looking
for a clear thumbs up or thumbs down on human rights. - I
contend that human rights are still important for U.S. foreign
policy. T u t e d States IS in-fact still --_-__
-
leadmg the world on
human rights, but in the wrong d i r e c t i ~ o r n o t 1 n g X O r f i $ m
instrumentalism over_- l~ngterrnethicZ~~nc_i~_l~,-&~b&~f~ii-
_L_ -_--
d&ds Instead of fair dealing, and a fearful view of human nature
o v ~ T e e o p ' i G o ~ G C r i G ~ l y p h l s f i c a t array e d of
no&-~~~~afiizations (NGOs) and other leaders in
civicsociety continue;o demand that human rights ideas be more
fully incorporated into U.S. foreign policy. To some extent, these
advocates have succeeded in framing public policy choices in
human rights terms, but too often competing interests eclipse
human rlghts considerations. Hwun.rights-talk h a s not bqen
a c _ c ~ b ~ h u Urights m ~ behaviors4
n
SDI 2005 HRlSofi Power
JVC
B. Policies focusing on ethnic differences and rights affects ethnic relations in other
countries

( ) Lake a n d Rothchild, 1998 (David a n d Donald, Professor of Political Science at

Cornell University a n d Professor of Political Science a t University of California a t Davis, The
International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, a n d Escalation, P. 36-37)

6 h e . s e c o n d segment of the argument recognizes that motives to ~ e r f o r mh h -

nically meaningful behaviors are determined partly by the ethnic activities of
other states. Ethnic strife w-e&ate.-seensitizes people elsewhere to their
own ethnic particularities, possibly raising their expectations -- of ethnic conthci
a x o m e . We Yhiil-~;Chit inte%tio?d-GG?&ependencies can-give certain
countries disproportionate global significance. Under the right circumstances, .-- -in

- -
-

fact,
_-. &nzwzahaQroduces
.- -.ethnic dissimilation within one country might
-- _ li_-., - - .-
.-._
~

touskoff a &.erbandwagon - that he&htens the role of ethnicity in successive othh)

; e 6 p h k argument accommo&tCsX existenie o~ondition;tl;at accord_e-&nE
---.-
- .--
%tilo~n?within apart~culirc;uii!3 $ ~ ~ ~ m i n u nto~ethnic
t y dissimilation-.,_*..--
else-
. ..--
w G i t is consistent with a persistent s t a & X I o w ethnic activity Moreover,
~ t a E m a yinfluence one another asymmetrically. Because of the enormous --_ influ-.. , .
e n ~ i c i e aimeds at helping-A'merican ethnic minorities I,
are likely t o k v e an e ~ ~ e c i a l ~ ~ e ~ ~elsewhere. i m ~ \-- ~ ~ ~ ~ i o n s
In the presence of multiple social equilibria, small shocks t o a country,
whether internal or external, -- e- chan~s, And it the interdepen-
dencies among individual behaviors are not readily observable, the changes will
exhibit another characteristic: imperfect predictability. A key aspect of the model
outlined below is that the interdependencies among individual behaviors are
~ o o r l yobservable. The source of unobservability is ethnicpreferencefalsijication,
the act of misrepresenting one's ethnic needs under real or imagined social pres-
s u r e ~In. ~the presence of such preference falsification, ethnic dissimilation need
not involve changes in ethnic dispositions or prejudices. It can occur without a
prior buildup of ethnic mistrust or a prior escalation in the perceived need for
ethnic solidarity. Moreover, the contributors to dissimilation may include indi-
viduals who would rather not alter their behaviors. In any case, whatever the
attitudinal transformations that precede a dissimilation process, the consequent
changes in the social importance of ethnicity may be disproportionately large.
The possibility of di~proportionalit~ between causes and effects, coupled with
the imperfect observability of the possible causes, lessens the predictability of
ethnic dissimilation processes. At the same time, the very factors that make it
difficult to forecast the course of ethnic relations facilitate retrospective ex-
planation7/( 37 -
SD12005 HIUSofi Power
JVC
C. This dissimilation results in escalatory ethnic conflicts

( ) Lake a n d Rothchild, 1998 (David a n d Donald, Professor of Political Science at

Comell University a n d Professor of Political Science a t University of California at Davis, The
International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, a n d Escalation, P. 30-31)

-t( act as a trigger for lnterslate confl~ctin four

otherways First, m processes similar --- E-$ e - f i m -and most
- dlrecl path Bf d~ffu-
1
s--
o--
n above, ethnic warfare
states Into v~olence
- -
Ethnic
may
-
s ~ l-gvey_in_to
combatants
l
In one
n&hbonng
state may use
I
terntones and-draw
the
_

terntory of-a sec-

-
-------.-./-
ond for stag~ngareas, retreats, and so forth-w~th or without the latter's consent
This spdlover can lead to recrlminatlons between the two affected states and, In
cases of "hot pursuit," direct border clashes that may sp~ralout of control As
Keller (Chapter Twelve) agarn notes, such spdlovers have been a frequent worry
In Africa In March 1991, ln but one posslble example, Charles Taylor's forces m
L ~ b e r ~jolneda wlth S~erra Leonean d~ssldentsand w a d e d Sierra Leone
(W~ppman1993, 170) There have also been problems In the former Yugoslama,
with mlnor mcldents occurring at the Austrian border, SerblaMJNA overflights of
Hungary and the bomblng of a border vdlage, and JNA forces withdrawng

through Italian territory (Steinberg 1993, 52). Although potentially dangerous,

and often used as an excuse for involvement by neighbors looking for a greater
role, such spillovers can normally be resolved amicably However, as borders
become more fluid in areas of ethnic instability, and if the strategic dilemmas
become acute, violent encounters may ensue.
Second, ethnic mobilization __.-- often contains
-.-__
within it an irredentist dimension,
. .

as-!L'ThE
..
ieaders d e ~ ~ ~ e a ~ d d ~ yn o nt e ~ h~ I e ~ ss ~ b u t
salient ethnic homeland-typically
-- -. defined as the largest area of terri-
to>'ev~r=&~=fi3= to have been controlled by the group (Carment
1994; Carment and James 1995). Examples include Somalia3 invasion of the
Ogaden region of Ethiopia, Nazi Germany3 incorporation of the Sudetenland,
and Pakistan and India's continuing conflict over Kashmir. in Chapter Five,
Fearon concludes that irredentist conflicts are particularly prone to problems of
credible commitment.
Third, ethnicityg_rordes
-----._I--- - --
a strong basis .
for "diversionary wars"
~-.. -.-. -- -.-- -
stimulated by
-___
L ^

political leaders-b--
A e s & b ~ & g ~ ! k n dfrpPm.earid see~!ng.t.o__r_al~-:upportfd;@ir
continued ry&-.ipmi!j%~onflict abroad."- Ethnicity and its emotional appeal io
.
an "us versus them" outlook hrovides a particularly salient principle of organiza-
tion and support. This was precisely the strategy used by Serbian President
Milosevic; faced with growing opposition to his presidency and a majority that
favored far-reaching economic reforms, which he opposed, the embattled presi-
dent "played the ethnic c a r d and precipitated the collapse of Yugoslavia (Bates
-
and Weingast 1995;. Diilas 1995. 85 and 105).
>

F o u r t h , d a t o r p a & e s ~ t h i nthe region may consider states with significant

internal conflicts to be gasy ta=wm-weakeneasent,
aggressor states may calculate that thexrospects for an easy-*pap victoryze
.--- --
now Ereater t ~ n - b ~ ~ e _ ; c h a l ~ e ~ g G target
g t h is
e thus more attractiv=thiopiak
internal weakness, for example, appears to have contributed to Somaliak 1977
challenge in the Ogaden (Carment and James 1995,94). Such strategies may also
backfire, however, as predatory states often appear to miscalculate the rally effect
that their aggression provokes. This may have been the case in the Ogaden war,
when Siad Barre sought to take advantage of the revolution in Ethiopia to settle
outstanding territorial issues to his advantage; contrary to his expectations, Barre
actually mobilized support for the new regime in Ethiopia and locked his coun-
try into a costly war.) 3/ -
 HRlSoft Power

D. The impact is war, genocide, racism, and terrorism

TAe U.S. ?r f .
- ,f/ 64 d+A&i C O ~ ~ P : v~; eP ~Cf &&jO
Kuran, 1998 [Timur, The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict, "Ethnic Dissimilation
and Its International Diffusion," Professor of Political Science at USC, p.-]
We live in an age when Euro-American civilization in general, and American
L I T ure in particular, contributes heavily to global understandings, myths, sensi-
tivities, and attitudes. People everywhere watch American movies and receive
news from American press services. And throughout the world large numbers
want to rebuild their countries in the image of the United States. The global
impact of American culture is akin to the influence that Roman-Hellenic c-ulture
once enjoyed in the Mediterranean basin. The relevant consequence here is that ,
ethnic relations in the United States set salient examples from which people in ~

other countries draw lessons, authority, and inspiration. Although the United
States does not shape global expectations unilaterally, the influences that it exerts j
are highly disproporti na e to its global share of population, even perhaps to its
5~
global share of i n c o m a
Johnson - Vats - Cleary
HR & soft Power Core u (5 w3de\\d. -
SDI 2005
of -

Other Countries listen to U.S. human rights messages

Sikkink, 2004 [Kathryn, Mixed Signals: U.S. Human R i ~ h t Policy
s and Latin America p.

pumm righis mesages are intrinsically hard to deliver and hard t$

& government engaged in repression does not want to hear messages ab;
L^-./ man rights. Government forces involved in repression are breaking,
I L ~mestic and international law. Because they know that what the)' are
.ei<uf&illegal, they usually work to hide the information about what is occur
hide hsinformation not only from international observers but also
own public, and sometimes even from parts of the g0vernmentitself.T
tice of disappearances, for example, was a complex repressive tool tha
signed to terrorize the population while at the same time hiding the
state repression was occurring. This hiding of information makes hum
policy more difficult, because it must work with uncertain informa
vided by unofficial sources. Human rights reports were important for
esis and development of human rights policy because the)' provided
source of information about human rights practices. But the problems:
ering reliable information on human rights practices means that eve

be a lag between the time a government initi-

domestic and international observers
blem and who is responsible for it.
rces to violate human rights, govern-
ns about why such law breaking is permitted
ine provides one such justification-
idden are needed to protect the nation
ns are used to sustain individual and na-
ghts message, however, undermines
acks the state identity and the individual
.
tances, leaders will try not to hear these
ges, and they will vilify and attack the messenger. A government engaged
ession will often mishear or misinterpret what it hears if it can. Am-
s or contradictory messages on human rights thus play into the tendency
essages that attack their identity and un-

on the contrary, human rights messages

s the identity of the deliverers and sup-
I believe that the evidence from Latin
human rights messages ran contrary to
e they exacerbated relations with for-
as an article of faith among Latin American experts in
e Department in the 1970s and I 980s that U.S. national interests de-
upon cordial relations with militaries in the region.They belikved that
rights messages undermined positive bilateral relations.
us, when U.S. policy makers gave a cue like "get terrorism over quickly,"
led to mention that this should be done w i t h the rule of law and while
es in the region were all too ready to
reen light. It was taken as a reaffirmation that the il-
ade had the blessing of the powerful and influential
d their common identity as defenders of freedom
Johnson - Vats - Cleary
HR & Soft Power Core 5 ;4 ~odidled SDI 2005
-Of-

Global influence of US ethnic policies based on perception of reality.

( ) Lake a n d Rothchild, 1998 (David a n d Donald, Professor of Political Science a t

Cornell University a n d Professor of Political Science a t University of California a t Davis, The
International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, a n d Escalation, P. 55-56)

here have been countertrends. For example, the consumption patterns of all
major ethnic groups have accommodated the steady flow of new consumer-
goods. And they have been equally quick to adopt new production technologies.
Such trends undoubtedly influence global perceptions concerning the social sig-
nificance of ethnicity in the United States. But they do not offset the influence of
policies and statements that celebrate ethnic rights and differences. As in other
domains, it is the perception of reality that guides individual responses, not real-
ity itself; and the perception is shaped largely by trends that receive attention. If
American public discourse emphasizes the negative dimensions of American eth-
nic relations, other countries will be exposed to indications of ethnic dissimila-
tion in the United States, possibly missing signs of the continuing vitality of the
American melting pot. An important reason why American public discourse has
been sympathetic to ethnic dissimilation is that individual Americans have
tended to avoid expressing reservations about policies that promote dissimilation,
lest they be accused of racism or ethnocentrism. For a quarter-century, polls have
consistently shown that most Americans privately reject ethnic quotas, guide-
lines, and timetable^.^^ But it is their public actions and statements that outsiders
observe, not their private reservations.
An illustration of the global influence of American ethnic policies lies in an
episode that occurred during Tansu Ciller's 1993 visit to the United States, her
first as Turkey's premier. During a joint news conference with President Clinton,
she was asked how she would deal with Kurdish unrest in Eastern Anatolia.
Attempting to explain her position in terms familiar to Americans, she replied
that the Turkish state would remain an ethnic melting pot. The Turkish press
treated this response as a gaffe, and commentators cited it as proof of her inex-
perience and simplemindedness. Moreover, her embarrassed advisors took pains
to make her aware that in advanced couptries the ideal of the m e l t i ~ gpot has
given way to that of the "salad b0~1."*3What might have happened had an
American president stated in Ankara, where the Turkish melting pot remains a
popular ideal, that the United States should remain a salad bowl? The American
press would probably not have considered the statement a blunder, if it took
notice at all. Where most Turks want to adapt to international political norms,
Americans generally believe that others should look to them for political guid-
ance. The international demonstration and reputation effects of American ethnic
relations thus swamp the corresponding effects of ethnic relations within Turkey. ,
 <

fi
Johnson - Vats - Cleary -1. 5 SDI 2005
HR & Soft Power Core U -of -

U.S. Human Rights Policy influences other nations

Sikkink, 2004 [Kathryn, Mixed Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy and Latin America p.

But the most important cues we send about human rights policy come
!hrough our own human rights behavior. When the U . S government holds C
0,
people incommunicado without access to lawyers, it flaunts the rule of law and
invites similar illegal detentions elsewhere. When members of the U.S. mili-
tary torture and humiliate prisoners, as they did in the Abu Ghraib prison in
Iraq, they signal that such behavior is acceptable, and they destroy U.S. credi-
k'
iL\
bility to protest torture anywhere in the world.When the U.S. government re- 0-
fuses to ratify human rights treaties or LLunsigns"them, it sends a message that
it doesn't believe in international human rights lawJ
.--.. .
Johnson - Vats - Cleary SDI 2005
HR & Soft Power Core 6%;. ldm Tlue,~o
\4 -of -

Hidden threshold exists for ethnic war.

( ) Lake a n d Rothchild, 1998 (David a n d Donald, Professor of PoIiticaI Science at

Comell University a n d Professor of Political Science at University of California a t Davis, The
International Spread of E t l i ~ Conflict:
c Fear, Diffusion, a n d Escalation, P. 59)
..
n not her implication relates to interpreting the impact of past events and
trends. The fact that a certain ethnic policy or process has had no obvious inter-
national effects does not establish its irrelevance. The developments may well
have raised the possibility of dissimilation in various parts of the world through L, Ad&.
their effects on private preferences, thresholds, and expectations. Though appear- y'bcri+ .~;.p
./
ing to have had no international impact, they could be paving the way for a string
of dissimilation processes. Just as social developments may make an individual I;<-
increasingly prepared to extend his ethnic activities without actually changing his --./

observable behavior, so the same developments may make entire societies

increasingly ready for ethnic dissimilation without actually triggering the process.
Because public ethnic behaviors are interdependent and because they may differ
from the underlying private preferences, observed ethnic patterns of ethnic activ-
ity can hide possibilities.for- change>5/3
-
 SDI 2005
Johnson - Vats - Cleary
HR & Soft Power Core @\.\L& p ~ ~ $ o f-

Ethnic conflicts escalate because of power shifts and extreme

demands from outside nation.

( ) Lake a n d Rothchild, 1998 (David a n d Donald, Professor of Political Science at

Comell University a n d Professor of Political Science a t University of California a t Davis, The
International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, a n d Escalation, P. 25-26)

( ~ u i l d i n ~upon the causes of ethnic conflict discussed above, diffusion can

occur in four ways. These four processes are not necessarily exclusive and all may
occur simultaneousl~First, events abroad may change directly the ethnic balance
of power at home, disrupting the existing ethnic contract and precipitating vio- Pi 1 ,
lence. Through this first route, ethnic conflict may actually be contagious in the
full sense of this overused term. For instance, refugee flows from a neighboring C4-4'
state may substantially alter the state's own ethnic composition (Newland 1993) p r,cl,/6 j
Armed insurgents from one state may seek refuge in a second and stir up local
conflicts in their wake, as in the recent violence in Zaire, where the presence of
large numbers of Hutu refugees have prompted, in part, local Tulsi-related insur-
gents to declare war on their own government. As Edmond ~ e l l e rnotes in
Chapter Twelve, these are constant concerns for many African states. Similar
changes in the ethnic balance of power can occur in the breakup of federal states,
even without the actual migration of peoples across recognized international bor-
ders. Once central political authority in Yugoslavia began to unravel, the relevant
ethnic balance of power shifted from the federal level to the now independent
republics. As this shift occurred, minority groups--previously protected by their
kin in other regions-were left exposed and vulnerable. This emboldened the
new majority and threatened the new.minority in each state, undermining the
ethnic contract and leading the groups into a spiral of violence (see Fearon 1993;
Hardin 1995, 156-63; and Djilas 1995). In this way, Slovenia's relatively minor
conflict with Serbia diffused to the other republics, and became more virulent
with each additional occurrence.'+
Second, ethnic conflict in one country may prompt groups in another to make
more extreme demands. Groups in one state, witnessing ethnic mobilization or,
more importantly, political success by ethnic groups in another, may increase
their own political agitation and demand a significantly greater share of the
resource pie-increasing the probability of conflict. Kuran (Chapter Two) devel-
ops a strong argument on the importance of this "demonstration effectn in stim-
ulating ethnic dissimilation abroad. Similarly, ethnic conflict elsewhere may cause
groups to update their beliefs about the likely demands of other groups in their
own country Even in the absence of any change in the underlying political power
of groups or in the claims made, if the groups believe others are now more likely
to challenge the existing ethnic contract and issue greater demands, their best
response may be to strike preemptively before the others have actually increased
their levels of mobilization. Thus, changes in beliefs about the likely behavior of
others can precipitate conflict even in the absence of any manifest demands or
actions. As groups update their beliefs about one another by o b s e ~ n gevents
elsewhere, ethnic conflict can literally materialize out of thin air. Islamic funda-
mentalism appears to have stimulated greater concerns in France about its large
Algerian minority and, especially, has raised fears that the latter is likely to make
appeals for greater autonomy and a more favorable distribution of resources;

.
although such concerns have stimulated sporadic violence by French rightists,
the conflict has not to date reached the level of widespread v i 0 l e n c e . 7 ~ ~ .6 -
Johnson - Vats - Cleary
HR & Soft Power Core E L L b A f ql lw~'T/g SDI 2005
-of -

Ethnic conflicts caAfdiffuse through demonstration effects and chain

reaction.

( ) Lake and Rothchild, 1998 (David and Donald, Professor of Political Science at
Cornell University and Professor of Political Science at University of California at Davis. The
International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, P. 111-113)
.
.

(one could object to br counter the above arguments on several grounds First,
although it may be true that irredentist projects in Eastern Europe can only
extend so far, what about the possibility of diffusion through chain reactions?
Ethnic conflicts typically produce large numbers of refugees, whose arrival in a
new place may cause new tensions and problems. For example, the government

in Belgrade has tried to resettle Serbs fleeing Croatia and Bosnia in Kosovo, where
their presence adds to tensions with the ethnic Albanians who make up the vast
(and oppressed) majority." Likewise, refugees from Rwanda may recently have
heightened ethnic tensions in Burundi,14 as they have on numerous occasions in
the past.I5 There is no doubt that the presence of Hutu refugees and militia in
eastern Zaire following the 1994 violence in Rwanda figured directly in the upris-
ing of Zairian Tutsi and other groups against the refugees and the Zairian gov-
ernment. In the worst case, then, one can imagine a chain reaction in which eth-
nic war causes refugees, who de-stabilize a new place, causing more war, causing
more refugees, and so on.
A closely related argument concerns possible demonstration effects of ethnic
conflict. Even without flows of refugees or some other material transborder
impact, it could be that if people in state B simply observe increased ethnic con-
flict in state A this will increase the risk of similar violence in state B.I6Seeing pic-
tures and hearing stories of killing due to ethnic antagonisms in state A could
make people in state B more fearful and worried about the dangers posed by eth-
nic others in state V i f it can happen there, why couldn't it happen here?"
Heightened fears and suspicions could then play into the hands of ethnic politi-
cal entrepreneurs seeking to mobilize an ethnically based political coalition, and
so increase the ethnification of politics in state B. Lemarchand (1994a, 60) argues
that exactly such a demonstration effect exacerbated ethnic tensions in Burundi
in the 1960s and subsequently: "no other event did more to sharpen the edges of
ethnic hatred in Burundi than the Hutu revolution in neighboring Rwanda
(1959-19621. . . . By identifying their political aims and aspirations with their
Rwanda kinsmen, [some Hutus] imputed to the Tutsi of Burundi hegemonic
motives that the Tutsi did not at first possess but to which they eventually gave a
substance of truth. Conversely, many Tutsi saw in the Rwanda upheaval an omi-
nous prefiguration of their own destinies. A kind of self-fulfillingprophecy was
thus set into motion."
Demonstration effectsmight also work through learning by political elites. For
example, observing how Milosevic successfully used the ethnic card in Serbia to
cement his hold on power might encourage other politicians in trouble to try sim-
ilar tactics.17
Although chain reactions and demonstration effects are without doubt possible
mechanisms for the cross-border spread of ethnic conflict, these arguments tend
to neglect the countervailing incentives that potentially affected publics and gov-
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emments often have to slow, contain, or arrest such processes. Concerning
demonstration effects, for instance, ethnic conflict in state A need not inevitably
lead p o p l e in state B to become more hostile to ethnic others in their own coun-
try Instead, they might respond that "such things must not be allowed to happen
here." And regardless of public reactions, governments can surely have strong
incentives to counter possible demonstration effects or chain reactions. Empirical
suggests that governments worry about the impact of refugee flows-and
other means of transmission, and may respond preemptively. For example, as
they observed the severity of the Bosnian war, Albanian leaders in Tirana dra-
,
matically moderated their calls for active pursuit of autonomy and secession of
~ o s o v oprovince, in large part from fear of war with Serbia or a major refugee cri-
sis.'B With the encouragement of the leadership in Tirana, the Kosovan Albanians
constructed a shadow government and a private, underground educational sys-
tem as part of a strategy that seeks autonomy while avoiding bloodshed.Ig Finally,
[he war in Yugoslavia has served as a powerful object lesson in what can happen
if political leaders foment, and mass publics support, interethnic hostility. Rather
than increasing the legitimacy and power of ethnic appeals in Eastern Europe, the
war may have the opposite effect, in part through the action of international orga-
nizations interested in acting more aggressively to prevent similar conflicts from
developing.20 This is not to argue that countervailing forces will always under-
mine demonstration effects and chain reactions-the Rwanda-Burundi-Zaire case
1/ suggests otherwise-but that it is wrong to suppose that they will always or even
usually produce rapid cross-border transmission of ethnic v i o l e n c e . 2 p I// - !;j
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Ethnic conflicts misrepresented as "wildfires", but rarely spread to

have a large effect on major powers.

( ) Lake a n d Rothchild, 1998 (David a n d Donald, Professor of Political Science at

Cornell University a n d Professor of Political Science a t University of California at Davis, The
international Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, a n d Escalation, P. 109-110)

/'
Journalists and academics frequently use fire metaphors when discussing ethnic
conflicts. Mixes of ethnic groups in a territory are compared to "kindling or "tin-
der" that could easily be "ignitedl by extremists who then start a uulldfire."
Similarly, ethnically mixed areas are explosives that will go off with the slightest
rE
"spark." "Kosovo could blow at any timen says Tne E~onomist.~ These metaphors 4/ Q
suggest that ethnic conflicts have an inherent ~otentialto spnad rapidly and cata-
stmphically Since its stan in 1992,Western obselvers of the war in Yugoslavia have
repeatedly prophesied its spread throughout and possibly beyond the ~ a l k a n c t o
KOSOVO, then Albania, Macedonia, Greece, Turkey, . . . Russia?
Although the fire image may correctly represent some of the dynamics of
increasing ethnic conflict -on the in a particular area, the suggestion that
such conflicts are prone to spread like wildfire from one state or region to another
needs to be questioned. Indeed, the opposite might be the more reasonable expla-
nation. I argue in this section that ethnic conflicts have properties that should
tend to make them self-limiting in geographic extent. Further, if and when they
d o spread in Eastern Europe, they are unlikely to engage basic security interests
of the Western powers.'
In the first place, ethnic conflicts that turn violent are typically "about" irre-
denta or attempts to secede to found an independent nation state. This means
that the claims that give rise to ethnic conflicts will typically extend only as far as
there are "brethren" to bring into Greater Ruritania, or brethren for Ruritania to
intervene to protect. Moreover, the progress of a Greater Ruritania only directly
threatens neighboring states with non-negligible Ruritanian populations, or states
that are unlucky enough to possess territory that was at some point in the past
allegedly controlled by Ruritanians. In the cases of, say, Serbia, Croatia, Albania,
Macedonia, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia, the bulk of any such irredentist
project involves only some borders with only some immediate neighbors. And
although border conflicts among minor powers can be notoriously long-lived and
difficult to settle, they tend to "simmer" rather than explode, and they have not
in the past made for general wars or caused tremendous grief among the major
p o w e r s . 7 I D ?- !I D
- .-