Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 38, No. 1 (2016), pp.

1–27 DOI: 10.1355/cs38-1a

© 2016 ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute ISSN 0129-797X print / ISSN 1793-284X electronic

Indonesia as an Emerging
Peacekeeping Power: Norm
Revisionist or Pragmatic
Provider?
DAVID CAPIE

Indonesia is frequently mentioned as an emerging player in United

Nations (UN) peacekeeping, but its role has been understudied
compared to other emerging powers. Drawing on interviews with
foreign and defence ministry officials, and independent analysts in
Jakarta, as well as statements by Indonesian representatives in the UN
and other forums, this article makes three arguments. First, although
Indonesia has a long history of involvement in UN peacekeeping
operations (PKOs), there has been a major change in policy in the
last decade, with much greater importance attached to peacekeeping.
Jakarta has set itself the goal of becoming a top ten troop contributing
country with 4,000 personnel deployed by 2019. Second, although
Indonesia retains a strong preference for traditional “blue helmet”
missions mandated by the UN Security Council (UNSC), and based on
principles of host country consent, impartiality and non-use of force,
its views on peacekeeping are evolving. While Indonesia has concerns
about aspects of the “new” peacekeeping agenda, such as Protection
of Civilians and robust peace enforcement missions, in practice it
has proved to be more pragmatic than some of its rhetoric might
suggest. Third, although emerging powers are frequently portrayed as
conservative, Indonesia has been an advocate for a more ambitious

David Capie is Associate Professor of International Relations and

Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University
of Wellington. Postal address: P.O. Box 600, Wellington 6040, New
Zealand; email: david.capie@vuw.ac.nz.

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 2 David Capie

approach to peacekeeping in Southeast Asia. It was the first to argue

for an ASEAN peacekeeping force and has supported the use of
regional troops to monitor peace agreements. In sum, the Indonesian
case supports some of the claims made about emerging powers and
peace operations but challenges others, underlining the diversity of
this group of states.

Keywords: Indonesia, United Nations, peacekeeping, emerging powers.

There is growing interest among analysts in the increasing

involvement of emerging powers in peace operations. As a larger
share of United Nations (UN) peacekeepers are sourced from non-
Western states, some have argued that these countries will increasingly
demand more of a say in the deployment of those troops, including
operational mandates and financing.1 This, they claim, will challenge
liberal norms around peacekeeping and peacemaking operations,
including doctrines such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and
Protection of Civilians (POC), and robust measures such as the
Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) deployed as part of the United
Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (MONUSCO). One influential analysis has described this as
“the new geo-politics of peace operations”, arguing that emerging
powers “are likely to act as ‘norm revisionists’ increasingly influencing
the make-up, design and conduct of future peace operations on the
basis of their own interests and approaches”.2
This article examines the changing policy and interests of
Indonesia against the backdrop of those claims. Indonesia is
frequently mentioned as an emerging player in peacekeeping, but its
role has been understudied compared to, for example, China, India,
South Africa and Brazil. Several recent reports devoted to emerging
powers and peace operations identify Indonesia as a relevant actor,
but it receives little detailed attention when it comes to the actual
analysis.3 Drawing on interviews with foreign and defence ministry
officials, and independent analysts in Jakarta, as well as statements
by Indonesian representatives in the UN and other forums, this
article seeks to fill the gap.
In discussing Indonesia’s growing role in peacekeeping operations
(PKOs), the article makes three arguments. First, although Indonesia
has a long history of involvement in UN PKOs, there has been a
significant change in its policy in the last decade, with much greater
importance attached to peacekeeping in particular since 2011. The
article offers some explanations for this new emphasis and explores

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 Indonesia as an Emerging Peacekeeping Power 3

how it might play out in the future, including highlighting potential

constraints.
Second, although Indonesia retains a strong preference for
traditional “blue helmet” missions mandated by the UN Security
Council (UNSC), and based on principles of host country consent,
impartiality and limited use of force, these considerations are not
static. While Indonesia is cautious about aspects of the “new”
peacekeeping agenda, such as POC and peace enforcement missions,
it cannot be considered a norm revisionist. Rather, Jakarta’s views on
peacekeeping reflect its wider concerns about global order. Indonesia
wants to be involved in peacekeeping missions that have wide
legitimacy, with greater clarity around mandates and resourcing,
and with more consultation between the authorizing powers in
the UNSC and troop contributing countries. In reality, Indonesia
has also proved to be more pragmatic than some of its rhetoric
would suggest.
Third, to the extent that Indonesia has challenged norms, it
has done so as an advocate for a more ambitious approach to
peacekeeping in Southeast Asia. It was the first to argue for an ASEAN
peacekeeping force and has supported the use of regional troops
to monitor peace agreements. In doing so, it has challenged long-
established ASEAN norms around non-interference and encountered
resistance from some neighbouring states.4 In sum, the Indonesian
case supports some of the claims made about emerging powers
and peace operations but challenges others, underlining the diversity
of this group of states.
The article is organized into four sections. The first part
provides a brief overview of the literature on emerging powers
and peace operations, identifying some of the core claims and
situating the Indonesian case. Section two provides an overview of
Indonesia’s involvement in peacekeeping, including the important
changes in policy and practice that have taken place in the last
five years. It also offers some explanations for this significant new
commitment. The third section examines Indonesian views on some
of the liberal norms associated with the new peacekeeping agenda,
concluding that while it has reservations, it is far from being
a norm revisionist. The final section discusses Indonesia’s role
within ASEAN, making the case that it has been one of the
more innovative and ambitious Asian powers when it has come
to challenging long-established regional norms around multilateral
military cooperation.

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 4 David Capie

The “New Geopolitics” of Peace Operations

Over the last decade there has been a growing interest in the role
of emerging powers in peacekeeping operations.5 This has been
prompted by the striking decline in the proportion of peacekeepers
provided to UN missions by Western states: from 73 per cent of all
peacekeepers in 1990 to just 6 per cent in 2014.6 A large literature
has emerged exploring how states that were once wary of, or hostile
towards, UN peacekeeping have stepped up their contributions.7 For
example, Brazil, China, India and South Africa have tripled their
share of the total personnel deployed on UN PKOs from 5 per cent
in 2001 to 15 per cent in 2010.8 The greatest part of this research
has focused on the role of China, but there is also a large body of
work exploring India’s peacekeeping policy, as well as other emerging
powers such as Brazil, Russia, Turkey and South Africa.9
Underlying this interest is the assumption that as the political
and economic power of new players grows, and they become more
important participants in peace operations, they will demand a
greater say in decisions around how, when and where peacekeeping
is conducted. Indeed, as the respected Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) has argued “there are already signs that
such shifts are affecting peace operations”.10 While no one suggests
emerging powers have an identical set of interests or capabilities,
analysts note historically they share a common experience of being
outside the core group of states who shaped the post-World War II
international order. In the words of one report, these are states that
have been “on the outside looking in”.11 With growing economic,
political and military power, these countries expect to have a greater
say in decisions about the norms, rules and practices that shape
global politics.
Looking specifically at peace operations, analysts note the
different views of the “established powers”, primarily in the West,
and emerging powers. Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams distinguish
between what they call Westphalian and post-Westphalian approaches
to peace operations, with emerging powers tending to favour a
more Westphalian approach that prioritizes state sovereignty and
non-intervention.12 Benjamin Carvalho and Cedric de Coning go
further, saying
in broad terms most countries in the West have over the last decade
increased their willingness to intervene in crisis zones, with force
if necessary, to protect civilians and to promote democracy, while

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 Indonesia as an Emerging Peacekeeping Power 5

the rising powers take a more nuanced view, favouring instead

the principles of sovereignty and self-determination.13

According to one leading scholar of peace operations, Thierry

Tardy, this narrower understanding of the concept of state
sovereignty is “equated by a relatively strict adherence to the three
peacekeeping principles (impartiality, non-resort to force and
consent of the host state), and a general opposition to the
conceptual overstretch that characterizes them”.14 Emerging powers
are less enthusiastic about peace enforcement and peacebuilding,
because they perceive them “to have been abused by the West
as a tool to impose neoliberal values on weak states, and thus
as a way of using the UN and other international and regional
organisations to increase its (i.e. the West’s) influence in the
international system”.15
These differences have most starkly played out in debates
around the 2011 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led
military intervention in Libya and the ongoing humanitarian crisis
in Syria. But out of the limelight, distinct approaches have also
been identified in analyses of attitudes towards UN peacekeeping
by a range of emerging powers. For example, in their lengthy
survey of Chinese contributions to UN PKOs, Bates Gill and Huang
Chin-Hao argue that China is seeking to “gradually counterbalance
Western influence and more actively shape the norms guiding UN
peacekeeping operations in ways that are consistent with Chinese
foreign policy principles and national interests”.16
In these analyses of emerging powers and PKOs, Indonesia
frequently attracts attention. For example, a 2012 SIPRI report
describes Indonesia — along with Brazil and China — as one of
peacekeeping’s “new players”. With a population of 255 million and
an economy that has been predicted to be larger than those of the
United Kingdom and Germany by 2030, this is hardly surprising.17
Yet, compared to the numerous case studies on China, India
and Brazil, Indonesia has been comparatively neglected. Bangkit
Widodo’s 2010 unpublished paper is a very useful discussion of
Indonesian peacekeeping in the context of Jakarta’s bebas aktif
(“free and independent”) foreign policy, but his analysis predates
the recent increase in government attention to peacekeeping.18
Prominent Indonesian foreign policy intellectual and former
presidential adviser Dewi Fortuna Anwar has provided an empirically
rich analysis, but it also largely focuses on the period prior to

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 6 David Capie

2012. 19 Alistair Cook compares Indonesia’s contributions with

those of Malaysia, and Natalie Sambhi examines Jakarta’s new
peacekeeping ambitions, but their fine works do not address
Indonesian responses to changing normative debates about the
nature of peace operations. 20 Finally, Leonard Hutabara has
explored peacekeeping from the perspective of a participant,
with especially useful detail on the changes required inside the
Indonesian defence bureaucracy.21 However, this is a small body
of work compared to the equivalent research on contributors like
Brazil or South Africa, let alone China or India. It raises a number
of questions: How important is peacekeeping to Indonesia? What
interests underlie its new approach? What kind of norms does
Indonesia support and oppose when it comes to the broader peace
operations environment?

Indonesia’s “New” Peacekeeping Policy

Despite the attention it has attracted recently, Indonesia is not
a new player in peacekeeping. In fact, it is one of the oldest
supporters of UN missions. Indonesia made its first contribution in
1956, when it contributed 559 troops to the KONGA I deployment
to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai. The
operation came just a year after Indonesia had hosted the Asian-
African Conference in Bandung, and the gesture was motivated in
large part by a sense of anti-Western solidarity with Egypt, which
had been an important and influential early supporter of Indonesia’s
independence.
Soon after, Indonesia’s second “Garuda contingent” was sent to
the UN mission in the Congo (UNOC), with a 1,144 strong battalion
arriving in October 1960. In dispatching troops, Indonesia’s first
president, Sukarno, was again motivated by an anti-colonial spirit, as
well as a desire to elicit support from African states for Indonesia’s
dispute with The Netherlands over Dutch West New Guinea.22
During this mission, Jakarta clashed with the leadership of the UN
force, arguing that only the government of Patrice Lumumba could
authorize the presence of peacekeepers in the Congo. Lumumba’s
seizure by the forces of Mobutu Sese Seko led Indonesian President
Sukarno to turn down a request from UN Secretary-General Dag
Hammarskjöld to extend the deployment, presaging Indonesia’s
concern with the legitimacy of peacekeeping missions that continues
to the present day.23 A second battalion was eventually sent to the

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 Indonesia as an Emerging Peacekeeping Power 7

Congo in 1962–63, and the 3,457 troops marked Indonesia’s largest

deployment at that point in time.
The bloody aftermath of the military’s ascent to power
in October 1965 saw a dramatic fall in Indonesia’s participation
in peacekeeping. The Indonesian armed forces (Tentara Nasional
Indonesia, TNI) played a small role in the 1971 International
Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS) in South Vietnam,
but peacekeeping contributions effectively stopped until the end of
the Cold War. Support for the United Nations Transitional Authority
in Cambodia (UNTAC) mission (1992–94) marked the start of a
period of renewed engagement, and Indonesian forces played an
active role, including negotiating for the release of six UNTAC
personnel taken hostage by the Khmer Rouge. But even after the
UNTAC deployment, Angela Kane could still write that in the 1990s
“peacekeeping was not high on the [Indonesian] political agenda”.24
In 2000, embroiled in an economic and political crisis and reeling
from the installation of a UN-authorized force in East Timor,
Indonesia had just 44 personnel deployed in UN PKOs.25
A quick snapshot of Indonesian deployments today shows
a dramatic change. As of December 2015, Indonesia was the
world’s twelfth largest troop and police contributing country, with
2,854 personnel in the field (including 31 women).26 Its Garuda
Contingent was involved in ten missions, spanning from the Middle
East (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, UNIFIL), Africa
(United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur, UNAMID,
Sudan), United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), United Nations
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (MONUSCO), United Nations Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), United Nations Mission
for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), United Nations
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), United Nations Mission in South
Sudan (UNMISS), United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
(UNISFA) (Abyei, contested between Sudan and South Sudan) and
the Americas — The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH).
This shift reflects the elevated role successive governments
have given to peacekeeping in Indonesian foreign and strategic
policy over the last decade. Ambitious statements about a
peacekeeping force in Southeast Asia were made towards the end
of President Megawati Sukarnoputri’s administration (these are

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 8 David Capie

discussed in greater detail below), but it was during the presidency

of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–14) that a much greater
engagement with UN PKOs became apparent, and it continues
under his successor, President Joko Widodo (“Jokowi”). This shift
in position can be seen in five important changes.
First, since the beginning of Yudhoyono’s first term there has been
a determination to send significantly more personnel to participate in
UN missions. One of the new president’s first actions in 2004 was
to dispatch 144 military engineers and medical staff to the DRC as
part of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUC). In 2006, he responded to an appeal
from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon to send troops to the UNIFIL
mission in Lebanon, a deployment that has been renewed numerous
times subsequently. However, the scale of Indonesia’s ambitions
really became clear in 2012 when it declared the goal of becoming
a top ten troop contributing country (TCC), with more than 4,000
troops in the field. According to one official, the figure of 4,000
was carefully identified as the threshold needed to break into the
top ten,27 but in a speech alongside Ban Ki-Moon at the opening
of the Indonesian National Peacekeeping Training Centre in 2012,
Yudhoyono said a longer-term and “more challenging” goal was to
deploy 10,000 troops (which would make it one of the top two to
three contributors).28
Indonesia is already backing up this rhetoric with larger
deployments, including battalion size forces sent to Lebanon, Darfur
and Mali. In 2014 it eclipsed Italy to become the single largest
contributor to UNIFIL. Troops have also been sent further from what
have historically been Indonesia’s core areas of interest in Africa, the
Middle East and Europe. The dispatch of an Indonesian contingent
to MINUSTAH in Haiti in 2012 marked the first time its forces
had been deployed to Latin America. In another important symbol
of Indonesia’s growing profile, an Indonesian officer was appointed
Force Commander of MINURSO in 2013.29
Alongside military personnel, Indonesia has steadily increased
its contribution of police to PKOs. The first six Indonesian police
(POLRI) officers were sent to UNMIS in Sudan in 2007, followed
by the first Formed Police Unit of 150 officers to UNAMID in
Darfur in 2008, a deployment that is ongoing. According to foreign
ministry officials, one of Indonesia’s most important peacekeeping
goals is to increase the participation of POLRI. However, despite
encouragement from the police leadership, this is an objective that

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 Indonesia as an Emerging Peacekeeping Power 9

is challenged by ongoing problems of capacity and corruption.30

For example, in October 2013, only a third of officers who sat a
preliminary test for UN police roles passed.31 POLRI expect these
figures to improve as a younger generation of officers, who have
stronger language skills for example, increasingly begin to apply
for UN positions.32
Second, in addition to steadily increasing troop and police
numbers, Indonesia has begun to provide more enabling platforms
such as helicopters and ships. Following a request from the UN
Secretary-General in 2012, Jakarta agreed to send three Mi-17-V5
transport helicopters to the mission in Darfur. In 2015, a further three
helicopters were sent to Mali to provide support for the MINUSMA
mission, thus committing more than half of the country’s Mi-17s
to UN missions.33 Since 2009, the Indonesian navy has deployed
a succession of Diponegoro (SIGMA)-class corvettes in support of
the Maritime Task Force UNIFIL, patrolling alongside the Lebanese
navy to secure Lebanon’s coastline and prevent trafficking in arms
and other illicit materials. In 2015, the first of the navy’s new Bung
Tomo-class corvettes was sent to join UNIFIL.34
Third, there have been major changes to the way the government
considers requests for peacekeeping contributions, with the aim
of creating a “more structured and disciplined” process when it
comes to how, when and where Indonesia participates.35 Presidential
Decree 85 (2011) created a new coordinating forum to deliberate
requests from the UN. The Tim Koordinasi Misi Pemeliharaan
Perdamaian/TKMPP forum is chaired by the foreign minister, who
reports to the “Steering Minister”, the Coordinating Minister for
Political, Security and Legal Affairs.36 As well as working to improve
pre-deployment planning, the forum is supposed to ensure the
support of the media in order to generate “public enthusiasm for
peace missions”.37 Police contributions to peacekeeping missions have
been put under the responsibility of a one-star ranked officer.38 In
2015, Presidential Decree 86 further expanded the kind of missions
Indonesian forces can participate in to include those mandated
by regional and international organizations and not simply those
authorized by the UN.39
Fourth, Indonesia has invested significantly in building its national
training capacity for peacekeeping. A state of the art peacekeeping
training facility was opened at Sentul outside Bogor in 2012. The
Indonesian Peace and Security Centre (IPSC) is a 240-hectare campus
that houses seven smaller centres, which focus on peacekeeping

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 10 David Capie

operations, language training, military sports training, humanitarian

assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) training, counter-terrorism training
and peacekeeping mission standby forces, as well as housing the
Indonesian Defense University.40 The IPSC is the largest facility of
its kind in Southeast Asia, and was partly funded by the United
States Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). The facility has
been offered to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (UNDPKO) and neighbouring states, and in 2012 it
hosted a meeting of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus
(ADMM-Plus) Experts’ Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations.
POLRI is in the process of building its own training complex on
the site.
Finally, peacekeeping has taken a much more visible place
in Indonesia’s regional and international diplomacy. In addition
to actively pressing for a regional peacekeeping capability in
Southeast Asia (discussed below), Indonesia hosted the July 2015
Asia-Pacific Regional Meeting on Peacekeeping, which saw 150
representatives from 30 troop contributing countries come together
as a regional consultation in the lead up to the September 2015
UN Peacekeeping Summit. 41 Indonesia was a co-host of the
US-sponsored Summit, with Vice-President Jusuf Kalla leading the
delegation.42 Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi has spoken strongly
in support of an ongoing commitment to peacekeeping, describing
it as “both an integral part of [Indonesia’s] constitutional mandate
and an important element in its foreign policy and multilateral
diplomacy”.43

Explaining the New Importance of Peacekeeping

What explains this much greater emphasis on peacekeeping? One
report claims that Indonesia’s new interest can be explained by
the changing balance of power in the Asia Pacific. In this view, a
“multilateral approach to conflict issues and peace operations offers
[Indonesia] a way to address China’s growing regional strength”.44
But while the rise of China obviously shapes many aspects of
Indonesian foreign and defence policy, it is not clear why it
should necessarily lead to increased support for peace operations,
in particular missions far from Southeast Asia. Indeed, as
Chiyuki Aoi and Yee-Kuang Heng note, one key reason many
Asian states have historically not been major participants in UN
peacekeeping is because of the persistence of threats nearer to

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 Indonesia as an Emerging Peacekeeping Power 11

home.45 They also argue that a resurgence of Great Power politics

may actually be “a constraining factor in the development of
peace-support related capabilities for regional states, who allocate
resources toward developing higher-end capabilities for territorial
defense”.46
Rather than assigning explanatory primacy to shifts in the
balance of power, a mix of ideational and domestic level variables
seem to be more important in the Indonesian case. First, numerous
interviews suggest increased peacekeeping reflects a greater
sense of self-confidence on the part of Indonesian leaders and
the belief that Indonesia is ready to play a larger role on the
international stage. Officials and well-placed analysts point to
Indonesia’s membership in the G20 and in the Mexico–Indonesia–
Turkey–South Korea–Australia (MITKA) group, its term on the
UNSC from 2007 to 2008 (and desire to serve again on the
Council in 2019–20) and discussions of a “post-ASEAN foreign
policy” as examples of this ambition.47 As one foreign ministry
official put it, “it’s the Spider-Man principle: with great power
comes great responsibility”.48 A bigger peacekeeping contribution
underscores Indonesia’s longstanding desire to play a larger role in a
reformed UN.
Related to this is the desire to present a democratic identity.
Throughout the Yudhoyono administration, the need to democratize
foreign policy was a familiar refrain, reflected in support for
initiatives like the ASEAN Inter-governmental Commission on
Human Rights (AICHR) and the hosting of the Bali Democracy Forum
(BDF).49 Don Emmerson describes Yudhoyono’s efforts to “leverage
his country’s stature as the world’s third largest democracy” in
its foreign policy.50 Interviews conducted by the author frequently
produced comments about peacekeeping helping to “project a
democratic image”.51 This is true not just for Indonesia’s reputation
internationally, but also for the image of the armed forces inside
and outside the country. As Avery Poole argues,
it is partly an attempt to overcome the damage to Indonesia’s
international reputation caused by the actions taken by the
Indonesian military and militias following the East Timor
independence vote in 1999, and in other sites of separatist turmoil
such as Papua.52

A second set of reasons is more institutional and grounded in

changes in the country’s civil-military relations. For much of its
history the TNI had a focus on internal security and countering

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 12 David Capie

domestic challenges to the country’s territorial integrity. This

changed after the fall of Soeharto and the formal separation of the
police and military in April 1999. Over the past decade the armed
forces have become increasingly outward facing and, since the end
of the separatist conflict in Aceh in particular, the military has
had a large number of “idle” troops looking for something to do.53
Peacekeeping is a popular mission, especially among the younger
officer cohort and is seen as contributing towards the development of
a more professional force.54 It provides practical experience, increases
the prospects for promotion and offers allowance payments. As one
interviewee said, the new commitment to peacekeeping is likely to
be sustained, in part because “the military is very interested in the
mission”.55
Third, as well as individual incentives, peacekeeping provides
benefits for Indonesia’s modest defence industrial sector and is seen
as a way to advance its defence diplomacy goals. It allows the testing
of new capabilities, such as the Bung Tomo corvette sent to the
Mediterranean and the PT Pindad-produced Anoa-APS3 armoured
vehicle, which has seen service with the Garuda Contingents in
Lebanon and Darfur. Oman, Malaysia, Nepal and Bangladesh have
reportedly shown interest in buying the comparatively low-cost
vehicle as a result.56 Peacekeeping has also become an important
way to engage with other armed forces. In 2014, Indonesia and
the United States held “Garuda Shield”, an exercise based on a
peacekeeping scenario. Peacekeeping, like HA/DR cooperation,
provides a less controversial way for Indonesia to expand its
bilateral defence ties with Washington. 57 A similar exercise,
“Garuda Kookabura”, takes place with the Australian Defence Force,
and in remarks following the Indonesia–Australia 2+2 Meeting in
Sydney in December 2015, Australian Defence Minister Marise
Payne highlighted the importance of connections between the
Australian and Indonesian peacekeeping centres in preparing
“participants for future deployments to complex and multidimensional
peace operations”.58
Finally, a fourth crucial factor points to the catalytic role
of individuals in driving policy — in this case former President
Yudhoyono. As a TNI general, Yudhoyono served with the United
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia during 1995–96,
where he was Indonesia’s Chief Military Observer. His son Agus
also served as a high profile peacekeeper in the UNIFIL mission
in Lebanon in 2006. Indonesian officials frequently highlight that

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 Indonesia as an Emerging Peacekeeping Power 13

Yudhoyono was the only world leader with practical experience

serving as a peacekeeper, something Ban Ki-Moon echoed during
a visit to the Sentul Peacekeeping Training Centre in 2012. The
president’s Democratic Party even featured Indonesia’s contribution
to peacekeeping in its television advertisements during 2009
legislative elections.59 There is little doubt that UN peacekeeping
attracted more attention from Yudhoyono than it received from
any of his predecessors, or his successor Jokowi, and as one
official put it “what [got] Yudhoyono’s attention [got] the military’s
attention”.60

Obstacles?
Despite the impressive rhetoric and the genuine shift to embrace
peacekeeping as a central plank of Indonesia’s strategic and foreign
policy in the last decade, there are some obstacles that will make it
difficult for Jakarta to meet some of the more ambitious objectives
set out recently.
The first and most frequently mentioned is resources, both
financial but also in terms of military capabilities. The recent
expansion of peacekeeping has been made possible by sustained
economic growth and the resulting expansion of the Indonesian
defence budget from US$2.5 billion in 2003 to US$8.1 billion in
2014.61 But critics note that as a share of gross domestic product,
Indonesia spends much less than almost all of its neighbours, and
promises to double spending to support the Minimum Essential Force
(MEF) modernization initiative have not materialized.62 According to
Benjamin Scheer, the Indonesian army has only
taken incremental steps toward a more modern, agile and
deployable force. Most of its units remain non-deployable because
of ineffective training schemes, lack of financial resources and a
territorial command structure more suited to provincial politics
than operational effectiveness.63

Indonesia has comparatively few transport helicopters (some of

which do not meet UN standards), although there were indications
early in 2016 that the air force may purchase an unspecified
number of new CH-47 Chinook transport helicopters.64 The age of
its air transport fleet has also come in for criticism, especially after
the crash of an air force C-130 Hercules transport aircraft killed
143 people in June 2015.65 The Indonesian air force acquired four

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 14 David Capie

newer (albeit second hand) C-130Hs from Australia in 2012 and

may purchase more on favourable terms in 2016. In addition to
equipment problems, troops struggle to meet the basic standards
(such as language skills) required for UN peacekeeping, and there
is still a lack of clear military doctrine concerning PKOs.
A second and related impediment concerns the inefficiency of
the Indonesian bureaucracy, which suffers from a lack of whole-
of-government coordination, inter-agency rivalries and duplication.
Although the new Peacekeeping Coordinating Forum is a step
forward in bringing together ministers to deal with peacekeeping
requests, it has not worked flawlessly. It includes eight major
portfolios (including the ministries of defence, finance, interior
and the police), which as one source noted was its “main
strength, but also its main weakness”. 66 Although the group
meets regularly at the deputies’ level, it is more difficult to
convene ministers. The forum is therefore “authoritative … but it’s
hard to make a decision”.67 Some analysts have bemoaned a lack
of inter-agency coordination and called for a “more consistent
approach to decision-making, deployments and re-deployments”.68
In 2013 officials conceded that delays and complications in
decision making had meant several “missed opportunities for new
contingents”.69
Notwithstanding these challenges, there seems little doubt that
Indonesia will achieve its goal of becoming a top ten TCC by 2019,
even if the target of 10,000 troops in the field remains aspirational.
What then might this mean for the key norms around peacekeeping?
Is Indonesia likely to be a voice for “norm revision” when it comes
to peacekeeping’s “new agenda”?

A Norm Revisionist?
Like most of the members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),
and many states in the developing world, Indonesia is sceptical
about the expansion of PKOs away from the traditional notion
of blue helmet missions based on the “holy trinity” principles of
impartiality, consent of the parties and limited use of force. These
concerns are linked to broader anxieties about the weakening of
sovereignty and fears that powerful states could misuse peace
operations to advance their own interests. Here, the “loss” of East
Timor and the humiliating imposition of a UN-sanctioned peacekeeping
force in Indonesia’s territory in 1999 is an especially important

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 Indonesia as an Emerging Peacekeeping Power 15

and powerful experience. One 2004 account quotes Indonesian

officials as saying that “PKOs can be seen as an ‘instrument’
of strong powers to intrude into a strategic region” or used
“as a cover for developed states’ attempts at achieving their national
interests”.70
Indonesian officials are careful about the terminology they
employ, striving to avoid using the term “peace operations”, which
they argue connotes a wider range of military activities; instead
they prefer the term “peacekeeping operations”.71 Government
representatives have been lukewarm at best in their support for
the notion of R2P, signing on to the 2005 United Nations Summit
Outcome Document, but doing little to advance the norm within
Southeast Asia.72
Jakarta has also expressed reservations about the expanding
use of force in peacekeeping operations. One example is the
deployment of the MONUSCO Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the
DRC under Security Council Resolution 2098 (2013). The FIB
is mandated to carry out “targeted offensive operations” to
“neutralize” specified armed groups and reduce the threat to state
and civilian security. In comments to the UN Special Committee on
Peacekeeping Operations in February 2015, the Indonesian
representative warned that although the FIB had been effective,
“it risked being seen as partial, which had already undermined
credibility and could harm future United Nations overtures”.73
Indonesia reportedly declined to allow a C-130 air transport task
force to accompany its peacekeepers to the DRC because of “political
issues related to the FIB”.74
However, despite this wariness, there are signs that Indonesia’s
views on peacekeeping are evolving. Statements from Indonesian
officials increasingly recognize that the line between traditional and new
peacekeeping missions is rarely clear. In a 2013 debate in the UNSC,
Indonesia’s permanent representative referred to the “understandable
overlap between the dynamic boundaries of peacekeeping, peace-
enforcement, peace-building and development”.75 Addressing the
July 2015 Asia-Pacific Regional Meeting on Peacekeeping, Foreign
Minister Marsudi said that
UN peacekeeping is in the midst of evolution toward a complex
and multidimensional role. Blue helmets are increasingly
entrusted with more robust mandates, with blurred boundaries
between conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement
and peacebuilding.76

01 David-3P.indd 15 22/3/16 11:17 am

 16 David Capie

Dewi Fortuna Anwar argues that the prolonged conflict in

Syria has been particularly important in leading Indonesian
leaders to rethink their views on peace enforcement missions. In
August 2012, Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa called on the
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to unite to demand
action from the UNSC to stop the violence in Syria, “if necessary
by using Chapter VII of the UN Charter”.77 At the 2013 APEC
Leaders Meeting in Bali, President Yudhoyono showed a similar
pragmatism, when he reportedly intervened in a discussion about
the possibility of international action in Syria after the chemical
weapons attacks in Ghouta. According to a member of his special
staff, he said:
we must intervene, not because of the new threat of chemical
weapons or to remove President Bashar al-Assad, but to stop the
bloodshed in Syria, to encourage humanitarian assistance and
to allow her people to begin a new inclusive and transparent
political process.78

Rather than opposing aspects of the new peacekeeping agenda

outright, Indonesia has focused its criticisms on particular issues
it sees as problematic and more amenable to reform. In particular,
it has called for greater clarity in mission mandates and in the
use of concepts like POC.79 In remarks to the UNSC Open Debate
on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in January 2016, the
Indonesian representative called for a “common doctrine” on POC
and “practical guidelines” on implementing a POC mandate. 80
Officials have urged better pre-mandate planning and assessments
regarding local dynamics and the likely threat to civilians.81 One
of the key suggestions to come out of the Jakarta meeting of Asia-
Pacific Regional Meeting on Peacekeeping Operations was the need
to implement the recommendation in the UN High-Level Independent
Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report to introduce two-stage
mandates in PKOs. This would ensure that the mandate and the
configuration of the mission are tailored to the particular context
where peacekeeping forces will work.
Indonesia has also been a strong voice for improved
communications between the UNSC and troop and police
contributing countries. In November 2012, Indonesia’s Permanent
Representative to the UN Desra Percaya called for “regular, timely
and meaningful consultations” between the UNSC, DPKO, troop
contributors and financial contributors, arguing that “substantive
interaction with all peacekeeping stakeholders is necessary to ensure

01 David-3P.indd 16 22/3/16 11:17 am

 Indonesia as an Emerging Peacekeeping Power 17

that United Nations peacekeeping missions are effectively enabled

to achieve their mandates”.82 The importance of conflict prevention
and mediation is another common refrain in Indonesian official
statements.
However, concern about vague mandates and a lack of
consultation has not seen Indonesian unwillingness to participate in
UN missions. Although one account argues that “at the normative
level Indonesia only provides support for international and regional
peacekeeping missions that are essentially peaceful in nature”,
numerous examples show that reality is somewhat different.83
Notwithstanding Jakarta’s reservations about the FIB in the DRC,
it has been willing to continue to provide troops to MONUSCO.
Similarly, although there was debate inside the Indonesian
government about whether the mission mandate to Mali was “peace
enforcement” or traditional peacekeeping, it only delayed rather
than prevented the deployment of troops and three helicopters.
A willingness to send peacekeepers to Syria and the Gaza Strip
(as was mooted in 2014) also suggests a less cautious attitude to
sending the TNI to unstable conflict zones than might have been
the case in the past.84

Or Norm Entrepreneur?
If it is hard to sustain the argument that Indonesia is a revisionist
when it comes to liberal peacekeeping norms, a look at peacekeeping
in Southeast Asia further raises questions about the portrayal
of emerging powers as conservative and obstructive. Indeed, if
Indonesia has been a norm revisionist, then it has been in
challenging local norms and pushing for a more ambitious approach
to peacekeeping in Southeast Asia. In the last decade, Jakarta has
played the lead role in putting peacekeeping on the regional agenda.
It has done so despite the fact that multilateral military cooperation
has traditionally been seen as inconsistent with ASEAN’s normative
traditions.85
The idea of an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force was first mooted in
2003, when Indonesia was serving as ASEAN Chair. The proposal
initially came from Rizal Sukma, the then well-connected executive
director of the Centre for International and Strategic Studies (CSIS),
a Jakarta think-tank, as part of a speech he gave setting out his
vision for an ASEAN Security Community.86 Sukma argued that in
order to enhance its legitimacy, ASEAN needed to “strengthen

01 David-3P.indd 17 22/3/16 11:17 am

 18 David Capie

its capability to prevent and resolve conflicts and disorder”.

Indonesia had found the Australian-led intervention into East
Timor deeply disturbing. An intervention led by an ASEAN force
would have been preferable, but of course no such capacity
existed. Sukma’s idea was picked up by then Indonesian Foreign
Minister Hassan Wirajuda and Marty Natalegawa, who was at
the time the Acting Director-General for ASEAN Cooperation in
Indonesia’s foreign ministry.
In a February 2004 draft Plan of Action, Wirajuda called for
the creation of an “ASEAN Standby Force”, which could respond
quickly to crises in Southeast Asia. As Natalegawa said at the
time, “ASEAN countries should know one another better than
anyone else and therefore we should have the option for ASEAN
countries to take advantage of an ASEAN peacekeeping force to
be deployed if they so wish.” 87 Given ASEAN’s preferences at
the time, the idea was extremely ambitious and deliberately so
(as Sukma said in an interview, “we thought if we asked for ten
we might get five”). It was strongly opposed by Singapore at the
March 2004 ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting (SOM), as was a call
for a regional peacekeeping training centre. 88 However, although
the idea of a greater Southeast Asian peacekeeping capacity fell
on fallow ground, it continues to resurface from time to time. In
2015, Malaysian Defence Minister Hishammuddin Hussein again
called for an ASEAN peacekeeping force that could be deployed
to regional trouble spots, a suggestion which still encountered
scepticism from some of its fellow members. 89
More progress has been made around the idea of a collaborative
regional peacekeeping training mechanism. This was first
mentioned in the Blueprint for the ASEAN Political and Security
Community (APSC) and identified as a project for the ASEAN
Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) process to advance. The
APSC Blueprint envisages a network of national peacekeeping
training centres to conduct joint planning, training and sharing
experiences. At its fifth meeting held in May 2011 in Jakarta,
the ADMM adopted a Concept Paper on the Establishment of
ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network (APCN) with the goal
of “facilitating existing and future peacekeeping centers …
to conduct joint planning/training and exchange experiences,
proposed various activities”. 90 These activities fell into short,
medium and long-term baskets. In the short-term, ASEAN
members have committed to sharing on peacekeeping training

01 David-3P.indd 18 22/3/16 11:17 am

 Indonesia as an Emerging Peacekeeping Power 19

curricula, materials and methodology, and to provide assistance

for ASEAN member states to establish their own peacekeeping
centres. The medium-term goals are to develop Standard
Operating Procedures (SOPs), develop common peacekeeping
training, operations and best practices manuals, and begin
combined training. Finally, over an unspecified longer-term, the
ADMM will establish a common standby arrangement, enhance
interoperability of peacekeeping forces and develop existing
centres into centres of excellence.
As of late 2015, one modest sign of progress was a concept
paper on an ASEAN Militaries Ready Group on Humanitarian
Assistance and Disaster Relief, adopted at the 3rd APCN meeting
in Cambodia. The ASEAN Ready Group is to be a “dedicated
force comprised of specialists in disaster relief and military
medicine from all ASEAN countries under a single banner”. 91
The concept paper makes clear that participation in the Ready
Group is to be “flexible, non-binding and voluntary” and
“contributing ASEAN Member States’ military personnel and
assets … remain under their own national command and control.
The final decision whether to deploy resources … remains a
national decision.” 92 Yet more than a decade after Indonesia
first raised the idea of a regional peacekeeping force, progress
can described as incremental at best.
In addition to advocating for peacekeeping as part of the
APSC, Indonesia has called for troops to be used to monitor
disputes in Southeast Asia. Following armed confrontation between
Thailand and Cambodia over the disputed Preah Vihear Temple
in February 2011, Foreign Minister Natalegawa offered to send
a mixed team of Indonesian military and civilian monitors to
the border to supervise a ceasefire agreement. 93 The initiative
was initially accepted by both parties, but was later rejected
by the Thai military. There has been greater success in the
southern Philippines, where since 2011 a contingent of TNI
solders has taken part in the International Monitoring Team
(IMT) in Mindanao. The IMT, which takes place under the
auspices of the OIC and not ASEAN, monitors implementation
of the ceasefire, civilian protection component, rehabilitation
and development, and socio-economic agreements between the
government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). 94 The
Indonesian deployments are small — usually around just 15
personnel — and conditions are regarded as difficult compared
to those enjoyed by troops on UN missions. 95

01 David-3P.indd 19 22/3/16 11:17 am

 20 David Capie

Conclusion
Over the last decade, and in particular the last five years, Indonesia
has significantly increased its commitment to UN peacekeeping.
It has matched lofty rhetoric with meaningful action, raising the
number of personnel it has in the field from just 44 in 2000 to
almost 3,000 in 2016. There seems little doubt that, absent some
unforeseen crisis or catastrophe, Indonesia will meet its goal of
becoming a top ten TCC with 4,000 troops deployed by 2019.
Alongside the growing number of people, there is a new willingness
to deploy enabling platforms, including helicopters, armoured
vehicles and a range of naval vessels. A major new commitment
to build peacekeeping capacity within the TNI is underway. There
have also been efforts to improve how the bureaucracy deals
with requests for peacekeepers, although this is still hampered by
inter-agency rivalry and a lack of a coordinated approach across
government.
This new interest is driven by a strong desire among elites
to play a larger role on the regional and global stage, to project a
democratic identity and to make the case that Indonesia deserves
a greater voice and representation in international forums like the
UN. The popularity of peacekeeping with the armed forces and its
usefulness in showcasing Indonesia’s defence industry and supporting
defence diplomacy are important additional motivations. Buttressed
by broad constituencies in the bureaucracy, the armed forces and
among the public, the greater emphasis given to peacekeeping is
unlikely to be reversed any time soon.
This is just as well because Indonesia’s expansion has come
at a time of enormous challenges for peace operations globally.
More troops than ever are needed, and missions are becoming
increasingly dangerous, with the lines between peacekeeping and
peace enforcement increasingly blurred. Like most emerging powers,
Indonesia has reservations about the so-called new peacekeeping
agenda, including POC, R2P and “robust peacekeeping”. Partly for
normative reasons, and partly due to limited military capability, it
is still more comfortable with traditional blue helmet peacekeeping
missions and has expressed apprehension about more assertive
mandates such as the one given to the FIB in the DRC. Jakarta has
genuine concerns about the abuse of peacekeeping by larger powers
and the humiliating experience with the “loss” of East Timor still
rankles with Indonesian political and military elites.

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 Indonesia as an Emerging Peacekeeping Power 21

But despite this, there is little sign that Indonesia’s concerns

are preventing it from taking part in UN operations. In the DRC,
South Sudan, Darfur and Haiti, UN peacekeepers have mandates that
authorize them to use force to protect civilians. The presence of
the FIB in MONUSCO, a significant counter-terrorism dimension to
the MINUSMA mission in Mali, or the use of force by MINUSTAH
against Haitian gangs, has not led Indonesia to withdraw its forces
or refuse to renew them. There are also signs that the ongoing war
in Syria has led some Indonesian leaders to rethink their principled
objections to peace enforcement missions.
The picture of Indonesia that emerges from this analysis is not
one that fits the description of a simple norm revisionist. Rather,
Indonesia’s strong desire to increase its contributions for reputational
and instrumental reasons means it can better be described as a
cautious but pragmatic provider of peacekeepers, keen to make its
mark as a leading contributor of troops and police, even as mandates
increasingly move away from the model of peacekeeping it has
historically supported. The Indonesian experience therefore seems
consistent with one analyst’s claim that emerging powers “implicitly
draw a distinction between principled positions expressed in UN
political fora on issues such as state sovereignty, host states’ consent
or protection of civilians on the one hand, and country-specific
situations or actions on the ground on the other”.96

NOTES
The author would like to express his gratitude to Rizal Sukma, Iis Gindarsah, Riefqi
Muna as well as the many Indonesian government, military and police representatives
who agreed to be interviewed on this topic. M. Zakaria Al-Anshori was enormously
helpful in setting up interviews and meetings in Jakarta, and Alistair Cook and
Paul Sinclair provided helpful sources and comments on the earlier drafts of this
article. The author would especially like to thank the journal’s anonymous referees
for extremely helpful feedback and suggestions.
1
See for example, Sharon Wiharta, Neil Melvin and Xenia Avezov, The New
Geo-Politics of Peace Operations: Mapping the Emerging Landscape (Stockholm:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, September 2012).
2
Ibid., p. 2.
3
See for example Benjamin Carvalho and Cedric de Coning, Rising Powers and
the Future of Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding (Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding
Resource Centre, November 2013), p. 2.
4
David Capie, “Evolving Attitudes to Peacekeeping in ASEAN”, in New Trends
in Peacekeeping: In Search of a New Direction (Tokyo: National Institute for
Defence Studies, 2015).

01 David-3P.indd 21 22/3/16 11:18 am

 22 David Capie

5
For a good discussion of the concept of “emerging powers” in the context
of peace operations, see Kai Kenkel, “South America’s Emerging Power:
Brazil as Peacekeeper”, International Peacekeeping 17, no. 5 (December 2010):
644–61.
6
Derived from UN data and cited in Sophie Maarleveld, “Where is the West?
An Examination of the Decline In Western Troop Contributions to UN
Peacekeeping”, Master of International Relations thesis, Victoria University of
Wellington, 2015.
7
Thierry Tardy, “Emerging Powers and Peacekeeping: An Unlikely Normative
Clash”, Geneva Centre for Security Policy Policy Paper 2 (2012/13).
8
Wiharta et al., The New Geo-Politics of Peace Operations, op. cit., p. 11.
9
On China see M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Attitude Towards UN Peacekeeping
Operations Since 1989”, Asian Survey 36, no. 11 (November 1996): 1102–21;
Liu Teiwa, “Marching for a More Open, Confident and Responsible Great Power:
Explaining China’s Involvement in UN Peacekeeping Operations”, Journal of
International Peacekeeping 13 (2009): 101–30; Bates Gill and Huang Chin-Hao,
China’s Expanding Role in Peacekeeping Operations: Prospects and Policy
Implications, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 25 (Stockholm: Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, 2006); Marc Lanteigne, “Red and Blue: China’s Evolving
United Nations Peacekeeping Policies and Soft Power Development”, in Asia-
Pacific Nations in International Peace Support and Stability Missions, edited
by Chiyuki Aoi and Yee-Kuang Heng (New York: Palgrave, 2014), pp. 113–40.
On India, see C. Raja Mohan, “India and International Peace Operations”, SIPRI
Insights on Peace and Security (April 2013); Frank van Rooyen, “Blue Helmets
for Africa: India’s Peacekeeping in Africa” and Kabilan Krishnasamy, “A Case
for India’s ‘Leadership’ in United Nations Peacekeeping”, International Studies
47, nos. 2–4 (April–July 2010): 225–46. Recent work on Brazil includes Kenkel,
“South America’s Emerging Power”, op. cit.; Rita Santos and Teresa Almeida
Cravo, Brazil’s Rising Profile in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Since
the End of the Cold War (Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre,
March 2014), pp. 1–7.
10
Wiharta et al., The New Geo-Politics of Peace Operations, op. cit., Chapter 3.
11
Carvalho and de Coning, Rising Powers and the Future of Peacekeeping and
Peacebuilding, op. cit., p. 2.
12
Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping, 2nd ed.
(Boston, Massachusetts: Polity Press Malden, 2012), pp. 28–39.
13
Carvalho and de Coning, Rising Powers and the Future of Peacekeeping and
Peacebuilding, op. cit., p. 4.
14
Tardy, “Emerging Powers and Peacekeeping”, op. cit., p. 2.
15
Carvalho and de Coning, Rising Powers and the Future of Peacekeeping and
Peacebuilding, op. cit., p. 4.
16
Gill and Huang, China’s Expanding Role in Peacekeeping Operations, op. cit.,
p. viii.
17
Shivali Nayek, “Indonesia’s Economy to Eclipse Germany, UK by 2030: McKinsey”,
CNBC Asia-Pacific, 25 September 2012.

01 David-3P.indd 22 22/3/16 11:18 am

 Indonesia as an Emerging Peacekeeping Power 23

18
Bangkit Rahmat Tri Widodo, “Indonesia’s Peacekeeping Missions within the
‘Independent and Active’ Foreign Policy”, unpublished paper, 2010.
19
Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Indonesia’s Peacekeeping Operations: History, Practice
and Future Trend”, in Asia-Pacific Nations in International Peace Support and
Stability Missions, op. cit., pp. 189–210.
20
Alistair D.B. Cook, “Southeast Asian Perspectives on UN Peacekeeping”, Journal
of International Peacekeeping 18, nos. 3–4 (2014): 154–74; Natalie Sambhi,
“Indonesia’s Push for Peacekeeping Operations”, The Strategist, 17 September
2013.
21
Leonard Hutabarat, “Indonesian Participation in the UN Peacekeeping”, Global
and Strategis 8, no. 2 (July–December 2014): 183–99.
22
Widodo, “Indonesia’s Peacekeeping Missions within the ‘Independent and Active’
Foreign Policy”, op. cit., pp. 9–10.
23
Indonesian permanent representative to the UN Sukarddjo Wirjopranoto to
UN Secretary-General, 12 January 1960, Document 37/0141, United Nations archives,
available at <http://search.archives.un.org/uploads/r/united-nations-archives/
1/6/7/16736fcdd98cac77f2a6206362bf30846be99e86d214dafb5df5282d8cf1901e/
S-0845-0004-17-00001.pdf>.
24
Angela Kane, “Other New and Emerging Peacekeepers”, in Challenges for the
New Peacekeepers, edited by Trevor Findlay (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996), p. 110.
25
Hutabarat, “Indonesian Participation in the UN Peacekeeping”, op. cit., p. 186.
26
The latest data is available at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/
statistics/contributors.shtml>.
27
Author interview with foreign ministry official, Jakarta, 8 July 2013.
28
“Indonesia to send 10,000 for UN Peacekeeping Mission”, Antara, 20 March 2012.
29
“Indonesian Major General Appointed Force Commander of UN Western Sahara
Mission”, United Nations News Centre, 27 August 2013.
30
Author interview with foreign ministry official, Jakarta, 8 July 2013.
31
“Polri Encourages Officers to Join UN Peacekeeping Missions”, Jakarta Post,
21 October 2013.
32
Personal communication with senior Indonesia National Police official, Wellington,
3 March 2016.
33
“TNI Deploys Peacekeeping Troops to Mali”, Tempo, 18 September 2015.
34
Ridzwan Rahmat, “Indonesia Conducts First Test Firing of Exocet from Bung
Tomo Corvette”, IHS Jane’s 360, 28 May 2015.
35
Author interview with foreign ministry official, Jakarta, 8 July 2013.
36
“Indonesia and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations”, available at <http://
kemlu.go.id/en/kebijakan/isu-khusus/Pages/Indonesia-and-the-United-Nations-
Peacekeeping-Operations.aspx>.
37
Hutabarat, “Indonesian Participation in the UN Peacekeeping”, op. cit., p. 194.
38
Personal communication with senior Indonesia National Police official, Wellington,
3 March 2016.

01 David-3P.indd 23 22/3/16 11:18 am

 24 David Capie

39
Sharon Wiharta, “Contributor Profile: Indonesia”, available at <www.
providingforpeacekeeping>. Wiharta’s excellent piece is the most up-to-date
summary of Indonesia’s contributions, but it only became available while this
article was in the final stages of publication.
40
“US Backed Training Center Fuels Indonesia’s Peacekeeping Transformation”,
Stars and Stripes, 29 July 2013.
41
“Summary: Complex Strategies for Peacekeeping: Enhancing Capabilities and
Effective Responses of UN Peacekeeping Operations”, Asia-Pacific Regional
Meeting on Peacekeeping Operations, Jakarta, 27–28 July 2015.
42
Rendi A. Witular, “Indonesia Pledges 4000 Peacekeepers by 2019”, Jakarta Post,
30 September 2015.
43
Retno Marsudi, “Strengthening Support for UN Peacekeeping”, Jakarta Post,
4 August 2015.
44
Wiharta et al., The New Geo-Politics of Peace Operations, op. cit., p. 12.
45
Chiyuki Aoi and Yee-Kuang Heng, “The Asia-Pacific in International Peace
Support and Stability Operations”, in Aoi and Heng, Asia-Pacific Nations,
op. cit., p. 18.
46
Ibid.
47
Author interviews with foreign ministry officials, 7–8 July; author interviews
with Iis Gindersah and Rizal Sukma, Centre for Strategic and International
Studies, Jakarta, 11 July 2013.
48
Author interview with foreign ministry official, Jakarta, 8 July 2013.
49
For a good discussion of the changes in this period, see Greta Nabbs-Keller,
“Reforming Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry: Ideas, Organization and Leadership”,
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 35, no. 1 (April 2013): 56–82.
50
Cited in Christopher Roberts, Ahmad Habir and Leonard Sebastian, eds.,
Indonesia’s Ascent: Power, Leadership and the Regional Order (Basingstoke,
UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 158.
51
Author interview with Riefqi Muna, Jakarta, 11 July 2013.
52
Avery Poole, “The Foreign Policy Nexus: National Interests, Political Values and
Identity”, in Indonesia at Home and Abroad: Economics, Politics and Security,
edited by Christopher Roberts, Ahmad Habir and Leonard Sebastian (Canberra:
National Security College, Australian National University, 2014), p. 47; see also the
views of UNDPKO Director for Policy, Evaluation and Training Izumi Nakamitsu
quoted in cable from US Embassy Jakarta to National Security Council, 3 April
2009, available at <https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09JAKARTA605_a.
html>.
53
Leonard Sebastian, “Assessing 12-year Military Reform in Indonesia: Major
Strategic Gaps for the Next Stage of Reforms”, RSIS Working Paper No. 227
(Singapore: Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2011), p. 11.
54
Author interview with Brigadier-General Jan Pieter Ate, Director of International
Cooperation, Ministry of Defence, Jakarta, 9 July 2013.
55
Author interview with Iis Gindersah, Centre for Strategic and International
Studies, Jakarta, 11 July 2013.

01 David-3P.indd 24 22/3/16 11:18 am

 Indonesia as an Emerging Peacekeeping Power 25

56
“Pindad Anoa 6x6 armored vehicle”, available at <http://www.globalsecurity.
org/military/world/indonesia/aps-3-anoa.htm>.
57
For a discussion of how humanitarian assistance and disaster relief cooperation
advances broader US military objectives in Asia, see David Capie, “The United
States and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in East Asia: Connecting
Coercive and Non-Coercive Uses of Military Power”, Journal of Strategic Studies
38, no. 3 (2015): 309–31.
58
Transcript of Joint Press Conference by Australian Foreign Minister Bishop
and Australian Minister for Defence Payne, Australia–Indonesia 2+2, Sydney,
21 December 2015.
59
Cable from US Embassy Jakarta to National Security Council, 3 April 2009,
op. cit.
60
Author interview with Indonesian foreign ministry official, 8 July 2013.
61
Iis Gindarsah and Adhi Pramarikzki, “Politics, Security and Defense in
Indonesia: The Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy”, in Roberts et al., Indonesia’s Ascent,
op. cit., 141.
62
Prashanth Parameswaran, “Why is Indonesia Set to Cut Its Defence Budget in
2016?”, The Diplomat, 10 September 2015.
63
Benjamin Schreer, Moving Beyond Ambitions? Indonesia’s Military Modernization
(Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 2013), p. 26.
64
Chris Pocock, “Indonesia Set to Buy Chinooks”, AIN Online, 16 February
2016.
65
Endy Bayuni, “Indonesia Military Must Review Priorities”, Straits Times,
14 July 2015.
66
Author interview with Indonesian foreign ministry official, Jakarta, 8 July
2013.
67
Ibid.
68
Hutabarat, “Indonesian Participation in the UN Peacekeeping”, op. cit., pp. 196–97.
69
Author interview with Indonesian foreign ministry official, Jakarta, 8 July
2013.
70
Indonesian officials quoted in Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia and Regional Security:
The Quest for Cooperative Security”, in Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation:
National Interests and Regional Order, edited by Tan See Seng and Amitav
Acharya (Armark, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p. 82.
71
Wiharta, “Contributor Profile: Indonesia”, op. cit.
72
David Capie, “The Responsibility to Protect Norm in Southeast Asia: Framing,
Resistance and the Localization Myth”, The Pacific Review 25, no. 1 (February
2012): 75–91.
73
“Dangerous Peacekeeping to Deployment Areas Demand Adherence to Founding
Principles, Focus on Performance, Impartiality, Special Committee told as Session
Opens”, 17 February 2015, available at <http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/gapk219.
doc.htm>.
74
“Visit of the Commandant of INDF PKC to UN Military Adviser and Permanent
Mission of the Republic of Indonesia”, 4 December 2014, available at <http://

01 David-3P.indd 25 22/3/16 11:18 am

 26 David Capie

www.pkc-indonesia.mil.id/en/news/visit-of-the-commandant-of-indf-pkc-to-un-
military-adviserand-permanent-mission-of-the-republic-of-i>.
75
Remarks by Indonesian Permanent Representative Desra Percaya to the debate on
UNSC Resolution 2086 on United Nations peacekeeping operations, 21 January
2013, available at <http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10888.doc.htm>.
76
Retno Marsudi, “Strengthening Support for UN Peacekeeping”, op. cit.
77
Anwar “Indonesia’s Peacekeeping Operations: History, Practice and Future Trend”,
in Aoi and Heng, Asia-Pacific Nations, op. cit., p. 208.
78
Andre Omer Siregar, “Indonesia’s Call for a Middle Way Out of the Syrian
Crisis”, Jakarta Post, 24 October 2013.
79
See for example, Statement by Ambassador Desra Percaya, Permanent Representative
of Indonesia to the United Nations, Security Council Open Debate on the
“Peacekeeping Operations: New Trends”, 11 June 2014.
80
Statement by Ambassador Muhammad Anshor, Deputy Permanent Representative
of Indonesia to the United Nations, Security Council Open Debate on the
“Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict”, 19 January 2016.
81
Statement by Ambassador Desra Percaya, Permanent Representative of Indonesia
to the United Nations, Security Council Open Debate on the “Protection of
Civilians in Armed Conflict”, 12 February 2014.
82
United Nations Security Council, S/PV.6870, 26 November 2012.
83
Anwar, “Indonesia’s Peacekeeping Operations: History, Practice and Future
Trend”, in Aoi and Heng, Asia-Pacific Nations, op. cit., p. 204.
84
“RI Awaits Go Ahead to Send Peacekeepers to Syria, Gaza Strip”, Jakarta Post,
30 August 2014.
85
On ASEAN norms and the “ASEAN Way”, see David Capie and Paul M. Evans,
The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007), pp. 9–20.
86
Cited in Joseph Chinyong Liow, “Can Indonesia Fulfill Its Aspirations to
Regional Leadership?”, Asan Forum, 15 October 2014, available at <http://www.
theasanforum.org/can-indonesia-fulfill-its-aspirations-to-regional-leadership/>.
87
Cited in Carlyle Thayer, “ASEAN and UN Peacekeeping”, The Diplomat,
25 April 2014.
88
Author interview with Rizal Sukma, Jakarta, 11 July 2013; “Singapore Sidesteps
Asean Peacekeeping Force”, Reuters, 4 March 2004.
89
Trefor Moss, “Malaysia Proposes Regional Peacekeeping Force”, Wall Street
Journal, 18 March 2015.
90
ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting, Concept Paper on the Establishment of an
ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network (ASEAN, n.d.), available at <http://www.
asean.org/storage/images/archive/document/18471-j.pdf>.
91
Prashanth Parameswaran, “ASEAN Peacekeeping Meeting Concludes in Cambodia”,
The Diplomat, 9 October 2015.
92
ASEAN Disaster Management Handbook 2015 (Honolulu, Hawaii: Center
for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, 2015),
p. 43.

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 Indonesia as an Emerging Peacekeeping Power 27

93
Brian Padden, “Thailand, Cambodia Agree to Indonesian Observers at Border”,
VOA News, 5 May 2011.
94
“Indonesia Joins IMT”, Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process,
11 April 2011.
95
Author interview with senior TNI officer, Jakarta, 9 July 2013; Margareth
Sembiring, “Can Indonesia Advance the Mindanao Peace Process?”, The Nation,
31 October 2013.
96
Thierry Tardy, “UN Peacekeeping: The 21st Century Challenges”, in New Trends
in Peacekeeping, op. cit., p. 67.

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