SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES

RULE 72

VDA DE MANALO VS. CA (2001) Arcilla, Jay

FACTS: Troadio Manalo, a resident of Sampaloc, Manila, died intestate in 1992. He was
survived by his wife and his eleven children, who are all of legal age. He left several real
properties located in Manila and in Tarlac including a business- Manalo’s Machine Shop
with offices at Quezon City and at Valenzuela. In November, the respondents, who are
eight of the surviving children filed a petition with the RTC for the judicial settlement of the
estate of their late father and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo, as administrator
thereof. The trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing and directing
the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in Metro Manila and directing service by registered mail of the order. The trial
court issued an order declaring the whole world in default, except the government, and
set the reception of evidence of the petitioners. However, this order of general default
was set aside by the trial court upon motion of the petitioners who were granted ten(10)
days within which to file their opposition to the petition. The trial court called resolved such
issues in the following manner: 1. admitted the opposition for the purpose of considering
the merits 2. denied the hearing for such affirmative defenses are irrelevant and
immaterial 3.declared that the court had jurisdiction 4.denied the motion for inhibition 5.)
set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular administrator in the for
hearing. The MR of the petitioners was denied; hence, they filed a petition for certiorari,
contending that: (1) the venue was improperly laid; (2) the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was included in the
intestate proceedings; (4)there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise
among members of the same family, in accordance with Article 222 of NCC, and (5) no
certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition. CA dismissed; MR was
denied. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUES: W/N CA erred in upholding the questioned orders of the RTC which denied their
motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate?

RULING: NO. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and
Distribution of Estate is a SPECIAL PROCEEDING and, as such, it is a remedy whereby
the respondents seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.. In the
determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the character
of the relief sought in the complaint shall be controlling. A careful scrutiny of the petition
belies the claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition
contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of
a deceased person such as the fact of death and his residence which are foundation facts
upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest. It also
contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the
properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings.
In addition, the reliefs prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard
the intention to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father.
DISPOSITION:Petition is denied for lack of merit
PATRICIA NATCHER VS. HON. COURT OFAPPEALS Arcilla, Jay
FACTS: Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners
of a parcel of land in Manila. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with
his six children entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate. They
adjudicated and divided among themselves the real property. Under the agreement:
Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children received 1/14 share of the
said property .The heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of Consolidation-
Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights"- they subdivided among themselves
the parcel of land. Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion
of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square
meters registered under Graciano's name. The land was further subdivided into two
separate lots. Graciano sold the 1st lot to a third person but retained ownership over the
2ndlot. Graciano married petitioner Patricia Natcher. He sold the 2 nd lot to Natcher, a
title was issued under her name. Graciano dies leaving his 6 children and Natcher as
heirs. A civil case was filed a complaint before the RTC of Manila by the 6 children;
alleging that Natcher through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery,
acquired the 2nd lot by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale in her
favour; that their legitimes have been impaired. In her reply, Natcher averred that she was
legally married to Graciano on 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise
considered a compulsory heir of the latter .RTC ruled that the deed of sale executed by
the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a
complete nullity, that no evidence that a separation of property was agreed upon in the
marriage settlements nor there has been decreed a judicial separation of property
between them ,hence, the spouses are prohibited from entering into a contract of sale. It
is not also a valid donation BUT can be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance
of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court’s decision ratiocinating t is the probate
court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. The
court a quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance/annulment of title, went beyond
its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person.
ISSUE: May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action
for reconveyance/ annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to
advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?
HELD: NO. CA decision is AFFIRMED.

Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special
proceedings, in this wise: a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. A civil action
may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions,
subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action. A special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact. There lies
a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal
demand of ones right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the
law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules.
The term special proceeding may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish
the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal
pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings,
the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion It may accordingly be
stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are instituted and
prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or
suits in equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not
ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to some special mode
as in the case of proceedings commenced without summons and prosecuted without
regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions. A special proceeding
must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for particular
relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or motion
upon notice.

TABUADA VS. RUIZ Azarcon, Pia Lea

FACTS: Special proceeding # 5198 (settlement of intestate estate of Calaliman) was filed
in RTC Iloilo. RTC rendered a decision that they will no longer be setting any hearing as
parties assured that they are going to submit a "Motion for judgment based on an
amicable settlement" on or before December 25, 2004. On March 2, 2005, RTC
terminated the proceedings for failure to submit amicable settlement invoking Sec.3, Rule
17 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner and Calaliman filed MR. On the ground that it was
premature there being yet no payment of debt and distribution of estate and that they
have prepared necessary papers for amicable settlement. MR, denied. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: whether or not Judge Ruiz is correct in dismissing the case for failure of parties
to submit amicable settlement?

RULING: Judge Ruiz erred when it dismissed the case for failure of parties to submit
amicable settlement. While a compromise agreement or an amicable settlement is very
strongly encouraged, the failure to consummate one does not warrant any procedural
sanction, much less provide an authority for the court to jettison the case. Sp. Proc. No.
5198 should not have been terminated or dismissed by the trial court on account of the
mere failure of the parties to submit the promised amicable settlement and/or the Motion
for Judgment Based on An Amicable Settlement. Given the non-contentious nature of
special proceedings (which do not depend on the will of an actor, but on a state or
condition of things or persons not entirely within the control of the parties interested), its
dismissal should be ordered only in the extreme case where the termination of the
proceeding is the sole remedy consistent with equity and justice, but not as a penalty for
neglect of the parties therein. The third clause of Section 3, Rule 17, which authorizes the
motu propio dismissal of a case if the plaintiff fails to comply with the rules or any order
of the court, cannot even be used to justify the convenient, though erroneous, termination
of the proceedings herein. An examination of the December 6, 2004 Order readily reveals
that the trial court neither required the submission of the amicable settlement or the
aforesaid Motion for Judgment, nor warned the parties that should they fail to submit the
compromise within the given period, their case would be dismissed. Hence, it cannot be
categorized as an order requiring compliance to the extent that its defiance becomes an
affront to the court and the rules. And even if it were worded in coercive language, the
parties cannot be forced to comply, for, as aforesaid, they are only strongly encouraged,
but are not obligated, to consummate a compromise. An order requiring submission of an
amicable settlement does not find support in our jurisprudence and is premised on an
erroneous interpretation and application of the law and rules.

HILADO VS. CA Azarcon, Pia Lea

Facts: The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May
2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto
(administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino. At the
time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the
petitioners. The first, was then pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod
City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second
was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar
Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.
Thereafter, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6,
Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private
respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters
of administration in her favor. In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory
of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her
deceased husband. In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent
included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then being
litigated before the Bacolod City courts. Subsequently, petitioners filed with the Manila
RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, praying that they be furnished with
copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. petitioners filed
an omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by
private respondent of the required inventory of the decedent's estate. Petitioners also filed
other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private
respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that had been
submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate. Manila RTC issued an order
denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties
within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings.
CA likewise dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: WON creditors whose credit is based on contingent claim have the right to
participate in the settlement proceeding by way of intervention under Rule 19 Won
petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of the deceased person, are
entitled to copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings.

RULING: Notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19
does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim.
The definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent
claims. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an
intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x" While the
language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in
the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required
of an intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply
contingent and expectant." Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class
of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86. These actions,
being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against
the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. #2 In the same manner that the Rules
on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person interested in the estate,
the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead
provides for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in those
proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the
petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court
not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to
protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which
such interests can be protected. Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to
the records of the intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than
mandating the service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the
interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed of
in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Nonetheless, in the instances that the
Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all "interested parties" the
petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled to such notice. The instances when
notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in
reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or
administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor
or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real
estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for
distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in
her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.

RULE 73
PACIOLES VS. CHUATOCO-CHING Borja, Catherine
FACTS: Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties, stock investments, bank
deposits and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her husband,
petitioner, and their two minor children. Milio Pacioles husband of deceased Miguelita
filed with the RTC a verified petition for the settlement of Miguelita’s estate. Miguelita’s
mother, Miguela, filed an opposition, on the grounds that petitioner is incompetent and
unfit to exercise the duties of an administrator; and the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is
composed of “paraphernal properties. Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s
opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct and material interest in the estate.
Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she
gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them “would
undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business
partners.” Subsequently, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion that
an Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution
of the estate among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorney’s fees. Respondent
opposed on the ground that the partition and distribution of the estate is “premature and
precipitate,” considering that there is yet no determination “whether the properties
specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint venture.” The
intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and attorney’s fees but denied
petitioner’s prayer for partition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed
“premature.” It also ordered that a hearing on oppositor’s claim as indicated in her
opposition to the instant petition is necessary to determine ‘whether the properties listed
in the amended complaint filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal or the paraphernal
properties of the deceased, or a co-ownership between the oppositor and the petitioner
in their partnership venture.’”

ISSUE: May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of
ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedents estate?

RULING: It is already recognized that probate court may hear and pass upon questions
of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be
included in the inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely incidental and
provisional. However, it is apparent from the Resolutions that the purpose of the hearing
set by the intestate court was actually to determine the propriety of oppositors
(respondents) claim. According to the intestate court, if it is true that the oppositor
(respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelitas) properties, then it means that she has a
material and direct interest in the estate and, hence, she should be given her day in court.
The intended day in court or hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety of
respondent’s contention that she is the true owner of the bulk of Miguelitas estate.
Although, the respondent made it appear that her only intent was to determine the
accuracy of petitioner’s inventory, however, a close review of the facts and the pleadings
reveals her real intention. Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped
its jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off stance on the
matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of
decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of
the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property,
not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of
the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course of an
intestate or probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.

SABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR., VS. LEONILA

PORTUGAL-BELTRAN Borlagdatan, April

FACTS: It appears from the records that Jose Portugal (Portugal, Sr.) contracted two
marriages. 1st marriage with Paz Lazo in 1942 whom he had a daughter named Leonila
Perpetua Aleli Portugal (respondent) 2nd marriage with Isabel de la Puerta in 1948, who
gave birth to a boy named Jose Douglas Portugal, Jr. (petitioners). By virtue of a Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights executed by Portugal Sr. and his 4 siblings,
over the estate of their father, a parcel of land n Caloocan was issued a TCT in the name
of “Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo”. Paz died in 1984, while Portugal Sr. died
intestate in 1985. In 1988, Leonila executed an “Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of
Estate of Deceased Person”, adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land, and was
subsequently registered (1988) in her name “Leonila Portugal Beltran, married to Merardo
M. Beltran, Jr.” In 1996, Isabel and Portugal, Jr. (petitioners) filed a complaint against
Leonila for cancellation of Affidavit of Adjudication and TCT issued in her name, alleging
that Leonila is not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, Sr., hence, not entitled
to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land, and accordingly prayed that said TCT be cancelled
and a new one be issued in their (petitioner’s) name. A Pre-Trial Order was issued & after
trial, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction
without resolving the issues as stated in the pre-trial order, on the ground that petitioner’s
status and right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate court.
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to CA, citing the case of Carino vs. Carino. In this case,
the SC ratiocinates that the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the
death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity
of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However, the
CA found Carino to be inapplicable. The appellate court held that in Carino case, the main
issue was the validity of the two marriages, whereas in the instant case, the main issue
is the annulment of title to property. Thus, the CA affirmed the TC’s dismissal of the case.
Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: WON petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status
as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of respondent’s Affidavit of
Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name.

RULING: NO. In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was
the sole heir to Portugal’s estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit
of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a
property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a
qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased
left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.

Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate

court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a decease
PADA-KILARIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS Cadavis, Albert
FACTS: Jacinto Pada had six children, namely, Marciano, Ananias, Amador, Higino,
Valentina and Ruperta. He died intestate. His estate included a parcel land a residential
and coconut land in Leyte. It is the northern portion cadastral Lot which is the subject to
the instant controversy. During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano
Pada, obtained permission from him to build a house on the northern. Then Feliciano
died, his son, Pastor, continued living in the house together with his eight children.
Petitioner Verona Pada hilario, one of Pastor/s children, has been living in that house.
The heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extrajudicial partition of his estate. For this
purpose, they executed a private document which they, however, never registered in the
office of the Registrar of Deed. Both Ananias and Marciano, represented by his daughter,
Maria, that cadastral Lot as allocated during the said partition. Then Ananias died, his
daughter, Juanita, succeeded to his right as co-owner of said property. Juanita Pada sold
to engr. Ernesto Paderes, the right of his father, Ananias, as co-owner. Later on, Maria
Pada sell the co-ownership p right of his father, Marciano. Private respondent, who is the
first cousin of Maria, was the buyer. Private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses
vacate the northern portion, so his family can utilize the said area. The amicable
settlement was failed. Private respondent filed in the MCTC, a complaint for ejectment
with prayer for damages against petitioner spouses. However, the heirs of Amador Pada
executed a Deed of Donation transferring to petitioner Verona Pada Hilario, their
respective shares as co-owners of the lot. Petitioner spouses alleged that the northern
portion of the Lot had already been donated to them by the heirs of Amador Pada. They
contended that the extra-judicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada executed was
invalid and ineffectual since no special power of attorney was executed by Marciano,
Amador or Higino in favor of their respective children presented them in the extrajudicial
partition. Moreover, it was effectuated only through a private document that was never
registered in the office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte. the MCTC rendered judgment
in favor of petitioner spouses. Private respondent appealed to the Regional trial court and
render the reversal of judgment. Petitioners filed in the court of Appeals a petition for relief
and later on, a Motion for Reconsideration, however, bot here dismissed. Hence this
petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial partition of the estate is valid RULING:
We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs made
in 1951 is valid albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No law requires
partition among heirs to be in writing and be registered in order to be valid. The
requirement in sec. 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of court that a partition be put in a
public document and registeredhas for its purpose th e protection of creditors and the
heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as
constructive notice to others. it follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not
executed with the prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are
involved. Without creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an
estate to enter into agreement for distribution thereof in manner and upon a plan different
from those provided by the rules from which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred
that a writing and be registered to be valid. The partition of inherited property need not be
embodied in a public document to be effective as regards the heirs that participated
therein. The 1951 extrajudicial partition of Jacinto Pada’s estate being legal and effective
as among his heirs, Juanita and Maria pada validly transferred their ownership rights over
the lot to Engr. Paderes and private respondent.

PEDROSA VS. COURT OF APPEALS De Guzman , Jabrielle

FACTS: Spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated proceedings

before the CFI of Ozamiz City for the legal adoption of herein petitioner, Maria Elena
Rodriguez Pedrosa. CFI granted the petition. Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner
and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguel’s estate, adjudicating
between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel. Private respondents filed
an action to annul the adoption of petitioner before the CFI of Ozamiz City. CFI denied
the petition and upheld the validity of the adoption. Thereafter, the private respondents
appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals. While said appeal was pending, the
Rodríguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina for the
partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the
representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his brothers
and sisters. Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal but upheld the validity of the adoption
of petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share
of the properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and
Loreto were not heirs since they were not their blood relatives. Petitioner, then, filed a
complaint to annul the 1983 partition. Said complaint was later amended on March 25,
1987 to include the allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise were made
between the plaintiffs and the defendants, but the same failed. The Regional Trial Court
dismissed the complaint. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUES: (1) whether or not the complaint for annulment of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Partition had already prescribed (2) whether or not said deed is valid

HELD: Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who
have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition
(2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that
all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or
are represented by themselves or through guardians. Petitioner, as the records confirm,
did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the two-year prescriptive
period is not applicable in her case. The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4)
years. Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or
three years and ten months after the questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11,
1983, was executed, we hold that her action against the respondents on the basis of fraud
has not yet prescribed. Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule
on publication of extrajudicial settlement. It states: The fact of the extrajudicial settlement
or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner
provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding
upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. Under said
provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the
extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The rule contemplates a
notice which must be sent out or issued before the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is
agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of
extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which was when publication was done in
the instant case. The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of
extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed of
extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no
knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Maria Elena is an heir
of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of
Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate,
following the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil Code. The private respondent
Rodriguezes cannot claim that they were not aware of Maria Elenas adoption since they
even filed an action to annul the decree of adoption. Neither can they claim that their
actions were valid since the adoption of Maria Elena was still being questioned at the time
they executed the deed of partition. The complaint seeking to annul the adoption was filed
only twenty six (26) years after the decree of adoption, patently a much delayed response
to prevent Maria Elena from inheriting from her adoptive parents. The decree of adoption
was valid and existing. With this factual setting, it is patent that private respondents
executed the deed of partition in bad faith with intent to defraud Maria Elena. It is clear
that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and
void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The
partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who
were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no
notice thereof. As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it
was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had
prescribed after two years from its execution in 1941. To say that Maria Elena was
represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena, the adopted child,
was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only represented her own
interests and not those of Maria Elena. Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his
estate automatically vested to his child and widow, in equal shares. Respondent
Rodriguezes interests did not include Miguels estate but only Pilars estate.

RULE 75
ALABAN VS COURT OF APPEALS Hipolito, Nina Anthonette
FACTS Respondent Francisco Provido filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will and
Testament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado a. ALLEGATION: he was the heir
of the decedent and the executor of her will. b. RTC’s RULING: allowed the probate of
the will and directed the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent Petitioners after
4 months filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings a. CLAIMs: 1) they
are the intestate heirs of the decedent. 2) RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition
due to non-payment of the correct docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice
to the other heirs. will could not have been probated because: a) the signature of the
decedent was forged; b) the will was not executed in accordance with law, that is, the
witnesses failed to sign below the attestation clause; c) the decedent lacked testamentary
capacity to execute and publish a will; d) the will was executed by force and under duress
and improper pressure; e) the decedent had no intention to make a will at the time of
affixing of her signature; and f)she did not know the properties to be disposed of, having
included in the will properties which no longer belonged to her. b. RTC’s Ruling: denied
motion 1) petitioners were deemed notified of the hearing by publication and that the
deficiency in the payment of docket fees is not a ground for the outright dismissal of the
petition. 2) RTC’s Decision was already final and executory even before petitioners’ filing
of the motion to reopen 3. Petitioners filed a petition to annul RTC’s decision a. CLAIM:
there was a compromise agreement between petitioners and respondents and they learnt
the probate proceeding only in July 2001 b. CA’s RULING: petition dismissed 1) no
showing that petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of newtrial,
appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies through no fault
of their own.

ISSUE: W/N the allowance of the will to probate should be annulled for failure to mention
the petitioners asparties

RULING: No 1. Probate of a will is considered action in rem a. Under the Rules of Court,
any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other personinterested in the
estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction
to have the will allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving the will must bepublished
for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, as
well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator b. Petitioners became parties due to the publication of the notice of hearing 2.The
filing of motion to reopen is similar to a motion for new triala.The ruling became final and
executor because the motion was filed out of time. Given that they knew of the decision
4 months after they could have filed a petition for relief from judgment after the denial of
their motion to reopen. 3. Petition for annulment of judgment must still fail for failure to
comply with the substantive requisites, a. An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy
in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.
PURPOSE: to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a
renewal of litigation. 4. Notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees,
and devisees of the testator a. the will states that the respondent was instituted as the
sole heir of the decedent thus he has no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the
petition for probate or personally notify them.

RULE 76
ANTOS VS. CASTILLO

FACTS: Petitioner Emerita Santos, in her behalf and as guardian of the minor
acknowledge natural children of the deceased, filed a petition for probate of the will of
Nicolas Azores. She also filed a motion for the appointment of a special administrator. At
the hearing, respondents Jose, Sinfrosa and Antonio Azores, legitimate children of the
deceased filed their opposition, on the ground that the court had not acquired jurisdiction
on the case. Petitioner's allegations being insufficient to confer jurisdiction because she
did not allege that she had the custody of the will, and therefore, was not entitled to
present it for probate and furtherance because the will that should be probated is the
original and not a copy thereof, as the one presented by the petitioner. Petitioner filed an
amended petition praying that respondents be required to present the copies of the will
and the codicil in their possession. Court issued an order denying the petition for the
appointment of a special administrator by petitioner and ordered Jose Azores, who has
custody of the last will and testament and all other documents in relation thereto, to deliver
said papers to the court within the date from notice. Consequently, petitioner filed a motion
praying that her amended petition be admitted. However, before this motion was decided,
respondents, after their father's death, presented the original of the will and codicil, and
petitioned that they be admitted for probate. The court issued an order dismissing the
petition filed by the petitioner.

ISSUE: Who is entitled to apply for probate? WON the court acquired jurisdiction over the
case
RULING: Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that no will shall pass either
real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed. For this purpose, section 626
provides that the person who has the custody of he will shall, within 4 days after he knows
of the death of the testator, deliver the will to the court which has jurisdiction, or to the
executor named in the will. Sections 628 and 629 proscribed coercive means to compel
a person having the custody of a will to deliver it to the court which has jurisdiction.
Petitioner alleged that the deceased designated nobody as custodian of his will but that
he directed his nephew Manuel Azores to deliver a copy thereof to her, to keep one in his
possession, and to turn over the other two copies to his son Jose Azores, with instructions
to the effect that if petitioner or his son failed to present said will for probate, Manuel
should take charge of presenting it to the court. Taking everything into account therefore,
it is of the court's view that Jose Azores, the son of the deceased, had the custody of the
will because the original thereof was turned over to him. For the sake of argument,
however, admitting that the testator had designated nobody as custodian of the will, it
cannot be denied that his act of subsequently making a codicil and entrusting the custody
thereof to his legitimate children, clearly modified his last will. In this sense, the custody
of both is entrusted to his legitimate children and not to Manuel Azores or to petitioner.
Hence, as the legitimate children of the deceased had custody of the originals of the will
and of the codicil, they alone could, had the right and where bound by law to apply for the
probate of their father' last will. In order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the
case for the probate of a will and for the administration of the properties left by a deceased
person, the application must allege, in addition to the residence of the deceased and other
indispensable facts or circumstances, that the applicant is the executor in the will or is the
person who had custody of the will to be probated. The original of said document must
be presented or sufficient reasons given to justify the nonrepresentation of said original
and the acceptance of the copy or duplicate thereof. Since these requisites had not been
complied with in the application filed by the petitioner, the respondent judge did not
exceed in jurisdiction in dismissing the application in question.
ANCHETA VS GUERSAY-DALAYGON GR NO. 139868; June 8, 2006

TOPIC: Rule 77 –Allowance of Will Proved Outside of the Philippines and

Administration of Estate Thereunder

Facts: Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were
American citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted
daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey died in 1979. She left a will wherein she
bequeathed her entire estate to Richard consisting of Audrey’s conjugal share in real
estate improvements at Forbes Park, current account with cash balance and shares of
stock in A/G Interiors. Two years after her death, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-
Dalaygon. Four years thereafter, Richard died and left a will wherein he bequeathed his
entire estate to respondent, except for his shares in A/G, which he left to his adopted
daughter. Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in the court where Audrey’s will was
admitted to probate, filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a
project of partition of Audrey’s estate. The motion and project of partition were granted.
Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator with regards to Richard’s will also filed a project of
partition, leaving 2/5 of Richard’s undivided interest in the Forbes property was allocated
to respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereof was allocated to their three children.
Respondent opposed on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, where
Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator
in the property subject to the legacy.
Issue: Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be annulled under the
circumstances.

Held: A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land
of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal.
Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. However, in
exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of
jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested
in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason
of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to
negligence. Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate
according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to
extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12,
1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.

RULE 78

FACTS: In 1995, Dr. Arturo De Los Santos filed a petition for probate of his will. He
declared that he has no compulsory heirs and that he is naming as sole devisee and
legatee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc. (ASF). The named executrix is Pacita De
Los Reyes Phillips. The petition was filed in RTC Makati Branch 61. Judge Fernando
Gorospe of said court determined that Arturo is of sound mind and was not acting in
duress when he signed his last will and testament and so Branch 61 allowed the last will
and testament on February 16, 1996.
Ten days from the allowance, Arturo died. Thereafter, Pacita, as executrix, filed a motion
for the issuance of letters of testamentary with Branch 61. She however withdrew the
motion but later on refilled it with RTC Makati Branch 65.
Meanwhile, a certain Octavio Maloles II filed a motion for intervention with Branch 61
claiming that as a next of kin (him being the full blooded nephew of Arturo) he should be
appointed as the administrator of the estate and that he is an heir.
Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an order transferring the motion filed by Pacita
to Branch 61. Judge Santos ratiocinated that since the probate proceeding started in
Branch 61, then it should be the same court which should hear Pacita’s motion. Branch
61 however refused to consolidate and referred the case back to Branch 65. Branch 65
subsequently consolidated the case per refusal of Branch 61. Eventually, Branch 65
allowed the motion for intervention filed by Octavio.
ISSUE: Whether or not Octavio Maloles II has the right to intervene in the probate
proceeding.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court first clarified that the probate of will filed in Branch 61 has
already terminated upon the allowance of the will. Hence when Pacita filed a motion with
Branch 65, the same is already a separate proceeding and not a continuance of the now
concluded probate in Branch 61. There is therefore no reason for Branch 65 to refer back
the case to Branch 61 as it initially did. Further even if the probate was terminated, under
Rule 73 of the Rules of Court concerning the venue of settlement of estates, it is provided
that when a case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the
branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the other branches.
Anent the issue of Octavio being an heir, such contention has no merit. He is not an heir.
Arturo died testate. Next of kins may only inherit if a person dies intestate. In this case,
Arturo left a valid will which expressly provided that ASF is the sole legatee and devisee
of his estate

TORRES VS. SICAT

FACTS: On August 25, 1950, Luis Morales, married to Hermenegilda Sicat, died in the
municipality of Tarlac, Tarlac Seven days later, Jose Torres alleging to be a creditor of
the conjugal partnership commenced this special proceeding in the Tarlac court
petitioning for the issuance of letter of administration in favor of Atty. Pedro B. De Jesus,
for the purpose of settling the estate of the deceased. Twelve days afterwards the widow
voiced her opposition, and claimed preference to be appointed as administratrix. She said
the only close relatives and forced heirs were her six legitimate minor children, besides
herself.
RTC: The petitioner presented evidence. The oppositor submitted none. Then the trial
judge, disregarding the preference established by law for the surviving widow, entered on
August 16, 1951 an order appointing Atty. Pedro B. De Jesus as administrator. Under
section 6, rule 79 of the Rules of Court, when a person dies intestate, administration
should be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be (b) if such
surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be incompetent or unwilling, . . . it may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve; (c) If there is no such creditor competent and
willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select. The trial
judge was cognizant of this statutory preference. But he expressly stated his reason for
disregarding it, saying in effect: "Apparently the amount of credits exceeds the value of
the conjugal assets; therefore the interest of the creditors deserves paramount
consideration. Now inasmuch as the widow has shown hostility to the creditors by openly
disputing their credits, she is therefore unsuitable, for having adverse interests." A probate
court cannot arbitrarily disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse to the
administration of the estate of a deceased person; but if the person enjoying such
preferential rights is unsuitable the court may appoint another person. Unsuitableness for
appointment as administrator may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to
those immediately interested in the estate of such an extent as to render the appointment
inadvisable. "The surviving widow" the trial judge stated, "has always consistently refused
to recognize the credits" and manifested her determination to "resist the claims of
creditors."
ISSUE: Whether RTC’s appointment should be upheld, ignoring the surviving widows
preferential right.
RULING: In our opinion it is a sound juridical principle that the administrator should not
adopt attitudes nor take steps inimical to the interests of the creditors. The administration
of the intestate is undertaken for the benefit of both the heirs and the creditors. but by
creditors we mean those declared to be so in appropriate proceedings. Before their
credits are fully established they are not "creditors" within the purview of the above
principle. So it is not improper — it is even proper — for the administrator or whoever is
proposed for appointment as such, to oppose, or to require competent proof of, claims
advanced against the estate. "The propriety of contesting particular claims must
frequently be left largely to his discretion and no presumption of bad faith or misconduct
will be made against him." (34 C. J. S., p. 259.) At the hearing of the petition for the
appointment of administrator, this widow practically did nothing more than to inform the
alleged creditors, "prove your credit before I honor it." That is not necessarily dishonest
nor contrary to real creditors. And then, not having opposed all creditors, because she
did not deny the estate's liability to the People's Bank, she could not strictly be considered
hostile to the creditors. Had she acknowledged indebtedness to everyone coming forward
with a claim, regardless of its merit, she would be useless, even harmful, both to the heirs
and the actual creditors. Under the rules (Rule 87) creditors; claims may be filed, and
considered, only after the regular administrator has been appointed. Hence, in selecting
the administrator, the court could not yet normally accord priority treatment to the interests
of those whose credits were in dispute. And counsel for herein appellant did well in
opposing the presentation of evidence of the objected credits at the hearing, arguing in
part, . . . the time has not yet arrived when this court can even entertain the presentation
of those exhibits because the stage of presenting claims has not yet arrived.
Consequently, this court can not even receive as evidence the said documents as
evidence of indebtedness, because if those evidence will be accepted then we will be in
a position to rebut them and to enter into actual trial to show that they are not really
evidence of indebtedness, and in that case we will not terminate because then we will be
contending as to whether those were really executed or really contracted. ... On the other
hand, the appealed order conceding that the evidence "showed clearly that the surviving
widow is fully competent in a high degree to administer the intestate of her deceased
husband", plainly indicates that except for her supposed hostility to creditors she was
suitable for the trust. Consequently, having found that her attitude did not per se constitute
antagonism to the creditors, we must necessarily declare and enforce her superior right
to appointment as administratrix under Rule 79. Wherefore, the questioned order
appointing Atty. Pedro B. De Jesus is annulled, and one will be entered requiring the
issuance by the court a quo of letters of administration to the widow appellant subject to
such terms and conditions as are appropriate under the Rules. Costs against the
appellee.

RULE 79
TAYAG VS. TAYAG-GALLOR
FACTS: Respondent, Tayag-Gallor or TG, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over the estate of Ismael Tayad. She claims that she is 1 of 3 illegitimate
children of Ismael. Ismael was married to petitioner but they didn't have any children of
their own. Ismael died intestate, leaving behind 2 lots and one motor vehicle, both in
possession of petitioner. Petitioner promised respondent and her brothers 100K each as
their share in the proceeds of the sale of the motor vehicle. Petitioner only gave half.
Respondent alleged that petitioner intends to dispose of the properties of Ismael to the
respondents prejudice, Petitioner opposed this petition of TG asserting that the properties
were purchased by her using her own money, she even denied all of petitioners
allegations. Petitioner filed for dismissal for failure to state a cause of action. Petitioner
reiterated that she is the sole owner of the properties by presenting TCTs. She also
averred that it was necessary for respondent to show proof that she was acknowledged
and recognized by Ismael Tayag. There being no such allegation, the action becomes
one to compel recognition. DENIED. CA also denied petitioners motion and directed the
trial court to proceed with the dispatch. CA ruled that the allegation of respondent that
she is an illegitimate child suffices for a cause of action, without the need to state that she
had been recognized or acknowledged. Petitioner came to the SC and asserts that
respondent should not be allowed to prove her filiation in the settlement of Ismael's estate.
Because the claim of filiation should not be allowed to be proved in an action for
settlement of an estate.
ISSUE: Whether respondent's petition for the issuance of letters of administration
sufficiently states a cause of action considering that she merely alleged she is an
illegitimate child?
RULING: YES. Petition for issuance of letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person. An interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate, such
as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest
must be material and direct. The petition for the issuance is a suit for the settlement of
the intestate estate of Ismael Tayag. The right of respondent to maintain such a suit is
dependent on whether she is entitled to successional rights as an illegitimate child which
may be established through voluntary or compulsory recognition. Petitioner’s ground is
essentially based on her contention that by Ismael's death, respondent can no longer
establish her filiation. However, petitioner overlooked the fact that respondent's
successional rights may be established not just by judicial action to compel recognition
but also by proof that she had been voluntarily acknowledged. Respondent was yet to
show her proof of filiation because of petitioner's opposition. So, there is no way yet to
determine if her petition is actually one to compel recognition or whether she has a
material and direct interest to maintain the suit. So, the allegation that respondent is an
illegitimate child suffices even without stating that she has been recognized or
acknowledged. This petition by petitioner is DENIED.

RULE 80
HEIRS OF CASTILLO VS. GABRIEL
FACTS: On January 25, 1989, Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel, wife of Lorenzo Almoradie, died
in Malabon City leaving behind a sizable inheritance consisting mostly of real estate and
shares of stock. A month after her death, Crisanta’s mother commenced an intestate
proceedings before RTC of Malabon City docketed as Spc. Proc. No. 192-MN. She
prayed among others that the letters of administration be issued to her son, Mariano
Yanga, brother of Crisanta. RTC appointed Lorenzo as administrator. However, the
marriage between Lorenzo and Crisanta was declared void for being bigamous. Then,
RTC removed Lorenzo as administrator and appointed Mariano. On October 16, 1989,
Belinda Dahlia Castillo filed a motion for intervention, claiming that she is the only
legitimate child of Lorenzo and Crisanta but on June 2, 1990 Belinda Castillo died. On
November 3, 1989, Roberto Y. Gabriel filed before RTC a petition for probate of an
alleged will and for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favour. He alleged that he
discovered his mother’s will on Oct. 25, 1989 in which he was instituted as the sole heir
and designated as alternate executor for the named executor therein, Francisco Yanga,
brother of Crisanta, who had predeceased the latter. The RTC of Malabon City dismissed
the intestate proceedings of Spec. Proc. No. 192-MN. The probate court appointed
Roberto Y. Gabriel as special administrator of his mother’s estate. However, on April 16,
2001, Roberto died. His widow Dolores filed a Manifestation and Motion where she
informed the probate court about her husband’s death and prayed that she be admitted
as substitute in place of her late husband and be appointed as administratix as well. Heirs
of Belinda opposed to it contended that she was not Crisanta’s next of kin. RTC appointed
Dolores as special administratix. The Heirs of Belinda moved to reconsider but it was
denied by the probate court. CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE: Whether the appointment of Dolores as special administratix by probate court is
proper
HELD: Yes. The Court has repeatedly held that the appointment of a special administrator
lies in the sound discretion of the probate court. A special administrator is a representative
of a decedent, appointed by the probate court to care for and preserve his estate until an
executor or general administrator is appointed. When appointed, a special administrator
is regarded not as a representative of the agent of the parties suggesting the appointment,
but as the administrator in charge of the estate, and, in fact, as an officer of the court. As
such officer, he is subject to the supervision and control of the probate court and is
expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, especially its smooth
administration and earliest settlement. The principal object of appointment of temporary
administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass into hands of person fully
authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs. In many instances, the
appointment of administrators for the estates of decedents frequently become involved in
protracted litigations, thereby exposing such estates to great waste and losses unless an
authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the assets in the interim is appointed.
The occasion for such an appointment, likewise, arises where, for some cause, such as
a pendency of a suit concerning the proof of the will, regular administration is delayed.
The new Rules have broadened the basis for the appointment of an administrator, and
such appointment is allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or
administration by any cause, e.g. , parties cannot agree among themselves. It needs to
be emphasized that in the appointment of a special administrator (which is but temporary
and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed), the probate court does not
determine the shares in the decedents estate, but merely appoints who is entitled to
administer the estate. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of
distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the
administration as to be the basis of distribution. Thus, the preference of respondent is
sound, that is, not whimsical, or contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle. The
petitioners strenuous invocation of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court is misplaced.
The rule refers to the appointment of regular administrators of estates; Section 1, Rule
80, on the other hand, applies to the appointment of a special administrator. It has long
been settled that the appointment of special administrators is not governed by the rules
regarding the appointment of regular administrators.

RULE 81
RULE 82
OCAMPO VS OCAMPO G.R. No. 187879 July 5, 2010
FACTS: Vicente and Maxima Ocampo died intestate leaving 3 children namely Leonardo,
Renato and Erlinda. The 3 siblings divided the profits of the decedents’ estate among
themselves. Subsequently, Leonardo died leaving his surviving spouse Dalisay and 3
children namely Vince, Merlinda and Leonardo, Jr. When Leonardo died, Renato and
Erlinda took over to the exclusion of the widowed wife Dalisay. Dalisay and her 3 children
filed a petition for intestate proceedings of the estate of Vicente, Maxima and her
deceased husband Leonardo. It seeks to settle the estate and appoint an administrator
to divide such as they were not receiving any profit anymore. Respondents Renato and
Erlinda countered assailing the petition defective as it sought two estates in one
proceeding (Estate of Vicente and Maxima; and Leonardo’s estate.)There was a motion
to appoint Renato and Erlinda as administrators but was countered by Dalisay as it would
cause further injustice and nominated Binan Rural Bank as administrator. Trial Court
accepted that respondent Renato and petitioner Dalisay be appointed as joint
administrators. Petitioner Dalisay was revoked of her appointment as her nomination of
Binan Rural bank constituted a waiver and the court found that she is unfit to such office.
Renato and Erlinda, as special administrators, was ordered by the court to produce a true
inventory of the estate. RTC later on revoked the appointment of Renato and Erlinda for
failure to comply with the order and failure to pay the bond as prescribed by the rules and
that there was an alleged sale made by them involving a real property belonging to the
estate. Renato and Erlinda (Respondents herein) appealed to the CA and CA ruled that
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in appointing Melinda (daughter of Dalisay)
as a regular administrator.
ISSUE: WON the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion on the revocation of the
respondents as special administrators and appointment of Merlinda (daughter of Dalisay)
as regular administratrix.
RULING: The court finds no abuse of discretion on the revocation but finds it improper
for Merlinda to be a “regular” administratrix. The probate court may at its discretion
appoint or remove special administrators toher than the groundsenumerated in the Rules.
The respondents were not able to comply with the payment of the bond which is required
in Rule 81 and also, there was evident bad faith on the part of the respondents as
administrators when an alleged sale of the property included in the estate was done thru
a conditional deed of sale. As a result of such transaction, it deprived the estate of profits
accruing from the said real property (monthly rentals.) Such reason of the probate court
being grounded on equity, justice and legal principles. As to the appointment of Merlinda,
it must be as a “special” administrator and not a “regular” administrator. Rule 78
determines the persons to be appointed as regular administrators. She is neither an heir
or a creditor to the estate. However, the SC held her as a special administratrix due to
her competency in filing the bond and true inventory of the estate as soon as the RTC
appointed her of such responsibility. Such acts clearly manifested her intention to serve
willingly. Pending the proceeding for regular administration, Merlinda is designated as
special administratrix of the estate.
RULE 83
RULE 84
RULE 85
QUASHA-PENA VS. LCN CONS G.R. No. 174873 August 26, 2008
FACTS: Raymond Triviere passed away on December 14, 1987. On January 13, 1988,
proceedings for the settlement of his intestate estate were instituted by his widow, Amy Consuelo
Triviere, before the RTc of Makati City Atty. Enrique P. Syquia and Atty. William H. Quasha of
the Quasha Law Office, representing the widow and children of the late Raymond Triviere,
respectively, were appointed administrators of the estate of the deceased in April 1988. As
administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of real estate
taxes, security services, and the preservation and administration of the estate, as well as litigation
expenses. In February 1995, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for
Payment of their litigation expenses but the RTC denied the said motion in May 1955. In 1996,
Atty. Quasha also passed away. Atty. Redentor Zapata also of the Quasha Law Office, took over
as the counsel of the Triviere children, and continued to help Atty. Syquia in the settlement of the
estate. On 6 September 2002, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another Motion for Payment, for
their own behalf and for their respective clients. On the other hand, LCN, the only remaining
claimant against the Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond Triviere filed its Comment
on/Opposition to the Motion on 2. LCN countered that the RTC had already resolved the issue of
payment of litigation expenses when it denied the first Motion for Payment filed by Atty. Syquia
and Atty. Quasha for failure of the administrators to submit an accounting of the assets and
expenses of the estate as required by the court. Eventually, the RTC granted the second Motion for
Payment; however, it reduced the sums to be paid. LCN, then filed a motion for reconsideration
but the same was denied by the RTC. Recourse was then resorted to the Court of Appeals. On May
2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision essentially ruling in favor of LCN. While the
Court of Appeals conceded that Atty. Syquia and the Quasha Law Office, as the administrators of
the estate of the late Raymond Triviere, were entitled toadministrator's fees and litigation expenses,
they could not claim the same from the funds of the estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Quasha Law Office is entitled to payment of the expenses incurred as
executor or administrator of the estate of Triviere.
HELD: No. Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court, which reads: Section 7.
What expenses and fees allowed executor or administrator. Not to charge for services as attorney.
Compensation provided by will controls unless renounced. When the executor or administrator is
an attorney, he shall not charge against the estate any professional fees for legal services rendered
by him. The afore-quoted provision is clear and unequivocal and needs no statutory construction.
Here, in attempting to exempt itself from the coverage of said rule, the Quasha Law Office presents
conflicting arguments to justify its claim for attorney's fees against the estate. At one point, it
alleges that the award of attorney's fees was payment for its administration of the estate of the late
Raymond Triviere; yet, it would later renounce that it was an administrator
RULE 86
STRONGHOLD VS. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 147561 June 22, 2006
FACTS: Republic Asahi Glass contracts with JDS for the construction of roadways and drainage
systems in RAG's compound. JDS does so andfiles the required compliance bond with Stronghold
Insurance acting as surety. The contract is 5.3M the bond is 795k. JDS falls woefully behind
schedule, prompting RAG to rescind the contract and demand the compliance bond. The owner of
JDS dies and JDS disappears. Shire fuses to pay the bond claiming that the death of JDS owner
extinguishes the obligation.
ISSUE: WON petitioner’s liability under the performance bond was automatically extinguished
by the death of Santos, the principal.
RULING: As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the
obligation. Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented
by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only obligations that are
personal or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death. Furthermore, the
liability of petitioner is contractual in nature, because it executed a performance bond, as a surety,
petitioner is solidarily liable with Santos in accordance with the Civil Code. Section 5 of Rule 86
of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims arising from a contract
against the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not actually extinguished. What
is extinguished is only the obligee’s action or suit filed before the court, which is not then acting
as a probate court. In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had
under his contracts with respondent were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by
provision of law. Hence, his death did not result in the extinguishment of those obligations or
liabilities, which merely passed on to his estate. Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set
up to wipe out the obligations under the performance bond. Consequently, petitioner as surety
cannot use his death to escape its monetary obligation under its performance bond.

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT

CORPORATION G.R. No. 170498. January 9, 2013
FACTS: On October 5, 2000, Sherwood Holdings Corporation, Inc. (SHCI) filed a complaint for
sum of money against Absolute Management Corporation (AMC). The complaint was docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-00-42105 and was assigned to the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 80. SHCI
alleged in its complaint that it made advance payments to AMC for the purchase of 27,000 pieces
of plywood and 16,500 plyboards in the sum of P12,277,500.00, covered by Metrobank Check
Nos. 1407668502, 140768507, 140768530, 140768531, 140768532, 140768533 and 140768534.
These checks were all crossed, and were all made payable to AMC. They were given to Chua,
AMC’s General Manager, in 1998. Chua died in 1999, and a special proceeding for the settlement
of his estate was commenced before the RTC of Pasay City. This proceeding was pending at the
time AMC filed its answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint. SHCI made demands on
AMC, after Chua’s death, for allegedly undelivered items worth P8,331,700.00. According to
AMC, these transactions could not be found in its records. Upon investigation, AMC discovered
that in 1998, Chua received from SHCI 18 Metrobank checks worth P31,807,500.00. These were
all payable to AMC and were crossed or for payee’s account only
ISSUE: Whether Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint against Chua’s estate should be allowed.
HELD: YES. RATIO: The specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court should
prevail over the general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court; the settlement of
the estate of deceased persons (where claims against the deceased should be filed) is primarily
governed by the rules on special proceedings, while the rules provided for ordinary claims,
including Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, merely apply suppletorily.

RULE 87