Laurel vs Garcia

GR 92013 July 25, 1990.

Facts:

Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi Property, which
is located in Japan. It is one of the properties given by the Japanese Government as
reparations for damage done by the latter to the former during the war.

Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is property of public
dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated.

Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply to the case
because the property is located in Japan. They posit that the principle of lex situs
applies.

Issues and Held:

1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated.

The answer is in the affirmative.

Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is
convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents
have failed to do. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the
commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.

2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.

The answer is in the affirmative.

We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law
situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over
the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer
immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the
transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined; and (2)
A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a
domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should
apply.

In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.

The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question
that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent
officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the
procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex
situs does not apply.

The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of
the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real
properties procured through reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority
to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely
explains that it is the foreign law which should determine who can acquire the properties
so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino
citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.

Saudi Arabian Airlines vs Court of Appeals

Milagros Morada was working as a stewardess for Saudia Arabian Airlines. In 1990,
while she and some co-workers were in a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, an Arab co-
worker tried to rape her in a hotel room. Fortunately, a roomboy heard her cry for help
and two of her Arab co-workers were arrested and detained in Indonesia. Later, Saudia
Airlines re-assigned her to work in their Manila office. While working in Manila, Saudia
Airlines advised her to meet with a Saudia Airlines officer in Saudi. She did but to her
surprise, she was brought to a Saudi court where she was interrogated and eventually
sentenced to 5 months imprisonment and 289 lashes; she allegedly violated Muslim
customs by partying with males. The Prince of Makkah got wind of her conviction and
the Prince determined that she was wrongfully convicted hence the Prince absolved her
and sent her back to the Philippines. Saudia Airlines later on dismissed Morada.
Morada then sued Saudia Airlines for damages under Article 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code. Saudia Airlines filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the case because the applicable law should be the law of Saudi Arabia.
Saudia Airlines also prayed for other reliefs under the premises.
ISSUE: Whether or not Saudia Airlines’ contention is correct.
HELD: No. Firstly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over Saudia Airlines when the
latter filed a motion to dismiss with petition for other reliefs. The asking for other reliefs
effectively asked the court to make a determination of Saudia Airlines’s rights hence a
submission to the court’s jurisdiction.
Secondly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the case because as alleged in the
complaint of Morada, she is bringing the suit for damages under the provisions of our
Civil Law and not of the Arabian Law. Morada then has the right to file it in the QC RTC
because under the Rules of Court, a plaintiff may elect whether to file an action in
personam (case at bar) in the place where she resides or where the defendant resides.
Obviously, it is well within her right to file the case here because if she’ll file it in Saudi
Arabia, it will be very disadvantageous for her (and of course, again, Philippine Civil
Law is the law invoked).
Thirdly, one important test factor to determine where to file a case, if there is a foreign
element involved, is the so called “locus actus” or where an act has been done. In the
case at bar, Morada was already working in Manila when she was summoned by her
superior to go to Saudi Arabia to meet with a Saudia Airlines officer. She was not
informed that she was going to appear in a court trial. Clearly, she was defrauded into
appearing before a court trial which led to her wrongful conviction. The act of
defrauding, which is tortuous, was committed in Manila and this led to her humiliation,
misery, and suffering. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, the SC finds
that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged
tortious conduct took place).

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner, vs.

HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and
Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting
Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as
the Superintendent of International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL
SCHOOL, INC., respondents.,

G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000

FACTS:

Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is a

domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign
diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The decree authorizes the School
to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or
abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from
otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that
have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. School hires both foreign
and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-
hires and (2) local-hires.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-hires
are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-hires.

When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a legitimate
labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the
School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This
issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the
appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.

ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB, the
matter reached the DOLE which favored the School. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires.

RULING:

NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is entitled to
“humane conditions of work.” These conditions are not restricted to the physical
workplace – the factory, the office or the field – but include as well the manner by which
employers treat their employees.

Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code.

Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard
to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.

The Constitution enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and promote their
welfare, In Section 18, Article II of the constitution mandates “to afford labor full
protection”. The State has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and
capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public
interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to
the common good.

However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.
A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less
than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate
to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the
collective bargaining provisions of the law.

The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of
the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees’ interest, such
as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working
conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and
(4) similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure
to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.

In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to
be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective
bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated
separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure.
Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as
the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires
such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel
allowances. These benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and
justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining
unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective
collective bargaining rights.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED
IN PART.

G.R. No. L-11759 March 16, 1917

CAYETANO LIM and MARCIANO LIM, petitioners-appellants,

vs.
THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, respondent-appellee.

Williams, Ferrier and SyCip for appellants.

Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

The real question raised on this appeal is whether the Insular Collector of Customs may
lawfully deny entry into the Philippine Islands to two children aged 8 and 14 years,
respectively, under and by authority of the Chinese Immigration, Laws, it appearing that
the children arrived at the Port of Manila accompanied by and in the custody of their
mother, a Filipino woman; that they were born in China, out of lawful wedlock; and that
their father was a Chinese person.

It is contended, on behalf of the Insular Collector of Customs, that these children being
Chinese persons are denied the right of entrance into the Philippine Islands under the
express terms of the Chinese immigration laws. On the other hand, it is urged on behalf
of the children that they are entitled to enter, regardless of the provisions of the Chinese
immigration laws, since the admitted facts, as it is said, disclose that they are citizens of
the Philippine Islands; and for the further reason, that their mother, who is entitled to
their custody and charged with their maintenance and education, is clearly entitled to
take up her residence in the Philippine Islands and should not be required, to that end,
to abandon her minor children.

Without discussing or deciding any of the contentions of the parties as to the rights of
citizenship of these children, actual or inchoate, we are of opinion that by analogous
reasoning to that upon which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the
wives and minor children of Chinese merchants domiciled in the United States may
enter that country without certificates, these children must be held to be entitled to enter
the Philippine Islands with their mother, for the purpose of taking up their residence here
with her, it appearing that she is natural guardian, entitled to their custody and charged
with their maintenance and education. (U. S. vs. Gue Lim, 176 U. S. 459.)

In the case just cited the court said:

While the literal construction of the section would require a certificate, as therein
stated, from every Chinese person, other than a laborer, who should come into
the country, yet such a construction leads to what we think an absurd result, for it
requires a certificate for a wife of a merchant, among others, in regard to whom
its would be impossible to give the particulars which the statute requires shall be
stated in such certificate.

"Nothing is better settled," says the present Chief Justice, in Lau Ow

Bew vs. United States (144 U. S., 59) "than that statutes should receive a
sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if
possible, so as to avoid and unjust or an absurd conclusion.

The purposes of the sixth section, requiring the certificate, was not to prevent the
persons named in the second article of the treaty from coming into the country,
but to prevent Chinese laborers from entering under the guise of being one of the
classes permitted by the treaty. It is the coming of Chinese laborers that the act
is aimed against.

It was said in the opinion in the Lau Ow Bew case, in speaking of the provisions
that the sole evidence permissible should be the certificate: "This rule of
evidence was evidently prescribed by the amendment as a means of effectually
 preventing the violation or evasion of the prohibition against the coming of
Chinese laborers. It was designed as a safeguard to prevent the unlawful entry of
such laborers, under the pretense that they belong to the merchant class or to
some other of the admitted classes."

It was also held in that case that although the literal wording of the statute of
1884, section six, would require a certificate in the case of a merchant already
domiciled in the United States and who had left the country for temporary
purposes, animo revertendi, yet its true and proper construction did not include
his case, and the general terms used in the act were limited to those persons to
whom Congress manifestly intended to apply them, which would be those who
were about to come to the United States for the first time, and not to those
Chinese merchants already domiciled in the United States who had gone to
China for temporary purposes only, with the intention of returning. The case of
Wan Shing vs. United States (140 U. S., 24), was referred to, and attention called
to the fact that the appellant therein was not a merchant but a laborer, who had
acquired no commercial domicile in this county, and was clearly within the
exception requiring him to procure and produce the certificate specified in the
act. The rule was approved, and the differences in the two cases pointed out by
the Chief Justice.

To hold that a certificate is required in this case is to decide that the woman
cannot come into this country at all, for it is not possible for her to comply with the
act, because she cannot in any event procure the certificate even by returning to
China. She must come in as the wife of her domiciled husband or not at all. The
act was never meant to accomplish the result of permanently excluding the wife
under the circumstances of this case, and we think that, properly and reasonably
construed, it does not do so. If we hold that she is entitled to come in as the wife,
because the true construction of the treaty and the act permits it, there is no
provision which makes the certificate the only proof of the fact that she is such
wife.

In the case of the minor children, the same result must follow as in that of the
wife. All the reasons which favor the construction of the statute as exempting the
wife from the necessity of procuring a certificate apply with equal force to the
case of minor children of a member or members of the admitted classes. They
come in by reason of their relationship to the father, and whether they
accompany or follow him, a certificate is not necessary in either case. When the
fact is established to the satisfaction of the authorities that the person claiming to
enter, either as wife or minor child, is in fact the wife or minor child of one of the
members of the class mentioned in the treaty as entitled to enter, them that
person in entitled to admission without the certificate.

We are not advised of any provision of Chinese law which differentiates the status of
infant children, born out of lawful wedlock, from that of similar children under the laws in
force in the Philippine Islands. We assume, therefore, that in China as well as in the
Philippine Islands such children have the right to look to their mother for their
maintenance and education, and that she is entitled to their custody and control in
fulfilling the obligations towards them which are imposed upon her, not only by the
natural impulses of love and affection, but also by the express mandate of the law. And
it having been held on the highest authority that the general terms of the Act were
limited to those to whom Congress manifestly intended to apply them as set forth in the
foregoing opinion, and that "nothing is better settled than that statutes should receive a
sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possible, so
as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion," we are of opinion that the Chinese
Immigration Laws should not be construed so as to exclude infant children of a Filipino
mother, born out of lawful wedlock, seeking entrance to the Philippine Islands for the
purpose of taking up their residence with her in her native land.

It has been suggested that such a ruling opens the door to fraud and evasion, but we
are not much impressed with the force of this suggestion, knowing as we do that the
immigration authorities have been furnished by the law with peculiarly effective
machinery for its enforcement, well calculated to defeat any attempt to make an
unauthorized or improper use of so manifestly reasonable an exception from the literal
construction and application of its general provisions.

Some confusion seems to have arisen in the court below as to the precise nature and
effect of the somewhat inartificial pleadings upon which these proceedings were
submitted. The case appears to have been submitted upon an answer to an order to
show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not issue upon the petition filed on
behalf of the infant children. In the form in which the answer is couched, there is much
in the contention of the appellee that the trial court should have treated the answer as in
substance and effect a demurrer to the petition, admitting the truth of the facts alleged
therein, but praying judgment as to whether it sets forth facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action and to justify the issuance of the writ. We are inclined to think, however,
that the understanding of the parties and of the court below was that the answer should
be treated rather as in the nature of a return to a writ of habeas corpus, accepting as
true the allegations of the petition but maintaining the legality of the detention upon the
facts thus submitted. Without considering at this time whether in habeas corpus
proceedings the respondent may, without consent of court, demur to, instead of
answering an order to show cause why the writ should not issue, and without
considering or deciding the course which should be pursued where a respondent
attempts to file a demurrer to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in lieu of the return
prescribed by the statute to the writ when actually issued; we treat the answer to the
order to show cause in the case at bar as we think the parties and the court below
understood it should be treated, that is to say, as in substance and effect the return
which the Insular Collector desired to make to the writ of habeas corpus issued or
assumed to have been issued in response to the petition on behalf of the children held
in custody by him.

We conclude, therefore, that, it appearing that the respondent Collector of Customs is

detaining the petitioners under an erroneous construction of the immigration laws, and it
appearing from the facts disclosed by the administrative proceedings that these children
are entitled to admission into the Philippine Islands, the order entered in the court below
should be reversed, and in lieu thereof an order should be entered directing the
discharge of these children from the custody of the Insular Collector of Customs, with
the costs in both instances, de officio. So ordered.

. Sweet Lines Inc. vs. Teves, et. Al.

G.R. No. L-37750 May 19, 1978

Lessons Applicable: Contract of Adhesion (Transportation)

Laws Applicable:

FACTS: Atty. Leovigildo Tandog and Rogelio Tiro bought tickets for Tagbilaran City via
the port of Cebu Since many passengers were bound for Surigao, M/S "Sweet Hope
would not be proceeding to Bohol. They went to the proper brancg office and was
relocated to M/S "Sweet Town" where they were forced to agree "to hide at the cargo
section to avoid inspection of the officers of the Philippine Coastguard." and they were
exposed to the scorching heat of the sun and the dust coming from the ship's cargo of
corn grits and their tickets were not honored so they had to purchase a new one. They
sued Sweet Lines for damages and for breach of contract of carriage before the Court
of First Instance of Misamis Oriental who dismissed the complaint for improper venue. A
motion was premised on the condition printed at the back of the tickets –dismissed
instant petition for prohibition for preliminary injunction

ISSUE: W/N a common carrier engaged in inter-island shipping stipulate thru condition
printed at the back of passage tickets to its vessels that any and all actions arising out
of the contract of carriage should be filed only in a particular province or city

HELD: NO. petition for prohibition is DISMISSED. Restraining order LIFTED and SET
ASIDE

contract of adhesion not that kind of a contract where the parties sit down to deliberate,
discuss and agree specifically on all its terms, but rather, one which respondents took
no part at all in preparing just imposed upon them when they paid for the fare for the
freight they wanted to ship. We find and hold that Condition No. 14 printed at the back
of the passage tickets should be held as void and unenforceable for the following
reasons circumstances obligation in the inter-island ship will prejudice rights and
interests of innumerable passengers in different s of the country who, under Condition
No. 14, will have to file suits against petitioner only in the City of Cebu subversive of
public policy on transfers of venue of actions philosophy underlying the provisions on
transfer of venue of actions is the convenience of the plaintiffs as well as his witnesses
and to promote 21 the ends of justice.
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation vs. Jack Robert Sherman

G.R. No. 72494 11 August 1989 Medialdea, J:

Facts: Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd., a company incorporated in Singapore applied with,
and was granted by, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Singapore
branch an overdraft facility in the maximum amount of Singapore dollars 200,000.00
(which amount was subsequently increased to Singapore dollar 375,000.00). As a
security for the repayment bythe COMPANY of the sum advanced, Jack Robert
Sherman and Deodato Reloj, herein private respondents, and a certain Robin de Clive
Lowe, all of whom were directors of said COMPANY at such time, executed a Joint and
Several Guarantee in favor of petitioner BANK whereby they agreed to pay, jointly and
severally, on demand all sums owed by the COMPANY to petitioner BANK under the
aforestated overdraft facility. The Joint and Several Guarantee provides that: "This
guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed
and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic
of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts of Singapore
shall have jurisdiction overall disputes arising under this guarantee . . ." The COMPANY
failed to pay its obligation. Thus, petitioner BANK demanded payment from the private
respondents, conformably with the provisions of the Joint and Several Guarantee.
Inasmuch as the private respondents still failed to pay, petitioner BANK filed a civil case
for a collection of a sum of money against Sherman and Reloj before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. In turn, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint and over the
persons of the defendants, but, it was denied. Subsequently, the court granted the
petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the suit.
Held: Yes. The parties did not stipulate that only the courts of Singapore, to the
exclusion of all the rest, has jurisdiction. Neither did the clause in question operate to
divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction. In International Law, jurisdiction is often defined
as the right of a State to exercise authority over persons and things within
its boundaries subject to certain exceptions. This authority, which finds its source in the
concept of sovereignty, is exclusive within and throughout the domain of the State. A
State is competent to take hold of any judicial matter it sees fit by making its courts and
agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases brought before them. While it is
true that “the transaction took place in Singaporean setting” and that law not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in International Law: a State does
not have jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it, whether
the proceedings are in rem quasi in rem or in personam. To be reasonable, the
jurisdiction must be based on some minimum contacts that will not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice. The defense of private respondents that the
complaint should have been filed in Singapore is based merely on technicality. They did
not even claim, much less prove, that the filing of the action here will cause them any
unnecessary trouble, damage, or expense. On the other hand, there is no showing that
petitioner BANK filed the action here just to harass private respondents.

PHILSEC INVESTMENT et al vs.CA et al

G.R. No. 103493 June 19, 1997

FACTS: Private respondent Ducat obtained separate loans from petitioners Ayala
International Finance Limited (AYALA) and Philsec Investment Corp (PHILSEC),
secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat.
In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, private respondent 1488, Inc., through its
president, private respondent Daic, assumed Ducat’s obligation under an Agreement,
whereby 1488, Inc. executed a Warranty Deed with Vendor’s Lien by which it sold to
petitioner Athona Holdings, N.V. (ATHONA) a parcel of land in Texas, U.S.A., while
PHILSEC and AYALA extended a loan to ATHONA as initial payment of the purchase
price. The balance was to be paid by means of a promissory note executed by
ATHONA in favor of 1488, Inc. Subsequently, upon their receipt of the money from
1488, Inc., PHILSEC and AYALA released Ducat from his indebtedness and delivered
to 1488, Inc. all the shares of stock in their possession belonging to Ducat.

As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance, the entire amount covered by the
note became due and demandable. Accordingly, private respondent 1488, Inc. sued
petitioners PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in the United States for payment of the
balance and for damages for breach of contract and for fraud allegedly perpetrated by
petitioners in misrepresenting the marketability of the shares of stock delivered to 1488,
Inc. under the Agreement.

While the Civil Case was pending in the United States, petitioners filed a complaint “For
Sum of Money with Damages and Writ of Preliminary Attachment” against private
respondents in the RTC Makati. The complaint reiterated the allegation of petitioners in
their respective counterclaims in the Civil Action in the United States District Court of
Southern Texas that private respondents committed fraud by selling the property at a
price 400 percent more than its true value.

Ducat moved to dismiss the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati on the grounds of (1) litis
pendentia, vis-a-vis the Civil Action in the U.S., (2) forum non conveniens, and (3)
failure of petitioners PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to state a cause of action.

The trial court granted Ducat’s MTD, stating that “the evidentiary requirements of the
controversy may be more suitably tried before the forum of the litis pendentia in the
U.S., under the principle in private international law of forum non conveniens,” even as it
noted that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.

Petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the principle
of litis pendentia and forum non conveniens.
The CA affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case against Ducat, 1488, Inc., and Daic on the
ground of litis pendentia.

ISSUE: is the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati barred by the judgment of the U.S. court?

HELD: CA reversed. Case remanded to RTC-Makati. NO

While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several
cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. This is because in this
jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a
foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of
a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. Rule 39, §50 provides:

Sec. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. — The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a

foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title
to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but
the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to
challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res judicata or
conclusive of the rights of private respondents. The proceedings in the trial court were
summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was even furnished copies of
the pleadings in the U.S. court or apprised of the evidence presented thereat, to assure
a proper determination of whether the issues then being litigated in the U.S. court were
exactly the issues raised in this case such that the judgment that might be rendered
would constitute res judicata.

Second. Nor is the trial court’s refusal to take cognizance of the case justifiable under
the principle of forum non conveniens:

First, a MTD is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, sec.1, which does not include
forum non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle
requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly considered a matter of
defense.
Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming
jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after “vital facts are established, to
determine whether special circumstances” require the court’s desistance.
Jorge Gonzales and Panel of Arbitrators v. Climax Mining Ltd., Climax-Arimco
Mining Corp., and Australasian Philippines Mining Inc.
G.R. No. 161957
FACTS
• Consolidation of two previous cases in the same disputed Addendum Contract
entered into by the parties.
▫ There was an arbitration clause in the Addendum Contract
• Petition to compel arbitration filed by Climax-Arimco before the RTC of Makati
while the complaint for the nullification of the Addendum Contract was pending
before the DENR Panel of Arbitrators.
• Climax had sent Gonzales a demand for arbitration pursuant to the arbitration
clause of the Addendum Contract.
• Gonzales filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Addendum Contract
containing the arbitration clause is void in view of the acts of fraud, oppression
and violation of the Constitution and other acts committed by Climax.
• The RTC granted Gonzales motion and set the case for pre-trial.
• Another motion for reconsideration filed by Climax claiming that RA 876 does not
authorize a pre-trial but directs the court to hear the motion summarily and
resolve the same within 10days.
• Judge Pimentel granted the motion and directed the parties to arbitration.
ISSUE
• Whether or not it was proper for the RTC, in the proceeding to compel arbitration
to order the parties to arbitrate even though the defendant therein has raised the
twin issues of validity and nullity of the Addendum Contract.
• The case should go to arbitration.
• Disputes do not go to arbitration unless and until the parties have
agreed to abide by the arbitrator’s decision.
• A contract is required for arbitration to take place and to be binding.
• Two or more persons may submit to the arbitration of one or more
arbitrators any controversy existing between them at the time of the
submission which may be the subject of an action, or the parties
 may in such contract agree to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising between them.
• Submission shall be valid, enforceable and irrevocable
• Exception: Grounds recognized by law for the revocation of any
contract.
• Gonzales’ complaint alleged fraud but did not provide any
particulars to substantiate it. The complaint repeatedly
mentioned fraud, oppression, violation of the Constitution
and similar conclusions but nowhere did it give any ultimate
facts or particulars relative to the allegations.

Case Title: US vs Look Chow, 18 Phil 573

Subject Matter: Applicability of the provisions of Art 2 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:

Between 11 and 12 o'clock a.m. in August 19, 1909, the Port of Cebu and internal
revenue agent of Cebu, respectively, went aboard the steamship Erroll to inspect and
search its cargo, and found two sacks containing opium. The defendant stated freely
and voluntarily that he had bought these sacks of opium in Hong Kong with the intention
of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that as his hold had already
been searched several times for opium he ordered two other chinamen to keep the
sack. All the evidence found properly constitutes corpus delicti.

It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that it came from
Hong Kong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports in Manila and Cebu.

Issue:
Whether or not courts of local state can exercise its jurisdiction over foreign vessels
stationed in its port.

Held:

Yes. The Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the matter. The mere possession of a
thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their
ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country,
on account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality.
However, the same rule does not apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within
the Philippines, in the present case, a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon the
Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the penal law in force at the place of
the commission of the crime. Only the court established in the said place itself has
competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.

El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Vicente Palanca G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918
FACTS:

Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real

property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China
and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning again to the Philippines. The
mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident,
it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to
send copy of the summons to the defendant’s last known address, which is in Amoy,
China. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless,
after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and
judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards
sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908,
this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after the confirmation
of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of
the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order
of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The
basis of this application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon
were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over
the subject of the action.
ISSUE:

* Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject
matter of the action
* Whether or not due process of law was observed

RULING:

On Jurisdiction

The word “jurisdiction” is used in several different, though related, senses since it may
have reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or
to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the
parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation.

The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its
powers in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the
actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant.

How Jurisdiction is Acquired

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court
and his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal
process exerted over the person.

Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from
a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual
custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein,
under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized
and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times within the
potential power of the court, may never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration
of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where
the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its
progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we
term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of
land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual
physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to
be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in
favor of the petitioner against all the world.

In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a

proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly
speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The
expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with reference to
certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as
responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The
action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the
former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to
subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All
proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of
the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a
general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive
only between the parties.

It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is
made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as
such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to
appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with reference
to the principles governing actions in rem.

Lazaro Rayray vs Chae Kyung Lee

Rayray married Lee in 1952 in Pusan, Korea. Before the marriage, Lee was able to
secure a marriage license which is a requirement in Korea prior to marrying. They lived
together until 1955. Rayray however later found out that Lee had previously lived with 2
Americans and a Korean. Lee answered by saying that it is not unusual in Korea for a
woman to have more than one partner and that it is legally permissive for them to do so
and that there is no legal impediment to her marriage with Rayray. Eventually they
pursued their separate ways. Rayray later filed before lower court of Manila for an
action to annul his marriage with Lee because Lee’s whereabouts cannot be
determined and that his consent in marrying Lee would have not been for the marriage
had he known prior that Lee had been living with other men. His action for annulment
had been duly published and summons were made known to Lee but due to her
absence Rayray moved to have Lee be declared in default. The lower court denied
Rayray’s action stating that since the marriage was celebrated in Korea the court cannot
take cognizance of the case and that the facts presented by Rayray is not sufficient to
debunk his marriage with Lee.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rayray’s marriage with Lee is null and void.
HELD: The lower court erred in ruling that Philippine courts do not have jurisdiction over
the case. As far as marriage status is concerned, the nationality principle is controlling
NOT lex loci celebracionis. The lower court is however correct in ruling that Rayray’s
evidence is not sufficient to render his marriage with Lee null and void. Rayray said that
the police clearance secured by Lee is meant to allow her to marry after her subsequent
cohabitation/s with the other men – which is considered bigamous in Philippine law. The
SC ruled that the police clearance is wanting for it lacks the signature of the person who
prepared it and there is no competent document to establish the identity of the same.
Also, through Rayray himself, Lee averred that it is ok in Korea for a person
who cohabited with other men before to marry another man. This is an indication that
Lee herself is aware that if it were a previous marriage that is concerned then that could
be a legal impediment to any subsequent marriage. Rayray cannot be given credence in
claiming that his consent could have been otherwise altered had he known all these
facts prior to the marriage because he would lie to every opportunity given him by the
Court so as to suit his case.

Far East International Import and Export Corporation vs Nankai Kogyo Co. Ltd.
etal
GR NO. L-13525 November 30, 1962

Facts: On December 26, 1956, the Far East International Import & Export Corporation,
Far East for short, organized under Philippine Laws, entered into a Contract of Sale of
Steel Scrap with the Nankai Kogyo Co., Ltd., Nankai for short, a foreign corporation
organized under Japanese Laws with address at Osaka, Japan. The buyer sign in
Japan and the seller in Manila, Philippines. Upon perfection of the contract and after
having been informed of the readiness to ship and that the Export License was to expire
on March 18, 1957, Nankai opened a letter for credit (No. 38/80049) with the China
Banking Corporation, issued by the Nippon Kangyo, Ltd., Tokyo, Japan, in the amount
of $312,500.00 on January 30, 1957. On March 15, 1957, only four (4) days before the
expiration of the Far East licence, three (3) boats sent by Nankai arrived in the
Philippines, one to load in Manila, the other two at Poro Point, San Fernando, La Union,
and Tacloban, Leyte, respectively. On March 19, 1957, the expiration of the export
license, only 1,058.6 metric tons of scrap steel was loaded on the SS Mina (loading in
Manila). The loading was accordingly stopped. The boat at Poro Point was also
unloaded of the 200 metric tons, for the same reason. An agreement was reached
whereby the Far East would seek an extension of the license. However, the untimely
death of President Magsaysay and the taking over by President Garcia changed the
picture, for the latter and/or his agents refused to extend the license. The two boats
sailed to Japan without any cargo, the third (SS Mina) only 1,058.6 metric tons. As
repeated requests, both against the shipping agent and the buyers (Nankai), for the
issuance of the of Bill Lading were ignored, Far East filed on May 16, 1957, the present
complaint for Specific Performance, damages, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
directed against Nankai and the shipping company, to issue and deliver to the plaintiff, a
complete set of negotiable of Lading for the 1,058.6 metric tons of scrap and a writ of
preliminary injunction against the China Banking Corporation and the Nankai to
maintain the Letter Credit. The lower court issued on May 17, 1957 anex parte writ of
preliminary injunction, after Far East had posted a bond in the amount of P50,000.00.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and
over the person of the defendant-appellant.

Held: Yes. It is true that the defendant entered a Special Appearance, wherein it
contested the jurisdiction of the Philippines Courts to take cognizance of the case on
grounds contained in the various pleadings presented by it. The motion to dismiss on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction had been overruled because it did not appear
indubitable. Subsequently, however, the defendant filed its Answer and invoked
defenses and grounds for dismissal of complaint other than lack of jurisdiction, which
circumstance vested upon the Court jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.

Even though the defendant objects to the jurisdiction of the court, if at the same time he
alleges any non-jurisdictional ground for dismissing the action, the Court acquires
jurisdiction over him. Even though he does not intend to confer jurisdiction upon the
court, his appearance for some other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction subjects
him to jurisdiction of the court.Even though he does not wish to submit to the jurisdiction
of the court, he cannot ask the court to act upon any question except the question of
jurisdiction, without conferring jurisdiction upon the court.

Thus though a Special appearance to object to the jurisdiction is not a submission, if it is

followed by a motion to dismiss or to quash the motion invokes the jurisdiction of Court
to decide the issue raised by the motion; and a decision of that issue binds the
defendant. Therefore if the decision of the motion is based upon a finding of facts
necessary to jurisdiction, this finding binds the defendant and the court acquires
jurisdiction to determine the merits of the case.

Undoubtedly if after his objection to the jurisdiction is wrongly overruled, a defendant

files a cross complaint demanding affirmative relief, he cannot thereafter claim that the
court had no jurisdiction over him.

Not only did appellant allege non-jurisdictional grounds in its pleadings to have the
complaint dismissed, but it also went into trial on the merits and presented evidence
destined to resist appellee’s claim. Verily, there could not be a better situation of
acquired jurisdiction based on consent. Consequently, the provision of the contract
wherein it was agreed that disputes should be submitted to a Board of Arbitration which
may be formed in Japan (in the supposition that it can apply to the matter in dispute –
payment of the scrap), seems to have been waived with appellant’s voluntary
submission. Apart from the fact that the clause employs the word “may”.
The appellant alleges that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction, because it was not
doing business in the Philippines and the requirement of summons had not been
fulfilled. It is difficult to lay down any rule of universal application to determine when a
foreign corporation is doing business. Each case must turn upon its own peculiar facts
and upon the language of the statute applicable. But from the proven facts obtaining in
this particular case, the appellant’s defense of lack of jurisdiction appears unavailing.

In the instant case, the testimony of Atty. Pablo Ocampo that appellant was doing
business in the Philippines corroborated by no less than Nabuo Yoshida, one of
appellant’s officers, that he was sent to the Philippines by his company to look into the
operation of mines, thereby revealing the defendant’s desire to continue engaging in
business here, after receiving the shipment of the iron under consideration, making the
Philippines a base thereof.

Gemperle vs. Schenker

G.R. No. L-18164; January 23, 1967

Facts:

This case was the result of William Gemperle’s retaliatory act when respondent
spouses Paul and Helen Schenker filed a case against him for the enforcement of
Schenker's allegedly initial subscription to the shares of stock of the Philippines-Swiss
Trading Co., Inc. and the exercise of his alleged pre-emptive rights to the then unissued
original capital stock of said corporation and the increase thereof, as well as for an
accounting and damages. Petitioner alleged that the said complaint tainted his name as
a businessman. He then filed a complaint for damages and prays for the retraction of
statements made by Helen Schenker.
Summons was personally served to Helen Schenker but not to Paul Schenker.
Helen then filed an answer with a counterclaim, but Paul Schenker filed a motion to
dismiss arguing that the court never acquired jurisdiction over his person since
admittedly, he is a Swiss citizen, residing in Zurich, Switzerland, and has not been
actually served with summons in the Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Paul Schenker.

Ruling:

Yes, although as a rule, when the defendant is a non-resident and in an accion

in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be acquired only
through voluntary appearance or personal service of summons. But this case is an
exception to the said rule. The Supreme ratiocinated:

“We hold that the lower court had acquired jurisdiction over said defendant, through
service of the summons addressed to him upon Mrs. Schenker, it appearing from said
answer that she is the representative and attorney-in-fact of her husband
aforementioned civil case No. Q-2796, which apparently was filed at her behest, in her
aforementioned representative capacity. In other words, Mrs. Schenker had authority to
sue, and had actually sued on behalf of her husband, so that she was, also, empowered
to represent him in suits filed against him, particularly in a case, like the of the one at
bar, which is consequence of the action brought by her on his behalf.”

Briefly, in an accion in personam where the defendant is a non-resident, substituted

service of summons does not apply. However, by way of exception, substituted service
of summons may be effected, if the following requisites are present:

1. The summons is served to the spouse of the defendant

2. The spouse must be residing in the Philippines

3. The spouse is appointed as attorney-in-fact of the spouse defendant in a previous

case involving the non-resident spouse.

Delos Santos vs Montesa Jr.

512 SCRA 148 [GR No. 73531 April 6, 1993]

Facts: Petitioners’ mental distress started when private respondent, who supposedly
owns Lot 39 of the Cadastral survey of Bustos with an area of 5,358 square meters
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. U-7924 a portion of which petitioners entered
and occupied, lodged the complaint geared towards petitioners’ eviction. Summons was
served through the mother of petitioners when the process server was unable to locate
Dolores, Nicolas, and Ricardo delos Santos in Talampas, Bustos, Bulacan. For failure of
petitioners to submit the corresponding answer, judgment was rendered pursuant to the
rules on summary procedure. Petitioners were ordered to vacate the premises and pay
reasonable rents until the possession is rendered. Upon learning of said decision,
petitioners sought to reconsider on the principal thesis that they were never served
notice of the conciliation meeting at the barangay level, as well as the summons. They
insist that private respondent was referring to a different piece of realty because
petitioners actually occupied Lot No. 3568 owned by Nicolas delos Santos under
Original Certificate of Title No. F-10418. Moreover, petitioners advanced the proposition
that Dolores’ husband should have been impleaded. All of these arguments were to no
avail. As indicated earlier, execution pending appeal was ordered due to petitioners’
failure to post a supersedeas bond.
Issue: Whether or not the execution is proper.

Held: No. At first blush, it would appear that the recourse pursued by petitioners could
elicit a favorable response from us in as much as the proof of service of the summons
upon petitioners does not indicate impossibility of personal service, a condition
precedent for resorting to substituted service. Even then, and assuming in gratia
argumenti that the statutory norms on service of summons have not been strictly
complied with, still, any defect in form and in the manner of effecting service thereof
were nonetheless erased when petitioners’ counsel moved to re-examine the impugned
decision and posed a subsequent bid on appeal to impede immediate execution.
Indeed, such demeanor is tantamount to voluntary submission to the competencia of
the court within the purview of Section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court since
any mode of appearance in court by a defendant or his lawyer is equivalent to service of
summons, absent any indication that the appearance of counsel for petitioner was
precisely to protest the jurisdiction of the court over the person of defendant.

Neither can We treat the motion for reconsideration directed against the unfavorable
disposition as a special appearance founded on the sole challenge on invalid service of
summons since the application therefor raised another ground on failure to state a
cause of action when conciliation proceedings at the barangay level were allegedly
bypassed, nay, disregarded.

The fact that petitioners are supposedly occupying a parcel of land other than the realty
claimed by private respondent deserves scant consideration since a clarification on a
factual query of this nature is proscribed by the second paragraph, Section 2 of Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court. Verily, counsel for petitioners’ assertion in the notice of
appeal filed with respondent judge that the grievance to be elevated to this Court will
focus “fully on a question of law” is a self-defeating posture and operates as a legal bar
for us to dwell into the truth or falsehood of such factual premise.

Petitioners argue next that execution pending appeal was ordered without any prior
notice to them. This notion is also devoid of substance since it erroneously suggests
that the court is duty-bound to notify petitioners of the immediate enforcement of the
appealed .appeal under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court who is obliged
to serve a copy of such motion on the adverse party’s counsel, which, on the face of the
subject motion, was effected by personal delivery.

REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES et al. v. PIMENTEL, temporary administrator of ESTATE

OF PIMENTEL, DECEASED, et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 06–1204. Argued March 17, 2008—Decided June 12, 2008

A class action by and for human rights victims (Pimentel class) of Ferdinand Marcos,
while he was President of the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), led to a nearly $2
billion judgment in a United States District Court. The Pimentel class then sought to
attach the assets of Arelma, S. A. (Arelma), a company incorporated by Marcos, held by
a New York broker (Merrill Lynch). The Republic and a Philippine commission
(Commission) established to recover property wrongfully taken by Marcos are also
attempting to recover this and other Marcos property. The Philippine National Banc
(PNB) holds some of the disputed assets in escrow, awaiting the outcome of pending
litigation in the Sandiganbayan, a Philippine court determining whether Marcos’ property
should be forfeited to the Republic. Facing claims from various Marcos creditors,
including the Pimentel class, Merrill Lynch filed this interpleader action under 28 U.
S. C. §1335, naming, among the defendants, the Republic, the Commission, Arelma,
PNB (all petitioners here), and the Pimentel class (respondents here). The Republic and
the Commission asserted sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976, and moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b),
arguing that the action could not proceed without them. Arelma and PNB also sought a
Rule 19(b) dismissal. The District Court refused, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding
that the Republic and the Commission are entitled to sovereign immunity and are
required parties under Rule 19(a), and it entered a stay pending the Sandiganbayan
litigation’s outcome. Finding that that litigation could not determine entitlement to
Arelma’s assets, the District Court vacated the stay and ultimately awarded the assets
to the Pimentel class. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that dismissal was not
warranted under Rule 19(b) because, though the Republic and the Commission were
required parties, their claim had so little likelihood of success on the merits that the
action could proceed without them. The court found it unnecessary to consider whether
prejudice to those entities might be lessened by a judgment or interim decree in the
interpleader action, found the entities’ failure to obtain a judgment in the Sandiganbayan
an equitable consideration counseling against dismissing the interpleader suit, and
found that allowing the interpleader case to proceed would serve the Pimentel class’
interests.

Held:

1. Because Arelma and PNB also seek review of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, this
Court need not rule on the question whether the Republic and the Commission, having
been dismissed from the suit, had the right to seek review of the decision that the suit
could proceed in their absence. As a general matter any party may move to dismiss an
action under Rule 19(b). Arelma and PNB have not lost standing to have the judgment
vacated in its entirety on procedural grounds simply because they did not appeal, or
petition for certiorari on, the underlying merits ruling denying them the interpleaded
assets. Pp. 7–9.

2. Rule 19 requires dismissal of the interpleader action. Pp. 9–20.

 (a) Under Rule 19(a), nonjoinder even of a required person does not always result in
dismissal. When joinder is not feasible, the question whether an action should proceed
turns on nonexclusive considerations in Rule 19(b), which asks whether “in equity and
good conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or should be
dismissed.” The joinder issue can be complex, and the case-specific determinations
involve multiple factors, some “substantive, some procedural, some compelling by
themselves, and some subject to balancing against opposing interests,” Provident
Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U. S. 102, 119. Pp. 9–10.

(b) Here, Rule 19(a)’s application is not contested: The Republic and the
Commission are required entities. And this Court need not decide the proper standard
of review for Rule 19(b) decisions, because the Ninth Circuit’s errors of law require
reversal. Pp. 10–19.

(1) The first factor directs the court to consider, in determining whether the action
may proceed, the prejudice to absent entities and present parties in the event judgment
is rendered without joinder. Rule 19(b)(1). The Ninth Circuit gave insufficient weight to
the sovereign status of the Republic and the Commission in considering whether they
would be prejudiced if the case proceeded. Giving full effect to sovereign immunity
promotes the comity and dignity interests that contributed to the development of the
immunity doctrine. See, e.g., Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480,
486. These interests are concrete here. The entities’ claims arise from historically and
politically significant events for the Republic and its people, and the entities have a
unique interest in resolving matters related to Arelma’s assets. A foreign state has a
comity interest in using its courts for a dispute if it has a right to do so. Its dignity is not
enhanced if other nations bypass its courts without right or good cause. A more specific
affront could result if property the Republic and the Commission claim is seized by a
foreign court decree. This Court has not considered the precise question presented, but
authorities involving the intersection of joinder and the United States’ governmental
immunity, see, e.g.,Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U. S. 371, 373–375,
instruct that where sovereign immunity is asserted, and the sovereign’s claims are not
frivolous, dismissal must be ordered where there is a potential for injury to the absent
sovereign’s interests. The claims of the Republic and the Commission were not
frivolous, and the Ninth Circuit thus erred in ruling on their merits. The privilege of
sovereign immunity from suit is much diminished if an important and consequential
ruling affecting the sovereign’s substantial interest is determined, or at least assumed,
by a federal court in its absence and over its objection. The Pimentel class’ interest in
recovering its damages is not discounted, but important comity concerns are implicated
by assertion of foreign sovereign immunity. The error is not that the courts below gave
too much weight to the Pimentel class’ interests, but that they did not accord proper
weight to the compelling sovereign immunity claim. Pp. 11–16.

(2) The second factor is the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or
avoided by relief or measures alternative to dismissal, Rule 19(b)(2), but no alternative
remedies or forms of relief have been proposed or appear to be available. As to the
third factor—whether a judgment rendered without the absent party would be adequate,
Rule 19(b)(3)—“adequacy” refers not to satisfaction of the Pimentel class’ claims, but to
the “public stake in settling disputes by wholes, whenever possible,” Provident
Bank, supra, at 111. Going forward with the action in the absence of the Republic and
the Commission would not further this public interest because they could not be bound
by a judgment to which they were not parties. As to the fourth factor—whether the
plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder,
Rule 19(b)(4)—the Ninth Circuit made much of the tort victims’ lack of an alternative
forum. But Merrill Lynch, not the Pimentel class, is the plaintiff as the stakeholder in the
interpleader action. See 28 U. S. C. §1335(a). The Pimentel class’ interests are not
irrelevant to Rule 19(b)’s equitable balance, but the Rule’s other provisions are the
relevant ones to consult. A dismissal on the ground of nonjoinder will not provide Merrill
Lynch with a judgment determining entitlement to the assets so it could be done with the
matter, but it likely would give Merrill Lynch an effective defense against piecemeal
litigation by various claimants and inconsistent, conflicting judgments. Any prejudice to
Merrill Lynch is outweighed by prejudice to the absent entities invoking sovereign
immunity. In the usual course, the Ninth Circuit’s failure to give sufficient weight to the
likely prejudice to the Republic and the Commission would warrant reversal and remand
for further determinations, but here, that error plus this Court’s analysis under Rule
19(b)’s additional provisions require the action’s dismissal. Pp. 17–20.

G.R. No. L-1403 October 29, 1948VICENTE CALUAG and JULIANA GARCIA
vs.
POTENCIANO PECSON and ANGEL H. MOJICA,Judges of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, and LEON ALEJOFACTS:
On August 10, 1937, Alejo filed a complaint against Caluag and Garcia for
the redemptionof one-half
pro indiviso
of a parcel of land in Guiguinto, Bulacan. After
t r i a l , t h e C F I B u l a c a n rendered judgment ordering petitioners to execute a deed of
sale in favor of Fortunato Alejo, uponpayment by plaintiff, as purchase price, of the
amount of P2,551. Petitioners filed an appeal to theCA but it was denied. Consequently, Alejo
filed a Motion for Execution.When the petitioners opposed, Alejo filed before CFI a petition
for contempt and it was grantedby the respondent. A petition for certiorari was filed
against the respondent judge, allegedly actedwithout or in excess of the
jurisdiction of the court in rendering the resolution which declares
thepetitioners guilty of contempt of court for not complying or performing its prior order
requiring thepetitioners to execute a deed of sale in favor of plaintiff over one -
half of the land
pro indiviso
inquestion. The petitioners in support of the present petition for certiorari, alleged other
2 grounds, towit: (1) that plaintiff's action abated or w as extinguished upon
the death of the plaintiff Fortunato Alejo, because his right of legal redemption was
a personal one, and therefore not transferable to hiss u c c e s s o r s
in interest; and (2) that, even assuming that it is
a p e r s o n a l o n e a n d t h e r e f o r e transferable, his successors in interest have failed to secure
the substitution of said deceased by hislegal representative under section 17, Rule 3.
ISSUE:
WON respondent Judge Angel Mojica acted without jurisdiction in proceeding against
anddeclaring the petitioners guilty of contempt.
HELD:
Yes
RATIO:
It is well settled that jurisdiction of the subject matter of a particular case is something
morethan the general power conferred by law upon a court to take cognizance of cases
of the generalclass to which the particular case belongs. The respondent
Judge Mojica acted not only without jurisdiction in proceeding against and
declaring the petitioners guilty of contempt, but also in excessof jurisdiction in ordering the
confinement of the petitioners, because it had no power to impose suchp u n i s h m e n t u p o n
the latter. The respondent judge has no power under the law
t o o r d e r t h e confinement of the petitioners until they have compiled with the order of the
court. A wrong decision made within the limits of the court's authority is erroneous
and may be correctedon appeal or other direct review, but a wrong, or for that matter a
correct, decision is void, and maybe set aside either directly or collaterally,
where the court exceeds its jurisdiction and power inrend ering it. Hence
though the court has acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and
thep a r t i c u l a r c a s e h a s b e e n s u b m i t t e d p r o p e r l y t o i t f o r h e a r i n g a n d
d e c i s i o n , i t w i l l o v e r s t e p i t s jurisdiction if it renders a judgment which it has no
power under the law to render.

Auten v Auten

acts:
Margarite Auten sues Harold Auten in
New York to recover support for her and her children thatHarold owed b virtue of a
separation agree!ent. "heAutens were !arried in #ngland. Harold deserted
her,went to A!erica, obtained a Me$ican divorce, then!arried another wo!an.
Margarite went to New York,where she and Harold ca!e to a separation agree!entwhich
provided that Harold was to pa to a trustee,
forM a r g a r i t e % s a c c o u n t , & ' p o u n d s s t e r l i n g ( ) r i t i s h currenc * a
!onth for her support and that of their +children. "he agree!ent also provided that the
werenot to sue each other in an action relating to
theirs e p a r a t i o n , a n d M a r g a r i t e w o u l d n o t c a u s e a n co!plaint
against Harold in an urisdiction because of his alleged divorce and re!arriage. Harold
!ade a fewp a ! e n t s o n l , s o M a r g a r i t e - l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r separation
in #ngland, charging Harold with adulter .Harold was served in New York with process in that
suitand he was ordered to pa ali!on pendent lite.
"his# n g l i s h c a s e n e v e r p r o c e e d e d t o t r i a l . M a r g a r i t e instituted the instant
suit to recover support due underthe agree!ent.
Doctrine:
e n t e r o f / r a v i t 0 / r o u p i n g o f o n t a c t s "heor 1 "he courts,
instead of regarding
as conclusivet h e p a r t i e s % i n t e n t i o n o r t h e p l a c e o f ! a k i n g o r perfor!
ance, la e!phasis rather upon the law of theplace which has the !ost signi-cant
contacts with the!atter in dispute.

ISSUES:
> h i c h l a w a p p l i e d a s t o t h e i s s u e o f w h e t h e r Margari
te%s co!!ence!ent of the #nglish case(petition for separation
with charge of adulter *constituted a rescission and repudiat
i o n o f t h e separation agree!ent? #nglish

RATIO:Based on the center o !ravit"# or !ro$pin! o contacts# theor" o

the con%ict o la&s' En!lishla& !overns(
Bn the instant case1
o
#ngland has the !ost signi-cant contacts with thecase.
•
"he agree!ent was between )ritish sub ects.
•
"he were !arried in #ngland.
•
"he lived there as a fa!il for 27 ears.
•
Harold abandoned his fa!il and was in the C<on a te!porar visa.
•
Margarite%s sole purpose was to get Harold toagree to support their fa!il .
•
"he !one was to be paid to a trustee in New York but those who stood to bene-
t live in#ngland.

•
"he agree!ent refers to )ritish currenc (poundssterling.*
o
New York%s onl connection to the case is where the agree!ent was !ade , and
where the trusteeto who! the !one was to be paid held o=ce.
o
Bt is unlikel that Margarite intended to sub ectherself to the law of another
state which she wasnot fa!iliar with.
•
#nglish law !ust be applied.
o
Bt is for the courts of that state to deter!inew h e t h e r M a r g a
r i t e % s i n s t i t u t i o n o f a c a s e constituted a breach of their agree!ent
Saudi Arabian Airlines vs Court of Appeals
Milagros Morada was working as a stewardess for Saudia Arabian Airlines. In 1990,
while she and some co-workers were in a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, an Arab co-
worker tried to rape her in a hotel room. Fortunately, a roomboy heard her cry for help
and two of her Arab co-workers were arrested and detained in Indonesia. Later, Saudia
Airlines re-assigned her to work in their Manila office. While working in Manila, Saudia
Airlines advised her to meet with a Saudia Airlines officer in Saudi. She did but to her
surprise, she was brought to a Saudi court where she was interrogated and eventually
sentenced to 5 months imprisonment and 289 lashes; she allegedly violated Muslim
customs by partying with males. The Prince of Makkah got wind of her conviction and
the Prince determined that she was wrongfully convicted hence the Prince absolved her
and sent her back to the Philippines. Saudia Airlines later on dismissed Morada.
Morada then sued Saudia Airlines for damages under Article 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code. Saudia Airlines filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the case because the applicable law should be the law of Saudi Arabia.
Saudia Airlines also prayed for other reliefs under the premises.
ISSUE: Whether or not Saudia Airlines’ contention is correct.
HELD: No. Firstly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over Saudia Airlines when the
latter filed a motion to dismiss with petition for other reliefs. The asking for other reliefs
effectively asked the court to make a determination of Saudia Airlines’s rights hence a
submission to the court’s jurisdiction.
Secondly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the case because as alleged in the
complaint of Morada, she is bringing the suit for damages under the provisions of our
Civil Law and not of the Arabian Law. Morada then has the right to file it in the QC RTC
because under the Rules of Court, a plaintiff may elect whether to file an action in
personam (case at bar) in the place where she resides or where the defendant resides.
Obviously, it is well within her right to file the case here because if she’ll file it in Saudi
Arabia, it will be very disadvantageous for her (and of course, again, Philippine Civil
Law is the law invoked).
Thirdly, one important test factor to determine where to file a case, if there is a foreign
element involved, is the so called “locus actus” or where an act has been done. In the
case at bar, Morada was already working in Manila when she was summoned by her
superior to go to Saudi Arabia to meet with a Saudia Airlines officer. She was not
informed that she was going to appear in a court trial. Clearly, she was defrauded into
appearing before a court trial which led to her wrongful conviction. The act of
defrauding, which is tortuous, was committed in Manila and this led to her humiliation,
misery, and suffering. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, the SC finds
that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged
tortious conduct took place).

George Bobcok vs William Jackson

Nasa book page 75

SPOUSES ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA vs. CA and TRANSWORLD AIRLINES,
INC.
G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioners-spouses Cesar Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana
purchased 3 airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines,
Inc. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles. The tickets of petitioners-spouses were
purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All
three tickets represented confirmed reservations.

On the appointed date, however, petitioners checked in but were placed on the wait-list
because the number of passengers who had checked in before them had already taken
all the seats available on the flight. Out of the 42 names on the wait list, the first 22
names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles, including petitioner
Cesar Zalamea. The two others were not able to fly. Those holding full-fare tickets were
given first priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the
full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and
daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding.

Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not
be accommodated because it was also fully booked. Thus, they were constrained to
book in another flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines. Upon their
arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach of
contract of air carriage before the RTC- Makati. The lower court ruled in favor of
petitioners . CA held that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated
upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. Since it is a
matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of
airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal
Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on
respondent TransWorld Airlines. Thus petitioners raised the case on petition for review
on certiorari.

ISSUE;
WON TWZ acted with bad faith and would entitle Zalameas to Moral and Examplary
damages.
RULING:
The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved.
Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them.
Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such
officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer
service agent, in her deposition that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil
Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. No official publication of said code was
presented as evidence. Thus, respondent court’s finding that overbooking is specifically
allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not
applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which
require that the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by
the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket
is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Since the tickets were sold and issued
in the Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law.

Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling
the passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. In Alitalia Airways v. Court of
Appeals, where passengers with confirmed bookings were refused carriage on the last
minute, this Court held that when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on
a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has
every right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then
the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Where an airline had
deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their
seats in case all of them would show up for the check in. For the indignity and
inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is
entitled to an award of moral damages.

For a contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty — a duty to
provide public service and convenience to its passengers which must be paramount to
self-interest or enrichment.

Respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not informing its passengers beforehand
that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they have confirmed tickets if there
was overbooking. Respondent TWA should have incorporated stipulations on
overbooking on the tickets issued or to properly inform its passengers about these
policies so that the latter would be prepared for such eventuality or would have the
choice to ride with another airline.

Respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged policy of
giving less priority to discounted tickets. Neither did it present any argument of
substance to show that petitioners were duly apprised of the overbooked condition of
the flight or that there is a hierarchy of boarding priorities in booking passengers. It is
evident that petitioners had the right to rely upon the assurance of respondent TWA,
thru its agent in Manila, then in New York, that their tickets represented confirmed seats
without any qualification. The failure of respondent TWA to so inform them when it could
easily have done so thereby enabling respondent to hold on to them as passengers up
to the last minute amounts to bad faith. Evidently, respondent TWA placed its self-
interest over the rights of petitioners under their contracts of carriage. Such conscious
disregard of petitioners’ rights makes respondent TWA liable for moral damages. To
deter breach of contracts by respondent TWA in similar fashion in the future, we
adjudge respondent TWA liable for exemplary damages, as well.

In the case of Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, this Court explicitly held that a
passenger is entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of the tickets he had to buy for a
flight to another airline. Thus, instead of simply being refunded for the cost of the
unused TWA tickets, petitioners should be awarded the actual cost of their flight from
New York to Los Angeles.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED

Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank vs Venicio Escolin

In November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas made a will. In
May 1957, while she was domiciled here in the Philippines (Iloilo City), she died.
In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton
Hodges. Linnie however also stated in her will that should her husband later die, said
estate shall be turned over to her brother and sister.
In December 1962, Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled here). Atty. Leon
Gellada, the lawyer of Charles filed a motion before the probate court (there was an
ongoing probate on the will of Linnie) so that a certain Avelina Magno may be appointed
as the administratrix of the estate. Magno was the trusted employee of the Hodges
when they were alive. Atty. Gellada manifested that Charles himself left a will but the
same was in an iron trunk in Charles’ office. Hence, in the meantime, he’d like to have
Magno appointed as administratrix. Judge Venicio Escolin approved the motion.
Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said
will. Since said will basically covers the same estate, Magno, as admininistratrix of
Linnie’s estate opposed the said petition. Eventually, the probate of Charles’ will was
granted. Eventually still, the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank was appointed
as administrator. But Magno refused to turn over the estate.
Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to
Linnie’s brother and sister and since that is her will, the same must be respected.
Magno also contended that Linnie was a Texan at the time of her death (an alien
testator); that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, successional rights are governed by
Linnie’s national law; that under Texas law, Linnie’s will shall be respected regardless of
the presence of legitimes (Charles’ share in the estate).
PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws because
Linnie was domiciled outside Texas at the time of her death (applying
the renvoidoctrine).
ISSUE: Whether or not Texas Law should apply.
HELD: The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court. Both parties
failed to adduce proof as to the law of Texas. The Supreme Court held that for what the
Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that
would be presented in the probate court. The Supreme Court however emphasized that
Texas law at the time of Linnie’s death is the law applicable (and not said law at any
other time). NOTE: Dynamics of law.

MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. v. GUERRERO

G.R. No. 136804 February 19, 2003Petitioners: MANUFACTURERS HANOVER
TRUST CO. and/or CHEMICAL BANK Respondents: RAFAEL MA. GUERRERO
FACTS
The petition alleged the following:-

On May 17, 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero fled before the Regional Trial Court
of Maniaagainst Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank -

Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly for (1) illegally withheld taxed charged
againstinterests on his checking account with the Bank, (2) a returned check worth
$18,000.00 due tosignature verification problems; and (3) unauthorized conversion of
his account.-

The bank filed

its Answer alleging that Guerrero’s acco
unt is governed by New York law which
does not permit any Guerrero’s claims except actual damages.
-

Seeking the dismissal of Guerrero’s claims, t

he Bank filed a Motion for Partial SummaryJudgment, supported by an affidavit of
New York attorney Alyssa Walden.-

The RTC deni

ed the Bank’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.-

The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing
the RTCOrders
ISSUE
Whether the Walden affidavit does serve as proof of the New York law and
jurisprudence
HELD
The Walden affidavit stated conclusions from the affiant’s personal interpretation and opinion of the
facts
of the case vis-à-vis, the alleged laws and jurisprudence without citing any laws in
particular. While theattached copies of some US court decisions do not comply with
Section 24 of Rule 132 on proof of official records or decisions of foreign courts. Thus,
the Walden affidavit did not prove the current stateof New York law and jurisprudence.
Hence, the petition is denied for lack of merit and Court of Appeal’s decision is affirmed.
:

GIBBS vs. GOVT. OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

G.R. No. L-35694
December 23, 1933
FACTS:
Allison D. Gibbs and his wife Eva Johnson Gibbs are both citizens of California and
domiciled therein since their marriage in July 1906. There was no antenuptial
marriage contract between the parties and during the existence their marriage
the spouses acquired lands in the Philippine Islands, as conjugal property. On
November 28, 1929, Mrs. Gibbs died and that in accordance with the law of California,
the community property of spouses who are citizens of California, upon the death of the
wife previous to that of the husband, belongs absolutely to the surviving
husband without administration. In intestate proceedings, Allison D. Gibbs, on
September 22,
1930, filed an ex parte
petition. The court granted said petition and entered
a decree adjudicating the said Allison D. Gibbs to be the sole and absolute
owner of said lands, applying section 1401 of the Civil Code of California.
When this decree presented to the Register of Deeds of Manila and
demanded for the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title, it declined to
accept as binding said decree of court and refused to register the transfer of
title of the said conjugal property to Allison D. Gibbs, on the ground that the
corresponding inheritance tax had not been paid. Thereupon, Allison filed in
the said court a petition for an order requiring the said register of deeds "to
issue the corresponding titles" to the petitioner without requiring previous
payment of any inheritance tax.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Eva Johnson Gibbs at the time of her death is the
owner of a descendible interest in the Philippine lands.
RULING:
The
second paragraph Article 10 of the Civil Code provides:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the
order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights
and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever
may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be
situated.
The second paragraph of article 10 applies only when a legal or
testamentary succession has taken place in the Philippines and in
accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is
consulted only in regard to the order of succession or the extent of the
successional rights;
in other words, the second paragraph
of article 10 can be invoked only when the
1
deceased was vested with a descendible interest in
property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine
Islands.
In the case of Clarke
vs
. Clarke, the court said:
It is principle firmly established that to the law of the state in
which the land is situated we must look for the rules which govern its
descent, alienation, and transfer, and for the effect and construction of
wills and other conveyances.
This fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of article 10
of our Civil Code as follows: "Personal property is subject to the laws of the
nation of the owner thereof; real property to the laws of the country in which
it is situated.”
Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title which
vested in Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of the community lands
here in question must be determined in accordance with the
lex rei sitae
. It
is admitted that the Philippine lands here in question were acquired as
community property of the conjugal partnership of the appellee and his wife.
Under the law of the Philippine Islands, she was vested of a title equal to that
of her husband.
It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law
of the Philippine Islands, vested of a descendible interest, equal to
that of her husband, in the Philippine lands covered by certificates
of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, from the date of their
acquisition to the date of her death.
The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid
was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this transmission
plainly falls within the language of section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of
the Administrative Code which levies a tax on inheritances. It is unnecessary
in this proceeding to determine the "order of succession" or the "extent of
the successional rights" (article 10, Civil Code,
supra
) which would be
regulated by section 1386 of the Civil Code of California which was in effect
at the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs.

Aznar vs. Garcia 7 s 95

Facts:
Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California
where he resided and consequently was considered a California Citizen for a period of
nine years to 1913. He came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until the
time of his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country, he
had always considered himself as a citizen of California.
In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of some money in
favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a decision rendered by the Supreme Court
had been declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel of Helen
claims that under Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, California law should be applied, the
matter is returned back to the law of domicile, that Philippine law is ultimately
applicable, that the share of Helen must be increased in view of successional rights of
illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On the other hand, counsel for daughter
Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of the Mew Civil Code, the national
of the deceased must apply, our courts must apply internal law of California on the
matter. Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator
should dispose any property possessed by him in absolute dominion.

Issue:
Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply.

Held:
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen
Christensen Garcia said in effect that there be two rules in California on the matter.
1. The conflict rule which should apply to Californian’s outside the California,
and
2. The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles in califronia.
The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the California Civil code States
that “if there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it
is deemed to follow the decree of its owner and is governed by the law of the domicile.”
 Christensen being domiciled outside california, the law of his domicile, the
Philippines is ought to be followed.
Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is remanded to the lower
court with instructions that partition be made as that of the Philippine law
provides.

Maria Cristina Bellis vs Edward Bellis

Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first
wife whom he divorced he had five legitimate children (Edward Bellis et al), by his
second wife, who survived him, he had three legitimate children. He, however, also had
three illegitimate children in the Philippines (Maria Cristina Bellis et al). Before he died,
he made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his
Philippine properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were not given anything. The
illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground that they have been deprived of their
legitimes to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to be applied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the
successional rights of the illegitimate children.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that the said children, maria Kristina et al, are not
entitled to their legitimes under the Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased,
there are no legitimes.

PAULA T. LLORENTE v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000Petitioner: PAULA T. LLORENTERespondents:
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE
FACTS
The petition alleged the following:-

On February 22, 1937, Lorenco N. Llorente, an enlisted serviceman of the United States
Navy,and petitioner Paula Llorente were married before a Catholic priest in Nabua,
Camarines Sur.-

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship.-

Lorenzo discovered that the petitioner Paula was having an adulterous relationship with
this brother; thus he returned to the United States and filed for divorce which was grante
d by theSuperior Court of the State of California on November 27, 1951 and became
final in December 4,1952.-

On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married the private defendant Alicia F. Llorente in
Manila. Theunion produced three children
–
Raul, Luz and Beverly.-

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament which bequeathed all
his property to Alicia and their three children and appointing the private defendant as th
e soleexecutor of the will.-

On June 11, 1985, Lorenzo died.-

On September 4, 1985, Paula filed a petition for letters of adm

inistration over Lorenzo’s estate in
her favour since (1)
she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) the property were acquired during
their marriage, (3) and the will encroaches here legitimate and ½ share of the conjugal
property.-

On May 18, 1987, the RTC ruled in favour of the petitioner since the divorce decree is
void andinapplicable to the Philippines and that the defendant is not entitled to any
share from the estate.-

On July 31, 1995, Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision with modificat
ion that thedefendant would be a co-owner of properties Lorenzo acquired during their
cohabitation.-

Petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration which is denied due to lack of merit.
ISSUES
1.

Whether the divorce obtained by Lorenzo Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid
andrecognized under Philippine jurisdiction2.

Whether the Last Will and Testament of Lorenzo Llorente is valid

HELD
1.

As a matter of comity, divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
in viewof the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons or
lex patriae
.2.

As per Art. 17 of the Civil Code, “The forms and solemnities of

contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.” Whether
the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required by the Philippine law,
the willwas duly probated.Hence, the petition is granted and decision of the Court of
Appeals is set aside
race J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio

CITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in

Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia.
However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving
the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at
Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the
couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of
fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16,
1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy
on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Rederick’s
marriage with Editha Samson.

ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as

evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.

HELD:
The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued
was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized
Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal
capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree. The said
decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily
because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be
used.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a

public or official record of a foreign country by either:

(1) an official publication or

(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:

(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in

the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and

(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan
City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacity
to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES (PIA) CORPORATION vs HON. BLAS F.

OPLE, in his capacity as Minister of Labor; HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., in his
capacity as Deputy Minister; ETHELYNNE B. FARRALES and MARIA MOONYEEN
MAMASIG
G.R. No. 61594 September 28, 1990

FACTS: On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International Airlines Corporation

(PIA), a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, executed in
Manila 2 separate contracts of employment, one with private respondent Farrales and
the other with private respondent Mamasig. 1 The contracts, which became effective on
9 January 1979, provided in pertinent portion as follows:
5. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY
This agreement is for a period of 3 years, but can be extended by the mutual consent of
the parties.
xxx xxx xxx
6. TERMINATION
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA reserves the right to
terminate this agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in
advance one month before the intended termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the
EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one month’s salary.
xxx xxx xxx
10. APPLICABLE LAW:
This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of Pakistan,
and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any
matter arising out of or under this agreement.

Farrales & Mamasig (employees) were hired as flight attendants after undergoing
training. Base station was in Manila and flying assignments to different parts of the
Middle East and Europe.

roughly 1 year and 4 months prior to the expiration of the contracts of employment, PIA
through Mr. Oscar Benares, counsel for and official of the local branch of PIA, sent
separate letters, informing them that they will be terminated effective September 1,
1980.
Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint, for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of company benefits and bonuses, against PIA with the then Ministry of Labor
and Employment (MOLE).

PIA’s Contention: The PIA submitted its position paper, but no evidence, and there
claimed that both private respondents were habitual absentees; that both were in the
habit of bringing in from abroad sizeable quantities of “personal effects”; and that PIA
personnel at the Manila International Airport had been discreetly warned by customs
officials to advise private respondents to discontinue that practice. PIA further claimed
that the services of both private respondents were terminated pursuant to the provisions
of the employment contract.

Favorable decision for the respondents. The Order stated that private respondents had
attained the status of regular employees after they had rendered more than a year of
continued service; that the stipulation limiting the period of the employment contract to 3
years was null and void as violative of the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing rules and regulations on regular and casual employment; and that the
dismissal, having been carried out without the requisite clearance from the MOLE, was
illegal and entitled private respondents to reinstatement with full backwages.
Decision sustained on appeal. Hence, this petition for certiorari

ISSUE: (Relative to the subject) Which law should govern over the case? Which court
has jurisdiction?
HELD: Philippine Law and Philippine courts
Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which
specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and,
secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection
with the agreement “only [in] courts of Karachi Pakistan”.
We have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected with public interest
and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered
illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship.
the contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed here, at
least partially; private respondents are Philippine citizens and respondents, while
petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is licensed to do business (and actually doing
business) and hence resident in the Philippines; lastly, private respondents were based
in the Philippines in between their assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All
the above contacts point to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a
proper forum for the resolution of contractual disputes between the parties.
Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement cannot be
given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon
them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA did not undertake to
plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it must therefore be
presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the
applicable provisions of Philippine law.
[DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION, eh?]
Petition denied.
_______
NOTES:
Another Issue: petitioner PIA invokes paragraphs 5 and 6 of its contract of employment
with private respondents Farrales and Mamasig, arguing that its relationship with them
was governed by the provisions of its contract rather than by the general provisions of
the Labor Code.
A contract freely entered into should, of course, be respected, as PIA argues, since a
contract is the law between the parties. The principle of party autonomy in contracts is
not, however, an absolute principle. The rule in Article 1306, of our Civil Code is that the
contracting parties may establish such stipulations as they may deem convenient,
“provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy.” Thus, counter-balancing the principle of autonomy of contracting parties is the
equally general rule that provisions of applicable law, especially provisions relating to
matters affected with public policy, are deemed written into the contract. Put a little
differently, the governing principle is that parties may not contract away applicable
provisions of law especially peremptory provisions dealing with matters heavily
impressed with public interest. The law relating to labor and employment is clearly such
an area and parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from
the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other. It is thus
necessary to appraise the contractual provisions invoked by petitioner PIA in terms of
their consistency with applicable Philippine law and regulations.
ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 110263 July 20, 2001Petitioner: ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS
(M) BERHADRespondents: COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
CONSTRUCTIONCORPORATION
FACTS
The petition alleged the following:-

In 1983, petitioner initiated a suit to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it
had put infavour of the private respondent, then known as Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines.-

On September 13, 1985, the High Court of Malaysia rendered judgment in favour of
the petitioner and against the private respondent-

On September 5, 1988, petitioner initiated a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig toenforce the judgment of the High Court of Malaysia.-

On October 14, 1991, the trial court dismissed the petitioner’s complaint.
-

On May 19, 1993, the Court of Appeals dismissed the same and affirmed the decision
of the trialcourt.
ISSUES
1.

Whether the judgment of High Court of Malaysia is valid and binding to Philippine
jurisdiction2.

Whether it is the procedural law of Malaysia that determines the validity of the service of
thecourt process
HELD
1.

Having proven through evidence the existence of and authenticity of foreign judgment,
saidforeign judgment enjoys presumptive validity and the burden to prove otherwise fell
upon the party who disputed its validity.2.

Matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of summons or
court process upon the defendant, the authority of the counsel to appear and represent
a defendant andthe formal requirements in a decision are governed by
lex fori
or the internal law of the forum, i.e.the law of Malaysia in this case. In line with this,
there
is no merit to the respondent’s argument
that the foreign judgment is not enforceable in view of the absence of any statement of
facts andlaw upon which the award was based. By
lex fori,
under the procedural rules of the High Court of Malaysia, a valid judgment may be
rendered even without stating the law upon the judgement is based.Hence, the petition
is granted and the decision of Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside.