Republic of the Philippines a government de factotherein and its power to promulgate rules and laws in the occupied territory,
gate rules and laws in the occupied territory, must
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947
ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,
vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.
Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.
RESOLUTION
In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition for habeas
corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy
giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of
treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the
sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance
of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over
these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic:
(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute
and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government
or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the qualified
and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory
wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which
consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law.
ed., 429; Secretary of State Webster Report to the President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6
Web. Works, 526);
Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory
occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the
enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred
thereby to the occupier, as we have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75
Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant
it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular
government (which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the
state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or
severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty
cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least
during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily
to the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory
occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war, "although the former is in fact prevented
from exercising the supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law of our times"; (II
Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44,
45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is
not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their
legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended
allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the petitioner's contention rests;
Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was suspended in
Castine, set forth in the decision in the case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in
1819, and quoted in our decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta
vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in connection with the question, not of sovereignty, but of the existence of
have been based, either on the theory adopted subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the
military occupation of an enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the
first case, the word "sovereignty" used therein should be construed to mean the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the legitimate government and is not transferred to the
occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting said government
thereof; and that in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to the suspension of
the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907, and
therefore it can not be applied to the present case;
Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance," repudiated by
Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory
occupied by the enemy toward the military government established over them, such allegiance may, at
most, be considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or
sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives as above described,
and does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign
country owes to his own government or sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of a government or
sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same
way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason
against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving
them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is
nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the protection he receives, it would necessarily
follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the
citizenship thereof since he has enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life, in
return for the protection he receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship, because
he would not be bound to obey most of the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not
receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own;
Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty
by the legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because the
authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague
Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government
and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh
and dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate
government, they are inoperative or not applicable to the government established by the occupant; that
the crimes against national security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to war, correspondence with
hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those against public order, such as rebellion,
sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political complexion because they
bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate
government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as against the occupant, because they can not
be committed against the latter (Peralta vs.Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses
against public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable as offenses against
the invader for the reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were also inoperative as against the
ousted government for the latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the
occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed
against the national security of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied
territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation;
Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force,
unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the
social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of de facto government
and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the
military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control
of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the
Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the
requirements of public conscience (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of
Land Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these
limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them, and the
laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those which, though
continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as
suspended or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants;
Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and
obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive
action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and
comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend
the operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the
inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him;
because it is evident that such action is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not
necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is
tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular government
or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled illegally by
the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may
lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor;
Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to
disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of
humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist
the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own government without the
latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not aid them in
their military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer
the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty — such theory
would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party
in the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing the
exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide;
(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined
and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime against said
government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people of the United States, exercised
through their authorized representative, the Congress and the President of the United States, was made,
upon the establishment of the Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of
the Philippines established by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides
according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of
section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain
operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the
Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to
the Government and corresponding officials under this constitution;
Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though
not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as
Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was recognized not only by the Legislative Department or
Congress of the United States in approving the Independence Law above quoted and the Constitution of
the Philippines, which contains the declaration that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them" (section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive Department
of the United States; that the late President Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among
others, "As I stated on August 12, 1943, the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having
now the status as a government of other independent nations — in fact all the attributes of complete
and respected nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it is a principle
upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, among them in the case of
Jones vs. United States (137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question of sovereignty is "a purely
political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any
government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of the
country.
Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which provides
that pending the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All citizens of
the Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United States", was one of the few limitations of the
sovereignty of the Filipino people retained by the United States, but these limitations do not away or are
not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that the people of each State of the Union
preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that of the United States conferred upon the latter by
the States; that just as to reason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State
Government, in the same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation
against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine
Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does
not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the
Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people,
for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that "The government established by this constitution shall
be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the
sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth
of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines";
This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to deny the petitioner's
petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to be stated in the said
opinion, without prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros
dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in a separate opinion.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
ManilaEN BANC
G.R. No. L-21049 December 22, 1923
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISAAC PEREZ, defendant-appellant.
Mario Guariña for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa Real for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that
municipality, happening to meet on the morning of April 1, 1992, in the presidencia of Pilar, they became
engaged in a discussion regarding the administration of Governor-General Wood, which resulted in Perez
shouting a number of times: "The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for
having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence." Charged in the
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code having to do with
contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority, and convicted thereof, Perez has
appealed the case to this court. The question presented for decision is, What crime, if any, did the
accused commit?
A logical point of departure is the information presented in this case. It reads in translation as follows:
 That on or about April 1, 1922, in the municipality of Pilar, Province of Sorsogon, Philippine
Islands, the said accused, Isaac Perez, while holding a discussion with several persons on
political matters, did criminally, unlawfully and wilfully and with knowledge that Honorable
Leonard Wood was the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and in the discharge of his
functions as such authority, insult by word, without his presence, said Governor-General,
uttering in a loud voice and in the presence of many persons, and in a public place, the
following phrases: "Asin an mangña filipinos na caparejo co, maninigong gumamit nin
sundang asin haleon an payo ni Wood huli can saiyang recomendacion sa pag raot con
Filipinas," which in English, is as follows: "And the Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for
cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Philippines.
Contrary to article 256 of the Penal Code.
At the trial of the case, two witnesses were called on behalf of the prosecution and three witnesses on
behalf of the defense. According to the first witness for the Government, Juan Lumbao, the municipal
president of Pilar, what Perez said on the occasion in question was this:
"The Filipinos, like myself, should get a bolo and cut off the head of Governor-General Wood, because he
has recommended a bad administration in these Islands and has not made a good recommendation; on
the contrary, he has assassinated the independence of the Philippines and for this reason, we have not
obtained independence and the head of that Governor-General must be cut off." Higinio J. Angustia,
justice of the peace of Pilar, in a written statement, and Gregorio Cresencio, another witness for the
prosecution, corroborated the testimony of the first witness. Cresencio understood that Perez invited
the Filipinos including himself to get their bolos and cut off the head of Governor-General Wood and
throw it into the sea.
The witnesses for the defense did not deny that an altercation took place on the morning of April 1,
1922, in which the accused participated. But they endeavored to explain that the discussion was
between Perez and one Severo Madrid, the latter maintaining that the fault was due to the Nacionalista
Party, while Perez argued that the Governor-General was to blame. The accused testified that the
discussion was held in a peaceful manner, and that what he wished to say was that the Governor-
General should be removed and substituted by another. On the witness stand, he stated that his words
were the following: "We are but blaming the Nacionalista Party which is in power but do not take into
account that above the representatives there is Governor-General Wood who controls everything, and I
told him that the day on which the Democrats may kill that Governor-General, then we, the Filipinos will
install the government we like whether you Democratas want to pay or not to pay taxes."
The trial judge found as a fact, and we think with abundant reason, that it had been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused made use of the language stated in the beginning of this decision and
set out in the information. The question of fact thus settled, the question of law recurs as to the crime of
which the accused should be convicted.
It should be recalled that the fiscal named, in the information, article 256 of the Penal Code as having
been infringed and the trial judge so found in his decision. The first error assigned by counsel for the
appellant is addressed to this conclusion of the lower court and is to the effect that article 256 of the
Penal Code is no longer in force.
In the case of United States vs. Helbig ([1920], R. G. No. 14705 1), the accused was charged with having
uttered the following language: "To hell with the President of the United States and his proclamation!"
Mr. Helbig was prosecuted under article 256, and though the case was eventually sent back to the court
of origin for a new trial, the appellate court by majority vote held as a question of law that article 256 is
still in force.
In the case of People vs. Perfecto ([1922], 43 Phil., 887), the accused was charged with having published
an article reflecting on the Philippine Senate and its members in violation of article 256 of the Penal
Code. In this court, Mr. Perfecto was acquitted by unanimous vote, with three members of the court
holding that article 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty
over the Philippines, and with six members holding that the Libel Law had the effect of repealing so
much of article 256 as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the information
and the facts, the defendant was neither guilty of a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code nor of the
libel Law. In the course of the main opinion in the Perfecto case, is found this significant sentence: "Act
No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected article 256,
but as to this point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement."
It may therefore be taken as settled doctrine, to which those of us who retain a contrary opinion must
bow with as good grace as we can muster, that until otherwise decided by higher authority, so much of
article 256 of the Penal Code as does not relate to ministers of the Crown or to writings coming under
the Libel Law, exist and must be enforced. To which proposition, can properly be appended a corollary,
namely: Seditious words, speeches, or libels, constitute a violation of Act No. 292, the Treason and
Sedition Law, and to this extent, both the Penal Code and the Libel Law are modified.
Accepting the above statements relative to the continuance and status of article 256 of the Penal Code,
it is our opinion that the law infringed in this instance is not this article but rather a portion of the
Treason and Sedition Law. In other words, as will later appear, we think that the words of the accused
did not so much tend to defame, abuse, or insult, a person in authority, as they did to raise a disturbance
in the community.
In criminal law, there are a variety of offenses which are not directed primarily against individuals, but
rather against the existence of the State, the authority of the Government, or the general public peace.
The offenses created and defined in Act No. 292 are distinctly of this character. Among them is sedition,
which is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. It is a revolt against legitimate authority.
Though the ultimate object of sedition is a violation of the public peace or at least such a course of
measures as evidently engenders it, yet it does not aim at direct and open violence against the laws, or
the subversion of the Constitution. (2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 974; U.S. vs. Abad [1902], 1 Phil., 437;
People vs. Cabrera [1922], 43 Phil., 64.)
It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must not be interpreted so as to
abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of
Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is
within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious. But when the intention
and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of
assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted
authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State. (III Wharton's
Criminal Law, pp. 2127 et seq.; U.S. vs. Apurado [1907], 7 Phil., 422; Peoplevs. Perfecto, supra.)
Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official
position, like the Presidency of the United States and other high offices, under a democratic form of
government, instead, of affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive
attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free
speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce
disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to
the Government and obedient to the laws.
The Governor-General is an executive official appointed by the President of the United States by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, and holds in his office at the pleasure of
the President. The Organic Act vests supreme executive power in the Governor-General to be exercised
in accordance with law. The Governor-General is the representative of executive civil authority in the
Philippines and of the sovereign power. A seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attack on the
rights of the Filipino people and on American sovereignty. (Concepcion vs. Paredes [1921], 42 Phil., 599;
U.S. vs. Dorr [1903], 2 Phil., 332.)
Section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, as amended by Act No. 1692, appears to have
been placed on the statute books exactly to meet such a situation. This section reads as follows:
Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, or who shall write, publish or
circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or against the
Government of the Philippine Islands, or who shall print, write, publish utter or make any
statement, or speech, or do any act which tends to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in
executing his office or in performing his duty, or which tends to instigate others to cabal or
meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or
which tends to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, or which tends to disturb the
peace of the community or the safety or order of the Government, or who shall knowingly
conceal such evil practices from the constituted authorities, shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding two thousand dollars United States currency or by imprisonment not exceeding
two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.
In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and done an act
which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes. He has made a
statement and done an act which suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a
statement and done an act which tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities. He has
made a statement and done an act which tended to disturb the peace of the community and the safety
or order of the Government. All of these various tendencies can be ascribed to the action of Perez and
may be characterized as penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended.
A judgment and sentence convicting the accused of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended,
is, in effect, responsive to, and based upon, the offense with which the defendant is charged. The
designation of the crime by the fiscal is not conclusive. The crime of which the defendant stands charged
is that described by the facts stated in the information. In accordance with our settled rule, an accused
may be found guilty and convicted of a graver offense than that designated in the information, if such
graver offense is included or described in the body of the information, and is afterwards justified by the
proof presented during the trial. (Guevarra's Code of Criminal Procedure, p. 9; De Joya's Code of Criminal
Procedure, p. 9.)
The penalty meted out by the trial court falls within the limits provided by the Treason and Sedition Law,
and will, we think, sufficiently punish the accused.
That we have given more attention to this case than it deserves, may be possible. Our course is justified
when it is recalled that only last year, Mr. Chief Justice Taft of the United States Supreme Court, in
speaking of an outrageous libel on the Governor of the Porto Rico, observed: "A reading of the two
articles removes the slightest doubt that they go far beyond the "exuberant expressions of meridional
speech," to use the expression of this court in a similar case in Gandia vs. Pettingill (222 U.S. , 452, 456).
Indeed they are so excessive and outrageous in their character that they suggest the query whether their
superlative vilification has not overleapt itself and become unconsciously humorous." (Balzac vs. Porto
Rico [1922], 258 U.S., 298.) While our own sense of humor is not entirely blunted, we nevertheless
entertain the conviction that the courts should be the first to stamp out the embers of insurrection. The
fugitive flame of disloyalty, lighted by an irresponsible individual, must be dealt with firmly before it
endangers the general public peace.
The result is to agree with the trial Judge in his findings of fact, and on these facts to convict the accused
of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended. With the modification thus indicated, judgment is
affirmed, it being understood that, in accordance with the sentence of the lower court, the defendant
and appellant shall suffer 2 months and 1 day's imprisonment and pay the costs. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-399 January 29, 1948
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO PRIETO (alias EDDIE VALENCIA), defendant-appellant.
Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for treason on 7 counts. After pleading not guilty he
entered a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained the original plea to counts 4, 5, and 6.
The special prosecutor introduced evidence only on count 4, stating with reference to counts 5 and 6
that he did not have sufficient evidence to sustain them. The defendant was found guilty on count 4 as
well as counts 1, 2, 3, and 7 and was sentenced to death and to pay the fine of P20,000.Two witnesses
gave evidence on count 4 but their statements do not coincide on any single detail. Juanito Albano, the
first witness, testified that in March, 1945, the accused with other Filipino undercovers and Japanese
soldiers caught an American aviator and had the witness carry the American to town on a sled pulled by
a carabao; that on the way, the accused walked behind the sled and asked the prisoner if the sled was
faster than the airplane; that the American was taken to the Kempetai headquarters, after which he did
not know what happened to the flier. Valentin Cuison, the next witness, testified that one day in March,
1945, he saw the accused following an American and the accused were Japanese and other Filipinos.
These witnesses evidently referred to two different occasions. The last witness stated that the American
was walking as well as his captors. And there was no sled, he said, nor did he see Juanito Albano, except
at night when he and Albano had a drink of tuba together.
This evidence does not testify the two-witness principle. The two witnesses failed to corroborate each
other not only on the whole overt act but on any part of it. (People vs. Adriano, 44 Off. Gaz., 4300;
Cramer vs. U. S., 65 S. Ct. 918.)
The lower court believes that the accused is "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of treason
complexed by murder and physical injuries," with "the aggravating circumstances mentioned above."
Apparently, the court has regarded the murders and physical injuries charged in the information, not
only as crimes distinct from treason but also as modifying circumstances. The Solicitor General agrees
with the decision except as to technical designation of the crime. In his opinion, the offense committed
by the appellant is a "complex crime of treason with homicide."
Counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 are as follows:
1. On or about October 15, 1944, in the municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, said accused being a member of the Japanese Military Police and acting as
undercover man for the Japanese forces with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give
aid and comfort to the enemy did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercovers
to the barrio of Poknaon, for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and locating their
hideouts; that said accused and his companions did apprehended Abraham Puno, tie his
 hands behind him and give him fist blows; thereafter said Abraham Puno was taken by the However, the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were carried out may be taken as an
accused and his Japanese companions to Yati, Liloan, Cebu, where he was severely tortured aggravating circumstance. Thus, the use of torture and other atrocities on the victims instead of the
by placing red hot iron on his shoulders, legs and back and from there he was sent back to the usual and less painful method of execution will be taken into account to increase the penalty under the
Japanese detention camp in Mandaue and detained for 7 days; provision of article 14, paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal Code, since they, as in this case, augmented
the sufferings of the offended parties unnecessarily to the attainment of the criminal objective.
2. On or about October 28, 1944, in the municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, said accused acting as an informer and agent for the Japanese Military Police, This aggravating circumstance is compensated by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. it is true
with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy, did, the, that the accused pleaded not guilty to counts 4, 5 and 6 but count 4 has not be substantiated while
and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a counts 5 and 6 were abandoned.
group of Filipino undercovers for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla
suspects; that the herein accused and his companions did in fact apprehend Guillermo Ponce
In this first assignment of error, counsel seeks reversal of the judgment because of the trial court's failure
and Macario Ponce from their house; that said accused and his companions did tie the hands
to appoint "another attorney de oficio for the accused in spite of the manifestation of the attorney de
of said Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce behind their backs, giving them first blows on the
oficio (who defended the accused at the trial) that he would like to be relieved for obvious reasons."
face and in other parts of the body and thereafter detained them at the Kempei Tai
Headquarters; that Guillermo Ponce was released the following day while his brother was
detained and thereafter nothing more was heard of him nor his whereabouts known; The appellate tribunal will indulge reasonable presumptions in favor of the legality and regularity of all
the proceedings of the trial court, including the presumption that the accused was not denied the right
to have counsel. (U.S. vs. Labial, 27 Phil., 82.) It is presumed that the procedure prescribed by law has
3. Sometime during the month of November, 1944, in the Municipality of Mandaue, Province
been observed unless it is made to appear expressly to the contrary. (U.S. vs. Escalante, 36 Phil., 743.)
of Cebu, Philippines, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to
The fact that the attorney appointed by the trial court to aid the defendant in his defense expressed
the enemy and her military forces, said accused acting as an enemy undercover did, then and
reluctance to accept the designation because, as the present counsel assumes, he did not sympathize
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol of
with the defendant's cause, is not sufficient to overcome this presumption. The statement of the counsel
some 6 Filipinos and 2 Japanese soldiers to barrio Pakna-an, municipality of Mandaue for the
in the court below did no necessarily imply that he did not perform his duty to protect the interest of the
purpose of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla suspects, and said patrol did in fact
accused. As a matter of fact, the present counsel "sincerely believes that the said Attorney Carin did his
apprehend as guerrilla suspects Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin who were forthwith tied
best, although it was not the best of a willing worker." We do not discern in the record any indication
with a rope, tortured and detained for 6 days; that on the 7th day said Damian Alilin and
that the former counsel did not conduct the defense to the best of his ability. if Attorney Carin did his
Santiago Alilin were taken about 1/2 kilometer from their home and the accused did bayonet
best as a sworn member of the bar, as the present attorney admits, that was enough; his sentiments did
them to death;
not cut any influence in the result of the case and did not imperil the rights of the appellant.

7. In or about November 16, 1944, in Mandaue, in conspiracy with the enemy and other
In conclusion, we find the defendant not guilty of count 4 and guilty of treason as charged in counts 1,2,3
Filipinos undercovers, said accused did cause the torture of Antonio Soco and the killing of Gil
and 7. There being an aggravating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua. The
Soco for guerrilla activities.
judgment of the lower court will be modified in this respect accordingly. In all other particulars, the same
will be affirmed. it is so ordered, with costs of this instance against the appellant.Moran, C.J., Feria,
The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts and the infliction of physical Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, and Padilla, JJ., concur.
injuries on others are not offenses separate from treason. Under the Philippine treason law and under
the United States constitution defining treason, after which the former was patterned, there must
Republic of the Philippines
concur both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. One without the other does not
SUPREME COURT
make treason.
Manila
EN BANC
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of action. G.R. No. L-477 June 30, 1947
Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
U.S., ante.) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another vs.
penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes APOLINARIO ADRIANO, defendant-appellant.
identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in Remedios P. Nufable for appellant.
combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lacson for appellee.
as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a TUASON, J.:
robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for treason by the People's Court sentencing the accused
possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may to life imprisonment, P10,000 fine, and the costs.
not a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense
where, as in this case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason. This rule would not, of course,
The information charged:
preclude the punishment of murder or physical injuries as such if the government should elect to
prosecute the culprit specifically for those crimes instead on relying on them as an element of treason. it
is where murder or physical injuries are charged as overt acts of treason that they can not be regarded That between January and April, 1945 or thereabout, during the occupation of the Philippines
separately under their general denomination. by the Japanese Imperial Forces, in the Province of Nueva Ecija and in the mountains in the
 Island of Luzon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named
accused, Apolinario Adriano, who is not a foreigner, but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to
the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation of said allegiance,
did then and there willfully, criminally and treasonably adhere to the Military Forces of Japan
in the Philippines, against which the Philippines and the United States were then at war,
giving the said enemy aid and comfort in the manner as follows:
That as a member of the Makapili, a military organization established and designed to assist
and aid militarily the Japanese Imperial forces in the Philippines in the said enemy's war
efforts and operations against the United States and the Philippines, the herein accused bore
arm and joined and assisted the Japanese Military Forces and the Makapili Army in armed
conflicts and engagements against the United States armed forces and the Guerrillas of the
Philippine Commonwealth in the Municipalities of San Leonardo and Gapan, Province of
Nueva Ecija, and in the mountains of Luzon, Philippines, sometime between January and
April, 1945. Contrary to Law.
The prosecution did not introduce any evidence to substantiate any of the facts alleged except that of
defendant's having joined the Makapili organization. What the People's Court found is that the accused
participated with Japanese soldiers in certain raids and in confiscation of personal property. The court
below, however, said these acts had not been established by the testimony of two witnesses, and so
regarded them merely as evidence of adherence to the enemy. But the court did find established under
the two-witness rule, so we infer, "that the accused and other Makapilis had their headquarters in the
enemy garrison at Gapan, Nueva Ecija; that the accused was in Makapili military uniform; that he was
armed with rifle; and that he drilled with other Makapilis under a Japanese instructor; . . . that during the
same period, the accused in Makapili military uniform and with a rifle, performed duties as sentry at the
Japanese garrison and Makapili headquarters in Gapan, Nueva Ecija;" "that upon the liberation of Gapan,
Nueva Ecija, by the American forces, the accused and other Makapilis retreated to the mountains with
the enemy;" and that "the accused, rifle in hand, later surrendered to the Americans."
Even the findings of the court recited above in quotations are not borne out by the proof of two
witnesses. No two of the prosecution witnesses testified to a single one of the various acts of treason
imputed by them to the appellant. Those who gave evidence that the accused took part in raids and
seizure of personal property, and performed sentry duties and military drills, referred to acts allegedly
committed on different dates without any two witnesses coinciding in any one specified deed. There is
only one item on which the witnesses agree: it is that the defendant was a Makapili and was seen by
them in Makapili uniform carrying arms. Yet, again, on this point it cannot be said that one witness is
corroborated by another if corroboration means that two witnesses have seen the accused doing at least
one particular thing, it a routine military chore, or just walking or eating.
We take it that the mere fact of having joined a Makapili organization is evidence of both adherence to
the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. Unless forced upon one against his will, membership in the
Makapili organization imports treasonable intent, considering the purposes for which the organization
was created, which, according to the evidence, were "to accomplish the fulfillment of the obligations
assumed by the Philippines in the Pact of Alliance with the Empire of Japan;" "to shed blood and sacrifice
the lives of our people in order to eradicate Anglo-Saxon influence in East Asia;" "to collaborate
unreservedly and unstintedly with the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in the Philippines;" and "to fight
the common enemies." Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not be proved by the oaths of two witnesses.
Criminal intent and knowledge may be gather from the testimony of one witness, or from the nature of
the act itself, or from the circumstances surrounding the act. (Cramer vs. U.S., 65 Sup. Ct., 918.)
At the same time, being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act. It is not necessary, except for
the purpose of increasing the punishment, that the defendant actually went to battle or committed
nefarious acts against his country or countrymen. The crime of treason was committed if he placed
himself at the enemy's call to fight side by side with him when the opportune time came even though an
opportunity never presented itself. Such membership by its very nature gave the enemy aid and comfort.
The enemy derived psychological comfort in the knowledge that he had on his side nationals of the
country with which his was at war. It furnished the enemy aid in that his cause was advanced, his forces
augmented, and his courage was enhanced by the knowledge that he could count on men such as the
accused and his kind who were ready to strike at their own people. The principal effect of it was no
difference from that of enlisting in the invader's army.
But membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must be established by the deposition of two witnesses.
Does the evidence in the present case meet this statutory test? Is two-witness requirement fulfilled by
the testimony of one witness who saw the appellant in Makapili uniform bearing a gun one day, another
witness another day, and so forth?
The Philippine law on treason is of Anglo-American origin and so we have to look for guidance from
American sources on its meaning and scope. Judicial interpretation has been placed on the two-witness
principle by American courts, and authoritative text writers have commented on it. We cull from
American materials the following excerpts which appear to carry the stamp of authority.
Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 3, section 1396, p. 2282, says:
In England the original Statute of Edward, although requiring both witnesses to be to the
same overt act, was held to mean that there might be one witness to an overt act and
another witness to another overt act of the same species of treason; and, in one case it has
been intimated that the same construction might apply in this country. But, as Mr. Wigmore
so succinctly observes: "The opportunity of detecting the falsity of the testimony, by
sequestering the two witnesses and exposing their variance in details, is wholly destroyed by
permitting them to speak to different acts." The rule as adopted in this country by all the
constitutional provisions, both state and Federal, properly requires that two witnesses shall
testify to the same overt act. This also is now the rule in England.
More to the point is this statement from VII Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., section 2038, p. 271:
Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole of the overt act; or, if it is separable, there
must be two witnesses to each part of the overt act.
Learned Hand, J., in United States vs. Robinson (D.C.S.D., N.Y., 259 Fed., 685), expressed the same idea:
"It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to the whole overt act. It may be possible to piece bits
together of the overt act; but, if so, each bit must have the support of two oaths; . . .." (Copied as
footnote in Wigmore on Evidence, ante.) And in the recent case of Cramer vs. United States (65 Sup. Ct.,
918), decide during the recent World War, the Federal Supreme Court lays down this doctrine: "The very
minimum function that an overt act must perform in a treason prosecution is that it shows sufficient
action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding that the accused actually gave aid and comfort to
the enemy. Every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason must
be supported by the testimony of two witnesses."
In the light of these decisions and opinions we have to set aside the judgment of the trial court. To the
possible objection that the reasoning by which we have reached this conclusion savors of sophism, we
have only to say that the authors of the constitutional provision of which our treason law is a copy
purposely made conviction for treason difficult, the rule "severely restrictive." This provision is so
exacting and so uncompromising in regard to the amount of evidence that where two or more witnesses
give oaths to an overt act and only one of them is believed by the court or jury, the defendant, it has
been said and held, is entitled to discharge, regardless of any moral conviction of the culprit's guilt as
gauged and tested by the ordinary and natural methods, with which we are familiar, of finding the truth.
Natural inferences, however strong or conclusive, flowing from other testimony of a most trustworthy
witness or from other sources are unavailing as a substitute for the needed corroboration in the form of
direct testimony of another eyewitness to the same overt act.
The United States Supreme Court saw the obstacles placed in the path of the prosecution by a literal
interpretation of the rule of two witnesses but said that the founders of the American government fully
realized the difficulties and went ahead not merely in spite but because of the objections.
(Cramer vs. United States, ante.) More, the rule, it is said, attracted the members of the Constitutional
Convention "as one of the few doctrines of Evidence entitled to be guaranteed against legislative
change." (Wigmore on Evidence, ante, section 2039, p. 272, citing Madison's Journal of the Federal
Convention, Scott's ed., II, 564, 566.) Mr. Justice Jackson, who delivered the majority opinion in the
celebrated Cramer case, said: "It is not difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel with this
Constitutional provision. Perhaps the farmers placed rather more reliance on direct testimony than
modern researchers in psychology warrant. Or it may be considered that such a quantitative measure of
proof, such a mechanical calibration of evidence is a crude device at best or that its protection of
innocence is too fortuitous to warrant so unselective an obstacle to conviction. Certainly the treason
rule, whether wisely or not, is severely restrictive." It must be remembered, however, that the
Constitutional Convention was warned by James Wilson that "'Treason may sometimes be practiced in
such a manner, as to render proof extremely difficult — as in a traitorous correspondence with an
enemy.' The provision was adopted not merely in spite of the difficulties it put in the way of prosecution
but because of them. And it was not by whim or by accident, but because one of the most venerated of
that venerated group considered that "prosecutions for treason were generally virulent.'"
Such is the clear meaning of the two-witness provision of the American Constitution. By extension, the
lawmakers who introduced that provision into the Philippine statute books must be understood to have
intended that the law should operate with the same inflexibility and rigidity as the American forefathers
meant.The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted with costs charged de oficio.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery and Captain
Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like Blackbeard
flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a
tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of generosity,
so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch
possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men,
women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7
o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East
Indies. There the boat was surrounded by sixvintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros
first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of
the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to the described. All of the
persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and
holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after
eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the Moros finally arrived at
Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women,
and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There
they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A
demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense
charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine
Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine
Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a judgment was rendered
finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua),
to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended parties,
the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 924
rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de officio. By a process of
elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is
robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and
in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as is again done in
this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law hostes
humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be
punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he
may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all
so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-
mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs.
Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time is
whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force. Article
153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation not at war
with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with
Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next preceding article
shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the crimes referred to in the
second paragraph of the same article, from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.
 2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the
physical injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred
and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in
Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving
themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code, when Spain is
mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national territory.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who, according to the
Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such.
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the effect of a
transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-known. The political law of the
former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the
Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government,
remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to
secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue
until by direct action of the new government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands, etc., R.
Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by the Instructions of
President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding General of the Army of
Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately
operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory,
such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are
considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they
are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and practice they are not usually abrogated,
but are allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as
they were before the occupations. This enlightened practice is so far as possible, to be adhered to on the
present occasion. (Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt
Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant to
include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the Constitution of
the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but
to Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the civil law,
and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor to
statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so,
considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and
the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to define and
punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations. (U.S.
Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute books the necessary ancillary
legislation, provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of
nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life. (U.S.
Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the Constitution
and the members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its universal conception
under the law of nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy are
not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction of
articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that wherever
"Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards"
are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and
citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of United States
vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a limited
meaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public
officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:
The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the
Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall be punished
with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the
United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and
154, to be still in force in the Philippines.
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to article 154. There
are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing either cadena
perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the
abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary
for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. In this
connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and
compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction provided by article 11,
as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating
circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by
causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength,
and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be
taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating
circumstance of lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty
to impose capital punishment.
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death
penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the women), but is not
unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance
with provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the
defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who
is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and
place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two
appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly
and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the
costs of both instances. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-60100 March 20, 1985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME RODRIGUEZ alias JIMMY alias WILFRED DE LARA y MEDRANO and RICO LOPEZ, accused-
appellants.
G.R. No. L-60768 March 20, 1985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DARIO DE REYES alias DARIO DECE RAYMUNDO y ELAUSA, accused- appellant.
G.R. No. L-61069 March 20, l985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PETER PONCE y BULAYBULAY alias PETER POWE, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Appellants Jaime Rodriguez alias Jimmy alias Wilfred de Lara y Medrano, Rico Lopez, Davao Reyes alias
Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa and Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay alias Peter Power were charged of the
crime of piracy in an information filed before the then Court of First Instance of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi,
which reads:
That on or about 3:15 in the morning of August 31, 1981, at the vicinity of Muligin Island and within the
territorial waters of the Municipality of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi, Province of Tawi-Tawi, and within the
jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the above-named accused Wilfred de Lara y Medrano, alias Jaime
Rodriguez (Jimmy) Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa; Rico Lopez y Fernandez and Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay
alias Peter Power being crew members of the M/V Noria 767, a barter trade vessel of Philippine registry,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another and armed with bladed
weapons and high caliber firearms, to wit: three (3) daggers, two (2) M-14, one (1) garand and one (1)
Browning Automatic Rifle, with intent of gain and by means of violence and intimidation upon persons,
did then and there willfully and unlawfuflly, and feloniously take, steal and carry away against the
consent of the owners thereof, the equipments and other persona) properties belonging to the crew
members and passengers of the said M/V Noria 767, consisting of cash money amounting to Three
Million Five Hundred Seventeen Thousand Three Hundred Pesos (P3,517,300.00), personal belongings of
passengers and crew amounting to One Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos (P130,000.00), the vessel's
compass, navigational charts and instruments amounting to Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) to the
damage and prejudice of the aforementioned owners in the total amount of THREE MILLION SIX
HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P3,687,300.00) Philippine Currency; that
by reason of and on the occasion of the said piracy and for the purpose of enabling the abovenamed
accused to take, steal and carry away the properties abovementioned, the herein accused in pursuance
to their conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill and with
evident premeditation, treacherously attack, assault, stab, shot and, taking advantage of superior
strength, use personal violence upon the persons of Abdusador Sumihag, Vicente America, Perhan Tan,
Marcos Que, Ismael Turabin, Mabar Abdurahman, Wadi Aduk Rasdi Alfad, Kasmir Tan, Peter Paul Chiong,
Juaini Husini Ismael Ombra, Sabturani Ulag, Mutalib Sarahadil, Bajubar Adam, Quillermo Wee, Reuben
Segovia Ho, Michael Lao, Yusop Abubakar, Hahji Hussin Kulavan, Amjad Quezon, Rebuan Majid Edgar
Tan, Abdurasul Alialam Federico Canizares, Omar Tahil Gilbert Que, Arajul Salialam, Masihul Bandahala,
Asola Mohammaddin, Batoto Sulpicio, Sakirani Bassal, Ibrahim Jamil, Saupi Malang and Gulam Sahiddan,
thereby inflicting upon them multiple gunshot wounds which caused their instantaneous death and
likewise causing physical injuries upon the persons of Inggal Issao Abduhasan Indasan Hadji Yusop H.
Alfad and Hadji Mahalail Alfad, thus performing all acts of execution which could have produced the
death of said persons, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason or cause independent of the will of
said accused, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said victims which prevented
death.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, night time
and the use of superior strength. (pp. 97-98, Rollo of L-61069)
Upon arraignment on February 25, 1982, Jaime Rodriguez and Rico Lopez, assisted by their counsel,
pleaded guilty to the charge, were convicted on March 5, 1982 and sentenced each "to suffer the
extreme penalty of death."
Dario Dece Raymundo, upon arraignment, interposed a plea of not guilty. However, he withdrew his plea
and substituted it with that of guilty. On March 10, 1982 he was convicted of the crime charged and
sentenced "to suffer the extreme penalty of death."
Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay entered the plea of not guilty.
After trial, he was found guilty and was also sentenced "to suffer the extreme penalty of death."
No pronouncement was made with respect to the civil liabilities of the four defendants because "there
was a separate civil action for breach of contract and damages filed with the same trial court in Civil Case
No. N-85 against the several defendants, including the four accused aforementioned." (p. 26, L-61069)
The case of the four convicted defendants is now before Us on automatic review.
Evidence shows that on August 29, 1981, at about 7:30 in the evening, the vessel M/V Noria 767, owned
and registered in the name of Hadji Noria Indasan left Jolo wharf for Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi. It arrived at
the port of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi the following day, August 30, 1981, at around 2:00 in the afternoon. In
the evening of the same date, the vessel left for Labuan. On board the vessel were several traders and
crew members. Two or three hours after its departure, while sailing about 25 miles from Cagayan de
Tawi-Tawi, a commotion occurred in one of the cabins of the vessel.
Three witnesses testified on what they saw and heard.
Mr. Clyde Que, a passenger, heard noises inside a cabin and, after awhile, he heard shots being fired. He
rushed to the motor launch to hide and on his way through the engine room, he saw appellant Peter
Ponce. Then appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Dario Dece and Rico Lopez, all armed with rifles, started firing
towards Que's companions after which they brought Que to the pilot's house to handle the steering
wheel. He was substituted by Usman, another passenger, while Que and the other crew members were
ordered to throw overboard sacks of copra and the dead bodies of Peter Chiong, Michael Lao, Casmin
Tan and Vicente America. At the time, appellant Peter Ponce, armed with a M-14 rifle, stood guard.
Hadji Mahalail Alfad, another passenger, heard commotions from the motor launch, followed by gunfire.
He hid by laying down among the sacks of copra. He saw appellants Peter Ponce, Jaime Rodriguez, Rico
Lopez and Dario Dece coming down the stairs as they were firing shots until Fred Canizares and Guilbert
Que were hit, their bodies falling upon him. When he tried to move, he realized that he was also hit on
the right side of his stomach. Thereafter, he pretended to be dead till daytime.
Emil Macasaet, Jr., the skipper of the vessel heard the commotion from one of the cabins. He ordered his
men to open the door but it could not be opened. After awhile, the door opened and he saw a gun
pointed at them. Whereupon, he hid behind the bags of copra until appellant Jaime Rodriguez came and
fired at him. Luckily, he was not hit. He and some of his men crawled and they took cover in the bodega
of copra. While in hiding there were gunfires coming from Dario Dece and Peter Ponce. About four (4)
hours later, his Chief Mate Usman persuaded him to come out otherwise something worse would
happen. He saw Jaime Rodriguez who ordered him to direct his men to throw the copras as well as the
dead bodies overboard.
About ten o'clock in the morning of the same day, the vessel reached an island where the four appellants
were able to secure pumpboats. Macasaet was ordered to load in one of the pumpboats nine (9) attache
cases which were full of money. Rico Lopez and Jaime Rodriguez boarded one pumpboat, while Peter
Ponce and Dario Dece boarded another, bringing with them: dressed chicken, softdrinks, durian, boxes
of ammunitions, gallons of water and some meat, as well as rifles.
Municipal Health Officer Leopoldo Lao went aboard the vessel M/V Noria when it arrived at Cagayan de
Tawi-Tawi on September 2, 1981 and saw at the wharf ten dead bodies, all victims of the sea-jacking,
namely: Gulam Sahiddan, Arajul Naran Salialam, Mallang Saupi, Guilbert Que, Frederico Canizares,
Masihul Bandahala, Ribowan Majid Edgar Tan, Omar Sabdani Tahir and Abdurasul Salialam.
In their brief, appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez and Dario Dece claim that the trial court erred (1) in
imposing the death penalty to the accused-appellants Jaime Rodriguez alias Wilfred de Lara, Rico Lopez y
Fernandez and Davao de Reyes, alias Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa despite their plea of guilty; (2) in
giving weight to the alleged sworn statements of Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay, Identified as Exhibits "C" to
"C-10" and Exhibits "I to I-5", as evidence against Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay; (3) in holding that accused-
appellant Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay is guilty of the crime of piracy; (4) in holding that the defense of
Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay was merely a denial; and, (5) in holding that Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay
entrusted the P1,700.00 which was his personal money to Atty. Efren Capulong of the National Bureau of
Investigation.
There is no merit in this appeal of the three named defendants, namely: Jaime Rodriguez and Rico Lopez
in G.R. No. L-60100, and Dario Dece in G.R. No. L-60768.
Anent the first assigned error, suffice it to say that Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the
Anti-Piracy Law, amending Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code and which took effect on August 8,
1974, provides:
SEC. 3. Penalties.—Any person who commits piracy or highway robbery/brigandage as herein defined,
shall, upon conviction by competent court be punished by:
a) Piracy.—The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed. If
physical injuries or other crimes are committed as a result or on the occasion thereof, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape, murder or no homocide is committed as a result or on the
occasion of piracy, or when the offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves, or
when the seizure is accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of death
shall be imposed. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the penalty imposable upon persons found guilty of the crime of piracy where rape, murder or
homicide is committed is mandatory death penalty. Thus, the lower court committed no error in not
considering the plea of the three (3) defendants as a mitigating circumstance. Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code states that:
b) ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.—In all cases in which the law prescribes a
single indivisible penalty, it shag be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.
With respect to the other assigned errors, We also find them to be devoid of merit. Appellants Peter
Ponce gave a statement (Exhibits "C" to "C-11") to the Malaysian authorities and another statement
(Exhibits "I" to "I-15") before the National Bureau of Investigation of Manila. When said statement
(Exhibits "C" to "C-11") was offered in evidence by the prosecution, the same was not objected to by the
defense, aside from the fact that Peter Ponce, on cross examination, admitted the truthfulness of said
declarations, thus:
Q And the investigation was reduced into writing is that correct?
A Yes. sir.
Q And you were investigated by the police authority of Kudat and Kota Kinabalo, is that right?
A Yes, sir. Only in Kudat.
Q And that statement you gave to the authority at Kudat, you have signed that statement, is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what you stated is all the truth before the authority in Kudat?
A Yes, sir. (pp. 33-34, tsn, May 28, 1982)
Relative to the appeal of appellant Peter Ponce (G.R. No. L-61069), which We likewise declare to be
without merit, evidence shows that his participation in the commission of the offense was positively
testified to by the master of the vessel, Emil Macasaet, Jr., and a passenger, Hadji Mahalail Alfad.
Another witness, passenger Clyde Que also pointed to have seen him (Peter Ponce) armed with an M-14
rifle.
Considering the testimonies of Clyde Que and Emil Macasaet, Jr. who actually saw appellant Peter Ponce
firing his weapon indiscriminately at the passengers and crew members in wanton disregard of human
lives and the fact that after the looting and killing, appellant Peter Ponce, still armed, joined Dario Dece
in one pumpboat, there can be no question that he was in conspiracy with the three other defendants.
After his arrest, Ponce gave a statement to the authorities stating therein his participation as well as
those of his companions (Exhibits "I" to "I-1").
The four (4) appellants were arrested and detained by the Malaysian authorities. On January 8, 1982, the
National Bureau of Investigation authorities fetched and brought them to Manila where they executed
their respective statements after Rico Lopez and Peter Ponce delivered to the NBI, P3,700.00 and
P1,700.00, respectively, aside from the P527,595.00 and one Rolex watch which the Malaysian
authorities also turned over to the Acting In-Charge of the NBI in Jolo.
The statement of Ponce (Exhibit " I ") contains the questions and answers pertinent to Section 20 of the
1973 Constitution, to wit:
l. QUESTION: Mr. Peter Ponce, we are informing you that you are under investigation here in connection
with the robbery committed on the M/V Noria last August 31, 1981, where you are an Assistant
Engineer. You have a right to remain silent and to refuse to answer any of our questions here. You have
the right to be represented by counsel of your choice in this investigation. Should you decide to be
represented by a lawyer but cannot afford one we will provide a lawyer for you free. Should you decide
to give a sworn statement, the same shall be voluntary and free from force or intimidation or promise of
reward or leniency and anything that you saw here maybe used for or against you in any court in the
Philippines. Now do you understand an these rights of yours?
ANSWER: Yes, sir
2. Q: Do you need the services of a lawyer?
A: No, sir.
3. Q: Are you willing to affix your signature hereinbelow to signify that you so understand all your rights
as above stated and that you do not need the services of a lawyer?
A: Yes, sir. (p. 11 6, Rollo)
Thus, it is clear that Peter Ponce was fully advised of his constitutional right to remain silent and his right
to counsel.
Considering the written statements of all the appellants, (Exhibits "E", "F", "G", "H", "J" and "K"),
interlocking as they are with each other as each admits his participation and those of the other co-
accused, there is no room for doubt that conspiracy existed among them. The conduct of appellant
Peter Ponce before, during and after the commission of the crime is a circumstance showing the
presence of conspiracy in the commission of the crime. As a consequence, every one is responsible for
the crime committed.WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-57292 February 18, 1986
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULAIDE SIYOH, OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI, accused-appellants.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court of First Instance of Basilan, Judge Jainal
D. Rasul as ponente, imposing the death penalty.
In Criminal Case No. 318 of the aforesaid court, JULAIDE SIYOH, OMARKAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN
and ANDAW JAMAHALI were accused of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated murder said
to have been committed according to the information as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of July, 1979, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, viz., at Mataja Is., Municipality of Lantawan, Province of Basilan, Philippines, the above named
accused, being strangers and without lawful authority, armed with firearms and taking advantage of
their superior strength, conspiring and confederating together, aiding and assisting one with the other,
with intent to gain and by the use of violence or intimidation against persons and force upon things, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, fire their guns into the air and stop the pumpboat
wherein Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and Antonio de Guzman were riding,
traveling at that time from the island of Baluk-Baluk towards Pilas, boarded the said pumpboat and take,
steal and carry away all their cash money, wrist watches, stereo sets, merchandise and other personal
belongings amounting to the total amount of P 18,342.00, Philippine Currency; that the said accused, on
the occasion of the crime herein above-described, taking advantage that the said victims were at their
mercy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, ordered them to jump
into the water, whereupon, the said accused, fired their guns at them which caused the death of Rodolfo
de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and wounding one Antonio de Guzman; thus the accused
have performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Qualified Piracy with
Quadruple Murder, but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reasons of causes in dependent of
their will, that is, said Antonio de Guzman was able to swim to the shore and hid himself, and due to the
timely medical assistance rendered to said victim, Antonio de Guzman which prevented his death.
(Expediente, pp. 1-2.)
An order of arrest was issued against all of the accused but only Julaide Siyoh and Omar-kayam Kiram
were apprehended. (Id, p. 8.)
After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion.
WHEREFORE, in view of the fore going considerations, this Court finds the accused Omar-kayam Kiram
and Julaide Siyoh guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Piracy with Triple Murder and
Frustrated Murder as defined and penalized under the provision of Presidential Decree No. 532, and
hereby sentences each one of them to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. However, considering the
provision of Section 106 of the Code of Mindanao and Sulu, the illiteracy or ignorance or extreme
poverty of the accused who are members of the cultural minorities, under a regime of so called
compassionate society, a commutation to life imprisonment is recommended. (Id, p. 130.)
In their appeal, Siyo and Kiram make only one assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OMAR-KAYAM
KIRAM AND JULAIDE SIYOH HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. (Brief, p. 8.)
The People's version of the facts is as follows:
Alberto Aurea was a businessman engaged in selling dry goods at the Larmitan Public Market, in the
province of Basilan (pp. 2-3, tsn). On July 7, 1979 and on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman, Danilo
Hiolen, Rodolfo de Castro and Anastacio de Guzman received goods from his store consisting of
mosquito nets, blankets, wrist watch sets and stereophono with total value of P15,000 more or less (pp.
4-6, tsn). The goods were received under an agreement that they would be sold by the above-named
persons and thereafter they would pay the value of said goods to Aurea and keep part of the profits for
themselves. However these people neither paid the value of the goods to Aurea nor returned the goods
to him (pp. 6-7, tsn). On July 15, 1979, Aurea was informed by Antonio de Guzman that his group was
held up near Baluk- Baluk Island and that his companions were hacked (p. 8, tsn). On July 16, 1979, the
bodies of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen and Anastacio de Guzman were brought by the PC seaborne
patrol to Isabela, Basilan (pp. 17-18, 29, tsn). Only Antonio de Guzman survived the incident that caused
the death of his companions.
It appears that on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman together with his friends who were also travelling
merchants like him, were on their way to Pilas Island, Province of Basilan, to sell the goods they received
from Alberto Aurea. The goods they brought with them had a total value of P18,000.00 (pp- 36-37, tsn).
They left for Pilas Island at 2:00 p.m. of July 10, 1979 on a pumpboat. They took their dinner and slept
that night in the house of Omar-kayam Kiram at Pilas Island (pp. 37-38, tsn).
The following day, July 11, 1979, de Guzman's group, together with Kiram and Julaide Siyoh, started
selling their goods, They were able to sell goods worth P 3,500.00. On July 12, 1979, the group, again
accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh, went to sell their goods at another place, Sangbay, where they sold
goods worth P 12,000.00 (pp. 40-42, tsn). They returned to Pilas Island at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon
and again slept at Kiram's house. However that night Kiram did not sleep in his house, and upon inquiry
the following day when Antonio de Guzman saw him, Kiram told the former that he slept at the house of
Siyoh.
On that day, July 13, 1979, the group of Antonio de Guzman went to Baluk-Baluk, a place suggested by
Kiram. They were able to sell goods worth P3,000.00 (pp. 43-46, tsn). They returned to Pilas Island for
the night but Kiram did not sleep with them (p. 47, tsn).
The following day, July 14, 1979, the group again went to Baluk-Baluk accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh
(pp. 48, 50 t.s.n), They used the pumpboat of Kiram. Kiram and Siyoh were at that time armed with
'barongs'. They arrived at Baluk-Baluk at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and upon arrival at the place
Kiram and Siyoh going ahead of the group went to a house about 15 meters away from the place where
the group was selling its goods (pp. 50-53, tsn). Kiram and Siyoh were seen by the group talking with two
persons whose faces the group saw but could not recognize (pp. 53-54, tsn). After selling their goods, the
members of the group, together with Kiram and Siyoh, prepared to return to Pilas Island. They rode on a
pumpboat where Siyoh positioned himself at the front while Kiram operated the engine. On the way to
Pilas Island, Antonio de Guzman saw another pumpboat painted red and green about 200 meters away
from their pumpboat (pp. 55, tsn). Shortly after" Kiram turned off the engine of their pumpboat.
Thereafter two shots were fired from the other pumpboat as it moved towards them (pp. 57-58, tsn).
There were two persons on the other pumpboat who were armed with armantes. De Guzman
recognized them to be the same persons he saw Kiram conversing with in a house at Baluk-Baluk Island.
When the boat came close to them, Kiram threw a rope to the other pumpboat which towed de
Guzman's pumpboat towards Mataja Island. On the way to Mataja Island, Antonio de Guzman and his
companions were divested of their money and their goods by Kiram (pp. 59-61, tsn). Thereafter Kiram
and his companions ordered the group of de Guzman to undress. Taking fancy on the pants of Antonio
de Guzman, Kiram put it on. With everybody undressed, Kiram said 'It was good to kill all of you'. After
that remark, Siyoh hacked Danilo Hiolen while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de Castro. Antonio de Guzman
jumped into the water. As he was swimming away from the pumpboat, the two companions of Kiram
fired at him, injuring his back (pp. 62-65, tsn). But he was able to reach a mangrove where he stayed till
nightfall. When he left the mangrove, he saw the dead bodies of Anastacio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen
and Rodolfo de Castro. He was picked up by a fishing boat and brought to the Philippine Army station at
Maluso where he received first aid treatment. Later he was brought to the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital
at Isabela, Basilan province (pp. 66-68, tsn).
On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead bodies of his companions at the wharf, de Guzman saw
Siyoh and Kiram. He pointed them out to the PC and the two were arrested before they could run. When
arrested, Kiram was wearing the pants he took from de Guzman and de Guzman had to ask Pat. Bayabas
at the Provincial Jail to get back his pants from Kiram (pp. 69-72, tsn).
Antonio de Guzman was physically examined at the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan and
findings showed: 'gunshot wound, scapular area, bilateral, tangenital' (Exh. C, prosecution). (pp. 134-136,
tsn). Dr. Jaime M. Junio, Provincial Health Officer of Basilan, examined the dead bodies of Rodolfo de
Castro and Danilo Hiolen and issued the corresponding death certificates (Exhs. D and E, prosecution).
(pp. 137-138; 140-141, tsn). (Brief, pp. 5-11.)
As can be seen from the lone assignment of error, the issue is the credibility of witnesses. Who should be
believed Antonio de Guzman who was the lone prosecution eye-witness or Siyoh and Kiram the accused-
appellants who claims that they were also the victims of the crime? The trial court which had the
opportunity of observing the demeanor of the witnesses and how they testified assigned credibility to
the former and an examination of the record does not reveal any fact or circumstance of weight and
influence which was overlooked or the significance of which was misinterpreted as would justify a
reversal of the trial court's determination. Additionally, the following claims of the appellants are not
convincing:
1. That if they were the culprits they could have easily robbed their victims at the Kiram house or on any
of the occasions when they were travelling together. Suffice it to say that robbing the victims at Kiram's
house would make Kiram and his family immediately suspect and robbing the victims before they had
sold all their goods would be premature. However, robbing and killing the victims while at sea and after
they had sold all their goods was both timely and provided safety from prying eyes.
2. That the accused immediately reported the incident to the PC. The record does not support this
assertion. For as the prosecution stated: "It is of important consequence to mention that the witness
presented by the defense are all from Pilas Island and friends of the accused. They claimed to be
members of retrieving team for the dead bodies but no PC soldiers were ever presented to attest this
fact. The defense may counter why the prosecution also failed to present the Maluso Police Daily Event
book? This matter has been brought by Antonio not to the attention of the PC or Police but to an army
detachment. The Army is known to have no docket book, so why take the pain in locating the army
soldiers with whom the report was made? (Memorandum, p. 7.) And Judge Rasul also makes this
observation: "..., this Court is puzzled, assuming the version of the defense to be true, why the lone
survivor Antonio de Guzman as having been allegedly helped by the accused testified against them.
Indeed, no evidence was presented and nothing can be inferred from the evidence of the defense so far
presented showing reason why the lone survivor should pervert the truth or fabricate or manufacture
such heinous crime as qualified piracy with triple murders and frustrated murder? The point which
makes us doubt the version of the defense is the role taken by the PC to whom the report was allegedly
made by the accused immediately after the commission of the offense. Instead of helping the accused,
the PC law enforcement agency in Isabela, perhaps not crediting the report of the accused or believing in
the version of the report made by the lone survivor Antonio de Guzman, acted consistently with the
latter's report and placed the accused under detention for investigation." (Expediente,pp. 127-128.)
3. That the affidavits of Dolores de Guzman, wife of the deceased Anastacio de Guzman, and Primitiva de
Castro, wife of the deceased Rodolfo de Castro, state that Antonio de Guzman informed them shortly
after the incident that their husbands were killed by the companions of Siyoh and Kiram. The thrust of
the appellants' claim, therefore, is that Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali were the killers and not the
former. But this claim is baseless in the face of the proven conspiracy among the accused for as Judge
Rasul has stated:
It is believed that conspiracy as alleged in the information is sufficiently proved in this case. In fact the
following facts appear to have been established to show clearly conspiracy: A) On July 14, 1979, while
peddling, the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman noticed that near the window of a dilapidated house,
both accused were talking to two (2) armed strange-looking men at Baluk-Baluk Island; B) When the
pumpboat was chased and overtaken, the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman recognized their captors to
be the same two (2) armed strangers to whom the two accused talked in Baluk- Baluk Island near the
dilapidated house; C) The two accused, without order from the two armed strangers transferred the
unsold goods to the captors' banca; D) That Tony de Guzman and companion peddlers were divested of
their jewelries and cash and undressed while the two accused remained unharmed or not molested.
These concerted actions on their part prove conspiracy and make them equally liable for the same crime
(People vs. Pedro, 16 SCRA 57; People vs. lndic 10 SCRA 130). The convergence of the will of the
conspirators in the scheming and execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation of all of them the
act of any of them (People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA, 759). (Id., pp. 128-129.)
4. That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was killed together with Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo
Hiolen because his remains were never recovered. There is no reason to suppose that Anastacio de
Guzman is still alive or that he died in a manner different from his companions. The incident took place
on July 14, 1979 and when the trial court decided the case on June 8, 1981 Anastacio de Guzman was still
missing. But the number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is not material. P.D. No. 532
considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of
piracy, as a special complex crime punishable by death regardless of the number of victims.
5. That the death certificates are vague as to the nature of the injuries sustained by the victims; were
they hacked wounds or gunshot wounds? The cause of death stated for Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo
Hiolen is: "Hemorrhage due to hacked wounds, possible gunshot wounds." (Exhs. D and E.) The cause is
consistent with the testimony of Antonio de Guzman that the victims were hacked; that the appellants
were armed with "barongs" while Indanan and Jamahali were armed with armalites.
WHEREFORE, finding the decision under review to be in accord with both the facts and the law, it is
affirmed with the following modifications: (a) for lack of necessary votes the penalty imposed shall
be reclusion perpetua; and (b) each of the appellants shall pay in solidum to the heirs of each of the
deceased indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00. No special pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81567 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and
RENATO VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA O. UMIL, and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82 July 9, 1990
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN. RAMON MONTANO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and
RAMON CASIPLE. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARINO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD,
T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention
Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.
G.R. No. 83162 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA.
VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR MARIANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 85727 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 86332 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO. ALFREDO
NAZARENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila,
P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MAURO
AROJADO,respondents.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82.
Ramon S. Esguerra, Barbara Anne C. Migallos and Agripino G. Morga for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-
84.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioner in G.R. No. 83162.
Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy, Taquio & Association for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. No. 86332.
The Solicitor General for the respondents.
PER CURIAM:
The are eight (8) petitioners for habeas corpus filed before the Court, which have been consolidated
because of the similarity of issues raised, praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, ordering
the respective respondents to produce the bodies of the persons named therein and to explain why they
should not be set at liberty without further delay.
In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is not available to the petitioners as they have been legally arrested and are detained by virtue
of valid informations filed in court against them.
The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were made without warrant and,
that no preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that the informations filed against them are null
and void.
The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in their respective pleadings, and it finds
that the persons detained have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional
right to liberty, and that the circumstances attending these cases do not warrant their release on habeas
corpus.
The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized in law. The
occasions or instances when such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out in Section 5, Rule 113
of the Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7.
An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, is justified when the person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto, viz., in the act of
committing an offense; or when an offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest
has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. The rationale
behind lawful arrests, without warrant, was stated by this Court in the case of People vs. Kagui
Malasugui 1 thus:
To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his
crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the
most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances.
The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose behalf these petitions for habeas
corpushave been filed, had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense, when
apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant were clearly justified, and that they are, further,
detained by virtue of valid informations filed against them in court.
A brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the eight (8) petitions is in order.
I
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos), the record shows that, on 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence
Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a
member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes
Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person,
who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA
liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January
1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was
transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined
thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Rolando Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman
who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM
soldiers seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot.
As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal
who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an
information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of "Double Murder with Assault
Upon Agents of Persons in Authority." The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-30112 and
no bail was recommended. On 15 February 1988, the information was amended to include, as
defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the original information, was still unidentified.
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf
of Roberto Umil,Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9
February 1988 and the respondents filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February 1988. Thereafter, the
parties were heard on 15 February 1988.
On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against them,
and they were accordingly released. The petition for habeas corpus, insofar as Umil and Villanueva are
concerned, is now moot and academic and is accordingly dismissed, since the writ of habeas corpus does
not lie in favor of an accused in a criminal case who has been released on bail. 2
As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the two (2)
CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for
his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is
unjustified.
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed
subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without
warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed
in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in
the nature of continuing crimes. As stated by the Court in an earlier case:
From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were initially arrested illegally is,
therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy
or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance, on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No.
2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside
from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of
the herein detainees was well within the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.
2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the
course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting
them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause
before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable.
Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons
committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in
pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the
situation that involves the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities. If
killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities
which is of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion,
merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these contingencies continues cannot be
less justified. . . . 3
The record, moreover, shows that the criminal case filed against Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr.
for "Double Murder, etc." was tried in the court below and at the conclusion thereof, or on 17 August
1988, Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. were found guilty of the charge and sentenced accordingly.
Rolando Dural is now serving the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court. Thus, the writ of habeas
corpus is no longer available to him. For, as held in the early case of U.S. vs. Wilson: 4
In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest, the fact remains that the defendant
was actually in court in the custody of the law on March 29, when a complaint sufficient in form and
substance was read to him. To this he pleaded not guilty. The trial followed, in which, and in the
judgment of guilty pronounced by the court, we find no error. Whether, if there were irregularities in
bringing him personally before the court, he could have been released on a writ of habeas corpus or now
has a civil action for damages against the person who arrested him we need not inquire. It is enough to
say that such irregularities are not sufficient to set aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint and after a trial free from error.
II
In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa), the arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra, without
warrant, is also justified. When apprehended at the house of Renato Constantino in Marikina Heights,
Marikina, Metro Manila, Wilfredo Buenaobra admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him
letters to Renato Constantino and other members of the rebel group. Amelia Roque, upon the other
hand, was a member of the National United Front Commission, in charge of finance,
and admitted ownership of subversive documents found in the house of her sister in Caloocan City. She
was also in possession of ammunition and a fragmentation grenade for which she had no permit or
authority to possess.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that on 27 June 1988, one Rogelio Ramos y Ibanes, a member of
the NPA, who had surrendered to the military authorities, told military agents about the operations of
the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New Peoples Army (NPA) in Metro Manila. He
identified some of his former comrades as "Ka Mong", a staff member of the Communications and
Transportation Bureau; "Ka Nelia", a staff member in charge of finance; "Ka Miller", an NPA courier from
Sorsogon and Lopez, Quezon; "Ka Ted", and "Ka Totoy". He also pointed to a certain house occupied by
Renato Constantino located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro
Manila, which is used as a safehouse of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP-NPA.
In view of these revelations, the Constantino house was placed under military surveillance and on 12
August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, a search of the house was conducted at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, by a combined
team of the Criminal Investigation Service, National Capital District (CIS-NCD) and the Constabulary
Security Group (CSG). In the course of the search, the following articles were found and taken under
proper receipt:
a) One (1) Colt M16A1 long rifle with defaced serial number;
b) One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK/8 SN: 260577 & 2605778;
c) Two (2) fragmentation hand grenades;
d) Fifty-six (56) live ammunition for Cal. 5.56 mm;
e) Five (5) live ammunition for Cal. .380;
f) One (1) ICOM VHF FM Radio Transciever SN: 14903
g) One (1) Regulated power supply 220V AC;
h) One (1) Antennae (adjustable);
i) One (1) Speaker with cord ALEXAR;
j) Voluminous Subversive documents.
When confronted, Renato Constatino could not produce any permit or authority to possess the firearms,
ammunition, radio and other communications equipment. Hence, he was brought to the CIS
Headquarters for investigation. When questioned, he refused to give a written statement, although
he admitted that he was a staff member of the executive committee of the NUFC and a ranking member
of the International Department of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day (12 August 1988), Wilfredo Buenaobra arrived at
the house of Renato Constantino in the Villaluz Compound. When accosted, he readily admitted to the
military agents that he is a regular member of the CPP/NPA and that he went to the place to deliver
letters to "Ka Mong", referring to Renato Constatino, and other members of the rebel group. On further
questioning, he also admitted that he is known as "Ka Miller" and that he was from Barangay San Pedro,
Lopez, Quezon. Among the items taken from him were the following:
(1) Handwritten letter addressed to "Ka Bing & Co. from A & Co." dated August 11,
1988;
(2) Handwritten letter addressed to "ROD from VIC (Schell datre)" dated August
11, 1988;
(3) Handwritten letter addressed to "Suzie" from "Vic", dated August 11, 1988.
Also found Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper containing a written but jumbled telephone
number of Florida M. Roque, sister of Amelia Roque alias "Ka Nelia", at 69 Geronimo St., Caloocan City.
Acting on the lead provided as to the whereabouts of Amelia Roque, the military agents went to the
given address the next day (13 August 1988). They arrived at the place at about 11:00 o'clock in the
morning. After identifying themselves as military agents and after seeking permission to search the
place, which was granted, the military agents conducted a search in the presence of the occupants of the
house and the barangay captain of the place, one Jesus D. Olba.
The military agents found the place to be another safehouse of the NUFC/CPP. They found ledgers,
journals, vouchers, bank deposit books, folders, computer diskettes, and subversive documents as well
as live ammunition for a .38 SPL Winchester, 11 rounds of live ammunition for a cal. .45, 19 rounds of live
ammunition for an M16 Rifle, and a fragmentation grenade. As a result, Amelia Roque and the other
occupants of the house were brought to the PC-CIS Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for
investigation. Amelia Roque admitted to the investigators that the voluminous documents belonged to
her and that the other occupants of the house had no knowledge of them. As a result, the said other
occupants of the house were released from custody.
On 15 August 1988, Amelia Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for inquest after which an
information charging her with violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-1196. Another information for violation of the
Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Amelia Roque before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City,
which is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-150458.
An information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Wilfredo Buenaobra before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No.
23715. Bail was set at P4,000.00.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court on behalf of Amelia Roque
and Wilfredo Buenaobra. At the hearing of the case, however, Wilfredo Buenaobra manifested his desire
to stay in the PC-INP Stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon City. According, the petition for habeas
corpus filed on his behalf is now moot and academic. Only the petition of Amelia Roque remains for
resolution.
The contention of respondents that petitioners Roque and Buenaobra are officers and/or members of
the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP was not controverted or traversed by said
petitioners. The contention must be deemed admitted. 5 As officers and/or members of the NUFC-CPP,
their arrest, without warrant, was justified for the same reasons earlier stated vis-a-vis Rolando Dural.
The arrest without warrant of Roque was additionally justified as she was, at the time of apprehension,
in possession of ammunitions without license to possess them.
III
In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos), the arrest of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple,
without warrant, is also justified under the rules. Both are admittedly members of the standing
committee of the NUFC and, when apprehended in the house of Renato Constatino, they had a bag
containing subversive materials, and both carried firearms and ammunition for which they had no
license to possess or carry.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of 13 August 1988, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated
Domingo T. Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple arrived at the house of Renato Constatino at Marikina Heights, within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
Marikina, which was still under surveillance by military agents. The military agents noticed bulging
objects on their waist lines. When frisked, the agents found them to be loaded guns. Anonuevo and
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, the
Casiple were asked to show their permit or license to possess or carry firearms and ammunition, but they
accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a
could not produce any. Hence, they were brought to PC Headquarters for investigation. Found in their
preliminary investigation with the same right to adduced evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed
possession were the following articles:
in this Rule.

a) Voluminous subversive documents

b) One (1) Cal. 7.65 MOD 83 2C Pistol SN: 001412 with one (1) magazine for Cal. 7.65 containing ten (10)
live ammunition of same caliber;
c) One (1) Cal. 7.65 Pietro Barreta SN; A18868 last digit tampered with one (1) magazine containing five
(5) live ammunition of same caliber.
At the PC Stockade, Domingo Anonuevo was identified as "Ka Ted", and Ramon Casiple as "Ka Totoy" of
the CPP, by their comrades who had previously surrendered to the military.
On 15 August 1988, the record of the investigation and other documentary evidence were forwarded to
the Provincial Fiscal at Pasig, Metro Manila, who conducted an inquest, after which Domingo Anonuevo
and Ramon Casiple were charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The cases are docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 74386 ad 74387,
respectively. No bail was recommended.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, alleging that the said Anonuevo and Casiple were unlawfully arrested
without a warrant and that the informations filed against them are null and void for having been filed
without prior hearing and preliminary investigation. On 30 August 1988, the Court issued the writ
of habeas corpus, and after the respondents had filed a Return of the Writ, the parties were heard.
The petitioners' (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim that they were unlawfully arrested because there was no
previous warrant of arrest, is without merit The record shows that Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon
Casiple were carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunition in their person when they were
apprehended.
The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, however, refused to sign a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In the informations filed against them,
the prosecutor made identical certifications, as follows:
This is to certify that the accused has been charged in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, that no preliminary investigation was conducted because the accused
has not made and signed a waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
that based on the evidence presented, there is reasonable ground to believe that the crime has been
committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary investigation after the informations had been filed against them
in court. Petitioners cannot now claim that they have been deprived of their constitutional right to due
process.
IV
In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant, of Vicky Ocaya is justified under the
Rules, since she had with her unlicensed ammunition when she was arrested. The record of this case
shows that on 12 May 1988, agents of the PC Intelligence and Investigation of the Rizal PC-INP
Command, armed with a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a search of a house located at Block 19, Phase II, Marikina Green
Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. In
the course of the search, Vicky Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive documents and
several rounds of ammunition for a .45 cal. pistol were found in the car of Vicky Ocaya. As a result, Vicky
Ocaya and Danny Rivera were brought to the PC Headquarters for investigation. When Vicky Ocaya could
not produce any permit or authorization to possess the ammunition, an information charging her with
violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The case is docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. 73447. Danny Rivera, on the other hand, was released from custody.

There is also no merit in the contention that the informations filed against them are null and void for
On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed, with this Court on behalf of Vicky Ocaya and
want of a preliminary investigation. The filing of an information, without a preliminary investigation
Danny Rivera. It was alleged therein that Vicky Ocaya was illegally arrested and detained, and denied the
having been first conducted, is sanctioned by the Rules. Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as
right to a preliminary investigation.
amended, reads:

It would appear, however, that Vicky Ocaya was arrested in flagranti delicto so that her arrest without a
Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant. — When a person is lawfully arrested without
warrant is justified. No preliminary investigation was conducted because she was arrested without a
a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed
warrant and she refused to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to
by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first
Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rule of Court, as amended.
conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.

However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of
the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and
in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver,
V
The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Amelia Roque claim that the
firearms, ammunition and subversive documents alleged to have been found in their possession when
they were arrested, did not belong to them, but were "planted" by the military agents to justify their Petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks nor innocently visiting a camp,
illegal arrest. but were arrested in such time, place and circumstances, from which one can reasonably conclude tat
they were up to a sinister plot, involving utmost secrecy and comprehensive conspiracy.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to support their aforesaid claim. On the
other hand, no evil motive or ill-will on the part of the arresting officers that would cause the said IV
arresting officers in these cases to accuse the petitioners falsely, has been shown. Besides, the arresting
officers in these cases do not appear to be seekers of glory and bounty hunters for, as counsel for the
In. G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on habeas corpus of the petitioner Deogracias Espiritu,
petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple say, "there is absolutely nothing in the evidence submitted during the
who is detained by virtue of an Information for Violation of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code
inquest that petitioners are on the 'AFP Order of Battle with a reward of P150,000.00 each on their
(Inciting to Sedition) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is similarly not warranted.
heads.'" 6 On the other hand, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the arrest of the petitioners is not a
product of a witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA
safehouses pointed to by no less than former comrades of the petitioners in the rebel movement. The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the General Secretary of the Pinagkaisahang
Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators Nationwide (PISTON), an association of drivers and operators of public
service vehicles in the Philippines, organized for their mutual aid and protection.
The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated Memorandum, aptly observes:

Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November 1988, while he was sleeping
. . . . To reiterate, the focal point in the case of petitioners Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple,
in his home located at 363 Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, he was awakened by his sister Maria Paz Lalic
was the lawful search and seizure conducted by the military at the residence of Renato Constantino at
who told him that a group of persons wanted to hire his jeepney. When he went down to talk to them,
Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila. The raid at Constantino's
he was immediately put under arrest. When he asked for the warrant of arrest, the men, headed by Col.
residence, was not a witch hunting or fishing expedition on the part of the military. It was a result of an
Ricardo Reyes, bodily lifted him and placed him in their owner-type jeepney. He demanded that his
in-depth military surveillance coupled with the leads provided by former members of the underground
sister, Maria Paz Lalic, be allowed to accompany him, but the men did not accede to his request and
subversive organizations. That raid produced positive results. to date, nobody has disputed the fact that
hurriedly sped away.
the residence of Constantino when raided yielded communication equipment, firearms and
ammunitions, as well as subversive documents.
He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District at Blumentritt, Manila where he
was interrogated and detained. Then, at about 9:00 o'clock of the same morning, he was brought before
The military agents working on the information provided by Constantino that other members
the respondent Lim and, there and then, the said respondent ordered his arrest and detention. He was
of his group were coming to his place, reasonably conducted a "stake-out" operation whereby some
thereafter brought to the General Assignment Section, Investigation Division of the Western Police
members of the raiding team were left behind the place. True enough, barely two hours after the raid
District under Police Capt. Cresenciano A. Cabasal where he was detained, restrained and deprived of his
and Constantino's arrest, petitioner Buenaobra arrived at Constantino's residence. He acted suspiciously
liberty. 7
and when frisked and searched by the military authorities, found in his person were letters. They are no
ordinary letters, as even a cursory reading would show. Not only that, Buenaobra admitted that he is a
NPA courier and was there to deliver the letters to Constantino. The respondents claim however, that the detention of the petitioner is justified in view of the
Information filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed therein as Criminal
Case No. 88-683-85, charging him with violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to
Subsequently, less than twenty four hours after the arrest of Constantino and Buenaobra,
Sedition).
petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple arrived at Constantino's place. Would it be unreasonable for the
military agents to believe that petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple are among those expected to visit
Constantino's residence considering that Constatino's information was true, in that Buenaobra did come The respondents also claim that the petitioner was lawfully arrested without a judicial warrant of arrest
to that place? Was it unreasonable under the circumstances, on the part of the military agents, not to since petitioner when arrested had in fact just committed an offense in that in the afternoon of 22
frisk and search anyone who should visit the residence of Constantino, such as petitioners Anonuevo and November 1988, during a press conference at the National Press Club.
Casiple? Must this Honorable Court yield to Anonuevo and Casiple's flimsy and bare assertion that they
went to visit Constantino, who was to leave for Saudi Arabia on the day they were arrested thereat? Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urging all drivers and operators to go on
nationwide strike on November 23, 1988, to force the government to give into their demands to lower
As to petitioner Roque, was it unreasonable for the military authorities to effect her arrest the prices of spare parts, commodities, water and the immediate release from detention of the president
without warrant considering that it was Buenaobra who provided the leads on her identity? It cannot be of the PISTON (Pinag-isang Samahan ng Tsuper Operators Nationwide). Further, we heard Deogracias
denied that Buenaobra had connection with Roque. Because the former has the phone number of the Espiritu taking the place of PISTON president Medardo Roda and also announced the formation of the
latter. Why the necessity of jumbling Roque's telephone number as written on a piece of paper taken Alliance Drivers Association to go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988. 8
from Buenaobra's possession? Petitioners Roque and Buenaobra have not offered any plausible reason
so far. Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Pres Club in order to investigate him, but he gave
the lawmen the slip. 9 He was next seen at about 5:00 o'clock that afternoon at a gathering of drivers and
In all the above incidents, respondents maintain that they acted reasonably, under the time, symphatizers at the corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and Valencia Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was
place and circumstances of the events in question, especially considering that at the time of petitioner's heard to say:
arrest, incriminatory evidence, i.e, firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents were found in
their possession.
 Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na kasali sila, at hindi tayo titigil
hanggang hindi binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto nating pagbaba ng halaga ng spare parts, bilihin
at and pagpapalaya sa ating pinuno na si Ka Roda hanggang sa magkagulo na. 10 (emphasis supplied)
The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November 1988. He was invited for questioning
and brought to police headquarters after which an Information for violation of Art. 142 of the Revised
Penal Code was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 11
Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in accordance with the provisions of Rule 113,
Sec. 5(b) of the Rules of Court and that the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid information filed
with the competent court, he may not be released on habeas corpus. He may, however be released upon
posting bail as recommended. However, we find the amount of the recommended bail (P60,000.00)
excessive and we reduce it to P10,000.00 only.
VII
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station Commander), we also find no merit in the submission of Narciso
Nazareno that he was illegally arrested and is unlawfully detained. The record of this case shows that at
about 8:30 o'clock in the morning of 14 December 1988, one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of
men near the corner of T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. One of
the suspects in the killing was Ramil Regal who was arrested by the police on 28 December 1988. Upon
questioning, Regal pointed to Narciso Nazareno as on of his companions in the killing of the said Romulo
Bunye II. In view thereof, the police officers, without warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno and brought
him to the police headquarters for questioning. Obviously, the evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong
because on 3 January 1989, an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and two (2) others,
with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The
case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail, but the motion was denied by the trial
court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused,
Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno
and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January
1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Biñan, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said
Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed against him with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which had taken cognizance of said case and had, in
fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of
the evidence against him).
The findings of the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna are based upon the facts
and the law. Consequently, we will not disturb the same. Evidently, the arrest of Nazareno was effected
by the police without warrant pursuant to Sec. 5(b), Rule 113, Rules of Court after he was positively
implicated by his co-accused Ramil Regala in the killing of Romulo Bunye
II; and after investigation by the police authorities. As held in People vs. Ancheta: 12
The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does not
presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. For
the detention to be perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest
has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime
and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated therein.
VIII
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the proper
courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction
to issue the process or make the order, of if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas
corpus will not be allowed. Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing
that:
Sec. 4. When writ is allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person alleged
to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or
defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with a convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment. (emphasis supplied)
At this point, we refer to petitioner's plea for the Court of re-examine and, thereafter, abandon its
pronouncement in Ilagan vs. Enrile, 13 that a writ of habeas corpus is no longer available after an
information is filed against the person detained and a warrant of arrest or an order of commitment, is
issued by the court where said information has been filed. 14The petitioners claim that the said ruling,
which was handed down during the past dictatorial regime to enforce and strengthen said regime, has
no place under the present democratic dispensation and collides with the basic, fundamental, and
constitutional rights of the people. Petitioners point out that the said doctrine makes possible the arrest
and detention of innocent persons despite lack of evidence against them, and, most often, it is only after
a petition for habeas corpus is filed before the court that the military authorities file the criminal
information in the courts of law to be able to hide behind the protective mantle of the said doctrine.
This, petitioners assert, stands as an obstacle to the freedom and liberty of the people and permits
lawless and arbitrary State action.
We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said doctrine. It is based upon express provision
of the Rules of Court and the exigencies served by the law. The fears expressed by the petitioners are not
really unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-examination or reappraisal, with a view to its abandonment,
of the Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and the better practice would be, not to limit
the function of thehabeas corpus to a mere inquiry as to whether or not the court which issued the
process, judgment or order of commitment or before whom the detained person is charged, had
jurisdiction or not to issue the process, judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case, but rather,
as the Court itself states in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, 15 "in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must
inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention-from the moment petition was taken into
custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition;" and "only after such a
scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been
satisfied." This is exactly what the Court has done in the petitions at bar. This is what should henceforth
be done in all future cases of habeas corpus. In Short, all cases involving deprivation of individual liberty
should be promptly brought to the courts for their immediate scrutiny and disposition.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the
bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.
No costs.SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, 11 th Judicial Region,
Digos, Davao del Sur convicting defendant- appellant Ruben Burgos y Tito of The crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Ruben Burgos sufficiently established beyond
reasonable doubt, of the offense charges , pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 9, in relation to General
Order No. 6, dated September 22, 1972, and General Order No. 7, dated September 23, 1972, in relation
further to Presidential Decree No. 885, and considering that the firearm subject of this case was not used
in the circumstances as embraced in paragraph I thereof, applying the provision of indeterminate
sentence law, accused Ruben Burgos is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal maximum, as minimum penalty, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum penalty,
pursuant to sub-paragraph B, of Presidential Decree No. 9, as aforementioned, with accessory penalties,
as provided for by law.
As a result of this judgment, the subject firearm involved in this case (Homemade revolver,
caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221) is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the
government, to be disposed of in accordance with law. Likewise, the subversive documents, leaflets
and/or propaganda seized are ordered disposed of in accordance with law.
The information charged the defendant-appellant with the crime of illegal possession of firearm in
furtherance of subversion in an information which reads as follows:
That in the afternoon of May 13, 1982 and thereabout at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above- named accused with intent to possess and
without the necessary license, permit or authority issued by the proper government agencies, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep, possess, carry and have in his possession, control and
custody one (1) homemade revolver, caliber .38, make Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221, which
firearm was issued to and used by the accused at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, his area of operations
by one Alias Commander Pol for the New People's Army (NPA), a subversive organization organized for
the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines through lawless and
violent means, of which the accused had knowledge, and which firearm was used by the accused in the
performance of his subversive tasks such as the recruitment of New Members to the NPA and collection
of contributions from the members.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized in the decision of the lower court as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Through the testimony of Pat. Pepito Bioco, and Sgt. Romeo Taroy, it appears that by virtue of an
intelligent information obtained by the Constabulary and INP units, stationed at Digos, Davao del Sur, on
May 12, 1982, one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surre0ndered to the authorities at about
9:00 o'clock A.M. at Digos, Davao del Sur Constabulary Headquarters, stating that he was forcibly
recruited by accused Ruben Burgos as member of the NPA, threatening him with the use of firearm
against his life, if he refused.
Along with his recruitment, accused was asked to contribute one (1) chopa of rice and one peso (P1.00)
per month, as his contribution to the NPA TSN, page 5, Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Immediately, upon receipt of said information, a joint team of PC-INP units, composed of fifteen (15)
members, headed by Captain Melchesideck Bargio, (PC), on the following day, May 13, 1982, was
dispatched at Tiguman; Davao del Sur, to arrest accused Ruben Burgos. The team left the headquarter at
1:30 P.M., and arrived at Tiguman, at more or less 2:00 o'clock PM where through the help of Pedro
Burgos, brother of accused, the team was able to locate accused, who was plowing his field. (TSN, pages
6-7, Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Right in the house of accused, the latter was caned by the team and Pat. Bioco asked accused about his
firearm, as reported by Cesar Masamlok. At first accused denied possession of said firearm but later,
upon question profounded by Sgt. Alejandro Buncalan with the wife of the accused, the latter pointed to
a place below their house where a gun was buried in the ground. (TSN, page 8, Hearing-October 14,
1982)
Pat. Bioco then verified the place pointed by accused's wife and dug the grounds, after which he
recovered the firearm, Caliber .38 revolver, marked as Exhibit "A" for the prosecution.
After the recovery of the firearm, accused likewise pointed to the team, subversive documents which he
allegedly kept in a stock pile of qqqcogon at a distance of three (3) meters apart from his house. Then
Sgt. Taroy accordingly verified beneath said cogon grass and likewise recovered documents consisting of
notebook colored maroon with spiral bound, Exhibit "B" for the prosecution; a pamphlet consisting of
eight (8) leaves, including the front and back covers entitled Ang Bayan, Pahayagan ng Partido Komunista
ng Pilipinas, Pinapatnubayan ng Marxismo, Leninismo Kaisipang Mao qqqZedong dated December 31,
1980, marked as Exhibit "C", and another pamphlet Asdang Pamantalaang Masa sa Habagatang
Mindanao, March and April 1981 issue, consisting of ten (10) pages, marked as Exhibit "D" for the
prosecution.
Accused, when confronted with the firearm Exhibit "A", after its recovery, readily admitted the same as
issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, otherwise known as a certain Alias Pedipol, allegedly team leader of
the sparrow unit of New People's Army, responsible in the liquidation of target personalities, opposed to
NPA Ideological movement, an example was the killing of the late Mayor Llanos and Barangay Captain of
Tienda Aplaya Digos, Davao del Sur. (TSN, pages 1-16, Hearing-October 14,1982).
To prove accused's subversive activities, Cesar Masamlok, a former NPA convert was presented, who
declared that on March 7, 1972, in his former residence at Tiguman Digos, Davao del Sur, accused Ruben
Burgos, accompanied by his companions Landrino Burgos, Oscar Gomez and Antonio Burgos, went to his
house at about 5:00 o'clock P.M. and called him downstair. Thereupon, accused told Masamlok, their
purpose was to ask rice and one (1) peso from him, as his contribution to their companions, the NPA of
which he is now a member. (TSN, pages 70, 71, 72, Hearing-January 4, 1983).
Accused and his companions told Masamlok, he has to join their group otherwise, he and his family will
be killed. He was also warned not to reveal anything with the government authorities. Because of the
threat to his life and family, Cesar Masamlok joined the group. Accused then told him, he should attend a
seminar scheduled on April 19, 1982. Along with this invitation, accused pulled gut from his waistline a
.38 caliber revolver which Masamlok really saw, being only about two (2) meters away from accused,
which make him easily Identified said firearm, as that marked as Exhibit "A" for the prosecution. (TSN,
pages 72, 73, and 74, Hearing-January 4, 1983).
On April 19, 1982, as previously invited, Masamlok, accompanied by his father, Matuguil Masamlok,
Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides went to the house of accused and attended the seminar, Those present in the
seminar were: accused Ruben Burgos, Antonio Burgos, Oscar Gomez, Landrino Burgos, alias Pedipol and
one alias Jamper.
The first speaker was accused Ruben Burgos, who said very distinctly that he is an NPA together with his
companions, to assure the unity of the civilian. That he encouraged the group to overthrow the
government, emphasizing that those who attended the seminar were already members of the NPA, and
if they reveal to the authorities, they will be killed.
Accused, while talking, showed to the audience pamphlets and documents, then finally shouted, the NPA
will be victorious. Masamlok likewise Identified the pamphlets as those marked as Exh. exhibits "B", "C",
and "D" for the prosecution. (TSN, pages 75, 76 and 77, Hearing-January 4, 1983)
Other speakers in said meeting were Pedipol, Jamper and Oscar Gomez, who likewise expounded their
own opinions about the NPA. It was also announced in said seminar that a certain Tonio Burgos, will be
responsible for the collection of the contribution from the members. (TSN, pages 78-79, Hearing- January
4, 1983)
On May 12, 1982, however, Cesar Masamlok surrendered to Captain Bargio of the Provincial
Headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Panfilo Lovitos was presented t prove that on May 19, 1982, he administered
the subscription of th extra-judicial confession of accused Ruben Burgos, marked as Exhibit "E " for the
prosecution, consisting of five (5) pages.
Appearing voluntarily in said office, for the subscription of his confession, Fiscal Lovitos, realizing that
accused was not represented by counsel, requested the services of Atty. Anyog, whose office is adjacent
to the Fiscal's Office, to assist accused in the subscription of his extra-judicial statement.
Atty. Anyog assisted accused in the reading of his confession from English to Visayan language, resulting
to the deletion of question No. 19 of the document, by an inserted certification of Atty. Anyog and
signature of accused, indicating his having understood, the allegations of his extra-judicial statement.
Fiscal Lovitos, before accused signed his statement, explained to him his constitutional rights to remain
silent, right to counsel and right to answer any question propounded or not.
With the aid of Atty. Anyog, accused signed his confession in the presence of Atty. Anyog and Fiscal
Lovitos, without the presence of military authorities, who escorted the accused, but were sent outside
the cubicle of Fiscal Lovitos while waiting for the accused. (TSN, pages 36-40, nearing November 15,
1982)
Finally, in order to prove illegal possession by accused of the subject firearm, Sgt. Epifanio Comabig in-
charge of firearms and explosives, NCO Headquarter, Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur, was
presented and testified, that among the lists of firearm holders in Davao del Sur, nothing was listed in
the name of accused Ruben Burgos, neither was his name included among the lists of persons who
applied for the licensing of the firearm under Presidential Decree No. 1745.
After the above-testimony the prosecution formally closed its case and offered its exhibits, which were
all admitted in evidence, despite objection interposed by counsel for accused, which was accordingly
overruled.
On the other hand, the defendant-appellant's version of the case against him is stated in the decision as
follows:
From his farm, the military personnel, whom he said he cannot recognize, brought him to the PC
Barracks at Digos, Davao del Sur, and arrived there at about 3:00 o'clock, on the same date. At about
8:00 o'clock P.M., in the evening, he was investigated by soldiers, whom he cannot Identify because they
were wearing a civilian attire. (TSN, page 14 1, Hearing-June 15, 1983)
The investigation was conducted in the PC barracks, where he was detained with respect to the subject
firearm, which the investigator, wished him to admit but accused denied its ownership. Because of his
refusal accused was mauled, hitting him on the left and right side of his body which rendered him
unconscious. Accused in an atmosphere of tersed solemnity, crying and with emotional attachment,
described in detail how he was tortured and the ordeals he was subjected.
He said, after recovery of his consciousness, he was again confronted with subject firearm, Exhibit "A",
for him to admit and when he repeatedly refused to accept as his own firearm, he was subjected to
further prolong (sic) torture and physical agony. Accused said, his eyes were covered with wet black
cloth with pungent effect on his eyes. He was undressed, with only blindfold, pungent water poured in
his body and over his private parts, making his entire body, particularly his penis and testicle, terribly
irritating with pungent pain.
All along, he was investigated to obtain his admission, The process of beating, mauling, pain and/or
ordeal was repeatedly done in similar cycle, from May 13 and 14, 1982. intercepted only whenever he
fell unconscious and again repeated after recovery of his senses,
Finally on May 15, 1982, after undergoing the same torture and physical ordeal he was seriously warned,
if he will still adamantly refuse to accept ownership of the subject firearm, he will be salvaged, and no
longer able to bear any further the pain and agony, accused admitted ownership of subject firearm.
After his admission, the mauling and torture stopped, but accused was made to
sign his affidavit marked as Exhibit "E" for the prosecution, consisting of five (5)
pages, including the certification of the administering officer, (TSN, pages 141-148,
Hearing-June 15, 1983)
In addition to how he described the torture inflicted on him, accused, by way of explanation and
commentary in details, and going one by one, the allegations and/or contents of his alleged extrajudicial
statement, attributed his answers to those questions involuntarily made only because of fear, threat and
intimidation of his person and family, as a result of unbearable excruciating pain he was subjected by an
investigator, who, unfortunately he cannot Identify and was able to obtain his admission of the subject
firearm, by force and violence exerted over his person.
To support denial of accused of being involved in any subversive activities, and also to support his denial
to the truth of his alleged extra-judicial confession, particularly questions Nos. 35, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45,
46 and 47, along with qqqs answers to those questions, involving Honorata Arellano ahas Inday Arellano,
said Honorata Arellano appeared and declared categorically, that the above-questions embraced in the
numbers allegedly stated in the extrajudicial confession of accused, involving her to such NPA
personalities, as Jamper, Pol, Anthony, etc., were not true because on the date referred on April 28,
1982, none of the persons mentioned came to her house for treatment, neither did she meet the
accused nor able to talk with him. (TSN, pages 118- 121, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
She, however, admitted being familiar with one Oscar Gomez, and that she was personally charged with
subversion in the Office of the Provincial Commander, Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur, but
said charge was dismissed without reaching the Court. She likewise stated that her son, Rogelio Arellano,
was likewise charged for subversion filed in the Municipal Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, but was
likewise dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. (TSN, pages 121-122, in
relation to her cross-examination, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
To support accused's denial of the charge against him, Barangay Captain of Tiguman, Digos, Davao del
Sur, Salvador qqqGalaraga was presented, who declared, he was not personally aware of any subversive
activities of accused, being his neighbor and member of his barrio. On the contrary, he can personally
attest to his good character and reputation, as a law abiding citizen of his barrio, being a carpenter and
farmer thereat. (TSl pages 128-129, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
He however, admitted in cross-examination, that there were a lot of arrests made by the authorities in
his barrio involving subversive activities but they were released and were not formally charged in Court
because they publicly took their oath of allegiance with the government. (TSN, pages 133-134, in relation
to page 136, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
Finally, to support accused's denial of the subject firearm, his wife, Urbana Burgos, was presented and
who testified that the subject firearm was left in their house by Cesar Masamlok and one Pedipol on May
10, 1982. It was night time, when the two left the gun, alleging that it was not in order, and that they will
leave it behind, temporarily for them to claim it later. They were the ones who buried it. She said, her
husband, the accused, was not in their house at that time and that she did not inform him about said
firearm neither did she report the matter to the authorities, for fear of the life of her husband. (TSN,
page 24, November 22, 1983)
On cross-examination, she said, even if Masamlok during the recovery of the
firearm, was wearing a mask, she can still Identify him. (TSN, page 6, Hearing-
November 22, 1983)
After the above-testimony, accused through counsel formally rested his case in
support of accused's through counsel manifestation for the demurrer to evidence
of the prosecution, or in the alternative for violation merely of simple illegal
possession of firearm, 'under the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4, reflected in the manifestation of counsel for accused. (TSN,
pages 113-114, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
Accused-appellant Ruben Burgos now raises the following assignments of error, to wit:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT (SIC) THE ARREST OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITHOUT VALID
WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE SEARCH IN THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR
FIREARM WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.
III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
FOR VIOLATION OF P.D. No. 9 IN RELATION TO GENERAL ORDERS NOS. 6 AND 7
Was the arrest of Ruben Burgos lawful? Were the search of his house and the subsequent confiscation of
a firearm and documents allegedly found therein conducted in a lawful and valid manner? Does the
evidence sustaining the crime charged meet the test of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
The records of the case disclose that when the police authorities went to the house of Ruben Burgos for
the purpose of arresting him upon information given by Cesar Masamlok that the accused allegedly
recruited him to join the New People's Army (NPA), they did not have any warrant of arrest or search
warrant with them (TSN, p. 25, October 14, 1982; and TSN, p. 61, November 15, 1982).
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or
such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The constitutional provision is a safeguard against wanton and unreasonable invasion of the privacy and
liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers and effects. This Court explained in Villanueva vs.
Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why this right is so important:
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be also looked upon as a
recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home, but not necessarily thereto
confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US 293 [19661) What is sought to be guarded is a man's
prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can
assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants
around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such have access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle.
Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any
invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life, (Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757
[1966], Brennan, J. and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616, 630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his
authoritative work (Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court [1966], could fitly characterize this
constitutional right as the embodiment of a 'spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of
home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no
legs than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding
social need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards.' (Ibid, p. 47).
The trial court justified the arrest of the accused-appelant without any warrant as falling under one of
the instances when arrests may be validly made without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 6 * of the Rules of
Court, provides the exceptions as follows:
a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an
offense in his presence;
b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
The Court stated that even if there was no warrant for the arrest of Burgos, the fact that "the authorities
received an urgent report of accused's involvement in subversive activities from a reliable source (report
of Cesar Masamlok) the circumstances of his arrest, even without judicial warrant, is lawfully within the
ambit of Section 6-A of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and applicable jurisprudence on the matter."
If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and seizure of the firearm and the alleged subversive
documents would become an incident to a lawful arrest as provided by Rule 126, Section 12, which
states:
A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.
The conclusions reached by the trial court are erroneous.
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or
is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be
committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting
officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the
firearm was given by the appellant's wife.
At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive
document. Neither was he committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in fact,
plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of
his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the
requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the
situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the
Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond
the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic
right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.
The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that the arrest may still be considered lawful under Section
6(b) using the test of reasonableness. He submits that. the information given by Cesar Masamlok was
sufficient to induce a reasonable ground that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof.
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact
or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential
precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the
commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the
identity of the perpetrator.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led the
authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a
crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information
from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful, If an arrest without warrant is unlawful
at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered afterwards can make it
lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.
More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to
arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant
of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime.
There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or
escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown,
The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made by Masamlok who was
not required to subscribe his allegations under oath. There was no compulsion for him to state truthfully
his charges under pain of criminal prosecution. (TSN, p. 24, October 14, 1982). Consequently, the need to
go through the process of securing a search warrant and a warrant of arrest becomes even more clear.
The arrest of the accused while he was plowing his field is illegal. The arrest being unlawful, the search
and seizure which transpired afterwards could not likewise be deemed legal as being mere incidents to a
valid arrest.
Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to be
searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right
exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such
a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia
v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not
amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by
Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia V. Locsin (supra)
xxx xxx xxx
. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do
not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a
consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.
(56 C.J., pp. 1180, 1181).
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights."
(Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458).
That the accused-appellant was not apprised of any of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest is
evident from the records:
A CALAMBA:
Q When you went to the area to arrest Ruben Burgos, you were not armed with an arrest warrant?
A None Sir.
Q Neither were you armed with a search warrant?
A No Sir.
Q As a matter of fact, Burgos was not present in his house when you went there?
A But he was twenty meters away from his house.
Q Ruben Burgos was then plowing his field?
A Yes Sir.
Q When you called for Ruben Burgos you interviewed him?
A Yes Sir.
Q And that you told him that Masamlok implicated him?
A No Sir.
Q What did you tell him?
A That we received information that you have a firearm, you surrender that firearm, first he denied but
when Sgt. Buncalan interviewed his wife, his wife told him that it is buried, I dug the firearm which was
wrapped with a cellophane.
Q In your interview of Burgos you did not remind him of his rights under the constitution considering
that he was purposely under arrest?
A I did not.
Q As a matter of fact, he denied that he has ever a gun?
A Yes Sir.
Q As a matter of fact, the gun was not in his possession?
A It was buried down in his horse.
Q As a matter of fact, Burgos did not point to where it was buried?
A Yes Sir.
(TSN, pp. 25-26, Hearing-October 14, 1982)
Considering that the questioned firearm and the alleged subversive documents were obtained in
violation of the accused's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, it follows that
they are inadmissible as evidence.
There is another aspect of this case.
In proving ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents, the prosecution
presented the two arresting officers who testified that the accused readily admitted ownership of the
gun after qqqs wife pointed to the place where it was buried. The officers stated that it was the accused
himself who voluntarily pointed to the place where the alleged subversive documents were hidden.
Assuming this to be true, it should be recalled that the accused was never informed of his constitutional
rights at the time of his arrest. So that when the accused allegedly admitted ownership of the gun and
pointed to the location of the subversive documents after questioning, the admissions were obtained in
violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec. 20 of Art. IV of the Bill of Rights
winch provides:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such
right.. . .
The Constitution itself mandates that any evidence obtained in violation of this right is inadmissible in
evidence. Consequently, the testimonies of the arresting officers as to the admissions made by the
appellant cannot be used against him.
The trial court validly rejected the extra-judicial confession of the accused as inadmissible in evidence.
The court stated that the appellant's having been exhaustively subjected to physical terror, violence, and
third degree measures may not have been supported by reliable evidence but the failure to present the
investigator who conducted the investigation gives rise to the "provocative presumption" that indeed
torture and physical violence may have been committed as stated.
The accused-appellant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel during the
custodial interrogation. The lower court correctly pointed out that the securing of counsel, Atty. Anyog,
to help the accused when he subscribed under oath to his statement at the Fiscal's Office was too late. It
could have no palliative effect. It cannot cure the absence of counsel at the time of the custodial
investigation when the extrajudicial statement was being taken.
With the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents inadmissible in
evidence against the accused-appellant, the only remaining proof to sustain the charge of Illegal
Possession of Firearm in Furtherance of Subversion is the testimony of Cesar Masamlok.
We find the testimony of Masamlok inadequate to convict Burgos beyond reasonable doubt. It is true
that the trial court found Masamlok's testimony credible and convincing. However, we are not
necessarily bound by the credibility which the trial court attaches to a particular witness. As stated
in People vs.. Cabrera (100 SCRA 424):
xxx xxx xxx
. . .Time and again we have stated that when it comes to question of credibility the findings of the trial
court are entitled to great respect upon appeal for the obvious reason th+at it was able to observe the
demeanor, actuations and deportment of the witnesses during the trial. But we have also said that this
rule is not absolute for otherwise there would be no reversals of convictions upon appeal. We must
reject the findings of the trial court where the record discloses circumstances of weight and substance
which were not properly appreciated by the trial court.
The situation under which Cesar Masamlok testified is analogous to that found in People vs.
Capadocia (17 SCRA 98 1):
. . . The case against appellant is built on Ternura's testimony, and the issue hinges on how much
credence can be accorded to him. The first consideration is that said testimony stands uncorroborated.
Ternura was the only witness who testified on the mimeographing incident. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . .He was a confessed Huk under detention at the time. He knew his fate
depended upon how much he cooperated with the authorities, who were then
engaged in a vigorous anti-dissident campaign. As in the case of Rodrigo de Jesus,
whose testimony We discounted for the same reason, that of Ternura cannot be
considered as proceeding from a totally unbiased source. . . .
In the instant case, Masamlok's testimony was totally uncorroborated. Considering that Masamlok
surrendered to the military certainly his fate depended on how eagerly he cooperated with the
authorities. Otherwise, he would also be charged with subversion. The trade-off appears to be his
membership in the Civil Home Defense Force. (TSN, p. 83, January 4, 1983). Masamlok may be
considered as an interested witness. It can not be said that his testimony is free from the opportunity
and temptation to be exaggerated and even fabricated for it was intended to secure his freedom.
Despite the fact that there were other persons present during the alleged NPA seminar of April 19, 1982
i.e., Masamlok's father ,Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides (TSN, p. 74, January 4, 1983) who
could have corroborated Cesar Masamlok's testimony that the accused used the gun in furtherance of
subversive activities or actually engaged in subversive acts, the prosecution never presented any other
witness.
This Court is, therefore, constrained to rule that the evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
As held in the case of People vs. Baia (34 SCRA 347):
It is evident that once again, reliance can be placed on People v. Dramayo (42 SCRA
59), where after stressing that accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
synonymous with guilt, it was made clear: 'Only if the judge below and the
appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed
precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be
one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his
innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test
of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The
conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility
for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it
amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty.' (Ibid, 64. Cf.
People v. Alvarez, 55 SCRA 81; People v. Joven, 64 SCRA 126; People vs. Ramirez,
69 SCRA 144; People vs. Godov 72 SCRA 69; People v. Lopez, 74 SCRA 205; People
v. Poblador, 76 SCRA 634; People v. Quiazon, 78 SCRA 513; People v. Nazareno, 80
SCRA 484; People vs. Gabilan 115 SCRA 1; People v. Gabiana, 117 SCRA 260; and
People vs. Ibanga 124 SCRA 697).
We are aware of the serious problems faced by the military in Davao del Sur where there appears to be a
well-organized plan to overthrow the Government through armed struggle and replace it with an alien
system based on a foreign ideology. The open defiance against duly constituted authorities has resulted
in unfortunate levels of violence and human suffering publicized all over the country and abroad. Even as
we reiterate the need for all freedom loving citizens to assist the military authorities in their legitimate
efforts to maintain peace and national security, we must also remember the dictum in Morales vs.
Enrile (1 21 SCRA 538, 569) when this Court stated:
While the government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives,
the rebels, and the lawless with an the means at its command, it should always be
remembered that whatever action is taken must always be within the framework
of our Constitution and our laws.
Violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion. A cavalier attitude towards
constitutional liberties and protections will only fan the increase of subversive activities instead of
containing and suppressing them.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED, on grounds of reasonable doubt, of the crime with which he
has been charged.
The subject firearm involved in this case (homemade revolver, caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with Serial
No. 8.69221) and the alleged subversive documents are ordered disposed of in accordance with law.Cost
de oficio.SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37007 July 20, 1987
RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, and ARMANDO
VALDEZ,petitioners,
vs.
ANGELITO C. SALANGA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Branch
IV), and JUAN TUVERA, SR., respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Third
Judicial District, in Criminal Case No. D-529 entitled "The People of the Philippines versus Juan Tuvera,
Sr., et al.," granting the motion to quash the information filed by accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., herein
respondent. The issue is whether a barrio captain can be charged of arbitrary detention.
The facts are as follows:
On October 12, 1972, an information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas
Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat, in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo
Mangsat alias Rudy, all of Manaoag, Pangasinan, of the crime of ARBITRARY DETENTION, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 21st day of April 1973, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, in barrio Baguinay,
Manaoag, Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Juan
Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain, with the aid of some other private persons, namely Juan Tuvera, Jr., Bertillo
Bataoil and one Dianong, maltreated one Armando Valdez by hitting with butts of their guns and fists
blows and immediately thereafter, without legal grounds, with deliberate intent to deprive said Armando
Valdez of his constitutional liberty, accused Barrio captain Juan Tuvera, Sr., Cpl. Tomas Mendoza and Pat.
Rodolfo Mangsat, members of the police force of Mangsat, Pangasinan conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, lodge and lock said
Armando Valdez inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours. (Emphasis
supplied.)
CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 124 of the R.P.C.
Dagupan City, October 12, 1972.
(SGD.) VICENTE C. CALDONA
Assistant Provincial Fiscal
All the accused, including respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr., were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
On April 4, 1973, Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to support
the filing of the information. Petitioner Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S. Milo filed an opposition
thereto.
Finding that respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr. was not a public officer who can be charged with Arbitrary
Detention, respondent Judge Angelito C. Salanga granted the motion to quash in an order dated April 25,
1973.
Hence, this petition.
Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who, without legal grounds, detains a person.1 The
elements of this crime are the following:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.2
The ground relied upon by private respondent Tuvera for his motion to quash the information which was
sustained by respondent Judge, is that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,3 that is, that the
facts alleged in the information do not constitute the elements of Arbitrary Detention.
The Information charges Tuvera, a barrio captain, to have conspired with Cpl. Mendoza and Pat.
Mangsat, who are members of the police force of Manaoag, Pangasinan in detaining petitioner Valdez
for about eleven (11) hours in the municipal jail without legal ground. No doubt the last two elements of
the crime are present.
The only question is whether or not Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain is a public officer who can be liable for
the crime of Arbitrary Detention.
The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain or order the
detention of persons accused of a crime. Such public officers are the policemen and other agents of the
law, the judges or mayors.4
Respondent Judge Salanga did not consider private respondent Tuvera as such public officer when the
former made this finding in the questioned order:
Apparently, if Armando Valdez was ever jailed and detained more than six (6) hours, Juan
Tuvera, Sr., has nothing to do with the same because he is not in any way connected with the Police
Force of Manaoag, Pangasinan. Granting that it was Tuvera, Sr., who ordered Valdez arrested, it was not
he who detained and jailed him because he has no such authority vested in him as a mere Barrio Captain
of Barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan. 5
In line with the above finding of respondent Judge Salanga, private respondent Tuvera asserts that the
motion to quash was properly sustained for the following reasons: (1) That he did not have the authority
to make arrest, nor jail and detain petitioner Valdez as a mere barrio captain;6 (2) That he is neither a
peace officer nor a policeman,7(3) That he was not a public official;8 (4) That he had nothing to do with
the detention of petitioner Valdez;9 (5) That he is not connected directly or indirectly in the
administration of the Manaoag Police Force;10 (6) That barrio captains on April 21, 1972 were not yet
considered as persons in authority and that it was only upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No.
299 that Barrio Captain and Heads of Barangays were decreed among those who are persons in
authority;11 and that the proper charge was Illegal Detention and Not Arbitrary Detention.12
We disagree.
Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio lieutenants (who were later named
barrio captains and now barangay captains) were recognized as persons in authority. In various cases,
this Court deemed them as persons in authority, and convicted them of Arbitrary Detention.
In U.S. vs. Braganza,13 Martin Salibio, a barrio lieutenant, and Hilario Braganza, a municipal councilor,
arrested Father Feliciano Gomez while he was in his church. They made him pass through the door of the
vestry and afterwards took him to the municipal building. There, they told him that he was under arrest.
The priest had not committed any crime. The two public officials were convicted of Arbitrary Detention.14
In U.S. vs. Gellada,15 Geronimo Gellada, a barrio lieutenant, with the help of Filoteo Soliman, bound and
tied his houseboy Sixto Gentugas with a rope at around 6:00 p.m. and delivered him to the justice of the
peace. Sixto was detained during the whole night and until 9:00 a.m. of the next day when he was
ordered released by the justice of the peace because he had not committed any crime, Gellada was
convicted of Arbitrary Detention.16
Under Republic Act No. 3590, otherwise known as The Revised Barrio Charter, the powers and duties of
a barrio captain include the following: to look after the maintenance of public order in the barrio and to
assist the municipal mayor and the municipal councilor in charge of the district in the performance of
their duties in such barrio;17 to look after the general welfare of the barrio;18 to enforce all laws and
ordinances which are operative within the barrio;19 and to organize and lead an emergency group
whenever the same may be necessary for the maintenance of peace and order within the barrio.20
In his treatise on Barrio Government Law and Administration, Professor Jose M. Aruego has this to say
about the above-mentioned powers and duties of a Barrio Captain, to wit:
"Upon the barrio captain depends in the main the maintenance of public order in the barrio. For public
disorder therein, inevitably people blame him.
"In the event that there be a disturbing act to said public order or a threat to disturb public order, what
can the barrio captain do? Understandably, he first resorts to peaceful measures. He may take
preventive measures like placing the offenders under surveillance and persuading them, where possible,
to behave well, but when necessary, he may subject them to the full force of law.
"He is a peace officer in the barrio considered under the law as a person in authority. As such, he may
make arrest and detain persons within legal limits.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other
public officers like judges and mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this
crime.22 A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would show that they are similar to those
of a barrio captain23 except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the
same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given the authority to detain or order
detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the
aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez.24
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like private respondent Tuvera, Sr., can be the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the
held liable for Arbitrary Detention. following personal property to wit:

Next, private respondent Tuvera, Sr. contends that the motion to quash was validly granted as the facts Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
and evidence on record show that there was no crime of Arbitrary Detention;25 that he only sought the portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
aid and assistance of the Manaoag Police Force;26 and that he only accompanied petitioner Valdez to business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
town for the latter's personal safety.27 statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).

Suffice it to say that the above allegations can only be raised as a defense at the trial as they traverse as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or
what is alleged in the Information. We have repeatedly held that Courts, in resolving a motion to quash, intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications
cannot consider facts contrary to those alleged in the information or which do not appear on the face of adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
the information. This is because a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the and the Revised Penal Code."
information.28 Matters of defense cannot be proved during the hearing of such a motion, except where
the Rules expressly permit, such as extinction of criminal liability, prescription, and former jeopardy.29 In
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution
the case of U.S. vs. Perez,30 this Court held that a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged
and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents,
do not constitute an offense cannot allege new facts not only different but diametrically opposed to
books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3)
those alleged in the complaint. This rule admits of only one exception and that is when such facts are
the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases
admitted by the prosecution.31lawphi1
filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents,
papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed
Lastly, private respondent claims that by the lower court's granting of the motion to quash jeopardy has of in accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this
already attached in his favor32 on the ground that here, the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final
without his express consent. disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-
Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any
copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision
Respondent's contention holds no water. An order granting a motion to quash, unlike one of denial, is a
be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and
final order. It is not merely interlocutory and is therefore immediately appealable. The accused cannot
commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in
claim double jeopardy as the dismissal was secured not only with his consent but at his instance.33
accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash
moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The questioned Order of
April 25, 1973 in Criminal Case No. D-529 is hereby set aside. Let this case be remanded to the
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and
appropriate trial court for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.
have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by
petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against
Republic of the Philippines herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
EN BANC
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and
vs.
seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as
Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I.
PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question
Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant
the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 — hereinafter referred to as
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the
Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued,
legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and
on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of
that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or
parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of
the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to
above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongsexclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to
the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers
were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they
were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear
that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have
been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights
of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not
been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment,
when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of
the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the
personal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the
aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by
this Court,12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence
against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled,
namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the
authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative,
whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners
herein.1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and
that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection,
the Constitution13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were
issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a
"violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code." In other words, nospecific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges
who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts,
or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the
applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would
be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the
aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace
officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted —
to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of
keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by
legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants,
that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing
in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court
added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and
loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the
things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the
searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus
seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are
unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said
position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go
free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion
of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the searching
officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in
the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful
seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted
the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
 As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has
been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official
may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that
wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are
concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal
Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led
by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific
guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible
in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by
the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise,
then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and
seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual
charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state
invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus
with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's
high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the
Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process
Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers
the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its
provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded
operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of
the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent
under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive
protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches — state or federal —
it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine — an essential part
of the right to privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly
recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf
could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion
of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure.
To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment.
Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to
deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way
— by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that
the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States,
and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore
constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.
Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured
by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police
officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our
decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a
search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime
by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not
comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such
competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence,
no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its
issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing
expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or
make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under
consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the
party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do
not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually — but, understandably — finds
itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and
moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of
the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962,
petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard,
House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among
the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert
P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other
effects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said
petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which
they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United
States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the
aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been
Advanced, notin their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be
readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought
to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits
attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent
allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases
relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we agree
thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave
the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned;
that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the
Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal;
that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and
other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the
writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the
aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs
prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29)
places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement
as to costs.It is so ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES,
INC.,petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE
CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET
AL., respondents.
Lorenzo M. Tañada, Wigberto E. Tañada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo, Jejomar
Binay and Rene Saguisag for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by
respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon
City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D,
RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We
Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the
said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to
be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum"
newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the
return of the seized articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer, Presidential
Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their
representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined from using
the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in Criminal
Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The plea for
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset to
July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the aforementioned
articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of the
aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction
was rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come to this
Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before respondent judge.
Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants before this Court, should have filed a
motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this procedural flaw notwithstanding,
we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues
raised not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was
televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special
circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the words of the
revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the
power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its operation,
whenever the purposes of justice require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is laid on
the fact that while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition
impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than six [6]
months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the petition
thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation] with the fact that
the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983, more than half a year after the petitioners' premises had been
raided.
The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited this long to bring their
case to court, it was because they tried at first to exhaust other remedies. The events of the past eleven
fill years had taught them that everything in this country, from release of public funds to release of
detained persons from custody, has become a matter of executive benevolence or largesse
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to the President, like Fiscal
Flaminiano, sent a letter to President Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet asking the return at
least of the printing equipment and vehicles. And after such a letter had been sent, through Col. Balbino
V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential Security Command, they were further
encouraged to hope that the latter would yield the desired results.
 After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to
Court. [pp. 123-124, Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find no ground
to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts exerted by
petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had abandoned their right to the
possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as
evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped from
challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the logic of respondents. These
documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with them,
within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any way affect
the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in
question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional
provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court . 6 This objection, however, may properly be
considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9,
1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his
witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No. 19, Road
3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, respectively.
Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the
ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was
allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
This assertion is based on that portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states:
Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of
committing the crime of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he
is keeping and concealing the same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were applied
for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would be quite
absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and the same
place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were specifically set forth in the
application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which executed the search
warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is more apparent
than real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units
C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening paragraph of
the said warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind when he issued
Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient
particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in
the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant
on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant
intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also been said that the executing officer may
look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be
searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the warrants were
directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani
Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized under a
search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of
the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against
whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b]
of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily,
stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose possession it may be at the time
of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person
against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under the
warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the disputed
warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments
or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on
in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or
works" are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo 9 where this legal provision
was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when
placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant,
usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent
of the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the
ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col. Rolando N.
Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. 10 The application was accompanied by the Joint
Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom Intelligence and
Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of
the application for the search warrants on December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have provided
sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance
with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in
connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its
supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive
material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad
statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing
equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are
all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under
Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of
probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a
grave error for respondent judge to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the
joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated by
our unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and things above-described
were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote
the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines,
and April 6 Movement." 13
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, ...
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his
witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of
First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant,
of the existence of probable cause." As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before
respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is
that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be
seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment,
typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment, tape
recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the
"WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents communication, letters and
facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to promote the objectives
and piurposes of the subversive organization known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire
Movement and Apr 6 Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive materials
and propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records,
pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments
concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too
general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703
or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the
seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General
Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and
therefore invalid. 17 The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in
question cannot be characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English history: the era
of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were
given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of
dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it
is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the
voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan
Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were
padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were
discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press
guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to
express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework
where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the
citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they have
been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which authorizes "the
sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged in subversive activities against
the government and its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance with implementing rules and
regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense." It is doubtful however, if
sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of any implementing rules and regulations
promulgated by the Minister of National Defense.

Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less than President
Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the property seized from
petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:

The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for sequestration

of the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing presses, according to Information
Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.

On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in
Quezon City and took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all materials in
the premises.

Cendaña said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment remain
at the disposal of the owners, subject to the discretion of the court. 19

That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further confirmed by the
reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of U.S.
Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM "
case. 20 In this reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:

2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our

authorities to close the paper's printing facilities and confiscate the equipment and
materials it uses. 21

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent judge
on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The prayer for a
writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is hereby granted and all articles seized
thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs.

SO ORDERED.