G.R. No. 183830 October 19, 2011 pleading for mercy: Please stop noy, it is painful noy!
for mercy: Please stop noy, it is painful noy!; 8 that the cries came from an area with lush
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DELFIN CALISO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decisive question that seeks an answer is whether the identification of the perpetrator of the
crime by an eyewitness who did not get a look at the face of the perpetrator was reliable and
positive enough to support the conviction of appellant Delfin Caliso (Caliso).
Caliso was arraigned and tried for rape with homicide, but the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
21, in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte found him guilty of murder for the killing of AAA, 1 a
mentally-retarded 16-year old girl, and sentenced him to death in its decision dated August 19,
2002.2 The appeal of the conviction was brought automatically to the Court. On June 28, 2005, 3 the
Court transferred the records to the Court of Appeals (CA) for intermediate review pursuant to the
ruling in People v. Mateo.4 On October 26, 2007,5 the CA, although affirming the conviction,
reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua and modified the civil awards. Now, Caliso is before us in
a final bid to overturn his conviction.
Antecedents
The information dated August 5, 1997 charged Caliso with rape with homicide perpetrated in the
following manner:
That on or about the 5th day of June, 1997, at Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge upon one
AAA, who is a minor of 16 years old and a mentally retarded girl, against her will and consent; that
on the occasion of said rape and in furtherance of the accused’s criminal designs, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, and taking advantage of superior
strength, attack, assault and use personal violence upon said AAA by mauling her, pulling her
towards a muddy water and submerging her underneath, which caused the death of said AAA soon
thereafter.
CONTRARY to and in VIOLATION of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7659,
otherwise known as the "Heinous Crimes Law".6
At his arraignment on November 12, 1997,7 Caliso pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The records show that AAA died on June 5, 1997 at around 11:00 am in the river located in
Barangay Tiacongan, Kapatagan, Lanao Del Norte; that the immediate cause of her death was
asphyxia, secondary to drowning due to smothering; that the lone eyewitness, 34-year old Soledad
Amegable (Amegable), had been clearing her farm when she heard the anguished cries of a girl
bamboo growth that made it difficult for Amegable to see what was going on; that Amegable
subsequently heard sounds of beating and mauling that soon ended the girl’s cries; that Amegable
then proceeded to get a better glimpse of what was happening, hiding behind a cluster of banana
trees in order not to be seen, and from there she saw a man wearing gray short pants bearing the
number "11" mark, who dragged a girl’s limp body into the river, where he submerged the girl into
the knee-high muddy water and stood over her body; that he later lifted the limp body and tossed it
to deeper water; that he next jumped into the other side of the river; that in that whole time,
Amegable could not have a look at his face because he always had his back turned towards
her;9 that she nonetheless insisted that the man was Caliso, whose physical features she was
familiar with due to having seen him pass by their barangay several times prior to the
incident;10 that after the man fled the crime scene, Amegable went straight to her house and told
her husband what she had witnessed; and that her husband instantly reported the incident to the
barangay chairman.
It appears that one SPO3 Romulo R. Pancipanci declared in an affidavit 11 that upon his station
receiving the incident report on AAA’s death at about 12:45 pm of June 5, 1997, he and two other
officers proceeded to the crime scene to investigate; that he interviewed Amegable who identified
the killer by his physical features and clothing (short pants); that based on such information, he
traced Caliso as AAA’s killer; and that Caliso gave an extrajudicial admission of the killing of AAA.
However, the declarations in the affidavit remained worthless because the Prosecution did not
present SPO3 Pancipanci as its witness.
Leo Bering, the barangay chairman of San Vicente, Kapatagan, Lanao Del Norte, attested that on
the occasion of Caliso’s arrest and his custodial interrogation, he heard Caliso admit to the
investigating police officer the ownership of the short pants recovered from the crime scene; that
the admission was the reason why SPO3 Pancipanci arrested Caliso from among the curious
onlookers that had gathered in the area; that Amegable, who saw SPO3 Pancipanci’s arrest of
Caliso at the crime scene, surmised that Caliso had gone home and returned to the crime scene
thereafter.12
Municipal Health Officer Dr. Joseph G.B. Fuentecilla conducted the post-mortem examination on
the body of AAA on June 6, 1997, and found the following injuries, to wit:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. The dead body was generally pale wearing a heavily soiled old sleeveless shirt and garter skirts.
2. The body was wet and heavily soiled with mud both nostrils and mouth was filled with mud.
3. The skin of hands and feet is bleached and corrugated in appearance.
4. 2 cm. linear lacerated wound on the left cheek (sic).
5. Multiple small (sic) reddish contusions on anterior neck area.
6. Circular hematoma formation 3 inches in diameter epigastric area of abdomen.
7. Four erythematus linear abrasion of the left cheek (sic).
8. Presence of a 6x8 inches bulge on the back just below the inferior angle of both scapula
extending downwards.
9. The body was wearing an improperly placed underwear with the garter vertically oriented to the
right stained with moderate amount of yellowish fecal material.
10. Minimal amount of pubic hair in the lower pubis with labia majora contracted and retracted.
11. There’s no swelling abrasion, laceration, blood hematoma formation in the vulva. There were
old healed hymenal lacerations at 5 and 9 o’clock position.
12. Vaginal canal admits one finger with no foreign body recovered (sic).
13. Oval shaped contusion/hematoma 6 cm at its greatest diameter anterior surface middle 3rd left
thigh.
14. Presence of 2 contusion laceration 1x0.5 cm in size medial aspect left knee. 13
Dr. Fuentecilla also conducted a physical examination on the body of Caliso and summed up his
findings thusly:
P.E. FINDINGS:
1. Presence of a 7x0.1 cm. horizontally averted linear erythematus contusion left side of neck (Post
▲).
2. 8x0.2 cm. reddish linear abrasion (probably a scratch mark) from the left midclavicular line
extending to the left anterioraxillary line.
3. Presence of 2 erythematus abrasion 3 cmx0.1 cm in average size dorsal surface (probably a
scratch mark) middle 3rd left arm.
4. 2.5 cm. abrasion dorsal surface middle and right forearm.
5. Presence of a linear erythematus contusion (probably a scratch mark) 2x7 cm. in average size
lateral boarder of scapula extending to left posterior axillary line.
6. Presence of 2 oblique oriented erythematus contusion (probably a scratch mark) 14x022 cm. and
5x0.2 cm. in size respectively at the upper left flank of the lower back extending downward to the
midline.
7. Presence of 5 linear reddish pressure contusion parallel to each other with an average 5 cm left
flank area.14
In his defense, Caliso denied the accusation and interposed an alibi, insisting that on the day of the
killing, he plowed the rice field of Alac Yangyang from 7:00 am until 4:00 pm.
Yangyang corroborated Caliso’s alibi, recalling that Caliso had plowed his rice field from 8 am to 4
pm of June 5, 1997. He further recalled that Caliso was in his farm around 12:00 noon because he
brought lunch to Caliso. He conceded, however, that he was not aware where Caliso was at the
time of the killing.
Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment on August 19, 2002, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, accused DELFIN CALISO is hereby
sentenced to death and to indemnify the heirs of AAA in the amount of ₱50,000.00. The accused is
also hereby ordered to pay the said heirs the amount of ₱50, 000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.15
The RTC found that rape could not be complexed with the killing of AAA because the old-healed
hymenal lacerations of AAA and the fact that the victim’s underwear had been irregularly placed
could not establish the commission of carnal knowledge; that the examining physician also found
no physical signs of rape on the body of AAA; and that as to the killing of AAA, the identification by
Amegable that the man she had seen submerging AAA in the murky river was no other than Caliso
himself was reliable.
Nevertheless, the RTC did not take into consideration the testimony of Bering on Caliso’s
extrajudicial admission of the ownership of the short pants because the pants were not presented
as evidence and because the police officers involved did not testify about the pants in court.16 The
RTC cited the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength to raise the crime from
homicide to murder, regarding the word homicide in the information to be used in its generic sense
as to include all types of killing.
Ruling of the CA
On intermediate review, the following errors were raised in the brief for the
accused-appellant,17 namely:
i. The court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of murder despite
the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt;
ii. The court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the incredible and inconsistent
testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
iii. The court a quo gravely erred in appreciating the qualifying aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage of superior strength and the generic aggravating circumstance of disregard of sex[; and]
iv. The court a quo gravely erred in imposing the death penalty.
As stated, the CA affirmed Caliso’s conviction for murder based on the same ratiocinations the RTC
had rendered. The CA also relied on the identification by Amegable of Caliso, despite his back
being turned towards her during the commission of the crime. The CA ruled that she made a
positive identification of Caliso as the perpetrator of the killing, observing that the incident
happened at noon when the sun had been at its brightest, coupled with the fact that Amegable’s
view had not been obstructed by any object at the time that AAA’s body had been submerged in the
water; that the RTC expressly found her testimony as clear and straightforward and worthy of
credence; that no reason existed why Amegable would falsely testify against Caliso; that Caliso did
not prove the physical impossibility for him to be at the crime scene or at its immediate vicinity at the
time of the incident, for both Barangay San Vicente, where AAA’s body was found, and Barangay
Tiacongan, where the rice field of Yangyang was located, were contiguous; that the attendant
circumstance of abuse of superior strength qualified the killing of AAA to murder; that disregard of
sex should not have been appreciated as an aggravating circumstance due to its not being alleged
in the information and its not being proven during trial; and that the death penalty could not be
imposed because of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, prohibiting its imposition in the
Philippines.
The CA decreed in its judgment, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated August 19, 2002, finding appellant
guilty of Murder, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant Delfin Caliso is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and is directed to pay the victim’s heirs the amount of P50,000.00
as moral damages, as well as the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, in addition to the
civil indemnity of P50,000.00 he had been adjudged to pay by the trial court.
SO ORDERED.18
Issue
The primordial issue is whether Amegable’s identification of Caliso as the man who killed AAA at
noon of July 5, 1997 was positive and reliable.
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime
but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be established,
there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt. 19
The CA rejected the challenge Caliso mounted against the reliability of his identification as the
culprit by Amegable in the following manner:20
As to the first two errors raised, appellant contends that the testimony of Soledad Amegable was
replete with discrepancies. Appellant avers, for instance, that Soledad failed to see the assailant’s
face. Moreover, considering the distance between where Soledad was supposedly hiding and
where the incident transpired, appellant states that it was inconceivable for her to have heard and
seen the incident. According to appellant, witness Soledad could not even remember if at that time,
she hid behind a banana plant, or a coconut tree.
At bench, the incident happened at noon, when the sun was at its brightest. Soledad could very well
recognize appellant. Furthermore, notwithstanding the fact that it was his back that was facing her,
she asserted being familiar with the physical features of appellant, considering that he frequented
their barangay. Even during her cross-examination by the defense counsel, Soledad remained
steadfast in categorically stating that she recognized appellant:
Q: Mrs. Amegable, you said during your direct examination that you saw Delfin Caliso, the accused
in this case, several times passed by your barangay, am I correct?
A: Several times.
Q: By any chance prior to the incident, did you talk to him?
A: No, sir.
Q: Are you acquainted with him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Even if he is in his back position?
A: Yes, sir. (Emphasis Supplied)
Given the circumstances as stated above, it was even probable that Soledad caught glimpses of
the profile of the appellant at the time of the incident. She related, in addition, that when the victim
was being submerged in the water, there was no object obstructing her view.
The inconsistencies as alleged by appellant, between Soledad Amegable’s declaration in court and
her affidavit, such as the tree or plant from where she was hiding behind at the time of the incident,
are insignificant and cannot negate appellant’s criminal liability. Her whole attention was riveted to
the incident that was unfolding before her. Besides, any such inconsistencies are minor. Slight
contradictions are indicative of an unrehearsed testimony and could even serve to strengthen the
witness’ credibility. A witness who is telling the truth is not always expected to give a perfectly
concise testimony, considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory.
In fact, the testimony of a single eye-witness is sufficient to support a conviction, so long as such
testimony is found to be clear and straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial court.
Furthermore, over here, witness Soledad had no reason to testify falsely against appellant.
Besides, the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial
court, because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their
demeanor, conduct and attitude.lawphi1 Findings of the trial court on such matters are binding and
conclusive on the appellate court.
Contrary to the CA’s holding that the identification of Caliso based on Amegable’s recognition of
him was reliable, the Court considers the identification not reliable and beyond doubt as to meet the
requirement of moral certainty.
When is identification of the perpetrator of a crime positive and reliable enough for establishing his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does not always
require direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be possible in crimes
where there are no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally confirm
the identification and overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused. Thus, the
Court has distinguished two types of positive identification in People v. Gallarde,21 to wit: (a) that by
direct evidence, through an eyewitness to the very commission of the act; and (b) that by
circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is last seen with the victim immediately before
or after the crime. The Court said:
xxx Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of
being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of
positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the
perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This
constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may
not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to
positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when
the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before
and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification,
which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of
evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that
the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are
the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others,
then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and
elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such
a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a
crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If
resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the
absence of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper
protection.22
Amegable asserted that she was familiar with Caliso because she had seen him pass by in her
barangay several times prior to the killing. Such assertion indicates that she was obviously
assuming that the killer was no other than Caliso. As matters stand, therefore, Caliso’s conviction
hangs by a single thread of evidence, the direct evidence of Amegable’s identification of him as the
perpetrator of the killing. But that single thread was thin, and cannot stand sincere scrutiny. In every
criminal prosecution, no less than moral certainty is required in establishing the identity of the
accused as the perpetrator of the crime. Her identification of Caliso as the perpetrator did not have
unassailable reliability, the only means by which it might be said to be positive and sufficient. The
test to determine the moral certainty of an identification is its imperviousness to skepticism on
account of its distinctiveness. To achieve such distinctiveness, the identification evidence should
encompass unique physical features or characteristics, like the face, the voice, the dentures, the
distinguishing marks or tattoos on the body, fingerprints, DNA, or any other physical facts that set
the individual apart from the rest of humanity.
A witness’ familiarity with the accused, although accepted as basis for a positive identification, does
not always pass the test of moral certainty due to the possibility of mistake.
No matter how honest Amegable’s testimony might have been, her identification of Caliso by a
sheer look at his back for a few minutes could not be regarded as positive enough to generate that
moral certainty about Caliso being the perpetrator of the killing, absent other reliable circumstances
showing him to be AAA’s killer. Her identification of him in that manner lacked the qualities of
exclusivity and uniqueness, even as it did not rule out her being mistaken. Indeed, there could be
so many other individuals in the community where the crime was committed whose backs might
have looked like Caliso’s back. Moreover, many factors could have influenced her perception,
including her lack of keenness of observation, her emotional stress of the moment, her proneness
to suggestion from others, her excitement, and her tendency to assume. The extent of such factors
are not part of the records; hence, the trial court and the CA could not have taken them into
consideration. But the influence of such varied factors could not simply be ignored or taken for
granted, for it is even a well-known phenomenon that the members of the same family, whose
familiarity with one another could be easily granted, often inaccurately identify one another through
a sheer view of another’s back. Certainly, an identification that does not preclude a reasonable
possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any evidentiary force. 23
Amegable’s recollection of the perpetrator wearing short pants bearing the number "11" did not
enhance the reliability of her identification of Caliso. For one, such pants were not one-of-a-kind
apparel, but generic. Also, they were not offered in evidence. Yet, even if they had been admitted in
evidence, it remained doubtful that they could have been linked to Caliso without proof of his
ownership or possession of them in the moments before the crime was perpetrated.
Nor did the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of Amegable to impute the killing to Caliso
guarantee the reliability and accuracy of her identification of him. The dearth of competent
additional evidence that eliminated the possibility of any human error in Amegable’s identification of
Caliso rendered her lack of bad faith or ill motive irrelevant and immaterial, for even the most
sincere person could easily be mistaken about her impressions of persons involved in startling
occurrences such as the crime committed against AAA. It is neither fair nor judicious, therefore, to
have the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of Amegable raise her identification to the level of
moral certainty.
The injuries found on the person of Caliso by Dr. Fuentecilla, as borne out by the medical certificate
dated June 9, 1997,24 did not support the culpability of Caliso. The injuries, which were mostly mere
scratch marks,25 were not even linked by the examining physician to the crime charged. Inasmuch
as the injuries of Caliso might also have been due to other causes, including one related to his
doing menial labor most of the time, their significance as evidence of guilt is nil.
In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit, the accused’s
constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved is not overcome, and he is
entitled to an acquittal,26 though his innocence may be doubted.27 The constitutional presumption of
innocence guaranteed to every individual is of primary importance, and the conviction of the
accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense he put up but on the strength of the
evidence for the Prosecution.28

WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on October 26, 2007 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE for
insufficiency of evidence, and accused-appellant Delfin Caliso is ACQUITTED of the crime of
murder.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City is directed to forthwith release Delfin
Caliso from confinement, unless there is another lawful cause warranting his further detention.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 190178 February 12, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA, Accused-Apellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The peculiar nature of rape is that conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely upon the word of
the private complainant because it is essentially committed in relative isolation or even in secrecy,
and it is usually only the victim who can testify of the unconsented coitus. Thus, the long standing
rule is that when an alleged victim of rape says she was violated, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has indeed been committed. Since the participants are usually the only
witnesses in crimes of this nature and the accused's conviction or acquittal virtually depends on the
private complainant's testimony, it must be received with utmost caution. It is then incumbent upon
the trial court to be very scrupulous in ascertaining the credibility of the victim's testimony. Judges
must free themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman claiming to have
been sexually abused and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant
of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should
equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice according to law. 1
Before Us is an appeal from the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Forcible Abduction with Rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The present case involves eight (8) sets of Information for Forcible Abduction with Rape filed by
private complainant ("AAA") against appellant, Felimon Patentes.
The Prosecution’s Case
On 5 December 1998, at about 11:00 a.m., AAA boarded a bus for Bansalan, Davao City, to visit
and bring medicines to her sick grandmother. While seated at the rear portion of the bus, appellant
suddenly sat next to her. It was the second time AAA met appellant; the first time was on 4
December 1998, when appellant persistently courted her. She only knew appellant as he was a
friend of her brother.
After a brief conversation, appellant suddenly showed her his bolo, covered by a red scabbard
tucked in his right side while he held a red steel pipe with Arabic markings, which he used to
threaten to kill AAA should AAA disobey him. Appellant then accompanied AAA to her
grandmother’s place and returned to Davao City proper by bus. As they walked around, appellant
placed his right hand on AAA’s shoulder. Appellant also held AAA’s right hand, which covers her
mouth with a handkerchief.
Upon reaching Davao City, they rode a jeepney to Sasa and alighted at a nearby convenience store.
Upon arrival, a man gave something to appellant, which he immediately placed inside his pocket.
Appellant then brought AAA to his house in Hacienda Heights, Davao City, where his parents, sister,
brother-in-law, nephews and nieces live.
Upon entering the house, appellant dragged AAA to a room upstairs and tied her to a sewing
machine. Appellant then started to smoke something, which he also forced AAA to inhale, causing
AAA to feel light, weak and dizzy. This prevented AAA from fighting back as appellant removed
AAA’s clothes. Doffed of his own clothes, appellant mounted her and inserted his penis into her
vagina.
The following day, 6 December 1998, appellant again forced AAA to inhale the smoke from his
cigarette, causing her to feel weak and dizzy as appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA.
On 7 December 1998, appellant again had carnal knowledge of AAA using threats, force and
intimidation, causing bruises on AAA’s arms.
On 8 December 1998, while appellant was sleeping beside AAA, AAA slowly got up to escape.
However, AAA’s attempt, while feeble, woke up appellant. Appellant then punched her in the
stomach, causing AAA to lose consciousness. When AAA gained a little strength, appellant again
mauled her and raped her again.
On 9 December 1998, after AAA took a bath, appellant raped AAA while pointing a bolo to her
neck.
On 10, 11 and 12 December 1998, appellant raped AAA while threatening her with bodily harm. He
also threatened to kill her family, in case she tells anyone of her ordeal.
On 13 December 1998, to free herself from her predicament, AAA convinced appellant that she will
marry him. Appellant agreed. Appellant’s mother accompanied AAA to the latter’s house to discuss
the marital plans with AAA’s family. Surprised by the marital plans, AAA’s mother asked for a
private moment with AAA. In their conversation, AAA confessed how appellant forcibly took her to
his house on 5 December 1998 and raped her for more than a week. AAA’s mother then
accompanied AAA to report her ordeal to the police, where AAA was examined by a doctor, Dr.
Samuel Cruz, the City Health Officer of Davao City.
Dr. Cruz testified that he examined AAA. In his report, he noted the following observations about
AAA: (1) contusion on the breast caused by a kiss mark; (2) hymen was intact and can readily
admit a normal-sized erect male penis without sustaining any injury; and (3) vaginal canal was
negative for spermatozoa. Dr. Cruz also added that he cannot tell whether it was AAA’s first sexual
intercourse as the vagina was not injured but had healed lacerations.
The Accused-Appellant’s Defense
On 5 December 1998, pursuant to their previous agreement, appellant accompanied AAA to
Bansalan to visit and bring medicines to AAA’s grandmother. After going around Davao City, they
went to his house at about 7:00 p.m. Appellant then offered to bring AAA to her house but the latter
refused, insisting that she wanted to live with appellant because she was fed up with her mother,
who often called her "buntog" or prostitute.
AAA stayed in appellant’s house together with the latter’s parents, sister, brother-in-law, nephews
and nieces. AAA slept in the same room with appellant and had consented sexual intercourse.
Throughout AAA’s stay, she was free to roam around the house and even helped in the household
chores. Pursuant to their marital plans, AAA’s grandfather went to appellant’s house on 7
December 1998. As a result, they agreed to set the wedding date on 27 May 1999. Appellant’s
mother also went to AAA’s house to discuss the marital plans on 14 December 1998. However,
AAA’s mother rejected the marriage proposal because of appellant’s social standing.
Leonora Gerondio (Gerondio), appellant’s neighbor, testified that she first met AAA in appellant’s
house on 5 December 1998. The following day, Gerondio again saw AAA when she went to
appellant’s house. Appellant told her that he will marry AAA. Since then, Gerondio saw AAA
everyday from 7 to 11 December 1998, cleaning the surroundings, doing the laundry, and walking
around the vicinity. AAA even visited her house and talked about AAA and appellant’s marital plans.
In her observation, AAA and appellant acted like a couple. Gerondio also accompanied appellant’s
mother to AAA’s house to discuss AAA and appellant’s marital plans. However, AAA’s mother
rejected the marriage proposal.
Wilma Enriquez (Enriquez), a common friend of AAA and appellant, testified that between 5 to 12
December 1998, she went twice to appellant’s house upon AAA’s invitation to talk about the
couple’s marital plans.
During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) AAA, private complainant
herself; (2) Dr. Samuel Cruz; (3) PO1 Lennie Ronquillo; (4) private complainant’s mother; and (5)
Julie Dayaday.
On the other hand, the defense presented: (1) Felimon Patentes, accused-appellant himself; (2)
Leonora Gerondio; (3) Wilma Enriquez; and (4) Francisca Patentes.
After trial, the lower court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of
Forcible Abduction with Rape and seven (7) counts of Rape. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
Felimon Patentes a.k.a. Arnold Patentes is hereby sentenced as follows:
1. Criminal Case No. 42,786-99 - Reclusion Perpetua
2. Criminal Case No. 42,787-99 - Reclusion Perpetua
3. Criminal Case No. 42,788-99 - Reclusion Perpetua
4. Criminal Case No. 42,789-99 - Reclusion Perpetua
5. Criminal Case No. 42,790-99 - Reclusion Perpetua
6. Criminal Case No. 42,791-99 - Reclusion Perpetua
7. Criminal Case No. 42,792-99 - Reclusion Perpetua
8. Criminal Case No. 42,793-99 - Reclusion Perpetua
The accused shall indemnify AAA Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) in each of the eight cases
for a total of Two Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos (₱240,000.00).
SO ORDERED.4
Aggrieved, appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court with modification. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED as to the conviction of appellant FELIMON
PATENTES for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape and seven (7) counts of eight (8)
counts of Rape and as to the imposition upon him of the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of
the eight (8) offenses. His civil liability, however, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
Appellant FELIMON PATENTES is hereby directed to pay the following amounts:
1. ₱50,000.00 each as civil indemnity for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape and seven
(7) counts of Rape or a total of ₱400,000.00;
2. ₱75,000.00 each as moral damages for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape and seven
(7) counts of Rape or a total of ₱600,000.00; and
3. ₱25,000.00 each as temperate damages for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape and
seven (7) counts of Rape or a total of ₱200,000.00.
SO ORDERED.5
The appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial court on the matter of credibility of the
witnesses for the prosecution. According to the appellate court, "AAA’s account of her ordeal in the
hands of appellant was straightforward, firm, candid and consistent. Notwithstanding the rigid,
lengthy and rigorous cross-examination by the defense, AAA remained steadfast in her narration of
the details of her harrowing experience. A thorough reading of the transcript shows that AAA’s
testimony bears the earmarks of truth and credibility."6
Hence, this appeal.
The elements necessary to sustain a conviction for rape are: (1) the accused had carnal knowledge
of the victim; and (2) said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b)
when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12
years of age or is demented.7 In the case at bar, appellant never denied having carnal knowledge of
AAA. The only matter, thus, to be resolved by this Court is whether appellant had carnal knowledge
of AAA against her will using threats, force or intimidation, or that AAA was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or was under 12 years of age or is demented.
Appellant argues that if AAA really was raped for more than an entire week, it is perplexing why she
did not escape, or even seek the help of the neighbors despite several opportunities to do
so.8 Appellant further alleges that AAA’s failure to escape and her helping in the household chores
in appellant’s house prove that she was not raped and that they had consensual sexual
intercourse.9
About this position, the appellate court noted and reasoned that, "appellant threatened AAA with
harm in the event that she told anyone of what happened between them. The lingering fear instilled
upon AAA is understandable considering that appellant was always armed with a bolo and was
constantly showing it to AAA. The possibility of him making good his threat was not at all remote
and the fear for her life remained palpable."10
Behavioral psychology teaches us that people react to similar situations dissimilarly. There is no
standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident as the workings of the
human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable.11 Nevertheless, the Court
must be guided by established principles.
In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a man of rape
is easy, but to disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused may be innocent; (2)
inasmuch as only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the
complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merit and should not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense.12 So long as the private complainant’s testimony meets the test of
credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.13
Following these legal precepts, AAA’s testimony, placed side by side with the prosecution’s
evidence, must stand the test of credibility.
1. Absence of external signs or physical injuries does not negate the
commission of rape since proof of injuries is not an essential element of the
crime.14 And, it is also a precept that physical evidence is of the highest order
and speaks more eloquently than all witnesses put together. 15 In the case at
bar, the prosecution failed to present any scintilla of proof to support its claim.
In fact, contrary to the prosecution’s claim that AAA was dragged, tied, mauled,
slapped and boxed, the medical certificate revealed no telltale sign of the
prosecution’s allegations. It has to be noted that the medical examination was
conducted the day after AAA’s supposed escape from appellant. As shown by
the medical certificate, AAA had no external signs of physical injuries, save for
a kiss mark, to wit:16
EXTRAGENITAL PHYSICAL INJURY:
Contusion, reddish purple, breast, right side, lower-inner quadrant, 2.0x1.0 cm.
xxx
CONCLUSIONS:
1. The above physical injury was noted on the body of the subject, age of
which is consistent with the alleged date of infliction.
2. That under normal conditions without subsequent complications and unless
a deeper involvement might be present but which is not clinically apparent at
the time of examination, said injury will require medical attendance of not more
than seven (7) days from date of infliction.
3. Hymen intact and its orifice, wide as to allow complete penetration by an
average-sized male organ in erection without causing hymenal injury.17
2. The time-honored test in determining the value of the testimony of a witness
is its compatibility with human knowledge, observation and common
experience of man.18 Thus, whatever is repugnant to the standards of human
knowledge, observation and experience becomes incredible and must lie
outside judicial cognizance.19
As culled from the records, AAA lived with appellant’s family for eight (8) days – in the same house
where appellant’s parents, sister, brother-in-law, nephews and nieces also lived. AAA even called
appellant’s mother, "mama." As argued by the defense, "the members of the appellant’s family
could have noticed that she was being forced and raped by the accused if the accusations were
really true."20 Indeed, it is incompatible with human experience to keep a sex slave for eight (8)
days in a house where the abuser’s entire family, including the abuser’s minor nephews and nieces
live.
When appellant and AAA arrived in the former’s house, they were greeted by appellant’s father. If
AAA’s account were true that appellant dragged her to a room upstairs and then tied her to a
sewing machine, appellant’s father could have noticed and reacted to the obvious violence. To say
the least, he would have talked to the appellant about the deed. Instead, and incredibly, appellant’s
mother went to AAA’s house to propose marriage – contrary to the common experience.
Contrary to the prosecution’s claim that AAA only saw appellant on 4 December 1998, a day before
the alleged commission of the crime, it was stipulated that AAA knew appellant as appellant was a
neighbor and friend of AAA’s brother.21 Furthermore, appellant’s mother was the midwife who
assisted AAA’s housemaid in giving birth.22 Lastly, AAA and appellant have a common friend,
Enriquez, who testified that she saw the two in appellant’s house, through AAA’s invitation. 23 The
TSN reflects the inconsistencies in AAA’s testimony:24
Q: Do you know that his mother is a midwife?
A: No, Sir. Because she helped in the delivery of our housemaid.
Q: When did your housemaid give birth?
A: When I went to Bansalan on December 5 I passed by the house she was about to deliver and I
saw the mother of the accused that’s the time I came to know his mother.
Q: Is it not that your stepfather even went to the house where you stayed? Q: There were no people?

A: No, sir. A: We are used to ride (sic) pedicab.

Q: You will deny that? Q: So you rode a pedicab at that time?

A: I did not see him. A: No, Sir. [Emphasis supplied]

xxxx We are mindful that appellant’s bare invocation of the sweetheart theory cannot alone stand. It must
be corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence. Usually, these are letters, notes,
Q: Is it not you said you were being locked? photos, mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the lovers.30 There is such
corroboration in this case. To support its sweetheart theory, the defense presented appellant and
AAA’s common friend, Enriquez, who attested to the veracity of appellant’s claim:31
A: I was locked at the door when my father arrived. I do not know because he locked me at the
room. [Emphasis supplied]
Q: When you arrived at their house did you see the complainant AAA?

For several days that AAA had been missing, which would have caused worry and anxiety among
AAA’s family members, AAA’s father, instead of reporting the matter to police authorities, went to A: Yes, sir.
appellant’s house to discuss AAA and appellant’s marital plans on 7 December 1998. 25 Clearly, this
is contrary to human logic and experience, and inconsistent with the prosecution’s claim. Q: Were you able to talk to her?

3. The conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual assault is of utmost A: Yes, sir.
importance in establishing the truth or falsity of the charge of rape. 26 In the case at bar, the
actuations of AAA after the alleged rape is totally uncharacteristic of one who has been raped. It is Q: Can you tell the court what was the subject of your conversation?
contrary to normal human behavior for AAA to willingly go with her abuser’s mother, and worse, to
live with her abuser’s entire family in one roof for eight (8) days sans any attempt to escape.
A: She told me that she and Felimon Patentes are getting married, saying where they will live and
that they will go into the buy and sell business.
It goes against the grain of human experience for a woman who has been robbed of her honor and
chastity not to seize an opportunity to escape from the clutches of her malefactor.27 Instead of
escaping from her abuser, AAA visited appellant’s neighbor. 28 Even if AAA had several Q: Did you notice AAA to be happy with Felimon Patentes?
opportunities to share her ordeal to be rescued by her friend, Wilma, AAA inexplicably failed and
instead described the details of her marital plans. What is truly exceptional, however, is the A: Yes, sir.
testimony of AAA that she visited her grandmother during the period of her alleged abduction.
Despite inconsistencies in her testimony as shown in the TSN, AAA admitted the visit to her Q: And the second time you went to their place do you remember what was the subject of your
grandmother:29 conversation?

Q: So you did not proceed to your grandmother’s house, where is the house of your grandmother? A: Regarding their plan of getting married. [Emphasis supplied]

A: Km. 81. Appellant’s neighbor, Gerondio, corroborated the testimony:32

Q: Near the Dulo? Q: Do you remember seeing the accused sometime on December 5, 1998?

A: A bit farther of Dulo. A: Yes, sir.

Q: You rode in a jeep and the driver is your cousin? Q: Where did you see him?

A: No sir we rode (sic) pedicab going to my grandmother’s place. A: In their house, he just arrived.
Q: Was he alone? xxxx

A: He is with AAA. Q: What did you observe from them?

xxxx A: As if they are married.

Q: On the following day did you see again AAA? Q: What were the actions that you saw in them?

A: Yes, sir. A: They were loving with each other.

Q: Where did you see her? Q: What do you mean by loving?

A: Inside their house, she was walking. A: They are close to each other, they joke, and Felimon would place his arm on the shoulder of AAA.
[Emphasis supplied]
xxxx
A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which means
Q: When was that when you saw her? a moral certainty that the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution. 33 In the
case at bar, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of establishing with moral certainty
the truthfulness of the charge that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against her will using
A: The next day, December 6, 1998. threats, force or intimidation.

xxxx The testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity should not be received with
precipitate credulity for the charge can easily be concocted. 34 Courts should be wary of giving
Q: On the succeeding days, from December 7 to 11 were you able to see AAA in the house of undue credibility to a claim of rape, especially where the sole evidence comes from an alleged
Felimon? victim whose charge is not corroborated and whose conduct during and after the rape is open to
conflicting interpretations.35 While judges ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation that
A: Yes, sir. a rape victim undergoes as she seeks justice, they should equally bear in mind that their
responsibility is to render justice based on the law. 36

Q: Where did you see her?

The numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of private complainant have created reasonable
doubt in Our mind.1âwphi1In view of the foregoing considerations, the presumption of innocence in
A: In the house of the accused, Felimon.
favor of appellant must be upheld considering that the evidence brought forth in trial falls short of
the quantum of proof to support a conviction.37
Q: What was she doing?
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, finding appellant
A: She was cleaning the surroundings of the house and did the laundry, and she was also going FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Forcible Abduction with Rape,
around. is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA is ACQUITTED on the ground
of reasonable doubt. His immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered unless he is being
Q: When you said going around or "suroy-suroy" where did she go around? detained for some other charge.

A: She also went to our house. SO ORDERED.

Q: Were you able to talk to her personally?

A: Yes, sir.
 A.M. No. 2011-07-SC October 4, 2011
SUPREME COURT, Complainant,
vs.
EDDIE V. DELGADO, UTILITY WORKER II, JOSEPH LAWRENCE M. MADEJA, CLERK IV,
AND WILFREDO A. FLORENDO, UTILITY WORKER II, ALL OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK
OF COURT, SECOND DIVISIONRespondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The present administrative matter is based on the following facts:
On 2 June 2011, Supreme Court Associate Justice and Second Division Chairperson Antonio T.
Carpio caused the transmittal of two (2) sealed Agenda to the Office of Clerk of Court – Second
Division (OCC-SD).1 Contained in the Agenda are the itemized lists of cases taken up by the
Court’s Second Division during the sessions held on 30 May and 1 June 2011, as well as the
handwritten marginal notes of Justice Carpio showing the specific actions adopted by the division
on each case item.2 The transmittal of the Agenda was made for the purpose of allowing the
Second Division Clerk of Court to prepare the draft minutes of the 30 May and 1 June 2011
sessions.3
Inside the OCC-SD
Ms. Christine S. Puno (Ms. Puno), an Executive Assistant III at the OCC-SD, received the two (2)
Agenda on behalf of the office.4 Ms. Puno is the duly designated personnel of the OCC-SD
authorized to receive and open the sealed Agenda coming from the Office of Justice
Carpio.5 Promptly, Ms. Puno forwarded both Agenda to Atty. Ma. Luisa L. Laurea (Atty.
Laurea)—the Second Division Clerk of Court.6
Atty. Laurea instructed Ms. Puno to have the Agenda photocopied, beginning with the one for the
30 May 2011 session.7 As is customary, the 30 May 2011 Agenda was ordered to be photocopied
in two (2) sets: one to serve as a duplicate of Atty. Laurea, while the other as a copy of the Agenda
Division of the office.8 The original Agenda will be left with the Minutes Division, which will draft the
minutes of the session.9
Following the instructions of Atty. Laurea, Ms. Puno gave the 30 May 2011 Agenda to Mr. Julius
Irving C. Tanael (Mr. Tanael)—a Utility Worker II at the OCC-SD—for photocopying.10 Mr. Tanael is
one of only four personnel in the OCC-SD who are authorized to make photocopies of Agenda with
actions.11
Upon completing his task, Mr. Tanael reckoned that the copies of the 30 May 2011 Agenda were
too voluminous to be bound by mere staple wire.12 Hence, Mr. Tanael gave the finished copies to
herein respondent Eddie V. Delgado (Delgado) for stitching.13
Upon finishing with the stitching, respondent Delgado returned the two (2) copies of the 30 May
2011 Agenda to Mr. Tanael.14 In turn, Mr. Tanael gave one copy to the Agenda Division and
another copy to Ms. Puno for transmittal to Atty. Laurea.15
Before Ms. Puno could furnish Atty. Laurea her copy of the 30 May 2011 Agenda, however, she
caught respondent Delgado acting suspiciously while holding and reading sheets of pink-colored
papers, which are similar to that used by the OCC-SD in photocopying Agenda.16 She then saw
respondent Delgado keep the same sheets inside the drawer of his office desk.17
It was at that point that Ms. Puno began to suspect that the sheets held, read and kept by
respondent Delgado might have been taken from the copies of the 30 May 2011 Agenda.18 Thus,
Ms. Puno at once requested Mr. Tanael to help check whether the pages of the said photocopies
were complete.19
The inspection of the duplicates revealed that one copy of the 30 May 2011 Agenda—the one given
to the Agenda Division—had missing pages, pages 58, 59 and 70.20 Later, Ms. Puno was able to
confirm her suspicion as she found two (2) of the missing pages i.e., pages 58 and 59, hidden
below a pile of expediente21 inside the drawer of respondent Delgado’s desk.22 She and Mr. Tanael
then stapled back the recovered pages 58 and 59, and replaced the still unaccounted page 70 in
the copy of the Agenda Division.23
After office hours, Ms. Puno confided what happened to Ms. Auralyn Veloso (Ms. Veloso) and Atty.
Teresita A. Tuazon (Atty. Tuazon).24 Ms. Veloso is an Assistant Records Officer in OCC-SD, while
Atty. Tuazon is the Assistant Clerk of Court of the Second Division. 25
On 6 June 2011, Atty. Tuazon reported the incident involving the missing pages of a copy of the 30
May 2011 Agenda to Atty. Laurea.26 Alarmed, Atty. Laurea called respondent Delgado, Ms. Puno
and Atty. Tuazon in her office for an initial investigation.27
Initial Investigation
In the presence of Atty. Laurea, Atty. Tuazon and Ms. Puno, respondent Delgado candidly admitted
during the initial investigation that he took pages 58, 59 and 70 from one of the copies of the 30
May 2011 Agenda.28 However, respondent Delgado also disclosed that he removed the pages from
the subject Agenda only as a favor to herein respondents Joseph Lawrence Madeja (Madeja) and
Wilfredo A. Florendo (Florendo).29
As it turned out, after respondent Delgado received the copies of the 30 May 2011 Agenda for
stitching, he was approached by respondents Madeja and Florendo who expressed interest on
certain items apparently included in the Agenda.30 Respondents Madeja and Florendo then asked
respondent Delgado if he could provide them with a copy. 31 Respondent Delgado professed that
out of "pakikisama" he removed the would-be missing pages from one of the copies entrusted to
him for stitching and gave them to respondents Madeja and Florendo. 32 Respondents Madeja and
Florendo, however, would eventually return these pages to respondent Delgado because,
purportedly, none of the items about which they were interested was in them.33
After hearing the confession and incriminating statements of respondent Delgado, Atty. Laurea
called for respondents Madeja and Florendo to join the initial investigation.34
For their part, respondents Madeja and Florendo admitted during the initial investigation that they
asked for and, in fact, obtained the missing pages in the 30 May 2011 Agenda. 35 Respondent
Madeja even admitted giving his copy of the missing pages to a certain "Dading."36 Dading was
later identified to be Melquiades S. Briones, (Mr. Briones) a Clerk III in the Office of the Clerk of
Court – En Banc.37 Both respondents Madeja and Florendo attested that court employees from
other Divisions had been requesting for copies of the Agenda, to which they were inclined to
accede in exchange for tokens like "pang-merienda" or "pamasahe."38
Upon conclusion of the initial investigation, Atty. Laurea and Atty. Tuazon prepared a
Memorandum39 summarizing the statements made by the respondents during the course of the
investigation. This Memorandum was then submitted to Justice Carpio, as Chairman of this Court’s
Second Division.40
Formal Investigation
On 8 June 2011, this Court, through its Second Division, issued a Resolution 41 treating the
Memorandum submitted by Atty. Laurea and Atty. Tuazon as a formal administrative complaint
against the respondents. In the same Resolution, the Complaints and Investigation Division of the
Office of Administrative Services (OAS) was tasked to conduct a formal investigation on the matter
and to thereafter submit an evaluation, report and recommendation. 42The Resolution also placed
the respondents under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days. 43
Acting on the Resolution, the OAS directed the respondents to submit their respective written
explanations on the Memorandum.44 In compliance with this directive, respondent Florendo
submitted a Plea for Judicial Clemency and Understanding with Motion to Lift Preventive
Suspension45 on 15 June 2011. On 17 June 2011, respondent Madeja filed his
Comment/Explanation.46 Respondent Delgado, however, failed to submit any written explanation. 47
The OAS also conducted separate hearings on 15 June 2011 and 4 July 2011, wherein the
statements of the respondents,48 Atty. Tuazon,49 Ms. Puno,50 Mr. Tanael,51 Mr. Briones52 and one
Mr. Willy M. Mercado53 were taken.
In their written explanations as well as statements during the formal hearings, both respondent
Madeja and Florendo adamantly denied having made any admission during the initial investigation
regarding their complicity in the removal of the missing pages in the copy of the 30 May 2011
Agenda.54 They submit that there is no actual evidence that shows that they have knowledge of or
involvement in the actions of respondent Delgado.55
Respondent Delgado in his statement during the formal hearings, on the other hand, stood by his
admissions during the initial investigation.56
The OAS Recommendation
On 1 September 2011, the OAS submitted to this Court a Memorandum 57 embodying its findings
and evaluation. In sum, it considered respondent Delgado guilty of Grave Misconduct for his
unauthorized removal of pages 58, 59 and 70 in a copy of the 30 May 2011 Agenda. 58 The OAS
also found respondents Madeja and Florendo guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service, for their participation in the unauthorized removal of the said pages. 59
Thus, following the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, 60 the OAS
made the following recommendations:61
a. that Eddie V. Delgado, casual Utility Worker II, be found guilty of grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having been directly involved in the unauthorized
taking of three (3) pages from the Agenda with Action dated May 30, 2011, and be dismissed from
the service with forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, if he has any, and with
prohibition from reemployment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government
including government-owned or controlled corporations; and
b. that Joseph Lawrence M. Madeja, Clerk IV, and Wilfredo A. Florendo, Utility Worker II, be found
guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and be suspended for six (6) months
without pay, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be
dealt with more severely. The period of ninety (90) days preventive suspension they have thus
served so far shall be credited to them in the service of said penalty. (Emphasis supplied)
OUR RULING
We modify the findings and recommendations of the OAS.
We begin with the obvious and from the admissions during the initial investigation when there was
yet not enough time for device and advice. Respondents Madeja and Florendo asked respondent
Delgado for a copy of several items included in the 30 May 2011 Agenda. Acceding to the request,
respondent Delgado removed pages 58, 59 and 70 from a copy of the Agenda entrusted to him for
stitching and gave them to respondents Madeja and Delgado. Veritably, the acts of respondents
complement each other; they are but completions of a common Grave Misconduct.
Respondents’ Complicity
It must be stressed that insofar as the involvement of respondent Delgado is concerned, there is no
longer any issue to be resolved. Respondent Delgado has been consistent with his admission of
involvement during both the initial investigation in the OCC-SD and the formal investigation of the
OAS.62 It is, therefore, already settled fact that respondent Delgado was the person who actually
removed the pages 58, 59 and 70 from the subject Agenda.
What remains in dispute is the participation of respondents Madeja and Florendo in the removal of
the pages in the subject Agenda. As stated earlier, both respondents Madeja and Florendo
vehemently denied having been involved in the taking of the missing Agenda pages during the
formal investigation of the OAS.63 This sharply contradicts their reported admission of complicity
during the initial investigation conducted by the OCC-SD.
The evidence at hand, however, point out that respondents Madeja and Florendo, indeed, connived
with respondent Delgado in removing the three (3) pages from a copy of the 30 May 2011 Agenda.
The denial of respondents Madeja and Florendo, in a complete turnaround from an earlier
admission, is unavailing as against the positive, straightforward and consistent statements of
respondent Delgado.
First. Respondent Delgado’s statements, not only in the initial investigation but also in the formal A: Opo.
investigation, were unwavering in their implication of respondents Madeja and Florendo.
Respondent Delgado categorically identified respondents Madeja and Florendo as the persons who xxx
induced him to remove several pages from a copy of the 30 May 2011 Agenda and thereafter
obtained them.64 Thus, as respondent Delgado relates during the formal investigation:65
Q: Kung ang nawawalang pages ay tatlo, ibig mong sabihin, tatlo din ang tinanggal?

Q: Itong nangyaring insidente noong June 2, 2011, ano ang naging partisipasyon mo dito?
A: Usually, Ma’am, ‘yung hiningi po ni Joseph Madeja, mali ang item na naibigay ko sa kanya. Hindi
niya na po naibalik sa akin inilagay lang niya dun sa mga scratch ko. Nagkamali po ng ano ……
A: Ganito po ang pangyayari, kasi po lumapit sa akin ang kasama ko.

Q: Kumbaga ang intended page ay nasa page 5 & 7, ang naibigay mo page 3?
Q: Sinong kasama mo?

A: Parang ganito po, may item po ‘yan kasi. Kunwari, number 1,2,3,4,5,6 may number pa ng item
A: Si Florendo at si Madeja. ang naibigay ko sa kanya ay yung number hindi ‘yung item. Kunwari, sabi ninyo page 70, ang
naibigay ko sa kanya hindi ‘yung mismong item number kaya ang sabi niya, "Mali ito."
Q: Willie Florendo at si…..?
xxx
A: Joseph Madeja.
Q: Noong mali ang page na ibinigay mo, ibinalik ba sa ‘yo o hindi?
Q: Okay.
A: Inilagay na lang po sa side ko, sabi niya, "Mali ang ibinigay mo." Kasi binigyan na ako ni [Ms.
A: Nung time pong ‘yun wala naman pong ….. kasi po pinatahi lang sa akin ‘yun. Puno] ng kopya…. nung kulang kaya hindi ko na inano yun.

Q: Ang alin? Q: Hindi ka ba man lang nag-take ng initiative na kahit papano ay xerox lang ang ibigay mo sa
kanila?
A: Yung agenda po.
A: Hindi po kasi pwedeng… pag ibinigay mo sa nag-se-xerox…..
Q: Pinatahi sa ‘yo ‘yung agenda?
Q: Kasi makikita niya?
A: Opo.
A: Opo.
Q: Pagkatapos?
Q: So, makikita niya at hinayaan mong ma-discover na may nawawalang pahina, tama ba ako?
A: Wala po sa loob ko. Tinanong nila ako kung nand’yan pa ang agenda, sabi ko, "Ganun, ganun."
Yung May 30, "Tingnan mo nga kung and’yan ‘yung item ganun. Wala naman sa akin," sabi ko, A: Tama po.
"Andito," sabi ko. "Bigyan mo nga ako," sabing ganun.
Q: In, effect, ang ini-establish ko ngayon ay magkaka-kuntyaba kayo?
xxx
A: Yun na din po ang magiging ano nun eh.
Q: Paano mong ginawa ‘yung pagbibigay ng copy ng agenda kina Madeja?
xxx (Emphasis supplied)
A: Tiningnan ko lang po ‘yun kung anong item tapos inabot ko lang sa kanila.
Second. It was never shown that respondent Delgado was motivated by any ill will in implicating
xxx respondents Madeja and Florendo. As a witness, the credibility of respondent Delgado remained
unsullied. We find his statements worthy of belief.66
Q: Yung items na ‘yun ay nakapaloob dito sa pages 58, 59 and 70 at’yun ang binigay mo sa kanila?
Third. The unsubstantiated denial of respondents, therefore, falters in light of the direct and positive
statements of respondent Delgado. The basic principle in Evidence is that denials, unless
supported by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony of truthful
witnesses.67
Respondent’s Administrative Liability
Having established the involvement of each respondent in the removal of the pages of the subject
Agenda, We next determine their administrative culpability.
We lay first the premises:
1. As stated beforehand, the 30 May 2011 Agenda contain an itemized list of cases taken up by the
Court’s Second Division during the sessions held on the concerned date and the handwritten
marginal notes of Justice Carpio noting the specific actions adopted by the division on each
case.68 Under Rule 11, Section 5 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, 69 such a document is
considered confidential.
2. Owing to the confidential nature of the contents of an Agenda, the OCC-SD follows a very strict
procedure in handling them.70 Thus, as can be gathered from the factual narration, only a few
specified personnel within the OCC-SD are authorized to have access to an Agenda – e.g., only Ms.
Puno is authorized to receive and open; only four (4) persons are authorized to photocopy.71
3. None of the respondents is entitled to a copy of an Agenda. 72 None of them has any authority to
be informed of the contents of an Agenda, much less to obtain a page therefrom. 73
a. Respondent Delgado holds a casual appointment74 as a Utility Worker II in the OCC-SD. His
primary work in the said office is to stitch pleadings, records and other court documents.75
b. Respondent Madeja holds a permanent appointment as Clerk IV in the OCC-SD. His primary
task in the said office is the inventory of case rollos.76
c. Respondent Florendo holds a permanent appointment as Utility II in the OCC-SD. As such, he
performs various duties in the office like receiving and delivering case rollos, releasing of agenda
reports and stitching court records.77
Given the foregoing, We find that there are adequate grounds to hold respondents administratively
liable.
First. The act of the respondents in causing the removal of several pages in a copy of the 30 May
2011 Agenda is a malevolent transgression of their duties as court personnel—particularly, as
employees detailed at the OCC-SD. The act is unauthorized and a blatant disregard of the standard
operating procedures observed by the office in handling confidential documents, such as the
Agenda. It compromised the ability of the OCC-SD to efficiently perform its functions and also
imperiled the environment of confidentiality the office is supposed to be clothed with.
As court employees, respondents clearly committed a willful breach of the trust reposed upon them
by this Court. They thereby violated Sections 1 and 3, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel,78 to wit:
CANON IV
PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES
SECTION 1. Court personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and with diligence.
They shall commit themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their office during
working hours.
xxx.
SECTION 3. Court personnel shall not alter, falsify, destroy or mutilate any record within their
control.
This provision does not prohibit amendment, correction or expungement of records or documents
pursuant to a court order. (Emphasis supplied)
Second. The acts of the respondents fall squarely under the offense Grave Misconduct. In Valera v.
Ombudsman,79We defined the offense as follows:
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any
of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or disregard of established
rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence.80 (Emphasis supplied)
Rule IV, Section 52(A) (3) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases 81 in the Civil
Service, on the other hand, classifies Grave Misconduct as a grave offense punishable with
Dismissal even in its first commission.
Third. The fact that respondents Madeja and Florendo merely induced the removal of, but did not
actually remove, the missing pages from the subject Agenda, do not make their liability any less
than that of respondent Delgado. After all, the evidence in this case adequately shows the
existence of connivance among the respondents.
The evidence in this case establishes that respondent Delgado came to remove the missing pages
from the subject Agenda because he acceded to the request of respondents Madeja and
Florendo.82 The removal of the Agenda pages was undoubtedly done for the benefit of respondents
Madeja and Florendo.
Verily, the cajoling employed by respondents Madeja and Florendo is as much a part of the Grave
Misconduct as the act of removing the Agenda pages itself. The proposal is intricately linked and
inseparable with the submission. As to their liability, therefore, Respondents Madeja and Floredo
must stand in equal footing with respondent Delgado.1avvphi1
Fourth. This Court had already held that the conduct and behavior of all officials and employees of
an office involved in the administration of justice, from the highest judicial official to the lowest
personnel, requires them to live up to the strictest standard of honesty, integrity and uprightness in
order to maintain public confidence in the judiciary.83Court employees, as the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel puts it, "serve as sentinels of justice" and "any act of impropriety on their part
immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the people’s confidence in it."84

In the case at bench, the respondents palpably failed to meet the high standard expected from
them as court employees. Their conduct is neither excusable nor tolerable. The respondents,
through their acts, have proven themselves to be unfit for continued employment in the judiciary.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the respondents Eddie V. Delgado, Utility Worker
II, Joseph Lawrence M. Madeja, Clerk IV and Wilfredo A. Florendo, Utility Worker II, all of the Office
of the Clerk of Court, Second Division are hereby DISMISSED from the service, with FORFEITURE
OF ALL BENEFITS, except accrued leave benefits, and WITH PREJUDICE to reinstatement or
reappointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No.
99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz,
private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to
vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The
petition alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail
to a potential extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong
Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on
June 20, 1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of China and became the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the
offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of
conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and
October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of
seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for
the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application
for the provisional arrest of private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private
respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ
of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest
void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and
sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final
and executory on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil
Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part,
private respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for
bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
respondent is a high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No.
99-95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his
application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001
allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s further erosion of civil liberties. The petition
for bail is granted subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he
will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself
amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in
this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for
hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so
desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest
before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court
soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in
favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was
denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that
there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to
bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed
under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process
resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first
time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee
may be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC
of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking
through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the
constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in
criminal proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted
above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1,
6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on
bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII,
Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely
emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be
taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in
nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent’s case. However, this Court
cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual
person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the
corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the
individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual
person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine
that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the
second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted
in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the
laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg
principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is
now a valid subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave
recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life,
liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the
principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding
upon the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this
Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution, 3the
principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General
Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the
Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of
every person to life, liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment
is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity
of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore,
has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due
process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court,
to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified.
In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person
under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies
include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right
to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving
recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination
of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not
necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as
deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history.
Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only.
This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail
has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative
proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international
conventions to uphold human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for
failure to secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After
noting that the prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him
bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that
while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the machinery of
criminal law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that
foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail
pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon
the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed
in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies
to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both
are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in
the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and
protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty.
Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines
"extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the
disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty
imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to
demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and
the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. 8 It is not a criminal
proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its
nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow
extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different
nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. 12 Nor
is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character.13 Its object is to
prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state
from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. 14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a
deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain
the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6
of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further
note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional
arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from
provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for
extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a
criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of
liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary
detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained
incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other
words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any
crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his
fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the
extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal
proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of
innocence of the accused. As Purganancorrectly points out, it is from this major premise that the
ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition
proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention"
is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such
extraditee is a fugitive from justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears
the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the
purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due
process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an
extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily
met.

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying
bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of
substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of
extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his
Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used
in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof
beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee
must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the
orders and processes of the extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not
a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine
whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not,
the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and
thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 177743 January 25, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALFONSO FONTANILLA y OBALDO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An indispensable requisite of self-defense is that the victim must have mounted an unlawful
aggression against the accused. Without such unlawful aggression, the accused cannot invoke
self-defense as a justifying circumstance.
The accused prays for the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on June 29, 2006, 1
whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for murder handed down by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 34, in Balaoan, La Union.
Antecedents
At around 9:30 p.m. on October 29, 1996, Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road in
Butubut Oeste, Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head with a
piece of wood called bellang.2Olais fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the
head with a piece of stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only because Joel
Marquez and Tirso Abunan, the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted at him, causing him to run away.
Marquez and Abunan rushed their father-in-law to a medical clinic, where Olais was pronounced
dead on arrival.3
On April 25, 1997, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union filed an information for murder
against Fontanilla in the RTC, viz:
That on or about the 29th day of October 1996, along the Provincial Road at Barangay Butubut
Oeste, Municipality of Balaoan, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike with a
long coconut night stick and thereafter hit with a stone the head of Jose Olais, thereby inflicting on
the latter head wounds which caused the death of the latter, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of said victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The accused pleaded not guilty.
The State presented Marquez and Abunan as its witnesses. They claimed that they were only
several meters away from Olais when Fontanilla struck him; that they shouted at Fontanilla, who
fled because of them; and that they were able to see and to identify Fontanilla as the attacker of
their father-in-law because the area was then well-lighted.5
Dr. Felicidad Leda, the physician who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Olais, attested that
her post-mortem examination showed that Olais had suffered a fracture on the left temporal area of
the skull, causing his death. She opined that a hard object or a severe force had hit the skull of the
victim more than once, considering that the skull had been already fragmented and the fractures on
the skull had been radiating.6
SPO1 Abraham Valdez, who investigated the slaying and apprehended Fontanilla, declared that he
had gone looking for Fontanilla in his house along with other policemen; that Fontanilla’s father had
denied that he was around; that their search of the house had led to the arrest of Fontanilla inside;
and that they had then brought him to the police station.7 Valdez further declared that Fontanilla
asserted that he would only speak in court.8
At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the incident, he had been
standing on the road near his house when Olais, wielding a nightstick and appearing to be drunk,
had boxed him in the stomach; that although he had then talked to Olais nicely, the latter had
continued hitting him with his fists, striking him with straight blows; that Olais, a karate expert, had
also kicked him with both his legs; that he had thus been forced to defend himself by picking up a
stone with which he had hit the right side of the victim’s head, causing the latter to fall face down to
the ground; and that he had then left the scene for his house upon seeing that Olais was no longer
moving.9
Fontanilla’s daughter Marilou corroborated her father’s version. 10
On June 21, 2001, the RTC declared Fontanilla guilty as charged, and disposed thusly:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment declaring he
accused ALFONSO FONTANILLA Y OBALDO @ ‘Carlos’ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of MURDER as defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, Sec. 6, and thereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA TO DEATH and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos ( ₱50,000.00).
SO ORDERED.11
The RTC rejected Fontanilla’s plea of self-defense by observing that he had "no necessity to
employ a big stone, inflicting upon the victim a mortal wound causing his death"12 due to the victim
attacking him only with bare hands. It noted that Fontanilla did not suffer any injury despite his claim
that the victim had mauled him; that Fontanilla did not receive any treatment, and no medical
certificate attested to any injury he might have suffered, having been immediately released from the
hospital;13 that Fontanilla’s failure to give any statement at the time he surrendered to the police
was inconsistent with his plea of self-defense;14 and that the manner of attack against Olais
established the attendance of treachery.15
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC, holding that Fontanilla did not establish the indispensable
element of unlawful aggression; that his failure to report the incident to the police at the earliest
opportunity, or even after he was taken into custody, negated the plea of self-defense; and that the
nature of the victim’s injury was a significant physical proof to show a determined effort on the part
of Fontanilla to kill him, and not just to defend himself.16
The CA ruled that treachery was attendant, because Olais had no inkling that a fatal blow was
looming upon him, and because Fontanilla was inconspicuously hidden from view when he struck
Olais from behind, rendering Olais unable to retaliate.17
Nonetheless, the CA rectified the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death to only reclusion
perpetua upon noting the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, and disposed as
follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Balaoan,
La Union, Branch 34, in Criminal Case No. 2561 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
appellant Fontanilla is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. No cost.
SO ORDERED.18
The accused is now appealing, insisting that the CA erred because:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IGNORING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S CLAIM OF
SELF-DEFENSE.
II.
EVEN GRANTING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT KILLED THE VICTIM, THE TRIAL COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER
WHEN THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
III.
FURTHERMORE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE
SPECIAL PRIVILEGE[D] MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE
AND THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.
Ruling
We affirm the conviction.
Fontanilla pleaded self-defense. In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by
clear and convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.19 Unlawful aggression is the
indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is
established, self-defense is unavailing, for there is nothing to repel.20 The character of the element
of unlawful aggression is aptly explained as follows:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying circumstance
of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense of oneself.
The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the
aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending
himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must
establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a
physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent;
and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent
unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or
with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the
injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening;
it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be
offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a
knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere
threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was
holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot. 21
By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the
death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his
infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory
and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability. 22 Having
thus admitted being the author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of
proving the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court,23 and he would be held criminally
liable unless he established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory proof.24 He should discharge
the burden by relying on the strength of his own evidence, because the Prosecution’s evidence,
even if weak, would not be disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing. 25 Nonetheless, the
burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt remained with the State until the end of the
proceedings.
Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals that, one, Olais did not
commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and, two, Fontanilla’s act of hitting the victim’s head
with a stone, causing the mortal injury, was not proportional to, and constituted an unreasonable
response to the victim’s fistic attack and kicks.
Indeed, had Olais really attacked Fontanilla, the latter would have sustained some injury from the
aggression. It remains, however, that no injury of any kind or gravity was found on the person of
Fontanilla when he presented himself to the hospital; hence, the attending physician of the hospital
did not issue any medical certificate to him. Nor was any medication applied to him. 26 In contrast,
the physician who examined the cadaver of Olais testified that Olais had been hit on the head more
than once. The plea of self-defense was thus belied, for the weapons used by Fontanilla and the
location and number of wounds he inflicted on Olais revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to
prevent or repel an attack from Olais. We consider to be significant that the gravity of the wounds
manifested the determined effort of the accused to kill his victim, not just to defend himself. 27
The CA and the RTC found that treachery was attendant. We concur. Fontanilla had appeared out
of nowhere to strike Olais on the head, first with the wooden stick, and then with a big stone,
causing Olais to fall to the ground facedown. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack
effectively denied to Olais the ability to defend himself or to retaliate against Fontanilla.
The imposition of reclusion perpetua by the CA was warranted under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code,28 which prescribes reclusion perpetua to death as the penalty for murder. Under the
rules on the
application of indivisible penalties in Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code,29 the lesser penalty of
reclusion perpetua is imposed if there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances. Yet,
the Court points out that the RTC erroneously imposed "RECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH" as
the penalty. Such imposition was bereft of legal justification, for reclusion perpetua and death,
being indivisible, should not be imposed as a compound, alternative or successive penalty for a
single felony. In short, the imposition of one precluded the imposition of the other.
The Court also modifies the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC to only the death
indemnity of ₱50,000.00. When death occurs due to a crime, the damages to be awarded may
include: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (b) actual or compensatory
damages; (c) moral damages; (d) exemplary damages; and (e) temperate damages. 30
Accordingly, the CA and the RTC should also have granted moral damages in addition to the death
indemnity, which were of different kinds.31 The death indemnity compensated the loss of life due to
crime, but appropriate and reasonable moral damages would justly assuage the mental anguish
and emotional sufferings of the surviving family of Olais. 32 Although mental anguish and emotional
sufferings of the surviving family were not quantifiable with mathematical precision, the Court must
nonetheless strive to set an amount that would restore the heirs of the deceased to their moral
status quo ante. Given the circumstances, ₱50,000.00 should be reasonable as moral damages,
which, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,33 we are bound to award despite the absence of any
allegation and proof of the heirs’ mental anguish and emotional suffering. The rationale for doing so
rested on human nature and experience having shown that:
xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part
of the victim’s family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved
one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only
steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection
and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to
them.34 1âwphi1
Another omission of the CA and the RTC was their non-recognition of the right of the heirs of the
victim to temperate damages. The victim’s wife testified about her family’s incurring funeral
expenses of ₱36,000.00, but only ₱18,000.00 was backed by receipts. It is already settled that
when actual damages substantiated by receipts sum up to lower than ₱25,000.00, temperate
damages of at least ₱25,000.00 become justified, in lieu of actual damages in the lesser amount
actually proved by receipts. It would obviously be unfair to the heirs of the victim to deny them
compensation by way of actual damages despite their honest attempt to prove their actual
expenses by receipts (but succeeding only in showing expenses lower than ₱25,000.00 in
amount).35 Indeed, the heirs should not be left in a worse situation than the heirs of another victim
who might be nonetheless allowed temperate damages of ₱25,000.00 despite not having
presented any receipts at all. With the victim’s wife having proved ₱18,000.00 worth of expenses,
granting his heirs temperate damages of ₱25,000.00, not only ₱18,000.00, is just and proper. Not
to do so would foster a travesty of basic fairness.
The Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in criminal cases as part of the
civil liability "when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances."36 The
Civil Code permits such damages to be awarded "by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages."37 In light of such
legal provisions, the CA and the RTC should have recognized the entitlement of the heirs of the
victim to exemplary damages on account of the attendance of treachery. It was of no moment that
treachery was an attendant circumstance in murder, and, as such, inseparable and absorbed in
murder. As well explained in People v. Catubig:38
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a
two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private
victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription
of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The
increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by
the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission.
Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is
likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little
sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or
qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of
consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the
civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle
the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230
of the Civil Code.
For the purpose, ₱30,000.00 is reasonable and proper as exemplary damages, 39 for a lesser
amount would not serve result in genuine exemplarity.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on June 29, 2006 by the Court of Appeals,
subject to the MODIFICATION of the civil damages, by ordering accused Alfonso Fontanilla y
Obaldo to pay to the heirs of Jose Olais ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages and ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages in addition to the ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity and the ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, plus interest of 6% per annum on such amounts from the finality of the judgment.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 158143 September 21, 2011
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO B. BALMACEDA and ROLANDO N. RAMOS, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari,1 filed by the Philippine Commercial International
Bank2 (Bank or PCIB), to reverse and set aside the decision3 dated April 29, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69955. The CA overturned the September 22, 2000 decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 148, in Civil Case No. 93-3181, which held
respondent Rolando Ramos liable to PCIB for the amount of ₱895,000.00.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On September 10, 1993, PCIB filed an action for recovery of sum of money with damages before
the RTC against Antonio Balmaceda, the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Manila branch. In its
complaint, PCIB alleged that between 1991 and 1993, Balmaceda, by taking advantage of his
position as branch manager, fraudulently obtained and encashed 31 Manager’s checks in the total
amount of Ten Million Seven Hundred Eighty Two Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos
(₱10,782,150.00).
On February 28, 1994, PCIB moved to be allowed to file an amended complaint to implead Rolando
Ramos as one of the recipients of a portion of the proceeds from Balmaceda’s alleged fraud. PCIB
also increased the number of fraudulently obtained and encashed Manager’s checks to 34, in the
total amount of Eleven Million Nine Hundred Thirty Seven Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos
(₱11,937,150.00). The RTC granted this motion.
Since Balmaceda did not file an Answer, he was declared in default. On the other hand, Ramos
filed an Answer denying any knowledge of Balmaceda’s scheme. According to Ramos, he is a
reputable businessman engaged in the business of buying and selling fighting cocks, and
Balmaceda was one of his clients. Ramos admitted receiving money from Balmaceda as payment
for the fighting cocks that he sold to Balmaceda, but maintained that he had no knowledge of the
source of Balmaceda’s money.
THE RTC DECISION
On September 22, 2000, the RTC issued a decision in favor of PCIB, with the following dispositive
portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants as follows:
1. Ordering defendant Antonio Balmaceda to pay the amount of ₱11,042,150.00 with interest
thereon at the legal rate from [the] date of his misappropriation of the said amount until full
restitution shall have been made[.]
2. Ordering defendant Rolando Ramos to pay the amount of ₱895,000.00 with interest at the legal
rate from the date of misappropriation of the said amount until full restitution shall have been
made[.]
3. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff moral damages in the sum of ₱500,000.00 and attorney’s
fees in the amount of ten (10%) percent of the total misappropriated amounts sought to be
recovered.
4. Plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.4
From the evidence presented, the RTC found that Balmaceda, by taking undue advantage of his
position and authority as branch manager of the Sta. Cruz, Manila branch of PCIB, successfully
obtained and misappropriated the bank’s funds by falsifying several commercial documents. He
accomplished this by claiming that he had been instructed by one of the Bank’s corporate clients to
purchase Manager’s checks on its behalf, with the value of the checks to be debited from the
client’s corporate bank account. First, he would instruct the Bank staff to prepare the application
forms for the purchase of Manager’s checks, payable to several persons. Then, he would forge the
signature of the client’s authorized representative on these forms and sign the forms as PCIB’s
approving officer. Finally, he would have an authorized officer of PCIB issue the Manager’s checks.
Balmaceda would subsequently ask his subordinates to release the Manager’s checks to him,
claiming that the client had requested that he deliver the checks.5 After receiving the Manager’s
checks, he encashed them by forging the signatures of the payees on the checks.
In ruling that Ramos acted in collusion with Balmaceda, the RTC noted that although the Manager’s
checks payable to Ramos were crossed checks, Balmaceda was still able to encash the
checks.6 After Balmaceda encashed three of these Manager’s checks, he deposited most of the
money into Ramos’ account.7 The RTC concluded that from the ₱11,937,150.00 that Balmaceda
misappropriated from PCIB, ₱895,000.00 actually went to Ramos. Since the RTC disbelieved
Ramos’ allegation that the sum of money deposited into his Savings Account (PCIB, Pasig branch)
were proceeds from the sale of fighting cocks, it held Ramos liable to pay PCIB the amount of
₱895,000.00.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
On appeal, the CA dismissed the complaint against Ramos, holding that no sufficient evidence
existed to prove that Ramos colluded with Balmaceda in the latter’s fraudulent manipulations.8
According to the CA, the mere fact that Balmaceda made Ramos the payee in some of the
Manager’s checks does not suffice to prove that Ramos was complicit in Balmaceda’s fraudulent
scheme. It observed that other persons were also named as payees in the checks that Balmaceda
acquired and encashed, and PCIB only chose to go after Ramos. With PCIB’s failure to prove
Ramos’ actual participation in Balmaceda’s fraud, no legal and factual basis exists to hold him
liable.
The CA also found that PCIB acted illegally in freezing and debiting ₱251,910.96 from Ramos’ bank
account. The CA thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is granted. The Decision of the trial court rendered on September 22,
2000[,] insofar as appellant Ramos is concerned, is SET ASIDE, and the complaint below against
him is DISMISSED.
Appellee is hereby ordered to release the amount of ₱251,910.96 to appellant Ramos plus interest
at [the] legal rate computed from September 30, 1993 until appellee shall have fully complied
therewith.
Appellee is likewise ordered to pay appellant Ramos the following:
a) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages
b) ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
c) ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.9
THE PETITION
In the present petition, PCIB avers that:
I
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO HOLD
THAT RESPONDENT RAMOS ACTED IN COMPLICITY WITH RESPONDENT BALMACEDA
II
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONER TO RELEASE THE
AMOUNT OF ₱251,910.96 TO RESPONDENT RAMOS AND TO PAY THE LATTER MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES10
PCIB contends that the circumstantial evidence shows that Ramos had knowledge of, and acted in
complicity with Balmaceda in, the perpetuation of the fraud. Ramos’ explanation that he is a
businessman and that he received the Manager’s checks as payment for the fighting cocks he sold
to Balmaceda is unconvincing, given the large sum of money involved. While Ramos presented
evidence that he is a reputable businessman, this evidence does not explain why the Manager’s
checks were made payable to him in the first place.
PCIB maintains that it had the right to freeze and debit the amount of ₱251,910.96 from Ramos’
bank account, even without his consent, since legal compensation had taken place between them
by operation of law. PCIB debited Ramos’ bank account, believing in good faith that Ramos was not
entitled to the proceeds of the Manager’s checks and was actually privy to the fraud perpetrated by
Balmaceda. PCIB cannot thus be held liable for moral and exemplary damages.
OUR RULING
We partly grant the petition.
At the outset, we observe that the petition raises mainly questions of fact whose resolution requires
the re-examination of the evidence on record. As a general rule, petitions for review on certiorari
only involve questions of law.11 By way of exception, however, we can delve into evidence and the
factual circumstance of the case when the findings of fact in the tribunals below (in this case
between those of the CA and of the RTC) are conflicting. When the exception applies, we are given
latitude to review the evidence on record to decide the case with finality.12
Ramos’ participation in Balmaceda’s scheme not proven
From the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, we find it beyond question that
Balmaceda, by taking advantage of his position as branch manager of PCIB’s Sta. Cruz, Manila
branch, was able to apply for and obtain Manager’s checks drawn against the bank account of one
of PCIB’s clients. The unsettled question is whether Ramos, who received a portion of the money
that Balmaceda took from PCIB, should also be held liable for the return of this money to the Bank.
PCIB insists that it presented sufficient evidence to establish that Ramos colluded with Balmaceda
in the scheme to fraudulently secure Manager’s checks and to misappropriate their proceeds. Since
Ramos’ defense – anchored on mere denial of any participation in Balmaceda’s wrongdoing – is an
intrinsically weak defense, it was error for the CA to exonerate Ramos from any liability.
In civil cases, the party carrying the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence, or evidence which, to the court, is more worthy of belief than the evidence offered in
opposition.13 This Court, in Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc.,14 defined "preponderance of
evidence" in the following manner:
"Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either
side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or
"greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last
analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
The party, whether the plaintiff or the defendant, who asserts the affirmative of an issue has the
onus to prove his assertion in order to obtain a favorable judgment, subject to the overriding rule
that the burden to prove his cause of action never leaves the plaintiff. For the defendant, an
affirmative defense is one that is not merely a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff's
cause of action, but one which, if established, will constitute an "avoidance" of the claim. 15
Thus, PCIB, as plaintiff, had to prove, by preponderance of evidence, its positive assertion that
Ramos conspired with Balmaceda in perpetrating the latter’s scheme to defraud the Bank. In
PCIB’s estimation, it successfully accomplished this through the submission of the following
evidence:
[1] Exhibits "A,""D,""PPPP,""QQQQ," and "RRRR" and their submarkings, the application forms for
MCs, show that [these MCs were applied for in favor of Ramos;]
A: We found out that he forged the signature of the client.
Q: On that particular application?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Showing to you several applications for Manager’s Check previously attached as Annexes "A, B,
C, D and E["] of the complaint. Could you please tell us where is that particular alleged signature of
a client applying for the Manager’s check which you claimed to have been forged by Mr.
Balmaceda?

[2] Exhibits "K,""N,""SSSS,""TTTT," and "UUUU" and their submarkings prove that the MCs were A: Here sir.
issued in favor of x x x Ramos[; and]

xxxx
[3] [T]estimonies of the witness for [PCIB].16

Q: After the accomplishment of this application form as you stated Mrs. witness, do you know what
We cannot accept these submitted pieces of evidence as sufficient to satisfy the burden of proof happened to the application form?
that PCIB carries as plaintiff.

On its face, all that PCIB’s evidence proves is that Balmaceda used Ramos’ name as a payee when
he filled up the application forms for the Manager’s checks. But, as the CA correctly observed, the
mere fact that Balmaceda made Ramos the payee on some of the Manager’s checks is not enough
basis to conclude that Ramos was complicit in Balmaceda’s fraud; a number of other people were
made payees on the other Manager’s checks yet PCIB never alleged them to be liable, nor did the
Bank adduce any other evidence pointing to Ramos’ participation that would justify his separate
treatment from the others. Also, while Ramos is Balmaceda’s brother-in-law, their relationship is not
sufficient, by itself, to render Ramos liable, absent concrete proof of his actual participation in the
fraudulent scheme.
A: Before that application form is processed it goes to several stages. Here for example this was
signed supposed to be by the client and his signature representing that, he certified the signature
based on their records to be authentic.
Q: When you said he to whom are you referring to?
A: Mr. Balmaceda. And at the same time he approved the transaction.
xxxx

Moreover, the evidence on record clearly shows that Balmaceda acted on his own when he applied Q: Do you know if the corresponding checks applied for in the application forms were issued?
for the Manager’s checks against the bank account of one of PCIB’s clients, as well as when he
encashed the fraudulently acquired Manager’s checks.
A: Yes sir.

Mrs. Elizabeth Costes, the Area Manager of PCIB at the time of the relevant events, testified that
Balmaceda committed all the acts necessary to obtain the unauthorized Manager’s checks – from Q: Could you please show us where these checks are now, the one applied for in Exhibit "A" which
is in the amount of ₱150,000.00, where is the corresponding check?
filling up the application form by forging the signature of the client’s representative, to forging the
signatures of the payees in order to encash the checks. As Mrs. Costes stated in her testimony:
A: Rolando Ramos dated December 26, 1991 and one of the signatories with higher authority, this
is Mr. Balmaceda’s signature.
Q: I am going into [these] particular instances where you said that Mr. Balmaceda [has] been
making unauthorized withdrawals from particular account of a client or a client of yours at Sta. Cruz
branch. Would you tell us how he effected his unauthorized withdrawals? Q: In other words he is likewise approving signatory to the Manager’s check?

A: He prevailed upon the domestic remittance clerk to prepare the application of a Manager’s check
which [has] been debited to a client’s account. This particular Manager’s check will be payable to a
certain individual thru his account as the instruction of the client.
Q: What was your findings in so far as the particular alleged instruction of a client is concerned?
A: Yes sir. This is an authority that the check [has] been encashed.
Q: In other words this check issued to Rolando Ramos dated December 26, 1991 is a cross check
but nonetheless he allowed to encash by granting it.
Could you please show us? Q: Do you know if this particular person having in fact withdraw of received the proceeds of [these]
particular checks, the payee?
ATTY. PACES: Witness pointing to an initial of the defendant Antonio Balmaceda, the notation
cross check. A: No sir.

A: And this is his signature. Q: It was all Mr. Balmaceda dealing with you?

xxxx A: Yes sir.

Q: How about the check corresponding to Exhibit E-2 which is an application for ₱125,000.00 for a Q: In other words it would be possible that Mr. Balmaceda himself gotten the proceeds of the
certain Rolando Ramos. Do you have the check? checks by forging the payees signature?

A: Yes sir. A: Yes sir.18 (emphases ours)

ATTY. PACES: Witness producing a check dated December 19, 1991 the amount of ₱125,000.00 Mrs. Nilda Laforteza, the Commercial Account Officer of PCIB’s Sta. Cruz, Manila branch at the
payable to certain Rolando Ramos. time the events of this case occurred, confirmed Mrs. Costes’ testimony by stating that it was
Balmaceda who forged Ramos’ signature on the Manager’s checks where Ramos was the payee,
Q: Can you tell us whether the same modus operandi was ad[o]pted by Mr. Balmaceda in so far as so as to encash the amounts indicated on the checks. 19Mrs. Laforteza also testified that Ramos
he is concerned? never went to the PCIB, Sta. Cruz, Manila branch to encash the checks since Balmaceda was the
one who deposited the checks into Ramos’ bank account. As revealed during Mrs. Laforteza’s
cross-examination:
A: Yes sir he is also the right signer and he authorized the cancellation of the cross
check.17 (emphasis ours)
Q: Mrs. Laforteza, these checks that were applied for by Mr. Balmaceda, did you ever see my client
go to the bank to encash these checks?
xxxx

A: No it is Balmaceda who is depositing in his behalf.

Q: These particular checks [Mrs.] witness in your findings, do you know if Mr. Balmaceda [has]
again any participation in these checks?
Q: Did my client ever call up the bank concerning this amount?

A: He is also the right signer and approved officer and he was authorized to debit on file.
A: Yes he is not going to call PCIBank Sta. Cruz branch because his account is maintained at
Pasig.
xxxx

Q: So Mr. Balmaceda was the one who just remitted or transmitted the amount that you claimed
Q: And do you know if these particular checks marked as Exhibit G-2 to triple FFF were [was sent] to the account of my client?
subsequently encashed?

A: Yes.20 (emphases ours)

A: Yes sir.

Even Mrs. Rodelia Nario, presented by PCIB as its rebuttal witness to prove that Ramos encashed
Q: Were you able to find out who encashed? a Manager’s check for ₱480,000.00, could only testify that the money was deposited into Ramos’
PCIB bank account. She could not attest that Ramos himself presented the Manager’s check for
A: Mr. Balmaceda himself and besides he approved the encashment because of the signature that deposit in his bank account.21 These testimonies clearly dispute PCIB’s theory that Ramos was
he allowed the encashment of the check. instrumental in the encashment of the Manager’s checks.

xxxx We also find no reason to doubt Ramos’ claim that Balmaceda deposited these large sums of
money into his bank account as payment for the fighting cocks that Balmaceda purchased from him.
Ramos presented two witnesses – Vicente Cosculluela and Crispin Gadapan – who testified that
Ramos previously engaged in the business of buying and selling fighting cocks, and that
Balmaceda was one of Ramos’ biggest clients.
Quoting from the RTC decision, PCIB stresses that Ramos’ own witness and business partner,
Cosculluela, testified that the biggest net profit he and Ramos earned from a single transaction with
Balmaceda amounted to no more than ₱100,000.00, for the sale of approximately 45 fighting
cocks.22 In PCIB’s view, this testimony directly contradicts Ramos’ assertion that he received
approximately ₱400,000.00 from his biggest transaction with Balmaceda. To PCIB, the testimony
also renders questionable Ramos’ assertion that Balmaceda deposited large amounts of money
into his bank account as payment for the fighting cocks.
On this point, we find that PCIB misunderstood Cosculluela’s testimony. A review of the testimony
shows that Cosculluela specifically referred to the net profit that they earned from the sale of the
fighting cocks;23 PCIB apparently did not take into account the capital, transportation and other
expenses that are components of these transactions. Obviously, in sales transactions, the buyer
has to pay not only for the value of the thing sold, but also for the shipping costs and other
incidental costs that accompany the acquisition of the thing sold. Thus, while the biggest net profit
that Ramos and Cosculluela earned in a single transaction amounted to no more than
₱100,000.00,24 the inclusion of the actual acquisition costs of the fighting cocks, the transportation
expenses (i.e., airplane tickets from Bacolod or Zamboanga to Manila) and other attendant
expenses could account for the ₱400,000.00 that Balmaceda deposited into Ramos’ bank account.
Given that PCIB failed to establish Ramos’ participation in Balmaceda’s scheme, it was not even
necessary for Ramos to provide an explanation for the money he received from Balmaceda. Even if
the evidence adduced by the plaintiff appears stronger than that presented by the defendant, a
judgment cannot be entered in the plaintiff’s favor if his evidence still does not suffice to sustain his
cause of action;25 to reiterate, a preponderance of evidence as defined must be established to
achieve this result.
PCIB itself at fault as employer
In considering this case, one point that cannot be disregarded is the significant role that PCIB
played which contributed to the perpetration of the fraud. We cannot ignore that Balmaceda
managed to carry out his fraudulent scheme primarily because other PCIB employees failed to
carry out their assigned tasks – flaws imputable to PCIB itself as the employer.
Ms. Analiza Vega, an accounting clerk, teller and domestic remittance clerk working at the PCIB,
Sta. Cruz, Manila branch at the time of the incident, testified that Balmaceda broke the Bank’s
protocol when he ordered the Bank’s employees to fill up the application forms for the Manager’s
checks, to be debited from the bank account of one of the bank’s clients, without providing the
necessary Authority to Debit from the client.26 PCIB also admitted that these Manager’s checks
were subsequently released to Balmaceda, and not to the client’s representative, based solely on
Balmaceda’s word that the client had tasked him to deliver these checks. 27
Despite Balmaceda’s gross violations of bank procedures – mainly in the processing of the
applications for Manager’s checks and in the releasing of the Manager’s checks – Balmaceda’s
co-employees not only turned a blind eye to his actions, but actually complied with his instructions.
In this way, PCIB’s own employees were unwitting accomplices in Balmaceda’s fraud.
Another telling indicator of PCIB’s negligence is the fact that it allowed Balmaceda to encash the
Manager’s checks that were plainly crossed checks. A crossed check is one where two parallel
lines are drawn across its face or across its corner.28 Based on jurisprudence, the crossing of a
check has the following effects: (a) the check may not be encashed but only deposited in the bank;
(b) the check may be negotiated only once — to the one who has an account with the bank; and (c)
the act of crossing the check serves as a warning to the holder that the check has been issued for a
definite purpose and he must inquire if he received the check pursuant to this purpose; otherwise,
he is not a holder in due course.29 In other words, the crossing of a check is a warning that the
check should be deposited only in the account of the payee. When a check is crossed, it is the duty
of the collecting bank to ascertain that the check is only deposited to the payee’s account. 30 In
complete disregard of this duty, PCIB’s systems allowed Balmaceda to encash 26 Manager’s
checks which were all crossed checks, or checks payable to the "payee’s account only."
The General Banking Law of 200031 requires of banks the highest standards of integrity and
performance. The banking business is impressed with public interest. Of paramount importance is
the trust and confidence of the public in general in the banking industry. Consequently, the
diligence required of banks is more than that of a Roman pater familias or a good father of a
family.32 The highest degree of diligence is expected.33
While we appreciate that Balmaceda took advantage of his authority and position as the branch
manager to commit these acts, this circumstance cannot be used to excuse the manner the Bank –
through its employees –handled its clients’ bank accounts and thereby ignored established bank
procedures at the branch manager’s mere order. This lapse is made all the more glaring by
Balmaceda’s repetition of his modus operandi 33 more times in a period of over one year by the
Bank’s own estimation. With this kind of record, blame must be imputed on the Bank itself and its
systems, not solely on the weakness or lapses of individual employees.
Principle of unjust enrichment not applicable
PCIB maintains that even if Ramos did not collude with Balmaceda, it still has the right to recover
the amounts unjustly received by Ramos pursuant to the principle of unjust enrichment. This
principle is embodied in Article 22 of the Civil Code which provides:
Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him.
To have a cause of action based on unjust enrichment, we explained in University of the Philippines
v. Philab Industries, Inc.34 that:
Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or
obligations of others, but instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense
that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully.
Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must unequivocally prove
that another party knowingly received something of value to which he was not entitled and
that the state of affairs are such that it would be unjust for the person to keep the benefit.
Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or for
property or benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable obligation to
account for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud,
coercion, or request. Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite
for the enforcement of the doctrine of restitution.35 (emphasis ours)
Ramos cannot be held liable to PCIB on account of unjust enrichment simply because he received
payments out of money secured by fraud from PCIB. To hold Ramos accountable, it is necessary to
prove that he received the money from Balmaceda, knowing that he (Ramos) was not entitled to it.
PCIB must also prove that Ramos, at the time that he received the money from Balmaceda, knew
that the money was acquired through fraud. Knowledge of the fraud is the link between Ramos and
PCIB that would obligate Ramos to return the money based on the principle of unjust enrichment.
However, as the evidence on record indicates, Ramos accepted the deposits that Balmaceda made
directly into his bank account, believing that these deposits were payments for the fighting cocks
that Balmaceda had purchased. Significantly, PCIB has not presented any evidence proving that
Ramos participated in, or that he even knew of, the fraudulent sources of Balmaceda’s funds.
PCIB illegally froze and debited Ramos’ assets
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious commission of a wrong; it partakes of the nature of fraud. 39
As the facts of this case bear out, PCIB did not act out of malice or bad faith when it froze Ramos’
bank account and subsequently debited the amount of ₱251,910.96 therefrom. While PCIB may
have acted hastily and without regard to its primary duty to treat the accounts of its depositors with
meticulous care and utmost fidelity,40 we find that its actions were propelled more by the need to
protect itself, and not out of malevolence or ill will. One may err, but error alone is not a ground for
granting moral damages.41
We also disallow the award of exemplary damages. Article 2234 of the Civil Code requires a party
to first prove that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before he can be
awarded exemplary damages.1âwphi1 Since no reason exists to award moral damages, so too can
there be no reason to award exemplary damages.
We deem it just and equitable, however, to uphold the award of attorney’s fees in Ramos’ favor.
Taking into consideration the time and efforts involved that went into this case, we increase the
award of attorney’s fees from ₱20,000.00 to ₱75,000.00.

We also find that PCIB acted illegally in freezing and debiting Ramos’ bank account. In BPI Family
Bank v. Franco,36 we cautioned against the unilateral freezing of bank accounts by banks, noting
that:
More importantly, [BPI Family Bank] does not have a unilateral right to freeze the accounts of
Franco based on its mere suspicion that the funds therein were proceeds of the multi-million peso
scam Franco was allegedly involved in. To grant [BPI Family Bank], or any bank for that matter, the
right to take whatever action it pleases on deposits which it supposes are derived from shady
transactions, would open the floodgates of public distrust in the banking industry. 37
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. We AFFIRM the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated April 29, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 69955 with the MODIFICATION that the award of
moral and exemplary damages in favor of Rolando N. Ramos is DELETED, while the award of
attorney’s fees is INCREASED to ₱75,000.00. Costs against the Philippine Commercial
International Bank.
SO ORDERED.

We see no legal merit in PCIB’s claim that legal compensation took place between it and Ramos,
thereby warranting the automatic deduction from Ramos’ bank account. For legal compensation to
take place, two persons, in their own right, must first be creditors and debtors of each other. 38 While
PCIB, as the depositary bank, is Ramos’ debtor in the amount of his deposits, Ramos is not PCIB’s
debtor under the evidence the PCIB adduced. PCIB thus had no basis, in fact or in law, to
automatically debit from Ramos’ bank account.

On the award of damages

Although PCIB’s act of freezing and debiting Ramos’ account is unlawful, we cannot hold PCIB
liable for moral and exemplary damages. Since a contractual relationship existed between Ramos
and PCIB as the depositor and the depositary bank, respectively, the award of moral damages
depends on the applicability of Article 2220 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Article 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the
court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule
applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. [emphasis
ours]
 G.R. No. 182356 December 4, 2013
DRA, LEILA A DELA LLANO, Petitioner,
vs.
REBECCA BIONG, doing business under the name and style of Pongkay
Trading, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Very case essentially turns on two basic questions: questions of fact and questions of law.
Questions of fact are the parties and their counsel to respond to, based on what supporting facts
the legal questions require; the court can only draw conclusion from the facts or evidence adduced.
When the facts are lacking because of the deficiency of presented evidence, then the court can
only draw one conclusion: that the cause must fail for lack of evidentiary support.
The present case is one such case as Dra. Leila A dela Llana’s(petitioner) petition for review on
certorari1challenging the February 11, 2008 Decision2 and the March 31, 2008 resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89163.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car
along North Avenue, Quezon City.4
His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at
the backseat.5
Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal light turned red. A few
seconds after the car halted, a dump truck containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the car’s
rear end, violently pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the car’s rear end collapsed and its
rear windshield was shattered. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart from these
minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from any other visible physical
injuries.6
The traffic investigation report dated March 30, 2000 identified the truck driver as Joel Primero. It
stated that Joel was recklessly imprudent in driving the truck. 7
Joel later revealed that his employer was respondent Rebecca Biong, doing business under the
name and style of "Pongkay Trading" and was engaged in a gravel and sand business.8
In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of
her neck and shoulder. The pain became more intense as days passed by. Her injury became more
severe. Her health deteriorated to the extent that she could no longer move her left arm. On June 9,
2000, she consulted with Dr. Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation medicine specialist, to examine her
condition. Dr. Milla told her that she suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury caused by the
compression of the nerve running to her left arm and hand. Dr. Milla required her to undergo
physical therapy to alleviate her condition. Dra. dela Llana’s condition did not improve despite three
months of extensive physical therapy.9
She then consulted other doctors, namely, Drs. Willie Lopez, Leonor Cabral-Lim and Eric Flores, in
search for a cure. Dr. Flores, a neuro-surgeon, finally suggested that she undergo a cervical spine
surgery to release the compression of her nerve. On October 19, 2000, Dr. Flores operated on her
spine and neck, between the C5 and the C6 vertebrae. 10
The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the
practice of her profession since June 2000 despite the surgery.11
Dra. dela Llana, on October 16, 2000, demanded from Rebecca compensation for her injuries, but
Rebecca refused to pay.12
Thus, on May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City (RTC). She alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm as a result of the vehicular
accident and claimed ₱150,000.00 for her medical expenses (as of the filing of the complaint) and
an average monthly income of ₱30,000.00 since June 2000. She further prayed for actual, moral,
and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees. 13
In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana had no cause of action against her as no
reasonable relation existed between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana’s injury. She
pointed out that Dra. dela Llana’s illness became manifest one month and one week from the date
of the vehicular accident. As a counterclaim, she demanded the payment of attorney’s fees and
costs of the suit.14
At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness 15 and Joel as a hostile
witness.16
Dra. dela Llana reiterated that she lost the mobility of her arm because of the vehicular accident. To
prove her claim, she identified and authenticated a medical certificate dated November 20, 2000
issued by Dr. Milla. The medical certificate stated that Dra. dela Llana suffered from a whiplash
injury. It also chronicled her clinical history and physical examinations. 17
Meanwhile, Joel testified that his truck hit the car because the truck’s brakes got stuck. 18
In defense, Rebecca testified that Dra. dela Llana was physically fit and strong when they met
several days after the vehicular accident. She also asserted that she observed the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel. She pointed out that she required
Joel to submit a certification of good moral character as well as barangay, police, and NBI
clearances prior to his employment. She also stressed that she only hired Primero after he
successfully passed the driving skills test conducted by Alberto Marcelo, a licensed
driver-mechanic.19
Alberto also took the witness stand. He testified that he checked the truck in the morning of March
30, 2000. He affirmed that the truck was in good condition prior to the vehicular accident. He opined
that the cause of the vehicular accident was a damaged compressor. According to him, the
absence of air inside the tank damaged the compressor.20
RTC Ruling
The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s
whiplash injury to be Joel’s reckless driving.21
It found that a whiplash injury is an injury caused by the sudden jerking of the spine in the neck area.
It pointed out that the massive damage the car suffered only meant that the truck was
over-speeding. It maintained that Joel should have driven at a slower pace because road visibility
diminishes at night. He should have blown his horn and warned the car that his brake was stuck
and could have prevented the collision by swerving the truck off the road. It also concluded that Joel
was probably sleeping when the collision occurred as Joel had been driving for fifteen hours on that
fateful day. The RTC further declared that Joel’s negligence gave rise to the presumption that
Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in Joel's selection and
supervision of Joel. Rebecca was vicariously liable because she was the employer and she
personally chose him to drive the truck. On the day of the collision, she ordered him to deliver
gravel and sand to Muñoz Market, Quezon City. The Court concluded that the three elements
necessary to establish Rebecca’s liability were present: (1) that the employee was chosen by the
employer, personally or through another; (2) that the services were to be rendered in accordance
with orders which the employer had the authority to give at all times; and (3) that the illicit act of the
employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him. The RTC thus
awarded Dra. dela Llana the amounts of ₱570,000.00 as actual damages, ₱250,000.00 as moral
damages, and the cost of the suit.22
CA Ruling
In a decision dated February 11, 2008, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. It held that Dra. dela Llana
failed to establish a reasonable connection between the vehicular accident and her whiplash injury
by preponderance of evidence. Citing Nutrimix Feeds Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 23 it declared that
courts will not hesitate to rule in favor of the other party if there is no evidence or the evidence is too
slight to warrant an inference establishing the fact in issue. It noted that the interval between the
date of the collision and the date when Dra. dela Llana began to suffer the symptoms of her illness
was lengthy. It concluded that this interval raised doubts on whether Joel’s reckless driving and the
resulting collision in fact caused Dra. dela Llana’s injury. It also declared that courts cannot take
judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. It observed that Dra. dela Llana did
not immediately visit a hospital to check if she sustained internal injuries after the accident.
Moreover, her failure to present expert witnesses was fatal to her claim. It also gave no weight to
the medical certificate. The medical certificate did not explain how and why the vehicular accident
caused the injury.24
The Petition
Dra. dela Llana points out in her petition before this Court that Nutrimix is inapplicable in the present
case. She stresses that Nutrimix involved the application of Article 1561 and 1566 of the Civil Code,
provisions governing hidden defects. Furthermore, there was absolutely no evidence in Nutrimix
that showed that poisonous animal feeds were sold to the respondents in that case. As opposed to
the respondents in Nutrimix, Dra. dela Llana asserts that she has established by preponderance of
evidence that Joel’s egligent act was the proximate cause of her whiplash injury. First, pictures of
her damaged car show that the collision was strong. She posits that it can be reasonably inferred
from these pictures that the massive impact resulted in her whiplash injury. Second, Dr. Milla
categorically stated in the medical certificate that Dra. dela Llana suffered from whiplash
injury. Third, her testimony that the vehicular accident caused the injury is credible because she
was a surgeon.
Dra. dela Llana further asserts that the medical certificate has probative value. Citing several cases,
she posits that an uncorroborated medical certificate is credible if uncontroverted. 25
She points out that expert opinion is unnecessary if the opinion merely relates to matters of
common knowledge. She maintains that a judge is qualified as an expert to determine the
causation between Joel’s reckless driving and her whiplash injury. Trial judges are aware of the fact
that whiplash injuries are common in vehicular collisions.
The Respondent’s Position
In her Comment,26 Rebecca points out that Dra. dela Llana raises a factual issue which is beyond
the scope of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. She maintains
that the CA’s findings of fact are final and conclusive. Moreover, she stresses that Dra. dela Llana’s
arguments are not substantial to merit this Court’s consideration.
The Issue
The sole issue for our consideration in this case is whether Joel’s reckless driving is the proximate
cause of Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury.
Our Ruling We find the petition unmeritorious.
The Supreme Court may review questions of fact in a petition for review on certiorari when the
findings of fact by the lower courts are conflicting
The issue before us involves a question of fact and this Court is not a trier of facts. As a general rule,
the CA’s findings of fact are final and conclusive and this Court will not review them on appeal. It is
not the function of this Court to examine, review or evaluate the evidence in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We can only review the presented evidence, by
way of exception, when the conflict exists in findings of the RTC and the CA. 27
We see this exceptional situation here and thus accordingly examine the relevant evidence
presented before the trial court.
Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict."
Under this provision, the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are:
(1) damages to the plaintiff;
(2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the
defendant must respond, was guilty; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.28
These elements show that the source of obligation in a quasi-delict case is the breach or omission
of mutual duties that civilized society imposes upon its members, or which arise from
non-contractual relations of certain members of society to others. 29
Based on these requisites, Dra. dela Llana must first establish by preponderance of evidence the
three elements of quasi-delict before we determine Rebecca’s liability as Joel’s employer.
She should show the chain of causation between Joel’s reckless driving and her whiplash injury.
Only after she has laid this foundation can the presumption - that Rebecca did not exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel - arise.30
Once negligence, the damages and the proximate causation are established, this Court can then
proceed with the application and the interpretation of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.31
Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, "an action
predicated on an employee’s act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held
liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his employee."32
The rationale for these graduated levels of analyses is that it is essentially the wrongful or negligent
act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris in extra-contractual obligations.33
In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater
weight of credible evidence.34
The reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to
proof.
In short, mere allegations are not evidence.35
In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel’s negligence and
Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish by preponderance of
evidence that Joel’s negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not
have occurred.36
Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence:
(1) the pictures of her damaged car,
(2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and
(3) her testimonial evidence. However, none of these pieces of evidence show the causal relation
between the vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In other words,
Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or the evidentiary facts by which the
factum probandum or the ultimate fact can be established, as fully discussed below.37
A.
The pictures of the damaged
car only demonstrate the
impact of the collision
Dra. dela Llana contends that the pictures of the damaged car show that the massive impact of the
collision caused her whiplash injury. We are not persuaded by this bare claim. Her insistence that
these pictures show the causation grossly belies common logic. These pictures indeed
demonstrate the impact of the collision. However, it is a far-fetched assumption that the whiplash
injury can also be inferred from these pictures.
B.
The medical certificate cannot be
considered because it was
not admitted in evidence
Furthermore, the medical certificate, marked as Exhibit "H" during trial, should not be considered in
resolving this case for the reason that it was not admitted in evidence by the RTC in an order dated
September 23, 2004.38
Thus, the CA erred in even considering this documentary evidence in its resolution of the case. It is
a basic rule that evidence which has not been admitted cannot be validly considered by the courts
in arriving at their judgments.
However, even if we consider the medical certificate in the disposition of this case, the medical
certificate has no probative value for being hearsay. It is a basic rule that evidence, whether oral or
documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the
witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. 39
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence40 except in very unusual
circumstance that is not found in the present case. Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should
not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and
competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency
to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its
evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the Rules of
Court.41
During trial, Dra. dela Llana testified:
"Q: Did your physician tell you, more or less, what was the reason why you were feeling that pain in
your left arm?
A: Well, I got a certificate from her and in that certificate, she stated that my condition was due to a
compression of the nerve, which supplied my left arm and my left hand.
Court: By the way, what is the name of this physician, Dra.?
Witness: Her name is Dra. Rosalinda Milla. She is a Rehabilitation Medicine Specialist. Atty.
Yusingco: You mentioned that this Dra. Rosalinda Milla made or issued a medical certificate. What
relation does this medical certificate, marked as Exhibit H have to do with that certificate, you said
was made by Dra. Milla?
Witness: This is the medical certificate that Dra. Milla made out for me.
Atty. Yusingco: Your Honor, this has been marked as Exhibit H.
Atty. Yusingco: What other medical services were done on you, Dra. dela Llana, as a result of that
feeling, that pain that you felt in your left arm?
Witness: Well, aside from the medications and physical therapy, a re-evaluation of my condition
after three months indicated that I needed surgery.
Atty. Yusingco: Did you undergo this surgery?
Witness: So, on October 19, I underwent surgery on my neck, on my spine.
Atty. Yusingco: And, what was the result of that surgical operation?
Witness: Well, the operation was to relieve the compression on my nerve, which did not resolve by
the extensive and prolonged physical therapy that I underwent for more than three
months."42(emphasis ours)
Evidently, it was Dr. Milla who had personal knowledge of the contents of the medical
certificate.1âwphi1 However, she was not presented to testify in court and was not even able to
identify and affirm the contents of the medical certificate. Furthermore, Rebecca was deprived of
the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Milla on the accuracy and veracity of her findings. We also
point out in this respect that the medical certificate nonetheless did not explain the chain of
causation in fact between Joel’s reckless driving and Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury. It did not
categorically state that the whiplash injury was a result of the vehicular accident. A perusal of the
medical certificate shows that it only attested to her medical condition, i.e., that she was suffering
from whiplash injury. However, the medical certificate failed to substantially relate the vehicular
accident to Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury. Rather, the medical certificate only chronicled her
medical history and physical examinations.
C.
Dra. dela Llana’s opinion that
Joel’s negligence caused her
whiplash injury has no probative value
Interestingly, the present case is peculiar in the sense that Dra. dela Llana, as the plaintiff in this
quasi-delict case, was the lone physician-witness during trial. Significantly, she merely testified as
an ordinary witness before the trial court. Dra. dela Llana essentially claimed in her testimony that
Joel’s reckless driving caused her whiplash injury. Despite the fact that Dra. dela Llana is a
physician and even assuming that she is an expert in neurology, we cannot give weight to her
opinion that Joel’s reckless driving caused her whiplash injury without violating the rules on
evidence. Under the Rules of Court, there is a substantial difference between an ordinary witness
and an expert witness. The opinion of an ordinary witness may be received in evidence regarding:
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.1âwphi1 Furthermore, the
witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a
person.43
On the other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown to possess.44
However, courts do not immediately accord probative value to an admitted expert testimony, much
less to an unobjected ordinary testimony respecting special knowledge. The reason is that the
probative value of an expert testimony does not lie in a simple exposition of the expert's opinion.
Rather, its weight lies in the assistance that the expert witness may afford the courts by
demonstrating the facts which serve as a basis for his opinion and the reasons on which the logic of
his conclusions is founded.45
In the present case, Dra. dela Llana’s medical opinion cannot be given probative value for the
reason that she was not presented as an expert witness. As an ordinary witness, she was not
competent to testify on the nature, and the cause and effects of whiplash injury. Furthermore, we
emphasize that Dra. dela Llana, during trial, nonetheless did not provide a medical explanation on
the nature as well as the cause and effects of whiplash injury in her testimony.
 The Supreme Court cannot take
judicial notice that vehicular
accidents cause whiplash injuries.

Indeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by the parties before the trial court shows
that Dra. Dela Llana did not present any testimonial or documentary evidence that directly
shows the causal relation between the vehicular accident and Dra. Dela Llana’s injury. Her
claim that Joel’s negligence causes her whiplash injury was not established because of the
deficiency of the presented evidence during trial. We point out in this respect that courts cannot
take judicial notice that vehicular ccidents cause whiplash injuries. This proportion is not public
knowledge, or is capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions.46 We have no expertise in the field of medicine. Justices and
judges are only tasked to apply and interpret the law on the basis of the parties’ pieces of evidence
and their corresponding legal arguments.

In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her cause by preponderance of evidence.
While we commiserate with her, our solemn duty to independently and impartially assess the merits
of the case binds us to rule against Dra. dela Llana’s favor. Her claim, unsupported by
prepondernace of evidence, is merely a bare assertion and has no leg to stand on.

WHEREFORE, presmises considered, the assailed Decision dated February 11, 2008 and
Resolution dated March 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED and the petition is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 184054 October 19, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ARNEL ZAPATA y CANILAO, Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We decide the appeal, filed by Arnel Zapata y Canilao (appellant), from the decision1 and the
resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated November 28, 2007 and March 6, 2008, respectively,
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02136. The CA decision affirmed in toto the October 12, 2005 decision3 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, San Fernando City, finding the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
In its October 12, 2005 decision, the RTC found the appellant guilty of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The RTC held that the witnesses for the
prosecution were able to prove that a buy-bust operation indeed took place; and the shabu subject
of the sale was brought to, and duly identified in, court. It found no improper motive on the part of
the police officers to falsely testify against the appellant. The lower court likewise disregarded the
appellant’s claim of frame-up, as this defense can easily be concocted and is a common and
standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of dangerous drugs. Accordingly, it ordered the
appellant to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and to pay a ₱500,000.00 fine.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. It held that the poseur-buyer positively
identified the appellant as the person who gave him two (2) transparent plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substances in exchange for ₱300.00. It added that the plastic sachets were
submitted to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination, and were
found to be positive for the presence of shabu. It likewise held that the defense failed to overcome
the presumption that the police officers regularly performed their official duties. The CA further ruled
that the chain of custody over the seized items was not shown to have been broken. It also took
note of the admission of the appellant’s wife that the appellant was a "financier of drugs," as well as
the positive result of the drug test conducted on the appellant.
Our Ruling
The appellant’s conviction stands.
For a successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs under Section 5, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165, the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller,
the object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti of
evidence.4
The evidence for the prosecution showed the presence of all these elements. Police Officer (PO)3
John U. Salcedo narrated in detail on how the police conducted a surveillance on the appellant for
two months; and how he and PO1 Edwin Carlos conducted the buy-bust operation. PO3 Salcedo
duly and positively identified the appellant as the person who sold to him two (2) transparent plastic
sachets containing white crystalline substances in exchange for ₱300.00. The white crystalline
substances contained in the two plastic sachets were later on confirmed to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, per Chemistry Report No. D-316-2004 issued by the PNP Forensic
Chemist, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Maria Luisa David. The marked money used in the entrapment
operation was likewise positively identified by the arresting officers as the same one provided and
used in the buy-bust operation. PO1 Carlos corroborated PO3 Salcedo’s testimony on all material
points. Significantly, the appellant failed to produce convincing proof that the prosecution witnesses
had any improper or malicious motive when they testified.
Contrary to the appellant’s assertion, the chain of custody over the seized prohibited drugs was
shown not to have been broken. The evidence shows that after PO3 Salcedo received the two
plastic sachets from the appellant, PO3 Salcedo and PO1 Carlos brought the appellant and the
confiscated items to the police station. There, PO3 Salcedo immediately marked the two plastic
sachets with "JUS 1" and "JUS 2," respectively.5 PO3 Salcedo, thereafter, turned over the seized
items to Senior Police Officer 3 Danilo Fernandez who, in turn, made the appropriate requests for
the laboratory examination of the seized items and for the drug test on the appellant. On the same
day, PO1 Ronwald Basa brought the plastic sachets and the appellant’s urine sample to the PNP
Crime Laboratory, where a certain SPO1 Sales received and immediately forwarded the submitted
specimens to P/Insp. David. The latter then examined the two heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachets marked as "JUS 1" and "JUS 2," and found them to be positive for the presence of shabu.
She likewise examined the appellant’s urine sample, and concluded that it tested positive for the
presence of shabu. When the prosecution presented the two plastic sachets in court, PO3 Salcedo
positively identified them to be the same items he seized from the appellant.
The prosecution thus established the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized items from the
time they were first seized until they were brought for examination and presented in court. Clearly,
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the drugs seized from the appellant were duly proven not
to have been compromised.lawphil
Finally, we stress that the appellant failed to raise the buy-bust team's alleged non-compliance with
Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 during trial; this argument cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal. At any rate, whatever minor deviations there might have been is not fatal, as failure to
strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 will not necessarily render the items
confiscated from an accused inadmissible; what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as these are the evidence critical in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 6 In the present case, we find sufficient
compliance by the police with the required procedure on the custody and control of the seized items.
The succession of events established by evidence shows that the items seized were the same
items tested, and subsequently identified and testified to in court.
WHEREFORE, the decision and the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated November 28, 2007
and March 6, 2008, respectively, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02136 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 170512 October 5, 2011
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO T. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO – DE CASTRO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the reversal of the
Decision2 dated July 4, 2005 and the Resolution3 dated October 27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 70571. The judgment of the appellate court reversed and set aside the
Decision4 dated September 24, 2001 and the Joint Order5 dated February 15, 2002 of the Office of
the Ombudsman for Mindanao in OMB-MIN-ADM-01-170; while the appellate court’s resolution
denied the motion for reconsideration6 assailing its decision.
On January 11, 2001, Jaime B. Acero executed an affidavit against herein respondent Antonio
Reyes and Angelito Peñaloza, who were the Transportation Regulation Officer II/Acting
Officer-in-Charge and Clerk III, respectively, of the Land Transportation Office (LTO) District Office
in Mambajao, Camiguin. Acero narrated thus:
That, on January 10, 2001, at about 2:00 o’clock P.M. I went to the Land Transportation Office, at
Mambajao, Camiguin to apply for a driver’s license;
That, I was made to take an examination for driver’s license applicants by a certain Tata Peñaloza
whose real name is Angelito, a clerk in said office;
That, after the examination, [Peñaloza] informed me that I failed in the examination; however if I am
willing to pay additional assessment then they will reconsider my application and I am referring to
[Peñaloza] and [Reyes];
That, I asked how much will that be and [Peñaloza] in the presence of [Reyes] answered ₱680.00,
so I agreed;
That, I then handed ₱1,000.00 to [Peñaloza] and [Peñaloza] handed it to the cashier;
That, [Peñaloza] in turn handed to me the change of ₱320.00 only and a little later I was given the
LTO Official Receipt No. 62927785 (January 10, 2001) but only for ₱180.00 which O.R. serves as
my temporary license for 60 days; and the balance of ₱500.00 was without O.R. and retained by
Peñaloza;
That, I feel that the actuation of Antonio Reyes and Angelito Peñaloza are fraudulent in that they
failed to issue receipt for the extra ₱500.00 paid to them; and [Reyes] know that I am with [the
Commission on Audit];
That, I execute this affidavit to file charges against the guilty parties.7
Attached to Acero’s affidavit was the LTO Official Receipt No. 62927785, showing his payment of
₱180.00.8
The above affidavit was apparently filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Camiguin,
but the same was later referred9 to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The latter office
thereafter ordered10 Reyes and Peñaloza to submit their counter-affidavits within ten days from
notice.
On June 19, 2001, Peñaloza filed his Counter-Affidavit.11 He denied telling Acero that if the latter
were willing to pay additional costs, Reyes and Peñaloza would reconsider his application.
Peñaloza stated that he did administer the examination to Acero but since he was very busy, he
requested their security guard, Dominador Daypuyat, to check the answers of Acero using their
answer guide. After Daypuyat checked Acero’s paper, Peñaloza noted the score of 22/40.
Peñaloza informed Acero of the failing grade and told him that it was up to Reyes to decide on the
matter. Acero then went to the office of Reyes and after a few minutes, he came back and returned
his application documents to Peñaloza. After examining the application form, Peñaloza saw that the
same did not contain Reyes’ signature but a plus sign (+) and the number 27 beside the score of
22/40. Peñaloza knew that it was Reyes who wrote the "+ 27" and the same indicated that Acero
had to pay additional costs in order to pass the examination, as was done in the past.
Thereafter, when Peñaloza allegedly informed Reyes that Acero was an auditor, the latter was
summoned into Reyes’ office. Reyes asked if Acero wanted to retake the examination or just pay
the additional costs. Acero eventually said "yes" and Peñaloza inferred that the former agreed to
pay Reyes the extra costs. Peñaloza recounted that Reyes instructed him to prepare the driver’s
license of Acero. Peñaloza gave Acero’s application documents to Lourdes Cimacio, the senior
statistician, who processed the driver’s license. When the cashier asked for Acero’s payment, the
latter gave Peñaloza a one-thousand-peso bill. The cashier, in turn, handed to Peñaloza a change
of ₱820.00. From the said amount, Peñaloza gave to Acero ₱320.00, while ₱500.00 was given to
Reyes. Acero soon left the office. Peñaloza said that Acero called their office not long after, asking
for a receipt for the ₱500.00. Peñaloza then asked if Acero had not come to an understanding with
Reyes that a receipt would not be issued for the additional cost. Acero insisted on a receipt then
hanged up. Peñaloza told Reyes of Acero’s demand and Reyes told him to cancel the driver’s
license. When told that the same could not be done anymore, Reyes allegedly gave Peñaloza
₱500.00, instructing the latter to return the money to Acero under circumstances where nobody
could see them. Peñaloza stated that he waited for Acero to come back to their office but the latter
did not do so anymore.
Peñaloza also submitted in evidence the affidavit12 of Rey P. Amper. Amper narrated that he
started working at the LTO in Mambajao, Camiguin in September 1988 as a driver-examiner. In
February 1994, Reyes became the acting Head of Office, and eventually the Head of Office, of the
LTO in Mambajao. About four months thereafter, Reyes verbally instructed Amper to send to him
(Reyes) all the applicants for driver’s licenses who failed the examinations. In case Reyes was
absent, the applicants were to wait for him. Subsequently, Reyes gave Amper a piece of paper
containing the rates to be charged to the "applicant-flunkers" in addition to the legal fees. Amper
was also told to deliver the additional payments to Reyes. Amper stated that his office table and
that of Reyes were located in one room. Reyes would allegedly tell the applicant-flunkers to either
re-take the examinations or pay additional costs. In most cases, Amper said that the
applicant-flunkers would only be too willing to pay the extra costs. Reyes would then instruct Amper
to add more points to applicant-flunkers’ scores, which meant that Reyes and the applicants
concerned had come to an agreement for the payment of additional costs. Amper added that the
said practice of Reyes was a "goad to his conscience" and he talked about it to Peñaloza. They
allegedly reported the matter to their District Representative Pedro Romualdo, but the latter could
only express his regrets for having recommended Reyes to his position. The practice of Reyes of
claiming additional costs continued up to the time Amper left the LTO. Amper declared that he knew
that it was Reyes alone who took and benefitted from his illegal exactions. The employees of the
LTO in Mambajao were purportedly aware of the practice of Reyes but they were afraid to come out
against their Head of Office.
The affidavit13 of Margie B. Abdala was also presented by Peñaloza. Abdala stated that she
accompanied Peñaloza and the latter’s wife, Ebony, to the house of Acero on January 13, 2001.
Ebony urged Acero not to include Peñaloza anymore in the complaint. Acero assured them that his
complaint was principally directed against Reyes for requiring him (Acero) to pay additional costs
for which he was not issued any official receipt. Peñaloza brought with him Acero’s application form
for a driver’s license, which had already been approved by Reyes, and he asked the latter to
complete the same. Peñaloza also tried to return the ₱500.00 from Reyes that was not covered by
a receipt. Acero, however, refused to fill up the application form and to accept the money. When
Ebony asked why Acero agreed to pay the additional cost required by Reyes, the latter answered
that he did not understand what was meant by additional cost.
On June 19, 2001, Reyes manifested14 that, for purposes of the instant case, he was adopting the
counter-affidavit he filed in another Ombudsman case, docketed as OMB-MIN-01-0090,15 as both
cases involved the same parties and the same incident.
In his counter-affidavit,16 Reyes claimed that Acero’s complaint was a "blatant distortion of the truth
and a mere fabrication of the complainant."17 Reyes asserted that a perusal of the
affidavit-complaint revealed that the only imputation against him was that Peñaloza allegedly told
Acero to pay ₱680.00 in his (Reyes’) presence. The affidavit revealed that it was Peñaloza who
processed the application of Acero; the money was allegedly given to Peñaloza and it was he who
handed the change back to Acero; and he had no participation and was not present when the
money changed hands. Reyes stated that when he conducted an informal investigation on the
complaint, Peñaloza admitted to having pocketed the extra ₱500.00. Reyes allegedly reprimanded
Peñaloza and ordered the latter to return the money to Acero. Based on the receipt submitted by
Acero, the same proved that as far as the LTO and Reyes were concerned, what was received by
the office was only ₱180.00. Reyes contended that he did not ask or receive money from Acero and
it was Peñaloza who pocketed the ₱500.00.
In an Order18 dated June 20, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao directed the parties to
appear before its office on July 11, 2001 for a preliminary conference. The parties were to consider,
among others, the need for a formal investigation or whether the parties were willing to submit their
case for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record and such other evidence as they will
present at the conference.
On July 6, 2001, Acero sent the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a telegram,19 stating that he
was waiving his right to avail of the preliminary conference.
On July 11, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an Order,20 stating that none of
the parties appeared in the preliminary conference scheduled for that day. In view of the
non-appearance of the respondents therein, they were considered to have waived their right to a
preliminary conference. The case was then deemed submitted for decision.
On July 23, 2001, the counsel for Peñaloza informed the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao that
his client was waiving his right to a formal investigation and was willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the evidence on record. Peñaloza also submitted the additional affidavit of
one of their witnesses, Rickie Valdehueza.
In his affidavit,21 Valdehueza stated that on January 5, 2001, he applied for a driver’s license with
the LTO in Mambajao, Camiguin. He took an examination on that day, which was conducted by an
employee he later came to know as Dominador Daypuyat. After the latter checked his test paper,
Valdehueza was told that he got a failing score. His application was then turned over to Peñaloza,
who told him to see Reyes. Valdehueza said that Reyes advised him not to retake the examination
anymore and just pay ₱1,500.00. Valdehueza bargained for ₱1,200.00 since he had no money and
Reyes agreed. Reyes then wrote the sign "+ 20" next to Valdueza’s score of 30, such that what
appeared on the test paper was "30 + 20." Reyes returned the test paper and instructed
Valdehueza to tell Peñaloza to add "20" to his score. Valdehueza went back to the LTO on January
10, 2001 bringing ₱1,200.00. Before he could go to Reyes’ office, he was accosted by Daypuyat in
the lobby who informed him that his license was already completed. Daypuyat also took ₱700.00 to
give to Reyes. Valdehueza gave ₱500.00 to the cashier as payment for the ₱240.00 license fee. He
told the cashier to just give his change to Reyes.
On September 24, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao rendered a Decision in
OMB-MIN-ADM-01-170, adjudging Reyes guilty of grave misconduct and finding Peñaloza guilty of
simple misconduct. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:
Here, as borne out of the record, there is no denying the fact that [Acero] failed in the examination
given for a driver’s license, yet ultimately, herein complainant was granted a temporary driver’s
license. It is therefore very logical to presume that something in between was agreed upon between
the applicant and the person charged with the grant of license.
Based on the testimony of [Peñaloza] and corroborated by the testimonies of Rey P. Amper
(Record, pp. 31-32) and Rickie Valdehueza (Record, pp. 44-45), [Reyes] would give the flunker the
option of retaking the examination or to simply pay an additional cost to have a passing grade
without actually re-taking the same. As testified to by Rey P. Amper, "xxx in almost all cases, the
applicant-flunker would only be too willing to pay the additional costs, in which case, Mr. Reyes
would instruct him to go back to my table. Then Mr. Reyes would call me, saying: ‘Ray, just add
more to his score.’, which to me meant that he and the applicant-flunker had come to an agreement
to pay the ‘additional costs’." Mr. Amper testifies further that this matter of extending a passing
grade to a flunker for a monetary consideration has been a system within this LTO agency
perpetrated by [Reyes] since he assumed as Head of Office thereat.
Verily, [Reyes] took advantage of his position and office in exacting the so-called additional cost
from those who flunked the examination. There is nowhere in the record authorizing the Head of
Office of the LTO to adjust a failing grade into a passing grade. In addition, there is nowhere in the
record that supports the legality of collecting additional costs over and above the legal fees. This is
a pure and simple case of extortion and certainly, such act is a breach of his oath of office as well
as a deliberate disregard of existing rules and regulations. Based on the foregoing, this Office finds
respondent [Reyes] guilty of grave misconduct.
As regards [Peñaloza], while he may have helped or facilitated in the collection of that additional
costs, he could not be as guilty as [Reyes].
Understandably, it is normal for a subordinate to keep mum while an anomaly is going on specially
when the perpetrator is the Head of Office. There is fear in him and normally, such subordinate
would just "ride along", so to speak. But nonetheless, [Peñaloza] has to be sanctioned. While the
infraction he had helped accomplished may not have been voluntary on his part but as a public
official, he should have registered his objection regardless of the consequence that may occur.
Based on the foregoing, this Office finds respondent [Peñaloza] guilty of simple misconduct.
WHEREFORE, there being substantial evidence, this Office finds respondent Antonio T. Reyes
guilty of grave misconduct and he is hereby meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service
pursuant to Section 23(c) [Grave Offenses], Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292. Likewise, this Office finds respondent Angelito G. Peñaloza guilty of
Simple Misconduct and he is hereby meted the penalty of SUSPENSION from office without pay for
a period of Six (6) months based on Section 23(b) [Less Grave Offenses] Rule XIV of the Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. In both instances, the execution of the penalties
imposed shall be made immediately after the same shall have been final and executory. 22
In their bid to challenge the above ruling, Reyes filed a Motion for Reconsideration cum Motion to
Set the Case for Preliminary Conference,23 while Peñaloza filed a Motion for Reconsideration.24 On
February 15, 2002, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued a Joint Order,25 denying the
aforesaid motions of Reyes and Peñaloza.
Reyes elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review26 under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, which petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70571.
In the assailed Decision dated July 4, 2005, the Court of Appeals granted the petition of Reyes and
reversed the judgment of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The appellate court reasoned
thus:
It must be pointed out that in the complaint-affidavit filed by Acero, it was only Peñaloza who
received the money and the balance of P 500.00 which was without O.R. was retained by Peñaloza.
Nowhere in the complaint-affidavit could one find the name of Reyes, herein petitioner, nor is it
alleged there that Reyes was around when Acero handed to Peñaloza the P 1000.00. From the
evidence on record, it was, clearly, only Peñaloza all along. Nowhere in the record is Reyes’
complicity suggested or even slightly hinted.
xxxx
It does not appear on record that [Reyes] was the one who ordered and received the "additional
assessment". Rather, it was Peñaloza alone who approached the complainant, discussed about the
"additional assessment", and retained the balance of P 500 basing on the complaint-affidavit filed
by Acero.
We note with sadness that the counter-affidavit of Peñaloza, of itself, was considered enough
evidence by the investigation officer in finding [Reyes] guilty of grave misconduct, and dismissing
him from government service. The testimony of Peñaloza is, however, a self-serving declaration
considering that he is the co-respondent in the Ombudsman case filed by Acero. Such a declaration
which was obviously made principally to save his own neck should have been received with caution.
This vital objection to the admission of this kind of evidence is its hearsay character and to permit
its unqualified introduction in evidence would open the door to frauds and perjuries.
It may be true that Reyes failed to attend the scheduled preliminary conference where he could
have refuted all the hearsay evidence submitted against him. The introduction of such as evidence
does not, however, give them the probative value which they did not bear in the first place. Hearsay
evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence.
The self-serving evidence presented in the form of a counter-affidavit by Peñaloza should not have
been taken hook, line and sinker, so to speak, for there was no way of ascertaining the truth of their
contents. Moreover, in the Motion for Reconsideration dated November 13, 2001 [Reyes] claimed
that he was not furnished any copy of Peñaloza’s counter-affidavit. Thus, admissions made by
Peñaloza in his sworn statement are binding only on him. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another.
The charge of misconduct is a serious charge, a "capital offense" in a manner of speaking, which
may cause the forfeiture of one’s right to hold a public office. Therefore, said charge must be
proven and substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Mere allegation will not suffice. It
should be supported by competent evidence, by substantial evidence. We find the case against
[Reyes] wanting in this regard.
FOR THESE REASONS, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision dated 24 September 2001
and the Joint Order dated 15 February 2002 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. [Reyes] is hereby
exonerated from the administrative charge for insufficiency of evidence.27
The Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration28 of the Court of Appeals decision. The same was, however, denied in the assailed
Resolution dated October 27, 2005.
Hence, the Office of the Ombudsman (petitioner) filed the instant petition, raising the following
issues:
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN NULLIFYING THE D E C I
S I O N OF THE OMBUDSMAN, DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE CONTRARY TO
LAW AND APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN THAT:
(i) It re-examined and weighed the evidence submitted in the administrative proceedings
and worse, substituted its judgment for that of the Ombudsman; and,
(ii) It made a conclusion that substantial evidence does not exist to warrant a finding of
administrative culpability on the part of respondent Reyes.29
In essence, the fundamental issue in the instant case is whether the charge of grave misconduct
against Reyes was sufficiently proven by substantial evidence. Petitioner settled this issue in the
affirmative, while the Court of Appeals ruled otherwise.
In Salazar v. Barriga,30 the Court characterized the administrative offenses of misconduct and
grave misconduct as follows:
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with
the performance of official functions and duties of a public officer.
In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest. Corruption as an
element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official who unlawfully or wrongfully uses his
station or character to procure some benefit for himself, contrary to the rights of others. 31
Here, petitioner adjudged Reyes guilty of grave misconduct after finding that Reyes, being then the
Head of Office of the LTO in Mambajao, Camiguin, illegally exacted money from Acero in exchange
for the issuance of a driver’s license to the latter, notwithstanding that Acero did not pass the
requisite written examination therefor.
In assailing the judgment of the Court of Appeals, petitioner avers that the findings of fact of the
Office of the Ombudsman are entitled to great weight and must be accorded full respect and credit
as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner argues that it is not the task of the
appellate court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before an administrative body and to
substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of
evidence.
Indeed, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 mandates that the findings of fact by the Office of the
Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. 32 In administrative and
quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is necessary to establish the case for or
against a party. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if
other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.33
Dadulo v. Court of Appeals34 reiterates that in reviewing administrative decisions, it is beyond the
province of this Court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or
otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency
of evidence. However, while it is not the function of the Court to analyze and weigh the parties'
evidence all over again, an exception thereto lies as when there is serious ground to believe that a
possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result.
After carefully perusing the records of this case, we find that the above-cited exception, rather than
the general rule, applies herein. Otherwise stated, the Court deems it proper that a review of the
case should be made in order to arrive at a just resolution.
In the main, the evidence submitted by the parties in OMB-MIN-ADM-01-170 consisted of their
sworn statements, as well as that of their witnesses. In the affidavit of Acero, he categorically
identified both Reyes and Peñaloza as the persons who had the prerogative to reconsider his failed
examination, provided that he paid an additional amount on top of the legal fees. For his part,
Peñaloza ostensibly admitted the charge of Acero in his counter-affidavit but he incriminated Reyes
therein as the mastermind of the illicit activity complained of. To corroborate this allegation,
Peñaloza submitted the affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza. Amper was a former LTO employee
who allegedly had first-hand knowledge of the practice of Reyes of imposing and pocketing
additional fees; while Valdehueza declared that he was an applicant for a driver’s license who was
likewise made to pay the said additional fees to Reyes. Upon the other hand, Reyes’
counter-affidavit repudiated the allegations of Acero, insisting that it was Peñaloza who illegally
took the amount of ₱500.00 from Acero.
Reyes faults petitioner for placing too much reliance on the counter-affidavit of Peñaloza, as well as
the affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza. Reyes claims that he was not furnished a copy of the said
documents before petitioner rendered its Decision dated September 24, 2001. Reyes, thus, argues
that his right to due process was violated. Petitioner, on the other hand, counters that Reyes was
afforded due process since he was given all the opportunities to be heard, as well as the
opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration of petitioner’s adverse decision.
On this point, the Court finds merit in Reyes’ contention.
Ledesma v. Court of Appeals35 elaborates on the well established doctrine of due process in
administrative proceedings as follows:
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type
proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given
an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and
giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him
constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 36
Moreover, Department of Health v. Camposano37 restates the guidelines laid down in Ang Tibay v.
Court of Industrial Relations38 that due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance
with the following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents’ right to a hearing, which includes the right
to present one’s case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there
must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a
decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the
controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision
must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the various
issues involved.39
In the present case, the fifth requirement stated above was not complied with.1avvphi1 Reyes was
not properly apprised of the evidence offered against him, which were eventually made the bases of
petitioner’s decision that found him guilty of grave misconduct.
To recall, after the affidavit of Acero was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, the The records of OMB-MIN-ADM-01-170 are REMANDED to the Office of the Ombudsman, which is
respondents therein, i.e., Reyes and Peñaloza, were ordered to submit their counter-affidavits in hereby ordered (a) to furnish respondent Antonio T. Reyes copies of the affidavits of Angelito G.
order to discuss the charges lodged against them. While Peñaloza acknowledged in his Peñaloza, Rey P. Amper and Rickie Valdehueza, and (b) to conduct further proceedings in
counter-affidavit his participation in the illicit transaction complained of, he pointed to Reyes as the OMB-MIN-ADM-01-170 as may be appropriate.
main culprit. Peñaloza thereafter submitted the affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza as witnesses
who would substantiate his accusations. However, the records reveal that only the Office of the No pronouncement as to costs.
Ombudsman-Mindanao and Acero were furnished copies of the said affidavits. 40 Thus, Reyes was
able to respond only to the affidavit of Acero. It would appear that Reyes had no idea that Peñaloza,
a co-respondent in the administrative case, would point an accusing finger at him and even supply SO ORDERED.
the inculpatory evidence to prove his guilt. The said affidavits were made known to Reyes only after
the rendition of the petitioner’s Decision dated September 24, 2001.

The fact that Reyes was able to assail the adverse decision of the petitioner via a Motion for
Reconsideration Cum Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Conference did not cure the violation
of his right to due process in this case. Reyes filed the said motion precisely to raise the issue of the
violation of his right to due process. There is nothing on record to show that Reyes was furnished
with, or had otherwise received, a copy of the affidavits of Peñaloza, Amper and Valdehueza,
whether before or after the Decision dated September 24, 2001 was issued. Thus, it cannot be said
that Reyes had a fair opportunity to squarely and intelligently answer the accusations therein or to
offer any rebuttal evidence thereto.

It is true that, in the past, this Court has held that the right to due process of a respondent in an
administrative case was not violated if he was able to file a motion for reconsideration to refute the
evidence against him. However, the instant case should be differentiated from Ruivivar v. Office of
the Ombudsman,41 which likewise involved the issue of administrative due process. In the said
case, Ruivivar was found administratively liable for discourtesy in the course of her official functions
and was meted the penalty of reprimand. In her motion for reconsideration, Ruivivar argued that
she was deprived of due process because she was not furnished copies of the affidavits of
complainant’s witnesses. Thereafter, the Ombudsman ordered that Ruivivar be furnished with
copies of the affidavits of the witnesses, with the directive for her to file any pleading that she may
deem appropriate. As Ruivivar still opted not to controvert the affidavits that were belatedly
provided to her, the Ombudsman ruled that her right to due process was not violated and her
administrative liability was upheld. The Court affirmed the ruling of the Ombudsman, declaring that
"the law can no longer help one who had been who had been given ample opportunity to be heard
but who did not take full advantage of the proffered chance."42

In the instant case, petitioner plainly disregarded Reyes’ protestations without giving him a similar
opportunity, as in Ruivivar, to be belatedly furnished copies of the affidavits of Peñaloza, Amper
and Valdehueza to enable him to refute the same. As it were, petitioner rendered its Decision dated
September 24, 2001 on the basis of evidence that were not disclosed to Reyes. This the Court
cannot sanction. A judgment in an administrative case that imposes the extreme penalty of
dismissal must not only be based on substantial evidence but also rendered with due regard to the
rights of the parties to due process.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 4, 2005 and the Resolution dated October 27, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70571, as well as the Decision dated September 24, 2001 and
the Joint Order dated February 15, 2002 of the Office of the Ombudsman in
OMB-MIN-ADM-01-170, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
 G.R. No. 203186 December 4, 2013
XAVIER C. RAMOS, Petitioner,
vs.
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC. and/or ALFONSO L. SALCEDO, JR., Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
2
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[[1] are the Decision dated November 12, 2010 and
Resolutio3 dated August 6, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 104161 which
modified the Decision4 dated March 31, 2008 and Resolution5 dated May 30, 2008 of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR 00-09-07510-06 finding petitioner Xavier C.
Ramos (Ramos) concurrently negligent with respondent BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. (BPI Family)
and thus ordering the equitable reduction of his retirement benefits from ₱546,000.00 to
200,000.00.
The Facts
Ramos was employed by BPI Family in 1995 and eventually became its Vice-President for Dealer
Network Marketing/Auto Loans Division,6 the duties and responsibilities of which were to:
(a) receive applications for auto loans from auto dealers and salesmen;7
(b) analyze market demands8 and formulate marketing strategies; and
(c) enhance dealer and manufacturer relations.9
During his tenure, a client named Trezita10 B. Acosta (Acosta) entered into and obtained several
auto and real estate loans from BPI Family which were duly approved and promptly paid. 11
On December 15, 2004, Acosta purportedly secured another auto loan from BPI Family in the
amount of ₱3,097,392.00 for the purchase of a Toyota Prado vehicle (subject loan) which had
remained unpaid. As it turned out, Acosta did not authorize nor personally apply for the subject loan,
rendering the transaction fraudulent.12
After investigation, BPI Family discovered that:
(a) a person misrepresented herself as Acosta and succeeded in obtaining the delivery of a Toyota
Prado from the Toyota-Pasong Tamo Branch, pursuant to the Purchase Order (PO) and Authority
to Deliver (ATD) issued by Ramos;
(b) Ramos released these documents without the prior approval of BPI Family’s credit committee;
and
(c) Ramos was grossly remiss in his duties since his subordinates did not follow the bank’s safety
protocols, particularly those regarding the establishment of the loan applicant’s identity, and that the
promissory note was not even signed by the applicant in the presence of any of the marketing
officers.13
As a consequence, BPI Family lost ₱2,294,080.00, which amount was divided between Ramos and
his three (3) other subordinates, with Ramos shouldering the proportionate amount of
₱546,000.00.14
The foregoing amount was subsequently deducted from Ramos’ s benefits which accrued upon his
retirement on May 1, 2006.15
In relation thereto, he executed a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim16 dated June 21, 2006, agreeing
to release the bank from any claim or liability with respect to, inter alia, his separation pay or
retirement benefits.17
Claiming that the deductions made by BPI Family were illegal, Ramos filed a complaint for
underpayment of retirement benefits and non- payment of overtime and holiday pay and premium
pay against BPI Family and/or its President at that time, Alfonso L. Salcedo, Jr., before the
Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC,18 docketed as NLRC NCR 00-09-07510-06.
The LA Ruling
In a Decision19 dated June 27, 2007, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed Ramos’s complaint, ruling
that the deduction made on his retirement benefits was "legal and even reasonable"20 since Ramos
was negligent in running his department. In particular, the LA found that Ramos failed to ensure
that his subordinates complied with the bank’s Know Your Customer (KYC) safety protocols, and
that he issued the PO and ATD without the prior approval of the credit committee. 21
The LA further noted that the quitclaim executed by Ramos must be given the force and effect of
law, effectively barring any future claim by him against BPI Family. 22
The NLRC Ruling
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA in a Decision23 dated March 31, 2008, holding that the
deduction complained of was "illegal and unreasonable"24 in that:
(a) the alleged negligence committed by Ramos was not substantially proven as he was not
expected to personally examine all loan documents that pass through his hands or to require the
client to personally appear before him because he has subordinates to do those details for him; 25
(b) the issuance of the PO and ATD prior to the loan’s approval is not an irregular procedure, but an
ordinary occurrence in BPI Family;26 and
(c) the deduction does not fall under the exceptions prescribed under Article 113 27 of the Labor
Code on allowable deductions.28
Further, it found Ramos’s consequent signing of the quitclaim to be without effect. 29
Accordingly, it ordered BPI Family to return/refund to Ramos the amount of 546,000.00, with
additional payment of 10% thereof as attorney’s fees.30
BPI Family moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the NLRC on May 30,
2008;31 hence, it filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. Pending resolution thereof, Ramos
submitted a manifestation that he had caused the execution of the NLRC decision and the sum
amounting to ₱600,000.00 was released in satisfaction of his claim. 32
The CA Ruling
In a Decision33 dated November 12, 2010, the CA affirmed the finding of negligence on the part of
Ramos, holding that Ramos was remiss in his duty as head of Dealer Network Marketing/Auto
Loans Division in failing to determine the true identity of the person who availed of the auto loan
under the name "Trezita Acosta".34
It observed that Ramos should have forwarded the documents for approval to the Loan’s Review
Section and/or the Credit Evaluation Section of the bank and should not have authorized the
release of the car loan without clearance from the credit committee. 35
However, it also attributed negligence on the part of BPI Family since it sanctioned the practice of
issuing the PO and ATD prior to the approval of the credit committee.36
Such relaxed supervision over its divisions contributed to a large extent to its defraudation. 37
Thus, finding BPI Family’s negligence to be concurrent with Ramos, the CA found it improper to
deduct the entire ₱546,000.00 from Ramos ’s retirement benefits and, instead, equitably reduced
the same to the amount of ₱200,000.00.38
Ramos moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution 39 dated August 6,
2012. Hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in attributing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC when it found the deduction made from Ramos’s retirement
benefits to be illegal and unreasonable.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious. To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the
petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the
discretion conferred upon them. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a
capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. 40
To be considered "grave," the discretionary authority must be exercised in a despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in
contemplation of law.41
In labor disputes, the NLRC’s findings are said to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion when its
conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence. As held in the case of Mercado v. AMA
Computer College-Parañaque City, Inc.,42 citing Protacio v. Laya Mananghaya & Co.:43
The CA only examines the factual findings of the NLRC to determine whether or not the
conclusions are supported by substantial evidence whose absence points to grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the recent case of Protacio v. Laya
Mananghaya & Co., we emphasized that:
As a general rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court
does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
based their conclusion. The query in this proceeding is limited to the determination of whether or
not the NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
rendering its decision. However, as an exception, the appellate court may examine and measure
the factual findings of the NLRC if the same are not supported by substantial evidence.
The Court has not hesitated to affirm the appellate court’s reversals of the decisions of labor
tribunals if they are not supported by substantial evidence . 44 (Emphases supplied; citations
omitted)
The requirement that the NLRC’s findings should be supported by substantial evidence is clearly
expressed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides that "[i]n cases filed before
administrative or quasi- judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion."
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the CA to have erred in attributing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in finding that the deduction made from Ramos’s
retirement benefits was improper. Two (2) reasons impel the foregoing conclusion:
First, as correctly observed by the NLRC, BPI Family was not able to substantially prove its
imputation of negligence against Ramos. Well-settled is the rule that the burden of proof rests upon
the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue.45
In this case, BPI Family failed to establish that the duty to confirm and validate information in credit
applications and determine credit worthiness of prospective loan applicants rests with the Dealer
Network Marketing Department, which is the department under the supervision of
Ramos.1âwphi1 Quite the contrary, records show that these responsibilities lie with the bank’s
Credit Services Department, namel y its Credit Evaluation Section and Loans Review and
Documentation Section,46 of which Ramos was not part of.
Second, as similarly observed by the NLRC, Ramos merely followed standing company practice
when he issued the PO and ATD without prior approval from the bank’s
Credit Services Department. In fact, as the CA itself notes, BPI Family adopted the practice of
processing loans with extraordinary haste in order to overcome arduous competition with other
banks and lending institutions, despite compromising procedural safeguards, viz.: 47

In a separate audit report (herein appended as Annex "E"), it was noted that marketing officers
regularly issue or release purchase orders and authorities to deliver to car dealers (in case of
dealer generated auto loan wherein a loan originates from the automobile dealer who submits the
financing transactions, down payment and mortgage fee by the debtor-car purchaser to the bank)
before the approval of the documents.

The report further noted that the practice has been adopted due in part to the stiff competition with
other banks and lending institutions. Resultantly, in 2005 alone, approximately 111 car loan
applications were released ahead of the approval of the credit evaluation section.

Such findings of the auditing division have not been rebutted or countered as erroneous.

In fact, in all 111 instances, the bank did not attempt to rectify the flaw by calling the respondent’s
attention to the manner by which he disregarded important bank procedure or protocol in
accommodating car loan applications.

It would seem unthinkable that respondent bank has had no knowledge thereof when its credit
evaluation committee could have easily relayed the variations to the management for expedient
solution. Any conscientious, well-meaning banking institution (such as respondent bank, We
imagine) would have raised the red flag the moment the violation is first discovered. However, in
the case before Us, respondent bank did not sound alarm until the discovery of the first
defraudation. Without doubt, its uncharacteristically relaxed supervision over its divisions
contributed to a large extent to the unfortunate attainment of fraud. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, it is readily apparent that Ramos’s action of issuing the PO and ATD ahead
of the approval of the credit committee was actually conformant to regular company practice which
BPI Family itself sanctioned. As such, Ramos cannot be said to have been negligent ion his duties.
To this end, it is well to note that in loan transactions, banks are mandated to ensure that their client
wholly comply with all the documentary requirements in relation to the approval and release of loan
applications.48 As BPI Family "uncharacteristically relaxed supervision over its divisions," yielding
as it did to the demands of industry competition, it is but reasonable that solely bears the loss of its
own shortcomings.

All told, absent any showing that the NLRC’s decision was tainted with capriciousness or any
semblance of whimsicality, the Court is wont to grant the present petition and accordingly reverse
the CA decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 12, 2010 and Resolution
dated August 6, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 014161 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The National Labor Relations Commission‘s Decision dated March 31, 2008 ad Resolution
dated May 30, 2008 in NLRC NCR 00-09-07510-06 are hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 190710 June 6, 2011
JESSE U. LUCAS, Petitioner,
vs.
JESUS S. LUCAS, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Is a prima facie showing necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order? In this petition for
review on certiorari, we address this question to guide the Bench and the Bar in dealing with a
relatively new evidentiary tool. Assailed in this petition are the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision1 dated September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated December 17, 2009.
The antecedents of the case are, as follows:
On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with
Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing)2 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 72, Valenzuela City. Petitioner narrated that, sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie Uy (Elsie),
migrated to Manila from Davao and stayed with a certain "Ate Belen (Belen)" who worked in a
prominent nightspot in Manila. Elsie would oftentimes accompany Belen to work. On one occasion,
Elsie got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belen’s workplace, and an intimate
relationship developed between the two. Elsie eventually got pregnant and, on March 11, 1969, she
gave birth to petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. The name of petitioner’s father was not stated in
petitioner’s certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later on told petitioner that his father is
respondent. On August 1, 1969, petitioner was baptized at San Isidro Parish, Taft Avenue, Pasay
City. Respondent allegedly extended financial support to Elsie and petitioner for a period of about
two years. When the relationship of Elsie and respondent ended, Elsie refused to accept
respondent’s offer of support and decided to raise petitioner on her own. While petitioner was
growing up, Elsie made several attempts to introduce petitioner to respondent, but all attempts
were in vain.
Attached to the petition were the following: (a) petitioner’s certificate of live birth; (b) petitioner’s
baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis
University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from the
same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of Music;
and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a musical
prodigy.
Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of the
petition to establish filiation. His counsel therefore went to the trial court on August 29, 2007 and
obtained a copy of the petition.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, on September
3, 2007, the RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued the
Order3 setting the case for hearing and urging anyone who has any objection to the petition to file
his opposition. The court also directed that the Order be published once a week for three
consecutive weeks in any newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, and that the Solicitor
General be furnished with copies of the Order and the petition in order that he may appear and
represent the State in the case.
On September 4, 2007, unaware of the issuance of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed
a Special Appearance and Comment. He manifested inter alia that: (1) he did not receive the
summons and a copy of the petition; (2) the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore
summons should be served on him as respondent; (3) should the court agree that summons was
required, he was waiving service of summons and making a voluntary appearance; and (4) notice
by publication of the petition and the hearing was improper because of the confidentiality of the
subject matter.4
On September 14, 2007, respondent also filed a Manifestation and Comment on Petitioner’s Very
Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Respondent reiterated that the petition for recognition is
adversarial in nature; hence, he should be served with summons.
After learning of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration.5 Respondent averred that the petition was not in due form and substance because
petitioner could not have personally known the matters that were alleged therein. He argued that
DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to respondent as petitioner’s
father. Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence.
On July 30, 2008, the RTC, acting on respondent’s motion for reconsideration, issued an
Order6 dismissing the case. The court remarked that, based on the case of Herrera v. Alba, 7 there
are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which the parties have to face:
a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance
between the putative father and the child. The court opined that petitioner must first establish these
four procedural aspects before he can present evidence of paternity and filiation, which may include
incriminating acts or scientific evidence like blood group test and DNA test results. The court
observed that the petition did not show that these procedural aspects were present. Petitioner failed
to establish a prima facie case considering that (a) his mother did not personally declare that she
had sexual relations with respondent, and petitioner’s statement as to what his mother told him
about his father was clearly hearsay; (b) the certificate of live birth was not signed by respondent;
and (c) although petitioner used the surname of respondent, there was no allegation that he was
treated as the child of respondent by the latter or his family. The court opined that, having failed to
establish a prima facie case, respondent had no obligation to present any affirmative defenses. The
dispositive portion of the said Order therefore reads:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the petitioner to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects
of a traditional paternity action in his petition, his motion for the submission of parties to DNA testing
to establish paternity and filiation is hereby denied. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration to the Order dated July 30, 2008, which the
RTC resolved in his favor. Thus, on October 20, 2008, it issued the Order9 setting aside the court’s
previous order, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order dated July 30, 2008 is hereby reconsidered and
set aside.
Let the Petition (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) be set for hearing
on January 22, 2009 at 8:30 in the morning.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.10
This time, the RTC held that the ruling on the grounds relied upon by petitioner for filing the petition
is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. The court stressed that the
petition was sufficient in form and substance. It was verified, it included a certification against forum
shopping, and it contained a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which
petitioner relies on for his claim, in accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. The
court remarked that the allegation that the statements in the petition were not of petitioner’s
personal knowledge is a matter of evidence. The court also dismissed respondent’s arguments that
there is no basis for the taking of DNA test, and that jurisprudence is still unsettled on the
acceptability of DNA evidence. It noted that the new Rule on DNA Evidence11 allows the conduct of
DNA testing, whether at the court’s instance or upon application of any person who has legal
interest in the matter in litigation.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Order dated October 20, 2008 and for Dismissal
of Petition,12reiterating that (a) the petition was not in due form and substance as no defendant was
named in the title, and all the basic allegations were hearsay; and (b) there was no prima facie case,
which made the petition susceptible to dismissal.
The RTC denied the motion in the Order dated January 19, 2009, and rescheduled the hearing. 13
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, questioning the Orders dated
October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009.
On September 25, 2009, the CA decided the petition for certiorari in favor of respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED for being meritorious. The
assailed Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009 both issued by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 172 of Valenzuela City in SP. Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the case docketed as SP. Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07 is
DISMISSED.14
The CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent, as no
summons had been served on him. Respondent’s special appearance could not be considered as
voluntary appearance because it was filed only for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the
court over respondent. Although respondent likewise questioned the court’s jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the petition, the same is not equivalent to a waiver of his right to object to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person.
The CA remarked that petitioner filed the petition to establish illegitimate filiation, specifically
seeking a DNA testing order to abbreviate the proceedings. It noted that petitioner failed to show
that the four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met. The CA
further held that a DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a
prima facie case, thus:
While the tenor [of Section 4, Rule on DNA Evidence] appears to be absolute, the rule could not
really have been intended to trample on the substantive rights of the parties. It could have not
meant to be an instrument to promote disorder, harassment, or extortion. It could have not been
intended to legalize unwarranted expedition to fish for evidence. Such will be the situation in this
particular case if a court may at any time order the taking of a DNA test. If the DNA test in
compulsory recognition cases is immediately available to the petitioner/complainant without
requiring first the presentation of corroborative proof, then a dire and absurd rule would result. Such
will encourage and promote harassment and extortion.
xxxx
At the risk of being repetitious, the Court would like to stress that it sees the danger of allowing an
absolute DNA testing to a compulsory recognition test even if the plaintiff/petitioner failed to
establish prima facie proof. x x x If at anytime, motu proprio and without pre-conditions, the court
can indeed order the taking of DNA test in compulsory recognition cases, then the prominent and
well-to-do members of our society will be easy prey for opportunists and extortionists. For no cause
at all, or even for [sic] casual sexual indiscretions in their younger years could be used as a means
to harass them. Unscrupulous women, unsure of the paternity of their children may just be taking
the chances-just in case-by pointing to a sexual partner in a long past one-time encounter. Indeed
an absolute and unconditional taking of DNA test for compulsory recognition case opens wide the
opportunities for extortionist to prey on victims who have no stomach for scandal.15
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. On December 17, 2009, the CA denied the motion for lack of
merit.16
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF
LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF HEREIN RESPONDENT ALBEIT THE SAME
WAS NEVER RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.
I.A
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT JURISDICTION
WAS NOT ACQUIRED OVER THE PERSON OF THE RESPONDENT.
I.B
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO REALIZE THAT
THE RESPONDENT HAD ALREADY SUBMITTED VOLUNTARILY TO THE JURISDICTION OF
THE COURT A QUO.
I.C
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ESSENTIALLY RULED THAT
THE TITLE OF A PLEADING, RATHER THAN ITS BODY, IS CONTROLLING.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED THE DISMISSAL
OF THE PETITION BY REASON OF THE MOTION (FILED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE
COURT A QUO) FOR THE CONDUCT OF DNA TESTING.
II.A
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ESSENTIALLY RULED THAT
DNA TESTING CAN ONLY BE ORDERED AFTER THE PETITIONER ESTABLISHES PRIMA
FACIE PROOF OF FILIATION.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WITH ITS MISPLACED RELIANCE ON
THE CASE OF HERRERA VS. ALBA,
ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE ‘FOUR SIGNIFICANT PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF A
TRADITIONAL PATERNITY ACTION.’17
Petitioner contends that respondent never raised as issue in his petition for certiorari the court’s
lack of jurisdiction over his person. Hence, the CA had no legal basis to discuss the same, because
issues not raised are deemed waived or abandoned. At any rate, respondent had already
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court by his filing of several motions asking for
affirmative relief, such as the (a) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated September 3, 2007;
(b) Ex Parte Motion to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated November 6, 2007;
and (c) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated October 20, 2008 and for Dismissal of
Petition. Petitioner points out that respondent even expressly admitted that he has waived his right
to summons in his Manifestation and Comment on Petitioner’s Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear
the Case. Hence, the issue is already moot and academic.
Petitioner argues that the case was adversarial in nature. Although the caption of the petition does
not state respondent’s name, the body of the petition clearly indicates his name and his known
address. He maintains that the body of the petition is controlling and not the caption.
Finally, petitioner asserts that the motion for DNA testing should not be a reason for the dismissal of
the petition since it is not a legal ground for the dismissal of cases. If the CA entertained any doubt
as to the propriety of DNA testing, it should have simply denied the motion. 18 Petitioner points out
that Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence does not require that there must be a prior proof of
filiation before DNA testing can be ordered. He adds that the CA erroneously relied on the four
significant procedural aspects of a paternity case, as enunciated in Herrera v. Alba. 19Petitioner
avers that these procedural aspects are not applicable at this point of the proceedings because
they are matters of evidence that should be taken up during the trial.20
In his Comment, respondent supports the CA’s ruling on most issues raised in the petition for
certiorari and merely reiterates his previous arguments. However, on the issue of lack of jurisdiction,
respondent counters that, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, he raised the issue before the CA in
relation to his claim that the petition was not in due form and substance. Respondent denies that he
waived his right to the service of summons. He insists that the alleged waiver and voluntary
appearance was conditional upon a finding by the court that summons is indeed required. He avers
that the assertion of affirmative defenses, aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, cannot be considered as waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over such person.
The petition is meritorious.
Primarily, we emphasize that the assailed Orders of the trial court were orders denying
respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition for illegitimate filiation. An order denying a motion to
dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as it leaves
something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the
general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action
for certiorari, which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and until a final
judgment or order is rendered. In a number of cases, the court has granted the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari on the denial of the motion to dismiss but only when it has been tainted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 21 In the present case, we
discern no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the motion to dismiss.
The grounds for dismissal relied upon by respondent were (a) the court’s lack of jurisdiction over his
person due to the absence of summons, and (b) defect in the form and substance of the petition to
establish illegitimate filiation, which is equivalent to failure to state a cause of action.
We need not belabor the issues on whether lack of jurisdiction was raised before the CA, whether
the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent, or whether respondent waived his
right to the service of summons. We find that the primordial issue here is actually whether it was
necessary, in the first place, to serve summons on respondent for the court to acquire jurisdiction
over the case. In other words, was the service of summons jurisdictional? The answer to this
question depends on the nature of petitioner’s action, that is, whether it is an action in personam, in
rem, or quasi in rem.
An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is
directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person
as defendant, but its object is to subject that person's interest in a property to a corresponding lien
or obligation. A petition directed against the "thing" itself or the res, which concerns the status of a
person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth
certificate, is an action in rem.22
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to
validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has
jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property
under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law, or (b) as a result of the
institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. 23
The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the simple filing of the
petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world
that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an
objection of any sort to the right sought to be established. 24 Through publication, all interested
parties are deemed notified of the petition.
If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting
the court with jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due process requirements. 25 This is but
proper in order to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so
chooses.26 Hence, failure to serve summons will not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to try and
decide the case. In such a case, the lack of summons may be excused where it is determined that
the adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to file his opposition, as in this case. We find that the
due process requirement with respect to respondent has been satisfied, considering that he has
participated in the proceedings in this case and he has the opportunity to file his opposition to the
petition to establish filiation.
To address respondent’s contention that the petition should have been adversarial in form, we
further hold that the herein petition to establish filiation was sufficient in form. It was indeed
adversarial in nature despite its caption which lacked the name of a defendant, the failure to
implead respondent as defendant, and the non-service of summons upon respondent. A
proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party
and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.27 In this petition—classified as an action in
rem—the notice requirement for an adversarial proceeding was likewise satisfied by the publication
of the petition and the giving of notice to the Solicitor General, as directed by the trial court.
The petition to establish filiation is sufficient in substance. It satisfies Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules
of Court, which requires the complaint to contain a plain, concise, and direct statement of the
ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff bases his claim. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out
without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate.28 A complaint states a cause of
action when it contains the following elements: (1) the legal right of plaintiff, (2) the correlative
obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal
right.29
The petition sufficiently states the ultimate facts relied upon by petitioner to establish his filiation to
respondent. Respondent, however, contends that the allegations in the petition were hearsay as
they were not of petitioner’s personal knowledge. Such matter is clearly a matter of evidence that
cannot be determined at this point but only during the trial when petitioner presents his evidence.
In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the question submitted to the
court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations made in the complaint to constitute a
cause of action and not whether those allegations of fact are true, for said motion must
hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. 30
The inquiry is confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no other. 31 The test of the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the
court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the
complaint.32
If the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in form and substance but their veracity and
correctness are assailed, it is incumbent upon the court to deny the motion to dismiss and require
the defendant to answer and go to trial to prove his defense. The veracity of the assertions of the
parties can be ascertained at the trial of the case on the merits. 33
The statement in Herrera v. Alba34 that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional
paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this
case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties
have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined
at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed.
The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case—the first procedural
aspect in a paternity case—is therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence
and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-à-vis
the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More
essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is
warranted considering that no such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter
has just set the said case for hearing.
At any rate, the CA’s view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA testing without corroborative
proof is well taken and deserves the Court’s attention. In light of this observation, we find that there
is a need to supplement the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid the courts in resolving motions for DNA
testing order, particularly in paternity and other filiation cases. We, thus, address the question of
whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order.
The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and
use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the "prescribed parameters on the requisite
elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory
reports, etc.), the possible sources of error, the available objections to the admission of DNA test
results as evidence as well as the probative value of DNA evidence." It seeks "to ensure that the
evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and properly, [and]
shall not be misused and/or abused and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA
analysis serves justice and protects, rather than prejudice the public." 35
Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are
aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. Section 4 states:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. – The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu
proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a
DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of
the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains
discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute
necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity
and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA
testing.

(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation
for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated December 17, 2009 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela City are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the
proper resolution of the case; and

(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the
accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.

This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any
party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced.

This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during
the hearing, the said conditions are established.

In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause
hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case
or a reasonable possibility of paternity or "good cause" for the holding of the test. 36 In these states,
a court order for blood testing is considered a "search," which, under their Constitutions (as in ours),
must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a
prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding
of probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained —

Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the
particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory
blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are
required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be
made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We
agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory
blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As
explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to
voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants
issuance of a court order for blood testing.371avvphi1

The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father
from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner
must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
 G.R. No. 193250 April 25, 2012
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner,
vs.
AMELIO TRIA and JOHN DOE, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the January 18, 2012 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
108571 entitled Philippine National Bank v. Department of Justice, Amelio C. Tria and John Doe
which affirmed the Resolution dated December 26, 2007 issued by the Department of Justice.
The Facts
Respondent Amelio C. Tria (Tria) was a former Branch Manager of petitioner Philippine National
Bank (PNB), assigned at PNB’s Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System Branch
(PNB-MWSS) located within the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS)
Compound, Katipunan Road, Balara, Quezon City.
On September 21, 2001, MWSS opened Current Account (C/A) No. 244-850099-6 with
PNB-MWSS and made an initial deposit of PhP 6,714,621.13 on October 10, 2001. The account
was intended as a depository for a loan from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to fund Contract
No. MS-O1C.
To withdraw from the account, PNB checks must be issued and three signatures secured—one
signatory each from MWSS, Maynilad Water Services, Inc. (MWSI), and the contractor, China-Geo
Engineering Corporation (China-Geo).2
On April 16, 2003, C/A 244-850099-6 became dormant with a balance of PhP 5,397,154.07.3
In the meantime, Tria requested a listing of the dormant accounts of PNB-MWSS and borrowed the
folders of MWSS and C/A 244-850099-6.4 On one occasion, Tria also inquired about the
irregularities involving manager’s checks committed by the bank’s former branch accountant. 5
On April 22, 2004, PNB-MWSS received a letter-request from MWSS instructing the deduction of
PhP 5,200,000 (plus charges) from C/A 244-850099-6 and the issuance of the corresponding
manager’s check in the same amount payable to a certain "Atty. Rodrigo A. Reyes." The
letter-request was purportedly signed and approved by the duly authorized signatories of MWSS.
Hence, C/A 244-850099-6 was re-activated in light of the letter-request.6
The letter-request, supporting documents, and Manager’s Check Application Form were then
evaluated by the bank’s Sales and Service Officer (SSO), Agnes F. Bagasani, who found the same
to be in order.7
Edsel B. Francisco (Francisco), who was also designated to perform the tasks of a Fund Transfer
Processor (FTP), likewise verified the letter-request and the documents from the MWSS Current
Account folder of the bank. He then effected the transaction requested by debiting C/A No.
244-850099-6 for the purchase of a Manager’s Check payable to "Atty. Rodrigo A. Reyes" and
prepared a Batch Input Sheet listing the supporting documents for the transaction together with the
other transactions for that day.8
Manager’s Check No. 1165848 was, thus, prepared and issued in the name of Atty. Rodrigo A.
Reyes (Atty. Reyes) for the amount of PhP 5,200,000 (five million two hundred thousand pesos).9
On April 26, 2004, PNB-MWSS received cash delivery from PNB’s Cash Center in the amount of
PhP 8,660,000.10Nonetheless, at around 11:00 a.m. of the same day, respondent Tria
accompanied Atty. Reyes in presenting Manager’s Check No. 1165848 to PNB’s Quezon City
Circle Branch (PNB-Circle) for encashment and told PNB-Circle’s SSO, George T. Flandez
(Flandez), that PNB-MWSS had no available cash to pay the amount indicated in the Manager’s
Check. He also informed Flandez that Atty. Reyes was a valued client of his branch and was in a
hurry to leave for a scheduled appointment.11
To confirm the issuance of Manager’s Check No. 1165848, Flandez called PNB-MWSS and talked
to its Sales and Service Head, Geraldine C. Veniegas (Veniegas).12 Veniegas confirmed that
PNB-MWSS issued a manager’s check in favor of Atty. Reyes and sent a letter-confirmation
through e-mail to PNB-Circle.13
While waiting for the confirmation, Flandez interviewed Atty. Reyes. Atty. Reyes told Flandez that
he was an MWSS contractor and the amount covered by Manager’s Check No. 1165848
represented the proceeds of his recent contract with MWSS. Atty. Reyes then showed his driver’s
license and Integrated Bar of the Philippines identification card to Flandez and wrote the numbers
of these cards on the back of the manager’s check.14
Upon receiving confirmation from PNB-MWSS regarding the manager’s check, Flandez went to the
Cash Center of PNB-Circle to pick up the cash requisition. Tria and Atty. Reyes, however, followed
him with Tria telling Flandez: "Pirmahan ko na lang ‘tong check, George. Identify ko na lang siya
kasi nagmamadali siya. Dito na lang i-receive. For security… kasi nag-iisa lang siya."15 Tria then
placed his signature on the check above the handwritten note "PAYEE IDENTIFIED – AMELIO C.
TRIA."16
In August 2004, Veniegas, the Sales and Service Head of PNB-MWSS, observed that Tria showed
sudden concern with the Minutes of the Meeting dated August 6, 2004 even if he was no longer
involved in the operations of the bank. Tria reminded her to prepare the Minutes of the Meeting.
Tria then made revisions therein.17 After the revised Minutes of the Meeting had been signed by all
the attendees, Tria sought to further amend the Minutes, as follows:
9. For your information, BM Tria, per delineation of functions has no approving authority except in
the opening of current and savings account. The BM is purely on marketing clients and giving
services to existing and new clients. Sometimes, we are requesting his assistance like:
- represent/follow up our operational needs in the Head Office;
- handles client complaints;
- assists in emergency cash requisitions;
- assists in accompanying valued client/clients to QC Circle Branch for encashment of MCs merely
to identify the bearer/payee and confirmation of the MC whenever we are short in cash;
- we usually seek some advice and strategies on handling clients complaints and on other
operational matters.18
On November 1, 2004, Tria retired as PNB-MWSS’ Manager under PNB’s regular retirement plan.19
On February 2, 2005, Zaida Pulida (Pulida), the MWSS employee in charge of C/A No.
244-850099-6,20 inquired about the account’s outstanding balance. While she was trying to
reconcile the records of MWSS and PNB, she inquired about a debit entry dated April 22, 2004 to
C/A No. 244-850099-6 in the amount of PhP 5,200,000.
Veniegas verified that PhP 5,200,000 was indeed debited and was encashed using Manager’s
Check No. 1165848 in favor of Atty. Rodrigo A. Reyes. Veniegas also attempted to retrieve the files
for the transaction on April 22, 2004 but discovered that the duplicate copy of Manager’s Check No.
1165848, the manager’s check application form and the letter of authority were all missing.21
Pulida notified Veniegas that MWSS did not apply for the issuance of the manager’s check payable
to Atty. Reyes. Upon verification with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, it was discovered that
there was no Rodrigo A. Reyes included in its membership roster. Further, upon inspection of the
PNB-MWSS microfilm copy of Manager’s Check No. 1165848, it was shown that the check was
negotiated and encashed at the PNB-Circle on April 26, 2004 and was annotated with "ok for
payment per confirmation and approval of PNB MWSS" by Tria on the dorsal portion of the check.22
On February 14, 2005, MWSS wrote the new Branch Manager of PNB-MWSS, Ofelia Daway,
about the unauthorized withdrawal from their PNB C/A No. 244-850099-6.23 MWSS expressed
surprise at the withdrawal of PhP 5,200,030 from its account when it had not issued any PNB
checks. The MWSS letter also stated that:
Our contractor has already submitted their final billing and we expect to withdraw the full amount
deposited to the said account within a month’s time. We therefore demand the refund or restoration
within five (5) days after receipt of this letter of the amount of P5,200,030.00 to PNB Account No.
244-850099-6 representing the amount withdrawn without MWSS authorization/instructions.
Otherwise, we will use all the legal means available to MWSS to recover the amount.
PNB conducted its own investigation and, at its conclusion, sought to hold Tria liable for qualified
theft.24
Employees of PNB-MWSS, Veniegas, Bagasani, and Francisco, and PNB-Circle’s SSO, Flandez,
executed separate complaint-affidavits to recount the circumstances of the issuance and
encashment of Manager’s Check No. 1165848, and accused Tria guilty of qualified theft.
Tria, via his Counter-Affidavit, contended that (1) there was no taking of personal property; (2) there
was no intent to gain on his part; (3) the personal property does not belong to PNB even if it is the
depositary bank; (4) there was no grave abuse of confidence on his part; and (5) his alleged
identification of the payee is not the operative act that triggered the payment of the manager’s
check by the PNB-MWSS Branch.25 Instead, Tria argued that it was Flandez who approved and
paid the manager’s check even beyond his authority. He added that it was the other bank
employees who should be held liable for the loss.
In his Reply-Affidavit dated February 20, 2006, Flandez contradicted Tria’s claim that Tria left
PNB-Circle immediately after signing Manager’s Check No. 1165848. According to Flandez, Tria
helped Atty. Reyes count the PhP 5,200,000 by the bundle and even asked the bank’s security
guard for a plastic bag for the cash.26
Following a preliminary investigation, the Assistant City Prosecutor issued a Resolution27 on
August 15, 2006 stating that Tria’s identification of the payee did not consummate the payment of
the Manager’s Check. Rather, it was held, the consummation of the payment occurred during
Flandez’ approval of the encashment. The Resolution’s dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Undersigned respectfully recommends the approval of the
above and the dismissal of the charge for Qualified Theft against respondent Amelio C. Tria due to
lack of evidence and probable cause.
PNB moved for reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution28 dated April 13, 2007.
Undaunted, PNB filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and prayed for the
reversal of the August 15, 2006 and April 13, 2007 Resolutions issued by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCP).
On December 26, 2007, then Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzales issued a Resolution dismissing
PNB’s petition for review. PNB’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated
February 27, 2009.
PNB sought recourse before the Court of Appeals (CA). It alleged that both the OCP and the DOJ
committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to consider that Tria and Atty. Reyes/John Doe
conspired in committing the crime of qualified theft; and the DOJ committed grave abuse of
discretion in failing to consider the existence of probable cause in the instant case and affirming the
OCP’s findings that there is no probable cause to hold Tria and Atty. Reyes/John Doe for trial in the
crime of qualified theft.
The Ruling of the CA
On January 18, 2010, the CA decided in favor of Tria. In affirming the DOJ Resolution issued by
Secretary Gonzales, the CA took notice of how Manager’s Check No. 1165848 was issued and
paid by PNB after the verification made by PNB’s own employees.
The CA ruled that probable cause against Tria and Atty. Reyes was not established since the
employees of PNB made the encashment after their own independent verification of C/A No.
244-850099-6. Further, the CA deferred to the DOJ’s determination of probable cause for the filing
of an information in court as it is an executive function and ruled that the resolutions were not
reversible as PNB was unable to show that these resolutions of the DOJ were tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. The CA, thus, affirmed the OCP’s finding that Tria’s identification of the payee
did not by itself bring about the payment of the subject manager’s check and concluded that the
element of taking of personal property belonging to another without the owner’s consent is lacking
since PNB consented to the taking by Atty. Reyes.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions dated December 26, 2007
and February 29, 2009, issued by Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzales in I.S. No. 05-10093. are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
PNB, thus, questions the Decision of the CA by the instant appeal.
The Ruling of this Court
We find petitioner’s appeal meritorious.
According to the CA, it was the approval of the request for the issuance and for the encashment of
the manager’s check by the employees of PNB that resulted in the withdrawal of the amount
encashed by Atty. Reyes/John Doe. Hence, according to the appellate court, the OCP was correct
in not pursuing the criminal case against Tria.
Clearly, the CA in the instant case erroneously overlooked vital factual circumstances that call for a
reversal of its ruling.
While discretionary authority to determine probable cause in a preliminary investigation to ascertain
sufficient ground for the filing of an information rests with the executive branch, 29 such authority is
far from absolute. It may be subject to review when it has been clearly used with grave abuse of
discretion.30 And indeed, grave abuse of discretion attended the decision to drop the charges
against Tria as there was more than probable cause to proceed against him for qualified theft.
It must be emphasized at the outset that what is necessary for the filing of a criminal information is
not proof beyond reasonable doubt that the person accused is guilty of the acts imputed on him, but
only that there is probable cause to believe that he is guilty of the crime charged.
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, are such facts as are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof.31 It is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he is to be prosecuted. 32 A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and
that it was committed by the accused.33
The acts of Tria and the relevant circumstances that led to the encashment of the check provide
more than sufficient basis for the finding of probable cause to file an information against him and
John Doe/Atty. Reyes for qualified theft. In fact, it is easy to infer from the factual milieu of the
instant case the existence of all the elements necessary for the prosecution of the crime of qualified
theft.
As defined, theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without violence against,
or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take the personal property of another without
the latter’s consent.34 If committed with grave abuse of confidence, the crime of theft becomes
qualified.35 In précis, qualified theft punishable under Article 310 in relation to Articles 308 and 309
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is committed when the following elements are present:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force
upon things; and
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
In the instant case, the first and second elements are unquestionably present. The money involved
is the personal property of Tria’s employer, PNB. Tria’s argument that the amount does not belong
to PNB even if it is the depositary bank is erroneous since it is well established that a bank acquires
ownership of the money deposited by its clients.36
The third element, intent to gain or animus lucrandi, is an internal act that is presumed from the
unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. 37 This element is immediately
discernable from the circumstances narrated in the affidavits submitted by PNB’s employees. In
particular, it is plain from Tria’s misrepresentation that the person he called Atty. Reyes was a
valued client of PNB-MWSS who was authorized to encash the manager’s check and his act of
revising his functions as stated in the Minutes of the Meeting referred to by Veniegas to make it
appear that he had been tasked with "accompanying valued client/clients to QC Circle Branch for
encashment of MCs merely to identify the bearer/payee and confirmation of the MC whenever we
are short in cash."
The fifth element is undisputed, while the last element, that the taking be done with grave abuse of
confidence, is sufficiently shown by the affidavits of PNB and Tria’s own admission of the position
he held at the Bank. A bank’s employees are entrusted with the possession of money of the bank
due to the confidence reposed in them and as such they occupy positions of confidence. 38
It is the existence of the fourth element––the taking be done without the owner’s consent––that is
the crux of contention. While the appellate court, together with the DOJ and OCP, maintains the
negative and equates the cumulative acts of the other PNB employees as the consent of PNB in the
issuance and encashment of the manager’s check, this Court cannot find itself to sustain such
opinion.
On the contrary, the facts portray the stark absence of consent on the part of PNB for the issuance
of manager’s check payable to "Atty. Rodrigo A. Reyes" and its felonious encashment by John
Doe/Atty. Reyes in complicity with Tria.
Tria, it must be reiterated, was PNB’s bank manager for its MWSS branch. The check in question
was a manager’s check. A manager’s check is one drawn by a bank’s manager, Tria in this case,
upon the bank itself. We have held that it stands on the same footing as a certified check, which is
deemed to have been accepted by the bank that certified it, as it is an order of the bank to pay,
drawn upon itself, committing in effect its total resources, integrity and honor behind its issuance.
By its peculiar character and general use in commerce, a manager’s check is regarded
substantially to be as good as the money it represents. 39 In fact, it is obvious from the PNB
affidavits that the MWSS C/A was deducted upon the issuance of the manager’s check and not
upon its encashment. Indeed, as the bank’s own check, a manager’s check becomes the primary
obligation of the bank and is accepted in advance by the act of its issuance.40
Taking this fact into consideration, it cannot be denied that the wheels of the felony started turning
days before the misrepresentations made by Tria at PNB-Circle. And the encashment was a mere
culmination of the crime that was commenced in PNB-MWSS.
The felony of qualified theft started with the use of the now missing falsified letter-request and
supporting documents for the issuance of the manager’s check and the re-activation of the MWSS
C/A. It was the pretense of an authority from MWSS that deprived PNB the liberty to either withhold
or freely give its consent for the valid reactivation of the account and issuance of the check. Quoting
from Black v. State,41 this Court held in Gaviola v. People42 that such pretense does not validate a
taking:
In all cases where one in good faith takes another’s property under claim of title in himself, he is
exempt from the charge of larceny, however puerile or mistaken the claim may in fact be. And the
same is true where the taking is on behalf of another, believed to be the true owner. Still, if the claim
is dishonest, a mere pretense, it will not protect the taker.
In more conventional words, this Court sustained the finding of qualified theft in People v.
Salonga,43 where the taking was done through the issuance of a check by the very person
responsible for, and in custody of, the said check, viz:
The crime charged is Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Document. The
information alleged that the accused took P36,480.30 with grave abuse of confidence by forging the
signature of officers authorized to sign the subject check and had the check deposited in the
account of Firebrake Sales and Services, a fictitious payee without any legitimate transaction with
Metrobank. Theft is qualified if it is committed with grave abuse of confidence. The fact that
accused-appellant as assistant cashier of Metrobank had custody of the aforesaid checks and had
access not only in the preparation but also in the release of Metrobank cashier’s checks suffices to
designate the crime as qualified theft as he gravely abused the confidence reposed in him by the
bank as assistant cashier. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Similar to the bank involved in Salonga, PNB was deprived of the discretion to withhold its consent
since, as the circumstances establish, the very person responsible for the custody and the issuance
of the check is the one guilty for its felonious issuance and encashment, its former branch manager
Tria.
Indeed, the pretense made in PNB-MWSS that led to the issuance of the Manager’s Check cannot
be imputed on anyone other than Tria. His role as the branch manager of PNB-MWSS who had the
responsibility over the functions of the employees of PNB-MWSS cannot be overlooked. As branch
manager, Tria signs manager’s checks. He serves as the last safeguard against any pretense
resorted to for an illicit claim over the bank’s money. The acts of the other bank officials in the
MWSS branch in processing the manager’s checks pass through the supervision and approval of
Tria. Thus, the processing and approval of the check are the responsibility of Tria.
As such, Tria is duty-bound to verify from the bank’s client any supposed authority given for the
issuance of a manager’s check. He was, therefore, duty-bound to confirm with MWSS whether the
letter-authorization for the deduction of P5.2 million from the MWSS C/A is genuine, legal and
binding. Tria is required to exercise the highest degree of care since the degree of diligence
required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family where the fiduciary nature of their
relationship with their depositors is concerned.44 This degree of diligence was wanting in Tria’s
failure to determine the veracity of said letter-authority considering that the amount to be deducted
is large, with the withdrawal of almost the entire amount of the deposit leaving only less than PhP
200, more so when the account has been dormant since April 16, 2003.
As standard banking practice intended precisely to prevent unauthorized and fraudulent
withdrawals, a bank manager verifies with the client-depositor to authenticate and confirm that
he/she has validly authorized such withdrawal. Such failure of Tria as bank manager to verify the
legitimacy of the requested withdrawal lends credence to the accusation that he colluded with Atty.
Reyes to feloniously take money from PNB, and his complicity includes depriving the bank of its
opportunity to deny and withhold the consent for the necessary issuance of Manager’s Check No.
1165848. It cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that PNB did not consent to the issuance of the check
and its eventual encashment—which both constitute the taking of personal property—as
respondents had made sure that the bank was rendered inutile and incapable to give its consent.
The fourth element of the crime clearly exists.
Furthermore, a branch manager normally stays at his branch to perform his functions and duties in
such position in said branch except on official business as prescribed by the bank. Certainly, it is
not one of the duties of a branch manager to leave his office and personally accompany a payee of
a manager’s check it issued to another branch to encash said check. It is, therefore, unusual and
highly suspicious for Tria to leave his office located in Balara, Diliman, Quezon City and travel to
Quezon Avenue where the PNB-Circle is located to identify a fictitious payee and ensure the
encashment of the check.
Tria could just have waited for a call from the branch manager of the PNB Quezon City Circle
Branch to verify the authenticity of said check. Such extra effort and unexplained gesture on the
part of Tria to provide assistance to Atty. Reyes, a fake lawyer, to ensure the encashment of the
check leaves one to believe that he is in cahoots with the impostor.1âwphi1
What is more, it is curious that Tria accompanied John Doe/Atty. Reyes to encash the manager’s
check in another branch under the pretext that his own branch is short of cash when in fact more
than PhP 8 million has just been delivered to PNB-MWSS. Such misrepresentation can only be
considered as an attempt to cover the crime and pass the blame to other PNB employees, as in fact
the CA ruled that Flandez is to blame. This attempt is further reinforced by the curious case of the
missing fictitious letter-request and its supporting documents, which were last seen in the vault of
PNB-MWSS which can be accessed by Tria. Furthermore, the allegation of Veniegas that Tria
unilaterally and secretly revised the bank’s Minutes of the Meeting to reflect that he had "no
approval authority" beyond opening accounts but was specifically requested by the bank to "assist
valued clients" in encashing checks at the Quezon City Circle Branch shows an ingenious ploy by
Tria to cover his tracks upon the eventual discovery of the theft and is in contravention of the
General Banking Law of 2000.45

Nonetheless, nothing is more damning than the fact that Tria vouched for the identity of John
Doe/Atty. Reyes, even claimed that Atty. Reyes is a valued client of PNB-MWSS, affixed his
signature at the back portion of the check to guarantee that Atty. Reyes is the true and legal payee,
and ultimately guaranteed that the Manager’s check is legally effective and valid and everything is
aboveboard. PNB-Circle could have verified from MWSS if the deduction is authorized especially
considering that the money will be deducted from an account of a government corporation. The
identification by Tria of Atty. Reyes as payee precluded and preempted the bank officials from
verifying the transaction from MWSS. Thus, the identification made by Tria impliedly warranted to
the PNB-Circle that said Manager’s check was validly issued with the consent of PNB, and that the
encashment is legal and warranted.

It must also be noted that Tria likewise made representations to the PNB-Circle that the Manager’s
check is legal and valid as evidenced by the annotation at the dorsal portion of the check "ok for
payment per confirmation and approval of PNB MWSS." The act of Tria in confirming and
approving the encashment of the check by Reyes is the pretense of the consent given to him by
PNB to authorize the issuance of the manager’s check that resulted in the taking of PhP 5.2 million
from PNB. Tria must, therefore, be prosecuted and tried before the courts of justice.

While it is truly imperative to relieve a person from the pain of going through the rigors of trial, it is
more imperative to proceed with the prosecution of a criminal case to ensure that the truth is
revealed and justice served when there is a prima facie case against him. 46

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
108571 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City is
ORDERED to file an Information charging Amelio C. Tria and Atty. Reyes/John Doe for Qualified
Theft.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 185128 January 30, 2012
(Formerly UDK No. 13980)
RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY CASTILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review1 on Certiorari under Rule 45 of Ruben del
Castillo assailing the Decision2 dated July 31, 2006 and Resolution3 dated December 13, 2007 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27819, which affirmed the Decision4 dated March 14,
2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. CBU-46291, finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.)
6425.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was engaged in selling shabu, police officers
headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the
house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC and around 3 o'clock in the afternoon
of September 13, 1997, the same police operatives went to Gil Tudtud St., Mabolo, Cebu City to
serve the search warrant to petitioner.
Upon arrival, somebody shouted "raid," which prompted them to immediately disembark from the
jeep they were riding and went directly to petitioner's house and cordoned it. The structure of the
petitioner's residence is a two-storey house and the petitioner was staying in the second floor.
When they went upstairs, they met petitioner's wife and informed her that they will implement the
search warrant. But before they can search the area, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw
petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon chased him but
to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar with the entrances and exits of the place.
They all went back to the residence of the petitioner and closely guarded the place where the
subject ran for cover. SPO3 Masnayon requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few
minutes thereafter, his men returned with two barangay tanods.
In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado, and the elder sister of petitioner named
Dolly del Castillo, searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner
allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but
one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles, including four
(4) plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Consequently, the articles that were
confiscated were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The contents of the four (4)
heat- sealed transparent plastic packs were subjected to laboratory examination, the result of which
proved positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
Thus, an Information was filed before the RTC against petitioner, charging him with violation of
Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended. The Information5 reads:
That on or about the 13th day of September 1997, at about 3:00 p.m. in the City of Cebu,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate
intent, did then and there have in his possession and control four (4) packs of white crystalline
powder, having a total weight of 0.31 gram, locally known as "shabu," all containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without license or prescription from any
competent authority.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
During arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not guilty. 7
Subsequently, trial on the merits ensued.
To prove the earlier mentioned incident, the prosecution presented the testimonies of SPO3
Bienvenido Masnayon, PO2 Milo Arriola, and Forensic Analyst, Police Inspector Mutchit Salinas.
The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of petitioner, Jesusa del Castillo,
Dalisay del Castillo and Herbert Aclan, which can be summarized as follows:
On September 13, 1997, around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner was installing the electrical
wirings and airconditioning units of the Four Seasons Canteen and Beauty Parlor at Wacky Bldg.,
Cabancalan, Cebu. He was able to finish his job around 6 o'clock in the evening, but he was
engaged by the owner of the establishment in a conversation. He was able to go home around
8:30-9 o'clock in the evening. It was then that he learned from his wife that police operatives
searched his house and found nothing. According to him, the small structure, 20 meters away from
his house where they found the confiscated items, was owned by his older brother and was used as
a storage place by his father.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the
Information. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Ruben del Castillo "alyas Boy
Castillo," GUILTY of violating Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. There
being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances proven before this Court, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Six (6) Months and One (1)
Day as Minimum and Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months as Maximum of Prision Correccional.
The four (4) small plastic packets of white crystalline substance having a total weight of 0.31 gram,
positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, are ordered confiscated and shall be
destroyed in accordance with the law.
SO ORDERED.8
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his case with the CA, but the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision is AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is DISMISSED, with
costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.9
After the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the CA, petitioner filed with this
Court the present petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the following
arguments raised:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION, THE RULES OF COURT AND ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE VIS-A-VIS VALIDITY OF SEARCH WARRANT NO. 570-9-1197-24;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE
CRYSTALLINE POWDER ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON THE FLOOR OF THE NIPA HUT OR
STRUCTURE ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, NOT ONLY
BECAUSE THE SAID COURT SIMPLY PRESUMED THAT IT WAS USED BY THE PETITIONER
OR THAT THE PETITIONER RAN TO IT FOR COVER WHEN THE SEARCHING TEAM ARRIVED
AT HIS RESIDENCE, BUT ALSO, PRESUMING THAT THE SAID NIPA HUT OR STRUCTURE
WAS INDEED USED BY THE PETITIONER AND THE FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE
CRYSTALLINE POWDER WERE FOUND THEREAT. THE SUBJECT FOUR (4) PACKS OF
WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER ARE FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS TREE; and
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE ELEMENT OF
"POSSESSION" AS AGAINST THE PETITIONER, AS IT WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER. HAD THE SAID COURT PROPERLY
APPLIED THE ELEMENT IN QUESTION, IT COULD HAVE BEEN ASSAYED THAT THE SAME
HAD NOT BEEN PROVEN.10
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment dated February 10, 2009, enumerated
the following counter-arguments:
I an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
SEARCH WARRANT No. 570-9-11-97-24 issued by Executive Judge Priscilla S. Agana of Branch
24, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is valid.
II
The four (4) packs of shabu seized inside the shop of petitioner are admissible in evidence against
him.
III
The Court of Appeals did not err in finding him guilty of illegal possession of prohibited drugs. 11
Petitioner insists that there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant, considering that
SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, the police officer who applied for it, had no personal knowledge of the
alleged illegal sale of drugs during a test-buy operation conducted prior to the application of the
same search warrant. The OSG, however, maintains that the petitioner, aside from failing to file the
necessary motion to quash the search warrant pursuant to Section 14, Rule 127 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, did not introduce clear and convincing evidence to show that
Masnayon was conscious of the falsity of his assertion or representation.
Anent the second argument, petitioner asserts that the nipa hut located about 20 meters away from
his house is no longer within the "permissible area" that may be searched by the police officers due
to the distance and that the search warrant did not include the same nipa hut as one of the places
to be searched. The OSG, on the other hand, argues that the constitutional guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizure is applicable only against government authorities and not to
private individuals such as the barangay tanod who found the folded paper containing packs of
shabu inside the nipa hut.
As to the third argument raised, petitioner claims that the CA erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be presumed to
be in possession of the same just because they were found inside the nipa hut. Nevertheless, the
OSG dismissed the argument of the petitioner, stating that, when prohibited and regulated drugs
are found in a house or other building belonging to and occupied by a particular person, the
presumption arises that such person is in possession of such drugs in violation of law, and the fact
of finding the same is sufficient to convict.
This Court finds no merit on the first argument of petitioner.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such
probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing
and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the
applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. 12 According to
petitioner, there was no probable cause. Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
place sought to be searched.13 A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing
that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused.
Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would
justify conviction.14 The judge, in determining probable cause, is to consider the totality of the
circumstances made known to him and not by a fixed and rigid formula, 15 and must employ a
flexible, totality of the circumstances standard.16 The existence depends to a large degree upon the
finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. This Court, therefore, is in no position to
disturb the factual findings of the judge which led to the issuance of the search warrant. A
magistrate's determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great
deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. 17
Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and
circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place
sought to be searched.18 A review of the records shows that in the present case, a substantial basis
exists.
With regard to the second argument of petitioner, it must be remembered that the warrant issued A SPO1 Cirilo Pogoso and Milo Areola went upstairs and found nothing.
must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it
to be valid. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of Q What about you, where were you?
all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional
requirement of definiteness.19 In the present case, Search Warrant No. 570-9-1197-2420
specifically designates or describes the residence of the petitioner as the place to be searched. A I [was] watching his shop and I was with Matillano.
Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the
residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having been found in a place other than the one Q What about the barangay tanod?
described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the
presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of petitioner's constitutional guaranty against A Together with Milo and Pogoso.
unreasonable searches and seizure. The OSG argues that, assuming that the items seized were
found in another place not designated in the search warrant, the same items should still be
Q When the search at the second floor of the house yielded negative what did you do?
admissible as evidence because the one who discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a
private individual, the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure being
applicable only against government authorities. The contention is devoid of merit. A They went downstairs because I was suspicious of his shop because he ran from his shop,
so we searched his shop.
It was testified to during trial by the police officers who effected the search warrant that they asked
the assistance of the barangay tanods, thus, in the testimony of SPO3 Masnayon: Q Who were with you when you searched the shop?

Fiscal Centino: A The barangay tanod Nilo Gonzalado, the elder sister of Ruben del Castillo named Dolly del
Castillo.
Q For how long did the chase take place?
Q You mean to say, that when (sic) SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, Barangay Tanod Nilo
Gonzalado and the elder sister of Ruben del Castillo were together in the shop?
A Just a very few moments.

A Yes.
Q After that, what did you [do] when you were not able to reach him?

Q What happened at the shop?

A I watched his shop and then I requested my men to get a barangay tanod.

A One of the barangay tanods was able to pick up white folded paper.
Q Were you able to get a barangay tanod?

Q What [were] the contents of that white folded paper?

A Yes.

A A plastic pack containing white crystalline.

Q Can you tell us what is the name of the barangay tanod?

Q Was that the only item?

A Nelson Gonzalado.

Q For point of clarification, how many barangay tanod [did] your driver get? A There are others like the foil, scissor.

A Two. Q Were you present when those persons found those tin foil and others inside the electric shop?

A Yes.21
Q What happened after that?

A We searched the house, but we found negative. The fact that no items were seized in the residence of petitioner and that the items that were
actually seized were found in another structure by a barangay tanod, was corroborated by PO2
Arriola, thus:
Q Who proceeded to the second floor of the house?
FISCAL: A The one who first entered the electronic shop is our team leader Bienvenido Masnayon.

Q So, upon arriving at the house of Ruben del Castillo alias Boy, can you still recall what took Q You mentioned that Masnayon entered first. Do you mean to say that there were other persons or
place? other person that followed after Masnayon?

A We cordoned the area. A Then we followed suit.

Q And after you cordoned the area, did anything happen? Q All of your police officers and the barangay tanod followed suit?

A We waited for the barangay tanod. A I led Otadoy and the barangay tanod.

Q And did the barangay tanod eventually appear? Q What about you?

A Yes. And then we started our search in the presence of Ruben del Castillo's wife. A I also followed suit.

Q What is the name of the wife of Ruben del Castillo? Q And did anything happen inside the shop of Ruben del Castillo?

A I cannot recall her name, but if I see her I can recall [her] face.
Q What about Ruben del Castillo, was she around when [you] conducted the search?
A No. Ruben was not in the house. But our team leader, team mate Bienvenido Masnayon saw that
Ruben ran away from his adjacent electronic shop near his house, in front of his house.
A It was the barangay tanod who saw the folded paper and I saw him open the folded paper
which contained four shabu deck.
Q How far were you when you saw the folded paper and the tanod open the folded paper?
A We were side by side because the shop was very small.22

Q Did you find anything during the search in the house of Ruben del Castillo? SPO1 Pogoso also testified on the same matter, thus:

A After our search in the house, we did not see anything. The house was clean. FISCAL CENTINO:

Q What did you do afterwards, if any? Q And where did you conduct the search, Mr. Witness?

A We left (sic) out of the house and proceeded to his electronic shop. A At his residence, the two-storey house.

Q Do you know the reason why you proceeded to his electronic shop? Q Among the three policemen, who were with you in conducting the search at the residence of the
accused?
A Yes. Because our team leader Bienvenido Masnayon saw that (sic) Ruben run from that store
and furthermore the door was open. A I, Bienvenido Masnayon.

Q How far is the electronic shop from the house of Ruben del Castillo? Q And what transpired after you searched the house of Ruben del Castillo?

A More or less, 5 to 6 meters in front of his house. A Negative, no shabu.

xxxx Q And what happened afterwards, if any?

Q So, who entered inside the electronic shop? A We went downstairs and proceeded to the small house.
Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what was that small house which you
proceeded to?
A It is a nipa hut.
Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A 5 to 10 meters.
Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut supposed to be?
A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.
Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the nipa hut?
A I was just outside the nipa hut.
Q And who among the team went inside?
A PO2 Milo Areola and the Barangay Tanod.23
Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police
authorities who effected the searched warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as
agents of persons in authority. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code defines persons in authority
and agents of persons in authority as:
x x x any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some
court or governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A
barangay captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.
A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority,
is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and
property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person
who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in
authority.
The Local Government Code also contains a provision which describes the function of a barangay
tanod as an agent of persons in authority. Section 388 of the Local Government Code reads:
SEC. 388. Persons in Authority. - For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay,
sangguniang barangay members, and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay
shall be deemed as persons in authority in their jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and
members who may be designated by law or ordinance and charged with the maintenance of
public order, protection and security of life and property, or the maintenance of a desirable
and balanced environment, and any barangay member who comes to the aid of persons in
authority, shall be deemed agents of persons in authority.
By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as the barangay tanods were acting as
agents of a person in authority during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search conducted was
unreasonable and the confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence. Assuming ex gratia
argumenti that the barangay tanod who found the confiscated items is considered a private
individual, thus, making the same items admissible in evidence, petitioner's third argument that the
prosecution failed to establish constructive possession of the regulated drugs seized, would still be
meritorious.
Appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court since the latter has
the unique opportunity to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying,24 unless attended with arbitrariness or plain
disregard of pertinent facts or circumstances, the factual findings are accorded the highest degree
of respect on appeal25 as in the present case.
It must be put into emphasis that this present case is about the violation of Section 16 of R.A. 6425.
In every prosecution for the illegal possession of shabu, the following essential elements must be
established: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not
authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge that the
said drug is a regulated drug.26
In People v. Tira,27 this Court explained the concept of possession of regulated drugs, to wit:
This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However, the
prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs.
Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession.
Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the
accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion
and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place
where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid
conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is
located, is shared with another.28
While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is
under appellant’s control or possession.29 The CA, in its Decision, referred to the possession of
regulated drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one. Constructive possession exists when the
drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
dominion and control over the place where it is found. 30 The records are void of any evidence to
show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said
structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said
structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by
profession. The CA, in its Decision, noted a resolution by the investigating prosecutor, thus:
x x x As admitted by respondent's wife, her husband is an electrician by occupation. As such,
conclusion could be arrived at that the structure, which housed the electrical equipments is actually
used by the respondent. Being the case, he has control of the things found in said structure. 31
In addition, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution do not also provide proof as to the
ownership of the structure where the seized articles were found. During their direct testimonies,
they just said, without stating their basis, that the same structure was the shop of petitioner. 32
During the direct testimony of SPO1 Pogoso, he even outrightly concluded that the electrical
shop/nipa hut was owned by petitioner, thus:
FISCAL CENTINO:
prosecution's failure to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner's control and dominion, there
casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the
law's own starting perspective on the status of the accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he is
presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. 36
Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that
would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.37 1âwphi1

Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what was that small house which you WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 27819,
proceeded to? which affirmed the Decision dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Cebu, in
Criminal Case No. CBU-46291 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ruben del
Castillo is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
A It is a nipa hut.

SO ORDERED.
Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house of Ruben del Castillo?

A 5 to 10 meters.

Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut supposed to be?

A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.

Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the nipa hut?

A I was just outside the nipa hut.33

However, during cross-examination, SPO3 Masnayon admitted that there was an electrical shop
but denied what he said in his earlier testimony that it was owned by petitioner, thus:

ATTY. DAYANDAYAN:

Q You testified that Ruben del Castillo has an electrical shop, is that correct?

A He came out of an electrical shop. I did not say that he owns the shop.

Q Now, this shop is within a structure?

A Yes.

Q How big is the structure?

A It is quite a big structure, because at the other side is a mahjong den and at the other side is a
structure rented by a couple.34

The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of the
drugs in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the drugs. 35 With the
 G.R. No. 178771 June 8, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ALBERTO ANTICAMARA y CABILLO and FERNANDO CALAGUAS FERNANDEZ a.k.a.
LANDO CALAGUAS,
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00556,
affirming the trial court's judgment finding appellants Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (Lando) and
Alberto Cabillo Anticamara (Al) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder in Criminal
Case No. 4498-R and of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention in Criminal Case No.
4481-R.
Lando, Al, Dick Tañedo (Dick), Roberto Tañedo (Bet), Marvin Lim (Marvin), Necitas
Ordeñiza-Tañedo (Cita), and Fred Doe are charged with the crimes of Murder and of
Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention in two separate Informations, which read:
For Murder (Criminal Case No. 4498-R)
That on or about the early morning of May 7, 2002, in Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome,
Municipality of Rosales, Province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, being then armed with a hand gun, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and superior
strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take Sulpacio Abad, driver of the
Estrellas, hog tied (sic) him, brought (sic) to a secluded place, shoot and bury in a shallow grave, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
Contrary to Article 248, Revised Penal Code.
For Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention (Criminal Case No. 4481-R)
That on or about the 7th day of May 2002, more or less 3:00 o'clock in the early morning, at the
Estrella Compound, Brgy. Carmen East, Municipality of Rosales, Province of Pangasinan, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who are private persons,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with firearms, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Sulpacio Abad and AAA, 2 both employees of the
Estrellas, thereby depriving them of their liberty, all against their will for a period of twenty-seven
(27) days.
That in the course of the kidnapping, Sulpacio Abad was killed and buried in Brgy. Carmen,
Rosales, Pangasinan and AAA was raped for several times by her abductors.
Contrary to Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to RA 7659.
When arraigned of the aforementioned crimes, Lando, Al and Cita all pleaded not guilty, while Dick,
Bet, Marvin and Fred Doe remained at-large. Thereafter, a joint trial ensued.
As summarized in the People's brief, the facts as established by the evidence of the prosecution
are as follows:
About 3 o'clock in the early morning of May 7, 2002, househelper AAA and driver Abad Sulpacio
were sleeping in their employers' house located in Barangay Carmen East, Rosales, Pangasinan.
Their employers, Conrado Estrella and his wife, were out of the house at that time (TSN, December
4, 2002, pp. 4-7). Momentarily, AAA was jolted from sleep when she heard voices saying, "We will
kill her, kill her now" and another voice saying, "Not yet!" Hiding under her blanket, AAA later heard
someone saying, "We only need money, we only need money." Thereafter, she heard someone
talking in Ilocano which she could not understand. Then she heard somebody say, "Cebuana yan,
Cebuana yan, kararating lang galing Cebu." AAA heard the persons conversing which she
estimated about four to five meters away (TSN, ibid., pp. 11-12).
Thereafter, AAA observed about six (6) persons enter the house, who she later identified as
accused Dick Tañedo, Marvin Lim, Bert Tañedo, a certain Fred and appellants Alberto Anticamara
alias "Al Camara," and Fernando Fernandez alias "Lando Calaguas." One of the intruders
approached her and told her not to move (TSN, ibid., p. 8).
Later, when AAA thought that the intruders were already gone, she attempted to run but to her
surprise, someone wearing a bonnet was watching her. Someone, whom she later recognized as
Dick Tañedo, tapped her shoulder. AAA asked Tañedo, "Why Kuya?" Tañedo replied, "Somebody
will die." After a brief commotion, appellant alias "Lando Calaguas" asked the group saying, "What
shall we do now?" They then decided to tie AAA. Later, AAA was untied and led her outside the
house. Outside, AAA saw Abad, who was also tied and blindfolded, seated inside a vehicle (TSN,
April 26, 2004, pp. 6-10).
The group later brought AAA and Abad to the fishpond owned by their employers. AAA saw Cita
Tañedo there. The group brought Abad outside the vehicle and led him away (TSN, December 2,
2002, pp. 13-18; TSN, February 17, 2003, pp. 5-8).
Later, alias "Fred" returned telling the group, "Make the decision now, Abad has already four bullets
in his body, and the one left is for this girl." When Cita Tañedo made a motion of cutting her neck,
appellant alias "Lando Calaguas" and "Fred" boarded the vehicle taking along with them AAA. They
later proceeded towards San Miguel Tarlac, where Lando Calaguas resided. They stayed in
Lando's house where they kept AAA from May 7 to May 9, 2002 (TSN, December 4, 2002, pp.
18-22; TSN, February 17, 2003, pp. 7-9).
On May 9, 2002, appellant Lando Calaguas told AAA that Fred and Bert Tañedo would kill her.
Lando then brought AAA to a hotel in Tarlac, telling AAA that he would leave her there as soon as
Fred and Bert Tañedo leave the place. However, once inside the hotel room, appellant Lando
Calaguas sexually molested AAA. Lando told AAA to follow what he wanted, threatening her that he
would turn her over to Fred and Bert Tañedo. After Lando raped AAA, he brought her back to his
house. Later, Fred, Bert Tañedo and Lando Calaguas transferred AAA to Riles, Tarlac (TSN, ibid.,
pp. 9-13).
AAA was brought to the residence of Fred's niece, a certain Minda, where Fred kept AAA as his
wife. At nighttime, Fred would repeatedly ravish AAA, threatening her that he would give her back
to appellant Lando Calaguas who, AAA knew, killed Abad Sulpacio. She was afraid Lando might
also kill her (TSN, ibid., pp. 14-16).
On May 22, 2002, Fred brought AAA to Carnaga (should be Kananga), Leyte, together with his wife
Marsha and their children. AAA stayed in the house of Marsha's brother Sito, where she was made
as a house helper (TSN, ibid., p. 17).
On June 4, 2002, AAA escaped from the house of Sito. She proceeded to Isabel, Leyte and sought
the help of her friend Susana Ilagan. After hearing AAA's plight, Susana called AAA's brother in
Cebu, who later fetched AAA in Isabel, Leyte and brought her to Mandaue City. When they arrived
in Mandaue City, they immediately reported the incident to the police authorities. On June 23, 2002,
AAA executed a Sworn Statement (Exh. "D," TSN, ibid., pp. 18-20).
Meanwhile, Dr. Ronald Bandonil, Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Sulpacio Abad. Dr. Bandonil prepared Autopsy Report No.
N-T2-23-P (Exh. "A") which contains the following findings, to wit:
x Remains placed in a sealed metal coffin, wrapped in two (2) layers of black, plastic garbage bags,
and covered in (sic) a red-stripped cotton blanker. A thick layer of lime embeds the whole torso.
x Remains in a far advanced state of decomposition, with the head completely devoid of soft tissue.
A cloth is wrapped around the eyesockets and tied to the back of the skull. The skull does not show
any signs of dents, chips nor fractures. The other recognizable body part is the chest area which
retained a few soft tissues and skin, but generally far advanced in decomposition. The whole gamut
of internal organs have undergone liquefaction necrosis and have been turned into grayish-black
pultaceous masses. Worn on top of the remaining chest is a sando shirt with observable holes at
the left side, both front and back. A large hole is seen at the area of the left nipple, with traces of
burning at its edges and inward in direction. A tied cloth is also observable at the remnants of the
left wrist.
x At the upper chest, which is the most recognizable, remaining and intact part of the torso, a hole,
1.0 cm. x 2.0 cms., with signs of burning, edges inverted, is seen at the left anterior axillary line just
below the left nipple. Another hole is seen 1.5 cms. x 2.5 cms. in diameter, edged averted (sic) at
the right chest, along the right anterior axillary line, 5.0 cms. below the right nipple. A 3rd hole,
almost unrecognizable is seen at the left groin area.
x The other parts of the cadaver are too far advanced in decomposition to have remarkable
findings.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
GUNSHOT WOUNDS, TRUNK3
In his defense, Lando denied having committed the crimes charged and interposed alibi as a
defense. He claims that at the time of the incident on May 7, 2002, he was in Barangay Maligaya,
San Miguel, Tarlac, with his family. He denied ever going to the Estrella farm in Sitio Rosalia,
Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan.
Al claimed that he acted as a lookout and was tasked to report to his companions if any person or
vehicle would approach the house of the Estrellas. He said that he was forced to follow what was
ordered of him and did not report the matter to the police because he was threatened to be killed,
including the members of his family who were in Cebu.
On August 23, 2004, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53, rendered
its Decision,4 the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
I. In Criminal Case No. 4498-R for Murder:
A. Accused Nicetas "Cita" Tañedo is hereby acquitted of the crime charged for
insufficiency of evidence;
B. Accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (alyas Lando Calaguas) and
Alberto Anticamara (alyas Al Camara) are hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery,
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Considering the presence of aggravating circumstance of pre-meditation, with
no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, the penalty of DEATH is hereby
imposed upon the two (2) accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (Lando
Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (Al Camara). They are also ordered jointly
and severally [to] pay the heirs of the victim Abad Sulpacio the following:
1) Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages;
2) Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as indemnity for the death of
the victim;
3) Fifty-Seven Thousand One Hundred Twenty-Two Pesos and Thirty
Centavos (₱57,122.30) as actual damages; and
4) The cost of suit.
II. Criminal Case No. 4481-R for Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention:
A) Accused Nicetas "Cita" Tañedo is hereby acquitted of the crime charged for
insufficiency of evidence;
B) Accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (alyas Lando Calaguas) and
Alberto Anticamara (alyas Al Camara) are hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of Kidnapping/Serious Illegal
 Detention of the victim AAA as charged, defined and penalized under Article BY RAPE, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE CRIME OF RAPE WAS NOT
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659. Considering that DULY PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
the victim AAA was raped during her detention, the maximum penalty of
DEATH is hereby imposed upon the two accused, Fernando Calaguas IV
Fernandez (Lando Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (Al Camara). The two
accused are also ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the victim AAA the
amount of: THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING SCANT
CONSIDERATION TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHICH IS MORE CREDIBLE THAN THAT OF THE
1) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) as moral damages; PROSECUTION

2) Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as exemplary damages; and V

3) Cost of suit. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING A VERDICT OF

CONVICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE GUILT OF THE
As to the rest of the accused who are still at-large, let this case be set to the ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
archives until they are apprehended. DOUBT.7

SO ORDERED.5 On January 9, 2007, Al, through the PAO, appealed the Decision of the CA to this Court. Al had
assigned the following errors, to wit:
In light of the Court’s ruling in People v. Mateo,6 the records of the cases were forwarded by the
RTC to the CA for its review. The CA rendered a Decision dated December 15, 2006, affirming the I
decision of the RTC in Criminal Case Nos. 4498-R and 4481-R. However, in view of the abolition of
the death penalty pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346, which was approved on June 24, 2006, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
the appellants were sentenced to reclusion perpetua. GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING/SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION
IN SPITE OF THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE BEYOND
On January 9, 2007, Lando, through the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), appealed the Decision of REASONABLE DOUBT THAT HE CONSPIRED WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED TO
the CA to this Court. Lando had assigned the following errors in his appeal initially passed upon by COMMIT THE CRIME CHARGED.
the CA, to wit:
II
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE ACCUSED
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CONSPIRACY THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH FOR THE SPECIAL COMPLEX
EXISTED BETWEEN AND AMONG THE ALLEGED PERPETRATORS OF CRIME OF KIDNAPPING/SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION WITH RAPE, IN
THE CRIME. SPITE OF THE FACT THAT HE HAD NO PARTICIPATION IN THE
COMMISSION OF [TWO] SEXUAL ABUSES AGAINST THE VICTIM.
II
III
ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE LOWER
COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF THE CRIME OF THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
MURDER INSTEAD OF HOMICIDE. ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER IN SPITE OF
THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE BEYOND
III REASONABLE DOUBT THAT HE CONSPIRED WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED TO
COMMIT THE SAME.8

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH FOR THE In capsule, the main issue is whether the appellants are guilty of the crimes charged.
CRIME OF KIDNAPPING/SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION, AGGRAVATED
In Criminal Case No. 4498-R for Murder:
Circumstantial Evidence
The trial court found that although there was no direct eyewitness in the killing of Sulpacio in the
early morning of May 7, 2002 at Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, the
prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish with moral certainty the
identities and guilt of the perpetrators of the crime.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the
existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common
experience .9 Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination of
all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 10 A judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form
an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.11
In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, when analyzed and taken
together, lead to the inescapable conclusion that the appellants are responsible for the death of
Sulpacio. The Court quotes with approval the lower court's enumeration of those circumstantial
evidence:
The testimony of AAA had clearly established the following facts:
1. At about 3:00 in the early morning of May 7, 2002, while she and the victim Abad Sulpacio were
sleeping inside the house of the Estrella family in Barangay Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan several
persons entered to rob the place;
2. Inside the house, she saw and recognized the accused Lando Calaguas and Dick Tañedo, and
heard the latter uttering "somebody will die";
3. Bringing her outside the house, Lando pushed her into the Revo where she saw inside Abad
Sulpacio who was blindfolded and with his hands tied;
4. Inside the Revo, she recognized the accused Dick Tañedo, Lando Calaguas, Marvin Lim,
Roberto Tañedo, Alberto Anticamara and Fred;
5. The Revo then proceeded towards the fishpond owned by the Estrellas in Sitio Rosalia, Brgy.
San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan;
6. The last time that she saw Abad Sulpacio was when he was dragged out from the vehicle by
Lando, Fred, Marvin and Al upon reaching Sitio Rosalia. At that, time Dick Tañedo stayed with her
in the vehicle;
7. Thereafter, when Fred returned to the vehicle, she heard him uttered (sic): "Make a decision now.
Abad has already four (4) bullets in his body, and the one left is for this girl." 12
In addition to these circumstances, the trial court further found that AAA heard Fred utter "Usapan
natin pare, kung sino ang masagasaan, sagasaan." (Our agreement is that whoever comes our
way should be eliminated). Moreover, NBI Agent Gerald V. Geralde testified that on June 23, 2002,
appellant Al admitted his participation as lookout and naming his companions Dick, Lando, Fred,
Marvin and Bet as the ones who took AAA and Sulpacio from the house of the Estrellas and
brought them to the fishpond. Al also pointed and led the authorities to a shallow grave in Sitio
Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, where the remains of Sulpacio were
buried. The autopsy conducted on the body, prepared by the Medico Legal Officer Dr. Bandonil,
shows that several holes were found on various parts of the body of the victim and Dr. Bandonil
concluded that the cause of the victim's death was the gunshot wounds. The report also indicates
that a piece of cloth was found wrapped around the eye sockets and tied at the back of the skull,
and another cloth was also found tied at the remnants of the left wrist.
In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing of Sulpacio, the prosecution was
able to paint a clear picture that the appellants took Sulpacio away from the house of the Estrellas,
tied and blindfolded him, and brought him to another place where he was repeatedly shot and
buried.
Conspiracy
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It may be inferred from the acts of the
accused before, during or after the commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be
enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by
evidence of a chain of circumstances.13 To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail
of the execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be
performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator may be assigned
separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a
whole collective effort to achieve their common criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the
act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of each of
them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. 14
In the present case, prior to the commission of the crime, the group met at the landing field in
Carmen, Pangasinan and discussed their plan to rob the house of the Estrellas with the agreement
that whoever comes their way will be eliminated. 15 Appellant Al served as a lookout by posting
himself across the house of the Estrellas with the task of reporting any movements outside. Fred
then climbed the old unserviceable gate of the Estrella compound and then opened the small door
and the rest of the group entered the house of the Estrellas through that opening. 16 After almost an
hour inside the house, they left on board a vehicle with AAA and Sulpacio. AAA and Sulpacio were
brought to Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan. In that place, Sulpacio was
killed and AAA was brought to another place and deprived of her liberty. These circumstances
establish a community of criminal design between the malefactors in committing the crime. Clearly,
the group conspired to rob the house of the Estrellas and kill any person who comes their way. The
killing of Sulpacio was part of their conspiracy. Further, Dick's act of arming himself with a gun
constitutes direct evidence of a deliberate plan to kill should the need arise.
Appellant Al attempts to evade criminal liability by alleging that he was only forced to participate in
the commission of the crime because he and his family were threatened to be killed. Al's defense
fails to impress us. Under Article 1217 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal
liability if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, because such person does not act with freedom. 18 To
avail of this exempting circumstance, the evidence must establish: (1) the existence of an
uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is
greater than, or at least equal to, that committed.19 For such defense to prosper, the duress, force,
fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a
well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future
injury is not enough.20
There is nothing in the records to substantiate appellant Al's insistence that he was under duress
from his co-accused while participating in the crime that would suffice to exempt him from incurring
criminal liability. The evidence shows that Al was tasked to act as a lookout and directed to station
himself across the house of the Estrellas. Al was there from 7:30 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. 21 of the following
day, while the rest of the group was waiting in the landing field. Thus, while all alone, Al had every
opportunity to escape since he was no longer subjected to a real, imminent or reasonable fear.
However, he opted to stay across the house of the Estrellas for almost six (6) hours, 22 and
thereafter returned to the landing field where the group was waiting for his report. Subsequently, the
group proceeded to the Estrellas’ house. When the group entered the house, Al stayed for almost
one (1) hour outside to wait for his companions. Later, when the group left the house aboard a
vehicle, Al rode with them in going to Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan,
bringing with them Sulpacio and AAA.23 Clearly, appellant Al had ample opportunity to escape if he
wished to, but he never did. Neither did he request for assistance from the authorities or any person
passing by the house of the Estrellas during the period he was stationed there. Clearly, Al did not
make any effort to perform an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to
commit the felony and prevent the commission thereof that would exempt himself from criminal
liability.24 Therefore, it is obvious that he willingly agreed to be a part of the conspiracy.
Alibi and Denial
Appellant Lando denied having committed the crime charged and interposed alibi as a defense. He
claims that at the time of the incident he was in his house at Tarlac, together with his family. On the
other hand, the appellants were positively identified by AAA, as two (2) of the six (6) malefactors
who forcibly took her and Sulpacio from the Estrella house in the early morning of May 7, 2002.
Both the trial court and the CA found the testimony of AAA credible. The Court gives great weight to
the trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of a witness because it had the opportunity to observe
the facial expression, gesture, and tone of voice of a witness while testifying; thus, making it in a
better position to determine whether a witness is lying or telling the truth. 251avvphi1
Between the categorical statements of the prosecution witness, on one hand, and the bare denial of
the appellant, on the other, the former must perforce prevail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger
than a negative testimony especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Alibi and
denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving
evidence undeserving of weight in law. They are considered with suspicion and always received
with caution, not only because they are inherently weak and unreliable but also because they are
easily fabricated and concocted.26 Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution
witnesses who were not shown to have any ill-motive to testify against the appellants.27
As to the defense of alibi. Aside from the testimony of appellant Lando that he was in Tarlac at the
time of the incident, the defense was unable to show that it was physically impossible for Lando to
be at the scene of the crime. Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that
he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for
him to have been at the scene of the crime.Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the
place where the appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as
well as the facility of access between the two places. 28 Where there is the least chance for the
accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi must fail.29 During the trial of the case,
Lando testified that the distance between his house in Brgy. Maligaya, San Miguel, Tarlac to the
town of Rosales, Pangasinan is only around forty (40) kilometers. Such distance can be traversed
in less than 30 minutes using a private car and when the travel is continuous. 30 Thus, it was not
physically impossible for the appellant Lando to be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident.
In addition, positive identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it impotent, especially
where such identification is credible and categorical.31
Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances
In convicting the appellants, the courts a quo appreciated treachery in qualifying the killing to
murder and evident premeditation in imposing the penalty of death. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself
arising from the defense that the offended party might make. 32 Two conditions must concur for
treachery to exist, namely, (a) the employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution was
deliberately and consciously adopted.33
In the case at bar, it was proven that when AAA boarded the vehicle, she saw Sulpacio tied and
blindfolded. Later, when they reached the fishpond, Sulpacio, still tied and blindfolded, was led out
of the vehicle by the group. When the remains of Sulpacio was thereafter found by the authorities,
the autopsy report indicated that a piece of cloth was found wrapped around the eye sockets and
tied at the back of the skull and another cloth was also found tied at the left wrist of the victim. There
is no question therefore, that the victim's body, when found, still had his hands tied and blindfolded.
This situation of the victim when found shows without doubt that he was killed while tied and
blindfolded; hence, the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery was present in the
commission of the crime. In People v. Osianas,34 the Court held that:
x x x In the case at bar, the means used by the accused-appellants to insure the execution of the
killing of the victims, so as to afford the victims no opportunity to defend themselves, was the act of
tying the hands of the victims. Teresita saw the accused-appellants hog-tie the victims and take
them away with them. Later that night, Dionisio Palmero saw the victims, still hog-tied, walking with
the accused-appellants. The following day, the victims were found dead, still hog-tied. Thus, no
matter how the stab and hack wounds had been inflicted on the victims in the case at bar, we are
sure beyond a reasonable doubt that Jose, Ronilo and Reymundo Cuizon had no opportunity to
defend themselves because the accused-appellants had earlier tied their hands. The fact that there
were twelve persons who took and killed the Cuizons further assured the attainment of
accused-appellants' plans without risk to themselves.35
The aggravating circumstance of superior strength cannot be separately appreciated because it is
absorbed by treachery.36
The circumstance of evident premeditation requires proof showing: (1) the time when the accused
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his
determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow
him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.37The essence of premeditation is that the
execution of the act was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out
the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. 38 From the time the
group met at the landing field at around 6:30 p.m. of May 6, 2002, and discussed the possibility of
killing anyone who stands on their way, up to the time they took Sulpacio away from the Estrellas’
house and eventually killed him thereafter at around past 3:00 a.m., more than eight hours had
elapsed – sufficient for the appellants to reflect on the consequences of their actions and desist
from carrying out their evil scheme, if they wished to. Instead, appellants evidently clung to their
determination and went ahead with their nefarious plan.
In Criminal Case No. 4481-R for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
The Court finds appellant Lando guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with rape, defined in and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code39 are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other
manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4)
in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping
or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c)
any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill
him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.40
The crime of kidnapping was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. Appellants
Lando and Al, both private individuals, forcibly took AAA, a female, away from the house of the
Estrellas and held her captive against her will. Thereafter, appellant Lando brought AAA to his
house in San Miguel Tarlac, whereby she was deprived of her liberty for almost one month. It is
settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in an
enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty.41 For there to be
kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. 42 Its essence is the actual
deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect
such deprivation.43 Although AAA was not confined in an enclosure, she was restrained and
deprived of her liberty, because every time appellant Lando and his wife went out of the house, they
brought AAA with them. The foregoing only shows that AAA was constantly guarded by appellant
Lando and his family.
The crime of rape was also established by the prosecution. Appellant Lando succeeded in having
carnal knowledge of AAA through the use of threat and intimidation. AAA testified that on May 9,
2002, appellant Lando brought her to a hotel to hide her from Fred and Bert, who intended to kill her.
Appellant Lando told her to follow his orders, otherwise, he will give her to Fred and Bert. While in
the hotel, appellant Lando raped her.44 Clearly, for fear of being delivered to Fred and Bert and of
losing her life, AAA had no choice but to give in to appellant Lando's lustful assault. In rape cases,
the credibility of the victim's testimony is almost always the single most important factor. When the
victim's testimony is credible, it may be the sole basis for the accused's conviction. 45 This is so
because owing to the nature of the offense, in many cases, the only evidence that can be given
regarding the matter is the testimony of the offended party.46
The last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides that if the victim is killed or
dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts,
the maximum penalty shall be imposed. In People v. Larrañaga,47 this provision gives rise to a
special complex crime. Thus, We hold that appellant Lando is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape in Criminal Case No.
4481-R.
However, the Court does not agree with the CA and trial court's judgment finding appellant Al liable
for Rape in Criminal Case No. 4481-R. In People v. Suyu,48 We ruled that once conspiracy is
established between several accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, they would all be
equally culpable for the rape committed by anyone of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless
anyone of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the others from committing rape. 49 Also,
in People v. Canturia,50 the Court held that:
x x x For while the evidence does convincingly show a conspiracy among the accused, it also as
convincingly suggests that the agreement was to commit robbery only; and there is no evidence
that the other members of the band of robbers were aware of Canturia's lustful intent and his
consummation thereof so that they could have attempted to prevent the same. x x x
The foregoing principle is applicable in the present case because the crime of robbery with rape is a
special complex crime defined in and penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code, and the crime of kidnapping with rape in this case is likewise a special complex crime
as held in the case of People v. Larrañaga.51There is no evidence to prove that appellant Al was
aware of the subsequent events that transpired after the killing of Sulpacio and the kidnapping of
AAA. Appellant Al could not have prevented appellant Lando from raping AAA, because at the time
of rape, he was no longer associated with appellant Lando. AAA even testified that only Fred and
appellant Lando brought her to Tarlac,52 and she never saw appellant Al again after May 7, 2002,
the day she was held captive. She only saw appellant Al once more during the trial of the
case.53 Thus, appellant Al cannot be held liable for the subsequent rape of AAA.
The Penalties
In Criminal Case No. 4498-R, the attendant circumstance of treachery qualified the killing to murder.
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death.
Since the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged and proven, the
imposable penalty upon the appellants is death, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 1, of the Revised
Penal Code.54 In view, however, of the passage of R.A. No. 9346,55 prohibiting the imposition of the
death penalty, the penalty of death is reduced to reclusion perpetua,56without eligibility for parole.57
In Criminal Case No. 4481-R, the penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with rape is death. In view of R.A. No. 9346, the penalty of death is reduced to
reclusion perpetua,58 without eligibility for parole.59 Accordingly, the imposable penalty for appellant
Lando is reclusion perpetua.
As to appellant Al, the prescribed penalty for serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance in the commission of the offense, the proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion
perpetua, pursuant to Article 6360 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Damages
In Criminal Case No. 4498-R, the award of civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of
the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. 61 In People v.
Quiachon,62 even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed because of the prohibition in R.A.
9346, the civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00 is proper, because it is not dependent on the actual
imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the
imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. As explained in People v.
Salome,63 while R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the fact remains that
the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death, and the offense is still heinous.
Accordingly, the award of civil indemnity in the amount of ₱75,000.00 is proper.
Anent moral damages, the same are mandatory in cases of murder, without need of allegation and
proof other than the death of the victim.64 However, consistent with recent jurisprudence on heinous
crimes where the imposable penalty is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. No.
9346, the award of moral damages should be increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00.65
The award of exemplary damages is in order, because of the presence of the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation in the commission of the crime. 66 The Court
awards the amount of ₱30,000.00, as exemplary damages, in line with current jurisprudence on the
matter.67
Actual damages is also warranted. Modesta Abad, the spouse of victim Sulpacio, incurred
expenses in the amount of ₱57,122.30, which was duly supported by receipts.68lawphil
cases of illegal detention. This is predicated on AAA's having suffered serious anxiety and fright
when she was detained for almost one (1) month.80
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00556
is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATIONS as follows:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 4498-R, appellants Fernando Calaguas Fernandez alias "Lando" and
Alberto Cabillo Anticamara alias "Al" are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of parole,
and to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of Sulpacio Abad the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱57,122.30 as
actual damages.
(b) In Criminal Case No. 4481-R, appellant Fernando Calaguas Fernandez alias "Lando" is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility
of parole, and to pay the offended party AAA, the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. Appellant Alberto Cabillo
Anticamara alias "Al" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is also
directed to pay, jointly and severally, with appellant Fernando Calaguas Fernandez alias "Lando,"
the victim AAA the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.

In Criminal Case No. 4481-R, AAA is entitled to civil indemnity in line with prevailing jurisprudence
that civil indemnification is mandatory upon the finding of rape.69 Applying prevailing jurisprudence,
AAA is entitled to ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity.70

In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, 71 without
the necessity of additional pleadings or proof other than the fact of rape. 72 Moral damages is
granted in recognition of the victim's injury necessarily resulting from the odious crime of
rape.73 Such award is separate and distinct from the civil indemnity. 74 However, the amount of
₱100,000.00 awarded as moral damages is reduced to ₱75,000.00, in line with current
jurisprudence.75

The award of exemplary damages to AAA in the amount of ₱50,000 is hereby reduced to
₱30,000.00 in accordance with recent jurisprudence.76

As to appellant Al. In the absence of conspiracy, the liability of the accused is individual and not
collective.77 Since appellant Al is liable only for the crime of serious illegal detention, he is jointly
and severally liable only to pay the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity. For serious illegal
detention, the award of civil indemnity is in the amount of ₱50,000.00, in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.78

Along that line, appellant Al's liability for moral damages is limited only to the amount of
₱50,000.00.79 Pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered in
 G.R. No. 185212 February 15, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
MARITESS ALOLOD, EFREN DEOCAMPO, ELMER DEOCAMPO and EDWIN
DEOCAMPO, Accused,
EFREN DEOCAMPO, Appellant.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about when circumstantial evidence may be considered sufficient to support a finding
of guilt in a murder case.
The Facts and the Case
The Provincial Prosecutor of Sultan Kudarat charged the accused Maritess Alolod, Efren
Deocampo, Edwin Deocampo, and Elmer Deocampo with double murder before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, Branch 19, in Criminal Cases 2531 and 2532.
The prosecution evidence shows that Melanio and Lucena Alolod adopted accused Maritess and
took her into their home in Barangay Poblacion, Lebak, Sultan Kudarat. Maritess had two children
with her lover, Efren Deocampo, who was never allowed to set foot on her parents’ house since
they loathed him. In May 1998, the old couple, Melanio and Lucena, suddenly went missing.
Neighbors and relatives testified last seeing the old couple on May 27, 1998. A neighbor,
Magdalena Ato, recalled that the two were in good health. In fact, Melanio even went to market
early in the day. At around 8:30 that evening, as he was making his rounds, a security guard at
Salaman Institute, Demetrio Nebit, saw two men standing near the fence that separated the school
from the Alolod house. On seeing Nebit, the two hurried into a nearby toilet but the security guard
followed and told them to come out. Nebit identified one of the two to be Efren Deocampo, a former
classmate, and his brother Edwin.
At about 2:00 a.m. on the following day, May 28, Victor Ato, Magdalena’s husband, awakened to
strange sounds coming from the Alolod house just five to six meters away. Victor heard a woman
sobbing and what sounded like a pig being butchered. He looked out through the window but,
seeing no one, he just went back to bed. When Victor woke up at 5:30 a.m., he saw Efren at the
kitchen of the Alolod house.
Later that day, Magdalena had the chance to ask Maritess about the sounds coming from their
house during the night. Maritess explained that Melanio was ill and she was having a difficult time
giving him medicine. Maritess added that her parents had left for Cotabato City early that morning.
Meantime, on inspection that morning, the school security guard noticed that the cyclone wire of the
fence where he saw Efren and Edwin standing the night before had been cut. He reported the
incident to the school principal.
Annaliza Relles, the grandniece of the Alolods, noticed the absence of the old couple when she
came over that morning to cook for them. Only Maritess and her two children were there. Maritess
told Annaliza that her parents had left for a vacation. Annaliza tried to use one of the toilets in the
house but it was padlocked. Maritess told her to just use the other toilet.
On May 29 Generita Caspillo, Maritess’ relative and close friend, stayed at the Alolod residence to
keep them company because according to Maritess, her father suffered a stroke and had to be
brought to Cotabato for medical treatment. While Generita was there, she noticed a pile of red soil
near the well at the garden.
On May 30 Annaliza and Generita saw Efren’s younger brothers Edwin and Elmer at the Alolod
residence. The next day, during their town fiesta, friends and relatives came by to visit the old
couple but Maritess told them that they had gone to Davao City and would not return until August
16 or 17. By June the couple’s grandchildren who would stay at their house for school began
arriving. They observed the frequent presence of the Deocampo brothers in the house. Sometime
in August, Generita and her mother, Lucena’s sister, came to pay a visit. They saw Efren wearing
Melanio’s wristwatch. Maritess insisted that her parents were still in Davao for medical check-up.
In August, Maritess and her children, together with the Deocampo brothers, left the Alolod house to
live at Sitio Gila-gila, Barangay Kuya, South Upi, Maguindanao. When the Alolod spouses did not
return to their home, their relatives started looking for them. They found out that the missing couple
did not go to either Davao or Cotabato or to their relatives in Iloilo. Their clothes and other personal
effects were still in the house. The last entry on the recovered diary of Melanio was on May 27.
Suspecting that something was amiss, the couple’s relatives, Francisco Estaris and Joel Relles,
searched the house for clues. They even dug up elevated and depressed soil formation around the
place but for naught.
Finally, on October 9, 1998 Francisco noticed a portion of the land planted with camote. Francisco
found the place unlikely for camote since it was shaded from the sun. Those who boarded at the
house said that it was Maritess and Efren who planted them. With the help of others, Francisco dug
up the suspected spot. There they found the decomposing bodies of Melanio and Lucena. Based
on the post-mortem report, Melanio was strangled with a wire; Lucena was stabbed.
On May 10, 2001 the RTC found the four accused guilty of murder of Lucena, with Efren and Edwin
as principals and Maritess and Elmer as accessories, in Criminal Case 2531 and of the murder of
Melanio in Criminal Case 2532. In each case, the RTC sentenced Efren and Edwin to suffer the
penalty of death, while Maritess and Elmer were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum to 10 years of prision mayor, as
maximum. The RTC also ordered the accused to pay ₱50,000.00 to the heirs of Lucena and
another ₱50,000.00 to the heirs of Melanio, and to pay the costs.
While the case was on appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) granted the request of Maritess and
Elmer to withdraw their appeals, leaving only those of Efren and Edwin for its consideration. On
August 30, 2007 the CA rendered judgment in CA-G.R. CR-HC 00419, affirming with modification
the RTC decision. The CA reduced the penalty imposed on Efren to reclusion perpetua and on
Edwin who was a minor to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum to 15 years and 1 day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In addition to the ₱50,000.00 granted by the RTC as civil
indemnity in each of the cases, the CA further ordered the additional payment of ₱25,000.00 as
exemplary damages and another ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages for a total of ₱100,000.00 in
each case, with the principals severally liable for ₱60,000.00 and the accessories for ₱40,000.00 of
this amount. Efren and Edwin appealed to this Court. Edwin, however, on a letter to the Office of
the Solicitor General dated December 7, 2008, manifested his intention to withdraw his appeal. On
August 26, 2009 the Court granted Edwin’s withdrawal, leaving Efren as the sole accused-appellant
in this case.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s finding
that accused Efren was responsible for the murder of the Alolod couple based on circumstantial
evidence.
The Ruling of the Court
The rule of evidence that applies when no witness saw the commission of the crime1 provides:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain that inexorably leads to one fair conclusion:
the accused committed the crime to the exclusion of all others. 2
Here, those circumstances abound.
1. Efren had always been banned from the old couple’s house because they strongly disapproved
his relationship with Maritess, their adopted daughter so he had no business being around that
house.
2. The old couple were enjoying good health before the evening of May 27, 1998.
3. On May 28 they were suddenly gone from the house, meaning that they were killed on the night
of May 27 or early morning of May 28.
4. On the night of May 27 the security guard at Salaman Institute saw Efren and Edwin standing on
the school side of the fence next to the old couple’s house. They even tried to conceal themselves
in the school toilet. The next day, the guard discovered that the fence wire had been cut.
5. At about 2:00 a.m. of May 28 a neighbor heard the sound of a woman sobbing and what seemed
like the butchering of a pig.
6. At break of dawn, a witness saw Efren in the Alolod kitchen.
7. From then on Efren and his brothers frequented the old couple’s house, with Efren wearing the
old man’s watch.
8. Maritess definitely lied about her adoptive parents going to Cotabato City and subsequently to
Davao City for medical treatment when people started looking for them. They were of course buried
in the garden.
9. A witness heard Efren instructing Maritess to plant more camote on a pile of red soil beside the
house.
10. The bodies of the old couple were found underneath those plants.
The alibi of Efren that he was in Maguindanao at about the time the old couple was killed does not
encourage belief.1âwphi1 The security guard saw him with his brother at 8:30 p.m. of May 27 near
the couple’s house where they had no business being there. A neighbor saw Efren at the kitchen of
that house on the morning following the slaying of the couple. And it was not physically impossible
for the accused to be at the crime scene when it happened. 3 Sitio Gila-gila, South Upi, Maguindao
was merely 15 kilometers from Lebak, Sultan Kudarat.
The CA, however, correctly reduced the imposable penalty from death to reclusion perpetua, not
only because the information failed to allege the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and the
victims’ age but likewise, because of Republic Act 93464 that now prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty.
Consistent with recent jurisprudence the Court is awarding ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, 5
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages,6 another ₱75,000.00 as moral damages,7 and ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages,8 for a total of ₱205,000.00 in each case. But these amounts should only apply
to Efren and not to the rest of the accused who withdrew their appeals. 9 Here, the RTC ordered
Maritess, Edwin and Elmer to pay only ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity in each case or a total of
₱100,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC 00419
dated August 30, 2007 with MODIFICATION ordering accused Efren Deocampo to indemnify the
heirs of Melanio and Lucena Alolod in the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages, another ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, or a total of ₱205,000.00 in each case, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 209137 July 1, 2015 (22) twenty two pcs. Php500.00 bills

EDUARDO CELEDONIO, Petitioner, (2) two necklace 18K worth Php30,000.00

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. (2) two bracelet worth Php11,500.00

DECISION (2) two gold ring worth Php8,000.00

MENDOZA, J.: (1) one wedding ring worth 14K worth Php1,500.00

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Eduardo Celedonio (1) one wrist watch swiss military worth Php10,000.00
(Celedonio) assails the April 8, 2013 Decision1 and the September 17, 2013 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 34472, affirming the August 18, 2011 Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 35668-MN. (1) one cellphone NOKIA 8250 worth Php3,000.00

The Information,4 dated April 25, 2007, charged Celedonio with the crime of Robbery with Force (3) three pairs of earrings worth Php15,000.00
Upon Things, the accusatory portion of which reads:
(3) three pcs. of 100.00 US dollars worth Php15,000.00
That on or about the 22nd day of April 2007, in the Municipality of Navotas, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with (60) sixty pcs. of Php50.00 bills worth Php3,000.00
intent to gain and by means of force upon things, and without the consent of the owner, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of the herein complainant by (100) one hundred pcs. of Php20.00 bills worth Php2,000.00
destroying the backdoor of said house, and once inside, take, rob and carry away the following:

(15) fifteen pcs. of Php100.00 bills worth Php1,500.00 owned and belonging to CARMENCITA DE
(1) one gold bracelet 24K Php8,000.00 GUZMAN y SERRANO, to the damage and prejudice of the herein complainant, in the
aforementioned amount of Php223,000.00.
(3) necklace (1) one 24K and (2) two 18K Php42,000.00
Contrary to law.5
(2) two digicam Sony player Php22,000.00
Version of the Prosecution
(1) one DVD portable Php5,000.00
The evidence for the prosecution shows that on the evening of April 21, 2007, a certain Adriano
(1) one wrist watch Tagheur Php30,000.00 Marquez (Marquez)witnessed the robbery perpetrated in the house of Carmencita De Guzman (De
Guzman)while she was away to attend to the wake of her deceased husband. No one was left in
(1) one sun glass Guess Php5,000.00 the house. Marquez, whose house was opposite the house of De Guzman and Celedonio, which
were adjacent to each other, identified Celedonio as the culprit. Upon learning of the incident, De
Guzman reported it to the police and requested that Celedonio be investigated for possibly having
(1) one camera Canon Php2,500.00 committed the crime, based on the account of Marquez.

(1) one Gameboy advance Php5,000.00 Later, a follow-up operation was conducted by PO1 Rommel Roque (PO1 Roque)and SPO2 Adrian
Sugui (SPO2 Sugui), accompanied by Marquez. They proceeded to Raja Humabon St., Navotas, to
(1) one calculator Php1,500.00 survey the area for the possible identification and apprehension of the suspect. On their way,
Marquez pointed to a man on a motorcycle and said, "Sir, siya po si Eduardo Celedonio." The
(1) one discman Sony Php3,000.00 police immediately flagged down Celedonio. PO1 Roque asked him if he was Eduardo Celedonio,
but he did not reply and just bowed his head.

(2) two pcs. 100.00 US dollar bills

SPO2 Sugui informed Celedonio of a complaint for robbery against him. Celedonio still remained
silent and just bowed his head. SPO2 Sugui asked him, "Where [were] the stolen items?"
Celedonio then alighted from his motorcycle and opened its compartment where PO1 Roque saw
some of the stolen items, as per report of the incident, such as the portable DVD player and a
wristwatch, among others.6
PO1 Roque asked Celedonio if the same were stolen, to which the latter answered, "Iyan
po."7 Thus, Celedonio was arrested and was informed of his constitutional rights. More itemswere
seized from Celedonio at the police station.
Version of the Accused
After the prosecution rested its case, Celedonio filed his Demurrer to Evidence (with leave of court)
citing as his ground the alleged illegality of his arrest and the illegal search on his motorcycle. The
RTC denied the demurrer, stating that the question of the legality of Celedonio’s arrest had been
mooted by his arraignment and his active participation in the trial of the case. It considered the
seizure of the stolen items as legal not only because of Celedonio’s apparent consent to it, but also
because the subject items were in a moving vehicle.8
In his defense, Celedonio claimed that he was at home with his wife, sleeping, at the time of the
incident. His wife corroborated his statement.
In its Decision, dated August 18,2011, the RTC found Celedonio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Robbery with Force Upon Things. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision9 reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused EDUARDO CELEDONIO y MONIS GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for the offense of Robbery with Force Upon Things as defined and penalized
under Article 299 (a)2 of the Revised Penal Code, he is therefore sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor as maximum. He is also ordered to pay private complainant the amount of Php105,000.00
which is the worth of what has not been recovered from the loss she suffered by reason of the
robbery.
SO ORDERED.10
The trial court was convinced that the prosecution clearly established that: 1) a robbery had been
committed; 2) it was committed recently; 3) several of the stolen items including cash were found in
Celedonio’s possession; and 4) Celedonio had no valid explanation for his possession of the stolen
goods.11
Insisting on his innocence, Celedonio appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the RTC
erred: 1) in convicting him of the crime despite the insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence; 2) in
not finding that the search was illegal, rendering the articles recovered inadmissible; and 3) in not
finding that the prosecution witness Marquez was ill-motivated in testifying against him.12
The CA, however, affirmed the RTC in toto. It found that the totality of circumstances warranted the
finding that Celedonio was solely and directly responsible for the crime. 13
In addition, the CA brushed aside Celedonio’s argument that he was illegally arrested and that the
items seized should be excluded as evidence. It stressed that Celedonio was not arrested when he
voluntarily opened the compartment of his motorcycle. He was only brought to the police for
investigation after some of the stolen items were found in his motorcycle compartment. 14 Further,
Celedonio’s failure to raise the issue before his arraignment constituted a waiver on his part to
question the legality of his arrest.15
Celedonio moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUES
I
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING THAT THE PETITIONER’S
GUILT WAS PROVEN BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
II
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT FINDING THAT THE SEARCH CONDUCTED ON THE PETITIONER
WAS ILLEGAL, RENDERING THE ARTICLES RECOVERED INADMISSIBLE.
III
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WITNESS ADRIANO MARQUEZ
WAS ILL-MOTIVATED IN TESTIFYING AGAINST THE PETITIONER.
The petition lacks merit.
Jurisprudence tells us that direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix from which a trial court
may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules on evidence allow a trial court to rely on
circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. The lack of direct evidence does not ipso
facto bar the finding of guilt against the appellant. As long as the prosecution establishes the
accused-appellant’s participation in the crime through credible and sufficient circumstantial
evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion that he committed the imputed crime, the latter
should be convicted.16
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.17
In this case, the prosecution sufficiently laid down the circumstances that, when taken together,
constituted an unbroken chain that led to a reasonable conclusion that Celedonio was the
perpetrator. The CA opined that:
xxx As correctly pointed out by the trial court, these circumstances are: accused was a next door
neighbor of private complainant; he was seen by another neighbor going over the concrete fence
separating their houses and ransacking a room in complainant’s house; during the time, no one
was inside complainant’s house as all of them were at the wake of private complainant’s recently
demised husband; two (2) days after, most of the items discovered to have been stolen that night
were found in the compartment of the accused’s motorcycle which he was riding on when accosted
by the police; the items recovered from him were identified by the complainant as her stolen
property; during the trial accused denied that the stolen items were found in his possession and
claimed that they were "planted" by the police investigators to frame him up of the robbery. In short,
the accused could not explain his possession of the recently stolen items found in his sole
possession.
xxxx
We find the conviction of accused-appellant based on circumstantial evidence factually and legally
tenable, as the facts from which the aforementioned circumstances arose have been proved
through the positive testimony of Adriano Marquez, PO1 Rommel Roque and Carmencita de
Guzman.18
The defense does not refute the existence of the commission of robbery. In fact, Celedionio himself
acknowledged that the prosecution’s circumstantial evidence, although weak, ambiguous and
inconclusive, established that 1) a robbery had been committed; 2) it was committed recently; 3)
several of the stolen items including cash were found in his possession; and 4) he had no valid
explanation for his possession of the stolen goods.19 Celedonio, however, still insisted that he
cannot be convicted of the crime of robbery because 1) he was not caught in exclusive possession
of the stolen items; 2) the search conducted on him was illegal thereby rendering the seized articles
inadmissible; and 3) the witness Marquez was ill-motivated in testifying against him.
These arguments, however, do not hold water.
First, Celedonio was, in fact, caught in exclusive possession of some of the stolen items when the
police officers flagged down his motorcycle during their follow-up operation. He failed to give a
reasonable explanation as to his possession of the said items. Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person
possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, is owned by him.
Celedonio never claimed ownership of the subject items. When the alleged stolen items were found
in his motorcycle compartment which he had control over, the disputable presumption of being the
taker of the stolen items arose. He could have overcome the presumption, but he failed to give a
justifiable and logical explanation. Thus, the only plausible scenario that could be inferred therefrom
was that he took the items.
Second, no illegal search was made upon Celedonio. When the police officers asked where the
stolen items were, they merely made a general inquiry, and not a search, as part of their follow-up
operation. Records did not show that the police officers even had the slightest hint that the stolen
items were in Celedonio’s motorcycle compartment. Neither was there any showing that the police
officers frisked Celedonio or rummaged over his motorcycle. There was no showing either of any
force or intimidation on the part of the police officers when they made the inquiry. Celedonio himself
voluntarily opened his motorcycle compartment. Worse, when he was asked if the items were the
stolen ones, he actually confirmed it.20 The police officers, therefore, were left without any recourse
but to take him into custody for further investigation. At that instance, the police officers had
probable cause that he could be the culprit of the robbery. He did not have any explanation as to
how he got hold of the items. Moreover, taking into consideration that the stolen items were in a
moving vehicle, the police had to immediately act on it.
Third, contrary to Celedonio’s argument, Marquez was a credible witness. Jurisprudence also tells
us that where there is no evidence that the witnesses of the prosecution were actuated by ill motive,
it is presumed that they were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. 21
In this case, if only to discredit Marquez, Celedonio claimed that they once had a fight over a water
meter. As correctly observed by the CA, however, such allegation was too insignificant that it could
not destroy whatever credibility Marquez possessed as a witness. The CA, thus, posited:
xxx It is true that under the Rules of Court, a witness may be impeached by evidence that his
general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity is bad.1âwphi1 However, a witness cannot be
impeached by evidence of particular wrongful acts, unless there is a showing of previous conviction
by final judgment such that not even the existence of pending information maybe shown to impeach
him.
More so, in this case, wherein no information was filed against the witness, but only the mere say
so of the accused on Marquez' alleged involvement in a quarrel with him over a water meter.
Furthermore, no testimony was presented to show that the reputation of Marquez for truth, honesty
or integrity is bad; no evil motive has been established against prosecution witness Marquez that
might prompt him to testify falsely against accused-appellant Celedonio.22
Alibi and denial were the only defenses of Celedonio. Unless he can strongly support his claims
that the items were "planted" and that it was physically impossible for him to be in De Guzman's
house other than the mere averment that he was asleep at the time, his defenses cannot prevail
over the strong circumstantial evidence.23
Having established the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, the CA did not commit any
reversible error in upholding the RTC. In the absence of any indication that the R TC and the CA
overlooked facts or circumstances that would result in a different ruling in this case, the Court will
not disturb their factual findings.24
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.