Republic of the Philippines

COURT OF APPEALS
Manila

MOONWALK DEVELOPMENT AND

HOUSING CORPORATION,
Petitioner,

- versus - CA-G.R. SP No. 130955

PHASE I MOONWALK
RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION
(PHIMRA),
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - -x

REJOINDER
(to the Reply dated 08 May 2014)

COMES NOW, the RESPONDENT, through undersigned

counsel, unto this Honorable Court, most
respectfully states:

1. On 13 May 2014, the Respondent received by

registered mail the copy of the Petitioner’s Reply
to its Comment on the latter’s Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision dated 21 January
2014. Hence, this Rejoinder to the said Reply;

2. In its Reply, the Petitioner accused the

Respondent of misleading this Honorable Court when
the latter allegedly ignored its allegation that
“Atty. (Rogelio P.) Nogales, in view of his serious
stroke and two (2) life threatening operations, was
not able to inform Petitioner MDHC his receipt of
the Office of the President’s adverse Decision
dated January 31, 2014;”

3. The Petitioner cited the case of Salazar

v. Court of Appeals1 and posited that the above
actuation of Atty. Nogales constituted a “grossly
negligent conduct” that allegedly resulted in the
outright deprivation of its property, thus,
justifying the relaxation of the strict application
of technical rules;

1 G.R. No. 142920, 06 February 2002.

 4. Firstly, the Petitioner’s allegation that
the Respondent misled this Honorable Court is
distasteful as it is unfounded. We are inviting the
Petitioner to read once again our Comment to its
Motion for Reconsideration. Contrary to its
allegation, the Respondent devoted three (3)
paragraphs of its Comment discussing the alleged
life threatening medical condition of Atty.
Nogales;2

5. Secondly, the Petitioner appears to be

confused when it categorized Atty. Nogales’ action
as “grossly negligent act clearly tantamount to
abandonment of his client’s cause,” but cited the
latter’s medical condition as the reason behind the
allegedly negligent act. How can Atty. Nogales be
grossly negligent and at the same time be excused
in his failure to inform the Petitioner of the
adverse Decision of the Office of the President
because of his life threatening medical condition?

6. As a matter of fact, Petitioner even

conceded that “it would be impossible for (it) to
confer with Atty. Nogales regarding the status of
the case x x x for the very obvious reason that
Atty. Nogales is still recuperating from his
serious medical condition;”

7. More importantly, it is now much too late

in the day for the Petitioner to assail the final
decision of the Office of the President on the
ground that its previous counsel was “grossly
negligent” in handling its case because of the
latter’s illness. This issue was never raised by
the Petitioner in its pleadings before the Office
of the President (i.e., Motion for Extension of
Time with Motion to Withdraw Appearance as Counsel
filed by Atty. Nogales, Entry of Appearance with
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
Petitioner’s present counsel) and even in its
subsequent pleadings filed before this Honorable
Court in relation to the above-titled case;

8. Thirdly, assuming for the sake of argument

that the omission of Atty. Nogales can plausibly
qualify as a negligent act, the same does not

2 Paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of the Respondent’s Comment.

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justify the reversal of the assailed Decision of
the Office of the President since the Petitioner
was not deprived of its property without due
process of law. This is the jurisprudential ruling
laid down by the Supreme Court in the recent case
of Sofio v. Valenzuela,3 thus:

Although the petitioners’ former

counsel was blameworthy for the track
their case had taken, there is no
question that any act performed by
the counsel within the scope of his
general or implied authority is still
regarded as an act of the client. In
view of this, even the negligence of
the former counsel should bind them as
his clients. To hold otherwise would
result to the untenable situation in
which every defeated party, in order
to salvage his cause, would simply
claim neglect or mistake on the part
of his counsel as a ground for
reversing the adverse judgment. There
would then be no end to litigation,
for every shortcoming of the counsel
could become the subject of challenge
by his client through another counsel
who, if he should also be found
wanting, would similarly be disowned
by the same client through yet another
counsel, and so on ad infinitum. This
chain of laying blame could render
court proceedings indefinite,
tentative and subject to reopening at
any time by the mere replacement of
the counsel.

Nonetheless, the gross negligence of

counsel alone would not even warrant a
deviation from the principle of
finality of judgment, for the client
must have to show that such negligence
resulted in the denial of due process
to the client. When the counsel’s
mistake is so great and so serious
that the client is prejudiced and is
denied his day in court, or when the

3 G.R. No. 157810, 15 February 2012.

3
 counsel is guilty of gross negligence
resulting in the client’s deprivation
of his property without due process of
law, the client is not concluded by
his counsel’s mistakes and the case
can be reopened in order to give the
client another chance to present his
case. As such, the test herein is
whether their former counsel’s
negligence deprived the petitioners of
due process of law.

(Citations omitted, underscoring

ours.)

9. Pertinently, the case of Sofio

categorically held that a counsel’s failure to file
a motion for reconsideration only amounted to
simple negligence and do not necessarily deny due
process to a party who had the opportunity to be
heard at some point of the proceedings;

10. In the instant case, the Petitioner was

never denied of its day in court. It was given
ample opportunity to defend its interests in due
course in the proceedings before the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board, which decision was even
appealed by the Petitioner to the Office of the
President. Thus, the Petitioner’s contention that
Atty. Nogales’ failure to timely file the Motion
for Reconsideration before the Office of the
President resulted in outright deprivation of its
property is clearly erroneous and without basis;

11. Fourthly, the case of Salazar v. Court of

Appeals,4 which was cited by the Petitioner, does
not find application in the instant case. The
Supreme Court relaxed the strict application of
technical rules in the said case because the
petitioners therein were “deprived of their right
to present evidence at the trial proper” and
“deprived of their right to appeal the adverse
order of the trial court when their lawyer failed
to promptly notify them of the same, to enable them
to move for reconsideration or appeal in due
course.” Surely, these circumstances are not
present in the instant case;

4 See note no. 1.

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 12. Finally, it may not be amissed to
reiterate at this point that Petitioner was also
guilty of neglect. It failed to exercise ordinary
prudence and diligence to be brought up to date as
regards the status of its case or the steps being
taken by Atty. Nogales in the defense of its case;

13. No amount of artful argumentation by the

Petitioner in this case will erase the effect of
the admission in its Motion for Reconsideration
that it only followed up the status of its appeal
from Atty. Nogales after 15 February 2013 when the
reglementary period to file motion for
reconsideration has already expired. Consequently,
the Petitioner should, therefore, suffer whatever
adverse judgment is rendered against it. This now
brings to mind the legal maxim that equity aids the
vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights -
vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas subvenit.5

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is
respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that
the Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration be
denied for lack of merit.

Other measures of relief and remedies that are

just and equitable under the circumstances are
likewise prayed for.

Makati City for the City of Manila.

23 May 2014.

5 Mojar v. Agro Commercial Security Services Agency, Inc, G. R. No.

187188, 27 June 2012, citing Ampo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
169091, 16 February 2006.

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 HM RAMOS AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICE
G/F Erlag Building, 102 Esteban St.
Legazpi Village, Makati City
Tel. Nos. 813-6953/812-6689
email address: hmramlaw2004@yahoo.com

by:

HERMENEGILDO M. RAMOS, JR.

PTR #4225892/01-03-14/Mkt.
IBP Lifetime Member Roll #012125/11-27-13
Attorney’s Roll #37404
MCLE Compliance #IV-0019122

LLOYD FRANCIS L. SABAS

PTR #4232767/01-07-14/Mkt.
IBP #894840/12-17-13/Mla
Attorney’s Roll #62438
Admitted to the Bar on 29 April 2013

Copy furnished:

ATTY. PARIS G. REAL

Real Brotarlo & Real
Counsel for Petitioner
Cityland 10, 4/F Tower I & 10th Floor Tower II
156 H.V. Dela Costa Street, Ayala Avenue North
Makati City

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Malacañang, Manila

HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
HLURB Office, NHA Compound
Kalayaan Avenue cor. Mayaman Street
Diliman, Quezon City

ATTY. MICHELLE JAN BABIANO

Housing and Land Use Arbiter
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
HLURB Office, NHA Compound
Kalayaan Avenue cor. Mayaman Street
Diliman, Quezon City

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 EXPLANATION

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 11, Rule

13 of the Rules of Court, it is respectfully
manifested that copies of the foregoing “Rejoinder
(to the Reply dated 08 May 2014)” were filed and
served through registered mail due to lack of
personnel and time to effect personal filing and
service. (Please disregard if filed or served
personally).

LLOYD FRANCIS L. SABAS