Historic Derivation of Reliability Values For Fixed Steel Jacket Offshore Structures

REPORT JANUARY
573 2017
Historic derivation of reliability values

for fixed steel jacket offshore structures
Clarification of the intent of the existing text in ISO 19902:2007 Informative Annex A
diligent implement
Acknowledgements
This report is prepared by the Offshore Structures Subcommittee
under the auspices of the Standards Committee.
The Annex was written by John Wægter of Ramboll Oil & Gas
Photography used with permission courtesy of

©curraheeshutter/iStockphoto and ©vitchanan/iStockphoto (Front
cover) ©Tomasz Wyszołmirski/iStockphoto (Back cover)
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REPORT JANUARY
573 2017
Historic derivation of reliability

values for fixed steel jacket offshore
structures
Clarification of the intent of the existing text in ISO 19902:2007 Informative Annex A
Revision history
VERSION DATE AMENDMENTS
1.0 January 2017 First release

Historic derivation of reliability values for 4
fixed steel jacket offshore structures
Contents
Acknowledgements 2
Contents 4
Objective 5
Introduction 6
References 7
Annex: Reprint of ISO/TC 67/SC 7 N 749 8

Objective
This IOGP report was developed based on an industry desire to capture and explain
the historic derivation by Shell of reliability values associated with fixed steel
jacket offshore structures. A summary of some of this work is presented in Annex
A.9.9.3.3 to ISO 19902:2007. On reflection, it is considered that the text could have
been written in a manner less open to misinterpretation for current design and
assessment to this ISO Standard.
While acknowledging the excellent work performed by Shell in this regard,

primarily in the 1990s, it needs to be stated that this work represents the views of
one operator based on typical jacket platform configurations, assumptions, and
mathematical models of that time. Therefore, the values quoted neither represent
an industry consensus concerning the reliability of all offshore steel jacket
platform systems, nor target reliability values which all such platform systems
should achieve.
In addition to replicating the work published by Shell, John Wægter of Ramboll

explains herein the calculation method linking the design partial (safety) factors,
the reserve strength ratio (RSR) which captures the ratio of jacket system
collapse (pushover) strength to the design strength, and the notional probability
of platform system failure. He also compares current design practice specified in
Standards, RSRs based on both mean and characteristic strength values, the most
representative application of Accidental Limit State in pushover analyses, and the
benefits and potential misuse of hazard curves.
Introduction
In the late 1980s, the offshore oil and gas industry recognized the potential value
of a partial factor approach to structural design over the traditional working stress
design (or allowable stress design). In the latter approach, the maximum load is
limited to a proportion of the component elastic or ultimate strength. In the partial
factor approach (also called load and resistance factor design LRFD), recognition
is given to different uncertainty between the underlying design parameters, e.g.
environmental load is less well defined than dead load, strength under combined
forces is less well defined than under e.g. tensile force alone.
This ultimately led API to develop a LRFD version of their API RP 2A WSD standard
for offshore fixed steel structures. In developing its parallel first edition 19902
standard, ISO required a partial factor approach. The global nature of the ISO
standard led several international organizations and experts to perform and
publish calibration studies for their regions and platform configurations. Of these,
Efthymiou and van de Graaf of Shell published the most extensive studies [1–4].
Unfortunately, to date, other reliability studies have tended to be via regional JIPs
or smaller contractor-led or academic-led publications.
Understandably, with a paucity of quality information in this area, the industry

references the work by Shell as best practice; while this may be true, at present
there is no industry consensus on minimum or ‘target’ reliability levels for new
steel jackets or other offshore structure types. This topic is subject to ongoing
debate at Offshore Structural Reliability Conferences [5–6] and also in General
Requirements Standards ISO 19900 and API RP 2GEN.
It is not the intention of this report to make any recommendations for the future,
but rather to capture and explain the historic values that Shell recommend in their
publications.
References
Van de Graaf, J.W., Tromans, P.S. and Efthymiou, M., The Reliability of Offshore
Structures and its Dependence on Design Code and Environment, Proc. 27th Offshore
Technology Conf. – Paper 7382. Houston: May 1994.
Efthymiou, M., van de Graaf, J.W., Tromans, P.S. and Hines, I.M., Reliability Based
Criteria for Fixed Steel Offshore Platforms, Proc. Conf. OMAE-96. Florence, Italy:
June 1996.
Efthymiou, M. and van de Graaf, J.W., Reliability and (re)assessment of fixed steel
structures, Proc. Conf. OMAE-11 – Paper 50253. Rotterdam, The Netherlands: June
2011.
IOGP Report 486, Reliability of offshore structures - current design and potential
inconsistencies. Report of London workshop in December 2012. London: March
2014.
American Petroleum Institute (API). API Report of Houston Conference: September

2014.
Annex:
Reprint of ISO/TC 67/SC 7 N 749
Historical background Acceptance criteria for ISO 19902:2007
pushover analysis
1 Background and findings
1.1 Introduction
In this document acceptance criteria for pushover analysis in ISO 19902, [1], are discussed
and quantified based on the simple reliability model proposed by Efthymiou, [2].
The reliability model is a generic model that considers only one load effect resisted by one
resistance. Such a simple reliability model has limitations in providing detailed information of
specific parts of a structure, but has been found applicable in describing global responses
(typically base shear) realistically as long as the deck is not impinged by waves.
1.2 Pushover analysis

A pushover analysis aims at predicting the real structural behaviour as closely as possible,
ideally without any bias. Therefore all parameters entered into a pushover analysis should be
best estimate values, and the RSR requirements given in ISO 19902 are based on mean
values of action and resistance, respectively (taken as best estimate values).
However, mean values of resistance are not easily established because traditional codified
design is based on a characteristic component strength procedure. In order to use pushover
analysis to its full potential in accordance with ISO 19902 there are two ways to progress. One
way is to estimate mean values of resistance using known or assumed distributions of the
resistance. The other way is to recast the ISO pushover safety format to using characteristic
resistance rather than mean resistance. It is this second way that is discussed in detail in this
document.
The characteristic component strength in ISO 19902 is defined in a two-step procedure in
which characteristic material strength values are used together with design formulae given in
the standard. Using characteristic yield strength values in the formulae in Clauses 13 to 15 of
ISO 19902 are assumed to produce characteristic component strengths, and the use of the
mean yield strength in pushover analysis is assumed to mirror mean resistance.
In ISO 19902 the characteristic yield strength for component based design shall be taken as
the specified minimum yield strength (SMYS) of the material. However in most other standards,
e.g. Eurocodes, the characteristic strength values generally correspond to a 5 % fractile value.
In this document it has been demonstrated that the use of 5 % fractile characteristic resistance
rather than mean resistance leads to a safety format where the assumed COV for resistance
only affects the safety level modestly. The safety level thus obtained is slightly higher than
current ISO 19902 requirements, and could potentially justify a minor reduction of the RSR
requirements.
1.3 ISO 19902 design philosophy

In ISO 19902 the prime safety format for ULS and ALS analysis is a required RSR value, but
also the use of a partial safety factor format with action factors derived from the required RSR
value is allowed. - In this document the requirements to new structures are discussed, while
specific requirements for existing structures are not discussed in any detail.
Generally, in ISO 19902 a suitable safety level is obtained using specific design equation that
compares load effects and resistances based on specified RSR values or partial coefficients.
John Wægter Ramboll Oil & Gas 1

pushover analysis
Ultimate limit states are associated with a 100-year return period for the environmental load.
The associated RSR requirement (L1 structure) for the North West Europe region is minimum
1.85 or a partial action factor of 1.35 (A.7.10 and H.2.3). It is noted that the RSR apply for all
structural forms covered by ISO 19902 at the specific geographical location, while the partial
action factor of 1.35 given only apply for a 'typical North Sea jacket structure with conventional
framing'. Appropriate partial action factors for other structural forms shall be adjusted to
produce a RSR close to 1.85 (A.7.10).
In ISO 19902 it is a requirement to design/assess structures both in the ULS design situation
and in the ALS situation. This is not a trivial requirement as often believed, because wave
loads with a longer return period than the 100-year reference load expose structural parts
differently and at a higher elevation than the 100-year load. Generally, the 10 000 year wave
load should therefore not be taken simply as a scaled version of the 100-year load, but should
reflect both a potential change in wave kinematics and a higher stretch upwards.
Accidental limit states (ALS) are associated with a 10 000 year return period for the abnormal
environmental load and for accidental loads. The associated RSR requirement is implied to be
minimum 1.0. - In this document we only deal with the ALS abnormal environmental load, while
accidental loads are not discussed in detail.

pushover analysis
2 Efhymiou reliability model

2.1 Introduction
In this section the reliability model developed by Efthymiou, [2], is scrutinized. In particular
the RSR and γ E values quoted in ISO 19902 Clause A.9.9.3.3. are recalculated and
commented.
2.2 Features of the Reliability Model

The reliability model is based on the following main elements:
 Description of the Environment: using models that take into account the joint probability
of waves, current and winds in defining the 100-year load and the long term load
distribution.
 Wave Loading Models: using a wave force recipe that accounts for the three-dimensional
features of real seas and uses realistic force coefficients.
 Ultimate strength: the structural strength refers to system collapse.
The reliability model used is a simple model where both the global load effects and the ultimate
structural resistance are assumed lognormally distributed. As mentioned above, the limit state
considered in pushover analysis (system strength) is the total collapse of the structure where
individual component failure is acceptable as long as the effects of load redistribution can be
accommodated within the system.
The following definitions are used:
Meanvalue
Bias 
Characteristicvalue
Standarddeviation
COV 
Meanvalue
It is noted that the long term distribution of the environmental loading generally is a function of
the geographical location, The required values of RSR and γ E will therefore differ between
different geographical areas.
The basic idea is to choose a reliability target level of safety, and subsequently adjust the
required RSR and γ E values to yield the specified safety level in any of the considered
geographical areas.
Although the acceptance criteria could/should also be a function of the exposure level, this
aspect is not addressed neither in [2] nor in this document.

pushover analysis
2.3 Reliability model

When both the global load E and the structure's ultimate resistance R are assumed to be
lognormally distributed the expression for the safety index beta is given by
 R 2
m 1  VE 
ln  
 Em
1  VR 
2

 
beta Rm Em VE VR 
ln 1  VR    1  VE 
2 2
  
Rm is the mean resistance (relative to E100 , i.e. Rm = RSR)
Em is the mean load for a given reference return period (relative to E100 )
VR is the resistance COV
VE is the load COV
It is noted that in [2] Em is termed the load. Strictly speaking the parameter needed is the load
effect or in modern terms the action effect. However, in order not to confuse this documents
with such details, the nomenclature originally used in [2] has also been used in this document.
In [2] the parameters of the lognormal distribution describing the 20-yr extreme load are given
as Table 2 and are reproduced below. These data are used to calculate a lifetime β value based
on an assumed 100-year design event and a lifetime platform exposure (reference period) of 20
years. In this document the lifetime β values are transformed to annual probabilities of failure.
Table 2 provides information for several geographical areas: namely Central North Sea (CNS),
Northern North Sea (NNS), Gulf of Mexico (GOM) and AUS (northwest coast of Australia). The
table provides the following parameters of the lognormal distribution: most probable value (E 20 ).
mean value (E20m), sigma (σE) and COV (VE) for each geographical area. - The values needed
to calculate β are the mean value and COV.

pushover analysis
The COV values in Table 2 account for for the short-term variability in wave parameters within a
storm, as well as the long term variability. In addition one must account for the uncertainty in
hydrodynamic areas and volumes and marine growth. This effect is represented by COV = 8
percent and a bias factor of 1.0. This COV must be combined with the COV values from Table
2.
2.4 Safety index in API LRFD for GOM

The reliability model can be used to calculate the lifetime (20 years) safety index inherent in the
API LRFD code, [3].
In [2] the following information was derived based on the GOM database:
 mean RSR=1.85
 γ E=1.35
 COVR=0.05
Further, it was noted that the mean RSR is proportional to γ E, resulting in the following
relationship
 Rm=1.85/1.35 * γ E=1.37*γ E
The inherent safety index in API LRFD, valid for the population of offshore structures in the
GOM, can therefore be calculated from
Rm  1.85 (times the 100-yr reference load)
Em  0.79 (times the 100-yr reference load, Table 2)
2 2
VE  0.32  0.08 VE  0.33 (Table 2)
VR  0.05
resulting in the safety index  

beta Rm Em VE VR  2.77126

βgom  beta Rm Em VE VR 
βgom  2.77
The β value thus calculated is a lifetime value associated with a reference period of 20 years
based on a (characteristic) 100-year design event.

pushover analysis
2.5 Calibrating other locations to GOM safety level

The above result can be used to calibrate the safety level in other areas to that of GOM. This
can be done using the GOM safety index as target level of safety and consider each
individual area with the long-term wave load distribution given in Table 2.
Rearranging the previously given equation for β results in
Em

 exp β ln 1  VR
2  2
 
Rm β Em VE VR 
2      1  VE 
1  VE
2
1  VR
If we now use this equation for the different areas from Table 2 we arrive at
GOM  2
Rm 2.771 0.79  0.32  0.08 0.05  1.85
2 

RSRgom  Rm 2.771 0.79  0.32  0.08 0.05
2 2  γEgom 
1
 RSR gom
1.37
RSRgom  1.85 γEgom  1.35
AUS  2
Rm 2.771 0.78  0.33  0.08 0.05  1.866
2 

RSRaus  Rm 2.771 0.78  0.33  0.08 0.05
2 2  γaus 
1
 RSR aus
1.37
RSRaus  1.87 γaus  1.36
NNS  2
Rm 2.771 0.81  0.265  0.08 0.05  1.681
2 

RSRnns  Rm 2.771 0.81  0.265  0.08 0.05
2 2  γEnns 
1
 RSR nns
1.37
RSRnns  1.68 γEnns  1.23

pushover analysis
CNS &  2 2
Rm 2.771 0.84  0.212  0.08 0.05  1.548 
SNS
 2
RSRcns  Rm 2.771 0.84  0.212  0.08 0.05
2  γEcns 
1
 RSR cns
1.37
RSRcns  1.55 γEcns  1.13
The values found correspond, apart from minor round off differences, to the ones determined in
[2] Table 3, which is reproduced below.
A different approach would be to state a target probability of failure given as probabilities

/annum and derive values for RSR and γ E to achieve this target. This approach will be
further investigated in the following sections and will be used extensively throughout the rest
of this document.
2.6 Target probability calibration for new manned installations

In [2] an appropriate level of reliability for new, permanently manned installations has been
proposed. This corresponds to a target probability of failure of 3*10-5 /annum.
The probability of failure and β relates as Pf = Φ(-β) where Φ is defined as
x
 1 2
 exp
1
Φ ( x )    z  dz
 2 π 2 

∞
For the reliability model considered until now the reference period is 20 years, i.e. the required
probability of failure (in 20 years) for new manned installations is approximately given as
5 4
Pf20  20 3  10 Pf20  6  10
This transformation between 20-year values and annual values is acceptable as long as
the failure events from year to year are independent events, [4].

pushover analysis
The β 20 value corresponding to Pf20 can (by trial and error) be found from
4
Φ ( 3.23886 )  6  10 the corresponding β 20 value is therefore taken as 3.239.
If we now use this β value for the different areas from Table 2 we arrive at
AUS  2 2
Rm 3.239 0.78  0.33  0.08 0.05  2.182 
 2
RSRaus  Rm 3.239 0.78  0.33  0.08 0.05
2  γaus 
1
 RSR aus
1.37
NNS  2 2
Rm 3.239 0.81  0.265  0.08 0.05  1.913 
 2
RSRnns  Rm 3.239 0.81  0.265  0.08 0.05
2  γEnns 
1
 RSR nns
1.37
CNS &  2 2
Rm 3.239 0.84  0.212  0.08 0.05  1.724 
SNS
 2
RSRcns  Rm 3.239 0.84  0.212  0.08 0.05
2  γEcns 
1
 RSR cns
1.37
The values found correspond, apart from minor round off differences, to the ones determined in
[2] Table 4, which is reproduced below.

pushover analysis
2.7 Target probability calibration for new unmanned installations

In [2] also an appropriate level of reliability for new, unmanned/evacuated installations has been
proposed. This correspond to a target probability of failure of 5*10-4 /annum.
For the reliability model considered the reference period is 20 years, i.e. the corresponding
probability of failure is
4 3
Pf20  20 5  10 Pf20  10.000  10
3
Φ ( 2.3263)  10.001  10 the corresponding β 20 value is therefore taken as 2.326.
If we now use this β value for the different areas from Table 2 we arrive at
AUS  2 2
Rm 2.326 0.78  0.33  0.08 0.05  1.609 
 2
RSRaus  Rm 2.326 0.78  0.33  0.08 0.05
2  γaus 
1
 RSR aus
1.37
NNS  2 2
Rm 2.326 0.81  0.265  0.08 0.05  1.486 

RSRnns  Rm 2.326 0.81  0.265  0.08 0.05
2 2  γEnns 
1
 RSR nns
1.37
CNS &  2 2
Rm 2.326 0.84  0.212  0.08 0.05  1.398 
SNS

RSRcns  Rm 2.326 0.84  0.212  0.08 0.05
2 2  γEcns 
1
 RSR cns
1.37
The values found correspond again, apart from minor round off differences, to the ones
determined in [2] Table 5, which is reproduced below.

pushover analysis
In [2] it is noted that the values of Table 5 relate to new, not normally manned structures. For
existing installations in this category, the criteria in Table 5 can potentially be relaxed, using
cost benefit considerations.
2.8 Historical comments on the API and ISO development

When API determined to develop a LRFD version of its WSD design code it was the goal to
carry over the experience from many years of design of offshore structures mainly in the Gulf
of Mexico. This was done by calibrating component behaviour in the new LRFD code to the
mean β's inherent in the WSD code, using a slightly simplified version of the beta equation
given in this document.
By using this type of calibration, and still base the design on a component design, the new
LRFD code had the same mean safety level as the WSD version and incorporated the
experienced structural performance accumulated from previous WSD designs.
At the same time a need to assess old platforms, originally designed to old API WSD codes,
became quite obvious. The API solution to this problem was to introduce pushover analysis
to fully utilize the system strength of the platforms, and to use less stringent, but still
adequate acceptance criteria, than used for new structures. So, originally API only allowed
pushover analysis for assessment of old platforms, but not for the design of new structures.
With the development of the ISO 19902 standard there was a need to broaden the above API
approaches to be used not only in the GOM, but worldwide. Further, there was a recognition
that pushover analysis had not only a role in assessment. In a broader context it could be
used to define the 'true' safety level of a structure as it is based on system behaviour rather
than component behaviour. This way of thinking is reflected and supported in [2].
The prime safety parameter in ISO 19902 (in relation to ULS/ALS environmental loading) was
therefore chosen as the RSR value. This means that all structures, complex or simple, at the
same location, have the same required system strength (expressed as RSR). The challenge
was then to define the required RSR value for different geographical locations in a rational
and consistent way. The procedures from [2] were finally accepted (after years of
discussion), and the RSR and γ E values from [2] are also (partially) referenced in ISO 19902.
It is important to remember that the values calculated are RSR requirements with a derived γ E
that would give the required RSR for a 'standard GOM/North Sea' structure. Therefore, ISO
19902 gives its safety requirement in terms of a minimum RSR value and 'proposes' a γ E that
for a typical structure in the region considered, when used in a component based design,
would give a structure with (at least) the required RSR. The user must for unusual structures
make sure that the γ E used actually gives the required RSR, and if this is not the case,
increase the γ E until the required RSR value is obtained (A.7.10).

pushover analysis
In this document Section 2.4 'Safety index in API LRFD for GOM' determines the safety level
for system based design based on the accumulated GOM experience. The GOM data base
has been used to determine RSR values for 'well-behaving' GOM structures, and a mean RSR
value of 1.85 (at least) was found when compared with an updated API LRFD design using
γ E=1.35 in a component design. These results were interpreted as a RSR = 1.85 requirement
for the system design of new structures and a corresponding γ E = 1.35 value for component
based design.
If pushover analysis only should be used to design/reassess structures in GOM, the story
could end here, because an adequate safety level in terms of the RSR value has been
established.
However, ISO 19902 wanted to use these approaches on a world wide scale where one could
account for the differences in storm wave statistics in different geographical regions.
The first idea was, as also given in [2], to assume that the safety level (β gom) valid for GOM
would also be sufficient for other geographical regions with fabrication practices not too
different from GOM practices. RSR requirements based on the GOM safety level, but
adjusted to local storm wave statistics, are calculated in the Section 2.5 'Calibrating other
locations to GOM safety level'. The results are similar to the results in [2].
A different approach, based on a chosen annual probability of failure (although notional), [2],
was used to calibrate RSR requirements for different geographical regions. This has been
done in the sections 2.6. and 2.7, 'Target probability calibration for new manned installations'
and 'Target probability calibration for new unmanned installations'.

pushover analysis
3 Improved pushover safety format
3.1 Introduction
As previously demonstrated the reliability model was originally used to calculate the lifetime
(20 years) safety index inherent in the API LRFD code based on the following information:
 mean RSR=1.85
 COVR=0.05
This information reflects GOM conditions, and it was assumed that the ultimate strength of an
offshore space frame structure primarily is governed by the strength characteristics of
members (braces) in compression or tension and the strength of tubular K and X joints under
axial loading. For these critical components strength databases in both the US and Europe
indicate that the component strength is adequately represented by COV = 10 percent.
However, as explained in [2], the uncertainty in system strength reduces when a number of
members are involved in the collapse mechanism. Thus, when four members take part in the
failure mechanism the system COV is reduced from 10 to 5 percent, and this COVR value was
used throughout the calibrations.
The proposed ISO pushover safety format outlined in [2] is based on the same assumed value
of COVR and it is noted that the COV representing the foundation failure mode has not been
explicitly discussed. There are good reasons for not being too focused on COV values for the
foundation resistance for typical jacket structures as foundation failures rarely occur, despite
they are often numerically predicted, see [5]. However, if one wants to improve the foundation
modeling towards a more realistic representation than used today, then the system COV
associated with foundation failure may be as relevant as the COV for structural component
failure.
The parameters in the reliability model are mean values and COV's for the load and the
resistance, respectively. In the following we will study the assumed distributions (lognormal)
and investigate the sensitivity of β to the choice of VR. In addition we will investigate whether
it is possible to propose a slightly changed safety format based on using the 'usual'
characteristic values for strength, but still use expected (mean) values for the loading. Such
an improved safety format should ideally produce the required β value, and at the same time
be less sensitive to VR than the current mean value (resistance) formulation.
3.2 Details of API requirements for GOM

3.2.1 General
The starting point is a study of the GOM population previously investigated.
The probability density function for load is given by:
 Lognormal distribution
 Em=0.79 (times the 100-yr reference load)
 VE=0.33
The parameters for the probability distributions are determined from [4] as

pushover analysis
 
Em
Logmean (μ lnX) 
λ Em VE  ln  
 1  V 2
 E 
ln 1  VE
2
Logdeviation(σlnX)  
ε VE 
 
The probability density function for E can be determined as
  Em
 
densityE x Em VE  λ  ln  Auxiliary parameters for plotting
 1  V 2
 E   Em   2.0 
Emean Em     Em 
MeanE   
ln 1  VE
2 0 
ε
 
dlnorm ( x λ ε )
1.8
1.6
1.4
 2
densityE x 0.79  0.32  0.08
2
 1.2
1
MeanE
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3
x Emean( 0.79)
Figure 1 Load density function (red) with mean value (blue)
Similarly, the probability density function for the resistance R can be determined as
 
Rm  Rm 

densityR x Rm VR  λ  ln   
Rmean Rm 
 Rm 
 1  V 2
 R 
ln 1  VR
2
ε  4.5 
  MeanR   
dlnorm ( x λ ε ) 0 

pushover analysis
4.5
 
densityE x 0.79  0.32  0.08 3.5
2 2
3
MeanE
2.5
densityR( x 1.85 0.05)
2
MeanR
1.5
0.5
0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3
x Emean( 0.79) x Rmean( 1.85)
Figure 2 Load density function (red) and resistance density function (black)
3.2.2 Probability of failure

The probability of failure corresponding to the 20 year reference period can be found directly
from the above distributions (Figure 2).
The cumulative probability function for R can be found as
 Rm

cumprobR x Rm VR  λ  ln 
 1  V 2
 R 
ln 1  VR
2
ε
 
plnorm ( x λ ε )
0.75
cumprobR( x 1.85 0.05) 0.5
0.25
0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
x
Figure 3 Cumulative probability function for resistance

pushover analysis
From basic probability of failure relationships given e.g. in [4], it follows that
FR( x )  cumprobR( x 1.85 0.05) FR(x) is cumulative distribution function
 2
fE( x )  densityE x 0.79  0.32  0.08
2 fE(x) is probability density function
The probability of failure associated with the investigated probability densities can be determined
as
8
TOL  1  10 parameter for setting accuracy for integration to determine pf20
10
 3 Pf20 4
Pf20   FR( x )  fE( x ) dx Pf20  2.792  10 p fa  p fa  1.4  10
 20
0
Thus the inherent annual probability of failure in API LRFD is, based on the Efthymiou
reliability model, equal to 1.4x10-4 .
The 20-year probability of failure can also be determined directly from the β 20 value, see
Sections 2.4 and 2.6 as
3
Φ ( 2.77126 )  2.792  10
and note the (required) correspondence between the two calculated values of probability of
failure.
3.2.3 β20 sensitivity to choice of VR

As previously discussed the reliability model is used to determine load and resistance
parameters so that a required target value of β 20 is obtained. However, the model is based on
an assumed (fixed) value VR = 0.05, and thus contains a sensitivity to other choices of VR as
displayed below.
VR  0.05 0.051  0.2
4
3.5
3
2.5
beta1.85 0.79  0.32  0.08 V R 2
2 2
 
1.5
1
0.5
0
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
VR
Figure 4 β 20 sensitivity to choice of VR

pushover analysis
Similarly, the annual probability of failure sensitivity to VR may be expressed as
4
5 10
4
4 10
4
Φ beta1.85 0.79  0.32  0.08 VR 3 10
2 2
  
4
20 2 10
4
1 10
0
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
VR
Figure 5 Annual probability of failure sensitivity to choice of V R
It is noted that the probability model contains some sensitivity to the choice of VR, resulting in
less reliable structures than assumed if the actual value of VR exceeds the value (0.05) used
for the calibration. On the other hand, the difference between using VR equal to 0,05 and 0,15
results in a factor of around 2 on the annual probability of failure. Recognizing our informational
and computational limits within the reliability model, a factor of 2 is within the accuracy implied
by such models, see [6].
In my opinion the above findings justify the choice of a fixed value of VR in the calibration of
RSR values that may be used for all structural forms (covered by ISO 19902).
Despite these findings an improved reliability model based on the use of characteristic strength
parameters has been found to produce annual probabilities of failure that are even less
sensitive to the choice of VR.
3.2.4 Improved reliability model

In conventional partial action factor design the values used in the design process are denoted
characteristic values, i.e. we use a characteristic load and a characteristic resistance. We
typically use a 100-year return period load with some difference between the mean value and
the characteristic value on the loading side, and a low fractile value for the resistance. Figure
6 below, taken from API LRFD, [3], illustrates this process.

pushover analysis
Figure 6 Illustration of load and resistance probability (API LRFD)
It is noted that API LRFD denotes the characteristic value the 'nominal value' rather than the
characteristic value, but otherwise the two terms are identical.
The existing API/Efthymiou reliability models for pushover analysis use mean values as
characteristic values, i.e. bias is equal to 1. However, we can introduce bias in the pushover
reliability model by introducing
Rm  BR Rc
Em  BE Ec
in the expression for the β-equation. We denote this new β-expression 'betabias', but it
produces the same β-values as the original β-equation just based on bias and characteristic
input instead of mean value.
 B  R 1  V 2 
R c E
ln  
 BE Ec 1  VR2 
 
betabias Rc BR Ec BE VE VR 
ln 1  VR    1  VE 
2 2
  
It can easily be seen that the above expression reflects the reliability model in Figure 6.
However, for the purpose of defining what we will denote an improved reliability model for
pushover analysis, we want to use the mean load value and a low (5 %) fractile value for the

pushover analysis
resistance. By doing so we end up with a familiar procedure in which we can determine the
wave loading as given in the ISO 19902 wave load recipe (practically unbiased, see [7]), and
the resistance using 'usual' characteristic strength parameters.
We therefore use the betabias equation with BE = 1 and Ec = mean wave load. Rc determined
from this expression is (as Rm) relative to E100 . Rc thus determined expresses the RSR value
to use when biased resistance parameters are introduced as 'characteristic values' rather than
mean values. This RSR value is denoted RSRc.
3.2.5 Determination of RSR c

We will use a 5 % percentile for the system strength rather the mean value, and want to
determine the corresponding RSRc value.
From Figure 6 it appears that that RSR value in a pushover analysis is equal to the mean
safety margin. RSRc is similarly equal to the distance from the mean load to the 5 % fractile
value in the resistance distribution. I can therefore be determined as the value where the
cumulative probability of the resistance is equal to 5 %.
The inverse cumulative probability function for R can be found as
 Rm
 
invcumprobR x Rm VR  λ  ln 
 1  V 2
 R 
ln 1  VR
2
ε
 
qlnorm ( x λ ε )
invcumprobR ( 0.05 1.85 0.05)  1.702 this is the RSRc value, because FR( 1.702 )  0.05
This means that the required RSR is reduced from 1.85 to 1.702 if characteristic (5 % fractile)
values are used rather than mean values for the system resistance. The reduction factor on
RSR to obtain RSRc is 1.702/1.85 = 0.92. It is noted that this reduction factor only is related
to the resistance distribution based on a shift from mean value to 5 % fractile value.
3.2.6 Properties of the improved reliability model

The resistance bias in the improved reliability model can be found from
Rm

BR Rm VR 

invcumprobR 0.05 Rm VR 
This bias function gives us bias values corresponding to the 5 % fractile value for the
considered resistance distribution given by Rm and VR. Introducing the calculated bias function
into the betabias relation one can appreciate the beneficial properties of the improved reliability
model, see the figure below. When determining RSRc values from RSR values as done here,
and using these RSRc values in a pushover analysis based on characteristic resistance (5 %
fractile), we obtain slightly conservative β levels for all relevant VR values (Figure 7).

pushover analysis
Using the existing reliability model lower than anticipated β values are obtained for values of
VR higher than 0.05. The conclusion being that the improved reliability model is more robust
than the original API/Efthymiou reliability model as it produces a safe and less varying
reliability level for all relevant values of V R.
4
3.5
beta1.85 0.79  0.32  0.08 V R
2 2
  3
2.5
betabias1.702 BR 1.85 VR 0.79 1  0.32  0.08 VR
  2 2
  2
1.5
betabias1.702 BR( 1.85 0.05) 0.79 1  0.32  0.08 0.05 1
2 2
 
0.5
0
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
VR
Figure 7 β 20 using RSR approach (red) and RSRc approach (blue), target
β 20 -value indicated in black
These calculations were made for GOM conditions. Similar calculations may be made for other
geographical regions as demonstrated below.
3.3 Details of CNS & SNS requirements
3.3.1 General
In this section we will make similar investigations for CNS and SNS as previously carried out for
GOM. We will look at the criteria for the design of new manned installations as proposed in [2],
i.e. based on a target probability of failure of 3*10-5 /annum.
The probability density function for load is given by Table 2 from [2]:
 Lognormal distribution
 Em=0.84 (times the 100-yr reference load)
 VE=0.212 , Vm=0.08
The resistance is given by Table 4 from [2]:
 mean RSR=1.73
 COVR=0.05
Using these values the load density function and the resistance density function can be
calculated as shown in the figure below.

pushover analysis
4.5

densityE x 0.84  0.212  0.08 3.5
2 2

3
MeanE
2.5
densityR( x 1.73 0.05)
2
MeanR
1.5
0.5
0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3
x Emean( 0.84) x Rmean( 1.73)
Figure 8 Load density function (red) and resistance density function (black)
3.3.2 Probability of failure

We can make a check of the inherent probability of failure based on the cumulative probability
function for R and the load density function previously defined:
FR( x )  cumprobR( x 1.73 0.05)

fE( x )  densityE x 0.84  0.212  0.08
2 2
The probability of failure associated with the investigated probability densities can be determined
as
10
 4 Pf20 5
Pf20   FR( x )  fE( x ) dx Pf20  5.672  10 p fa  p fa  2.84  10
 20
0
The calculated annual probability of failure is very close to the target value of 3*10-5 /annum.
3.3.3 Determination of RSR c

As before we use the 5 % percentile for the system strength rather than the mean value, and
want to determine the corresponding RSRc value.
RSR c  invcumprobR ( 0.05 1.73 0.05) RSR c  1.592
This means that the required RSR value is reduced from 1.73 to 1.592 if characteristic (5 %
fractile) values are used rather than mean values for the system resistance.

pushover analysis
The results are verified in the figure below and it is noted that the improved reliability model
again is more robust than the original reliability model as it produces a safe and less varying
reliability level for all relevant values of V R.
4
3.5
beta1.73 0.84  0.212  0.08 V R
2 2
  3
2.5
betabias1.592 BR 1.73 VR 0.84 1  0.212  0.08 VR
  2 2
  2
1.5
betabias1.592 BR( 1.73 0.05) 0.84 1  0.212  0.08 0.05 1
2 2
 
0.5
0
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
VR
Figure 9 β 20 using RSR approach (red) and RSRc approach (blue), target
β 20 -value indicated in black
As previously found when analyzing GOM data, the reduction factor on RSR to obtain RSRc is
0.92.

pushover analysis
3.4 ISO 19902 implementation of the improved reliability model
3.4.1 General
In this section we will discuss the ISO 19902 requirements and how the improved reliability
model could be implemented.
3.4.2 ISO 19902 background

Requirements to RSR values and corresponding partial action factors to be used for
component based design are in principle given in 'Annex H Regional information'. Like other
annexes in the standard this annex is informative by nature. However, information in Annex H
is normative for structures located in the defined areas, and informative for other regions.
Requirements are therefore given in 'H.2.2 Regulatory framework in NW Europe' with specific
requirements to partial action factors in 'H.2.3.1 Partial action factors'. H.2.3.1 reads: 'The
partial action factor for environmental actions shall be 1.35 (see 9.10), unless rational analysis
demonstrate an alternative value is appropriate'.
More advanced users of ISO 19902 will be surprised to experience that no specific RSR value
is given in Annex H. It can only be seen as a reflection of the fact, that during the development
of the standard it was very difficult, close to impossible, to reach consensus about the required
safety requirements, and in the end only the partial action factor was given.
Despite the fact that partial action factors fundamentally are derived parameters from given
RSR requirements, the majority of practical users of ISO 19902 argued at the time of writing
the standard, that establishing a consensus value of the partial action factor for environmental
action was a much more important achievement than specifying the RSR value.
In fairness one should also remember that at the time of writing ISO 19902 few people had
practical experience with pushover analysis, while the overwhelming majority had extensive
experience with component based design. These people generally saw ultimate strength
analysis (pushover analysis) as a specialized tool for very few designers and were eager to
promote a partial factor design as 'the normal design route' in ISO 19902.
Although irrational, this and strong time pressures to finalize the standard is the reason why the
RSR picture became blurred and did not become part of annex H. In hindsight this is highly
regrettable and should definitely be remedied in future versions of ISO 19902.
However, regional RSR requirements and appropriate ways of deriving such information was
not entirely left out, but was referred to Annex A. The most direct guidance is given in
A.7.10.1, where it is stated that the RSR for a typical L1 platform in the North Sea should be
close to 1.85 (new structure). This requirement should be seen as equivalent to the
requirement of using a partial action factor for environmental loads equal to 1.35 for component
based design of a new structure (Regional information H.2.3.1).- In fact, the fundamental
requirement is RSR = 1.85 and the γ f = 1.35 is the calibrated partial action factor for a typical
North Sea platform.
3.4.3 ISO 19902 implementation

It has been demonstrated that it is possible to improve the reliability model simply by using
characteristic resistance values rather than mean values. The result is a more robust model
than the original API/Efthymiou reliability model, as the improved model will produce a safe and
less varying reliability level for all relevant values of V R. The practical result is simply to use

pushover analysis
reduced RSR requirements, here denoted RSRc requirements, in pushover analysis based on
characteristic strength values rather than mean values.
The detailed investigations done in this document for both GOM and CNS & SNS conditions
demonstrate that the reduction factor on RSR to obtain RSRc is 0.92, and that this reduction
factor only is related to the resistance distribution based on a shift from mean value to 5 %
fractile value.

pushover analysis
4 Discussion of ISO 19902 design philosophy
4.1 Use of nonlinear pushover analysis

4.1.1 General
When using a nonlinear pushover analysis to estimate system reserve strength in terms of the
RSR, the designer quantifies the structure's ability to resist overload relative to a chosen
reference action, which depends on the limit state considered. In ISO 19902 pushover analysis
is associated with either the 100-year design environmental situation, or with accidental design
situations with a significantly lower probability of occurrence.
The pushover analysis is carried out by demonstrating that a certain target value of RSR is
met. This target value depends on several parameters, which for environmental action are
 geographical region (wave environment)

 exposure level (L-level)
 limit state considered (ULS or ALS)
In the following discussion we will study the steps in the design or assessment process when
the starting point is a notional probability of failure used together with the basic reliability model
previously discussed. In addition, we will discuss the fundamental difference between the
regular design situation and accidental design situations.
According to ISO 19902 offshore structures and their structural components shall be designed
to satisfy particular limit states. Each limit state is verified by defining a number of design
situations, and requiring that the associated action effects shall meet given design criteria.
Design situations are classified into three categories:
1. persistent situations, with a duration similar to the design service life of the structure;
2. transient situations, with a much shorter duration and varying levels of intensity;
3. accidental situations, which are of short duration and low probability of occurrence.
Persistent and transient situations are typically considered in the regular ULS design using an
environmental load E100 with a return period of 100 years. Accidental situations consider
hazards with a return period of 10 000 years denoted E 10000 (and associated persistent
situations) in the ALS design situation.
4.1.2 Hazards
Accidental design situations are treated by considering hazards. A hazard is in ISO
19902 defined as a potential for human injury, damage to the environment, damage to property,
or a combination of these. Using such a broad definition of a hazard, several of the usual
hazards to a platform (e.g. extreme storms) are treated in the regular design situation for a
structure, while hazards considered in accidental design situations are errors and abnormal
and accidental situations with a low, but not neglectable probability of occurrence.
In ISO 19902 hazards are categorized based on probability of occurrence, and are divided into
three main groups.

pushover analysis
 Group1: hazards with a probability of occurring or being exceeded of the order of 10-2 per
annum (return periods of the order of 100 years);
 Group 2: hazards with a 10 to 100 times lower probability of occurring or being exceeded,
i.e. probabilities of the order of 10-3 to 10-4 per annum (return periods of the order of 1000
to 10 000 years);
 Group 3: hazards with a probability of occurring or being exceeded markedly lower than
10-4 per annum (returns periods well in excess of 10 000 years).
Designing for hazards of group 1 for design environmental actions (wind, waves and current and
earthquake when relevant) is normally treated by the regular design process and is incorporated
in the verification of ULS limit states for persistent and transient design situations.
Other hazards belonging to Group 1 and not treated by the regular design process and
hazards belonging to Group 2 are addressed by a requirement that the structure shall satisfy
particular accidental limit state (ALS) requirements. These accidental limit states are verified
through specified accidental situations.
Hazards falling into Group 3 are sometimes referred to as residual accidents and may
normally be neglected for design.
4.1.3 Robustness
According to ISO 19902 Clause 7.9 a structure shall incorporate robustness through
consideration of the effects of all hazards and their probabilities of occurrence to ensure that
consequent damage is not disproportional to the cause. The intention of the associated ALS
limit states is to ensure that the structure can tolerate specified accidental situations and, if
damage occurs, that it subsequently maintains structural integrity for a sufficient period under
specified environmental conditions to enable evacuation to take place. This requirement is
sometimes called the progressive collapse limit state (PLS) requirement.
Accidental situations relate to two types of hazards:
 Hazards associated with identified accidental events. These hazards belong to Group
1 or Group 2 and are not included in the regular design process.
 Hazards associated with abnormal environmental actions. These actions can occur
due to the possible exposure to very rare and abnormally severe environmental conditions.
They correspond to a significantly longer return period than the ordinary design actions,
i.e. they belong to Group 2.
In lieu of better information the abnormal design situation may be based on a return period of
10 000 years for an exposure level L1 platform. This return period is an indication of the order
of magnitude rather than a precise number, since accurate databases for such small
probabilities of exceedance rarely exist.
4.2 Safety levels in the design process

4.2.1 General
For pushover analysis according to ISO 19902 the RSR requirement in the regular design
process is based on a 100-year environmental action and is in the following denoted RSR2 ,
while the RSR requirement for the 10 000-year environmental action is denoted RSR4 . The
index on RSR indicates the exponent in the considered return period.

pushover analysis
4.2.2 Regular design situation

The safety level for the regular design situation is defined by a chosen target β value, or a
corresponding notional target annual probability of failure, and is associated with E100 .
Procedures for determining the annual probability of failure have been explained and detailed in
the previous sections of this document.
Thus, the design of new manned platforms (L1) is according to Table 4, [2], based on an
annual probability of failure of pfa =3*10-5 , leading to an RSR2 requirement of 1.73 for the
Central and Southern North Sea.
4.2.3 Abnormal environmental design situation

An accidental design situation based on 10 000-year environmental actions shall also be
investigated, and shall be used as basis for the design if it is more onerous than the regular
design situation.
For platforms with sufficient air gap Tromans found in [8] a ratio of the 10 000-year to the
100-year environmental load equal to 1.65 for UK waters. This value supports the common
perception that the regular design situation is the most onerous one as long as wave load on
the topsides is avoided. This conclusion is normally true for global response values such as
base shear and overturning moment for a typical jacket structure. But it is not true for the
upper part of the structure, and in particular not for a monotower structure where the 10
000-year wave load exposes the central column above the 100-year crest. In such cases the
only direct wave loading above the 100-year crest stems from the higher 10 000-year crest.
For platforms with insufficient air gap, deck wave impingement on the topsides typically makes
the abnormal design situation the most onerous for all parts of the structure.
In ISO 19902 this is captured as a requirement to demonstrate an RSR4 equal to at least 1.0
for the abnormal environmental action.

pushover analysis
5 Hazard curves: use and misuse

5.1 General
In this section the hazard curve concept is introduced, and its place in defining accidental
loads is discussed.
5.2 Hazard curves
5.5.1 General
A hazard curve describes the variation of the hazard loading magnitude with return period or
annual probability of exceedance, see Figure 10 taken from [9].
From the previous sections we have seen that in broad terms the RSR and the load return
period of the environment (wave, ice, etc.) determine the probability of failure of the structural
system.
Figure 10 Example of hazard curves
It can be seen that hazard curves are location dependent and also depend on the type of
hazard considered. The slope of the curve provides a measure of the relative difficulty of
reducing a given risk for hazards with a return period longer than 100 years.
Most hazard curves published are approximately linear when the return period axis is
logarithmic and the slope can be defined as the ratio of the 10 000-year hazard intensity
divided by the 100-year intensity, i.e. E4 /E2 .
This ratio may be obtained from long term statistics generated in a response based criteria
study or, if that is not available, estimated from the ratio of the 10 000-year wave height H4 to
the 100-year wave height H2 by assuming E4 /E2 approximated by (H4 /H2 )2 . The required load
level for a given return period longer than 100 years can then be read from the hazard curve.
It is noted that such load levels taken from the hazard curve are expressed as multiples of E 2

pushover analysis
and not as multiples of E4 , which should be preferred because of the difference in the two load
patterns (E4 higher and possibly of different shape in load vector).
In nearly all studies published the response presented in the hazard curve is base shear
(sometimes also overturning moment).
5.5.2 The nature of hazard curves

Fixed offshore structures designed in accordance with ISO 19902 are in ULS designed to resist
overload from waves with a lower annual exceedance probability than 10-2 by specification of
the reserve strength ratio, RSR2 . Provided that the load versus exceedance probability is of a
well behaved nature, the design load thus obtained was, especially earlier, assumed to result in
a reasonable platform safety against overload from abnormal waves with a return period longer
than 100 years. - However this is not always true, especially for wave-in-deck type loading
situations.
Load level
ALSbad
RSR2 *E2
ALSwell
E2
Figure 11 Illustration of well-behaving and bad-behaving response problems
Most platforms of the jacket type are for wave loading well-behaving as long as the deck is not
impinged by waves, and typically the ULS design with a certain RSR2 requirement is more
onerous than the ALS requirement associated with RSR4 = 1 with reference to E4 .
The load levels are illustrated on Figure 11 (principle, not to scale) adapted from [10]. It should
be noted that the RSR value for the ULS design is associated with the 100-year return period
load (E2 ), while the ALS abnormal wave load is associated with a return period load (E 4 ) of 10
000-years.
However, when the deck is impinged by waves the ALS abnormal wave load design is typically
more onerous than the ULS design.
Figure 11 demonstrates the importance of the ALS abnormal wave load requirement in ISO
19902 formulated directly with reference to the 10 000-year return period, and not as multiples
of the 100-year wave load.

pushover analysis
5.5.3 Why current hazard curves should be used with caution

The above discussion demonstrates the potential of hazard curves to illustrate global response
levels (typically base shear) in dependence of the return period of the environmental load.
If the load pattern does not change significantly with the return period, then well-behaving
hazard curves of the type shown in Figure 10 are realistic. However, for wave loading with e.g.
wave-in-deck load for the 10 000-year wave load, this is not the case.
The hazard curve (in Figure 10) references the 100-year load vector and does not account for
the fact that wave loads with a longer return period are higher (and possibly of a different shape)
than the 100-year load. This can have dramatic effects for certain structures, e.g. the upper part
of a monotower platform and as already mentioned in cases where the deck is impinged by the
wave crest.
Therefore, the design load vector for ALS design should not be given as multiples of the
100-year wave load vector, but rather as the 10 000-year load vector associated with a RSR4
requirement equal to at least 1.0 (as done in ISO 19902).
6 Bibliography
1. DS/EN ISO 19902. 'Fixed steel offshore structures'. 1. ed. 2008.
2. Efthymiou, M. et. al. 'Reliability-Based Criteria for Fixed Steel Offshore Platforms'.
Transactions of the ASME. Vol. 119, May 1997.
3. API LRFD, 1993. Recommended Practice for Planning, Designing and Constructing Fixed
Offshore Platforms LRFD, First Edition, July 1993, API, Washington, DC.
4. Melchers, R. E. 'Structural Reliability Analysis and Prediction'. 2nd Ed. Wiley 1999.
5. Chen et al. 'Analysis of Potential Conservatism in Foundation Design for Offshore Platform
Assessment'. Final Project Report. Prepared for the Minerals Management Service.
October 2009.
6. Cornell, A., 1995. 'OTC 7753 Structural Reliability - Some Contributions to Offshore
Technology'.
7. Heideman, J. C. and Weaver, T. O., 1992. 'Static Wave Force Procedure for Platform
Design'. Proceedings of Civil Engineering in the Oceans V, College Station, Texas.
American Society of Civil Engineers, New York.
8. Tromans, P. 2001. 'Extreme environmental load statistics in UK waters'. HSE Offshore
Technology Report.
9. Efthymiou, M. and van de Graaf, J.W. 'Reliability and (re)assessment of fixed steel
structures'. OMAE2011-50253.
10. Haver, S. 'Freak Waves: A Suggested Definition and Possible Consequences for Marine
Structures'. Ifremer Seminar 2004.

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based on an industry desire to
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derivation by Shell of reliability
values associated with fixed steel
jacket offshore structures.

Historic Derivation of Reliability Values For Fixed Steel Jacket Offshore Structures

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Historic derivation of reliability values

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Historic derivation of reliability

VERSION DATE AMENDMENTS

1.0 January 2017 First release

Annex: Reprint of ISO/TC 67/SC 7 N 749 8

While acknowledging the excellent work performed by Shell in this regard,

In addition to replicating the work published by Shell, John Wægter of Ramboll

Understandably, with a paucity of quality information in this area, the industry

American Petroleum Institute (API). API Report of Houston Conference: September

1 Background and findings

1.2 Pushover analysis

1.3 ISO 19902 design philosophy

John Wægter Ramboll Oil & Gas 1

John Wægter Ramboll Oil & Gas 2

2 Efhymiou reliability model

2.2 Features of the Reliability Model

The following definitions are used:

John Wægter Ramboll Oil & Gas 3

2.3 Reliability model

Rm is the mean resistance (relative to E100 , i.e. Rm = RSR)

VR is the resistance COV

VE is the load COV

John Wægter Ramboll Oil & Gas 4

2.4 Safety index in API LRFD for GOM

Rm  1.85 (times the 100-yr reference load)

Em  0.79 (times the 100-yr reference load, Table 2)

resulting in the safety index  

John Wægter Ramboll Oil & Gas 5

2.5 Calibrating other locations to GOM safety level

Rearranging the previously given equation for β results in

RSRgom  1.85 γEgom  1.35

RSRaus  1.87 γaus  1.36

RSRnns  1.68 γEnns  1.23

John Wægter Ramboll Oil & Gas 6

RSRcns  1.55 γEcns  1.13

A different approach would be to state a target probability of failure given as probabilities

2.6 Target probability calibration for new manned installations

The probability of failure and β relates as Pf = Φ(-β) where Φ is defined as

John Wægter Ramboll Oil & Gas 7

RSRaus  2.18 γaus  1.59

RSRnns  1.91 γEnns  1.40

RSRcns  1.72 γEcns  1.26

John Wægter Ramboll Oil & Gas 8

2.7 Target probability calibration for new unmanned installations

RSRaus  1.61 γaus  1.17

RSRnns  1.49 γEnns  1.08

RSRcns  1.40 γEcns  1.02

John Wægter Ramboll Oil & Gas 9

2.8 Historical comments on the API and ISO development

John Wægter Ramboll Oil & Gas 10

John Wægter Ramboll Oil & Gas 11

3 Improved pushover safety format

3.2 Details of API requirements for GOM

The probability density function for load is given by:

John Wægter Ramboll Oil & Gas 12

The probability density function for E can be determined as

Figure 1 Load density function (red) with mean value (blue)

John Wægter Ramboll Oil & Gas 13

3.2.2 Probability of failure