Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 152375 December 16, 2011

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JOSE L. AFRICA (substituted by his
heirs), MANUEL H. NIETO, JR., FERDINAND E. MARCOS (substituted by his
heirs), IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
and POTENCIANO ILUSORIO (substituted by his heirs), Respondents.

II. The Sandiganbayan’s ruling on the finality of its 1998 resolution was legally
erroneous but did not constitute grave abuse of discretion

In light of the above discussions and conclusions, the Sandiganbayan

undoubtedly erred on a question of law in its ruling, but this legal error did not
necessarily amount to a grave abuse of discretion in the absence of a clear showing that
its action was a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment affecting its exercise of
jurisdiction.62Without this showing, the Sandiganbayan’s erroneous legal conclusion
was only an error of judgment, or, at best, an abuse of discretion but not a grave
one. For this reason alone, the petition should be dismissed.

Despite this conclusion, however, we opt not to immediately dismiss the petition in light
of the unique circumstances of this case where the petitioner cannot entirely be faulted
for not availing of the remedy at the opportune time, and where the case, by its nature,
is undoubtedly endowed with public interest and has become a matter of public
concern.63 In other words, we opt to resolve the petition on the merits to lay the issues
raised to rest and to avoid their recurrence in the course of completely resolving the
merits of Civil Case No. 0009.

Although the word "rested" nowhere appears in the Rules of Court, ordinary court
procedure has inferred it from an overview of trial sequence under Section 5, Rule 30
(which capsulizes the order of presentation of a

party’s evidence during trial), read in relation to Rule 18 on Pre-Trial,64 both of the Rules
of Court. Under Section 5, Rule 30, after a party has adduced his direct evidence in the
course of discharging the burden of proof,65 he is considered to have rested his case,
and is thereafter allowed to offer rebutting evidence only.66 Whether a party has rested
his case in some measure depends on his manifestation in court on whether he has
concluded his presentation of evidence.67

In its second and third motions, respectively, the petitioner expressly admitted that "due
to oversight, [the petitioner] closed and rested its case";68 and that it "had terminated the
presentation of its evidence in x x x Civil Case No. 0009."69 In the face of these
categorical judicial admissions,70 the petitioner cannot suddenly make an about-face
and insist on the introduction of evidence out of the usual order. Contrary to the
petitioner’s assertion, the resting of its case could not have been conditioned on the
admission of the evidence it formally offered. To begin with, the Bane deposition, which
is the lone piece of evidence subject of this present petition, was not among the pieces
of evidence included in its formal offer of evidence and thus could not have been
admitted or rejected by the trial court.

The Court observes with interest that it was only in this present petition
for certiorari that the petitioner had firmly denied having rested its case. 71 Before then,
the petitioner never found it appropriate to question on certiorari the Sandiganbayan’s

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denial of its 2nd motion which prayed, inter alia, for the reopening of the case. This is
a fatal defect in the petitioner’s case.

Although the denial of the petitioner’s first motion did not necessitate an immediate
recourse to the corrective writ of certiorari, the denial of the 2nd motion dictated a
different course of action. The petitioner’s non-observance of the proper procedure for
the admission of the Bane deposition, while seemingly innocuous, carried fatal
implications for its case. Having been rebuffed on its first attempt to have the Bane
deposition adopted in Civil Case No. 0009, and without seeking reconsideration of the
denial, the petitioner presented its other pieces of evidence and eventually rested its
case. This time, the petitioner forgot about the Bane deposition and so failed to include
that piece of evidence in its formal offer of evidence.

More than two years later, the petitioner again tried to squeeze in the Bane deposition
into its case. In resolving the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
Sandiganbayan’s 2000 resolution, the Sandiganbayan held that the Bane deposition
has "become part and parcel" of Civil Case No. 0009. This pronouncement has obscured
the real status of the Bane deposition as evidence (considering that, earlier, the
Sandiganbayan already denied the petitioner’s attempt to adopt the Bane deposition as
evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 for the deponent cannot be cross-examined in court).
Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan ultimately denied the petitioner’s motion to reopen the
case. Having judicially admitted the resting of its case, the petitioner should have
already questioned the denial of its 2nd motion by way of certiorari, since the denial of
its attempt to reopen the case effectively foreclosed all avenues available to it for the
consideration of the Bane deposition. Instead of doing so, however, the petitioner
allowed the 60-day reglementary period, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, to lapse, and proceeded to file its 3rd motion.

Significantly, the petitioner changed its legal position in its 3rd motion by denying
having rested its case and insisting on the introduction of the Bane deposition. Rebuffed
once more, the petitioner filed the present petition, inviting our attention to the
Sandiganbayan’s resolutions,72 which allegedly gave it "mixed signals."73 By pointing to
these resolutions, ironically, even the petitioner impliedly recognized that they were then
already ripe for review on certiorari. What the petitioner should have realized was that
its 2nd motion unequivocally aimed to reopen the case for the introduction of further
evidence consisting of the Bane deposition. Having been ultimately denied by the court,
the petitioner could not have been prevented from taking the proper remedy
notwithstanding any perceived ambiguity in the resolutions.

On the other end, though, there was nothing intrinsically objectionable in the
petitioner’s motion to reopen its case before the court ruled on its formal offer of
evidence. The Rules of Court does not prohibit a party from requesting the court to allow
it to present additional evidence even after it has rested its case. Any such opportunity,
however, for the ultimate purpose of the admission of additional evidence is already
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. It is from the prism of the exercise of this
discretion that the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to reopen the case (for the purpose of
introducing, "marking and offering" additional evidence) should be viewed. We can
declare this Sandiganbayan action invalid if it had acted with grave abuse of discretion.