JURISDICTION

A. Supreme Court:
1. No original Jurisdiction over criminal cases
2. Appellate jurisdiction: a) by petition for review b) by notice of appeal
B. Court of Appeals
1. No original jurisdiction
2. Appellate jurisdiction: a) by notice of appeal b) by petition for review
C. Sandiganbayan
1. Original and exclusive jurisdiction under the ff. guidelines:
a. what offense or crime was committed
a) R.A. 3019 – Anti Graft and Corrupt Practice Act
b) R.A. 1379 – the law on Ill-gotten Wealth
c) Chap. II, Title VII, Bk. 2 of RPC – Bribery
d) Exec. Orders 1, 2, 14, 14-A – PCGG cases
e) Estafa under the Hannah Serana case, 542 SCRA, 1/22/08
f) Falsification under the Ramiscal vs Sandiganbayan
b. Who committed the offense/crime
b-1. Public officers in the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the government with salary grade 27
according to R.A. 6758
The Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
Read: Escobal vs. Garchitorena, 422 SCRA
b-2. Private individuals committing the offense/crime with public officers,
Read: People vs. Henry T. Go, March 25, 2014
Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan, 603 SCRA
People vs. Benipayo, 586 SCRA
c. How was the offense/crime committed
Read: Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA
Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 227 SCRA
Hannah Serana vs. Sandiganbayan, 542 SCRA
2. Appellate Jurisdiction
All cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of original or appellate jurisdiction over cases of
public officer with salary grade less than 27 charged with offenses/crimes aforementioned
D. Regional Trial Courts
1. Original exclusive: all criminal cases which are not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court. The offense must carry a penalty of more than six years or prision mayor
2. Appellate jurisdiction: all criminal cases from the MTC
E. Family Courts (RA 8369)
1. Exclusive original:
 a. where a party is a minor at the time of commission
b. violence against women and children
c. child abuse
d. drug cases
F. Metropolitan/Municipal Trial Court
1. All violations of city/municipal ordinances
2. All offenses punishable with imprisonment of not more than 6 years
3. Violations of traffic rules and regulations
4. Violations of the Bouncing Check Law
5. Damage to property with fine of not more than P10,000.00
G. Courts of Muslim Mindanao (RA 6734 as amended by 9054)
1. Shari’ah Circuit courts
2. Shari’ah District courts
3. Shari’ah Appellate courts
All personal, family and property relations cases between muslims residing in the autonomous
region of muslim Mindanao
H. What are military courts? Only service oriented cases. . .
Note: Read the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (RA 10175)
Read Bonifacio vs. RTC of Makati, Br. 149, 620 SCRA
Read Disini Jr. vs. Secretary of Justice, Feb. 18, 2014, 716 SCRA

Aguinaldo
SERENA vs SANDIGANBAYAN
542 SCRA, January 22, 2008
FACTS
The petitioner charged for the crime of Estafa, is a government scholar and a student regent of the University of the
Phillipines, Diliman, Quezon City. While in the performance of her official functions, she represented to former President
Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the UP will be renovated and renamed as Pres. Joseph Ejercito Estrada
Student Hall and for which purpose accused requested the amount of P15,000,000.00.
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person because as a UP student regent, she was
not a public officer due to the following: 1.) that being merely a member in representation of the student body since she
merely represented her peers; 2.) that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a UP student regent;
and 3.) she does not fall under Salary Grade 27.
The Ombudsman contends that petitioner, as a member of the BOR is a public officer, since she had the general powers
of administration and exercise the corporate powers of UP. Compensation is not an essential part of public office.
Moreover, the Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant
belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and corporate powers in the university. It is well-
established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board of directors, or board of trustees in the
case of non-stock corporations.
ISSUES
1.) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the Estafa case
2.) Whether or not a government scholar and UP student regent is a public officer with salary grade 27.
HELD
1.) The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an
unjust or an absurd conclusion. Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each
other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature. Evidently, from the provisions of Section 4(B) of P.D.
No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office.
Plainly, Estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense
is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the
offense is committed in relation to their office
2.) Public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by
law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public
officer. (Laurel vs Desierto)
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explicitly vest the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Hence, it is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock
corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606 the statute
defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
It is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the
public office.
Therefore, Petitioner is a public officer by express mandate of P.D.No. 1606 and jurisprudence.

Abroguena
GARCIA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
603 SCRA 348

Public Officers; Forfeiture Proceedings; Unexplained Wealth; Plunder; Jurisdiction; The Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over actions for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, albeit the proceeding there under is civil in
nature—the civil liability for forfeiture cases does not arise from the commission of a criminal offense.—And in response
to what she suggests in some of her pleadings, let it be stated at the outset that the SB has jurisdiction over actions for
forfeiture under RA 1379, albeit the proceeding there under is civil in nature. We said so in Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,
460 SCRA 600 (2005), involving no less than petitioner’s husband questioning certain orders issued in Forfeiture I case.

A forfeiture case under Republic Act No. 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and different from a
plunder case, thus negating the notion that the crime of plunder absorbs the forfeiture case.—It bears stressing,
as a second point, that a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and different from a
plunder case, thus negating the notion that the crime of plunder charged in Crim. Case No. 28107 absorbs the forfeiture
cases. In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission of the criminal acts in
furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the language of Sec. 4 of RA 7080, for purposes of establishing
the crime of plunder, it is “sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy [to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth].” On
the other hand, all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence, under RA 1379 is the
disproportion of respondent’s properties to his legitimate income, it being unnecessary to prove how he
acquired said properties. As correctly formulated by the Solicitor General, the forfeitable nature of the properties under
the provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed from a determination of a specific overt act committed by the respondent
public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal wealth.
Double Jeopardy; Double jeopardy, as a criminal law concept, refers to jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense, suggesting that double jeopardy presupposes two separate criminal prosecutions.—Given the foregoing
considerations, petitioner’s thesis on possible double jeopardy entanglements should a judgment of conviction ensue in
Crim. Case 28107 collapses entirely. Double jeopardy, as a criminal law concept, refers to jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense, suggesting that double jeopardy presupposes two separate criminal prosecutions. Proceedings under RA
1379 are, to repeat, civil in nature. As a necessary corollary, one who is sued under RA 1379 may be proceeded against
for a criminal offense. Thus, the filing of a case under that law is not barred by the conviction or acquittal of the defendant
in Crim. Case 28107 for plunder.

Republic Act No. 7080 did not repeal Republic Act No. 1379—nowhere in Republic Act No. 7080 is there a provision
that would indicate a repeal, expressly or impliedly, of Republic Act No. 1379.—Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find any
provision that would indicate a repeal, expressly or impliedly, of RA 1379. RA 7080 is a penal statute which, at its most
basic, aims to penalize the act of any public officer who by himself or in connivance with members of his family amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of at least PhP 50 million. On the other hand, RA 1379
is not penal in nature, in that it does not make a crime the act of a public official acquiring during his incumbency an
amount of property manifestly out of proportion of his salary and other legitimate income. RA 1379 aims to enforce the
right of the State to recover the properties which were not lawfully acquired by the officer. It has often been said that all
doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal and all efforts should be exerted to harmonize and give effect to all
laws and provisions on the same subject. To be sure, both RA 1379 and RA 7080 can very well be harmonized. The
Court perceives no irreconcilable conflict between them. One can be enforced without nullifying the other.

Courts; Jurisdiction; Summons; It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound
by its decision or orders.—It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound by its
decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode authorized by and proper under the Rules, is the means
by which a court acquires jurisdiction over a person.

Summons; Requirements for Substituted Service.—In Mano-toc v. Court of Appeals, 499 SCRA 21 (2006), we broke
down the requirements to be: (1) Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying on substituted service or
the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service within a
reasonable time. Reasonable time being “so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent
and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights
and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party.” Moreover, we indicated therein that the sheriff must show several
attempts for personal service of at least three (3) times on at least two (2) different dates. (2) Specific details in the return,
i.e., the sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal
service. (3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at defendant’s house or
residence; or on a competent person in charge of defendant’s office or regular place of business.
351

Criminal Procedure; Motion to Dismiss; A defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of
the court over his person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily
before the court.—A defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court.
What the rule on voluntary appearance—the first sentence of the above-quoted rule—means is that the voluntary
appearance of the defendant in court is without qualification, in which case he is deemed to have waived his
defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons.

Special Appearance; A special appearance before the court––challenging its jurisdiction over the person through a motion
to dismiss even if the movant invokes other grounds––is not tantamount to estoppel or a waiver by the movant of his
objection to jurisdiction over his person, and, such is not constitutive of a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court.—The leading La Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 78 (1994), applies to the instant case. Said case
elucidates the current view in our jurisdiction that a special appearance before the court—challenging its jurisdiction over
the person through a motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes other grounds—is not tantamount to estoppel or a
waiver by the movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his person; and such is not constitutive of a voluntary submission
to the jurisdiction of the court.

FACTS
Two consolidated petitions under Rule 65, each interposed by petitioner Clarita D. Garcia, with application for injunctive
relief.
FIRST PETITION- GR. 170122:
In the first petition for mandamus and/or certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 170122, petitioner seeks to nullify and set aside
the August 5, 2005 Order, as reiterated in another Order dated August 26, 2005, both issued by the Sandiganbayan,
Fourth Division, which effectively denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss and/or to quash Civil Case No. 0193, a suit for
forfeiture commenced by the Republic of the Philippines against the petitioner and her immediate family.
It was stated that summons were issued and all served on Gen. Garcia at his place of detention. Per the Sheriff’s Return
dated November 2, 2005, the summons were duly served on respondent Garcias.
Instead of an answer, the Garcias filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of the SB’s lack of jurisdiction over
separate civil actions for forfeiture. By Resolution of January 20, 2005, the SB denied the motion to dismiss; declared
the same motion as pro forma and hence without tolling effect on the period to answer. The same resolution declared
the Garcias in default. And eventually Sandiganbayan fourth division therefore denied said motion to dismiss
and to quash information on Civil Case 0193.
The issuance of Order dated August 26, 2005 triggered petitioner Clarita to interposed her first special civil action for
mandamus and/or certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 170122, raising the issues:
xxx
A. For lack of proper and valid service of summons, the [SB] 4th Division could not have acquired jurisdiction over
petitioner’s, [and her children’s] x x x persons, much less make them become the true “parties-litigants, contestants or
legal adversaries” in forfeiture I. As the [SB] has not validly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner’s [and her children’s]
x x x persons, they could not possibly be declared in default, nor can a valid judgment by default be rendered
against them.
B. Even then, mere declaration in default does not per se bar petitioner from challenging the [SB] 4th Division’s lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of forfeiture I as the same can be raised anytime, even after final judgment. In the
absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter, any and all proceedings before the [SB] are null and void.
SECOND PETITION-GR 171381:
The second petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 171381, seeks to nullify and set aside the November 9, 2005
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, insofar as it likewise denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss and/or
quash Civil Case No. 0196, another forfeiture case involving the same parties but for different properties.
It was stated that on July 12, 2005, the SB sheriff served the corresponding summons. In his return of July 13, 2005, the
sheriff stated giving the copies of the summons to the OIC/Custodian of the PNP Detention Center who in turn handed
them to Gen. Garcia. The general signed his receipt of the summons, but as to those pertaining to the other respondents,
Gen. Garcia acknowledged receiving the same, but with the following qualifying note: “I’m receiving the copies of Clarita,
Ian Carl, Juan Paolo & Timothy—but these copies will not guarantee it being served to the above-named (sic).”
On July 26, 2005, Clarita and her children, thru special appearance of counsel, filed a motion to dismiss and/or to quash
Forfeiture II primarily for lack of jurisdiction over their persons and on the subject matter thereof which is now covered by
the plunder case.
To the above motion, the Republic filed its opposition with a motion for alternative service of summons. The motion for
alternative service would be repeated in another motion of August 25, 2005. The SB denied both the petitioner’s motion to
dismiss and/or to quash and the Republic’s motion for alternative service of summons and eventually on November 9,
2005, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to dismiss and quash Civil Case 0196.
Because of said Order, Clarita then now alleged that the SB 4th Division acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Joint Resolution dated November 9, 2005 and its Resolution of January 24, 2006
denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss and/or to quash in that:
A. Based on its own finding that summons was improperly served on petitioner, the [SB] ought to have dismissed
forfeiture II for lack of jurisdiction over petitioner’s person x x x.
B. By virtue of the plunder case filed with the [SB] Second Division that mandates the automatic forfeiture of unlawfully
acquired properties upon conviction, the [SB] Fourth Division has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of forfeiture.
ISSUE
Whether the Fourth Division of the SB has acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner—and her three sons for that
matter—considering that, first, vis-à-vis Civil Case Nos. 0193 (Forfeiture I) and 0196 (Forfeiture II), summons against her
have been ineffectively or improperly served.
HELD
SB did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioners.
Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides for the requirements of a valid substituted
service of summons, thus:
“SEC. 7. Substituted service.—If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or
(b) (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof.”
It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound by its decision or orders. Valid
service of summons, by whatever mode authorized by and proper under the Rules, is the means by which a court
acquires jurisdiction over a person.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were served personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos
Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP Detention Center, who acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing his signature.
It is also undisputed that substituted service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II were made on petitioner and her
children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP Detention Center. However, such substituted services of summons were
invalid for being irregular and defective.
It is apparent that no valid substituted service of summons was made on petitioner and her children, as the service made
through Maj. Gen. Garcia.
The stringent rules on valid service of summons for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendants,
however, admits of exceptions, as when the party voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by asking
affirmative relief. In the instant case, the Republic asserts that petitioner is estopped from questioning improper service of
summons since the improvident service of summons in both forfeiture cases had been cured by their (petitioner and her
children) voluntary appearance in the forfeiture cases. The Republic points to the various pleadings filed by petitioner and
her children during the subject forfeiture hearings. The Court cannot subscribe to the Republic’s views.
The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides:
“Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance.—The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to
service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.”
Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his person, together
with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court. What the rule on
voluntary appearance—the first sentence of the above-quoted rule—means is that the voluntary appearance of
the defendant in court is without qualification, in which case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of
jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons.
The pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject forfeiture cases, however, do not show that she voluntarily appeared
without qualification. Petitioner filed the following pleadings in Forfeiture I: (a) motion to dismiss; (b) motion for
reconsideration and/or to admit answer; (c) second motion for reconsideration; (d) motion to consolidate forfeiture case
with plunder case; and (e) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I. And in Forfeiture II: (a) motion to dismiss and/or
to quash Forfeiture II; and (b) motion for partial reconsideration.
The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to dismiss, were filed by petitioner solely for special appearance with the
purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of the SB over her person and that of her three children. Petitioner asserts therein
that SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and of her three children for lack of valid service of summons through
improvident substituted service of summons in both Forfeiture I and Forfeiture II.
It cannot be said that petitioner and her three children voluntarily appeared before the SB to cure the defective substituted
services of summons. They are, therefore, not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the SB over their persons nor
are they deemed to have waived such defense of lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, there being no valid substituted
services of summons made, the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner and her children. And
perforce, the proceedings in the subject forfeiture cases, insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned, are
null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the order declaring them in default must be set aside and voided insofar as
petitioner and her three children are concerned.

Bobiles
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 124644 February 5, 2004
ARNEL ESCOBAL, petitioner,
vs
HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez,
Executive Clerk of Court IV of the Sandiganbayan, Hon. David C. Naval, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Naga City, Branch 21, Luz N. Nueca, respondents.
Criminal Law; Courts; Jurisdiction; Criminal Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; The jurisdiction of the court over
criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the Information or the Complaint and the statute I effect at the time of
the commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.—
The respondent Presiding Justice acted in accordance with law and the rulings of this Court when he ordered the
remand of the case to the RTC, the court of origin.
The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the Information or the Complaint
and the statute in effect at the time of the commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive
application thereof. The jurisdictional requirements must be alleged in the Information. Such jurisdiction of the court
acquired at the inception of the case continues until the case is terminated.
Same; Same; Same; Sandiganbayan; Public Officers; For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under Section
4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861 over crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, it
is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office and theoffender and the discharge of official
duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was
committed by the offender in relation to his office because that would be a conclusion of law.—
However, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committed by public
officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the
offender and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the
Information that the crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because that would be a
conclusion of law.The amended Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner does not contain any allegation
showing the intimate relation between his office and the discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the
offense charged when on November 24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include therein an
allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in relation to office. The trial court erred when it ordered the elevation of
the records to the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect
and under Section 2 of the law:
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their
equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
FACTS
Petitioner Escobal is a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine Constabulary, as well as the
Intelligence Group of the Philippine National Police. Escobal was conducting surveillance operations on drug trafficking in
a restaurant located along Barlin St., Naga City and got involved in a shooting incident, resulting in the death of one
Rodney Rafael N. Nueca, son of private respondent Luz Nueca.
Consequently, Escobal and one Natividad who remain at large, were charged with murder filed before the RTC of Naga
City, Branch 21.
When arraigned, Escobal pleaded not guilty. He then filed a Motion to Quash the Information alleging that as a member of
the PNP, the court martial, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and officers. Said
motion was denied.
The trial thereafter proceeded and as the prosecution rested its case, Ecobal commenced the presentation of his
evidence. He then filed a Motion to Dismiss the case. Citing Republic of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al., he argued that
since he committed the crime in the performance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the
case.
Said motion was denied by the RTC. The trial court then conducted a preliminary hearing and found that Escobal
committed the crime charged while not in the performance of his official function. The trial court added that upon the
enactment of R.A. No. 7975, the issue had become moot and academic. The amendatory law transferred the jurisdiction
over the offense charged from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC since the petitioner did not have a salary grade of "27" as
provided for in or by Section 4(a)(1), (3) thereof. The trial court nevertheless ordered the prosecution to amend the
Information pursuant to the ruling in Republic v. Asuncion and R.A. No. 7975. The amendment consisted in the inclusion
therein of an allegation that the offense charged was not committed by the petitioner in the performance of his
duties/functions, nor in relation to his office.
Escobal then filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that Luz Nueca ategorically and unequivocably admitted in her
complaint filed with the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) that he was on an official mission when the crime was
committed.
The RTC then issued an Order reversing its prior Order and ruled that EscobaL was on official mission when the shooting
occurred. The RTC ordered the prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and to allege that the offense charged was
committed by Escobal in the performance of his duties and transmit the same, as well as the complete records, to the
Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan, however, remanded the case to the RTC. It reasoned that under P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
R.A. No. 7975, the RTC retained jurisdiction over the case, considering that the petitioner had a salary grade of "23."
Furthermore, the prosecution had already rested its case and the petitioner had commenced presenting his evidence in
the RTC; following the rule on continuity of jurisdiction, the latter court should continue with the case and render judgment
therein after trial.
Upon the remand of the records, the RTC set the case for trial for the petitioner to continue presenting his evidence.
Instead of adducing his evidence, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, assailing the Order of the Presiding Justice of
the Sandiganbayan remanding the records of the case to the RTC
ISSUE
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject matter the crime charged having been committed
while accused Escobal was in the performance of his duties as PNP member.
 HELD
The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the Information or the Complaint and
the statute in effect at the time of the commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive
application thereof.
For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
P.D. No. 1861 over crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts showing the
intimate relation between the office of the offender and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information.
It is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his
office because that would be a conclusion of law.
Under R.A. 7975, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a position
corresponding to a salary grade below 27, the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be,
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
The amended Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the
intimate relation between his office and the discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense
charged when it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include therein an allegation that the petitioner
committed the crime in relation to office.
Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a position
corresponding to a salary grade below "27," the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be,
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade
"23." He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the
crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No.
7691.

Alim
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HENRY T. GO
G.R. No. 168539 | EN BANC | March 25, 2014
The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount
to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. – Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court’s
ruling in G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for
Consolidation in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with petitioner’s contention that private respondent’s act of
posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that
the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person
to the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, it has been held that: When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a
competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the
jurisdiction of the court, he must raise the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest
opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the
court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex. rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)

The Sandiganbayan is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of
Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1606 as
amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories
with the said public officers. – The SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A.
8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public
officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with
then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and
tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be done.
Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the
person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to decide a
case would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as death of one of the alleged
offenders.
 FACTS
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then Secretary of the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in
conspiracy with accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc.
(PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession Agreement, after the project for
the construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded
to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement substantially amended the draft Concession Agreement
covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law),
specifically the provision on Public Utility Revenues, as well as the assumption by the government of the liabilities of
PIATCO in the event of the latter's default under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the
Concession Agreement, which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government of the Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the person of Mr. Henry T. Go
HELD
Yes. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the person of Mr. Henry T. Go. As alleged in the Information filed against
Mr. Go, which is deemed hypothetically admitted in his Motion to Quash, the latter conspired with Secretary Enrile in
violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability
incurred by a co-conspirator is also incurred by the other co-conspirators.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom respondent can be
charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no
longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of
Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of
conspiracy between him and private respondent. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable
cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for his death, he
should have been charged. The death of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor
or survivors.
Mr. Go’s act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule
is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to
submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea
or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. Verily, Mr. Go’s participation in the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also
covered other matters which called for respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Mr. Go may not be heard now to
deny said court’s jurisdiction over him. However, by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, this can no longer be done.
Nonetheless, it does not follow that the Sandiganbayan is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the
case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no
longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.

Andres
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO
G.R. No. 154473
Criminal Procedure; Libel; Jurisdiction; The jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred
by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless a latter statute provides for a retroactive
application thereof.-Uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case
conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless a latter statute provides for a retroactive
application thereof. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, is explicit on
which court has jurisdiction to try cases of written defamations, thus: the criminal and civil action for damages in cases of
written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first
instance [now, the Regional Trial Court] of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or
where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense x x x.
 Same; Same; Public Officers; Sandiganbayan; The grant to the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over offenses
committed in relation to (public) office, similar to the expansion of the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court
(MTCs), did not divest the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of its exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written
defamation cases regardless of whether the offense is committed in relation to office---the broad and general
phraseology of Section 4, Presidential Decree No.1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, cannot be construed to
have impliedly repealed, or even simply modified, such exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC.---As we have
constantly held in Jalandoni, Bocobo, People v. Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 32, 265 SCRA 645 (1996),
Manzano, 292 SCRA herein that the law, as it still stands at present, dictates that criminal and civil actions for damages in
cases of written defamations shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the RTC to the exclusion of all other courts. A
subsequent enactment of a law defining the jurisdiction of other courts cannot simply override, in the absence of an
express repeal or modification, the specific provision in the RTC vesting in the RTC, as aforesaid, jurisdiction over
defamations in writing or by similar means. The grant to the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over offenses committed in
relation to (public) office, similar expansion of the jurisdiction of the MTCs, did not divest the RTC of its exclusive and
original jurisdiction to try written defamation cases regardless of whether the offenses is committed in relation to office.
The broad and general phraseology of Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249,
cannot be construed to have impliedly repealed, or even simply modified, such exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
RTC.

FACTS
Respondent Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Chairman of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), was charged with libel
before the Office of the City Prosecutor by Photokina Marketing Corporation, which felt alluded to in a speech made by
Alfredo before the Bahay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines, and in an television interview before “Point Blank”, a show
hosted by Ces Orena-Drilon at ANC. The Office of the City Prosecutor, in both instances, filed Informations for libel before
the Regional Trial Court. In both instances, Alfredo moved for the dismissal of the case, considering that at the time he
made the alleged utterances, he was an impeachable officer and the same was made in relation to his duties, therefore,
even assuming that he can be charged with libel, the same should be lodged with the Sandiganbayan. In both instances,
the RTC ruled in his favor, thus Photokina elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
On whether the utterances were made in relation to his office; and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case?
HELD
“Libel cases shall be tried by the regional trial courts having jurisdiction over them to the exclusion of the metropolitan trial
courts, municipal trial courts in cities, municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts.”
As held in Jalandoni, Bocobo, People v. Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 32, Manzano, and analogous
cases, we must, in the same way, declare herein that the law, as it still stands at present, dictates that criminal and civil
actions for damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the RTC to the
exclusion of all other courts. A subsequent enactment of a law defining the jurisdiction of other courts cannot simply
override, in the absence of an express repeal or modification, the specific provision in the RPC vesting in the RTC, as
aforesaid, jurisdiction over defamations in writing or by similar means. The grant to the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over
offenses committed in relation to (public) office, similar to the expansion of the jurisdiction of the MTCs, did not divest the
RTC of its exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written defamation cases regardless of whether the offense is
committed in relation to office. The broad and general phraseology of Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8249, cannot be construed to have impliedly repealed, or even simply modified, such
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC.
Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without qualification, it is unnecessary and
futile for the parties to argue on whether the crime is committed in relation to office. Thus, the conclusion reached by the
trial court that the respondent committed the alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as former COMELEC chair, and
deprives it of jurisdiction to try the case, is, following the above disquisition, gross error.
Culla
LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
301 SCRA 298; G.R. NO. 12809620 JAN 1999
Constitutional Law; Statutes; every law has in its favour the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. -

The established rule is that every law has in its favour the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. The burden of
proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. The burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly
discharged in the present case.

Courts; Sandiganbayan; Jurisdiction; Requisites for a Case to Fall Within the Exclusive Original Jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. – A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to all under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A.
3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order No.s 1, 2, 14, and 14-A,
issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2)
the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is public official or employee holding any of the positions
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.

Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Republic Act 8249; Under Section 4, par. b of Republic Act 8249, what determines
the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender; In enacting Republic Act 8249, the
Congress simply restored the original provisions of Presidential Decree 1606 which does not mention the criminal
participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan. – Considering that herein
petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised
Penal Code, the governing provision on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A.
8249. This paragraph b pertains to “other offenses or felonies whether simple of complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of [Section4 R.A. 8249] in relation of their office.” The
phrase “other offenses or felonies is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to
the accused’s official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is the
official position or rank of the offender – that is, whether he is one of those pubic officers or employees enumerated in
paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any
reference to the criminal participation of the accused pubic officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice
or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not
mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Constitutional Law; Equal Protection Clause; Statues; Statutory Construction; Every classification made by law is
presumed reasonable – the part who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. – Petitioner and intervenors’
posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law because its enactment was
particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve
merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire
Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every
classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of
arbitrariness.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based
on reasonable classification. – It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of
the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not
arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing condition only; and (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class, all of which are present in this case.
 Same; Same; The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial
has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction under Republic Act 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as the approval of the law,
rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. – The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to
rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonableness of the questioned provisions. The classification between
those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could
have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249 =, as against those cases
where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. In
the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter parties had already documents.
Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, its can
be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of the jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has
to provide for a remedy in the form of transitory provisions. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that
Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as them.

Same; Statutes Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; The Congress in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by
the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. – On the
perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during the committee hearings, the same
would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the
legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of
which one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative
powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation.

Same; Same; Ex Post Facto Laws; Words and Phrases; “ex Post Facto Laws,” Explained. – This contention is
erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull, as ex post facto law is one – (a) which makes an
act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or (b)
which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and
inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; (d) which alters the legal rules of
evidence and receives less of different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense or its
consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage. This Court added two more to the list, namely: (f) that
which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which
when done was lawful; (g) deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled,
such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.

Same; Same; Same; Republic Act 8249 is not a penal law – it is a substantive law on jurisdiction, and not being a
penal law, its retroactive application cannot be challenged as unconstitutional. – Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits
retrospectively of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in
character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their
violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, which amended
P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been
declared by the court as not as penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by
which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of
R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

Same; Same; Same; The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the
prohibition against ex post facto laws. – Petitioner’s and intervenors’ contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal
which they required under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention
has already been rejected by the court several times considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutor y
in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included
in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an
amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does
not come within the prohibition. Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. It has been ruled
that adjective statutes may be applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.
 Same; Statutes; Bills; Sandiganbayan; Jurisdiction; the expansion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it
can be considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary
consequence of the amendments; The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title is
satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to
achieve. – The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provision of the Constitution. Much emphasis is
placed on the wording in the title of the law that it “defines” the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does it
to “expand” its jurisdiction. The expansion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does
not have to be expressly stated in the title of law because such is the necessary consequences of the amendments. The
requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive
enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general purpose which is the statute seeks to achieve. Such rule
is liberally interpreted and should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. There is a here sufficient
compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject of (involving the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to
that general subject. The Congress, in employing the word “define” in the title of the law, acted within its powers since
Section 2, Article VII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body two “define, prescribed, and apportion the
jurisdiction of various courts”

Courts; Jurisdiction; Pleadings and Practice; The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute,
and the elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has
jurisdiction over a case. – The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that
definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence
the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and not
by the evidence presented by the parties of the trial.

Same; Same; Same; Criminal Law; Right to be Informed; It is essential that the accused of be informed of the
facts that are imputed to him as “he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense.” – The noble object of written accusations cannot be over emphasized. This was explained in the US v. Karelsen:
“the object of this written accusations was – First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against
him as will enable to make his defense; and second to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a
further prosecution of the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether
they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be had. In order that this requirement that may be satisfied,
facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; there must be set forth in
the complaint with reasonable particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the
complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.”
(Emphasis supplied) It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him, as “he is
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The mere allegation in the amended information that the offense was
committed that the accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient – that phrase is merely a conclusion of
law, not a factual averment that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the
accused’s official duties. – The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularity as will reasonably
indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not
satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended information that the offense was committed by the accused
public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely as conclusion of law, not a factual averment
that would show the close intimacy that the offense charged and the discharge of the accused’s official duties.

Same; Same; Same; Same; What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would
indicate the close intimacy between the discharged of the accused’s official duties and the commission of the offense
charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office. – In the aforecited case of
People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase “committed in relation to public office” does not appear in the
information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is
controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the
discharge of the accused’s official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as
having been committed in relation to public office.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Where there is failure to show in the informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused Philippine National Police officers, the offense
charged is plain murder and, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. – Consequently, for
failure to show in the amended informations that the charged of murder was intimately connected with the discharge
officials functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and,
therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.

FACTS
Petitioner Lacson was involved in a criminal case that started when eleven persons, believed to be members of
the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) were killed by the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) where
the petitioner was one of the heads. Then, in a media expose, it was said that what happened was a rub-out and not a
shoot-out.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the
amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the “principal
accused” are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was
approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal
accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
Among other issues, petitioner argues that Republic Act (R.A.) 8249, that was enacted during his case was
pending has a retroactive effect and is plan from the facts and was made to suit the petitioner’s case, thus, making it an
ex-post facto law that would affect the right of the accused to procedural due process.
ISSUE
Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to the
office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether the case falls within the
Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.
HELD
Yes. The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to public office
does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the
close intimacy between the discharge of the accused’s official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order
to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected
with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is
,
plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court not the Sandiganbayan.

Au
SANCHEZ vs. DEMETRIOU
227 SCRA 627
SANCHEZ vs. DEMETRIOU
227 SCRA 627

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; the absence of preliminary investigation does not impair the
validity of the information or otherwise render the same defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court
over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the information.
 - The petitioner was present at that hearing and he never disowned Atty. Panelo as his counsel. During the entire
proceedings, he remained quiet and let this counsel speak and argue on his behalf. It was only in his tardy Reply
that he has suddenly bestirred himself and would now question his representation by this lawyer as unauthorized
and inofficious. Section 3, Paragraph (d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, provides that if the respondent cannot
be subpoenaed or, if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits, the investigating officer shall base his
resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant. Just as the accused may renounce the right to be
present at the preliminary investigation , so may he waive the right to present counter-affidavits or any other
evidence in his defense. At any rate, it is settled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair
the validity of the information or otherwise render the same defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of
the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the information. If no preliminary investigation has
been held, or if it is flawed, the trial court may, on motion of the accused, order an investigation or reinvestigation
and hold the proceedings in the criminal case in abeyance. In the case at bar, however, the respondent judge saw
no reason or need for such a step. Finding no arbitrariness in her factual conclusions, we shall defer to her
judgment.

Same; Same; Same; Ombudsman; The Ombudsman’s power under Sec. 15 paragraph (1) of RA 6770 is not an exclusive
authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged.

- The ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15 paragraph (1) of RA 6770 to investigate and prosecute
any illegal act or omission of any public official. However as we held only two years ago in the case of Aguinaldo
v. Domagas, this authority "is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in. respect of
the offense charged." Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended information filed in this case
needed the approval of the Ombudsman. It is not disputed that the information and amended information here did
not have the approval of the Ombudsman. However, we do not believe that such approval was necessary at all. In
Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA. 545 (1990), the Court held that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate
charges of illegal or omissions on the part of any public official, i.e., any crime imputed to a public official. It must,
however, be pointed out that the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate "any [illegal] act or omission of any
public official" (191 SCRA at 550) is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in
respect of the offense here charged, i.e., the crime of sedition. Thus, the non-involvement of the office of the
Ombudsman in the present case does not have any adverse legal consequence upon the authority the panel of
prosecutors to file and prosecute the information or amended information.

Same; Same; Same; Arrest; Application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal
declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other
and an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.

- "Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking of a person into custody in order
that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. Under Section 2 of the same Rule, an arrest is
effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his voluntary submission to the custody of the
person making the arrest. Application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal
declaration of arrest is not, required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part of one of the parties to arrest
the other and an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is
necessary. The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, by virtue of a letter-invitation
issued by PNP Commander Rex Piad requesting him to appear at the said camp for investigation. In Babst v.
13
National Intelligence Board this Court declared: Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that ordinarily, an
invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at his
pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however, such an invitation
can easily assume a different appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes from a powerful group composed
predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time when the country has just emerged from martial rule
and when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not entirely been lifted, and the
designated interrogation site is a military camp, the same can be easily taken, not as a strictly voluntary
invitation which it purports to be, but as an authoritative command which one can only defy at his peril. . . .
(Emphasis supplied) In the case at bar, the invitation came from a high-ranking military official and the
investigation of Sanchez was to be made at a military camp. Although in the guise of a request, it was obviously a
 command or an order of arrest that the petitioner could hardly he expected to defy. In fact, apparently cowed by
the "invitation," he went without protest (and in informal clothes and slippers only) with the officers who had come
to fetch him. It may not be amiss to observe that under R.A. No. 7438, the requisites of a "custodial investigation"
are applicable even to a person not formally arrested but merely "invited" for questioning. It should likewise be
noted that at Camp Vicente Lim, the petitioner was placed on "arrest status" after he was pointed to by Centeno
and Malabanan as the person who first raped Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Respondent Zuño himself acknowledged
during the August 13, 1993 hearing that, on the basis of the sworn statements of the two state witnesses,
petitioner had been "arrested."

Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction over the person of the accused; Motion to quash; Case at bar; Where the accused
objects to the jurisdiction of the Court over his person, he may move to quash the information but only on that ground. If
he raises other grounds in the motion to quash, he is deemed to have waived that the objection and to have submitted his
person to the jurisdiction of the court.

- The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court
lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on August
26, 1993 against him and the other accused in connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be sure, but
it was nonetheless legal. Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, we find that the trial court still
lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The rule is that if the accused objects to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, he may move to quash the information, but only on that ground. If, as in
this case, the accused raises other grounds in the motion to quash, he is deemed to have waived that objection
and to have submitted his person to the jurisdiction of that court. The Court notes that on August 13, 1993, after
the petitioner was unlawfully arrested, Judge Lanzanas issued a warrant of arrest against Antonio L. Sanchez in
connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for violation of R.A No. 6713. Pending the
issuance of the warrant of arrest for the rape-slay cases, this first warrant served as the initial justification for his
detention. The Court also adverts to its uniform ruling that the filing of charges, and the issuance of the
corresponding warrant of arrest, against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at
least deny him the right to be released because of such defect. * Applicable by analogy to the case at bar is Rule
102 Section 4 of the Rules of Court that: Sec, 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears
that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction
to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the
process, judgment, or order. Nor shall, anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person
charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.

Same; Same; Prosecutor; The prosecutor cannot be compelled to include in the information a person against whom he
believes no sufficient evidence of guilt exists.

- While the prosecuting officer is required by law to charge all those who in his opinion, appear to be guilty, he
nevertheless cannot be compelled to include in the information a person against whom he believes no sufficient
evidence of guilt exists. The appreciation of the evidence involves the use of discretion on the part of the
prosecutor, and we do not find in the case at bar a clear showing by the petitioner of a grave abuse of such
discretion. The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the Secretary of Justice or in special
cases by the President of the Philippines. But even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a person against
whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. The courts try and
absolve or convict the accused but as a rule have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him. The possible
exception is where there is an unmistakable showing of a grave abuse of discretion that will justify judicial
intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But in such a case the proper remedy to call for such exception is a
petition for mandamus, not certiorari or prohibition. Moreover, before resorting to this relief, the party seeking the
inclusion of another person as a co-accused in the same case must first avail itself of other adequate remedies
such as the filing of a motion for such inclusion.
 FACTS
A warrant of arrest was served to Mayor Antonio L. Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna in connection with the rape-slay of Mary
Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez.
The respondent Secretary of Justice expressed his apprehension that the trial of the said cases might result in a
miscarriage of justice because of the tense and partisan atmosphere in Laguna in favor of the petitioner and the
relationship of an employee in the trial court with one of the accused. Thus, the court ordered the transfer of the venue of
the seven cases to Pasig, Metro Manila where they were raffled to respondent Judge Harriet Demetriou.
ISSUE
Whether or not as a public officer, he can be tried for the offense only by the Sandiganbayan.
HELD
No. Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No, 1606, as amended by P.D. No.1861, provides:
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code:
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00. . . .
The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner stands charged obviously does not fall under paragraph (1),
which deals with graft and corruption cases. Neither is it covered by paragraph (2) because it is not an offense committed
in relation to the office of the petitioner.
In the case at bar, there is no allegation that the crime of rape with homicide imputed to the petitioner was connected with
the discharge of his functions as municipal mayor or that there is an "intimate connection" between the offense and his
office. It follows that the said crime, being an ordinary offense, is triable by the regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan.

Dequina
G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic
Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused
are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
"27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
city department heads;
" (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank
of senior superintended or higher;
" (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman
and special prosecutor;
" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations.
" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27'" and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
" (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27'" and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14 A, issued in
1986.
The petitioner in this case was charged with Estafa they claimed that this is outside the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan
since the latter has jurisdiction only in the following cases It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter
II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X,
Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.
The petitioner’s contention lacks merit.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office
The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements :
(a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.

Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer

In Laurel v. Desierto, the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office:
"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by
law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public
officer."
In Geduspan v. People,
“ We held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part
specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by
express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. “
Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law (Section
4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.
Petitioner falls under this category.)
Facts
Petitioner- Accused – Movant – Hannah Serrena received 15 million pesos from the office of the President for the purpose
of renovation of UP Vinzons Hall. It was received thru Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). However
said project did not materialize the succeeding student regent Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman,
Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P. filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office
of the Ombudsman.
Ombudsman filed for estafa in Sandiganbayan
Petitioner contends that Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in
her capacity as UP student regent. Petitioner asserts that Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction only for the Crimes Committed
by Public Officers and Estafa failing under Crimes against Property hence he moved to quash the information.
Moreover Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over her person since she was not a public officer and she merely
represented her peers.
She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with the
Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole.
Her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public
officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed in relation to her
office; (d) the funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not from the government.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Hannah Serena, a government scholar/ UP Student Regent, for
alleged Malversation of public funds.
Held
Governing law for the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan id PD 1606 Section 4 and not RA 3019 The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 provides “Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.”
The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to
their office.
In the present case petitioner is a public officer – adopting the definition of Mechem:
"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by
law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public
officer."
Moreover petitioner falls within the definition of said law particularly in Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explicitly vested
the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As
the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock
corporation

Bartolazo
DISINI V SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
716 SCRA 237, Feb. 18, 2014
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Subpoena; It is well-settled that the power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively a
judicial function. Executive agencies have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers.—The
process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of a subpoena. Petitioners’ objection is that the
issuance of subpoenas is a judicial function. But it is well - settled that the power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively a
judicial function. Executive agencies have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers.
Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a function usually lodged in
the hands of law enforcers to enable them to carry out their executive functions. The prescribed procedure for disclosure
would not constitute an unlawful search or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of communications and
correspondence. Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; View that the judicial steps in cybercrime prosecution start as early as the
investigation of cybercrimes, through the issuance of warrants necessary for real-time collection of traffic data, as well as
the issuance of the orders for the disclosure of data retained by internet service providers.—The judicial steps in
cybercrime prosecution start as early as the investigation of cybercrimes, through the issuance of warrants necessary for
real-time collection of traffic data, as well as the issuance of the orders for the disclosure of data retained by internet
service providers. After these, courts also determine the probable cause for the arrest of suspects accused of committing
cybercrimes. The suspect’s arrest would then lead to a trial that, depending on the suspect’s conviction or acquittal, could
then go through the judiciary appellate process. During trial, pieces of evidence would be presented and testimonies
heard, and trial courts would then exercise their constitutional duty to adjudicate the cases brought before them.

Same; Same; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; Jurisdiction; View that Section 21 of the Cybercrime Law grants the Regional
Trial Courts (RTC) jurisdiction over any violation of the Cybercrime Law, and provides that special cybercrime courts
manned by specially trained judges should be designated.—The designation of special cybercrime courts of course is not
outside our power to undertake: Section 21 of the Cybercrime Law grants the Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction over any
violation of the Cybercrime Law, and provides that special cybercrime courts manned by specially trained judges should
be designated. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, empowers this Court to promulgate rules
on the pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts.

Facts
Petitioners seek to declare several provisions of RA 10175 Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 unconstitutional
and void. The said law aims to regulate access to and use of cyberspace. The cyberspace is a boon to the need of the
current generation for greater information and facility of communication. But all is not well with the system since it could
not filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of
them can, for instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully the latter by posting
defamatory statements against him that people can read. The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in
sex or for exposing to pornography guileless children who have access to the internet. For this reason, the government
has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings
The government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from happening and punish
their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act. However Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the
cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The
government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish
wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.
On February 5, 2013 the Court extended the original 120-day temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier
issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent government agencies from implementing the cybercrime law until further
orders.
Issue
Whether the prosecution under both RPC and RA 10175 is valid
Held
For purposes of double jeopardy analysis, therefore, Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175 and Article 353 in relation to
Article 355 of the Code define and penalize the same offense of libel. Under the Double Jeopardy Clause, conviction or
acquittal under either Section 4(c)(4) or Article 353 in relation to Article 355 constitutes a bar to another prosecution for
the same offense of libel.
 The Supreme Court resolves to leave the determination of the correct application of Section 7 authorizing
prosecution of the offender under both RPC and RA 10175 to actual cases because when two different laws define two
crime, prior jeopardy as to one does not bar prosecution of the other although both offenses arise from the same fact, if
each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. There is an exception in charging
crimes stated under sec4(c)(4) and 4(c)(2) as charging these crimes to both applicable laws constitute a violation of the
proscription against double jeopardy.
The judicial steps in cybercrime prosecution start as early as the investigation of cybercrimes, through the
issuance of warrants necessary for real time collection of traffic data, as well as the issuance of the orders for the
disclosure of data retained by internet service providers. After these, courts also determine the probable cause for the
arrest of suspects accused of committing cybercrimes. The suspect’s arrest would then lead to a trial that, depending on
the suspect’s conviction or acquittal, could then go through the judiciary appellate process. During trial, pieces of evidence
would be presented and testimonies heard, and trial courts would then exercise their constitutional duty to adjudicate the
cases brought before them.
The designation of special cybercrime courts of course is not outside our power to undertake: Section 21 of the
Cybercrime Law grants the Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction over any violation of the Cybercrime Law, and provides that
special cybercrime courts manned by specially trained judges should be designated. Section 5, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution, on the other hand, empowers this Court to promulgate rules on the pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts.
The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of a subpoena. Petitioners’ objection is that
the issuance of subpoenas is a judicial function. But it is well settled that the power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively
a judicial function. Executive agencies have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers.
Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a function usually lodged in
the hands of law enforcers to enable them to carry out their executive functions. The prescribed procedure for disclosure
would not constitute an unlawful search or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of communications and
correspondence. Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention.
There is the problem of extraterritoriality and the evils that it spawns on speech. Enforcement of the crime of libel
will be viable only if the speaker is within our national territory. Those residing in other countries are beyond our
jurisdiction. To be extradited, they will have to have laws similar to ours. If they reside in a state different from our 1930
version of libel, then we will have the phenomenon of foreigners or expatriates having more leeway to criticize and
contribute to democratic exchanges than those who have stayed within our borders.
With regard to the constitutionality,
Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;
The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since no
fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act accessing the computer
system of another without right. It is a universally condemned conduct.
Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
It does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism,the act of
willfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic document, or
electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other
peoples computer systems and private documents. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
The law is reasonable in penalizing the offender for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead,
destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same.
Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to
privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of law.
This section regulates are specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion of personal identifying data of
another. There is no fundamental right to acquire anothers personal data
 Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for favor and
consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam. Likewise, engaging in sexual acts
privately through internet connection, perceived by some as a right, has to be balanced with the mandate of the State to
eradicate white slavery and the exploitation of women.
Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
In theory, nothing prevents the government from invoking the ACPA when prosecuting persons who commit child
pornography using a computer system. Actually, ACPAs definition of child pornography already embraces the use of
"electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means."
Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But no one can
complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is rational basis for such higher
penalty.The potential for uncontrolled proliferation of a particular piece of child pornography when uploaded in the
cyberspace is incalculable.
Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications; UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also known as "spam." The term
"spam" surfaced in early internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy games. One who repeats the same sentence or
comment was said to be making a "spam."
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited commercial communications or spams
are a nuisance that wastes the storage and network capacities of internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of
commerce and technology, and interferes with the owners peaceful enjoyment of his property. Transmitting spams
amounts to trespass to ones privacy since the person sending out spams enters the recipients domain without prior
permission. The OSG contends that commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.
These have never been outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in such ads. What matters is that the
recipient has the option of not opening or reading these mail ads. That is true with spams. Their recipients always have
the option to delete or not to read them.
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited
commercial ads addressed to him. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.
Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes; UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of
expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy
way.In the absence of legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other
countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications,
and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.
Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
It merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying circumstance. As the Solicitor General
points out, there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of information and
communications technology and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in question, the
offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm. The distinction, therefore,
creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.
Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175; UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct application of Section 7 that authorizes
prosecution of the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, WITH THE
EXCEPTION of the crimes of:
1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well as
2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act
10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation of the same
proscription, and, in respect to these, is void and unconstitutional.
On the crime of libel.
Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals
from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal
code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar
means" for committing libel.
But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or
article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the penal code provisions on libel were enacted. The
culture associated with internet media is distinct from that of print.
The internet is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling, anything-goes writing style. In a sense, they are a world
apart in terms of quickness of the readers reaction to defamatory statements posted in cyberspace, facilitated by one-click
reply options offered by the networking site as well as by the speed with which such reactions are disseminated down the
line to other internet users.
Hence, Section 4(c)(4) penalizing online libel is valid and constitutional with respect to the original author of the post; but
void and unconstitutional with respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it; and