REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUPREME COURT
MANILA

EN BANC

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

REPRESENTED BY SOLICITOR
GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA,
Petitioner,
– versus –

CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P.A.

G.R. No. 237428
SERENO,
For: Quo Warranto
Respondent.

Senators LEILA M. DE LIMA and

ANTONIO “SONNY” F. TRILLANES IV,
Movant-Intervenors.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Movant-intervenors, Senators LEILA M. DE LIMA and ANTONIO
“SONNY” F. TRILLANES IV, through undersigned counsel, respectfully state
that:

1. On 29 May 2018, Movant-intervenors, in such capacity, requested

and obtained a copy of the Decision of the Supreme Court dated 11 May
2018, by which eight members of the Court voted to grant the Petition for
Quo Warranto, resulting in the ouster of Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A.
Sereno.

2. The Supreme Court’s majority decision, penned by Justice Tijam,

ruled that:

2.1. There are no grounds to grant the motion for inhibition filed
by respondent Chief Justice Sereno;

2.2. Impeachment is not an exclusive means for the removal of

an impeachable public official;
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2.3. The instant Petition for Quo Warranto could proceed

independently and simultaneously with an impeachment;

2.4. The Supreme Court’s taking cognizance of the Petition for

Quo Warranto is not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers;

2.5. The Petition is not dismissable on the Ground of

Prescription, as “[p]rescription does not lie against the State”; and

2.6. The Petitioner sufficiently proved that Respondent violated

the SALN Law, and such failure amounts to proof of lack of integrity of
the Respondent to be considered, much less nominated appointed, as
Chief Justice by the Judicial and Bar Council and the President of
Republic, respectively.

3. Movant-intervenors, respectfully disagreeing with the findings and

conclusions of the Supreme Court, hereby file the instant Motion for
Reconsideration.

4. The majority decision likewise denied the Motion for Intervention

filed by herein Movant-Intervenors, stating that their claimed interest as
Senator-judges in impeachment proceedings is merely contingent or
expectant, as it “is still contingent on the filing of the articles of impeachment
before the Senate”.

5. Movant-Intervenors likewise seek reconsideration of this ruling, on

the grounds that, as will be further discussed below, the circumstances
surrounding the filing of the present Petition clearly show that the interest
they invoke and seek to protect through their Motion for Intervention is
actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, such that an adverse ruling
by the Supreme Court will result in an actual injury to the constitutional rights,
duties and prerogatives of herein Movant-Intervenors and their fellow
members of Congress, particularly in the Senate. In fact, this view is
supported by Proposed Senate Resolution No. 738, which was signed by
fourteen (14) members of the Senate, including eight (8) majority members,
namely, then Senate President Aquilino “Koko” Pimentel III, Senate
President Pro Tempore Ralph Recto, Senators Joel Villanueva, Loren
Legarda, Sherwin Gatchalian, Francis Escudero, Sonny Angara, and Grace
Poe, and all six (6) members of the Senate minority, namely, Minority Leader
Franklin Drilon, Francis “Kiko” Pangilinan, Bam Aquino, Risa, Hontiveros,
and herein Movant-Intervenors, Antonio Trillanes IV and Leila de Lima.

A. IMPEACHMENT IS AN
EXCLUSIVE MEANS FOR THE
REMOVAL OF AN

2
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IMPEACHABLE PUBLIC
OFFICIAL

6. The subject of the said proceeding, the Chief Justice of the

Supreme Court, is, by express provision of the Constitution, removal from
office exclusively by impeachment, as is every other member of the Supreme
Court, the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman.1

7. Under the same Article of the Constitution, the exclusive power

to try and decide all cases of impeachment is vested upon the Senate,2
whose judgment in such cases “shall not extend further than removal from
office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the
Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.”3

8. In other words, under the Constitution, it is the exclusive domain

of the Philippine Senate, acting on a verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment, or Articles of Impeachment, filed by at least one-third of all
Members of the House of Representatives, to remove the Chief Justice (or
any other impeachable officer for that matter) from office.

9. Thus, the filing of the quo warranto petition seeking the removal
of Chief Justice Sereno violates the legal interest and duty vested by the
Constitution on the Senate, of which movant-intervenors are members, and
is, thus, repugnant to the Constitution and destructive of the system of checks
and balances established therein.

10. Hence, this opposition-in-intervention, seeking the outright

dismissal of the quo warranto petition, it being without basis and, in fact,
contrary to the Constitution.

Chief Justice is an impeachable officer

11. The constitutional qualifications under Art.8, Sec. 7(1) for

appointment to the Supreme Court are limited to: (1) natural born citizenship,
(2) age, (3) and experience, i.e., at least fifteen years of practice of law. These
are legally enforceable objective qualifications in the sense that the Supreme
Court can nullify the appointment of someone who does not possess any of
these three qualifications. The President, for example, cannot appoint
someone who is a foreigner, or 30 years of age, or is not even a lawyer. These

1
Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution.
2
Section 3(6), Article XI.
3
Section 3(7), Article XI.

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are qualifications for which there are judicially discoverable and manageable
standards, and can thus be passed upon by the Supreme Court in the exercise
of its power of judicial review.

12. On the other hand, Art. 8, Sec.7(3) states that “[a] Member of the
Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence.” These are not objective constitutional qualifications, but
subjective characteristics of a judge.

13. These subjective characteristics are addressed for consideration of

the Judicial and Bar Council and the President. Questions of competence,
integrity, probity, and independence are not susceptible to analysis with the
tools of legal doctrine; instead, they require political discernment on the part
of the JBC and the President. They are “soft variables” for which there are
no judicially manageable standards.

14. Thus, a person possessing such objective qualifications, who is also

determined as possessing the subjective qualifications by the fact that he or
she has been nominated by the Judicial and Bar Council and appointed by the
President, and who then takes the oath of office, as in the case of Chief Justice
Sereno, is already an impeachable public officer and can no longer be
removed, except through the process of impeachment.

The Removal from Office of Members of

the Class of “Impeachable Officials” Can
Only Be Obtained Exclusively Through
Impeachment

15. The quo warranto petition filed by the OSG seeks the removal or
ouster of the Chief Justice via a means other than impeachment.

16. This is contrary to the language, spirit and design of the

Constitution.

The language of the Constitution provides

for the manner by which “impeachable
officers”, including members of the
Supreme Court, may be removed from
office.

17. Article XI of the Constitution, on “Accountability of Public

Officers”, Section 2 states that the Chief Justice, as a member of the Supreme
Court, “may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.”

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18. That the said constitutional provision uses the word “may” does
not take away from the exclusive character of removing impeachable officials
solely by impeachment.

18.1. First of all, the word “may” applies to the phrase “be
removed from office”. It is meant to emphasize that these officials – who
are among those who hold the highest positions in their respective spheres
and who are, thus, the most powerful officials in the land – nonetheless
remain accountable to the public because there remains a mechanism that
“may” be resorted to in order to remove them from office.

18.2. In other words, the word “may” indicates that, though the
sensitivity of their positions necessitate that they be free from the threat
of being charged and removed from office by less stringent means that
could affect the effective discharge of their powers and responsibilities,
they are nevertheless still subject to public scrutiny and “may” still
penalized for their actions, albeit through the mechanism outlined in
Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

18.3. In fact, it is precisely the use of the word “may” in this

provision, in this particular Article of the Constitution, and in the context
of the special character of this class of officials that emphasizes both the
possibility of removal of these officials from office, as well as the intent
to make the process of removal be exclusive.

18.4. Secondly, it is deceptively simplistic to argue that the word

“may” means that resort to impeachment is directory, in the sense that
other means of removing this class of officials from office is still available.
As far back as 1913 (and reiterated thereafter4), the Honorable Court has
unequivocally rejected such simplistic interpretation, holding that:

…[I]t is well settled that in statutory interpretation the word "may" should be
read "shall" where such construction is necessary to give effect to the
apparent intention of the legislator. In Rock Island County
Supervisors vs. United States (71 U.S., 435, 446), Mr. Justice Swayne says:

The conclusion to be deduced from the authorities is that where

power is given to public officers, in the language of the Act before us,
or in equivalent language, whenever the public interest or individual
rights call for its exercise, the language used, though permissive in
form, is in fact peremptory. What they are empowered to do for a
third person the law requires shall be done. The power is given, not
for their benefit, but for his. It is placed with the depository to meet
the demands of right, and to prevent a failure of justice. It is given as
a remedy to those entitled to invoke its aid, who would otherwise be
remediless. In all such cases it is held that the intent of the Legislature,

4
De Mesa v. Mencias, G.R. No. L-24583, 21 March 2018.

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which is the test, was not to devolve a mere discretion, but to impose
a positive and absolute duty.

Whether the word "may" in a statute is to be construed as mandatory and

imposing a duty, or merely as permissive and conferring discretion, is to be
determined in each case from the apparent intention of the statute as
gathered from the context, as well as from the language of the particular
provision. The question in each case is whether, taken as a whole and viewed
in the light of surrounding circumstances, it can be said that a purpose
existed on the part of the legislator to enact a law mandatory in its character.
If it can, then it should be given a mandatory effect. (Colby
University vs. Village of Canandaigua (U.S.), 69 Fed., 671, 673; Kansas Pacific
Ry. Co. vs. Reynolds, 8 Kan., 623, 628; Kemble vs. McPhaill, 60 Pac., 1092,
1093, 128 Cal., 444; Inhabitants of Worcester County vs.Schlesinger, 82
Mass. (16 Gray), 166, 168; People vs. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 56 N.E., 953,
956, 184 Ill., 597; State vs. Withrow (Mo.), 24 S.W., 638, 641; Leavenworth
& D. M.R. Co. vs. Platte County Court, 42 Mo., 171, 174.)5

18.5. Applied in this case, and in the words of the Supreme Court,
the constitutional provision “is, in fact, peremptory” one, given that it is
one:

i. “where power is given to public officers” (i.e., the power to

remove this class of officials from office);

ii. both “the public interest” (i.e., the interest to ensure that a
balance is struck between giving these high-ranking officials,
who are holding sensitive posts, the security needed to
discharge their duties without fear or favour, and the need
to nonetheless preserve a means, albeit a stringent one, of
holding them accountable to the public) and “individual
rights” (i.e., the right of these officials to invoke the
protection,6 limited as it may be, afforded to them by the
stringent requirements of impeachment proceedings), call
for its exercise in the manner set forth therein; and

18.6. Furthermore, as will be further discussed below, the intent

to make impeachment the exclusive mode of removing impeachable
officials from office is clear, not just in the language of the provision, but
also implicitly in the context of what it intends to accomplish as a feature
of the system of checks and balances that underpin our structure of

5
In re application of MARIO GUARIÑA for admission to the bar, G.R. No. L 1179, January 8, 1913. Emphasis
supplied.
6
The intent to make the impeachment process as much as measure to exact accountability and to protect
this class of public officials is explicit in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, as will be
discussed further below.

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government, and explicitly based on the deliberations of the Framers of

the Constitution.

The system of checks and balances set forth

in the Constitution requires that the
method of removal of impeachable officers
be exclusive

19. The landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission7 explains the

implicit, yet undeniable, fundamental principles upon which our system if
government is founded:

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of

government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division
in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be
kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.
For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a
check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment
of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become
a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of
two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly.
The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session
whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as
a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission
on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the
concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of
treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the
Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to
appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the
judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the
judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments
in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold
lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government. xxx.8

20. Indeed, the Constitution has “in the main, blocked out in deft
strokes and in bold lines” the powers wielded by each branch of government.
7
63 Phil. 139 (1936).
8
Emphasis supplied.

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The power to remove impeachable officers from office is explicitly vested in

the Senate, acting on the Articles of Impeachment duly filed by the House of
Representatives.

The Deliberations of the Constitutional

Commission leaves no doubt as to the intent
behind Section 2, Article XI of the
Constitution

21. The exclusivity of the impeachment process, as a means by which

Members of the Supreme Court may be removed from office, is explicitly
apparent in the deliberations of 1986 Constitutional Commission:

MR. REGALADO: I propose to add in Section 2 as a last sentence thereof as

already amended the following: ALL OTHER PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
EMPLOYEES MAY BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE AS PROVIDED BY LAW BUT
NOT BY IMPEACHMENT. The reason for the amendment is this: While
Section 2 enumerates the impeachable officers,
there is nothing that will prevent the legislature as it stands now from
providing also that other officers not enumerated therein shall also be
removable only by impeachment, and that has already happened.

Under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan Decree, justices of the
Sandiganbayan may be removed only by impeachment, unlike their
counterparts in the then Court of Appeals. They are, therefore, a privileged
class on the level of the Supreme Court. In the Committee on Constitutional
Commissions and Agencies, there are many commissions which are sought
to be constitutionalized — if I may use the phrase — and the end result
would be that if they are constitutional commissions, the commissioners
there could also be removed only by impeachment. What is there to prevent
the Congress later — because of the lack of this sentence that I am seeking
to add — from providing that officials of certain offices, although
nonconstitutional, cannot also be removed
except by impeachment? 9

22. The repeated use of the phrase “also… only by impeachment”

leaves nothing to doubt: the intent of the Framers of the Constitution is that
this “privileged class” of public officials may only be removed by impeachment.

23. The foregoing was merely a repetition of deliberations previously

had, which also reflected the intent to make the impeachment process the
only means by which to remove this class of officials. In fact, just two days
prior, the rationale thereof was also put on record:

MR. DAVIDE. xxx On lines 13 and 14, I move for the deletion of the words
“and the Ombudsman.” The Ombudsman should not be placed on the level

9
R.C.C. No. 41 Monday, July 28, 1986. Emphasis supplied.

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of the President and the Vice-President, the members of the judiciary and
the members of the Constitutional Commissions in the matter of removal
from office.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. MONSOD: We regret we cannot accept the amendment because we

feel that the Ombudsman is at least on the same level as the Constitutional
Commissioners and this is one way of insulating it from politics.

MR. DAVIDE: Madam President, to make the members of the Ombudsman

removable only by impeachment would be to enshrine and install an officer
whose functions are not as delicate as the others whom we wanted to protect
from immediate removal by way of an impeachment.

MR. MONSOD: We feel that an officer in the Ombudsman, if he does his work
well, could be stepping on a lot of toes. We would really prefer to keep him
there but we would like the body to vote on it, although I would like to ask if
we still have a quorum, Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT: Do we have a quorum? There are Members who are in the
lounge.

The Secretary-General and the pages conduct an actual count of the

Commissioners present.

THE PRESIDENT: We have a quorum.

MR. MONSOD: May we restate the proposed amendment for the benefit of
those who were not here a few minutes ago.

MR. DE LOS REYES: Madam President, parliamentary inquiry. I thought that

amendment was already covered in the amendment of Commissioner
Rodrigo. One of those amendments proposed by Commissioner Rodrigo was
to delete the word “Ombudsman” and, therefore, we have already voted on
it.

MR. DAVIDE: Madam President, may I comment on that.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the Gentleman may proceed.

MR. DAVIDE: The proposed amendment of Commissioner Rodrigo was the

total deletion of the office of the Ombudsman and all sections relating to it.
It was rejected by the body and, therefore, we can have individual
amendments now on the particular sections.

THE PRESIDENT: The purpose of the amendment of Commissioner Davide is

not just to include the Ombudsman among those officials who have to be
removed from office only on impeachment. Is that right?

MR. DAVIDE: Yes, Madam President.

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MR. RODRIGO: Before we vote on the amendment, may I ask a question?

THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.

MR. RODRIGO: The Ombudsman, is this only one man?

MR. DAVIDE: Only one man.

MR. RODRIGO: Not including his deputies.

MR. MONSOD: No.

VOTING

THE PRESIDENT: We will now vote on the amendment.

As many as are in favor of the proposed amendment of Commissioner

Davide, please raise their hand. (Few Members raised their hand.)

As many as are against, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised
their hand.)

The results show 10 votes in favor and 14 against; the amendment is lost.10

24. The imperative character of the exclusivity of the impeachment

proceedings as a means to remove this class of public officials is, once again,
explicit and invites no doubt. In the words of the President of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, these officials “have to be removed from office
only on impeachment.”

25. The rationale is also clear, it is as much a means of exacting the

accountability of such officials, as a means of “insulating them from politics”
and of protecting them from retaliatory acts arising from the discharge of
their delicate functions that entail “stepping on a lot of toes.” The idea
behind the protection is to clothe them with some form of immunity so that
they may act independently without fear of being removed from office
through ordinary means.

26. In fact, the protection is deemed so critical that, before a vote on

the proposed amendment that would have excluded the Ombudsman from
the list was taken, a member of the ConCom made a point of ensuring that
there was still a quorum.

27. Impeachment is, therefore, an exclusive removal mechanism for a

select group of public officials. Any procedure that undermines this
mechanism should be construed in the strictest possible sense to maintain the
design of the Constitution.

10
R.C.C. NO. 40 Saturday, July 26, 1986. Emphasis supplied.

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The Supreme Court has repeatedly

recognized the exclusive character of the
impeachment process as a means of
removing impeachable officers from office

28. The Honorable Court has consistently held that this provision
“proscribes removal from office of the aforementioned constitutional
officers by any other method,”11 and, in one particular case, had occasion to
repeat this in connection with an attempt to remove a Supreme Court Justice
through disbarment proceedings.12

29. The case of In re: Gonzales13is especially instructive:

The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988 in
Administrative Case No. 3135 in the following terms:

There is another reason why the complaining for disbarment here

must be dismissed. Members of the Supreme Court must, under
Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine
Bar and may be removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI
[2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member
of the Court during the Member's incumbency, would in effect be to
circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate that
Members of the Court may be removed from office only by
impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article
XI (2) of the Constitution. xxx (Emphasis supplied)

This is not the first time the Court has had occasion to rule on this matter.
In Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, the Court said:

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, the above provision proscribes removal from office of the

aforementioned constitutional officers by any other method;
otherwise, to allow a public officer who may be removed solely by
impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office,
would be violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental law.

xxx xxx xxx

The provisions of the 1973 Constitution we referred to above in Lecaroz v.

Sandiganbayan are substantially reproduced in Article XI of the 1987
Constitution:

11
Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 56384, 22 March 1984.
12
Cuenco v. Fernan, A.C. No. 3135, 17 February 1988.
13
A.M. No. 88-4-5433, 15 April 1988.

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xxx xxx xxx

It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that its
Members or the other constitutional officers we referred to above are
entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged
violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior.
What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural
requirements that must be observed before such liability may be determined
and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from
office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court
Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer
either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any
wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate
proceedings.

The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence

and separation of powers. The rule is important because judicial
independence is important. Without the protection of this rule, Members of
the Supreme Court would be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants
or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any number of reasons might seek
to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court.

It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer should
forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against a Member
of this Court. The remedy of a person with a legitimate grievance is to file
impeachment proceedings.14

B. THE SUPREME COURT’S ACT OF

TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE
INSTSANT PETITION FOR QUO
WARRANTO IS A VIOLATION OF
THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION
OF POWERS;

The Constitution Vests In The Senate The

Sole Power To Try And Decide All Cases
Of Impeachment And, Thus, Cause The
Removal Of The Chief Justice Of The
Supreme Court

30. From the foregoing, it is beyond cavil that there is only one way by
which Members of the Supreme Court may be ousted or removed from
office, i.e., by impeachment; and the same is intended to be both a means of
exacting their accountability, and of protecting them from politics and

14
Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.

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retaliatory acts from those who may be aggrieved by their discharge of their
duties.

31. Section 3 of Article XI further states, in part, that:

SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment.

xxx xxx xxx

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at

least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute
the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official

more than once within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath
or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall
be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of
the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal
from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the
Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject
to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.15

32. It is quite apparent from the foregoing that the Senate is the only
body that has the power to remove an impeachable officer from office.

33. Had it been the intent of the Constitution to give members of the
Supreme Court the power to remove one of their own, it would have
provided for a mechanism similar to the existence of Electoral Tribunals in
the Senate and the House of Representatives, which are mandated to “be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members”;16 or explicitly empowered “[e]ach House … [to]
punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of
two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member”.17
34. In fact, a proposal was submitted during the drafting of the
pertinent constitutional provision, which would have transferred to the
Supreme Court the power to adjudicate impeachment cases, as is the pratice
in several jurisdictions. However, the Constitutional Commission ultimately
decided against it (even the proposed compromise amendment that would

15
Emphasis supplied.
16
Article VI, Section 17, Constitution.
17
Article VI, Section 16(3).

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make it applicable only to the President), and deliberately decided to adopt

the United States version (i.e., with the Senate having the sole power to try
and decide impeachment cases), to wit:

MR. NOLLEDO: The Commissioner need not overhaul the procedure. But it
seems to me that she is suggesting some sort of judicial review; am I right?

MS. AQUINO: No, what I am suggesting is to transfer the impeachment power

after the impeachment articles have been initiated and formulated by the
joint action of the legislative chambers to the judicial courts.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. OPLE: Commissioner Aquino must be aware that the main provision on
impeachment in the draft article under discussion was lifted virtually from
the two previous Constitutions, actually almost a verbatim copy of Article VII
of the United States Constitution that was framed and ratified in 1787. xxx

xxx xxx xxx

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): The Chair would like to understand
the present parliamentary situation. Is Commissioner Aquino proposing a
specific amendment?

MS. AQUINO: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): On what section and what is the
nature of the amendment?

MS. AQUINO: It will overhaul massively Section 3 in the sense that I am

contemplating the possibility of amending Section 3 to vest in the judicial
courts the power of impeachment trials after the impeachment articles have
been formulated and initiated by the joint action of the legislative chambers.
But the Committee has expressed reluctance to this position.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): Precisely, the Chair would like to know
the reaction of the Committee on the proposed amendment.

MR. MONSOD: Mr. Presiding Officer, the Committee explained its position
that we believe the present provision serves a very useful purpose, and we
want to see it retained. Furthermore, if I get the drift of the arguments of
Commissioner Aquino, the overhaul would involve the introduction of the
judicial branch of the government into the process in the case of the
President.

Our position is that the President has been directly elected by the people.
Since this is a political act, the more appropriate judge of the President in
this matter should probably be the direct representatives of the people as
well, which are the Senate and the House.

14
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Republic of the Philippines v. Sereno
G.R. No. 237428
Page 15 of 25

MS. AQUINO: Mr. Presiding Officer, I am presently inclined to respect the

position of the Committee.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. GUINGONA.: Last question. Mr. Presiding Officer.

Mention was made here about the impeachment proceeding we are

adopting as being copied from the United States. Is the honorable
Commissioner aware that in other countries the legislature is given the power
to initiate and the courts are vested with the power to adjudicate an
impeachment proceeding? I would like to cite, among others, the following
countries: United Arab Republic, Zambia, the Republic of France, Burundi,
Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Cyprus, Gabon, Somalia, Iran,
Iraq, Laos, and others.

MS. AQUINO: I am not aware of that, Mr. Presiding Officer. But I am thankful
for that citation because it reinforces my position.

xxx xxx xxx

MS. AQUINO: Mr. Presiding Officer, the proposed amendment on Section 3

(5) would seek to transfer the jurisdiction of the impeachment trial pertaining
only to the President from the Senate to the Supreme Court, such that I would
seek co-sponsorship with Commissioner Guingona to propose an
amendment by substitution on Section 3 (5), page 2, beginning on line 15.
The proposed amendment reads: “The Senate shall have the sole power to
try impeachment CASES AFFECTING THE VICE-PRESIDENT, MEMBERS OF THE
SUPREME COURT AND MEMBERS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS.
When the President is on trial, the Supreme Court shall BE CONVENED AS
THE COURT OF IMPEACHMENT. No person shall be convicted without the
concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate IN THE CASE OF
THE VICE-PRESIDENT, MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT AND MEMBERS
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS OR OF THE MEMBERS OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF THE PRESIDENT.

MR. ROMULO: For reasons we have already explained, the Committee regrets
that we cannot accept that amendment principally because we believe this is
a political act. The President’s peers who are equally elected are a better
judge of the matter; finally, we feel it would politicize the Supreme Court.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): Does Commissioner Aquino ask for a
vote?

MS. AQUINO: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

VOTING

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): As many as are in favor of the

proposed amendment of Commissioner Aquino, please raise their hand.
(Few Members raised their hand.)

15
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Republic of the Philippines v. Sereno
G.R. No. 237428
Page 16 of 25

As many as are against, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised
their hand.)

The results show 13 votes in favor and 25 votes against; the proposed
amendment is lost.18

35. It is clear from the foregoing that the intent to vest the power to
remove impeachable officers from office solely on the Senate, to the
exclusion even of the Surpeme Court, is completely deliberate and, thus,
unequivocal.

Quo Warranto Is Not The Proper Remedy

36. Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum. What

cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.

37. If Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI were so meticulously and

deliberately framed to make impeachment an exclusive means of removing
impeachable officers from office, and to vest solely on the Senate the power
to try and devide impeachment cases, then to attempt to oust an impeachable
officer, such as the Chief Justice, through a means other than impeachment
is an attempt to contravene the Constitution, which the Honorable Court
cannot sanction.

38. This is especially true if the proposed mode is a quo warranto

proceeding, which relies on the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme
Court. It is no different from an attempt to remove a member of the Supreme
Court under the rules on disbarment proceedings (as in the cases of Cuenco v,
Fernan,19 In re Gonzales, 20 Jarque v. Desierto, 21 and Marcoleta v. Borra, 22), or
through a legislative act, such as prosecution under the Sandiganbayan law (as
in the case of Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan23)

39. Asking the Supreme Court to oust one of their own, at the behest
of the Executive Department, through a means that is less stringent than the
requirements and procedure set forth in the Constitution, is precisely the
“politicization” that the pertinent Constitutional provisions were designed to
insulate impeachable officers and the Supreme Court from.

40. In any case, the Solicitor General’s allegation of lack of “integrity”

on the part of the Chief Justice for her supposed incomplete SALN when she

18
Supra, footnote #14.
19
A.C. No. 3135, 17 February 1988.
20
A.M. No. 88-4-5433, 15 April 1988.
21
A.C. No. 4509, 5 December 1995.
22
A.C. No. 7732, 30 March 2009.
23
G.R. No. 56384, 22 March 1984.

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MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Republic of the Philippines v. Sereno
G.R. No. 237428
Page 17 of 25

applied for the position of Chief Justice is a question that does not go into
her constitutional qualification. Submission of SALN is, in the first place,
not a constitutional qualification.

41. Whether or not such incomplete SALN amounts to a lack of

integrity on her part is a question addressed to the sound discretion of the
JBC and the President pre-appointment, and the House of Representatives
and the Senate upon her assumption into office.

42. In fact, such grounds is subsumed among those set forth in Section
2 of Article XI, i.e., betrayal of public trust, and, in the case of Chief Justice
Sereno, is precisely one of the proposed articles for her impeachment.

43. To seek her ouster in such grounds is, therefore, an undue intrusion
into the prerogatives vested solely on the House of Representatives and the
Senate, respectively.

44. In any case, whether or not such failure amounts to a lack of

integrity is precisely one of those grounds that is so subjective that it is best
threshed out through an impeachment trial, and not to a quo warranto
proceeding before the Supreme Court.

C. THE INSTANT PETITION FOR

QUO WARRANTO COULD NOT
PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY
AND SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH
AN IMPEACHMENT

45. Even assuming that the impeachment is not an exclusive means to

oust an impeachable officer, the fact remains that the filing of the quo
warranto petition cannot proceed simultaneously with an impeachment
proceedings. Especially one that is based on the same grounds, seeks the
same relief of ouster (which, once granted, would render the impeachment
proceedings moot), and one that was filed later in time.

45.1. In fact, it is public knowledge that, as far back as 13

September 2017, the said House Committee had found the impeachment
complaint filed by Atty. Larry Gadon “sufficient in form and substance”,
and that hearings thereon are being conducted ever since.24

45.2. Said proceedings, to date, have progressed to the point that

on 8 March 2018, members of the House Committee on Justice voted in

24
http://www.manilatimes.net/timeline-house-panel-finds-probable-cause-to-impeach-sereno/384823/

17
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Republic of the Philippines v. Sereno
G.R. No. 237428
Page 18 of 25

favor of finding probable cause to impeach Chief Justice Lourdes

Sereno,25 and, on 19 March 2018, it approved the following six (6) articles
of impeachment, as stated in the speech of House justice committee
chairperson Rep. Reynaldo Umali:

i. Non-filing and non-disclosure of her sworn statement of

assets and liabilities and net worth (SALN), constituting the
impeachable offense of culpable violation of the Constitution
and/or betrayal of public trust;

ii. Committing corruption and betrayal of public trust when she

misused a total amount of ₱18 million of public funds thereby
manifesting her grandiose sense of self-importance;

iii. Committing culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal

of public trust and/or other high crimes when she arrogated
unto herself the powers reposed upon the Supreme Court as
a collegial, deliberative and consultative body;

iv. Committed culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of

public trust and/or other high crimes when she deliberately
and maliciously abused her position as the Chief Justice and
ex officio Chairperson of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC);

v. Committed culpable violation of the Constitution and

betrayal of public trust when she deliberately undermined and
violated the principles of separation of powers among the
three branches of government; and

vi. Committed betrayal of public trust when she willfully and

deliberately failed to comply with her oath of office by
tyrannical abuse of discretionary power.26

45.3. Last 11 April 2018, the House of Representatives Press and

Public Affairs Bureau issued an official Press Release, which quoted Speaker
Pantaleon Alvarez as saying that “the House of Representatives would be
able to approve the Articles of Impeachment against Supreme Court Chief
Justice on-leave Ma. Lourdes Sereno within a week or two after the
resumption of session of Congress on May 15.”27 Speaker Alvarez likewise
recalled “that the House Committee on Justice had already found

25
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/973675/breaking-house-justice-panel-finds-probable-cause-to-impeach-
sereno
26
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/976360/breaking-house-panel-oks-articles-of-impeachment-vs-sereno
27
Press and Public Affairs Bureau, House of Representatives. “Sereno impeachment within 1-2 weeks from
resumption of session: Alvarez”. 11 April 2018. Accessed at:
http://www.congress.gov.ph/press/details.php?pressid=10625. Emphasis supplied.

18
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Republic of the Philippines v. Sereno
G.R. No. 237428
Page 19 of 25

probable cause to impeach Sereno and prepared the corresponding

committee report and Articles of Impeachment against her.”28

45.4. The same official Press Release of the House of

Representatives stated that “[b]efore Congress adjourned last March 21
the Committee on Rules referred the matter for plenary consideration.”29

45.5. Thus, it is public knowledge that the Quo Warranto

Petition, alleging the same grounds for the Chief Justice’s removal,
was filed long after the impeachment process has already been filed.

45.6. The fact that this is one of the grounds for impeachment
charged against Chief Justice Sereno was made known to the Honorable
Court as far back as August 2017 of last year, considering that on 24
August 2017, it was reported that the Supreme Court, in resolutions dated
August 8 and 15, granted the requests of the Volunteers Against Crime
and Corruption (VACC) and of Atty. Larry Gadon, respectively, for the
release of documents that are to be “used in filing an impeachment
complaint.” 30

45.7. On 15 and 30 August 2017, impeachment complaints were,

indeed, filed before the House of Representatives against the Chief Justice
by representatives of the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption
(VACC) and Atty. Gadon, respectively.31

45.8. Atty. Gadon’s request, in particular, which the House

Committee on Justice later found to be sufficient in form and substance
and is thus the basis of the Articles of Impeachment approved by the
Committee,32 sought the release of various documents, including the
Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALNs) of Chief Justice
Ma. Lourdes P.A. Sereno, explicitly citing that the same shall be used in
the filing of an impeachment complaint.33

45.9. In fact, members of the Honorable Court even appeared

before the House Committee on Justice to testify during the hearings held
to determine the existence of probable cause.

46. In addition, the Quo Warranto Petition was intentionally and

specifically filed in order to impede and pre-empt the impeachment

28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/925357/supreme-court-impeachment-saln-release-maria-lourdes-sereno-
request-larry-gadon
31
http://www.manilatimes.net/timeline-house-panel-finds-probable-cause-to-impeach-sereno/384823/
32
http://www.manilatimes.net/timeline-house-panel-finds-probable-cause-to-impeach-sereno/384823/
33
Ibid.

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MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Republic of the Philippines v. Sereno
G.R. No. 237428
Page 20 of 25

proceedings, according to the Solicitor General himself, when he admitted,

in a press conference held on the occasion of the filing, that the filing of the
Petition for Quo Warranto was intended to prevent the impeachment trial
from proceeding, claiming that it was “an act of kindness”, as “[t]he Office
of the Solicitor General will not allow [the Chief Justice] to undergo the
indignity that the late Chief Justice Renato Corona suffered at the hands of
politicians who unjustly convicted him.”34

47. Thus, it is very misleading to state that the Quo Warranto Petition
could proceed simultaneously with the impeachment proceedings, as,
obviously, the Supreme Court’s act of granting the same – as it did, indeed,
do in this case – would render moot and inutile the earlier initiated and
ongoing impeachment proceedings.

48. Therefore, even assuming that Quo Warranto is a valid remedy and
impeachment is not exclusive, following the maxim qui prior est tempore, potior
est jure35 and in accordance with the respect due to the constitutional Doctrine
of Separation of Powers, the Supreme Court ought to have, at the very
least, held in abeyance any action that would have mooted or otherwise
defeated the prior-in-time impeachment proceedings, which is well
within the Constitutionally mandated powers of the House of
Representatives and the Senate to take cognizance of.

49. According to the Supreme Court itself, there are two (2) exceptions
to applying the prior-in-time rule. However, instead of justifying deviation
from the general rule, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the
Petition for Quo Warranto makes the application of the general rule
even more imperative.

50. As stated by the Supreme Court:

In the 1956 case of Teodoro v. Mirasol, we deviated from the

"priority-in-time rule" and applied the "more appropriate action
test" and the "anticipatory test."

The "more appropriate action test" considers the real issue raised by
the pleadings and the ultimate objective of the parties; the more
appropriate action is the one where the real issues raised can be fully
and completely settled. In Teodoro, the lessee filed an action for
declaratory relief to fix the period of the lease, but the lessor moved
for its dismissal because he had subsequently filed an action for
ejectment against the lessee. We noted that the unlawful detainer

34
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/972920/jose-calida-sereno-supreme-court-impeachment-solicitor-general-
chief-justice
35
VICTRONICS COMPUTERS, INC. v. RTC, et al., G.R. No. 104019 January 25, 1993, citing Black's Law
Dictionary, Fifth ed., 1125.

20
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Republic of the Philippines v. Sereno
G.R. No. 237428
Page 21 of 25

suit was the more appropriate action to resolve the real issue
between the parties - whether or not the lessee should be allowed
to continue occupying the land under the terms of the lease
contract; this was the subject matter of the second suit for unlawful
detainer, and was also the main or principal purpose of the first suit
for declaratory relief.

In the "anticipatory test," the bona fides or good faith of the parties
is the critical element. If the first suit is filed merely to preempt the
later action or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal,
then the first suit should be dismissed. In Teodoro, we noted that the
first action, declaratory relief, was filed by the lessee to anticipate
the filing of the second action, unlawful detainer, considering the
lessor's letter informing the lessee that the lease contract had
expired. 36

51. Applying the “more appropriate test”, it is the impeachment

proceedings that is the more appropriate proceedings, considering that
the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. This fact cannot be made more
apparent than during the oral arguments, when rules of evidence, including
rules of materiality and relevance, appeared to have been disregarded because
what was conducted was a mere “oral arguments” and not the methodical
and technical presentation of evidence that would have ensured, not only that
the rights of the respondent were adequately protected, but also, in the words
of the Supreme Court itself, “the one where the real issues raised can be fully
and completely settled.”

52. This is especially true since, applying the “anticipatory test”, it is the
second case that was filed in order to pre-empt the first proceedings and not
the other way around. According to the Supreme Court, “[a] crucial
consideration is the good faith of the parties”.37 Solicitor General
Calida’s public admission that the filing of the Petition for Quo
Warranto was intended to make the impeachment proceedings
unnecessary and, thus, to prevent it from proceeding in due course is
clear evidence of lack of good faith in the filing of the Petition vis-à-vis the
impeachment proceedings.

D. GRANTING THE PETITION FOR

QUO WARRANTO, RESULTING
IN THE OUSTER OF THE
SUBJECT OF THE
IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS,
IS A VIOLATION OF THE
36
Benavidez v. Salvador, G.R. No. 173331, December 11, 2013.
37
Benavidez v. Salvador, G.R. No. 173331, December 11, 2013.

21
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Republic of the Philippines v. Sereno
G.R. No. 237428
Page 22 of 25

CONSTITUTION; HENCE,
MOVANT-INTERVENORS’
INTEREST IN PREVENTING
SUCH A VIOLATION OF THEIR
RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION IS
NEITHER MERE EXPECTANT
AND INCHOATE

53. As stated earlier, the impeachment proceedings is not only ongoing,

it also preceded the Petition for Quo Warranto. So, too, the fact that the
latter alleges the same grounds as one of the Articles of Impeachment is
known to the Supreme Court, as some of the evidence presented during the
hearings of the House Committee on Justice was provided by the Court itself.

54. Considering that it is clear that the filing of the Petition for
Quo Warranto was intentionally filed in order to undermine the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate to hear and decide impeachment
cases, as well as the exclusive prerogative of all senators to try the same,
it is disingenuous to conclude that the interest being protected by herein
Movant-Intervenors, as Senator-judges, are mere expectant and inchoate. It
is clear that their interest is actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate,
as to justify their intervention in this case.

55. In fact, their interest is so real and immediate that the Petition for
Quo Warranto was specifically filed in order to pre-empt and thwart it.

56. Hence, for the Honorable Court to proceed with deciding the
Petition – despite the pendency of an earlier instituted impeachment
proceedings based on the same grounds, which Petition was filed
intentionally in order to pre-empt and impede the progress thereof – is an
undue and unconstitutional act of usurpation of Congress’s exclusive power
to remove and impeachable officer via impeachment proceedings.

57. Thus, respect for the Doctrine of Separation of Powers dictates

that the Honorable Court give due respect to a co-equal branch of
government, and to help uphold and defend the powers explicitly vested
upon such co-equal branch by the Constitution, by dismissing the Quo
Warranto Petition or, at the very least, deferring any decision thereon until
the impeachment proceedings have had the opportunity to run its due course
in accordance with the Constitution.

58. In fact, other members of the Senate, including herein Movant-

Intervenors, filed Senate Resolution No. 738, entitled “Resolution Expressing

22
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Republic of the Philippines v. Sereno
G.R. No. 237428
Page 23 of 25

The Sense Of The Senate To Uphold The Constitution On The Matter Of Removing
A Chief Justice From Office”, stating, in part:

WHEREAS, Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that

members of the Supreme Court "may be removed from office, on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution xxx";
WHEREAS, Section 3( 1) of Article XI states that "The House of
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment"; Section 3(6) of the same Article states that "The Senate
shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment
xxx";
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court's decision to grant the quo warranto
petition sets a dangerous precedent that transgresses the exclusive
powers of the legislative branch to initiate, try, and decide all cases of
impeachment;
WHEREAS, a fundamental doctrine of a republican government is the
separation of powers of the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of government; and while this doctrine does not guarantee
absolute autonomy in the discharge of functions of each branch, the
corollary doctrine of checks and balances ensures their co-equality;
WHEREAS, the Senate recognizes that the continued harmonius
interdependence of these branches lies in the faithful adherence of each
branch of government to the Constitution;
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED to express
the sense of the Senate of the Philippines to uphold the Constitution on the
matter of removing a Chief Justice from office, and respectfully urge the
Supreme Court to review its decision to nullify the appointment of Maria
Lourdes Sereno as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

59. Therefore, as duly-elected Senators of the Republic of the

Philippines currently sitting as members of the 17th Congress of the
Philippines, movant-intervenors have a specific interest in ensuring that the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate to hear and decide impeachment cases, as
well as the exclusive prerogative of all senators to try the same, are not
undermined; and that the Honorable Court does not allow itself to become
complicit with this blatant attempt to circumvent and outrightly vipolate the
Constitution.

E. THERE ARE SUFFICIENT

GROUNDS TO SUPPORT THE
MOTION FOR INHIBITION
FILED BY RESPONDENT CHIEF
JUSTICE SERENO

23
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Republic of the Philippines v. Sereno
G.R. No. 237428
Page 24 of 25

60. In the course of the proceedings, the animosity between the parties
and some of the members of the Honorable Court became quite palpable and
apparent. It has become evident that the Honorable Court cannot render a
judgment based purely on the merits of the case, given such hostile
environment.

61. With all due respect to the Honorable Court, the proceedings last
10 April 2018 cannot honestly be considered as wholly impartial, as to satisfy
the due process requirement that those who shall hear, try and decide cases
ought to possess the cold neutrality of impartial judges.

62. Thus, in light of what transpired during the oral arguments, herein
movant-intervenors hereby manifest their deep concern about the propriety
of the Honorable Court’s denial of the Motions for Inhibition, and thus
strongly urge the Honorable Court to reflect on the wisdom of proceeding
with this case notwithstanding the apparent lack of impartiality of some of its
members.

63. Moreover, movant-intervenors respectfully manifest that the

hostile environment for adjudicating the present case has clouded the
jurisdictional issue they raised in their Opposition-in-Intervention, i.e., the
issue of the lack of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear and decide the
Petition for Quo Warranto, insofar as it seeks to oust or remove an impeachable
officer on the grounds of her alleged lack of “integrity”.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, herein movant-intervenors, most respectfully pray that

this Honorable Court RECONSIDER its Decision dated 11 May 2018; and,
instead, DISMISS the Petition for Quo Warranto dated 2 March 2018 for LACK
OF JURISDICTION, or, at the very least, hold in abeyance any final action
therein pending the impeachment proceedings.

Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.

Quezon City for Manila, 31 March 2018.

RIGOROSO GALINDEZ & RABINO LAW OFFICES

Rm 901-902, 9th Floor, FilGarcia Tower,
140 Kalayaan Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City
Office Tel. Nos. 924-2396/924-8552
Fax No. 929-1609

By:

24
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Republic of the Philippines v. Sereno
G.R. No. 237428
Page 25 of 25

FLORIN T. HILBAY
Counsel for Movant-Intervenors
Roll of Attorneys No. 44957
PTR No. 5642721; 01/11/18; Q.C
IBP Lifetime Membership No. 08505
MCLE Exemption No. V-000908, issued on 12/3/2015
florin.hilbay@gmail.com

TEDDY ESTEBAN F. RIGOROSO

Counsel for Movant-Intervenors
Roll of Attorneys No. 42240
PTR No. 5521162; 01/03/18; Q.C.
IBP No. 020461; 01/05/18; Q.C.
MCLE Compliance No. V-0005526; 01/14/15

COPY FURNISHED VIA REGISTERED MAIL:

SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA

Petitioner
Office of the Solicitor General
134 Amorsolo Street, Legaspi Village,
1229 Makati City

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Respondent
Office of the Chief Justice
Supreme Court, Padre Faura, Street
Ermita, Manila City
1000, Metro Manila

EXPLANATION FOR MODE OF SERVICE

Please be informed that the undersigned counsel served a copy of the foregoing
Motion for Reconsideration upon the foregoing parties/office by registered mail as
evidenced by the attached Affidavit of Service by Registered Mail due to the
shortage of available manpower to effect the service thereof by personal delivery.

TEDDY ESTEBAN F. RIGOROSO

25