POLICE INVESTIGATION
MIRANDA RIGHTS
The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent; (b) anything he says
can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his
counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so
desires.
PEOPLE V ANDAN
ANDAN was accused of rape with
homicide. The girl was taken while she
was on her way to school and was found
dead in a vacant lot near Andan’s house.
The police found bloodstains in Andan’s
backyard, and arrested him while he was
in his parents’ house.
Upon interrogation, he initially said that he
was just a lookout and named two other
neighbors as perpetrators. He told police
that he knew where the victim’s bags
were, and retrieved them from a flowerpot
in his house.
The next day, the Mayor visited the police
headquarters. ANDAN requested that
they talk in private. They were led to
another room. He then admitted that he
killed the girl. The mayor opened the door
and let media representatives in to
interview ANDAN. He repeated his
confession before the cameras.
On appeal, he claims that his confession
The confession to the police is The Bill of Rights does not concern itself
inadmissible but the confession to the with the relation between a private
mayor and the media is admissible. individual and another individual. It
governs the relationship between the
It was appellant himself who individual and the State. The prohibitions
spontaneously, freely and voluntarily therein are primarily addressed to the
sought the mayor for a private meeting. State and its agents.
The mayor did not know that appellant
was going to confess his guilt to him.
When appellant talked with the mayor as
a confidant and not as a law enforcement
officer, his uncounselled confession to
him did not violate his constitutional
rights.
The confession to the news reporters
were given free from any undue influence
from the police authorities. The news
reporters acted as news reporters when
they interviewed ANDAN. They were not
acting under the direction and control of
the police. They did not force appellant to
grant them an interview and reenact the
commission of the crime. In fact, they
asked his permission before interviewing
him. They interviewed him on separate
is inadmissible because it was taken
without the presence of counsel.
PEOPLE V ENDINO AND GAGARIN
Respondents shot and stabbed a man in
Palawan then made a run for it. Gagarin
was caught in Antipolo several months
later.
On their way to the airport, they stopped
at the ABS-CBN television station where
accused Galgarin was interviewed by
reporters. Video footages of the interview
were taken showing Galgarin admitting
his guilt while pointing to his nephew
Edward Endino as the gunman. According
to Galgarin, after attacking Aquino, they
left for Roxas, Palawan, where his sister
Langging who is Edward's mother, was
waiting. Langging gave them money for
their fare for Manila. They took the boat
for Batangas, where they stayed for a few
days, and proceeded to Manila where
they separated, with him heading for
Antipolo. Galgarin appealed for Edward to
give himself up to the authorities. His
interview was shown over the ABS-CBN
evening news program TV Patrol.
days not once did appellant protest his
innocence. Instead, he repeatedly
confessed his guilt to them. He even
supplied all the details in the commission
of the crime, and consented to its
reenactment. All his confessions to the
news reporters were witnessed by his
family and other relatives. There was no
coercive atmosphere in the interview of
appellant by the news reporters.
The confession is admissible. The
interview was recorded on video and it
showed accused-appellant unburdening
his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in
the presence of newsmen. Such
confession does not form part of custodial
investigation as it was not given to police
officers but to media men in an attempt to
elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the
public.
We do not suggest that videotaped
confessions given before media men by
an accused with the knowledge of and in
the presence of police officers are
impermissible. Indeed, the line between
proper and invalid police techniques and
conduct is a difficult one to draw,
particularly in cases such as this where it
is essential to make sharp judgments in
determining whether a confession was
given under coercive physical or
psychological atmosphere.
A word of counsel then to lower courts:
we should never presume that all media
confessions described as voluntary have
been freely given. This type of confession
always remains suspect and therefore
should be thoroughly examined and
scrutinized.
PEOPLE V CAGUIOA
C was charged with murder. At the trial, a
policeman testified that he had waived his
right to counsel during interrogation and
presented a handwritten statement to
prove this claim.
The lower court judge didn't buy this shit
and dismissed the case because C’s
constitutional rights were violated.
PEOPLE V MAQUEDA
M accused of robbery with murder.
Statement taken by police without
counsel. Admitted by lower court and
convicted.
The trial court admitted the Sinumpaang
Salaysay of accused Maqueda although it
was taken without the assistance of
counsel because it was of the opinion that
since an information had already
benefited in court against him and he was
arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest
issued by the court, the Sinumpaang
Salaysay was not, therefore, taken during
custodial investigation.
Certiorari does not lie. The petition must
be dismissed. It was not shown that the
alleged waiver was given freely and
voluntarily. The questioning was rather
perfunctory. An even more telling
circumstance against such alleged waiver
being given credence was that private
respondent, a native of Samar, then
nineteen years old, was interrogated
extensively in Tagalog, no showing
having been made that his acquaintance
with the language was such that he could
fully understand the import of what was
asked him.
We cannot agree with its sweeping view.
If this were so, then there would be a
hiatus in the criminal justice process
where an accused is deprived of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel and to be informed of such rights.
Such a view would not only give a very
restrictive application to Section 12(1); it
would also diminish the said accused's
rights under Section 14(2) Article III of the
Constitution.
On the specific question of whether or not
the right to counsel during custodial
interrogation interrogation may be waived,
the Court rules that there is no bar to such
a waiver if made intelligently and
voluntarily, with full understanding of its
consequences.
The exercise of the rights to remain silent
and to counsel and to be informed thereof
under Section 12(1), Article III of the
Constitution are not confined to that
period prior to the filing of a criminal
complaint or information but are available
at that stage when a person is "under
investigation for the commission of an
offense."
PEOPLE V AMESTUZO The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of
the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called
Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a
person while he is under custodial
investigation.
The right to be assisted by counsel
attaches only during custodial
investigation and cannot be claimed by
the accused during identification in a
police line-up because it is not part of the
custodial investigation process. This is
because during a police line-up, the
process has not yet shifted from the
investigatory to the accusatory and it is
usually the witness or the complainant
who is interrogated and who gives a
statement in the course of the line-up.
Police line-up is not part of the custodial
investigation; hence, the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet
be invoked at this stage.
However, we agree that complainants
out-of-court identification of accused-
appellant was seriously flawed as to
preclude its admissibility. In resolving the
admissibility and reliability of out-of-court
identifications, we have applied the totality
of circumstances test.
The out-of-court identification of herein
accused-appellant by complainants in the
police station appears to have been
improperly suggestive.

PEOPLE V OBRERO There was only a perfunctory reading of What renders the confession of accused-
the Miranda rights to accused-appellant appellant inadmissible is the fact that
without any effort to find out from him accused-appellant was not given the
whether he wanted to have counsel and, Miranda warnings effectively.
if so, whether he had his own counsel or
he wanted the police to appoint one for
him. This kind of giving of warnings, in
several decisions, has been found to be
merely ceremonial and inadequate to
transmit meaningful information to the
suspect. Especially in this case, care
should have been scrupulously observed
by the police investigator that accused-
appellant was specifically asked these
questions considering that he only
finished the fourth grade of the
elementary school.
 Moreover, Art. III, 12(1) requires that
counsel assisting suspects in custodial
interrogations be competent and
independent. Here, accused-appellant
was assisted by Atty. De los Reyes, who,
though presumably competent, cannot be
considered an "independent counsel" as
contemplated by the law for the reason
that he was station commander of the
WPD at the time he assisted accused-
appellant.

JESALVA V PEOPLE The assailed statements herein were

spontaneously made by petitioner and
were not at all elicited through
questioning. It was established that
petitioner, together with his cousin Fiscal
Jayona, personally went to the police
station and voluntarily made the
statement that Leticia jumped out of his
vehicle at around 12:30 a.m. of
September 9, 1992.[41] The RTC and the
CA did not, therefore, err in holding that
the constitutional procedure for custodial
investigation is not applicable in the
instant case.

EXCLUSIONARY RULE/FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE

According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative
evidence (the " fruit " ) derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of
the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is
at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that
evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence
taints all evidence subsequently obtained. (People v Alicando)

MAPP V OHIO All evidence obtained by searches and

seizures in violation of the Federal
Constitution is inadmissible in a criminal
trial in a state court

PEOPLE V ALICANDO First. The arraignment of the appellant is It is not only the uncounselled confession
null and void. The records do not reveal that is condemned as inadmissible, but
that the Information against the appellant also evidence derived therefrom. The
was read in the language or dialect known pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged
to him. bloodstains were evidence derived from
the uncounselled confession illegally
Second. The plea of guilt made by the extracted by the police from the appellant.
appellant is likewise null and void. The
records do not reveal any information
about the personality profile of the
appellant which can serve as a
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a
free and informed plea of guilt.

Third. Some prosecution evidence,

offered independently of the plea of guilt
of the appellant, were inadmissible, yet,
were considered by the trial court in
convicting the appellant. These are
inadmissible evidence for they were
gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo
City PNP as a result of custodial
interrogation where appellant verbally
confessed to the crime without the benefit
of counsel.
PEOPLE V JANUARIO Appellants might have indeed committed
the crime in concert with Eliseo Sarita and
Eduardo Sarinos. However, what could
have been their valuable admissions and
confessions as far as the prosecution was
concerned were sullied and rendered
inadmissible by the irregular manner by
which the law enforcement agents
extracted such admissions and
confessions from appellants. Without
such statements, the remaining
prosecution evidence -- consisting mostly
of hearsay testimony and investigation
reports -- is sorely inadequate to prove
appellants participation in the crime.
PEOPLE V SAMONTAEZ
PEOPLE V MOJELLO Concededly, the December 17, 1996
custodial investigation upon appellant's
apprehension by the police authorities
violated the Miranda doctrine on two
grounds: (1) no counsel was present; and
(2) improper waiver of the right to counsel
as it was not made in writing and in the
presence of counsel. However, the
December 23, 1996 custodial
investigation which elicited the appellant's
confession should nevertheless be upheld
for having complied with Art. III, Sec. 12,
The main evidence relied upon for the
conviction of appellants were their own
extrajudicial confessions which admittedly
were extracted and signed in the
presence and with the assistance of a
lawyer who was applying for work in the
NBI. Such counsel cannot in any wise be
considered independent because he
cannot be expected to work against the
interest of a police agency he was hoping
to join, as a few months later, he in fact
was admitted into its work force. For this
violation of their constitutional right to
independent counsel, appellants deserve
acquittal. After the exclusion of their
tainted confessions, no sufficient and
credible evidence remains in the Courts
records to overturn another constitutional
right: the right to be presumed innocent
of any crime until the contrary is proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
The Philippine law on custodial
investigation has evolved to provide for
more stringent standards than what was
originally laid out in Miranda v. Arizona.
The purpose of the constitutional
limitations on police interrogation as the
process shifts from the investigatory to
the accusatory seems to be to accord
even the lowliest and most despicable
criminal suspects a measure of dignity
and respect. The main focus is the
suspect, and the underlying mission of

HO WAI PANG V PEOPLE
SURVEILLANCE/RECORDING OF COMMUNICATIONS
par. 1.
The extrajudicial confession executed by
appellant on December 23, 1996,
applying Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 of the
Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No.
7438, Sec. 2 complies with the strict
constitutional requirements on the right to
counsel. In other words, the extrajudicial
confession of the appellant is valid and
therefore admissible in evidence.
While there is no dispute that petitioner
was subjected to all the rituals of a
custodial questioning by the customs
authorities and the NBI in violation of his
constitutional right under Section 12[31] of
Article III of the Constitution, we must not,
however, lose sight of the fact that what
said constitutional provision prohibits as
evidence are only confessions and
admissions of the accused as against
himself.
In the case at bench, petitioner did not
make any confession or admission during
his custodial investigation.
Petitioners conviction in the present case
was on the strength of his having been
caught in flagrante delicto transporting
shabu into the country and not on the
basis of any confession or admission.
custodial investigation – to elicit a
confession.
Even though improper interrogation
methods were used at the outset, there is
still a possibility of obtaining a legally valid
confession later on by properly
interrogating the subject under different
conditions and circumstances than those
which prevailed originally.
Infraction of the rights of an accused
during custodial investigation or the so-
called Miranda Rights render inadmissible
only the extrajudicial confession or
admission made during such
investigation.[1] The admissibility of other
evidence, provided they are relevant to
the issue and is not otherwise excluded
by law or rules, is not affected even if
obtained or taken in the course of
custodial investigation.[2]
GAANAN V IAC An extension telephone cannot be placed
in the same category as a dictaphone,
dictagraph or the other devices
enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200
as the use thereof cannot be considered
as "tapping" the wire or cable of a
telephone line. The telephone extension
in this case was not installed for that
purpose. It just happened to be there for
ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory
construction that in order to determine the
true intent of the legislature, the particular
clauses and phrases of the statute should
not be taken as detached and isolate
KATZ V US
Acting on a suspicion that Katz was
transmitting gambling information over the
The phrase "device or arrangement" in
Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not
exclusive to that enumerated therein,
should be construed to comprehend
instruments of the same or similar nature,
that is, instruments the use of which
would be tantamount to tapping the main
line of a telephone. It refers to instruments
whose installation or presence cannot be
presumed by the party or parties being
overheard because, by their very nature,
they are not of common usage and their
purpose is precisely for tapping,
intercepting or recording a telephone
conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument
which is very common especially now
when the extended unit does not have to
be connected by wire to the main
telephone but can be moved from place '
to place within a radius of a kilometer or
more. A person should safely presume
that the party he is calling at the other end
of the line probably has an extension
telephone and he runs the risk of a third
party listening as in the case of a party
line or a telephone unit which shares its
line with another.
1. The Government's eavesdropping
activities violated the privacy upon which
petitioner justifiably relied while using the
phone to clients in other states, Federal
agents attached an eavesdropping device
to the outside of a public phone booth
used by Katz. Based on recordings of his
end of the conversations, Katz was
convicted under an eight-count indictment
for the illegal transmission of wagering
information from Los Angeles to Boston
and Miami. On appeal, Katz challenged
his conviction arguing that the recordings
could not be used as evidence against
him. The Court of Appeals rejected this
point, noting the absence of a physical
intrusion into the phone booth itself. The
Court granted certiorari.
US V WHITE
Respondent was convicted in 1966 of
narcotics violations following a trial where
evidence was admitted of certain
incriminating statements of respondent
that were overheard by warrantless
electronic eavesdropping by Government
agents by means of a transmitter which
an informer consented to wear during his
telephone booth, and thus constituted a
"search and seizure" within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.
(a) The Fourth Amendment governs not
only the seizure of tangible items, but
extends as well to the recording of oral
statements. Silverman v. United States.
(b) Because the Fourth Amendment
protects people, rather than places, its
reach cannot turn on the presence or
absence of a physical intrusion into any
given enclosure. The "trespass" doctrine
of Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S.
438, and Goldman is no longer
controlling.
2. Although the surveillance in this case
may have been so narrowly circumscribed
that it could constitutionally have been
authorized in advance, it was not in fact
conducted pursuant to the warrant
procedure which is a constitutional
precondition of such electronic
surveillance. Pp. 389 U. S. 354-359.
If the law gives no protection to the
wrongdoer whose trusted accomplice is or
becomes a police agent, neither should it
protect him when that same agent has
recorded or transmitted the conversations
which are later offered in evidence to
prove the State's case.
meetings with respondent. The informer
could not be located at trial, and the trial
court overruled objections to the
testimony of the agents who conducted
the electronic surveillance. Reading Katz
v. United States, (1967), as overruling On
Lee v. United States, (1952), the Court of
Appeals held that the agents' testimony
was impermissible under the Fourth
Amendment, and reversed respondent's
conviction.
Held: The judgment is reversed.
US V KNOTTS
Having reason to believe that one
Armstrong was purchasing chloroform to
be used in the manufacture of illicit drugs,
Minnesota law enforcement officers
arranged with the seller to place a beeper
(a radio transmitter) inside a chloroform
container that was sold to Armstrong.
Officers then followed the car in which the
chloroform was placed, maintaining
contact by using both visual surveillance
and a monitor which received the beeper
signals, and ultimately tracing the
chloroform, by beeper monitoring alone,
to respondent's secluded cabin in
Wisconsin. Following three days of
intermittent visual surveillance of the
cabin, officers secured a search warrant
and discovered the chloroform container,
and a drug laboratory in the cabin,
including chemicals and formulas for
While respondent had the traditional Monitoring the beeper signals did not
expectation of privacy within a dwelling invade any legitimate expectation of
place insofar as his cabin was concerned, privacy on respondent's part, and thus
such expectation of privacy would not there was neither a "search" nor a
have extended to the visual observation "seizure" within the contemplation of the
from public places of the automobile Fourth Amendment. The beeper
arriving on his premises after leaving a surveillance amounted principally to
public highway, or to movements of following an automobile on public streets
objects such as the chloroform container and highways. A person traveling in an
outside the cabin. The fact that the automobile on public thoroughfares has
officers relied not only on visual no reasonable expectation of privacy in
surveillance, but also on the use of the his movements.
beeper, does not alter the situation.
Nothing in the Fourth Amendment
prohibited the police from augmenting
their sensory faculties with such
enhancement as science and technology
afforded them in this case. There is no
indication that the beeper was used in any
way to reveal information as to the
movement of the chloroform container
producing amphetamine. After his motion
to suppress evidence based on the
warrantless monitoring of the beeper was
denied, respondent was convicted in
Federal District Court for conspiring to
manufacture controlled substances. The
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
the monitoring of the beeper was
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
SPOUSES HING V CHOACHUY
within the cabin, or in any way that would
not have been visible to the naked eye
from outside the cabin.
Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not
be confined to his house or residence as
it may extend to places where he has the
right to exclude the public or deny them
access. The phrase "prying into the
privacy of another’s residence," therefore,
covers places, locations, or even
situations which an individual considers
as private. And as long as his right is
recognized by society, other individuals
may not infringe on his right to privacy.
This "reasonable expectation of privacy"
test determines whether a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and
whether the expectation has been
violated.In Ople v. Torres,52 we
enunciated that "the reasonableness of a
person’s expectation of privacy depends
on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his
conduct, the individual has exhibited an
expectation of privacy; and (2) this
expectation is one that society recognizes
as reasonable."
Video surveillance cameras should not
cover places where there is reasonable
expectation of privacy, unless the consent
of the individual, whose right to privacy
would be affected, was obtained. Nor
should these cameras be used to pry into
the privacy of another’s residence or
business office as it would be no different
from eavesdropping, which is a crime
under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-
Wiretapping Law.