Analysis
The Back and Forth of Turkey’s “Westernness”
Summary: Whether or not Turkey
is turning its back on the West is
a frequently asked question and a
common refrain, particularly after
Turkey’s reaction to Israel’s assault
against Hamas in Gaza. Turkey re-
mains strategically Western-oriented
and in fact the ongoing Ergenekon
investigation reaffirms its Atlanticist
credentials. What Turkey’s Western
allies must do is have a self-critical
look at their record and then ask
themselves whether the strategic
“Westernness” of Turkey is enough.
How Turkey’s Western partners
deal with these issues and whether
they will spend the necessary time
and energy to manage their rela-
tionships with Turkey may have as
much, if not more, of an impact on
how Turkey ultimately develops.
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by Soli Ozel*
ISTANBUL — The periodic fits about
whether Ankara is turning its back on
the West are a staple of discussions
and analyses on Turkey. The fact that
a party that has its roots in the coun-
try’s Islamist movement is in power
helps intensify the anxiety of those
who worry about a Turkey that is not
oriented toward the West. Yet one can
also indeed argue that those who are so
concerned do not invest the energy, the
time, and the political determination to
ensure that Turkey remains Western-
oriented.
The European Union’s increasing
ambivalence, in particular the outright
offensive language of some of its mem-
bers against Turkey, has certainly un-
dermined the Turkish public’s faith in
the sincerity of its European partners.
As a result, recent survey polls have
shown a considerable drop in support
for EU membership. The Turkish Prime
Minister’s cavalier attitude during his
recent trip to Brussels, not to mention
his rhetoric, reflects both this disillu-
sionment and the resulting emotional
urge of defiance.
Sympathy for the United States,
although recently improved, was at
one point the lowest in the world. This
was not simply the result of the Bush
Doctrine or the language used toward
the Iraq war chosen by some members
of the U.S. administration.
*
Soli Ozel teaches at Istanbul Bilgi University’s Department of International Relations and Political Science and is a columnist for the
Turkish daily Sabah. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the German
Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF).
There were three types of reaction that
shaped the public’s perception of U.S.
strategy. Turkey’s secular left saw the
Iraq war as imperialist aggression, while
the Islamists saw the Iraq war as yet
another assault on a Muslim country
in an effort to control its resources and
do Israel’s bidding. Talk of a Greater
Middle East project also irked them,
because in their minds this was a
project of subjugating the region and
its Muslim peoples to the United States
and Israel.
Then there were the nationalist
elements that saw the Iraq war and its
likely outcomes—like an independent
or even highly autonomous Kurdis-
tan—as a major threat to Turkish
security. This group, consisting over-
whelmingly of secularists (civilians as
well as active and retired military
personnel), also disliked the Greater
Middle East project. They believed that
this was part of a plan to subjugate
Turkish interests to those of the United
States. In their view, which was in
stark contrast to the Islamist view, the
neoconservative project wanted to turn
Turkey into a “moderately Islamist”
state. Loose or careless talk on the part
of some U.S. officials to that effect
exacerbated this group’s anxiety.
Much more importantly, though, such
people thought that in the post-Cold
War world and particularly in the
Analysis
post-invasion of Iraq world when America’s power and influ-
ence were waning, Turkey’s interests no longer coincided
with those of the West. To the contrary, they argued, the
American project ran afoul of Turkey’s interests both because
of its domestic design of moderate Islamism and because it
undermined Turkey’s aspirations for a zone of interest and
influence to the east, in Central Asia and beyond. The natural
result of such thinking by some of Turkey’s secularist elites
was the articulation of a non-Western posture in strategic
affairs and an inclination to look for partners, if not allies, in
Russia, Iran, and China.
This approach, dubbed “Eurasianist,” was first articulated
in March 2002 at a conference in Istanbul by the then-
Secretary General of the National Security Council,
General Tuncer Kılınç. He asked that Turkey drop the
European Union without turning its back on the United
States, and seek to work with Russia and Iran. Five years later
in London, he would call on Turkey to get out of NATO.
Released following a day of questioning, General Kılınç was
recently arrested as part of the ongoing Ergenekon investiga-
tion. Colleagues close to the General have also been arrested
and are still being held, awaiting indictment.
The Ergenekon case is a confusing and controversial one that
added yet another axis of polarization to Turkey’s turbulent
politics. Many Turks who have been following the investiga-
tion and its subsequent arrests find the process confusing.
Some see signs of too much partisanship and revanchism in
the zeal of the prosecutors. Those high profile individuals
who have been arrested are mostly identified with the
Eurasianist school of thought, the bane of the Islamists. And
the intelligence and investigative units of the police are
suspected of being controlled by adherents of a religious
community.
It is true that the investigation itself, the text of the first
indictment, and the conduct of the security forces during the
arrests are full of procedural problems that will ultimately
overshadow the final verdicts. Many of those arrested still do
not know what they are being charged with, and there have
been many cases of privacy violations and public exposure of
persons who may not be related with the case at all. However
helpful this case may prove to be for further civilianization
of Turkey, the carelessness regarding legal procedures, the
sanctity of privacy, and the grinding slowness of the process
have raised concerns. Such nonchalance about legal brutality
2
cannot reassure those who seek a Turkey that observes the
rule of law.
Still, the Ergenekon case is an important step in cleansing
Turkey’s security apparatuses of clandestine networks and
putschists. The published diaries of a former Navy com-
mander indicated that there were two coup attempts in 2003
and 2004, quelled by then Chief-of-General Staff General
Hilmi Özkök. In the past, these groupings were engaged in
illicit activities, murders, and an assortment of other crimes.
They also had the ability of blocking investigations into their
own criminal activities.
However, it is quite clear that the probe itself, the arrests, and
the discovery of these networks would not have been possible
without the active or tacit support of the Turkish military. In
the simplest of terms, it appears that the pro-Atlanticist and the
more pro-democracy wing of the Turkish military is targeting
or weakening the authoritarian Eurasianist elements.
In this restricted sense then, Turkey is remaining Western.
The country’s strategic orientation will remain Atlanticist
and the Turkish military is comfortable with identifying itself
as a NATO member. Unlike the Cold War period, Turkey’s
own interests will be more strongly articulated in the councils
of the Alliance, where disagreements or even discord exist.
Such problems, though, do not alter the fundamental choice
made by the military and the Turkish government. Despite
strong appearances to the contrary, the Turkish government
has not repudiated its Atlantic ties, and over the course of
its term in office has even embraced it. One can reasonably
make the argument that in its second term, the ruling Justice
and Development Party (AKP) has exhibited a strong desire
to return to the patterns of the Cold War: build relations with
the West on a solely American track, and expect less pressure
for democratization.
Reacting to the brutality of the recent Israeli attack against
Hamas in Gaza, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s prime min-
ister, used strong language when stating that Israel went
beyond a legitimate expression of rightful outrage. As Econo-
mist Correspondent Amberin Zaman reports in her own On
Turkey piece, Erdoğan’s discourse also fanned the flames of
ugly anti-Semitism, the likes of which have not been seen in
this country for a long time, if ever. By erasing the distinc-
tion between Israelis and Jews, the Prime Minister crossed a
sacred line and gave life to an assorted group of racists who
always wait in the wings.
Analysis

Yet, Erdoğan also strongly rebuked those officials who

proposed that he recall Turkey’s ambassador in Tel Aviv or
cut diplomatic ties with Israel. “I am not running a grocery
store, I am governing the Republic of Turkey,” Erdoğan said.
During the course of the war, the Turkish ambassador was in
contact with Israeli authorities, and a Turkish envoy had
access to everyone he asked to meet with during his visit
there. The strategic logic held its own.
One must therefore probe deeper to revisit the original
question of whether or not Turkey is turning its back on the
West. If indeed it is true that Turkey is remaining Western
in terms of its strategic orientation, all the while asking for
more autonomous space to play as a regional power in its
surrounding regions, then the definition of the West must be
expanded. For reasons that are not immediately tangible, it is
imperative that Turkey remains a Western country in terms
of its domestic political organization, ideological make-up,
and the principles and values it upholds. In other words,
Turkey must be a democratic and secular state where rule
of law is the supreme value. The challenge for the Turks is
whether or not, in this most difficult transition period from
a tutelary democracy toward a genuine one (assuming they
don’t get stuck in electoral authoritarianism), they can forge
the institutions and the political structure necessary to get
there.
Soli Ozel, Lecturer, Bilgi University; Columnist, Sabah
Soli Ozel teaches at Istanbul Bilgi University’s Department of
International Relations and Political Science. He is a columnist for the
national daily Sabah and is senior advisor to the chairman of the
Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association. Additionally, he
is the editor of TUSIAD’s magazine Private View.
About GMF
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dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding
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and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation can
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supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded
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GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In
addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices
in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and
Bucharest.

Thus, the issue of “losing Turkey,” is about the character of

the country more so than its strategic orientation. This is why
Turkey’s Western partners also have choices to make. Will they
be happy to work with a Turkey that is not an accomplished
democracy simply because it is expedient to do so? Or will they
want it to be a bona fide member of the Atlantic community?
Similarly, will they see Turkey as essentially a Middle
Eastern country that allies itself with the West in that region?
Or will they treat it as a member of the Atlantic alliance that
has strengths in the Middle East? How Turkey’s Western
partners answer these questions and whether they will spend
the necessary time and energy to manage the Turkish file may
have as much, if not more, of an impact on where Turkey
stands.