Foreign Policy Program
Policy Brief
April 21, 2009
Summary: As the Obama administration
defines its foreign policy agenda, voices
around the world caution that the West
cannot “export” democracy and should
adapt more “modest” foreign policies.
This year marks the 20th anniversary of
the collapse of communism in Eastern
Europe, providing an opportune mo-
ment to review lessons learned in the
postcommunist world that suggest that
the United States and Europe should
not retreat from their support for demo-
cratic reform abroad, but rather redefine
the place of democracy promotion in a
revitalized transatlantic agenda.
Foreign policy debates suggest that
the lessons learned from the postcom-
munist world since 1989 must be
reinforced and learned anew. Backslid-
ing and rising authoritarianism has led
experts to warn against “democratic
pessimism” that could lead policymak-
ers to pull back their support for democ-
racy abroad. The Western Balkans and
former Soviet Union highlight the limits
of democracy promotion, the protracted
difficulties of post-conflict states, and
the potential for backlash by powerful
states, challenges which will continue
to confront policymakers in the coming
years. Yet, the reinforcing role of interna-
tional efforts also show that democracy
promotion can provide resources and
expertise to new democracies as they
build and sustain reforms.
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The myth of “exporting” democracy:
Lessons from Eastern Europe after 1989
by John K. Glenn1
As the Obama administration defines its
foreign policy agenda, voices around the
world caution that we have learned that
the West cannot “export” democracy and
should adopt more “modest” foreign poli-
cies.2 Experts warn that “America does not
have the ability to transform the world...
we should go slow and focus on building
its prerequisites—the checks and balances
of civil society and constitutionalism—and
not rush elections or impose political
change through force.”3
Regrettably, this argument reacts to the
previous administration’s rhetoric in the
Middle East by obscuring decades of Amer-
ican and European experience in the field
of democracy promotion that relied neither
on the use of force nor focused solely on
elections. This year not only marks the
beginnings of a new U.S. administration
but also the 20th anniversary of the col-
lapse of communism in Eastern Europe in
1989. It provides an opportune moment to
review lessons learned in the post com-
munist world that suggest the United States
and Europe should not retreat from their
support for democratic reform abroad, but
rather redefine the place of democracy pro-
motion in a revitalized transatlantic agenda.
1
John K. Glenn is the director of foreign policy at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). Thanks to Thomas Caroth-
ers, Pavol Demes, Peter van Praagh, and Ivan Vejvoda for input and comments on earlier drafts of this brief. The views expressed
here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of GMF.
2
See for example Gabor Steingart. “The end of arrogance.” Spiegel Online, March 3, 2009. Retrieved at: http://www.spiegel.de/in-
ternational/world/0,1518,610980,00.html
3
Richard Haass. “The World that Awaits.” Newsweek, November 3, 2008
While the fall of the Berlin Wall remains a
jubilant image of a Europe reunited at the
end of the 20th century, the lessons learned
over the past 20 years are more complex
and often misunderstood. Did the West
“export” democracy to Eastern Europe? No.
Numerous organizations provided help—
resources, expertise, and technology—to
different countries with varied results over
time because there was no “blueprint” for
change and reform was primarily driven
from within.
The countries of Central and Eastern
Europe overthrew communist regimes
in 1989 and eventually joined NATO and
the European Union; the countries of the
Western Balkans fell into violence and
continue to rebuild fragile institutions; and
the countries of the former Soviet Union
have seen backlash as well as backsliding to-
ward authoritarianism. Differences across
the postcommunist world illustrate that,
while external efforts can play an impor-
tant moral role in supporting democrats
under authoritarian regimes, they are rarely
decisive in the fall of these regimes. They
can provide help to emerging democracies
in reforming institutions and building civil
societies, but even then, democracies are
fragile and vulnerable to backsliding as well
as external pressures.
Foreign Policy Program
Policy Brief
The histories and politics of each of the countries in the region
merit deeper attention than can be given here. In the sections below,
this policy brief analyzes paths of democratization since 1989 to
highlight the prospects for and the limits of Western influence.
Central and Eastern Europe on the road to the EU and NATO
Despite prior support for the democratic oppositions under com-
munism, the United States and Western Europe did not engage in
regime change in Central and Eastern Europe, nor were they the
driving force in these new democracies joining NATO and the Euro-
pean Union. Rather, at a moment when international, domestic,
political, and economic conditions came together, Eastern Europe-
ans initiated unanticipated transformations of communist regimes
that had ruled for more than 40 years and, subsequently, their
leaders sought and met the conditions for membership in NATO
and the European Union. It may be tempting to see the path of
democratization as inevitable in hindsight, but it was not a foregone
conclusion. Only Czechoslovakia under President Tomas Masaryk
had a history of durable democracy in the region during the inter-
war period, and the democratic transformations unfolded across
the region in ways that reflected differences in the postwar histories
of communism, with some countries undergoing Spanish-style
transfers of power negotiated between the old regime and opposi-
tion and others with regimes collapsing in the face of mass protests.
Following the transformations in 1989, Western experts helped
to prepare new constitutions and advised on the reform of legal
systems, which facilitated the decentralization of power and the
development of a nascent new political culture. International ef-
forts supported fundamental reforms across the region at a time
when local institutions were resource poor, including reforms of
parliamentary, educational, cultural, scientific, and religious institu-
tions. They helped to build new civil societies through support for
non-governmental organizations, independent media, and busi-
nesses. American private foundations (such as the Eurasia Founda-
tion, the Ford Foundation, Freedom House, Open Society Institute,
the Mott Foundation, and Rockefeller Brothers Fund), as well as
organizations funded at an arms-length by the U.S. government
(like the National Endowment for Democracy and its four associ-
ated institutes) sought to respond quickly to the transformations,
focusing on support for new political parties, civic groups, and
media organizations. European aid mechanisms tended to focus
on reforming state institutions, funded by governments (such as the
Swedish International Development Agency, and United Kingdom’s
Know How Fund) or the European Union (programs known by
their acronyms PHARE and TACIS).
The contrast between American and European efforts to promote
democracy may be a useful generalization for the initial period after
the fall of communism, but there are many counter-examples and
these differences became less pronounced as time went by. For ex-
ample, the Dutch Matra program, German political party founda-
tions, and new European government funded arms-length institu-
tions (such as the British Westminster Foundation for Democracy)
provided support for civil society groups, while U.S. Congressional
exchange programs and United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) provided resources to assist the reform of
state institutions.
Yet, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe followed different
paths of reform that reflected the political and economic legacies of
communism. While this is not the place to review the histories of
countries in the region, marked differences in reform can be seen
between Poland, which pursued rapid economic reform after 1989
but only drafted a new constitution in 1997, and Czechoslovakia,
which peacefully divided into its constituent republics in 1993, with
the two new states taking different approaches to economic reform
in the 1990s. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, formerly part of the
Soviet Union, inherited different ethnic, political, and economic
conditions and pursued distinct policies of liberalization and
reform. All of the countries in the region, however, identified mem-
bership in NATO and the European Union as the primary objectives
of their foreign policies.
NATO and the then-European Community were initially poorly
prepared for the fall of communism, with limited prior ties to the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and disagreements among
its member states over the desirability of enlargement. By 2006,
ten countries in Central and Eastern Europe joined NATO and the
European Union: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia. “Condi-
tionality” was central to the process of enlargement, especially in
explaining the mechanisms of influence of NATO and the European
Union. The conditions for EU membership included the three
Copenhagen criteria: (1) fully functioning liberal democratic sys-
tems that include respect for human rights and the rule of law, (2) a
functioning market-based economy with the capacity to withstand
competitive pressures, and (3) being prepared to take on the EU’s
body of laws. Progress in formal EU membership negotiations
depended on applicants’ abilities to fulfill the 30 chapters of the
acquis communautaire that detail the legal rights and obligations
of membership deriving from the founding treaties and subsequent
legislation. Conditionality was not seen as imposing democracy,
but as a legitimate part of the overall assistance packages helping
transitional societies to reform. The required adaptations provoked
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Foreign Policy Program
Policy Brief
resentment at times and declining public support for NATO and
the European Union, but the accession processes had to be led by
domestic actors.
Enlargement was not without backsliding, as it became clear that,
even among countries with the prospect of NATO and EU mem-
bership, new democracies were fragile. NATO and the European
Union pointedly excluded Slovakia from the first wave of invita-
tions for membership in response to the semi-authoritarian policies
of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar who had been elected in 1992
and 1994. In anticipation of national elections in Slovakia in 1998,
Americans and Europeans provided training and support to civil
society groups that mobilized voter turnout and convened public
debate for an electoral “regime change” to bring the country back
on a democratic path. After Slovakia subsequently accelerated its
reforms, it was invited as part of the second wave of countries to
join NATO and the European Union. These experiences were a
learning process as well for European and American efforts to rein-
force new democracies that remained fragile.
Rebuilding the Western Balkans
The conflicts in the Western Balkans in the 1990s showed the limits
of Western influence and that democratization was not inevitable.
Yugoslavia in the 1980s seemed to have the most advantageous
conditions for democratization among communist states, with its
relatively advanced economic development, education, and open-
ness to the rest of the world. Yet, while Slovenia extricated itself
from the federation in 1991 and eventually joined the European
Union and NATO, violence among the other republics of Yugosla-
via demonstrated the appeal of nationalism by former-communist
leaders threatened by democratization. Only after the violence had
been halted in Bosnia, with the Dayton Accords in 1995, and in
Kosovo following the NATO-led bombing of Serbia in 1999, could
efforts begin to help to stabilize and rebuild discredited political
institutions, shattered economies, and ethnically polarized societies.
International organizations such as the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe, the United Nations, and NATO played
critical roles in administering the region after the fighting had
ceased, running elections, building new institutions, and helping to
train new officials and policemen. American and European non-
governmental organizations such as the International Crisis Group,
the Open Society Institute, the National Democratic Institute for
International Affairs, and Catholic Relief Services, to name only a
few, were active in developing policy solutions, training political
parties, supporting civil society organizations, and reconstructing
local communities. Over time, as the situation gradually stabilized
in some parts of the region, international assistance shifted toward
support for capacity building of state and local institutions through
programs funded by USAID and the European Union. While few
disputed the importance of the international community in provid-
ing resources to stabilize and rebuild, questions were raised about
encouraging elections in a post-conflict setting where voters may be
likely to elect ethnic political parties that reinforce divisions rather
than promote cooperation. Others noted concerns about corrup-
tion in the absence of the rule of law as well as the sustainability of
initiatives at risk for remaining dependent on donors in the absence
of a functioning economy.
American and European efforts in the Western Balkans also led to
innovations with the creation of new public-private partnerships
to address the challenges of donor coordination. Private founda-
tions and non-governmental organizations joined to create new
independent institutions that would “re-grant” governmental
assistance to the region, such as the Balkan Trust for Democracy,
the European Fund for the Balkans, and the Regional Cooperation
Council. These partnerships have been initiated by both American
and European foundations and attracted additional support from
governments and private foundations on both sides of the Atlantic.
They have been established in and run by people from the region to
support democracy, good governance, and Euroatlantic integration.
Subsequently, these partnerships have served as a model for other
regions, such as the Black Sea.
The difficult paths toward rebuilding and reform have varied for
reasons that reflect the legacies of the 1990s. Croatia and Albania
gradually incorporated democratic reforms and welcomed foreign
democracy assistance as part of fulfillment of the membership
package in NATO and the European Union. After years of violence
and authoritarian rule by Serbian President Slobodan Milošević,
widespread popular protest led to his removal from power in 2000
and trial in the Hague. Subsequent reform in Serbia struggled with
instability after the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djinjić,
although recent presidential and parliamentary elections led to
a more stable government committed to redressing the past that
served as the basis for a Stabilization and Association Agreement
with a path toward EU membership. At the same time, Bosnia,
Montenegro, and Serbia have joined the Partnership for Peace pro-
gram, taking steps toward NATO membership. In the most difficult
settings, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, doubts remain about the pros-
pect for self-sustaining states and economies, and Western efforts
continue to play a key role in governing territories that struggle with
corruption and illegal trade.
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Foreign Policy Program
Policy Brief
Backsliding and backlash in the former Soviet Union
The prospects for reform in the states of the former Soviet Union
remain even more uncertain, with backsliding, rising authoritarian-
ism, and backlash against democracy promotion efforts since their
independence in the 1990s. These mostly impoverished and often
poorly-known countries, located between the geopolitical realities
of the European Union and Russia, have received far less attention
and aid than other countries in the region. Many of these countries
exist in a semi-authoritarian “grey zone,” with periodic semi-free
elections that are manipulated by powerful leaders who exert au-
thority over all political and civic life. While Western governmental
and non-governmental assistance programs were active in Russia
and the former-Soviet Union in the 1990s, as in Central and Eastern
Europe with the hope of supporting democratic reform, new politi-
cal leadership whose authority rose with higher energy prices have
mounted challenges to international efforts in the region.
The 2003 “Rose Revolution” in Georgia and the 2004 “Orange Revo-
lution” in Ukraine inspired in part by the defeat of semi-authori-
tarian regimes in Slovakia and Serbia, led some observers to hope
that reform was possible in the region. American and European
foundations and non-governmental organizations active in the
region responded to calls for assistance by Georgian and Ukrainian
civil society groups to expose manipulated elections, promote in-
dependent media, strengthen opposition movements, and mobilize
voters, leading to new leadership that declared their commitment
to reform. The European Union extended its Neighborhood Policy
and later Eastern Partnership, which, while not containing a path to
EU membership, seeks to provide financial and technical support
for reform.
Initial hopes that Ukraine and Georgia might soon become new
members of NATO and the European Union, however, quickly gave
way to concern, as the new leaderships showed signs of impatience
with democratic processes when unable to achieve positive so-
cioeconomic results. In Georgia, criticism surrounded President
Mikheil Saakashvili’s repression of domestic protest, as well as con-
trol over the media, and subsequent actions surrounding the origins
of the Russian-Georgian war in 2008. Ukraine’s “orange” coalition
that led its revolution splintered soon afterward and produced
governments that have struggled with factionalism, incompetence,
and corruption, as well as a country divided about its direction for
the future.
The “colored revolutions,” however, not only inspired other pro-
democracy actors in the post-Soviet space but also rang alarm bells
among their neighbors. Belorussian President Alexander Lukashen-
ka reasserted authoritarian control over all spheres of life, repressing
independent activity and leading former Secretary of State Condo-
leezza Rice to describe it as the “last dictatorship in Europe.” Russia
warned of the threat posed by NATO enlargement at its borders,
temporarily halted energy shipments to Ukraine and Belarus in the
winters of recent years, and ultimately sent troops into Georgia.
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin challenged the legitimacy
of democracy promotion efforts to operate in the region, expelling
representatives of American and European democracy assistance
NGOs and imposing restrictions upon their legal status and activi-
ties, policies subsequently adopted by governments in Central Asia.
Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan
formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2005, declaring
their shared commitment to the sovereignty of their members from
external influence.
Lessons learned
Lessons from the postcommunist world since 1989 may not be new
to practitioners, but foreign policy debates about the future of de-
mocracy promotion show that they must be reinforced and learned
anew. Backsliding among new democracies and rising authoritari-
anism has led experts to warn against “democratic pessimism” that
could lead policymakers to pull back on their support for democ-
racy abroad.4 Initial signs from the Obama administration raised
questions as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared on her first
trip abroad that she did not want human rights concerns to get in
the way of the partnership between the United States and China. At
the same time, hesitation and even opposition to further NATO and
EU enlargement has grown among current member states in recent
years.
While observers have noted the Obama administration’s apparent
reluctance to use the language of democracy, the proposed 2010
budget makes a commitment to double U.S. foreign assistance
to help “the weakest states reduce poverty, combat global health
threats, develop markets, govern peacefully, and expand democracy
worldwide.” The new administration needs to continue the process
of distancing democracy promotion from “regime change” and to
articulate its place among other competing foreign policy priori-
ties such as energy security, fighting terrorism, preventing nuclear
proliferation, and international trade. The lessons from postcom-
munism compel advocates of democracy promotion to be modest,
4
Thomas Carothers. “Stepping back from democratic pessimism.” Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace, Carnegie Paper no. 99, February 2009.
4
Foreign Policy Program

Policy Brief
recognizing that democracy is never exported but always driven
from within and frequently fragile, subject to backsliding. Post- John K. Glenn, Director of Foreign Policy, GMF
conflict situations and rising authoritarianism pose challenges with
John K. Glenn joined the German Marshall Fund of the United States
risks of corruption, inefficiency, and ineffectiveness. In the world
(GMF) in 2004 as the organization’s director of foreign policy and is
of public policy, we cannot compare and assess the past 20 years
the primary author of the Key Findings Report for Transatlantic Trends.
against an alternative model in which the United States and Europe
He is also a visiting scholar at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
did nothing or something different to promote democracy. Yet the
International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University. He is a frequent
reinforcing role of international efforts also shows that democracy
commentator on international affairs, has written numerous articles, and
promotion can provide resources and expertise to new democracies
is the author of Framing Democracy: Civil Society and Civic Movements in
as they build and sustain reforms.
Eastern Europe. Dr. Glenn holds a bachelor’s degree from Oberlin College,
and a master’s degree and Ph.D. in sociology from Harvard University.
Democracy promotion belongs on the transatlantic agenda, with
EU enlargement as one of the key success stories in recent years.
About GMF
Concerns about the rhetoric of the Bush administration’s “freedom
agenda” in the Middle East have led some to emphasize differences
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a
in democracy promotion between the United States and Europe.5
nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution
As this policy brief shows, this distinction is often exaggerated. On
dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding
the ground in Eastern Europe, similar programs with common aims
between North America and Europe. In addition, GMF supports a
were initiated by Americans and Europeans seeking to help reform
number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972
institutions and support civil societies. Backlash in the former
through a gift from Germany on the 25th anniversary of the Marshall
Soviet Union has affected American and European nongovernmen-
Plan as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF
tal organizations alike. Interestingly, some of the most dynamic
maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to
efforts in recent years have been undertaken by new members of
its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe:
EU and NATO sharing their experiences of democratic transforma-
Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest.
tions with other regions. At the same time, the Western Balkans and
former-Soviet Union highlight the limits of democracy promotion,
the protracted difficulties of post-conflict situations, and the poten-
tial for backlash by powerful states, challenges that will continue to
confront policymakers in the coming years.

5
Tamara Cofman Wittes and Richard Youngs. “Europe, the United States, and Middle Eastern Democ-
racy: Repairing the Breach.” Analysis Paper No. 18, Saban Center, Brookings Institution, January 2009.