Analysis
June 4, 2009
Summary: The campaign for an
independent Kurdish state by the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
has been termed Turkey’s number
one headache. While the PKK’s
attacks against the Turkish army
have bolstered Turkish nationalism,
Turkey’s image has been tainted by its
response to these assaults. In
addition, Turkey’s failure to resolve the
issue with the Kurds has hindered the
development of its democracy.
Recent statements by the Turkish
army and government as well as
responses from Kurdish political
leaders and the PKK have made
the potential for a compromise
appear more realistic. Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan, Turkey’s prime minister,
acknowledged that “mistakes”
have been made in dealing with the
Kurds, and Ahmet Turk, the leader of
the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society
Party (DTP) outlined that non-violent
measures should be used to develop
a democratic solution to the Kurdish
problem. This brief examines the
steps necessary for both sides to
come to a peaceful solution.
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Turkey’s Kurds: Toward a Solution?
by Amberin Zaman*
ANKARA — For a quarter of a century,
separatist Kurdish rebels of the out-
lawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
have been waging an armed campaign
against the Turkish army for an inde-
pendent Kurdish state carved out of
Iran, Iraq, Syria, and a very large chunk
of southeastern Turkey. Over 40,000
people have died in the conflict that has
cost the Turkish government billions
of dollars to contain. The “Kurdish
problem,” as it has been labeled, is
Turkey’s number one headache. The
army’s tactics in battling the PKK
has dented Turkey’s image, with
hundreds of thousands of Kurds
forcibly displaced from their villages
and thousands of Kurdish activists
tortured and jailed. The PKK’s own
brutal methods, including attacks
against civilian targets, have sharpened
Turkish nationalism and prevented
successive governments from moving
on reforms that would address the de-
mands of Turkey’s estimated 14 million
Kurds for greater cultural and politi-
cal rights. Broadly speaking, Turkey’s
failure to resolve the Kurdish issue has
arrested its development into a fully-
fledged Western-style democracy. It
has also blunted Turkish influence in
its natural hinterland in Kurdish-con-
trolled northern Iraq.
Yet, over the past month a series of
statements from the army, the govern-
ment, Kurdish political leaders, and
*
Amberin Zaman is the Turkey correspondent for The Economist and writes a weekly column for the Turkish daily Taraf. The views
expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the German Marshall Fund of the United
States (GMF).
the PKK itself has raised hopes that
after decades of deadlock a compro-
mise might be struck. Early signs of a
shift came in 2005 when Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan, Turkey’s prime minister,
acknowledged during a rally in the
southeastern province of Diyarbakir
that the state had made “mistakes” in
its dealings with the Kurds. His words
followed a raft of EU-tailored reforms
that loosened restrictions on publishing
and broadcasting in the Kurdish lan-
guage. Soon after, Emre Taner, Turkey’s
intelligence chief, initiated secret
contacts with the regional government
in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq.
The aim was to broker a deal through
Iraqi Kurdish mediators that would
allow PKK rebels, who are based in the
mountains separating Iraq from Iran,
to lay down their arms. Fighters un-
tainted by the violence would have been
permitted to return to Turkey, while
their leaders would be shipped off to
any European country willing to accept
them. But the plan ran into resistance
from the Turkish army, and PKK hawks
alike, and was quietly shelved.
The Bush administration’s decision in
November 2007 to share real time intel-
ligence with the Turkish army on PKK
activities and to let Turkish warplanes
bomb their bases in northern Iraq, over
the objections of the Iraqi Kurds, dra-
matically shifted the balance in several
ways. The PKK has been squarely put
Analysis
on the defensive and has sustained heavy losses. The percep-
tion that the United States favors Iraqi Kurds over Turkey
(because of Ankara’s refusal to let U.S. troops use Turkish
territory to launch a second front against Saddam Hussain
in 2003) has dissipated. After a prolonged chill, relations be-
tween the Turkish army and the United States have improved.
This, in turn, has prompted Iraqi Kurds to be more coop-
erative with Ankara. The appointment last August of Gen-
eral Ilker Basbug as Turkey’s new chief of general staff was
another turning point. General Basbug has long advocated
that the Kurdish problem cannot be solved through military
means alone. In a landmark speech last month, the General
referred to the “peoples of Turkey” rather than applying the
term “Turk,” which was used by his predecessors to define all
citizens of Turkey. He also spoke of the Kurds. “This is a first
and marks a big change in rhetoric perhaps even in actual
policy,” said Hasim Hasimi, a veteran Kurdish politician.
General Basbug’s speech coincided with a declaration by
Abdullah Gül, Turkey’s president, that there now exists “a
historic opportunity” to solve the Kurdish problem. Mean-
while, Besir Atalay, Turkey’s interior minister, hinted that
“Turkified” villages could re-adopt their original Kurdish
names. Coming on the heels of the January launch of Tur-
key’s first-ever state run Kurdish language television channel,1
Atalay’s comments suggest that the Justice and Development
Party (AKP) is ready to further expand cultural rights for the
Kurds; crucially, the army isn’t demurring. And for a change,
Deniz Baykal, the main opposition leader of the Republican
People’s Party, has been making some positive noises too.
This virtuous cycle seemed almost complete when Murat
Karayilan, the PKK’s top military commander, told a Turkish
newspaper that independence was no longer on the PKK’s
agenda and that it would be ready to negotiate a deal with the
government through third parties if need be. The govern-
ment, however, has ruled out talking to the PKK, which is
on the U.S. State Department’s list of terrorist organiza-
tions. Herein lies the conundrum: How can the government
proceed with a deal that doesn’t smack of negotiating with
terrorists?
It is precisely to impart this image that Karayilan has been
extending his olive branch together with the fig leaf of “third
1
See Amberin Zaman, “Winning Kurdish Hearts and Minds: The Battle Shifts to the Airwaves,” On
Turkey series. Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, January 12, 2009.
2
parties.” He is making a virtue of necessity. The PKK is under
pressure from all fronts. It no longer enjoys the patronage of
Syria. Iran isn’t as friendly anymore either. The Iraqi Kurds
see the PKK increasingly as more of a threat to their own
stability than as a card to wield against Turkey. Rapproche-
ment between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds manifested itself
more concretely than ever before on June 1 after a joint
Turkish/Iraqi-Kurdish company began pumping oil from the
Tak Tak oil fields in northern Iraq to be exported through a
pipeline running to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast. According
to the Diyarbakir Chamber of Commerce and Industry, some
1,200 Turkish companies are doing business in northern Iraq.
On the same day, the PKK announced that it was extending
by a further six weeks its unilateral ceasefire, first declared
on April 24, but that it reserved the right to “defend” itself if
the Turkish army were to pursue its operations against the
rebels. On May 29, six Turkish soldiers were killed in a mine
blast near the Iraqi border. The army retaliated with aerial
raids against PKK targets across the border. The PKK claimed
that rogue elements had planted the mine. Ahmet Turk, the
leader of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP)
that is widely seen as a political front for the rebels, took the
rare step of indirectly criticizing the PKK. All those who talk
about a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem “should
remove their hands from the trigger,” Turk said. In so doing,
Turk asserted a measure of independence from the PKK.
Turkish leaders should reward the DTP leader’s courage—the
PKK likes to assassinate dissenters within its ranks—with
gestures of its own. The first would be for Erdoğan—who has
long spurned Turk’s requests for a meeting—to arrange one
as soon as possible. He should also speak up against the pos-
sible closure of the DTP on the thinly supported charges that
it is a “terrorist front” (no matter that none of its members
has been accused of any violent act). Turk makes no secret
of the fact that the bulk of his party’s supporters also feel
sympathy for the PKK.
By engaging with the DTP, the government would send a
clear signal to these disenfranchised citizens that it respects
free expression of their demands so long as this is done
through politics not guns. And if the PKK is serious about
peace it will need, as Turk has said, to keep its finger off
the trigger, remain silent, and allow the DTP to articulate
Analysis
the Kurds’ demands. In the meantime, Iraqi Kurds must
do their share in keeping up pressure on the PKK. And to
keep the Iraqi Kurds firmly on board, Turkey will need to
overcome its queasiness over their federal status, which is
enshrined in Iraq’s constitution. All of this will take big
doses of courage, without which the historic opportunity
Gül speaks of will be missed yet again.
Amberin Zaman, Correspondent, The Economist
Amberin Zaman is the Turkey correspondent for The Economist and
writes a weekly column for the Turkish daily Taraf.
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