Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
DECISION
NACHURA, J : p
SO ORDERED. 16
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, raising the issue of
whether the DOLE Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion in taking
cognizance of the appeal and affirming the dismissal of its petition for
cancellation of respondent's registration. SCaIcA
In a Decision dated May 30, 2005, the CA denied the petition. The CA
opined that the DOLE Secretary may legally assume jurisdiction over an
appeal from the decision of the Regional Director in the event that the
Director of the BLR inhibits himself from the case. According to the CA, in
the absence of the BLR Director, there is no person more competent to
resolve the appeal than the DOLE Secretary. The CA brushed aside the
allegation of bias and partiality on the part of the DOLE Secretary,
considering that such allegation was not supported by any evidence.
The CA also found that the DOLE Secretary did not commit grave abuse
of discretion when she affirmed the dismissal of the petition for cancellation
of respondent's registration as a labor organization. Echoing the DOLE
Secretary, the CA held that the requirements of registration of labor
organizations are an exercise of the overriding police power of the State,
designed for the protection of workers against potential abuse by the union
that recruits them. These requirements, the CA opined, should not be
exploited to work against the workers' constitutionally protected right to
self-organization.
The Court of Appeals seriously erred in ruling that the Labor Secretary
properly assumed jurisdiction over Petitioner's appeal of the Regional
Director's Decision in the Cancellation Petition . . . .
B. The unilateral inhibition by the BLR Director cannot justify the Labor
Secretary's exercise of jurisdiction over the Appeal.
II.
In Abbott, the appeal from the Regional Director's decision was directly
filed with the Office of the DOLE Secretary, and we ruled that the latter has
no appellate jurisdiction. In the instant case, the appeal was filed by
petitioner with the BLR, which, undisputedly, acquired jurisdiction over the
case. Once jurisdiction is acquired by the court, it remains with it until the
full termination of the case. 25
Thus, jurisdiction remained with the BLR despite the BLR Director's
inhibition. When the DOLE Secretary resolved the appeal, she merely stepped
into the shoes of the BLR Director and performed a function that the latter
could not himself perform. She did so pursuant to her power of supervision
and control over the BLR. 26
Petitioner was not denied the right to due process when it was not
notified in advance of the BLR Director's inhibition and the DOLE Secretary's
assumption of the case. Well-settled is the rule that the essence of due process
is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 32 Petitioner had the
opportunity to question the BLR Director's inhibition and the DOLE
Secretary's taking cognizance of the case when it filed a motion for
reconsideration of the latter's decision. It would be well to state that a critical
component of due process is a hearing before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal, for all the elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be
meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial and biased
judge. 33 It was precisely to ensure a fair trial that moved the BLR Director
to inhibit himself from the case and the DOLE Secretary to take over his
function.
R.A. No. 9481 also inserted in the Labor Code Article 242-A, which
provides:
(b) Its list of officers, minutes of the election of officers, and list of voters
within thirty (30) days from election;
(c) Its annual financial report within thirty (30) days after the close of
every fiscal year; and
(d) Its list of members at least once a year or whenever required by the
Bureau.
Failure to comply with the above requirements shall not be a ground for
cancellation of union registration but shall subject the erring officers or
members to suspension, expulsion from membership, or any appropriate
penalty.
ILO Convention No. 87, which we have ratified in 1953, provides that
"workers' and employers' organizations shall not be liable to be dissolved or
suspended by administrative authority." The ILO has expressed the opinion
that the cancellation of union registration by the registrar of labor unions,
which in our case is the BLR, is tantamount to dissolution of the organization
by administrative authority when such measure would give rise to the loss of
legal personality of the union or loss of advantages necessary for it to carry
out its activities, which is true in our jurisdiction. Although the ILO has
allowed such measure to be taken, provided that judicial safeguards are in
place, i.e., the right to appeal to a judicial body, it has nonetheless reminded
its members that dissolution of a union, and cancellation of registration for
that matter, involve serious consequences for occupational representation. It
has, therefore, deemed it preferable if such actions were to be taken only as a
last resort and after exhausting other possibilities with less serious effects on
the organization. 40
The aforesaid amendments and the ILO's opinion on this matter serve
to fortify our ruling in this case. We therefore quote with approval the DOLE
Secretary's rationale for denying the petition, thus:
It is undisputed that appellee failed to submit its annual financial reports
and list of individual members in accordance with Article 239 of the
Labor Code.However, the existence of this ground should not necessarily
lead to the cancellation of union registration. Article 239 recognizes the
regulatory authority of the State to exact compliance with reporting
requirements. Yet there is more at stake in this case than merely
monitoring union activities and requiring periodic documentation
thereof.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Heritage Hotel Manila v. National Union of Workers in the Hotel, Restaurant
and Allied Industries-Heritage Hotel Manila Supervisors Chapter, G.R. No.
178296, [January 12, 2011], 654 PHIL 395-413)
D E CI S IO N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J : p
On January 24, 2000, KFWU filed with DOLE Regional Office No. IV, a
Petition for Certification Election to be conducted in the bargaining unit
composed of 145 rank-and-file employees of respondent. 5 Attached to its
petition are a Certificate of Creation of Local/Chapter 6 issued on January
19, 2000 by DOLE Regional Office No. IV, stating that it [KFWU] submitted
to said office a Charter Certificate issued to it by the national federation Phil.
Transport & General Workers Organization (PTGWO), and a Report of
Creation of Local/Chapter. 7
1998 11 . . ..
xxx xxx xxx
2. No union.
SO DECIDED. 15
As to the failure of KFWU to file its books of account, the DOLE held
that such omission was not a ground for revocation of union registration or
dismissal of petition for certification election, for under Section 1, Rule VI of
Department Order No. 9, a local or chapter like KFWU was no longer
required to file its books of account. 19
Since respondent union clearly consists of both rank and file and
supervisory employees, it cannot qualify as a legitimate labor
organization imbued with the requisite personality to file a petition for
certification election. This infirmity in union membership cannot be
corrected in the inclusion-exclusion proceedings during the pre-election
conference.
Finally, contrary to the pronouncement of public respondent, the
application of the doctrine enunciated in Toyota Motor Philippines
Corporation vs. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union was
not construed in a way that effectively denies the fundamental right of
respondent union to organize and seek bargaining representation . . . .
However, R.A. No. 9481 took effect only on June 14, 2007; 26 hence,
it applies only to labor representation cases filed on or after said date. 27 As
the petition for certification election subject matter of the present petition
was filed by KFWU on January 24, 2000, 28 R.A. No. 9481 cannot apply to
it. There may have been curative labor legislations 29 that were given
retrospective effect, 30 but not the aforecited provisions of R.A. No. 9481, for
otherwise, substantive rights and interests already vested would be impaired
in the process. 31
Instead, the law and rules in force at the time of the filing by KFWU of
the petition for certification election on January 24, 2000 are R.A. No.
6715, 32 amending Book V of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (Labor
Code), 33 as amended, and the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No.
6715, 34 as amended by Department Order No. 9, series of 1997. 35
It was in R.A. No. 875, under Section 3, that such questioned mingling
was first prohibited, 40 to wit:
Then the Labor Code was enacted in 1974 without reproducing Sec. 3
of R.A. No. 875. The provision in the Labor Code closest to Sec. 3 is Article
290, 43 which is deafeningly silent on the prohibition against supervisory
employees mingling with rank-and-file employees in one labor organization.
Even the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor
Code 44 (Omnibus Rules) merely provides in Section 11, Rule II, thus:
The obvious repeal of the last clause of Sec. 3, R.A. No. 875 prompted
the Court to declare in Bulletin v. Sanchez 45 that supervisory employees who
do not fall under the category of managerial employees may join or assist in
the formation of a labor organization for rank-and-file employees, but they
may not form their own labor organization. ESHAcI
Effective 1989, R.A. No. 6715 restored the prohibition against the
questioned mingling in one labor organization, viz.:
Unfortunately, just like R.A. No. 875, R.A. No. 6715 omitted specifying
the exact effect any violation of the prohibition would bring about on the
legitimacy of a labor organization.
It was the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 6715 (1989
Amended Omnibus Rules) which supplied the deficiency by introducing the
following amendment to Rule II (Registration of Unions):
Thus, when the issue of the effect of mingling was brought to the fore
in Toyota, 48 the Court, citing Article 245 of the Labor Code, as amended
by R.A. No. 6715, held:
But then, on June 21, 1997, the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules was
further amended by Department Order No. 9, series of 1997 (1997
Amended Omnibus Rules). Specifically, the requirement under Sec. 2 (c) of
the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules — that the petition for certification
election indicate that the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees has not
been mingled with supervisory employees — was removed. Instead, what the
1997 Amended Omnibus Rules requires is a plain description of the
bargaining unit, thus: TEHIaD
Rule XI
Certification Elections
which does not require that, for its creation and registration, a local or
chapter submit a list of its members.
All said, while the latest issuance is R.A. No. 9481, the 1997 Amended
Omnibus Rules, as interpreted by the Court in Tagaytay Highlands, San
Miguel and Air Philippines, had already set the tone for
it. Toyota and Dunlop no longer hold sway in the present altered state of the
law and the rules. ACIDSc
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Kawashima Textile Mfg., Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 160352, [July
23, 2008], 581 PHIL 359-381)
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J : p
BMDOMSI then filed an appeal to the BLR alleging that the union
members are all employees of De Ocampo and that the bargaining unit it
seeks to represent is appropriate. 18 cHDAIS
The CA affirmed the Decision of the BLR. It ruled that there was no
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in the application for
registration. The record shows that, as BMDOMSI had indicated, the
bargaining unit as described is composed of rank-and-file employees with
occupational classifications under technical and faculty. 26 The CA found that
there could be no misrepresentation as the members appearing in the
minutes of the general membership meeting, and the list of members who
attended the meeting and ratified the union constitution and by-laws, are in
truth employees of the school, though some service the hospital. 27 The CA
also ruled that, other than De Ocampo's bare allegations, there was no proof
of intent to defraud or mislead on the part of BMDOMSI. Hence, the charge
of fraud, false statement or misrepresentation cannot be sustained. 28
However, the CA observed that the members of the union, who are
from academic, non-academic, and general services, do not perform work of
the same nature, receive the same wages and compensation, nor share a
common stake in concerted activities. 29 While these factors dictate the
separation of the categories of employees for purposes of collective
bargaining, 30 the CA reasoned that such lack of mutuality and commonality
of interest of the union members is not among the grounds for cancellation of
union registration under Article 239 of the Labor Code. 31
II
We agree with the BLR and the CA that BMDOMSI did not commit
fraud or misrepresentation in its application for registration. In the form
"Report of Creation of Local Chapter" 39 filed by BMDOMSI, the applicant
indicated in the portion "Description of the Bargaining Unit" that it is
composed of "Rank and File" and under the "Occupational Classification," it
marked "Technical" and "Faculty."
We disagree.
The BLR and the CA's finding that the members of BMDOMSI are
rank-and-file employees is supported by substantial evidence and is binding
on this Court. 46On the other hand, other than the allegation that BMDOMSI
has the same set of officers with BMDOMMC and the allegation of mixed
membership of rank-and-file and managerial or supervisory
employees, De Ocampo has cited no other evidence of the alleged fraud and
misrepresentation.
SO ORDERED.
D E CI S IO N
NACHURA, J : p
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the July
19, 2005 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 86868,
and its September 28, 2005 Resolution 2 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
On September 15, 1994, the UNION and DEL PILAR entered into a
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) 3 granting salary increase and other
benefits to the teaching and non-teaching staff. Among the salient provisions
of the CBA are:
ARTICLE V
SALARY INCREASE
ARTICLE VI
The UNION then assessed agency fees from non-union employees, and
requested DEL PILAR to deduct said assessment from the employees' salaries
and wages. DEL PILAR, however, refused to effect deductions claiming that
the non-union employees were not amenable to it.
Reviewing the records of this case and the law relative to the
issues at hand, we came to the conclusion that it was an error on [the]
part of [DEL PILAR] not to have collected agency fee due other workers
who are non-union members but are included in the bargaining unit
being represented by [the UNION]. True enough as was correctly quoted
by [the UNION] Art. 248, to wit:
All told while there was error on [the] part of [DEL PILAR] for
the first issue, [it] came through in the second. But as it is, we do not
believe that a finding of unfair labor practice can be had considering the
lack of evidence on record that said acts were done to undermine the
union or stifle the member's right to self organization or that the
[petitioners] were in bad faith. If at all, it's (sic) error may have been
the result of a mistaken notion that individual check-off authorization
is needed for it to be able to validly and legally deduct assessment
especially after individual[s] concerned registered their objection. On
the other hand (sic), it is not error to negotiate for a better term in the
CBA. So long as [the] parties will agree. It must be noted that a CBA is
a contract between labor and management and is not simply a litany of
benefits for labor. Moreso, for unfair labor practice to prosper, there
must be a clear showing of acts aimed at stifling the worker's right to
self-organization. Mere allegations and mistake (sic) notions would not
suffice.
SO ORDERED. 5
SO ORDERED. 8
DEL PILAR filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, but the CA
denied the same on September 28, 2005. 9
The issue here boils down to whether or not the UNION is entitled to
collect agency fees from non-union members, and if so, whether an
individual written authorization is necessary for a valid check off.
DEL PILAR admitted its failure to deduct the agency fees from the
salaries of non-union employees, but justifies the non-deduction by the
absence of individual written authorization. It posits that Article 248 (e) is
inapplicable considering that its employees derived no benefits from the CBA.
The annual salary increase of its employee is a benefit mandated by law, and
not derived from the CBA. According to DEL PILAR, the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) required all educational institutions to
allocate at least 70% of tuition fee increases for the salaries and other benefits
of teaching and non-teaching personnel; that even prior to the execution of
the CBA in September 1994, DEL PILAR have already granting annual
salary increases to its employees. Besides, the non-union employees objected
to the deduction; hence, a written authorization is indispensable to effect a
valid check off. DEL PILAR urges this Court to reverse the CA ruling insofar
as it orders the deduction of agency fees from the salaries of non-union
employees, arguing that such conclusion proceeds from a misplaced premise
that the salary increase has risen from the CBA.
By this jurisprudential yardstick, this Court finds that the CA did not
err in upholding the UNION's right to collect agency fees.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Del Pilar Academy v. Del Pilar Academy Employees Union, G.R. No. 170112,
[April 30, 2008], 576 PHIL 549-557)
D E CI S IO N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J : p
FACTS
The Petition at bar arose from the following factual and procedural
antecedents.
At the time when the numerous controversies in the instant case first
came about, petitioners Atty. Eduardo J. Mariño, Jr., Ma. Melvyn P. Alamis,
Norma P. Collantes, and Fernando Pedrosa were among the executive officers
and directors (collectively called the Mariño Group) of the University of Sto.
Tomas Faculty Union (USTFU), a labor union duly organized and registered
under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and the bargaining
representative of the faculty members of the University of Santo Tomas
(UST). 4
2.0. Under this Agreement the University shall grant salary increases, to
wit:
2.1. THIRTY (P30.00) PESOS per lecture unit per month to covered
faculty members retroactive to June 1, 1991;
2.2. Additional THIRTY (P30.00) PESOS per lecture unit per month on
top of the salary increase granted in [paragraph] 2.1 hereof to the
said faculty memberseffective June 1, 1992;
3.0. The UNIVERSITY shall likewise restore to the faculty members the
amounts corresponding to the deductions in salary that were taken from
the pay checks in the second half of June, 1989 and in the first half of
July, 1989, provided that said deductions in salary relate to the union
activities that were held in the aforestated payroll periods, and provided
further that the amounts involved shall be taken from the P42 Million
(sic) economic package.
6.0. The benefits herein granted constitute the entire and complete
package of economic benefits granted by the UNIVERSITY to the covered
faculty members for the balance of the term of the existing collective
bargaining agreement.
7.0. It is clearly understood and agreed upon that the aggregate sum of
P42 million is chargeable against the share of the faculty members in the
incremental proceeds of tuition fees collected and still to be collected;
Provided, however, that he (sic) commitment of the UNIVERSITY to pay
the aggregate sum of P42 million shall subsist even if the said amount
exceeds the proportionate share that may accrue to the faculty members
in the tuition fee increases that the UNIVERSITY may be authorized to
collect in School-Year 1992-1993, and, Provided, finally, that the
covered faculty members shall still be entitled to their proportionate
share in any undistributed portion of the incremental proceeds of the
tuition fee increases in School-Year 1992-1993, and incremental
proceeds are, by law and pertinent Department of Education Culture and
Sports (DECS) regulations, required to be allotted for the payment of
salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits of teaching and
non-teaching personnel for the UNIVERSITY.
8.1. the University has complied with the requirements of the law
relative to the release and distribution of the incremental proceeds of
tuition fee increases as these incremental proceeds pertain to the faculty
share in the tuition fee increase collected during the School-Year
1991-1992; and,
8.2. the economic benefits herein granted constitute the full and
complete financial obligation of the UNIVERSITY to the members of its
faculty for the period June 1, 1991 to May 31, 1993, pursuant to the
provisions of the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement.
9.0. Subject to the provisions of law, and without reducing the amounts
of salary increases granted under paragraphs 2.0, 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3[,] the
UNION shall have the right to a pro-rata lump sum check-off of all sums
of money due and payable to it from the package of economic benefits
granted under this Agreement, provided that there is an authorization of
a majority of the members of the UNION and provided, further, that the
P42 million economic package herein granted shall not in any way be
exceeded. IEAacS
10.0. This Agreement shall be effective for a period of two (2) years,
starting June 1, 1991 and ending on May 31, 1993, provided, however,
that if for any reason no new collective bargaining agreement is entered
into at the expiration date hereof, this Agreement, together with the
March 18, 1991 Collective Bargaining Agreement, shall remain in full
force and effect until such time as a new collective bargaining agreement
shall have been executed by the parties.
BY: BY:
(signed) (signed)
President
Attested by[:]
(signed)
REV. FR. ROLANDO DELA ROSA, O.P. (Emphasis ours.)
On 12 September 1992, the majority of USTFU members signed
individual instruments of ratification, 7 which purportedly signified their
consent to the economic benefits granted under the MOA. Said instruments
uniformly recited:
I, the undersigned UST faculty member, aware that the law requires
ratification and that without ratification by majority of all faculty
members belonging to the collective bargaining unit, the Memorandum of
Agreement between the University of Santo Tomas and the UST Faculty
Union (or USTFU) dated September 10, 1992 may be questioned and all
the faculty benefits granted therein may be cancelled, do hereby ratify
the said agreement.
Under the Agreement, the University shall pay P42 million over a period
of two (2) years from June 1, 1991 up to May 31, 1992. ITDSAE
_________________________
Signature of Faculty Member (Emphasis
ours.)
After deducting from the P42 million economic benefits package the
P4.2 million check-off to USTFU, the amounts owed to UST, and the salary
increases and bonuses of the covered faculty members, a net amount of
P6,389,145.04 remained. The remaining amount was distributed to the
faculty members on 18 November 1994.
Let the entire records of this case be remanded to the Regional Office of
origin for the immediate conduct of election of officers of USTFU. The
election shall be held under the control and supervision of the Regional
Office, in accordance with Section 1 (b), Rule XV of Department Order
No. 9, unless the parties mutually agree to a different procedure
consistent with ensuring integrity and fairness in the electoral
exercise. TSEHcA
The BLR found no basis for the order of the DOLE-NCR Regional
Director to the Mariño Group to account for the amounts of P2 million and
P7 million supposedly paid by UST to USTFU. The BLR clarified that UST
paid USTFU a lump sum of P7 million. The P2 million of this lump sum was
the payment by UST of its outstanding obligations to USTFU under the 1986
CBA. This amount was subsequently donated by USTFU members to the
Philippine Foundation for the Advancement of the Teaching Profession, Inc.
The remaining P5 million of the lump sum was the consideration for the
settlement of an illegal dismissal case between UST and the Mariño Group.
Hence, the P5 million legally belonged to the Mariño Group, and there was no
need to make it account for the same. As to the interest earnings of the sum
of P9,766,570.01 that was invested by the Mariño Group in a bank, the
BLR ruled that the same was included in the amount of P6,389,145.04 that
was distributed to the faculty members on 18 November 1994.
The BLR further reasoned that the P4.2 million collected by the Mariño
Group was in the nature of attorney's fees or negotiation fees and, therefore,
fell under the general prohibition against such fees in Article 222 (b) 33 of the
Labor Code, as amended. Also, the exception to charging against union funds
was not applicable because the P42 million economic benefits package under
the 10 September 1992 MOA was not union fund, as the same was intended
not for the union coffers, but for the members of the entire bargaining unit.
The fact that the P4.2 million check-off was approved by the majority of
USTFU members was immaterial in view of the clear command of Article
222 (b) that any contract, agreement, or arrangement of any sort, contrary
to the prohibition contained therein, shall be null and void.
According to the Court of Appeals, the BLR did not commit grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in ruling that the
P42 million economic benefits package was merely the share of the faculty
members in the tuition fee increases pursuant to Republic Act No. 6728. The
appellate court explained:
With our foregoing findings and disquisitions, We thus agree with the
[BLR] that the aforesaid amount of P42,000,000.00 should not answer
for any attorney's fees claimed by the Petitioners. . . . .
Moreover, [Section 5 of Rule X of] the CBL of the Union provides that:
Worse, the check-off for union dues and attorney's fees were included in
the ratification of the MOA. The members were thus placed in a situation
where, upon ratification of the MOA, not only the check-off of union dues
and special assessment for labor education fund but also the payment of
attorney's fees were (sic) authorized. 38
We agree with the Petitioners that the elections of officers of the Union,
before the Decision of the [BLR], had been unfettered by any intervention
of the DOLE. However, We agree with the Decision of the [BLR] for two
(2) specific reasons, namely: (a) the parties are given an opportunity to
first agree on a different procedure to ensure the integrity and fairness of
the electoral exercise, before the DOLE, may supervise the election[.] SCaDAE
Under Article IX of the CBL, the Board of Officers of the Union shall
create a Committee on Elections, Comelec for brevity, composed of a
chairman and two (2) members appointed by the Board of Officers[.]
It, however, appears that the term of office of the Petitioners had already
expired in September of 1996. In fact, an election of officers was
scheduled on October 6, 1996. However, on October 4, 1996,
[respondents] and the members of the faculty of UST, both union
member and non-union member, elected [respondents] as the new
officers of the USTFU. The same was, however, (sic) nullified by the
Supreme Court, on November 16, 1999. However, as the term of office
of the [respondents] had expired, on October 4, 1999, there is nothing
to nullify anymore. By virtue of an election, held on January 14, 2000,
the [respondents] were elected as the new officers of the Union, which
election was not contested by the Petitioners or any other group in the
union.
We are thus faced with a situation where one set of officers claim to be
the legitimate and incumbent officers of the Union, pursuant to the CBL
of the Union, and another set of officers who claim to have been elected
by the members of the faculty of the Union thru an election alleged to
have been supervised by the DOLE which situation partakes of and is akin
to the nature of an intra-union dispute[.] . . . .
Undeniably, the CBL gives the Board of Officers the right to create and
appoint members of the Comelec. However, the CBL has no application to
a situation where there are two (2) sets of officers, one set claiming to be
the legitimate incumbent officers holding over to their positions who have
not exercised their powers and functions therefor and another claiming
to have been elected in an election supervised by the DOLE and, at the
same time, exercising the powers and functions appended to their
positions. In such a case, the BLR, which has jurisdiction over the
intra-union dispute, can validly order the immediate conduct of election
of officers, otherwise, internecine disputes and blame-throwing will
derail an orderly and fair election. Indeed, Section 1(b), [Rule XV], Book
V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code, as
Petitioners elevated the case to this Court via the instant Petition,
invoking the following assignment of errors:
I.
III.
II
RULING
The provisions of Republic Act No. 6728 were not arbitrarily applied by
the DOLE-NCR Regional Director, the BLR, or the Court of Appeals to the
P42 million economic benefits package granted by UST to USTFU,
considering that the parties themselves stipulated in Section 7 of the MOA
they signed on 10 September 1992 that:
7.0. It is clearly understood and agreed upon that the aggregate sum of
P42 million is chargeable against the share of the faculty members in the
incremental proceeds of tuition fees collected and still to be collected[;]
Provided, however, that he (sic) commitment of the UNIVERSITY to pay
the aggregate sum of P42 million shall subsist even if the said amount
exceeds the proportionate share that may accrue to the faculty members
in the tuition fee increases that the UNIVERSITY may be authorized to
collect in School-Year 1992-1993, and, Provided, finally, that the
covered faculty members shall still be entitled to their proportionate
share in any undistributed portion of the incremental proceeds of the
tuition fee increases in School-Year 1992-1993, and which incremental
proceeds are, by law and pertinent Department of Education Culture and
Sports (DECS) regulations, required to be allotted for the payment of
salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits of teaching and
The "law" in the aforequoted Section 7 of the MOA can only refer
to Republic Act No. 6728, otherwise known as the "Government Assistance
to Students and Teachers in Private Education Act". Republic Act No.
6728 was enacted in view of the declared policy of the State, in conformity
with the mandate of the Constitution, to promote and make quality
education accessible to all Filipino citizens, as well as the recognition of the
State of the complementary roles of public and private educational
institutions in the educational system and the invaluable contribution that
the private schools have made and will make to education. 45 The said statute
primarily grants various forms of financial aid to private educational
institutions such as tuition fee supplements, assistance funds, and scholarship
grants. 46
(1) Financial assistance for tuition for students in private high schools
shall be provided by the government through a voucher system in the
following manner: CHDTEA
(a) For students enrolled in schools charging less than one thousand five
hundred pesos (P1,500) per year in tuition and other fees during school
year 1988-89 or such amount in subsequent years as may be
determined from time to time by the State Assistance Council: The
Government shall provide them with a voucher equal to two hundred
ninety pesos P290.00: Provided, That the student pays in the
1989-1990 school year, tuition and other fees equal to the tuition and
other fees paid during the preceding academic year: Provided,
further, That the Government shall reimburse the vouchers from the
schools concerned within sixty (60) days from the close of the
registration period: Provided, furthermore, That the student's family
resides in the same city or province in which the high school is located
unless the student has been enrolled in that school during the previous
academic year.
(b) For students enrolled in schools charging above one thousand five
hundred pesos (P1,500) per year in tuition and other fees during the
school year 1988-1989 or such amount in subsequent years as may be
determined from time to time by the State Assistance Council, no
assistance for tuition fees shall be granted by the Government: Provided,
however, That the schools concerned may raise their tuition fee subject to
Section 10 hereof.
(2) Assistance under paragraph (1), subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall be
granted and tuition fees under subparagraph (c) may be increased, on the
condition that seventy percent (70%) of the amount subsidized, allotted
for tuition fee or of the tuition fee increases shall go to the payment of
salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits of teaching and
non-teaching personnel except administrators who are principal
stockholders of the school, and may be used to cover increases as provided
for in the collective bargaining agreements existing or in force at the time
when this Act is approved and made effective: Provided, That
government subsidies are not used directly for salaries of teachers of
nonsecular subjects. At least twenty percent (20%) shall go to the
improvement or modernization of buildings, equipment, libraries,
laboratories, gymnasia and similar facilities and to the payment of other
costs of operation. For this purpose, schools shall maintain a separate
record of accounts for all assistance received from the government, any
tuition fee increase, and the detailed disposition and use thereof, which
record shall be made available for periodic inspection as may be
determined by the State Assistance Council, during business hours, by the
faculty, the non-teaching personnel, students of the school concerned,
and Department of Education, Culture and Sports and other concerned
government agencies. (Emphases ours.) TEDHaA
Petitioners contend that the P4.2 million check-off, from the P42
million economic benefits package, was lawfully made since the requirements
of Article 222 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended, were complied with by the
Mariño Group. The individual paychecks of the covered faculty employees
were not reduced and the P4.2 million deducted from the P42 million
economic benefits package became union funds, which were then used to pay
attorney's fees, negotiation fees, and similar charges arising from the CBA. In
addition, the P4.2 million constituted a special assessment upon the USTFU
members, the requirements for which were properly observed. The special
assessment was authorized in writing by the general membership of USTFU
during a meeting in which it was included as an item in the agenda.
Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for disregarding the authorization of
the special assessment by USTFU members. There is no law that prohibits the
insertion of a written authorization for the special assessment in the same
instrument for the ratification of the 10 September 1992 MOA. Neither is
there a law prescribing a particular form that needs to be accomplished for
the authorization of the special assessment. The faculty members who signed
the ratification of the MOA, which included the authorization for the special
assessment, have high educational attainment, and there is ample reason to
believe that they affixed their signatures thereto with full comprehension of
what they were doing.
(o) Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special
assessments, attorney's fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary
fees may be checked off from any amount due to an employee without an
individual written authorization duly signed by the employee. The
authorization should specifically state the amount, purpose and
beneficiary of the deduction.
Article 222 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended, prohibits the payment
of attorney's fees only when it is effected through forced contributions from
the employees from their own funds as distinguished from union
funds. 49 Hence, the general rule is that attorney's fees, negotiation fees, and
other similar charges may only be collected from union funds, not from the
amounts that pertain to individual union members. As an exception to the
general rule, special assessments or other extraordinary fees may be levied
upon or checked off from any amount due an employee for as long as there is
proper authorization by the employee.
The Court further determines that the requisites for a valid levy and
check-off of special assessments, laid down by Article 241 (n) and (o),
respectively, of the Labor Code, as amended, have not been complied with in
the case at bar. To recall, these requisites are: (1) an authorization by a
written resolution of the majority of all the union members at the general
membership meeting duly called for the purpose; (2) secretary's record of the
minutes of the meeting; and (3) individual written authorization for
check-off duly signed by the employee concerned. 51
Viewed in this light, the Court does not hesitate to declare as illegal the
check-off of P4.2 million, from the P42 million economic benefits package,
for union dues and special assessments for the Labor Education Fund and
attorney's fees. Said amount rightfully belongs to and should be returned by
petitioners to the intended beneficiaries thereof, i.e., members of the
collective bargaining unit, whether or not members of USTFU. This directive
is without prejudice to the right of petitioners to seek reimbursement from
the other USTFU officers and directors, who were part of the Mariño Group,
and who were equally responsible for the illegal check-off of the aforesaid
amount.
(3) Election of new officers
The BLR issued such an order since USTFU then had two groups,
namely, the Mariño Group and the Gamilla Group, each claiming to be the
legitimate officers of USTFU.
The Court points out, however, that neither the Decision of the BLR nor
of the Court of Appeals took into account the fact that an election of USTFU
officers was already conducted on 14 January 2000, which was won by the
Gamilla Group. There is nothing in the records to show that the said election
was contested or made the subject of litigation. The Gamilla Group had
exercised their powers as USTFU officers during their elected term. Since the
term of union officers under the USTFU Constitution and By-Laws was only
for three years, then the term of the Gamilla Group already expired in 2003.
It is already beyond the jurisdiction of this Court, in the present Petition, to
still look into the subsequent elections of union officers held after 2003.
The election of the Gamilla Group as union officers in 2000 should have
already been recognized by the BLR and the Court of Appeals. The order for
USTFU to conduct another election was only a superfluity. The issue of who
between the officers of the Mariño Group and of the Gamilla Group are the
legitimate USTFU officers has been rendered moot by the succeeding events in
the case.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Mariño, Jr. v. Gamilla, G.R. No. 149763, [July 7, 2009], 609 PHIL
549-586)
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J : p
During the last General Membership Meeting of the union on February 20,
1996, you openly declared that you recognized the officers of the KMU
not those of the NFL, that you submit to the stuctures [sic] and authority
of the KMU not of the NFL, and that you are loyal only to the KMU not to
the NFL.
Also, in the same meeting, you admitted having sent a proposal for a
renewed collective bargaining agreement to the management without
any consultation with the NFL. In fact, in your letter dated February 21,
1996 addressed to Rev. Gregorio Iyoy, the Administrator of the hospital,
you categorically stated as follows: "We do not need any endorsement
from NFL, more particularly from Atty. Armando Alforque to negotiate
our CBA with MCCH." You did not only ignore the authority of the
undersigned as Regional Director but you maliciously prevented and
bluntly refused my request to join the union negotiating panel in the CBA
negotiations.
Considering the gravity of the charges against you, the critical nature of
the undertaking to renew the collective bargaining agreement, and the
serious threat you posed to the organization, you are hereby placed under
temporary suspension from your office and membership in the union
immediately upon receipt hereof pending investigation and final
disposition of your case in accordance with the union's constitution and
by-laws.
SO ORDERED. 15
In its Resolution dated November 14, 2001, the CA's Eighth Division
dismissed the petition on the ground that out of 88 petitioners only 47 have
signed the certification against forum shopping. 18 Petitioners moved to
reconsider the said dismissal arguing that the 47 signatories more than
constitute the principal parties as the petition involves a matter of common
concern to all the petitioning employees. 19 By Resolution 20 dated May 28,
2002, the CA reinstated the case only insofar as the 47 petitioners who
signed the petition are concerned.
Petitioners challenged the validity of the November 14, 2001 and May
28, 2002 resolutions before this Court in a petition for review on certiorari,
docketed asG.R. No. 154113.
SO ORDERED. 22
SO ORDERED. 29
Complainants Yballe, et al., also challenged before the CA the March 12,
2003 Decision and April 13, 2004 Resolution of the NLRC in a petition
for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 84998 (Cebu City). By
Decision 30 dated November 7, 2008, the CA granted their petition, as
follows:
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 31
On the other hand, petitioner MCCHI in G.R. No. 187861 prayed for
the modification of the CA decision by deleting the award of separation pay
and reinstating the March 14, 2001 decision of the NLRC. 34
G.R. No. 187861 was consolidated with G.R. Nos. 154113 and
187778 as they involve similar factual circumstances and identical or
related issues. G.R. No. 196156 was later also consolidated with the aforesaid
cases.
The issues are: (1) whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition
for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 66540) with respect to the petitioners in G.R.
No. 154113 for their failure to sign the certification against forum shopping;
(2) whether MCCHI is guilty of unfair labor practice; (3) whether petitioning
employees were illegally dismissed; and (4) if their termination was illegal,
whether petitioning employees are entitled to separation pay, backwages,
damages and attorney's fees. IHCSTE
The Court has laid down the rule in Altres v. Empleo 35 as culled from
"jurisprudential pronouncements", that the certification against forum
shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise,
those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under
reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or
petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or
defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum
shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
(b) Workers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for
purposes of collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and
protection. The right oflegitimate labor organizations to strike and
picket and of employers to lockout, consistent with the national interest,
shall continue to be recognized and respected. However, no labor union
may strike and no employer may declare a lockout on grounds involving
inter-union and intra-union disputes.
(d) The notice must be in accordance with such implementing rules and
regulations as the Department of Labor and Employment may
promulgate. TcSCEa
RULE XXII
Art. 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, provides for the
consequences of an illegal strike to the participating workers:
. . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any
worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of
illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment
status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike
shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment,
even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful
strike.
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decision and disturb
not what is settled. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, once a court has laid
down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere
to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are
substantially the same, 54even though the parties may be different. It
proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus,
where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward
by parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a
competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate
the same issue. 55 TCacIA
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that
circumstances attendant in a particular case override the great benefits
derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is
justified in setting it aside. 56 For the Court, as the highest court of the land,
may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially
with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision
that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification. 57
Although the Bascon case involved the very same illegal strike in MCCHI
which led to the termination of herein petitioners, its clearly erroneous
application of the law insofar only as the award of back wages warrants
setting aside the doctrine. Indeed, the doctrine of stare
decisis notwithstanding, the Court has abandoned or overruled precedents
whenever it realized that the Court erred in the prior decisions. "Afterall,
more important than anything else is that this Court should be right." 58
With respect to backwages, the principle of a "fair day's wage for a fair
day's labor" remains as the basic factor in determining the award
thereof. If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no
wage or pay unless, of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to
work but was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed or otherwise
illegally prevented from working. While it was found that respondents
expressed their intention to report back to work, the latter exception
cannot apply in this case. In Philippine Marine Officers' Guild v. Compañia
Maritima, as affirmed in Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort v. Manila
Diamond Hotel Employees Union, the Court stressed that for this
exception to apply, it is required that the strike be legal, a situation that
does not obtain in the case at bar.
Attorney's fees
The case is hereby remanded to the Executive Labor Arbiter for the
recomputation of separation pay due to each of the petitioners union
members in G.R. Nos. 154113, 187778 and 196156 except those who have
executed compromise agreements approved by this Court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Abaria v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 154113, 187778,
187861, 196156, [December 7, 2011], 678 PHIL 64-101)
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J : p
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 3 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails the September 25, 2007 Decision 4 and the February 5, 2008
Resolution 5 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 97053.
Factual Antecedents
In December 2003, the parties signed a 5-year CBA 9 effective June 1, 2003
until May 31, 2008. 10
Vacation and sick leave credits are not automatic. They have to be
earned. Monthly, a qualified employee earns an equivalent of 1.25
days credit each for VL and SL. Vacation Leave and Sick Leave
credits of 15 days become complete at the cut off date of May 31
of each year. (Example, only a total of 5 days credit will be given to
an employee for each of sick leave [or] vacation leave, as of month
end September, that is, 4 months from June to September
multiplied by 1.25 days). An employee, therefore, who takes VL or
SL beyond his leave credits as of date will have to file leave without
pay for leaves beyond his credit.
ARTICLE XII
Unable to settle their differences at the grievance level, the parties referred the
matter to a Voluntary Arbitrator. During the hearing, respondent submitted
affidavits to prove that there is an established practice of giving two retirement
benefits, one from the Private Education Retirement Annuity Association
(PERAA) Plan and another from the CBA Retirement Plan. Sections 1, 2, 3 and
4 of Article XVI of the CBA provide:
ARTICLE XVI
b. Staff — Upon reaching the age of sixty (60) with at least five (5)
years of unbroken, credited service.
SO ORDERED. 24
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA in its
February 5, 2008 Resolution. 25
Issues
a.
b.
c.
d.
Petitioner's Arguments
Petitioner argues that there is only one retirement plan as the CBA Retirement
Plan and the PERAA Plan are one and the same. 27 It maintains that there is no
established company practice or policy of giving two retirement benefits to its
employees. 28 Assuming, without admitting, that two retirement benefits were
released, 29petitioner insists that these were done by mere oversight or mistake
as there is no Board Resolution authorizing their release. 30 And since these
benefits are unauthorized and irregular, these cannot ripen into a company
practice or policy. 31 As to the affidavits submitted by respondent, petitioner
claims that these are self-serving declarations, 32 and thus, should not be given
weight and credence. 33
In addition, petitioner claims that the Memorandum dated August 16, 2005,
which provides for the guidelines on the implementation of vacation and sick
leave credits as well as vacation leave commutation, is valid because it is in full
accord with existing policy. 34
Respondent's Arguments
Respondent belies the claims of petitioner and asserts that there are two
retirement plans as the PERAA Retirement Plan, which has been implemented
for more than 30 years, is different from the CBA Retirement
Plan. 35 Respondent further avers that it has always been a practice of
petitioner to give two retirement benefits 36 and that this practice was
established by substantial evidence as found by both the Voluntary Arbitrator
and the CA. 37
As to the Memorandum dated August 16, 2005, respondent asserts that it is
arbitrary and contrary to the CBA and existing practices as it added
qualifications or limitations which were not agreed upon by the parties. 38
Our Ruling
The Non-Diminution Rule found in Article 100 39 of the Labor Code explicitly
prohibits employers from eliminating or reducing the benefits received by their
employees. This rule, however, applies only if the benefit is based on an express
policy, a written contract, or has ripened into a practice. 40 To be considered a
practice, it must be consistently and deliberately made by the employer over a
long period of time. 41
An exception to the rule is when "the practice is due to error in the construction
or application of a doubtful or difficult question of law." 42 The error, however,
must be corrected immediately after its discovery; 43 otherwise, the rule on
Non-Diminution of Benefits would still apply. CTDAaE
In this case, respondent was able to present substantial evidence in the form of
affidavits to support its claim that there are two retirement plans. Based on the
affidavits, petitioner has been giving two retirement benefits as early as
1997. 44 Petitioner, on the other hand, failed to present any evidence to refute
the veracity of these affidavits. Petitioner's contention that these affidavits are
self-serving holds no water. The retired employees of petitioner have nothing to
lose or gain in this case as they have already received their retirement benefits.
Thus, they have no reason to perjure themselves. Obviously, the only reason they
executed those affidavits is to bring out the truth. As we see it then, their
affidavits, corroborated by the affidavits of incumbent employees, are more
than sufficient to show that the granting of two retirement benefits to retiring
employees had already ripened into a consistent and deliberate practice.
Moreover, petitioner's assertion that there is only one retirement plan as the
CBA Retirement Plan and the PERAA Plan are one and the same is not
supported by any evidence. There is nothing in Article XVI of the CBA to
indicate or even suggest that the "Plan" referred to in the CBA is the PERAA
Plan. Besides, any doubt in the interpretation of the provisions of the CBA
should be resolved in favor of respondent. In fact, petitioner's assertion is
negated by the announcement it made during the LMC Meeting on February 8,
2006 regarding its plan of implementing a "one-retirement plan." For if it were
true that petitioner was already implementing a one-retirement policy, there
would have been no need for such announcement. Equally damaging is the
letter-memorandum 45 dated May 11, 2006, entitled "Suggestions on the
defenses we can introduce to justify the abolition of double retirement policy,"
prepared by the petitioner's legal counsel. These circumstances, taken together,
bolster the finding that the two-retirement policy is a practice. Thus, petitioner
cannot, without the consent of respondent, eliminate the two-retirement policy
and implement a one-retirement policy as this would violate the rule on
non-diminution of benefits.
Sections 1 and 2 of Article XII of the CBA provide that all covered employees
are entitled to 15 days sick leave and 15 days vacation leave with pay every
year and that after the second year of service, all unused vacation leave shall be
converted to cash and paid to the employee at the end of each school year, not
later than August 30 of each year.
The Memorandum dated August 16, 2005, however, states that vacation and
sick leave credits are not automatic as leave credits would be earned on a
month-to-month basis. This, in effect, limits the available leave credits of an
employee at the start of the school year. For example, for the first four months
of the school year or from June to September, an employee is only entitled to
five days vacation leave and five days sick leave. 46 Considering that the
Memorandum dated August 16, 2005 imposes a limitation not agreed upon by
the parties nor stated in the CBA, we agree with the CA that it must be struck
down.
In closing, it may not be amiss to mention that when the provision of the CBA is
clear, leaving no doubt on the intention of the parties, the literal meaning of the
stipulation shall govern. 47 However, if there is doubt in its interpretation, it
should be resolved in favor of labor, 48 as this is mandated by no less than the
Constitution.49
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed September 25, 2007
Decision and the February 5, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 97053 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.