ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN

(1) Trump's Washington decides to move US embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem

- If the United States moved the embassy to Jerusalem, it would mean that the US effectively
recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. That would overturn 70 years of international consensus,
and, many argue, would effectively signal the end of moves to achieve peace between Israelis and
Palestinians.
- The US has never had its embassy in Jerusalem. It has always been in Tel Aviv, with the
Ambassador's residence in Herzliya Pituach, about 30 minutes north.
- In 1995, the US Congress passed a law requiring America to move the embassy from Tel Aviv to
Jerusalem. Proponents said the US should respect Israel's choice of Jerusalem as its capital, and
recognize it as such.
- Every president since 1995 -- Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama -- has declined to move the
embassy, citing national security interests. Every six months, the President has used the presidential
waiver to circumvent the embassy move.
- The Israeli government has lauded Trump's pledge to follow through with the embassy move.
Jerusalem Mayor Nir Barkat has been perhaps the most outspoken advocate, launching a campaign just
days before the US President's inauguration, urging him to make good on his promise.
- Palestinian leaders are adamant that an embassy move to Jerusalem would be a violation of
international law, and a huge setback to peace hopes. More immediately, there are fears it could set off
a wave of unrest -- perhaps even street protests and violence -- in the Palestinian territories and across
the Arab world.
- Palestinians say that moving the embassy would prejudge one of the most sensitive issues in the
conflict - the status of Jerusalem - and undermine the US' status as an honest mediator.
- Referencing the expansion of Israel's illegal settlement project and its house demolition policies in
East Jerusalem, the move is described merely as an additional "step" that Israel would be taking to
fulfill its objective of making Jerusalem its "undivided" capital.

(2) Xi Jinping's China lifts presidential term limits

- On March 11, 2018, the National People's Congress (China's parliament) scrapped presidential term
limits, paving the way for President Xi Jinping to rule indefinitely over the world's most populous
country.
- The Communist Party, which says the move merely aligns the presidency with the limit-free titles of
party and military chief, claims "the masses" unanimously called for the removal of term limits. But the
proposal was kept secret until it was revealed in a state media report on February 25, a week before the
legislature's opening session.
- The surprise move triggered a backlash online, prompting censors to block phrases and words such as
"I disagree" and "emperor" and the image of Winnie the Pooh, the cartoon bear to which Xi has been
compared.
- Xi has spent his first term purging the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) of any faction that
challenged his omnipotence, while dialing up censorship, amassing more than a dozen separate
leadership roles and assembling a budding cult of personality. His strongman persona draws strength

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from his exploitation of key populist issues, including fortification of claims over a huge part of the
South China Sea.
- China’s return to strongman politics dredges up dark memories of the nation’s tribulations under Mao
Zedong, whose ill-fated Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution cost tens of millions of lives.
With reverence for Xi a necessary condition for career advancement, there’s very little incentive to
voice differing opinions, with the lack of vigorous policy debate a real worry for continued good
governance. Today, this has possibly calamitous consequences far from China’s borders given the
world’s number two economy remains the single largest contributor to global GDP growth.

(3) The Syrian Civil War

The Syrian Civil War (Arabic: ‫الحرب األهلية السورية‬, Al-ḥarb al-ʼahliyyah as-sūriyyah) is an ongoing
multi-sided armed conflict in Syria fought primarily between the government of President Bashar al-
Assad, along with its allies, and various forces opposing the government.
- The unrest in Syria, part of a wider wave of 2011 Arab Spring protests, grew out of discontent with
the Assad government and escalated to an armed conflict after protests calling for his removal were
violently suppressed. The war is being fought by several factions: the Syrian government and its
international allies, a loose alliance of Sunni Arab rebel groups (including the Free Syrian Army), the
majority-Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Salafi jihadist groups (including al-Nusra Front)
and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), with a number of countries in the region and
beyond being either directly involved, or rendering support to one or another faction.
- Iran, Russia and Hezbollah support the Syrian government militarily, with Russia conducting air
operations in support of the government since September 2015. On the other hand, the U.S.-led
international coalition established in 2014 with a declared purpose of countering ISIL, have conducted
airstrikes against ISIL in Syria as well as against government and pro-government targets.
- International organizations have accused the Syrian government, ISIL and rebel groups of severe
human rights violations and of many massacres. The conflict has caused a major refugee crisis. Over
the course of the war a number of peace initiatives have been launched, including the March 2017
Geneva peace talks on Syria led by the United Nations, but fighting continues.

(4) Refugee crisis involving Sub-Saharan Africans en route to Europe

- The massive inflow of refugees that the EU witnessed in 2015/2016 hit many countries by surprise. In
particular, countries such as Austria, Sweden and Germany, which took in the highest numbers
compared to their population, faced severe challenges. However, from a global perspective the situation
in Europe only constitutes the “tip of the iceberg”. The overwhelming majority of displaced people are
hosted in developing countries, either as Internally Displaced People or as refugees in countries
neighbouring conflict zones. Developing countries host 13.9 million refugees under UNHCR mandate
or about 86 percent of the world’s refugees. So contrary to what has been sometimes claimed in
popular media, refugees are not “invading” the higher-income countries.
- Sub-Saharan Africans, who come to Europe, are commonly portrayed as „destitute“ or „desperate”.
However, they are often relatively well educated and from moderate socio-economic backgrounds.
They move because of a general lack of opportunities, fear of persecution and violence, or a
combination of both.
- The distraction and chaos in Libya made it possible for many migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa to
cross over to Europe using overcrowded rubber boats. Most of the migrants come from Senegal,

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Gambia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria as well as the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Cameron, Sudan and the Horn of Africa.
- It bears noting that refugees are not “invading” the higher income countries. Instead, most of them (86
percent) remain in developing countries (where they stay and eventually settle). Stronger emphasis
shall therefore be placed on supporting the people in these countries by tackling the root causes of
migration. Besides economic, educational and governance projects, a stronger focus shall be placed on
combatting terrorism and calming civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa.
- Those refugees, who arrived in Europe, should be able to receive a just and timely asylum procedure.
They should not be used as an instrument to create fear and to split the society, but rather be given the
chance to demonstrate their talents and contribute to economic growth.

(5) The rise of right-wing populism around the world

- Right-wing populism is a political ideology which combines right-wing politics and populist rhetoric
and themes. ... Right-wing populism in the Western world is generally—though not exclusively—
associated with ideologies such as new nationalism, anti-globalization, nativism, protectionism and
opposition to immigration.
- For the UK and the US, the greatest contributing factor is the increasing wealth gap between the
haves and have-nots. The failure to address this wealth gap is leading to increasing social instability
and economic and social black swan events. These are issues commonly exploited by politicians and
political parties.
- Brexit, Trump and India's Modi: Apparently unrelated, yet inter-connected through a thin thread - it’s
the worldwide rise of terrorism and widening gap betweent the poor and the ultra rich and the common
man’s perception that enough is not being done to curb the menace.

(6) Hard or soft Brexit?

- Some members of PM Theresa May’s Cabinet are pushing for a “soft” Brexit, which would allow
remaining close to the EU’s single market and customs union. Others favour a “hard” Brexit and aim to
strike a trade deal similar to CETA, the agreement concluded between the EU and Canada.
Multinational corporations with plants in the UK favour a soft Brexit. In a leaked report, the Japanese
government points out that 879 Japanese companies, including manufacturing giant Hitachi and
carmakers Honda, Nissan and Toyota, employ 142,000 staff in Britain. It calls Mrs May to keep Britain
in the EU single market and customs union, warning that Japanese companies may otherwise relocate
to continental Europe.
- The EU has promised to make Brexit as difficult as possible to punish UK and to discourage other EU
members from thinking of exiting from the union, too. Theresa May’s reported agreement with her
cabinet on a future trading relationship with the EU has been criticised as based on “pure illusion” by
the European council president, Donald Tusk, as frustration with the UK erupted in Brussels.
- Leaving the customs union would be more problematic than envisaged by both voters and politicians
at the time of the Brexit vote. It would not only raise the possibility a hard border between Northern
Ireland and the Republic, endangering the reconciliation process between them; but it may also lead
multinationals to move out of UK, resulting in the loss of thousands of jobs.
- If the UK government decides to go for hard Brexit, it should make sure that the rules of origin it
negotiates with the EU as part of the new trade deal are as flexible as possible, to minimise the
distortion of global supply chains and the risk of relocation of multinationals. The devil is in the detail:

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what threshold of minimum domestic content is agreed on cars may, for example, decide whether
companies like Honda and Nissan remain in the UK or move to France or Germany.

(7) Global terrorism

- The terrorist purpose is usually inhibitive, i.e., to force a government to withdraw from or desist from
undertaking something. Terrorist violence puts pressure on a government both directly through overt
threats and actions and indirectly through instilling fear in the population.
- The use of terrorism to further a political cause has accelerated in recent years. Modern terrorism
largely came into being after the Second World War with the rise of nationalist movements in the old
empires of the European powers. These early anti-colonial movements recognised the ability of
terrorism to both generate publicity for the cause and influence global policy. Bruce Hoffman, director
of the Centre of Security Studies at Georgetown University writes that, "The ability of these groups to
mobilize sympathy and support outside the narrow confines of their actual “theaters of operation” thus
taught a powerful lesson to similarly aggrieved peoples elsewhere, who now saw in terrorism an
effective means of transforming hitherto local conflicts into international issues."
- Most of the world has seen an increase in terrorism — but deaths from terror attacks have decreased.
In fact, terrorism-related deaths around the world are down for the second straight year, according to
the Institute for Economics and Peace's annual Global Terrorism Index; there was a 22% decrease to
25,673 deaths in 2016 compared to the peak of terror activity in 2014 when over 32,500 people were
killed,
- Still, as the total number of terrorism-related deaths has decreased in the last two years, the number of
countries experiencing terrorism-related deaths increased in 2016. 94% of all terrorism-related deaths
happened in the Middle East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia.
- Four of the five countries most affected by terrorism — Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Nigeria —
recorded an improvement. Nigeria saw an 80% reduction in terrorism-related deaths, as Boko Haram
has been hit hard by the Multinational Joint Task Force. Iraq was the only country of the five most
affected by terrorism to record an increase in deaths, as ISIS increased suicide attacks to make up for
lost territory.
- 99% of all terrorism-related deaths in the past 17 years have happened in countries that have an
ongoing conflict or high levels of political terror. The reduction in the number of terrorism-related
deaths may be due in part to the cessation or resolution of conflicts in terrorism hotspots.
- Large majorities around the world think the UN Security Council should have the right to authorize
military force to stop a country from supporting terrorist groups.

(8) How to solve a problem like North Korea

- Analysts predict it would take approximately 30 minutes for a nuclear-tipped intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) launched from North Korea to reach Los Angeles. With the powers in
Pyongyang working doggedly toward making this possible—building an ICBM and shrinking a nuke to
fit on it—analysts now predict that Kim Jong Un will have the capability before Donald Trump
completes one four-year term.
- Kim’s regime may be evil and deluded, but it’s not stupid. It has made sure that the whole world
knows its aims, and it has carried out public demonstrations of its progress, which double as a thumb in

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the eye of the U.S. and South Korea. The regime has also moved its medium-range No-dong and Scud
missiles out of testing and into active service, putting on displays that show their reach—which now
extends to South Korean port cities and military sites, as well as to the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station
in Iwakuni, Japan. In mid-May, the regime successfully fired a missile that traveled, in a high arc,
farther than one ever had before: 1,300 miles, into the Sea of Japan. Missile experts say it could have
traveled 3,000 miles, well past American forces stationed in Guam, if the trajectory had been lower.
- North Korea’s military exercises leave little doubt that Pyongyang plans to use large numbers of
nuclear weapons against U.S. forces throughout Japan and South Korea to blunt an invasion. In fact,
the word that official North Korean statements use is “repel.” North Korean defectors have claimed that
the country’s leaders hope that by inflicting mass casualties and destruction in the early days of a
conflict, they can force the United States and South Korea to recoil from their invasion.
- Options to resolve the North Korean crisis:
1. Prevention: A crushing U.S. military strike to eliminate Pyongyang’s arsenals of mass destruction,
take out its leadership, and destroy its military. It would end North Korea’s standoff with the United
States and South Korea, as well as the Kim dynasty, once and for all.
2. Turning the screws: A limited conventional military attack—or more likely a continuing series of
such attacks—using aerial and naval assets, and possibly including narrowly targeted Special Forces
operations. These would have to be punishing enough to significantly damage North Korea’s
capability—but small enough to avoid being perceived as the beginning of a preventive strike. The goal
would be to leave Kim Jong Un in power, but force him to abandon his pursuit of nuclear ICBMs.
3. Decapitation: Removing Kim and his inner circle, most likely by assassination, and replacing the
leadership with a more moderate regime willing to open North Korea to the rest of the world.
4. Acceptance: The hardest pill to swallow—acquiescing to Kim’s developing the weapons he wants,
while continuing efforts to contain his ambition.
- A successful diplomatic initiative ultimately will need to address two competing preoccupations: U.S.
and wider international fears of what the Pyongyang regime would do with an advanced nuclear
capacity, and the regime’s fear of what might happen to it without one. The U.S. government should
marry its sanctions and those of the U.N. to a clear and realistic political goal. An incremental solution
could include pauses on North Korean testing of its missile system or weapons, before Pyongyang
crosses what the White House sees as a red line; the United States agreeing to less provocative military
exercises; and consensus on humanitarian support even as sanctions kick in. That might not satisfy
anyone. But at least it would provide the space needed to explore a more durable resolution.

(9) US-Saudi-Iran rivalry

- This rivalry will likely eclipse other Middle Eastern fault lines in 2018. It is enabled and exacerbated
by three parallel developments: the consolidation of the authority of Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi
Arabia’s assertive crown prince; the Trump administration’s more aggressive strategy toward Iran; and
the end of the Islamic State’s territorial control in Iraq and Syria, which allows Washington and Riyadh
to aim the spotlight more firmly on Iran.
- The contours of a U.S./Saudi strategy (with an important Israeli assist) are becoming clear. It is based
on an overriding assumption that Iran has exploited passive regional and international actors to bolster
its position in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon. Washington and Riyadh seek to re-establish a sense of
deterrence by convincing Tehran that it will pay at least as high a price for its actions as it can inflict on
its adversaries.
- The strategy seems to involve multiple forms of pressure to contain, squeeze, exhaust, and ultimately
push back Iran. It has an economic dimension (via U.S. sanctions); a diplomatic one (witness vocal U.S.

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and Saudi denunciations of Iran’s regional behavior and Riyadh’s ham-handed attempt to force
Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s resignation); and a military one (so far exerted principally by
Saudi Arabia in Yemen and by Israel in Syria).
- Whether it will work is another question. Although recent protests in Iran have introduced a new and
unpredictable variable, Tehran and its partners still appear to be in a strong position. The Bashar al-
Assad regime, backed by Russian air power, is prevailing in Syria. Across Iraq, Iran-linked Shiite
militias are entrenching themselves in state institutions. In Yemen, Tehran’s relatively small investment
in backing the Houthis has helped them weather the Saudi-led campaign and even launch missiles of
unprecedented range and accuracy into Saudi territory.
- Despite demonstrating its resolve to confront Iran and its partners, Riyadh has been unable to alter the
balance of power. Forcing Hariri’s resignation backfired, not just because he later withdrew it, but also
because all of Lebanon united against the move and Hariri then inched closer to Lebanese President
Michel Aoun and Hezbollah. In Yemen, Riyadh turned the Houthis and former President Ali Abdullah
Saleh against each other, but in doing so further fragmented the country and complicated the search for
a settlement and a face-saving Saudi exit from a war that is enormously costly not only to Yemenis but
also to Riyadh’s international standing. The Trump administration confronts similar obstacles. Thus far
its belligerence, refusal to certify the nuclear deal, threats of new sanctions, and launching of several
strikes at and near regime targets in Syria have done little to reverse Tehran’s reach.
- With so many flashpoints, and so little diplomacy, the risk of an escalatory cycle is great: Any move
— new U.S. sanctions that Iran would see as violating the nuclear deal; a Houthi missile strike hitting
Riyadh or Abu Dhabi, for which Washington and Riyadh would hold Tehran responsible; or an Israeli
strike in Syria that kills Iranians — could trigger a broader confrontation.

(10) Crisis in Venezuela

- Venezuela took yet another turn for the worse in 2017, as President Nicolás Maduro’s government ran
the country further into the ground while strengthening its political grip. The opposition has imploded.
Prospects for a peaceful restoration of democracy appear ever slimmer. But with the economy in free
fall, Maduro faces enormous challenges. Expect the humanitarian crisis to deepen in 2018 as GDP
continues to contract.
- In late November, Venezuela defaulted on part of its international debt. Sanctions will make debt
restructuring nearly impossible. Increasing Russian support is unlikely to suffice, while China appears
reluctant to bail Maduro out. A default could provoke the seizure of Venezuelan assets abroad,
crippling the oil trade that accounts for 95 percent of the country’s export earnings.
- Street demonstrations and clashes that killed over 120 people between April and July subsided after
the July election of a National Constituent Assembly composed entirely of government allies.
Subsequent polls for state governors and mayors led to major opposition losses amid disputes over
whether to participate. But food shortages, a collapsed health system, and spiraling violent crime mean
conditions for unrest persist.
- While opposition politicians look to the presidential vote, due by late 2018, as an opportunity and
entry point for foreign engagement, the government is unlikely to permit a credible vote. It might call
early polls, catch its opponents unprepared, and deploy the same voter suppression tactics it has used to
win local and regional elections. If the opposition begins to show signs of recovery, Maduro might seek
to avoid elections altogether by claiming that external threats warrant a state of emergency. A less
probable scenario is that the ruling party splits over who will succeed Maduro; without a formal
mechanism, the military would be the likely arbiter. Meanwhile, the weak Venezuelan state will

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continue to provide a haven for criminal networks and opportunities for money laundering, drug
trafficking, and people smuggling, further disquieting Venezuela’s neighbors.
- The prognosis for 2018 is further deterioration, humanitarian emergency, and an increased exodus of
Venezuelans. Sustained domestic and international pressure — as well as guarantees of future
immunity — will be required to push the government toward credible presidential elections.

(11) The war in Afghanistan

- The War in Afghanistan looks set to intensify in 2018. The United States’ new Afghanistan strategy
raises the tempo of operations against the Taliban insurgency, with more U.S. forces, fiercer U.S.
airstrikes, and more aggressive ground offensives by Afghan forces. The aim, according to senior
officials, is to halt the Taliban’s momentum and, eventually, force it into a political settlement. For now,
though, the strategy is almost exclusively military.
- This strategy faces serious obstacles. While hitting the Taliban harder might bring tactical gains, it is
unlikely to change the war’s course or the incentives of a locally rooted and potent insurgency. The
Taliban currently controls or is contesting more territory than at any time since 2001; it is better
equipped and, even if pressured through conventional fighting, it would retain the ability to mount
spectacular urban attacks that erode confidence in the government. Besides, between 2009 and 2012,
the Taliban withstood more than 100,000 U.S. troops.
- Military leaders contend that this time will be different because Trump, unlike Obama, has not set a
withdrawal date. That argument holds little water. It also misreads the insurgency: Battlefield losses in
the past have not impacted Taliban leaders’ willingness to negotiate. Forthcoming Afghan elections (a
parliamentary poll is slated for July 2018; a presidential vote is due in 2019) will suck oxygen from the
military campaign. Every vote since 2004 has ignited some form of crisis, and political discord today is
particularly severe, with President Ashraf Ghani accused by his critics of monopolizing power in the
hands of a few advisors.
- The strategy also underplays regional shifts. Thus far, U.S. regional diplomacy has centered on
pressuring Pakistan; yet the calculations that motivate Islamabad’s support for the insurgency are
unlikely to change. The Taliban also now enjoys ties to Iran and Russia, which claim to view it as a
bulwark against an Islamic State branch in Afghanistan that is small but resilient—and also capable of
mounting high-profile attacks. Washington’s militarized approach and diminished diplomacy risk
signaling to those countries that it seeks not to stabilize and leave Afghanistan but to maintain a
military presence. Given that they are likely to perceive such a presence as a threat to their own
interests, it could lead them to increase support for insurgents. Nor does U.S. diplomacy on
Afghanistan currently involve China, whose increasing clout in parts of South Asia will make it critical
to any settlement.
- It is true that demonstrating sustained U.S. support might reinforce the morale of the Afghan Army; a
precipitous withdrawal, in contrast, could trigger chaos. But as the battlefield tempo increases, the
Trump administration should keep lines of communication to the insurgency open and explore the
contours of a settlement with Afghanistan’s neighbors and other regional powers, however slim
prospects currently appear. U.S. allies in Afghanistan should push for a greater diplomatic political
component to the U.S. strategy. As it stands, that strategy sets the stage for more violence while closing
avenues for de-escalation. Afghan civilians will pay the price.