Provisional Remedies Cases - Rule 58

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES 1 of 336
Rule 58: Preliminary Injunction
City Government of Baguio City v. Masweng ..................................................... 86

PURPOSE OF THE WRIT ........................................................................................... 4
Reyes v. Demetria, En Banc .................................................................................. 92

PNB v. RJ Ventures Realty & Development Corp, ................................................ 4
Reyes v. Demetria, En Banc ................................................................................. 100
STATUS QUO ANTE ................................................................................................. 20
SECTION 3 -- REQUISITES ..................................................................................... 103
First Global Realty & Development Corp. v. Agustin ........................................ 20
Manila International Airport Authority v. CA................................................... 103
SECTION 1 .................................................................................................................. 26
SECTION 3 -WHAT IS A RIGHTS IN ESSE? ........................................................... 112
DOH, et. al v. Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. .............................................................. 26
Paranaque v. Ebio .................................................................................................. 112
Levi Strauss& Co., v. Clinton Apparelle .............................................................. 30
Orocio v. Angulunan ............................................................................................. 118
SECTION 2 – DOCTRINE OF NON-JURISDICTION ............................................ 39
OWWA v. Chavez, et al ....................................................................................... 130
Gomos v. Adiong ................................................................................................... 39
Boncodin v. NECU ................................................................................................ 141
Dela Paz v. Adiong ................................................................................................ 44
APRI v. Municipality of Garcia ............................................................................. 151
Mangahas v. Paredes .............................................................................................. 51
SECTION 3 - NO RIGHT IN ESSE ........................................................................... 157
Section 2- EXCEPTIONS ........................................................................................... 56
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY VS. CA – GO TO
Decano v. Edu, ....................................................................................................... 56 SECTION3, REQUISITES ..................................................................................... 157
Dagupan Electric Co. v. Paño ................................................................................ 61 Bangus Fry Fisherfolk v. Lanzanas...................................................................... 157
FEBTCv. CA ........................................................................................................... 167

Allgemeine Bau Chemie Phils. V. Metrobank .................................................... 76
CSC v. CA ............................................................................................................... 80 Bayanihan Music v. BMG Records,et. al ............................................................ 170

LEVI STRAUSS VS. CLINTON APPARELLE – GO TO SECTION 1 ................. 174 Gonzales v. State Properties Corporation .......................................................... 223
Elidad Kho v. CA, et. al ........................................................................................ 174 Borja v. Salcedo .................................................................................................... 229
BONCODIN VS. NECU – SEE SECTION 3, WHAT IS A RIGHT IN ESSE ...... 180 Pesayco v. Layague ............................................................................................... 237
APRI VS. MUNICIPALITY OF PADRE GARCIA – SAME ................................. 180 Lago v. Abul ......................................................................................................... 243
SECTION 3 - THERE IS RIGHT IN ESSE .................................................................181 Bagong West Kabulusan 1 Neighborhood v. Lerma ......................................... 250
Talento v. Escalada, Jr. ..........................................................................................181 SECTION 5 ............................................................................................................... 256
CSC v. CA .............................................................................................................. 186 Editha Palma Gil v. Lopez, Jr. ............................................................................. 256
Section 3 - ACTUAL VIOLATION OF RIGHT ....................................................... 192 LAGO VS. ABUL – SEE SECTION 4 ................................................................... 261
Fortune Life Insurance v. Luczon, Jr. ................................................................. 261

Hernandez v. NAPOCOR .................................................................................... 192
Gomos v. Adiong ................................................................................................. 266

Section 3 - INEFFECTUAL JUDGMENT ................................................................. 201
Merontos v. Zerna ............................................................................................... 270

Unilever Phils, Inc. v. CA ..................................................................................... 201
IN READMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT VS. HON. ABESAMIS – GO TO
ST
PNB VS. RJ VENTURES – GO TO PURPOSE OF WRIT (1 CASE) ............... 206 SECTION 4 ........................................................................................................... 274
SECTION 4 ............................................................................................................... 207 Llamson v. Logronio ........................................................................................... 274
Tomawis v. Caudang ........................................................................................... 282

Bacolod City Water District v. Labayen ............................................................ 207
City Government of Butuan v. CBS ................................................................... 289

Universal Motors Corp. v. Rojas ......................................................................... 214
Garrido v. Tortogo, et al. .................................................................................... 299

In Re Admin Complaint v. Hon.Abesamis ........................................................ 220
SECTION 6 ............................................................................................................... 309
Sps. Yap v. International Exchange Bank .......................................................... 309
SECTION 7 ................................................................................................................ 318
FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE VS. LUCZON – GO TO SECTION 5 ................ 318
SECTION 8 ................................................................................................................ 319
Natalia Realty v. CA .............................................................................................. 319
Philex Gold Phils v. Philex Bulawan Supervisor’s Union .................................. 323
SECTION 9 ............................................................................................................... 326
Elidad Kho v. CA .................................................................................................. 326
Palma Gil v. Lopez ................................................................................................ 332

The assailed Resolution denied petitioner Philippine National Bank's (PNB's)

Motion for Reconsideration dated 3 May 2004.
PURPOSE OF THE WRIT
The Antecedents
PNB v. RJ Ventures Realty & Development Corp,
As culled from the records, the facts show that on 26 February 1999,
FIRST DIVISION respondents RJ Ventures Realty & Development Corporation (RJVRD) and Rajah
Broadcasting Network, Inc. (RBN) filed a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer
G.R. No. 164548 September 27, 2006 for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
4 5
Injunction against petitioner PNB and Juan S. Baun, Jr. with the Regional Trial
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
Court (RTC), Branch 66 of Makati City, and docketed as Civil Case No. 99-452.
vs.
RJ VENTURES REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and RAJAH
In its Complaint, respondents contended that on 13 June 1996, First Women's
BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC.,respondents. Credit Corporation (FWCC) received an invitation to bid from PNB anent the
sale of an 8,000 square meter property, located at Paseo de Roxas corner Sen.
DECISION
Gil. Puyat Avenue, Makati City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
6
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: S-15223 (Buendia Property). On 10 July 1996, FWCC bid the amount
of P455,000.00 per square meter or a total ofP3,640,000,000.00; and pursuant to
Before this Court is a Petition for Review filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of PNB Rules and Regulations on the Acceptance and Evaluation of Proposals, it
1 2
Court assailing the 31 March 2004 Decision and the 8 July 2004 Resolution of deposited ten percent (10%) of the offered price or P364,000,000.00 with the
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 56119. The challenged Decision disposed, PNB by way of two checks, No. 418796 and No. 418797, in the amounts
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thus: of P312,000,000.00 and P52,000,000.00, respectively. On 11 July 1996, FWCC
submitted a revised offer increasing its bid by P5,000.00 per square meter or a
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is total additional amount of P40,000,000.00. In view of the increase, FWCC
hereby GRANTED, the assailed Orders dated July 28, 1999 and October 8
deposited with PNB an additional amount of P4,000,000.00. On 17 July 1996,
26, 1999, respectively, [are] REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and the 9
FWCC was awarded the Buendia Property. PNB's Notice of Award to FWCC set
3
preliminary injunction earlier issued is reinstated. No cost. a condition that within thirty (30) calendar days from receipt of the same, the
successful offeror shall tender payment of the balance of the purchase price in
10
the form of a manager's or cashier's check. On 24 July 1996, FWCC, invoking
11
Section 7.2 of the PNB Rules requested PNB to finance the entire balance of the 15.2 Mr. Ramon P. Jacinto, the majority stockholder of RJVRD will
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purchase price. On 17 September 1996 and pending action on its loan pledge to PNB 70% of his shares of stock in RBN and 40% of his shares
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application, FWCC assigned all its rights, claims, interest, and title over the of stock in FWCC.
13
Buendia Property to RJVRD. The latter assumed the right to purchase the
Buendia Property and the obligations of FWCC to PNB on the balance of the bid Moreover, in their Complaint a quo, respondents avowed that on 30 September
price. 1996, following the payment by RJVRD to PNB of the additional deposit
of P368,000,000.00, the parties entered into a loan agreement wherein PNB will
Respondents further posited that PNB initially refused to finance the entire finance the balance of the purchase price in the amount of P2,944,000,000.00
balance of the purchase price except to the extent of seventy-five percent (75%) subject to conditions,inter alia, that after the transfer of the Buendia Property in
14
thereof. However, PNB finally agreed to grant a loan to RJVRD equivalent to the name of RJVRD, the same shall be mortgaged in favor of PNB. On even date,
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eighty percent (80%) of the purchase price or for the amount RJVRD and PNB executed a Loan Agreement. A Deed of Sale and a Real
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of P2,944,000,000.00. The grant was conditioned on the deposit by RJVRD with Estate Mortgage, both dated 30 September 1996 were similarly executed
PNB of an additional ten percent (10%) of the purchase price to the first ten between RJVRD and PNB over the Buendia Property. The Loan Agreement
percent (10%) downpayment which the former had paid. Otherwise stated, included a two-way peso/dollar convertibility feature at the option of RJVRD;
RJVRD was required to raise an additional amount hence, to avail of a lower interest rate, RJVRD converted its peso loan to US
15
of P368,000,000.00. Moreover, to allow RJVRD to raise the additional amount, dollar based on a rate of exchange of P26.23 to US$1.00, or for a total amount of
PNB proposed to lend RBN the required amount, the latter being an affiliate US$112,237,895.54.
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company of RJVRD, which amount will be available for relending to RJVRD.
Respondents claimed that RJVRD undertook to engage foreign investors for the
Respondents described the said arrangement in this wise: project. It entered into negotiations with Hyundai Construction of South Korea
which were eventually suspended. Its talks with Siemens of Austria, and
15.0 PNB shall extend a loan to RBN in the amount of P350,000,000.00 Property Investment and Development Management Corporation of Singapore
which in turn would be loaned to RJVRD. 21
failed. Respondents interposed further that the Asian currency crisis on 11 July
1997 caused a depreciation of the Philippine peso which correspondingly
15.1 The proceeds of the loan shall be used by RJVRD to partially pay the
increased the obligation of RJVRD to PNB from P2,944,000,000.00
additional 10% orP368,000,000.00 deposit on the Property. PNB 22
toP5,405,301,470.82 inclusive of interest. On 30 September 1997, in an effort to
documents would however show that the loan was for the expansion of
continue the project, RJVRD entered into a joint venture agreement with Fil-
RBN.
Estate Management Incorporated for the development of the Buendia Property.
RBN secured another loan from PNB in the amount of P100,000,000.00, part of
which was used in paying the interest for the loan it had secured in favor of Groups of Companies sent Mr. Benjamin Palma Gil, president of PNB, a
RJVRD. In addition, as and by way of security, RBN assigned in favor of PNB, all proposal for the settlement of respondents' accounts, including a request for the
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its rights and interest over radio and television frequencies issued by the restructuring of the loans.
National Telecommunications Commission, located in Tuguegarao, Baguio,
Manila, Cebu, Bacolod, Iloilo, including those in Cagayan de Oro (FM Stations), On 25 January 1999, PNB, through its counsel, sent RBN a demand letter,
32
23
and Manila (AM Station and TV-UHF Station). On September 1997, RJVRD requiring the latter to settle their outstanding account of P841,460,891.91. In a
paid PNB the accrued interest on the loan amounting to P353,478,628.88. RBN letter similarly dated 25 January 1999, PNB by counsel, demanded from RJVRD
33
also updated its first account with PNB by paying about P41,000,00.00. In March the settlement of its total obligation of P5,405,301,470.82. On 28 January 1999,
1998, RJVRD, RBN and PNB entered into discussions on the restructuring of the RBN sent a letter to PNB's counsel, expressing its surprise to receive the demand
loans. Respondents alleged that while discussions were ongoing, the accounts of letter despite their continuing negotiations with PNB for the restructuring of its
34
24 25
RJVRD and RBN became delinquent. PNB sent RJVRD, a notice, dated 2 June accounts. In its letter, RBN said that it was, in fact, required by PNB to
1998, declaring their accounts delinquent and demanding the settlement of the redenominate its dollar loans into pesos as an initial step for the restructuring of
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same.
26 the account, and which it has complied. On even date, RJVRD sent a letter to
PNB's counsel emphasizing that it had not been advised of any adverse
Respondents asserted that prior to 11 June 1998, in line with the continuing development in their negotiation with PNB nor had it been informed of the
discussions between PNB and RBN for the restructuring of the loan, PNB discontinuance of the negotiation. RJVRD sought for additional time to justify
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required the redenomination of RBN's loan as a condition for its its proposal to PNB with the aim of arriving at a friendly settlement.
27
restructuring. On 11 June 1998, RBN sent a letter to PNB in agreement to the
redenomination of the loan, stating therein the agreed terms for the On 18 February 1999, PNB made a demand to RBN to turnover the possession
restructuring of the loan. RJVRD sent a letter to PNB agreeing to redenominate and/or control of Broadcasting Equipment Inventory located at No. 33,
37
its own loan based on PNB's initial proposal, which letter was returned to Dominican Hills, Baguio City. On 18 February 1999, RJVRD received a Notice of
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RJVRD for the reason that, at that time, the proposals for the restructuring of Extrajudicial Sale, dated 1 February 1999 for the sale of the Buendia Property to
the RJVRD loan component did not call for the redenomination of the loan of be held on 2 March 1999 at the City Hall, Makati City.
28
RJVRD. On 24 June 1998, RBN sent a letter to PNB, confirming to
29
Respondents manifested in their Complaint that when RJVRD, as assignee of
redenominate the loan under the terms stated in its letter of 11 June 1998. On 9
FWCC purchased the Buendia Property from PNB, the Philippine economy was
September 1998, respondents asseverated that PNB made a call to RJVRD,
progressive; that it was under this favorable economic scenario that RJVRD
asking the latter to redenominate its loans. On the same date, RJVRD sent PNB,
30
agreed to the terms and conditions of the loan agreements; however, following
a letter in agreement to the redenomination. On 23 October 1998, the RJ
the Asian economic crisis of July 1997, and with the depreciation of the
Philippine peso, the loan of RJVRD which was denominated in US dollars rose the restraining order or injunction, if finally determined that respondents are
39
from P2,944,000,000.00 (US$112,237,895.54) to P5,405,301,470.82. According to not entitled thereto.
respondents, from the original contract price of P3,680,000,000.00, RJVRD
already made a payment ofP736,000,000.00, representing twenty-percent (20%) Acting on respondent's prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
42
of the value of the Buendia Property and P353,478,628.88, representing interest Order, the RTC, issued an Order dated 2 March 1999, denying the same. The
on the loan or a total of P1,089,478,628.88; and that PNB never effectively lost RTC held that the evidence showed that respondents are in default of payment
control over the Buendia Property, considering that simultaneous with the of its loan from PNB, amounting to P5,405,301,470.82, including interests and
execution of the Loan Agreement between RJVRD and PNB, RJVRD executed a penalties. According to the RTC, the respondents failed to prove that they have
Real Estate Mortgage over the Buendia Property in favor of PNB. Furthermore, a clear right to restrain the foreclosure of the Buendia Property; whereas, it is
40
respondents sought to find recourse under Article 19 of the Civil Code. They PNB which has a clear right to the Buendia Property. The RTC opined that the
contended that the action on the part of PNB to foreclose the collaterals pledged evidence failed to prove that respondents will suffer "irreparable injury" if the
or mortgaged by RJVRD and RBN, including the extrajudicial sale of the Buendia foreclosure of the Buendia Property is not enjoined, for under the law,
Property on 2 March 1999 at the City Hall of Makati City, and the planned take respondents have one (1) year from the date of the registration of the sale with
over of RBN's radio facilities in Baguio City would be, among others, the Register of Deeds within which to redeem the Buendia Property; thus,
premature.
41 respondents will have a chance to recover the ownership thereof by way of
redemption. Finally, the RTC ruled that the rule of equity is on the side of PNB
Finally, in support of its Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining considering that the Buendia Property was formerly owned by PNB. The RTC
Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, respondents alleged that RJVRD denied the application for Temporary Restraining Order for lack of merit, and
and RNB would suffer great and irreparable injury by the extrajudicial held that the exposure of PNB in the transaction amounted toP5,405,301,470.82,
43
foreclosure of the property and the take over of RBN's radio facilities in Baguio, while the exposure of respondents is P1,089,478,628.00.
unless a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction is
issued enjoining defendants from implementing the Notice of Extrajudicial Sale On 2 March 1999, the Buendia Property was sold in a public auction conducted
44
dated 1 February 1999, and enjoining PNB from taking possession and control of by Atty. Juan S. Buan, Notary Public of Makati City. There being no other
RBN's radio facilities in Baguio City. Respondents maintained that the bidder, the Buendia Property was sold to PNB for the amount
commission or continuance of the acts complained of during the litigation or ofP2,800,000,000.00. On 3 May 1999, RBN received a Notice of Extrajudical Sale
the non-performance thereof would work injustice to RJVRD and RBN. They from PNB, specifying therein that the property covered by Broadcating
manifested their willingness to post a bond as the court a quo may fix in its Equipment Inventory located at No. 33 Dominical Hills, Baguio City will be sold
discretion, to answer for whatever damages PNB may sustain for the reason of for cash at public auction to the highest bidder on 10 May 1999, at the City Hall,
Baguio City, pursuant to the terms of the Deed of Chattel Mortage dated 19 June substantiate and support its claim that it is entitled to the Writ of Preliminary
45
1994 to satisfy the mortgage indebtedness ofP841,460,491.91. Injunction in order to enjoin PNB from foreclosing on the subject chattels.
According to PNB, it was able to show that RBN failed without justifiable cause
Following this development, on 4 May 1999, respondents filed an Urgent or reason to service the credit facilities extended to it. PNB advanced the
Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of argument that RBN has no clear right in esse; therefore, it cannot seek relief
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Preliminary Injunction. Respondents prayed that a Temporary Restraining from the court. PNB claimed that they were able to prove irreparable damage to
Order be issued enjoining PNB or any persons acting under its instructions from the bank if PNB will be enjoined from foreclosing on the chattel mortgages. PNB
foreclosing on any other collaterals pledged or mortgaged by respondents to maintained that proceeding with the auction sale of the subject properties
PNB, particularly that which is subject of the Notice of Extrajudicial Sale to be would lower the bank's "past due ratio" approximately by 2%; hence, with the
conducted by Notary Public Perlita Chan-Rondez in Baguio City on 10 May 1999. decrease in the bank's "past due ratio percentage," there would be no legal
It was likewise prayed that after due proceedings, a Writ of Preliminary impediment to PNB's resumption to full lending operations since the Bangko
47
Injunction be similarly issued. Sentral ng Pilipinas' recommendation for stoppage of grants of new loans is
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anchored on PNB's current high "past due ratio." In support of its Motion for
On 7 May 1999, the RTC issued an Order granting the Writ of Preliminary
Reconsideration, PNB further theorized that decreasing its "past due ratio"
Injunction respondents' application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
would improve investors' confidence; hence, substantially enhancing the
Order (TRO), upon posting of a bond in the amount ofP1,000,000.00.
viability of PNB in its move to attain full privatization by the year 2000.
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On 27 May 1999, the RTC issued an Order, granting the Writ of Preliminary 52
In its Opposition, respondents submitted that during the hearing of the
Injunction, enjoining PNB from foreclosing all collaterals pledged or mortgaged
application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the court expressed its position
by respondents to PNB, in particular those described in Exhibits A to L thereof,
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that it will not receive evidence relative to the merits of the case as the same
after the posting of a bond in the amount of P5,000,000.00. According to the
would pre-empt the resolution of the merits or dispose of the main case without
court, the right of PNB to foreclose the chattel mortgages is still challenged by
trial; therefore, by agreement of the parties, the principal issue was limited to
the respondents and therefore, is not yet clearly established. Hence, if PNB is
whether RBN will suffer irreparable injury if the writ of preliminary injunction is
allowed to foreclose the subject chattel mortgages, the determination of the
not issued. According to respondents, the damage to RBN's image, loss of
right of PNB to foreclose the subject properties will become moot and academic.
listenership, advertisers, staff and employees is unquantifiable in monetary
Subsequently, on 28 May 1999, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued.
terms. Irreparable damage would be caused to RBN if PNB is allowed to
51 foreclose its equipments. It would also disrupt, if not, paralyze, the operations of
On 9 June 1999, PNB filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of 27 May
1999. PNB averred, inter alia, that RBN failed to produce any evidence to
RBN's stations. They further asserted that there is no reason to disturb the the part of the RTC in dissolving the Writ of Preliminary Injunction earlier
injunction issued by the court absent a showing of manifest abuse. issued.
53
On 28 July 1999, the RTC issued an Order granting PNB's Motion for Before the appellate court, respondents argued that the sufficiency of their
Reconsideration. This was subsequently rectified in the Order of 29 July 1999 as application for preliminary injunction was already raised and passed upon by
to the date of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction from May 28, 1998 to May the RTC in the Injunction Order dated 27 May 1999; however, PNB was not able
54
28, 1999. In lifting the Writ of Preliminary Injunction of 28 May 1999, the RTC to allege "other grounds" for the lifting thereof as mandated by Section 6 of Rule
57
rationalized that the failure of RBN to pay the three (3) credit facilities it 58 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, respondents asserted that on the issue of
obtained from defendant PNB was established; thus, RBN was considered to the purported delinquency, the RTC failed to consider PNB's judicial
have effectively "defaulted" on its loan obligation. In the same Order, the RTC admissions, whereby the rights of PNB should be those of a seller covered by the
concluded that RBN made express admission of its delinquency in its law on Sales (Title VI, Book IV, Civil Code), and not those of a money-lender
Complaint. Moreover, the RTC held that the "cross-default covered by the law on Loans (TitleXI, Book IV, Civil Code); hence, PNB's rights
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provision" embodied in the Loan Agreement between the parties establishes as a seller are either to rescind the sale, retrieve the title to the property
against the grant of the injunction. transferred to the buyer, and exact payment of damages or to leave the property
with the buyer, to exact payment of the entire price with interest, and recover
Respondents moved for a reconsideration of the 28 July 1999 Order, submitting damages thereby suffered. According to the respondents, the PNB as seller had
that there was no reason to disturb the preliminary injunction order as there recovered through foreclosure the Buendia Property. They alleged that: PNB had
was no showing of a manifest abuse by then Presiding Judge Hon. Eriberto U. forfeited in its favor as mortgagor, the payments already made by RJVRD and
Rosario, in the issuance thereof. Respondents explicated, inter alia, that the the interest thereon; PNB is in the process of recovering as mortgagor and seller
sufficiency of their application was already passed upon by the RTC through the additional damages in the form of interests, penalties, charges, attorney's fees,
Order dated 27 May 1999. etc; and PNB is in the process of recovering as mortgagor, by way of the
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foreclosure of mortgage, other realty and chattels of significant value.
On 26 October 1999, the RTC issued an Order, denying respondents' Motion
Respondents contended that there was no grave abuse of discretion in the
for Reconsideration for the lifting of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 28
issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction because the contemplated
May 1999.
foreclosure of the other properties will work injustice to RBN and would render
ineffectual any judgment on the merits of the case ineffectual.
Aggrieved, on 7 December 1999, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Orders
Anent the issue of whether respondents will suffer irreparable injury,
dated 28 July 1999 and 26 October 1999, imputing grave abuse of discretion on
respondents pleaded that although the immediate effect of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction may be quantifiable in pesos, the effect on the agreements without justifiable cause and despite due demand. Anent the issue
respondents is its viability that stands to be affected in the long-term. on the existence of irreparable injury, PNB challenged respondents' contention
Respondents rationalized that the foreclosure of the radio equipment will result by arguing that there is, in fact, a pecuniary standard by which RBN's damage
in the stoppage of operations, and eventually, the loss of the image of the can be measured per the testimony of RBN's witness that it will suffer a loss
station. These factors will cause the loss of its listenership and client confidence, of P1.2 Billion for the next ten (10) years. PNB further posited that there were no
which cannot be quantifiable in monetary terms. Moreover, respondents set judicial admissions on their part to the effect that RJVRD and RBN are not
forth the contention that even as PNB suggested that after foreclosure, the radio delinquent. In furtherance of its opposition, PNB averred that it acted in two
equipment would either be sold to improve PNB's liquidity or disposed by way separate capacities as seller and lender. As a seller, PNB owned the Buendia
of lease-purchase agreement, there exists no assurance that RBN can repurchase Property and offered it for sale to interested parties. PNB accepted the bid of
the foreclosed collaterals. RJVRD and the property was sold to the latter. As a lender, PNB supplied the
credit facility to RJVRD as the latter needed to borrow money to finance the
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals payment of the remaining balance. PNB insisted that these two transactions
58
cannot be treated as one and the same; hence, there is nothing that prevents it
On 9 December 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution temporarily
from acting as a seller and lender at the same time. In fine, PNB maintained that
enjoining PNB from foreclosing any collateral pledged or mortgaged by RJVRD
RJVRD did not default on the payment of the purchase price for such was
and RBN, and from taking possession and control of the latter's radio facilities in
completely paid; rather, it defaulted on the payment of the loan, on its principal,
Baguio City, until further orders from the appellate court. In granting the same,
and interest.
the Court of Appeals underscored that the purpose of the temporary injunctive
relief is to preserve the status quo antebetween the parties, and so as not to 59
On 4 February 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution, granting the
render moot and academic the relief prayed for in the Petition. Accordingly, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, enjoining PNB and its agents from foreclosing
Court of Appeals set the hearing on the application for the issuance of a the collaterals pledged and mortgaged by RJVRD and RBN and from taking over
preliminary injunction on 11 January 2000. possession and control of RBN radio facilities in Baguio City. The appellate
court, held, viz:
On 10 January 2000, the PNB filed a Comment with the Court of Appeals,
disputing the imputation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC The principal action in the petition at bar dwells on the controversy on
when it lifted the preliminary injunction. The PNB opposed respondents' claim whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of
that there exists in their favor a right to be protected. According to PNB, the discretion in issuing the order lifting and setting aside the injunctive
foreclosure of the collaterals shall be effective upon the default of RBN, which relief earlier issued in Civil Case No. 4592 (sic). If no preliminary
default had been established as RBN was unable to properly service the loan injunction is issued in this case, pending resolution of such main
petition, respondent will proceed to foreclose the pledged or mortgaged issued on 28 May 1999. The Court of Appeals held that the RTC was not asked to
collaterals. In that eventuality, petitioners stand to sustain injury and make a definitive conclusion on the issue of whether RBN was indeed guilty of
irreparable damage, the loss of its properties, income[,] and clientele default in paying its loan nor was it asked to resolve whether RBN committed a
listeners in the subject radio broadcasting station in Baguio City, even breach against PNB which necessitated foreclosure. A determination of whether
before the instant certiorari proceeding could be resolved. To allow the there was default or breach can be only be reached after the principal action is
impending foreclosure to proceed, at this point in time, will surely be set for trial on the merits after the parties are given opportunity to present
violative of petitioners' right to be heard and to due process. It is for this evidence in support of their respective claims.
reason, for the preservation of the status quo between the parties,
pending decision of the main petition and in order not to render the The appellate court decreed, to wit:
same moot and academic, We feel justified to grant the preliminary

It must be emphasized that a preliminary injunction may be granted at
injunction prayed for.
any stage of an action prior to final judgment, requiring a person to
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the refrain from a particular act. As the term itself suggests, it is merely
petition at bar, let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction be issued in this temporary, subject to the final disposition of the principal action. The
case enjoining the respondent PNB, its officers or agents from justification for the preliminary injunction is urgency. It is based on
foreclosing the collateral pledged and mortgaged by petitioners, RJ evidence tending to show that the action complained of must be stayed
Ventures Realty & Development Corporation and Rajah Broadcasting lest the movant suffer irreparable injury or the final judgment granting
Network, Inc., from taking over possession and control of RBN radio the relief sought become ineffectual. Necessarily, that evidence need only
facilities in Baguio City, upon the posting of a P1,000,000.00 injunction be a "sampling," as it were, and intended merely to give the court an idea
bond. of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of
the case on the merits. The evidence submitted at the hearing on the
Undeterred, PNB filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that the Order of 4 motion for preliminary injunction is not conclusive of the principal
February 2000 be set aside and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the action, which has yet to be decided. (Olalia vs. Hizon, 196 SCRA 665
Court of Appeals be immediately lifted and dissolved. [1991]).
Acting on the Motion, the Court of Appeals, rendered the assailed Decision Anent the issue of whether RBN would sustain "irreparable injury"
dated 31 March 2004, denying the same. In the same order, the appellate court, should the chattel mortgage be foreclosed, it bears repeating that the
reversed and set aside the Orders dated 28 July 1999 and 26 October 1999 of the evidence to be submitted at the hearing on the motion for preliminary
RTC; hence, effectively reinstating the Writ of Preliminary Injunction earlier injunction need not be conclusive and complete. On this score, We find
petitioners to have sufficiently established the existence of irreparable I

injury to justify, albeit provisionally, the restraint of the act complained
against them. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FILED BY PNB INVOLVES
QUESTIONS OF FACTS WHICH SHOULD BE A CAUSE FOR ITS
We find that the potential injury demonstrated by the various DISMISSAL;
testimonies presented by petitioners more than satisfies the legal and
jurisprudential requirements of "irreparable injury." There is no II
gainsaying in that the foreclosure of the subject radio equipment[s]

WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFAULT BY RJVRD AND RBN IN THE
would inevitably result in stoppage of operations. This, in turn, shall
PAYMENT OF THEIR RESPECTIVE LOAN OBLIGATIONS TO PNB
result to (sic) the station's tarnished image and consequent loss of
JUSTIFIES THE DENIAL OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF
public listenership. Loss of listenership then leads to loss of confidence
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION FOR THE FORECLOSURE OF THE
of the station's patrons and advertising clients that would cause serious
MORTGAGED PROPERTIES;
repercussions on its ability to sustain its operations. Undoubtedly, the
loss of image and reputation by a radio station are matters that are not
III
quantifiable in terms of monetary value.
WHETHER OR NOT RBN'S ADMISSION OF ITS FAILURE TO SETTLE
All told, We find the court a quo's lifting of the injunction earlier issued
ITS LOAN OBLIGATION IN FULL GIVES PNB A CLEAR RIGHT TO
tainted with grave abuse of discretion properly correctable by the
FORECLOSE THE MORTGAGE;
60
special writ of certiorari.
IV
On 4 May 2004, PNB moved for the reconsideration thereon. On 8 July 2004,
the Court of Appeals rendered a Resolution, finding no justification to compel a WHETHER OR NOT [THE] RIGHT OF RJVRD AND RBN TO A WRIT
modification or reversal of the 31 March 2004 Decision. OF INJUNCTION IS CLEAR, EXISTING[,] AND UNMISTAKABLE; and
Hence, the instant Petition. V
The Issues WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD

LEGAL BASIS IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE ORDER
PNB recites the following statement of the issues, viz:
DATED JULY 28, 1999 AND OCTOBER 26, 1999 OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 66, AND THEREBY ISSUING A SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. – A preliminary
61
WRIT OF CERTIOARI IN FAVOR OF RJVRD AND RBN. injunction may be granted when it is established:
The Ruling of the Court (a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and
the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
The pivotal issue in the instant Petition is whether the Court of Appeals commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or
correctly reinstated the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 28 May 1999. in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a
Hence, the question is whether respondents RJVRD and RBN are entitled to the limited period or perpetually;
Writ of Preliminary Injunction. It is for this reason that we shall address and
concern ourselvesonly with the assailed writ, but not with the merits of the (b) That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of
case pending before the trial court. A preliminary injunction is merely a the act or acts complained of during the litigation would
62
provisional remedy, adjunct to the main case subject to the latter's outcome. It probably work injustice to the applicant; or
63
is not a cause of action in itself.
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening,
This Petition has no merit. or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done,
some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
Foremost, we reiterate that the sole object of a preliminary injunction is to applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding,
64
maintain the status quo until the merits can be heard. A preliminary and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
65
injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of
final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a Otherwise stated, for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to issue, the following
particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a requisites must be present, to wit: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable
party's substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the right that must be protected, and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the
67
principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a writ to prevent serious damage. Indubitably, this Court has likewise stressed
claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be avoided for that the very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in
otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as the party the existence of a cause of action and in the probability of irreparable injury,
66
applying for the writ is concerned. inadequacy of pecuniary compensation and the prevention of multiplicity of
68
suits. Sine dubio, the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a
The grounds for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction are prescribed pending case rests in the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the
in Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. Thus: case since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involve
69
findings of facts left to the said court for its conclusive determination. Hence, court a fair idea of whether a justification for the issuance of the writ exists, only
the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be a "sampling" of the evidence is needed, pending a decision on the merits of the
70 74
interfered with except when there is grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of case. Hence, the determination of respondents' default and the legality of the
discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious defenses they adduced are matters appropriately subject of the trial on the
and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or merits.
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty Second, there is an urgent and paramount necessity to prevent serious damage.
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in Indeed, an injunctive remedy may only be resorted to when there is a pressing
contemplation of law.
71 necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any
75
standard compensation. PNB assails the existence of this ground by raising the
We find the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals to be in accord with argument that there is, in actuality, a pecuniary standard by which RBN's
law. damage can be measured, as evidenced by the testimony of RBN's witness that it
will suffer a loss of P1.2 Billion for the next ten (10) years.
72
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. While this is perhaps one of our more
emphatic doctrines, it admits of certain exceptions, inter alia, when the findings To be sure, this court has declared that the term irreparable injury has a definite
73
of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court. In the case at meaning in law. It does not have reference to the amount of damages that may
bar, we apply the exception and proceed to make a determination of whether be caused but rather to the difficulty of measuring the damages inflicted. If full
there is a factual and legal bases for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to issue. compensation can be obtained by way of damages, equity will not apply the
76
remedy of injunction. The Court of Appeals declared that the evidence
First, respondents were able to establish a clear and unmistakable right to the adduced by respondents more than satisfies the legal and jurisprudential
possession of the subject collaterals. Evidently, as owner of the subject requirements of irreparable injury. It behooves this court to appreciate the
collaterals that stand to be extrajudicially foreclosed, respondents are entitled to unique character of the collaterals that stand to be affected should the Writ of
the possession and protection thereof. RBN as the owner and operator of the Preliminary Injunction be dissolved as PNB would have it. The direct and
subject radio equipment and radio stations have a clear right over them. The inevitable result would be the stoppage of the operations of respondents' radio
instant case does not involve abstract rights, or a future and contingent rights, stations, consequently, losing its listenership, and tarnishing the image that it
but a right that is already in existence. To our minds, petitioner's claim that has built over time. It does not stretch one's imagination to see that the cost of a
respondents have lost their rights to the subject collaterals in the face of their destroyed image is significantly the loss of its good name and reputation. As
admission of default is best threshed out in a full-blown trial a quo where the aptly appreciated by the appellate court, the value of a radio station's image and
merits of the case can be tried and determined. Significantly, to give the trial reputation are not quantifiable in terms of monetary value. This conclusion can
be gleaned from the testimony of respondents' witness, Jose E. Escaner, Jr., Atty. Mendoza:
General Manager of RBN, thus:
Q: What radio station are you referring to?
Atty. Mendoza:
Witness:
Q: Now, in your forty (40) years in the broadcast (sic) industry, have
you had any personal experience in (sic) any actual interruption in the A: DYRB.
operations of a radio station programming?

Atty. Mendoza:
Witness:
Q: What would be the consequence if the radio stations of RBN stops
A: Yes, when I was handling the network of the then Ambassador (sic) operation (sic)?
Nanding Cojuanco within which the radio stations were sequestered

Witness:
and sometime or the other it (sic) went off the air and immediately, we
do not have any revenues, so much so that we actually suffered two (2)
A: It will lose whatever image it has generated to this point and (sic)
to three (3) years.
time, it will cost irreparable damage not only to its operation but most
of all (sic) its image as being built by RNB. Rajah Broadcasting Network
Atty. Mendoza:
and I doubt very much if it will still be able to recoup to a very good
Q: And how long did it take for that station in Cebu that you mentioned result, what we are now generating.
to retain its listenership day? (sic)

Atty. Mendoza:
Witness:
That is all for the witness, Your Honor.
A: Well, honestly, until now its airtime, because of its image, status
COURT:
image (sic) which is the reputation of an AM Station while they are still
recouping other stations, the other reports came over (sic) and
Alright (sic), cross.
practically brought their ratings down, so, until now they still have to
recoup. Atty. dela Vega:
With the permission of the Honorable Court. will cost damage and (sic) our image immediately. That will cost
damage to our contracts right now without keeping with our clients.
xxxx
Atty. dela Vega:
Atty. dela Vega:
Q: Usually that person who owns that particular equipment will get the
Q: Based from (sic) your experienced (sic) as the person engaged in particular equipment. When you say get, what do you mean by get Mr.
media practice Mr. Witness, with respect to the possession, let us go to Witness?
the heart of the matter as of this point and time.
Witness:
COURT:
A: If for instance was what we are talking about right now, you are
You shoot the question straight. going to foreclose, ok, (sic), what will we use?
Atty. dela Vega: Atty. dela Vega:
Yes, Your Honor. Q: Assuming Mr. Witness, that the creditor of Rajah Broadcasting
Network will not get, will not get the equipment, will not get their
(continuing to (sic) the witness
account, will it adversely affect the operations of Rajah Broadcating?
Q Will it made a difference to the operations of a radio station and

Witness:
relation with the listeners and their clients if technical equipments, in
(sic) the technical equipments, the ownership over the sale are A: Still it will.
transferred to another person?
Atty. dela vega:
Witness:
Q: In what way?
A: If you take the equipment immediately that would mean stopping
our operations. That would mean stopping our day to day Witness:
communication with our listenership. That they will be wondering, that
A: Because that will have an effect now on our relation with our 56119, reversing and setting aside the 28 July 1999 and 26 October 1999 Orders of
clientele. The image will be doubt (sic). The will be doubt, there be the RTC, Branch 66 of Makati City in Civil Case No. 99-452, and reinstating the
vacillation in the planning of the media plans, vacillation in the buying Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on 28 May 1999 are AFFIRMED. Costs
of airtime. against petitioners.
Atty. dela Vega: SO ORDERED.
Q It will affect? Footnotes:

40
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides, to wit:
Witness: "Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
A: It will affect. The confidence is there.
faith."
50
The properties covered by Exhibits A to L are listed in the 27 May 1999 Order
Atty. dela Vega:
of the RTC, to wit:
Q: It will affect? [P]roperty covered by broadcasting equipment inventory located at No.
33 Dominical Hills, Baguio City (Exh. A); the property covered by
Witness: broadcasting equipment inventory located at Morgagor's Transmitter
House in Sitio Halang, Barangay San Roque, Antipolo, Rizal (Exh. B);
77
A: We do not want our clientele to lose confidence.
the property covered by broadcasting equipment inventory located at
Mortgagor's DZRJ station in 7849 Makati Avenue, corner Gen. Luna
Evidently, there exists in the case at bar a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
Street, Makati City (Exh. C); all to be conducted on May 10, 1999 at 10:00
consequences to respondents which cannot be remedied under any standard
o'clock in the morning at the City Hall Baguio City, City Hall-Antipolo
compensation. After a careful scrutiny of the attendant circumstances, we do
City, City Hall-Makati City, respectively.
not find herein a reason for reversing the reinstatement by the Court of Appeals
xxxx
of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction earlier issued.
"Broadcasting Equipment Inventory located at DYRJ-FM Station, 10th
The Fallo Floor, Centerpoint Hotel, Plaridel Street, corner Osmeña Blvd., Cebu
City" (Exh. D);
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 31 March 2004 and
the Resolution dated 8 July 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
"Broadcasting Equipment Inventory located at DXDJ-FM Station, Rm. SEC. 6. Grounds for objection to, or for motion of dissolution of,
310 A, B & C Banco Davao Building, San Pedro Street, Davao City" (Exh. injunction or restraining order. – The application for injunction or
E); restraining order may be denied, upon a showing of its insufficiency.
"Broadcasting Equipment Inventory located at DXRJ-FM Station, The injunction or restraining order may also be denied, or, if granted,
Carmen Hills, Pryce Plaza, Cagayan de Oro City" (Exh. F); may be dissolved on other grounds upon affidavits of the party or
"Broadcasting Equipment Inventory located at DYNJ-FM Station, TRB person enjoined, which may be opposed by the applicant also by
Building, J.M Basa Street, Iloilo City" (Exh. G); affidavits. It may further be denied, or, if granted, may be dissolved, if it
"Broadcasting Equipment Inventory located at the Mortgagor's appears after hearing that although the applicant is entitled to the
Novaliches AM Station" (Exh. H); injunction or restraining order, the issuance or continuance thereof, as
"Broadcasting Equipment Inventory located at the Mortgagor's the case may be, would cause irreparable damage to the party or person
transmitter house in Sitio Halang, Brgy. San Roque, Antipolo, Rizal, enjoined while the applicant can be fully compensated for such
Cagayan de Oro" (Exh. I); damages as he may suffer, and the former files a bond in an amount
"Broadcasting Equipment Inventory located at the Mortgagor's station fixed by the court conditioned that he will pay all damages which the
in La Villa, Theresa Pension, Tuguegarao, Cagayan Valley" (Exh. J); applicant may suffer by the denial or the dissolution of the injunction or
"Broadcasting Equipment Inventory located at the Mortgagor's DZRJ restraining order. It if appears that the extent of the preliminary
station in 7849 Makati Avenue corner Gen. Luna Street, Makati City" injunction or restraining order granted is too great, it may be modified.
64
(Exh. K); "Status quo" to be preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last actual,
"Broadcasting Equipment Inventory located at DYFJ-FM Station, Rm. 5, peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy. See
3rh (sic) Floor Arremar Building, P. Hernandez Street, corner Margarita Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., p. 1410, citing Edgewater Constr. Co., Inc. v.
Street, Bacolod City" (Exh. L); id. at 234-235. Percy Wilson Mortg. & Finance Corp., 2 Ill.Dec. 864, 357 N.E.2d 1307, 1314;
55
The provision, reads, viz: Knecht v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56122, 18 November 1993, 228 SCRA 1, 6,
4.03 – Cross-Default – Any default by RJ Ventures Realty and citing Rodulfa v. Alfonso, 76 Phil. 225 (1946); Philippine Economic Zone
Development Corporation [and] First Women's Credit Corporation Authority v. Vianzon, 391 Phil. 186, 193 (2000).
65
under the forms and condition of the various documents evidencing There are generally two kinds of preliminary injunction: (1) a prohibitory
these loan/credit accommodations with the Bank shall likewise injunction which commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act; and
constitute an event of default under this agreement. (2) a mandatory injunction which commands the performance of some positive
56
Id. at 237. act to correct a wrong in the past. See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Clinton Apparelle,
57
Section 6, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court reads: Inc., G.R. No. 138900, 20 September 2005, 470 SCRA 236, 252.
72
Mamsar Enterprises Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Varley Trading, Inc., G.R.
No. 142729, 29 November 2005, 476 SCRA. 378, 382, citing cases.
73
In Mamsar, the Court enumerated the following exceptions: (1) when the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjecture; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) where there
is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case and the same
is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) the findings of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings of fact are conclusions without specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well [as] in the petitioners'
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the finding
of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and is contradicted by the evidence on record."
“WHEREFORE, the order dated May 21, 1998 and June 26, 1998 of the court a
quo are SET ASIDE and the petition is hereby GRANTED. FGRDC is hereby
STATUS QUO ANTE
enjoined from taking possession of the subject property until Civil Case No. 97-
2678, which is pending before the court a quo has been heard and finally
First Global Realty & Development Corp. v. Agustin [5]
resolved.”
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 144499. February 19, 2002] The Facts
FIRST GLOBAL REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. CHRISTOPHER SAN AGUSTIN, respondent.
The undisputed facts of the case are summarized by the Court of Appeals
in this wise:
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.: “The subject matter of the instant controversy is a parcel of land, including the
house built thereon, located at No. 3491 Honda St., Bo.
A writ of preliminary injunction is issued pendente lite to preserve the Pinagkaisahan, Makati City (‘subject property’). The subject property was
status quo. To be entitled to one, the applicant must show a prima facie right to previously covered by TCT No. 180235, dated January 27, 1967, which was issued
the relief demanded in the complaint. In the present case, the applicant has in the name of [herein respondent’s] mother, Lilian Sales-San Agustin.
sufficiently demonstrated that, indeed, he has such right and that grave and [Respondent], together with his parents, brothers and sisters have been in
irreparable injury would befall him and his family, unless the injunctive relief is possession of the subject property since 1967 up to the present.
granted while the main case pends in the trial court.
xxx xxx
xxx
Statement of the Case
“The conflict leading to the instant petition began when the subject property
[1]
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules was sold to spouses Enrique and Angelina Camacho (spouses Camacho) in 1994
[2]
of Court, challenging the April 28, 2000 Decision of the Court of for the amount of P2.5 million pesos, ‘net of capital gains tax, documentary
[3]
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 49083 and the August 10, 2000 CA stamp tax, transfer taxes and the remaining balance of the petitioner’s loan with
[4]
Resolution denying reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed DBP.
Decision reads as follows:

“The records show that spouses Camacho succeeded in convincing petitioner to Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati City (Branch 143), and docketed as Civil
accept a partial payment of P100,000.00 pesos upon the execution of a deed of Case No. 95-697.
absolute sale in their favor over the subject property. The balance of P2.4 million
pesos would be paid once the title over the same was transferred in the name of “On June 28, 1996, Branch 143 rendered a decision ordering the foreclosure of
spouses Camacho. The latter agreement came about because spouses Camacho the subject property and the subsequent sale thereof at public auction. Spouses
would use the subject property to raise the amount of P2.4 million pesos, that is Camacho did not file a motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
to say, they would secure a loan from a bank or financial institution with the Consequently, FGRDC filed a motion for execution which was granted
subject property as collateral. on February 7, 1997.
“On May 24, 1994, DBP released the subject property to petitioner upon full “The sale of the subject property at public auction was, nevertheless, thrust
payment of the latter’s outstanding loan. Thereafter, [respondent] executed a aside in view of the dacion en pago which spouses Camacho executed in favor of
deed of sale in favor of spouses Camacho, who in turn paid respondent] the FGRDC. On April 29, 1997, the dacion en pago was registered before the
amount of P100,000.00 pesos. On May 26, 1994, TCT No. 194868 was issued in Register of Deeds of Makati City, which paved the way for the issuance of TCT
the name spouses Camacho. No. 209050 in the name of FGRDC.
“It appeared that First Global Realty Development Corporation (FGRDC), “Accordingly, on September 8, 1997, FGRDC demanded rentals from
[herein petitioner], granted spouses Camacho’s loan application with the subject [respondent], specifically [from] his mother, for the latter’s use of the subject
property as collateral, in the amount of P1.190 million. However, despite receipt property. When FGRDC’s demand was unheeded by [respondent], it filed a
of the loan and petitioner’s demand to pay the balance of the purchase price of motion for issuance of a writ of possession before Branch 143.
the subject property, spouses Camacho did not pay the same.
“Apparently, on November 20, 1997, [respondent] filed a motion for intervention
“Sensing that [respondent’s] demand to pay fell on deaf ears, he filed a criminal before Branch 143, wherein he asked for the rescission of the deed of absolute
complaint for estafa against spouses Camacho. Unfortunately, the case did not sale/mortgage, dacion en pago and cancellation of FGRDC’s title over the subject
prosper because the spouses Camacho could not be located for the proper property.
service of the warrant of arrest.

“However, finding the motion for intervention to be a futile undertaking,
“In the ensuing period, [respondent] discovered that FGRDC filed a special civil [respondent] filed a separate complaint for ‘rescission of the deed of absolute
action for the foreclosure of the subject property inasmuch as spouses Camacho sale, annulment of the dacion en pago and cancellation of title and issuance of a
defaulted in the payment of their loan obligation. The case was assigned to the new title with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a
writ of injunction’ against FGRDC, seeking to enjoin the latter from taking respondent and the Camachos. Moreover, the fact that the property remained in
possession of the subject property. The case was raffled to Branch 141 (court a the possession of respondent’s mother at the time the couple sold it to
quo), where public respondent is the presiding judge, and docketed as Civil Case petitioner should have warned it of a defect in its claims.
No. 97-2673. [8]
Aggrieved by the CA Decision, petitioner lodged the present recourse.
“On May 21, 1998, the court a quo issued an order denying [respondent’s] prayer
for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner filed a motion for Issues
reconsideration but [it] was denied in an order dated June 26, 1998 for lack of
[6]
merit.”
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for our
consideration:
Order of the Trial Court

“1. Whether or not the factual findings of the Honorable Court of Appeals
upon which it issued the April 28, 2000 Decision and the August 10, 2000
[7]
In its Order dated May 21, 1998, the RTC denied the application of
Resolution are devoid of support by the evidence or the same are based on a
respondent for a preliminary injunction to prevent petitioner from evicting him
misapprehension of facts; and
from the subject property. The trial court held that under the facts alleged in the
Complaint, respondent had sold the property to the Camacho spouses 2. Whether or not petitioner is a purchaser in good faith and for value;
for P2,500,000. The spouses initially gave him P100,000, with the balance to be hence, entitled to the possession of the litigated property.”
[9]
paid after they would have secured a loan using the property as collateral. The
lower court added that cause of action of respondent was to demand payment of The foregoing points really boil down to the gut issue of whether
the balance from the Camachos. The former’s Motion for Reconsideration of the respondent is entitled to the possession of the property while the main case for
Order was denied by the RTC in its June 26, 1998 Order. rescission is pending in the RTC.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court’s Ruling
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC and granted the injunctive relief The Petition has no merit.
prayed for by respondent. It held that petitioner should not be given possession
of the property pendente lite, because it knew of the agreement between
Principal Issue: A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to
Possession Pendente Lite in order to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the pendency
of an action. It is issued to preserve the status quo ante -- the last actual,
Petitioner seeks to dispossess respondent of the subject property on the peaceful, and uncontested status that preceded the actual
[10]
strength of a dacion en pago executed in its favor by the Camacho spouses who, controversy. In Saulog v. CA, the Supreme Court ruled thus:
in turn, had purportedly bought it from herein respondent.

“A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to
Respondent, on the other hand, claims that petitioner failed to show a clear final judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. It may be
right to possess it. To dispossess him pendente lite would be clearly unjust. We granted at any time after the commencement of the action and before final
agree. judgment, when it is established that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief
Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court enumerates various grounds for demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
the issuance of a preliminary injunction, as follows: commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of
an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; that the commission or
“SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary continuance of some act complained of during the litigation or the non-
injunction may be granted when it is established: performance thereof would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or that the
defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be
“(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights respecting the
relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a
limited period or perpetually; “A preliminary injunction, as the term itself suggests, is merely temporary,
subject to the final disposition of the principal action and its purpose is to
“(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts preserve the status quo of the things subject of the action and/or the relation
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the between the parties, in order to protect the right of the plaintiff respecting the
applicant; or subject of the action during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise or if no
preliminary injunction were issued, the defendant may, before final judgment,
“(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening or is attempting
do or continue the doing of the act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain,
to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in
and thus make ineffectual the final judgment rendered afterwards granting the
violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or
relief sought by the plaintiff. Its issuance rests entirely within the discretion of
proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.”
the court taking cognizance of the case and is generally not interfered with Respondent’s Complaint in the trial court seeks the following: the
[11]
except in cases of manifest abuse.” rescission of the Deed of Absolute Sale between himself and the Camacho
spouses, the annulment of the dacion en pagoexecuted by the latter in favor of
Likewise, in Paramount Insurance v. CA, this Court held that “[i]njunction petitioner, and the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of title to it as well as
is an extraordinary remedy calculated to preserve the status quo of things and to the issuance of a new one in favor of respondent.
prevent actual or threatened acts violative of the rules of equity and good
The factual findings of both the trial and the appellate courts show that
conscience as would consequently afford an injured party a cause of action
respondent intended to sell the subject property to the Camacho spouses for the
resulting from the failure of the law to provide for an adequate or complete
sum of P2,500,000. The couple initially paid P100,000, with the agreement that
relief x x x. Its sole purpose is not to correct a wrong of the past, in the sense of
[12] the balance would be paid when they would have secured a loan using the
redress for injury already sustained, but to prevent further injury.”
subject property as collateral. To facilitate their procurement of a loan, the title
The purpose of a preliminary injunction, then, is “to prevent threatened or to the property was transferred to them.
continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be
Using the subject property as collateral, the Camachos were able to obtain
thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo
[13] a loan of P1,190,000 from petitioner. Upon the former’s failure to pay the loan,
until the merits of the case can be heard fully.” Thus, it will be issued only
the latter sought to foreclose the mortgage over it. However, before the property
upon a showing of a clear and unmistakable right that is violated. Moreover, an
could be foreclosed, petitioner and the couple allegedly agreed on a dacion en
urgent and permanent necessity for its issuance must be shown by the
[14] pago, in which the latter ceded ownership of the property in favor of the former
applicant.
in consideration of the payment of the loan. Respondent contends that when
In the present case, the status quo that is sought to be preserved is the petitioner conducted an on-site investigation of the property in connection with
possession of the property by respondent and his right to use it as his dwelling, the couple’s application for a loan, the latter learned that the former was living
pending determination of whether or not he had indeed sold it to the Camachos in the subject premises and was thus in actual possession of it. The CA found, in
and, consequently, whether the latter’s transfer of its ownership to petitioner fact, that petitioner was aware that respondent -- the previous owner --
via dacion en pago should be upheld. remained an unpaid seller.
Moreover, respondent argues that the dacion en pago is riddled with a

Prima Facie number of irregularities. He maintains that the Camachos executed it way back
Right to Possess in 1994 when they were still applying for a loan, not immediately prior to the
supposed foreclosure in 1997. At the same time, they also executed a promissory
note and mortgage for the same amount. As respondent points out, adacion en
pago that cedes property in favor of the creditor is not compatible with a and during the institution of the Complaint. He and his family have long owned,
mortgage wherein property is foreclosed in case of failure to pay the principal possessed and occupied it as their family home since 1967. To dispossess him of
loan. it now would definitely alter the status quo to their detriment.
Indeed, the records show that the dacion en pago signed in 1994 was
registered only in 1997. It was executed in lieu of the foreclosure of the property Ineffectual Judgment
when the Camachos failed to pay their loan obligations. The amount stated in
the dacion as consideration was the P1,190,000 loan that they had obtained from
By selling their family home to the Camachos for P2,500,000, the
petitioner. It is therefore strange that the couple would buy a parcel of land
respondent hoped to improve the plight of his family. By a strange turn of
for P2,500,000, obtain a loan to help finance payment for the same, and finally
events, he will now find himself homeless with only the sum of P100,000 to
cede the same property for an amount much lower than that for which they
purchase a new dwelling for himself and his relatives. Indeed, justice and equity
purchased it. Moreover, by executing adacion, the sellers effectively waived the
dictate that he should remain in possession of the property pendente lite.
redemption period normally given a mortgagor.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
In sum, we hold that respondent was able to show a prima facie right to the
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
relief demanded in his Complaint. The Camachos’ nonpayment of the purchase
price agreed upon and the irregularities surrounding the dacion en pago are SO ORDERED.
serious enough to allow him to possess the property pendente lite.
Grave Injustice in a
Transfer of Possession
In addition, respondent has shown that to allow petitioner to take

immediate possession of the property would result in grave injustice. As we have
stated above, the ownership of the property, the validity of the sale between
respondent and the Camachos and the legitimacy of the dacion en
pago executed by the latter in favor of petitioner are still subject to
determination in the court below. Furthermore, there is no question that
respondent has been in possession of the premises during all this time -- prior to
On December 22, 1998, then Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr.

3
issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 27, Series of 1998, outlining the
SECTION 1
guidelines and procedures on the accreditation of government suppliers for
pharmaceutical products.
DOH, et. al v. Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc.
4
A.O. No. 27 was later amended by A.O. No. 10, Series of 2000, providing for
SECOND DIVISION
additional guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at ensuring that
only qualified bidders can transact business with petitioner Department of
G.R. No. 169304 March 13, 2007
Health (DOH). Part V of A.O. No. 10 reads, in part:
THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, SECRETARY MANUEL M. DAYRIT, USEC.

1. Drug Manufacturer, Drug Trader and Drug Importer shall be allowed
MA. MARGARITA GALON and USEC. ANTONIO M. LOPEZ, Petitioners,
to apply for accreditation.
vs.
PHIL. PHARMAWEALTH, INC., Respondent.
2. Accreditation shall be done by the Central Office-Department of
Health.
DECISION
3. A separate accreditation is required for the drug suppliers and for

CARPIO MORALES, J.:
their specific products.
Assailed via petition for review are issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
1 xxxx
SP No. 84457, to wit: a) Decision dated May 12, 2005 which affirmed the order
issued by Judge Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
12. Only products accredited by the Committee shall be allowed to be
Branch 264 denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 68208; and b)
procured by the DOH and all otherentities under its
2
Resolution dated August 9, 2005 which denied petitioners’ motion for 5
jurisdiction. (Underscoring supplied)
reconsideration.
6 7
On May 9, 2000 and May 29, 2000, respondent submitted to petitioner DOH a
Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. (respondent) is a domestic corporation engaged in the
request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited drug
business of manufacturing and supplying pharmaceutical products to
products, including the antibiotic "Penicillin G Benzathine." Based on the
government hospitals in the Philippines.
schedule provided by petitioner DOH, it appears that processing of and release
12
of the result of respondent’s request were due on September 2000, the last In their Comment, petitioner DOH, Secretary Alberto Romualdez, Jr. who was
8
month of the quarter following the date of its filing. later succeeded by petitioner Secretary Manuel M. Dayrit, and individual
petitioners Undersecretaries Margarita Galon and Antonio Lopez argued for the
Sometime in September 2000, petitioner DOH, through petitioner Antonio M. dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit in view of the express reservation
Lopez, chairperson of the pre-qualifications, bids and awards committee, issued made by petitioner DOH to accept or reject any or all bids without incurring
9
an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin liability to the bidders, they positing that government agencies have such full
G Benzathine (Penicillin G Benzathine contract). discretion.
Despite the lack of response from petitioner DOH regarding respondent’s 13

Petitioners subsequently filed a Manifestation and Motion (motion to dismiss)
request for inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products, praying for the outright dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of
respondent submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract. When the state immunity. Additionally, they alleged that respondent’s representative was
bids were opened on October 11, 2000, only two companies participated, with not duly authorized by its board of directors to file the complaint.
respondent submitting the lower bid at P82.24 per unit, compared to
Cathay/YSS Laboratories’ (YSS) bid of P95.00 per unit. In view, however, of the To petitioners’ motion to dismiss, respondent filed its
14
non-accreditation of respondent’s Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract comment/opposition contending, in the main, that the doctrine of state
was awarded to YSS. immunity is not applicable considering that individual petitioners are being
sued both in their official and personal capacities, hence, they, not the state,
10
Respondent thus filed a complaint for injunction, mandamus and damages would be liable for damages.
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
15
temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City praying, By Order of December 8, 2003, the trial court denied petitioners’ motion to
inter alia, that the trial court "nullify the award of the Penicillin G Benzathine dismiss.
contract (IFB No. 2000-10-11 [14]) to YSS Laboratories, Inc. and direct defendant
16
DOH, defendant Romualdez, defendant Galon and defendant Lopez to declare Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed a
17
plaintiff Pharmawealth as petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, before which they maintained
that the suit is against the state.
the lowest complying responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract, and that
18
they accordingly award the same to plaintiff company" and "adjudge defendants By the assailed Decision of May 12, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
Romualdez, Galon and Lopez liable, jointly and severally to plaintiff, for [the court’s Order. And by Resolution of August 9, 2005, it denied petitioners’
therein specified damages]."

11 motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition for review which raises the sole issue of whether the state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to
24
Court of Appeals erred in upholding the denial of petitioners’ motion to dismiss. impose a charge or financial liability against the State.
The petition fails. As regards individual petitioners’ suability for damages, the following discussion
on the applicability of the defense of state immunity from suit is relevant.
The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned
was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now embodied in
done in the performance of official functions will result in a charge or financial Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted
liability against the government. In the first case, the Constitution itself assures principles of international law, which we have now adopted as part of the law of
19 25
the availability of judicial review, and it is the official concerned who should be the land.
20
impleaded as the proper party.
While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the
In its complaint, respondent sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials
against petitioners in their official capacity. Since judicial review of acts alleged of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
26
to have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion is guaranteed by the duties. The suit is regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the
Constitution, it necessarily follows that it is the official concerned who should judgment against the officials will require the state itself to perform a positive
21
be impleaded as defendant or respondent in an appropriate suit. act, such as the appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages
27
awarded against them.
Moreover, part of the reliefs prayed for by respondent is the enjoinment of the
implementation, as well as the nullification of the award to YSS, the grant of The rule, however, is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all
28
which may not be enforced against individual petitioners and their successors circumstances. Shauf v. Court of Appeals elucidates:
22
except in their official capacities as officials of the DOH.
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his
As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff.
despite its being an unincorporated agency of the government, for the only As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of
29
causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus. Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al., ‘ Inasmuch as the State
23
Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government
directed against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or
officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the
protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of personal capacity does not automatically remove the same from the protection
immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an of the doctrine of state immunity. Neither, upon the other hand, does the mere
action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State invocation of official character suffice to insulate such official from suability and
department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates liability for an act committed without or in excess of his or her
33
or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an authority. These are matters of evidence which should be presented and
unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not proven at the trial.
have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the
State may not be sued without its consent.’ The rationale for this ruling is that WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated May 12,
the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating 2005 and Resolution dated August 9, 2005 issued by the Court of Appeals are
an injustice. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)1avvphi1 AFFIRMED.
Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official SO ORDERED.
capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of
others. Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in
his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of
30
may have been committed while he occupied a public position.
In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for
damages in connection with their alleged act of "illegal[ly] abus[ing] their
official positions to make sure that plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be
awarded the Benzathine contract [which act was] done in bad faith and with full
31
knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers given by law" is
permissible, in consonance with the foregoing principles. For an officer who
exceeds the power conferred on him by law cannot hide behind the plea of
32
sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally.
It bears stressing, however, that the statements in the immediately foregoing

paragraph in no way reflect a ruling on the actual liability of petitioners to
respondent. The mere allegation that a government official is being sued in his
8
of Quezon City, Branch 90. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
98-34252, entitled "Levi Strauss & Co. and Levi Strauss (Phils.), Inc. v. Clinton
Levi Strauss& Co., v. Clinton Apparelle
Aparelle, Inc. and/or Olympian Garments, Inc."
SECOND DIVISION
The Complaint alleged that LS & Co., a foreign corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, U.S.A., and engaged in the
G.R. No. 138900 September 20, 2005
apparel business, is the owner by prior adoption and use since 1986 of the
LEVI STRAUSS & CO., & LEVI STRAUSS (PHILS.), INC., Petitioners, internationally famous "Dockers and Design" trademark. This ownership is
vs. evidenced by its valid and existing registrations in various member countries of
CLINTON APPARELLE, INC., Respondent. the Paris Convention. In the Philippines, it has a Certificate of Registration No.
46619 in the Principal Register for use of said trademark on pants, shirts,
DECISION blouses, skirts, shorts, sweatshirts and jackets under Class 25.
9
Tinga, J.: The "Dockers and Design" trademark was first used in the Philippines in or
about May 1988, by LSPI, a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture,
1
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
sale and distribution of various products bearing trademarks owned by LS & Co.
Civil Procedure filed by Levi Strauss & Co. (LS & Co.) and Levi Strauss
To date, LSPI continues to manufacture and sell Dockers Pants with the
(Philippines), Inc. (LSPI) assailing the Court of 10
"Dockers and Design" trademark.
2 3
Appeals’ Decision and Resolution respectively dated 21 December 1998 and 10
May 1999. The questioned Decision granted respondent’s prayer for a writ of LS & Co. and LSPI further alleged that they discovered the presence in the local
4
preliminary injunction in its Petition and set aside the trial court’s orders dated market of jeans under the brand name "Paddocks" using a device which is
5 6
15 May 1998 and 4 June 1998 which respectively granted petitioners’ prayer for substantially, if not exactly, similar to the "Dockers and Design" trademark
the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and application for the owned by and registered in the name of LS & Co., without its consent. Based on
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. their information and belief, they added, Clinton Apparelle manufactured and
continues to manufacture such "Paddocks" jeans and other apparel.
7
This case stemmed from the Complaint for Trademark Infringement, Injunction
and Damages filed by petitioners LS & Co. and LSPI against respondent Clinton However, since LS & Co. and LSPI are unsure if both, or just one of impleaded
*
Apparelle, Inc. (Clinton Aparelle) together with an alternative defendant, defendants are behind the manufacture and sale of the "Paddocks" jeans
Olympian Garments, Inc. (Olympian Garments), before the Regional Trial Court
11
complained of, they brought this suit under Section 13, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules Acting on the prayer for the issuance of a TRO, the trial court issued
12 14
of Civil Procedure. an Order setting it for hearing on 5 May 1998. On said date, as respondent
failed to appear despite notice and the other defendant, Olympian Garments,
The Complaint contained a prayer that reads as follows: had yet to be notified, the hearing was re-scheduled on 14 May 1998.
15
1. That upon the filing of this complaint, a temporary restraining order be On 14 May 1998, neither Clinton Apparelle nor Olympian Garments appeared.
immediately issued restraining defendants, their officers, employees, agents, Clinton Apparelle claimed that it was not notified of such hearing. Only
representatives, dealers, retailers or assigns from committing the acts herein Olympian Garments allegedly had been issued with summons. Despite the
complained of, and, specifically, for the defendants, their officers, employees, absence of the defendants, the hearing on the application for the issuance of a
agents, representatives, dealers and retailers or assigns, to cease and desist from TRO continued.
16
manufacturing, distributing, selling, offering for sale, advertising, or otherwise

17
using denims, jeans or pants with the design herein complained of as The following day, the trial court issued an Order granting the TRO applied for,
substantially, if not exactly similar, to plaintiffs’ "Dockers and Design" the pertinent portions of which state:
trademark.
…Considering the absence of counsel/s for the defendant/s during the summary
2. That after notice and hearing, and pending trial on the merits, a writ of hearing scheduled on May 5, 1998 and also during the re-scheduled summary
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining defendants, their officers, employees, hearing held on May 14, 1998 set for the purpose of determining whether or not
agents, dealers, retailers, or assigns from manufacturing, distributing, selling, a Temporary Restraining Order shall be issued, this Court allowed the counsel
offering for sale, advertising, jeans the design herein complained of as for the plaintiffs to present on May 14, 1998 their arguments/evidences in
substantially, if not exactly similar, to plaintiffs’ "Dockers and Design" support of their application. After hearing the arguments presented by the
trademark. counsel for the plaintiffs during the summary hearing, this Court is of the
considered and humble view that grave injustice and irreparable injury to the
3. That after trial on the merits, judgment be rendered as follows: plaintiffs would arise before the matter of whether or not the application for the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction can be heard, and that, in the
a. Affirming and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction;
interest of justice, and in the meantime, a Temporary Restraining Order be
issued.
b. Ordering that all infringing jeans in the possession of either or both
defendants as the evidence may warrant, their officers, employees, agents,
WHEREFORE, let this Temporary Restraining Order be issued restraining the
retailers, dealers or assigns, be delivered to the Honorable Court of plaintiffs,
13
defendants, their officers, employees, agents, representatives, dealers, retailers
and be accordingly destroyed;
or assigns from committing the acts complained of in the verified Complaint, for and this Court is of the considered belief and humble view that, without
and specifically, for the defendants, their officers, employees, agents, necessarily delving on the merits, the paramount interest of justice will be better
representatives, dealers and retailers or assigns, to cease and desist from served if the status quo shall be maintained and that an injunction bond
manufacturing, distributing, selling, offering for sale, advertising or otherwise of P2,500,000.00 appears to be in order. (see Sections 3 and 4, Rule 58, 1997
using denims, jeans or pants with the design complained of in the verified Rules of Civil Procedure)
Complaint as substantially, if not exactly similar, to plaintiffs’ "Dockers and
Design" trademark; until after the application/prayer for the issuance of a Writ IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the plaintiffs’ prayer for the issuance of a writ
of Preliminary Injunction is heard/resolved, or until further orders from this of preliminary injunction is GRANTED. Accordingly, upon the plaintiffs’ filing,
Court. within ten (10) days from their receipt hereof, an injunction bond
of P2,500,000.00 executed to the defendants to the effect that the plaintiffs will
The hearing on the application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary pay all damages the defendants may sustain by reason of this injunction in case
Injunction as embodied in the verified Complaint is set on May 26, 1998 the Court should finally decide that the plaintiffs are not entitled thereto, let a
(Tuesday) at 2:00 P.M. which setting is intransferable in character considering writ of preliminary injunction issue enjoining or restraining the commission of
that the lifetime of this Temporary Restraining Order is twenty (20) days from the acts complained of in the verified Complaint in this case, and specifically, for
18
date hereof. the defendants, their officers, employees, agents, representatives, dealers and
retailers or assigns or persons acting in their behalf to cease and desist from
19
On 4 June 1998, the trial court issued another Order granting the writ of manufacturing, distributing, selling, offering for sale, advertising, or otherwise
preliminary injunction, to wit: using, denims, jeans or pants with the design complained of in the verified
Complaint in this case, which is substantially, if not exactly, similar to plaintiffs’
ORDER
"DOCKERS and DESIGN" trademark or logo as covered by the Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer Certificate of Registration No.
This resolves the plaintiffs’ application or prayer for the issuance of a writ of
46619, until after this case shall have been decided on the merits and/or until
preliminary injunction as embodied in the verified complaint in this case.
20
further orders from this Court.
Parenthetically, this Court earlier issued a temporary restraining order.
(seeOrder dated May 15, 1998; see also Order dated May 26, 1998)
The evidence considered by the trial court in granting injunctive relief were as
follows: (1) a certified true copy of the certificate of trademark registration for
After a careful perusal of the contents of the pleadings and documents on record
"Dockers and Design"; (2) a pair of DOCKERS pants bearing the "Dockers and
insofar as they are pertinent to the issue under consideration, this Court finds
Design" trademark; (3) a pair of "Paddocks" pants bearing respondent’s assailed
that at this point in time, the plaintiffs appear to be entitled to the relief prayed
logo; (4) the Trends MBL Survey Report purportedly proving that there was
confusing similarity between two marks; (5) the affidavit of one Bernabe Alajar On the second motion, the arguments raised in the plaintiffs’ aforecited
which recounted petitioners’ prior adoption, use and registration of the Consolidated Opposition likewise appear to be impressed with merit. Besides,
"Dockers and Design" trademark; and (6) the affidavit of one Mercedes Abad of there appears to be no strong and cogent reason to reconsider and set aside this
Trends MBL, Inc. which detailed the methodology and procedure used in their Court’s Order dated June 4, 1998 as it has been shown so far that the trademark
21
survey and the results thereof. or logo of defendants is substantially, if not exactly, similar to plaintiffs’
"DOCKERS and DESIGN" trademark or logo as covered by BPTTT Certificate of
22
Clinton Apparelle thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion for Registration No. 46619 even as the BPTTT Certificate of Registration No. 49579
23
Reconsideration of the Order granting the writ of preliminary injunction. of Clinton Apparelle, Inc. is only for the mark or word "PADDOCKS" (see
24
Meantime, the trial court issued an Order approving the bond filed by Records, p. 377) In any event, this Court had issued an Order dated June 18, 1998
petitioners. for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction after the plaintiffs filed the
25
required bond of P2,500,000.00.
On 22 June 1998, the trial court required the parties to file their "respective
citation of authorities/ jurisprudence/Supreme Court decisions" on whether or IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the aforecited Motion To Dismiss and Motion
not the trial court may issue the writ of preliminary injunction pending the For Reconsideration are both DENIED for lack of merit, and accordingly, this
resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration and the Motion to Dismiss filed by Court’s Order dated June 18, 1998 for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
respondent. injunction is REITERATED so the writ of preliminary injunction could be
implemented unless the implementation thereof is restrained by the Honorable
On 2 October 1998, the trial court denied Clinton Apparelle’s Motion to
26
Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.
Dismiss and Motion for Reconsiderationin an Omnibus Order, the pertinent
portions of which provide: The writ of preliminary injunction was thereafter issued on 8 October 1998.
27
After carefully going over the contents of the pleadings in relation to pertinent Thus, Clinton Apparelle filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
28
portions of the records, this Court is of the considered and humble view that: certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, assailing the
On the first motion, the arguments raised in the plaintiffs’ aforecited
orders of the trial court dated 15 May 1998, 4 June 1998 and 2 October 1998.
Consolidated Opposition appears to be meritorious. Be that as it may, this Court
would like to emphasize, among other things, that the complaint states a cause 29
On 20 October 1998, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution requiring herein
of action as provided under paragraphs 1 to 18 thereof. petitioners to file their comment on the Petition and at the same time issued the
prayed-for temporary restraining order.
The appellate court rendered on 21 December 1998 its now the sufficiency of evidence are not to be resolved in such a petition; (2) in
assailed Decision granting Clinton Apparelle’s petition. The Court of Appeals holding that there was no confusion between the two marks; (3) in ruling that
held that the trial court did not follow the procedure required by law for the the erosion of petitioners’ trademark is not protectable by injunction; (4) in
issuance of a temporary restraining order as Clinton Apparelle was not duly ignoring the procedure previously agreed on by the parties and which was
notified of the date of the summary hearing for its issuance. Thus, the Court of adopted by the trial court; and (5) in declaring that the preliminary injunction
30
Appeals ruled that the TRO had been improperly issued. issued by the trial court will lead to the closure of respondent’s business.
33
The Court of Appeals also held that the issuance of the writ of preliminary In its Comment, Clinton Apparelle maintains that only questions of law may be
injunction is questionable. In its opinion, herein petitioners failed to sufficiently raised in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It asserts
establish its material and substantial right to have the writ issued. Secondly, the that the question of whether the Court of Appeals erred in: (1) disregarding the
Court of Appeals observed that the survey presented by petitioners to support survey evidence; (2) ruling that there was no confusion between the two marks;
their contentions was commissioned by petitioners. The Court of Appeals and (c) finding that the erosion of petitioners’ trademark may not be protected
remarked that affidavits taken ex-parte are generally considered to be inferior to by injunction, are issues not within the ambit of a petition for review on
testimony given in open court. The appellate court also considered that the certiorari under Rule 45. Clinton Apparelle also contends that the Court of
injury petitioners have suffered or are currently suffering may be compensated Appeals acted correctly when it overturned the writ of preliminary injunction
in terms of monetary consideration, if after trial, a final judgment shall be issued by the trial court. It believes that the issued writ in effect disturbed
31
rendered in their favor. the status quo and disposed of the main case without trial.
In addition, the Court of Appeals strongly believed that the implementation of There is no merit in the petition.
the questioned writ would effectively shut down respondent’s business, which in
its opinion should not be sanctioned. The Court of Appeals thus set aside the At issue is whether the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction by the trial
orders of the trial court dated 15 May 1998 and 4 June 1998, respectively issuing a court was proper and whether the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the
temporary restraining order and granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary orders of the trial court.
injunction.
Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court defines a preliminary injunction as an
32
With the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners are now before order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final order
this Court seeking a review of the appellate court’s Decision and Resolution. LS requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or
& Co. and LSPI claim that the Court of Appeals committed serious error in: (1) acts. Injunction is accepted as the strong arm of equity or a transcendent
disregarding the well-defined limits of the writ of certiorari that questions on remedy to be used cautiously as it affects the respective rights of the parties, and
only upon full conviction on the part of the court of its extreme necessity. An violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or
extraordinary remedy, injunction is designed to preserve or maintain the status proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
quo of things and is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts
34
until the merits of the case can be heard. It may be resorted to only by a litigant Under the cited provision, a clear and positive right especially calling for judicial
for the preservation or protection of his rights or interests and for no other protection must be shown. Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce
35
purpose during the pendency of the principal action. It is resorted to only contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in
when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences, which esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to
37
cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. The resolution of an a cause of action. There must exist an actual right. There must be a patent
application for a writ of preliminary injunction rests upon the existence of an showing by the complaint that there exists a right to be protected and that the
38
emergency or of a special recourse before the main case can be heard in due acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right.
36
course of proceedings.
There are generally two kinds of preliminary injunction: (1) a prohibitory
Section 3, Rule 58, of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the injunction which commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act; and
issuance of a preliminary injunction: (2) a mandatory injunction which commands the performance of some positive
39
act to correct a wrong in the past.
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. – A preliminary
injunction may be granted when it is established: The Court of Appeals did not err in reviewing proof adduced by petitioners to
support its application for the issuance of the writ. While the matter of the
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion
of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or of the trial court, this discretion must be exercised based upon the grounds and
acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a in the manner provided by law. The exercise of discretion by the trial court in
limited period or perpetually; injunctive matters is generally not interfered with save in cases of manifest
40
abuse. And to determine whether there was abuse of discretion, a scrutiny
(b) That the commission, continuance, or non-performance of the act or acts must be made of the bases, if any, considered by the trial court in granting
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the injunctive relief. Be it stressed that injunction is the strong arm of equity which
applicant; or must be issued with great caution and deliberation, and only in cases of great
41
injury where there is no commensurate remedy in damages.
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting
to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in
In the present case, we find that there was scant justification for the issuance of Given the single registration of the trademark "Dockers and Design" and
the writ of preliminary injunction. considering that respondent only uses the assailed device but a different word
mark, the right to prevent the latter from using the challenged "Paddocks"
Petitioners anchor their legal right to "Dockers and Design" trademark on the device is far from clear. Stated otherwise, it is not evident whether the single
Certificate of Registration issued in their favor by the Bureau of Patents, registration of the trademark "Dockers and Design" confers on the owner the
*
Trademarks and Technology Transfer. According to Section 138 of Republic Act right to prevent the use of a fraction thereof in the course of trade. It is also
42
No. 8293, this Certificate of Registration is prima facie evidence of the validity unclear whether the use without the owner’s consent of a portion of a
of the registration, the registrant’s ownership of the mark and of the exclusive trademark registered in its entirety constitutes material or substantial invasion
right to use the same in connection with the goods or services and those that are of the owner’s right.
related thereto specified in the certificate. Section 147.1 of said law likewise
grants the owner of the registered mark the exclusive right to prevent all third It is likewise not settled whether the wing-shaped logo, as opposed to the word
parties not having the owner’s consent from using in the course of trade mark, is the dominant or central feature of petitioners’ trademark—the feature
identical or similar signs for goods or services which are identical or similar to that prevails or is retained in the minds of the public—an imitation of which
those in respect of which the trademark is registered if such use results in a creates the likelihood of deceiving the public and constitutes trademark
43
likelihood of confusion. infringement. In sum, there are vital matters which have yet and may only be
established through a full-blown trial.
However, attention should be given to the fact that petitioners’ registered
trademark consists of two elements: (1) the word mark "Dockers" and (2) the From the above discussion, we find that petitioners’ right to injunctive relief has
wing-shaped design or logo. Notably, there is only one registration for both not been clearly and unmistakably demonstrated. The right has yet to be
features of the trademark giving the impression that the two should be determined. Petitioners also failed to show proof that there is material and
considered as a single unit. Clinton Apparelle’s trademark, on the other hand, substantial invasion of their right to warrant the issuance of an injunctive writ.
uses the "Paddocks" word mark on top of a logo which according to petitioners Neither were petitioners able to show any urgent and permanent necessity for
is a slavish imitation of the "Dockers" design. The two trademarks apparently the writ to prevent serious damage.
differ in their word marks ("Dockers" and "Paddocks"), but again according to
petitioners, they employ similar or identical logos. It could thus be said that Petitioners wish to impress upon the Court the urgent necessity for injunctive
respondent only "appropriates" petitioners’ logo and not the word mark relief, urging that the erosion or dilution of their trademark is protectable. They
"Dockers"; it uses only a portion of the registered trademark and not the whole. assert that a trademark owner does not have to wait until the mark loses its
distinctiveness to obtain injunctive relief, and that the mere use by an infringer
of a registered mark is already actionable even if he has not yet profited thereby The trial court must state its own findings of fact and cite particular law to
or has damaged the trademark owner. justify grant of preliminary injunction. Utmost care in this regard is
46
demanded.
Trademark dilution is the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify
and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of: (1) The trial court in granting the injunctive relief tersely ratiocinated that "the
competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties; or (2) plaintiffs appear to be entitled to the relief prayed for and this Court is of the
likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception. Subject to the principles of considered belief and humble view that, without necessarily delving on the
equity, the owner of a famous mark is entitled to an injunction "against another merits, the paramount interest of justice will be better served if
person’s commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use the status quo shall be maintained." Clearly, this statement falls short of the
begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive requirement laid down by the above-quoted case. Similarly, in Developers Group
47
quality of the mark." This is intended to protect famous marks from subsequent of Companies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held that it was "not enough" for the
44
uses that blur distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it. trial court, in its order granting the writ, to simply say that it appeared "after
hearing that plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for."
Based on the foregoing, to be eligible for protection from dilution, there has to
be a finding that: (1) the trademark sought to be protected is famous and In addition, we agree with the Court of Appeals in its holding that the damages
distinctive; (2) the use by respondent of "Paddocks and Design" began after the the petitioners had suffered or continue to suffer may be compensated in terms
petitioners’ mark became famous; and (3) such subsequent use defames of monetary consideration. As held in Government Service Insurance System v.
48
petitioners’ mark. In the case at bar, petitioners have yet to establish whether Florendo:
"Dockers and Design" has acquired a strong degree of distinctiveness and
whether the other two elements are present for their cause to fall within the …a writ of injunction should never have been issued when an action for damages
ambit of the invoked protection. The Trends MBL Survey Report which would adequately compensate the injuries caused. The very foundation of the
petitioners presented in a bid to establish that there was confusing similarity jurisdiction to issue the writ of injunction rests in the probability of irreparable
between two marks is not sufficient proof of any dilution that the trial court injury, inadequacy of pecuniary estimation and the prevention of the
must enjoin. multiplicity of suits, and where facts are not shown to bring the case within
49
these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused.
The Court also finds that the trial court’s order granting the writ did not
adequately detail the reasons for the grant, contrary to our ruling in University We also believe that the issued injunctive writ, if allowed, would dispose of the
of the Philippines v. Hon. Catungal Jr.,

45
wherein we held that: case on the merits as it would effectively enjoin the use of the "Paddocks" device
without proof that there is basis for such action. The prevailing rule is that
courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction that would in effect requirement of hearing and prior notice before injunction may issue has been
50
dispose of the main case without trial. There would be a prejudgment of the relaxed to the point that not all petitions for preliminary injunction must
main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since it would undergo a trial-type hearing, it being a hornbook doctrine that a formal or trial-
51
assume the proposition which petitioners are inceptively bound to prove. type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process. Due
process simply means giving every contending party the opportunity to be heard
Parenthetically, we find no flaw in the Court of Appeals’ disquisition on the and the court to consider every piece of evidence presented in their favor.
consequences of the issued injunction. An exercise of caution, we believe that 52
Accordingly, this Court has in the case of Co v. Calimag, Jr., rejected a claim of
such reflection is necessary to weigh the alleged entitlement to the writ vis-à- denial of due process where such claimant was given the opportunity to be
vis its possible effects. The injunction issued in the instant case is of a serious heard, having submitted his counter-affidavit and memorandum in support of
nature as it tends to do more than to maintain the status quo. In fact, the his position.
53
assailed injunction if sustained would bring about the result desired by

petitioners without a trial on the merits. After a careful consideration of the facts and arguments of the parties, the Court
finds that petitioners did not adequately prove their entitlement to the
Then again, we believe the Court of Appeals overstepped its authority when it injunctive writ. In the absence of proof of a legal right and the injury sustained
declared that the "alleged similarity as to the two logos is hardly confusing to by the applicant, an order of the trial court granting the issuance of an
the public." The only issue brought before the Court of Appeals through injunctive writ will be set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of
respondent’s Petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court involved the grave 54
discretion. Conformably, the Court of Appeals was correct in setting aside the
abuse of discretion allegedly committed by the trial court in granting the TRO assailed orders of the trial court.
and the writ of preliminary injunction. The appellate court in making such a
statement went beyond that issue and touched on the merits of the WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
infringement case, which remains to be decided by the trial court. In our view, it Appeals dated 21 December 1998 and its Resolution dated 10 May 1999 are
was premature for the Court of Appeals to declare that there is no confusion AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
between the two devices or logos. That matter remains to be decided on by the
trial court. SO ORDERED.
Finally, we have no contention against the procedure adopted by the trial court
in resolving the application for an injunctive writ and we believe that
respondent was accorded due process. Due process, in essence, is simply an
opportunity to be heard. And in applications for preliminary injunction, the
On February 26, 2001, Saripada Ali Pacasum filed Special Civil Action
No. 690-01 for mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory
SECTION 2 – DOCTRINE OF NON-JURISDICTION
injunction against FAPE. He alleged that FAPE was required by law to
pay subsidy to Pacasum College, Inc. under the Educational Service
Gomos v. Adiong
Program of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS);
that although the DECS has already released to FAPE the total amount
FIRST DIVISION
of P746,000,000.00 for payment to different participating schools, FAPE
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1863 October 22, 2004 refused to release to Pacasum College, Inc. the sum of P1,845,040.00
which represented the remaining unpaid collectible of the said
ATTY. JOSE ALFONSO M. GOMOS, FUND FOR ASSISTANCE TO PRIVATE institution for the school year 2000-2001; that the continued refusal by
EDUCATION (FAPE),complainants, FAPE to release the said amount has caused the school to fail in its
vs. obligation to pay the salaries of its teachers for 3 months.
JUDGE SANTOS B. ADIONG, Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Marawi
1
City, respondent. On the same day the petition was filed, respondent judge granted the
application for preliminary mandatory injunction upon the posting by the
DECISION petitioner of a surety or property bond in the amount of P200,000.00.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: On February 28, 2001, the respondent judge issued another order directing the
president of FAPE, Dr. Roberto T. Borromeo, "to prepare and issue a check for
In two verified complaints dated March 12, 2001 and March 22, 2001 filed with
P1,845,040.00 representing the payment to the Pacasum College, Inc. x x x
the Office the Court Administrator (OCA), Sultan Sabdulah Ali Pacasum, in his
payable to its president and chairman Saripada Ali Pacasum, the petitioner
capacity as President and Chairman of Pacasum College, Inc., Atty. Alfonso M. 2
herein." On the same day, Sheriff Acmad Alipanto served upon FAPE, throught
Gomos and Dr. Roberto T. Borromeo, as counsel and President of the Fund for
its president, summons and a copy of the petition.
Assistance to Private Education (FAPE) respectively, charged respondent Judge
Santos B. Adiong of RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City with gross ignorance of law, On March 5, 2001, FAPE filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition docketed
3
abuse of authority and gross misconduct. as CA-G.R. No. 63533 before the Court of Appeals, challenging the Orders, both
dated February 26, 2001, issued by the respondent judge. It argued that a
The antecedent facts are as follows:
pending ownership dispute between Sultan Sabdulah Ali Pacasum and Saripada
Ali Pacasum over the shares of the Pacasum College before the Securities and
Exchange Commission precludes the release of the remaining balance of the hearing, notice and jurisdictional requirements of the Rules of Court in issuing
subsidy to Pacasum College under the ESC Program, which requires that any the questioned orders of February 26 and 28, 2001.
dispute must be settled first before the release could be made. The petition
further stated that the RTC of Marawi City has no jurisdiction to enforce the In his Comment, respondent judge claimed that he took cognizance of Special
writs of mandamus and preliminary injunction to FAPE, in its principal office in Civil Action No. 690-10 after it was raffled to his court. He found that the
Makati City, since the place is outside the 12th judicial region where it pleadings were in order; that after a careful examination of the pleadings
4
belongs. FAPE also prayed for the issuance of a TRO against Saripada Ali submitted by the petitioner, he saw an extreme necessity to resolve the case
Pacasum and his agents who have been harrassing its employees with hourly expeditiously; and that all the pending incidents has been rendered moot and
calls and threats of bodily harm. academic with the dismissal of Special Civil Action No. 690-10.
On March 9, 2001, Sheriff Acmad Alipanto and Saripada Ali Pacasum served an After evaluation of the records, the OCA found that the respondent judge was
Order dated March 7, 2001, which was allegedly issued on a mere ex-parte liable for gross ignorance of the law, oppression and abuse of authority; that the
motion by Saripada Ali Pacasum, reiterating the Orders of February 26, 2001 respondent, as the Presiding Judge of RTC, Marawi City, has no authority to
with a warning that "failure to comply would be under pain of contempt of enforce a preliminary injunction in Makati City where the principal office of
5
court." On March 13, 2001, Saripada Ali Pacasum together with a Makati FAPE was located; that he violated the rights of FAPE employees when he
policeman served warrant of arrest upon Dr. Borromeo. summarily cited them in contempt without regard to the procedure prescribed
by the Rules of Court. He abused his authority when he issued a warrant of
On March 14, 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a TRO enjoining the respondent arrest on May 25, 2001 despite a TRO issued by the Court of Appeals.
judge from enforcing the orders of February 26, 2001. Despite the TRO, Accordingly, the OCA made the following recommendations:
respondent judge ordered the arrest of Dr. Borromeo and certain FAPE
employees for failure to comply with his directive. Two of FAPE’s employees, 1. This matter be re-docketed as a regular administrative case against
namely: Evangeline Domondon and Nenita Torres, were subsequently arrested the respondent judge;
and detained.
2. Respondent judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
On March 12, 2001, Sultan Sabdulah Ali Pacasum filed a letter complaint before the rules;
the OCA charging the respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law and
3. Respondent judge be meted with the penalty of FINE in the sum of
gross misconduct. On March 22, 2001, a similar letter-complaint was filed by 6
Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00).
Atty. Jose Gomos on the same ground that the respondent judge violated the
7
Upon being directed by the Court, complainants manifested their willingness to In the case at bar, the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is not a
submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings mere deficiency in prudence, or lapse of judgment on the part of respondent
8
submitted. Respondent judge, on the other hand, failed to file his manifestation judge but a blatant disregard of basic rules constitutive of gross ignorance of the
hence, the Court was constrained to dispense with the filing thereof. law. The responsibility of judges to keep abreast of the law and changes therein,
as well as with the latest decisions of the Supreme Court, is a pressing need. One
We agree with the recommendations of the OCA, except as to the penalty. cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory acquaintance with the statute and
procedural rules. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know,
Respondent judge granted Saripada Ali Pacasum’s application for preliminary 11
excuses no one – not even judges.
mandatory injunction on the very same day the Special Civil Action No. 690-01
was filed on February 26, 2001. Sections 4(c) and 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Respondent judge is likewise guilty of gross ignorance of the law for summarily
9
Civil Procedure is very explicit that the writ of preliminary injuction may issue punishing FAPE’s president and employees without any written charge for
only after prior notice and hearing upon the adverse party. In issuing the subject indirect contempt or giving them any opportunity to explain their refusal to
writ on the very same day the application was filed and considering that the obey the court’s order, as mandated by Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of
person against whom the same was to be served was located in Makati, 12
Civil Procedure. What makes the act more reprehensible was the four FAPE
summons could not have been served upon them or a hearing conducted in employees cited for contempt, two of whom were arrested and detained with
evident disregard of the due process requirements of the Rules of Court. the exception of Dr. Borromeo, were not even impleaded in Special Civil Action
No. 690-10. Worse, the arrest of the said employees was made despite the
Respondent judge’s failure to comply with procedural due process is aggravated
issuance by the Court of Appeals of a TRO enjoining the respondent from
by his total inattention to the parameters of his jurisdiction. As the presiding
enforcing the Order of February 26, 2001.
judge of RTC, Marawi City, he should have known that Makati City was way
beyond the boundaries of his territorial jurisdiction insofar as enforcing a writ of The contempt power was given to the courts in trust for the public, by tradition
preliminary injunction is concerned. Section 21(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, and necessity, inasmuch as respect for the courts, which are ordained to
provides that the RTC shall exercise original jurisdiction in the issuance of writs administer the laws necessary to the good order of society, is as necessary as
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and respect for the laws themselves. As in all other powers of the court, the
injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions. The contempt power, however plenary it may seem, must be exercised judiciously
10
rationale, as explained in Embassy Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, is "that the and sparingly. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride,
trial court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin 13
prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties. The failure of
acts being performed or about to be performed outside its territorial a judge to afford the alleged contemner the opportunity to be heard as a matter
jurisdiction." of due process of law deserves administrative sanction.
The seeming eagerness and haste with which respondent judge demonstrated in Obviously, after being chastised twice, respondent judge has remained
issuing the assailed orders, warrants and writ betray a design to railroad judicial undeterred in disregarding the law which he has pledged to uphold and the
processes to favor a preferred litigant. The act of a judge in citing a person in Code which he has promised to live by. He appears undaunted by the previous
contempt of court in a manner which displays obvious partiality is deplorable penalties and warnings he received. If only for this, we are constrained to
and violative of Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires a judge impose a penalty more severe than a fine, as earlier recommended. Suspension
to behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity and from office for 6 months would be reasonble under the circumstances.
14
impartiality of the judiciary. A judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
grave abuse of judicial authority for having precipitately adjudged guilty of WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Santos B. Adiong, Presiding Judge of Regional
indirect contempt in disregard of the elementary rules of procedure. Trial Court, Branch 8, Marawi City, is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the
law for issuing a writ of preliminary injunction in violation of Section 21(1) of
The Court recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and Sections 4(c) and 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of
and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, Civil Procedure and for citing FAPE employees in contempt of court in
but only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where, disregard of Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly,
however, the procedure is so simple and the facts so evident as to be beyond he is SUSPENDED from office without salary and other benefits for SIX (6)
permissible margins of error, to still err thereon amounts to ignorance of the MONTHS with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
15
law. dealt with more severely.
Under Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, amending Rule 140 of the Rules of Court SO ORDERED.
on the Discipline of Justices and Judges, gross ignorance of the law is classified
as a serious charge which carries with it a penalty of either dismissal from FOOTNOTES:
9
service, suspension for more than 3 months but not exceeding 6 months, or a Section 4(c) Rule 58 states: When an application for a writ of preliminary
fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. injunction or a temporary restraining order is included in a complaint or any
initiatory pleading, the case, if filed in a multiple sala court, shall be raffled only
We take judicial notice that the respondent judge had been previously after notice to and in the presence of the adverse party or the person to be
sanctioned in (1) A.M. No. RTJ-98-1407 per Resolution of July 20, 1998, where he enjoined. In the event, such notice shall be preceded, or contemporaneously
was fined in the sum of P20,000.00 for ignorance of the law; and (2) A.M. No. accompanied by service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint or
RTJ-00-1581 per Resolution of July 2002, where he was also fined in the sum of initiatory pleading and the applicant’s affidavit or bond, upon the adverse party
P5,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion. in the Philippines x x x .
Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception.

– No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior
notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear
from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that
great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the
matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the applicantion for
preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary
restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days
from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as
herein provided. Within the said tweenty-day period, the court must
order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place,
why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the same
period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and
accordingly issue the corresponding order x x x.
Dela Paz v. Adiong Considering that the petition herein is sufficient in form and substance,
a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction is hereby issued requiring
the respondents, specifically FAPE and its officials, including its
Chairman respondent RAUL S. ROCO, to prepare and issue a check in
SECOND DIVISION
the amount of P4,000,000.00 representing the entitlement of the
petitioner for School Year 2001-2002, payable to its President/Chairman
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1857 November 23, 2004
3
DATU SARIPADA ALI PACASUM, under pain of arrest and contempt.
GABRIEL DELA PAZ, complainant,
The following day, March 5, 2002, respondent issued another Order, thus:
vs.
JUDGE SANTOS B. ADIONG, RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, respondent.
Finding the ex-parte motion of the petitioner to be impressed with
merit, it is hereby approved.
RESOLUTION
WHEREFORE, the appropriate Sheriffs of Makati and Mandaluyong,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Metro Manila, are hereby ordered to serve the attached Writ of
1
In a verified letter complaint dated May 15, 2002, Gabriel dela Paz, Officer-in- Preliminary Mandatory Injunction upon the respondents, and make a
2 4
Charge of Fund for Assistance to Private Education (FAPE), charged Judge return on their actions taken thereon.
Santos B. Adiong of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marawi City, Branch 8 of
On March 12, 2002, FAPE, through counsel, filed an omnibus motion set aside
gross ignorance of the law and/or abuse of authority.
5
orders of March 4 and 5, 2002 and to dismiss the case. In its motion, FAPE
Pacasum College, Inc., represented by Saripada Ali Pacasum, filed with the RTC, claimed that it was not served with summons but received copies of the
a petition for mandamus with application for a preliminary mandatory questioned orders on March 8, 2002; that the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 813-02, against FAPE, injunction which was intended to be enforced in Makati is outside the
represented by Roberto T. Borromeo, Secretary Raul S. Roco, Ramon C. Bacani jurisdiction of the Twelfth Judicial Region of RTC Marawi City; that Section 21 of
and Carolina C. Porio. Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended, provides that the RTC has
jurisdiction to issue writ of injunction which may be enforced in any part of its
On March 4, 2002, respondent judge issued an Order, to wit: respective regions; that the writ was granted without hearing and notice; neither
was there a showing of an affidavit that would establish that great or irreparable
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION
injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard nor was In his letter-complaint, dela Paz claims as follows: Respondent's issuance of the
there a showing that a bond had been filed. writ of preliminary mandatory injunction dated March 4, 2002 was in glaring
disregard and defiance of Section 21 of B.P. Blg. 129 which limits the authority of
On May 6, 2002, another Order was issued by the respondent, thus: RTCs to issue writs of mandamus within their respective regions. The issuance
of the writ was in disregard of the notice and hearing requirements under Rule
It appears on record that despite service to the respondents copies of
58 of the Rules of Court. Respondent continues to issue orders directing FAPE to
the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued by this Court on
release the amount of P4,000,000.00 to Datu Saripada Ali Pacasum even in a
March 4, 2002 and until date respondents failed to obey or comply (sic)
case where it was not a party thereto as in Corporate Case No. 010 filed by
the Writ as directed and considering that funds due to the petitioner 9
Sultan Sabdullah Ali Pacasum against Datu Saripada Ali Pacasum, et al.,
has been deposited in the bank, the assigned Sheriff of Makati City is
respondent issued an Order dated April 22, 2002, wherein he stated the
ordered to take custody of the said funds/check in the name of
following:
PACASUM COLLEGE INC., in the amount of 4 million pesos.
Collectible for the school year 2001-2002 and release the same to In view of this order there exists no legal impediment to the
SARIPADA ALI PACASUM, President/Chairman of the said school thru enforcement of the previous orders of this Court particularly a Writ of
garnishment proceedings at the (BPI), Bank of Philippine Islands, Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued in Special Civil Action No.
Benavidez St., Legaspi Village, Makati City or BPI main at Ayala Ave., 813-02 dated March 4, 2002 directing the respondent FAPE to release to
Makati City and/or any other banks including LANDBANK of the the petitioner the sum of P4,000,000.00 representing the petitioner's
Philippines, Ortigas Center Branch which is the official depositary bank entitlement for the School Year 2001-2002 and the order of the Court in
of the DECS out of the deposit of Funds for Assistance for (sic) Private Special Civil Case No. 878 dated March 4, 2002 directing the defendant
6
Education (FAPE) in order not to defeat the purpose of the said Writ. DR. CARMEN DOMMITORIO to immediately release to the plaintiff
SARIPADA PACASUM the sum of P1,000,000.00 under pain of arrest
On May 8, 2002, Makati Sheriff Melchor C. Gaspar issued notices of 10
and contempt.
garnishment to Land Bank Head Office in Ortigas Center Branch and BPI-Far
7
East Bank in Pasay Road Branch, Makati. Subsequently, FAPE, through counsel, Respondent explains in his second indorsement dated July 29, 2002 that he had
wrote Sheriff Gaspar a letter asking the latter to rectify his act of issuing notices ordered the dismissal of Special Civil Action No. 813-02 per his resolution dated
of garnishment considering that the same was made pursuant to a patently June 21, 2002 and that he had recalled and set aside his questioned orders dated
8
illegal and void order of the respondent. March 4 and 5, 2002. He submits that with the dismissal of the said case, the
herein complaint has become moot and academic and should no longer be given
11
due course.
12
Complainant, in a letter dated August 23, 2002, informed us that FAPE's total disregard of the rules, respondent judge is clearly ignorant of the
counsel was not furnished with a copy of the respondent's resolution dismissing rules. The subsequent dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 813-02 per
the case; and that there is still a pending motion for reconsideration filed by order dated 21 June 2002, which also recalled and set aside the orders of
petitioner in the said case and FAPE's manifestation with comment and March 4 and 5, 2002, does not render the instant administrative
opposition thereto. Complainant claims that aside from the Orders dated March complaint moot and academic considering that the issue involved in the
4 and 5, 2002 ignorantly issued by respondent judge, his order dated May 6, instant case is administrative and not judicial in character. Specifically,
2002 which directed the garnishment of the funds of their office and followed by the issue is with regard to respondent judge's violation of the law or
a writ of garnishment issued by a Makati sheriff really paralyzed FAPE's procedure which is tantamount to ignorance of the law or procedure.
operations until a temporary restraining order was issued by the Court of Undoubtedly, respondent judge violated the above-cited rules because
13
Appeals. Complainant prays that their complaint be treated better than just the records are bare that prior to the issuance of the subject writ, he
being dismissed for being moot and academic as respondent would want it to notified the respondent FAPE and conducted a hearing. For this reason,
be. there is no doubt that respondent judge is guilty of ignorance of the
rules.
Both parties manifested that they are submitting the case for resolution based
14
on the pleadings filed. Concerning respondent judge's issuance of an order dated 22 April 2002
in Corporate Case No. 010 directing FAPE to issue a check in the sum of
The Court Administrator submitted his Report finding respondent judge guilty P4 million pesos pursuant to the order dated 04 March 2002 in Special
of gross ignorance of law and grave abuse of authority and recommending that Civil Action No. 813-02, such an act is tantamount to an abuse of his
he be meted with the penalty of suspension from office for a period of six (6) authority. Records revealed that FAPE was not a party to Corporate
months without pay with a warning that the commission of a similar act in the Case No. 010. Nonetheless, respondent judge still directed FAPE to
future will warrant his dismissal from the service. In arriving at his findings and comply with an order in a case, which they have nothing to do.
recommendations, the Court Administrator stated:
Aside from the fact that respondent judge issued an order against a
As correctly claimed by the complainant, respondent judge had indeed non-party to Corporate Case No. 010, he also had no authority to issue
issued the two (2) orders of March 4 & 5, 2002 without complying with said order because he already inhibited himself from trying the case.
the mandatory requirement of notice and hearing under Section 5, Rule Records revealed that on 21 November 2001 respondent judge inhibited
58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that: "No himself from trying and hearing Corporate Case No. 010 (SEC Case No.
preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior 10-99-6437). Respondent judge even caused the forwarding of the
notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined x x x." Because of his records of the said case to the Office of the Court Administrator so that
the court in Iligan City, which was designated as special court to try and injunction within their respective designated territories." Likewise, in
decide corporate cases (SEC-related cases) would be designated in lieu the case of Embassy Farms, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (1990), it was held
of respondent judge. Acting on the said request, the Court, per that: "Generally, an injunction under Section 21 of the Batas Pambansa
Resolution of 10 June 2002 in A.M. No. 02-4-207-RTC, designated Judge Bilang 129 is enforceable within the region. The reason is that the trial
Amer R. Ibrahim, Pairing Judge, RTC, Marawi City to try and decide court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to
Corporate Case No. 010. enjoin acts being performed or about to be performed outside its
territorial boundaries."
Despite said inhibition and the subsequent designation of another
judge, respondent judge still issued the order of 22 April 2002. Similarly, the Court, in the case of Martin vs. Guerrero, 317 SCRA 166
Respondent judge's justification for the issuance of the said order was (1999), penalized then Assisting Judge Eleuterio F. Guerrero, RTC,
because the Office of the Court Administrator returned the records of Branch 18, Tagaytay City with a fine of P1,000 pesos and admonition
Corporate Case No. 010 to his sala for further proceedings. While it is with warning for issuing a writ against a party who is a resident of
true that the records were indeed returned to his sala, there is no Parañaque City, an area which is outside of his judicial jurisdiction.
showing that respondent judge was given the authority to handle the Specifically, the Court held that: "Under the foregoing clear provisions
case. The Court's directive was for Judge Ibrahim, the pairing judge of of B.P. 129 and the Rules of Court, regional trial courts have jurisdiction
Branch 8, to continue the trial and hearing of Corporate Case No. 010. to issue writs of habeas corpus only when such writs can be enforced
Thus, respondent judge was fully aware of his lack of authority to within their respective judicial districts, as extraordinary writs issued by
handle the case. For lack of authority to do so, respondent judge is them are limited to and operative only within such areas. Clearly then,
guilty of grave abuse of authority. respondent judge had no authority to issue writ of habeas corpus
against herein complainant, who was a resident of Parañaque, an area
Worse, respondent judge issued the subject extraordinary writ to be outside his judicial jurisdiction".
enforced outside his judicial region, in gross violation of Section 21 of
B.P. Blg. 129 which provides that Regional Trial Courts exercise original Thus, consistent with the aforesaid rulings of the court, it follows then
jurisdiction in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, that respondent judge, being a presiding judge of RTC, Marawi City, has
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be no authority to enforce the subject preliminary mandatory injunction in
enforced in any part of their respective judicial regions. Makati City. The subject writ of preliminary mandatory injunction just
like the subject writ of habeas corpus in the aforesaid case of Judge
The Honorable Court in the case of PNB versus Pineda, 197 SCRA 1 Guerrero cannot be enforced by respondent judge against a party who is
(1991), held that: "Regional Trial Courts can only enforce their writs of in Makati City, an area outside of his judicial jurisdiction. Clearly,
respondent judge had grossly violated the provisions of Section 21 of The OCA's findings and recommendations are well-taken.
B.P. Blg. 129.
The rule on injunction as found under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides
From all the foregoing, we find respondent judge guilty of gross that the same can only be granted upon a verified application showing facts
ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority. entitling the applicant to the relief demanded and upon the filing of a bond
16
executed to the party or person enjoined. It is also provided that no
Under Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC dated 11 September preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the
2001, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is considered a serious party or person sought to be enjoined unless shown that great or irreparable
charge with the following sanctions: (a) dismissal from the service; or injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice;
(b) suspension from office without pay for more than 3 months but not that a temporary restraining order may be issued effective for a period of twenty
exceeding six months; or (c) a fine of more than P20,000.00 pesos but (20) days from service on the party sought to be enjoined.
17
not exceeding P40,000.00 pesos.

A perusal of the Order dated March 4, 2002 failed to show that respondent
Record in the Docket and Clearance Division, OCA shows that conducted a hearing before the injunction was granted or that complainant was
respondent judge had been previously penalized in the following cases: given prior notice thereof. In fact, complainant stressed that FAPE was not at all
served with summons before the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was
1. FINED in the sum of P20,000.00 pesos (sic) for Ignorance of the Law
issued. It was not also shown whether the applicant posted a bond and the same
in A.M. No. RTJ-98-1407 per Resolution of 20 July 1998;
was approved before the order granting the preliminary mandatory injunction
was issued. A bond is required unless exempted by the court. The Order merely
2. FINED in the sum of P5,000.00 pesos (sic) for Gross Ignorance of the
stated that the petition was sufficient in form and substance without even
Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion in A.M. No. RTJ-00-1581 per
stating the facts which would support the granting of the injunction. This is a
Resolution of 02 July 2002.
clear violation of the rule.
In determining the penalty to be imposed, it is important to note that
Moreover, Section 21 of B.P. Blg. 129, provides:
this is respondent judge's 3rd offense involving the same act, which is
gross ignorance of the law, hence he may be meted with a severe
SEC. 21. Original Jurisdiction in other cases. – Regional Trial Courts
penalty of either DISMISSAL from the service or SUSPENSION from
shall exercise original jurisdiction:
office without pay for more than 3 months but not exceeding 6 months,
15
at the discretion of the Court.
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo Order of inhibition citing the fact that the records of the case which he
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any forwarded to the OCA were returned to his court for further proceedings. He
part of their respective regions; then concluded that there exists no legal impediment to the enforcement of the
previous orders of this Court particularly a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
……… Injunction issued in Special Civil Action No. 813-02 dated March 4, 2002
directing the respondent FAPE to release to the petitioner the sum of
Respondent's court is in Marawi City which falls within the twelfth judicial
P4,000,000.00 representing the petitioner's entitlement for the School Year
region. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by respondent
2001-2002. Although the respondent in Corporate Case No. 010 is the petitioner
requiring FAPE, which is holding office in Makati City, and its officials who have
in Special Civil Action No. 813-02, (where the subject preliminary mandatory
their residences in Metro Manila, to issue a check in the amount of
injunction was issued and now the basis of this administrative complaint) FAPE,
P4,000,000.00 payable to Datu Saripada Ali Pacasum, is outside the territorial
however, was not a party in the Corporate Case.
jurisdiction of respondent's court. Thus, the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction issued by the respondent is void considering that his authority to Moreover, respondent has no authority to issue the Order in Corporate Case No.
issue an injunction is limited only to and operative only within his respective 010 since the matter of his inhibition was still pending with the OCA. In fact,
18
provinces or districts. because of respondent's Order of inhibition with further assignment to other
corporate courts of RTC, Lanao and Cagayan de Oro City, the plaintiff in
Consequently, the Order dated March 5, 2002 directing the sheriff of Makati and
Corporate Case No. 010 filed with OCA a motion to retain the corporate case
Mandaluyong to serve the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to FAPE, et
with the RTC of Marawi City, which we granted in our Resolution dated June 10,
al. is a jurisdictional faux pas as the respondent can only enforce his orders 20
19
2002. In the same resolution, we authorized Judge Amer R. Ibrahim, Pairing
within the territorial jurisdiction of his court.
Judge, RTC of Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, Branch 9, to try and decide Corporate
Case No. 010; and reminded respondent of Supreme Court Circular No. 10.
Likewise, respondent has also shown abuse of his authority in issuing his Order
dated April 22, 2002 in Corporate Case No. 010 requiring FAPE, a non-party to 21
Circular No. 10 provides that with respect to single sala courts, only the order
the case, to comply with the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued in
of inhibition shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for appropriate action;
Special Civil Action No. 813-02. Notably, respondent in his Order dated
the records of the case shall be kept in the docket of the court concerned while
November 21, 2001 inhibited himself from hearing the corporate case and
awaiting the instruction and/or action of the Supreme Court thereon. This aims
forwarded the entire records to the OCA for further assignment to other
to avoid needless moving of the records in order to prevent the possibility of the
designated corporate courts of the RTC in Lanao and Cagayan de Oro City.
records being lost in transit. Thus, the return of the records of Corporate Case
Despite this pending matter, respondent acted on a motion to set aside his
No. 010 to respondent's court is not an authority for respondent to proceed with We are not persuaded. We find the belated action on complainant's omnibus
the case. motion as a mere afterthought because the same was filed as early as March 12,
2002. Respondent could have easily reconsidered his previous Orders dated
It has been held that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, March 4 and 5, 2002. In fact, the Order dated April 22, 2002 in Corporate Case
erroneous acts of a judge in his juridical capacity are not subject to disciplinary No. 010, which we found to have been issued when respondent had no authority
action, for no magistrate is infallible. The lack of malicious intent however, to do so because of his Order of inhibition, had even reiterated his previous
cannot completely free the respondent from liability specially so when the law is order for FAPE to release the P4,000,000.00 to Datu Saripada Ali Pacasum.
22
so elementary, thus not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We Moreover, the issuance of respondent's Order dated May 6, 2002, directing the
23
reiterate what we said in a case which also involved the herein respondent, sheriff of Makati City to take custody of the funds/check in the name of
thus: PACASUM COLLEGE, INC., in the amount of 4 million pesos for release to
SARIPADA ALI PACASUM, President/Chairman of the said school through
A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional
garnishment proceedings, was already tantamount to a denial of the omnibus
competence. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the
motion. Thus, the fact that the omnibus motion was subsequently granted by
rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. A judge owes
respondent and Special Civil Action No. 813-02 was dismissed, would not
the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law and is
absolve respondent from administrative liability.
expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence.
Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of Finally, this is respondent's third offense. He had previously been fined and
injustice. sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be
dealt with most severely. We find the penalty recommended by OCA to be
In his Comment, respondent contends that Special Civil Action No. 813-02 had
reasonable for respondent's offense.
already been dismissed per his Resolution dated June 21, 2002, thus the instant
administrative complaint has become moot and academic. In dismissing the WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Santos B. Adiong of the Regional Trial Court,
case, respondent explained that in the course of the inventory of all his pending Branch 8, Marawi City, is hereby found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law
cases, he found an unresolved omnibus motion to set aside the orders dated and abuse of authority and is hereby suspended for a period of six (6) months
March 4 and 5, 2002 and to dismiss the case filed by FAPE's counsel and since without pay, effective immediately, with a warning that the commission of a
the allegations were found to be well-taken, he granted the motion by setting similar act in the future will warrant his dismissal from the service.
aside his earlier orders and dismissed the case.
SO ORDERED.
Mangahas v. Paredes Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. Private respondent averred that petitioners
constructed houses on the property without his knowledge and consent and
that several demands were made, but the same fell on deaf ears as petitioners
refused to vacate the premises. This prompted private respondent to refer the
THIRD DIVISION
matter to the Lupon Tagapayapa for conciliation. The recourse proved futile
G.R. No. 157866 February 14, 2007 since the parties were not able to settle amicably. Private respondent then filed
an ejectment suit before the MeTC.
AUGUSTO MANGAHAS and MARILOU VERDEJO, petitioners,
vs. On 23 April 1997, petitioners filed their answer denying having unlawfully
Hon. JUDGE VICTORIA ISABEL PAREDES, Presiding Judge, Br. 124, deprived private respondent possession of the contested property. Petitioners
Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City; SHERIFF ERLITO BACHO, Br. 124, claimed that they have resided in the subject lot with the knowledge and
Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City; and AVELINO BANAAG,Respondents. conformity of the true owner thereof, Pinagkamaligan Indo-Agro Development
Corporation (PIADECO), as evidenced by a Certificate of Occupancy signed by
DECISION PIADECO’s president in their favor.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: On 10 July 1997, petitioners filed a Manifestation And Motion To Suspend
Proceedings on the ground that the subject property is part of the Tala Estate
This petition for Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, Prohibition With Prayer For
and that the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 85, in Civil Case No. Q-96-29810
Provisional Remedy filed by petitioners Augusto Mangahas and Marilou Verdejo
issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 10 November 1997, enjoining the
1
seeks to nullify and set aside the 14 February 2003 Order of the Regional Trial
MeTCs of Quezon City and Caloocan City from ordering the eviction and
Court (RTC), Branch 124, Caloocan City, denying their Motion to Suspend
demolition of all occupants of the Tala Estate. They posited that the injunction
Execution in Civil Case No. C-19097.
issued by the Quezon City RTC is enforceable in Caloocan City because both
cities are situated within the National Capital Region.
The instant controversy arose from a verified complaint for Ejectment filed by
private respondent Avelino Banaag on 31 January 1997 before the Metropolitan
In an order dated 7 August 1997, the MeTC denied said manifestation and
Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 49, Caloocan City, against petitioners. Private
motion.1awphi1.net It ratiocinated that the injunction issued by the Quezon City
respondent alleged that he is the registered owner of the disputed property
RTC has binding effect only within the territorial boundaries of the said court
identified as Lot 4, Block 21, located in Maligaya Park Subdivision, Caloocan
and since Caloocan City is not within the territorial area of same, the injunction
City, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 196025 of the
it issued is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
For failure of the parties to arrive at a compromise agreement during the Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff, ordering defendants
preliminary conference, they were required to submit their respective position Augusto Mangahas, Victor Solis, Elisa M. Dionila, Joselito Mangahas and
papers containing their positions on the following issues: (a) whether or not the Rogelio Verdejo and all persons claiming right under them as follows:
torrens title of private respondent is a valid basis of his right to eject petitioners,
(b) whether the MeTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case, and (c) 1) To vacate the lot in question by removing their houses erected
whether either the private respondent or petitioners are entitled to their thereat and restore possession of the lot to the plaintiff;
respective claims for damages.

2) To pay plaintiff a reasonable compensation for their use of the
In their position paper, petitioners insisted that they are entitled to the premises for the period from August, 1996 until the property is vacated
possession of the land because they have been occupants thereof as early as at the rate of two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos per month;
1978, long before the property was acquired by private respondent. Since they
3) To reimburse to plaintiff the sum of ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos
possessed the property for that long, the MeTC has no jurisdiction to hear and
as and for attorney’s fees; [and]
decide the case as ejectment suit applies only to instances where possession of
the land lasted for a period of not more than one year. In addition, they claimed 2
4) To pay the costs of this suit.
that private respondent has not proffered any evidence that he has prior
physical possession over the property. Petitioners reiterated their posture in the On 2 December 1999, petitioners appealed to the RTC, which case was docketed
motion to suspend proceedings wherein they urged the MeTC to respect the as Civil Case No. C-19097. In a Decision dated 16 November 2000, the trial court
Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC. They also affirmed in toto the MeTC decision. It ruled that the MeTC was correct in
alleged that private respondent’s certificate of title originated from a fictitious denying petitioners’ motion to suspend proceedings anchored on the Writ of
title. Preliminary Injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC reasoning that the writ
of the latter court is limited only to its territorial area, thus, the same has no
In a decision dated 5 October 1999, the MeTC ruled for private respondent. It
binding effect on the MeTC of Caloocan City. It sustained the MeTC’s ruling
opined that TCT No. 196025 in private respondent’s name was an indefeasible
that the latter court has jurisdiction over the case as the same has been filed
proof of his ownership of the lot and his inherent right to possess the same. This
within the reglementary period from the date of demand to vacate.
title entitled private respondent better right to possess the subject property over
Furthermore, the RTC stated that the validity of private respondent’s title
petitioners’ Certificate of Occupancy executed in their favor by PIADECO. It
cannot be assailed collaterally in the instant case.
held that it has jurisdiction over the controversy since private respondent filed
the case within one year from the time the demand to vacate was given to On 18 December 2000, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which the
petitioners. The decretal portion of the decision reads: RTC denied in a resolution dated 1 June 2001.
4
Unfazed, petitioners appealed the ruling of the RTC to the Court of Appeals on is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with the Regional Trial Courts and
5
6 June 2001 which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65076. the Court of Appeals. Such concurrence of jurisdiction does not give the
6
petitioners unbridled freedom of choice of court forum. A direct recourse of the
3
In a Decision dated 25 April 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only
the RTC. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was, likewise, denied in a when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically
Resolution dated 20 November 2002. set out in the petition.
7
The decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory on 13 In the instant case, petitioners have not offered any exceptional or compelling
December 2002. reason not to observe the hierarchy of courts. Hence, the petition should have
been filed with the Regional Trial Court.
Meanwhile, on 11 December 2000, private respondent filed with the RTC a
motion for execution pending appeal which was opposed by petitioners. In an Equally noteworthy is petitioners’ resort to this Court through petition for
order dated 12 September 2001, the RTC granted the motion. declaratory relief. This action is not among the petitions within the original
8
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Rule 63 of the Rules of Court which deals
To implement and enforce its decision, the same court on 27 September 2001
with actions for declaratory relief, enumerates the subject matter thereof, i.e.,
issued a Writ of Execution. On 28 September 2001, petitioners filed a Motion to
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, the construction or validity of
Reconsider Order dated 12 September 2001 which was denied in an order dated 5
statute or ordinance. Inasmuch as this enumeration is exclusive, petitioners’
February 2002.
action to declare the RTC order denying their motion to suspend execution, not
being one of those enumerated, should warrant the outright dismissal of this
On 17 January 2003, petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Execution before the
9
case.
RTC. Said motion was denied in an order dated 14 February 2003. On 05 March
2003, Sheriff Erlito Bacho implemented and enforced the writ of execution.
At any rate, since the complete records of this case have already been elevated,
this Court deems it wise to resolve the controversy on the merits.
Hence, the instant recourse.
Petitioners assail the Order dated 14 February 2003 of the RTC Caloocan City
At the outset it must be pointed out that petitioners’ direct recourse to this
and its Decision dated 16 November 2000 on the sole ground that the said court
Court via petition for Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, Prohibition With Prayer For
is precluded from issuing said Order and Decision by virtue of the Writ of
Provisional Remedy is an utter disregard of the hierarchy of courts and should
Injunction issued on 10 November 1997 by the Quezon City RTC.
have been dismissed outright. This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction
It must be remembered that the issue on the enforceability of the injunction Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over which the said branch may
order originating from the Quezon City RTC had already been litigated and exercise appellate jurisdiction. xxx"
finally decided when the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65076 affirmed the
Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. C-19097. Said Decision had become final Taking Our bearings from the above pronouncement, the Regional Trial Court
10
and executory per Entry of Judgment dated 25 April 2002. The relevant portion of Caloocan City could not be deemed to have committed a reversible error
of the Court of Appeals’ Decision reads: when it denied the petitioners’ Motion to Suspend Proceedings. Apparently, the
extent of the enforceability of an injunction writ issued by the Regional Trial
11
The petitioners postulate that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated Court is defined by the territorial region where the magistrate presides.
November 10, 1997 which emanated from the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City should have prompted the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City to suspend Consequently, the issue involving the binding effect of the injunction issued by
the ejectment proceedings then pending before it. It was the petitioners’ the Quezon City RTC became the law of the case between the parties. Under
contention that the injunction writ issued in Quezon City is enforceable also in this legal principle, whatever is irrevocably established as the controlling legal
Caloocan City inasmuch [as] both cities are situated within the National Capital rule or decision between the parties in the same case continues to be the law of
Region. the case, so long as the facts on which the decision was predicated
12
continue. Stated otherwise, the doctrine holds that once an appellate court has
Under Sec. 17 of B.P. 129, the exercise of jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts declared the law in a case that declaration continues to hold even in subsequent
13
and their judges is basically regional in scope (Malaoan vs. Court of Appeals, 232 appeal. The reason lies in the fact that public policy dictates that litigations
SCRA 249), but under Sec. 18, it may be limited to the territorial area of the must be terminated at some definite time and that the prevailing party should
branch in which the judges sits (OCA vs. Matas, August 2, 1995). not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing
14
party.
Sec. 18 of B.P. 129 states:
Petitioners are therefore barred from assailing the ruling that the injunction
"Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. – The issued by the Quezon City RTC has no binding effect to the courts of Caloocan
Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a branch of the Regional City as this issue had already been passed upon with finality. Issues should be
Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be laid to rest at some point; otherwise there would be no end to litigation. As
deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of elucidated in Hufana v. Genato :
15
determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions, whether civil or

criminal, as well as determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial It is well established that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains
unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with
them. The dictum therein laid down became the law of the case and what was
once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision, continues
to be binding between the same parties as long as the facts on which the
decision was predicated, continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
Hence, the binding effect and enforceability of that dictum can no longer be
relitigated anew since said issue had already been resolved and finally laid to
rest in that aforementioned case (Miranda v. CA, 141 SCRA 306 [1986]), if not by
the principle of res judicata, but at least by conclusiveness of judgment.
Quite conspicuously, the instant petition assailing the order of the RTC denying
petitioners’ motion to suspend execution is a ploy to deprive private respondent
of the fruits of his hard-won case. It must be stressed that once a decision
becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the presiding judge to
issue a writ of execution except in certain cases, as when subsequent events
16
would render execution of judgment unjust. Petitioners did not allege nor
proffer any evidence that this case falls within the exception. Hence, there is no
reason to vacate the writ of execution issued by the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 124, Caloocan City, denying petitioners’ Motion to Supend Execution
dated 14 February 2003 in Civil Case No. C-19097 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
not confined to the courts of first instance of Metropolitan Manila where their
offices are maintained to the exclusion of the courts of first instance in those
Section 2- EXCEPTIONS
localities where the aggrieved parties reside and the questioned decisions are
sought to be enforced. The Court further affirms the decision of said court
FIRST DIVISION
adjudging the order of removal from office as null and void for having been
issued by said respondent who was not the appointing authority and had no
Decano v. Edu,
authority to remove, since under the applicable law, the power to remove
petitioner was vested in the department head as the appointing authority.
G.R. No. L-30070 August 29, 1980 The facts are undisputed.
FEDERICO DECANO, petitioner-appellee, On September 12, 1962, the then Undersecretary of Public Works and
vs. Communications issued to Federico Decano, herein petitioner-appellee, a
ROMEO F. EDU, as Acting Commissioner of Land Transportation and temporary appointment to the position of janitor in the Motor Vehicles
1
CIPRIANO POSADAS, as Acting Registrar, Land Transportation Office, Dagupan City Agency, with compensation at the rate of P1,440.00 per
Commission, Dagupan City Agency, respondents-appellants. annum. The appointment having been approved by the Commissioner of Civil
Service, the said appointee assumed office on September 10, 1962 and he served
therein for almost four years, or until April 29, 1966 when herein respondent-
appellant Cipriano Posadas, as Acting Registrar, Land Transportation
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Commission, Dagupan City, received a telegram from respondent-appellant
Romeo F. Edu, in his then capacity as Acting Commissioner of Land
In this appeal, the Court upholds the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
Transportation Commission (LTC), terminating his (Decano's) services effective
of Pangasinan over the petition for "Mandamus and Injunction" filed by herein
as of the close of business on that day.
petitioner-appellee against respondents-appellants, although the official station
of the first named respondent, whose official actuation is assailed, is in Quezon
Shortly thereafter, the aggrieved petitioner-appellee filed before the Court of
City which is outside the jurisdictional district of the said court. The main issue
First Instance of Pangasinan a petition for "Mandamus and Injunction" claiming
raised is the correctness and legality of said national official's order dismissing
that the aforementioned officials of the LTC acted without power and in excess
petitioner from the service of the Land Transportation Commission, and the
of authority in removing him from the service, and therefore praying of the
power of judicial review of the administrative decisions of national officials is
court to declare as null and void the order for his removal, to declare him
3
entitled to the position, to compel his reinstatement and payment of his regular Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications. He could therefore be
salary, and to enjoin, preliminary, and then permanently, respondents from removed at the pleasure of the appointing official.
disturbing, molesting or otherwise ousting him from his position as janitor.
But this is not to say that petitioner could be removed by the respondent
As prayed for, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court at Commissioner of Land Transportation since the latter was not the official who
the commencement of the proceedings commanding respondents "to desist and appointed him but the Undersecretary acting for the Secretary of Public Works
refrain from disturbing, molesting or otherwise ousting the petitioner from his and Communications nor had said respondent been granted by law the power of
position as janitor in the Land Transportation Commission, Dagupan City removal.
Agency, and to pay the petitioner his corresponding salary from the date of
notice of said preliminary injunction, until further orders from the Court." Per section 79(d) of the Revised Administrative Code, the provision then in
force, it is the department head, upon the recommendation of the chief of the
After trial, while agreeing with respondent Edu that petitioner's appointment as bureau or office concerned, who has the power to "appoint all subordinate
janitor was temporary and therefore the latter could be ousted from his position officers and employees whose appointment is not expressly vested by the law in
4
at any time with or without cause, the lower court nevertheless declared in its the President of the Philippines; and it is also the department head who may
judgment of October 29, 1968 that petitioner's removal was null and void upon remove or punish such employees, except as especially provided otherwise in
5
the ground that under the law, respondent Commissioner of Land the Civil Service Law." It appears that this provision has been precisely applied
Transportation was not the appointing authority insofar as the position of in the appointment of petitioner, for upon the recommendation of the then
petitioner and an other minor positions in his office were concerned; and thus Administrator of the defunct Motor Vehicles Office, it was signed and issued by
lacking the power of appointment, said respondent had neither the power of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications.
removal.
It should be further noted that after petitioner's aforementioned appointment as
Hence, this appeal interposed by respondents-appellants which we find to be janitor in the then Motor Vehicles Office, Republic Act No. 4136 known as the
not well taken. Transportation and Traffic Code created the Land Transportation Commission
from which law respondent Edu is supposed to have derived his powers as
There is no question that petitioner could be removed from office at any time, Commissioner. Perusal of this law however shows nothing that vests in the said
2
for it has been held repeatedly that the acceptance of a temporary appointment commissioner any power to appoint or to remove employees in that new office.
divests an appointee of the right to security of tenure against removal without On the contrary, the placement of said commission under the Department of
cause. it is readily apparent from petitioner's appointment papers that the 6
Public Works and Communications is specifically provided. Hence, the power
character of his term of office was "Temporary" and signed by the then to appoint, and the corollary power to remove, employees in the Land
Transportation Commission thus remained with the Secretary of Public Works terminating the services of respondent was a fait accompli and this he had done
and Communications. As generally the power to remove is inherent in the without authority, as earlier discussed. The injunction is question, consequently,
7
power to appoint , it follows that the termination of petitioner's services by must be taken only to restrain the implementation of respondent Edu's order by
respondent Edu, who then had no power to appoint, was without authority and his co-respondent whose official station at Dagupan City is within the territorial
therefore null and void. boundaries of the trial court's jurisdictional district.
9
In seeking reversal of the trial court's decision, respondents make capital of the Thus, in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen, et al., in
fact that the petition for mandamus with injunction was filed in the Court of which the acts sought to be controlled by "Injunction with Preliminary
First Instance of Pangasinan while respondent Edu holds office in Quezon City Injunction" were relative to the establishment of a local telephone system being
which, they claim, is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the said court. done within the territorial boundaries of the judicial district of the Court of First
Respondents cite the long line of cases from the 1960 case of Acosta vs. Instance of Roxas, the Court similarly upheld the jurisdiction of the Court of
8
Alvendia where this Court, pursuant to sec. 44 (h) of the Judiciary Act, jointly First Instance of Roxas over the petition, although two of the respondents
or alternatively with sec. 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and/or section 2 of named therein the Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, and the
Rule 58, ruled that a court of first instance has no jurisdiction to require or Regional Superintendent of Region IV of the Bureau of Telecommunications —
control the execution of an act committed beyond the limits of its territorial had their official stations at Manila and Iloilo City, respectively, as follows:
jurisdiction. These cases invariably involved petitions for writs of injunction
seeking to control the actions of courts or officers outside the territorial ... In the instant case, the acts relative to the establishment of a
jurisdiction of the respondent courts of first instance where said petitions had local telephone system by petitioners were being done within
been filed. The Acosta ruling of non-jurisdiction does not apply, however, to the the territorial boundaries of the province or district of
facts and circumstances at bar. respondent Court, and so said Court had jurisdiction to restrain
them by injunction. It does not matter that some of the
Here, petitioner seeks primarily the annulment of the dismissal order issued by respondents in the trial court, at whom the injunction order
respondent Edu, mandamus and injunction being then merely coronary was issued, had their official 'residence outside the territorial
remedies to the main relief sought, and what is prayed to be enjoined, as in fact jurisdiction of the trial court. In the case of Gonzales vs.
the trial court did enjoin by preliminary injunction, is the implementation of the Secretary of Public Works, et al., (G.R. No. L-21988, September
termination order against the petitioner. It is true that the order of dismissal 30, 1966, 18 SCRA 296), wherein the only question raised was
was issued by respondent Edu, but it was to be implemented in Dagupan City by whether the Court of First Instance of Davao had jurisdiction to
his subordinate officer, respondent Acting Registrar of the LTC stationed at entertain a case the main purpose of which was to prevent the
Dagupan City. Insofar, therefore, as respondent Edu is concerned, the order enforcement of a decision of the Secretary of Public Works who
was in Manila this Court held that, inasmuch as the acts sought decision, the provincial courts of first instance have equal jurisdiction with the
to be restrained were to be performed within the territorial Manila courts to review decisions of national officials, as otherwise litigants of
boundaries of the province of Davao, the Court of First Instance ted means would practically be denied access to the courts of the localities
of Davao had jurisdiction to hear and decide the case, and to where the reside and where the questioned acts are sought to be enforced. Thus,
issue the necessary injunction order. This Gonzales case was an Justice J.B.L. Reyes stressed on behalf of the Court that —
action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction and/or preliminary mandatory injunction to prevent A careful analysis of the allegations made in the petition wig
the demolition of Gonzales' dam in Davao in compliance with show that the petitioner's principal complaint was that the
the order of the Secretary of Public Works. decision of the Director of Lands, as affirmed by the Secretary
of Agriculture and the Executive Secretary, was contrary to law
It follows, therefore, that since the acts to be restrained were in giving retroactive application to Lands Administrative Order
being done in Roxas City, or within the territorial jurisdiction of No. 7-1. In other words, the remedy sought was the judicial
respondent court, the latter had jurisdiction to restrain said review of the administrative decision in question and its
acts even if the office of respondent Director of the Bureau of annulment on account of errors of law allegedly committed. ...
Telecommunications is in Manila, and that of respondent
Regional Superintendent of Region IV is in Iloilo City. The doctrines invoked in support of the theory of non-
jurisdiction (Castano vs. Lobingier, 7 Phil. 91;Acosta vs.
As in the above-cited case of Aligaen, the national official stationed at Quezon Alvendia, L-14958, Oct. 31, 1960; Samar Mining Co. vs. Arnado,
City, namely, respondent Commissioner Edu, was impleaded as respondent in L-17109, June 30, 1961) are inapplicable, in that those cases
the Pangasinan court for a complete determination of the issues involved, the involved petitions for writs of injunction seeking to control the
legality of Edu's order of dismissal being the pivotal issue to determine the actions of courts or officers outside the territorial jurisdiction of
merits of the mandamus and injunction aspects of the petition. In other words, the respondent courts involved. Here the sole point in issue
Mr. Edu was joined as respondent not for injunction purposes but mainly for is whether the decision of the respondent public officers was
testing the legality of his dismissal order and his transmittal thereof to his legally correct or not and without going into the merits of the
corespondent registrar at Dagupan City to implement the same and terminate case, we see no cogent reason why this power of judicial review
the services of the petitioner in Dagupan City. should be confined to the courts of first instance of the
locality where the offices of respondents are maintained, to
As held by the Court in the 1965 case of Gayacao vs. The Honorable Executive the exclusion of the courts of first instance in thoselocalities
10
Secretary, etc, et al., where the issue is the correctness of a national official's
where the plaintiffs reside, and where the questioned decisions belief." It constitutes substantial compliance with the requirement of section 6
12
are being enforced. of Rule 7, as held in Madrigal vs. Rodas. At any rate, this petty technicality
deserves scant consideration where the question at issue is one purely of law
It is easy to see that if the contested ruling of the court below is and there is no need of delving into the veracity of the allegations in the
sustained, the same would result not only in hardship to petition, which are not disputed at all by respondents. As we have held time and
litigants of limited means, practically amounting to denial of again, imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure are to be
access to the courts, but would also unnecessarily encumber the disregarded except where substantial rights would otherwise be prejudiced.
Manila courts whose dockets are already over —
burdened. Actually, since Ortua vs. Singson, 59 Phil. 440, the ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed.
power of provincial courts of first instance to review
administrative decisions of national officials has
been consistently recognized.
While the petitioner herein also prayed that the land

authorities be ordered to reinstate her original application,
such remedy is purely a corollary to the main relief sought; for,
as the allegations now stand, reversal' of the questioned
administrative decision would necessarily lead to the same
result.
Respondents finally raise a technical point referring to the allegedly defective

verification of the petition filed in the trial court, contending that the clause in
the verification statement "that I have read the contents of the said petition; and
that [to] the best of my knowledge are true and correct" is insufficient since
11
under section 6 of Rule 7, it is required that the person verifying must have
read the pleading and that the allegations thereof are true of his own
knowledge. We do not see any reason for rendering the said verification void.
The statement "to the best of my knowledge are true and correct" referring to
the allegations in the petition does not mean mere "knowledge, information and
Dagupan Electric Co. v. Paño Narvaez and Jose T. Apigo against Hon. Ernani Cruz Pano, District Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, and MC Adore Finance and
Investment, Incorporated. The pertinent allegations of the petition are:
FIRST DIVISION
5. That petitioner DECORP is a legislative franchise holder to operate and
maintain for profit electric services within its franchised area comprising
G.R. No. L-49510 January 28, 1980
the City of Dagupan and the towns of Sta. Barbara, Calasiao, San Jacinto
DAGUPAN ELECTRIC CORPORATION, ISABELITA L. LLAMES, PRIMO C. and San Fabian, an in the province of Pangasinan, and that its generating
NARVAEZ and JOSE T. APIGO,petitioners, plant is located in San Miguel, Calasiao, Pangasinan;
vs.
6. That private respondent MC Adore is the owner of the MC Adore
THE HONORABLE ERNANI CRUZ PANO, DISTRICT JUDGE OF THE
International Palace Hotel which is located in the City of Dagupan and
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH XVIII and MC ADORE
which became operational in March, 1978;
FINANCE AND INVESTMENT INCORPORATED, respondents.
7. That private respondent MC Adore is a customer of the petitioner;

Luis E. Serafica & Associates for petitioners.
8. That for failure on the part of private respondent MC Adore to pay its
Arthur Lim for private respondents.
September and October 1978 bills, the petitioner served a Notice of
Disconnection on November 25, 1978 that unless payment is made within
the usual period of 48 hours, the disconnection of service will be made,
FERNANDEZ, J.: hence on November 27, 1978 at 1: 15 p.m., after the expiration of the 48-
hour period and no payment was made, the petitioner corporation
This is an original special civil action for certiorari and prohibition to, annul the
disconnected the electrical services to the former;
proceedings in Civil Case No.. Q-26502 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XVIII, Quezon City, entitled "MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc., 9. That on December 6, 1978, respondent MC Adore filed a complaint for
plaintiff, versus Dagupan Electric Corporation, et al., defendants" on the ground damages with writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the
of lack of jurisdiction and to prohibit the respondent judge from proceeding petitioner corporation in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
further in the case, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary XVIII, presided by the respondent judge, and which complaint was
injunction filed by Dagupan Electric Corporation, Isabelita I. Llames, Primo C. docketed as Civil Case No. Q-26502, a xerox copy of which is hereto
attached as Annex. "A" and. made an integral part of this petition; 13. That also on the same date, December 8, 1978, acting on the said
Amended Complaint, Annex "A-l"; petition for contempt, Annex "C", the respondent judge issued an order.
the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:
10. That on the same date December 6, 1978, the judge, issued ex parte
Order for a preliminary mandatory injunction, commanding the In today's hearing nobody appeared for- defendant Dagupan
petitioner corporation as well as its agents in Dagupan City to "restore Electric Corporation. the Court finds that pursuant to Sec- 3,
immediately not later than 5-M p.m., December 7, 1978, the electrical (Rule 7 1), Rules of Court and without finally resolving whether
power of the MC Adore International Palace Hotel and resume the defendant's corporate officers may be adjudged in contempt, the
electrical supply of an the electrical services and facilities to said hotel to Court finds that their corporate officers, except Atty. Leonardo
enable plaintiff to operate it fully, under pain of contempt for violation Baro may be held in custody until the order is complied, as the
thereof" and in the same Order, the respondent judge set the application Court finds no valid justification for this contumacious
for preliminary mandatory injunction for head on December 11, 1978 at disobedience. Defendant Corporation has its head offices in
9:00 o'clock in the morning. A certified, xerox copy of said Order is hereto Quezon City, and although the plant is in Dagupan City, the plant
attached as Annex "B" and made an integral part hereof; can only act upon orders of the Quezon City head office. The
Court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71, Rules of Court orders the arrest
11. That on December 8, 1978, the private respondent also moved that its and confinement of Isabelita Llames, President of defendant
"cash bond in the sum of P50,000.00 represented by Check No. 12100 of corporation, Primo Narvaez, General Manager of defendant
the Bank of Philippine Islands payable to the clerk of court" be substituted corporation and Jose Apigo if by 12:00 o'clock midnight,
by a surety bond. A copy of said motion is hereto attached as Annex C 1; December 8, 1978 the mandatory injunction is not complied with,
and for detention to continue until the order is complied with.
12. That for failure of the petitioner and its agents in Dagupan City to
The Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary and the
comply with the aforesaid preliminary mandatory injunction, MC Adore
Provincial Commander of the Philippine Constabulary in
filed a petition to declare defendant Corporation and its corporate officers
Pangasinan are ordered to enforce this order if by midnight
in contempt of court, also on the same day, December 8, 1978. A xerox
December 8, 1978 the mandatory injunction is not complied with.
copy of said petition is hereto attached as Annex "D" and made an integral
This order of arrest is deemed cancelled if the restoration is made
part hereof;
within the aforesaid period, without prejudice to the Court
considering whether the respondents may be adjudged guilty of
contempt correspondingly punished.
A certified xerox copy of the said Order is hereto attached as Annex 'E' ordinary course of law, as in fact, the respondent court has just issued the
and made an integral part hereof; two other orders today which are hereto attached and marked as Annexes
'h' and 'i' respectively.
14. That on December 11, 1978, the date for hearing of the petitioner for
preliminary mandatory injunction, as set in the Order of December 6, 18. That there is no appeal from the orders of December 6, 8, and 19, 1978,
1978, the petitioner corporation appeared and moved for the and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
reconsideration of the Orders of December 6, 1978 and December 8, 1978, course of law.
Annexes "B' and "E", for want of jurisdiction, excess of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion. A copy of the Motion for Reconsideration is 19. That pending the resolution of this petition only a writ of preliminary
hereto attached and marked as Annex "F"; injunction issuing from the Honorable Supreme Court can stop the
enforcement of the void Orders complained of thru subsequent orders of
15. That the respondent judge in an order dated December 19, 1978, denied the respondent court designed to implement the void orders complained
1
the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, and further ordered the of: ... "
enforcement of the preliminary mandatory injunction, specifically its
order of December 6, 1978, Annex "B". A certified xerox copy of said order In a resolution dated January 3, 1979, this Court, without giving due
2
is hereto attached and marked as Annex "G"; course to the petition, required the respondents to comment thereon.
16. That the private respondent MC Adore, even before the Order of The private respondent, MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc., in its
December 19, 1978, was served upon the petitioner, has already mobilized comment filed on March 7, 1979, alleged:
the police authorities to arrest the petitioners, and to enforce the

Respondent MC ADORE is the owner and operator of the MC Adore
preliminary mandatory injunction, which in effect constitutes final
International Palace Hotel located at Dagupan City Philippines, which is a
judgment in the case even before the petitioners have answered the
five-star hotel costing P75M in which the government through the
complaint in the civil case before the respondent judge;
Development Bank of the Philippines has a 75% equity. In a relatively
17. That in the light of the earlier actuations of the respondent judge, short span of tune. the hotel has earned an excellent reputation in the
more particularly the issuance of the Order of December 8, 1978, there is tourism industry, particularly in Dagupan City and its environs. On the
imminent danger that the petitioners may be unlawfully deprived of their other hand, respondent (should be petitioner) DECORP is engaged in the
liberty, as well as their property, without due process of law, to which business of supplying electricity in Dagupan City BUT its principal office
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the and executive address is at Suite 201 Delta Building West Avenue, Quezon
City. Its modus operandi or system of business operation is to buy electric THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY & 70/100 (P25,380.70) PESOS covering the
power from the National Power Corporation and retails this, in turn, to its electrical consumption of the hotel for the period May 31 to June 30, 1978.
customers in Dagupan City, such as MC ADORE. Immediately after having sent to MC ADORE the said electric bill,
petitioners, by means of fraud and deceit, retrived said Bill and summarily
On or about October 29, 1977, respondent MC ADORE engaged the wrote on the face of the bill the word "ERRONEOUS"
services of petitioner DECORP to supply electric power to the
aforementioned MC ADORE HOTEL by depositing with petitioner To complicate matters and aggravate the injury to MC ADORE,
DECORP the amount of P35,000.00 for consumption and the amount of petitioners on or about July 12, 1978, without the knowledge and consent
P25,000.00 for the extension line of 313.8 KV; that, however, the Polyphase of MC ADORE, surreptitiously removed the electric meter of the hotel
meter a, the said hotel and the transmission line from DECORP to the and made some adjustments and reinstalled the same.
hotel were installed and paid for by MC ADORE by its own expenses
although the same were the obligation and duty of petitioner DECORP; MC ADORE strongly protested against petitioners' abovedescribed
that, actually, it was only sometime in March, 1978, that plaintiff utilized unlawful and malicious acts but petitioners sent instead to respondent
or consumed electric power during the process of testing the centralized MC ADORE on July 26, 1978 an electric bill unilaterally prepared by
air-conditioning system of the hotel building until the end of April, 1978. petitioners for the period May 31 to June 30, 1978 in the amount of
EIGHTY THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FORTY THREE & 62/100
The electric bills for the months of March and April, 1978 in the amount (P80,243.62) PESOS thereby changing without justifiable basis the
of P7,221.00 and P65,822.47, respectively, were duly and fully paid for by original bill for P25,380.70.
respondent MC ADORE to petitioner DECORP.
In due course, MC ADORE filed with the Board of Power and Waterworks
Pursuant to MC ADORE's energy conservation program in line with a complaint against the petitioners dated August 12, 1978 and
governmental policy to this effect, and because the testing period of the subsequently amended on August 21, 1978, demanding redress from
centralized air-conditioning system had been successfully terminated, the petitioners' illegal and highhanded acts, as a result of which the Board of
electric consumption of MC ADORE for May, 1978 significantly lowered Power and Waterworks issued an Order dated August 18, 1978 directing
and its electric bill for said period amounted to only P35,707.85 which MC petitioners to "refrain from disconnecting electric service of MC ADORE
ADORE likewise diligently and fully paid to the petitioners. International Palace, Dagupan, pending resolution of Letter-Complaint
dated August 12, 1978."
Sometime on or about July 10, 1978, petitioners sent its (sic) electric bills
to respondent MC ADORE in the amount of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND
Instead of complying with the Restraining Order of the Board of Power about by petitioners' abovedescribed malicious, unlawful and malevolent
and Waterworks, petitioners sent to MC ADORE on November 25, 1978, a acts, the said guests had to transfer to other hotels and/or residences and
Saturday, at about 1:00 o'clock p.m. when banking facilities were already other expected guests and patrons were likewise forced not to check-in to
closed, a notice of disconnection, and, two (2) days later, or on November the hotel, thereby also causing additional tremendous losses and damages
27, 1978, petitioners disconnected electrical power to the respondent's MC to MC ADORE.
Adore Hotel, without any legal or factual basis and justification, thereby
causing to the respondent MC ADORE tremendous actual damages and Respondent MC ADORE (Plaintiff in the court below), was thus
losses in an amount of not less than Five Million (P5,000,000.00) Pesos constrained to file before the court a quo a complaint for damages with
and such other sum representing moral, exemplary and other damages writ of preliminary mandatory injunction docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
that shall be proved at the trial, as duly claimed in the Amended 26502 (Annex A of Petition) which was later on amended so as to include
Complaint (Annex "A-1", Petition). petitioner DECORP's executive officers Isabelita Llames, Primo Narvaez
and Jose T. Apigo (who are also petitioners in this case). per Amended
After the illegal and unlawful disconnection of the electrical powers of the Complaint filed with the lower court on December 14, 1978, Annex A-I
hotel made by petitioners as alleged hereinabove, the Board of Power and Petition. While the petitioners make reference to the orders of December
Waterworks required petitioners, particularly petitioner Isabelita Llames, 6 and 8, 1978, Annexes B and E of the petition. petitioners however have
in a letter dated December 1, 1978, duly received on the same date by completely omitted the fact that on December 11, 1978, the lower court
petitioner DECORP, to re-connect immediately electric powers and issued the following order which we reproduce hereunder:
service to the hotel, but petitioners likewise did not obey this, and by said
unwarranted disobedience and open defiance rendered the Board of Considering the manifestation of the parties, and it appearing that
Power and waterworks helpless and impotent to protect the rights of the defendant corporation as well as its corporate officers strongly
respondents MC ADORE; hence, with all the more reason, the present disputes the factual allegations of the petition as it is claimed that
action before the lower court is respondent's effective remedy. petitioner is in arrears in the payment of its electric bill in the
amount of almost half a million pesos: and it appearing further that
As a matter of fact, respondent MC ADORE had already invited foreign this matter is also pending before the Board of Power, the Court in
guests and local patrons to the hotel's commitment to Penthouse 7 the interest of justice suspends the enforcement of the warrant of
scheduled and to be televised on December 9, 1978 for which respondent arrest issued on December 6, 1978, as well as its mandatory
MC ADORE had already paid Penthouse 7 and that several tickets had injunction pending a full hearing on the facts leading to the
already been sold, and that several guests had already checked in to the disconnection of the electrical facilities of petitioners. The Court
hotel but due to the complete power breakdown of the hotel brought
orders the parties to submit memoranda with supporting affidavits ORDER issue restraining respondents from enforcing or
in support of their respective claims. continuing to enforce the orders of December 6, 1978 and
December 12, 1978 all issued in Civil Case No. Q-26502, entitled
Let this, case be reset to December 15, 1978, at 10:00 o'clock in the "MC Adore Finance & Investment, Inc., Plaintiff, versus,
morning. Dagupan Electric Corp., Defendant' of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII at Quezon City, unless within
SO ORDERED.
five (5) days from notice, respondent (1) files a counter bond of
P225,000.00 to cover payment of its account in arrears with
The above-quoted Order shows that the injunction incident was fully
petitioner, stated by petitioner to be in the sum of P466,099.15;
discussed and ventilated before the lower court and that the parties
(2) shows that it has made regular payment to petitioner and
submitted exhaustive memoranda and affidavits in support of their
continues to make regular monthly payments of its monthly
respective claims, after which full hearing the lower court issued its order
electrical consumption after reconnection as per the monthly
of December 19, 1978, Annex G Petition. Emphasis is made on the Order
4
bills presented by petitioner."
of December 11, 1978 to highlight the fact that the subsequent order of
December 19, 1978, now sought to be reviewed by the petitioners, was
3
On March 21, 1979 the private respondent manifested that it had filed a
issued by the lower court after fun hearing on the controversy.
counterbond of P225,000.00 and that since the reconnection of electrical power
was effected on December 22, 1978 it had depositing with the lower court the
This Court issued a resolution dated March 14, 1979 which reads:
sum of P35,000.00 beginning January 1979 in compliance with the order of said
5
L-49520 (Dagupan Electric Corporation, et al. vs. Hon. Ernani court of December 19, 1979.
Cruz-Patio, et al.). — Considering the allegations, issues and
In a motion filed on April 10, 1979 by the petitioner, it is alleged that on March
arguments adduced in the petition for certiorari and
29, 1979 the Dagupan Electric Corporation sent a letter to the private
prohibition with preliminary injunction as well as private
respondent requesting payment of its monthly bills from December 22, 1978 up
respondents' comment thereon, the Court Resolved: (a) TO
to February 1979; that the said letter was received by the private respondent on
GIVE DUE COURSE to the petition; and (b) to REQUIRE (1) the
March 26, 1979; and that despite the lapse of 12 days since the private
petitioners to deposit P80.40 for costs and clerk's commission
respondent had received the billings of the Dagupan Electric Corporation, no
within five (5) days from notice hereof; and (2) both parties
payment had been made; and prayed that its Court "declare its temporary
submit simultaneous memoranda within thirty (30) days from
6
restraining order effective" so that the petitioner may act accordingly.
notice hereof. As prayed for, let a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
The private respondent MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc. opposed the hereof, the total amount due from said respondent to petitioner
motion of the petitioners dated April 10, 1979 and asked that the temporary corporation by way of payment of respondent's electric
restraining order of March 14, 1979, in so far as it orders MC Adore to make consumption after reconnection (on December 22, 1978) as per
regular monthly payments to the petitioners of the monthly electrical the monthly bills presented by petitioner is not fully paid.
consumption after reconnection "as per the monthly bills presented by
petitioners" be lifted and/or set aside inasmuch as the meter had not yet been The Court expressly laid down two (2) conditions for the
tested and sealed by the Board of Power.

7 suspension of the effectivity of the temporary restraining order
under its resolution of March 14, 1979, namely: (a) the filing of a
On May 12, 1979, the petitioners filed an urgent supplemental motion reiterating counterbond of P225,000.00 to cover payment of respondent's
their prayer that they be allowed to redisconnect the electric power from the account in with petitioner., stated by petitioner to be in the
hotel of the respondent MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc. on the ground sum of P466,099.15; and (b) that respondent show that 'it has
that said respondent had failed and refused to pay its electric power made regular payment to petitioner and continues to make
8
consumption based on the actual meter readings as directed by this Court. regular monthly payments of its monthly electric consumption
after reconnection as per the monthly bills presented by
This Court issued on May 18, 197 9 the following resolution: petitioner.' And it in behooves respondent after availing of said
conditions for suspension of the restraining order to now
L-49520 (Dagupan Electric Corporation, et al. vs. Hon. Ernani
renege on making such monthly payments and belatedly ask for
Cruz Patio, etc., et al.) — Upon consideration of petitioners'
the setting aside of such condition.
manifestation and motion with prayer that the Court's
temporary restraining order of March 14, 1979 be declared The urgent motions of petitioners for first and second
effective, and respondent McAdore Finance and Investment, extensions totalling thirty (30) days from April 22, 1979 within
Inc.'s opposition thereto as well as petitioners' manifestation which to file memorandum, are GRANTED.
and urgent supplemental motion praying that they be allowed
to redisconnect electric power from the premises of said The letter dated April 22, 1979 of Ms. Modesta R. Sabeniano,
respondent in implementation of said restraining order, the President and Chairlady of the Board of McAdore International
Court Resolved to GRANT petitioners' prayer declaring effective Palace, addressed to Acting Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando,
the Temporary Restraining Order of March 14, 1979 and in amplification of her telegrams requesting among others, for
allowing petitioners to disconnect the electric power at the the early disposition of this case, and said respondent McAdore
9
premises of respondent if within ten (10) days from notice International Palace's memorandum in this case, are NOTED.
The private respondent, MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc., filed on May other mode of computation, both within five (5) days from
24, 1979 an urgent motion to hold in abeyance compliance with the second notice hereof.
portion of the resolution dated March 16, 1979 in relation to the resolution dated
May 21, 1979 (should be May 18, 1979) on the ground that the current monthly Pending receipt of such comment and until further orders of
bills being presented by the petitioner, Dagupan Electric Corporation, to private this Court, implementation of the May 18, 1979 resolution
respondent are the result of readings taken from the electric meter which was allowing petitioner to disconnect the electric power in
tampered and asked that it be allowed to continue depositing the regular respondent's premises if the aforesaid accrued monthly bills
payment in the amount of P35,000.00 per month with the respondent court since reconnection are not fully paid, shall be HELD in
until such time that the issue on the tampered meter and questionable bins abeyance. Meanwhile, in order to avoid future disputes as to
shall have been finally resolved.

10 the monthly readings taken from the allegedly tampered meter,
the Court DIRECTS both parties or either of them to forthwith
On May 28, 1979, this Court issued the following resolution: make representations with the Board of Power and Waterworks
(1) to immediately REPLACE the electric meter presently
L-49520 (Dagupan Electric Corporation, et al. vs. Hon. Ernani installed in respondent's premises with a new sealed one at
Cruz-Patio, et al.) — The motion of Attys. Teves, Campos, respondent's expense; and (2) to CONDUCT with prior notice
Hernandez, and Lim for leave to withdraw as counsel for to and in the presence of both parties and/or their duly
respondent McAdore Finance and Investment, Incorporated, authorized representatives, a check-up and verification of the
and the urgent motion of petitioner for an extension of ten (10) present electric meter upon its removal and replacement with a
days from May 22, 1979 within which to file memorandum and new meter as to whether or not it has been tampered with, and
reply, are GRANTED. Considering respondent's urgent motion to REPORT to this Court the action taken hereon and the
to hold in abeyance compliance with the second portion of the results within five (5) days from notice.
11
resolution of March 16, 1979 in relation to the resolution of May

21, 1979, the Court Resolve to REQUIRE petitioner (a) to The private respondent, MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc., manifested on
COMMENT thereon; and (b) to SUBMIT to this Court, a month June 5, 1979 that on June I and 2, 1979, a thorough check-up and investigation of
by month itemization of the accrued electric bills of respondent the then existing power meter was conducted after which a new sealed meter
from December 22, 1978 (date of reconnection) to April 1979 was installed in replacement of the old one by a group composed of duly
stated by petitioner to total P378,669.49 in its manifestation authorized representatives of the petitioner, Dagupan Electric Corporation, and
and urgent supplemental motion of May 11, 1979 and whether the private respondent, together with the authorized representatives of the
such bills were based on the electric meter readings or some Board of Power.
Pursuant to this Court's resolution of May 28, 1979, the Acting Executive On June 13, 1979, the petitioners filed the following manifestation:
Director and the Office-In-Charge of the Board of Power and Waterworks
submitted on June 8, 1979 its report containing the following remarks: 1. The petitioners have secured a copy of the Report and
Findings of the Committee constituted by the Board of Power
1. The terminal covers of the potential and current transformers BOP composed of the BOP Chief Utilities Regulation Engineer
were sealed by the engineers of the Dagupan Electric Domingo C. Villanueva, BOP Electrical Engineer Margarito C.
Corporation after the wiring connections from the secondary Gatbonton, and BOP Supervising Precision Instrument
terminals of the potential and current transformers to the Technician Romeo R. Pulanco in accordance with the
terminals of the existing meter were traced and checked. Resolution dated 28 May 1979 of this Honorable Tribunal and
submit the said attached copy of the Report and Findings in
2. The meter which was placed, after it was tested and sealed by compliance with the said Resolution
the Board of Power Technician, was placed in a carton box and
sealed with masking tape. Signatures of representatives of both 2. From the said Report and Findings, it can be seen that the
parties and the Board were made and appears on the masking meter then installed (before replacement) was "within the
tape. The said meter is in the custody of MC Adore limits of tolerance of plus or minus 3% allowed by the Board"
International Palace. (paragraph 2, page 2 of Report and Findings), meaning the
meter then installed, upon which the electric billings sent by
3. After the newly installed meter was checked for the correct petitioner DECORP to private respondent was based, reflected
rotation of the meter disc, the representatives of the Dagupan the actual and true electric power consumption of the Hotel.
Electric Corporation sealed the meter terminal cover and KW
demand resetting lever and padlocked the meter box. This was 3. It should be noted also that the new wiring connection of the
done in the presence of the engineer of the MC Adore meter now presently installed. which is in accordance with the
International Palace and representatives of the Board. Guide for Installing General Electric watthour Meters (a wiring
con. section which is also correct and acceptable like the wiring
4. The connection of the NEW meter is in accordance with the connection "as found") was upon the instance of the Electric
G.E guide except for the consideration of line 1 (L1) and line 3 Engineer of private respondent, Engr. Roque A. Barrientos
(L3) in diagram were interchanged. By redrawing and analyzing (paragraph 4, page 2, of Report and Findings), so that private
the circuit, the results conforms with the G.E. guide for respondent would really not have any reason whatsoever for
installing watthour meters.
refusing to pay the future electric bills that will be sent by and having unlawfully assumed to be a lawyer, thereby committing an act
petitioner DECORP. constituting contempt of court and reiterating that the petitioners be allowed to
enforce the temporary restraining order.
This Court issued on June 22, 1979 the following resolution:
The private respondent, MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc., in turn, filed
In L-49520 (Dagupan Electric Corporation, et al. vs. Hon. on June 25, 1979 a petition to cite for contempt DECORP General Manager Jose
Ernani Cruz-Pano, etc. et al.), the Court Resolved: (a) to NOTE T. Apigo for having instituted a criminal complaint for theft in the Office of the
(1) petitioners' (1-a) comment on respondents' urgent motion City Fiscal of Dagupan City against Modesto R. Sabeniano for allegedly and
and amended urgent resolution of March 16, 1979; (2-a) unlawfully tampering with the MC Adore hotel's electric meter by interchanging
manifestation and compliance with the resolution of May 28, the positions of the current leads at the terminal in the transformers thereby
1979; (3-a) manifestation and motion stating that they have registering less electric current used by the hotel than actually consumed
made representations with the Board of Power and Waterworks therein.
in connection with the resolution of May 28, 1979; and (4-a)
manifestation stating that they have already secured a copy of The petitioners filed on June 25, 1979 a manifestation of compliance and urgent
the report and findings of the committee constituted by the motion stating that they had earlier registered their comment to the Amended
said Board of Power and Waterworks; (2) private respondent Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance Compliance with the Second Portion of the
MC Adore Finance & Investment, Inc.'s manifestation and Resolution dated March 16, 1979 by way of their comment on the private
motion alleging compliance with the resolution of May 28, respondent's urgent motion dated May 31, 1979 and praying that the amended
1979; (3) the compliance by the Officer-in-charge of the Board urgent motion filed by the private respondent be denied and that the petitioners
of Power and waterworks with the resolution of May 28, 1979; be allowed to enforce the temporary restraining order contained in the
and (4) the appearance of Atty. Teodoro P. Regino as counsel resolution dated March 16, 1979.
for private respondent McAdore Finance & Investment, Inc.;
and (b) both petitioners and respondents having filed their This Court issued a resolution dated July 6, 1979 which reads:
respective memoranda, to declare this case SUBMITTED for

In L-49520 (Dagupan Electric Corporation, et al. vs. Hon.
decision.
Ernani Cruz-Pano, etc., et al.), the Court Resolved to DEFER
The petitioners filed a motion on June 20, 1979 to cite Modesta Sabeniano for action on petitioners' counter-manifestation and motion to
contempt for having signed the manifestation and motion dated June 4, 1979 for strike out private respondent's manifestation and motion to
MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc. when she is not a member of the bar cite Modesto Sabeniano for contempt and their manifestation
of compliance with urgent motion, and respondent MC Adore to a judgment but also to an order of execution thereof before the rights
Finance & Investment, Inc.'s petition for contempt and between the parties are finally and irrevocably determined."
opposition to petitioners' aforesaid motion to strike out and to
cite Ms. Sabeniano for contempt, until decision on the merit of Stripped of verbiage unwarranted conclusions and irrelevant matters, the
this case. pertinent facts are that the petitioner, Dagupan Electric Corporation DECORP is
a domestic corporation with principal office address at Delta Building, West
On July 19, 1979, the petitioners filed a manifestation and supplemental motion Avenue, Quezon City; that pursuant to its business, it was granted the requisite
to implement the temporary restraining order alleging that on July 3, 1979, the franchise to operate and maintain electric services in the City of Dagupan and
petitioner Dagupan Electric Corporation sent a billing letter to McAdore other towns in Pangasinan; that it has its principal office in Quezon City
Finance and Investment, Inc. transmitting therewith the electric bill for private although its generating plant is located in Barrio San Miguel, Calasiao,
respondent's power consumption during the month of June 1979 in the amount Pangasinan; that the private respondent, MC Adore Finance and Investment,
of P90,269.26; that the said billing for June 1979 was based on a reading of the Inc., is also a domestic corporation with office at 148 N. Domingo, Cubao,
new electric meter which was installed at private respondent's hotel on June 2, Quezon City; that said private respondent owns and operates the MC Adore
1979 by the Board of Power and Waterworks in the presence of the International Palace Hotel at Dagupan City; that on February 2, 1978, the private
representatives of the parties in compliance with the resolution of this Court respondent, MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc., executed a contract for
dated May 28, 1979; that notwithstanding the installation of the new meter and power service with the petitioner DECORP; that the petitioner DECORP
the rewiring of the connections in the meter system in private respondent's rendered full power service upon the premises of the hotel in March 19, 1978;
hotel which erased all doubts as to the correctness of the billings of DECORP that acting in the belief that the June 1978 bill in the amount of 1'25,380.70 was
against, the private respondent in accordance with the said resolution of this erroneous, the petitioner DECORP recalled the same and a corrected bill in the
Court dated May 28, 1979, the private respondent has continuously refused to amount of P80,243.62 was sent to the private respondent; that the private
pay its bills and prayed that the temporary restraining order dated May 14, 1979 respondent failed and refused to pay the aforesaid bill; that this prompted
be ordered implemented so that the petitioners may proceed to disconnect the DECORP to issue on August 18, 1978 the usual 18-hours notice of disconnection
electric power from private respondent's hotel. in accordance with the terms of the contract executed between the parties; that
thereafter, the private respondent complained with the Board of Power and
The private respondent, MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc., opposed the Waterworks that the DECORP tampered with its electric meters; that upon its
manifestation and supplemental motion to implement temporary restraining own representation, the private respondent was able to secure a telegram order
order on the ground that to grant at this stage the petitioners' several motions issued by the Board of Power and Waterworks restraining DECORP from
to implement the temporary restraining order so as to snow them to disconnect disconnecting power services from the premises of the hotel pending resolution
the electric power from the private respondent's hotel "would amount not only
of the complaint; that the parties allegedly negotiated a settlement and both the Court finds no valid justification for this contumacious disobedience.
arrived at an agreement before the Board wherein the private respondent Defendant Corporation has its head offices in Dagupan City, the plant can
undertook to pay the accrued bills of June and July in the amount of P76,058.38 only act upon orders of the Quezon City head office. The Court pursuant to
and P77,609.70, respectively, and to pay the subsequent bills as they fall due; Sec. 3, Rule 71, Rules of Court orders the arrest and confinement of Isabelita
that the private respondent allegedly refused to pay the accrued bills; that in Llames. president of defendant corporation, Primo Narvaez, General
view thereof, the petitioner DECORP was constrained anew to serve the private Manager of defendant corporation, and Jose Apigo if by 12:00 o'clock
respondent the 48-hour notice of disconnection for its refusal to pay the midnight, December 8, 1978 the mandatory injunction is not complied with,
accrued bills; that consequently, on November 27, 1978 after forty-eight hours and for detention to continue until the order is complied with. The
from notice had lapsed, the DECORP disconnected the power from the premises Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary and the Provincial
of the hotel; that the private respondent filed a complaint with a prayer for Commander of the Philippine Constabulary in Pangasinan are ordered to
preliminary mandatory injunction on December 6, 1978 before the Court of First enforce this order if by midnight December 8, 1978 the mandatory
Instance of Rizal in Quezon City; that on the same day, December 6, 1978, the injunction is not complied with. This order to arrest is deemed cancelled if
presiding judge, Hon. Ernani Cruz-Pano, issued an order granting the issuance the restoration is made within the aforesaid period, without prejudice to the
of a preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the petitioner DECORP Court considering whether the respondent may be adjudged guilty of
and its agents to "restore immediately not later than 5:00 P.M., December 7, contempt correspondingly punished.
1978, the electrical power of the McAdore International Palace Hotel and
resume the electrical supplies of all the electrical services and facilities to said that on December 11, 1978, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of
hotel to enable the plaintiff to operate it fully, under pain of contempt for the questioned orders dated December 6, 1978 and December 8, 1978 on
violation thereof that on December 8, 1978, the private respondent filed a jurisdictional ground; that on December 19, 1978, the respondent judge issued
petition to declare the petitioners in contempt of court; that on December 8, an order denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration and ordering the
1978, the respondent judge issued an order, the pertinent portion of which enforcement of the questioned order dated December 6, 1978; and that,
reads: however, electric power on the premises of the hotel was not restored until
December 22, 1978.
In today's hearing nobody appeared for defendant Dagupan Electric
Corporation, the Court finds that pursuant to Sec. 3, Rules of Court and The main issue is whether or not the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Branch
without finally resolving whether defendant's corporate officers may be XVIII at Quezon City, has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-26502 entitled "MC
adjudged in contempt, the Court finds that their corporate officers, except Adore Finance and Investment, Inc. vs. Dagupan Electric Corporation, et al."
Atty. Leonardo Baro may be held in custody until the order is complied, as and, as a corollary issue, whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering
the Dagupan Electric Corporation. to restore the connection of the electric of the said corporation are made in Quezon City. The employees of the Dagupan
power to the hotel in Dagupan City owned and operated by MC Adore Finance Electric Corporation in Dagupan City merely carry out the orders issued by the
and Investment Corporation. officials of said corporation in Quezon City. Hence the acts sought to be
restrained are being committed in Quezon City.
The pertinent provision of the Judiciary Act of 1948 reads:
The respondent judge did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
Sec. 44. Original jurisdiction. — Courts of First Instance shall have original questioned order directing the Dagupan Electric Corporation to restore the
jurisdiction: connection of the electric power to the hotel owned by MC Adore Finance and
Investment, Inc. The record shows that the respondent judge conducted
xxx xxx xxx
hearings and gave the parties full opportunity to present their evidence before
issuing the orders sought to be set aside. The questioned order dated December
(h) Said court and their judges, or any of them, shall have the power to issue
19, 1978 which is self-explanatory reads:
writ of injunction,mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and
habeas corpus in their respective provinces and districts, in the manner
This case involves the disconnection of the electrical power of plaintiff's
provided in the Rules of Court.
MC Adore International Palace Hotel in Dagupan by Defendant Dagupan
Electric Corporation on November 27, 1978. Upon filing of the Complaint
The petitioners contend that the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Quezon City
on December 6, 1978 and in view of the representation of plaintiff that it
has no jurisdiction over the case because the act of disconnecting the power to
had commitments to foreign and local patrons, and that it is unable to
the hotel of the MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc. took place in Dagupan
operate the hotel, this Court issued mandatory injunction on December 6,
City, outside the Province of Rizal and Quezon City.
1978 and set the case for hearing on December 11, 1978 at 9:00 o'clock.
The respondents submit that the act of disconnection was the result of an order
The mandatory injunction was not enforced as executive officials of
issued by the Dagupan Electric Corporation from its business office in Quezon
Dagupan Electric Co. could not located. At the hearing of December I 1, i
City.
978, in view of defendant's representation that plaintiff was in arrears in
The Court of First Instance of Rizal at Quezon City has jurisdiction over Civil electric bills for almost half a million pesos, this Court suspended
Case No. Q-26502. enforcement of the writ pending a fun hearing. The hearing was reset for
December 15, 1978 on which date the Court (received) the evidence and
The Dagupan Electric Corporation has its principal office in Quezon City where (heard the) arguments of the parties.
the business of the corporation is managed by the Board of Directors. Decisions
From the evidence and arguments adduced by parties, it is undisputed Engineer of the Board of Power, dated September 4, 1978. This report
that the controversy between the parties arose from the act of defendant however has not yet been approved by the Board of Power.
in changing the billing of plaintiff for June 1978 from P25,380.70 to
P80,243.62. Dagupan sent the original bill for P25,380.70 on July 10, 1978; It would also be prejudicial to the public interest that operation of
recalled the bill and changed the billing to P80,243.62, after Dagupan plaintiff's hotel worth 75 million pesos, in which the Development Bank of
personnel found a reversal of the polarity of the wiring of MC Adore. The the Philippines has an exposure of almost 57 million (75%) should be
new billing was based on the average consumption of the hotel from July paralyzed because of this dispute.
12 to July 17, 1978.

On the question of jurisdiction, both parties are residents of Quezon City,
It is not contested that the electric meter installed on the premises was as they have their principal offices in Quezon City. The disconnection
intact and no tampering thereon was made. The unpaid bills as of order was initiated and had its life and source in Quezon City. The
November is only P138,000.00, and not half a million, as earlier mandatory injunction is addressed to the corporation in Quezon City. The
manifested. Dagupan plant acts only upon order of its officers in Quezon City.
Dagupan's action in disconnecting electric service is apparently premised The cases cited by defendant are in opposite In Tan (64 SCRA 364) the
at its finding that the electric meter did not faithfully reflect the power injunctive order was addressed to officials with official residence outside
consumption for June 1978; on the other hand, plaintiff suspects that the territorial jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.
adjustments were made by Dagupan which resulted in an increased Moreover, in the cases where the Supreme Court ruled that the district
consumption reading. It is the stance of plaintiff that its power court has improperly issued the writ (Palanan 22 SCRA 1186; Ruiz, 38
consumption was reduced because of an energy conservation program; SCRA 559, Cudiamat 22 SCRA 695, and Tan, 64 SCRA 364) no private
that the reading for the first month of operation was quite high because of right of ownership was involved. Rather they involved licenses or
the testing made on its central airconditioning system. privileges granted by government agencies with offices located beyond
the district court's territorial jurisdiction. Where private rights are
There is clearly a dispute as to the correct power consumption of plaintiff involved the Supreme Court had upheld the issuance of the writ. In
and it does not appear to be fair that defendant should by unilateral Gonzales vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, (18 SCRA
action terminate its services to plaintiff in the absence of any clear and 297) the injunction against the Secretary of Public Works who had his
definite finding that a reversal of the polarity of the hotel wirings had office in Manila, issued by the Court of First Instance of Davao, was
caused an abnormal drop in meter reading. Defendant appears to rely upheld. This involved the demolition of a dam in Davao.
heavily on the report of Margarito Gatbonton, Utilities Regulation
Here we have a case of the interference of plaintiff's property rights, with The various incidents regarding the correctness of the monthly bill presented by
situs in Quezon City by a corporation situs with situs in Quezon City. The the Dagupan Electric Corporation to the MC Adore Finance and Investment,
exercise of will by defendant had its origin in Quezon City. Inc. can be better heard and resolved by the respondent judge. Meanwhile, it
appearing that a tested meter has been installed on June 2, 1979 by the Board of
This Court can grant relief when that exercise of will causes irreparable Power and Waterworks in the premises of the hotel the MC Adore Finance and
prejudice as in the instant case. Investment, Inc. is directed anew to pay the monthly bills presented by the
Dagupan Electric Corporation beginning June 1979. If the MC Adore finance and
The Court therefore finds the Motion for Reconsideration to without
Investment, Inc. fails to do so within ten (10) days from notice of this decision,
merit and denies the same.
the Dagupan Electric Corporation s authorized to disconnect the electric power
from the hotel
The writ of mandatory injunction issued by this Court on December 6,
1978 is reinstated and its immediate enforcement is ordered.
The correct amounts due prior to June 1979 shall be resolved by the respondent
judge after hearing the parties.
The plaintiff is however ordered to deposit with the Court the sum of
P100,000.00 representing more or less one-half of the unpaid billings as of
The motion for contempt against Modesto Sabeniano and the motion for
November 1978, and thereafter to deposit monthly beginning January 1979
contempt against Jose T. Apigo are both denied for lack of merit.
P35,000.00 for delivery to defendant. It is likewise ordered to post
additional bond of P150,000.00. Compliance by plaintiff must be made not WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is are by dismissed but
later than Friday, December 22, 1978. the MC Adore Finance and Investment. Inc. is directed to pay the monthly bills
as presented by the Dagupan Electric Corporation from June 1979. If the said
Let copies of this Order be served upon the parties and their respective
MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc. fails to do so within ten (10) days from
counsel by the Sheriffs of Quezon City and Dagupan City.
notice hereof, the Dagupan Electric Corporation may disconnect the electric
12 owner from the MC Adore International Palace Hotel at Dagupan City. No
SO ORDERED.
pronouncement as to costs.
It is clear from the foregoing order that the respondent judge did not act
SO ORDERED.
capriciously or whimsically in ordering the Dagupan Electric Corporation to
restore the connection of the electric power to the hotel in Dagupan City of the
MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc..
commercial condominium built on lots covered by TCT Nos. 205967 and

2
205969 located at the Filinvest Corporate City, Alabang, Muntinlupa City.
Allgemeine Bau Chemie Phils. V. Metrobank
3
As security for the loan, AAHI executed a security agreement or real estate
mortgage dated November 19, 1996 over its property consisting of the lots
covered by TCT Nos. 205967 and 205969 and the condominium built thereon
THIRD DIVISION
including all units, parking slots, common areas and other improvements,
G.R. No. 15929 February 10, 2006 machineries and equipment. The real estate mortgage was registered with the
Register of Deeds on November 19, 1996 and duly annotated on the individual
ALLGEMEINE-BAU-CHEMIE PHILS., INC., Petitioner, Condominium Certificates of Title (CTC) on even date.
vs.
4
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO., HONORABLE N. C. PERELLO, On November 17, 1999, AAHI entered into a contract to sell with petitioner for
5
Presiding Judge of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-MUNTINLUPA, the purchase of Units 1004 and 1005 covered by CTC No. 54666 and CTC No.
6
BRANCH 276 and SHERIFF FELIX FALCOTELLO, Respondents. 54667 , respectively, and the right to the exclusive use of parking slots P515,
7 8
P516, P517, and P514 covered by CTC No. 54986, CTC No. 54987, CTC No.
DECISION 9 10
54988, CTC No. 54985 (the subject properties), respectively, for a total
purchase price of P23,571,280.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
11
On December 22, 1999, the parties executed an addendum to the contract to
The appellate court’s denial of petitioner Allgemeine-Bau-Chemie Phils., Inc.’s
sell whereby AAHI assigned to petitioner the right to the exclusive use of
petition to enjoin the implementation of a writ of possession issued by Branch
parking slot P504 covered by CTC No. 54975 for a consideration ofP600,000,
276, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City in favor of private
which petitioner paid on even date.
respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank) is the subject of the
present petition for review. 12
By separate letters dated March 23, 2000, AAHI and Solidbank informed
petitioner of the real estate mortgage forged by them and was advised to remit
1
Under a loan agreement dated November 19, 1996, Asian Appraisal Holdings,
its monthly amortizations for the units and parking slots it purchased to
Inc. (AAHI) obtained a loan amounting to P442,500,000 from Solidbank
Solidbank. Petitioner was also requested to inform Solidbank of the total
Corporation (Solidbank) for the construction of Asian Star Building, a 20 storey
installments it had paid for these units and parking slots and the balance still
13
due thereon
Petitioner which occupied the condominium units as its place of business had, foreclosure sale, delivery of title, and damages and for the issuance of a
by October 2001, fully settled its obligation to AAHI in the total amount temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
14
of P26,588,409.30. Metrobank to consolidate its title and to take possession of its properties.
23
On October 21, 2000, as AAHI defaulted on its loan obligation, Metropolitan The court Sheriff on April 15, 2002 issued a notice to vacate which was served
Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank), to which the banking operations of on May 16, 2002 upon all building occupants who were advised to make the
24
Solidbank were integrated, filed before the Muntinlupa RTC a Petition for Extra- necessary arrangements with Metrobank regarding their occupancy.
15
Judicial Foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage.
In the meantime, the Motion for Reconsideration of the April 9, 2002 Order of
25
AAHI not long after filed on October 30, 2000 also before the Muntinlupa RTC a Branch 276 filed by AAHI was denied by Order dated May 13, 2002, prompting
16
complaint against Solidbank, for Specific Performance with Preliminary it to file before the appellate court a petition for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Injunction to enjoin the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, docketed as
Civil Case No. 00-196, and raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC. Petitioner filed on June 18, 2002 a separate petition for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction with the
26
On October 31, 2000, the mortgaged properties were sold at public auction to appellate court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71217, also to enjoin the
17
the highest bidder, Metrobank, to which a Certificate of Sale was issued. The implementation of the writ of possession issued by Branch 276 of the
Certificate of Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City Muntinlupa RTC. In its petition, petitioner alleged that its complaint-in-
18
and annotated on the individual CTCs on April 4, 2001. intervention in Civil Case No. 00-196 pending in Branch 256 is its principal
action but as the said court could not enjoin Branch 276 from implementing the
On January 24, 2002, Metrobank filed an Ex-Parte petition for the Issuance of a writ of possession, both courts being of equal jurisdiction, it had no choice but
19
Writ of Possession of the properties subject of the foreclosed mortgage. The to file the petition with the appellate court.
27
petition was docketed as LRC Case No. 02-007 and raffled to Branch 276, RTC of
Muntinlupa. The petition was granted and a writ of possession was issued on On August 22, 2002, the Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals granted
20 28
April 9, 2002. petitioner’s prayer for, and issued a temporary restraining order in CA-G.R. SP
29
No. 71217. By Decision of January 22, 2003, the Seventh Division of the Court of
Also on April 9, 2002, petitioner filed before Branch 256 of the RTC in Civil Case Appeals denied, however, petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of
No. 00-196 (AAHI’s complaint against Solidbank for Specific Performance with preliminary injunction for failure to establish a clear and unmistakable right to
21
Preliminary Injunction) a motion for intervention, to which it attached a the subject properties.
30
22
complaint-in-intervention with prayer for the annulment of the extra-judicial
The motion for reconsideration of the above-said Resolution of January 22, 2003 The appellate court’s jurisdiction to grant a writ of preliminary injunction is
31
having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution dated July 23, 2003, limited to actions or proceedingspending before it, as Section 2 of Rule 58 of the
petitioner now comes before this Court on a petition for review, alleging that Rules clearly provides:
the appellate court committed grave and palpable error in denying its prayer for
32
a writ of preliminary injunction in flagrant violation of laws and jurisprudence. SECTION 2. Who may grant preliminary injunction. – A preliminary injunction
may be granted by the court where the action or proceeding is pending. x x
The petition fails. x (Emphasis supplied),
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action and hence, the or in a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus under Section 7 of Rule
jurisdiction of a court, are the allegations of the complaint and the character of 65, thus:
33
the relief sought. Petitioner’s only prayer in CA-G.R. No. 71217 is "for the
preservation of the status quo, that is, petitioner, having in possession over the SECTION 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. – The court in which the
subject properties for several years, shall retain such possession until the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also
controversy [Civil Case No. 00-196 before the said trial court [Branch 276, RTC grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the
of Muntinlupa City] has been finally resolved and respondents be prevented preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition
from taking over such possession."

34 shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the
Clearly, what petitioner filed with the appellate court was an original action for public respondent from further proceeding in the case. (Emphasis supplied)
preliminary injunction which is a provisional and extra-ordinary remedy
calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is availed of to In the case at bar, petitioner’s complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case No. 00-
prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard. 196 was pending before Branch 256 of the Muntinlupa RTC, not with the
appellate court. Petitioner’s petition before the appellate court does not show,
An original action for injunction is outside the jurisdiction of the Court of nay allege, that in issuing the writ of possession, the Muntinlupa RTC acted
Appeals, however. Under B.P. 129, the appellate court has original jurisdiction without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion for it to
36 37
only over actions for annulment of judgments of the RTCs and has original be treated as either one for certiorari or prohibition.
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus
and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes whether or not they are in Thus, for want of jurisdiction, the petition before the appellate court should
aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

35 have been dismissed outright.
At all events, it is well-settled that an order granting or denying a preliminary

38
injunction is not appealable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
EN BANC
"This treats of the Urgent Motion for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction dated
December 2, 2002 filed by [respondent] through counsel with this Court.
CSC v. CA
"No Comment on the same was ever filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
which is handling this case for and in behalf of the [Petitioner] Civil Service
Commission despite opportunity given it, per Resolution dated November 8,
G.R. No. 159696 November 17, 2005
2002.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner,
"This Court, after taking into consideration the allegations and the arguments
vs.
* set forth in this motion filed by [respondent] to support his stand, opted to
COURT OF APPEALS and RIMANDO A. GANNAPAO, Respondents.
grant [respondent’s] application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
DECISION Injunction at this stage of the proceedings considering that he is entitled to the
relief demanded and that the implementation of the assailed Resolution dated
PANGANIBAN, J.: April 3, 2002 of x x x Civil Service Commission and the Order implementing it
issued pursuant thereto, would probably work injustice and would cause
ertiorari will issue only to strike down acts done without or in excess of
irreparable damage to [respondent].
jurisdiction; or those executed with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Alleged errors "WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Motion for the Issuance of
committed in the exercise of jurisdiction are reviewable by timely appeal and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by [herein respondent] is hereby
cannot, as a rule, be deemed fit subjects of this extraordinary writ. GRANTED. Let [the] Writ of Preliminary Injunction be issued enjoining,
restraining and prohibiting public respondents [herein petitioner], their
The Case
representatives and/or anybody acting in their behalf, from implementing CSC
1 Resolution dated April 3, 2002 and to recall the order implementing it, if any
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking
2 issued pursuant thereto, upon the posting of a bond in the amount of One
to reverse the January 14, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos, to be executed to the [petitioner] or
GR SP No. 70605, granting respondent’s Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
3 parties enjoined, to the effect that [herein respondent] will pay to [herein
Preliminary Injunction. Also assailed is the July 29, 2003 Resolution of the CA
petitioner] or parties all damages which he or they may sustain by reason of the
denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The first assailed Resolution
injunction if the Court should finally decide that [herein respondent] is not
states in full:
4
entitled thereto."
The Facts "On February 6, 1998, [respondent] filed an ‘Urgent Motion for Reconsideration’
which was denied by the PNP Director General Santiago L. Aliño in [a]
The factual antecedents are narrated by the Office of the Solicitor General Resolution dated April 14, 1998.
(OSG), as follows:
"[Respondent] appealed the PNP Resolution to the National Appellate Board
"On December 22, 1995, a Complaint for Grave Misconduct and Moonlighting (NAB), National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). The appeal was dismissed
with Urgent Prayer for Preventive Suspension and Disarming was filed by the in a Resolution dated December 29, 1999.
stockholders and board members of United Workers Transport Corp. (UWTC)
against SPO1 Rimando Gannapao before the Philippine National Police, "On February 10, 2000, [respondent] filed a Petition for Appeal with the
Inspectorate Division, Camp Crame, Quezon City. Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). The appeal was denied
and the penalty of three (3) months suspension of petitioner was affirmed in a
"Pursuant to NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 96-010 dated July 21 1996, Resolution dated July 18, 2000.
a Summary Hearing was conducted by the Office of the Legal Service of the
National Headquarters PNP against [respondent] for the alleged moonlighting. "Thereafter, [respondent] appealed to the Civil Service Commission praying the
[Court’s comment: Records show that prior to the investigation conducted by setting aside of the penalty of three (3) months suspension and/or for the
the Office of Legal Service, however, another pre-charge investigation had been Commission to conduct a hearing or a reinvestigation alleging lack of due
held for the same case by the Headquarters Support Services also of the National process.
Headquarters of the PNP. The investigation appears to have been dismissed
upon the recommendation of Atty. Joselito Casugbu, who found the complaint "On April 3, 2002, the Civil Service Commission rendered Resolution No.
5
to be one of pure harassment. ] 020487, the dispositive part of which reads:
"On November 26, 1997, the Philippine National Police Chief Recaredo A. ‘WHEREFORE, the appeal of Rimando A. Gannapao is hereby DISMISSED.
Sarmiento II rendered a Decision imposing the three (3) months suspension of However, the order dated February 26, 2001 of then DILG Secretary Alfredo S.
[respondent], the dispositive part of which reads: Lim affirming the suspension of Gannapao for a period of three (3) months is
modified to dismissal from the service.’
‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Headquarters finds respondent SPO1
RIMANDO A. GANNAPAO GUILTY of the charge of serious irregularities in the "On May 30, 2002, Gannapao filed a petition for review with the Court of
performance of duties, thus, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of three Appeals assailing the Resolution of the Civil Service Commission.
(3) months suspension from the police service without pay.’

"On January 8, 2003, CSC through the Office of the Solicitor General filed its The Petition has no merit.
Comment on the Petition specifically stating among others that Gannapao was
not entitled to a preliminary injunction. Sole Issue:
"On January 14, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution granting Grave Abuse of Discretion
Gannapao’s motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining,

As an extraordinary remedy, a writ of certiorari issues only for the correction of
restraining and prohibiting CSC from implementing its assailed CSC Resolution
errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
No. 020487 dated April 3, 2002 dismissing [respondent].
jurisdiction. Absence of jurisdiction is the lack of legal power, right or authority
"[Respondent] filed its motion for reconsideration which was denied in a to hear and determine a cause. On the other hand, excess of jurisdiction means
Resolution dated July 29, 2003."

6 that an act -- though within the general power of the tribunal, board or officer --
is not authorized. Hence, the act is invalid with regard to that particular
Ruling of the Court of Appeals proceeding, in respect of which the conditions that authorize the exercise of the
9
general power are wanting.
The Court of Appeals granted respondent’s prayer for a preliminary injunction
enjoining the CSC from enforcing the latter’s assailed Decision pending appeal. Petitioner attacks the CA for issuing the Writ of Preliminary Injunction despite
The CA based its ruling on the probability that the immediate execution of the the Commission’s finding that private respondent was guilty of misconduct. The
CSC Decision might cause injustice and irreparable damage to petitioner. OSG adds that the injunctive relief violates the Administrative Code and the
CSC rules stating that administrative disciplinary penalties shall be immediately
7
Hence, this Petition. executory, notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal.
10
Issue We hold, however, that neither the Administrative Code nor the CSC rules
deprive courts of their power to grant restraining orders or preliminary
Petitioner submits this sole issue for our consideration: 11
injunctions to stay the execution of CSC decisions pending appeal. Moreover, a
court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction, when proper, is expressly
"The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
authorized by Section 2 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
granting the Motion for the Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in
8
favor of Respondent Gannapao."
"Sec. 2. Who may grant preliminary injunction. -- A preliminary injunction may
be granted by the court where the action or proceeding is pending. If the action
The Court’s Ruling
or proceeding is pending in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court, it exercise of judgment. As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged
may be issued by said court or any member thereof." errors committed in the exercise of that jurisdiction will amount to nothing
more than errors of judgment which, as a rule, are reviewable by a timely
Furthermore, Section 82 of Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular 19- 16
appeal of the final disposition of the case.
12
99 recognizes the authority of the CA and the Supreme Court to issue
restraining orders or injunctions, as follows: Issuance of Preliminary
"Section 82. Effect of Pendency of Petition for Review/Certiorari with the Court. -- Injunction Justified
The filing and pendency of a petition for review with the Court of Appeals or
certiorari with the Supreme Court shall not stop the execution of the final Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court prescribes the grounds for the issuance
decision of the Commission unless the Court issues a restraining order or an of a writ of preliminary injunction, as follows:
injunction. (Emphasis provided.)

"(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part
13
Having appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the CSC, the CA clearly has the of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or
discretion to issue an ancillary writ of preliminary injunction to secure the rights acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a
of private respondent pending appeal of his dismissal. Absent a clear showing of limited period or perpetually;
grave abuse of discretion, the exercise of judgment by the courts in injunctive

14
"(b) That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or acts
matters should not be interfered with.
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction applicant; or
implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or

"(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise defined, grave abuse is the exercise of power in
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts
an arbitrary or a despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal
probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the
aversion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty, or a refusal to perform the
15
action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual."
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Based on the foregoing, the requisites for the issuance of the writ are the
Certiorari will not issue to cure errors in proceedings or to correct mere
following: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be
erroneous conclusions of law or fact. The burden is upon petitioner to
protected and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
demonstrate that the questioned writ constitutes a whimsical and capricious 17
serious damage. In taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction, a court has the duty to determine whether the requisites for the Moreover, the immediate implementation of the not yet final penalty of
18
grant of the injunction are present in the case before it. dismissal from the service would surely cause private respondent (and his
family) irreparable damage. As pleaded in his Urgent Motion for Issuance of
In the present controversy, however, the assailed Order does not state the basis 21
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, his salary and
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The CA made no findings of benefits as a policeman are his family’s only source of income.
fact or law indicating that any of the elements essential for the grant of an
22
injunctive writ existed. After merely stating that it took "into consideration the Furthermore, in the said Urgent Motion, as well as the Petition filed by private
allegations and the arguments set forth" in the Urgent Motion filed by respondent before the Court of Appeals, he incessantly asserted that the case
Gannapao, the CA immediately concluded afterwards that respondent was against him had already been dismissed in an earlier PNP pre-charge
entitled to the relief demanded. investigation. When the case was reopened by the PNP Office of Legal Service,
he allegedly moved for the dismissal of the suit on the ground of res judicata.
19
In this connection, the Court reiterates its pronouncement in Garcia v. Burgos:
Instead of ruling on the issue of whether the prior dismissal was in fact a bar to
"It has been consistently held that there is no power the exercise of which is the reopening of the case, the PNP Office of Legal Service merely considered the
more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation and sound filing of the Motion to Dismiss as a waiver of his right to file an answer. Then it
discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an proceeded to rule on the case on its merits. He subsequently appealed to the
injunction. It is the strong arm of equity that should never be extended unless to CSC his three-month suspension, which had been affirmed by the DILG.
cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or Specifically, he claimed lack of due process and requested the CSC to grant him
commensurate remedy in damages." a hearing. Not only did it affirm the assailed Order of the DILG, it moreover
increased the penalty to dismissal from the service.
Nevertheless, in the interest of justice and fair play, this Court scrutinized the
records of the case and, indeed, found sufficient grounds for the grant of the Under the above circumstances, it appears that private respondent, without
injunctive Writ. Prior to the finality of the CSC Decision dismissing him, private prejudging his case on its merits, has raised a prima facie defense of lack of due
respondent has a clear and unmistakable right to his current position in the process. We hasten to add that the question of whether or not he was denied
police service. Unquestionably, the right to employment, oftentimes the lowly due process is one of fact that the CA is better equipped to determine. That the
employee’s only noble source of bread and butter, is entitled to protection by CA saw it fit to issue the questioned Writ to protect his rights in the interim was
20
the State. within the reasonable exercise of its judicial discretion. We find no arbitrariness
or capriciousness -- much less personal bias, hostility or animosity -- in the
exercise of its prerogatives.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
injunctive writ issued by the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples

(NCIP) against the demolition orders of petitioners.
City Government of Baguio City v. Masweng
The following undisputed facts are culled from the assailed Decision:
The case stemmed from the three (3) Demolition Orders issued by the City
G.R. No. 180206 February 4, 2009
Mayor of Baguio City, Braulio D. Yaranon, ordering the demolition of the illegal
structures constructed by Lazaro Bawas, Alexander Ampaguey, Sr. and a certain
THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO CITY, represented by REINALDO
Mr. Basatan on a portion of the Busol Watershed Reservation located at Aurora
BAUTISTA, JR., City Mayor; THE ANTI-SQUATTING COMMITTEE,
Hill, Baguio City, without the required building permits and in violation of
represented by ATTY. MELCHOR CARLOS R. RAGANES, CITY BUILDINGS
Section 69 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, Presidential Decree No.
and ARCHITECTURE office, represented by OSCAR FLORES; and PUBLIC
1096 and Republic Act No. 7279.
ORDER and SAFETY OFFICE, Represented by EMMANUEL
REYES, Petitioners.
Pursuant thereto, the corresponding demolition advices dated September 19,
vs.
2006 were issued informing the occupants thereon of the intended demolition
ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG, Regional Officer-National Commission on
of the erected structures on October 17 to 20, 2006. Consequently, Elvin
Indigenous People-CAR, ELVIN GUMANGAN, NARCISO BASATAN and
Gumangan, Narciso Basatan and Lazaro Bawas (hereinafter private respondents)
LAZARO BAWAS, Respondents.
filed a petition for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against the Office of the
DECISION
City Mayor of Baguio City through its Acting City Mayor, Reynaldo Bautista, the
TINGA, J.: City Building and Architecture Office, the Anti-Squatting Task Force, and the
Public Order and Safety Division, among others, (collectively called petitioners)
Petitioners, the City Government of Baguio City, represented by its Mayor, before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Cordillera
Reinaldo Bautista, Jr., the Anti-Squatting Committee, represented by Atty. Administrative Region (NCIP-CAR), Regional Hearing Office, La Trinidad,
Melchor Carlos R. Rabanes; the City Buildings and Architecture Office, Benguet, docketed as Case No. 31-CAR-06.
represented by Oscar Flores; and the Public Order and Safety Office,
represented by Emmanuel Reyes and later substituted by Gregorio Deligero, In their petition, private respondents basically claimed that the lands where
1
assail the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 96895, dated April their residential houses stand are their ancestral lands which they have been
2
16, 2007, and its Resolution dated September 11, 2007, which affirmed the occupying and possessing openly and continuously since time immemorial; that
their ownership thereof have been expressly recognized in Proclamation No. 15 that the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary restraining orders and writs
dated April 27, 1922 and recommended by the Department of Environment and of preliminary injunction only as auxiliary remedies to cases pending before it.
Natural Resources (DENR) for exclusion from the coverage of the Busol Forest
Reserve. They, thus, contended that the demolition of their residential houses is Further, the IPRA provides that Baguio City shall be governed by its Charter.
a violation of their right of possession and ownership of ancestral lands Thus, private respondents cannot claim their alleged ancestral lands under the
accorded by the Constitution and the law, perforce, must be restrained. provisions of the IPRA.
On October 16 and 19, 2006, Regional Hearing Officer Atty. Brain S. Masweng of Petitioners contend that private respondents are not entitled to the protection
the NCIP issued the two (2) assailed temporary restraining orders (TRO) of an injunctive writ because they encroached upon the Busol Forest
directing the petitioners and all persons acting for and in their behalf to refrain Reservation and built structures thereon without the requisite permit.
8
from enforcing Demolition Advice dated September 18, 2006; Demolition Order Moreover, this Court, in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals, had already
dated September 19, 2006; Demolition Order No. 25, Series of 2004; Demolition declared that the Busol Forest Reservation is inalienable and possession thereof,
Order No. 33, Series of 2005; and Demolition Order No. 28, Series of 2004, for a no matter how long, cannot convert the same into private property. Even
total period of twenty (20) days. assuming that private respondents have a pending application for ancestral land
claim, their right is at best contingent and cannot come under the protective
Subsequently, the NCIP issued the other assailed Resolution dated November 10, mantle of injunction.
2006 granting the private respondents’ application for preliminary injunction
subject to the posting of an injunctive bond each in the amount of P10,000.00.
3 Petitioners also claim that the Busol Forest Reservation is exempt from ancestral
claims as it is needed for public welfare. It is allegedly one of the few remaining
4
Acting on the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners, the Court of Appeals forests in Baguio City and is the city’s main watershed.
upheld the jurisdiction of the NCIP over the action filed by private respondents
and affirmed the temporary restraining orders dated October 16 and 19,
5 Finally, petitioners contend that the demolition orders were issued pursuant to
6 7
2006, and the Resolution dated November 10, 2006, granting the application the police power of the local government.1avvphi1
for a writ of preliminary injunction, issued by the NCIP. The appellate court also 9
In their Comment dated March 1, 2007, private respondents defend the
ruled that Baguio City is not exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No. 8371,
jurisdiction of the NCIP to take cognizance of and decide main actions for
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA).
injunction arguing that the IPRA does not state that the NCIP may only issue
Petitioners assert that the NCIP has no jurisdiction to hear and decide main such writs of injunction as auxiliary remedies. Private respondents also contend
actions for injunction such as the one filed by private respondents. They claim
that the IPRA does not exempt Baguio City from its coverage nor does it state (ICCs/IPs) and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their rights
12
that there are no ancestral lands in Baguio City. thereto. In order to fully effectuate its mandate, the NCIP is vested with
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving the rights of ICCs/IPs. The
As members of the Ibaloi Indigenous Community native to Baguio City, private only condition precedent to the NCIP’s assumption of jurisdiction over such
respondents are treated as squatters despite the fact that they hold native title disputes is that the parties thereto shall have exhausted all remedies provided
to their ancestral land. The IPRA allegedly now recognizes ancestral lands held under their customary laws and have obtained a certification from the Council
by native title as never to have been public lands. of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the
13
same has not been resolved.
Private respondents aver that the Busol Forest Reservation is subject to ancestral
10
land claims. In fact, Proclamation No. 15 dated April 27, 1922, which declared In addition, NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated April 9, 2003, known as
the area a forest reserve, allegedly did not nullify the vested rights of private the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure Before the NCIP, reiterates the
respondents over their ancestral lands and even identified the claimants of the jurisdiction of the NCIP over claims and disputes involving ancestral lands and
particular portions within the forest reserve. This claim of ownership is an enumerates the actions that may be brought before the commission. Sec. 5, Rule
exception to the government’s contention that the whole area is a forest III thereof provides:
reservation.
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.—The NCIP through its Regional Hearing
Lastly, private respondents assert that the power of the city mayor to order the Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of
demolition of certain structures is not absolute. Regard should be taken of the ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and
fact that private respondents cannot be issued building permits precisely interpretation of R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the following:
because they do not have paper titles over their ancestral lands, a requirement
for the issuance of a building permit under the National Building Code. (1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office
(RHO):
11
Petitioners’ Reply to Comment dated June 11, 2008 merely reiterates their
previous arguments. a. Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral
lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;
We shall first dispose of the elemental issue of the NCIP’s jurisdiction.
b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and
The NCIP is the primary government agency responsible for the formulation prior and informed consent of ICCs/IPs;
and implementation of policies, plans and programs to protect and promote the
rights and well-being of indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples
c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving of the allegations in their petition, whether private respondents are members of
14
violations of customary laws or desecration of ceremonial sites, ICCs/IPs. In their petition filed before the NCIP, private respondents, members
sacred places, or rituals; of the Ibaloi tribe who first settled in Baguio City, were asserting ownership of
portions of the Busol Forest Reservation which they claim to be their ancestral
d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of lands. Correctly denominated as a petition for injunction as it sought to prevent
R.A. 8371; and the enforcement of the demolition orders issued by the City Mayor, the petition
traced private respondents’ ancestry to Molintas and Gumangan and asserted
e. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.
their possession, occupation and utilization of their ancestral lands. The petition
also alleged that private respondents’ claim over these lands had been
(2) Original Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer:
recognized by Proclamation No. 15 which mentions the names of Molintas and
15
a. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, Gumangan as having claims over portions of the Busol Forest Reservation.
hereditary succession, and settlement of land disputes, between
Clearly then, the allegations in the petition, which axiomatically determine the
and among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled under
16
nature of the action and the jurisdiction of a particular tribunal, squarely
customary laws; and
qualify it as a "dispute(s) or controversy(s) over ancestral lands/domains of
b. Actions for damages arising out of any violation of Republic ICCs/IPs" within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP-
Act No. 8371. RHO.1avvphi1
(3) Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the Commission: The IPRA, furthermore, endows the NCIP with the power to issue temporary
restraining orders and writs of injunction. Sec. 69 thereof states:
a. Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral Domain
Titles/Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles (CADTs/CALTs) Sec. 69. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the NCIP.—The NCIP shall have the power
alleged to have been fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, and authority:
any person or community as provided for under Section 54 of
a) To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and
R.A. 8371. Provided that such action is filed within one (1) year
disposition of cases filed before it as well as those pertaining to its
from the date of registration.
internal functions and such rules and regulations as may be necessary
In order to determine whether the NCIP has jurisdiction over the dispute in to carry out the purposes of this Act;
accordance with the foregoing provisions, it is necessary to resolve, on the basis
b) To administer oaths, summon the parties to a controversy, issue As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the NCIP may issue temporary
subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the restraining orders and writs of injunction without any prohibition against the
production of such books, papers, contracts, records, agreements, and issuance of the writ when the main action is for injunction. The power to issue
other document of similar nature as may be material to a just temporary restraining orders or writs of injunction allows parties to a dispute
determination of the matter under investigation or hearing conducted over which the NCIP has jurisdiction to seek relief against any action which may
in pursuance of this Act; cause them grave or irreparable damage or injury. In this case, the Regional
Hearing Officer issued the injunctive writ because its jurisdiction was called
c) To hold any person in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose upon to protect and preserve the rights of private respondents who are
appropriate penalties therefor; and undoubtedly members of ICCs/IPs.
d) To enjoin any or all acts involving or arising from any case pending Parenthetically, in order to reinforce the powers of the NCIP, the IPRA even
before it which, if not restrained forthwith, may cause grave or provides that no restraining order or preliminary injunction may be issued by
irreparable damage to any of the parties to the case or seriously affect any inferior court against the NCIP in any case, dispute or controversy arising
social or economic activity. [Emphasis supplied] from or necessary to the
NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 echoes the above-quoted provision in interpretation of the IPRA and other laws relating to ICCs/IPs and ancestral
Sec. 82, Rule XV, which provides: domains.
17
Sec. 82. Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.—A writ of Petitioners argue that Baguio City is exempt from the provisions of the IPRA,
preliminary injunction or restraining order may be granted by the Commission and necessarily the jurisdiction of the NCIP, by virtue of Sec. 78 thereof, which
pursuant to the provisions of Sections 59 and 69 of R.A. [No.] 8371 when it is states:
established, on the basis of sworn allegations in a petition, that the acts
complained of involving or arising from any case, if not restrained forthwith, SEC. 78. Special Provision.—The City of Baguio shall remain to be governed by
may cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to any of the parties, or its Charter and all lands proclaimed as part of its townsite reservation shall
seriously affect social or economic activity. This power may also be exercised by remain as such until otherwise reclassified by appropriate legislation: Provided,
RHOs in cases pending before them in order to preserve the rights of the That prior land rights and titles recognized and/or acquired through any
parties. judicial, administrative or other processes before the effectivity of this Act shall
remain valid: Provided, further, That this provision shall not apply to any
territory which becomes part of the City of Baguio after the effectivity of this subordinated to that purpose. I therefore withdraw from sale or settlement the
Act.lavvphil.net [Emphasis supplied] following described parcels of the public domain situated in the Township of La
Trinidad, City of Baguio, Mountain Province, Island of Luzon, to wit:
The foregoing provision indeed states that Baguio City is governed by its own
charter. Its exemption from the IPRA, however, cannot ipso facto be deduced The fact remains, too, that the Busol Forest Reservation was declared by the
19
because the law concedes the validity of prior land rights recognized or acquired Court as inalienable in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals. The declaration
through any process before its effectivity. The IPRA demands that the city’s of the Busol Forest Reservation as such precludes its conversion into private
charter respect the validity of these recognized land rights and titles. property. Relatedly, the courts are not endowed with jurisdictional competence
to adjudicate forest lands.
The crucial question to be asked then is whether private respondents’ ancestral
land claim was indeed recognized by Proclamation No. 15, in which case, their All told, although the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary restraining
right thereto may be protected by an injunctive writ. After all, before a writ of orders and writs of injunction, we are not convinced that private respondents
preliminary injunction may be issued, petitioners must show that there exists a are entitled to the relief granted by the Commission.
right to be protected and that the acts against which injunction is directed are
violative of said right.
18 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 96895 dated April 16, 2007 and its Resolution dated
Proclamation No. 15, however, does not appear to be a definitive recognition of September 11, 2007 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Case No. 31-CAR-06 entitled,
private respondents’ ancestral land claim. The proclamation merely identifies Elvin Gumangan, Narciso Basatan and Lazaro Bawas v. Office of the City Mayor
the Molintas and Gumangan families, the predecessors-in-interest of private of Baguio City, et al. is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
respondents, as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation but does
not acknowledge vested rights over the same. In fact, Proclamation No. 15 SO ORDERED.
explicitly withdraws the Busol Forest Reservation from sale or settlement. It

EN BANC
provides:
Pursuant to the provisions of section eighteen hundred and twenty-six of Act

Numbered Twenty-seven Hundred and eleven[,] I hereby establish the Busol
Forest Reservation to be administered by the Bureau of Forestry for the purpose
of conserving and protecting water and timber, the protection of the water
supply being of primary importance and all other uses of the forest are to be
[2]
The case before the Court is a verified complaint of the heirs of the late
Reyes v. Demetria, En Banc
Justice Jose B. L. Reyes, represented by Adoracion Reyes, and the heirs of
Dr. Edmundo A. Reyes, namely, Ma. Teresa P. Reyes and Carlos P. Reyes
[3]
against Justices Demetrio G. Demetria, Ramon A. Barcelona and Roberto A.
Barrios, Court of Appeals, Atty. Teresita R. Marigomen, Division Clerk of Court,
[A. M. No. CA-01-32. January 23, 2002] Special Fourth Division, Court of Appeals and Mr. Efren R. Rivamonte, Special
Sheriff, Court of Appeals, for violation of Section 11, Rule 59 and Sec. 8, Rule 39
of the Revised Rules of court, Sections 3.01 and 3.08 of the Code of Judicial
HEIRS OF THE LATE JUSTICE JOSE B. L. Conduct and Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, for knowingly rendering an
REYES, complainants, vs. JUSTICES DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, unjust judgment.
RAMON A. BARCELONA, and ROBERTO A. BARRIOS [Special
Third Division]; ATTY. TERESITA R. MARIGOMEN, Division Clerk
of Court, Special Fourth Division and MR. EFREN R. RIVAMONTE, The Antecedent Facts
Special Sheriff, Mailing Section, respondents.

The instant administrative complaint arose from a simple ejectment case
RESOLUTION filed by complainants against Metro Manila Builders, Inc. (Manila Builders).
PARDO, J.: Pursuant to a contract executed on November 30, 1976, complainants’

predecessors-in-interest leased a parcel of land with an area of more than one (1)
“Justice Malcolm aptly described ideal judges as ‘men who have a mastery
hectare situated along Taft Avenue,Pasay City to Manila Builders for twenty five
of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law, who
(25) years at a rental rate of P15,000.00 to P30,000.00 a month. Under the lease
are permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside
agreement, Manila Builders would cover all present and future improvements
influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human units in a
on the property with insurance against certain risks and maintain the premises
judicial system equal and coordinate to the other two departments of
in good, sanitary and tenantable condition at all times.
government.’ Those who wield the judicial gavel have the duty to study our laws
and their latest wrinkles. They owe it to the public to be legally knowledgeable for However, Manila Builders violated the terms and conditions of the lease
[4]
ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice.”
[1] agreement. Exercising the right to unilateral rescission, complainants sent
notice to Manila Builders terminating the lease and demanding that they vacate
and surrender the premises subject of the lease agreement, which Manila
The Case Builders ignored.
[10]
On February 3, 1997, complainants filed with the On the same day, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution restraining
Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasay City, Branch 45 a complaint for the enforcement of the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 113-97,
[5] [11]
unlawful detainer based on the breach of the contract of lease, which the MTC, Pasay City, Branch 45. Only two (2) members of the division signed the
trial court decided on May 9, 1997 in complainants’ favor. The trial court resolution, respondents Justices Demetria, ponente, and Barcelona,
ordered Manila Builders evicted from the premises. concurring. Justice Amin, member, did not sign.
On May 16, 1997, complainants filed with the trial court a motion for On April 14, 1998, in Civil Case No. 98-0366, the Regional Trial
execution of the judgment of eviction. Meanwhile, Manila Builders appealed to Court, Pasay City, Branch 231 dismissed the action for annulment of judgment
the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, Branch 113; however, the appeal was on the ground that Manila Builder’s remedy is appeal in due time, which when
[12]
subsequently dismissed for failure to file an appeal memorandum on time. withdrawn, was effectively abandoned.
On November 5, 1997, Manila Builders elevated the case to the Court of On August 21, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision,
[6]
Appeals. On November 26, 1997, the trial court granted complainants’ motion the dispositive portion of which reads:
for execution, which order was correspondingly issued on December 1, 1997.
On December 8, 1997, the Court of Appeals issued an order restraining the “WHEREFORE, the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
execution of the ejectment judgment.

[7] 45, Pasay City in Civil Case No. 113-97 dated May 9, 1997 is SET ASIDE and the
orders dated March 23, 1998 and April 14, 1998, issued in Civil Case No. 98-0366
On February 7, 1998, the Court of Appeals allowed the withdrawal of appeal
are likewise SET ASIDE. Private respondent is hereby ordered to restore the
filed by Manila Builders. Simultaneously with the withdrawal of the appeal,
subject property in the possession of petitioner and are hereby permanently
Manila Builders filed with the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, Branch 231 an
enjoined from further committing acts disturbing physical possession of the
[8]
action for annulment of the ejectment judgment due to the court a quo’s lack
subject property by petitioner until after the expiration of the Contract of
of jurisdiction and prayed for a temporary restraining [13]
Lease.”
order and/or preliminary injunction to enjoin the execution of the
decision. However, the regional trial court did not issue an injunction against On the same date (August 21, 1998), Manila Builders filed a very urgent ex-
the trial court. parte motion for execution pending appeal.
On March 23, 1998, Manila Builders filed with the Court of Appeals a On September 14, 1998, complainants filed with the Supreme Court a
petition for certiorari and mandamus questioning the regional trial court’s “sub- petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
[9] [14]
silencio” denial of its application for injunctive relief. Appeals. On September 17, 1998, complainants filed with the Court of Appeals
their consolidated comment on the very urgent motion for execution pending
appeal, with motion to defer consideration due to the pendency of their petition On the same date, respondent Efren R. Rivamonte,
with the Supreme Court. process server at the mailing section of the Court of Appeals, was appointed
special sheriff to enforce the writ. Accordingly, 2nd Division Clerk of Court
Despite the pending petition with this Court, on September 18, 1998, the
Caroline G. Ocampo-Peralta issued a writ of execution as follows:
Court of Appeals issued a resolution granting the motion for execution,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WRIT OF EXECUTION
“Accordingly, this Court hereby RESOLVES to grant the instant petition.

“TO MR. EFREN RIVAMONTE
(Designated Special Sheriff
“1. A writ of Execution Pending Appeal of the Decision of this
by the Mailing Section,
Court dated August 21, 1998 is hereby issued.
Court of Appeals, Manila)
“The Division Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to furnish a certified true
G R E E T I N G S:
copy of this resolution and the decision of this Court dated August 21, 1998 to
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, and Regional Trial Court, Branch 231
WHEREAS, on August 21, 1998, a decision was issued by Special Third Division
both of Pasay City.
of this Court, promulgated on August 25, 1998 the dispositive portion of which
reads: (p. 485-486, Rollo)
“2. Private respondents and their counsel are hereby adjudged guilty of
indirect contempt of this Honorable Court and are hereby sentenced to pay a
‘WHEREFORE, the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
fine of P30,000.00. Private respondents and counsel are also directed to make a
45, Pasay City in Civil Case No. 113-97 dated May 9, 1997 is SET ASIDE and the
[15]
completer restoration to petitioner of the subject property.” [Emphasis
Orders dated March 23, 1998 and April 14, 1998, issued in Civil Case No. 98-0366
supplied]
are likewise SET ASIDE. Private respondents are hereby ordered to restore the
subject property in the possession of petitioner and are hereby permanently
On September 21, 1998, the Court of Appeals (Second Division) issued a
enjoined from further committing acts disturbing physical possession of the
resolution reading:
subject property by petitioner until after the expiration of the Contract of Lease.
“In view of the letter of Justice Demetrio G. Demetria (Ponente) dated

SO ORDERED.’
September 21, 1998, the Chief of the Mailing Section is hereby directed to
appoint a special sheriff to execute the decision of this Court dated August
“WHEREAS, on August 21, 1998, a Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Execution
[16]
21, 1998.”
Pending Appeal was filed by petitioner.
st
“WHEREAS, on September 18, 1998, a resolution was issued and promulgated by Members, Associate Justices of the FORMER THIRD DIVISION, this 21 of
the Former Special Third Division, the decretal portion of which reads: September, 1998, Court of Appeals, Manila.
‘Accordingly, this Court hereby RESOLVES to grant the instant motion. “Respectfully yours,
‘1. A writ of Execution Pending Appeal of the Decision of this Court [Sgd.]
dated August 21, 1998 is hereby issued. “CAROLINE G. OCAMPO-PERALTA
“Division Clerk of Court
‘The Division Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to furnish a certified true “Second Division”
[17]
copy of this resolution and the decision of this Court dated August 21, 1998 to
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, and Regional Trial Court, Branch 231 Also on the same date, respondent Rivamonte evicted complainants from
both of Pasay City. the premises and restored possession to Manila Builders.
‘2. Private respondents and their counsel are hereby adjudged guilty of indirect
contempt of this Honorable Court and are hereby sentenced to pay a fine of The Administrative Charges
P30,000.00. Private respondents and counsel are hereby directed to make a

complete restoration to petitioner of the subject property. Aggrieved by irregularities in the proceedings in CA-G. R. SP Nos. 47158
and 47720, on September 15, 2000, complainants filed with the Supreme Court
‘SO ORDERED. the instant administrative complaint against respondent justices and employees
of the Court of Appeals. Complainants alleged that they lost possession of the
“NOW THEREFORE, You are hereby commanded, pursuant to resolution dated
subject property due to the “malicious, deliberate and unlawful issuance” of
September 18, 1998 which granted petitioner’s Motion for Execution Pending
Justices Demetria and Barcelona of the March 23, 1998 restraining order.
Appeal, to enforce this Writ in accordance with the decision issued on August
Justices Demetria, Barcelona and Barrios further perpetrated an injustice when
21, 1998 by ordering private respondents to restore petitioners of the possession
they promulgated the decision of August 21, 1998, and issued the writ of
of the subject property, and to make a return of this Writ to this Court within
execution pending appeal dated September 21, 1998, despite the pendency of
five (5) days from date, with your proceedings endorse thereon.
appeal with the Supreme Court. Complainants charged respondent justices,
particularly the ponente, Justice Demetria, with violating pertinent provisions of
“WITNESS, the Honorable RAMON A. BARCELONA, Acting Chairman,
the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Honorable DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, and Honorable ROBERTO A. BARRIOS,
On May 4, 2001, the Court required respondents to file their respective Respondent Marigomen noted nothing erroneous or anomalous upon
[18]
comments on the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt. seeing only two (2) signatures in the resolution of March 23, 1998, as it is legally
permissible for a single justice to issue restraining orders, citing Rule 58, Section
On May 31, 2001, respondents Justices Ramon A. Barcelona and Roberto A.
[23] [24]
2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 3, Section 9, Revised Internal
Barrios, and Division Clerk of Court Teresita R. Marigomen filed a joint
[25]
[19] Rules of the Court of Appeals, as amended.
comment claiming innocence of the charges against them. On June 21, 2001,
respondent Justice Demetria filed his comment asserting good faith and
basically adopting the defenses and arguments of his co- The Court’s Ruling
[20]
respondents. OnOctober 4, 2001, respondent Rivamonte filed his comment
[21]
stating that he only complied with the orders of his superiors.
Respondents’ submissions are patently without merit. There is no question
With regard to the resolution of March 23, 1998, respondent Justice regarding the authority of the Court of Appeals to issue a preliminary writ of
Barcelona alleged that his concurrence in the issuance of the temporary injunction or temporary restraining order pending the resolution of petitions
restraining order was done “in good faith and in deference to the discretion of and appeals within its jurisdiction, especially in meritorious cases. What is
the ponente,” respondent Justice Demetria, “who has knowledge of the questionable is the irregular procedure by which the March 23, 1998 resolution
soundness and factual merits of the case.” We find this a wrongful approach to was arrived at and served on the parties.
the issue. Concurrence must be based on the justice’s conviction after mature
As it is, only two members of the Court of Appeals, Special Fourth Division,
deliberation, not deference to the ponente. Obviously, the procedure adopted
respondents Justices Demetria, ponente, and Barcelona, member, concurring,
showed that there was no due deliberation on the case by the justices of the
signed the resolution. Justice Omar U. Amin, member, did not sign. Hence, the
division. After the division members signed the resolution, the division
resolution may not be received for filing, much less served on the parties. The
members would not know the completeness of the signatures in the resolution
clear intent of the division members was for the three members to act on the
since its release was ordered by the ponente, not by the Division
resolution. It is true that under the rules, a member of the Court of Appeals
Chairman. Hence, the division members would not know if the resolution was
may issue a temporary restraining order. However, he shall advisedly use such
[22]
promulgated without the required number of signatures.
power sparingly, in case of extreme necessity where there are compelling
On the other hand, respondent Justice Demetria maintained that the reasons to abate or avoid a grave injury to a party. And, such issuance must be
issuance of the March 23, 1998 resolution temporarily restraining the submitted to the Court for ratification at the very next session of the Court.
enforcement of the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 113-97 has sound basis in
In light of the foregoing, we find that Justice Demetria,
law and jurisprudence and was made after a thorough study by him.
as ponente, disregarded existing rules of procedure. Considering that what he
violated were the same rules of procedure he was expected and required to
observe, such failure to comply was inexcusable. When the law transgressed is of its own decision. Discretionary execution under Rule 39, Section 2(a),
elementary, the failure to know or observe it constitutes gross ignorance of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, applies to a judgment or final order of
[26]
law. the trial court, upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due
[29]
hearing.
As regards respondent Marigomen, we find her explanation deferential to
the views of respondent justices. As division clerk of court, she is bound by the Respondents Justices Barcelona and Barrios state that they were impressed
prevailing rules of procedure of the Court of Appeals. Among her duties and by the good reasons posited by Manila Builders, that is, deprivation of income
responsibilities, she shall maintain the records of the Division in an orderly and its mounting obligations and liabilities. On the other hand, respondent
manner and keep watch over the status and progress of cases assigned to the Justice Demetria explained that there is no prohibition, whether expressed or
[27]
Division. She is expected to immediately report to the Justice assigned to implied, regarding the authority of the Court of Appeals to issue immediate
study the case the failure of any party or parties to comply with any resolution execution pending appeal of its own decision.
[28]
or order of the Court within the period prescribed therefor. She should have
We find no merit in respondents’ ratiocinations. Rule 51, Section
called the attention of the ponente upon seeing the incomplete signatures on
11, Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that the judgment of the Court of
the resolution. It should have been obvious that the resolution issuing a
Appeals shall be remanded to the lower court for execution ten (10) days after
temporary restraining order was intended as a collegiate act, not the order of a
entry of judgment, unless notice is given that the decision would be appealed
single justice. She should not have released and allowed the said resolution to
to the Supreme Court. By requiring the remand of the records to the lower
be served on the parties.
court after the entry of judgment, the rules completely cut off any authority of
Respondent Justice Barcelona may be absolved of administrative complicity the Court of Appeals to directly undertake the execution of the final judgment,
regarding the issuance of a temporary restraining order. He had no knowledge much less the authority to order its execution pending its finality.
about the lack of the requisite third signature before the resolution was
The Court cannot permit any act or omission, which yanks public faith
promulgated. After affixing his signature, the resolution was not submitted to [30]
away from the judiciary, for a judge’s utter lack of familiarity with the rules
the Chairman for promulgation and release by the Division Clerk of Court. [31]
undermines public confidence in the competence of the courts. In fact, the
However, we find it grossly appalling that the Court of Appeals’ former Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that judges must be faithful to the law and
Special Third Division (Barcelona, Demetria and Barrios, JJ.) immediately maintain professional competence. He must have the basic rules at the palm of
nd [32]
enforced its decision pending appeal. Worse, the Court of Appeals (2 Division, his hand and be proficient in the interpretation of laws and procedural rules.
Cui, Barcelona and Demetria, JJ.) directed the Chief of the Mailing Section to
Respondent justices argue that they did not have prior knowledge about
appoint a special sheriff to carry out the writ of execution pending appeal. The
the pendency of the petition before the Supreme Court, for had they learned
Court of Appeals has no authority to issue immediate execution pending appeal [33]
about it, they would not have allowed the execution of the judgment. The
record belies such pharisaical stance. In the first place, the Court of Appeals was With regard to respondent Rivamonte, considering that he relied on the
furnished with a copy of the petition. Secondly, the petitioners filed a belief that he was performing a ministerial duty of carrying out the orders of his
manifestation expressly opposing execution pending appeal because they had superiors, which he thought to be lawful and valid, and in the absence of malice
elevated the case to the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals ignored and bad faith, he may be absolved of administrative liability. However, as the
petitioners’ protestations. Thirdly, thedispositive portion of the September 18, assigned task was not within the scope of his duties as process server in the
1998 expressly acknowledged that the decision was not final, to wit: mailing section, prudence and caution dictated that he declines to perform the
assignment. He is hereby warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts
“Accordingly, this Court hereby RESOLVES to grant the instant petition. would be meted out with the appropriate penalty.
“1. A writ of Execution Pending Appeal of the Decision of this With regard to the allegation that respondent Justices Demetria, Barcelona
Court dated August 21, 1998 is hereby issued. and Barrios knowingly rendered an unjust judgment against complainants in the
certiorari petition, a review of the record would reveal insufficient evidence of
[34]
“x x x.” bad faith or ill motive on the part of the magistrates concurring in
the ponencia. At most, there was a lack of deliberation on the issues presented.
A scrutiny of the record reveals that respondent Justice Barrios did not take
This would not automatically warrant administrative sanctions against the
part in the appointment of respondent Rivamonte as special sheriff. The Court [39]
justices, in the absence of a showing of any bad faith, malice or corrupt
(Second Division, Cui, Barcelonaand Demetria, JJ.) by minute resolution [40]
purpose.
dated September 21, 1998, directed the Chief mailing section to appoint a special
sheriff.
[35] In order to discipline a judge, it must be clearly shown that the judgment
or order is unjust as being contrary to law and that the judge rendered it with
Indeed, respondent Justice Demetria has shown keen interest in the [41]
conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. Judges cannot be subjected
immediate execution of the decision despite the Court of Appeal’s lack of
to liability — civil, criminal or administrative — for any of their official acts, no
authority to appoint a special sheriff. The appointment of a special sheriff, in
matter how erroneous, so long as they act in good faith. It is only when they act
the person of respondent Rivamonte, encroached on the authority of the
fraudulently or corruptly, or with gross ignorance may they be held criminally
Supreme Court as the appointing power of all officials and employees of [42]
or administratively responsible. An erroneous decision or order is presumed
[36]
the judiciary. The Court of Appeals has no authority to appoint or to direct [43]
to have been issued in good faith in the absence of proof to the contrary.
[37]
any of its employees to appoint a special sheriff, who was not even bonded as
required by law.
[38] We find it apt to stress before we close that it is the duty of the members of
the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and
[44]
integrity of the judiciary. Judges must not only render just, correct and
impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their

[45]
fairness, impartiality and integrity. For, the conception of good judges has
been, and is, of men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge
[46]
their duties in accordance with law.
Respondent Rivamonte may be absolved of administrative liability but

must be admonished and warned to be more cautious in the discharge of his
duties.
The Judgment
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds respondent

Justice Demetrio G. Demetria guilty of gross misconduct and imposes on him a
fine of P20,000.00.
The Court DISMISSES the complaint against

respondent Teresita R. Marigomen with admonition and warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.
Finally, the Court DISMISSES the complaint against

respondent Efren R. Rivamonte with admonition and warning that a repetition
of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
In Our Resolution, respondent Demetria was found guilty of gross *misconduct:

(a) by issuing a temporary restraining order with the signature of only two out
Reyes v. Demetria, En Banc
of three justices of the Court of Appeals; (b) by enforcing the decision of the
appellate court notwithstanding the fact that the same is pending appeal with
the Supreme Court and (c) by showing his keen interest in the immediate
[A.M. No. CA-01-32. January 14, 2003] execution of the decision despite the lack of authority of the Court of Appeals to
appoint a Special Sheriff.
REYES vs. DEMETRIA
In support of his motion, respondent claims that: he was denied due process; he
EN BANC is not guilty of gross misconduct for the failure of one of the Justices of the
Court of Appeals to sign the Resolution granting the issuance of a temporary
Gentlemen:
restraining order; and, he is not guilty of misconduct "in allegedly directing the
appointment of a special sheriff".
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JAN
14 2003.
After reviewing our Decision promulgated on January 23, 2002 and the records
of the case, we find that respondent's motion for reconsideration is partly
A.M. No. CA-01-32 (Heirs of the Late Justice Jose B.L. Reyes vs. Justices Demetrio
meritorious.
G. Demetria, Ramon A. Barcelona and Roberto A. Barrios [Special Third Division];
Atty. Teresita A. Marigomen, Division Clerk of Court, Special Fourth Division and
Respondent was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law for disregarding
Mr. Efren R. Rivamonte, Special Sheriff, Mailing Section.)
existing rules of procedure in issuing a temporary restraining order which bore
the signatures of only two justices of the Court of Appeals. We are constrained
This refers to the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Demetrio G.
to rectify the same considering the provisions of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules
Demetria praying that the Resolution en banc dated January 23, 2002 be
of Court, to wit:
reconsidered and that he be absolved of all administrative charges leveled
against him. In compliance with our Resolution dated July 16, 2002, Division
"Section 5. xxx xxx xxx
Clerk of Court Caroline G. Ocampo-Peralta, of the Court of Appeals, and
complainants Heirs of the late Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, filed their respective "xxx. The effectivity of a temporary restraining order is not extendible without
Comments. need of any judicial declaration to that effect and no court shall have authority
to extend or renew the same on the ground for which it was issued.
"However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member thereof, the Clearly therefrom, even only one (1) member of the Court of Appeals * may issue
temporary restraining order shall be effective for sixty (60) days from service on a temporary restraining order. Thus, on this matter, respondent ** could not be
the party or person sought to be enjoined. A restraining order issued by the held guilty of gross misconduct.
Supreme Court or a member thereof shall be effective until further orders."
(emphasis supplied) Nevertheless, we maintain that the issuance of temporary restraining order by
only one or two justices of the Court of Appeals must be exercised sparingly,
and Sections 9 and 10, Rule 3 of the then prevailing Revised Internal Rules of the that is, only in case of extreme necessity where there is compelling reason to
Court of Appeals which provide: abate or avoid a grave injury to a party.
"Section 9. Action by a Justice. - The following may be considered and acted However, we find no justifiable reason to sustain respondent's claim that he was
upon by the Justice to whom the case is assigned for study and report: not given due process when the Court found that he is guilty*** of gross
misconduct in directing the appointment of a special sheriff in the absence of
"xxx xxx xxx; any hearing or investigation. Movant-respondent insist that he merely inquired
as to the possibility of the appointment of a sheriff and points to the fact that
"b. Motion or petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
the directive to the Chief of the Mailing Section to appoint a special sheriff to
injunction, restraining order, and other auxiliary writs;
carry out the writ of execution pending appeal was made by all three members
of the Division and not solely by him.
"xxx xxx xxx"
An examination of the record reveals that the directive referred to by

"Section 10. Absence of the Justice Assigned to the Study and Report. -When the
respondent is Annex "B" attached to the Comment of Justices Ramon Barcelona
Justice to whom the case is assigned for study and report is absent, the motions
(now retired) and Roberto Barrios which reads as follows:
and incidents enumerated in the proceeding section may be acted upon by the
Chairman or by the other member of the Division to which that Justice
"Sirs:
belongs. If the members of the division are all absent, any motion for the
issuance of a restraining order shall be referred to the Presiding Justice "Quoted hereunder for your information is a resolution of this
for appropriate action. Court.......SECOND.........DIVISION) dated....September 21, 1998....
"All other matters not mentioned in the proceeding section shall be cognizable "CA. G.R. SP No. 47156 METRO MANILA BUILDERS, INC.,
by the Division." (emphasis supplied)
"CA-G.R. SP NO. 47720 versus HON. Cesar_____ ET.AL..
"In view of the letter of Justice Demetrio Demetria (Ponente) dated September * Considering that respondent is guilty of gross misconduct in enforcing the
21, 1998, the Chief of the Mailing Section is hereby directed to appoint a special decision of the Court of Appeals despite knowledge of the designation of the
sheriff to execute the decision of this Court dated August 21, 1998. pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court and in causing the designation of
a special sheriff despite utter lack of authority to do so thereby showing unusual
"WITNESS the Honorable...EMETERIO C. CUI...Chairman, Honorable..RAMON interest therein, the imposition of a fine of P20,000.00 is in accordance with the
A. BARCELONA...and the Honorable...DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA...Members prevailing jurisprudence in 19983, when the complained resolution were issued.
st
this 21 .of..September.1998.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
"Very truly yours,
"(Sgd.) CAROLINE G. OCAMPO-PERALTA
"Division Clerk of Court"1
Respondent, in his present motion for reconsideration, does not refute the letter
mentioned in the about-quoted minute resolution of the former Second
Division showing indubitably that it was upon his instruction that a special
sheriff is appointed. Instead, respondent merely insists in his present motion for
reconsideration that the appointment of a special sheriff was authorized by all
three (3) Justices of the Court of Appeals which however does not justify the
wrongful appointment of a sheriff in said court.
Needless to emphasize, respondent had been given the opportunity to be heard

and as pointed out by complaints in their Comment, respondent had been
explicit in his Comment dated June 18, 2001 that he "does not see the need for
him to file his Comment to the instant complaint considering that he had
already been dismissed from office in A.M. No. 00-7-09 and, even in the event
that said dismissal is reconsidered, he would nevertheless resign or retire from
the service, hence, this case has been or will be rendered moot and academic"2.
International Airport Authority ("MIAA" for brevity) from terminating the

porterage concession of K Services Company ("K Services" for brevity).
SECTION 3 -- REQUISITES
Antecedent Facts
Manila International Airport Authority v. CA
K Services began providing porters for the domestic passenger terminal of the
Manila International Airport (now the Ninoy Aquino International Airport)
under a provisional permit for the period from January 1, 1976 to April 30, 1976.
FIRST DIVISION
MIAA and K Services subsequently executed a contract effective from May 1976
to April 30, 1977 that was renewed yearly until December 1984.
G. R. No. 118249 February 14, 2003
Although the parties did not renew their contract for the succeeding year, K
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
Services continued as porterage contractor from January 1985 until February
vs.
1987. Sometime in February 1987, however, MIAA gave notice that the services
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. EDITA M. MULINGTAPANG, Presiding Judge,
of K Services would be terminated on February 20, 1987. In response, K Services
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Metro Manila, Branch 115, and K
filed a petition for injunction on February 26, 1987 with the Regional Trial Court
SERVICES COMPANY, respondents.
of Pasay City docketed as Civil Case No. 4692-P.
DECISION
On December 26, 1989, the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113,
CARPIO, J.: rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 4692-P ruling that MIAA could terminate
its contract with K Services at any time. On April 12, 1991, K Services appealed
The Case the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals which dismissed the
appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 23053. The Court of Appeals also denied K Services’
1 2
Before this Court is a petition for review assailing the Amended Decision of the
subsequent motion for reconsideration. As K Services did not appeal, the
Court of Appeals dated December 2, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 32419 that upheld
decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory. Thus, the issue as
the writ of preliminary injunction granted by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
to whether MIAA could terminate the contract with K Services became res
3
City, Branch 115, in its Orders dated January 20, 1993 and August 5, 1993 in Civil 4
judicata.
Case No. 9500. The questioned orders of the trial court enjoined the Manila
Shortly after, K Services received a letter dated May 31, 1991 from then MIAA 1992 from General Manager Guillermo G. Cunanan to the MIAA Board of
General Manager Eduardo Carrascoso, the relevant portion of which stated: Directors. The memorandum stated that "Management has decided to
relinquish the management of these concessions and award them to the private
"Due to certain administrative problems that are preventing us from taking 7
sector at fair and reasonable fees x x x." The memorandum recommended to the
over, please continue operating said service until further notice from us. MIAA Board of Directors the approval of a schedule of concession fees
chargeable to concessionaires of porterage and other services.
In connection thereto, please be advised also that PAL Authorities and the MIA
Authority have come to an agreement whereby the latter shall operate and However, on December 1, 1992, General Manager Cunanan gave written notice
manage the Domestic Terminal II which necessarily includes the operation of to K Services to "wind up" its operations as "Management has decided to take
the porterage and other concessions therein. In this regard, you may take over over the aforecited services at the Domestic Passenger Terminals I and II."
8
the operation of the porterage service therein since the flights being operated in
this Terminal II used to be a part of your contract. Please coordinate this with K Services opposed the takeover. It filed on December 18, 1992 a Petition for
the Manager of the Domestic Passenger Terminal and the PAL Authorities Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for a Temporary Restraining
9
concerned. Order with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 115, docketed as Civil
Case No. 9500. Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the
Please understand however that in continuing the operation of the porterage trial court issued on December 28, 1992 a temporary restraining order against
service, you will be charged the monthly Concession Privilege Fee in the amount MIAA. On January 20, 1993, the trial court granted the writ of preliminary
of P45,000.00 for each Terminal or a total of P90,000.00 per month; further, you injunction prayed for by K Services, as follows:
will also abide by the terms and conditions of your expired
5
contract." (Emphasis supplied) "WHEREFORE, the Court, after careful evaluation and consideration of the
evidence adduced by the parties, so finds that this is a proper case where a Writ
K Services alleged that it was initially hesitant to accept MIAA’s offer. However, of Preliminary Injunction should issue and let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
it continued to provide porters for Domestic Terminal I and expanded its be issued to restrain and prevent the respondent Manila International Airport
operations to cover Domestic Terminal II upon the alleged verbal assurance of Authority or anyone acting for in (sic) its own behalf, from terminating the
MIAA’s officers that MIAA’s policy was to relinquish porterage operations to the porterage services of the petitioner K Services Company until further order from
private sector. K Services likewise claimed that MIAA officers also gave verbal this Court provided, however, that the petitioner files before this Court a bond
assurance that K Services would not be replaced with another porterage with sufficient sureties in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSANDS (sic)
6
contractor without a public bidding in which K Services could participate. In PESOS (P500,000.00), Philippine Currency, executed to the respondent to
support of its contention, K Services cited the memorandum dated August 28, answer and pay for whatever damages the respondent may sustain pending the
hearing on the merits of the main case by reason of the injunction if the Court "2. The allegations that the complaint states no cause of action, and that the
10
should finally decided (sic) that the petitioner was not entitled thereto." issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction has no factual and legal basis to
the mind of this Court, are not tenable. A hearing on the question of whether or
MIAA’s legal department duly received a copy of the trial court’s order. not a Writ of Preliminary Injunction should be issued was held wherein the
However, the Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG" for brevity) did not receive a parties and their counsels were allowed to go on oral arguments and this Court
copy of the injunctive writ, despite having already entered its appearance as after a careful evaluation of the evidence adduced thereat found that there is a
counsel for MIAA during previous hearings before the trial court. case where a writ of preliminary injunction should issue. Evidence adduced
shows that the petitioner is servicing the respondent as a porterage contractor
On February 11, 1993, the OSG filed a motion to dismiss the complaint filed by K
and that a notice of termination was sent to the petitioner. The allegation of the
Services on the grounds that: (1) the complaint failed to state a cause of action;
petitioner and presented before this Court is one for which a Court can make a
or (2) assuming the existence of a cause of action, a prior judgment barred the
valid judgment. Certainly, this Court has to issue a writ of preliminary
same. At the time MIAA filed the instant petition before the Court, this motion
injunction to avoid any irreparable loss that might be caused to the plaintiff.
to dismiss, opposed by K Services, was pending consideration by the trial court.
Nonetheless, to legally equate the respondent, this Court directed the petitioner
to file a P500,000.00 bond to answer for whatever damage the respondent might
On July 7, 1993, K Services filed a motion to cite MIAA’s General Manager
12
sustain pending hearing of the case on the merits."
Cunanan for contempt as the latter ostensibly attempted to oust and replace K
Services with another porterage contractor. It was only upon receipt of a copy of
The OSG, on MIAA’s behalf, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to the
the contempt motion that the OSG supposedly learned of the writ of
Court of Appeals assailing the trial court’s orders of January 20, 1993 and August
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. On July 23, 1993, the OSG filed
11
5, 1993. The OSG argued that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
an Omnibus Motion which mainly alleged that: (1) the injunctive writ lacked
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the writ of
legal and factual basis; and (2) K Services was using the injunction as a shield to
preliminary injunction and denied the Omnibus Motion without sufficient
violate the terms of the porterage agreement by charging fees in excess of the
factual and legal basis.
amount authorized by the contract. The Omnibus Motion prayed for
reconsideration of the order of January 20, 1993 and for the lifting of the The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
injunction.
13
In its Decision of December 22, 1993, the Court of Appeals set aside the
On August 5, 1993, the trial court denied MIAA’s Omnibus Motion, ruling that: questioned orders of the trial court for lack of sufficient basis, to wit:
"In the case at bar, while the right of petitioner to terminate the lease contract is "In the case at bar, the evidence submitted by both parties, as well as the issues
clear, and in fact ruled upon with finality or is res judicata, private respondent’s raised in the oral arguments, also by both parties, were the very bases upon
mere claim of an extended/expanded contract is unclear and disputed, to the which the writ of preliminary injunction was issued "to avoid any irreparable
effect that the granting of the writ of preliminary injunction at this stage of the loss that might be caused to the plaintiff." Thus, it has been ruled that it is well-
proceeding, being based on the doubtful genuineness and validity of the alleged established that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to a judge or
extended agreement, has not been successfully established." body in the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction where a party was not
deprived of its day in court as it was heard and had exhaustively presented all its
xxx arguments and defenses (Santos vs. CA, 214 SCRA 162).1awphi1.nét
"Thus, the court a quo acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 22, 1993, object of respondent’s
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders. motion for reconsideration, is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE, and a
14
new one rendered DISMISSING the instant petition."
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and the questioned orders
hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE." On January 26, 1995, the OSG filed with the Court a petition for review and
prayed for: (1) the reversal of the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals; (2)
While the motion for reconsideration filed by K Services before the Court of
the annulment of the assailed orders issued by the trial court; and (3) the
Appeals was pending, MIAA attempted to oust K Services based on the appellate
issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
court’s decision. Upon motion of K Services, the trial court issued an order to
trial court from implementing its assailed orders.
preserve the status quo ante by reinstating K Services as the porterage
contractor of Domestic Passenger Terminals I and II. The Issue
MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for the issuance of a temporary The MIAA raises this sole issue:
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the trial court from
implementing the status quo ante order. The Court of Appeals denied MIAA’s WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
motion in its Resolution of March 10, 1994. ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN SUSTAINING THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BY THE TRIAL COURT.
On December 2, 1994, the Court of Appeals promulgated an Amended Decision
reversing its earlier decision of December 22, 1993 and dismissing MIAA’s The central question for resolution is whether K Services was entitled to the writ
petition for certiorari. Citing "misapprehensions of fact," the Court of Appeals of preliminary injunction granted by the trial court. The Court shall deal only
ruled:
with the questioned writ and not with the merits of the case pending before the Thus, what matters is the intervening period after the trial court’s order of
trial court. August 5, 1993 – the last order MIAA assailed in its petition for certiorari – to the
time the petition was filed with the Court of Appeals. The records show that
The Ruling of the Court some seventy-seven days elapsed from MIAA’s receipt on August 6, 1993 of the
order of August 5, 1993 before MIAA’s petition for certiorari was filed with the
The petition is meritorious.
Court of Appeals on October 22, 1993.
Whether MIAA’s petition for certiorari should be considered barred by laches.

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court prevailing at the time did not fix a specific period
for filing a special civil action for certiorari. Jurisprudence then simply required
K Services contends that MIAA’s right to question the trial court’s order of
that petitions for certiorari should be filed within a reasonable time from receipt
January 20, 1993 is barred by laches. K Services points out that eight months had
17
of the questioned judgment or order. The Court then found three months to be
elapsed between the receipt by MIAA of the order of January 20, 1993 and the
reasonable, although courts were not precluded from entertaining petitions filed
filing of the petition for certiorari questioning the order before the Court of
beyond the three-month period if warranted by the demands of justice and
Appeals.
18
provided laches had not set in.
K Services’ argument is incorrect.
As the period of seventy-seven days in this instance was well within the three-
MIAA’s petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals sought to set aside month period regarded as reasonable by jurisprudence then, MIAA’s petition for
two orders of the trial court. These are the injunctive order of January 20, 1993, certiorari before the Court of Appeals could not be considered as barred by
and the later order of August 5, 1993 denying MIAA’s Omnibus Motion before laches.
the trial court.
We note that K Services likewise assailed before the trial and appellate courts
Laches is the failure, or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained time to do the timeliness and validity of MIAA’s Omnibus Motion filed on July 23, 1993.
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. However, both courts correctly opted to tackle the issues raised by MIAA. The
It is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, Omnibus Motion may be regarded as akin to a memorandum assailing the trial
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has court’s lack of jurisdiction to issue the injunctive writ, which may be ruled on,
15
abandoned or declined to assert it. We have held that, in establishing laches, considering that a jurisdictional question may be raised at any
19
what should be considered is the interval after the rendition of the last order time. Alternatively, the Omnibus Motion may be treated as a motion for
16
sought to be set aside. dissolution of the preliminary injunction authorized under Section 6, Rule 58 of
20
the old Rules of Court, which may be raised at any stage prior to final continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of an act
judgment.1a\^/phi1.net or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack (b) That the commission or continuance of some act complained of
or excess of jurisdiction when it granted the writ of preliminary injunction. during the litigation or the non-performance thereof would probably
work injustice to the plaintiff; or
MIAA asserts that K Services has not shown any clear and unmistakable right to
the protection of a writ of preliminary injunction. MIAA calls attention to the (c) That the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is
trial court’s order of January 20, 1993, which failed to state in particular the basis procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the
for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of K Services. plaintiff’s rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to
MIAA argues that the effect of the injunction is to force MIAA to extend the life render the judgment ineffectual."
of a contract that already expired by operation of its own provisions. For these
reasons, MIAA contends that the trial court, in granting the injunctive writ, The requisites necessary for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are:
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and
(2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
21
On the other hand, K Services maintains that it has the right to continue as the damage. The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of
porterage contractor of MIAA under the extension conferred on it by MIAA preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary for the
through General Manager Carrascoso. K Services further alleges that MIAA grant of an injunction are present in the case before it.
officers verbally assured K Services that MIAA’s policy was to privatize the
porterage and other services, and in any case, K Services would not be replaced In the instant case, however, the trial court’s order of January 20, 1993 was, on
without a public bidding. its face, bereft of basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. There
were no findings of fact or law in the assailed order indicating that any of the
We find for MIAA. elements essential for the grant of a preliminary injunction existed. The trial
court alluded to hearings during which the parties marked their respective
Section 3, Rule 58, of the old Rules of Court, which was applicable at the time, exhibits and the trial court heard the oral arguments of opposing counsels.
prescribed that a preliminary injunction could be granted provided: However, it cannot be ascertained what evidence was formally offered and
presented by the parties and given weight and credence by the trial court. The
"(a) That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole
basis for the trial court’s conclusion that K Services was entitled to a writ of
or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
preliminary injunction is unclear.
In its order of August 5, 1993, the trial court stated that it issued the injunction precipitately. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the
to prevent irreparable loss that might be caused to K Services. Once more, law permits it and the emergency demands it." (Emphasis supplied)
however, the trial court neglected to mention what right in esse of K Services, if
any, was in danger of being violated and required the protection of a The records before the Court do not reveal a clear and unmistakable right on
preliminary injunction. The trial court stated merely that K Services was the part of K Services that would entitle the latter to the protection of an
servicing MIAA as a porterage contractor and that a notice of termination was injunctive writ.
sent to K Services. Absent a preliminary finding by the trial court that K Services
The available records show, and the parties do not dispute, that the last contract
possessed the right to continue as MIAA’s concessionaire, MIAA’s termination
between MIAA and K Services had already expired. K Services’ claim to an
of K Services’ was not sufficient in itself to establish that there was an invasion
"Extended/Expanded Contract" is anchored on the letter of May 31, 1991 from
of K Services’ right.
General Manager Carrascoso. However, this letter expressly stipulated that the
25
Considering the far-reaching effects of a writ of preliminary injunction, the trial extension would only be "until further notice" from MIAA. We find the
court should have exercised more prudence and judiciousness in its issuance of argument of the OSG on this matter persuasive:
the injunction order. We remind trial courts that while generally the grant of a
"While it may be conceded that private respondent was allowed to continue
writ of preliminary injunction rests on the sound discretion of the court taking
operating the porterage service after the expiration of the contract as the above
cognizance of the case, extreme caution must be observed in the exercise of
22
letter shows, there is no question, however, that private respondent was only
such discretion. The discretion of the court a quo to grant an injunctive writ
allowed to operate up to a certain time, specified therein as "until further notice
must be exercised based on the grounds and in the manner provided by
23 24
from us." Indeed, there is nothing in said letter to indicate that private
law. Thus, the Court declared in Garcia v. Burgos:
respondent has until forever to operate the porterage service as private
"It has been consistently held that there is no power the exercise of which is respondent would like to make it appear. The fact that the authority to continue
more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation and sound the porterage service was specified up to a certain period is a clear indication
discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an that petitioner did not intend to allow private respondent to operate the
injunction. It is the strong arm of equity that should never be extended unless to porterage service for as long as it pleases. Perforce, it limited such privilege to a
26
cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or certain period or until further notice. x x x" 1a\^/phi1.net
commensurate remedy in damages.

Where the terms of a contract are clear, leaving no doubt on the intention of the
Every court should remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the contracting parties, the Court has held that the literal meaning of the
27
freedom of action of the defendant and should not be granted lightly or stipulations shall control. The phrase "until further notice" prescribed a limit
to the extension of the contract conditioned on a future event, specifically, the "10.02. Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary MIAA shall have the right
receipt by K Services of notice of termination from MIAA. In effect, the phrase to terminate or rescind this Contract without need of judicial intervention by
28
provided a resolutory facultative condition. It should be noted that "until" is a giving at least thirty (30) days written notice to that effect upon the
"word of limitation, used ordinarily to restrict that which precedes to what CONCESSIONAIRE, which notice shall be final and binding on both parties; x x
immediately follows it, and its office is to fix some point of time or some event x" (Emphasis supplied)
29
upon the arrival or occurrence of which what precedes will cease to exist."
Thus, even assuming that General Manager Carrascoso’s letter of May 31, 1991
Significantly, MIAA General Manager Carrascoso also explained in his May 31, extended the porterage contract, still MIAA had the right to terminate K
1991 letter that the extension was being offered because MIAA had Services’ porterage services by mere 30-days written notice.
administrative problems that prevented it from taking over the porterage
operations of the domestic passenger terminals. Further, K Services itself Both the trial court, in its order of August 5, 1993, and the Court of Appeals, in
admitted in its initial petition for prohibition filed before the trial court that it its Amended Decision, found that the injunctive writ was necessary to prevent
hesitated to accept the offer "because of the transiency and impermanence of serious damage or irreparable loss to K Services.
30
the ‘extension’." Taken together, these factors indicate that the parties
The Court has ruled, however, that the possibility of irreparable damage without
intended and understood that the extension was merely a temporary 33
proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction. Where the
arrangement.
complainant’s right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. Absent a
There is likewise no basis for K Services’ contention that its services as the clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of
34
porterage contractor cannot be terminated unless a public bidding is held to discretion.
determine its replacement. MIAA’s charter, as provided for in Executive Order

Thus, the trial court's grant of the injunctive writ in favor of K Services despite
No. 903, grants the MIAA ample authority to take over directly porterage
31
the lack of a clear and unmistakable right on the part of K Services constitutes
operations within the airport. Against this law, K Services’ claims of verbal
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. A finding that the
assurances from MIAA’s officers cannot prevail.
applicant for preliminary injunction may suffer damage not capable of pecuniary
Moreover, General Manager Carrascoso’s letter also expressly stated that K estimation does not suffice to support an injunction, where it appears that the
Services "should abide by the terms and conditions of your expired right of the applicant is unclear or disputed.
32
contract." Article X of the contract dated April 27, 1984, the last contract
Finally, in deciding to dismiss MIAA’s petition for certiorari, the Court of
executed between MIAA and K Services, stated that: 35
Appeals cited the Court’s pronouncement in Santos v. Court of Appeals. We
clarify that Santos does not constitute an exception to the requirement of a clear
and unmistakable right before an injunction may issue. On the contrary, the
Court in Santos expressly declared that all the requisites for the proper issuance
of a preliminary mandatory injunction were present, and the right of the
government to the injunctive writ was clear, well-defined and certain.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Decision of December

2, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32419 is SET ASIDE. The
Decision of December 22, 1993 of the Court of Appeals in the same case, setting
aside the Orders dated January 20, 1993 and August 5, 1993 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 115, in Civil Case No. 9500, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
1
Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the January 31, 2007 Decision and June 8,
SECTION 3 -WHAT IS A RIGHTS IN ESSE? 2
2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91350 allegedly
3
for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. The CA had reversed the Order of
Paranaque v. Ebio
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 196, issued on April
29, 2005 in Civil Case No. 05-0155.
Below are the facts.

THIRD DIVISION
Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land
G.R. No. 178411 June 23, 2010
consisting of 406 square meters, more or less, located at 9781 Vitalez Compound
OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE in Barangay Vitalez, Parañaque City and covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 01027
CITY ADMINISTRATOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY and 01472 in the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an accretion
ENGINEER OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY PLANNING AND of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert that the original occupant and possessor of
DEVELOPMENT COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF THE BARANGAY CAPTAIN the said parcel of land was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez. Sometime in
AND SANGGUNIANG PAMBARANGAY OF BARANGAY VITALEZ, 1930, Jose gave the land to his son, Pedro Vitalez. From then on, Pedro
PARAÑAQUE CITY, TERESITA A. GATCHALIAN, ENRICO R. ESGUERRA, continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after
4
ERNESTO T. PRACALE, JR., MANUEL M. ARGOTE, CONRADO M. CANLAS, executing an affidavit declaring possession and occupancy, Pedro was able to
5
JOSEPHINE S. DAUIGOY, ALLAN L. GONZALES, ESTER C. ASEHAN, obtain a tax declaration over the said property in his name. Since then,
MANUEL A. FUENTES, and MYRNA P. ROSALES, Petitioners, respondents have been religiously paying real property taxes for the said
6
vs. property.
MARIO D. EBIO AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRS namely, ARTURO V. EBIO,

Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro’s daughter, Zenaida.
EDUARDO V. EBIO, RENATO V. EBIO, LOURDES E. MAGTANGOB, MILA
Upon Pedro’s advice, the couple established their home on the said lot. In April
V. EBIO, and ARNEL V. EBIO, Respondents.
1964 and in October 1971, Mario Ebio secured building permits from the
DECISION Parañaque municipal office for the construction of their house within the said
7
compound. On April 21, 1987, Pedro executed a notarized Transfer of
8
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: Rights ceding his claim over the entire parcel of land in favor of Mario Ebio.
17
Subsequently, the tax declarations under Pedro’s name were cancelled and new property and expressing intent for a further dialogue. The request remained
9
ones were issued in Mario Ebio’s name. unheeded.1avvphi1
On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Parañaque City on
10
Resolution No. 08, series of 1999 seeking assistance from the City Government April 21, 2005 and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against
18
of Parañaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek located petitioners. In the course of the proceedings, respondents admitted before the
in the said barangay. The proposed road, projected to be eight (8) meters wide trial court that they have a pending application for the issuance of a sales patent
19
and sixty (60) meters long, will run from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
11
Compound traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. When the city
20
government advised all the affected residents to vacate the said area, On April 29, 2005, the RTC issued an Order denying the petition for lack of
respondents immediately registered their opposition thereto. As a result, the merit. The trial court reasoned that respondents were not able to prove
road project was temporarily suspended.

12 successfully that they have an established right to the property since they have
not instituted an action for confirmation of title and their application for sales
In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several officials patent has not yet been granted. Additionally, they failed to implead the
from the barangay and the city planning office proceeded to cut eight (8) Republic of the Philippines, which is an indispensable party.
coconut trees planted on the said lot. Respondents filed letter-complaints before
21
the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands, the Department of Interior and Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
13
Local Government and the Office of the Vice Mayor. On June 29, 2003,
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. On January
the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez held a meeting to discuss the construction
31, 2007, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision in favor of the respondents.
of the proposed road. In the said meeting, respondents asserted their opposition
According to the Court of Appeals--
to the proposed project and their claim of ownership over the affected
14
property. On November 14, 2003, respondents attended another meeting with
The issue ultimately boils down to the question of ownership of the lands
officials from the city government, but no definite agreement was reached by
adjoining Cutcut Creek particularly Road Lot No. 8 (hereinafter RL 8) and the
15
and among the parties.
accreted portion beside RL 8.
On March 28, 2005, City Administrator Noli Aldip sent a letter to the
The evidentiary records of the instant case, shows that RL 8 containing an area
respondents ordering them to vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days, or
of 291 square meters is owned by Guaranteed Homes, Inc. covered by TCT No.
16
be physically evicted from the said property. Respondents sent a letter to the
S-62176. The same RL 8 appears to have been donated by the Guaranteed Homes
Office of the City Administrator asserting, in sum, their claim over the subject
to the City Government of Parañaque on 22 March 1966 and which was accepted
by the then Mayor FLORENCIO BERNABE on 5 April 1966. There is no evidence of the property in question since 1930 even if the adjoining RL 8 was
however, when RL 8 has been intended as a road lot. subsequently registered in the name of Guaranteed Homes. x x x.
On the other hand, the evidentiary records reveal that PEDRO VITALEZ xxxx
possessed the accreted property since 1930 per his Affidavit dated 21 March 1966
for the purpose of declaring the said property for taxation purposes. The Further, it was only in 1978 that Guaranteed Homes was able to have RL 8
property then became the subject of Tax Declaration No. 20134 beginning the registered in its name, which is almost fifty years from the time PEDRO
year 1967 and the real property taxes therefor had been paid for the years 1966, VITALEZ occupied the adjoining accreted property in 1930. x x x.
1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1978, 1980, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999,
xxxx
2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. Sometime in 1964 and 1971, construction
permits were issued in favor of Appellant MARIO EBIO for the subject property.
We likewise note the continuous payment of real property taxes of Appellants
On 21 April 1987, PEDRO VITALEZ transferred his rights in the accreted
which bolster their right over the subject property. x x x.
property to MARIO EBIO and his successors-in-interest.
xxxx
Applying [Article 457 of the Civil Code considering] the foregoing documentary
evidence, it could be concluded that Guaranteed Homes is the owner of the In sum, We are fully convinced and so hold that the Appellants [have] amply
accreted property considering its ownership of the adjoining RL 8 to which the proven their right over the property in question.
accretion attached. However, this is without the application of the provisions of
the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription which is likewise applicable in the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED.
instant case. The challenged Order of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
22
xxxx SO ORDERED.
The subject of acquisitive prescription in the instant case is the accreted portion On June 8, 2007, the appellate court denied petitioners’ motion for
which [was] duly proven by the Appellants. It is clear that since 1930, Appellants reconsideration. Hence, this petition raising the following assignment of errors:
together with their predecessor-in-interest, PEDRO VITALEZ[,] have been in

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE
exclusive possession of the subject property and starting 1964 had introduced
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE A RIGHT IN
improvements thereon as evidenced by their construction permits. Thus, even
by extraordinary acquisitive prescription[,] Appellants have acquired ownership
ESSE IS IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED Petitioners, however, argue that since the creek, being a tributary of the river, is
JURISPRUDENCE[;] classified as part of the public domain, any land that may have formed along its
banks through time should also be considered as part of the public domain. And
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE respondents should have included the State as it is an indispensable party to the
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE SUBJECT LOT IS AVAILABLE action.
FOR ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION IS IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE[;] AND We do not agree.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THE It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial
23
COMPLAINT … FILED BY RESPONDENTS IN THE LOWER COURT. deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being
the case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84
The issues may be narrowed down into two (2): procedurally, whether the State 26
of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation to
is an indispensable party to respondents’ action for prohibitory injunction; and Article 457 of theCivil Code.
substantively, whether the character of respondents’ possession and occupation
of the subject property entitles them to avail of the relief of prohibitory Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 specifically covers ownership
injunction. over alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek. It reads:
The petition is without merit. ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks,
streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof,
An action for injunction is brought specifically to restrain or command the belong to the owners of such lands.
27
24
performance of an act. It is distinct from the ancillary remedy of preliminary
injunction, which cannot exist except only as part or as an incident to an Interestingly, Article 457 of the Civil Code states:
independent action or proceeding. Moreover, in an action for injunction, the
auxiliary remedy of a preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction may Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
issue.
25 accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters.
In the case at bar, respondents filed an action for injunction to prevent the local
government of Parañaque City from proceeding with the construction of an It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along
access road that will traverse through a parcel of land which they claim is owned the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial
by them by virtue of acquisitive prescription. property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have
been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the We also find that the character of possession and ownership by the respondents
adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, over the contested land entitles them to the avails of the action.
the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third
34
persons.
28 A right in esse means a clear and unmistakable right. A party seeking to avail
of an injunctive relief must prove that he or she possesses a right in esse or one
35
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. that is actual or existing. It should not be contingent, abstract, or future rights,
36
No matter how long the possession of the properties has been, there can be no or one which may never arise.
29
prescription against the State regarding property of public domain. Even a city
or municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as against the State.
30 In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro
Vitalez, had occupied and possessed the subject lot as early as 1930. In 1964,
31
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land respondent Mario Ebio secured a permit from the local government of
which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments Parañaque for the construction of their family dwelling on the said lot. In 1966,
along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear provision of Pedro executed an affidavit of possession and occupancy allowing him to declare
law. the property in his name for taxation purposes. Curiously, it was also in 1966
when Guaranteed Homes, Inc., the registered owner of Road Lot No. 8 (RL 8)
Moreover, an indispensable party is one whose interest in the controversy is which adjoins the land occupied by the respondents, donated RL 8 to the local
such that a final decree would necessarily affect his/her right, so that the court government of Parañaque.
32
cannot proceed without their presence. In contrast, a necessary party is one
whose presence in the proceedings is necessary to adjudicate the whole From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, only
controversy but whose interest is separable such that a final decree can be made one conclusion can be made: that for more than thirty (30) years, neither
33
in their absence without affecting them. Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local government of Parañaque in its corporate
or private capacity sought to register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly,
In the instant case, the action for prohibition seeks to enjoin the city respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property
government of Parañaque from proceeding with its implementation of the road through prescription. Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that
construction project. The State is neither a necessary nor an indispensable party they have yet to register their title over the said lot. It must be remembered that
to an action where no positive act shall be required from it or where no the purpose of land registration is not the acquisition of lands, but only the
obligation shall be imposed upon it, such as in the case at bar. Neither would it registration of title which the applicant already possessed over the land.
be an indispensable party if none of its properties shall be divested nor any of its Registration was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. A decree
37
rights infringed. of registration merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership.
38
Did the filing of a sales patent application by the respondents, which remains
pending before the DENR, estop them from filing an injunction suit?
We answer in the negative.
Confirmation of an imperfect title over a parcel of land may be done either

through judicial proceedings or through administrative process. In the instant
case, respondents admitted that they opted to confirm their title over the
property administratively by filing an application for sales patent.
Respondents’ application for sales patent, however, should not be used to

prejudice or derogate what may be deemed as their vested right over the subject
property. The sales patent application should instead be considered as a mere
superfluity particularly since ownership over the land, which they seek to buy
from the State, is already vested upon them by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
Moreover, the State does not have any authority to convey a property through
39
the issuance of a grant or a patent if the land is no longer a public land.
Nemo dat quod dat non habet. No one can give what he does not have. Such
principle is equally applicable even against a sovereign entity that is the State.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The January 31, 2007
Decision, as well as the July 8, 2007 Resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 91350 are hereby AFFIRMED.
With costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
5
1978. Pursuant thereto, the NAPOCOR Welfare Plan Committee, renamed and
reconstituted later on as the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund Board of Trustees
Orocio v. Angulunan
(NAPOCOR-WFBT), issued and promulgated a charter for the NAPOCOR
Welfare Fund which includes the following provisions:
ARTICLE VII
G.R. No. 179892-93 January 30, 2009
TERMINATION/AMENDMENT OF THE PLAN
ATTY. VICTORIANO V. OROCIO, Petitioner,
"Section 1. Termination/Amendment of the Plan – The Board of Directors may
vs.
amend, revise, repeal any or all of the provisions herein contained and/or
EDMUND P. ANGULUAN, LORNA T. DY and NATIONAL POWER
terminate the Plan, subject to the pertinent provisions of the Trust Agreement.
CORPORATION, Respondents.
Section 2. Payment of Member’s share – In the event of termination of the Plan,

DECISION
the balance to the credit of each member and the General Reserve for Employee
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Benefits shall be paid to the members in full. The accumulated amount in the
General Reserve for Employee Benefits shall be distributed among the members
1
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of in the proportion to the amount outstanding to their credit as of the time of
2
Court seeking to set aside the Resolution dated 31 October 2006, termination.
6
3 4
Decision dated 29 January 2007, and Resolution dated 27 September 2007, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 95786 and 95946. The NAPOCOR Board subsequently passed Resolution No. 82-172 fixing a
NAPOCOR employee’s contribution to the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund in a sum
The facts culled from the records are as follows: equivalent to 5% of his basic pay.
7
On 26 September 1978, the National Power Corporation Board of Directors Almost two decades thereafter, on 8 June 2001, Congress passed Republic Act
(NAPOCOR Board), pursuant to its specific power and duty to fix the No. 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA).
compensation, allowance and benefits of the NAPOCOR employees under EPIRA directed the restructuring of the power industry which includes the
Section 6(c) of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, passed Resolution No. 78-119 reorganization of NAPOCOR. Following the directive of EPIRA, the NAPOCOR
approving the grant of a monthly welfare allowance equivalent to 10% of an Board passed Resolution No. 2003-43 on 26 March 2003 abolishing the
employee’s basic pay to all NAPOCOR employees effective 1 October NAPOCOR Welfare Fund Department and other departments, and dissolving
the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund upon the effectivity of EPIRA on 26 June On 13 July 2004, there being no action or response on her letter, Segovia,
8
2001. Consequently, some of the employees in the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund together with Mrs. Emma C. Baysic (Baysic), former President of the NAPOCOR
Department and in other departments (who were also members of the Employees Association and former member of the NAPOCOR-WFBT, in their
NAPOCOR Welfare Fund) resigned, retired or separated from service. personal capacities and on behalf of the 559 non-EPIRA separated members,
Thereafter, the liquidation and dissolution process for the NAPOCOR Welfare filed with the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 217, a Petition
Fund commenced. for Mandamus, Accounting and Liquidation with a Prayer for the Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction against respondents NAPOCOR,
On 11 May 2004, the NAPOCOR-WFBT, with authority from the Commission on the NAPOCOR Board, Anguluan (as NAPOCOR Vice-President, Human
Audit, approved Resolution No. 2004-001 authorizing the release of P184 million Resources, Administration and Finance Department) and Lorna T. Dy (as
(which represented 40% of the liquid assets of NAPOCOR Welfare Fund in the NAPOCOR Senior Department Manager on Finance). The Petition was
12
total amount of P462 million as of 16 April 2004) for distribution to the docketed as Civil Case No. Q04-53121.
NAPOCOR Welfare Fund members who resigned, retired, or
separated upon the effectivity of EPIRA on 26 June 2001 (EPIRA separated Segovia, Baysic and the 559 non-EPIRA separated members were represented in
9
members). Civil Case No. Q04-53121 by petitioner Atty. Victoriano V. Orocio under a "Legal
13
Retainer Agreement" dated 1 September 2004, pertinent portions of which are
Pursuant to Resolution No. 2004-001, herein respondent Edmund P. Anguluan reproduced below:
(Anguluan), as Ex-OfficioChairman of NAPOCOR-WFBT, issued a
memorandum on 17 May 2004 to implement the release of P184 million only to SUBJECT: Petition for Mandamus with Damages Temporary Restraining
the EPIRA separated members to the exclusion of the NAPOCOR employees Order/Injunction, etc. with the Court "NPC RETIREES versus NPC, NP Board of
(who were also members of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund) who have resigned, Directors, et. al. before the RTC Quezon City for the payment/settlement of
retired, or separated prior to the effectivity of EPIRA (non-EPIRA separated their claims for NPC Welfare Fund (P462 Million assets and other assets liquid
10
members). or non-liquid).
This prompted Mrs. Perla A. Segovia (Segovia), former Vice-President of Human Dear Ms. Segovia and Ms. Baysic:
Resources and Administration and former Ex-Officio Chairman of the
NAPOCOR-WFBT, in behalf of the 559 non-EPIRA separated members and in In connection with the above-stated subject, hereunder are our terms and
her own personal capacity, to write a letter to Mr. Rogelio M. Murga, then conditions, to wit:
NAPOCOR President, demanding their equal shares in the remaining assets of

11
1. No acceptance fee;
the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund and access to information and records thereof.
2. All costs of litigation ([filing] and docket fees, etc.), miscellaneous of the EPIRA law and date of abolition of the Welfare Fund]) and
and out-of-pocket expenses the prosecution of said action shall be for NPC non-EPIRA separated members (those who ceased to be
the account of the clients; members of the Fund prior to June 26, 2001) are entitled to
"Earnings Differential" of the NPC Welfare Fund;
3. No appearance/meeting fee;
2. "Corrected Earnings Differential" refers to a benefit which is a
4. Contingency or success fees of fifteen percent (15%) of whatever result of re-computation of Member’s Equity Contributions and
amounts/value of assets (liquid and/or non-liquid) are recovered; Earnings using the correct rates of return vis-à-vis what was used
when they were separated. Period covered by the discrepancy is
5. This Retainer Agreement serves as Legal Authority for the Law Firm
from 1989 to 2003. Hence, affected are WF members separated
to receive and/or collect its contingency/success fee without further
anytime within the period 1989 to 2003;
demand.
xxxx
On 22 February 2006, the parties in the above-mentioned case, duly assisted by
14
their respective counsels, executed a Compromise Agreement whereby they 4. The Corrected Earnings Differential of all affected WF separated
agreed to amicably settle their dispute under the following terms and members shall earn 6% legal interest per annum computed from the
conditions: separation of the members from service up to March 31, 2006 for all the
non-EPIRA separated members and May 31, 2006 for the EPIRA
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
separated members;
xxxx
5. As of March 2006, the estimated Corrected Earnings Differential
for the non-EPIRA separated members is P119.196 Million while
WHEREAS, the parties have agreed to settle the instant case amicably.
for the EPIRA separated members isP173.589 Million or a total
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the parties herein have agreed as follows: of P292.785 Million, inclusive of the 6% legal interest;
1. Both the NPC EPIRA separated members (those members of the 6. In conformity with the Retainer Agreement dated September 1,
Welfare Fund affected by the EPIRA law and ceased to be 2004 between Mrs. Perla A. Segovia, Mrs. Emma Y. Baysic and Atty.
members of the Welfare Fund anytime from June 26, 2001 Victoriano V. Orocio; and Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney
[effectivity of the EPIRA LAW] to March 1, 2003 [implementation dated July 20, 2005 executed by Mrs. Perla A. Segovia and Mrs.
Emma Y. Baysic in favor of Atty. Victoriano V. Orocio, counsel for him entitled to collect an amount equivalent to 15% of the monies due the non-
petitioners, (copies attached as Annexes "A" and "B" respectively), EPIRA separated members as his attorney’s fees in conformity with the
18
15% attorney’s fees shall be deducted from the corresponding Compromise Agreement. In an Order dated 15 May 2006, the RTC granted
Corrected Earnings Differential of those non-EPIRA separated petitioner’s motion and decreed that he is entitled to collect the amount so
19
members who have already executed the corresponding Special demanded.
Power of Attorney/Written Authority for the deduction/payment
of said attorney’s fees, and shall be paid to V.V. Orocio and On 20 June 2006, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for the Issuance of a
20
Associates Law Office, represented by Atty. Victoriano V. Orocio, Writ of Execution of the RTC Order dated 15 May 2006. Respondents opposed
as compensation for his legal services as counsel for the non- the motion on the ground that there was no stipulation in the Compromise
EPIRA separated members subject to deduction of applicable Agreement to the effect that petitioner is entitled to collect an amount
taxes; equivalent to 15% of the monies due the non-EPIRA separated members.
Respondents contended that the amount of P119,196,000.00 due the non-EPIRA
xxxx separated members under the compromise agreement was a mere estimate and,
as such, cannot be validly used by petitioner as basis for his claim of 15%
15. The parties herein shall exert their best effort in order that the terms attorney’s fees.
21
and conditions of this agreement are implemented and complied with

22
in the spirit of fairness, transparency and equity; The RTC issued an Order on 25 July 2006 granting petitioner’s Motion and,
accordingly, a Writ of Execution of the RTC Order dated 15 May 2006 was issued
16. This Agreement is not contrary to law, good customs, public order or on 26 July 2006. Pursuant to the said Writ of Execution, RTC Branch Sheriff
public policy and is voluntarily entered into by the parties of their own Reynaldo B. Madoloria (Sheriff Madoloria) issued a Notice of Garnishment to
15
free will. Ms. Aurora Arenas (Arenas), Assistant Vice-President and Business Manager of
the Philippine National Bank (PNB)-NAPOCOR Extension Office, Diliman,
The parties filed with the RTC the very next day, 23 February 2006, a Joint
16
Quezon City, and to Mr. Emmanuel C. Mendoza (Mendoza), Unit Head of the
Motion before the RTC for the approval of their Compromise Agreement. The
Landbank of the Philippines-NAPOCOR Extension Office, Diliman, Quezon
RTC rendered a Decision on 3 April 2006 granting the parties’ Joint Motion and 23
17
City.
approving the said Compromise Agreement.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order dated 25 July
On 10 April 2006, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for Approval of 24
2006.
Charging (Attorney’s) Lien. Petitioner asked the RTC to issue an order declaring
On 12 August 2006, Sheriff Madoloria served to Arenas an "Order for Delivery of held that petitioner was entitled only to an amount of P1,000,000.00 as
25
Money." attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit.
Respondents Anguluan and Dy filed before the Court of Appeals on 22 August The Court of Appeals held that the amount of P17,794,572.70 sought to be
2006 a Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as collected by petitioner as attorney’s fees, equivalent to 15% of
CA-G.R. SP No. 95786, assailing the RTC Order dated 25 July 2006 and praying the P119,196,000.00 estimated corrected earnings differential for non-EPIRA
that a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction be separated members, was excessive based on the following reasons: (1) the
26
issued enjoining the implementation of the said RTC order. Respondent corrected earnings differential in the amount of P119,196,000.00 due the non-
NAPOCOR filed with the Court of Appeals on the same date another Petition EPIRA separated members was a mere estimate and was hypothetical. Thus,
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. petitioner was unjustified in using said amount as basis for his 15% attorney’s
95946, also challenging the RTC Order dated 25 July 2006 and praying that it be fees; (2) there was hardly any work by petitioner since (a) the compromise
set aside and a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary agreement was reached without trial or hearing on the merits; (b) there was no
injunction be issued prohibiting the RTC from enforcing the said order and the issue regarding the release and distribution of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund to
27
corresponding writ of execution and notice of garnishment. Subsequently, the non-EPIRA separated members as the enactment of EPIRA, not the efforts of
respondent NAPOCOR filed a Motion to Consolidate CA-G.R. SP No. 95946 petitioner, made such distribution possible; (c) there was no issue on how much
28
with CA-G.R. SP No. 95786 which was granted by the appellate court. each non-EPIRA separated members would receive because the amount of their
respective contribution was duly recorded by the respondents; (d) respondents
On 31 October 2006, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution granting have already distributed the corrected earnings differential to some non-EPIRA
respondents’ application for a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction. It separated members, and have given petitioner his corresponding partial
enjoined the RTC from implementing its Order dated 25 July 2006 and the attorney’s fees amounting to P3,512,007.32; (e) most of the non-EPIRA separated
corresponding writ of execution and notice of garnishment during the pendency members have not yet received their share under the compromise agreement
of CA-G.R. SP No. 95946 and No. 95786. Petitioner filed a motion for but petitioner, who was merely their agent, was already given partial payment as
29
reconsideration of the said resolution. attorney’s fees; (f) the amount of P17,794,572.70 represents"only less than one
fourth partial release of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund which means that the
On 29 January 2007, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision annulling
equivalent of three-fourths more would be demanded [by petitioner] in the
and setting aside: (1) the RTC Order dated 25 July 2006; (2) the corresponding
future;" and (3) the money claim of the non-EPIRA separated members was
Writ of Execution dated 26 July 2006; (3) the Notice of Garnishment dated 28
settled through a compromise agreement and not won by petitioner in a trial on
July 2006; and (4) Order for Delivery of Money dated 10 August 2006. It also
the merits.
The Court of Appeals determined that petitioner was entitled only to an amount THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS
of P1,000,000.00 as attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit. However, EDMUND P. ANGULUAN, LORNA T. DY AND NATIONAL POWER
since petitioner already received P3,512,007.32 from respondents as partial CORPORATION (NPC) ARE ENTITLED TO [PRELIMINARY] INJUNCTION AS
payment of his supposed 15% attorney’s fees, it ruled that such amount was THEY HAVE MATERIAL AND SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS, WHICH ARE CLEAR
more than sufficient and petitioner was not entitled to claim anymore the AND UNMISTAKABLE, i.e. RIGHTS OF BEING CLIENTS TO QUESTION THE
additional amount of P14,282,565.38. The fallo of the Decision of the Court of REASONABLENESS OF THE ATTORNEY’S FEES OF A LAWYER. THIS
Appeals reads: ALLEGED RIGHT IS NON-EXISTENT AND IN FACT FABRICATED
CONSIDERING THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE NOT THE CLIENTS AT ALL
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed July 25, 2006 Order, the July OF PETITIONER, ATTY. VICTORIANO V. OROCIO;
26, 2006 Writ of Execution, the July 28, 2006 Notice of Garnishment, and the
August 10, 2006 Order of Delivery of Money are herebyANNULLED and SET II.
ASIDE, and a new one is ordered, CAPPING at P3,512,007.32, the amount
manifested to have already been received from the welfare fund as attorneys THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE FIFTEEN PERCENT
fees, as the maximum amount that may be billed or collected as attorneys fees (15%) CONTINGENCY/SUCCESS FEE OF PETITIONER VICTORIANO V.
from the whole welfare fund – which amount is NOTED to have already OROCIO IS UNCONSCIONABLE AND UNREASONABLE DESPITE THE
exceeded what this court had fixed at P1,000,000.00 as the reasonable amount, UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE SAID ATTORNEY’S FEES IS AMONG THE
on quantum meruit, that may be collected as attorneys’ fees, pursuant to the TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF A JUDICIALLY APPROVED COMPROMISE
guidelines codified in Rule 20.01, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional AGREEMENT AND COURT ORDER APPROVING HIS CHARGING LIEN,
Responsibility.
30 WHICH AGREEMENT AND ORDER HAVE ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND
32
EXECUTORY.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned Decision but
this was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 27 September In his first assigned error, petitioner assails the Resolution dated 31 October
2007.
31 2006 of the Court of Appeals granting respondents’ application for a writ of
preliminary injunction.lawphil.net He claims that the Court of Appeals issued a
Hence, petitioner brought the instant petition before us assigning the following writ of preliminary injunction in favor of respondents because petitioner
errors: allegedly violated respondents’ material and substantial right as petitioner’s
clients to pay only reasonable attorney’s fees. Petitioner asserts that none of the
I. respondents is his client in the present case; that even respondents themselves
have not alleged or claimed that they are his clients; that the amount of
attorney’s fees he claimed was chargeable on a portion of the NAPOCOR facie established an urgent and paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ
Welfare Fund due his clients, the non-EPIRA separated employees; that if of preliminary injunction prayed for, to avoid irreparable injury to [herein
anyone would be injured by his claim of attorney’s fees, it would be his clients, respondents]. x x x.
the non-EPIRA separated employees, and not respondents; that none of his
clients has questioned or complained about the amount of attorney’s fees he is As can be gleaned from the foregoing, the basis of the Court of Appeals in
claiming; that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest and at most are granting the writ was petitioner’s alleged violation or invasion of respondents’
merely nominal parties-in-interest; that as mere nominal parties-in-interest, right, as petitioner’s clients, to pay only a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees
respondents are not entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction under the Rules to, and only for services actually rendered by, petitioner.
of Court; and that the requisites for the proper issuance of a writ of preliminary
33
The Court of Appeals is clearly mistaken.
injunction are lacking in the instant case.
It should be made clear that petitioner is the counsel for the non-EPIRA
In its Resolution dated 31 October 2006, the Court of Appeals granted
separated members in the latter’s quest to claim their shares in the NAPOCOR
respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction based on the
Welfare Fund. Petitioner was never hired or employed by respondents as their
following reasons:
counsel in the cases at bar. Respondents themselves do not claim or allege that
This Court finds that [herein respondents] have prima facie established [their] they are clients of petitioner. In fact, petitioner is representing the non-EPIRA
compliance with strict requirements for issuance of a writ of preliminary separated members, the opposing party to the respondents in the present cases.
injunction in this case. Under the leading case of Valencia vs. Court of Appeals,
Further, the amount of attorney’s fees being claimed by petitioner is chargeable
352 SCRA 72 (2001), the requisites of preliminary injunction are as follows: (a)
to the P119,196,000.00 corrected earnings differential of his clients, the non-
the invasion of the right of [herein respondents] is material and substantial; (b)
EPIRA separated members. Respondents have actually partially distributed such
the right of [herein respondents] is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an
amount to some non-EPIRA separated members pursuant to the Compromise
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious irreparable
Agreement. In other words, the non-EPIRA separated members are the lawful
damage to [herein respondents].
owners/beneficiaries of the amount from which petitioner’s attorney’s fees had
The right of [herein respondents] alleged to have been invaded is that a been and shall be taken.
client has the right to pay only a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees and
Hence, if anyone would be injured by petitioner’s claim for attorney’s fees, it
only for services actually rendered – which is clearly and unmistakably
would be his clients, the non-EPIRA separated members, and not respondents.
available to all clients. What [herein respondents] are claiming is a material and
substantial right. This Court finds that [herein respondents] have prima
It appears, however, that none of the non-EPIRA separated members has since the non-EPIRA separated members do not claim any damage or injury
questioned or complained about petitioner’s claim for attorney’s fees. caused by the execution of the RTC Order dated 15 May 2006. Even assuming
that respondents would probably suffer damages as administrators or
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or custodians of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund if the writ of preliminary injunction
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, was not granted, our ruling would still be the same. We have held that the
34
agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. A writ of preliminary possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not
injunction is a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit, as well as a 42
a ground for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Given these
preservative remedy issued to preserve the status quo of the things subject of considerations, we hold that the issuance by the Court of Appeals of a writ of
the action or the relations between the parties during the pendency of the preliminary injunction in favor of respondents in its Resolution, dated 31
35
suit. For a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the applicant is tasked to October 2006, was improper.lawphil.net
establish and convincingly show the following: (1) a right in esse or a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected; (2) a violation of that right; and (3) there is With regard to his second assigned error, petitioner maintained that his claim
an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent for attorney’s fees equivalent to 15% of the P119,196,000.00 estimated corrected
36
serious damage. earnings differential due the non-EPIRA separated members was not
unreasonable or unconscionable because such amount was expressly agreed
A clear legal right means one clearly founded on or granted by law or is upon in the Compromise Agreement between the non-EPIRA separated
37
enforceable as a matter of law. The existence of a right violated is a members and respondents. The Compromise Agreement was submitted to the
38
prerequisite to the granting of a writ of preliminary injunction. A writ of RTC for approval through the joint motion of the non-EPIRA separated
preliminary injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which members and respondents, and the RTC had rendered a final and executory
39
may never arise. It may be issued only if the applicant has clearly shown an decision approving the same. By virtue of res judicata, the Court of Appeals
actual existing right that should be protected during the pendency of the cannot alter or change the terms of the Compromise Agreement by prohibiting
40
principal action. In the absence of a clear legal right, or when the applicant’s petitioner from collecting his stipulated amount of attorney’s fees.
43
41
right or title is doubtful or disputed, preliminary injunction is not proper.
Petitioner also avers that the amount of P17,794,572.70, which is equivalent to
It is evident from the foregoing that respondents do not have a clear right or 15% of the P119,196,000.00 estimated corrected earnings differential due the
right in esse to pay only a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees to the petitioner non-EPIRA separated members from the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund is already
because such right belongs solely to petitioner’s clients, the non-EPIRA the total, not partial, amount he is claiming as attorney’s fees; that
separated members. There can be no violation of a right which does not exist in the P119,196,000.00 estimated corrected earnings differential due the non-EPIRA
the first place. Also, there was no necessity for the writ of preliminary injunction separated members from the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund is not hypothetical, such
amount having been actually computed and fixed by respondents themselves services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract for a
without the participation of petitioner and his clients, the non-EPIRA separated contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of litigation. Oftentimes, the
members; that he did a lot of legal work and utilized his legal skills on discovery contingent fee arrangement is the only means by which the poor clients can
procedures to force respondents to enter into the Compromise Agreement with have their rights vindicated and upheld." Further, such contracts are sanctioned
47
the non-EPIRA separated members; that the passage of EPIRA merely paved the by Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
way for the distribution of the remaining assets of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund;
that if not for his legal work and skills, the non-EPIRA separated members However, in cases where contingent fees are sanctioned by law, the same should
would not have received their lawful shares in the remaining assets of the be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, and should always be
NAPOCOR Welfare Fund; and that his claim for 15% attorney’s fees is supported subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness, such that under
by jurisprudence.
44 Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is tasked to charge
48
only fair and reasonable fees.
An attorney’s fee, in its ordinary concept, refers to the reasonable compensation
45
paid to a lawyer for the legal services he has rendered to a client. The client A stipulation on a lawyer’s compensation in a written contract for professional
and his lawyer may enter into a written contract whereby the latter would be services ordinarily controls the amount of fees that the contracting lawyer may
paid attorney’s fees only if the suit or litigation ends favorably to the client. This be allowed, unless the court finds such stipulated amount to be unreasonable or
is called a contingency fee contract. The amount of attorney’s fees in this unconscionable. If the stipulated amount for attorney’s fees is excessive, the
contract may be on a percentage basis, and a much higher compensation is contract may be disregarded even if the client expressed their conformity
49
allowed in consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit thereto. Attorney’s fees are unconscionable if they affront one’s sense of
46
fails. In the case at bar, the non-EPIRA separated members and petitioner justice, decency or reasonableness, or if they are so disproportionate to the value
voluntarily entered into a contingency fee contract whereby petitioner did not of the services rendered. In such a case, courts are empowered to reduce the
receive any acceptance fee or appearance/meeting fee. The non-EPIRA attorney’s fee or fix a reasonable amount thereof taking into consideration the
50
separated members expressly agreed to pay petitioner "contingency or success surrounding circumstances and the established parameters.
fees of fifteen percent (15%) of whatever amount/value of assets (liquid and/or

The principle of quantum meruit (as much as he deserves) may be a basis for
non-liquid)" recovered; and authorized petitioner’s law firm "to receive and/or
determining the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees. Quantum meruit is a
collect its contingency/success fee without further demand."
device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is
Contingent fee contracts are permitted in this jurisdiction because they redound unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it. It is applicable even if
to the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer "especially in cases where the there was a formal written contract for attorney’s fees as long as the agreed fee
client has meritorious cause of action, but no means with which to pay for legal was found by the court to be unconscionable. In fixing a reasonable
compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis ofquantum (4) he participated, as non-EPIRA separated members’ counsel, in the conduct
meruit, factors such as the time spent, and extent of services rendered; novelty of several hearings regarding the said application for the issuance of temporary
54
and difficulty of the questions involved; importance of the subject matter; skill restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction; (5) he obtained a
demanded; probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction from the RTC
the proferred case; customary charges for similar services; amount involved in which enjoined/prohibited respondents from excluding the non-EPIRA
55
the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client; certainty of separated members from their shares in the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund; (6) he
compensation; character of employment; and professional standing of the held numerous conferences with the non-EPIRA separated members wherein he
51
lawyer, may be considered. apprised the latter of the status of their claims and his legal strategies pertinent
56
thereto; and (7) he exerted utmost efforts which eventually led to the
It appears that the non-EPIRA separated members chose petitioner as their execution of the Compromise Agreement between the non-EPIRA separated
counsel because the latter, as former member of the NAPOCOR-WFBT for two members and respondents.
terms or four years, is familiar and knowledgeable on the operation of the
52
NAPOCOR Welfare Fund. Yet, according to the contingency fee contract By reason of petitioner’s dedication and persistence as can be gleaned above,
agreement between petitioner and the non-EPIRA separated members, respondents finally agreed to settle amicably with the non-EPIRA separated
petitioner received no acceptance fee and appearance/meeting fee when he took members as regards the latter’s claim for shares in the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund
on the non-EPIRA separated members’ case. Petitioner’s attorney’s fees were by virtue of the Compromise Agreement.
absolutely dependent on the success of non-EPIRA separated members’ claim
on the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund. Despite these circumstances, petitioner Undoubtedly, were it not for petitioner’s vigilance and zeal, respondents would
worked diligently in advocating the claims of the non-EPIRA separated not have executed the Compromise Agreement with the non-EPIRA separated
members against respondents as shown by the following: (1) petitioner took members. Hence, it is fair to conclude that petitioner was entitled to a
pains in verifying the identity and claim of each of the 559 non-EPIRA separated reasonably high compensation.
members on the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund; (2) petitioner prepared and filed a
However, petitioner’s attorney’s fees in the amount of P17,794,572.70 or
well-researched and well-argued petition with the RTC for the claims of the
53
equivalent to 15% of the P119,196,000.00 corrected earnings differential of the
non-EPIRA separated members; (3) he prepared and presented several
non-EPIRA separated members should be equitably reduced.
witnesses and numerous pertinent documents before the RTC in support of
their application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
In NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC DAMA) v. The National Power
preliminary injunction against respondents’ plan to exclude the non-EPIRA 57
Corporation (NPC), we awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement plus
separated members from receiving their shares in the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund;
backwages to several NPC employees because they were illegally dismissed by
the NPC. The NPC employees were represented by a certain Atty. Cornelio P. commercial enterprise, we approve in favor of Atty. Aldon and Atty. Orocio a
Aldon (Atty. Aldon) and Atty. Victoriano V. Orocio, (the petitioner in the charging lien of 10% (instead of 25%) on the amounts recoverable by petitioners
instant cases) under a legal retainer agreement which provides: (1) no from NPC pursuant to our Decision dated 26 September 2006.
acceptance fee; (2) miscellaneous/out of pocket expenses in the amount
ofP25,000.00; and (3) twenty-five percent (25%) of whatever amounts/monies are The abovementioned case may be reasonably applied by analogy in the instant
recovered in favor of said NPC personnel contingent on the success of the case since they have substantially similar circumstances. In the case before us,
case. Atty. Aldon and Atty. Orocio filed a Motion for Approval of Charging although the non-EPIRA separated members were not illegally dismissed, they
(Attorney’s) Lien pursuant to the legal retainer agreement. Although we granted were, nevertheless, separated from work by reason of EPIRA. In addition, the
the said motion, we reduced the amount of attorney’s fees which was chargeable non-EPIRA separated members had a legal retainer agreement/contingency fee
on the monies recoverable by the NPC employees from 25% to 10% because: contract with petitioner as their counsel.
While we duly recognize the right of Atty. Aldon and Atty. Orocio to a charging It should also be emphasized that the practice of law is a profession not a
lien on the amounts recoverable by petitioners pursuant to our 26 September moneymaking venture. A lawyer is not merely the defender of his client’s cause
2006 Decision, nevertheless, we deem it proper to reduce the same. Under and a trustee of his client’s cause of action and assets; he is also, and first and
Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a written contract for services shall foremost, an officer of the court and participates in the fundamental function of
control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be administering justice in society. It follows that a lawyer’s compensation for
unconscionable or unreasonable. The amounts which petitioners may recover as professional services rendered is subject to the supervision of the court, not just
the logical and necessary consequence of our Decision of 26 September 2006, to guarantee that the fees he charges and receives remain reasonable and
i.e., backwages and separation pay (in lieu of reinstatement), are essentially the commensurate with the services rendered, but also to maintain the dignity and
same awards which we grant to illegally dismissed employees in the private integrity of the legal profession to which he belongs. Upon taking his attorney’s
sector. In such cases, our Labor Code explicitly limits attorney’s fees to a oath as an officer of the court, a lawyer submits himself to the authority of the
58
maximum of 10% of the recovered amount. Considering by analogy the said courts to regulate his right to charge professional fees.
limit on attorney’s fees in this case of illegal dismissal of petitioners by

Thus, taking into account the foregoing circumstances and recognized
respondent NPC, a government-owned and controlled corporation; plus the
principles, the 15% attorney’s fees of petitioner should be reduced to 10%. As
facts that petitioners have suffered deprivation of their means of livelihood for
such, petitioner is entitled to collect only, as attorney’s fees, an amount
the last five years; and the fact that this case was originally filed before us,
equivalent to 10% of the P119,196,000.00 or P11,919,600.00.
without any judicial or administrative proceedings below; as well as the
fundamental ethical principle that the practice of law is a profession and not a
We note, however, that the compromise agreement was partially implemented

in the first week of April 2006 with the payment of P23,416,000.00 to some non-
59
EPIRA separated members. Petitioner admitted having already received an
amount of P3,512,007.32 as his attorney’s fees on the said partial payment
60
of P23,416,000.00. Accordingly, the amount of P3,512,007.32 received by
petitioner as attorney’s fees should be deducted from the fixed 10% attorney’s
fees or the amount of P11,919,600.00. Per computation, petitioner is entitled to
recover the amount of P8,407,592.68 as attorney’s fees.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals

dated 31 October 2006 in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 95786 and 95946 granting the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is hereby ANNULLED andSET
ASIDE. The Decision and Resolution, dated 29 January 2007 and 27 September
2007, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 95786 and 95946
are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is entitled to
recover attorney’s fees in the amount of P8,407,592.68 on the corrected
earnings differential of the non-EPIRA separated members. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA), comes to this

Court via the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
OWWA v. Chavez, et al 1
Rules of Court, assailing the 22 September 2005 Decision of the Court of
2
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87702, which affirmed the Order dated 30
September 2004, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasay City, Branch 117, in
THIRD DIVISION Civil Case No. 04-0415-CFM. The RTC granted the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction restraining OWWA from implementing its new
G.R. No. 169802 June 8, 2007 organizational structure.
OVERSEAS WORKERS WELFARE ADMINISTRATION, represented by Factual Antecedents

Administrator Marianito D. Roque,petitioner,
vs. OWWA is a government agency tasked primarily to protect the interest and
3
ATTY. CESAR L. CHAVEZ, OPHELIA N. ALMENARIO, ELVIRA ADOR, promote the welfare of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs). OWWA traces its
REYNALDO TAYAG, TORIBIO ROBLES, JR., ROSSANE BAHIA, RACQUEL beginnings to 1 May 1977, when the Welfare and Training Fund for Overseas
LLAGAS-KUNTING, MA. STELLA A. DULCE, ROSSANA SIRAY, EDUARDO Workers in the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) was created by
MENDOZA, JR., PRISCILLA BARTOLO, ROSE VILLANUEVA, CHERRY virtue of Letter of Instructions No. 537, with the main objective, inter alia, of
MOLINA, MARY ROSE RAMOS, MA. MINERVA PAISO, RODERIC DELOS providing social and welfare services to OFW, including insurance coverage,
REYES, RENATO DELA CRUZ, MARIVIC DIGMA, JESSIE BALLESTEROS, social work, legal and placement assistance, cultural and remittances services,
DONATO DAGDAG, MARK TUMIBAY, CYNTHIA FRUEL, DEMETRIO and the like. On 1 May 1980, Presidential Decree No. 1694 was signed into law,
SORIANO, MILAGROS GUEVARRA, ANGELITA LACSON, BERT BUQUID, formalizing the operations of a comprehensive Welfare Fund (Welfund), as
JUN SAMORANAS, TEODORO TUTAY, LEAH YOGYOG, MARIE CRUZ and authorized and created under Letter of Instructions No. 537. Presidential Decree
CONCEPCION BRAGAS REGALADO, respondents. No. 1694 further authorized that contributions to the Welfare and Training
Fund collected pursuant to Letter of Instructions No. 537 be transferred to the
DECISION Welfund. On 16 January 1981, Presidential Decree No. 1809 was promulgated,
4
amending certain provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1694. Subsequently,
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Executive Order No. 126 was passed which reorganized the Ministry of Labor
and Employment. Executive Order No. 126 also renamed the Welfare Fund as
The Case
the OWWA.
From the records, it is undisputed that on 9 January 2004, as there was yet no On 24 March 2004, DBM Secretary Emilia T. Boncodin (Boncodin), approved
7
formal OWWA structure duly approved by the Department of Budget and the organizational structure and staffing pattern of the OWWA. In her approval
Management (DBM) and the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the OWWA thereof, she stated that the total funding requirements for the revised
5
Board of Trustees passed Resolution No. 001, Series of 2004, bearing the title organizational structure shall be P107,546,379 for four hundred (400) positions.
"Approving the Structure of the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration," and Moreover, DBM Secretary Boncodin underscored that the funding shall come
depicting the organizational structure and staffing pattern of the OWWA, as solely from the OWWA funds and that no government funds shall be released
approved by Patricia A. Sto. Tomas (Sto. Tomas), then Chair of the OWWA for the implementation of the changes made.
Board of Trustees and then Secretary of the DOLE. According to Resolution No.
001, the structuring of the OWWA will stabilize the internal organization and On 31 May 2004, OWWA Administrator Virgilio R. Angelo (Angelo), issued
8
promote careerism among the employees. It will also ensure a more efficient Advisory No. 01, advising the officials and employees of the OWWA that the
and effective delivery of programs and services to member-OFWs. Resolution DBM had recently approved OWWA’s organizational chart, functional
No. 001 resolved, thus: statements, and the staffing pattern. Advisory No. 01 also announced that a
Placement Committee will be created to evaluate and recommend placement of
RESOLVED therefore, to approve as it is hereby approved, the OWWA all regular/permanent incumbents of OWWA in the new organizational chart
Structure which is hereto attached and made an integral part of this Resolution, and staffing pattern. All employees were asked to indicate in writing their
comprising mainly of the approved organizational chart, functional descriptions interest or preference in any of the approved plantilla item, especially for
and staffing pattern, subject to the following: promotion to the Human Resources Management Division, not later than 11
June 2004. Further, Advisory No. 01 emphasized that the OWWA Board of
a. There will be no displacement of existing regular employees; Trustees, thru its Resolution No. 001, Series of 2004, had declared the policy that
there will be no displacement of existing regular/permanent employees.
b. There will be no temporary appointments; and
Qualified casual and contractual personnel may apply for any vacant item only
after all regular/permanent employees of OWWA had been placed.
c. There will be no hiring of casuals, contractuals or consultants in the
new structure.
Subsequently, on 3 June 2004, DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas issued Administrative
Order No. 171, Series of 2004, creating a Placement Committee to evaluate
RESOLVED further, that the OWWA Structure be immediately submitted for
qualifications of employees; and to recommend their appropriate placement in
the appropriate actions of competent authorities, particularly the DBM and
6 the new organizational chart, functional statements and staffing pattern of the
CSC.
OWWA. Administrative Order No. 171 was partially amended by Administrative
Order No. 171-A, issued by DOLE Acting Secretary Manuel G. Imson (Imson),
authorizing the Placement Committee to recommend to the OWWA 6. Those who may opt to retire should submit to the HRMD, their
Administrator their evaluations, which shall thereafter be endorsed to the DOLE application for retirement, copy furnished the Budget Division for
9
Secretary for consideration. budget allocation purposes.
The Placement Committee was directed to comply with the pertinent The Placement Committee should complete its task not later than June 30, 2004.
CESB/CSC/DBM rules and regulations on its recommended placement of all
personnel of OWWA based on the following parameters, to wit :
10 On 8 June 2004, OWWA Administrator Angelo issued Advisory No. 02, inviting
OWWA officials and employees to an orientation on the new structure,
1. There would be no diminution nor displacement of functions and staffing pattern of the OWWA. Moreover, Advisory No. 02
permanent/regular employees of OWWA. required the holding of elections for the First and Second Level Representatives
who will elect from among themselves the regular official representatives and
2. Qualified casuals and contractual personnel may likewise be alternates in the Placement Committee deliberations. On 11 June 2004, Advisory
considered in the staffing pattern only after ensuring that the No. 03 was issued, announcing the conduct of an election for representatives
regular(s)/permanent employees of OWWA have already been placed. and alternates representing the employees in the first [Salary Grades (SG) 1-9]
and second level (SG 10-24), pursuant to Administrative Order No. 171, dated 3
3. Decentralization of functions to bring OWWA services closer to the
June 2004, as amended by Administrative Order No. 171-A.
public shall be adopted. Thus, priority in some promotions shall be
given to those who opt to be assigned in the regional offices, aside from On 18 June 2004, DOLE Acting Secretary Imson issued Administrative Order
performance. 11
No. 186, Series of 2004, prescribing the guidelines on the placement of
personnel in the new staffing pattern of the OWWA.
4. Deployment in the overseas posts shall be made on rotation basis
from both the frontline and the administrative staff, based on On 29 June 2004, herein respondents filed with the RTC, a Complaint for
performance. Annulment of the Organizational Structure of the OWWA, as approved by
OWWA Board Resolution No. 001, Series of 2004, with Prayer for the Issuance of
5. Regular/permanent incumbents interested for promotion should 12
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against herein petitioner OWWA and its
indicate their interest in writing to the Placement Committee: Attn: The 13
Board of Trustees. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 04-0415-CFM.
Chairperson.
In their Complaint, respondents alleged that the OWWA has around 24

consultants, 29 casual employees, 76 contractual workers, and 356 officers and
employees, which number does not include the 85 contractual employees in the The Ruling of the RTC
14
Office of the Secretariat of the OWWA Medicare. Respondents posited that the
17
approved Organizational Structure and Staffing Pattern of the OWWA increases On 30 September 2004, the RTC rendered an Order granting respondents’
the number of regular plantilla positions from 356 to 400; however, the increase prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of a bond in the sum
of 42 positions will not absorb the aforementioned consultants and casual and of P100,000.00. In the grant thereof, the RTC reasoned that any move to
contractual workers. They further averred that the plantilla positions in the reorganize the structure of the OWWA requires an amendatory law. It deemed
Central Office will be reduced from 250 to 140, while the regional offices will Resolution No. 001 was not merely a "formalization of the organizational
have an increase of 164 positions. According to the respondents, the resulting structure and staffing pattern of the OWWA," but a disruption of the existing
decrease in the number of employees in the Central Office will result in the organization which disturbs and displaces a number of regular employees,
constructive dismissal of at least 110 employees. Meanwhile, the deployment of including consultants and casual and contractual employees.
the regular central office personnel to the regional offices will displace the said
The RTC ratiocinated in this wise:
employees, as well as their families.
x x x All told, what is being done now at OWWA is a reorganization of its

Respondents challenged the validity of the new organizational structure of the
structure as originally conceived under P.D. No. 1694 [Organization and
OWWA. In fine, they contended that the same is null and void; hence, its
Administration of the Welfare for Overseas Workers] and P.D. No. 1809
implementation should be prohibited.
[Amending Certain Provisions of Presidential Decree 1694, Creating the
Respondents prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to "Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers"]. In the (sic) light of Section 11 of R.A. No.
restrain petitioners from: 1) implementing its organizational structure as 6656 which provides that "the executive branch of the government shall
approved by the OWWA Board of Trustees in its Resolution dated 9 January implement reorganization schemes within a specified period of time authorized
2004; and 2) advertising and proceeding with the recruitment and placement of by law", this court doubts whether a reorganization of OWWA can be effected
new employees under the new organizational structure.

15 without an enabling law.
Further, respondents prayed that after trial on the merits, OWWA’s Further, defendants do not dispute the fact that while the mechanics of the
organizational structure be declared as unconstitutional and contrary to law; reorganization is still being forged, the DOLE already processed applications
and the OWWA Board of Trustees be declared as having acted contrary to the and eventually hired employees not from among the existing employees of the
Constitution and existing laws, and with grave abuse of discretion in approving OWWA. This appears to be in contravention of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6656
Resolution No. 001, dated 9 January 2004.

16 which provides:
"Sec. 4. Officers and employees holding permanent appointments shall be given liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
preference for appointment to the new positions in the approved staffing the equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1, Art. III; ibid.). A person’s job is his
pattern comparable to their former position or in case there are not enough property. In many cases, as in the Philippine setting, one’s job also means one’s
comparable positions, to positions next lower in rank. life and the lives of those who depended on him. Hence, it is a policy of the
State to "free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate
"No new employees shall be taken in until all permanent officers and employees social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an
have been appointed, including temporary and casual employees who possess improved quality of life for all." (Sec. 8, Art. II, ibid.) Any act that, contrary to
the necessary qualification requirements, among which is the appropriate civil law, tends to deprive a worker of his work, violates his rights.
19
service eligibility for permanent appointment to positions in the approved

staffing pattern, in case there are still positions to be filled, unless such positions Finally, the RTC defended its jurisdiction over the controversy despite
are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature." petitioner’s protestations that jurisdiction over respondents’ complaint is lodged
in the administrative agencies tasked to implement the new OWWA structure.
Furthermore, defendant’s (sic) do not dispute the fact that the Placement It ruled that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable only where the
Committee was hastily constituted, that its members were not educated of their administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or administrative function; but,
task of job placement, that there was no real to goodness (sic) personnel where what is challenged is the constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by
evaluation and, finally, the Chairman of the Committee was simply hand-picked the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative functions,
by the DOLE Secretary contrary to the explicit injunction of Section 8 of the regular courts have jurisdiction over the matter.
20
Implementing Rules of R.A .No. 6656 that "the members shall elect their
18
Chairman." Therefore, the RTC, in its Order, dated 30 September 2004, granted
respondents’ prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, to wit:
The RTC also cited the protection afforded by the Constitution to workers,
specifically, officers or employees of the Civil Service in ruling that the existing WHEREFORE, upon plaintiff’s (sic) filing of a bond in the sum of P100,000.00,
organization of the OWWA need not be disturbed in any way and no single let a writ of preliminary injunction issue in: 1) restraining the defendants from
worker will be removed or displaced. Thus: implementing the new organizational structure of OWWA approved by the
Board of Trustees on January 9, 2004 and 2) restraining the defendants from
This court entertains no doubt that as workers, plaintiffs enjoy a right that is advertising and proceeding with the recruitment and placement of new
protected both by the Constitution and statutes. Thus, "(n)o officer or employee employees under the new organizational structure.
21
of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by
law. "(Sec. 2, par. 3, Art. IX, Constitution). "No person shall be deprived of life,
Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner, thru the Office of the it appearing that the reorganization of the OWWA is already slowly being put
22
Solicitor General (OSG), filed with the Court of Appeals, a Petition for into motion.
Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, Apropos, having successfully established a direct and personal injury as a
assailing the RTC Order of 30 September 2004.

23 consequence of the new reorganization[al] structure, it was only proper for the
court a quo to grant the writ of preliminary injunction to restrain, for the
The Ruling of the Appellate Court meantime, the implementation of the reorganization to prevent injury on
respondents until after the main case is heard and decided. Truly, as correctly
On 22 September 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, observed by the trial court, private respondents enjoy a right that is protected
which dismissed the petition. It affirmed the court a quo’s findings that both by the Constitution and statutes. A person’s job is not only his property but
respondents possess a clear and legal right to the immediate issuance of the his very life. The constitutional protection of the right to life is not just a
writ. It resolved that it was proper for the RTC to restrain, for the meantime, the protection of the right to be alive or to the security of one’s limb against
implementation of OWWA’s reorganization to prevent injury until after the physical harm. The right to life is also a right to a good life (Bernas, The
24
main case is heard and decided. It found respondents’ allegations sufficient to Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, Volume I, First
prove the existence of a right that should be protected by a writ of preliminary Edition, 1997) which includes the right to earn a living or the right to a
injunction. Thus: livelihood. A fortiori, the requisites for preliminary injunction to issue have
adequately been established: the existence of a clear and unmistakable right,
Petitioner averred, too, that majority of the casuals, contractuals and
and the acts violative of said right.
consultants have been employed for more than ten (10) years, if not twenty (20)
years, and were not regularized simply due to lack of regular positions in the While the evidence to be submitted at the hearing on the motion for
plantilla or the freezing of recruitment thereto. preliminary injunction need not be conclusive and complete, We find that
private respondents have adequately shown that they are in clear danger of
To be sure, private respondents have convincingly adduced evidence of specific
being irreparably injured unless the status quo is observed, in the meantime x x
acts to substantiate their claim of impending injury and not merely allegations 25
x.
of facts and conclusions of law, but factual evidence of a clear and unmistakable
right of being displaced or dismissed by the planned reorganization. These The appellate court was likewise of the opinion that the substantial issues raised
allegations are substantial enough to prove the right in esse. At best, the anxiety before the court a quo anent the validity of the organizational structure of the
of being dismissed or displaced is not premature, speculative and purely OWWA; the alleged lack of authority of the DBM to approve the same including
anticipatory, but based on real fear which shows a threatened or direct injury[,] the alleged violation by the OWWA of relevant statutes; the lack of consultation
prior to the reorganization; and the supposed illegal constitution of the Second, petitioner adduces the proposition that the reorganization of the
Placement Committee, are matters which the RTC is behooved to resolve. In OWWA does not require an amendatory law contrary to the holding of the
finding no error on the part of the RTC, the Court of Appeals said that without court a quo. The OSG maintains that there was no previous OWWA structure in
29
an injunctive relief, any decision that may be rendered in the suit would already the first place; and neither did Presidential Decree No. 1694 nor Presidential
26 30
be ineffective, moot and academic. Decree No. 1809, provide for an organizational structure for the OWWA.
27
Aggrieved, petitioner through the OSG, filed the instant petition. Third, petitioner disputes the existence of the rights of respondents to be
protected by the preliminary injunctive writ sought on the ground that the
In the instant petition, petitioner prays that the appealed Decision of the Court latter did not shown any legal right which needs the protection thereof, nor did
of Appeals be reversed and set aside, and that Civil Case No. 04-0415-CFM they show that any such right was violated to warrant the issuance of a
28
before the RTC be dismissed for lack of merit. preliminary injunction. Petitioner asserts that respondents did not claim that
they are the consultants or casual or contractual workers who would allegedly
The Issue
be displaced; and neither did respondents show that there is only one right or
cause of action pertaining to all of them. Neither was there a violation of their
The issue to be resolved is, whether the court a quo gravely abused its discretion
rights because respondents have all been given appointments in the new
in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction. Stated otherwise, the issue is
31
OWWA organizational structure.
whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTC in its grant of the
assailed writ of preliminary injunction. Clearly, we are thus confined to the
Finally, on respondents’ allegation that the reorganization of the OWWA will
matter of the propriety of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction by
reassign permanent employees to its regional offices, and consequently, displace
the trial court, and not to the merits of the case which is still pending before the
them and their families, petitioner counters that an employee may be reassigned
latter.
from one organizational unit to another in the same agency, provided that such
32
reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary.
The Case for the Petitioner
The Case for the Respondents

First, in support of their petition, petitioner posits that the OWWA has already
implemented the new organizational structure as the advertisement,
Respondents argue that the petitioner railroaded and raced against time to
recruitment, and placement of OWWA employees have been accomplished; and
implement the new OWWA organizational structure. They claim that in the
in the process, none of the respondents have been dismissed. Moreover, the act
process, petitioner exhibited manifest bad faith and injustice. What existed was
sought to be prevented has long been consummated; hence, the remedy of
a hasty reorganization and restructuring of the OWWA without adequate study
injunction should no longer be entertained.
and consultation, which was thereafter submitted and immediately approved by (b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or
the Board of Trustees. They insist that the creation of an organizational acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice
structure of the OWWA would require a presidential fiat or a legislative to the applicant; or
33
enactment pursuant to Republic Act No. 6656.
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
Further, respondents maintain that their right in esse was established during attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or
the proceedings for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, as their acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
complaint sufficiently showed the rights and interests of the parties. They subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
alleged that at no stage in the proceedings did petitioner question such rights. ineffectual.
In fact, petitioner made a waiver in open court to the effect that it was not
presenting testimonial evidence. According to the respondents, such an act was A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior
35
constitutive of an admission by petitioner of the existence of a right in esse in to the judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved or until the
36
their favor. termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction. To be
entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioner must show, inter alia, the existence of a
The Ruling of the Court clear and unmistakable right and an urgent and paramount necessity for the
37
writ to prevent serious damage. A writ of preliminary injunction is generally
Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, defines a preliminary injunction as an 38
based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. The evidence submitted
order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final order during the hearing on an application for a writ of preliminary injunction is not
requiring a party or a court, an agency or a person to refrain from a particular conclusive or complete for only a "sampling" is needed to give the trial court an
34
act or acts. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the grounds idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction as follows: 39
the case on the merits. In fact, the evidence required to justify the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction in the hearing thereon need not be conclusive or
Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. – A preliminary injunction 40
complete. It must also be stressed that it does not necessarily proceed that
may be granted when it is established: 41
when a writ of preliminary injunction is issued, a final injunction will follow.
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole
Moreover, the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the
or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or 42
part of the trial court. Thus, the rule is, the matter of the issuance of a writ of
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court,
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; 43
unless the court commits grave abuse of discretion. In Toyota Motor Phils.
44
Corporation Workers’ Association (TMPCWA) v. Court of Appeals, this Court In the case at bar, the RTC did not maintain the status quo when it issued the
pronounced that grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary writ of preliminary injunction. Rather, it effectively restored the situation prior
injunction implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is to the status quo, in effect, disposing the issue of the main case without trial on
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an arbitrary or the merits. What was preserved by the RTC was the state of affairs before the
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting issuance of Resolution No. 001, which approved the structure of the OWWA,
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty and the subsequent administrative orders pursuant to its passing. The RTC
enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law. It is clear that the assessment forgot that what is imperative in preliminary injunction cases is that the writ
and evaluation of evidence in the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction can not be effectuated to establish new relations between the parties. Hence, we
involve findings of facts ordinarily left to the trial court for its conclusive find herein an application of the lessons that can be learned from Rualo v.
45 51
determination. The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of Pitargue. In Rualo, this Court determined, among others, the propriety of the
preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary for the writ of preliminary injunction which was issued restraining the Bureau of
46
grant of an injunction are present in the case before it. However, as earlier Internal Revenue from further implementing its reorganization, and enforcing
52
stated, if the court commits grave abuse of its discretion in the issuance of the the orders pursuant thereto. This Court, in lifting the therein assailed writ,
writ of preliminary injunction, such that the act amounts to excess or lack of underscored the legal proscription which states that courts should avoid issuing
jurisdiction, the same may be nullified through a writ of certiorari or a writ of preliminary injunction which would in effect dispose of the main case
53
prohibition. without trial. According to the Court in Rualo, the trial court, in issuing the
writ of preliminary injunction, did not maintain the status quo but restored the
More significantly, a preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy, an situation before the status quo, that is, the situation before the issuance of the
adjunct to the main case subject to the latter’s outcome, the sole objective of 54
Revenue Travel Assignment Orders. The Court further declared that what
which is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of existed was an acceptance of therein respondents’ premise of the illegality of the
47
the case. The status quo should be that existing at the time of the filing of the reorganization, and a prejudgment on the constitutionality of the assailed
48
case. The status quo usually preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last 55
issuances. As in Rualo, we find herein a similar case where the RTC admitted
actual, peaceable and uncontested status which preceded the actual hook, line and sinker the mere allegations of respondents that the
49
controversy. The status quo ante litem is, ineluctably, the state of affairs which reorganization as instituted was unlawful without the benefit of a full trial on
is existing at the time of the filing of the case. Indubitably, the trial court must the merits. It also did not maintain the status quo but restored the landscape
50
not make use of its injunctive power to alter such status. before the implementation of OWWA’s reorganization. In thus issuing the writ
of preliminary injunction, the substantive issues of the main case were resolved
We hold that the RTC, in granting the assailed writ of preliminary injunction,
by the trial court. What was done by the RTC was quite simply a disposition of
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
the case without trial. This is an error in law and an exercise of grave abuse of it by law. The importance of the reorganization within the body and the benefits
discretion. Furthermore, we find that the RTC similarly prejudged the validity of that will accrue thereto were accentuated by the Board of Trustees in its
the issuances released by the OWWA Board of Trustees, as well as the other Resolution No. 001. The aforesaid resolution declared, inter alia, that the
governmental bodies (i.e., DBM, DOLE), which approved the organizational structuring of the OWWA will stabilize the internal organization and promote
structure and staffing pattern of the OWWA. In Rualo, this Court asserted the careerism among the employees, as well as ensure a more efficient and effective
58
presumption of regularity of the therein assailed government issuances. In this delivery of programs and services to member-OFWs’. However, we go further
case, we accentuate the same presumption. to opine that even the question of whether the OWWA requires an amendatory
law for its reorganization is one that should be best threshed out in the
Ineluctably, this Court is compelled to rule against the propriety of the grant of disposition of the merits of the case. Indeed, the question as to the validity of
the assailed ancillary writ of preliminary injunction on the material ground that the OWWA reorganization remains the subject in the main case pending before
the records do not support respondents’ entitlement thereto. the trial court. Its annulment is outside the realm of the instant Petition.
We do not find attendant the requisites for the issuance of a preliminary Assuming arguendo that respondents stand to be in danger of being transferred
injunctive writ. This Court is not convinced that respondents were able to show due to the reorganization, under the law, any employee who questions the
a clear and unmistakable legal right to warrant their entitlement to the writ. A 59
validity of his transfer should appeal to the CSC. Even then, administrative
mere blanket allegation that they are all officers and employees of the OWWA remedies must be exhausted before resort to the regular courts can be had.
without a showing of how they stand to be directly injured by the
implementation of its questioned organizational structure does not suffice to Finally, as aptly pointed out by the OSG, the acts sought to be prohibited had
prove a right in esse. As was aptly raised by the petitioner, respondents did not been accomplished. Injunction will not lie where the acts sought to be enjoined
60
show that they were dismissed due to the challenged reorganization. There was have already been accomplished or consummated. The wheels of OWWA’s
no showing that they are the employees who are in grave danger of being reorganization started to run upon the approval by the Board of Trustees of its
displaced. Respondents were similarly wanting in proving that they are the Resolution No. 001 entitled, "Approving the Structure of the Overseas Workers
consultants and contractual and casual employees, who will allegedly suffer by Welfare Administration." Subsequently, a series of issuances which approved
reason of the re-organization. This Court is consistently adamant in demanding the organizational structure and staffing pattern of the agency was issued by the
that a clear and positive right especially calling for judicial protection must be DBM, the OWWA Administrator, and by the DOLE. Resolution No. 001 has
56
established. As has been reiterated, injunction is not a remedy to protect or already been implemented. Case law has it that a writ of preliminary injunction
enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect a right will not issue if the act sought to be enjoined is a fait accompli.1avvphi1
not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an action which did not
57
give rise to a cause of action. In contrast, the rights of OWWA are accorded to
61
A writ of preliminary injunction being an extraordinary event, one deemed as a
62
strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy, it must be granted only in the
face of actual and existing substantial rights. In the absence of the same, and
where facts are shown to be wanting in bringing the matter within the
conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ must be struck down for having
been rendered in grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,

dated 22 September 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 87702, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court
pursuant to its Order, dated 30 September 2004, in Civil Case No. 04-0415-CFM
is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Boncodin v. NECU The assailed Decision upheld the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the
4
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, in its Resolutions dated
September 25, 2002, and October 29, 2002, in Civil Case No. Q-02-47615. The
questioned writ enjoined the implementation of National Power Corporation's
EN BANC
Board Resolution No. 2002-81 passed on July 24, 2002, and confirmed on August
G.R. No. 162716 September 27, 2006 14, 2002; Secretary Emilia T. Boncodin's Letter Memorandum dated May 8, 2002;
and Corporate Auditor Norberto Cabibihan's Memorandum Circular dated June
Honorable Secretary EMILIA T. BONCODIN of the Department of Budget 5, 2002.
and Management (DBM),petitioner,
vs. The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION EMPLOYEES CONSOLIDATED
The Facts
UNION (NECU), respondent.
The CA summarized the undisputed facts as follows:

DECISION
"On [October 8, 2001], the Board of Directors of NAPOCOR issued

PANGANIBAN, C.J.:
Board Resolution No. 2001-113 amending Board Resolution No. 99-35
Injunction is an extraordinary peremptory remedy available only when the which granted the Seniority in Position Pay. Board Resolution No. 99-35
claimant can show a clear and positiveright that must be protected. When the granted a step increment to all qualified NAPOCOR officials and
alleged right is unclear or dubious, the injunctive writ cannot be granted. As the employees who have been in their position for ten (10) years effective
present respondent has not proved a clear legal right to the salary step calendar year 1999. On the other hand, Board Resolution No. 2001-113
increments in question, the lower court is deemed to have gravely abused its reduced the ten (10) year requirement to three (3) years.
discretion when it issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
"On [November 12, 2001], then President of NAPOCOR, Jesus Alcordo,
The Case issued Circular No. 2001-51 providing for the implementing rules and
regulations of Board Resolution No. 2001-113. On May 6, 2002, the
1
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing NAPOCOR Officer-in-Charge, President and Chief Executive Officer,
2 3
the November 25, 2003 Decision and the March 4, 2004 Resolution, both Roland Quilala, issued Circular No. 2002-22 providing for additional
rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 74694. guidelines relative to the implementation of the step increment based
on length of service in the position to qualified NAPOCOR officials and increment based on length of service resulting from the application of
employees. Sections 2.2 (c) and 2.2 (d) of Circular No. 2002-22.
"On [November 26, 2001], petitioner furnished a letter addressed to Mr. "On [July 24, 2002], the NAPOCOR Board of Directors issued Board
Alcordo informing the latter that NAPOCOR's request for clearance to Resolution No. 2002-81 revising the implementation of the Step
implement Joint CSC-DBM Circular No. 1, s. 1990 which is the basis of Increment, the pertinent portion of which reads:
Board Resolution No. 2001-113 cannot be given due course for lack of
legal basis. In essence, petitioner holds that the grant of step increment 'NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY
based on length of service is an additional benefit under a different RESOLVED, That the recommendations of the Department of
name since NAPOCOR has already been granting seniority pay based Budget and Management (DBM), as explained by the
on the length of service as embodied in the Collective Negotiation Honorable Secretary and Director of NP Board, Emilia T.
Agreement (CNA). In addition, petitioner said that the grant of step Boncodin, relative to the submittedRevised Implementation
increment is not applicable to the salary plan of NAPOCOR considering of the Step Increment due to Length of Service in the
its higher salary rates [compared with that of the existing government position of the NPC employees, to cover the following:
pay plan]. Lastly, petitioner told Mr. Alcordo of the budget implication
'1) Pure seniority benefits counted as one (1) step increment for
of the grant of said proposal which she estimated to cost as high as
every three (3) years of service in the present position, covering
Eighty Four Million Pesos (P84,000,000.00).
from years 1994 up to 2001 or two (2) steps increment only;
"Based on the petitioner's foregoing letter, the Corporate Auditor of

'2) Rollback of basic monthly salary for NPC personnel who
NAPOCOR, Norberto Cabibihan, issued a Memorandum [dated June 5,
have been recipients of the step increase due to length of
2002] to Roland Quilala, NAPOCOR Officer-in-Charge, enjoining him
service in their present position in excess of the two steps
to suspend/stop payment of the step increment as embodied in NPC
increment granted in the above paragraph to qualified
Circular No. 2001-51 dated [November 12, 2001], [effective July 2002]. He
employees and officials, and Corrective Salary Adjustment
also requested the suspension of the implementation of NPC Circular
(CSA) effective September 1, 2002; and
No. 2002-22 dated [May 6, 2002]. He warned that succeeding payments
of the step increment shall be automatically disallowed.
'3) No payback by the NPC officials and employees who were
granted salary differentials covering the period October 2001 up
"On [June 21, 2002], Mr. Quilala issued a Memorandum enjoining
to August 2002. Approval of all this and the above benefits will
concerned officials to suspend the processing of the succeeding step
be sought from the Office of the President, Malacañang, upon would result to a grave and irreparable damage to them. Thus, public
assurance by the Secretary of the Department of Budget and respondent granted [NECU's] prayer for the issuance of the writ of
Management (DBM) that a favorable endorsement in support preliminary injunction subject to its filing of the Injunction Bond in the
thereof will be made, x x x and are hereby approved; x x x' amount of Eighty Four Million Pesos (P84,000,000.00) which is the
budget implication of the step increment as manifested by petitioner.
"Believing that NPC Circular Nos. 2001-51 and 2002-22 are within the
bounds of law and that they have already acquired a vested right in it, "Both parties moved for the reconsideration of the Resolution.
[respondent National Power Corporation Employees Consolidated Petitioner prayed for the reversal thereof while [respondent NECU]
Union (NECU) filed a Petition for Prohibition with Application for prayed for the deletion of the Injunction Bond. Public respondent
TRO/Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court in Quezon denied both motions in the second assailed Resolution dated [October
5
City on [August 27, 2002]. 29, 2002]."
"On [August 30, 2002], public respondent [Judge Percival Mandap Through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
Lopez, of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City] issued an sought relief from the CA. She argued that the RTC had "failed to consider the
Order granting private respondent's prayer for the issuance of a principle of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and allowed the grant of
6
Temporary Restraining Order and setting the hearing of the application seniority pay to NAPOCOR employees [without any legal basis]."
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on [September 9,
2002]. However, it appears that in lieu of oral arguments, the parties Ruling of the Court of Appeals
opted to file their respective position papers and memoranda on the

The CA found no cogent reason to disturb the conclusions reached by the lower
matter.
court. The appellate court ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of
"Hence, on [September 25, 2002], public respondent issued the first administrative remedies was not a hard and fast rule. It held that the
assailed Resolution granting private respondent's prayer for the determination of whether the arguments raised by respondent fell within the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. Public respondent held exceptions to the rule was within the sound discretion of the trial court.
that at that stage of the proceedings, respondents therein have not

Adopting the RTC's ratiocinations that grave and irreparable damage would be
shown that Circular No. 2001-51 and Board Resolution No. 2001-113,
inflicted on the employees if the writ was not granted, the Court of Appeals said:
which were implemented effective [July 1, 2001], are in contravention of
[any] law. He further held that a 'roll back' of the salaries of all the
"It is the humble view of this Court that matters of compensation, being
NAPOCOR employees, while the merits of the case is yet to be heard,
sacrosanct and held dearly as life itself, cannot easily be trifled with,
trampled upon and recalled at whim. The grim prospect of uncertainty "IV. Whether NAPOCOR has the power to issue Board Resolution No.
facing the [respondents] owing to their inevitable separation from the 2002-81 amending its Resolution No. 2001-113 and Circular No. 2001-51 in
service further compels this Court to act decisively and with dispatch order to correct its previous erroneous act of implementing the latter
7
while the main case is being heard." Resolution /Circular without the requisite review and approval by the
DBM.
The CA, however, refused to rule on the issue of whether there was legal basis
for the step increments. It believed that to do so would mean prejudging the "V. Whether Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure authorized the
main case pending before the trial court. issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction even if the relief/protection
applied for is the subject of controversy in the main action.
8
Hence, this Petition.
"VI. Whether Section 1, Rule 36 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
Issues required that an Order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for our 9
which it is based."
consideration:
Briefly, the issues brought for resolution by this Court are (1) the propriety of
"I. Whether Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure authorized the
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction; and (2) the legality of the step increments
Regional Trial Court to acquire jurisdiction over matters pending with
that were issued without the DBM's prior approval.
the COA by issuing a writ of preliminary injunction, which amounts to
an encroachment on the independence of the same constitutional body. Considering that the second issue concerns the merits of the case pending
before the trial court, the Court will limit its discussion only to the first
"II. Whether Section 16 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6758 (The Salary
question.
Standardization Law enacted on August 21, 1989) amended RA No. 6375
(NAPOCOR Charter), which authorized the Board of Directors to fix the The Court's Ruling
compensation, allowance and benefits of its employees.
The Petition is partly meritorious.
"III. Whether Sections 14 and 15 of RA 6758 mandated the DBM to
review and approve NAPOCOR Board Resolution No. 2001-113 and its Sole Issue:
implementing Circular No. 2001-51 before it may be legally
implemented. Propriety of the Preliminary Injunction
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Besides, the COA Rules do not clearly and explicitly prescribe the procedure for
addressing respondent's Complaint against the implementation. Indeed, while
Initially, petitioner assails the trial court's jurisdiction to issue the Writ of Corporate Auditor Cabibihan has yet to rule on whether or not to lift the
Preliminary Injunction. She contends that the Petition for Prohibition filed by suspension order, as petitioner contends, the fact remains that Board Resolution
respondent is premature, because COA has yet to rule on whether or not to lift No. 2002-81 has already modified the previous resolution, precisely to conform
the suspension of the step increments granted in Napocor Board Resolution No. to COA Rules.
2001-113 and Circular No. 2001-51. She adds that there is a need to follow the
procedural requirements and processes mandated in COA's 1997 Revised Rules Even assuming arguendo that the provision exists, the appeal mechanics under
(COA Rules) as a condition precedent for a resort to the courts by respondent. the COA Rules would not constitute a speedy and adequate remedy. A remedy is
She says further that it is not exempt from the doctrine of exhaustion of considered plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner
administrative remedies on the basis merely of its general assertions of from the injurious effects of the judgment or rule, order or resolution of the
10
irreparable injury. lower court or agency.
We disagree. A petition for prohibition is a preventive remedy and, as a rule, does not lie to
11
restrain an act that is already fait accompli. The Petition for Prohibition
It should be noted that shortly after Corporate Auditor Cabibihan issued the instituted by respondent before the trial court assailed the validity not only of
suspension Order dated June 5, 2002, the Napocor board passed Resolution No. petitioner's May 8, 2002 Letter Memorandum and Corporate Auditor
2002-81 on July 24, 2002, to rectify its Resolution No. 2001-113 and Circular No. Cabibihan's Memorandum Circular (suspension order) but, more important, it
2001-51, which were issued earlier without authority from the DBM. This time, assailed Napocor Board Resolution No. 2002-81, which was to be implemented
Resolution No. 2002-81, which was confirmed on August 14, 2002, bore the in September 2002. Given the impending "roll back" of the salaries of the
DBM's approval. affected employees, there was an urgent need for judicial intervention.
12
Under the new resolution, the step increments mentioned in the previous Moreover, respondent's immediate resort to judicial action is justified because
Resolution No. 2001-113 were limited to a maximum of two steps, and the "roll only legal issues are to be resolved, which are the validity of the step increments
back" of salaries of all the Napocor employees who received more than the two- and the authority of the DBM vis-à-vis the questioned Napocor Circular and
step increments was set to be implemented on September 1, 2002. With the Resolution.
13
circumstances then obtaining, it would have been impractical, if not illogical, for
respondent to "exhaust" administrative remedies before taking court action. All in all, the principle of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an
14
inflexible rule. It may be dispensed with in the present case, because its
application would not constitute a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. The invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; and (c)
issues here are purely legal, and judicial intervention has been shown to be there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
15
urgent. damage.
Injunctive Order The question of whether a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued is
16
Not Properly Issued addressed to the sound discretion of the issuing court. The grant of the writ is
conditioned on the existence of the movant's clear and positive right, which
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides thus: 17
should be protected. It is an extraordinary peremptory remedy available only
on the grounds expressly provided by law, specifically Section 3 of Rule 58.
"Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary
injunction may be granted when it is established: A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is
18
"enforceable as a matter of law."
'(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and
the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the Absent any clear and unquestioned legal right, the issuance of an injunctive writ
commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or 19
would constitute grave abuse of discretion. Injunction is not designed to
in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a protect contingent, abstract or future rights whose existence is doubtful or
limited period or perpetually; 20
disputed. It cannot be grounded on the possibility of irreparable damage
21
without proof of an actual existing right. Sans that proof, equity will not take
'(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of 22
cognizance of suits to establish title or lend its preventive aid by injunction.
the act or acts complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant; or 23
Relevantly, Olalia v. Hizon held as follows:
'(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, "It has been consistently held that there is no power the exercise of
threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation and
to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights sound discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the
of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or issuance of an injunction. It is the strong arm of equity that should
proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.'" never be extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law
cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages.
To be entitled to a writ of injunction, a party must establish the following
requisites: (a) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; (b) the
"Every court should remember that an injunction is a limitation upon them. Hence, the trial court concluded, its issuance of the injunctive writ was
30
the freedom of action of the defendant and should not be granted justified.
lightly or precipitately. It should be granted only when the court is fully
satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it."
24 We disagree.
In the present case, respondent anchors its entitlement to the injunctive writ on From the foregoing conflicting claims of the parties, it is obvious that the right
its alleged legal right to the step increments. It contends that under Republic claimed by respondent as its basis for asking for injunctive relief is far from
Act No. 6395 (Revised Charter of the National Power Corporation), the
25 clear. The validity of the circulars and board resolution has been put into serious
Napocor board was empowered to fix the compensation and benefits of its question; more so, in the light of Napocor Board Resolution No. 2002-81, which
employees; and to grant step increments, based on Memorandum Order No. 198 was issued precisely to rectify the previously issued resolution and circular.
issued by then President Fidel Ramos and on Republic Act (RA) No. 7648 While respondent's claimed right is not required to be conclusively established
(otherwise known as the "Electric Power Crisis Act of 1993").

26 at this stage, it is nevertheless necessary to show -- at least tentatively -- that it
exists and is not vitiated by any substantial challenge or contradiction as that
31
On the other hand, petitioner contends that the pertinent provision of the raised by petitioner. In our view, respondent has failed to comply with this
27
Napocor Charter, upon which respondent bases its claimed authority from the requirement.
28
board, has already been superseded or modified by Section 16 of Republic Act
29
No. 6758. This provision mandates the DBM's review and approval of Napocor The enforcement of the suspension order and Resolution No. 2002-81 would
Board Resolution No. 2001-113 and Circular No. 2001-51 prior to their effect the rollback of the salaries of Napocor employees receiving more than the
implementation. Hence, because these issuances were implemented without the two-step increments. True, their enforcement would be prejudicial to
DBM's mandatory review and approval, they cannot be made the source of any respondent members' interest, but merely showing this fact is not sufficient. It
right whatsoever. must also be established that the party applying for the writ has a clear legal
right that must be protected. Thus, a finding that the applicant for preliminary
In its Resolution dated September 25, 2002, the trial court noted that at that injunction may suffer damage not capable of pecuniary estimation does not
stage of the proceedings, petitioner had not shown that Circular No. 2001-51 and suffice to support an injunction, when it appears that the right to be protected is
32
Resolution No. 2001-113, which were already being implemented by Napocor, unclear or is seriously disputed.
were in contravention of any law. What the RTC perceived to be clear was that a
rollback of the salaries of all the Napocor employees, while the merits of the No Vested Right to the
case were yet to be heard, would result in grave and irreparable damage to Suspended Step Increments
Respondent contends that its members have already acquired a vested right to the limits of budgetary appropriations. The exercise of management prerogative
the suspended step increments, which they have been enjoying after the by government corporations are limited by the provisions of the laws applicable
38
issuance of Circular No. 2001-51 in October 2001. It alleges that the suspension to them. Subject to state regulation in particular is a public utility like
or revision of the circular (by virtue of Board Resolution No. 2002-81 issued on Napocor, its income, and the amount of money available for its operating
July 24, 2002, and confirmed on August 14, 2002) constitutes a salary expenses including labor costs.
diminution, which is clearly prejudicial to them.
Moreover, Article 100 of the Labor Code on "non-diminution of benefits" does
A vested right is one that is absolute, complete and unconditional; to its not contemplate the continuous grant of unauthorized or irregular
exercise, no obstacle exists; and it is immediate and perfect in itself and not compensation. The application of the principle presupposes that a company
33
dependent upon any contingency. To be vested, a right must have become a practice, policy and tradition favorable to the employees has been clearly
34
title -- legal or equitable -- to the present or future enjoyment of property. established; and that the payments made by the company pursuant to it have
39
ripened into benefits enjoyed by them.
35
As has been held, there is no vested right to salary increases. There must be a
40
lawful decree or order supporting an employee's claim. In Baybay Water District v. COA, a substantially similar contention was
resolved in this wise:
In the present case, because the validity of their implementation was
fundamentally assailed, the step increments enjoyed by the Napocor employees "x x x. The erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public
could not have ripened into vested rights. In brief, it is seriously contended that, officers does not estop the Government from making a subsequent
because they were granted without the required DBM approval, no vested rights correction of such errors. More specifically, where there is an express
to the step increments could have been acquired. provision of law prohibiting the grant of certain benefits, the law must
be enforced even if it prejudices certain parties due to an error
The terms and conditions of employment of government employees are committed by public officials in granting the benefit. x x x Practice,
36
governed by law. It is the legislature and -- when properly given delegated without more, no matter how long continued, cannot give rise to any
power -- the administrative heads of government that fix the terms and vested right if it is contrary to law."
41
conditions of employment through statutes or administrative circulars, rules,

37
and regulations. An Injunctive Writ, a Virtual
Disposition of the Main Case
While government instrumentalities and agencies are trying their best to
alleviate the financial difficulties of their employees, they can do so only within
While the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction generally rests on the sound debate. The validity of respondent's Complaint is a matter that must be
discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, extreme caution must be addressed initially by the trial court; that issue cannot be resolved at this time
42
observed in the exercise of that discretion. A court should, as much as possible, by this Court.
avoid issuing the writ, which would effectively dispose of the main case without
trial and/or due process.
43 In fine, we hold that respondent has not justified the issuance of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction by proving its clear and positive legal right to the step
In the present case, it is evident that the only ground relied upon for injunctive increments. The Court of Appeals thus erred in affirming the Resolutions of the
relief is the alleged nullity of petitioner's May 8, 2002 Memorandum and trial court dated September 25, 2002 and October 29, 2002.
Auditor Cabibihan's June 5, 2002 suspension order. Respondent contends that
petitioner and Cabibihan exceeded the limitations of their authority. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision and
Resolution REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon
By issuing a writ premised on that sole justification, the trial court in effect City is directed to proceed speedily with the trial on the merits of Civil Case No.
sustained respondent's claim that petitioner and Auditor Cabibihan had Q-02-47615 and to decide it with all deliberate dispatch. No costs.
exceeded their authority in ordering the suspension of the implementation of
the step increments; and that the suspension was patently invalid or, at the very SO ORDERED.
least, that the memorandum and circular were of doubtful validity. Thus, the
FOOTNOTES:
lower court prejudged the main case and reversed the rule on the burden of 14
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., Ltd. v. G.G. Sportswear Manufacturing
proof, because it assumed to be true the very proposition that respondent-
Corp., GR No. 146526, May 5, 2006 citing Province of Zamboanga del Norte v.
complainant in the RTC was duty-bound to prove in the first place.
Court of Appeals, 396 Phil. 709, October 11, 2000; Paat v. Court of Appeals, 334
Furthermore, the RTC's action ran counter to the well-settled rule that acts of Phil. 146, January 10, 1997. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedy
public officers are presumed to be regular and valid, unless sufficiently shown to admits of exceptions, in which judicial action may be validly resorted to
44
be otherwise. A court may issue a writ or preliminary injunction only when the immediately (1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue
respondent has made out a case of invalidity or irregularity. That case must be involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently
strong enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdictionl; (4) when there is estoppel on
validity; and it must show a clear legal right to the remedy sought.
45 the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable
injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter
Petitioner has gone to great lengths in arguing her position on the merits of the ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7)
prohibition case, but this is neither the time nor the opportunity for that kind of when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject In Searth Commodities Corp. v. CA, 207 SCRA 622, March 31, 1992, petitioners
matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not had only one main argument for the invalidity of the foreclosure sale. They
provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and (11) when there are sought to justify the issuance of the injunction by alleging that, at the time of
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable foreclosure, the remaining balance of the loan incurred by Petitioner Searth was
delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) when no administrative only P17,858; the three residential properties foreclosed by DBP to satisfy this
review is provided by law; (13) when the rule of qualified political agency applies; balance were, however, valued at P950,000. The Court held that, were the lower
and (14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been court to issue the desired writ to enjoin the sale of the properties on the basis of
rendered moot. the aforementioned justification by petitioners, the issuance of the writ would
28
"Section 16. Repeal of Special Laws and Regulations. – All laws, decrees, be a virtual acceptance of their claim that the foreclosure sale was null and void.
executive orders, corporate charters, and other issuance or parts thereof, that There would in effect be a prejudgment of the main case for annulment of the
exempt agencies from the coverage of the System, or that authorize and fix REM and the foreclosure sale.
position classification, salaries, pay rates or allowances of specified positions, or
group of officials and employees or of agencies, which are inconsistent with the
System, including the proviso under Section 2, and Section 16 of Presidential
Decree No. 985 are hereby repealed."
44
Rules Of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3(l).
45
See Valley Trading Co., Inc. v. CFI of ISabela, Br. II, 171 SCRA 501, March 31,
1989. In this case, petitioner filed a Complaint seeking a declaration of the
supposed nullity of a tax ordinance, which imposed a graduated tax on retailers,
wholesalers and distributors. It also prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction to enjoin the collection of that tax. The trial
court denied the prayer for a preliminary writ, and the Supreme Court affirmed
the denial. The Court noted that the only ground relied upon for injunction
relief was the alleged patent nullity of the ordinance. The Court ruled that if the
desired writ was issued on the basis of that sole justification by petitioner, the
issuance of that writ would be a virtual acceptance of his claim that the
imposition is patently invalid or of doubtful validity.
Professional Realty, Inc. (APRI) to rebuild the public market and construct a
shopping center.
APRI v. Municipality of Garcia
2
On 19 January 1995, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was executed
between petitioner APRI and respondent, represented by Mayor Gutierrez and
the members of the Sangguniang Bayan. Under the MOA, APRI undertook to
SECOND DIVISION
construct a shopping complex in the 5,000-square-meter area. In return, APRI
G. R. No. 183367 March 14, 2012 acquired the exclusive right to operate, manage, and lease stall spaces for a
period of 25 years.
AUSTRALIAN PROFESSIONAL REALTY, INC., JESUS GARCIA, and LYDIA
MARCIANO, Petitioners, In May 1995, Victor Reyes was elected as municipal mayor of respondent. On 6
vs. February 2003, respondent, through Mayor Reyes, initiated a Complaint for
MUNICIPALITY OF PADRE GARCIA BATANGAS PROVINCE, Respondent. Declaration of Nullity of Memorandum of Agreement with Damages before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosario, Batangas, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch
DECISION 87. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-004.
SERENO, J.: On 12 February 2003, the RTC issued summons to petitioners, requiring them to
file their Answer to the Complaint. However, the summons was returned
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
unserved, as petitioners were no longer holding office in the given address.
seeking to annul the Court of Appeals (CA) Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No.
1
102540 dated 26 March 2008 and 16 June 2008, which denied petitioners’ On 2 April 2003, a Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Service by Publication
Motion for the issuance of a status quo order and Motion for issuance of a was filed by respondent before the RTC and subsequently granted by the trial
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. court.
Statement of the Facts and the Case On 24 November 2003, the RTC issued an Order declaring petitioners in default
and allowing respondent to present evidence ex parte.
In 1993, fire razed to the ground the old public market of respondent
Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas. The municipal government, through its On 6 October 2004, a Decision was rendered by the RTC, which, after narrating
then Municipal Mayor Eugenio Gutierrez, invited petitioner Australian the testimonial evidence for respondent, stated:
After the completion of the testimony of Victor M. Reyes, counsel for the There having been no timely appeal made, respondent filed a Motion for
petitioner manifested that he will file the formal offer of evidence in writing. Execution of Judgment, which was granted by the RTC. A Writ of Execution was
thus issued on 15 July 2005.
On July 19, 2004, counsel for the petitioner filed before this Court his Formal
Offer of Documentary Exhibits consisting of Exhibits "A" to "H", inclusive of After learning of the adverse judgment, petitioners filed a Petition for Relief
submarkings. from Judgment dated 18 July 2005. This Petition was denied by the RTC in an
Order dated 15 June 2006. In another Order dated 14 February 2008, the trial
On August 18, 2004 an order was issued by the Court admitting all the exhibits court denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
formally offered by the petitioner thru counsel and this case was ordered
submitted for resolution of the Court. Petitioners later filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
dated 28 February 2008, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 102540. On 7 March 2008,
There is no opposition in the instant petition. petitioners filed before the CA a Motion for the Issuance of Status Quo Order
and Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
WHEREFORE, in view thereof, and finding the petition to be sufficient in form 4
Preliminary Injunction. The motion prayed for an order to restrain the RTC
and substance, it being supported by sufficient evidence, judgement (sic) is
from "further proceeding and issuing any further Order, Resolution, Writ of
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff as against the respondents as follows: 5
Execution, and any other court processes" in the case before it.
(a) The Memorandum of Agreement is hereby declared null and void

On 26 March 2008, the CA issued a Resolution denying the said motion, stating
for being contrary to law and public policy, particularly R.A. 6957 and
thus:
R.A. 7718;
After a careful evaluation of petitioners’ Motion for Issuance of Status Quo

(b) The respondents are hereby ordered to pay the amount of FIVE
Order and Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
MILLION PESOS (₱5,000,000.00) in favor of the plaintiff for damages
Preliminary Injunction, We find that the matter is not of extreme urgency and
caused to the latter;
that there is no clear and irreparable injury that would be suffered by the
petitioners if the prayer for the issuance of a Status Quo Order, Temporary
(c) The structures found within the unfinished PADRE GARCIA
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction is not granted.
SHOPPING CENTER are hereby declared forfeited in favor of the
In Ong Ching Kian Chuan v. Court of Appeals, it was held that, to be entitled to
Municipality of Padre Garcia.
injunctive relief, the petitioner must show, inter alia, the existence of a clear and
3
SO ORDERED.
unmistakable right and an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to exerted to locate APRI, or any inquiry as to the whereabouts of the said
prevent serious damage. petitioner.
WHEREFORE, petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of a Status Quo Order, On 6 August 2008, this Court required respondent to file its Comment. On 13
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby February 2009, the Comment was filed, alleging among others that despite the
6
DENIED for lack of merit. RTC’s issuance of a Writ of Execution, respondent did not move to implement
the said writ out of administrative comity and fair play. Even if the writ were
On 17 June 2008, the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the 26 March implemented, petitioners failed to state in categorical terms the serious injury
2008 Resolution, stating that the mere preservation of the status quo is not they would sustain.
sufficient to justify the issuance of an injunction.
Respondent further argues that it is now in possession of the contracts that the
On 8 July 2008, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari lessees of the Padre Garcia Shopping Center executed with APRI. Thus, there are
dated 6 July 2008. "actions [that militate] against the preservation of the present state of
7
things," as sought to be achieved with the issuance of a status quo order.
Petitioners claim that the amount of APRI’s investment in the Padre Garcia
Shopping Center is estimated at ₱30,000,000, the entirety of which the RTC On 2 June 2009, petitioners filed their Reply to respondent’s Comment.
declared forfeited to respondent without just compensation. At the time of the
filing of the Petition, APRI had 47 existing tenants and lessees and was deriving On 3 March 2010, this Court issued a Resolution requiring the parties to inform
an average monthly rental income of ₱100,000. The Decision of the RTC was the Court of the present status of CA-G.R. SP No. 102540. On 15 April 2010,
allegedly arrived at without first obtaining jurisdiction over the persons of respondent manifested that after the parties filed their respective Memoranda,
petitioners. The execution of the allegedly void judgment of the RTC during the the CA considered the case submitted for decision. On 12 May 2010, petitioners
pendency of the Petition before the CA would probably work injustice to the filed their Compliance, stating that the appellate court, per its Resolution dated
applicant, as the execution would result in an arbitrary declaration of nullity of 7 August 2008, held in abeyance the resolution of CA-G.R. SP No. 102540,
the MOA without due process of law. pending resolution of the instant Petition.
Petitioners further allege that respondent did not exercise reasonable diligence The Court’s Ruling
in inquiring into the former’s address in the case before the RTC. The Process
Server Return, with respect to the unserved summons, did not indicate the The Petition is denied for failure to show any grave abuse of discretion on the
impossibility of a service of summons within a reasonable time, the efforts part of the CA.
Procedural Issue: Propriety of a Petition for Review under Rule 45 be granted upon the filing of a verified application showing facts entitling the
applicant to the relief demanded.
Before proceeding to the substantive issues raised, we note that petitioners
resorted to an improper remedy before this Court. They filed a Petition for Essential to granting the injunctive relief is the existence of an urgent necessity
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to question the denial for the writ in order to prevent serious damage. A TRO issues only if the matter
of their Motion for the issuance of an injunctive relief. is of such extreme urgency that grave injustice and irreparable injury would
13
arise unless it is issued immediately. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rule of
Under Section 1 (c) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, no appeal may be taken 14
Court, a TRO may be issued only if it appears from the facts shown by
from an interlocutory order. An interlocutory order is one that does not dispose affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would be
8
of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon. An order inflicted on the applicant before the writ of preliminary injunction could be
granting or denying an application for preliminary injunction is interlocutory in heard.
9
nature and, hence, not appealable. Instead, the proper remedy is to file a
10
Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition under Rule 65. Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must show that (1) there
exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is directly
While the Court may dismiss a petition outright for being an improper remedy, threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is
it may in certain instances proceed to review the substance of the material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
11
petition. Thus, this Court will treat this Petition as if it were filed under Rule the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.
15
65.
The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests on
Substantive Issue: Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, since the
assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involves findings of fact
The issue that must be resolved by this Court is whether the CA committed 16
left to the said court for its conclusive determination. Hence, the exercise of
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’ Motion for the Issuance of
judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with,
Status Quo Order and Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order 17
except when there is grave abuse of discretion.
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (Motion for Injunction).
Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction

A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and
12
implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights and interests. An
jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO may
reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all a writ of injunction. Where the complainant’s right or title is doubtful or
18 24
in contemplation of law. The burden is thus on petitioner to show in his disputed, injunction is not proper.
application that there is meritorious ground for the issuance of a TRO in his
favor.
19 The general rule is that after a judgment has gained finality, it becomes the
ministerial duty of the court to order its execution. No court should interfere, by
25
In this case, no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the CA. It did not injunction or otherwise, to restrain such execution. The rule, however, admits
exercise judgment in a capricious and whimsical manner or exercise power in an of exceptions, such as the following: (1) when facts and circumstances later
arbitrary or despotic manner. transpire that would render execution inequitable or unjust; or (2) when there is
26
a change in the situation of the parties that may warrant an injunctive relief. In
No clear legal right this case, after the finality of the RTC Decision, there were no supervening
events or changes in the situation of the parties that would entail the injunction
A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is
20
of the Writ of Execution.
enforceable as a matter of law. In the absence of a clear legal right, the
21
issuance of the writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The possibility of No irreparable injury
irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for
22
injunction. Damages are irreparable where there is no standard by which their amount can
27
be measured with reasonable accuracy. In this case, petitioners have alleged
A perusal of the Motion for Injunction and its accompanying Affidavit filed that the loss of the public market entails costs of about ₱30,000,000 in
before the CA shows that petitioners rely on their alleged right to the full and investments, ₱100,000 monthly revenue in rentals, and amounts as yet
faithful execution of the MOA. However, while the enforcement of the Writ of unquantified – but not unquantifiable – in terms of the alleged loss of jobs of
Execution, which would nullify the implementation of the MOA, is manifestly APRI’s employees and potential suits that may be filed by the leaseholders of the
prejudicial to petitioners’ interests, they have failed to establish in their Petition public market for breach of contract. Clearly, the injuries alleged by petitioners
that they possess a clear legal right that merits the issuance of a writ of are capable of pecuniary estimation. Any loss petitioners may suffer is easily
preliminary injunction. Their rights under the MOA have already been declared subject to mathematical computation and, if proven, is fully compensable by
inferior or inexistent in relation to respondent in the RTC case, under a 28
damages. Thus, a preliminary injunction is not warranted. With respect to the
23
judgment that has become final and executory. At the very least, their rights allegations of loss of employment and potential suits, these are speculative at
under the MOA are precisely disputed by respondent. Hence, there can be no best, with no proof adduced to substantiate them.
"clear and unmistakable" right in favor of petitioners to warrant the issuance of
The foregoing considered, the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying the Motion for Injunction.1âwphi1In any case, petitioners may still seek
recourse in their pending Petition before the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated

26 March 2008 and 16 June 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 102540 are AFFIRMED. The
Court of Appeals is directed to proceed with dispatch to dispose of the case
before it.
SO ORDERED.
other MARINE LIFE OF MINOLO COVE, petitioners,

vs.
SECTION 3 - NO RIGHT IN ESSE
THE HONORABLE ENRICO LANZANAS as Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch VII, THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES — Region IV, represented by its Regional
Executive Director and its Regional Director for Environment, THE
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY VS. CA – GO TO
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, ORIENTAL MINDORO ELECTRIC
SECTION3, REQUISITES
COOPERATIVE, PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ORIENTAL MINDORO,
herein represented by GOVERNOR RODOLFO VALENCIA, PUERTO
GALERA MAYOR GREGORIO DELGADO, VICE MAYOR ARISTEO
Bangus Fry Fisherfolk v. Lanzanas ATIENZA, and MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF PUERTO
GALERA, JUAN ASCAN, JR., RAFAEL ROMEY, CENON SALCEDO, JERRY
DALISAY, SIMON BALITAAN, RENATO CATAQUIS, MARCELINO BANAAG,
DANIEL ENRIQUEZ, AMELYN MARCO, GABRIEL ILAGAN, MUNICIPAL
FIRST DIVISION
ENGINEER RODEL RUBIO, and MUNICIPAL PLANNING and
G.R. No. 131442 July 10, 2003 DEVELOPMENT COORDINATOR WILHELMINA LINESES, respondents.
BANGUS FRY FISHERFOLK, DIWATA MAGBUHOS, ANGELITA BINAY, CARPIO, J.:
ELMA GARCIA, VIRGILIO PANGUIO, ARSENIO CASTILLO, ARIEL

The Case
PANGUIO, ANTONIO PANGUIO, ANTONIO BUNQUIN, GENEROSO
BUNQUIN, CHARLIE DIMAYACYAC, RENATO PANGUIO, ATILANO 1 2
This is a petition for review of the Order dated 7 November 1997 of the
BUNQUIN, CARLOS CHAVEZ, JUAN DIMAYACYAC, FILEMON BUNQUIN,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7 ("Manila RTC"), dismissing petitioners'
MARIO MAGBUHOS, MAURO MAGBUHOS, NORA MAGBUHOS,
complaint for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
JEOVILYN, GENALYN and JORVAN QUIMUEL, minors, represented by
their parents FELICIANA and SABINO QUIMUEL, MARICAR MAGBUHOS, The Facts
minor, represented by her parents CARMELITA and ANTONIO
MAGBUHOS, MARLO BINAY, minor, represented by his parents On 30 June 1997, Regional Executive Director Antonio G. Principe ("RED
EFRENITA and CHARLITO BINAY, and the BANGUS, BANGUS FRY and Principe") of Region IV, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
("DENR"), issued an Environmental Clearance Certificate ("ECC") in favor of Valencia. Petitioners further prayed for the demolition of mooring structures
respondent National Power Corporation ("NAPOCOR"). The ECC authorized that respondents had already built.
NAPOCOR to construct a temporary mooring facility in Minolo Cove, Sitio
Minolo, Barangay San Isidro, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. The Sangguniang On 28 July 1997, prior to the filing of the amended complaint, the trial court
Bayan of Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a mangrove area and issued a 20-day temporary restraining order enjoining the construction of the
breeding ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone.

3 mooring facility. However, the trial court lifted the same on 6 August 1997 on
NAPOCOR's manifestation that the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro
7
The mooring facility would serve as the temporary docking site of NAPOCOR's was the one undertaking the construction of the mooring facility.
power barge, which, due to turbulent waters at its former mooring site in
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, required relocation to a safer site like Minolo Cove. On 28 August 1997, before filing their answers, respondents ORMECO and the
The 14.4 megawatts power barge would provide the main source of power for provincial officials of Oriental Mindoro moved to dismiss the complaint. These
the entire province of Oriental Mindoro pending the construction of a land- respondents claimed that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies,
based power plant in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. The ECC for the mooring rendering the complaint without cause of action. They also asserted that the
facility was valid for two years counted from its date of issuance or until 30 June Manila RTC has no jurisdiction to enjoin the construction of the mooring
1999.
4 facility in Oriental Mindoro, which lies outside the Manila RTC's territorial
jurisdiction.
Petitioners, claiming to be fisherfolks from Minolo, San Isidro, Puerto
5
Galera, sought reconsideration of the ECC issuance. RED Principe, however, Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that there was no need to
denied petitioners' plea on 15 July 1997. On 21 July 1997, petitioners filed a exhaust administrative remedies. They argued that the issuance of the ECC was
complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, for the in patent violation of Presidential Decree No. 1605, 8 Sections 26 and 27 of
9
cancellation of the ECC and for the issuance of a writ of injunction to stop the Republic Act No. 7160, and the provisions of DENR Department Administrative
construction of the mooring facility. Impleaded as defendants were the Order No. 96-37 ("DAO 96-37") on the documentation of ECC applications.
following: (1) NAPOCOR, (2) RED Principe, (3) DENR Region IV Technical Petitioners also claimed that the implementation of the ECC was in patent
Director for Environment Oscar Dominguez, (4) Oriental Mindoro Electric violation of its terms.
Cooperative ("ORMECO"), which is engaged in the distribution of electricity in

6
In its order of 7 November 1997, the trial court granted the motion and
Oriental Mindoro, and (5) certain officials of Puerto Galera. Petitioners
dismissed petitioners' complaint.
subsequently amended their complaint to include as additional defendants the
elective officials of Oriental Mindoro represented by then Governor Rodolfo G.
Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of the Trial Court Moreover, this Court finds the Opposition of the Petitioners highly
untenable and bereft of merits that the controverted act in question is
The trial court's order dismissing the complaint reads in part: patently illegal and there was an immediate need for judicial
intervention.
After careful evaluation and analysis, this Court finds the Motion to
Dismiss tenable and meritorious. The ECC in question was issued by the Regional Office of the DENR
which has jurisdiction and authority over the same . . .. And corollary to
Petitioners have clearly failed to exhaust all administrative remedies
this, the issue as to whether or not the Minolo Cove is within the
before taking this legal action in Court x x x.
enclosed coves and waters embraced by Puerto Galera bay and
protected by Medio island is a clear question of fact which the DENR
It is x x x worth mentioning that the decision of the Regional Director
may appropriately resolve before resorting to [the] Court[s].
may still be x x x elevated to the Office of the Secretary of the DENR to
fully comply with the process of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
This Court is likewise aware and cognizant of its territorial jurisdiction
And well settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that before bringing an
in the enforcement of Writ of Injunction. That truly, [a] writ of
action in or resorting to the Courts of Justice, all remedies of
injunction can only be enforced within [the] territorial jurisdiction of
administrative character affecting or determinative of the controversy at
this Court but not for acts which are being or about to be committed
that level should first be exhausted by the aggrieved party (Pestanas vs.
outside its territorial jurisdiction. Thus, inPhilippine National Bank vs.
Dyogi, L-25786, February 27, 1978). And petitioners' failure to exhaust
Pineda, 197 SCRA 1, the Honorable Supreme Court ruled: "Regional Trial
administrative remedies renders his [sic] petition dismissible (Chia vs.
Courts can only enforce their writs of injunction within their respective
Acting Collector of Customs, 177 SCRA 755). And a dismissal on the
designated territories. Furthermore, we find the issuance of the
ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies is tantamount to a
preliminary injunction directed against the Provincial Sheriff of Negros
dismissal based on lack of cause of action (Baguiro vs. Basa, Jr., 214
Occidental a jurisdictional paux [sic] pas (from Black Dictionary means
SCRA 437; Pineda vs. CFI of Davao, 111 Phil. 643; Sarabia vs. Secretary of
jurisdictional falsity) as the Courts of First Instance now Regional Trial
Agriculture & Natural Resources, L-16002, May 23, 1961; Gone, et al. vs.
Court[s], can only enforce their writs of injunction within their
District Engineer, et. al., L-22782, August 29, 1975; Abe-Abe, et al. vs.
respective designated territories.
Manta, et. al., L-4827, May 31, 1979) although it does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter (Mun. of La Trinidad, et And finally, this Court is not unmindful of the relevant and square
al. vs. CFI of Baguio-Benguet, et al., L-33889, June 28, 1983). application in the case at bar of Presidential Decree No. 1818, Executive
Order No. 380 dated November 27, 1989, and Circular No. 2-91 of the
Supreme Court that the National Power Corporation (NPC) is a public jurisdiction to issue the injunctive writ prayed for in the Amended
10
utility, created under special legislation, engaged in the generation and [Complaint].
distribution of electric power and energy. The mooring site of NPC in
Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro is one of its infrastructure projects The Issue
falling within the mantle of Executive Order No. 380, November 27,
The issue is whether the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint for
1989 x x x.
lack of cause action and lack of jurisdiction.
And as held by the Supreme Court in the case of National Power

The Ruling of the Court
Corporation vs. Honorable Abraham P. Vera, et al., 170 SCRA 721, courts
are without jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs against [the] National
The petition has no merit.
Power Corporation. The latter enjoys the protective mantle of P.D. 1818,
(Circular No. 2-91). Jurisdiction of the Manila RTC over the Case
xxx xxx xxx Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law. Such
jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint, irrespective of
Injunction in this case is not a mere ancillary [sic] writ but the main 11
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the reliefs sought.
action itself together with the Annulment of the Environmental
Clearance Certificate (ECC). Even assuming arguendo that the court A perusal of the allegations in the complaint shows that petitioners' principal
[can] annul the ECC how can the latter enforce the same against the cause of action is the alleged illegality of the issuance of the ECC. The violation
Provincial Government of Oriental Mindoro which was impleaded by of laws on environmental protection and on local government participation in
the petitioners as a necessary party together with the Oriental Mindoro the implementation of environmentally critical projects is an issue that involves
Electric Cooperative and the government officials of Puerto Galera, the validity of NAPOCOR's ECC. If the ECC is void, then as a necessary
Oriental Mindoro, whose acts and functions are being performed consequence, NAPOCOR or the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro
outside the territorial jurisdiction of this court? x x x Indisputably, the could not construct the mooring facility. The subsidiary issue of non-
injunction and annulment of ECC as prayed for in the petition are compliance with pertinent local ordinances in the construction of the mooring
inseparable x x x. facility becomes immaterial for purposes of granting petitioners' main prayer,
which is the annulment of the ECC. Thus, if the court has jurisdiction to
The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable that petitioners have failed to
determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC, then it has jurisdiction to hear
exhaust all the available administrative remedies and this Court has no
and decide petitioners' complaint.
Petitioners' complaint is one that is not capable of pecuniary estimation. It falls Clearly, the Manila RTC has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts under issuance of the ECC, although it could not issue an injunctive writ against the
Section 19(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. DENR or NAPOCOR. However, since the construction of the mooring facility
The question of whether petitioners should file their complaint in the Regional could not proceed without a valid ECC, the validity of the ECC remains the
Trial Court of Manila or Oriental Mindoro then becomes a matter of venue, to determinative issue in resolving petitioners' complaint.
12
be determined by the residence of the parties.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Petitioners' main prayer is the annulment of the ECC. The principal respondent,
DENR Region IV, has its main office at the L & S Building, Roxas Boulevard, The settled rule is before a party may seek the intervention of the courts, he
Manila. Regional Executive Director Principe of the DENR Region IV, who should first avail of all the means afforded by administrative processes. Hence, if
issued the ECC, holds office there. Plainly, the principal respondent resides in a remedy within the administrative machinery is still available, with a procedure
Manila, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Manila RTC. Thus, prescribed pursuant to law for an administrative officer to decide the
petitioners filed their complaint in the proper venue. controversy, a party should first exhaust such remedy before resorting to the
courts. The premature invocation of a court's intervention renders the
16
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts to issue injunctive complaint without cause of action and dismissible on such ground.
writs is limited to acts committed or about to be committed within their judicial
13
region. Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 1818 ("PD No. 1818") RED Principe of the DENR Region IV Office issued the ECC based on (1)
14
prohibited courts from issuing injunctive writs against government Presidential Decree No. 1586 ("PD No. 1586") and its implementing rules
17
infrastructure projects like the mooring facility in the present case. Republic Act establishing the Environmental Impact Statement System, (2) DAO 96-37 and
18
No. 8975 ("RA No. 8975"), which took effect on 26 November 2000, superseded (3) the Procedural Manual of DAO 96-37. Section 4 of PD No. 1586 requires a
PD No. 1818 and delineates more clearly the coverage of the prohibition, reserves proponent of an environmentally critical project, or a project located within an
the power to issue such writs exclusively with this Court, and provides penalties environmentally critical area as declared by the President, to secure an ECC
19
15
for its violation. Obviously, neither the Manila RTC nor the Oriental Mindoro prior to the project's operation. NAPOCOR thus secured the ECC because the
RTC can issue an injunctive writ to stop the construction of the mooring facility. mooring facility in Minolo Cove, while not an environmentally critical project, is
Only this Court can do so under PD No. 1818 and later under RA No. 8975. Thus, located within an environmentally critical area under Presidential Proclamation
20
the question of whether the Manila RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint No. 2146, issued on 14 December 1981.
considering that its injunctive writ is not enforceable in Oriental Mindoro is

academic.
The rules on administrative appeals from rulings of the DENR Regional requisite period will result in the finality of the RED's or Secretary's
Directors on the implementation of PD No. 1586 are found in Article VI of DAO decision(s), which can no longer be disturbed.
96-37, which provides:
An appeal shall not stay the effectivity of the RED's decision, unless the
SECTION 1.0. Appeal to the Office of the Secretary. — Any party Secretary directs otherwise.
aggrieved by the final decision of the RED may, within 15 days from
receipt of such decision, file an appeal with the Office of the Secretary. The right to appeal does not prevent the aggrieved party from first
The decision of the Secretary shall be immediately executory. resorting to the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the RED, to
give the RED an opportunity to re-evaluate his decision. (Emphasis
SECTION 2.0. Grounds for Appeal. — The grounds for appeal shall be added)
limited to grave abuse of discretion and serious errors in the findings of
fact which would cause grave or irreparable injury to the aggrieved Instead of following the foregoing procedure, petitioners bypassed the DENR
party. Frivolous appeals shall not be countenanced. Secretary and immediately filed their complaint with the Manila RTC, depriving
the DENR Secretary the opportunity to review the decision of his subordinate,
SECTION 3.0. Who May Appeal. — The proponent or any stakeholder, RED Principe. Under the Procedural Manual for DAO 96-37 and applicable
including but not limited to, the LGUs concerned and affected jurisprudence, petitioners' omission renders their complaint dismissible for lack
21
communities, may file an appeal. of cause of action. Consequently, the Manila RTC did not err in dismissing
petitioners' complaint for lack of cause of action.
The DENR Procedural Manual for DAO 96-37 explains these provisions thus:
On the Alleged Patent Illegality of the ECC
Final decisions of the RED may be appealed. These decisions include
those relating to the issuance or non-issuance of an ECC, and the Petitioners nevertheless contend that they are exempt from filing an appeal with
imposition of fines and penalties. By inference, the decision of the the DENR Secretary because the issuance of the ECC was in patent violation of
Secretary on the issuance or non-issuance of the ECC may also be existing laws and regulations. These are (1) Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
appealed based on this provision.Resort to courts prior to availing of this 1605, as amended, (2) Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local
remedy would make the appellant's action dismissible on the ground of Government Code of 1991), and (3) the provisions of DAO 96-37 on the
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. documentary requirements for the zoning permit and social acceptability of the
mooring facility.
The right to appeal must be exercised within 15 days from receipt by the
aggrieved party of such decision. Failure to file such appeal within the
25
Petitioners' contention is without merit. While the patent illegality of an act Galera" and thus protected under PD No. 1605. This is a question of fact that
exempts a party from complying with the rule on exhaustion Of administrative the DENR Secretary should have first resolved. In any event, there is no dispute
22
remedies, this does not apply in the present case. that NAPOCOR will use the mooring facility for its power barge that will supply
14.4 megawatts of electricity to the entire province of Oriental Mindoro,
Presidential Decree No. 1605 including Puerto Galera. The mooring facility is obviously a government-owned
23
public infrastructure intended to serve a basic need of the people of Oriental
Presidential Decree No. 1605 ("PD No. 1605"), as amended by Presidential
Mindoro. The mooring facility is not a "commercial structure; commercial or
Decrees Nos. 1605-A and 1805, declares as ecologically threatened zone "the
semi-commercial wharf or commercial docking" as contemplated in Section 1 of
coves and waters embraced by Puerto Galera Bay as protected by Medio Island."
PD No. 1605. Therefore, the issuance of the ECC does not violate PD No. 1605
This decree provides in part:
which applies only to commercial structures like wharves, marinas, hotels and
restaurants.
Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the
construction of marinas, hotels, restaurants, other commercial
Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. 7160
structures; commercial or semi-commercial wharfs [sic]; commercial
docking within the enclosed coves of Puerto Galera; the destruction of its Congress introduced Sections 26 and 27 in the Local Government Code to
mangrove stands; the devastation of its corals and coastline by large emphasize the legislative concern "for the maintenance of a sound ecology and
barges, motorboats, tugboat propellers, and any form of destruction by 26
clean environment." These provisions require every national government
other human activities are hereby prohibited. agency or government-owned and controlled corporation to hold prior
consultations with the local government unit concerned and to secure the prior
Section 2. x x x
approval of its sanggunian before implementing "any project or program that
may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources,
No permit for the construction of any wharf, marina, hotel, restaurants
loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover and extinction of animal or plant
and other commercial structures in Puerto Galera shall be issued
species." Sections 26 and 27 respectively provide:
without prior approval of the Office of the President upon the
recommendation of the Philippine Tourism Authority. (Emphasis
Section 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of
supplied)
Ecological Balance. — It shall be the duty of every national agency or
government-owned or controlled corporation authorized or involved in
NAPOCOR claims that since Minolo Cove lies outside of "Puerto Galera Bay as
24 the planning and implementation of any project or program that may
protected by Medio Island", PD No. 1605 does not apply to this case. However,
cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources,
petitioners assert that Minolo Cove is one of the "enclosed coves of Puerto
loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover and extinction of animal or eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where
plant species, to consult with the local government units, non- these will be implemented.
governmental organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain
the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the Again, Sections 26 and 27 do not apply to this case because as petitioners
28
people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological admit, the mooring facility itself is not environmentally critical and hence does
balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent or not belong to any of the six types of projects mentioned in the law. There is no
minimize the adverse effects thereof. statutory requirement for the concerned sanggunian to approve the
construction of the mooring facility. It is another matter if the operation of the
Section 27. Prior Consultations Required. — No project or program shall power barge is at issue. As an environmentally critical project that causes
be implemented by government authorities unless the consultations pollution, the operation of the power barge needs the prior approval of the
mentioned in Section . . . 26 hereof are complied with, and prior concerned sanggunian. However, what is before this Court is only the
approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That construction of the mooring facility, not the operation of the power barge. Thus,
occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not the issuance of the ECC does not violate Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. 7160.
be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Documentary Requirements for ECC Applications
27
In Lina, Jr. v. Paño, the Court interpreted these provisions in this manner: Under DAO 96-37, an ECC applicant for a project located within an
environmentally critical area is required to submit an Initial Environment
Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26 Examination, which must contain a brief description of the environmental
thereof x x x. setting and a documentation of the consultative process undertaken, when
29
appropriate. As part of the description of the environmental setting, the ECC
Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be applicant must submit a certificate of locational clearance or zoning certificate.
interpreted to mean projects and programs whose effects are among
those enumerated in Sections 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may Petitioners further contend that NAPOCOR, in applying for the ECC, did not
cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic change; (3) may cause the submit to the DENR Region IV Office the documents proving the holding of
depletion of non-renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of crop consultations and the issuance of a locational clearance or zoning certificate.
land, rangeland, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal or Petitioners assert that this omission renders the issuance of the ECC patently
plant species; and (6) other projects or programs that may call for the illegal.
The contention is also without merit. While such documents are part of the The contention is similarly without merit. The fact that NAPOCOR's ECC is
submissions required from a project proponent, their mere absence does not subject to cancellation for non-compliance with its conditions does not justify
render the issuance of the ECC patently illegal. To justify non-exhaustion of petitioners' conduct in ignoring the procedure prescribed in DAO 96-37 on
administrative remedies due to the patent illegality of the ECC, the public appeals from the decision of the DENR Executive Director. Petitioners
officer must have issued the ECC "[without any] semblance of compliance, or vigorously insist that NAPOCOR should comply with the requirements of
even an attempt to comply, with the pertinent laws; when manifestly, the officer consultation and locational clearance prescribed in DAO 96-37. Ironically,
has acted without jurisdiction or has exceeded his jurisdiction, or has petitioners themselves refuse to abide with the procedure for filing complaints
committed a grave abuse of discretion; or when his act is clearly and obviously and appealing decisions laid down in DAO 96-37.
30
devoid of any color of authority."
DAO 96-37 provides for a separate administrative proceeding to address
RED Principe, as chief of DENR Region IV, is the officer duly authorized under complaints for the cancellation of an ECC. Under Article IX of DAO 96-37,
31
DAO 96-37 to issue ECCs for projects located within environmentally critical complaints to nullify an ECC must undergo an administrative investigation,
areas. RED Principe issued the ECC on the recommendation of Amelia Supetran, after which the hearing officer will submit his report to the EMB Director or the
the Director of the Environmental Management Bureau. Thus, RED Principe Regional Executive Director, who will then render his decision. The aggrieved
acted with full authority pursuant to DENR regulations. Moreover, the legal party may file an appeal to the DENR Secretary, who has authority to issue cease
32
presumption is that he acted with the requisite authority. This clothes RED and desist orders. Article IX also classifies the types of violations covered under
Principe's acts with presumptive validity and negates any claim that his actions DAO 96-37, including projects operating without an ECC or violating the
are patently illegal or that he gravely abused his discretion. While petitioners conditions of the ECC. This is the applicable procedure to address petitioners'
may present proof to the contrary, they must do so before the proper complaint on NAPOCOR's alleged violations and not the filing of the instant
administrative forum before resorting to judicial remedies. case in court.
On the Alleged Non-Compliance with the Terms of the ECC A Final Word
Lastly, petitioners claim that they are justified in immediately seeking judicial The Court commends petitioners for their courageous efforts to safeguard and
recourse because NAPOCOR is guilty of violating the conditions of the ECC, maintain the ecological balance of Minolo Cove. This Court recognizes the
33
which requires it to secure a separate ECC for the operation of the power barge. utmost importance of protecting the environment. Indeed, we have called for
34
The ECC also mandates NAPOCOR to secure the usual local government the vigorous prosecution of violators of environmental laws. Legal actions to
permits, like zoning and building permits, from the municipal government of achieve this end, however, must be done in accordance with established rules of
Puerto Galera.
procedure that were intended, in the first place, to achieve orderly and efficient
administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
On December 18, 1986, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31 of Manila where the
liquidation proceeding was pending, approved the Purchase Agreement
FEBTCv. CA
executed by and among the same parties pursuant to the Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) earlier entered into by them. Alleging compliance with its
obligations under the MOA and the Purchase Agreement, petitioner then
FIRST DIVISION requested PBC's liquidator to execute the proper deeds of sale involving PBC's
fixed assets located in the following branches, to wit:
1. Soler (Arranque)
G.R. No. 123569 April 1, 1996
2. Bacolod City
3. Cabanatuan City
FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,
4. Laoag
vs.
5. San Pablo City
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO, II and VITALIANO
6. Cebu-Manalili
NANAGAS, II, respondents.
7. Davao-Sta. Ana
8. San Fernando, La Union
9. Legaspi City
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p 10. Iloilo City - Central Market
11. Units in Pacific Bank Condominium Bldg., Ayala Avenue,
Pacific Banking Corporation (PBC) was placed under receivership by the Central
Makati City
Bank under Monetary Board Resolution No. 699 dated July 5, 1985, and
thereafter placed under liquidation. Banks were invited to submit proposals for PBC's liquidator consistently refused to execute said deeds of sale and
the purchase of PBC's assets. On November 14, 1985, petitioner Far East Bank proceeded to offer for bidding to third parties the subject fixed assets.
and Trust Company (FEBTC) submitted its formal offer to purchase all the
assets of PBC. Subsequently, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was entered On July 5, 1993 FEBTC filed with the trial court a motion to direct PBC's
into by and among the petitioner as buyer, PBC through its liquidator as seller, liquidator to execute the deeds of sale with application for issuance of
and the Central Bank (CB). preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order to prevent the
liquidator from further offering to sell to third parties the subject fixed assets.
The RTC initially issued a temporary restraining order directing PBC's liquidator these properties are excluded from among the assets that can be purchased by
to desist from proceeding with the bidding. After hearing, the trial court the petitioner. Said section provides:
nevertheless denied the application of the petitioner for a writ of preliminary
injunction. Aggrieved, petitioner went to the respondent Court of Appeals. Sec. 1 — Purchase Agreement
On October 23, 1995, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision a. Within ninety (90) calendar days from the date of the
likewise denying petitioner's application for injunction. execution of this Memorandum of Agreement, subject to such
extension of time as shall be mutually agreed upon by the
Hence, the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 praying that the decision parties, the BUYER shall purchase all the assets of the SELLER
of the Court of Appeals be set aside and a temporary restraining order and/or as shall be defined and specifically described in the
preliminary injunction be issued against the respondent liquidator to prohibit corresponding Purchase Agreement to be executed by the
him from disposing of the subject fixed assets to other buyers. parties, inclusive of the SELLER's authority to operate its forty-
three (43) banking offices/branches, but exclusive of the
The main issue we need to resolve here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to following items:
the injunctive relief prayed for.
xxx xxx xxx
We rule in the negative.
vii. Assets submitted as collaterals
Petitioner submits that having met all the conditions and performed all its with the Central Bank; and
obligations under the Memorandum of Agreement as well as the Purchase
Agreement, it follows, as a matter of course, that petitioner has obtained a clear The issue whether or not injunction in favor of the petitioner should issue
right over the subject fixed assets, which right is being jeopardized by the hinges on the important question: Whether the disputed fixed assets were
stubborn refusal of the respondent liquidator to execute the deeds of sale collateralized with the Central Bank? Apparently however, this is a sole issue of
covering these fixed assets. fact. The rule is settled that pure questions of fact may not be the proper subject
of an appeal bycertiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. This mode
On the other hand, respondent liquidator maintains that, contrary to of appeal is generally limited only to questions of law which must be distinctly
petitioner's claim, the petitioner herein has not acquired ownership over the 1
set forth in the petition. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. The
subject fixed assets because the same were submitted as collaterals with the resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings on
Central Bank, and pursuant to Section 1(a) of the Memorandum of Agreement, these matters are received with respect and are in fact binding on the Supreme
2
Court subject only to certain exceptions none of which are present in the observe and examine the witnesses' conduct and attitude at the trial and in the
4
instant petition. witness chair.
In this case, the trial court, as affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals, Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court on Preliminary Injunction provides:
found that the subject fixed assets were indeed submitted as collaterals with the
Central Bank, and therefore were among the items not covered by the Purchase Sec. 3 — Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. — A
Agreement signed by the parties pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement. preliminary injunction may be granted at any time after the
Hence, the inescapable conclusion is the petitioner never acquired ownership commencement of the action and before judgment, when it is
over these properties. The trial court observed,viz: established:
A cursory perusal of the MOA will indicate that the PBC fixed (a) That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the
assets were expressly excluded from (sic) the PBC for purchase whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
of the FEBTC as they are collateralized assets with the Central commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the
Bank. performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or

perpetually;
xxx xxx xxx
(b) That the commission or continuance of some act
. . . [t]he latter [FEBTC] could not have ignored the fact that complained of during the litigation or the non-performance
PBC fixed assets were collateralized with the Central Bank thereof would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or
notwithstanding the allegations that document to that effect
were not shown by the Central (c) That the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or
Bank. . . .
3 is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in
violation of the plaintiff's rights respecting the subject of the
We are not about to set aside this factual finding of the trial court. Time and action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
again we have upheld the rule that findings of fact of the trial court should not
be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court has ignored or overlooked certain We find that the instant petition does not satisfy any of the grounds
facts or circumstances of weight and significance which, if considered, would abovementioned. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the
alter the result of the case, for trial judges are in the best position of weighing Court of Appeals dated October 23, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED.No cost.SO
conflicting declarations of witnesses in the light of the court's opportunity to ORDERED.

Bayanihan Music v. BMG Records,et. al On the strength of the abovementioned contracts, Bayanihan applied for and
was granted by the National Library a Certificate of Copyright Registration for
[G.R. No. 166337. March 7, 2005] each of the two musical compositions, thus: November 19, 1973, for the song
"Can We Just Stop and Talk A While" and on May 21, 1980, for the song "Afraid
BAYANIHAN MUSIC vs. BMG
for Love To Fade."
THIRD DIVISION
Apparently, without the knowledge and consent of petitioner Bayanihan, Chan
authorized his co-respondent BMG Records (Pilipinas) [BMG] to record and
Gentlemen:
distribute the aforementioned musical compositions in a then recently released
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court album of singer Lea Salonga.
dated MAR 7 2005.
In separate letters both dated December 7, 1999, petitioner Bayanihan informed
G.R. No. 166337 (Bayanihan Music Philippines, Inc. vs. BMG Records (Pilipinas) respondents Chan and BMG of its existing copyrights over the subject musical
and Jose Mari Chan, et al.) compositions and the alleged violation of such right by the two. Demands were
made on both to settle the matter with Bayanihan. However no settlement was
Subject of this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision dated reached by the parties.
December 14, 2004[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69626,
upholding the Order dated August 24, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court at Hence, on August 8, 2000, Bayanihan filed with the Regional Trial Court at
Quezon City, Branch 90, which found no merit in petitioner's application for the Quezon City a complaint against Chan and BMG for violation of Section 216 of
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, along with the Order dated January Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as theIntellectual Property Code of the
10, 2002, which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Philippines, with a prayer for the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent BMG from
On July 16, 1973, private respondent Jose Mari Chan (Chan) entered into a further recording and distributing the subject musical compositions in whatever
contract with petitioner Bayanihan Music Philippines, Inc. (Bayanihan), form of musical products, and Chan from further granting any authority to
whereunder the former assigned to the latter all his rights, interests and record and distribute the same musical compositions.
participation over his musical composition "Can We Just Stop and Talk A While".
On March 11, 1976, the parties entered into a similar contract over Chan's other In its answer, BMG contended, among others, that: (1) the acts of recording and
musical composition entitled "Afraid For Love To Fade". publication sought to be enjoined had already been consummated, thereby
rendering moot Bayanihan's prayer for TRO and/or preliminary injunction; and
(2) there is no clear showing that petitioner Bayanihan would be greatly IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the aforecited application or prayer for the
damaged by the refusal of the prayed for TRO and/or preliminary injunction. issuance of a TRO is denied.
BMG also pleaded a cross-claim against its co-respondent Chan for violation of
his warranty that his musical compositions are free from claims of third persons, SO ORDERED.
and a counterclaim for damages against petitioner Bayanihan.

Thereafter, the same court, in its subsequent Order dated August
[2]
Chan, for his part, filed his own answer to the complaint, thereunder alleging 24, 2001, cralaw likewise denied Bayanihan's prayer for a writ of preliminary
that: (1) it was never his intention to divest himself of all his rights and interest injunction, to wit:
over the musical compositions in question; (2) the contracts he entered into
After carefully going over the pleadings and the pertinent portions of the
with Bayanihan are mere music publication agreements giving Bayanihan, as
records insofar as they are pertinent to the issue under consideration, this Court
assignee, the power to administer his copyright over his two songs and to act as
finds that the plaintiff has not been able to show its entitlement to the relief of
the exclusive publisher thereof; (3) he was not cognizant of the application
preliminary injunction as prayed for in its verified complaint (see Section 4, Rule
made by and the subsequent grant of copyrights to Bayanihan; and (4)
58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended), hence, this Court is of the
Bayanihan was remissed in its obligations under the contracts because it failed
considered and humble view that the ends of justice shall be served better if the
to effectively advertise his musical compositions for almost twenty (20) years,
aforecited application is denied, (see also Order dated July 16, 2001).
hence, he caused the rescission of said contracts in 1997. Chan also included in
his answer a counterclaim for damages against Bayanihan.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the application or prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction is denied.
After hearing the parties, the lower court came out with an order denying
Bayanihan's prayer for TRO, saying, thus:
SO ORDERED.
After carefully considering the arguments and evaluating the evidence

Its motion for a reconsideration of the same order having been likewise denied
presented by counsels, this Court finds that the plaintiff has not been able to [3]
by the trial court in its next Order of January 10, 2002, cralaw petitioner
show its entitlement to the relief of TRO as prayed for in its verified complaint
Bayanihan then went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari, thereat
(see Section 4, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended), hence,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69626, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
this Court is of the considered and humble view that the ends of justice shall be
part of the trial court in issuing the Orders of August 24, 2001 and January 10,
served better if the aforecited application is denied.
2001, denying its prayers for a writ of preliminary injunction and motion for
reconsideration, respectively.
In the herein assailed Decision dated December 14, 2004, the Court of Here, nothing is more evident than the trial court's abiding awareness of the
Appeals upheld the challenged orders of the trial court and accordingly extremely difficult balancing act it had to perform in dealing with petitioner's
dismissed Bayanihan petition, thus: prayer for injunctive reliefs. Conscious, as evidently it is, of the fact that there is
manifest abuse of discretion in the issuance of an injunctive writ if the following
WHEREFORE, finding neither flaw of jurisdiction nor taint of grave abuse of requisites provided for by law are not present: (1) there must be a right in esse or
discretion in the issuance of the assailed Orders of the respondent court dated the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which the
August 24, 2001 and January 10, 2002, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No [5]
injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right, cralaw the trial court
costs. threaded the correct path in denying petitioner's prayer therefor. For, such a
[6]
[4]
writ should only be granted if a party is clearly entitled thereto. cralaw
SO ORDERED. cralaw
Of course, while a clear showing of the right to an injunctive writ is necessary

Hence, Bayanihan's present recourse. [7]
albeit its existence need not be conclusively established, cralaw as the evidence
required therefor need not be conclusive or complete, still, for an applicant, like
It is petitioner's submission that the appellate court committed reversible error
petitioner Bayanihan, to be entitled to the writ, he is required to show that he
when it dismissed its petition for certiorari and upheld the trial court's denial of
has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in its
its application for a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner insists that as
[8]
complaint. cralaw Here, the trial court did not find ample justifications for the
assignee of the copyrights over the musical compositions in question, it has a
issuance of the writ prayed for by petitioner.
clear legal right to a writ of preliminary injunction; that respondents BMG and
Chan violated its copyrights over the same musical compositions; that despite
Unquestionably, respondent Chan, being undeniably the composer and author
knowledge by respondent BMG of petitioner's copyrights over the said musical
of the lyrics of the two (2) songs, is protected by the mere fact alone that he is
compositions, BMG continues to record and distribute the same, to petitioner's
the creator thereof, conformably with Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known
great and irreparable injury.
as the Intellectual Property Code, Section 172.2 of which reads:
We DENY.
172.2. Works are protected by the sole fact of their creation, irrespective of their
mode or form of expression, as well as of their content, quality and purpose.
We have constantly reminded courts that there is no power, the exercise of
which is more delicate and requires greater caution, deliberation and sound
An examination of petitioner's verified complaint in light of the two (2)
discretion, or which is more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuance of
contracts sued upon and the evidence it adduced during the hearing on the
an injunction. A court should, as much as possible, avoid issuing the writ which
application for preliminary injunction, yields not the existence of the requisite
would effectively dispose of the main case without trial.
right protectable by the provisional relief but rather a lingering doubt on It is noted that Chan revoked and terminated said contracts, along with others,
whether there is or there is no such right. The two contracts between petitioner on July 30, 1997, or almost two years before petitioner Bayanihan wrote its sort
and Chan relative to the musical compositions subject of the suit contain the of complaint/demand letter dated December 7, 1999 regarding the recent
following identical stipulations: "use/recording of the songs 'Can We Just Stop and Talk A While' and 'Afraid for
Love to Fade,'" or almost three (3) years before petitioner filed its complaint on
7. It is also hereby agreed to by the parties herein that in the event the August 8, 2000, therein praying, inter alia, for injunctive relief. By then, it would
PUBLISHER [petitioner herein] fails to use in any manner whatsoever within appear that petitioner had no more right that is protectable by injunction.
two (2) years any of the compositions covered by this contract, then such
composition may be released in favor of the WRITER and excluded from this Lastly, petitioner's insinuation that the trial court indulged in generalizations
contract and the PUBLISHER shall execute the necessary release in writing in and was rather skimpy in dishing out its reasons for denying its prayer for
favor of the WRITER upon request of the WRITER; provisional injunctive relief, the same deserves scant consideration. For sure, the
manner by which the trial court crafted its challenged orders is quite
xxx xxx xxx understandable, lest it be subjected to a plausible suspicion of having prejudged
the merits of the main case.
9. This contract may be renewed for a period of two-and-one-half (2 1/2)
years at the option of the PUBLISHER. Renewal may be made by the WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED.
PUBLISHER by advising the WRITER of such renewal in writing at least five (5)
[9]
days before the expiration of this contract. cralaw SO ORDERED.
It would thus appear that the two (2) contracts expired on October 1,
1975 and March 11, 1978, respectively, there being neither an allegation, much
less proof, that petitioner Bayanihan ever made use of the compositions within
the two-year period agreed upon by the parties.
Anent the copyrights obtained by petitioner on the basis of the selfsame two (2)
contracts, suffice it to say 'that such purported copyrights are not presumed to
subsist in accordance with Section 218[a] and [b], of the Intellectual Property
[10]
Code, cralaw because respondent Chan had put in issue the existence thereof.
General Merchandising and Company (Summerville, for brevity) and Ang Tiam
Chay.
LEVI STRAUSS VS. CLINTON APPARELLE – GO TO SECTION 1
The petitioner's complaint alleges that petitioner, doing business under the
Elidad Kho v. CA, et. al
name and style of KEC Cosmetics Laboratory, is the registered owner of the
copyrights Chin Chun Su and Oval Facial Cream Container/Case, as shown by
Certificates of Copyright Registration No. 0-1358 and No. 0-3678; that she also
SECOND DIVISION has patent rights onChin Chun Su & Device and Chin Chun Su for medicated
cream after purchasing the same from Quintin Cheng, the registered owner
G.R. No. 115758 March 19, 2002
thereof in the Supplemental Register of the Philippine Patent Office on February
7, 1980 under Registration Certificate No. 4529; that respondent Summerville
ELIDAD C. KHO, doing business under the name and style of KEC
advertised and sold petitioner's cream products under the brand name Chin
COSMETICS LABORATORY, petitioner,
Chun Su, in similar containers that petitioner uses, thereby misleading the
vs.
public, and resulting in the decline in the petitioner's business sales and income;
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SUMMERVILLE GENERAL MERCHANDISING
and, that the respondents should be enjoined from allegedly infringing on the
and COMPANY, and ANG TIAM CHAY, respondents.
copyrights and patents of the petitioner.
DE LEON, JR., J.:

The respondents, on the other hand, alleged as their defense that Summerville is
1 the exclusive and authorized importer, re-packer and distributor of Chin Chun
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated May 24,
1993 of the Court of Appeals setting aside and declaring as null and void the Su products manufactured by Shun Yi Factory of Taiwan; that the said
2 Taiwanese manufacturing company authorized Summerville to register its trade
Orders dated February 10, 1992 and March 19, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 90, of Quezon City granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary name Chin Chun Su Medicated Cream with the Philippine Patent Office and
injunction. other appropriate governmental agencies; that KEC Cosmetics Laboratory of the
petitioner obtained the copyrights through misrepresentation and falsification;
The facts of the case are as follows: and, that the authority of Quintin Cheng, assignee of the patent registration
certificate, to distribute and market Chin Chun Su products in the Philippines
On December 20, 1991, petitioner Elidad C. Kho filed a complaint for injunction
had already been terminated by the said Taiwanese Manufacturing Company.
and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-91-10926, against the respondents Summerville
After due hearing on the application for preliminary injunction, the trial court On May 24, 1993, the appellate court rendered a Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
granted the same in an Order dated February 10, 1992, the dispositive portion of 27803 ruling in favor of the respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby given due course and the orders of
ACCORDINGLY, the application of plaintiff Elidad C. Kho, doing respondent court dated February 10, 1992 and March 19, 1992 granting
business under the style of KEC Cosmetic Laboratory, for preliminary the writ of preliminary injunction and denying petitioners' motion for
injunction, is hereby granted. Consequentially, plaintiff is required to reconsideration are hereby set aside and declared null and void.
file with the Court a bond executed to defendants in the amount of five Respondent court is directed to forthwith proceed with the trial of Civil
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to the effect that plaintiff will Case No. Q-91-10926 and resolve the issue raised by the parties on the
pay to defendants all damages which defendants may sustain by reason merits.
of the injunction if the Court should finally decide that plaintiff is not
5
entitled thereto. SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.
3 In granting the petition, the appellate court ruled that:
The respondents moved for reconsideration but their motion for The registration of the trademark or brandname "Chin Chun Su" by
reconsideration was denied by the trial court in an Order dated March 19, 1992.
4 KEC with the supplemental register of the Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks and Technology Transfer cannot be equated with
On April 24, 1992, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court registration in the principal register, which is duly protected by the
of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 27803, praying for the nullification of Trademark Law.1âwphi1.nêt
the said writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. After the
respondents filed their reply and almost a month after petitioner submitted her xxx xxx xxx
comment, or on August 14 1992, the latter moved to dismiss the petition for
As ratiocinated in La Chemise Lacoste, S.S. vs. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 373,
violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91, a circular prohibiting forum
393:
shopping. According to the petitioner, the respondents did not state the docket
number of the civil case in the caption of their petition and, more significantly,
"Registration in the Supplemental Register, therefore, serves as
they did not include therein a certificate of non-forum shopping. The
notice that the registrant is using or has appropriated the
respondents opposed the petition and submitted to the appellate court a
trademark. By the very fact that the trademark cannot as yet be
certificate of non-forum shopping for their petition.
on guard and there are certain defects, some obstacles which
the use must still overcome before he can claim legal ownership of the appellate court and stating that genuine Chin Chun Su products could be
of the mark or ask the courts to vindicate his claims of an obtained only from Summerville General Merchandising and Co.
exclusive right to the use of the same. It would be deceptive for
a party with nothing more than a registration in the In the meantime, the trial court went on to hear petitioner's complaint for final
Supplemental Register to posture before courts of justice as if injunction and damages. On October 22, 1993, the trial court rendered a
7
the registration is in the Principal Register. Decision barring the petitioner from using the trademark Chin Chun Su and
upholding the right of the respondents to use the same, but recognizing the
The reliance of the private respondent on the last sentence of copyright of the petitioner over the oval shaped container of her beauty cream.
the Patent office action on application Serial No. 30954 that The trial court did not award damages and costs to any of the parties but to
'registrants is presumed to be the owner of the mark until after their respective counsels were awarded Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
the registration is declared cancelled' is, therefore, misplaced (P75,000.00) each as attorney's fees. The petitioner duly appealed the said
and grounded on shaky foundation. The supposed presumption decision to the Court of Appeals.
not only runs counter to the precept embodied in Rule 124 of
8
the Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent On June 3, 1994, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution denying the
Office in Trademark Cases but considering all the facts petitioner's motions for reconsideration and for contempt of court in CA-G.R.
ventilated before us in the four interrelated petitions involving SP No. 27803.
the petitioner and the respondent, it is devoid of factual basis.

Hence, this petition anchored on the following assignment of errors:
As even in cases where presumption and precept may factually
be reconciled, we have held that the presumption is rebuttable,
I
not conclusive, (People v. Lim Hoa, G.R. No. L-10612, May 30,
1958, Unreported). One may be declared an unfair competitor RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
even if his competing trademark is registered (Parke, Davis & GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
Co. v. Kiu Foo & Co., et al., 60 Phil 928; La Yebana Co. v. chua JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO RULE ON PETITIONER'S MOTION
6
Seco & Co., 14 Phil 534)." TO DISMISS.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This she followed with several II
motions to declare respondents in contempt of court for publishing
advertisements notifying the public of the promulgation of the assailed decision RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO PROMPTLY RESOLVE Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, one of the
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is a proof that the
applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
III consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually. Thus, a preliminary
IN DELAYING THE RESOLUTION OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
injunction order may be granted only when the application for the issuance of
RECONSIDERATION, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS 10
the same shows facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded. This is the
DENIED PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO SEEK TIMELY APPELLATE RELIEF
reason why we have ruled that it must be shown that the invasion of the right
AND VIOLATED PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of complainant
is clear and unmistakable, and, that there is an urgent and paramount necessity
IV
11
for the writ to prevent serious damage.
RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
In the case at bar, the petitioner applied for the issuance of a preliminary
injunctive order on the ground that she is entitled to the use of the trademark
JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO CITE THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
9 on Chin Chun Su and its container based on her copyright and patent over the
IN CONTEMPT.
same. We first find it appropriate to rule on whether the copyright and patent
The petitioner faults the appellate court for not dismissing the petition on the over the name and container of a beauty cream product would entitle the
ground of violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91. Also, the petitioner registrant to the use and ownership over the same to the exclusion of others.
contends that the appellate court violated Section 6, Rule 9 of the Revised
Trademark, copyright and patents are different intellectual property rights that
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals when it failed to rule on her motion for
cannot be interchanged with one another. A trademark is any visible sign
reconsideration within ninety (90) days from the time it is submitted for
capable of distinguishing the goods (trademark) or services (service mark) of an
resolution. The appellate court ruled only after the lapse of three hundred fifty-
12
enterprise and shall include a stamped or marked container of goods. In
four (354) days, or on June 3, 1994. In delaying the resolution thereof, the
relation thereto, a trade name means the name or designation identifying or
appellate court denied the petitioner's right to seek the timely appellate relief.
13
distinguishing an enterprise. Meanwhile, the scope of a copyright is confined
Finally, petitioner describes as arbitrary the denial of her motions for contempt
to literary and artistic works which are original intellectual creations in the
of court against the respondents.
literary and artistic domain protected from the moment of their
14
We rule in favor of the respondents. creation. Patentable inventions, on the other hand, refer to any technical
solution of a problem in any field of human activity which is new, involves an relief demanded and only when his complaint shows facts entitling such
15
inventive step and is industrially applicable. reliefs xxx and it appearing that the trial court had already granted the
issuance of a final injunction in favor of petitioner in its decision rendered
Petitioner has no right to support her claim for the exclusive use of the subject after trial on the merits xxx the Court resolved to Dismiss the instant
trade name and its container. The name and container of a beauty cream petition having been rendered moot and academic. An injunction issued
product are proper subjects of a trademark inasmuch as the same falls squarely by the trial court after it has already made a clear pronouncement as to
within its definition. In order to be entitled to exclusively use the same in the the plaintiff's right thereto, that is, after the same issue has been decided
sale of the beauty cream product, the user must sufficiently prove that she on the merits, the trial court having appreciated the evidence presented, is
registered or used it before anybody else did. The petitioner's copyright and proper, notwithstanding the fact that the decision rendered is not yet
patent registration of the name and container would not guarantee her the right final xxx. Being an ancillary remedy, the proceedings for preliminary
to the exclusive use of the same for the reason that they are not appropriate injunction cannot stand separately or proceed independently of the
subjects of the said intellectual rights. Consequently, a preliminary injunction decision rendered on the merit of the main case for injunction. The
order cannot be issued for the reason that the petitioner has not proven that she merit of the main case having been already determined in favor of the
has a clear right over the said name and container to the exclusion of others, not applicant, the preliminary determination of its non-existence ceases to
having proven that she has registered a trademark thereto or used the same have any force and effect. (italics supplied)
before anyone did.
La Vista categorically pronounced that the issuance of a final injunction renders
We cannot likewise overlook the decision of the trial court in the case for final any question on the preliminary injunctive order moot and academic despite the
injunction and damages. The dispositive portion of said decision held that the fact that the decision granting a final injunction is pending appeal. Conversely, a
petitioner does not have trademark rights on the name and container of the decision denying the applicant-plaintiff's right to a final injunction, although
beauty cream product. The said decision on the merits of the trial court appealed, renders moot and academic any objection to the prior dissolution of a
rendered the issuance of the writ of a preliminary injunction moot and writ of preliminary injunction.
academic notwithstanding the fact that the same has been appealed in the Court
of Appeals. This is supported by our ruling in La Vista Association, Inc. v. The petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in not dismissing the
16
Court of Appeals , to wit: petition for certiorari for non-compliance with the rule on forum shopping. We
disagree. First, the petitioner improperly raised the technical objection of non-
Considering that preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy which compliance with Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 by filing a motion to dismiss
may be granted at any time after the commencement of the action and the petition for certiorari filed in the appellate court. This is prohibited by
before judgment when it is established that the plaintiff is entitled to the Section 6, Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that
"(I)n petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, has no right over the trademark and, consequently, to the issuance of a writ of
the provisions of Section 2, Rule 56, shall be observed. Before giving due course preliminary injunction.1âwphi1.nêt
thereto, the court may require the respondents to file their comment to, and not
a motion to dismiss, the petition xxx (italics supplied)". Secondly, the issue was Finally, we rule that the Court of Appeals correctly denied the petitioner's
raised one month after petitioner had filed her answer/comment and after several motions for contempt of court. There is nothing contemptuous about
private respondent had replied thereto. Under Section 1, Rule 16 of the Revised the advertisements complained of which, as regards the proceedings in CA-G.R.
Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss shall be filed within the time for SP No. 27803 merely announced in plain and straightforward language the
but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim. She promulgation of the assailed Decision of the appellate court. Moreover,
therefore could no longer submit a motion to dismiss nor raise defenses and pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the said
objections not included in the answer/comment she had earlier tendered. decision nullifying the injunctive writ was immediately executory.
Thirdly, substantial justice and equity require this Court not to revive a
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the
dissolved writ of injunction in favor of a party without any legal right thereto
Court of Appeals dated May 24, 1993 and June 3, 1994, respectively, are
merely on a technical infirmity. The granting of an injunctive writ based on a
hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against the petitioner.
technical ground rather than compliance with the requisites for the issuance of
the same is contrary to the primary objective of legal procedure which is to serve
SO ORDERED.
as a means to dispense justice to the deserving party.
The petitioner likewise contends that the appellate court unduly delayed the
resolution of her motion for reconsideration. But we find that petitioner
contributed to this delay when she filed successive contentious motions in the
same proceeding, the last of which was on October 27, 1993, necessitating
counter-manifestations from private respondents with the last one being filed
on November 9, 1993. Nonetheless, it is well-settled that non-observance of the
period for deciding cases or their incidents does not render such judgments
17
ineffective or void. With respect to the purported damages she suffered due to
the alleged delay in resolving her motion for reconsideration, we find that the
said issue has likewise been rendered moot and academic by our ruling that she
BONCODIN VS. NECU – SEE SECTION 3, WHAT IS A RIGHT IN ESSE
APRI VS. MUNICIPALITY OF PADRE GARCIA – SAME

On June 18, 2007, Petron received from the Provincial Assessor's Office of
SECTION 3 - THERE IS RIGHT IN ESSE
Bataan a notice of revised assessment over its machineries and pieces of
equipment in Lamao, Limay, Bataan. Petron was given a period of 60 days
Talento v. Escalada, Jr.
within which to file an appeal with the Local Board of Assessment Appeals
2
THIRD DIVISION (LBAA). Based on said revised assessment, petitioner Provincial Treasurer of
Bataan issued a notice informing Petron that as of June 30, 2007, its total
G.R. No. 180884 June 27, 2008 3
liability is P1,731,025,403.06, representing deficiency real property tax due from
1994 up to the first and second quarters of 2007.
EMERLINDA S. TALENTO, in her capacity as the Provincial Treasurer of the
Province of Bataan, petitioner, 4
On August 17, 2007, Petron filed a petition with the LBAA (docketed as LBAA
vs. Case No. 2007-01) contesting the revised assessment on the grounds that the
HON. REMIGIO M. ESCALADA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial subject assessment pertained to properties that have been previously declared;
Court of Bataan, Branch 3, andPETRON CORPORATION, respondents. and that the assessment covered periods of more than 10 years which is not
allowed under the Local Government Code (LGC). According to Petron, the
DECISION
possible valid assessment pursuant to Section 222 of the LGC could only be for
the years 1997 to 2006. Petron further contended that the fair market value or
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
replacement cost used by petitioner included items which should be properly
The instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the excluded; that prompt payment of discounts were not considered in
1
November 5, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan, Branch 3, in determining the fair market value; and that the subject assessment should take
Civil Case No. 8801, granting the petition for the issuance of a writ of effect a year after or on January 1, 2008. In the same petition, Petron sought the
5
preliminary injunction filed by private respondent Petron Corporation (Petron) approval of a surety bond in the amount of P1,286,057,899.54.
thereby enjoining petitioner Emerlinda S. Talento, Provincial Treasurer of

On August 22, 2007, Petron received from petitioner a final notice of delinquent
Bataan, and her representatives from proceeding with the public auction of
real property tax with a warning that the subject properties would be levied and
Petron's machineries and pieces of equipment during the pendency of the
6
auctioned should Petron fail to settle the revised assessment due.
latter's appeal from the revised assessment of its properties.
7
Consequently, Petron sent a letter to petitioner stating that in view of the
The facts of the case are as follows:
8
pendency of its appeal with the LBAA, any action by the Treasurer's Office on
the subject properties would be premature. However, petitioner replied that
only Petron's payment under protest shall bar the collection of the realty taxes the sale of the properties despite the pendency of Petron's appeal and posting of
9
due, pursuant to Sections 231 and 252 of the LGC. the surety bond with the LBAA, petitioner deprived Petron of the right to
appeal. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:
10
With the issuance of a Warrant of Levy against its machineries and pieces of
equipment, Petron filed on September 24, 2007, an urgent motion to lift the WHEREFORE, the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by plaintiff
final notice of delinquent real property tax and warrant of levy with the LBAA. It is hereby GRANTED and ISSUED, enjoining defendant Treasurer, her
argued that the issuance of the notice and warrant is premature because an agents, representatives, or anybody acting in her behalf from
appeal has been filed with the LBAA, where it posted a surety bond in the proceeding with the scheduled public auction of plaintiff's real
11
amount of P1,286,057,899.54. properties, or any disposition thereof, pending the determination of the
merits of the main action, to be effective upon posting by plaintiff to the
On October 3, 2007, Petron received a notice of sale of its properties scheduled Court of an injunction bond in the amount of Four Hundred Forty Four
12
on October 17, 2007. Consequently, on October 8, 2007, Petron withdrew its Million Nine Hundred Sixty Seven Thousand Five Hundred Three and
motion to lift the final notice of delinquent real property tax and warrant of levy 52/100 Pesos (P444,967,503.52) and the approval thereof by the Court.
13
with the LBAA. On even date, Petron filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Bataan the instant case (docketed as Civil Case No. 8801) for prohibition with Defendant's Urgent Motion for the Immediate Dissolution of the
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary Temporary Restraining Order dated October 23, 2007 is hereby
14
injunction. DENIED.
16
On October 15, 2007, the trial court issued a TRO for 20 days enjoining SO ORDERED.
petitioner from proceeding with the public auction of Petron's
15
properties. Petitioner thereafter filed an urgent motion for the immediate From the said Order of the trial court, petitioner went directly to this Court via
dissolution of the TRO, followed by a motion to dismiss Petron's petition for the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
prohibition.
The question posed in this petition, i.e., whether the collection of taxes may be
On November 5, 2007, the trial court issued the assailed Order granting Petron's suspended by reason of the filing of an appeal and posting of a surety bond, is
petition for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction, subject to Petron's undoubtedly a pure question of law. Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
posting of a P444,967,503.52 bond in addition to its previously posted surety provides:
bond of P1,286,057,899.54, to complete the total amount equivalent to the

SEC. 2. Modes of Appeal. -
revised assessment of P1,731,025,403.06. The trial court held that in scheduling
(c) Appeal by certiorari. - In all cases when only questions of law are loss or lapse was occasioned by one's own neglect or error in the choice of
18
raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition remedies.
for review on certiorari under Rule 45. (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, even if we assume that a petition under Rule 65 is the proper remedy,
Thus, petitioner resorted to the erroneous remedy when she filed a petition for the petition is still dismissible.
certiorari under Rule 65, when the proper mode should have been a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. Moreover, under Section 2, Rule 45 of the We note that no motion for reconsideration of the November 5, 2007 order of
same Rules, the period to file a petition for review is 15 days from notice of the the trial court was filed prior to the filing of the instant petition. The settled rule
order appealed from. In the instant case, petitioner received the questioned is that a motion for reconsideration is a sine qua non condition for the filing of a
order of the trial court on November 6, 2007, hence, she had only up to petition for certiorari. The purpose is to grant the public respondent an
November 21, 2007 to file the petition. However, the same was filed only on opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-
January 4, 2008, or 43 days late. Consequently, petitioner's failure to file an examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. Petitioner's
appeal within the reglementary period rendered the order of the trial court final failure to file a motion for reconsideration deprived the trial court of the
and executory. opportunity to rectify an error unwittingly committed or to vindicate itself of an

act unfairly imputed. Besides, a motion for reconsideration under the present
The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by circumstances is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy to the adverse
19
law is mandatory. Failure to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render judgment of the trial court.
the judgment final and executory and beyond the power of the Court's review.
Jurisprudence mandates that when a decision becomes final and executory, it Petitioner also blatantly disregarded the rule on hierarchy of courts. Although
becomes valid and binding upon the parties and their successors in interest. the Supreme Court, Regional Trial Courts, and the Court of Appeals have
Such decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
erroneous it may have been.

17 warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the
petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. Recourse should have
20
Petitioner's resort to a petition under Rule 65 is obviously a play to make up for been made first with the Court of Appeals and not directly to this Court.
the loss of the right to file an appeal via a petition under Rule 45. However, a
special civil action under Rule 65 can not cure petitioner's failure to timely file a True, litigation is not a game of technicalities. It is equally true, however, that
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Rule 65 is every case must be presented in accordance with the prescribed procedure to
21
an independent action that cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. The failure therefore of
remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45, especially if such
petitioner to comply with the settled procedural rules justifies the dismissal of The urgency and paramount necessity for the issuance of a writ of injunction
the present petition. becomes relevant in the instant case considering that what is being enjoined is
the sale by public auction of the properties of Petron amounting to at least P1.7
Finally, we find that the trial court correctly granted respondent's petition for billion and which properties are vital to its business operations. If at all, the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Section 3, Rule 58, of the Rules of repercussions and far-reaching implications of the sale of these properties on
Court, provides: the operations of Petron merit the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in
its favor.
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary
injunction may be granted by the court when it is established: We are not unaware of the doctrine that taxes are the lifeblood of the
government, without which it can not properly perform its functions; and that
appeal shall not suspend the collection of realty taxes. However, there is an
exception to the foregoing rule, i.e., where the taxpayer has shown a clear and
continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of an act
unmistakable right to refuse or to hold in abeyance the payment of taxes. In the
or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
instant case, we note that respondent contested the revised assessment on the
following grounds: that the subject assessment pertained to properties that have
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or
been previously declared; that the assessment covered periods of more than 10
acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice
years which is not allowed under the LGC; that the fair market value or
to the applicant; or
replacement cost used by petitioner included items which should be properly
(c) That a party, court, or agency or a person is doing, threatening, or excluded; that prompt payment of discounts were not considered in
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or determining the fair market value; and that the subject assessment should take
acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the effect a year after or on January 1, 2008. To our mind, the resolution of these
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment issues would have a direct bearing on the assessment made by petitioner.
ineffectual. Hence, it is necessary that the issues must first be passed upon before the
properties of respondent is sold in public auction.
The requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are: (1) the
existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an In addition to the fact that the issues raised by the respondent would have a
22
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. direct impact on the validity of the assessment made by the petitioner, we also
note that respondent has posted a surety bond equivalent to the amount of the
assessment due. The Rules of Procedure of the LBAA, particularly Section 7, Section 11. Who may Appeal; Mode of Appeal; Effect of Appeal; -
Rule V thereof, provides:
xxxx
Section 7. Effect of Appeal on Collection of Taxes. - An appeal shall not
suspend the collection of the corresponding realty taxes on the real No appeal taken to the Court of Appeals from the Collector of Internal
property subject of the appeal as assessed by the Provincial, City or Revenue x x x shall suspend the payment, levy, distraint, and/or sale of
Municipal Assessor, without prejudice to the subsequent adjustment any property for the satisfaction of his tax liability as provided by
depending upon the outcome of the appeal. An appeal may be existing law. Provided, however, That when in the opinion of the
entertained but the hearing thereof shall be deferred until the Court the collection by the aforementioned government agencies may
corresponding taxes due on the real property subject of the appeal shall jeopardize the interest of the Government and/or the taxpayer the
have been paid under protest or the petitioner shall have given a surety Court at any stage of the processing may suspend the collection and
bond, subject to the following conditions: require the taxpayer either to deposit the amount claimed or to file a
surety bond for not more than double the amount with the Court.
(1) the amount of the bond must not be less than the total realty taxes
and penalties due as assessed by the assessor nor more than double said WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
amount;
SO ORDERED.
(2) the bond must be accompanied by a certification from the Insurance

Commissioner (a) that the surety is duly authorized to issue such bond;
(a) that the surety bond is approved by and registered with said
Commission; and (c) that the amount covered by the surety bond is
within the writing capacity of the surety company; and
(3) the amount of the bond in excess of the surety company's writing
capacity, if any, must be covered by Reinsurance Binder, in which case,
a certification to this effect must likewise accompany the surety bond.
23
Corollarily, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9282, which amended Republic Act
No. 1125 (The Law Creating the Court of Tax Appeals) provides:
CSC v. CA "This treats of the Urgent Motion for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction dated
December 2, 2002 filed by [respondent] through counsel with this Court.
"No Comment on the same was ever filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
EN BANC
which is handling this case for and in behalf of the [Petitioner] Civil Service
Commission despite opportunity given it, per Resolution dated November 8,
G.R. No. 159696 November 17, 2005
2002.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner,
"This Court, after taking into consideration the allegations and the arguments
vs.
* set forth in this motion filed by [respondent] to support his stand, opted to
COURT OF APPEALS and RIMANDO A. GANNAPAO, Respondents.
grant [respondent’s] application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
DECISION Injunction at this stage of the proceedings considering that he is entitled to the
relief demanded and that the implementation of the assailed Resolution dated
PANGANIBAN, J.: April 3, 2002 of x x x Civil Service Commission and the Order implementing it
issued pursuant thereto, would probably work injustice and would cause
ertiorari will issue only to strike down acts done without or in excess of
irreparable damage to [respondent].
jurisdiction; or those executed with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Alleged errors "WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Motion for the Issuance of
committed in the exercise of jurisdiction are reviewable by timely appeal and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by [herein respondent] is hereby
cannot, as a rule, be deemed fit subjects of this extraordinary writ. GRANTED. Let [the] Writ of Preliminary Injunction be issued enjoining,
restraining and prohibiting public respondents [herein petitioner], their
The Case
representatives and/or anybody acting in their behalf, from implementing CSC
1 Resolution dated April 3, 2002 and to recall the order implementing it, if any
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking
2 issued pursuant thereto, upon the posting of a bond in the amount of One
to reverse the January 14, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos, to be executed to the [petitioner] or
GR SP No. 70605, granting respondent’s Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
3 parties enjoined, to the effect that [herein respondent] will pay to [herein
Preliminary Injunction. Also assailed is the July 29, 2003 Resolution of the CA
petitioner] or parties all damages which he or they may sustain by reason of the
denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The first assailed Resolution
injunction if the Court should finally decide that [herein respondent] is not
states in full:
4
entitled thereto."
The Facts "On February 6, 1998, [respondent] filed an ‘Urgent Motion for Reconsideration’
which was denied by the PNP Director General Santiago L. Aliño in [a]
The factual antecedents are narrated by the Office of the Solicitor General Resolution dated April 14, 1998.
(OSG), as follows:
"[Respondent] appealed the PNP Resolution to the National Appellate Board
"On December 22, 1995, a Complaint for Grave Misconduct and Moonlighting (NAB), National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). The appeal was dismissed
with Urgent Prayer for Preventive Suspension and Disarming was filed by the in a Resolution dated December 29, 1999.
stockholders and board members of United Workers Transport Corp. (UWTC)
against SPO1 Rimando Gannapao before the Philippine National Police, "On February 10, 2000, [respondent] filed a Petition for Appeal with the
Inspectorate Division, Camp Crame, Quezon City. Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). The appeal was denied
and the penalty of three (3) months suspension of petitioner was affirmed in a
"Pursuant to NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 96-010 dated July 21 1996, Resolution dated July 18, 2000.
a Summary Hearing was conducted by the Office of the Legal Service of the
National Headquarters PNP against [respondent] for the alleged moonlighting. "Thereafter, [respondent] appealed to the Civil Service Commission praying the
[Court’s comment: Records show that prior to the investigation conducted by setting aside of the penalty of three (3) months suspension and/or for the
the Office of Legal Service, however, another pre-charge investigation had been Commission to conduct a hearing or a reinvestigation alleging lack of due
held for the same case by the Headquarters Support Services also of the National process.
Headquarters of the PNP. The investigation appears to have been dismissed
upon the recommendation of Atty. Joselito Casugbu, who found the complaint "On April 3, 2002, the Civil Service Commission rendered Resolution No.
5
to be one of pure harassment. ] 020487, the dispositive part of which reads:
"On November 26, 1997, the Philippine National Police Chief Recaredo A. ‘WHEREFORE, the appeal of Rimando A. Gannapao is hereby DISMISSED.
Sarmiento II rendered a Decision imposing the three (3) months suspension of However, the order dated February 26, 2001 of then DILG Secretary Alfredo S.
[respondent], the dispositive part of which reads: Lim affirming the suspension of Gannapao for a period of three (3) months is
modified to dismissal from the service.’
‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Headquarters finds respondent SPO1
RIMANDO A. GANNAPAO GUILTY of the charge of serious irregularities in the "On May 30, 2002, Gannapao filed a petition for review with the Court of
performance of duties, thus, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of three Appeals assailing the Resolution of the Civil Service Commission.
(3) months suspension from the police service without pay.’

"On January 8, 2003, CSC through the Office of the Solicitor General filed its The Petition has no merit.
Comment on the Petition specifically stating among others that Gannapao was
not entitled to a preliminary injunction. Sole Issue:
"On January 14, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution granting Grave Abuse of Discretion
Gannapao’s motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining,

As an extraordinary remedy, a writ of certiorari issues only for the correction of
restraining and prohibiting CSC from implementing its assailed CSC Resolution
errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
No. 020487 dated April 3, 2002 dismissing [respondent].
jurisdiction. Absence of jurisdiction is the lack of legal power, right or authority
"[Respondent] filed its motion for reconsideration which was denied in a to hear and determine a cause. On the other hand, excess of jurisdiction means
Resolution dated July 29, 2003."

6 that an act -- though within the general power of the tribunal, board or officer --
is not authorized. Hence, the act is invalid with regard to that particular
Ruling of the Court of Appeals proceeding, in respect of which the conditions that authorize the exercise of the
9
general power are wanting.
The Court of Appeals granted respondent’s prayer for a preliminary injunction
enjoining the CSC from enforcing the latter’s assailed Decision pending appeal. Petitioner attacks the CA for issuing the Writ of Preliminary Injunction despite
The CA based its ruling on the probability that the immediate execution of the the Commission’s finding that private respondent was guilty of misconduct. The
CSC Decision might cause injustice and irreparable damage to petitioner. OSG adds that the injunctive relief violates the Administrative Code and the
CSC rules stating that administrative disciplinary penalties shall be immediately
7
Hence, this Petition. executory, notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal.
10
Issue We hold, however, that neither the Administrative Code nor the CSC rules
deprive courts of their power to grant restraining orders or preliminary
Petitioner submits this sole issue for our consideration: 11
injunctions to stay the execution of CSC decisions pending appeal. Moreover, a
court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction, when proper, is expressly
"The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
authorized by Section 2 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
granting the Motion for the Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in
8
favor of Respondent Gannapao."
"Sec. 2. Who may grant preliminary injunction. -- A preliminary injunction may
be granted by the court where the action or proceeding is pending. If the action
The Court’s Ruling
or proceeding is pending in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court, it exercise of judgment. As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged
may be issued by said court or any member thereof." errors committed in the exercise of that jurisdiction will amount to nothing
more than errors of judgment which, as a rule, are reviewable by a timely
Furthermore, Section 82 of Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular 19- 16
appeal of the final disposition of the case.
12
99 recognizes the authority of the CA and the Supreme Court to issue
restraining orders or injunctions, as follows: Issuance of Preliminary
"Section 82. Effect of Pendency of Petition for Review/Certiorari with the Court. -- Injunction Justified
The filing and pendency of a petition for review with the Court of Appeals or
certiorari with the Supreme Court shall not stop the execution of the final Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court prescribes the grounds for the issuance
decision of the Commission unless the Court issues a restraining order or an of a writ of preliminary injunction, as follows:
injunction. (Emphasis provided.)

"(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part
13
Having appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the CSC, the CA clearly has the of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or
discretion to issue an ancillary writ of preliminary injunction to secure the rights acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a
of private respondent pending appeal of his dismissal. Absent a clear showing of limited period or perpetually;
grave abuse of discretion, the exercise of judgment by the courts in injunctive

14
"(b) That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or acts
matters should not be interfered with.
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction applicant; or
implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or

"(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise defined, grave abuse is the exercise of power in
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts
an arbitrary or a despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal
probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the
aversion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty, or a refusal to perform the
15
action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual."
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Based on the foregoing, the requisites for the issuance of the writ are the
Certiorari will not issue to cure errors in proceedings or to correct mere
following: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be
erroneous conclusions of law or fact. The burden is upon petitioner to
protected and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
demonstrate that the questioned writ constitutes a whimsical and capricious 17
serious damage. In taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction, a court has the duty to determine whether the requisites for the Moreover, the immediate implementation of the not yet final penalty of
18
grant of the injunction are present in the case before it. dismissal from the service would surely cause private respondent (and his
family) irreparable damage. As pleaded in his Urgent Motion for Issuance of
In the present controversy, however, the assailed Order does not state the basis 21
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, his salary and
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The CA made no findings of benefits as a policeman are his family’s only source of income.
fact or law indicating that any of the elements essential for the grant of an
22
injunctive writ existed. After merely stating that it took "into consideration the Furthermore, in the said Urgent Motion, as well as the Petition filed by private
allegations and the arguments set forth" in the Urgent Motion filed by respondent before the Court of Appeals, he incessantly asserted that the case
Gannapao, the CA immediately concluded afterwards that respondent was against him had already been dismissed in an earlier PNP pre-charge
entitled to the relief demanded. investigation. When the case was reopened by the PNP Office of Legal Service,
he allegedly moved for the dismissal of the suit on the ground of res judicata.
19
In this connection, the Court reiterates its pronouncement in Garcia v. Burgos:
Instead of ruling on the issue of whether the prior dismissal was in fact a bar to
"It has been consistently held that there is no power the exercise of which is the reopening of the case, the PNP Office of Legal Service merely considered the
more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation and sound filing of the Motion to Dismiss as a waiver of his right to file an answer. Then it
discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an proceeded to rule on the case on its merits. He subsequently appealed to the
injunction. It is the strong arm of equity that should never be extended unless to CSC his three-month suspension, which had been affirmed by the DILG.
cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or Specifically, he claimed lack of due process and requested the CSC to grant him
commensurate remedy in damages." a hearing. Not only did it affirm the assailed Order of the DILG, it moreover
increased the penalty to dismissal from the service.
Nevertheless, in the interest of justice and fair play, this Court scrutinized the
records of the case and, indeed, found sufficient grounds for the grant of the Under the above circumstances, it appears that private respondent, without
injunctive Writ. Prior to the finality of the CSC Decision dismissing him, private prejudging his case on its merits, has raised a prima facie defense of lack of due
respondent has a clear and unmistakable right to his current position in the process. We hasten to add that the question of whether or not he was denied
police service. Unquestionably, the right to employment, oftentimes the lowly due process is one of fact that the CA is better equipped to determine. That the
employee’s only noble source of bread and butter, is entitled to protection by CA saw it fit to issue the questioned Writ to protect his rights in the interim was
20
the State. within the reasonable exercise of its judicial discretion. We find no arbitrariness
or capriciousness -- much less personal bias, hostility or animosity -- in the
exercise of its prerogatives.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing
injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends
Section 3 - ACTUAL VIOLATION OF RIGHT
only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative
acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical
Hernandez v. NAPOCOR
cases. On issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of law,
this Court declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their
1
power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts. In such cases, let the hammer
FIRST DIVISION fall and let it fall hard.
G.R. No. 145328 March 23, 2006 With health risks linked to exposure to electromagnetic radiation as their battle
cry, petitioners, all residents of Dasmariñas Village, are clamoring for the
2
EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, MA. ENCARBACION R. LEGASPI, JAIME reversal of the decision dated 3 May 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
BLANCO, JR., ENRIQUE BELO, CARLOS VIAPLANA, CARL FURER, No. 57849 as well as the resolution dated 27 September 2000, denying their
VIVENCIO TINIO, MICHAEL BRIGGS, ROSA CARAM, FAUSTO PREYSLER, motion for reconsideration.
ROBERT KUA, GEORGE LEE, GUILLERMO LUCHANGCO, PETER DEE,
3
LUISA MARQUEZ, ANGELITA LILLES, JUAN CARLOS, HOMER GO, The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Regional
AMADEO VALENZUELA, EMILIO CHING, ANTONIO CHAN, MURLI Trial Court of Makati, issuing a writ of preliminary injunction against
SABNANI, MARCOS ROCES, RAYMUNDO FELICIANO, NORMA GAFFUD, respondent National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) to stay the latter from
ALF HOLST, LOURDES P. ROQUE, MANUEL DY, RAUL FERNANDEZ, energizing and transmitting high voltage electric current through its cables
VICTORIA TENGCO, CHI MO CHENG, BARANGAY DASMARIÑAS, and erected from Sucat, Parañaque to Araneta Ave., Quezon City.
HON. FRANCISCO B. IBAY, petitioners

But, first, the facts:
vs.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondent
Sometime in 1996, NAPOCOR began the construction of 29 decagon-shaped
steel poles or towers with a height of 53.4 meters to support overhead high
DECISION
tension cables in connection with its 230 Kilovolt Sucat-Araneta-Balintawak
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Power Transmission Project. Said transmission line passes through the Sergio
Osmeña, Sr. Highway (South Superhighway), the perimeter of Fort Bonifacio,
and Dasmariñas Village proximate to Tamarind Road, where petitioners’ homes We have discussed the matter with the Dasmariñas and Forbes residents and we
are. have come up with four (4) options on how to address the problem, to wit:
Said project later proved to be petitioners’ bane of existence. Option Cost
Alarmed by the sight of the towering steel towers, petitioners scoured the Option 1: Transfer the line to Lawton Avenue P 111.84 million
internet on the possible adverse effects that such a structure could cause to their (proposal of Dasmariñas/Forbes)
health and well-being. Petitioners got hold of published articles and studies
linking the incidence of a fecund of illnesses to exposure to electromagnetic Option 2: Maintain 12 meters distance along P 77.60 million the village
fields. These illnesses range from cancer to leukemia.

Option 3: Construct an underground line P 482.00 million
Petitioners left no stones unturned to address their malady. They aired this
Option 4: Reroute along C-5 and South Luzon P 1,018.83 million
growing concern to the NAPOCOR, which conducted a series of meetings with
them. 5
Expressway (combination of overhead and underground)
NAPOCOR received flak from Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, who

Negotiations between petitioners and the NAPOCOR reached an impassé, with
in his Privilege Speech dated 10 May 1999, denounced the cavalier manner with
petitioners vying for the relocation of the transmission lines to Fort Bonifacio on
which Napocor ignored safety and consultation requirements in the questioned
one hand, and the NAPOCOR insisting on a 12-meter easement widening, on
project. 6
the other.
Petitioners brought their woes to the attention of Rep. Arnulfo Fuentebella, 7

Thus, petitioners, on 9 March 2000 filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer
Chairman of the House Committee on Energy, wherein NAPOCOR was asked to
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary
shed light on the petitioners’ problem. In a letter dated 8 November 1999,
Injunction against NAPOCOR. Harping on the hazardous effects of exposure to
Napocor President Federico Puno stated that NAPOCOR was still in the process
electromagnetic radiation to the health and safety to themselves and their
of coming up with a "win-win" solution to the concerns of the Dasmariñas
families, petitioners, through the instant case, sought what they had failed to
4
Village and Forbes Park residents.
achieve through amicable means with NAPOCOR and prayed, inter alia, for
damages and the relocation of the transmission lines to Lawton Avenue, Fort
In a letter dated 10 August 1999 addressed to Congressman Arnulfo P.
Bonifacio.
Fuentebella, NAPOCOR’s President wrote:
8
On 13 March 2000, Judge Francisco B. Ibay issued an order in Civil Case No. 00- mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource development project of the
352, which temporarily restrained the respondent from energizing and government, or any public utility operated by the government, including among
transmitting high voltage electric current through the said project. The other public utilities for transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and
pertinent portion of the said order reads: arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government
official from proceeding with or continuing the execution or implementation of
Acting on the plaintiffs’ "Urgent Omnibus Motion," it appearing that the subject any such project, or the operation of such public utility or pursuing any lawful
area will be energized by midnight tonight based on a report taken from activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation.
Representative Joker P. Arroyo by plaintiffs’ counsel, so as not to render moot
and academic the instant case, as prayed for, defendant National Power In the interregnum, by order dated 3 April 2000, the trial court ordered the
11
Corporation is ordered to maintain the status quo and/or be enjoined from issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against NAPOCOR. The trial court
energizing and transmitting high voltage electric current through its cables for articulated that an injunction was necessary to stay respondent NAPOCOR’s
forty eight (48) hours starting 4 o’clock in the afternoon today and ending 4 activation of its power lines due to the possible health risks posed to the
9
o’clock in the afternoon of 15 March 2000. petitioners. Asserting its jurisdiction over the case, the trial court was of the
view that Presidential Decree No. 1818 and jurisprudence proscribing injunctions
10
By order of 15 March 2000, the trial court extended the restraining order for 18 against infrastructure projects do not find application in the case at bar because
more days. of the health risks involved.
NAPOCOR filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining The trial court, thus, enjoined the NAPOCOR from further preparing and
Order and Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals assailing the above installing high voltage cables to the steel pylons erected near petitioners’ homes
order by the trial court. Alluding to Presidential Decree No. 1818 and from energizing and transmitting high voltage electric current through said
(1981), "Prohibiting Courts from Issuing Restraining Orders or Preliminary cables while the case is pending final adjudication, upon posting of the bond
Injunctions in Cases Involving Infrastructure and Natural Resource Development amounting to P5,000,000.00 executed to the effect that petitioners will pay all
Projects of, and Public Utilities Operated by, the Government," particularly Sec. 1, the damages the NAPOCOR may sustain by reason of the injunction if the Court
NAPOCOR stalwartly sought the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack should finally decide that the petitioners are not entitled thereto.
12
jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No. 1818 provides:

In light of the foregoing order of the trial court, the petition which NAPOCOR
Section 1. No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any filed with the Court of Appeals was later amended to include the prayer for the
restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction nullification and injunction of the Order dated 3 April 2000 of the trial court.
in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a
In the challenged decision of 3 May 2000, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial Fundamental to the resolution of the instant petition is the issue of whether or
court’s order, with the following fallo: not the trial court may issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction to enjoin the construction and operation of the 29 decagon-shaped
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby steel poles or towers by the NAPOCOR, notwithstanding Presidential Decree
GRANTED. The assailed orders of the respondent court, dated March 13, 2000 No. 1818.
13
and April 3, 2000, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioners clutch on their stand that Presidential Decree No. 1818 could not be
In the Court of Appeals’ rationale, the proscription on injunctions against construed to apply to cases of extreme urgency as in the present case when no
infrastructure projects of the government is clearly mandated by the above- less than the rights of the petitioners to health and safety hangs on the balance.
quoted Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1818, as reiterated by the Supreme
Court in its Circulars No. 2-91 and No. 13-93, dated 15 March 1991 and 5 March We find the petition to be imbued with merit.
1993, respectively.
Presidential Decree No. 1818 was issued on 16 January 1981, prohibiting judges
As their motion for reconsideration was met with similar lack of success, from issuing restraining orders against government infrastructure projects. In
petitioners, in a last attempt at vindication, filed the present petition for review part, the decree says, "No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue
on the following arguments: any restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary order, preliminary
mandatory injunction in any case, dispute or controversy involving an
I. infrastructure project." Realizing the importance of this decree, this Tribunal
had issued different circulars to implement this particular law.
Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions were purposely
designed to address matters of extreme urgency where there is probability of 16
Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits courts from issuing injunctions against
14
grave injustice and irreparable injury. 17
government infrastructure projects. In Garcia v. Burgos, Presidential Decree
No. 1818 was held to prohibit courts from issuing an injunction against any
II.
infrastructure project in order not to disrupt or hamper the pursuit of essential
government projects or frustrate the economic development effort of the nation.
The rule on preliminary injunction merely requires that unless restrained, the
act complained of will probably work injustice to the applicant or probably
15
While its sole provision would appear to encompass all cases involving the
violate his rights and tends to render the judgment ineffectual. (Emphasis in
implementation of projects and contracts on infrastructure, natural resource
the original.)
development and public utilities, this rule, however, is not absolute as there are
actually instances when Presidential Decree No. 1818 should not find such, these questions of law divest the case from the protective mantle of
application. In a spate of cases, this Court declared that although Presidential Presidential Decree No. 1818.
Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving
infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance of Moreover, the issuance by the trial court of a preliminary injunction finds legal
injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in controversies support in Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court which provides:
involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly

Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction
outside this dimension and involving questions of law, this Court declared that
may be granted when it is established:
courts could not be prevented from exercising their power to restrain or
18
prohibit administrative acts.
In the case at bar, petitioners sought the issuance of a preliminary injunction on
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
the ground that the NAPOCOR Project impinged on their right to health as
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
enshrined in Article II, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice
instill consciousness among them.
to the applicant; or
To boot, petitioners, moreover, harp on respondent’s failure to conduct prior

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
consultation with them, as the community affected by the project, in stark
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or
violation of Section 27 of the Local Government Code which provides: "no
acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
consultations mentioned are complied with, and prior approval of
ineffectual. (3a) (Emphasis supplied.)
the Sanggunian concerned is observed."
The rule on preliminary injunction merely requires that unless restrained, the
From the foregoing, whether there is a violation of petitioners’ constitutionally
act complained of will probably violate his rights and tend to render the
protected right to health and whether respondent NAPOCOR had indeed
judgment ineffectual.
violated the Local Government Code provision on prior consultation with the
affected communities are veritable questions of law that invested the trial court
with jurisdiction to issue a TRO and subsequently, a preliminary injunction. As
Here, there is adequate evidence on record to justify the conclusion that the related agencies, there is ample indicia to suggest to the mind of the court that
project of NAPOCOR probably imperils the health and safety of the petitioners the health concerns of the petitioners are, at the very least, far from imaginary.
so as to justify the issuance by the trial court of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Indeed, if there is no cause for concern, NAPOCOR would not have been stirred
Petitioners adduced in evidence copies of studies linking the incidence of to come up with options to address the woes of petitioners, nor would
illnesses such as cancer and leukemia to exposure to electromagnetic fields. The Congressman Escudero have fired away those strong words of censure, assailing
records bear out, to boot, a copy of a brochure of NAPOCOR regarding its what to Congressman Escudero smacks of a "cavalier manner by which the
Quezon Power Project from which will be supplying NAPOCOR with the power NAPOCOR has responded to earnest pleas for a review of its practice of
which will pass through the towers subject of the controversy. The NAPOCOR installing massive pylons supporting high tension cables in densely populated
19
brochure provides that because of the danger concomitant with high voltage areas."
power, Philippine laws mandate that the power lines should be located within
safe distances from residences. And the Quezon Power Project mandates an True, the issue of whether or not the transmission lines are safe is essentially
easement of 20 meters to the right and 20 meters to the left which falls short of evidentiary in nature, and pertains to the very merits of the action below. In
the 12-meter easement that NAPOCOR was proposing to petitioners. fact, petitioners recognize that the conclusiveness of their life, health and safety
concerns still needs to be proved in the main case below and they are prepared
Likewise on record, are copies of letters of Napocor President Federico Puno to to do so especially in the light of some studies cited by respondent that yield
Rep. Arnulfo Fuentebella, Chairman of the House Committee on Energy, stating contrary results in a disputed subject. Despite the parties’ conflicting results of
updates on the negotiations being undertaken by the NAPOCOR and the studies made on the issue, the possibility that the exposure to electromagnetic
Dasmariñas Village and Forbes Park residents. Also on file is the Privilege radiation causes cancer and other disorders is still, indeed, within the realm of
Speech dated 10 May 1999 of Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, who scientific scale of probability.
denounced the cavalier manner with which Napocor ignored safety and
consultation requirements in the questioned project. Equally important, we take judicial notice that the area alluded to as location of
the NAPOCOR project is a fragile zone being proximate to local earthquake
With a member of Congress denouncing the subject project of NAPOCOR faults, particularly the Marikina fault, among other zones. This is not to
because of the very same health and safety ills that petitioners now hew to in mention the risks of falling structures caused by killer tornadoes and super
this petition, and with documents on record to show that NAPOCOR made typhoons, the Philippines, especially Central Luzon, being situated along the
representations to petitioners that they are looking into the possibility of typhoon belt.
relocating the project, added to the fact that there had been series of
negotiations and meetings between petitioners and NAPOCOR as well as
Moreover, the Local Government Code, requires conference with the affected A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to
communities of a government project. NAPOCOR, palpably, made a shortcut to judgment of final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain
this requirement. In fact, there appears a lack of exhaustive feasibility studies on from a particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection
NAPOCOR’s part before making a go with the project on hand; otherwise, it of a party’s substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the
should have anticipated the legal labyrinth it is now caught in. principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a
claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be avoided for
These are facts, which the trial court could not ignore, and form as sufficient otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as the party
basis to engender the cloud of doubt that the NAPOCOR project could, indeed, applying for the writ is concerned.
endanger the lives of the petitioners. A preliminary injunction is likewise
justified prior to a final determination of the issues of whether or not At times referred to as the "Strong Arm of Equity," we have consistently ruled
NAPOCOR ignored safety and consultation requirements in the questioned that there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate and which calls for
project. Indeed, the court could, nay should, grant the writ of preliminary greater circumspection than the issuance of an injunction. It should only be
injunction if the purpose of the other party is to shield a wrongdoing. A ruling extended in cases of great injury where courts of law cannot afford an adequate
to the contrary would amount to an erosion of judicial discretion. or commensurate remedy in damages; "in cases of extreme urgency; where the
right is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly
After all, for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules do not in complainant’s favor; where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of
require that the act complained of be in violation of the rights of the applicant. plaintiff’s right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a
Indeed, what the Rules require is that the act complained of be probablyin continuing one, and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to
violation of the rights of the applicant. Under the Rules of Court, probability is reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the parties,
enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional remedy, which is different recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new
from injunction as a main action where one needs to establish absolute certainty relation." (Emphasis supplied.)
as basis for a final and permanent injunction.
What is more, contrary to respondents’ assertion, there is not a single syllable in
Pending the final determination of the trial court on the main case for damages, the circulars issued by this Court enjoining the observance of Presidential
of whether or not the NAPOCOR Project infringes on petitioners’ substantive Decree No. 1818, which altogether and absolutely, ties the hands of the courts
right to health and pending determination of the question of whether there was 21
from issuing a writ of preliminary injunction. What Circular 2-91 dated 15
non-observance of the prior-consultation proviso under the Local Government March 1991 seeks to enjoin is the indiscriminate issuance of court injunctions.
Code, it is prudent to preserve the status quo. In Phil. Ports Authority v. Cipres 22
The same holds for Circular 13-93 dated 5 March 1993 and Circular 68-
20
Stevedoring & Arrastre, Inc., we held: 23
94. And, in Circular No. 7-99, judges are enjoined to observe utmost caution,
prudence and judiciousness in the issuance of temporary restraining order and action of opening of the Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic. We were
in the grant of writs of preliminary injunction to avoid any suspicion that its categorical -
24
issuance or grant was for consideration other than the strict merits of the case.
Not infrequently, the government is tempted to take legal shortcuts to solve
There is not a hint from the foregoing circulars suggesting urgent problems of the people. But even when government is armed with the
an unbridled prohibition against the issuance of temporary restraining orders best of intention, we cannot allow it to run roughshod over the rule of law.
or preliminary injunctions. Again, we let the hammer fall and fall hard on the illegal attempt of the MMDA
to open for public use a private road in a private subdivision. While we hold that
In sum, what Presidential Decree No. 1818 aims to avert is the untimely the general welfare should be promoted, we stress that it should not be achieved
frustration of government infrastructure projects, particularly by provisional at the expense of the rule of law.
28
remedies, to the detriment of the greater good by disrupting the pursuit of

essential government projects or frustrate the economic development effort of In hindsight, if, after trial, it turns out that the health-related fears that
the nation. Presidential Decree No. 1818, however, was not meant to be a blanket petitioners cleave on to have adequate confirmation in fact and in law, the
prohibition so as to disregard the fundamental right to health, safety and well- questioned project of NAPOCOR then suffers from a paucity of purpose, no
25
being of a community guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land. matter how noble the purpose may be. For what use will modernization serve if
it proves to be a scourge on an individual’s fundamental right, not just to health
Lest we be misconstrued, this decision does not undermine the purpose of the and safety, but, ostensibly, to life preservation itself, in all of its desired quality?
NAPOCOR project which is aimed towards the common good of the people.
But, is the promotion of the general welfare at loggerheads with the WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision dated 3 May 2000 of the
26
preservation of the rule of law? We submit that it is not. Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57849 is REVERSED as well as the resolution
dated 27 September 2000. The Order dated 3 April 2000 of the Regional Trial
In the present case, the far-reaching irreversible effects to human safety should Court of Makati in Civil Case No. 00-352 is hereby REINSTATED. No
be the primordial concerns over presumed economic benefits per se as alleged pronouncement as to costs
by the NAPOCOR.
SO ORDERED.
Not too long ago, the Court, in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
27
(MMDA) v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., upheld the validity of the writ of FOOTNOTES:
16
preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals enjoining the The amendatory law of P.D. 1818 is Republic Act No. 8975, "An Act to Ensure
implementation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority’s proposed the Expeditious Implementation and Completion of Government Infrastructure
Projects by Prohibiting the Lower Courts from Issuing Temporary Restraining the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled to the
Orders, Preliminary Injunctions, or Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions, relief sought.
Providing Penalties for Violation Thereof, and for Other Purposes," approved on If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null
7 November 2000. Pertinent provisions of the Act read as follows: and void, the court may, if appropriate under the circumstances, award
SEC. 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary the contract to the qualified and winning bidder or order a rebidding of
Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions.- No court, except the the same, without prejudice to any liability that the guilty party may
Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary incur under existing laws.
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any SEC. 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders.- Any temporary restraining order,
of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or private, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction issued in
acting under the government's direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the violation of Section 3 hereof is void and of no force and effect.
following acts: SEC. 5. Designation of Regional Trial Courts.- The Supreme Court may
(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or designate regional trial courts to act as commissioners with the sole
site or location of any national government project; function of receiving facts of the case involving acquisition, clearance
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government and development of right-of-way for government infrastructure
as defined under Section 2 hereof; projects. The designated regional trial court shall within thirty (30) days
(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation from the date of receipt of the referral, forward its findings of facts to
of any such contract or project; the Supreme Court for appropriate action. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity
necessary for such contract/project.
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies
instituted by a private party, including but not limited to cases filed by
bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders involving
such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter
is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a
temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable
injury will arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in an amount to be
fixed by the court, which bond shall accrue in favor of the government if
clear and unmistakable right to the writ. Petitioner further contends that the
preliminary injunction issued against it already disposed of the main case
Section 3 - INEFFECTUAL JUDGMENT
without trial, thus denying petitioner of any opportunity to present evidence on
its behalf.
Unilever Phils, Inc. v. CA
The antecedents show that on August 24, 1994, private respondent Procter and
SECOND DIVISION
Gamble Phils., Inc. filed a complaint for injunction with damages and a prayer
for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against
G.R. No. 119280 August 10, 2006
petitioner Unilever, alleging that:
UNILEVER PHILIPPINES (PRC), INC., Petitioner,

1.5. As early as 1982, a P&G subsidiary in Italy used a key visual in the
vs.
advertisement of its laundry detergent and bleaching products. This key visual
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PROCTER AND GAMBLE
known as the "double-tug" or "tac-tac" demonstration shows the fabric being
PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents.
held by both hands and stretched sideways.
DECISION
1.6. The "tac-tac" was conceptualized for P&G by the advertising agency Milano
CORONA, J.: and Gray of Italy in 1982. The "tac-tac" was used in the same year in an
advertisement entitled "All aperto" to demonstrate the effect on fabrics of one of
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails P&GP’s products, a liquid bleach called "Ace."
1
the February 24, 1995 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
35242 entitled "Unilever Philippines (PRC), Inc. v. Honorable Fernando V. xxxxxxxxx
Gorospe, Jr. and Procter and Gamble Philippines, Inc. (P&GP)" which affirmed the
1.7. Since then, P&G has used the "tac-tac" key visual in the advertisement of its
issuance by the court a quo of a writ of preliminary injunction against it. The
products. In fact, in 1986, in Italy, the "tac-tac" key visual was used in the
writ enjoined petitioner from using and airing, until further orders of the court,
television commercial for "Ace" entitled "Kite."
certain television commercials for its laundry products claimed to be identical
2
or similar to its "double tug" or "tac-tac" key visual.
1.8. P&G has used the same distinctive "tac-tac" key visual to local consumers in
the Philippines.
Petitioner alleges that the writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial
court (and affirmed by the CA) without any evidence of private respondent’s
xxxxxxxxx
1.10. Substantially and materially imitating the aforesaid "tac-tac" key visual of On September 19, 1994, P&GP received a copy of the order dated September 16,
P&GP and in blatant disregard of P&GP’s intellectual property rights, Unilever 1994 ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and fixing a bond
on 24 July 1993 started airing a 60 second television commercial "TVC" of its of P100,000. On the same date, P&GP filed the required bond issued by
"Breeze Powerwhite" laundry product called "Porky." The said TVC included a Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc.
stretching visual presentation and sound effects almost [identical] or
substantially similar to P&GP’s "tac-tac" key visual. On September 21, 1994, petitioner appealed to the CA assigning the following
errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, to wit:
xxxxxxxxx
PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAD ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
1.14. On July 15, 1994, P&GP aired in the Philippines, the same "Kite" television JURISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
advertisement it used in Italy in 1986, merely dubbing the Italian language with TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
Filipino for the same produce "Ace" bleaching liquid whichP&GP now markets INJUNCTION IN VIOLATION OF THE RULES ON EVIDENCE AND
in the Philippines. PROCEDURE, PARTICULARLY OF SEC. 3 (a), RULE 58 OF THE REVISED
RULES OF COURT AND OF THE PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE.
1.15. On August 1, 1994, Unilever filed a Complaint with the Advertising Board of
the Philippines to prevent P&GP from airing the "Kite" television PUBLIC RESPONDENT IN ISSUING THE VOID ORDER DATED SEPTEMBER
3
advertisement. 16, 1994, HAD, IN EFFECT, ALREADY PREJUDGED THE MERITS OF THE
MAIN CASE.
On August 26, 1994, Judge Gorospe issued an order granting a temporary
restraining order and setting it for hearing on September 2, 1994 for Unilever to PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAD ISSUED THE VOID ORDER ACCORDING RELIEF
show cause why the writ of preliminary injunction should not issue. During the TO A NON-PARTY IN CIVIL CASE NO. 94-2434 WITHOUT JURISDICTION.
hearing on September 2, 1994, P&GP received Unilever’s answer with opposition
to preliminary injunction. P&GP filed its reply to Unilever’s opposition to a PUBLIC RESPONDENT IN ISSUING THE VOID ORDER HAD DEPRIVED
preliminary injunction on September 6, 1994. PETITIONER OF SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS; PUBLIC
RESPONDENT HAD FORECLOSED PETITIONER’S RIGHT AND THE
During the hearing on September 9, 1994, Judge Gorospe ordered petitioner to OPPORTUNITY TO CROSS-EXAMINE PROCTER’S WITNESSES ABAD AND
4
submit a sur-rejoinder. P&GP received Unilever’s rejoinder to reply on HERBOSA.
September 13, 1994. The following day, on September 14, 1994, P&GP filed its
sur-reply to Unilever’s rejoinder.
On February 24, 1995, the CA rendered its decision finding that Judge Gorospe The second ground is likewise not well-taken. As adverted to earlier, the
did not act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the disputed order. The provisional remedy of preliminary injunction will not issue unless it is shown in
petition for certiorari was thus dismissed for lack of merit. the verified complaint that plaintiff is probably entitled to the relief demanded,
which consists in whole or in part in restraining the commission or continuance
After a careful perusal of the records, we agree with the CA and affirm its of the acts complained of. In view of such requirement, the court has to make a
decision in toto: tentative determination if the right sought to be protected exists and whether
the act against which the writ is to be directed is violative of such right.
Petitioner does not deny that the questioned TV advertisements are
Certainly, the court’s determination as to the propriety of issuing the writ
substantially similar to P&GP’s "double tug" or "tac-tac" key visual. However, it
cannot be taken as a prejudgment of the merits of the case because it is
submits that P&GP is not entitled to the relief demanded, which is to enjoin
tentative in nature and the writ may be dissolved during or after the trial if the
petitioner from airing said TV advertisements, for the reason that petitioner has
court finds that plaintiff was not entitled to it….
Certificates of Copyright Registration for which advertisements while P&GP has
none with respect to its "double-tug" or "tac-tac" key visual. In other words, it is xxxxxxxxx
petitioner’s contention that P&GP is not entitled to any protection because it
has not registered with the National Library the very TV commercials which it Obviously, the determination made by the court a quo was only for purposes of
claims have been infringed by petitioner. preliminary injunction, without passing upon the merits of the case, which
cannot be done until after a full-blown hearing is conducted.
We disagree. Section 2 of PD 49 stipulates that the copyright for a work or
intellectual creation subsists from the moment of its creation. Accordingly, the The third ground is patently unmeritorious. As alleged in the Complaint P&GP
creator acquires copyright for his work right upon its creation.… Contrary to is a subsidiary of Procter and Gamble Company (P&G) for which the "double
petitioner’s contention, the intellectual creator’s exercise and enjoyment of tug" or "tac-tac" key visual was conceptualized or created. In that capacity,
copyright for his work and the protection given by law to him is not contingent P&GP used the said TV advertisement in the Philippines to promote its
or dependent on any formality or registration. Therefore, taking the material products. As such subsidiary, P&GP is definitely within the protective mantle of
allegations of paragraphs 1.3 to 1.5 of P&GP’s verified Complaint in the context of the statute (Sec. 6, PD 49).
PD 49, it cannot be seriously doubted that at least, for purposes of determining
whether preliminary injunction should issue during the pendency of the case, Finally, We find the procedure adopted by the court a quo to be in order….
P&GP is entitled to the injunctive relief prayed for in its Complaint.

The record clearly shows that respondent Judge followed the (procedure
provided for in Section 5, Rule 58, as amended by BP 224, and Paragraph A(8) of
the Interim Rules). In fact, the court a quo set the incident for hearing on particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or
September 2, 1994, at which date petitioner was ordered to show cause why the acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.
writ should not be issued. Petitioner filed an Opposition to the application for
preliminary injunction. The same incident was again set for hearing on Injunction is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid
September 9, 1994, during which the parties made some manifestations in injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard
7
support of their respective positions. Subsequent to such hearing petitioner filed compensation. As correctly ruled by the CA, there was an extreme urgency to
a Reply to P&GP’s Rejoinder to its Opposition. Under the foregoing grant the preliminary injunction prayed for by P&GP considering that TV
circumstances, it is absurd to even suggest that petitioner was not given its day commercials are aired for a limited period of time only. In fact, this Court takes
in court in the matter of the issuance of the preliminary injunctive relief. note of the fact that the TV commercial in issue ― the Kite TV advertisement ―
is no longer aired today, more than 10 years after the injunction was granted on
xxxxxxxxx September 16, 1994.
There was of course extreme urgency for the court a quo to act on plaintiff’s The sole objective of a writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status
8
application for preliminary injunction. The airing of TV commercials is quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. A writ of preliminary
9
necessarily of limited duration only. Without such temporary relief, any injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. Thus, it
permanent injunction against the infringing TV advertisements of which P&GP was impossible for the court a quo to fully dispose of the case, as claimed by
may possibly succeed in getting after the main case is finally adjudicated could petitioner, without all the evidence needed for the full resolution of the same.
be illusory if by then such advertisements are no longer used or aired by To date, the main case still has to be resolved by the trial court.
petitioner. It is therefore not difficult to perceive the possible irreparable
damage which P&GP may suffer if respondent Judge did not act promptly on its The issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely on the discretion of the
application for preliminary injunction.

5 court and is generally not interfered with except in cases of manifest
10
abuse. There was no such abuse in the case at bar, especially because
Preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy intended to provide protection to petitioner was given all the opportunity to oppose the application for injunction.
parties for the preservation of their rights or interests during the pendency of The fact was, it failed to convince the court why the injunction should not be
6 11
the principal action. Thus, Section1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides: issued. Thus, in Santos v. Court of Appeals, we held that no grave abuse of
discretion can be attributed to a judge or body issuing a writ of preliminary
Section 1. Preliminary injunction defined; classes. — A preliminary injunction is injunction where a party has not been deprived of its day in court as it was
an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment heard and it exhaustively presented all its arguments and defenses.
or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Section 3 - IRREPARABLE INJURY
ST
PNB VS. RJ VENTURES – GO TO PURPOSE OF WRIT (1 CASE)
On March 26, 1999, respondent City filed a case for Injunction With a Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order And/Or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
SECTION 4 against petitioner in the sala of public respondent judge. The petition stated
1
that on January 15, 1999, BACIWA published in the Visayan Daily Star, a local
Bacolod City Water District v. Labayen
paper of general circulation, a Schedule of Automatic Water Rates Adjustments
for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001. The rates were supposed to take effect seven
(7) days after its posting in the local papers or on January 22, 1999. The increase
SECOND DIVISION was aborted after petitioner unilaterally suspended the January 22, 1999
scheduled implementation. On March 15, 1999, however, petitioner announced
2
G.R. No. 157494 December 10, 2004 that the rate hike will be implemented on April 1, 1999.
BACOLOD CITY WATER DISTRICT, petitioner, Respondent City opposed. It alleged that the proposed water rates would violate
vs. due process as they were to be imposed without the public hearing required
3 4
THE HON. EMMA C. LABAYEN, Presiding Judge, RTC of Bacolod City, Br. under Letter of Instructions No. 700 and Presidential Decree No. 1479. Hence,
46 and the City of Bacolod,respondents. it prayed that before the hearing of the main case, a temporary restraining order
5
or a preliminary injunction be issued.
6
DECISION On March 30, 1999, the court a quo issued an Order summoning the parties
with their counsels to attend the preliminary hearing for the issuance of a
PUNO, J.: temporary restraining order or preliminary mandatory injunction. On April 8,
1999, it required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective
First, the chronology of facts. Petitioner Bacolod City Water District (BACIWA)
memoranda on whether it had jurisdiction over the case and whether a public
is a water district established pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 198 as a 7
hearing was conducted re the proposed increase in water rates.
government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter. It is in the
business of providing safe and potable water to Bacolod City. Petitioner filed its Position Paper dated April 15, 1999. It attached documents
evidencing the conduct of extensive and lengthy public hearings in fifty-eight
Public respondent City of Bacolod is a municipal corporation created by
(58) of the sixty-one (61) barangays of Bacolod City. It opined that original
Commonwealth Act No. 326, otherwise known as the Charter of Bacolod.
jurisdiction over cases on rate review is vested in the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA); appellate jurisdiction is vested in the National Water
15
Resources [Board] (NWRB) whose decisions shall be appealable to the Office of On July 23, 1999, petitioner filed its Reply to respondent City’s Opposition to
8
the President. the Motion to Dismiss reiterating that petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies provided by law hence the petition be dismissed for
9
On May 5, 1999, petitioner also filed a Motion to Dismiss. In an Order dated utter lack of merit.
May 7, 1999, the court directed respondent City to file its Opposition to
petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss within fifteen (15) days. After a hiatus of nearly seven (7) months, or on February 18, 2000, respondent
City filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
10
On June 17, 1999, respondent City filed a Motion to Set [for] Hearing its 16
And[/]Or Writ of Preliminary Injunction praying that the case be set for
application for a temporary restraining order or preliminary mandatory hearing on February 24, 2000. On the same date requested, respondent court
injunction. It alleged that the parties had already submitted their respective heard respondent’s application for temporary restraining order and issued an
memoranda and it has already submitted its Opposition to petitioner’s Motion 17
Order commanding petitioner to stop, desist and refrain from implementing
to Dismiss. It also alleged that petitioner had already effected the water rates the proposed water rates for the year 2000 which were then supposed to take
increase and collection, hence, causing irreparable injury to the public. effect on March 1, 2000.
Petitioner opposed the Motion. On July 20, 1999, respondent City filed its Reply On March 7, 2000, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and
to Opposition and reiterated that the application for the issuance of a temporary Dissolution of the Temporary
18
Restraining Order. Respondent court a
restraining order or preliminary mandatory injunction be heard since petitioner 19
quo issued on March 10, 2000 an Order directing respondent City to file an
continued to violate the right of the public to due process and it might take time Opposition to the Urgent Motion. In its Opposition, respondent
11
before the case would be finally resolved. On the same date, petitioner filed a 20
City contended that the temporary restraining order issued was not infirmed
12
Manifestation and Motion stating that the hearing may no longer be necessary with procedural and substantive defects. It also averred that respondent court
as the respective positions of both parties have already been presented and has jurisdiction over the case since the sole question of the lack of public
amplified in their pleadings and memoranda. hearing does not require the special knowledge or expertise of an administrative
13
agency and may be resolved by respondent court, hence the doctrine of primary
On July 22, 1999, respondent trial court issued an Order stating that there was
14
jurisdiction does not apply.
no more need to hear the caseon the merits as both parties have already
submitted their position papers and documents to prove their respective Respondent court continued with the proceedings by receiving the evidence of
allegations. petitioner in support of its Motion for Reconsideration and Dissolution of
Temporary Restraining Order. It further issued Orders dated March 17,
21 22
2000 and March 20, 2000.
23
On April 6, 2000, respondent court issued an Order finding petitioner’s Urgent in order to prevent the implementation of the water rates increase for the year
Motion for Reconsideration and Dissolution of Temporary Restraining Order 2001 which was to be imposed allegedly without the benefit of a public hearing.
moot and academic considering petitioner’s compliance of said temporary
29
restraining order. On December 21, 2000, respondent court issued the assailed Decision granting
the final injunction which allegedly confirmed the previous preliminary
24
Four (4) days after, in an Order dated April 10, 2000, it denied petitioner’s injunction.
Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.
30
Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Decision on
On April 19, 2000, respondent City filed a Manifestation praying that respondent January 11, 2001 asserting, among others, that the case was not yet ripe for
trial court issue a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner, stating thus: decision when the court granted the final injunction, the petitioner having had
no opportunity to file its answer, avail of the mandatory pre-trial conference and
A Temporary Restraining Order was issued against the respondents have the case tried on the merits.
which, however, expired before the parties were able to finish the
presentation of their respective witnesses and evidences; Respondent court denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit in an
31
Order dated January 24, 2001. Petitioner then filed a special civil action for
The instant case was submitted for resolution and decision of this certiorari under Rule 65 in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that public
Honorable Court during the last week of March but while awaiting the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave
decision of this Honorable Court, several complaints had reached the and patent abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
petitioner that the respondents had already reflected in the water she issued the final injunction in disregard of petitioner’s basic right to due
billings for the month of April the new water rates for the year 2000; process.
32
25
xxx The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review on certiorari,
26
ratiocinating thus:
Petitioner, for its part, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of respondent trial
court’s Order denying its Motion to Dismiss. Respondent City filed an In the case at bar, the [O]rder of public respondent dated 24 February
27
Opposition to [the] Motion for Reconsideration on June 1, 2000. 2000, though termed by BACIWA as a temporary restraining order, is in
fact a preliminary injunction. The period of the restraint was not
Respondent court did not act upon petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration until
28
limited. By its wordings, it can be safely inferred that the increased
respondent City filed an [Ex Parte] Motion for Speedy Resolution of the case
water rates must not be effected until final disposition of the main case.
on October 6, 2000 praying that the case be resolved before the year 2000 ends
This note of semi-permanence simply cannot issue from a mere C. THE HEREIN PETITIONER HAD NOT YET FILED ITS
temporary restraining order. It must be further noted that the ANSWER TO THE PETITION;
temporary restraining order has been elevated to the same level as the
preliminary injunction in the procedure, grounds and requirements of D. THERE WAS STILL NO JOINDER OF THE ISSUES SINCE
its obtention by S[ection] 4, Rule 58. Thus, to set [a] distinction, the NO ANSWER HAD YET BEEN FILED;
present practice is to categorically refer to it as a temporary restraining

E. THE MANDATORY PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE WAS NOT
order. In which case, the omission by the public respondent in referring
YET CONDUCTED;
to the 24 February 2000 order as a temporary restraining order could
33
not have been a mere oversight but deliberate.
F. THERE WAS NO TRIAL ON THE MERITS FOR THE MAIN
CASE.
Resorting to this Court, petitioner raises the following issues:
II
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT INSISTED

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED AND
THAT THE 24 FEBRUARY 2000 ORDER (ANNEX R) ISSUED BY THE
REFUSED TO RULE THAT RESPONDENT COURT HAD ACTED
TRIAL COURT WAS A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WHEN THE
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND/OR WITH GRAVE
RECORDS CLEARLY AND INDUBITABLY SHOW THAT IT WAS A
ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO).
RENDERING A DECISION PURPORTING TO ISSUE A FINAL
INJUNCTION AND CONFIRMING ITS ALLEGED PRELIMINARY
III
INJUNCTION, DESPITE THE FACT THAT:
BY DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, THE COURT OF
A. NO PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION HAD BEEN ISSUED;
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT EFFECTIVELY PREVENTED
PETITIONER FROM FULLY VENTILATING ITS CASE IN THE MAIN
B. THE RESPONDENT LOWER COURT DID NOT RESOLVE
ACTION DUE TO THE IRREGULAR AND CONFUSED PROCEEDINGS
HEREIN PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 34
CONDUCTED BY THE RESPONDENT COURT.
OF THE ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO
DISMISS;
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The initial issue is the proper characterization of the Order dated February 24, Bacolod City Water District as well as to its agents or representatives
2000. acting [o]n his behalf.
35
The sequence of events and the proceedings that transpired in the trial court xxx (emphases supplied)
make a clear conclusion that the Order issued was a temporary restraining order
and not a preliminary injunction. It can be gleaned from the afore-quoted Order that what the trial court issued
was a temporary restraining order and not a preliminary injunction. The trial
First. We quote the pertinent parts of the questioned Order: court has always referred to it as a temporary restraining order in the
36 37
succeeding Orders it issued on March 10, 2000 and April 6, 2000.
xxx
38
The parties, in their succeeding pleadings, also referred to the assailed Order
When this motion was called for hearing wherein both parties have as a temporary restraining order. The petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for
argued exhaustedly their respective sides, this court denied the ten (10) Reconsideration and Dissolution of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on
39
days extension for further amplification of the arguments of the March 1, 2000. This was opposed by respondent City itself in its Opposition to
respondent to oppose the said motion for issuance of a temporary Motion for Reconsideration and Dissolution of Temporary Restraining Order
restraining order. 40
(TRO) dated March 14, 2000. Further, respondent City, in its Manifestation
dated April 19, 2000 stated, viz:
It appearing therefore, that the acts of the defendant will actually affect
the plaintiff before the decision of this court can be rendered and in xxx
order to afford the court to pass on the issues without the same
becoming moot and academic and considering the urgency of the A Temporary Restraining Order was issued against the respondents
matter that immediate action should be taken, and pursuant to which, however, expired before the parties were able to finish the
Administrative Circular No. 6, Paragraph 4 and sub-paragraph 15 and presentation of their respective witnesses and evidences;
The Interim Rules and Guidelines [set forth] by the Rules of Court, this
court hereby orders the respondent[,] its agents, representatives xxx
or any person acting in his behalf to stop, desist and refrain from
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that while waiting for
implementing in their billings the new water rate increase which
the decision and order of the Honorable Court, a preliminary
will start on March 1, 2000. The Deputy Provincial Sheriff of this court
injunction as prayed for in the petition be issued against the
is hereby ordered to furnish copy of this order to the respondent
respondents.
41
x x x (emphases supplied) The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary
remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an
It can be gleaned from the foregoing that both parties and respondent trial incident of an independent action or proceeding. As a matter of course, in an
court have consistently referred to the directive as a temporary restraining action for injunction, the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, whether
order. It was only in the respondent court’s assailed Decision that the Order was prohibitory or mandatory, may issue. Under the law, the main action for
referred to as a preliminary injunction, viz: injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct
from, and should not be confused with, the provisional remedy of preliminary
xxx
injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve the status quo until the merits
44
can be heard. A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or
This Court therefore grants the final injunction prayed for restraining
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved or
the respondent from the commission of the act complained of for the
45
until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction.
year 2001 and hereby confirming the preliminary injunction
previously ordered.
A restraining order, on the other hand, is issued to preserve the status quo until
42 the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction which cannot be
xxx (emphasis supplied)
46
issued ex parte. Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a judge may issue a
Again, it was only when petitioner expressed its vehement objection on the temporary restraining order with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of
ruling that the final injunction confirmed the preliminary injunction previously issue. If before the expiration of the twenty (20)-day period the application for
issued, when the respondent City and the respondent trial court started to insist preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary restraining order would be
that the questioned Order was a preliminary injunction. Given the previous deemed automatically vacated. If no action is taken by the judge on the
undeviating references to it as a temporary restraining order, respondents application for preliminary injunction within the said twenty (20) days, the
cannot now consider it as a preliminary injunction to justify the validity of the temporary restraining order wouldautomatically expire on the 20th day by the
47
assailed Decision. The attendant facts and circumstances clearly show that the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary.
respondent trial court issued a temporary restraining order.
Hence, in the case at bar, since no preliminary injunction was issued, the
Second. Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is temporary restraining order granted automatically expired after twenty (20)
ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or days under the Rules. The fact that respondent court merely ordered "the
43
merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action. respondent[,] its agents, representatives or any person acting in his behalf to
stop, desist and refrain from implementing in their billings the new water rate
48
increase which will start on March 1, 2000" without stating the period for the
restraint does not convert the temporary restraining order to a preliminary party the constitutional right to due process. Over and above every desideratum
injunction. in litigation is fairness. All doubts should be resolved in favor of fairness.
The rule against the non-extendibility of the twenty (20)-day limited period of IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution
effectivity of a temporary restraining order is absolute if issued by a regional of the Court of Appeals dated November 27, 2002 and February 28, 2003,
trial court. The failure of respondent court to fix a period for the ordered respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the
restraint did not lend the temporary restraining order a breath of semi- court a quo for further proceedings.
permanence which can only be characteristic of a preliminary injunction. The
twenty (20)-day period provided by the Rules of Court should be deemed SO ORDERED.
incorporated in the Order where there is an omission to do so. It is because of

this rule on non-extendibility that respondent City was prompted to move that
hearings be set for its application of a preliminary injunction. Respondent City
cannot take advantage of this omission by respondent trial court.
Third. Even if we assume that the issued Order was a preliminary injunction,
petitioner is correct in contending that the assailed Decision is premature.
The records reveal that respondent court did not resolve petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order denying its Motion to Dismiss before it issued the
assailed Decision. Consequently, there was no answer filed by petitioner, no
joinder of issues, no mandatory pre-trial conference, and no trial on the merits,
yet, a Decision was handed down by the respondent trial court.
The short circuiting of the procedural process denied the petitioner due process
of law. It was not able to allege its defenses in an answer and prove them in a
hearing. The convoluted procedure allowed by the respondent trial court and
the pleadings filed by the parties which are not models of clarity certainly
created confusion. But this confusion should not be seized as a reason to deny a
Universal Motors Corp. v. Rojas One of complainant’s dealers was Nissan Specialist Sales Corporation (NSSC)
covering Misamis Oriental and other provinces and cities in northern
Mindanao, including Cagayan De Oro City.
SECOND DIVISION
In November 2000, NSSC ordered from complainant Nissan vehicles and spare
parts worth P5,476,500.00. NSSC issued several postdated checks in favor of
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1814 May 26, 2005
complainant to pay for the purchases. The checks, however, were dishonored
UNIVERSAL MOTORS CORPORATION Represented by GERARDO M. due to insufficient funds. Complainant demanded payment from NSSC but the
GELLE, complainant, latter repeatedly failed to comply. Hence, complainant stopped transacting with
vs. NSSC, although the latter still remained as dealer. Complainant later appointed
JUDGE FRANCISCO G. ROJAS, SR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Nissan Cagayan De Oro Distributors, Inc. (NICAD) to co-exist as dealer with
Cagayan De Oro City, respondent. NSSC to meet the market demand in Northern Mindanao.
DECISION On October 30, 2001, because of NSSC’s continued failure and refusal to pay its
obligation, complainant terminated its dealership agreement with NSSC. It also
PUNO, J.: filed a criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and/or estafa
against the officers of NSSC.
This is an administrative complaint filed by Universal Motors Corporation
(UMC), represented by Gerardo M. Gelle, Manager of Dealer Operations On February 22, 2002, NSSC filed Civil Case No. 2002-058 for breach of contract
Department of said corporation, against Judge Francisco G. Rojas, Sr., Presiding against complainant and its officers, Rodrigo T. Janeo, Jr. and Gerry Gelle, and
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Cagayan De Oro City, for serious NICAD and its officers, Jefferson Rolida and Peter Yap. The case was raffled to
misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion. the sala of respondent Judge Francisco G. Rojas, Sr.
1
The background facts are as follows: On March 1, 2002, respondent judge issued an order setting a summary hearing
on March 7, 2002 on the propriety of the issuance of a temporary restraining
Complainant UMC is the exclusive assembler and distributor in the Philippines 2
order.
of Nissan light commercial vehicles and spare parts. In the pursuit of its
business, it maintains a network of authorized dealers who purchase vehicles On March 6, 2002, NSSC filed an amended complaint which respondent judge
and spare parts from UMC and resell them in specified territories in the country. admitted in his order also dated March 6, 2002. The amended complaint
inserted a prayer for temporary restraining order which was not found in the when it issued a Temporary Restraining Order without fixing the
3
original complaint. amount of the bond, hence, defendants[’] Urgent Motion to Fix Bond
for Plaintiff/Applicant and Approve/Admit Defendant[’s] Counterbond
A hearing on the temporary restraining order was held on March 8, 2002. With Prayer to Lift Temporary Restraining Order is hereby denied for
6
lack of merit.
On March 11, 2002, respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order
"enjoining defendants, Universal Motors Corporation, Rodrigo T. Janeo, Jr., Respondent judge subsequently held several hearings with respect to the
[G]erry Gelle, Nissan Cagayan de Oro Distributors, Inc., Jefferson U. Rolida and preliminary injunction.
Peter Yap, their agents, representatives, successors and assigns, from continuing
in selling, dealing and marketing all models of motor vehicles and spare parts of On April 1, 2002, respondent judge ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary
Nissan; from terminating the dealer agreement between the plaintiff NSSC and injunction upon posting by the plaintiff of a bond in the amount of one million
defendant UMC; to stop the entry of defendant Nissan Cagayan de Oro pesos (P1,000,000.00). The writ of preliminary injunction was issued on April 2,
7
Distributors, Inc. and for the latter to do business on Nissan Products in the 2002 after NSSC filed its bond.
territory of plaintiff NSSC as defined in the Dealer Agreement and for defendant
UMC to stop supplying and doing trading transactions with defendant Nissan On the same day, complainant filed with the trial court an Urgent Motion to
8
Cagayan de Oro Distributors, Inc."
4 Recall/Dissolve Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction. But respondent judge
9
denied the same in the resolution dated April 11, 2002.
The following day, on March 12, 2002, NSSC filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bond
for Plaintiff/Applicant and Approve/Admit Defendant’s Counterbond with Complainant filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and
10
Prayer to Lift Temporary Restraining Order.
5 Prohibition assailing the preliminary injunction issued by respondent judge.
Respondent judge denied the motion in his order dated March 18, 2002. It In the meantime, NSSC filed with the trial court a Motion to Enforce Writ of
11
stated: Preliminary Injunction. Complainant, on the other hand, filed a Manifestation
12
and Motion to Cancel or Hold Proceedings in Abeyance. Respondent judge
Considering that during the summary hearing for the issuance of a resolved both motions on July 24, 2002, granting NSSC’s Motion to Enforce Writ
13
Temporary Restraining Order, defendants/movant herein failed to of Preliminary Injunction.
present evidence to prove that they may suffered [sic] irreparable injury
14
if ever the Court issued [sic] a Temporary Restraining Order and The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision also on July 24, 2004, finding
considering further that the Court has already exercise[d] its discretion that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction. The appellate court also observed:
It is worthy to note that public respondent issued an Order dated the caption of the complaint which stated that it was for "breach of contract,
March 11, 2002 granting a temporary restraining order for a period of 20 damages, with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order."
days without requiring private respondents to issue any bond at all Respondent judge construed the same to mean that the plaintiff therein
notwithstanding Rule 58[,] Section 4 (b) of the Rules of Court, and this expressly applied for a temporary restraining order. He also pointed out that the
compelled petitioners to file an Urgent motion to Fix Bond for complaint included a general prayer "for such other relief just and equitable,"
Plaintiff/Applicant and Approve/Admit Defendant’s Counterbond with and that the material allegations in the body of the complaint asked not only for
Prayer to Lift TRO dated March 12, 2002. a preliminary injunction but also for a temporary restraining order. Respondent
judge also denied that he argued for the plaintiff during the hearing on March 8,
On[e] final point. We further agree with petitioners’ observation that 2002. He said that the questions he propounded during the hearing were merely
public respondent issued an Order dated March 1, 2002 setting the clarificatory which is allowed by the Rules. Respondent judge also stated that he
application for a Temporary Restraining Order for hearing, acted within the bounds of Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure when he
notwithstanding the fact that private respondents were not applying for issued the temporary restraining order because he issued the same only after
a temporary restraining order in their complaint, and to correct the notice and hearing the parties. He argued that Sec. 2(b) of Rule 58 does not
irregularity, private respondents filed an Amended complaint on March prohibit the issuance of a temporary restraining order without bond. Besides, he
6, 2002 inserting the prayer for an application of a Temporary later required the plaintiff to post a bond of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00) as
Restraining Order, on which date, the Court issued an Order admitting a condition for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. Respondent
the Amended complaint. This blatant irregularity committed by the judge submitted that the issuance of a temporary restraining order and the non-
15
court a quo cannot be left unnoticed. requirement of bond did not amount to a violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct because he was never motivated by bad faith, but rather, on his best
Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint against respondent judge for 17
assessment of facts, to maintain the status quo.
serious misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, manifest partiality and grave
abuse of discretion. It alleges that respondent judge has exhibited manifest The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found respondent judge guilty of
partiality toward NSSC, as can be gleaned from the orders he issued in grave abuse of discretion and recommended a fine of twenty thousand pesos
connection with Civil Case No. 2002-058 and from the statements he made (P20,000.00), with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
during the hearings on the temporary restraining order and preliminary dealt with more severely.
16
injunction.
We agree with the recommendation of the OCA as we find respondent judge’s
Respondent judge denied the charges against him. He justified his order setting actions to constitute grave abuse of authority.
a summary hearing on the issuance of a temporary restraining order by citing
First, respondent judge ordered a hearing on the issuance of a temporary Sec. 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or
restraining order although it was not prayed for in the complaint. We are not temporary restraining order. — A preliminary injunction or
impressed with respondent judge’s argument that the caption and the body of temporary restraining order may be granted only when:
the complaint showed an intent to include a prayer for a temporary restraining
order. Nowhere in the allegations in the complaint was it shown that great or (a) The application in the action or proceeding is verified, and shows
irreparable injury would result to the plaintiff, NSSC, pending hearing on the facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded; and
preliminary injunction. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

(b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the
Procedure, a temporary restraining order may be issued only if it appears from
court where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond executed
the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or
to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the
irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the writ of
court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or
preliminary injunction could be heard. In addition, Section 4(a) of Rule 58 of
person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the
the Rules of Court is clear with regard to the procedure to be followed in the
injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should
issuance of writs of preliminary injunction, i.e., a preliminary injunction or
finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon
temporary restraining order may be granted only when the application in the
approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be
action or proceeding is verified, and shows facts entitling the applicant to
18
issued.
the relief demanded. We note that the relief sought by NSSC in the original
complaint consisted mainly of its reinstatement as dealer of Nissan vehicles and
xxx
spare parts in Northern Mindanao, and the termination of the dealership
agreement between UMC and NICAD. NSSC did not allege facts to support an While Section 4(b) of Rule 58 gives the presiding judge the discretion to require
urgent need to issue a temporary restraining order to prevent any great or a bond before granting a temporary restraining order, the Rules did not intend
irreparable injury that it might suffer while the preliminary injunction is being to give the judge the license to exercise such discretion arbitrarily to the
heard. In one case, the Court penalized a judge who awarded reliefs to plaintiffs prejudice of the defendant. Certainly, each member of the Bench is not a
19 20
without any showing that such reliefs were applied for. depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law. The bond
under Rule 58 is intended to pay all the damages which the party or person
Second, respondent judge issued the temporary restraining order without
against whom the temporary restraining order or injunction is issued may
requiring the plaintiff to post a bond. Sec. 4, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
sustain by reason thereof should the court finally decide that the applicant was
Procedure states:
not entitled thereto. Hence, it follows that unless it appears that the enjoined
party will not suffer any damage, the presiding judge must require the applicant
to post a bond, otherwise the courts could become instruments of oppression doing business as dealer of Nissan vehicles in Northern Mindanao. It does not
and harassment. require deep thinking to realize the losses that these companies will suffer if the
court orders them to freeze operations. Not only will they be deprived of
It is worthy to note that prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil potential earnings from sales but they will also have to expend for their
Procedure, no bond was required for the availment of a temporary restraining overhead even if they are not able to do business. Any fair judge would require
order. However, the present Rules now regulate the issuance of temporary the plaintiff in such case to ensure compensation to the defendant if it is later
restraining orders, not only by requiring a hearing, but also by imposing a bond found that the former is not entitled to the injunction. But not respondent
on the applicant to prevent the abuse of this relief by litigants. As explained by judge. He even rejected complainant’s motion to fix the plaintiff’s bond in Civil
Remedial Law expert Justice Florenz D. Regalado: Case No. 2002-058, although complainant, as defendant therein, had clearly
manifested its willingness to post a counterbond. We cannot consider such error
Under this amended section, a temporary restraining order has been
on the part of respondent judge as mere error in judgment. We agree with the
elevated to the same level as a preliminary injunction in the procedure,
findings of the OCA, thus:
grounds and requirements for its obtention. Specifically on the matter
of the requisite bond, the present requirement therefor not only for a From the foregoing, it is very evident that respondent committed grave
preliminary injunction but also for a restraining order, unless exempted abuse of discretion when he issued an Order dated March 1, 2002
therefrom by the court, puts to rest a controversial policy which was setting the application for a Temporary Restraining Order for hearing
either wittingly or unwittingly abused. Heretofore, no bond was notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiffs (NSSC) were not applying
required for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, except in for a temporary restraining order in their complaint. The alleged
labor cases brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari from a decision irregularity was later on corrected when the plaintiffs filed an Amended
of the National Labor Relations Commission where a monetary award Complaint on March 6, 2002 by inserting the prayer for an application
was granted, in which case the policy of the Supreme Court was to [for] Temporary Restraining Order which the Court admitted on [the]
require a bond equivalent to the monetary award or benefits granted as same day.
a condition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. The
exemption from bond in other cases, plus the fact that no hearing was In the case at bar, the errors committed by the respondent were not
required, made a temporary restraining order a much sought relief for honest mistakes in the performance of his duties. There was no urgency
21
petitioners. nor any irreparable injury which would require the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction in favor of
The temporary restraining order issued by respondent judge in Civil Case No. the plaintiffs. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals in its
2002-058 effectively enjoined the defendants therein, UMC and NICAD, from Decision dated July 24, 2002 the defendants (UMC) had already
terminated its dealership agreement with the plaintiffs (NSSC) as early

as October 30, 2001 on clear grounds of failure to pay its financial
obligations, and, thus, the latter (NSSC) were no longer entitled to avail
of the remedy of injunction as the act to be prevented by the issuance
thereof had long been consummated.
As for the rest of the charges, we find that the complainant failed to
adduce evidence in support of the same.
As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the

performance of his official duties renders him liable. In the absence of fraud,
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity do not
always constitute misconduct although said acts may be erroneous. It is true
that a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such
error was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice. This
does not mean, however, that a judge need not observe propriety, discreetness
22
and due care in the performance of his official functions. Indeed, all members
of the Bench are enjoined to behave at all times as to promote public confidence
23
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Respondent judge’s actions
with respect to the issuance of the temporary restraining order in Civil Case No.
2002-058 failed to live up to such high standards of judicial conduct.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent judge is ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY

THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) and WARNED that commission of the same
or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
In Re Admin Complaint v. Hon.Abesamis ordering them to be reinstated to their former position without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges, and with backwages, 13th month pay and sick and
vacation leave. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
affirmed the aforesaid decision but deleted the money claims. However, upon
[OCA I.P.I. No. 01-32-CA-J.February 13, 2002]
motion for reconsideration, the NLRC reinstated the Labor Arbiter's decision.
IN THE MATTER OF ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST HON.
The Company assailed the NLRC decision before the Court of Appeals, which
ABESAMIS, et al.
was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 54598 and raffled to the Special Twelfth Division,
SECOND DIVISION composed of respondent justices.
Gentlemen: On August 30, 1999, an alias writ of execution was issued against the Company
to collect P5,437,992.00 constituting the computed backwages, 13th month pay
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 13 and sick and vacation leave pay of the petitioners. A notice of garnishment was
2002. issued against the Company's account in the Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (RCBC).
OCA I.P.I. No. 01-32-CA-J(In the matter of Administrative Complaint against
Hon. Bernardo P. Abesamis, Hon. Eugenio S. Labitoria and Hon. Elvi John S. On September 21, 1999, the Company filed a "Very Urgent Motion for Issuance
Asuncion, Associate Justices and members of the Former Special Twelfth Division of a Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction" to
of the Honorable Court of Appeals.) enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution and the order of
garnishment, and if the same has already been implemented, to restrain RCBC
Petitioners, employees of Year Jan Industries, Phil., Inc. and members of the
from transferring the garnished amount to the NLRC Sheriff, or if the garnished
Year Jan Industries of Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization-
amount has already been transferred, to enjoin the NLRC from releasing the
Kilusang Mayo Uno (ANGLO-KMU), charge respondent Court of Appeals
same to the petitioners.
Justices Abesamis, Labitoria and Asuncion, with grave misconduct and abuse of
authority. On September 23, 1999, respondents issued a temporary restraining order. On
February 29, 2000, the Company's application for preliminary injunction was
The case arose from a labor dispute between petitioners and their employer,
granted upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,437,992.02. The Company,
Year Jan Industries, Phil., Inc. (Company, for brevity), for illegal dismissal. The
however, failed to post the bond required.
Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioners, declaring their dismissal illegal and
On March 20, 2000, the Company filed an Omnibus Motion seeking to modify The respondents, in issuing the assailed Resolution, acted within the confines
the February 29, 2000 Resolution which was denied on August 10, 2000. and limits of the law and their authority.
On October 6, 2000, the Company filed another Urgent Motion for Issuance of I. Petitioners, in their motion for writ of execution, moved only for the
TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction, this time, to enjoin the Labor Arbiter from execution of the money judgment. In the restraining orders issued by
implementing the alias writ of execution dated September 19, 2000, for the respondents, what was restrained and enjoined is the payment of the monetary
collection of P8,401,103.36 representing additional backwages/salaries of the claims adjudged by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC and not the reinstatement
petitioners. This was granted by respondents per Resolution dated October 11, of the petitioners to their former positions. Thus, with or without the
2000. restraining orders, the judgment of the NLRC reinstating the petitioners is
[1]
immediately executory pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code. cralaw
Aggrieved by issuance of the said Resolution, petitioners moved to inhibit the
respondents but was denied on January 30, 2000. II. The failure of the respondents to require the Company to post a bond did not
violate the Rules of Court. Paragraph (b) of Section 4, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules
Petitioners contend that the questioned Resolution of the Court of Appeals [2]
of Civil Procedure, gives the court discretion to require such bond. cralaw The
deprived them of their right to be reinstated and to be paid their lost income. court may, in proper cases, exempt the applicant from filing the bond normally
They also assert that the issuance of the TRO without requiring the posting of [3]
required. cralaw In issuing the October 11, 2000 Resolution, respondents were
the required surety bond and without defining the period of its effectivity or merely exercising a discretion granted them by law. Certainly, we find no abuse
duration transgresses Sections 5 and 7 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court and the of discretion, much less a grave or patent abuse of judgment when they issued
Canon of Judicial Ethics. the assailed Order. It must be stressed however, that respondents in their
Resolution dated February 29, 2000, required the Company to post a bond for
Respondents, upon the other hand maintain, viz: (1) that the TROs never
the issuance of the preliminary injunction. Unfortunately, the Company failed
enjoined nor restrained the reinstatement of the complainants; (2) that under
to comply, hence, the writ was never issued.
Sec. 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, the bond is posted only when required by
court; (3) that the phrase "until further orders of this Court" did not make the III. The TRO dated October 11, 2000 was not issued for an indefinite time. Under
period of the TROs indefinite; and (4) that the charges averred in the complaint Section 5, Paragraph 4, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a temporary
have already been passed upon and considered by this Court in G.R. No. 147388. restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals shall be effective for sixty (60)
days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined. It automatically
The complaint should be dismissed.
terminates upon the expiration of the 60 day period without need of any judicial
declaration to that effect.
In the assailed Resolution, the Court of Appeals ordered, among others, that SO ORDERED.
"the public respondent NLRC is also restrained and enjoined from surrendering
or releasing the garnished amount to the private respondents, until further
orders of this Court." As it is clear under the Rules that the effectivity of a TRO
issued by the Court of Appeals is only for a period of 60 days, it must be stressed
that the phrase "until further orders of this Court" embodied in said resolution
should be understood in such manner that the Court of Appeals may, in the
exercise of its discretion, shorten the lifespan of the TRO when circumstances so
warrant. Applying the foregoing, we find petitioners' allegation that the
questioned resolution transgresses the pertinent rules erroneous.
Lastly, the charges alleged in the complaint have already been passed upon and
considered by this Court in G.R. No. 147388. It must be recalled that after the
issuance of the October 11, 2000 Resolution, petitioners filed a motion for
inhibition grounded mainly on the issuance of the aforesaid resolution and
contending that the judicial action of respondents in issuing the assailed
Resolution impelled them "to believe that they could no longer obtain labor
justice." The motion was denied by respondents on January 30, 2001, hence,
petitioners elevated the matter to this Court. On June 27, 2001, we issued a
Resolution denying the petition "for failure of the petitioners to sufficiently
show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the challenged
resolutions as to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate
[4]
jurisdiction in this case." cralaw The dismissal of the petition, in effect, upholds
the correctness of respondents' acts in issuing the restraining orders. The
present administrative complaint is nothing but an attempt on the part of the
petitioners to re-ventilate or re-litigate issues already passed upon and
[5]
definitively resolved by this Court. cralaw
WHEREFORE, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

3
affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, setting
the raffle of Civil Case No. LP-99-0077 even without notice to some of the
Gonzales v. State Properties Corporation
defendants therein. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby

4
DISMISSED."
THIRD DIVISION
The Facts
G.R. No. 140765 January 25, 2001
The facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this manner:

GONZALO R. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
"x x x [R]espondent State Properties Corporation filed a verified
STATE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, respondent.
complaint for Recovery of Property based on ownership on March 23,
1999 with the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas against Petitioner
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Gonzalo R. Gonzales and his brothers and sisters, all heirs of the late
The Rules of Court requires that an initiatory pleading with an application for a Benito Gonzales. The complaint, accompanied [by] an application for
writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed before a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, prayed that
multiple-sala court shall be raffled only after (a) notice to and (b) in the after trial, the Court render judgment confirming its right to take and
presence of the adverse party or the person to be enjoined. These requirements enjoy possession of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
may be dispensed with, however, in cases where it can be satisfactorily shown No. S-17992 together with all improvements thereon to the exclusion of
that summons could not be served despite diligent efforts. Besides, in the the heirs of Benito Gonzales, inclusive of herein petitioner.1âwphi1.nêt
present case, petitioner has no reason to complain because he has been duly
"The case was raffled to Branch 253 of the Regional Trial Court of Las
served the requirements, and he does not claim to represent the allegedly
Piñas and summons [was] duly served on Petitioner Gonzalo Gonzales.
adversely affected parties.
"On April 15, 1998, Petitioner Gonzalo Gonzales filed an Omnibus

Statement of the Case
Motion, praying among others, that another raffle be held because the
1
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the November other defendants therein did not receive any notice of raffle as required
2
22, 1999 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 54677. The CA by Administrative Circular No. 20-95.
"In order to expedite the disposition of its application for injunctive "To this Order, private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration to
relief, private respondent filed a manifestation expressing that it which petitioner filed an opposition.
interpose[d] no objection to the said Omnibus Motion. Petitioner
Gonzalo Gonzales then filed his Answer. "On August 30, 1999, public respondent issued the now assailed order
which reconsidered his July 30, 1999 Order. Thus, the instant case was
5
"Meanwhile, private respondent filed a Motion for Service of Summons set for regular raffle on September 8, 1999."
by Publication on all the defendants therein, except Petitioner Gonzalo
Gonzales, for the reason that their residences [could] not be ascertained Ruling of the Court of Appeals
despite diligent inquiry. The Court (Branch 253) granted the said
Citing Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals ruled that,
motion at the hearing on May 21, 1999.
necessarily, if summons could not be served, notice for the raffle could not be
"Subsequently, private respondent received a Notice of Raffle from the served either. The CA also held that the logic of petitioner, who insisted
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Law Piñas otherwise, was flawed. Herein respondent, it pointed out, would have no
enjoining private respondent to attend the raffle of the case before the remedy in case the other defendants choose to make their whereabouts
sala of herein public respondent on July 30, 1999 at 1:00 p.m. unknown.
6
"On the said date, the counsel of Petitioner Gonzales and counsel of Hence, this recourse.
private respondent appeared but petitioner's counsel opposed the

Issues
holding of the raffle on the ground that the other defendants were not
duly notified of the raffle, again invoking Administrative Circular No. 7
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
20-95. This was granted by public respondent in his Order, to wit:
"1. Respondent Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion
'WHEREFORE, no raffle will be conducted. The Court advises
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that if summons
the parties affected to do what is to be done for the final
could not be personally served, raffle could likewise be held without
determination of the meaning of Administrative Circular No.
notice to parties;
20-95, par. (1) when there are other parties whose addresses are
not alleged in the complaint or with the unknown addresses.' 2. Respondent Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion
(p. 22. Records, Annex A) tantamount to excess or lack of jurisdiction in holding that in a case
where the parties are unknown, the case will have to be raffled first
before the court can act on the motion for leave to serve summons by Section 4 (c), Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The provision now
publication; reads as follows:
3. Respondent Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion "(c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a
tantamount to excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition; temporary restraining order is included in a complaint or any initiatory
pleading, the case, if filed in a multiple-sala court, shall be raffled only
8
4. There are special and important reasons to warrant a review." after notice to and in the presence of the adverse party or the person to
be enjoined. In any event, such notice shall be preceded, or
In the main, the issue before us is whether a case may be raffled, even when
contemporaneously accompanied, by service of summons, together
some of the parties could not be served notice because their whereabouts are
with a copy of the complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicant's
unknown.
affidavit and bond, upon the adverse party in the Philippines.
The Court's Ruling

"However, where the summons could not be served personally or by
substituted service despite diligent efforts, or the adverse party is a
The Petition has no merit.
resident of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom or is a
Main Issue: nonresident thereof, the requirement of prior or contemporaneous
Notice Requirement Prior to Raffle service of summons shall not apply."
Petitioner contends that under Section 4 (c) of Rule 58, a case may be raffled From the foregoing, it is clear that the prerequisites for conducting a raffle when
only after notice to and in the presence of the adverse party. These requisites, there is a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
according to him, are mandatory. Furthermore, he maintains that the latter part order are (1) notice to and (b) presence of the adverse party or person to be
of the rule, which allows service of summons to be dispensed with in case the enjoined. The above rule also provides that the notice shall be preceded or
adverse party cannot be located despite diligent efforts, should not be isolated accompanied by a service of summons to the adverse party or person to be
from other related provisions. He refers specifically to Section 5 of Rule 58, enjoined.
which provides that no writ of preliminary injunction shall be granted without
9 The second paragraph clearly states, though, that the required prior or
hearing and prior notice to the adverse party.
contemporaneous service of summons may be dispensed with in the following
10
Petitioner's argument is incorrect. Administrative Circular No. 20-95, which instances: (a) when the summons cannot be served personally or by substituted
provided for the requisites of a raffle of cases, has been incorporated into service despite diligent efforts, (b) when the adverse party is a resident of the
Philippines temporarily absent therefrom, or (c) when such party is a require prior hearing on the application with notice to the
nonresident. defendant; but that levy on property pursuant to the writ thus issued may
not be validly effected unless preceded, or contemporaneously
In such event, the notice of raffle and the presence of the adverse party must accompanied, by service of summons, a copy of the complaint x x x, the
also be dispensed with. As pointed out by respondent, "the requirement of application for attachment (if not incorporated in but submitted
notice of the raffle to the party whose whereabouts are unknown does not also separately from the complaint), the order of attachment, and the
apply x x x because the case will have to be raffled first before the court can act plaintiff's attachment bond." (Emphasis supplied.)
11
on the motion for leave to serve summons by publication."
15
In H.B. Zachry v. CA, the Court expounded on the aforecited ruling as follows:
Under the interpretation of petitioner, however, defendants, by the simple "[A] distinction should be made between the issuance and the enforcement of
expedient of concealing their whereabouts and thereby preventing the holding the writ. The trial court has unlimited power to issue the writ upon
of a raffle, can bar a trial court from acting on a case or from allowing a service commencement of the action even before it acquires jurisdiction over the
of summons by publication. Clearly, such interpretation would result in person of the defendant, but enforcement thereof can only be validly done after
12
absurdity and should not be countenanced. it shall have acquired jurisdiction."
Moreover, in his commentary on the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Justice Jose In this light, it may be stressed that pursuant to Davao Light and the subsequent
Feria explains that "[p]aragraphs (c) and (d) [of Section 4, Rule 58,] are based on cases prior to the 1997 Rules, a writ of attachment may be issued ex parte, but it
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Administrative Circular No. 20-95, with the modification cannot be implemented if the trial court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over
that the notice to the adverse party shall be preceded or contemporaneously the person of the defendant. In the present case, the notice of raffle is required
accompanied by service of summons as required in Davao Light & Power Co., to be served prior to or contemporaneously with the summons -- a requirement
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, with the same exceptions in Section 5 of Rule 57 but absent from the pre-1997 Rules. This requirement shows the intention of the
13
excluding actions in rem or quasi in rem." new Rules to ensure the implementation of the writ of preliminary injunction
14
and preclude the defense that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
In Davao Light, the Court held:
defendant.
"For the guidance of all concerned, the Court reiterates and reaffirms
Nonetheless, the 1997 rule barring the raffle of these cases without effecting the
the proposition that writs of attachment may properly issue ex parte
service of summons is not absolute. As earlier noted, the second paragraph of
provided that the Court is satisfied that the relevant requisites therefor
Section 4 (c) of Rule 58 clearly provides that the service of summons may be
have been fulfilled by the applicant, although it may, in its discretion,
dispensed with "where the summons could not be served personally or by
substituted service despite diligent efforts." Furthermore, even Justice Feria be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party
opines that the exceptions to the rule are the same as those in Section 5 of Rule or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the
57, the second paragraph of which reads thus: said twenty day period, the court must order said party or person to
show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not
"The requirement of prior or contemporaneous service of summons be granted, determine within the same period whether or not the
shall not apply where the summons could not be served personally or preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the
by substituted service despite diligent efforts, or the defendant is a corresponding order.1âwphi1.nêt
resident of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom, or the
defendant is a non-resident of the Philippines, or the action is one in "However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the
rem or quasi in rem." matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave
injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala
In the present case, respondent was able to show that the whereabouts of the court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte a
other defendants were unknown, and that summons could not be served temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours
personally or by substituted service. Hence, it cannot be required to serve such from issuance but he shall immediately comply with the provisions of
summons prior to or contemporaneous with the notice of raffle. The raffle, the next preceding section as to service of summons and the documents
therefore, may proceed even without notice to and the presence of the said to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two
adverse parties. (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a
summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order
Indeed, contrary to the argument of petitioner, allowing the raffle to proceed in
shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be
a case like this is not inconsistent with Section 5 of Rule 58, which reads as
heard. In no case shall the total period of effectively of the temporary
follows:
restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original
seventy-two hours provided herein." (Emphasis supplied.)
"SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. –
No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior
Furthermore, petitioner makes much ado about the requirement of notice of
notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear 16
raffle. In ordinary suits, notice of a raffle is given to the parties in order "to
from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or 17
afford [them] a chance to be heard in the assignment of their cases." According
irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be
to Justice Feria, the raffle of cases is done in open session with adequate notice,
heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary
"so that parties or their counsel will be prevented from choosing judges to hear
injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to 18
their case."
Petitioner has no ground to object, since he himself had been given notice prior
to the holding of the raffle. Furthermore, he has no standing to complain on
19
behalf of the other parties, because he does not claim to represent them.
In any event, the other defendants had been located and served summons. In
fact, the case was subsequently raffled on December 8, 1999, and a pretrial
20
conducted on May 9, 2000. the other defendants have not complained of any
impropriety in the raffle. Their silence on this question demonstrates the utter
lack of merit of petitioner's contention.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed

Decision AFFIRMED. Double costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Conformably with Rule 8 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines and Section 1 of
BP Blg. 224, the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby set on
Borja v. Salcedo
January 4, 2001 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning and at which date and time, the
respondents/defendants are hereby directed to appear and show cause why the
writ prayed for should not be granted.
SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-03-1746. September 26, 2003]
In the meantime, in order to maintain the status quo between the parties and to
ROGER F. BORJA, complainant, vs. JUDGE ZORAYDA H.
obviate irreparable damage the petitioner may suffer by reason of and as a
SALCEDO, respondent.
consequence of the acts sought to be enjoined pending hearing on the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction, the respondents/defendants are hereby
RESOLUTION
enjoined from enforcing Board Resolution No. 082, Series 2000 restraining Atty.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Marciano Brion, Jr. to sit, act and exercise the powers of a Director of San Pablo
City Water District representing the civic sector.
In a Complaint dated January 11, 2001, Roger F. Borja accuses Presiding
Judge Zorayda H. Salcedo of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 32) of San Pablo Let this Order together with the copy of the Complaint be served forthwith
City of gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion in issuing a upon the respondents/defendants who are hereby given a period of ten (10) days
temporary restraining order (TRO) in Civil Case No. SP-5775 (01), entitled, from receipt within which to file their Answer.
“Damaso T. Ambray vs. San Pablo City Water District, represented by General
Manager Roger Borja, et al.”, without complying with the 1997 Rules of Civil The Deputy Sheriff of this Branch is hereby ordered to implement the processes
Procedure. of this Court immediately.
Complainant alleges that the civil case was filed with the RTC of San Pablo
SO ORDERED
City on January 2, 2001 and on the same day, assigned by raffle to Branch 32,
presided over by respondent Judge. The following day, respondent Judge issued City of San Pablo, January 3, 2001.
an Order granting the TRO, to wit:
[1]
and a copy thereof was received by the complainant that afternoon.
Before this Court is a verified complaint praying for the issuance of a Temporary
Complainant claims that the procedure followed by respondent Judge
Restraining Order (TRO) which the Court finds to be sufficient in form and
violated Rule 58 Section 4 [b-c-d], 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the following
substance.
grounds:
(a) Being a multi-sala court, it is the Executive Judge that may issue an Complainant argues that when the law transgressed is elementary, as in the
ex-parte TRO good for 72 hours. instant case, the failure to know or observe it constitutes gross ignorance of the
[4]
law.
(b) The notice of raffle was not preceded or contemporaneously
accompanied, by service of summons, with the complaint or Upon the report and recommendation of the OCA, this Court, in a
initiatory pleading and the applicant’s affidavit and bond. Resolution dated August 29, 2001 resolved to require:
(c) Respondent Judge who was assigned to the case did not conduct
(a) respondent Judge Zorayda Salcedo to COMMENT on the complaint and
the required summary hearing with notice and in the presence of
motion for reconsideration within ten (10) days from notice hereof; and (b)
the parties within 24 hours after the Sheriff’s return of service
Judge Marivic T. Balisi-Umali, then Regional Trial Court Judge, San Pablo City,
and/or the records are received by the branch selected by raffle.
Branch 30, to EXPLAIN within ten (10 ) days from notice hereof why no
(d) The TRO was issued ex-parte without the required bond and disciplinary action should be taken against her for issuing an order dissolving a
[5]
without alleging that the matter is of extreme urgency and temporary restraining order issued by a court of co-equal jurisdiction.”
applicant would suffer grave or irreparable injury.
On October 16, 2001, respondent judge submitted her comment and
(e) Complainant did not ask for the issuance of a preliminary
apologized for the delay in its submission explaining that she, as well as her
[2]
injunction on January 4, 2001 in the morning. [6]
husband, underwent cataract operation. She informed the Court that she is
Then Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo, through a letter dated adopting as her comment the Indorsement dated November 16, 2000 which she
February 7, 2001, informed complainant that the subject matter of his complaint had submitted to this Court in connection with OCA IPI No. 00-1058-RTJ, an
is judicial in nature hence it shall be denied due course as there are judicial earlier administrative case also filed by herein complainant against her but
[3] [7]
remedies available under the Rules of Court yet to be exhausted. which was dismissed by this Court for lack of merit. She likewise emphasized
her “denial of partiality, ignorance of the law, bias and so forth being attributed
On March 30, 2001, however, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
to her by complainant for the reverse is true as it has been (her) desire … to
received a Motion from complainant dated March 29, 2001, praying for the
always observe impartiality, fairness, and dedication in the administration of
reconsideration of the notice of denial of his complaint on the strength of an
[8]
justice.”
Order dated January 19, 2001 issued by Judge Marivic Balisi-Umali of the RTC
(Branch 30), San Pablo City, dissolving the questioned TRO for failure to comply Judge Marivic T. Balisi-Umali in her Compliance dated October 17, 2001,
with the requisites of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 20-95. explained her actions relative to the case as follows:
May the Honorable First Division be informed that Civil Case No. SP-5757(01) The undersigned in dissolving the TRO did not ignore or overlook the fact that
xxx for Declaration of Nullity of Board Resolution No. 082, Series 2000 and for it was issued by a co-equal court, the orders or processes of which the
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order was originally raffled to Branch 32 of undersigned cannot interfere with, pass upon much less reverse. However,
the San Pablo City, RTC presided over by the Honorable Zoraida Herradura under the circumstances obtaining where it was clearly shown and the
Salcedo on January 2, 2001. The following day Judge Salcedo issued a Temporary undersigned was convinced that the TRO was irregularly issued, somehow she
Restraining Order (TRO). On even date, defendant Borja filed a Motion to had to correct the error. It was her conviction then and now that by sustaining
Inhibit Judge Herradura [Salcedo] from the case and which the latter the TRO because it was issued by a co-equal court would tantamount to
[9]
granted. On January 5, 2001, defendant Brion filed a Motion to Dissolve correcting a mistake with another mistake. (Emphasis supplied)
Temporary Restraining Order anchored on the ground that the TRO was issued
in violation of Rule 58, Section 4(d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and is In a Resolution dated July 17, 2002, this Court referred the case to the
[10]
therefore a patent nullity. On even date, the case was raffled to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.
undersigned. Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez submitted his Report, dated
November 4, 2002, pertinent portions of which read as follows:
The undersigned resolved the Motion to Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order
on January 19, 2001. A copy of her Order is hereto attached. The undersigned In the study of the entire record of the case, the undersigned observed that
dissolved the TRO because it was issued in violation of Supreme Court Circular respondent judge did not controvert the material allegations in the
No. 20-95. complaint. Her comment dated November 16, 2000, specifically relates to the
incidents involved in Civil Case No. SP-5454(99) which is the subject matter of
The record of the case forwarded to the undersigned from Branch 32 did
OCA IPI No. 00-1058-RTJ. We therefore find unavailing the explanation of Judge
not show that any Order setting a summary hearing on the application
Salcedo.
for TRO was caused to be issued by Branch 32 for service to all the parties.
We find that respondent judge failed to comply with Administrative Circular

Administrative Circular No. 20-95 mandates that the application for TRO shall
No. 20-95. No order setting a summary hearing on the application for
be acted upon only after all the parties are heard in a summary hearing.
temporary restraining order was furnished the defendants. A summary hearing
can not be dispensed with in view of the mandatory requirement that the
The undersigned humbly submits that as aforestated, Judge Salcedo
application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a
inhibited herself from the case which was thereafter re-raffled to the sala
summary hearing after the record of the case are transmitted to the branch
of the undersigned. The motion to Dissolve TRO had to be resolved.
selected by raffle.
A TRO may however be issued ex-parte if the matter is of such extreme urgency (2) Respondent Judge Zorayda H. Salcedo, RTC, Branch 32, San
that grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise unless it is issued Pablo City be fined in the amount of FIVE
immediately. Under such circumstances, the executive judge shall issue the THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS for her failure to comply with
TRO effective only for seventy-two (72) hours from its issuance. But such a Administrative Circular No. 20-95, with a warning that a
procedure is not applicable to respondent judge because she is not the repetition of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
executive judge of RTC, San Pablo City. (Emphasis supplied). severely; and
In Golangco vs. Villanueva, 278 SCRA 414, it was held that respondent judge’s (3) The explanation of Judge Marivic T. Balisi-Umali, then RTC
disregard of the Supreme Court’s pronouncement on temporary restraining Judge, Branch 30, San Pablo City be ACCEPTED for being
[11]
orders was not just ignorance of the prevailing rule; to a large extent, it was meritorious.
misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice and
grave abuse of authority. On March 27, 2003, complainant submitted a Memorandum emphasizing
that: respondent judge is not an Executive Judge; the complaint in Civil Case No.
Likewise, in Adao vs. Lorenzo, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1496, 316 SCRA 570, respondent SP-5775 (01) did not allege extreme urgency for the issuance of a TRO neither
judge was fined in the amount of P5,000.00 for his failure to abide by did it state that its non-issuance would cause grave injustice and irreparable
Administrative Circular No. 20-95. injury to the plaintiff; the TRO issued by respondent judge on January 3, 2001
failed to declare that it was effective for 72 hours only; and on January 19, 2001,
Concerning the dissolution of the questioned TRO by Judge Marivic T. Balisi- Judge Marivic T. Balisi-Umali dissolved the TRO issued by respondent judge for
Umali, RTC, Branch 30, San Pablo City, we find the same to be proper. Judge violation of SC Circular No. 20-95.
[12]
Umali has satisfactorily explained that she granted the defendant’s motion to
Respondent judge, on the other hand, manifested, through a letter dated
dissolve TRO on 19 January 2000 or only after Judge Salcedo inhibited herself
February 13, 2003, her willingness to submit the matter for resolution on the
from trying the case and the case re-raffled to the former’s sala on 5 January
[13]
basis of the pleadings on record.
2000.
After a review of the records of the case, we find the recommendations of
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended that: the OCA to be well taken.
(1) OCA IPI No. 01-1225-RTJ be RE-DOCKETED as a regular Administrative Circular No. 20-95 provides:
administrative matter;
1. Where an application for temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of
preliminary injunction is included in a complaint or any initiatory pleading filed
with the trial court, such complaint or initiatory pleading shall be raffled only before assignment by raffle to a judge without first conducting a summary
after notice to the adverse party and in the presence of such party or counsel. hearing.
In defense, respondent judge adopts as her comment in this case, the

2. The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties are
nd
2 indorsement dated November 16, 2002 which she submitted in OCA IPI No.
heard in a summary hearing conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the
00-1058-RTJ, which is an earlier administrative case filed against her by herein
records are transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. The records shall be
complainant. In said indorsement, respondent talked about the urgency of the
transmitted immediately after raffle.
issuance of the restraining order in that particular case and also mentions that:
3. If the matter is of extreme urgency, such that unless a TRO is issued, grave
…A judge may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous
injustice and irreparable injury will arise, the Executive Judge shall issue the
order or decision he renders. To unjustifiably hold otherwise, assuming that he
TRO effective only for seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but shall
has erred would make his position doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to
immediately summon the parties for conference and immediately raffle the case
try the facts or interpret the laws in the process of administering justice can be
in their presence. Thereafter, before the expiry of the seventy-two (72) hours,
infallible in his judgment. The error must be gross or patent, malicious,
the Presiding Judge to whom the case is assigned shall conduct a summary
deliberate or evident bad faith.
hearing to determine whether the TRO can be extended for another period until
a hearing in the pending application for preliminary injunction can be
As a matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are
conducted. In no case shall the total period of the TRO exceed twenty (20) days,
not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Good
including the original seventy-two (72) hours, for the TRO issued by the
faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are
Executive Judge.
sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find
refuge. (Quisumbing, J., Annabelle R. Gutierrez V. Hon. Rodolfo Palattao, A.M.
4. With the exception of the provisions which necessarily involve multiple-
[14]
RTJ-95-1326, July 8, 1998).
sala stations, these rules shall apply to single-sala stations especially with regard
to immediate notice to all parties of all applications for TRO.
We find the explanation of respondent in the present case to be insufficient
to excuse her from observing strict compliance with Supreme Court
In this case, it is not disputed that respondent judge issued a TRO without
Administrative Circular No. 20-95.
conducting the required summary hearing. There is no showing that it falls
under the exceptional circumstances enumerated by the afore-quoted As previously explained by this Court, there are differences in the requisites
administrative circular where a TRO may be issued by the Executive Judge for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and in the life of a TRO when it
[16]
is issued by an Executive Judgeand when it is issued by a Presiding Judge of a records shall be transmitted immediately after raffle. (Emphasis
[15]
court. In Adao vs. Lorenzo, we clarified: supplied).
If the temporary restraining order was issued by respondent in his capacity as In this case, respondent judge issued the questioned TRO in her capacity
Executive Judge, the TRO was good for 72 hours only. Within that period he as Presiding Judge. She should have known that a summary hearing was
was required to summon the parties to a conference before issuing the TRO and indispensable.
then assign the case by raffle. Thus, par. 3 of Administrative Circular No. 20-95 [17]
As we explained in Abundo vs. Judge Manio, Jr.
provides:
…The holding of a summary hearing prior to the issuance of a temporary

If the matter is of extreme urgency, such that unless a TRO is issued, grave
restraining order is mandatory, in view of the requirement that the application
injustice and irreparable injury will arise, the Executive Judge shall issue the TRO
for a temporary restraining order shall be acted upon only after all parties are
effective only for seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but shall immediately
heard in a summary hearing after the records are transmitted to the branch
summon the parties for conference and immediately raffle the case in their
selected by raffle. In other words, a summary hearing may not be dispensed
presence. Thereafter, before the expiry of the seventy-two (72) hours, the
with.
Presiding Judge to whom the case is assigned shall conduct a summary hearing
to determine whether the TRO can be extended for another period until a A TRO can be issued ex parte if the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave
hearing in the pending application for preliminary injunction can be injustice and irreparable injury will arise unless it is issued immediately. Under
conducted. In no case shall the total period of the TRO exceed (20) days, such circumstance, the executive judge shall issue the TRO effective only for
including the original seventy-two (72) hours, for the TRO issued by the seventy-two (72) hours from its issuance. The executive judge is then required to
Executive Judge. (Emphasis added) summon the parties to a conference, during which the case should be raffled in
their presence. Before the expiry of the seventy-two hours, the presiding judge
On the other hand, if the TRO was issued after Civil Case No. 3391 had been raffled
to whom the case was raffled shall conduct a summary hearing to determine
to Branch 2 and respondent judge issued it in his capacity as Acting Judge, then he
whether the TRO can be extended for another period until a hearing on the
should have complied with the following provision of Administrative Circular No. [18]
pending application for preliminary injunction can be held. (Emphasis
20-95, par. 2:
supplied)
The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties are
The reason for this is that Administrative Circular No. 20-95 aims to
heard in a summary hearing conducted within twenty-four (24) hours
restrict the ex parte issuance of a TRO to cases of extreme urgency in order to
after the records are transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. The [19]
avoid grave injustice and irreparable injury.
The rule holds that before a temporary restraining order may be issued, all prevailing rule, but to a large extent, constitutes misconduct, conduct
parties must be heard in a summary hearing first, after the records are prejudicial to the proper administration of justice, and grave abuse of authority;
transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. The only instance when a TRO may however, to be punishable, an act constituting ignorance of the law must not
be issued ex parte is when the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave only be contradictory to existing law and jurisprudence, but must also be
[24]
injustice and irreparable injury will arise unless it is issued immediately. Under motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.
such circumstance, the Executive Judge shall issue the TRO effective for 72 hours
In the present case, there is neither allegation nor proof that respondent
only. The Executive Judge shall then summon the parties to a conference during
judge was motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, corruption or any other ill-
which the case should be raffled in their presence. Before the lapse of the 72
motive.
hours, the Presiding Judge to whom the case was raffled shall then conduct a
summary hearing to determine whether the TRO can be extended for another However, it cannot be ignored that on September 7, 2000, barely a year
period until the application for preliminary injunction can be heard, which before the filing of the present administrative complaint, another administrative
period shall in no case exceed 20 days including the original 72 hours. case had been lodged against respondent judge by the same complainant
[25]
concerning the issuance of a TRO in another civil case without complying
Clearly, respondent Judge Salcedo as presiding judge of Branch 32 to which
with the same requirements of Administrative Circular No. 20-95, docketed as
Civil Case No. SP-5775 (01) was raffled, erred in issuing the questioned TRO
Adm. Matter No. OCA IPI 00-1058-RTJ. In compliance with the directive of this
without conducting the necessary hearing first. Only the executive judge may
Court, respondent filed her comment therein which she now reiterates in the
issue a TRO ex parte, under exceptional circumstances and following a specified
present administrative case.
procedure herein-abovementioned.
Unfortunately, the issue on the issuance of the TRO was sidetracked when
In meting out the correct penalty, we considered the following cases:
the administrative matter was dismissed by this Court for lack of merit per its
[20]
Adao vs. Judge Lorenzo where this Court pronounced that the failure of Resolution dated March 12, 2001, based on the recommendation of then Court
respondent therein, as an Executive Judge, to abide by Administrative Circular Administrator Alfredo Benipayo that what complainant assailed was
No. 20-95 in issuing the TRO constituted grave abuse of authority, misconduct, the wisdom of the decision rendered by respondent judge; that there was already
and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice for which reason, a pronouncement made by this Court that there is no reversible error
[21]
a fine of P5,000.00 was imposed on respondent judge. committed by respondent in the assailed decision; and that complainants
[22] themselves admitted in their complaint that the decision was rendered by the
Abundo vs. Judge Manio, Jr. where the Court reprimanded respondent
court after the case was tried on the merits.
judge and warned him for failing to comply with Administrative Circular No. 20-
[23]
95. The Court explained that while a judge’s disregard of the Supreme Court’s In other words, respondent judge had earlier been apprised of the
pronouncement on temporary restraining orders is not just ignorance of the provisions of Administrative Circular No. 20-95 and therefore, it cannot be said
that she is ignorant of the law. For her conscious disregard of a a basic rule on
the issuance of a TRO, Judge Salcedo must be held administratively liable not
for gross ignorance of the law but for grave abuse of authority and conduct
prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.
For this reason, we find the recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator to fine respondent in the amount of P5,000.00 to be just and
appropriate.
On the other hand, we accept the explanation of Judge Marivic T. Balisi-

Umali, RTC Judge, Branch 30, San Pablo City regarding her dissolution of the
TRO issued by Judge Salcedo of Branch 32 since it was issued in violation of SC
Circular No. 20-95. While the rule is that no court has the authority to nullify
the judgments or processes of another court they having co-equal power to
grant the same reliefs, said rule does not apply to this case for the simple reason
that Judge Balisi-Umali did not nullify the process of another court but she
merely acted as the presiding judge over a case that has been duly assigned to
her Branch by raffle after herein respondent had inhibited herself upon motion
of the complainant.
WHEREFORE, we find Judge Zorayda H. Salcedo of the Regional Trial

Court, Branch 32, San Pablo City guilty of grave abuse of authority and conduct
prejudicial to the proper administration of justice. She is imposed a fine of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) with a stern warning that repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
foreclosed the properties mortgaged by the spouses Robert Alan and Nancy
Limso (spouses Limso).
Pesayco v. Layague
2
On March 25, 2002, the spouses Limso filed Civil Case No. 29,036-2002 before
the RTC presided by Judge Layague for declaratory relief, with prayer for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction. In the complaint, the spouses Limso
SECOND DIVISION
claimed that the period to redeem should be governed by Act 3135 which
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1889 December 22, 2004 provides for a one (1) year redemption period from registration of the sale, not
3
by Republic Act No. 8791 or the General Banking Law of 2000. They also asked
MA. CECILIA L. PESAYCO, complainant, the court that R.A. No. 8791 be declared unconstitutional.
4
vs.
JUDGE WILLIAM M. LAYAGUE, RTC, Branch 14, Davao City, respondent. Pesayco contends that PNB was not notified of the raffle of this civil
5
case. Before the bank was served with summons and a copy of the complaint,
the spouses Limso amended their complaint into a petition, with an application
DECISION 6
for a temporary restraining order (TRO) . On April 10, 2002, Judge Layague
issued a TRO without conducting a hearing. However, after realizing his
TINGA, J.:
mistake, Judge Layague issued an Order dated April 16, 2002 reversing his earlier
7
This administrative case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint dated July 3, 2002, order.
filed before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by Atty. Ma. Cecilia L.
On April 25, 2002, PNB filed a Motion to Dismiss, with Opposition to Petitioner's
Pesayco (Pesayco) against Judge William M. Layague (Judge Layague) of the
Prayer for Issuance ofPreliminary Injunction and Application for Temporary
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14 of Davao City, charging the latter of gross
8
Restraining Order on the ground that the spouses Limso were guilty of forum-
ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order,
shopping after the writ of preliminary injunction granted by Branch 17 of RTC of
manifest partiality, unreasonable delay in the resolution of pending incident and
1 Davao City in Civil Case No. 28,170-2000 was dissolved by the Court of Appeals;
serious misconduct and inefficiency in the performance of his duty.
that there was a pending case involving the spouses Limso and PNB involving
The factual antecedents are as follows: the same issues and the same reliefs; that the petition stated no cause of action;
and that the spouses Limso had no locus standi to file the petition for not being
Pesayco filed the administrative case in her capacity as the Chief Legal Counsel the real parties-in-interest. A hearing on the application for a writ of preliminary
of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), which earlier had extrajudicially injunction was conducted.
On May 3, 2002, Judge Layague issued an Order granting the writ of preliminary similar writ of preliminary injunction issued by a different Branch of the Davao
injunction applied for by the spouses Limso. On May 13, 2002, PNB filed RTC (Branch 17) had been dissolved by the Court of Appeals. She also believes
9
a Motion for Reconsideration of the May 3, 2002 Order . According to Pesayco, that Judge Layague was biased when he denied the Motion to Dismiss in the
Judge Layague had, after issuing the Order filed a leave of absence up to May 31, same order granting the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction without any
10
2002 . However, by reason of his absence, the Motion for Reconsideration was hearing. Further, Pesayco assails the grant of preliminary injunction by Judge
17
resolved by the pairing judge who ruled in favor of PNB by dissolving the writ of Layague because the remedy is not available in a petition for declaratory relief.
11
preliminary injunction per the Order dated May 23, 2002.
Pesayco avers that she is aware of the rule that no notice of hearing is required
Aggrieved by the order of the pairing judge, the spouses Limso immediately when the initiatory pleading does not pray for a temporary restraining order
18
filed a Motion for Reconsideration on May 24, 2002. Judge Layague, Pesayco (TRO). She adds, however, that when the spouses Limso amended their
alleges cut short his leave and returned to work on May 28 or 29, 2002, so that complaint into a petition which included an injunctive relief, Judge Layague
12
he could hear the Motion for Reconsideration of the spouses Limso. should have sent the records back to the Clerk of Court for raffle pursuant to
Section 4(c), Rule 58 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which
On May 30, 2002, the lawyers and the vice-president of PNB filed a counter mandates that the case shall be raffled only after notice to and in the presence of
bond in the amount of P100 million. On that occasion, they were able to talk to the party to be enjoined.
19
Judge Layague, who allegedly expressed his misgivings about the order of the
pairing judge, saying that it was full of loopholes and dealt with "alien matters." Pesayco also alleges in her Affidavit-Complaint that in another case before the
20
Sensing bias and partiality from the statements of Judge Layague, PNB filed same judge and also involving PNB, a Motion for Reconsideration filed nearly a
13
a Motion to Inhibit Judge Layague . On June 24, 2002, Judge Layague reversed year earlier on June 6, 2001 by PNB had yet to be resolved, despite having been
the order of the pairing judge despite the Motion to Inhibit and reinstated his deemed submitted for resolution when PNB filed its reply on August 1, 2001.
14
previous order granting the writ of preliminary injunction. Pesayco points out that Judge Layague has failed to resolve the motion within
21
the reglementary period.
Pesayco is of the opinion that by granting the prayer for injunction, Judge
15
Layague disposed of the main case . She insists that the spouses Limso are In his comment to Pesayco's Affidavit-Complaint, Judge Layague argues that
guilty of forum-shopping since the reliefs they prayed for in Civil Case No. PNB was not entitled to a notice of raffle because what was initially filed was a
22
29,036-2002 are the same as those sought in Civil Case No. 28,170-2000 complaint without a prayer for a TRO. Even when the complaint was amended
entitled Davao Sunrise Investment Development Corporation v. PNB; Robert Alan into a petition, Judge Layague avers that he did not serve summons on PNB as it
16
Limso is the president of the plaintiff corporation in the other case. Pesayco was not necessary adding that he had nothing to do with the raffle of cases.
23
points out that the spouses Limso had sought the preliminary injunction after a What he did instead was to direct the latter to file a comment. As regards the
issuance of the TRO, Judge Layague admits erring in granting the TRO without Judge Layague confirms having met with the lawyers of PNB and its vice-
a hearing, yet points out that he had rescinded such order upon realizing his president but denied saying that the order of the pairing judge were full of
mistake. loopholes and included alien matters. Further, he avers that the denial of
PNB's Motion for Reconsideration on January 10, 2003 was done not out of
As to his issuance of the Order dated May 3, 2002, Judge Layague contends that vengeance but merely for the purpose of correcting the errors committed by the
he granted the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction based on pairing judge. In fact, Judge Layague notes that he subsequently granted
jurisprudence and after a careful consideration of the evidence of both PNB's Motion to Inhibit, albeit only on January 10, 2003, or some months after
24
parties. He avers that he was of the honest belief that the spouses Limso did Pesayco filed the instant complaint.
25
not commit forum-shopping since the two (2) purportedly related cases, did
not involve the same issues. He denies that his order granting the prayer for a Judge Layague admits the delay in resolving PNB's Motion for Reconsideration in
writ of preliminary injunction disposed of the main case because Civil Case No. 28, 469-2001, as he resolved it only on January 10, 2003. He
notwithstanding the order, the parties would still have to present their attributes the delay to his failing health and the condition of his court docket.
26
respective evidence on the proper redemption period. However, he partly blames the counsel for PNB for not reminding him of the
29
pendency of the motion.
Moreover, Judge Layague refutes the claimed that he denied the Motion to
Dismiss of PNB in the same order wherein he granted the prayer for a writ of In its report dated September 17, 2003, the OCA recommends that Judge
preliminary injunction. He cites his Order of May 3, 2002, noting that nowhere Layague be fined in the amount ofP10,000.00 for failure to apply Section 4(c),
in the order did he rule on the motion. He adds that the filing of the Motion to Rule 58 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure when he omitted to have
Dismiss by PNB was not sanctioned by the rules, since the order giving due the case raffled with due notice to PNB after the complaint was amended to
30
course to the petition clearly directed PNB to file a comment, and not a motion include a prayer for a TRO. The OCA also cites Judge Layague for inefficiency
to dismiss. Judge Layague alleges that he stated in open court that the motion with a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. The
27
would be treated as affirmative defenses. OCA, however, recommends the dismissal of the other charges for being judicial
31
in nature.
Judge Layague avers that he went on leave on May 9 up to May 28, 2002 to
32
undergo a physical examination and possibly prostatectomy. He denies having Noting that most of the issues raised in the complaint are sub judice, the OCA
33
purposely cut short his leave so he could hear and resolve the Motion for stresses that a study of the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 71527 reveals that the
Reconsideration of the spouses Limso. He claims that his absence depended on issues raised therein by PNB are essentially the same as those raised in the
28
the outcome of the medical examination. instant complaint. The records of the Court of Appeals show that a decision
favorable to PNB was rendered in the case on December 11, 2002 but on
December 20, 2002 the spouses Limso filed a Motion for Reconsideration which that for liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or
is still to be resolved. Thus, the OCA concludes, on those matters the complaint actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be
is still premature, and any action this Court may come out thereon may found to be erroneous but, most importantly, it must be established that he was
39
injudiciously pre-empt whatever action the Court of Appeals may take on moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other like motive. Similarly, a
34
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the spouses Limso. judge will be held administratively liable for rendering an unjust judgment—one
which is contrary to law or jurisprudence or is not supported by evidence—
The OCA finds Judge Layague accountable on two counts: for failing to apply when he acts in bad faith, malice, revenge or some other similar motive. In
40
Section 4(c), Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and for inefficiency in other words, in order to hold a judge liable for knowingly rendering an unjust
taking all of seventeen (17) months to resolve PNB's Motion for judgment, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is and
Reconsideration in Civil Case No. 28, 469-2001. that it was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. In
41
42
fine, bad faith is the ground for liability in either or both offenses.
No less than the Code of Judicial conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful
35
to the laws and maintain professional competence. Indeed, competence is a In the case at bar, there is dispute that PNB was not entitled to a notice of raffle
mark of a good judge. A judge must be acquainted with legal norms and at the time the initial complaint of the spouses Limso was filed since the same
36
precepts as well as with procedural rules. When a judge displays an utter lack did not contain a prayer for a TRO. However, when the complaint was amended
of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public's confidence in the to include such prayer, a notice of raffle should have been sent to PNB. The
competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. One who accepts OCA, agreeing with Pesayco, submits that Judge Layague's failure to send notice
the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the court the duty to be of raffle constitutes a violation of Section 4(c), Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
proficient in the law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of Procedure, which states:
incompetence. Basic rules of procedure must be at the palm of a judge's hands.
Section 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or
Thus, this Court has consistently held that a judge is presumed to know the law temporary restraining order. —A preliminary injunction or temporary
and when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross restraining order may be granted only when:
37
ignorance of the law. Verily, failure to follow basic legal commands embodied
in the law and the Rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, from which no (c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a
38
one is excused, and surely not a judge. temporary restraining order is included in a complaint or any
initiatory pleading, the case, if filed in a multi-sala court, shall be
However, not every mistake by a judge in the application of the law is vulnerable raffled only after notice to and in the presence of the adverse
to an attack for gross ignorance of the law. A caveat was laid down by this Court party or the person to be enjoined. In any event, such notice shall be
preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by service of summons, prayer for TRO is a gray area which has yet to be clarified by the Court, we could
together with a copy of the complaint or initiatory pleading and the not blame Judge Layague for retaining his assignment absent any express
applicant's affidavit and bond, upon the adverse party in the command in law or jurisprudence for him to abdicate it. Besides, such action is
Philippines. (Emphasis supplied) hardly indicative of any bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other like motive
which characterizes the offense of gross ignorance of the law.
….
However, we agree with the OCA that Judge Layague is guilty of Inefficiency. By
The OCA notes that to allow otherwise would lead to easy circumvention of the his own admission, it took seventeen (17) months to resolve the Motion for
rules by filing first a complaint without any prayer for a TRO, and amending Reconsideration filed by PNB in Civil Case No. 28, 469-2001. Moreover, Judge
such complaint only after the case had been raffled off to include a prayer for Layague resolved the motion for reconsideration only after the filing of the
the issuance of a TRO, thus effectively evading the requirement of notice to the instant complaint, leading one to wonder whether such resolution would have
adverse party, as well as depriving such party the opportunity to witness the been further delayed had Pesayco not lodged the case against him. This is a
raffle of the case. These concerns are quite valid, yet must be qualified by the blatant transgression of the rule that judges should dispose of the case with
following observations. promptitude for the same is not only an ethical issue but a constitutional right
of the litigants as well. In fact, the Code of Judicial Conduct enshrined in its
There is no rule of procedure that authorizes the re-raffling of a case by reason
pages the significance of this obligation on the part of the magistrates:
of an amendment of a complaint to include a prayer for preliminary injunction
or a TRO. Neither has there been jurisprudence holding that such re-raffling CANON 1. Rule 1.02. - A Judge should administer justice impartially and
should be done. It would thus be absurd to require the sending out of notices without delay.
for a non-existent raffle. On this point, Judge Layague could not be taken to task
for not applying Section 4(c) of Rule 58 simply because there is no indubitable CANON 3. Rule 3.05. – A judge shall dispose of the court's business
or settled guidepost that the procedure should be observed in the situation in promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
point.
This tribunal has emphasized that judicial indolence is considered gross
The concerns of the OCA are understandable, and it may well be observed that inefficiency punishable by fine or suspension from service without pay with the
the spouses Limso have come across a loophole to Rule 58. Yet we are mindful gravity of the penalty dependent on the attendant aggravating or mitigating
43
that the issue we are resolving is whether Judge Layague betrayed gross circumstances. Judge Layague ascribes the delay in the resolution of the
ignorance of the law in not applying Section 4(c), Rule 58. Considering that the motion to his ailing health and caseload. But this Court has ruled that if the
notice/raffle requirement in relation to a complaint amended to include a caseload of the judge or any other circumstance prevents the disposition of
cases within the prescribed period, he should ask for a reasonable extension of
time from the Supreme Court, so as to avoid or dispel any suspicion that
44 45
something sinister or corrupt is going on. InGolangco v. Judge Villanueva, we
held that the mandate to promptly dispose of cases or matters applies also to
motions or interlocutory matters or incidents pending before a magistrate.
Unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a pending incident is a violation of
the norms of judicial conduct and constitutes gross inefficiency that warrants
the imposition of an administrative sanction against the defaulting magistrate.
It must be noted that the delay for which Judge Layague is being found liable
pertains to only one pleading filed. This circumstance certainly does not
extenuate Judge Layague from sanction, yet may serve to reduce his penalty. A
fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) is appropriate under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, we find Judge Layague guilty

of INEFFICIENCY and fine him in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00) with a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
(Obico) before the RTC, Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental, and docketed as Civil
Case No. 2009-905. The action was spawned by the alleged threats of
Lago v. Abul
complainants to close the access road leading to Obico’s property, where the
latter’s milkfish (bangus) farm is located. Obico claimed that, if the access road
leading to her property was closed, she would be prevented from harvesting her
SECOND DIVISION milkfish, causing massive fish kills, and leading to heavy financial losses on her
part.
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2255 January 17, 2011
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3335-RTJ) Complainants assert that the civil complaint was never raffled, and that no
notice of raffle was ever served upon them, yet the case went directly to Branch
SPOUSES DEMOCRITO AND OLIVIA LAGO, Complainants, 43, where respondent judge is the acting presiding judge. He is also the acting
vs. executive judge of RTC, Gingoog City. Complainants claim that this is violative
JUDGE GODOFREDO B. ABUL, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH of Section 4(c), Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
43, GINGOOG CITY, Respondent.
2
On July 7, 2009, respondent judge issued an Order directing the issuance of a
DECISION TRO "effective seventy two (72) hours from date of issue," without requiring
Obico to put up a bond. Complainants allege that at that time, they were not yet
NACHURA, J.:
in receipt of the summons and copy of the complaint, as well as Obico’s affidavit
1 and bond. Complainants claim that this is violative of Section 4(c) and (d) of
The case arose from an amended complaint dated December 29, 2009, filed by
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
Spouses Democrito C. Lago and Olivia R. Lago (complainants), charging Judge
Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. (respondent judge) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 3
On July 14, 2009, respondent judge issued an Order extending the 72-hour
Branch 43, Gingoog City, with acts and omissions violative of the Standards of
TRO, which had already expired, "for another period provided that the total
Conduct Prescribed for Judges by Law, the Rules of Court, and the Code of
period should not exceed twenty days." Again, respondent judge failed to
Judicial Conduct.
require Obico to put up a bond even as complainants assert that it is already of
judicial notice that a TRO under the amended new rules has been elevated to
Complainants were the defendants in a civil action for Preliminary Injunction,
the level of an injunction.
Easement of Road Right of Way, and Attorney’s Fees, with prayer for a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), filed on July 2, 2009 by Christina M. Obico
4
In his Resolution dated August 11, 2009, respondent judge ordered, among presided over by Judge Rustico Paderanga, the regular presiding judge of RTC,
others, the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction conditioned upon the Camiguin Province, while Branch 43 was presided over by respondent judge,
application of a bond by Obico in the amount of P100,000.00. Complainants who is the regular judge of RTC, Branch 4, Butuan City.
argue, however, that said directive was violative of Section 5, Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court since they were not required "to show cause, at a specific time Respondent judge claims that he had faithfully observed the provisions of Rule
and place, why the injunction should not be granted." 58 of the Rules of Court, with respect to Civil Case No. 2009-905. He explains
that, as the acting executive judge of RTC, Gingoog City, he took cognizance of
Due to these acts of respondent judge, complainants filed a motion for the civil case, convinced that it had to be acted upon immediately. Thus, the
5
inhibition from further hearing the case, since they perceive that respondent issuance of the 72-hour TRO on July 7, 2009 was by virtue of his sound
judge was bereft of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The motion was discretion based on the civil complaint and its annexes.
6
denied by respondent judge in his Resolution dated October 28, 2009.
Complainants thus consider respondent judge’s non-inhibition as violative of Respondent judge said that he explained in his July 14, 2009 Order that he
the Code of Judicial Conduct, as it denied them due process and equal extended the 72-hour TRO to 20 days in this wise—
protection of the law.

Considering that the TRO previously granted was only for seventy-two hours,
7
On November 11, 2009, respondent judge issued an Order upon Obico’s motion, the same can be extended for another period provided that the total period
directing the reduction of the bond from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00. should not exceed twenty days. In order to prevent plaintiff from incurring
serious damage and heavy financial losses on her part, this court is inclined to
8
Complainants then filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance Further Proceedings on grant the extension of the Temporary Restraining Order for another period not
the ground of the pendency of their appeal before the Supreme Court of the exceeding twenty (20) days inclusive of the seventy two (72) hour period already
12
Order denying the motion for inhibition. However, at the December 15, 2009 granted previously by this court.
9
setting for pre-trial of the civil case, respondent judge issued an Order denying
the motion to hold in abeyance further proceedings. Respondent judge also With respect to the July 14, 2009 hearing for the TRO, respondent judge claims
allowed Obico to present evidence ex parte on January 26, 2010 for failure of that it was justified since he, as a mere acting presiding (and executive) judge of
complainants to appear during the pre-trial.

10 RTC, Gingoog City, conducts hearings in that sala only on Tuesdays and
Wednesdays because he has to travel about 144 kilometers from Butuan City,
11
In his Comment dated February 11, 2010, respondent judge clarifies that, as of where he is actually stationed. In the same July 14, 2009 Order, respondent
the time of the filing of the civil complaint, Branches 27 and 43 of the RTC, judge asserts that the conduct of the summary hearings on days other than
Gingoog City, had no regular presiding judges. Branch 27 was temporarily Tuesdays and Wednesdays would cause undue prejudice to the other cases
already scheduled way ahead of the subject civil action, thus, the sheer We find the recommendations of the OCA to be well-taken.
improbability of being accommodated.
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court on preliminary injunction,
Respondent judge asseverates that the writ of injunction was issued only after a pertinent to this case, provide—
serious consideration of all the factual and legal circumstances of the case. On
the other hand, he insists that the denial of the motion for inhibition was due to SEC. 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or temporary
its lack of factual and legal basis. restraining order.—A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order
may be granted only when:
After due investigation of this administrative case, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) issued its Report dated September 13, 2010, recommending (a) The application in the action or proceeding is verified, and shows
that this case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter, and, based on facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded; and
its finding that respondent judge was grossly ignorant of the law and rules of
(b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the court
procedure, recommended that he be meted a fine in the amount of P25,000.00,
where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or any similar infraction shall
or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect
be dealt with more severely.
that the applicant will pay such party or person all damages which he
The OCA found respondent judge to have been grossly and deliberately ignorant may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order
of the law and procedure for violation of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled
specifically by means of the following acts: (1) when the civil complaint with thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary
prayer for the issuance of a TRO was filed on July 2, 2009, respondent judge injunction shall be issued.
assumed jurisdiction thereon and, without the mandated raffle and notification
(c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a
and service of summons to the adverse party, issued a 72-hour TRO on July 7,
temporary restraining order is included in a complaint or any initiatory
2009; (2) when respondent judge set the case for summary hearing on July 14,
pleading, the case, if filed in a multiple-sala court, shall be raffled only
2009, purportedly to determine whether the TRO could be extended for another
after notice to and in the presence of the adverse party or the person to
period, when the hearing should be set within 72 hours from the issuance of the
be enjoined. In any event, such notice shall be preceded, or
TRO; (3) when he eventually granted an extension of an already expired TRO to
contemporaneously accompanied by service of summons, together with
a full 20-day period; and (4) when he issued a writ of preliminary injunction in
a copy of the complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicant’s
favor of Obico without prior notice to herein complainants and without the
required hearing.
However, where the summons could not be served personally or by single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for
substituted service despite diligent efforts, or the adverse party is a only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance, but shall immediately comply with
resident of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom or is a the provisions of the next preceding section as to the service of summons and
nonresident thereof, the requirement of prior or contemporaneous the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-
service of summons shall not apply. two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a
summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be
(d) The application for a temporary restraining order shall thereafter be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be heard. In no
acted upon only after all parties are heard in a summary hearing which case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order
shall be conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the sheriff’s exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two hours provided
return of service and/or the records are received by the branch selected herein.
by raffle and to which the records shall be transmitted immediately.
In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not
SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception.—No resolved within the said period, the temporary restraining order is deemed
preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the automatically vacated. The effectivity of a temporary restraining order is not
party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by extendible without need of any judicial declaration to that effect, and no court
affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would shall have authority to extend or renew the same on the same ground for which
result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to it was issued.
which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a
temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member thereof, the temporary
from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein restraining order shall be effective for sixty (60) days from service on the party
provided. Within the twenty-day period, the court must order said party or or person sought to be enjoined. A restraining order issued by the Supreme
person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should Court or a member thereof shall be effective until further orders.
not be granted. The court shall also determine, within the same period, whether
or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the The trial court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Tax
corresponding order. Appeals that issued a writ of preliminary injunction against a lower court, board,
officer, or quasi-judicial agency shall decide the main case or petition within six
13
However, subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of (6) months from the issuance of the writ.
extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable
injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a
Culled from the foregoing provisions, particularly with respect to the second judge that he could not set the required summary hearing except on Tuesdays
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, as amended, it is clear and Wednesdays, it should be noted that July 7, 2009, the date of the issuance of
that, on the matter of the issuance of an ex parte 72-hour TRO, an executive the 72-hour TRO, was a Tuesday, yet respondent judge could have set the
judge of a multiple-sala court (applicable to respondent judge), or the presiding summary hearing on July 8, 2009, a Wednesday. He failed to do so on the
judge of a single-sala court, is empowered to issue the same in matters of mistaken notion that, aside from his alleged hectic schedule, he could, at any
extreme emergency, in order to prevent grave injustice and irreparable injury to time, extend the 72-hour TRO for another period as long as the total period did
the applicant. However, it is also an unequivocal provision that, after the not exceed 20 days.
issuance of the 72-hour TRO, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court is
bound to comply with Section 4(c) of the same rule with respect to the service What is more appalling is that respondent judge extended the 72-hour TRO,
of summons and the documents to be served therewith. which had already and obviously expired, into a full 20-day TRO. An already
expired TRO can no longer be extended. Respondent judge should have known
The records of this case clearly show that respondent judge failed to cause the that the TRO he issued in his capacity as an acting executive judge was valid for
raffle of Civil Case No. 2009-905, since RTC, Gingoog City, is a multiple-sala only 72 hours. Beyond such time, the TRO automatically expires, unless, before
court, or to cause the notification and service of summons to complainants after the expiration of the said period, he, supposedly in his capacity as presiding
he issued the 72-hour TRO. Respondent judge’s July 7, 2009 Order was explicit judge to whom the case was raffled, conducted the required summary hearing in
when the civil case was set for summary hearing on July 14, 2009, purportedly to order to extend the TRO’s lifetime. Indubitably, a 72-hour TRO, issued by an
determine whether or not the TRO issued could be extended for another period. executive judge, is a separate and distinct TRO which can stand on its own,
Thus, it is manifest that respondent judge had directly assumed jurisdiction over regardless of whether it is eventually extended or not. It is not, as respondent
the civil action and all together disregarded the mandatory requirements of judge attempts to impress upon us, a mere part of the 20-day TRO issued by a
Section 4(c), Rule 58, relative to the raffle in the presence of the parties, and presiding judge to whom the case is raffled.
service of summons. This is gross error.
Moreover, respondent judge committed another blunder when he ordered the
Even assuming that there was a valid raffle to RTC, Branch 43, Gingoog City, issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction without the required hearing and
where respondent judge acts as the presiding magistrate, the supposed extreme without prior notice to the defendants, herein complainants. The records plainly
urgency of the issuance of the 72-hour TRO was belied by his setting of the disclose that the only hearing conducted prior to the August 11, 2009 Resolution
required summary hearing for the determination of the necessity of extending granting the preliminary injunction was the July 14, 2009 summary hearing for
the 72-hour TRO to 20 days, one week after the issuance thereof. Indeed, the extension of the 72-hour TRO. This could be gathered from the August 11,
Section 5, Rule 58 is explicit that such summary hearing must be conducted 2009 Resolution, wherein respondent judge declared—
within the said 72-hour period. Notwithstanding the explanation of respondent
During the hearing for the determination of the propriety (sic) the Temporary Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law or of the rules,
Restraining Order should be extended or whether the Writ of Injunction be and that, when committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative
granted, the plaintiff presented Christina M. Obico, who in essence testified that sanction, the rule applies only in cases within the parameters of tolerable
14
she operated fish cages at Gingoog Bay. x x x. misjudgment. When the law or the rule is so elementary, not to be aware of it or
to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. One who
Again, Rule 58, as amended, mandates a full and comprehensive hearing for the accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the court proficiency
determination of the propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary in the law, and the duty to maintain professional competence at all times. When
injunction, separate from the summary hearing for the extension of the 72-hour a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the
TRO. The preliminary injunction prayed for by the applicant can only be heard confidence of the public in the courts. A judge is expected to keep abreast of the
after the trial court has ordered the issuance of the usual 20-day TRO. Within developments and amendments thereto, as well as of prevailing jurisprudence.
that period of 20 days, the court shall order the party sought to be enjoined to Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.
15
show cause at a specified time and place why the injunction should not be
granted. During that same period, the court shall also determine the propriety In the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a judge in his
of granting the preliminary injunction and then issue the corresponding order judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. However, the assailed
to that effect. In the case of respondent judge, he gravely failed to comply with judicial acts must not be in gross violation of clearly established law or
what the rule requires, i.e., to give complainants the opportunity to comment or procedure, which every judge must be familiar with. Every magistrate presiding
object, through a full-blown hearing, to the writ of injunction prayed for. over a court of law must have the basic rules at the palm of his hands and
16
Instead, respondent judge railroaded the entire process by treating the summary maintain professional competence at all times.
hearing for the extension of the TRO as the very same hearing required for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.1avvphi1 Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross ignorance of the law or
procedure as a serious offense for which the imposable sanction ranges from
Verily, the absence of the hearing required by the Rules of Court is downright dismissal from the service to suspension from office, and a fine of more
reprehensible and, thus, should not be countenanced. The requirement of a than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. Under the premises, this Court
hearing is so fundamental that failure to comply with it not only amounts to finds it appropriate to impose on respondent judge the penalty of a fine in the
gross ignorance of rules and procedure, but also to an outright denial of due amount of P25,000.00.
process to the party denied such a hearing. Undoubtedly, the acts and omissions
of respondent judge warrant sanction from this Court. WHEREFORE, Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
43, Gingoog City, is found liable for Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure,
and is hereby meted a fine of P25,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition
of the same, or any similar infraction in the future, shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
Bagong West Kabulusan 1 Neighborhood v. Lerma Cupang, Muntinlupa City and covered by TCT Nos. 124275 and 157581 (the lots).
The cases, which were raffled to Branch 80 of the MeTC, were docketed as Civil
Case Nos. 4678-4715.
THIRD DIVISION
Branch 80 of the Muntinlupa MeTC, by decision of March 17, 2000, rendered
judgment in favor of CST Enterprises, Inc., ordering the defendants to vacate the
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1904 February 18, 2005
3
lots and surrender possession thereof to CST Enterprises, Inc. The judgment
BAGONG WEST KABULUSAN 1 NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC. became final and executory following which writs of execution were issued and
4
REPRESENTED BY ITS ACTING PRESIDENT WENEFREDO S. served on the defendants on June 14, 2000.
QUEDOR complainant,
It appears that the defendants refused to vacate the lots. Thus, by Order of
vs.
November 8, 2000, the MeTC directed the defendants to demolish their
JUDGE ALBERTO L. LERMA Respondent.
5
"respective structures" within 5 days from notice thereof. A writ of
6
DECISION demolition dated November 9, 2000 was accordingly issued directing the
sheriff to remove and demolish the houses and improvements introduced by the
CARPIO MORALES, J.: defendants on the lots.
Judge Alberto L. Lerma, Presiding Judge of Branch 256 of the Regional Trial On December 11, 2000, the Association, claiming to represent the
1
Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa, stands charged in a complaint dated September 21, underprivileged and homeless residents of the lots, but without naming the
2001 filed by the Bagong West Kabulusan Neighborhood Association, Inc. (the defendants in Civil Case Nos. 4678-4715, filed a Complaint against MeTC Sheriff
Association) for falsification of court records, gross violation of the Code of Armando M. Camacho, for "Injunction with Very Urgent Petition for the
Judicial Conduct, gross neglect of duty, and gross ignorance of the law with Issuance of Restraining Order to Preserve and Maintain the Status Quo,"
manifest bias and partiality. docketed as Civil Case No. 00-233.
7
The facts which spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows: The Complaint for injunction alleged that under R.A. No. 7279 (Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992), it is mandatory that before demolition
CST Enterprises, Inc. filed before the Muntinlupa Metropolitan Trial Court
or eviction can be effected, adequate relocation, whether temporary or
2
(MeTC) thirty eight (38) complaints forejectment against 39 individuals (the
permanent, be undertaken by the City of Muntinlupa and the National Housing
defendants) who were occupying lots located at West Kabulusan, Barangay 8
Authority with the assistance of other concerned government agencies. It thus
16
prayed that service of the notice to vacate and demolish be held in abeyance By Order of February 5, 2001, respondent denied the Association’s prayer for a
until the provisions of R.A. 7279 have been complied with and that, in the TRO, he finding that no great or irreparable injury would result if a TRO is not
meantime, a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued to preserve and issued immediately. Copies of this order were sent to the parties by registered
9 17
maintain the status quo. mail on February 16, 2001. In the meantime, notice of hearing of the application
for Preliminary Injunction on March 9, 2001 was issued.
On motion of the Association, a special raffle of Civil Case No. 00-233 was set on
10
December 15, 2000. On February 21, 2001, the Association filed a "Motion to Resolve the Pending
Incident of Temporary Restraining Order with Motion to Declare the Defendant
Meanwhile, in a petition filed by the defendants before the Court of Appeals, in Default" which was set by the movant for hearing on February 28, 2001. By
18
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 61991, assailing among other things, the MeTC Order of February 28, 2001, upon motion of the Association, the "Motion to
judgment in the ejectment cases which was sought to be annulled, the appellate Resolve Temporary Restraining Order and to Declare Defendant in default" was
court, by Resolution of December 12, 2000, issued a TRO enjoining the submitted for resolution.
19
11
enforcement of the writ of demolition.
During the hearing of the application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
The Association’s complaint for injunction in Civil Case No. 00-233 was raffled Injunction on March 9, 2001, respondent noted Sheriff Camacho’s absence.
to Branch 256 of the Muntinlupa RTC presided by respondent, Judge Alberto
Lerma. Summons dated January 2, 2001 was thereafter issued to Sheriff Camacho The Association later filed a Motion for Reconsideration of respondent’s Order
requiring him to enter his appearance and answer the Association’s petition of February 5, 2001 (denying the Motion for the issuance of a TRO) which was
20
within 15 days from service thereof, which summons was served on him on denied by Order of March 13, 2001.
12
January 15, 2001.
Meanwhile, due to procedural infirmities and for lack of merit, the Court of
21
Notice dated January 8, 2001 setting for hearing on January 17, 2001 the Appeals, by Resolution of March 19, 2001, dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 61991.
13
Association’s prayer for a TRO was issued. The notice addressed to Sheriff
Camacho was, however, served on him the day after the hearing or on January On motion of the Association, the hearing of "the main case for injunction" in
22
14
18, 2001. As he was not present during the hearing, respondent, on motion of Civil Case No. 00-233 was set for hearing on April 19, 2001 during which the
23
the Association, considered the matter of the issuance of TRO submitted for defendant sheriff again failed to show up. The hearing was thus reset to June
resolution.
15 22, 2001 during which respondent, on motion of the Association, declared its
24
"Motion to Declare Defendant in Default" submitted for resolution.
On September 14, 2001, the Association filed a "Very Urgent Motion to Resolve the enforcement and implementation of the decision rendered by the MeTC in
31
Complaint for Injunction," setting the motion for hearing on September 17, Civil Case Nos. 4678-4715; that on August 23, 2000, before the filing of Civil
25
2001. The Association was later to allege in its present complaint that the staff Case No. 00-233, he dismissed a petition of the defendants against the MeTC
26
of respondent refused to set the said motion for hearing. Branch 80 judge, for "Certiorari and Prohibition or Annulment of Judgment in
Civil Case Nos. 4678-4715 with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction,"
Alleging that respondent, "with manifest bias and partiality and with gross docketed as SP Civil Case No. 00-085, and denied their motion for
ignorance of R.A. 7279 and gross neglect of duty, deliberately delayed the 32
reconsideration of the dismissal; that the defendants elevated the case on
resolution of [Civil Case No. 00-233] in order for . . . [Sheriff] Camacho [to] December 4, 2000 to the Court of Appeals via petition for annulment of
EFFECT THE DEMOLITION before the resolution of [said] case so that [it] will judgment with injunction and very urgent motion for the issuance of a
27
be rendered moot and academic," the Association, through its Acting restraining order (CA-G.R. SP No.
33
61991) challenging (1) the
President, Wenefredo S. Quedor, filed on September 24, 2001 the present MeTC Decision dated March 17, 2000 in Civil Case Nos. 4678-4715; (2) the
complaint against respondent before the Office of the Court Administrator. RTC Order dated August 23, 2000 dismissing on motion of CST Enterprises, Inc.
the petition for certiorari in S.P. Civil Case No. 00-085; (3) the RTC Order dated
In the affidavit of the Acting President of the Association (hereinafter referred to
October 18, 2000 in S.P. Civil Case No. 00-085 denying the motion for
as complainant), it is averred that respondent violated Supreme Court
reconsideration filed by the defendants; (4) the MeTC Order dated November
Administrative Circular No. 20-95 requiring him to act on the application for a
8, 2000 in Civil Case Nos. 4678-4715 granting the motion for the issuance of a
TRO after all parties are heard in a summary hearing conducted within 24 hours
writ of demolition; (5) the MeTC Writ of Demolitiondated November 9, 2000
after the records are transmitted to the branch selected by raffle, he having set
in Civil Case Nos. 4678-4715; and (6) the Notice to Vacate and
for hearing the prayer for TRO only on January 17, 2001 or 33 days after the
28
Demolish dated November 20, 2000 issued by MeTC Sheriff Camacho in Civil
complaint was raffled to his sala.
Case Nos. 4678-4715.
It is further averred in the said affidavit that respondent maliciously and

Respondent further claimed
unlawfully falsified court records by making it appear that he already resolved
that a week after the defendants filed their petition before the appellate court or
the pending incident re the application for the issuance of a TRO by issuing the
onDecember 11, 2000, complainant again filed the Complaint for "Injunction wit
Order of February 5, 2001 when in fact the Motion to Resolve the application
29
h Very Urgent Petition for the Issuance of Restraining Order to Preserve and
was not yet resolved when it was heard on February 28, 2001.
Maintain the Status Quo" (Civil Case No. 00-233); that on December 12, 2000,
30 the Court of Appeals issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 61991 a Resolution enjoining the
Respondent, in his Comments dated November 29, 2001, claimed that several
enforcement of the writ of demolition for a period of 60 days from the date of its
actions were instituted by complainant and/or the defendants to stop at all cost
34
issuance, or until February 10, 2001 on account of which the Notice to Vacate Respondent went on to stress that all his actions and findings in Civil Case No.
and Demolish dated November 20, 2000, all addressed to the defendants, was 00-233 were in accordance with the Rules and the Canons on Judicial Ethics,
35
temporarily suspended. with cold judicial impartiality, and with no other objective but to uphold the
40
rule and majesty of the law.
Respondent furthermore alleged that on August 27,
41
2001, five months after the Court of Appeals dismissed CA- In its memorandum of August 18, 2003, the OCA opines that respondent
G.R. SP No. 61991, complainant filed a motion to suspend proceedings in Civil C should not have deferred the resolution of the pending incidents lest he be
ase Nos. 4678-4715 before Branch 80 of the MeTC for the same purpose, that is, accused of delay. And it finds that respondent offered no explanation why the
to hold in abeyance the enforcement of the notice to vacate and demolish dated order denying complainant’s application for a TRO is dated February 5, 2001
36 42
November 20, 2000; that when the hearing thereon occurred on February 28, 2001.
again, on September 24, 2001, the same daycomplainant filed the present admini
strative case against him and while the motion to suspend proceedings inCivil C To recall, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61991, issued a Resolution on
ase Nos. 4678- December 12, 2000 a day after Civil Case No. 00-233 (which also prayed for a
4715 remained pending, the defendants filed before the RTC a complaint, docket TRO) was filed on December 11, 2000, enjoining the enforcement of the writ of
ed asCivilCase No. 01- demolition against the defendants for a period of 60 days or until February 10,
268, for illegal eviction/demolition, loss of property and damages, injunction an 2001. As respondent was one of the respondents in said CA-G.R. SP No. 61991,
d temporaryrestraining order, relocation/restitution/benefits with prayer for lis his Order dismissing SP Civil Case No. 00-085 being among those challenged in
pendens, which was raffled and assigned to Branch 276, presided by Judge N.C. said case, it is assumed that he was served a copy of said Resolution.
Parello, again praying, among other things, to restrain Sheriff Camacho from
37
Consequently, when Civil Case No. 00-233 was raffled to respondent’s sala on
enforcing the notice to vacate and demolish; and that the motion to suspend
38
December 15, 2000, complainant’s prayer for a TRO had been rendered moot,
proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 4678-4715 was denied on November 9, 2001.
such relief having been already afforded the defendants by the appellate court in
In the main, respondent stressed that all these cases filed after a its Resolution of December 12, 2000. To further act on the therein petitioners’
writ of demolition was issued by the MeTCwere filed for the purpose of restraini prayer for a TRO would thus serve no useful purpose, that is, if respondent was
ng the sheriff from enforcing the notices to vacate and demolish, in violationof t actually notified of the TRO issued by the appellate court.
he rule against forum-shopping under Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
39
Assuming arguendo that, as respondent alleged, complainant was guilty of
Procedure, they involving the same parties, causes of action, and reliefs.
forum shopping, respondent should have dismissed Civil Case No. 00-233 in
43
accordance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
It would appear though that, to avert the possibility of complainant’s Complaint contrary, he was expected to proceed with reasonable promptness to implement
in Civil Case No. 00-233 being dismissed on the ground of forum shopping, it the writ according to its mandate.
made it appear that the parties therein and in CA-G.R. SP No. 61991 are not one
and the same. Complainant faults respondent for violating Supreme Court Administrative
Circular 20-95 for failure to call for a hearing on its application for a TRO within
A perusal of the allegations embodied in the complaint in Civil Case No. 00-233 24 hours after the case had been raffled to his sala on December 15, 2001, he
shows, however, that the Association-herein complainant actually represented having set the same for hearing only on January 17, 2000. Upon the assumption
the defendants- petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No. 61991: that the appellate court’s Resolution granting a TRO had not yet come to the
notice of respondent at the time Civil Case No. 00-233 was raffled to him,
Under date of November 17, 1999, CST Enterprises Inc. filed with the what is mandatory in the circular is the giving of notice and opportunity for the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City presided by Hon. Noli C. Diaz 39 adverse party to be heard and interpose objections in a summary hearing, before
(sic) ejectment cases against hereinplaintiffs and docketed as Civil Case Nos. a prayer for a TRO is acted upon. The period within which to conduct a
44
4678 to 4715 xxx. summary hearing is not 24 hours after the case has been raffled but 24 hours
after the records are transmitted to the branch to which it is raffled.
If indeed the Association-herein complainant represented the underprivileged
and homeless citizens of West Kabulusan, Brgy. Cupang in Civil Case No. 00- Pertinent paragraphs of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 20-95 are
233, it failed to comply with the requirements set forth under Rule 3, Section 3 of quoted hereunder:
45
the Rules of Court that when an action is prosecuted by a representative, the
beneficiaries shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed as the 1. Where an application for temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ
real parties in interest. On that score alone, the complaint could have been of preliminary injunction is included in a complaint or any initiatory
46
dismissed – for lack of cause under Sec. 1(d) of Rule 16. pleading filed with the trial court, such complaint or initiatory pleading
shall beraffled only after notice to the adverse party and in the presence
More. In the complaint in Civil Case No. 00-233, complainant did not implead of such party or counsel.
the Presiding Judge of Branch 80 of the MeTC who issued the writ of demolition
dated November 9, 2000 and CST Enterprises Inc. which stood to be adversely 2. The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties
affected in case a TRO was issued by respondent. On the other hand, the duty of are heard in a summary hearing conducted within twenty-four (24)
Sheriff Camacho, who was the sole defendant in the said case, to execute the hours after the records are transmitted to the branch selected by
writ of demolition was purely ministerial. In the absence of a directive to the raffle.The records shall be transmitted immediately after raffle.
xxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Again, granting arguendo that respondent may have erred in not taking a more
suitable course of action, given the circumstances surrounding the case, not to
This circular is now incorporated in the present Rules of Court as Rule 58, mention the palpable intent of the defendants to trifle with judicial processes,
Section 4 as follows: any lapse on his part can be seen as mere error of judgment, of which he may
not be held administratively liable in the absence of a showing of bad faith,
SEC. 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or restraining 49
malice, or corrupt purpose.
order. - A preliminary injunction ortemporary restraining order may be granted
only when: As for complainant’s imputation to respondent of falsification of court records
by making it appear that he already resolved the application for the issuance of a
xxx
TRO as early as February 5, 2001 when the application was yet to be heard on
February 28, 2001: The records before this Court disclose that the February 5,
(c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary
2001 Order denying complainant’s prayer for a TRO was sent to the parties by
restraining order is included in a complaint or any initiatory pleading, the case,
50
registered mail on February 16, 2001.
if filed in a multi-sala court, shall be raffled only after notice to and in the
presence of the adverse party or the person sought to be enjoined. In any event,
It is thus possible that when complainant filed on February 21, 2001, its "Motion
such notice shall be preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by service of
to Resolve the Pending Incident of Temporary Restraining Order with Motion to
summons, together with a copy of the complaint or initiatory pleading and the
Declare Defendant in Default," the hearing of which motion was set by
applicant’s affidavit and bond, upon the adverse party in the Philippines.
complainant-movant on February 28, 2001, complainant had not yet received
the February 5, 2001 Order of the Court.
xxx
Respecting the charge that respondent exhibited gross ignorance of the

(d) The application for a temporary restraining order shall thereafter be acted
provisions of R.A. 7279 with manifest bias and partiality, such allegation remains
upon only after all parties are heard in a summary hearing which shall be
unsubstantiated.
conducted within twenty four (24) hours after the sheriff’s return of service
and/or records are received by the branch selected by raffle and to which the
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, for insufficiency of evidence, the
records shall be transmitted immediately. (Underscoring supplied)
administrative complaint against respondent is hereby DISMISSED.
Clearly, the circular and the Rules of Court seek to minimize the ex-
47 48
parte, precipitate and improvident issuance of TROs.
Trial Court of Lupon, Davao Oriental, with Manifest Bias and Partiality, Undue
Delay in the Disposition of Case and Ignorance of the Law.
SECTION 5
Complainant alleged that she is the defendant in Civil Case No. 1110 for Forcible
Editha Palma Gil v. Lopez, Jr. Entry and Damages with Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction,
entitled "Carlos Palen, Sr., Plaintiff versus Editha Palma Gil, Defendant," pending
FIRST DIVISION
before the sala of respondent judge; and that respondent failed to render
judgment therein within the thirty-day period required by Rule 70, Section 11 of
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1453 April 29, 2003
the 1997 Code of Civil Procedure. She further averred that on October 9, 2001,
EDITHA PALMA GIL, complainant, the plaintiff in the said case filed a motion for temporary restraining order,
vs. which respondent Judge granted on the same day, despite procedural defects
JUDGE FRANCISCO H. LOPEZ, JR., Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Lupon, therein such as the lack of a verification, bond, and service of summons, all in
Davao Oriental, respondent. violation of Rule 58, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Complainant
further assails the manner in which the temporary restraining order was
RESOLUTION implemented with the assistance of policemen.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: In his Comment dated March 1, 2002, respondent judge denied that there was a
deliberate and unreasonable delay in the resolution of Civil Case No. 1110. He
A magistrate should dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases
alleged that aside from his court, he had to hear the cases in the municipal
within the required periods. Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith
courts in Governor Generoso and San Isidro, Davao Oriental due to the
and confidence of the public in the institution of justice, lowers its standards
inhibition of the presiding judges therein. Moreover, he alleged that the legal
and brings them into disrepute. Every judge must cultivate a capacity for quick
and factual issues raised in Civil Case No. 1110 are complicated. Anent the
decision; he must not delay the judgment which a party justly deserves. The
alleged issuance of temporary restraining order, respondent claims that what he
public trust reposed in a judge's office imposes upon him the highest degree of
issued was a status quo order because complainant's men entered the land in
1
responsibility to promptly administer justice.
dispute and attempted to prevent the harvesting of palay by plaintiff. Finally,
2
respondent states that he had to seek the assistance of the police to implement
In an Affidavit-Complaint dated October 30, 2001, complainant Editha Palma
the order because his court had no regular sheriff and because there were armed
Gil charged respondent Judge Francisco H. Lopez, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit 3
guards employed by both parties.
In compliance with our Resolution dated August 14, 2002, 4 both parties Rule 3.05. - A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and
manifested their willingness to submit the case on the basis of the pleadings decide cases within the required periods. (Emphasis ours)
5
filed.
Moreover, SC Administrative Circular No. 13-87 provides:
After evaluation, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found respondent
guilty of delay in the rendition of judgment in Civil Case No. 1110 and erred in 3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII,
issuing a temporary restraining order despite procedural defects. Hence, it Section 15 of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all
recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters
(P10,000.00). must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of

submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are
We agree with the findings of the OCA, however, we find the recommended given a period of three months to do so. . . (Emphasis ours)
penalty to be not commensurate with the gravity of respondent's misdeeds.
Along the same vein, SC Administrative Circular No. 1-88 states:
The reasons proffered by respondent judge, i.e., that he had to hear cases in the
6
other courts, will not excuse his delay in deciding Civil Case No. 1110. If he felt 6.1 All Presiding Judges must endeavor to act promptly on all motions
that he could not decide the case within the reglementary period, he should and interlocutory matters pending before their courts. x x x .
7
have asked for a reasonable extension of time to decide the same.
Considering the summary nature of Civil Case No. 1110, which is an action for
The office of a judge exists for one solemn end - to promote the ends of justice forcible entry, Rule 70, Section 11 of the 1997 Rules of Summary Procedure
by administering it speedily and impartially. The judge as the person presiding expressly provides:
8
over that court is the visible representation of the law and justice. Failure to
Period for rendition of judgment. - Within thirty (30) days after receipt of
resolve cases submitted for decision within the period fixed by law constitutes a
the affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for
serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition
9
filing the same, the court shall render judgment.
of their cases.
However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material

Rules 1.02 of Canon 1 and 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct state:
facts, it may, during the said period, issue an order specifying the
Rule 1.02. - A judge should administer justice impartially and without matters to be clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or
delay. (Emphasis ours) other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of
said order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after
receipt of the last affidavit or the expiration of the period for filing the (c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a
same. temporary restraining order is included in a complaint or any initiatory
pleading, the case, if filed in a multiple-sala court shall be raffled to only
The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just to gain time for after notice to and in the presence of the adverse party or the person to
the rendition of judgment. (Emphasis ours) be enjoined. In any event, such notice shall be preceded, or
Thus, respondent judge is guilty of gross inefficiency for his failure to resolve
a copy of the complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicant's
and dispose of Civil Case No. 1110 within the period prescribed by the Rules. The
10
penalty for gross inefficiency ranges from reprimand and admonition to
11 12
removal from office and/or a fine. However, where the summons could not be served personally or by
Respondent judge likewise erred in issuing the temporary restraining order.
resident of the Philippines, temporarily absent therefrom or is a
Rule 58, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
nonresident thereof, the requirement of prior contemporaneous service
of summons shall not apply.
Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order. - A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
(d) The application for a temporary restraining order shall thereafter be
order may be granted only when:
acted upon only after all the parties are heard in a summary hearing
which shall be conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the
(a) The application in the action or proceeding is verified and shows
sheriff's return of service and/or the records are received by the branch
facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded; and
selected by raffle to which the records shall be transmitted immediately.
The records reveal that the motion for temporary restraining order was not
13
verified. Respondent judge issued the Order on the same date when the
motion was filed without prior notice to the complainant and without a hearing.
that the applicant will pay to such party or person all damages which he
may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order
The issuance of the assailed Order cannot be justified under Rule 58, Section 5
if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads:
thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary
injunction shall be issued.
Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. - No restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original
preliminary injunction shall be grantedwithout hearing and prior seventy-two (72) hours provided therein. (Emphasis and italics ours)
notice to the person or party sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear
from the facts shown by the affidavits or by the verified application that Aside from the lack of verification of the motion, no affidavits of the applicant
great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the and his witnesses were appended thereto. Furthermore, the assailed Order did
matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for not specify the duration of the temporary restraining order.
preliminary injunction was made, may issue a temporary restraining

Respondent argues that considering that the complaint in Civil Case No. 1110
order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service
was verified and prayed for the issuance of a preliminary and prohibitory
on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided.
injunction, the verification of the motion for issuance of temporary restraining
Within the said twenty-day period, the court must order said party of
order may be dispensed with. We do not agree.
person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction
should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or
The Rules as above-quoted explicitly mandate that the application for injunction
not the preliminary injunction shall be granted and accordingly issued
should be verified. While litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case
the corresponding order.
must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an
14
orderly administration of justice.
However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the
matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave
We see nothing wrong in respondent's act of securing the assistance of the
police in implementing his Order. Administrative Circular No. 12-85, paragraph
court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte a
7 allows a judge to designate or deputize any person to serve court processes
temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours
and writs in remote areas in the absence of the regular sheriff thereat.
from issuance but he shall immediately comply with provisions of the
next preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be Furthermore, the better part of prudence, caution and plain conventional
served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) wisdom dictates the presence of the police on account of the potentially violent
hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a situation engendered by the presence of armed followers of the contending
summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order factions.
heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary Considering the seriousness of the respondent judge's offenses, stiffer penalties
should be imposed to inculcate in him the value of being proficient in both
substantive and procedural laws.
15
In Cañas v. Castigador, we held:
Observance of the law which he is bound to know and sworn to uphold

is required of every judge. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge
owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In short, when the law is so
elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
In the case at bar, the ignorance of respondent judge is so gross that he should
16
be held administratively liable even if he acted in good faith. Hence, the
imposition of a fine in the amount of P20,000.00 is a more appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, respondent Judge Francisco H. Lopez, Jr.

of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lupon, Davao Oriental, is found GUILTY
of gross ignorance of the law and gross inefficiency. He is ordered to pay a FINE
in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
October 2003, however, MVRDC filed a petition for annulment of real estate
mortgage and accounting with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
LAGO VS. ABUL – SEE SECTION 4
injunction and temporary restraining order ("petition") against complainant.
The case was filed before the RTC-Tuguegarao and docketed as Civil Case No.
Fortune Life Insurance v. Luczon, Jr.
6246. On the same day, RTC-Tuguegarao Executive Judge Vilma T. Pauig
EN BANC ("Judge Pauig") issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining
complainant and the deputy sheriff from holding a foreclosure sale of MVRDC’s
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1901 November 30, 2006 real properties on 10 October 2003. The TRO was to be effective for 72 hours.
The clerk of court sent a notice for the special raffle of the case on 13 October
FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE, COMPANY, INC., represented by AMBROCIA
2003.
G. CANCIO, Complainant,
vs. On 13 October 2003, MVRDC filed a motion for the extension of the TRO
JUDGE JIMMY H. F. LUCZON, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, ("motion for extension"), with notice of hearing for 16 October 2003. On the
Tuguegarao, Branch 1,Respondent. latter date, after the raffle of the case to his sala, respondent Judge issued an
1
Order extending the TRO for another 17 days.
RESOLUTION
On 28 October 2003, respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction

CARPIO, J.:
prayed for by MVRDC. Respondent Judge had not yet conducted any hearing on
the case. The injunction order reads:
For resolution is the administrative complaint filed by Fortune Life Insurance
Company, Inc. ("complainant"), through its Senior Vice-President Ambrocia G.
Considering the fact that the temporary restraining order will expire on October
Cancio, against Jimmy H. F. Luczon, Jr. ("respondent Judge"), Presiding Judge of
30, 2003 a date appearing from the allegations of the motion[,] that irreparable
the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao ("RTC-Tuguegarao"), Branch 1. The
injuries may result should the sheriff pursue the foreclosure of the mortgage[,]
charges are grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of the law, knowingly
the Court hereby grants the injunction subject however to a bond which will
rendering an unjust order, and bias and partiality under Section 3, Rule 140 of
answer for the damages which the defendants may suffer as a result of the
the Revised Rules of Court.
injunction and the bond is fixed at P300,000.00
Complainant had sought the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage executed in its
This injunction will take effect upon filing of the bond and shall continue until
favor by Maria Victoria Realty and Development Corporation ("MVRDC"). On 8
further orders from this Court.
The Sheriff and any of his deputies are hereby enjoined from enforcing the irreparable injuries to MVRDC. Respondent Judge further claimed that
foreclosure of the mortgage during the pendency of this injunction. complainant received a copy of the Motion to Set Hearing for the Issuance of
Preliminary Injunction, as shown by a registry receipt posted on 17 October
2
xxxx 2003. At any rate, respondent Judge stressed, he already issued an order
dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction on 18 March 2004 after
Complainant assailed the extension of the TRO and the issuance of the writ of
complainant filed a motion to dissolve the writ and MVRDC had filed its
preliminary injunction "based purely on the unilateral allegations of MVRDC."
comment to the motion.
Complainant argued that respondent Judge should not have issued the TRO or
writ without a summary hearing, especially considering that MVRDC’s petition In its evaluation of the allegations of both complainant and respondent Judge,
lacked an affidavit of merit. Complainant asserted that it clearly had the right to the OCA stated:
foreclose the mortgage. MVRDC defaulted in the payment of its loan, as shown
3
by copies of dishonored MVRDC checks totaling P3,165,810. Complainant The instant complaint is partly meritorious. Complainant stresses pertinent
pointed out that under the law, MVRDC would have the right to redeem any of points to account for respondent’s alleged culpability. A probe into each reveals
its foreclosed properties. Thus, according to complainant, there was no extreme that many of the issues raised are judicial in nature. Save for one, the
urgency, grave injustice or irreparable injury which would justify the injunction enumerated points warrant no culpability on the part of respondent Judge.
in MVRDC’s favor.
Complainant assails the supposed lack of an Affidavit of Merit. Viewed in the
In its 1st Indorsement dated 2 March 2004, the Office of the Court context of the actual petition for preliminary injunction, this contention cannot
Administrator (OCA) required respondent Judge to file his comment and to be countenanced. The absence of an Affidavit of Merit is not final where the
show cause why he should not be sanctioned. petition itself, which is under oath, recites the circumstances or facts which
constitute the grounds of the petition.
In his defense, respondent Judge claimed that he did not know personally the
counsels of either party to the case or any of their incorporators. Respondent Complainant also takes issue with the fact that it was not furnished a copy of
Judge maintained that he dealt with the parties on a professional level and he the bond. Apparently, this contention is premised on Section 7 of Rule 58, 1997
always acted fairly. Rules of Civil Procedure, which in effect allows the adverse party to "except to
the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon." Again, said
Respondent Judge claimed that complainant received a copy of the motion for contention cannot be sustained in light of the circumstances of the case at hand.
extension, as shown by a registry receipt posted on 13 October 2003. He granted A check with the records of the instant case discloses that the summons, a copy
the motion for extension in view of the urgency of the case and to avoid of the petition, and raffle notification were actually received by the complainant
on 10 October 2003. In Caluya v. Ramos, the failure of the defendants to furnish When the law or the rule is so elementary, not to be aware of it or to act as if
the adverse parties with copies of the bonds prior to their approval is not one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judges are duty-
sufficient to invalidate the orders dissolving the preliminary injunction where bound to be faithful to the law and the rules and to maintain professional
the attorneys for the latter were notified of the filing of the first bond; where competence at all times. Their role in the administration of justice requires a
they ultimately received copies of the bonds; and where they do not contend continuous study of the law, rules and jurisprudence, lest public confidence in
that said bonds are insufficient or that the sureties are not solvent. the judiciary be eroded by incompetence and irresponsible conduct.
Except for the allegation of lack of summary hearing, complainant’s charges x x x [I]t bears stressing that a writ of injunction is an extraordinary, peremptory
against respondent Judge should be dismissed for being judicial in nature. remedy that should be dispensed with circumspection, and both sides should
Essentially the same allegations were raised in the Motion to Dissolve Writ of first be heard whenever possible. In fact, judges are enjoined to observe utmost
Preliminary Injunction. The complainant assails the wisdom of the assailed caution, prudence and judiciousness in the issuance of [a] TRO and in the grant
Orders of respondent. However, it must be noted that the complainant has of preliminary injunction. In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, it was found that
adequate remedy under the Rules of Court to challenge said Orders. In fact, it the issuance of the assailed TRO was tainted with grave abuse of discretion for
filed a [m]otion to [d]issolve the [w]rit of [p]reliminary [i]njunction which was having been issued without prior notice and hearing.
eventually granted on 18 March 2004.
Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, "Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure" is
We submit, however, that the absence of summary hearing cannot be excused. classified as [a] serious offense for which the imposable sanction ranges from a
The conduct of a summary hearing is mandated under Section 5, Rule 58, 1997 fine to dismissal. However, we find [respondent Judge’s] acts not ingrained with
Rules of Procedure x x x x. malice or bad faith. x x x x
The requirement of hearing is so basic and fundamental that an omission of Recommendation: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the
[such] amounts to gross ignorance of rules and procedure and invites due Honorable Court are the recommendations that:
sanction. In this case, respondent [Judge] twice ignored this elementary
requisite. First, he extended the TRO. Then, after its expiration, he converted 1. The instant complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative case;
the same into a preliminary injunction. Both Orders were issued without
2. Respondent [Judge] be meted a fine in the amount of five thousand
conducting a summary hearing. The rules on preliminary injunction plainly
pesos for gross ignorance of the law; and
provide that it cannot be granted without notice to the defendant.
3. The rest of the charges against respondent [Judge] be DISMISSED for

4
being judicial in nature.
The evaluation and recommendation of the OCA are well-taken, except for the seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall
penalty. conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the temporary
restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary
5
The Rules of Court and Administrative Circular No. 20-95 require the holding injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the
of a hearing where both parties can introduce evidence and present their side temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original
before the court may issue a TRO or an injunctive writ. Section 5 of Rule 58 seventy-two hours provided herein. (Emphasis supplied)
provides:
Upon the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, where the matter is of
SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. — No extreme urgency and grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise, the
preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice Executive Judge may issue ex parte a TRO effective for 72 hours from issuance.
to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts Before the expiry of the 72 hours, the presiding judge to whom the case is raffled
shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the TRO can be
would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the extended until the pending application for injunction can be heard.1âwphi1
court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may
issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of Evidently, the hearing of the motion for extension set on 16 October 2003 did
twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, not take place. All the same, respondent Judge granted the motion on that date,
except as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court without mentioning the reason for the lack of hearing, or whether he intended
must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and to conduct one in the future on the prayer for the issuance of an injunction.
place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the Further compounding his error, respondent Judge failed to conduct a hearing on
same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, the injunction within the 20-day life of the TRO, as prescribed by the Rules of
and accordingly issue the corresponding order. Court. Yet he issued the assailed injunction order against complainant. The
injunction order did not even explain why no hearings had taken place prior to
However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is its issuance.
of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable
injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a Injunction is an extraordinary remedy to be resorted to when there is a pressing
single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for necessity to avoid injurious consequences that cannot be remedied under any
6
only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately comply standard compensation. A court may issue an injunction only if it is fully
with the provisions of the next preceding section as to service of summons and convinced of its extreme necessity and after it has complied with the procedural
the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid requirements set by law.
In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his shall be raffled only after notice to the adverse party and in the presence
7
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. However, the assailed of such party or counsel.
judicial acts must not be in gross violation of clearly established law or 2. The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all
procedure, with which every judge must be familiar. Every judge, while parties are heard in a summary hearing conducted within twenty-
presiding over a court of law, must have the basic rules at the palm of his hands four (24) hours after the records are transmitted to the branch
8
and maintain professional competence at all times. selected by raffle. The records shall be transmitted immediately after
raffle.
Respondent Judge’s failure to abide by Section 5, Rule 58 and Administrative 3. If the matter is of extreme urgency, such that unless a TRO is issued,
Circular No. 20-95 constitutes gross ignorance of the law for which he must be grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise, the Executive Judge
9
disciplined accordingly. Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by shall issue the TRO effective only for seventy-two (72) hours from
A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge issuance but shall immediately summon the parties for conference and
and penalized with dismissal, suspension, or a fine ranging from above P20,000 immediately raffle the case in their presence. Thereafter, before the
to P40,000. expiry of the seventy-two (72) hours, the Presiding Judge to whom
the case is assigned shall conduct a summary hearing to
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Jimmy H. F. Luczon, Jr. of the
determine whether the TRO can be extended for another period
Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Branch 1, liable for GROSS IGNORANCE
until a hearing in the pending application for preliminary
OF THE LAW and FINE him P21,000. We STERNLY WARN him that a
injunction can be conducted. In no case shall the total period of the
repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe
TRO exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two (72)
sanction.
hours, for the TRO issued by the Executive Judge.
4. With the exception of the provisions which necessarily involve
SO ORDERED.
multiple-sala stations, these rules shall apply to single-sala stations
FOOTNOTES: especially with regard to immediate notice to all parties of all
5
Administrative Circular No. 20-95, Re: Special Rules for Temporary Restraining applications for TRO.
Orders and Preliminary Injunctions, provides: x x x x (Emphasis supplied).
1. Where an application for temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ
of preliminary injunction is included in a complaint or any initiatory
pleading filed with the trial court, such complaint or initiatory pleading
injunction against FAPE. He alleged that FAPE was required by law to

pay subsidy to Pacasum College, Inc. under the Educational Service
Gomos v. Adiong
Program of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS);
that although the DECS has already released to FAPE the total amount
FIRST DIVISION
of P746,000,000.00 for payment to different participating schools, FAPE
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1863 October 22, 2004 refused to release to Pacasum College, Inc. the sum of P1,845,040.00
which represented the remaining unpaid collectible of the said
ATTY. JOSE ALFONSO M. GOMOS, FUND FOR ASSISTANCE TO PRIVATE institution for the school year 2000-2001; that the continued refusal by
EDUCATION (FAPE),complainants, FAPE to release the said amount has caused the school to fail in its
vs. obligation to pay the salaries of its teachers for 3 months.
JUDGE SANTOS B. ADIONG, Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Marawi
1
City, respondent. On the same day the petition was filed, respondent judge granted the
application for preliminary mandatory injunction upon the posting by the
DECISION petitioner of a surety or property bond in the amount of P200,000.00.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: On February 28, 2001, the respondent judge issued another order directing the
president of FAPE, Dr. Roberto T. Borromeo, "to prepare and issue a check for
In two verified complaints dated March 12, 2001 and March 22, 2001 filed with
P1,845,040.00 representing the payment to the Pacasum College, Inc. x x x
the Office the Court Administrator (OCA), Sultan Sabdulah Ali Pacasum, in his
payable to its president and chairman Saripada Ali Pacasum, the petitioner
capacity as President and Chairman of Pacasum College, Inc., Atty. Alfonso M. 2
herein." On the same day, Sheriff Acmad Alipanto served upon FAPE, throught
Gomos and Dr. Roberto T. Borromeo, as counsel and President of the Fund for
its president, summons and a copy of the petition.
Assistance to Private Education (FAPE) respectively, charged respondent Judge
Santos B. Adiong of RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City with gross ignorance of law, On March 5, 2001, FAPE filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition docketed
abuse of authority and gross misconduct. 3
as CA-G.R. No. 63533 before the Court of Appeals, challenging the Orders, both
dated February 26, 2001, issued by the respondent judge. It argued that a
The antecedent facts are as follows:
pending ownership dispute between Sultan Sabdulah Ali Pacasum and Saripada
Ali Pacasum over the shares of the Pacasum College before the Securities and
On February 26, 2001, Saripada Ali Pacasum filed Special Civil Action
Exchange Commission precludes the release of the remaining balance of the
No. 690-01 for mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory
subsidy to Pacasum College under the ESC Program, which requires that any
dispute must be settled first before the release could be made. The petition In his Comment, respondent judge claimed that he took cognizance of Special
further stated that the RTC of Marawi City has no jurisdiction to enforce the Civil Action No. 690-10 after it was raffled to his court. He found that the
writs of mandamus and preliminary injunction to FAPE, in its principal office in pleadings were in order; that after a careful examination of the pleadings
Makati City, since the place is outside the 12th judicial region where it submitted by the petitioner, he saw an extreme necessity to resolve the case
4
belongs. FAPE also prayed for the issuance of a TRO against Saripada Ali expeditiously; and that all the pending incidents has been rendered moot and
Pacasum and his agents who have been harrassing its employees with hourly academic with the dismissal of Special Civil Action No. 690-10.
calls and threats of bodily harm.
After evaluation of the records, the OCA found that the respondent judge was
On March 9, 2001, Sheriff Acmad Alipanto and Saripada Ali Pacasum served an liable for gross ignorance of the law, oppression and abuse of authority; that the
Order dated March 7, 2001, which was allegedly issued on a mere ex-parte respondent, as the Presiding Judge of RTC, Marawi City, has no authority to
motion by Saripada Ali Pacasum, reiterating the Orders of February 26, 2001 enforce a preliminary injunction in Makati City where the principal office of
with a warning that "failure to comply would be under pain of contempt of FAPE was located; that he violated the rights of FAPE employees when he
5
court." On March 13, 2001, Saripada Ali Pacasum together with a Makati summarily cited them in contempt without regard to the procedure prescribed
policeman served warrant of arrest upon Dr. Borromeo. by the Rules of Court. He abused his authority when he issued a warrant of
arrest on May 25, 2001 despite a TRO issued by the Court of Appeals.
On March 14, 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a TRO enjoining the respondent Accordingly, the OCA made the following recommendations:
judge from enforcing the orders of February 26, 2001. Despite the TRO,
respondent judge ordered the arrest of Dr. Borromeo and certain FAPE 1. This matter be re-docketed as a regular administrative case against
employees for failure to comply with his directive. Two of FAPE’s employees, the respondent judge;
namely: Evangeline Domondon and Nenita Torres, were subsequently arrested
and detained. 2. Respondent judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
the rules;
On March 12, 2001, Sultan Sabdulah Ali Pacasum filed a letter complaint before
the OCA charging the respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law and 3. Respondent judge be meted with the penalty of FINE in the sum of
6
gross misconduct. On March 22, 2001, a similar letter-complaint was filed by Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00).
Atty. Jose Gomos on the same ground that the respondent judge violated the 7
Upon being directed by the Court, complainants manifested their willingness to
hearing, notice and jurisdictional requirements of the Rules of Court in issuing
submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings
the questioned orders of February 26 and 28, 2001.
8
submitted. Respondent judge, on the other hand, failed to file his manifestation In the case at bar, the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is not a
hence, the Court was constrained to dispense with the filing thereof. mere deficiency in prudence, or lapse of judgment on the part of respondent
judge but a blatant disregard of basic rules constitutive of gross ignorance of the
We agree with the recommendations of the OCA, except as to the penalty. law. The responsibility of judges to keep abreast of the law and changes therein,
as well as with the latest decisions of the Supreme Court, is a pressing need. One
Respondent judge granted Saripada Ali Pacasum’s application for preliminary
cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory acquaintance with the statute and
mandatory injunction on the very same day the Special Civil Action No. 690-01
procedural rules. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know,
was filed on February 26, 2001. Sections 4(c) and 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of 11
9
excuses no one – not even judges.
Civil Procedure is very explicit that the writ of preliminary injuction may issue
only after prior notice and hearing upon the adverse party. In issuing the subject Respondent judge is likewise guilty of gross ignorance of the law for summarily
writ on the very same day the application was filed and considering that the punishing FAPE’s president and employees without any written charge for
person against whom the same was to be served was located in Makati, indirect contempt or giving them any opportunity to explain their refusal to
summons could not have been served upon them or a hearing conducted in obey the court’s order, as mandated by Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of
evident disregard of the due process requirements of the Rules of Court. 12
Civil Procedure. What makes the act more reprehensible was the four FAPE
employees cited for contempt, two of whom were arrested and detained with
Respondent judge’s failure to comply with procedural due process is aggravated
the exception of Dr. Borromeo, were not even impleaded in Special Civil Action
by his total inattention to the parameters of his jurisdiction. As the presiding
No. 690-10. Worse, the arrest of the said employees was made despite the
judge of RTC, Marawi City, he should have known that Makati City was way
issuance by the Court of Appeals of a TRO enjoining the respondent from
beyond the boundaries of his territorial jurisdiction insofar as enforcing a writ of
enforcing the Order of February 26, 2001.
preliminary injunction is concerned. Section 21(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended,
provides that the RTC shall exercise original jurisdiction in the issuance of writs The contempt power was given to the courts in trust for the public, by tradition
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and and necessity, inasmuch as respect for the courts, which are ordained to
injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions. The administer the laws necessary to the good order of society, is as necessary as
10
rationale, as explained in Embassy Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, is "that the respect for the laws themselves. As in all other powers of the court, the
trial court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin contempt power, however plenary it may seem, must be exercised judiciously
acts being performed or about to be performed outside its territorial and sparingly. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride,
jurisdiction." 13
prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties. The failure of
a judge to afford the alleged contemner the opportunity to be heard as a matter
of due process of law deserves administrative sanction.
The seeming eagerness and haste with which respondent judge demonstrated in Obviously, after being chastised twice, respondent judge has remained
issuing the assailed orders, warrants and writ betray a design to railroad judicial undeterred in disregarding the law which he has pledged to uphold and the
processes to favor a preferred litigant. The act of a judge in citing a person in Code which he has promised to live by. He appears undaunted by the previous
contempt of court in a manner which displays obvious partiality is deplorable penalties and warnings he received. If only for this, we are constrained to
and violative of Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires a judge impose a penalty more severe than a fine, as earlier recommended. Suspension
to behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity and from office for 6 months would be reasonble under the circumstances.
14
impartiality of the judiciary. A judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
grave abuse of judicial authority for having precipitately adjudged guilty of WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Santos B. Adiong, Presiding Judge of Regional
indirect contempt in disregard of the elementary rules of procedure. Trial Court, Branch 8, Marawi City, is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the
law for issuing a writ of preliminary injunction in violation of Section 21(1) of
The Court recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and Sections 4(c) and 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of
and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, Civil Procedure and for citing FAPE employees in contempt of court in
but only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where, disregard of Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly,
however, the procedure is so simple and the facts so evident as to be beyond he is SUSPENDED from office without salary and other benefits for SIX (6)
permissible margins of error, to still err thereon amounts to ignorance of the MONTHS with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
15
law. dealt with more severely.
Under Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, amending Rule 140 of the Rules of Court SO ORDERED.
on the Discipline of Justices and Judges, gross ignorance of the law is classified
as a serious charge which carries with it a penalty of either dismissal from
service, suspension for more than 3 months but not exceeding 6 months, or a
fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
We take judicial notice that the respondent judge had been previously
sanctioned in (1) A.M. No. RTJ-98-1407 per Resolution of July 20, 1998, where he
was fined in the sum of P20,000.00 for ignorance of the law; and (2) A.M. No.
RTJ-00-1581 per Resolution of July 2002, where he was also fined in the sum of
P5,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion.
investigation of the charged leveled against respondent; namely, gross ignorance

of the law, gross misconduct and grave abuse of authority.
Merontos v. Zerna
The Facts
THIRD DIVISION
The facts of this case are as follows.

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1506 August 9, 2001
3
On June 7, 1996, respondent issued a Temporary Restraining Order in Civil
JOSEFINA MERONTOS Vda. De SAYSON, complainant,
Case No. 07-373 in favor of the plaintiff, Napoleon Lee Sr.; and against the
vs.
defendants – Francisco Lumayag, Jose Bravo and Ricardo Sayson – as well as
Judge OSCAR E. ZERNA, respondent.
their agents, heirs and representatives. The Order directed defendants to refrain
from entering the parcel of land covered by OCT No. P-11750, registered under
PANGANIBAN, J.:
the plaintiff's name in the Registry of Deeds of Lanao del Norte. The disputed
A temporary restraining order (TRO) may be issued ex parte by an executive lot, which is situated in Barangay Gumagamot, Lala, Lanao del Norte, has an
judge in matters of extreme emergency, in order to prevent grave injustice and area of 10,741 sq.m. It is bounded southeast, southwest, and northwest by the
irreparable injury. Because such issuance of a TRO shall be effective only for Gumagamot River, and northeast by the property claimed by herein
seventy-two hours therefrom, as provided under Administrative Circular No. 20- complainant.
95, the ex parteissuance of a 20-day TRO is unauthorized and may make the
On June 9, 1996, the TRO was served upon complainant by Deputy Sheriff
judge administratively liable.1âwphi1.nêt
Conrado Hingco Jr., who thereafter entered her two-hectare fishpond and
The Case harvested prawn and fish products from it.
Before us is an administrative case arising from a verified Letter- In her verified Letter-Complaint, complainant sought injunction and damages
1
Complaint dated February 25, 1997, filed by Josefina Merontos vda. de Sayson from respondent, whom she charged with bad faith in the issuance of the TRO
against Judge Oscar E. Zerna of the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, without notice and hearing. She claims that the TRO was issued "with patent
2
Branch 7. In a letter dated March 3, 1997, Public Attorney II Vermin M. Quimco violation and disregard of the constitutional right of due process of the
of the Public Attorney's Office, Iligan City, endorsed the Complaint to then undersigned who is not even a party to the case," and that it was a "clear
Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo. Attorney Quimco requested an disregard and disobedience to Supreme Court Circular No. 20-95 prohibiting
judges from issuing Temporary Restraining Orders (TROs) without the
observance of the mandatory requirement of notice and summary hearing of the process which includes the opportunity to be notified and heard in a
parties concerned." In her words: summary hearing as required by the cited Supreme Court circular
4
before issuance of the same."
"That on or about the second week of June 1996, while he was actually
acting and performing his functions and duties as [p]residing [j]udge of In his Comment dated July 15, 1997, respondent denied that the TRO was issued
RTC Branch 07, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, with apparent and manifest with ignorance of the law and abuse of authority. He contended:
bias in favor of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 07-373, in the person of
Napoleon Lee Sr., and with patent violation and disregard of the "On June 7, 1996, a complaint was filed by plaintiff Napoleon T. Lee, Sr.
constitutional right of due process of the undersigned who is not even a versus Francisco Lumayag, Jose Bravo alias 'Joe' and Ricardo Sayson for
party to the case, said Judge Oscar Zerna, wilfully, wrongfully, and if not Injunction and Damages. The plaintiff alleged that he [was] an owner of
with gross ignorance of the constitution and pertinent law, and clear a certain parcel of land at Barangay Gumagamot with an area of 10,741
disregard and disobedience to Supreme Court Circular No: 20-95 sq.m., which is bounded on the S.E., S. W., and N. W., along lines 1-2-3-
prohibiting judges from issuing Temporary Restraining Orders (TROs) 4-5-6-7-8-9 by Gumagamot River and on the N.E., along lines 9-10-11-12-
without the observance of the mandatory requirement of notice and 13-14-1[, a] property claimed by Josefina Sayson. – Plaintiff further
summary hearing of the parties concerned, did actual[ly] issue and alleged that he ha[d] title of ownership over the land as evidenced by
promulgate a temporary restraining order. A certified copy of said OCT No. (KATIBAYAN NG ORIGINAL NA TITULO) No. P-11, 750,
restraining order which would speak for itself is hereto attached as Kaloob na Patente Blg. 123509-195-216, as registered in the Registry of
Annex A of this verified complaint. Deeds of Lanao del Norte x x x.
"That is the very same temporary restraining order utilized by Sheriff "Upon receipt of the complaint and finding [that] the subject matter of
Conrado Hingco Jr. the [p]rovincial [s]heriff of Judge Oscar Zerna, in this case was the harvest of the prawn over the lot in question, the
entering x x x the land that I possessed and tilted to my name, right Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order as prayed for considering
after the issuance of said TRO, and capitalizing on my the perishable nature of the prawn and the ready buyer during the
ignorance/innocence about legal process, he deceived me and my family harvest by enjoining the defendants for a period of 20 days from
to believe that such order authorize[d] him to harvest the prawn and harvesting the same. The defendants complained of the issuance of
fishpond products we introduced in my said fishpond. x x x. Temporary Restraining Order even charging the [c]ourt of ignorance of
the law by citing Administrative Circular No. 20-95-that the[c]ourt did
"That as the restraining order speaks for itself, neither [complainant] not conduct summary hearing with notice within 24 hours[;] however
nor any of the defendants were afforded by Judge Zerna x x x due the[c]ourt did not also [lose] sight of the fact that in his opinion the
matter was of extreme urgency considering the perishable nature of the pleading filed with the trial court, such complaint or initiatory pleading
prawn and its ready buyer. This is also provided for in par. 3 of said Circ. shall be raffled only after notice to the adverse party and in the presence
No. 20-95 in that if the matter is of extreme urgency and that grave of such party or counsel.
injustice and irreparable injury will arise, the [e]xecutive [j]udge shall
issue a Temporary Restraining Order effective only for 20 days from its "2. The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties
issuance. are heard in a summary hearing conducted within twenty-four (24)

hours after the records are transmitted to the branch selected by raffle.
Recommendation of the Court Administrator The records shall be transmitted immediately after raffle.
After evaluating the pleadings and the records filed by the parties, the court "3. If the matter is of extreme urgency, such that unless a TRO is issued,
administrator found that respondent was remiss in the performance of his grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise, the Executive Judge
duties. He granted the TRO effective, not for seventy-two hours as prescribed by shall issue the TRO effective only for seventy-two (72) hours from
law in cases of extreme urgency, but for the maximum of 20 days; and he did so issuance but shall immediately summon the parties for conference and
without conducting beforehand a summary hearing, as required under immediately raffle the case in their presence. Thereafter, before the
Administrative Circular No. 20-95. expiry of the seventy-two (72) hours, the Presiding Judge to whom the
case is assigned shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether
He recommends that respondent judge be fined P5,000 and "sternly warned that the TRO can be extended for another period until a hearing [o]n the
6
a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely." pending application for preliminary injunction can be conducted. In no
case shall the total period x x x exceed twenty (20) days, including the
The Court's Ruling
original seventy-two (72) hours, for the TRO issued by the Executive
Judge.
We agree with the court administrator. Administrative Circular No. 20-95
requires that an application for a TRO shall be acted upon, only after all parties
xxx xxx xxx
are heard in a summary hearing. It clearly provides:
The Circular aims to restrict the ex parte issuance of a TRO only to cases of
"SUBJECT: RE: SPECIAL RULES FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 7
extreme urgency, in order to avoid grave injustice and irreparable injury. Such
ORDERS AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS.
TRO shall be issued only by the executive judge and shall take effect only for
seventy-two (72) hours from its issuance. Furthermore, within the said period, a
"1. Where an application for temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ
summary hearing shall be conducted to determine whether the Order can be
of preliminary injunction is included in a complaint or any initiatory
extended for another period until a hearing on the pending application for a WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with
preliminary injunction can be conducted. more severely.
Untenable is respondent judge's contention that the Circular allows an SO ORDERED.

executive judge, in case of extreme urgency, to issue an ex parte TRO effective
for twenty days. Judges should be diligent in keeping abreast of developments in
law and jurisprudence, consistent with the mandate that the study of law is a
8
never-ending process.
9
In Golangco v. Villanueva, the Court held that the judge's disregard of the
Supreme Court's pronouncement on TROs was not just ignorance of the
prevailing rule, but also misconduct and grave abuse of authority. To be
punishable, however, ignorance of the law must be motivated by bad faith,
10
fraud, dishonesty or corruption. We find bad faith and dishonesty on the part
of respondent judge. He avers in his Comment that there was extreme urgency
in the ex parte TRO because the prawns, which were subject to spoilage, were
perishable; and the buyer was already waiting for the harvest. But Napoleon
Lee's Complaint did not contain such allegations. Nowhere was there any
mention of the immediate need of harvesting prawns or any produce from the
disputed property. Obviously, respondent is now clutching at straws. He had no
justifiable reason at all in immediately issuing the 20-day TRO.
Besides, the TRO was clearly rushed. Just a day after the plaintiff's Complaint
was filed on the afternoon of June 7, 1996 the TRO was issued and served on
herein complainant, without any effort to notify the defendants or to schedule a
summary hearing.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, Judge Oscar E. Zerna is hereby found LIABLE for gross ignorance
of the law, misconduct and grave abuse of discretion and FINED P5,000 with
promulgated on 10 June 2004, and 7 April 2005, respectively which annulled and
set aside the status quo order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4,
IN READMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT VS. HON. ABESAMIS – GO TO 3 4
Balanga, Bataan, dated 2 December 2002, and affirmed the order dated 11
SECTION 4 5
December 2002 denying respondents’ motion to dismiss.
The antecedents follow.

Llamson v. Logronio
Petitioner Miguel M. Llamzon is an Enterprise Service Officer III at the
Industrial Relations Unit, Bataan Economic Zone. He was formally charged with
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
SECOND DIVISION 6
service for having billed Edison (Bataan) Cogeneration Corporation overtime
fees for unloading of fuel for the dates 28 February 2000 and 20 March 2000,
G.R. No. 167745 June 26, 2007
despite knowledge that the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) had
MIGUEL M. LLAMZON, petitioner, discontinued billing registered locator/enterprises for overtime fees since 17
vs. December 1999. Petitioner filed his answer denying the charges against him and
ALMA FLORENCE LOGRONIO, NESTOR HUN NADAL and NICANOR requested a formal investigation and the transfer of the venue of the case to the
OLIVAR constituting the PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY Civil Service Commission Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga. This
CENTRAL BOARD OF INQUIRY, INVESTIGATION AND DISCIPLINE request was however denied, and the investigation was conducted by the PEZA
(PEZA-CBIID), PEZA Special Prosecutor NORMA CAJULIS and PEZA Central Board of Inquiry, Investigation and Discipline (PEZA-CBIID).
Director General LILIA DE LIMA,respondents.

While investigation was on-going, petitioner requested the PEZA-CBIID to
DECISION allow the PNP Crime Laboratory to examine the written contents of the billings
for overtime fees. The request was denied by PEZA-CBIID considering that the
TINGA, J.: National Bureau of Investigation had already issued a finding that the signatures
appearing in the billings are those of the petitioner.
1 2
The instant petition for review stems from the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74874 Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint on 17 September 2002 for
damages against respondents, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction, for allegedly
depriving him of his right to present witnesses for himself and to have he had indeed recalled his order of inhibition and would proceed to try the case,
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in the administrative considering that Branch
investigation. On the same date, Judge Benjamin Vianzon, presiding judge of
RTC, Branch 4, Balanga, Bataan, issued a TRO for twenty (20) days "for the 4 is a single-sala court and the matter of inhibition would have to be referred to
maintenance and preservation of the status quo," and scheduled the hearing for the Supreme Court, and it would take months before a new judge is designated.
7
preliminary injunction.
Meanwhile, respondents’ motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 565-ML was denied
13
Respondents moved to lift the TRO on the ground of non-holding of a summary by Judge Vianzon in his Order dated 11 December 2002.
hearing and failure of petitioner to show extreme urgency for the issuance of
8
Respondents brought the matter to the Court of Appeals, imputing grave abuse
said TRO. Respondents’ motion was denied by Judge Vianzon.
of discretion on the part of Judge Vianzon in: (i) his conduct of the proceedings
Respondents filed before the Office of the Court Administrator a complaint for before him; (ii) vacating his earlier order of inhibition; (iii) issuing the status
incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, misconduct, quo order dated 28 November 2002; and (iv) issuing the 11 December 2002 Order
and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice against Judge denying their motion to dismiss.
Vianzon. They also filed a motion for his inhibition in Civil Case No. 565-ML
9
The Court of Appeals found the petition partly meritorious. It ruled that Judge
which Judge Vianzon granted in his Order dated 21 October 2002.
Vianzon failed to observe Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Respondents moved for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 565-ML but petitioner concerning applications for preliminary injunction and TRO. According to the
opposed the motion. In the interim, petitioner filed a motion to maintain appellate court, Judge Vianzon granted a TRO for 20 days instead of only 72
the status quo, which Judge Vianzon granted through an Order dated 2 hours, and he did not conduct a summary hearing within 72 hours to determine
14
10
December 2002 (status quo order). Petitioner, on the other hand, filed a whether the TRO should be extended. The status quo order was issued also in
motion for reconsideration of the order of inhibition dated 21 October violation of the aforementioned Rule, specifically the portion which provides
11
2002, and a motion to cite petitioner in contempt for resuming the that the TRO shall not exceed 20 days and is deemed vacated if the application
administrative investigation upon the expiration of the TRO. for preliminary injunction is not resolved within the 20-day period and that no
court has the authority to extend or renew the TRO on the same ground for
15
Confused with the orders of Judge Vianzon, respondents filed a manifestation which it was issued.
seeking clarification whether the judge had recalled his earlier order of
12
inhibition. In his Order dated 15 November 2002, Judge Vianzon clarified that In addition, the Court of Appeals considered moot the issue of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Judge Vianzon in recalling his order of inhibition. It
found that the judge had already inhibited himself from hearing Civil Case No. infirmities in respondents’ petition which the Court of Appeals disregarded
16
565-ML via an Order dated 24 February 2003. when it gave due course to the petition.
The appellate court also found that respondents were unable to show that the As for the alleged defects in respondents’ petition before the Court of Appeals,
issuance of the 11 December 2002 Order denying their motion to dismiss was petitioner claims that respondents (i) failed to attach the certified true copies of
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. They likewise failed to file a motion for the assailed Orders; (ii) omitted the
reconsideration of the said order of denial, and were unable to show that the
filing thereof was unnecessary. discussion on the denial of the motion to dismiss; (iii) failed to state the date of
receipt of the third assailed Order; (iv) questioned the issuance of the 20-day
In the end, the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the 2 December TRO embodied in the 17 September 2002 Order when it was not even among
2002 status quo order, but dismissed the petition with respect to the order dated those included in the Orders assailed in their petition; (v) failed to file a motion
17
11 December 2002 denying the motion to dismiss. for reconsideration of all the assailed orders; (vi) filed a defective certificate
against forum shopping; (vii) failed to include an affidavit of service; and (viii)
Petitioner sought partial reconsideration of the decision, arguing for the are politically motivated when they filed the charges against petitioner.
20
propriety of the 20-day TRO and thestatus quo order of Judge Vianzon, and
pointing out alleged defects in respondents’ petition. The Court of Appeals For their part, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argue
18
denied the motion for lack of merit. that an ex-parte TRO is issued only in extremis, and has a lifetime of only 72
hours. In the instant case, the trial court issued the TRO ex-parte for a full term
Petitioner now proposes that the Court of Appeals erred when it: (i) ruled that of 20 days, and despite there being no clear showing that the applicant had a
the TRO and status quo order were wrongfully issued; and (ii) did not dismiss clear legal right that should be protected by the writ being sought. Furthermore,
respondents’ petition despite several defects which should have merited the respondents see the status quo order issued by Judge Vianzon as very much akin
outright dismissal thereof. to a writ of injunction, forbidding respondents from prosecuting the case
21
against petitioner.
According to petitioner, the TRO and status quo order were made in compliance
with Sec. 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In particular, he claims Anent Judge Vianzon’s order of inhibition, respondents state that while the
that a 20-day TRO can be issued without prior notice or hearing if it is shown matter of inhibition is within the sound discretion of the
that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant. On the other hand,
he justifies the status quo order by saying that it was issued on a ground judge concerned, that same discretion could not be invoked by the same judge
19
different from that for which the earlier TRO was made. He adverts to several in determining whether or not to recall or vacate his earlier order inhibiting
himself. There must be good and valid legal grounds for such recall, otherwise, Furthermore, within the said period, a summary hearing shall be conducted to
it becomes grave abuse of discretion and an indication of bias and partiality for a determine whether the Order can be extended for another period until a
22
judge to recall his earlier order of recusation. hearing on the pending application for preliminary injunction can be
26
conducted.
The petition must be denied.
The rule thus holds that before a TRO may be issued, all parties must be heard
At the onset, it must be emphasized that the propriety of the 20-day TRO is a in a summary hearing first, after the records are transmitted to the branch
non-issue. It was never raised as an issue in the petition before the Court of selected by raffle. The only instance when a TRO may be issued ex parte is when
Appeals, nor squarely ruled upon by the appellate court. Instead, it was the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave injustice and irreparable injury
discussed in conjunction with the propriety of Judge Vianzon’s issuance of will arise unless it is issued immediately. Under such circumstance, the
the status quo order dated 2 December 2002. But in any case, the Court will Executive Judge shall issue the TRO effective for 72 hours only. The Executive
delve into the mechanics of issuing TROs, if only to provide the proper Judge shall then summon the parties to a conference during which the case
perspective to the discussion of the related issue. should be raffled in their presence. Before the lapse of the 72 hours, the
23
Presiding Judge to whom the case was raffled shall then conduct a summary
Sec. 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court proscribes the grant of preliminary
injunction without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be
the application for preliminary injunction can be heard, which period shall in no
enjoined. However, the rule authorizes the court to which an application for 27
case exceed 20 days including the original 72 hours.
preliminary injunction is made to issue a TRO if it should appear from the facts
shown by affidavits or by the verified petition that "great or irreparable injury It thus becomes apparent that Judge Vianzon erred in issuing a TRO effective,
24
would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice," but not for 72 hours as prescribed by law in cases of extreme urgency, but for the
only for a limited 72-hour period. maximum of 20 days; and he did so
The second paragraph of Sec. 5, Rule 58 was actually lifted from paragraph 3 of without conducting beforehand a summary hearing, and without showing that
25
Administrative Circular No. 20-95, which aims to restrict the ex parte it falls under the exceptional circumstances enumerated by the Administrative
issuance of a TRO only to cases of extreme urgency in order to avoid grave Circular No. 20-95 where a TRO may be issued by the Executive Judge before
injustice and irreparable injury. Such TRO shall be issued only by the executive assignment by raffle to a judge without first conducting a summary hearing.
judge or single-sala station judge and shall take effect only for 72 hours from its
issuance. Now on to the real issues of this case.
The status quo order dated 2 December 2002 reads: The 2 December 2002 Order which directed that the "existing status quo be
maintained restraining and enjoining defendants from continuing with the
Considering the "[M]otion to Maintain Status Quo" filed by plaintiff, through hearing" was, for all intents and purposes an indefinite extension of the first
counsel Atty. Francisco Flaminiano, Jr., and finding the same to be in order, and TRO, or "a renewed or second temporary restraining order proscribed by the
considering further that the hearing on the propriety on the issuance of the writ rule and extant jurisprudence."
29
of preliminary injunction is still pending hearing and no subsequent order has

been issued after the issuance of the court’s order dated September 17, 2002, let The status quo order is in fact, worse than a second TRO since unlike an
the existing status quo be maintained restraining and enjoining defendants from ordinary TRO which has a lifetime of only 20 days, Judge Vianzon directed the
continuing with the hearing of Administrative Case No. 2002-01 until further maintenance of the status quo for an indefinite period, or "until further order
orders from this court. from this court." It was not a writ of preliminary injunction, because as
previously mentioned, the hearing on the application for the writ is still
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied) pending. Besides, in the event of an injunctive writ, an injunction bond is
30
required, unless exempted by the Court.
The above Order was improperly issued by Judge Vianzon. It was, for all intents
and purposes, a mere continuation of the 20-day TRO erroneously issued. Another important factor which militates against the correctness of the issuance
Indeed, this Court has ruled that a status quo ante order has "the nature of a of the status quo order is the fact that Judge Vianzon no longer had authority to
28
temporary restraining order." A TRO do so because he had already inhibited himself from hearing the case as early as
21 October 2002, or more than a month before he issued the 2 December
shall be effective only for a period of 20 days from notice to the party or person
2002 status quoorder. It appears that Judge Vianzon did not even forward his
sought to be enjoined. During the 20-day period, the judge must conduct a
order of inhibition to this Court, nor waited for the Court's resolution, but
hearing to consider the propriety of issuing a preliminary injunction. If no
instead immediately recalled his order of inhibition and proceeded to try the
action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within
case.
the said 20 days, the TRO would automatically expire on the 20th day by the
sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary. In the Now, to the alleged infirmities of respondents’ petition before the Court of
instant case, no such preliminary injunction was issued; in fact, as stated in the Appeals which petitioner claims should have merited its outright dismissal.
Order, "the hearing on the propriety on the issuance of the writ of preliminary Most of the alleged defects are connected with Judge Vianzon’s 15 November
injunction is still pending," hence, the TRO earlier issued, 2002 Order which recalled his earlier order of inhibition. Petitioner submits that
assuming arguendo that it was indeed validly issued, automatically expired respondents did not attach a certified true copy of the said Order, neither did it
under the aforesaid provision of the Rules of Court. indicate the date of receipt of the same, nor filed a motion for its
reconsideration. The other remaining issues are: (i) the alleged failure to file a the Court has dispensed with this requirement in several instances. Thus, a
motion for reconsideration of, and failure to discuss, the 11 December 2002 previous motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition for certiorari
Order of denial of respondents’ motion to dismiss; (ii) the failure to state in the is necessary unless: (i) the issue raised is one purely of law; (ii) public interest is
certificate on non-forum shopping that they filed administrative complaints involved; (iii) there is urgency; (iv) a question of jurisdiction is squarely raised
33
against Judge Vianzon; and (iii) the failure to attach the affidavit of service to before and decided by the lower court; and (v) the order is a patent nullity. In
the petition. the instant case, respondents stated that they did not file a motion for
reconsideration of the status quo order because it would be a useless exercise
As explained by the Court of Appeals, the order of recall of Judge Vianzon’s considering Judge Vianzon’s predilection for issuing orders without stating or
inhibition is already moot and academic, since he had already issued an Order specifying his basis therefor. In any case, the Court of Appeals found the status
31
dated 24 February 2003 inhibiting himself once again from the proceedings. quo order to be a nullity, since it was made in violation of the Rules of Court.
32
Besides, a new judge has already been assigned to hear the case. Thus, the fact
that only a photocopy of the 15 November 2002 Order was attached to the Petitioner maintains that respondents submitted a defective certificate against
petition cannot justify the dismissal of the entire petition, especially since forum shopping when they failed to declare the administrative complaints they
respondents attached the certified true copies of the other assailed Orders (2 filed against Judge Vianzon. The Court finds that the omission of the
December 2002 status quo order and 11 December 2002 denial of the motion to administrative cases against Judge Vianzon is not fatal to respondents’ petition.
dismiss) to the petition. For the same reason, respondents’ failure to state the Ultimately, what is truly important to consider in determining whether forum
date of receipt of the 15 November 2002 Order will not justify the dismissal of shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and party-litigant by a
the petition. party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or to
grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the
Even the purported absence of a discussion on the order denying respondents’
motion to dismiss cannot be a ground of the petition’s outright dismissal, since process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
34
the other issues raised therein were sufficiently discussed. As pointed out by the different fora upon the same issue. The administrative cases against Judge
Court of Appeals, it is because of this failure to show that the denial of motion Vianzon pending before the Office of the Court Administrator will not affect the
was tainted with grave abuse of discretion, and that respondents failed to file a outcome of the civil case a quo.
motion for reconsideration of the denial, that the petition was dismissed for lack
of merit insofar as it assailed the validity of the 11 December 2002 Order. Finally, on the alleged failure to attach an affidavit of service, the Court defers to
the finding of the Court of Appeals that an affidavit of service was "attached to
While the general rule is that before certiorari may be availed of, petitioner the petition stating that copies thereof were sent to respondents by registered
35
must have filed a motion for reconsideration of the act or order complained of, mail on January 14, 2003, as evidenced by registry receipts nos. 494 and 495."
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a
challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals of 10 June 2004 and Resolution of 7 summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be
April 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74874 are hereby AFFIRMED. extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be heard. In no
case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order
Costs against petitioners. exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two hours provided
herein.
SO ORDERED.
In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not
resolved within the said period, the temporary restraining order is deemed
FOOTNOTES:
23 automatically vacated. The effectivity of a temporary restraining order is not
Sec. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception.
extendible without need of any judicial declaration to that effect and no court
No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to
shall have authority to extend or renew the same on the same ground for which
the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by
it was issued.
affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would
However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member thereof, the temporary
result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to
restraining order shall be effective for sixty (60) days from service on the party
which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue
or person sought to be enjoined. A restraining order issued by the Supreme
temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days
Court or a member thereof shall be effective until further orders.(Emphasis
from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein
supplied.)
provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court must order said party or
(The original provision where the term "ex parte" described the nature of a
person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should
judge’s issuance of a 20-day TRO was deleted pursuant to an amendment made
not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not the
by the Court en banc in its Resolution in Bar Matter No. 803 of 17 February 1998,
preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the
Mendoza v. Ubiadas, 462 Phil. 632, 647 (2003).
corresponding order.
24
Id.
However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is
25
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 20-95, September 12, 1995
of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable
TO: COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS,
injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL
single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for
TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL
only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately comply
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, SHARI'A DISTRICT COURTS, SHARI'A CIRCUIT
with the provisions of the next preceding section as to service of summons and
the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-
COURTS AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE

PHILIPPINES
xxxx
3. If the matter is of extreme urgency, such that unless a TRO is issued, grave
injustice and irreparable injury will arise, the Executive Judge shall issue the
TRO effective only for seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but shall
immediately summon the parties for conference and immediately raffle the case
in their presence. Thereafter, before the expiry of the seventy-two (72) hours,
the Presiding Judge to whom the case is assigned shall conduct a summary
a hearing in the pending application for preliminary injunction can be
conducted. In no case shall the total period of the TRO exceed twenty (20) days,
including the original seventy-two (72) hours, for the TRO issued by the
Executive Judge.
xxxx
OMA staff and Regional Directors were not yet classified as Career Executive
Service (CES) positions. Hence, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) approved
Tomawis v. Caudang
Caudang's appointment as permanent.
On February 18, 1991, the directorship positions in the OMA, including those of
Regional Directors, were classified as CES positions thereby requiring CES
EN BANC
eligibility for permanent appointments. Said reclassification was embodied in
G.R. No. 166547 September 12, 2007 CSC Resolution No. 94-2925 and CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, both dated
May 13, 1994.
UMBRA M. TOMAWIS, petitioner,
7
vs. On February 4, 1993, Caudang received a notice that she had been replaced by
ATTY. NORA M. TABAO-CAUDANG, respondent. Mr. Umbra Tomawis (Tomawis), the latter having been appointed by then
President Fidel V. Ramos. Aggrieved, Caudang requested a ruling from the CSC
DECISION on her status (of appointment) as Regional Director. Before the CSC could
resolve the matter, on April 29, 1993, Caudang filed a petition for quo
NACHURA, J.:
warranto against Tomawis before this Court, but the same was dismissed for
1 lack of certification of non-forum shopping and verified statement of material
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of
8
dates, as required by Revised Circular No. 1-88 and Circular No. 28-91.
Appeals (CA), dated September 8, 2004, in CA-G.R. SP No. 84424, and its
2
Resolution dated December 20, 2004. The assailed Decision annulled and set 9
On January 4, 1994, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 94-0014 declaring
3
aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur, Branch 8,
Caudang's appointment as permanent. She was declared as the lawful
Marawi City, dated September 15, 2003 in Special Civil Action No. 820-02, as
incumbent, giving her the right to recover the position through a petition
4 5
well as its Order and Writ of Execution dated April 23, 2004.
for quo warranto before the appropriate court.
Factual and Procedural Antecedents

On the basis of the above resolution, on February 4, 1994, Caudang filed a
petition for quo warranto docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 33246. On June 30, 1994,
On September 1, 1987, then Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) Executive Director
6 the CA granted Caudang's petition reinstating her to the position and ordering
Jiamil I.M. Dianalan (Dianalan) appointed Atty. Nora M. Tabao-Caudang
10
Tomawis to vacate and relinquish the same. However, on motion for
(Caudang) as Regional Director of Region XII-B, pursuant to Section 8 of
reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General, the CA reversed itself in an
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 122-A, as amended by E.O. No. 295. At that time, the
11
Amended Decision dated October 17, 1994, ruling that the petition should not On December 18, 2001, then OMA Executive Director Habib Mujahab A. Hashim
15
have been entertained in the first place for being violative of the procedural (Hashim) issued a Memorandum to Tomawis clarifying that his appointment
rules on non-forum shopping, given the identical petition Caudang earlier filed was merely temporary and that a new appointment may be issued either in his
with this Court. On appeal before this Court via a petition for review favor or to another qualified individual. He was directed to start clearing himself
on certiorari, we denied the petition for failure to show that a reversible error of money, property and all other office accountabilities. On March 8, 2002,
16
had been committed by the appellate court. The said denial had become final Hashim issued Office Order No. 0079, series of 2002 reinstating Caudang to
and executory and the same was subsequently entered in the Book of Entries of the contested position. Consequently, Tomawis was directed to vacate and
12
Judgments. formally relinquish the position and turn over the office, along with its funds
and properties, to Caudang.
Left with no other recourse, Caudang went to the CSC and moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution of CSC Resolution No. 94-0014. In Resolution No. Caudang then requested the CSC to issue an order affirming the continuity of
13
966231 dated September 23, 1996, the CSC denied Caudang's motion. The CSC her service from the time she was separated from service on February 8, 1993
noted that Caudang's petition for quo warranto was dismissed by the CA, thus, until her reinstatement in 2002. On July 29, 2002, the CSC denied Caudang's
17
the motion for execution must necessarily fail. The CSC likewise held that the request in Resolution No. 021000. The CSC held that Caudang's request had no
services of Caudang were terminated by the Chief Executive prior to the filing of legal basis because CSC Resolution No. 94-0014 (which was ostensibly the basis
the petition for quo warranto, thus, preventing the Commission from an inquiry of Hashim's Office Order) was, in effect, reversed by the Court of Appeals in its
18
into the said separation from service effected by the President as the issue is October 17, 1994 Amended Decision.
14
reviewable only by the High Court. The CSC later denied Caudang's motion for
reconsideration. Aggrieved by Hashim's order requiring him to vacate his position, Tomawis
19
instituted an action for injunction and prohibition against Caudang and
On July 3, 1998, then OMA Executive Director Acmad Tomawis removed Hashim before the RTC. The case was docketed as Special Civil Action No. 820-
Tomawis from the contested position and appointed Engr. Dardagan Maruhom 02.
in his stead. Tomawis did not challenge his removal and, instead, claimed
terminal pay equivalent to his earned leave credits. He was re-appointed to the Tomawis likewise filed a verified complaint against Hashim for alleged violation
same position on July 31, 2000 by then OMA Executive Director Ismael Naga, Jr. of the "Anti-Graft Law" for issuing Office Order No. 0079. The Presidential Anti-
but his appointment was characterized as temporary, because he did not possess Graft Commission conducted a fact-finding inquiry and, acting on its
the appropriate CES eligibility. recommendation, the Office of the President (OP) dismissed the complaint on
the ground that the reinstatement of Caudang was just and lawful pursuant to
20
CSC Resolution No. 94-0014.
Meanwhile, on September 15, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of ground that the legal authority of Caudang as Regional Director was
Tomawis, the dispositive portion of which reads: administratively upheld by the OMA and the OP.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant petition for On January 16, 2004, Tomawis filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Execution of
Injunction and Prohibition is hereby granted for being highly the September 15 decision and December 15 order of the RTC averring that they
meritorious. Respondent OMA Executive Director Hon. HABIB had become final and executory for failure of Caudang to appeal the same
MUJAHAB A. HASHIM or any person acting in his behalf is hereby within the reglementary period. Caudang, however, opposed the motion
directed to cease, desist and refrain from enforcing office Order No. claiming that she had not been served a copy of the order denying her motion
0079, Series of 2002 dated March 8, 2002. Respondent Atty. Nora T. for reconsideration.
Caudang is likewise ordered to cease, desist and refrain from further
28
assuming the powers and functions of OMA Regional Director, Region On April 23, 2004, the court granted the motion and the corresponding writ of
29 30
XII-B, Marawi City. execution was accordingly issued. On May 7, 2004, Caudang moved to quash
31
the writ which the court denied in an Order dated May 19, 2004.
21
SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to the above writ of execution, then Undersecretary/OMA Executive
32
A copy of the decision was served on Caudang on September 24, 2003. The Director Datu Zamzamin L. Ampatuan issued Office Order No. 04-270 dated
22
following day, Caudang filed a motion for reconsideration which was June 3, 2004 re-installing Tomawis to the contested position until the issuance
23
denied on December 15, 2003. However, it appears from the records that of a new appointment either in his favor or to other qualified applicant.
24
Caudang never received a copy of the December 15 Order.
On June 9, 2004, Caudang elevated the matter to the CA via a special civil action
25
On December 18, 2003, Caudang filed a Manifestation praying for the for certiorari and prohibition assailing the validity of the writ of execution
immediate dismissal of the case, attaching thereto a copy of the Decision of the issued by the RTC on the ground that the decision sought to be executed did
33
Office of the President in OP Case No. 2-J-523 and a Certification issued by the not attain finality. Caudang claimed that it was the January 7 Order of the RTC
OMA Director for Administrative Services that Caudang is the incumbent that had, instead, become final and executory.
26
Regional Director of Region XII. However, this Manifestation (which was really
a motion for the dismissal of the pending case) was not set for hearing. On September 8, 2004, the CA rendered the assailed Decision in favor of
27
Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order dated January 7, 2004 setting aside its Caudang, the pertinent portion of which reads:
September 15 and December 15, decision and resolution, respectively, on the

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Marawi City in Spl. Cvl.
35
Action No. 820-02 dated 15 September 2003, the Order dated 23 April Tomawis' motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated
2004 and the Writ of Execution dated 23 April 2004 are December 20, 2004. Tomawis, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition, and
36
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Office Order No. 04-270, Series of in his Memorandum, he raises the following issues:
2004, issued by OMA Executive Director Zamzamin Ampatuan
directing the re-installation of respondent Umbra Tomawis as OMA (1).
Regional Director, Region XII-B, Marawi City is hereby declared NULL

DID NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF
and VOID. Director Ampatuan is further directed to recognize
DISCRETION AND ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS
petitioner ATTY. NORA TABAO-CAUDANG as the legitimate
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE THE
holder/occupant of the office. Land Bank of the Philippines, Marawi
DECISION OF JUDGE ADIONG DATED SEPTEMBER 15, 2003.
Branch, through its bank officials, is directed to desist from honoring
checks and withdrawals signed/issued by respondent Tomawis.
(2).
Respondent Umbra Tomawis is hereby ordered to cease and desist from
performing the functions of OMA Regional Director, Region XII-B, DID NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN RULING THAT THE
Marawi City and to surrender said office to petitioner Caudang. No PETITIONER HAD NO LEGAL RIG[H]T TO FILE SPL. CIVIL ACTION
pronouncement as to costs. NO. 802-02.
34
SO ORDERED. (3).
The appellate court held that in both procedural and substantive aspects of the DID NOT THE RESPONDENT COMMIT MULTIPLE FORUM
37
case, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion: first, the September 15 SHOPPING.
Decision of the RTC never attained finality because Caudang had not received a
copy of the resolution denying her motion for reconsideration; the rule on In his memorandum, Tomawis claims that the CA erred in reviewing the merits
constructive receipt of mails is not applicable because the envelope containing of the RTC decision, as it was never raised as an issue before the appellate court.
said resolution was marked "return to sender"; second, the January 7 Order of He claims that the only issue elevated to the appellate court was whether or not
the RTC is null and void for failure to comply with the procedural requirement the decision sought to be executed attained finality in order to warrant the
38
of a valid hearing; and third, the petition for injunction commenced by Tomawis issuance of a writ of execution. Tomawis also insists that he has the legal
is a disguised petition for quo warrantowhich should never have been personality to commence the injunction case being the occupant of the
39
entertained because Tomawis had no legal standing to file the same since he contested position, albeit in a temporary capacity. He further avers that the CA
held the contested position merely in a temporary capacity. should not have relied on the decision of the OP in OP Case No. 2-J-523 because
it was in the nature of a forgotten evidence since the respondent failed to after five (5) days from the date he received the first notice of the
40
present the same in her evidence-in-chief. Lastly, the petitioner argues that postmaster, whichever date is earlier.
respondent is guilty of multiple forum shopping in litigating her claim before
the CSC, the CA and this Court.
41 The rule on service by registered mail contemplates two situations: (1) actual
service, the completeness of which is determined upon receipt by the addressee
The petition is without merit. of the registered mail; and (2) constructive service, which is deemed complete
upon expiration of five (5) days from the date the addressee received the first
The first and second issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed together. notice from the postmaster.
43
It must be understood that there are two RTC decisions involved in the present Thus, there is constructive service by registered mail only if there is conclusive
case, the second (January 7) entirely incompatible with the first (September 15). proof that a first notice was duly sent by the postmaster to the addressee and
From the factual circumstances surrounding this case, and as correctly held by that such first notice had been delivered to and received by the addressee. The
the CA, the January 7 Order is null and void because of an incurable procedural best evidence to prove that notice was sent would be a certification from the
42
defect, i.e., it was never set for hearing. Thus, the only decision material to our postmaster to the effect that not only was notice issued or sent but also on how,
consideration is the September 15 Decision. Did the aforesaid decision attain when and to whom the delivery was made. The mailman may also testify that
finality to justify the issuance of a writ of execution? We answer in the negative. the notice was actually delivered.
44
Section 9, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides: In the instant case, there was no sufficient proof that the respondent actually
received a copy of the December 15 resolution. Neither was there proof that a
Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions. – Judgments, final
first notice was indeed received by her. As such, the rule on constructive notice
orders or resolutions shall be served either personally or by registered
cannot apply. Accordingly, since the respondent was not served a copy of the
mail. x x x.
resolution, the decision could never attain finality. Consequently, there can be
no valid basis for the issuance of the writ of execution.
Section 10 of the same Rule provides:
Before a writ of execution may issue, there must necessarily be a final judgment
Completeness of service. – Personal service is complete upon actual
or order that disposes of the action or proceeding. The writ of execution is the
delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of ten
means by which a party can enforce a final judgment or order of the court.
(10) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides. Service by
Absent a final judgment or order, there is nothing to enforce or execute; thus,
registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or
45
there can be no valid writ of execution.
Aside from nullifying the questioned writ of execution, the CA also delved into reinstatement of Tomawis to the position. This vacillating attitude only served
the intrinsic validity of the September 15 decision of the RTC, and Tomawis to create a hiatus in public service, totally repugnant to the basic rule that title
challenges the procedural propriety of such review by the appellate court. to public office should not be subjected to continued uncertainty. In addition, as
observed by the CA, the RTC judge remained deafeningly silent on the alleged
It is true that in her petition before the CA, Caudang merely sought the January 7 Order, neither confirming nor denying issuance of the same.
nullification of the writ of execution for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion. She did not raise as an issue the propriety of the RTC's decision Moreover, the appellate court could not have simply turned a blind eye to the
granting the writ of injunction. But the procedural lapse, if any, is of no great obvious blunder committed by the trial court in issuing the injunctive writ. To
moment. overlook such a manifest mistake would have been inconsistent with substantial
justice, and would have allowed a party to unjustly benefit from a mistake or
Be it remembered that in the performance of their duties, courts should not be inadvertence of the trial court. Thus, the Rules reserve to the appellate court the
shackled by stringent rules which would result in manifest injustice. Rules of right, resting in public duty, to take cognizance of palpable error on the face of
procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their the record and proceedings, especially such as clearly demonstrate that the
strict and rigid application, if they result in technicalities that tend to frustrate suitor has no cause of action. The rule does not intend for the (appellate) court
rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided. Substantive rights to sift the record and deal with questions which are of small importance, but
must not be prejudiced by a rigid and technical application of the rules. Indeed, only to notice errors which are obvious upon inspection and are of a controlling
when a case is impressed with public interest, we should relax the application of character. The underlying purpose of this reservation in the rule is to prevent
the rules. the miscarriage of justice resulting from oversight.
The controversy between Tomawis and Caudang started in 1993. Several cases On the merit of the RTC decision, we agree with the CA that Tomawis had no
had been brought before both judicial and administrative tribunals, and no final clear legal right to institute his petition for injunction. Indeed, the Tomawis suit
resolution had been reached. In the meantime, the legitimacy of the public before the RTC was a thinly disguised petition for quo warranto, and not having
officer who should occupy the position of OMA Regional Director, Region XII-B, any legal title to the position of Regional Director (his temporary appointment
remains in question. Public service is compromised. having been terminated), he did not possess proper personality to file the
46
action.
The RTC judge, who should have been resolute, proved to be indecisive. First, he
ordered Hashim and Caudang to cease and desist from enforcing Office Order Even if the initiatory pleading filed by Tomawis before the RTC is truly a special
No. 0079 and from occupying the position of Regional Director, respectively; civil action for injunction and prohibition, our conclusion remains – he still had
then, in his clarificatory order, he declared that his decision did not include the no clear legal right to institute the same.
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount tores
53
do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely a judicata in the other. True, respondent had previously instituted quo
47
provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action. As a rule, to warranto proceedings involving the same contested position, and her petitions
justify the injunctive relief prayed for, the movant must show: (1) the existence had been dismissed with finality by this Court. We, however, find that the issue
of a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) that the act in the instant case is based on a different set of facts.
48
against which injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. A "clear
legal right" means one clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as This case was initiated by no less than the petitioner himself through a petition
49
a matter of law. The onus probandi is on movant to show that there exists a for injunction before the RTC in order to enjoin the enforcement of Office
right to be protected, which is directly threatened by the acts sought to be Order No. 0079 which recognized the new appointment of the respondent
enjoined. Further, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is thereby terminating his (petitioner's) temporary appointment. The previous quo
material and substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for warranto actions instituted by the respondent were based on her appointment
the writ to prevent a serious damage.

50 on September 1, 1987. On the other hand, the present action is based on her
appointment on March 8, 2002. Although the issues in all of the cases brought
The facts clearly show that Tomawis was appointed Regional Director. However, to this Court involve the rightful occupant of the contested position, the fact
because he did not possess the requisite CES eligibility, pursuant to established remains that the "appointments" are distinct from one another.
rules and jurisprudence, his appointment was characterized merely as
temporary. His appointment papers dated July 31, 2000, specifically provided In view of all the foregoing, we hereby affirm the nullity of the writ of injunction
that his appointment was merely temporary. As such, he had no security of issued by the RTC for failure of the petitioner to show clear legal right to enjoin
51
tenure. Upon the issuance of Office Order No. 0079 appointing Caudang to the the enforcement of the office order. We likewise affirm the findings of the
position, Tomawis' right to the position ceased to exist. Thus, he should have appellate court that the September 15 Decision of the RTC never attained
vacated and relinquished the position and turned over the duties, funds and finality. Consequently, the corresponding writ of execution is null and void.
properties of the office to Caudang. Office Order No. 04-270 (installing petitioner to the contested position) issued
pursuant to the writ of execution is, likewise, annulled.WHEREFORE, the
Accordingly, his petition for injunction should have been denied outright by the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 8, 2004 Decision of the Court of
court. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ Appeals and its December 20, 2004 Resolution are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
52
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Lastly, we cannot sustain petitioner's claim that respondent is guilty of multiple

forum shopping. There is forum shopping where the elements of litis
City Government of Butuan v. CBS and as representative of her co-defendant v. Consolidated Broadcasting System
(CBS), Inc., doing business under the name and style "DXBR" Bombo Radyo
Butuan, represented by its Manager, Norberto P. Pagaspas, and the Hon.
Rosarito F. Dabalos, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 2, of Agusan del Norte and
THIRD DIVISION
Butuan City.
G.R. No. 157315 December 1, 2010
2
Antecedents
CITY GOVERNMENT OF BUTUAN and CITY MAYOR LEONIDES THERESA
In February, 2002, City Mayor Plaza (Mayor Plaza) wrote to the Sangguniang
B. PLAZA, the latter in her personal capacity and as representative of her
Panlungsod of Butuan City to solicit its support for her decision to deny the
co-defendant, Petitioners,
application for mayor’s permit of respondent Bombo Radyo/Consolidated
vs.
Broadcasting System (CBS), and to eventually close down CBS’s radio station.
CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING SYSTEM (CBS), INC., doing business
She justified her decision by claiming that CBS’s operating its broadcasting
under the name and style "DXBR" Bombo Radyo Butuan, represented by
business within the Arujiville Subdivision, a residential area, had violated the
its Manager, Norberto P. Pagaspas, and HON. ROSARITO F. DABALOS,
City’s zoning ordinance. Her letter pertinently reads:
PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 2, OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND
BUTUAN CITY, Respondents.
In 1994, Bombo Radyo/Consolidated Broadcasting System manifested their
intention to operate on their current site at Arujiville Subdivision which is a
DECISION
residential area. They were informed that they cannot situate their business in
BERSAMIN, J.: the area as it violates our zoning ordinance. However, they have pleaded and
was agreeable to operate in the area by virtue of a Temporary Use Permit (TUP)
Petitioners City Government of Butuan and City Mayor Leonides Theresa B. xxx.
Plaza (petitioners) appeal the adverse decision dated October 28, 2002
(dismissing their petition for certiorari and prohibition to challenge the grant by The TUP allowed them to operate in the area but only for a very limited period.
the trial judge of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction after As a matter of fact, the TUP was good only for one year, which can be renewed
1
reconsidering his earlier self-inhibition), and the resolution dated January 29, every year for a maximum of five (5) years or until 1999. Thus, right from the
2003 (denying their motion for reconsideration), both promulgated by the Court beginning they have been informed and forewarned that they cannot operate in
of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 69729 entitled City Government of Butuan the area forever and that they have to relocate to a proper area.
and City Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza, the latter in her personal capacity
Bombo Radyo renewed its TUP only in 1995 and 1996. They have failed to renew operation, with a warning that he would recommend the closure of its business
their TUP up to today. in case of non-compliance.
This office has received numerous complaints against Bombo Radyo for On February 19, 2002, CBS and its manager, Norberto Pagaspas, filed a
violation of private rights, inciting people to go rise against the government, complaint for prohibition, mandamus, and damages against the petitioners in
4
malicious imputations, insinuations against people not of their liking, false or the Regional Trial Court in Butuan City (RTC), with prayer for a temporary
fabricated news, etc. The list is so long to enumerate. Copies of the petitions, restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
manifestos from various groups is hereto attached for your perusal. petitioners from closing its station, or from disturbing and preventing its
business operations. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 5193, was raffled to
Thus, for violation of the city zoning ordinance, the expiration of their TUP, Branch 2, presided by Judge Rosarito P. Dabalos.
which was never renewed since 1997, failure to secure ECC and the numerous
complaints against the station of the residents within the immediate vicinity of On February 20, 2002, Judge Dabalos voluntarily inhibited and directed the
5
their premises and the threat they are causing to the peace and order of the return of Civil Case No. 5193 to the Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle. He
City, I have decided to deny their application for a mayor's permit and thereafter cited the circumstances that might affect his objectivity and impartiality in
to close the radio station. resolving the controversy as his justification, to wit:
In view of the foregoing premises, I am forwarding this matter to the xxx

Sangguniang Panlungsod to solicit your resolution of support on the matter.
a) That the undersigned was the object of its (plaintiff's) attacks and
This is not a decision calculated to deprived (sic) Radio Bombo of its freedom of criticism which are judgmental and not inquisitorial in the comments
speech or expression. This is just a simply matter of whether or not Radyo over the air;
Bombo has complied with existing laws and ordinances.
b) That the undersigned was shouted at disrespectfully by one of
Thereupon, the Sangguninang Panlungsod adopted Resolution-057-2002 "to plaintiff's reporters/news gatherers in the vicinity of the Hall of Justice;
strongly support the decision of the City Mayor to deny the application of
Consolidated Broadcasting System Development Corporation (Bombo Radyo- c) That plaintiff's commentaries are making pronouncements on legal
Butuan) for a Mayor’s Permit and thereafter close the radio station."
3 matters, substantive and procedural, based on its perception and not on
laws;
On February 18, 2002, the City’s licensing officer served on CBS’s station
manager a final/last notice of violation and demand to cease and desist illegal
d) That in its commentaries in attacking public officials as well as not also act on this case on the ground of 'delicadeza' considering that
private individuals, words which are disrespectful and indecent are defendant Hon. Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza is his 'kumadre' plus the fact
used. that before becoming judge he was the legal counsel of the LDP party here in
Butuan City, in the election of 1992 and 1995, which is the political party of the
and the net effect and result of its commentaries over the air causes confusion Plazas. RTC-Branch 1, being the exclusive Family Court cannot also be included
on the minds of the public, including the young that the court and government in any raffle.
offices and public officials will lose their credibility and respect which are due
them. In view of the foregoing, and on the ground of expediency, the Clerk of Court is
ordered to send this case to RTC-Branch 5, without raffle anymore, it being the
The court is aware of press freedom is enshrined in our constitution but such only practical available court in this jurisdiction as of this moment.
freedom should not be abused because in every right there is a concomitant
obligation. Civil Case No. 5193 was forwarded to Branch 5, presided by Judge Augustus L.
Calo, who recused because his wife had been recently appointed by Mayor Plaza
Let therefore this case be returned immediately to the office [of the] Clerk of to the City’s Legal Office. Judge Calo ordered the immediate return of the case
Court VI for re-raffling. to the Clerk of Court for forwarding to Vice Executive Judge Tomaneng.
SO ORDERED. Without any other judge to handle the case, Judge Tomaneng formally returned
Civil Case No. 5193 to Judge Dabalos, stating in his letter that Judge Dabalos’
On the same day, Judge Victor Tomaneng, Presiding Judge of Branch 33, issued
reason for inhibition did not amount to a plausible ground to inhibit. Judge
an order also inhibiting himself from handling Civil Case No. 5193, and in his
Tomaneng instructed Judge Dabalos to hear the case unless the Supreme Court
capacity as Vice Executive Judge (in lieu of Executive Judge Cipriano B. Alvizo, 7
approved the inhibition.
Jr., then on sick leave) directed the assignment of Civil Case No. 5193 to Branch 5
6
without raffle, viz: 8
On February 21, 2002, Judge Tomaneng issued a TRO, to wit:
xxx Considering that the Executive Judge Hon. Cipriano B. Alvizo, the Presiding The Court believes that there is a need to maintain the status quo until all the
Judge of RTC-Branch 4 and Acting-Designate Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 3, other issues in the complaint shall have been duly heard and determined
but who is now in Cebu City for medical treatment, it would be impractical to without necessarily implying that plaintiff is entitled to the prayers for
include his courts in the re-raffling of cases for the reason that the case is for injunction. The Court hereby resolves in the meantime to grant a temporary
prohibition, mandamus, injunction, etc., that needs immediate action. The restraining order.
herein Vice-Executive Judge who is the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 33, could
WHEREFORE, defendants City Gov't of Butuan and City Mayor Leonides Consequently, CBS requested the Court to designate another judge to hear its
Theresa B. Plaza, their attorneys, agents, employees, police authorities and/or application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the hearing of
10
any person acting upon the Mayor’s order and instruction under her authority which Judge Tomaneng had set on March 11, 2002.
are hereby enjoined to cease, desist and to refrain from closing or padlocking
RADYO BOMBO or from preventing, disturbing, or molesting its business In the meanwhile, or on March 8, 2002, the petitioners filed their answer to the
operations, including but not limited to the use and operation of its building, complaint, alleging affirmative and special defenses and praying for the
structures and broadcasting facilities, and the ingress or egress of its employees dismissal of the complaint, the lifting of the TRO, the denial of the prayer for
therein. preliminary injunction, and the granting of their counterclaims for moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
As this Court cannot issue a seventy-two (72) hour Temporary Restraining
Order because of the incoming delay on Monday, February 25, 2002, a During the hearing on March 11, 2002 of CBS’s application for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order is hereby issued effective for twenty (20) days from writ of preliminary injunction, at which the petitioners and their counsel did
issuance (Sec. 5, Rule 58, 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure). not appear, CBS’s counsel manifested that he was desisting from his earlier
request with the Court for the designation of another judge to hear Civil Case
Meanwhile, let this case be set for summary hearing on March 11, 2002 at 8:30 in No. 5193. Judge Dabalos noted the manifestation but reset the hearing of the
the morning to resolve the pending application for injunction and for the application for preliminary injunction on March 12, 2002, to give the petitioners
defendants to show cause why the same shall not be granted. an opportunity to show cause why the writ prayed for should not issue. For the
purpose of the resetting, Judge Dabalos caused a notice of hearing to be served
IT IS SO ORDERED. on the petitioners.
11
On February 25, 2002, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to lift or dissolve Upon receipt of the notice of hearing, the petitioners moved to quash the notice
temporary restraining order in Branch 2 (sala of Judge Dabalos). and prayed that the TRO be lifted, insisting that Judge Dabalos had already lost
12
his authority to act on Civil Case No. 5193 by virtue of his inhibition.
On February 26, 2002, Judge Dabalos referred his order of inhibition in Civil
Case No. 5193 to the Court Administrator for consideration, with a request for Nonetheless, Civil Case No. 5193 was called on March 12, 2002. The parties and
the designation of another Judge not stationed in Butuan City and Agusan del their respective counsel appeared. At the close of the proceedings on that date,
9
Norte to handle the case. Judge Dabalos granted CBS’s prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, to wit:
13
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing as the defendants did not introduce any Furnish copies of this order to the Hon. Supreme Court and the Hon. Court
evidence in spite of the order of the Court to show cause why no writ of Administrator.
preliminary injunction be issued and the repeated directive of the court in open
14
court for the defendants to present evidence which the defendants firmly SO ORDERED.
refused to do so on flimsy grounds, the Court resolves to issue a writ of

Following CBS’s posting of P200,000.00 as the required injunction bond, Branch
preliminary injunction as the complaint under oath alleges that plaintiff is a 15
2 issued the writ of preliminary injunction on March 15, 2002, commanding
grantee of a franchise from the Congress of the Philippines and the act
and directing the provincial sheriff to:
threatened to be committed by the defendants curtail the constitutional right of
freedom of speech of the plaintiff which the Court finds that it should be looked
xxx forthwith enjoin the City Government of Butuan and the Hon. City Mayor
into, the defendants' refusal to controvert such allegations by evidence deprived
Leonides Theresa B. Plaza, their attorneys, agents, employees, police authorities
the Court [of] the chance to be guided by such evidence to act accordingly that
and/or any person acting upon the mayor's order or instruction or under her
it left the court no alternative but to grant the writ prayed for, the City
authority to cease and desist and to refrain from closing or padlocking RADIO
Government of Butuan and City Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza, their
BOMBO or from preventing disturbing or molesting its business operations,
attorneys, agents, employees, police authorities and/or any person acting upon
including the use and operation of its building, structures, broadcasting
the Mayor's order or instructions or under her authority are hereby enjoined to
facilities and the ingress and egress of its employees therein. Copies of the writ
cease and desist and to refrain from closing or padlocking RADYO BOMBO or
of preliminary injunction, bond and other pertinent documents thereto be
from preventing, disturbing or molesting its business operations, including but
served on the defendants and thereafter make a return of your service of this
not limited to the use and operation of its building, structures, broadcasting
writ within the period required by law and the Rules of Court.
facilities and the ingress or egress of its employees therein upon plaintiff's
putting up a bond in the amount of P200,000.00 duly approved by this court Thus, the petitioners commenced in the CA a special civil action for certiorari
which injunction bond shall be executed in favor of the defendants to answer for and prohibition (with prayer for TRO or writ of preliminary injunction).
whatever damages which the defendants may sustain in connection with or
arising from the issuance of this writ if, after all the court will finally adjudge The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition upon a finding that
that plaintiff is not entitled thereto. Judge Dabalos had committed no grave abuse of discretion in acting upon CBS’s
application for preliminary injunction, given the peculiar circumstances
This order is without prejudice to the findings of the court after a formal surrounding the raffling and assignment of Civil Case No. 5193, and the urgent
hearing or a full blown trial. need to resolve the application for preliminary injunction due to the expiration
of Judge Tomaneng’s TRO by March 13, 2002. The CA held that the writ of
preliminary injunction had properly issued, because the petitioners had Ruling
threatened to defeat CBS’s existing franchise to operate its radio station in
Butuan City by not issuing the permit for its broadcast business. The appeal lacks merit. We find that the CA did not commit any error in
upholding the questioned orders of the RTC.
Issues
I
Hence, this appeal via petition for review on certiorari, with the petitioners Judge Dabalos lawfully re-assumed jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 5193
16
contending that:
In its decision, the CA ruled that Judge Dabalos did not gravely abuse his
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT discretion in re-assuming jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 5193 in the light of the
17
RESPONDENT JUDGE ROSARITO F. DABALOS ACTED WITH GRAVE obtaining circumstances cogently set forth in its assailed decision, to wit:
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN, ON MARCH 12, 2002, WITHOUT
SUFFICIENT NOTICE TO PETITIONERS, HE AGAIN TOOK Seemingly, petitioners lost sight of the reality that after the respondent judge
COGNIZANCE OF AND RE-ASSUMED JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL issued his order of inhibition and directed the return of the case to the Office of
CASE NO. 5193 AFTER HE HAD ALREADY EFFECTIVELY INHIBITED the Clerk of Court for re-raffle to another judge, Vice-Executive Judge Victor A.
HIMSELF FROM HEARING THE SAME IN TWO EARLIER ORDERS HE Tomaneng, noting that there is no other judge to handle the case, directed the
HAD ISSUED DATED FEBRUARY 20 AND FEBRUARY 26, 2002 return thereof to the public respondent in view of the extreme urgency of the
RESPECTIVELY. preliminary relief therein prayed for. Under the circumstances then obtaining,
the respondent judge could do no less but to act thereon. So it is that he
II. ASSUMING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE ROSARITO DABALOS proceeded with the scheduled hearing on the application for preliminary
COULD VALIDLY RE-ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL CASE NO. injunction on March 11, 2002 and thereafter reset it for continuation the
5193 AFTER HE HAD EARLIER ISSUED TWO ORDERS VOLUNTARILY following day to afford the petitioners an opportunity to oppose the application
INHIBITING HIMSELF FROM HEARING SAID CASE, THE COURT OF and show cause why the writ prayed for should not issue. The urgency of the
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT COURT action demanded of the respondent judge is further accentuated by the fact that
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING A WRIT the TRO issued by Judge Tomaneng was then about to expire on March 13, 2002,
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WITHOUT REQUIRING PRIVATE not to mention the circumstance that Executive Judge Cipriano B. Alvizo, Jr.,
RESPONDENT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW WHETHER SAID who happened to be around, advised the respondent judge to resolve the issues
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS A CLEAR RIGHT THERETO. to the best of his discretion. xxx
The petitioners disagree, and insist that Judge Dabalos lost the authority to act valid reasons for self-inhibition. The vesting of discretion necessarily proceeds
upon CBS’s application for preliminary injunction by virtue of his prior self- from the reality that there may be many and different grounds for a judge to
inhibition from hearing Civil Case No. 5193. recuse from a case, and such grounds cannot all be catalogued in the Rules of
18
Court. Thus did the Court cogently point out in Gutang v. Court of Appeals:
We cannot sustain the petitioners’ insistence.
xxx The import of the rule on the voluntary inhibition of judges is that the
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which contains the rule on inhibition decision on whether or not to inhibit is left to the sound discretion and
and disqualification of judges, states: conscience of the trial judge based on his rational and logical assessment of the
circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him. It makes clear to the
Section 1. Disqualification of judges.– No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any
occupants of the Bench that outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or
case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there might be
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth
other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to
computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been executor,
preference or predilections are many and varied.lawphi1
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the In his case, Judge Dabalos clearly discerned after the return of Civil Case No.
written consent of all parties-in-interest, signed by them and entered upon the 5193 to him by the Vice Executive Judge that his self-doubt about his ability to
record. dispense justice in Civil Case No. 5193 generated by the airing of criticisms
against him and other public officials by CBS’s commentators and reporters
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
would not ultimately affect his objectivity and judgment. Such re-assessment of
sitting in a case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
the ground for his self-inhibition, absent a showing of any malice or other
improper motive on his part, could not be assailed as the product of an unsound
The self-inhibition of Judge Dabalos was one taken in accordance with the
exercise of his discretion. That, it seems to us, even the petitioners conceded,
second paragraph of Section 1. Our resolution herein turns, therefore, on the
their objection being based only on whether he could still re-assume jurisdiction
proper interpretation and application of the second paragraph.
of Civil Case No. 5193.
The second paragraph of Section 1 (unlike the first paragraph) does not
We hold that although a trial judge who voluntarily inhibits loses jurisdiction to
expressly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition. This means that the
19
hear a case, he or she may decide to reconsider the self-inhibition and re-
determination of the grounds is left to the sound discretion of the judge, who
assume jurisdiction after a re-assessment of the circumstances giving cause to
must discern with only his or her conscience as guide on what may be just and
the inhibition. The discretion to reconsider acknowledges that the trial judge is twenty-day lifetime of the temporary restraining order would expire on March
in the better position to determine the issue of inhibition, and a reviewing 13, 2002. A repeat of the violent scenario of February 21 may occur unless the
tribunal will not disturb the exercise of that discretion except upon a clear and application is heard as scheduled by a Regional Trial Court Judge who had not
20
strong finding of arbitrariness or whimsicality. Thus, Judge Dabalos’ re- inhibited himself. xxx
assumption of jurisdiction was legally tenable, having come from his seizing the
opportunity to re-assess the circumstances impelling his self-inhibition upon Verily, Judge Dabalos’ decision to hear the application for preliminary
being faced with the urgent need to hear and resolve CBS’s application for injunction pending the Court’s resolution of the query on whether or not
preliminary injunction. Such action was commendable on his part, given that another Judge sitting outside the City of Butuan should take cognizance of Civil
the series of self-inhibitions by the other RTC Judges had left no competent Case No. 5193 did not constitute or equate to arbitrariness or whimsicality. He
judge in the station to hear and resolve the application. It can even be rightly had reasonable grounds to do so in the context of the tight circumstances that
said that a refusal by Judge Dabalos to re-assess and reconsider might have had developed in Civil Case No. 5193 following his self-inhibition. Surely, his
negated his sacred and sworn duty as a judge to dispense justice. decision to reconsider did not proceed from passion or whim, but from his
faithful adherence to his solemn oath to do justice to every man. He thereby
In this connection, the urgency for the RTC to hear and resolve the application neither violated any law or canon of judicial conduct, nor abused his juridical
for preliminary injunction factually existed. In fact, CBS had communicated it to authority.
21
the Court in its letter dated March 5, 2002, to wit:
II.
If not for the temporary restraining order issued on February 21, 2002 by the Petitioners to adduce evidence after granting of TRO
Honorable Judge VICTOR A. TOMANENG, Vice-Executive Judge and Presiding
Judge of Branch 33 of said court xxx violent confrontations would have The petitioners submit that Judge Dabalos improperly resolved CBS’s
continued between supporters of plaintiff RADIO BOMBO BUTUAN, on the application for preliminary injunction by not first requiring the applicant to
one hand, and the loyalists of City Mayor LEONIDES THERESA PLAZA adduce evidence in support of the application.
(including some city employees) led by the Mayor herself and her husband,
We do not agree with the petitioners.
former Mayor DEMOCRITO PLAZA II, on the other hand.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or

xxx
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an
22
As set forth in the temporary restraining order, the hearing on the application agency, or a person to refrain from a particular a particular act or acts. It may
for a writ of preliminary injunction is set on Monday, March 11, 2002 because the also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it is known
23
as a preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, a prohibitory injunction is one injustice and irreparable injury should its radio station suffer closure, had issued
that commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act, while a mandatory ex parte the TRO.
injunction commands the performance of some positive act to correct a wrong
in the past.
24 It was error on the part of the petitioners to insist that the evidence of CBS
should have first been required before Judge Dabalos issued the writ of
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of preliminary injunction. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court clearly lays the burden on
a party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property the shoulders of the petitioners, as the parties against whom the TRO was
25
sought to be protected. It is proper only when the applicant appears to be issued, to show cause why the application for the writ of preliminary injunction
26 31
entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint, which must aver the should not issue, thus:
27
existence of the right and the violation of the right, or whose averments must
in the minimum constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. — No
28
sought. Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are: preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the
(a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by
enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and paramount affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. An injunction will not issue to result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to
protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent and may never which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a
arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days
29
prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein
protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court must order said party or
enforceable as a matter of law.

30 person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should
not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not the
While it is true that CBS was not required to present evidence to prove its preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the
entitlement to the injunctive writ, the writ was nonetheless properly granted on corresponding order.
the basis of the undisputed facts that CBS was a grantee of a franchise from the
Legislature, and that the acts complained against (i.e., refusal of the Mayor’s xxx
permit and resulting closure of the radio station) were imminent and, unless
In fine, Judge Dabalos properly directed the petitioners to first present evidence
enjoined, would curtail or set at naught CBS’s rights under the franchise. In this
why the application for the writ of preliminary injunction should not be
regard, worthy of mention is that even the Vice Executive Judge, acknowledging
granted. By their refusal to comply with the directive to show cause by
that CBS had stood to suffer grave
presenting their evidence to that effect, the petitioners could blame no one but
themselves.
WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review on certiorari, and affirm the
decision dated October 28, 2002 promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 69729.
Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
established rules and guidelines connotes but a capricious exercise of discretion

that must be struck down in order that the prevailing party is not deprived of
Garrido v. Tortogo, et al.
the fruits of victory.
FIRST DIVISION
Via her pleading denominated as a petition for review on certiorari, the
petitioner has come directly to the Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
G.R. No. 156358 August 17, 2011
Branch 48, in Bacolod City for the nullification of the order dated November 12,
ANGELINA PAHILA-GARRIDO, Petitioner, 2002 (granting the respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory
vs. injunction [enjoining the execution of the final and executory decision rendered
ELIZA M. TORTOGO, LEONILA FLORES, ANANIAS SEDONIO, ADELINO in an ejectment suit by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities [MTCC], Branch 6, in
3
MONET, ANGIE MONET, JUANITO GARCIA, ELEONOR GARCIA, BENITA Bacolod City]) issued in SCA Case No. 01-11522 for being in violation of law and
MOYA, JULIO ALTARES, LEA ALTARES, CLARITA SABIDO, JULIE ANN jurisprudence.
VILLAMOR,JUANITA TUALA, VICTOR FLORES III, JOHNNY MOYA,
The petitioner also prays that the Court should enjoin the RTC from taking
HAZEL AVANCEÑA, SONIA EVANGELIO, and GENNY
further proceedings in SCA Case No. 01-11522, except to dismiss it.
MONTAÑO, Respondents.
Antecedents
DECISION
On June 23, 1997, Domingo Pahila commenced in the MTCC in Bacolod City an
BERSAMIN, J.:
action for ejectment with prayer for preliminary and restraining order to evict
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it several defendants, including the respondents herein, from his properties,
1
thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The enforcement of such docketed as Civil Case No. 23671 and raffled to Branch 6 of the MTCC. He
judgment should not be hampered or evaded, for the immediate enforcement of amended the complaint to implead the spouses of some of the defendants.
the parties’ rights, confirmed by final judgment, is a major component of the However, he died during the pendency of the action, and his surviving spouse,
ideal administration of justice. This is the reason why we abhor any delay in the herein petitioner Angelina Pahila-Garrido, was substituted for him on
2
full execution of final and executory decisions. Thus, a remedy intended to September 24, 1998.
frustrate, suspend, or enjoin the enforcement of a final judgment must be
The defendants in Civil Case No. 23671 were divided into two discrete groups.
granted with caution and upon a strict observance of the requirements under
The first group, represented by Atty. Romeo Subaldo, included those defendants
existing laws and jurisprudence. Any such remedy allowed in violation of
occupying Lot 641-B-1, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) T-167924; All the defendants appealed. On September 22, 1999, the RTC in Bacolod City
5
Lot 641-B-2, covered by TCT No. T-167925; and Lot No. 641-B-3, covered by TCT affirmed the decision of the MTCC.
No. T-167926, all owned by the plaintiff. The defendants in this group relied on
the common defense of being agricultural tenants on the land. The second Only the second group, which includes respondents herein, appealed the RTC’s
group, on the other hand, was represented by Atty. Ranela de la Fuente of the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), insisting that the land was foreshore land
Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) and counted the defendants occupying Lot No. and that the petitioner’s title (TCT No. 55630) was not valid. Considering that
F-V-3-3749-D, covered by TCT No. T-55630, also owned by the plaintiff. The the first group did not appeal, the RTC’s decision became final and executory as
second group’s common defense was that the plaintiff’s title was not valid to them.
because their respective portions were situated on foreshore land along the
On December 6, 1999, the CA dismissed the second group’s appeal, and later
Guimaras Strait, and thus their respective areas were subject to their own 6
denied their motion for reconsideration on April 17, 2000.
acquisition from the State as the actual occupants.
The respondents herein appealed the dismissal to the Court via a petition for
After the parties submitted their respective position papers, the MTCC rendered
4
certiorari (G.R. No. 143458), but the Court rejected their recourse on July 19,
a decision dated March 17, 1999 in favor of the petitioner, to wit: 7
2000, and issued an entry of judgment on October 20, 2000.
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT IS RENDERED IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF

In the meantime, on February 16, 2000, the MTCC amended its decision to
AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS except the defendant Damiana Daguno, as 8
correct typographical errors in the description of the properties involved. None
follows:
of the parties objected to or challenged the corrections.
1. Ordering the affected defendants or any person or persons in acting in their

On April 5, 2000, the MTCC issued the writ of execution upon the petitioner’s
behalf, assignees or successors-in-interests including members of their family to 9
motion. The writ of execution was duly served on August 24, 2000 upon all the
vacate portions of Lot No. 641-B-1 covered by TCT No. 16742, Lot No.641-B-2
defendants, including the respondents, as the sheriff’s return of service
covered by TCT No. T-167926 and Lot Plan-F-V-337490-D covered by TCT No. 10
indicated.
T-55630 which they occupy and turn over the possession of the said property to
the plaintiff, and to pay the cost of the suit.
On April 20, 2001, the respondents filed a motion to quash against the April 5,
2000 writ of execution and its aliases, and a motion to stay the execution of the
The prayer for preliminary injunction/restraining order is denied for lack of 11
March 17, 1999 decision and the February 16, 2000 amended decision. They
basis.
anchored their motions on the supposedly supervening finding that the lot
covered by the writ of execution was foreshore land belonging to the State. To
support their contention, they presented the following administrative issuances time, because of the movant’s insistence in occupying said land even after the
from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), namely: decision ejecting her from the plaintiff’s land had become final and executory.
(a) Memorandum dated August 30, 2000 issued by the Community In fine, the movant has not shown additional evidences or arguments which
Environment and National Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR would warrant the reversal of the order dated May 4, 2001.
recommending the cancellation of Free Patent F.P. No. 309502 from
which was derived Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-1, and WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration dated June 1, 2001 is denied.
petitioner’s TCT No. T-55630; and

SO ORDERED.
(b) Memorandum dated November 13, 2000 of the DENR Regional

The story would have ended then but for the fact that on October 1, 2001, or
Executive Director for Region VI in Iloilo City.
more than a year after the writ of execution was served upon the defendants in
They argued that such supervening event directly affected the execution of the Civil Case No. 23671, the respondents, led by respondent Elisa M. Tortogo, and
March 17, 1999 decision and its amendment, whose continued execution now assisted by Atty. Leon Moya, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
affecting foreshore land would be unjust to the occupants or possessors of the (with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining
property, including themselves.

12 order) in the RTC in Negros Occidental, docketed as SCA Case No. 01-
15
11522, praying:
On May 4, 2001, the MTCC denied the respondents’ motion to quash, observing
that the cancellation of the petitioner’s TCT No. T-55630 was an event that WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this
might or might not happen, and was not the supervening event that could stay HONORABLE COURT that the assailed ORDERS dated 4 May 2001 and 8 July
13
the execution. A month later, on June 8, 2001, the MTCC denied the 2001 be REVERSED, ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
14
respondents’ motion for reconsideration, viz:
PETITIONERS are further praying that after due notice and hearing, a
As of this point in time the movant has not shown that she has a better right to temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction be
possess the land she is presently occupying as a squatter, than the plaintiff who issued to enjoin the execution/implementation of the Decision dated 17 March
is in possession of a clean Torrens Title. It is not true that the execution of the 1999 and the 16 February 2000 Amended Decision.
decision of this court would be unjust to her. To put it bluntly, it would be more
Such other and further reliefs just and equitable under the premises.
unjust to the plaintiff who was deprived of possession of his land for a very long
17
On October 11, 2001, Judge Gorgonio J. Ybañez, to whose branch SCA Case No. On October 25, 2002, the petitioner sought a clarificatory order, moving that
01-11522 was raffled, granted the respondents’ prayer for a temporary restraining the TRO be vacated due to its being effective for only twenty days and because
16
order (TRO) in the following terms, to wit: such effectivity could neither be extended nor be made indefinite. She
complained that her hands had already been tied for a year from executing the
xxxx decision and from availing herself of the writ of demolition; and pleaded that it
was time to give her justice in order that she could already enjoy the possession
WHEREAS, the matter of issuance or not of a TRO was summarily heard on
of the property.
October 5, 2001 in the presence of the parties and counsels who were both heard
in support/amplification of their respective stand(s); On October 30, 2002, the respondents moved for the early resolution of the case
18
and for the issuance of the writ of prohibitory injunction.
WHEREAS, it appears that the issuance of a TRO prayed for would be in order
at this stage in this case because there appears an imminent danger of On November 12, 2002, the RTC issued the assailed writ of preliminary
demolition of the structures of herein petitioners at the premises in question, 19
prohibitory injunction, as follows:
pending the trial and final determination of the merits in this case – in this case
(sic) wherein the private respondent Pahila does not appear to have prior NOW, THEREFORE, YOU, the herein respondents, YOUR AGENTS,
possession of the premises in question, and, wherein although it appears that REPRESENTATIVES, or any person acting for and in behalf, are hereby
the title of the premises in question is in the name of respondent Pahila, there ENJOINED to CEASE and DESIST from further implementing the April 25, 2000
also is a showing that the same title may have been illegally issued; Writ of Execution and/or any of its aliases, or any demolition order, if one might
have been issued already, in Civil Case No. 23671 before MTCC, Branch 6,
WHEREAS, the very imminent danger of demolition may result to irreparable Bacolod City, pending the hearing and final determination of the merits in this
damage to herein petitioners, thus, the impending demolition appears to be a instant case, or until further orders from this Court.
compelling reason for the issuance of a TRO at this stage in this case.
xxxx
NOW THEREFORE, YOU, the herein respondents, YOUR AGENTS,
REPRESENTATIVES, or ANY PERSON acting for and in your behalf, are hereby SO ORDERED.
ENJOINED to CEASE and DESIST from further implementing the 5 April 2000
Writ of Execution and/or any of its Aliases or any demolition order, if one might The petitioner then directly came to the Court through her so-called "petition
have already been issued, in civil case No. 23671, MTCC, Branch 6, Bacolod City, for review on certiorari," seeking to annul and set aside the writ of preliminary
until further orders from this Court. prohibitory injunction issued by the RTC pursuant to its order dated November
12, 2002. She contended that: (a) the RTC issued the writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction in a way not in accord with law or the applicable I

jurisprudence, because the injunction was directed at the execution of a final
and executory judgment of a court of law; (b) the respondents (as the petitioners November 12, 2002 order of the RTC is an
in SCA Case No. 01-11522) had no existing right to be protected by injunction, interlocutory order that was not subject of appeal
because their right and cause of action were premised on the future and
With the petition being self-styled as a petition for review on certiorari, a mode
contingent event that the petitioner’s TCT No. T-55630 would be cancelled
of appeal, we have first to determine whether the assailed order of November 12,
through a separate proceeding for the purpose; and (c) the writ of preliminary
2002 was an interlocutory or a final order. The distinction is relevant in deciding
prohibitory injunction to enjoin the execution was issued long after the March
whether the order is the proper subject of an appeal, or of a special civil action
17, 1999 judgment of the MTCC had become final and executory.
for certiorari.
Issues
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known.
The petition presents the following issues, to wit: The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by
a. Whether the present petition is a proper remedy to assail the execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely
20
November 12, 2002 order of the RTC; and dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An
interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is
b. Whether the RTC lawfully issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary 21
yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not
prohibitory injunction to enjoin the execution of the already final and an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment
executory March 17, 1999 decision of the MTCC. leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the
case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
Ruling
The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the writ
We give due course to the petition as a petition for certiorari.
of preliminary injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and should
not be the subject of an appeal. The reason for disallowing an appeal from an
The RTC was guilty of manifestly grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which
excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of SCA Case No. 01-11522 and in
necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during
issuing the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction to restrain
the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay
the execution of the final and executory decision of the MTCC.
the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will
26
compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may require. It is available when the following indispensable elements concur,
may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him to wit:
22
and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An
interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment 1. That it is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising
has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
the appeal of the judgment itself.

2. That such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and
23
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory
3. That there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of 27
24
the ordinary course of law.
discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
Certiorari being an extraordinary remedy, the party who seeks to avail of the
II 28
same must strictly observe the rules laid down by law. The extraordinary writ
The petition, by alleging acts constituting manifestly grave abuse of discretion, of certiorari may be availed of only upon a showing, in the minimum, that the
was a petition for certiorari respondent tribunal or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
29
Without disregarding the rule that an interlocutory order cannot be the subject discretion.
of appeal, the Court is constrained to treat the present recourse as a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65. For a petition for certiorari and prohibition to prosper and be given due course,
it must be shown that: (a) the respondent judge or tribunal issued the order
Certiorari is a writ issued by a superior court to an inferior court of record, or without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; or (b) the
other tribunal or officer, exercising a judicial function, requiring the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous, and the remedy of appeal
30
certification and return to the former of some proceeding then pending, or the cannot afford adequate and expeditious relief. Yet, the allegation that the
record and proceedings in some cause already terminated, in cases where the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
25
procedure is not according to the course of the common law. The remedy is without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
brought against a lower court, board, or officer rendering a judgment or order will not alone suffice. Equally imperative is that the petition must satisfactorily
and seeks the annulment or modification of the proceedings of such tribunal, specify the acts committed or omitted by the tribunal, board or officer that
board or officer, and the granting of such incidental reliefs as law and justice constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of ordinary course of law admits exceptions. In Francisco Motors Corporation v.
31 33
judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of Court of Appeals, the Court has recognized exceptions to the requirement,
the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his
hostility, and the abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion judgment; (c) where there may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an
of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is
all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of
32
jurisdiction. urgency. The allegations of the petition definitely placed the petitioner’s
recourse under most, if not all, of the exceptions.
A reading of the petition shows that the petitioner has satisfied the
requirements to justify giving due course to her petition as a petition under Rule Was the petition timely filed?
65. She has identified therein some acts as constituting the RTC Judge’s
manifestly grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, It was. The petitioner received a copy of the order dated November 12, 2002 on
34
namely: (a) despite the final and executory nature of the judgment sought to be November 15, 2002. Pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 65, she had until January 14,
enjoined, the RTC still issued the TRO and, later on, the assailed writ of 2003, or 60 days from November 15, 2002, within which to file a petition for
35
preliminary prohibitory injunction to enjoin the implementation of the writ of certiorari. She filed the petition on January 2, 2003, well within the period for
execution; (b) the RTC issued the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction to her to do so.
protect the respondents’ alleged right in the subject properties, but the right did
We also observe that the rule that a petition should have been brought under
not appear to be in esse; and (c) the issuance of the TRO and the writ of
Rule 65 instead of under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (or vice versa) is not
preliminary prohibitory injunction was in violation of the requirements imposed 36
inflexible or rigid. The inflexibility or rigidity of application of the rules of
by Rule 58 of the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence.
procedure is eschewed in order to serve the higher ends of justice. Thus,
Did the petitioner’s failure to first make a motion for reconsideration in the RTC substance is given primacy over form, for it is paramount that the rules of
preclude treating her petition as a petition for certiorari? procedure are not applied in a very rigid technical sense, but used only to help
secure, not override, substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of
37
The answer is in the negative. That the petitioner did not file a motion for the rules is made, their aim is defeated. Verily, the strict application of
reconsideration in the RTC before coming to this Court did not preclude procedural technicalities should not hinder the speedy disposition of the case on
38
treating her petition as one for certiorari. The requirement under Section 1 of the merits. To institute a guideline, therefore, the Rules of Court expressly
Rule 65 that there must be no appeal, or any plain or adequate remedy in the mandates that the rules of procedure "shall be liberally construed in order to
41
promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of law. To frustrate the winning party’s right through dilatory schemes is to
39
every action and proceeding." frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of the courts, which thereby
increases the costs of litigation. The interest of justice undeniably demanded
III that we should immediately write finis to the litigation, for all courts are by oath
bound to guard against any scheme calculated to bring about the frustration of
March 17, 1999 Decision of the MTCC, being already final and executory, could
the winning party’s right, and to stop any attempt to prolong controversies
not be assailed; nor could its execution be restrained 42
already resolved with finality.
The respondents elevated to the Court the CA decision dated December 6, 1999
It is true that notwithstanding the principle of immutability of final judgments,
and resolution dated April 17, 2000 via a petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 143458
equity still accords some recourse to a party adversely affected by a final and
entitled Damiana Daguno, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.) The Court dismissed
executory judgment, specifically, the remedy of a petition to annul the judgment
the petition on July 19, 2000, and the dismissal became final and executory on
based on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, or the remedy of
October 20, 2000 because the respondents did not timely file a motion for
a petition for relief from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of
reconsideration. Consequently, the MTCC rightly issued the writ of execution 43
Court. He may also have a competent court stay the execution or prevent the
on April 5, 2000. Based on the sheriff’s return of service, the writ of execution
enforcement of a final judgment when facts and circumstances that render
was duly served upon all the defendants. 44
execution inequitable or unjust meanwhile transpire; or when a change in the
45
situation of the parties can warrant an injunctive relief.
Under the circumstances, the principle of immutability of a final judgment must
now be absolutely and unconditionally applied against the respondents. They
Neither of such remaining equitable remedies is available anymore to the
could not anymore be permitted to interminably forestall the execution of the
40
respondents, however, for the time for such remedies is now past. Indeed, it is
judgment through their interposition of new petitions or pleadings. Even as
now high time for the respondents to bow to the judgment, and to accept their
their right to initiate an action in court ought to be fully respected, their
fate under it.
commencing SCA Case No. 01-11522 in the hope of securing a favorable ruling
despite their case having been already fully and finally adjudicated should not IV
be tolerated. Their move should not frustrate the enforcement of the judgment,
the fruit and the end of the suit itself. Their right as the losing parties to appeal Issuance of TRO and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction is patently
within the prescribed period could not defeat the correlative right of the without basis and violated the requirements of the
winning party to enjoy at last the finality of the resolution of her case through
execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which would be the life of the Rules of Court and jurisprudence
At this juncture, we find and declare that the RTC Judge’s issuance of the on the part of the applicant, and in the absence of facts bringing the matter
assailed order dated November 12, 2002 granting the respondents’ application within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ must be struck down for
for the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction constituted manifestly grave being issued in grave abuse of discretion. Thus, injunction will not issue to
abuse of discretion. protect a right not in esse, which is merely contingent, and which may never
47
arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action.
A.
Here, the respondents did not establish the existence of an actual right to be
Respondents had no existing right violated protected by injunction. They did not, to begin with, hold any enforceable claim
by the implementation of the writ of execution in the property subject of the MTCC decision and of the writ of execution. The
Memoranda and investigative report, whereby the DENR appeared to classify
Generally, injunction, being a preservative remedy for the protection of
the property as foreshore land, conferred upon the respondents no interest or
substantive rights or interests, is not a cause of action in itself but merely a
right in the land. Under all circumstances, the classification was not a
provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is resorted to only when there
supervening event that entitled them to the protection of the injunctive relief.
is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences that cannot be redressed
Their claim to any right as of then was merely contingent, and was something
under any standard of compensation. The controlling reason for the existence of
that might not even arise in the future. Simply stated, they could not lay proper
the judicial power to issue the writ of injunction is that the court may thereby
claim to the land before the State has taken a positive act of first properly
prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties
classifying the land as foreshore land and the courts have first conclusively
before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated.
determined and adjudged the ownership in their favor in a suit brought for the
The application for the writ rests upon an alleged existence of an emergency or
purpose. Without the State’s positive act of classification and the courts’
of a special reason for such an order to issue before the case can be regularly
adjudication, all that the respondents had was an inchoate expectation that
heard, and the essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief
might not at all materialize, especially if we consider that the petitioner was
are that the complaint alleges facts that appear to be sufficient to constitute a
already the registered owner of the same property, as evidenced by her existing
cause of action for injunction and that on the entire showing from both sides, it
and valid transfer certificate of title covering the land (a fact that they
appears, in view of all the circumstances, that the injunction is reasonably 48
46
themselves admitted and acknowledged), for which she enjoyed the
necessary to protect the legal rights of plaintiff pending the litigation. 49
indefeasibility of a Torrens title.
A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event and is the strong arm

Presumably well aware that the respondents held absolutely no valid and
of equity or a transcendent remedy. It is granted only to
existing right in the land, the RTC Judge had plainly no factual and legal bases
protect actual and existing substantial rights. Without actual and existing rights
for enjoining the enforcement of the writ of execution through the TRO and the
writ of preliminary injunction. He obviously acted arbitrarily and whimsically, TRO indefinite. He thus took for granted the caution that injunction, as the
51
because injunction protected only an existing right or actual interest in strong arm of equity, should not be routinely or lightly granted. Again,
property. Thus, he was guilty of committing manifestly grave abuse of restraint was required of him, for the power to issue injunctions should be
discretion, and compounded his guilt by stopping the enforcement of a final and exercised sparingly, with utmost care, and with great caution and deliberation.
executory decision of the MTCC. The power is to be exercised only where the reason and necessity therefor are
52
clearly established, and only in cases reasonably free from doubt. For, it has
B. been said that there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, requires
greater caution and deliberation, or is more dangerous in a doubtful case, than
TRO and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction 53
the issuing of an injunction.
were wrongfully issued for an indefinite period
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for certiorari.

We further note that the RTC Judge expressly made the TRO effective until
further orders from him. He thereby contravened explicit rules of procedure. He We NULLIFY and SET ASIDE the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction
knowingly did so, considering that he thereby disregarded the nature and issued on November 12, 2002 for being devoid of legal and factual bases; and
purpose of the TRO as a temporary and limited remedy, instead of a permanent DIRECT the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, in Bacolod City to dismiss SCA
and unrestricted relief. He disregarded Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, Case No. 01-11522.
which expressly stated that the life span of a TRO was only 20 days from service
of the TRO on the party or person sought to be enjoined. Considering that the Presiding Judge Gorgonio J. Ybañez of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, in
limited life span of a TRO was a long-standing and basic rule of procedure, he Bacolod City is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE in writing within ten days from
consciously arrogated unto himself a power that he did not have. Ignoring a rule notice why he should not be administratively sanctioned for gross ignorance of
as elementary as the 20-day life span of a TRO amounted to gross ignorance of the law and procedure for his manifest disregard of the prohibition under the
law and procedure. His violation is seemingly made worse by the fact that he Rules of Court against unwarranted restraining orders and writs of injunction,
thereby usurped the authority of the Court as the only court with the power to and for issuing a temporary restraining order effective until furthers of the
50
issue a TRO effective until further orders. court.
Due to its lifetime of only 20 days from service on the party or person to be Costs of suit to be paid by the respondents. SO ORDERED.
enjoined, the TRO that the RTC Judge issued automatically expired on the
twentieth day without need of any judicial declaration to that effect.1avvphi1Yet,
by making the TRO effective until further orders, he made the effectivity of the
The factual antecedents are as follows:
SECTION 6 Respondent International Exchange Bank (iBank, for brevity) filed a collection
suit with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against
Sps. Yap v. International Exchange Bank Alberto Looyuko and Jimmy T. Go in the RTC of Makati. The case was raffled to
Branch 150 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-791. On 7 October 1999, the
trial court rendered a Decision in favor of respondent iBank and found Alberto
Looyuko and Jimmy T. Go liable, ordering them to pay the amount of ninety-six
THIRD DIVISION
million pesos (P96,000,000.00), plus penalty.
G.R. No. 175145 March 28, 2008

A Writ of Execution on the judgment against Mr. Looyuko was implemented.
SPOUSES ALFREDO and SHIRLEY YAP, Petitioners, Thereafter, a Writ of Execution was issued against Mr. Go for his part of the
vs. liability. Thereupon, respondent Renato C. Flora, Sheriff of Branch 150 of the
1
INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE BANK, SHERIFF RENATO C. FLORA and/or RTC of Makati City, issued a Notice of Sheriff’s Sale on 12 May 2000 notifying all
OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MAKATI the parties concerned, as well as the public in general, that the following real
CITY, Respondents. properties, among other properties, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCTs) No. PT-66751, No. PT-66749, No. 55469 and No. 45229 of the Registry of
DECISION Deeds of Pasig City, TCT No. 36489 of the Registry of Quezon City, and TCTs
No. 4621 and No. 52987 of the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City, allegedly
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: 5
owned by Mr. Go will be sold at public auction on 15 June 2000. Said public
auction did not push through.
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
2
of Civil Procedure which seeks to set aside the Resolution of the Court of
On 13 June 2000, petitioner-spouses Alfredo and Shirley Yap filed a Complaint
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 95074 dated 11 July 2006 which dismissed petitioner-
for Injunction with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
spouses Alfredo and Shirley Yap’s petition for certiorari which questioned the
Injunction with the RTC of Pasig City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
3
Order of Branch 264 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil
67945 and was raffled to Branch 158 thereof. Petitioners sought to stop the
Case No. 68088 recalling and dissolving the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
auction sale alleging that the properties covered by TCTs No. PT-66751, No. PT-
4
dated 13 August 2001, and its Resolution dated 9 October 2006 denying
66749, No. 55469 and No. 45229 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City, TCT No.
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
36489 of the Registry of Quezon City, and TCTs No. 4621 and No. 52987 of the
Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City, are already owned by them by virtue of Engracio M. Escariñas, Jr., Clerk of Court VII and Ex-Officio Sheriff of RTC
6
Deeds of Absolute Sale executed by Jimmy Go in their favor. They further Makati City, filed his Answer while respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora filed an
alleged that respondent sheriff disregarded their right over the properties Omnibus Motion (Motion to Refer the Complaint to the Office of the Clerk of
despite their execution of an Affidavit of Adverse Claim to prove their claim over Court for Raffle in the Presence of Adverse Party and Motion to Dismiss) dated
10
the properties and the publication of a Notice to the Public warning that various 17 October 2000.
deeds had already been issued in their favor evidencing their right over the
same. In an Order dated 20 February 2001, Hon. Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr. denied the
11
Omnibus Motion for lack of merit. Respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora filed a
12
A second Notice of Sheriff’s Sale dated 30 June 2000 was issued by Sheriff Flora Motion for Reconsideration dated 26 February 2001.
scheduling a public auction on 24 July 2000 for the afore-mentioned properties.
The public auction did not happen anew. Thereafter, a third Notice of Sheriff’s A hearing was held on the application for preliminary injunction. On 18 July
Sale dated 21 July 2000 scheduling a public auction on 22 August 2000 was 2001, an Order was issued by Judge Janolo granting petitioners’ application for
issued. issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The Order reads:
On 21 August 2000, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 158, issued an Order in Civil WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiffs’ application for issuance of a Writ
Case No. 67945 denying petitioners’ application for a writ of preliminary of Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED, and defendants and their
injunction.
7 representatives are enjoined from proceeding further with the execution,
including consolidating title and taking possession thereof, against plaintiffs’
As scheduled, the public auction took place on 22 August 2000 for which real properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. PT-66751, PT-
respondent sheriff issued a Certificate of Sale stating that the subject properties 66749, 55469, 45229, 4621, 52987 and 36489.
had been sold at public auction in favor of respondent iBank, subject to the
third-party claims of petitioners.
8 The Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall be issued upon plaintiffs’ posting of a
bond executed to defendant in the amount of Three Million Pesos
Petitioners filed with the RTC of Pasig City the instant case for Annulment of (P3,000,000.00) to the effect that plaintiffs will pay defendants all damages
Sheriff’s Auction Sale Proceedings and Certificate of Sale against iBank, the which the latter may sustain by reason of the injunction if it be ultimately
13
Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of RTC Makati City, and Sheriff Flora. The decided that the injunction is unwarranted.
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 68088 and was raffled to Branch 264. The
Complaint was amended to include a prayer for the issuance of a Temporary On 13 August 2001, upon posting a bond in the amount of three million pesos
14
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
9 (P3,000,000.00), Judge Janolo issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora filed on 29 August 2001 a Motion for treated as a petition under Rule 65 of the said Rules, the same would be
15
Reconsideration of the order granting the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dismissed for failure to sufficiently show that the questioned judgment is
16 20
which the trial court denied in an Order dated 21 November 2001. tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
With the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, respondents iBank and Accordingly, an Entry of Judgment was issued by the Supreme Court certifying
Sheriff Flora filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition that the resolution dismissing the case had become final and executory on 30
21
and Mandamus with prayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or July 2005.
17
Preliminary Injunction praying that it: (a) issue immediately a temporary
restraining order enjoining Judge Janolo from taking any action or conducting Subsequently, respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora filed with the RTC of Pasig
any further proceeding on the case; (b) annul the Orders dated 18 July 2001 and City, Branch 264, an Omnibus Motion (To Resolve Motion to Dismiss
21 November 2001; and (c) order the immediate dismissal of Civil Case No. Complaint and/or Dissolve Injunction) dated 31 January 2006 praying that their
68088. pending Motion for Reconsideration dated 26 February 2001 which seeks for the
dismissal of the case be resolved and/or the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
22
In its decision dated 18 July 2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed the previously issued be dissolved.
18
Petition. It explained that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by
Judge Janolo in promulgating the two Orders. It emphasized that its ruling only On 9 February 2006, petitioners filed their Comment thereon with Motion to
23
pertains to the propriety or impropriety of the issuance of the preliminary Cite in Contempt the counsel of respondents. They pray that the pending
injunction and has no bearing on the main issues of the case which are still to be Motion for Reconsideration be denied for being devoid of merit, and that the
resolved on the merits. The Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration filed by Motion to Dissolve Writ of Preliminary Injunction be also denied, it being a
respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora was denied for lack of merit.
19 clear defiance of the directive of the Supreme Court which ruled with finality
that the injunction issued by the trial court was providently issued and was not
Respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora thereafter filed with this Court a Petition tainted with grave abuse of discretion. They further ask that respondents’
for Certiorari which we dismissed. The Court’s Resolution dated 7 March 2005 counsel be cited in contempt of court and be meted out the appropriate
24
reads: penalty. Respondents filed a Reply dated 20 February 2006.
Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the petition for In a Manifestation dated 24 March 2006, respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora
certiorari, the Court Resolves to DISMISS the petition for being a wrong remedy submitted an Affidavit of Merit to emphasize their resolve and willingness,
under the Rules and evidently used as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal among other things, to file a counter-bond to cover whatever damages
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Besides, even if petitioners may suffer should the trial court decide to dissolve the writ of
25
preliminary injunction. Petitioners filed a Counter-Manifestation with Second The provisions of Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court allow
26
Motion to Cite Respondents’ Counsel in Direct Contempt of Court to which dissolution of the injunction granted provided there is affidavit of party or
27 28
respondents filed an Opposition. Petitioners filed a Reply thereto. persons enjoined; an opportunity to oppose by the other party; hearing on the
issue, and filing of a bond to be fixed by the court sufficient to compensate
29
In an Order dated 29 April 2006, the trial court recalled and dissolved the Writ damages applicant may suffer by dissolution thereby.
of Preliminary Injunction dated 13 August 2001, and ordered respondents to post
a counter-bond amounting to ten million pesos. It directed the Branch Clerk of A preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to the main
Court to issue a Writ Dissolving Preliminary Injunction upon the filing and case subject to the latter’s outcome. Its sole objective is to preserve the status
approval of the required counter-bond. The dispositive portion of the Order quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. The status quo is the
reads: last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy.
The status quo should be that existing at the time of the filing of the case. A
WHEREFORE, this Court’s writ of preliminary injunction dated August 13, 2001 preliminary injunction should not establish new relations between the parties,
is recalled and dissolved. Defendants are hereby ordered to post a counter-bond but merely maintain or re-establish the pre-existing relationship between them.
amounting to ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) to cover the damages plaintiffs x x x.
would incur should a favorable judgment be rendered them after trial on the
merits. When the complainant’s right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a
clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper and
The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to issue a Writ Dissolving Preliminary constitutes grave abuse of discretion. x x x. In the case at bar, plaintiffs’ deed of
30
Injunction upon the filing and approval of defendants’ counter-bond. sale was purported to be not duly notarized. As such, the legal right of what the
plaintiffs claim is still doubtful and such legal right can only be threshed out in a
The trial court explained its ruling in this wise:
full blown trial where they can clearly establish the right over the disputed
properties.
In our jurisdiction, the provisions of Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court allow
the issuance of preliminary injunction. This court granted plaintiffs’ prayer
Moreover, defendants are willing to post a counter bond which could cover up
preliminary injunction in the Order dated July 18, 2001 and the corresponding
to the damages in favor of plaintiffs in case the judgment turns out to be adverse
writ issued on August 13, 2001.
to them. Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, this is perfectly allowed and the
dissolution of the writ of injunction can accordingly be issued. In the case of
Defendants in this case, however, are not without remedy to pray for dissolution
Lasala vs. Fernandez, the highest court has enunciated that "a court has the
of preliminary injunction already granted because it is only interlocutory and
power to recall or modify a writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by
not permanent in nature.
it. The issuance or recall of a preliminary writ of injunction is an interlocutory 1. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS RESOLVED
matter that remains at all times within the control of the court." (G.R. No. L- WITH FINALITY THAT YOUR PERITIONERS WILL "SUFFER
16628, May 23, 1962). The defendants had shown that dissolution of the writ of IRREPARABLE INJURY" (C.A.’s emphasis) IF NO INJUNCTION IS
injunction is just and proper. It was duly shown that great and irreparable injury ISSUED.
would severely cause the defendants if the writ of injunction shall continue to
exist.
31 2. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE HON. SUPREME COURT RULED
WITH FINALITY THAT THE COURT A QUO DID NOT ABUSE ITS
On 5 May 2006, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED THE INJUNCTION DATED 13
32
Appeals asking that the trial court’s Order dated 29 April 2006 be set aside. AUGUST 2001, THUS, SUSTAINING THE REGULARITY OF THE WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.
During the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari, petitioners filed before the
33
trial court a Very Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings to which respondents II
34
filed a Comment.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE LEONCIO M. JANOLO, JR.
On 11 July 2006, the Court of Appeals resolved to dismiss outright the Petition GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS
for Certiorari for failure of petitioners to file a motion for reconsideration of the OF JURISDICTION BY FIXING THE PHP10,000,000.00 COUNTER-BOND
35 36
Order dated 29 April 2006. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE IRREPARABLE DAMAGE TO PETITIONERS
37
petitioners was denied. AS A RESULT OF DISSOLVING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS
INCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION OR COULD NOT BE
After being granted an extension of thirty days within which to file a petition for QUANTIFIED.
certiorari, petitioners filed the instant Petition on 14 December 2006. They made
the following assignment of errors: III
I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION IN OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSING YOUR PETITIONERS PETITION
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE LEONCIO M. JANOLO, JR. FOR CERTIORARI IN CA-GR SP NO. 95074, AS IT FAILED TO APPLY
GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE TO THE EFFECT THAT A MOTION FOR
OF JURISDICTION IN DISSOLVING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY RECONSIDERATION MAY BE DISPENSED WITH WHERE THE
INJUNCTION DATED 13 AUGUST 2001. CONTROVERTED ACT IS PATENTLY ILLEGAL OR WAS PERFORMED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AS HELD IN not falsified, documents. They add that the continuance of the Writ of
HAMILTON VS. LEVY, (344 SCRA 821) Preliminary Injunction would cause them irreparable damage because it
continues to incur damage not only for the nonpayment of the judgment award
IV (in Civil Case No. 98-791 before the RTC of Makati City, Br. 150), but also for
opportunity losses resulting from the continued denial of its right to consolidate
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED AND GRAVELY
title over the levied properties.
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION CLEARLY POINTING OUT TO THE COURT THAT AS There is no dispute that both the Court of Appeals and this Court have ruled
AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE, THE REQUIRED MOTION FOR that the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the trial court was not
RECONSIDERATION MAY BE DISPENSED WITH. tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Respondents tried to undo the issuance
of said writ but to no avail. The Resolution on the matter attained finality on 30
At the outset, it must be said that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 13
July 2005 and an entry of judgment was made.
August 2001 issued by the trial court has not yet been actually dissolved because
respondents have not posted the required counter-bond in the amount This, notwithstanding, respondents filed with the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 264,
of P10,000,000.00. The dissolution thereof is primed on the filing of the counter- an Omnibus Motion (To Resolve Motion to Dismiss Complaint and/or Dissolve
bond. Injunction) dated 31 January 2006 praying that their Motion for Reconsideration
dated 26 February 2001 of the trial court’s denial of their Motion to Dismiss
Petitioners argue that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered the
which the trial court failed to resolve, be resolved and/or the Writ of
dissolution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the propriety of its issuance
Preliminary Injunction previously issued be dissolved. With this Omnibus
having been affirmed by both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
Motion, the trial court issued the Order dated 13 August 2001 recalling and
There being an Order by this Court that the injunction issued by the trial court
dissolving the Writ of Preliminary Injunction conditioned on the filing of
was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the dissolution of said writ is a
a P10,000,000.00 counter-bond.
clear defiance of this Court’s directive.
The question is: Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, may the trial
Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the trial court has the authority
court recall and dissolve the preliminary injunction it issued despite the rulings
and prerogative to set aside the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. They add that
of the Court of Appeals and by this Court that its issuance was not tainted with
since petitioners’ Deed of Sale was not duly notarized, the latter’s application for
grave abuse of discretion?
preliminary injunction is devoid of factual and legal bases. They assert that, not
being public documents, the subject deeds of sale are nothing but spurious, if
We hold that the trial court may still order the dissolution of the preliminary preliminary injunction or restraining order granted is too great, it may be
injunction it previously issued.1avvphi1 We do not agree with petitioners’ modified.
argument that the trial court may no longer dissolve the preliminary injunction
because this Court previously ruled that its issuance was not tainted with grave Under the afore-quoted section, a preliminary injunction may be dissolved if it
abuse of discretion. appears after hearing that although the applicant is entitled to the injunction or
restraining order, the issuance or continuance thereof, as the case may be,
The issuance of a preliminary injunction is different from its dissolution. Its would cause irreparable damage to the party or person enjoined while the
38
issuance is governed by Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure applicant can be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer, and the
while the grounds for its dissolution are contained in Section 6, Rule 58 of the former files a bond in an amount fixed by the court on condition that he will pay
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As long as the party seeking the dissolution of the all damages which the applicant may suffer by the denial or the dissolution of
preliminary injunction can prove the presence of any of the grounds for its the injunction or restraining order. Two conditions must concur: first, the court
dissolution, same may be dissolved notwithstanding that this Court previously in the exercise of its discretion, finds that the continuance of the injunction
ruled that its issuance was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. would cause great damage to the defendant, while the plaintiff can be fully
compensated for such damages as he may suffer; second, the defendant files a
Section 6 of Rule 58 reads: 39
counter-bond. The Order of the trial court dated 29 April 2006 is based on this
ground.
Section 6. Grounds for objection to, or for motion of dissolution of, injunction
or restraining order. – The application for injunction or restraining order may be In the case at bar, the trial court, after hearing, found that respondents duly
denied, upon a showing of its insufficiency. The injunction or restraining order showed that they would suffer great and irreparable injury if the injunction shall
may also be denied, or, if granted, may be dissolved, on other grounds upon continue to exist. As to the second condition, the trial court likewise found that
affidavits of the party or person enjoined, which may be opposed by the respondents were willing to post a counter-bond which could cover the
applicant also by affidavits. It may further be denied, or, if granted, may be damages that petitioners may suffer in case the judgment turns out to be
dissolved, if it appears after hearing that although the applicant is entitled to the adverse to them. The Order of the trial court to recall and dissolve the
injunction or restraining order, the issuance or continuance thereof, as the case preliminary injunction is subject to the filing and approval of the counter-bond
may be, would cause irreparable damage to the party or person enjoined while that it ordered. Failure to post the required counter-bond will necessarily lead to
the applicant can be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer, and the non-dissolution of the preliminary injunction. The Order of Dissolution
the former files a bond in an amount fixed by the court conditioned that he will cannot be implemented until and unless the required counter-bond has been
pay all damages which the applicant may suffer by the denial or the dissolution posted.
of the injunction or restraining order. If it appears that the extent of the
The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary Moreover, a perusal of petitioners’ petition for certiorari filed with the Court of
injunction is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, and its Appeals shows that they filed the same because there was no appeal, or any
action shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it is demonstrated that it acted plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law except viaa petition for
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or, otherwise, in grave abuse of certiorari. When same was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for failure to file a
discretion. By the same token, the court that issued such a preliminary relief motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s Order, they argue that while the
40
may recall or dissolve the writ as the circumstances may warrant. In the case filing of a motion for reconsideration is a sine qua non before a petition for
on hand, the trial court issued the order of dissolution on a ground provided for certiorari is instituted, the same is not entirely without exception like where the
by the Rules of Court. The same being in accordance with the rules, we find no controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in
reason to disturb the same. excess of jurisdiction. It was only when the Court of Appeals dismissed their
Petition did they argue that exceptions to the general rule should apply. Their
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred and gravely abused its invocation of the application of the exceptions was belatedly made. The
discretion when it dismissed outright their Petition for Certiorari by failing to application of the exceptions should be raised in their Petition for Certiorari and
apply existing jurisprudence that a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed not when their Petition has already been dismissed. They must give their
with where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without reasons and explain fully why their case falls under any of the exceptions. This,
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. On the other hand, respondents urge the petitioners failed to do.
Court to deny the Petition for Review, arguing that the Court of Appeals
properly applied the general rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration Petitioners’ argument that they filed the Petition for Certiorari without filing a
is a conditionsine qua non in order that certiorari will lie. motion for reconsideration because there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the course of law except via a Petition for Certiorari does
We find petitioners’ contention to be untenable. not convince. We have held that the "plain" and "adequate remedy" referred to
in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a motion for reconsideration of the
The rule is well settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an 43
41
assailed Order or Resolution. The mere allegation that there is "no appeal, or
indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari. It
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy" is not one of the exceptions to the rule
must be stressed that a petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and
that a motion for reconsideration is a sine qua non before a petition for
should be filed only as a last resort. The filing of a motion for reconsideration is
certiorari may be filed.
intended to afford the trial court an opportunity to correct any actual error
42
attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and factual issues. By All told, we hold that the act of the trial court of issuing the Order dated 29
their failure to file a motion for reconsideration, they deprived the trial court of April 2006 was not patently illegal or performed without or in excess of
the opportunity to rectify any error it committed, if there was any. jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing outright petitioners’
Petition for Certiorari for failing to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial
court’s Order.
Our pronouncements in this case are confined only to the issue of the
dissolution of the preliminary injunction and will not apply to the merits of the
case.
WHEREFORE, all considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions

of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 95074 dated 11 July 2006 and 9 October
2006 are AFFIRMED. The Order dated 29 April 2006 of Branch 264 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil Case No. 68088 recalling and
dissolving the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 13 August 2001 is
AFFIRMED. Upon the posting by respondents of the counter-bond required, the
trial court is directed to issue the Writ Dissolving Preliminary Injunction. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECTION 7
FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE VS. LUCZON – GO TO SECTION 5

granting possession to private respondents of portions of the parcels of land

covered by TCT Nos. 31527 and 31528 (now No. N-67845). This decision is
SECTION 8
immediately executory. The Clerk of Court is directed to remand the records of
the case to the court of origin.
Natalia Realty v. CA

[G.R. No. 126462.February 5, 2003]
SO ORDERED."
NATALIA REALTY vs. CA
On November 28, 2002, private respondents filed a "Motion for Execution

FIRST DIVISION
Against TRO Bond (Manager's Check)". In their motion, private respondents
point out that to secure the issuance of a temporary restraining order, petitioner
Gentlemen:
posted with the Court a Manager's Check of BPI-Family Bank, Taytay Branch,
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB dated February 27, 1997 in the amount of P100,000.00. Petitioner posted the
5 2003. cash bond pursuant to the March 3, 1997 Resolution of the Court granting the
motion of petitioner to file a cash bond. The pertinent portion of the Court's
G.R. No. 126462(Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) resolution reads:
Before the Court are two motions filed by private respondents: (1) Motion for "The motion of the petitioner dated February 25, 1997 to file a cash bond in lieu
Execution Against TRO Bond (Manager's Check) and (2) Manifestation with of the supersedeas bond issued by Mercantile Insurance Company which
Motion for Entry of Judgment. petitioner filed on October 29, 1996 in order to expedite the issuance of a
temporary restraining order in this case and submitting a Manager's Check in
On November 12, 2002, the Court dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by
the amount of P100,000.00 issued by the BPI-Family Bank, Taytay Branch,
Natalia Realty, Inc. ("petitioner" for brevity) against Antonio Martinez, Felipe
is GRANTED. As prayed for, let a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
Padua, Mario Perfecto and Hermito Salodega ("private respondents" for brevity).
ISSUE enjoining the respondents from enforcing the Court of Appeals'
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
questioned resolutions promulgated on June 27, 1995 and June 19, 1996 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 44915 entitled "Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Antonio Martinez, et al."
"WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, shall forthwith issue and cause to be immediately
enforced an ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION of the Order of August 3, 1995
In view of the November 12, 2002 Decision of the Court dismissing the instant remanded to it. Private respondents manifest that they are now far more
petition, private respondents pray that the bond posted by petitioner with the interested in forthwith executing the decision of the Court granting them
Court, in the amount of P100,000.00, be executed on and released in private possession of the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 31527 and 31528 instead of
respondents' favor. pursuing execution on the bond. Private respondents would rather withdraw
their Motion for Execution Against TRO Bond (Manager's Check) if the motion
On December 16, 2002, the Court required petitioner to file its Comment. would only pose as an obstacle to an immediate execution of the Court's
decision. To expedite the execution of the decision, private respondents pray for
Petitioner filed its "Opposition to Motion of Ceferino Padua To Have Manager's
the issuance of an entry of judgment since petitioner did not file a motion for
Check of P100,000.00 Be Released In Favor of Respondents" arguing for the
reconsideration of said decision. Private respondents believe that an entry of
denial of the motion of private respondents. Petitioner contends that the
judgment is in order even while the Motion for Execution Against TRO Bond
manager's check deposited by it should be applied to the satisfaction of any
(Manager's Check) is pending before the Court.
judgment rendered in favor of private respondents, and after satisfying the
judgment, the balance should be refunded to it. Petitioner insists that a hearing The Court resolves to reiterate its declaration in its Decision dated November 12,
should be conducted to determine the extent of the damage suffered by private 2002 that said decision is immediately executory. The Court also resolves to
respondents. Petitioner invokes Section 18 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.The refer private respondents' Motion for Execution Against TRO Bond (Manager's
provision reads: Check) to the Regional Trial Court so that it could hear private respondents'
claim for damages.
"Sec. 18. Disposition of money deposited.- Where the party against whom
attachment had been issued has deposited money instead of giving counter- Section 1 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that before a writ of execution
bond, it shall be applied under the direction of the court to the satisfaction of could issue, the judgment obligee must first apply for execution with the court
any judgment rendered in favor of the attaching party, and after satisfying the of origin and with notice to the adverse party. Together with the motion, the
judgment the balance shall be rendered to the depositor or his assignee. If the judgment obligee must submit (1) certified true copies of the judgment or
judgment is in favor of the party against whom attachment was issued, the judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and (2) the entry of
whole sum deposited must be refunded to him or his assignee." such judgment or final order.[1]cralawAn entry of judgment is thus generally
required before a writ of execution could issue. However, where the judgment or
On January 13, 2003, private respondents filed a "Manifestation with Motion for
final order or resolution, or a portion thereof is ordered to be immediately
Entry of Judgment". Private respondents bewail the fact that the Regional Trial
executory, an entry of judgment is no longer necessary.[2]cralawSection 11 of
Court could not act on their motion for execution of the Decision of the Court
Rule 51 of the Rules of Court clearly provides:
dated November 12, 2002 because the records of the case have not been
"Sec.11- Except where the judgment or final order or resolution, or a portion The applicable provision to private respondents' claim for damages on the bond
thereof, is ordered to be immediately executory, the motion for its execution is Section 8 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. It states that the "amount of
may only be filed in the proper court after its entry." damages to be awarded to either party, upon the bond of the adverse party shall
be claimed, ascertained, and awarded under the same procedure prescribed in
To avoid unnecessary delays and to prevent the losing party from thwarting Section 20 of Rule 57." The pertinent portion of Section 20, Rule 57 in turn
execution, the 1997 Rules of Court has abandoned the requirement that a court provides:
must await the return of the records before it could effect
execution.[3]cralawThe Regional Trial Court, the court of origin in this case, has "xxx
therefore no reason to deny or delay the enforcement of execution just because
the records of the case have yet to be remanded to it. If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the party against whom
the attachment was issued, he must claim damages sustained during the
For as long as private respondents have on motion applied for a writ of pendency of the appeal by filing an application in the appellate court, with
execution with notice to the adverse party and submitted certified true copies of notice to the party in whose favor the attachment was issued or his surety or
the judgment or final orders sought to be enforced, the Regional Trial Court sureties, before the judgment of the appellate court becomes executory. The
should posthaste comply with the Court's directive. In its November 12, 2002 appellate court may allow the application to be heard and decided by the trial
Decision, the Court emphatically orders the Regional Court to "forthwith issue court.
and cause to be immediately enforced an ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION of the
Order of August 3, 1995 granting possession to private respondents of portions xxx"
of the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 31527 and 31528 (now No. N-67845).
In cases where injunction or a temporary restraining order is issued, the
This decision is immediately executory." To repeat, the absence of the records
damages that the other party may suffer by reason of the writ are recoverable
and entry of judgment should not be an excuse in delaying the execution of the
from the bond.[4]cralawThe Court has ruled in Socorro v. Aquino[5]cralaw that
Court's decision and which decision the Court declares to be "immediately
the dissolution of the injunction even if the injunction was obtained in good
executory".
faith amounts to a determination that the injunction was wrongly obtained and
With respect to private respondents' Motion for Execution Against TRO Bond a right of action on the injunction bond immediately accrues to the defendant.
(Manager's Check), the trial court is directed to hear private respondents' The dismissal of the petition in this case resulted in the dissolution of the
application for damages pursuant to Section 20, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. temporary restraining order, conferring on private respondents a right of action
on the injunctive bond.
Thus, the Regional Trial Court is instructed to hear and decide private
respondents' Motion for Execution Against TRO Bond (Manager's Check) to
determine the extent of damages sustained by private
respondents.[6]cralaw The hearing on private respondents' application for
damages against theP100,000.00 bond posted by petitioner should not in
anyway hinder the prompt execution of the order of the Court for the
immediate execution of its November 12, 2002 Decision.
WHEREFORE, the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, is

ordered to forthwith issue and cause to be immediately enforced an ALIAS
WRIT OF EXECUTION of the Order of August 3, 1995 granting possession to
private respondents of portions of the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 31527
and 31528 (now No. N-67845). The Motion for Execution Against TRO Bond
(Manager's Check) of private respondents is REFERRED to the same court so
that it could hear and decide the claim for damages pursuant to Section 20, Rule
57 of the Rules of Court.
Philex Gold Phils v. Philex Bulawan Supervisor’s Union from Padcal, Tuba, Benguet (referred to as the "ex-Padcal" supervisors) its
regular supervisory employees effective July 1, 1997. As the ex-Padcal supervisors
[G.R. No. 149758. September 25, 2006] were maintained under a "confidential payroll" who receive a different set of
benefits and higher salaries compared to the locally-hired supervisors (referred
PHILEX GOLD PHILIPPINES, INC., et al. vs. PHILEX BULAWAN
to as the local hires) of similar rank and classification and who perform parallel
SUPERVISORS UNION, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, JOSE D.
duties and functions, respondent union filed a complaint against petitioners
PAMPLIEGA
seeking the payment of wage differentials and damages and the rectification of
the discriminatory salary structure and benefits between the ex-Padcal
Special First Division
supervisors and the local hires.
Sirs/Mesdames:
On January 14, 2000, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision in favor of
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court respondent union and ordered petitioners, jointly and severally, to readjust the
dated SEPT. 25, 2006. monthly rates of pay of the locally-hired supervisors (with the categories of S-1
to S-5 ranks) in the same level or amount as that of the ex-Padcal supervisors
G.R. No. 149758 (Philex Gold Philippines, Inc., et al. vs. Philex Bulawan and to pay the wage differentials of the locally-hired supervisors. In his
Supervisors Union, represented by its President, Jose D. Pampliega) Resolution of February 29, 2000, the Voluntary Arbitrator clarified that there
was no discrimination in the determination of the rates of pay of the
For consideration of the Court are the following:
supervisors, but increased by P800 a month the amount of wages of the local
supervisors as their uniform wage increase effective October 1, 1999.
(a) Respondent's Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw Bond; and
Respondent union then filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals. In the
(b) Petitioners' Opposition (to respondent's Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw Bond)
decision of April 23, 2001, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
Respondent union was the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the Resolution dated February 29, 2000 of the Voluntary Arbitrator and reinstated
supervisors of petitioner Philex Gold Philippines, Inc., a gold mining company the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision dated January 14, 2000 with modification
with mine site at Vista Alegre, Nabulao, Sipalay, Negros Occidental. On July 2, that the adjustment of the monthly rates of pay of the locally-hired supervisors
1997, respondent union entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) as well as their wage differential pay be made effective August 1, 1997 up to the
with petitioners covering the period from August 1, 1996 to July 31, 2001. After finality of this decision. It also ordered that the case be remanded to the
the signing of the CBA, petitioners made the employees of Philex Mining Corp. Voluntary Arbitrator for the proper computation of wage differential and
attorney's fees.
Petitioners thus filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court with Petitioners counter that the temporary restraining order is intended to be a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. After the petitioners restraint only until the propriety of granting an injunction can be determined.
posted a cash bond of P100,000, the Court issued a temporary restraining order Since Section 8, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that the amount of
enjoining the execution of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 23, damages to be awarded shall be claimed in the same proceeding, the absence of
2001. an award of damages by the Court's decision dated August 25, 2005 does not
entitle the respondents to their claim for damages against the petitioners' bond.
On August 25, 2005, the Court rendered a decision affirming the decision of the Petitioners conclude that since it failed to file an application for damages during
Court of Appeals and lifting the temporary restraining order it earlier issued. the pendency of the appeal and before the decision became final and executory,
Applying the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work," the Court ruled that respondent union is not entitled to withdraw the bond they had posted.
petitioner company and its corporate officers were guilty of discriminating the
locally-hired supervisors of equal rank who performed the same kind of work as On the matter of preliminary injunction, Section 8, Rules 58 provides that:
the ex-Padcal supervisors.
SEC. 8. Judgment to include damages against party and sureties. - At the trial, the
Petitioners moved for a partial reconsideration averring that it had sufficiently amount of damages to be awarded to either party, upon the bond of the adverse
established that there was no discrimination. It argued that the ex-Padcal party, shall be claimed, ascertained, and awarded under the same procedure
supervisors possessed the necessary experience, training, and skill in the prescribed in section 20 of Rule 57. (9a)
underground mining method which they gained through lengthy service in the
Padcal mines which used the same technology and that none of the locally-hired Correlatively, Section 20, Rule 57 thereof provides that:
supervisors had undergone the same training. On November 14, 2005, the Court
SEC. 20. Claim for damages on account of improper, irregular or excessive
denied petitioners' motion for partial reconsideration.
attachment. - An application for damages on account of improper, irregular or
On December 28, 2005, respondent union filed the present Ex-Parte Motion to excessive attachment must be filed before the trial or before appeal is perfected
Withdraw Bond seeking the release of the P100,000 bond posted by petitioners or before the judgment becomes executory, with due notice to the attaching
on the temporary restraining order which the Court earlier issued. Respondent party and his surety or sureties, setting forth the facts showing his right to
claims that the P100,000 bond posted by petitioners should be released in favor damages and the amount thereof. Such damages may be awarded only after
of its employees who would have been earlier benefited by the supposed salary proper hearing and shall be included in the judgment on the main case.
adjustments in the decision of the Court of Appeals had the execution thereof
If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the party against whom
not been stayed for 4 years.
the attachment was issued, he must claim damages sustained during the
pendency of the appeal by filing an application in the appellate court, with Acting on the prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order, the Court
notice to the party in whose favor the attachment was issued or his surety or Resolves to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining the execution of the
sureties, before the judgment of the appellate court becomes executory. The decision dated April 23, 2001 and resolution dated August 29, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP
appellate court may allow the application to be heard and decided by the trial No. 57701 entitled "Philex Bulawan Supervisors Union, etc. vs. Philex Gold
court. Philippines, Inc., et al." upon the petitioners' filing of a bond in the amount of
One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) within a period of five (5) days from
Nothing herein contained shall prevent the party against whom the attachment notice hereof otherwise this resolution shall be deemed to be no force and
was issued from recovering in the same action the damages awarded to him effect. Said bond shall answer for the payment to private respondent of any
from any property of the attaching party not exempt from execution should the damages which it may incur by reason of the issuance of the temporary
bond or deposit given the latter be insufficient or fail to fully satisfy the award. restraining order sought, if it should be finally adjudged that said petitioners
(20a) were not entitled thereto, effective upon approval by this Court of the bond to
be posted.... (Emphasis supplied.)
While it may not have filed a claim for damages before the finality of the
judgment of this Court, respondent union is nonetheless entitled to recover on Petitioners added that there will be no damage to respondent union and its
the P100,000 bond posted by the petitioners. Respondent union's entitlement to members regarding the supposed salary adjustments mandated by the decision
the damages arises only after the finality of the decision of this Court, as it of the Court of Appeals since it may still claim the amounts awarded by the
would be only then that it can be determined with certainty whether Court of Appeals. The fact that the entitlement of respondent union and its
respondent union has incurred any damage as a result of the decision of the members to the salary adjustments pursuant to the decision of the Court of
Court of Appeals dated April 23, 2001 being enjoined at the instance of Appeals has been stalled by reason of the temporary restraining order issued
petitioners. Verily, the Court (First Division) in a Resolution dated October 8, constitutes the damage itself, thereby warranting the recovery on the bond in
2001 stated: favor of respondent union.
Considering the allegations contained, the issues and the arguments adduced in WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw
the petition for review on certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary [and/or Recover on the] Bond filed by respondent Philex Bulawan Supervisors
restraining order and/or status quo order, of the decision of the Court of Union is GRANTED and the opposition thereto filed by petitioners Philex Gold
Appeals dated April 23, 2001, the Court Resolves, without giving due course to Philippines, Inc. and its corporate officers is NOTED.
the petition, to require the respondents to COMMENT thereon, not to file a
motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. SO ORDERED.
General Merchandising and Company (Summerville, for brevity) and Ang Tiam
Chay.
SECTION 9
The petitioner's complaint alleges that petitioner, doing business under the
Elidad Kho v. CA name and style of KEC Cosmetics Laboratory, is the registered owner of the
copyrights Chin Chun Su and Oval Facial Cream Container/Case, as shown by
SECOND DIVISION
Certificates of Copyright Registration No. 0-1358 and No. 0-3678; that she also
has patent rights onChin Chun Su & Device and Chin Chun Su for medicated
G.R. No. 115758 March 19, 2002
cream after purchasing the same from Quintin Cheng, the registered owner
ELIDAD C. KHO, doing business under the name and style of KEC thereof in the Supplemental Register of the Philippine Patent Office on February
COSMETICS LABORATORY, petitioner, 7, 1980 under Registration Certificate No. 4529; that respondent Summerville
vs. advertised and sold petitioner's cream products under the brand name Chin
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SUMMERVILLE GENERAL MERCHANDISING Chun Su, in similar containers that petitioner uses, thereby misleading the
and COMPANY, and ANG TIAM CHAY, respondents. public, and resulting in the decline in the petitioner's business sales and income;
and, that the respondents should be enjoined from allegedly infringing on the
DE LEON, JR., J.: copyrights and patents of the petitioner.
1
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated May 24, The respondents, on the other hand, alleged as their defense that Summerville is
1993 of the Court of Appeals setting aside and declaring as null and void the the exclusive and authorized importer, re-packer and distributor of Chin Chun
2
Orders dated February 10, 1992 and March 19, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court, Su products manufactured by Shun Yi Factory of Taiwan; that the said
Branch 90, of Quezon City granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary Taiwanese manufacturing company authorized Summerville to register its trade
injunction. name Chin Chun Su Medicated Cream with the Philippine Patent Office and
other appropriate governmental agencies; that KEC Cosmetics Laboratory of the
The facts of the case are as follows:
petitioner obtained the copyrights through misrepresentation and falsification;
and, that the authority of Quintin Cheng, assignee of the patent registration
On December 20, 1991, petitioner Elidad C. Kho filed a complaint for injunction
certificate, to distribute and market Chin Chun Su products in the Philippines
and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
had already been terminated by the said Taiwanese Manufacturing Company.
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-91-10926, against the respondents Summerville
After due hearing on the application for preliminary injunction, the trial court On May 24, 1993, the appellate court rendered a Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
granted the same in an Order dated February 10, 1992, the dispositive portion of 27803 ruling in favor of the respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby given due course and the orders of
ACCORDINGLY, the application of plaintiff Elidad C. Kho, doing respondent court dated February 10, 1992 and March 19, 1992 granting
business under the style of KEC Cosmetic Laboratory, for preliminary the writ of preliminary injunction and denying petitioners' motion for
injunction, is hereby granted. Consequentially, plaintiff is required to reconsideration are hereby set aside and declared null and void.
file with the Court a bond executed to defendants in the amount of five Respondent court is directed to forthwith proceed with the trial of Civil
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to the effect that plaintiff will Case No. Q-91-10926 and resolve the issue raised by the parties on the
pay to defendants all damages which defendants may sustain by reason merits.
of the injunction if the Court should finally decide that plaintiff is not
5
entitled thereto. SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.
3 In granting the petition, the appellate court ruled that:
The respondents moved for reconsideration but their motion for The registration of the trademark or brandname "Chin Chun Su" by
reconsideration was denied by the trial court in an Order dated March 19, 1992.
4 KEC with the supplemental register of the Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks and Technology Transfer cannot be equated with
On April 24, 1992, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court registration in the principal register, which is duly protected by the
of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 27803, praying for the nullification of Trademark Law.1âwphi1.nêt
the said writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. After the
respondents filed their reply and almost a month after petitioner submitted her xxx xxx xxx
comment, or on August 14 1992, the latter moved to dismiss the petition for
As ratiocinated in La Chemise Lacoste, S.S. vs. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 373,
violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91, a circular prohibiting forum
393:
shopping. According to the petitioner, the respondents did not state the docket
number of the civil case in the caption of their petition and, more significantly,
"Registration in the Supplemental Register, therefore, serves as
they did not include therein a certificate of non-forum shopping. The
notice that the registrant is using or has appropriated the
respondents opposed the petition and submitted to the appellate court a
trademark. By the very fact that the trademark cannot as yet be
certificate of non-forum shopping for their petition.
on guard and there are certain defects, some obstacles which
the use must still overcome before he can claim legal ownership of the appellate court and stating that genuine Chin Chun Su products could be
of the mark or ask the courts to vindicate his claims of an obtained only from Summerville General Merchandising and Co.
exclusive right to the use of the same. It would be deceptive for
a party with nothing more than a registration in the In the meantime, the trial court went on to hear petitioner's complaint for final
Supplemental Register to posture before courts of justice as if injunction and damages. On October 22, 1993, the trial court rendered a
7
the registration is in the Principal Register. Decision barring the petitioner from using the trademark Chin Chun Su and
upholding the right of the respondents to use the same, but recognizing the
The reliance of the private respondent on the last sentence of copyright of the petitioner over the oval shaped container of her beauty cream.
the Patent office action on application Serial No. 30954 that The trial court did not award damages and costs to any of the parties but to
'registrants is presumed to be the owner of the mark until after their respective counsels were awarded Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
the registration is declared cancelled' is, therefore, misplaced (P75,000.00) each as attorney's fees. The petitioner duly appealed the said
and grounded on shaky foundation. The supposed presumption decision to the Court of Appeals.
not only runs counter to the precept embodied in Rule 124 of
8
the Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent On June 3, 1994, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution denying the
Office in Trademark Cases but considering all the facts petitioner's motions for reconsideration and for contempt of court in CA-G.R.
ventilated before us in the four interrelated petitions involving SP No. 27803.
the petitioner and the respondent, it is devoid of factual basis.

Hence, this petition anchored on the following assignment of errors:
As even in cases where presumption and precept may factually
be reconciled, we have held that the presumption is rebuttable,
I
not conclusive, (People v. Lim Hoa, G.R. No. L-10612, May 30,
1958, Unreported). One may be declared an unfair competitor RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
even if his competing trademark is registered (Parke, Davis & GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
Co. v. Kiu Foo & Co., et al., 60 Phil 928; La Yebana Co. v. chua JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO RULE ON PETITIONER'S MOTION
6
Seco & Co., 14 Phil 534)." TO DISMISS.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This she followed with several II
motions to declare respondents in contempt of court for publishing
advertisements notifying the public of the promulgation of the assailed decision RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
JURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO PROMPTLY RESOLVE Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, one of the
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is a proof that the
applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
III consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually. Thus, a preliminary
IN DELAYING THE RESOLUTION OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
injunction order may be granted only when the application for the issuance of
RECONSIDERATION, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS 10
the same shows facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded. This is the
DENIED PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO SEEK TIMELY APPELLATE RELIEF
reason why we have ruled that it must be shown that the invasion of the right
AND VIOLATED PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of complainant
is clear and unmistakable, and, that there is an urgent and paramount necessity
IV
11
for the writ to prevent serious damage.
RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
In the case at bar, the petitioner applied for the issuance of a preliminary
injunctive order on the ground that she is entitled to the use of the trademark
JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO CITE THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
9 on Chin Chun Su and its container based on her copyright and patent over the
IN CONTEMPT.
same. We first find it appropriate to rule on whether the copyright and patent
The petitioner faults the appellate court for not dismissing the petition on the over the name and container of a beauty cream product would entitle the
ground of violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91. Also, the petitioner registrant to the use and ownership over the same to the exclusion of others.
contends that the appellate court violated Section 6, Rule 9 of the Revised
Trademark, copyright and patents are different intellectual property rights that
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals when it failed to rule on her motion for
cannot be interchanged with one another. A trademark is any visible sign
reconsideration within ninety (90) days from the time it is submitted for
capable of distinguishing the goods (trademark) or services (service mark) of an
resolution. The appellate court ruled only after the lapse of three hundred fifty-
12
enterprise and shall include a stamped or marked container of goods. In
four (354) days, or on June 3, 1994. In delaying the resolution thereof, the
relation thereto, a trade name means the name or designation identifying or
appellate court denied the petitioner's right to seek the timely appellate relief.
13
distinguishing an enterprise. Meanwhile, the scope of a copyright is confined
Finally, petitioner describes as arbitrary the denial of her motions for contempt
to literary and artistic works which are original intellectual creations in the
of court against the respondents.
literary and artistic domain protected from the moment of their
14
We rule in favor of the respondents. creation. Patentable inventions, on the other hand, refer to any technical
solution of a problem in any field of human activity which is new, involves an relief demanded and only when his complaint shows facts entitling such
15
inventive step and is industrially applicable. reliefs xxx and it appearing that the trial court had already granted the
issuance of a final injunction in favor of petitioner in its decision rendered
Petitioner has no right to support her claim for the exclusive use of the subject after trial on the merits xxx the Court resolved to Dismiss the instant
trade name and its container. The name and container of a beauty cream petition having been rendered moot and academic. An injunction issued
product are proper subjects of a trademark inasmuch as the same falls squarely by the trial court after it has already made a clear pronouncement as to
within its definition. In order to be entitled to exclusively use the same in the the plaintiff's right thereto, that is, after the same issue has been decided
sale of the beauty cream product, the user must sufficiently prove that she on the merits, the trial court having appreciated the evidence presented, is
registered or used it before anybody else did. The petitioner's copyright and proper, notwithstanding the fact that the decision rendered is not yet
patent registration of the name and container would not guarantee her the right final xxx. Being an ancillary remedy, the proceedings for preliminary
to the exclusive use of the same for the reason that they are not appropriate injunction cannot stand separately or proceed independently of the
subjects of the said intellectual rights. Consequently, a preliminary injunction decision rendered on the merit of the main case for injunction. The
order cannot be issued for the reason that the petitioner has not proven that she merit of the main case having been already determined in favor of the
has a clear right over the said name and container to the exclusion of others, not applicant, the preliminary determination of its non-existence ceases to
having proven that she has registered a trademark thereto or used the same have any force and effect. (italics supplied)
before anyone did.
La Vista categorically pronounced that the issuance of a final injunction renders
We cannot likewise overlook the decision of the trial court in the case for final any question on the preliminary injunctive order moot and academic despite the
injunction and damages. The dispositive portion of said decision held that the fact that the decision granting a final injunction is pending appeal. Conversely, a
petitioner does not have trademark rights on the name and container of the decision denying the applicant-plaintiff's right to a final injunction, although
beauty cream product. The said decision on the merits of the trial court appealed, renders moot and academic any objection to the prior dissolution of a
rendered the issuance of the writ of a preliminary injunction moot and writ of preliminary injunction.
academic notwithstanding the fact that the same has been appealed in the Court
of Appeals. This is supported by our ruling in La Vista Association, Inc. v. The petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in not dismissing the
16
Court of Appeals , to wit: petition for certiorari for non-compliance with the rule on forum shopping. We
disagree. First, the petitioner improperly raised the technical objection of non-
Considering that preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy which compliance with Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 by filing a motion to dismiss
may be granted at any time after the commencement of the action and the petition for certiorari filed in the appellate court. This is prohibited by
before judgment when it is established that the plaintiff is entitled to the Section 6, Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that
"(I)n petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, has no right over the trademark and, consequently, to the issuance of a writ of
the provisions of Section 2, Rule 56, shall be observed. Before giving due course preliminary injunction.1âwphi1.nêt
thereto, the court may require the respondents to file their comment to, and not
a motion to dismiss, the petition xxx (italics supplied)". Secondly, the issue was Finally, we rule that the Court of Appeals correctly denied the petitioner's
raised one month after petitioner had filed her answer/comment and after several motions for contempt of court. There is nothing contemptuous about
private respondent had replied thereto. Under Section 1, Rule 16 of the Revised the advertisements complained of which, as regards the proceedings in CA-G.R.
Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss shall be filed within the time for SP No. 27803 merely announced in plain and straightforward language the
but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim. She promulgation of the assailed Decision of the appellate court. Moreover,
therefore could no longer submit a motion to dismiss nor raise defenses and pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the said
objections not included in the answer/comment she had earlier tendered. decision nullifying the injunctive writ was immediately executory.
Thirdly, substantial justice and equity require this Court not to revive a
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the
dissolved writ of injunction in favor of a party without any legal right thereto
Court of Appeals dated May 24, 1993 and June 3, 1994, respectively, are
merely on a technical infirmity. The granting of an injunctive writ based on a
hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against the petitioner.
technical ground rather than compliance with the requisites for the issuance of
the same is contrary to the primary objective of legal procedure which is to serve
SO ORDERED.
as a means to dispense justice to the deserving party.
The petitioner likewise contends that the appellate court unduly delayed the
resolution of her motion for reconsideration. But we find that petitioner
contributed to this delay when she filed successive contentious motions in the
same proceeding, the last of which was on October 27, 1993, necessitating
counter-manifestations from private respondents with the last one being filed
on November 9, 1993. Nonetheless, it is well-settled that non-observance of the
period for deciding cases or their incidents does not render such judgments
17
ineffective or void. With respect to the purported damages she suffered due to
the alleged delay in resolving her motion for reconsideration, we find that the
said issue has likewise been rendered moot and academic by our ruling that she
Trial Court of Lupon, Davao Oriental, with Manifest Bias and Partiality, Undue
Delay in the Disposition of Case and Ignorance of the Law.
Complainant alleged that she is the defendant in Civil Case No. 1110 for Forcible
Palma Gil v. Lopez
Entry and Damages with Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction,
entitled "Carlos Palen, Sr., Plaintiff versus Editha Palma Gil, Defendant," pending
FIRST DIVISION
before the sala of respondent judge; and that respondent failed to render
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1453 April 29, 2003 judgment therein within the thirty-day period required by Rule 70, Section 11 of
the 1997 Code of Civil Procedure. She further averred that on October 9, 2001,
EDITHA PALMA GIL, complainant, the plaintiff in the said case filed a motion for temporary restraining order,
vs. which respondent Judge granted on the same day, despite procedural defects
JUDGE FRANCISCO H. LOPEZ, JR., Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Lupon, therein such as the lack of a verification, bond, and service of summons, all in
Davao Oriental, respondent. violation of Rule 58, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Complainant
further assails the manner in which the temporary restraining order was
RESOLUTION
implemented with the assistance of policemen.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In his Comment dated March 1, 2002, respondent judge denied that there was a
deliberate and unreasonable delay in the resolution of Civil Case No. 1110. He
A magistrate should dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases
alleged that aside from his court, he had to hear the cases in the municipal
within the required periods. Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith
courts in Governor Generoso and San Isidro, Davao Oriental due to the
and confidence of the public in the institution of justice, lowers its standards
inhibition of the presiding judges therein. Moreover, he alleged that the legal
and brings them into disrepute. Every judge must cultivate a capacity for quick
and factual issues raised in Civil Case No. 1110 are complicated. Anent the
decision; he must not delay the judgment which a party justly deserves. The
alleged issuance of temporary restraining order, respondent claims that what he
public trust reposed in a judge's office imposes upon him the highest degree of
1 issued was a status quo order because complainant's men entered the land in
responsibility to promptly administer justice.
dispute and attempted to prevent the harvesting of palay by plaintiff. Finally,
2 respondent states that he had to seek the assistance of the police to implement
In an Affidavit-Complaint dated October 30, 2001, complainant Editha Palma
Gil charged respondent Judge Francisco H. Lopez, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit the order because his court had no regular sheriff and because there were armed
3
guards employed by both parties.
In compliance with our Resolution dated August 14, 2002, 4 both parties Rule 3.05. - A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and
manifested their willingness to submit the case on the basis of the pleadings decide cases within the required periods. (Emphasis ours)
5
filed.
Moreover, SC Administrative Circular No. 13-87 provides:
After evaluation, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found respondent
guilty of delay in the rendition of judgment in Civil Case No. 1110 and erred in 3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII,
issuing a temporary restraining order despite procedural defects. Hence, it Section 15 of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all
recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters
(P10,000.00). must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of

submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are
We agree with the findings of the OCA, however, we find the recommended given a period of three months to do so. . . (Emphasis ours)
penalty to be not commensurate with the gravity of respondent's misdeeds.
Along the same vein, SC Administrative Circular No. 1-88 states:
The reasons proffered by respondent judge, i.e., that he had to hear cases in the
6
other courts, will not excuse his delay in deciding Civil Case No. 1110. If he felt 6.1 All Presiding Judges must endeavor to act promptly on all motions
that he could not decide the case within the reglementary period, he should and interlocutory matters pending before their courts. x x x .
7
have asked for a reasonable extension of time to decide the same.
Considering the summary nature of Civil Case No. 1110, which is an action for
The office of a judge exists for one solemn end - to promote the ends of justice forcible entry, Rule 70, Section 11 of the 1997 Rules of Summary Procedure
by administering it speedily and impartially. The judge as the person presiding expressly provides:
8
over that court is the visible representation of the law and justice. Failure to
Period for rendition of judgment. - Within thirty (30) days after receipt of
resolve cases submitted for decision within the period fixed by law constitutes a
the affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for
serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition
9
filing the same, the court shall render judgment.
of their cases.
However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material

Rules 1.02 of Canon 1 and 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct state:
facts, it may, during the said period, issue an order specifying the
Rule 1.02. - A judge should administer justice impartially and without matters to be clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or
delay. (Emphasis ours) other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of
said order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after
receipt of the last affidavit or the expiration of the period for filing the (c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a
same. temporary restraining order is included in a complaint or any initiatory
pleading, the case, if filed in a multiple-sala court shall be raffled to only
The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just to gain time for after notice to and in the presence of the adverse party or the person to
the rendition of judgment. (Emphasis ours) be enjoined. In any event, such notice shall be preceded, or
Thus, respondent judge is guilty of gross inefficiency for his failure to resolve
a copy of the complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicant's
and dispose of Civil Case No. 1110 within the period prescribed by the Rules. The
10
penalty for gross inefficiency ranges from reprimand and admonition to
11 12
removal from office and/or a fine. However, where the summons could not be served personally or by
Respondent judge likewise erred in issuing the temporary restraining order.
resident of the Philippines, temporarily absent therefrom or is a
Rule 58, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
nonresident thereof, the requirement of prior contemporaneous service
of summons shall not apply.
Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order. - A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
(d) The application for a temporary restraining order shall thereafter be
order may be granted only when:
acted upon only after all the parties are heard in a summary hearing
which shall be conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the
(a) The application in the action or proceeding is verified and shows
sheriff's return of service and/or the records are received by the branch
facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded; and
selected by raffle to which the records shall be transmitted immediately.
The records reveal that the motion for temporary restraining order was not
13
verified. Respondent judge issued the Order on the same date when the
motion was filed without prior notice to the complainant and without a hearing.
that the applicant will pay to such party or person all damages which he
may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order
The issuance of the assailed Order cannot be justified under Rule 58, Section 5
if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads:
thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary
injunction shall be issued.
Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. - No restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original
preliminary injunction shall be grantedwithout hearing and prior seventy-two (72) hours provided therein. (Emphasis and italics ours)
notice to the person or party sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear
from the facts shown by the affidavits or by the verified application that Aside from the lack of verification of the motion, no affidavits of the applicant
great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the and his witnesses were appended thereto. Furthermore, the assailed Order did
matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for not specify the duration of the temporary restraining order.
preliminary injunction was made, may issue a temporary restraining

Respondent argues that considering that the complaint in Civil Case No. 1110
order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service
was verified and prayed for the issuance of a preliminary and prohibitory
on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided.
injunction, the verification of the motion for issuance of temporary restraining
Within the said twenty-day period, the court must order said party of
order may be dispensed with. We do not agree.
person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction
should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or
The Rules as above-quoted explicitly mandate that the application for injunction
not the preliminary injunction shall be granted and accordingly issued
should be verified. While litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case
the corresponding order.
must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an
14
orderly administration of justice.
However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the
matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave
We see nothing wrong in respondent's act of securing the assistance of the
police in implementing his Order. Administrative Circular No. 12-85, paragraph
court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte a
7 allows a judge to designate or deputize any person to serve court processes
temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours
and writs in remote areas in the absence of the regular sheriff thereat.
from issuance but he shall immediately comply with provisions of the
next preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be Furthermore, the better part of prudence, caution and plain conventional
served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) wisdom dictates the presence of the police on account of the potentially violent
hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a situation engendered by the presence of armed followers of the contending
summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order factions.
heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary Considering the seriousness of the respondent judge's offenses, stiffer penalties
should be imposed to inculcate in him the value of being proficient in both
substantive and procedural laws.
15
In Cañas v. Castigador, we held:
Observance of the law which he is bound to know and sworn to uphold

is required of every judge. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge
owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In short, when the law is so
elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
In the case at bar, the ignorance of respondent judge is so gross that he should
16
be held administratively liable even if he acted in good faith. Hence, the
imposition of a fine in the amount of P20,000.00 is a more appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, respondent Judge Francisco H. Lopez, Jr.

of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lupon, Davao Oriental, is found GUILTY
of gross ignorance of the law and gross inefficiency. He is ordered to pay a FINE
in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.

Provisional Remedies Cases - Rule 58

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PROVISIONAL REMEDIES 1 of 336

Rule 58: Preliminary Injunction

City Government of Baguio City v. Masweng ..................................................... 86

Reyes v. Demetria, En Banc .................................................................................. 92

FEBTCv. CA ........................................................................................................... 167

CSC v. CA ............................................................................................................... 80 Bayanihan Music v. BMG Records,et. al ............................................................ 170

Talento v. Escalada, Jr. ..........................................................................................181 SECTION 5 ............................................................................................................... 256

Fortune Life Insurance v. Luczon, Jr. ................................................................. 261

Gomos v. Adiong ................................................................................................. 266

Merontos v. Zerna ............................................................................................... 270

SECTION 4 ............................................................................................................... 207 Llamson v. Logronio ........................................................................................... 274

Tomawis v. Caudang ........................................................................................... 282

City Government of Butuan v. CBS ................................................................... 289

Garrido v. Tortogo, et al. .................................................................................... 299

SECTION 6 ............................................................................................................... 309

Sps. Yap v. International Exchange Bank .......................................................... 309

SECTION 7 ................................................................................................................ 318

FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE VS. LUCZON – GO TO SECTION 5 ................ 318

SECTION 8 ................................................................................................................ 319

Natalia Realty v. CA .............................................................................................. 319

Philex Gold Phils v. Philex Bulawan Supervisor’s Union .................................. 323

SECTION 9 ............................................................................................................... 326

Elidad Kho v. CA .................................................................................................. 326

Palma Gil v. Lopez ................................................................................................ 332

The assailed Resolution denied petitioner Philippine National Bank's (PNB's)

same moot and academic, We feel justified to grant the preliminary

petitioners to have sufficiently established the existence of irreparable I

gainsaying in that the foreclosure of the subject radio equipment[s]

Hence, the instant Petition. V

The Issues WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD

operations of a radio station programming?

Nanding Cojuanco within which the radio stations were sequestered

to retain its listenership day? (sic)

Atty. dela Vega: Atty. dela Vega:

Q Will it made a difference to the operations of a radio station and

Atty. dela Vega: SO ORDERED.

Q It will affect? Footnotes:

Decision reads as follows:

subject property as collateral. on February 7, 1997.

the name spouses Camacho. No. 209050 in the name of FGRDC.

service of the warrant of arrest.

Order of the Trial Court

Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court’s Ruling

in turn, had purportedly bought it from herein respondent.

Moreover, respondent argues that the dacion en pago is riddled with a

serious enough to allow him to possess the property pendente lite.

In addition, respondent has shown that to allow petitioner to take

On December 22, 1998, then Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr.

THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, SECRETARY MANUEL M. DAYRIT, USEC.

3. A separate accreditation is required for the drug suppliers and for

Despite the lack of response from petitioner DOH regarding respondent’s 13

therein specified damages]."

an injustice. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)1avvphi1 AFFIRMED.

It bears stressing, however, that the statements in the immediately foregoing

manufacturing, distributing, selling, offering for sale, advertising, or otherwise

of the Philippines v. Hon. Catungal Jr.,

assailed injunction if sustained would bring about the result desired by

Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception.

WHEREFORE, the appropriate Sheriffs of Makati and Mandaluyong,

not exceeding P40,000.00 pesos.

respective claims for damages.

determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions, whether civil or

vs. Communications issued to Federico Decano, herein petitioner-appellee, a