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প্রতিধ্বতি the Echo

ISSN 2278-5264

প্রতিধ্বতি the Echo


An Online Journal of Humanities & Social Science
Published by: Dept. of Bengali
Karimganj College, Karimganj, Assam, India.
Website: www.thecho.in
D. M. Armstrong on the Identity Theory of Mind
Shanjendu Nath
Associate Professor, Dept. of Philosophy, Rabindrasadan Girls‘ College,
Karimganj, Assam
Email:nathshanjendu@gmail.com
Abstract
The Identity theory of mind occupies an important place in the history of philosophy. This theory
is one of the important representations of the materialistic philosophy. This theory is known as
"Materialist Monist Theory of Mind". Sometimes it is called "Type Physicalism", "Type Identity"
or "Type-Type Theory" or "Mind-Brain Identity Theory". This theory appears in the
philosophical domain as a reaction to the failure of Behaviourism. A number of philosophers
developed this theory and among them U. T. Place, J. J. C. Smart, Herbert Feigl, D. Armstrong,
and David Lewis are prominent. The main thrust of this theory is states and processes of the
mind are identical to states and processes of the brain. In this paper, I am trying to delineate the
view of Armstrong on the nature of mind.

The Identity Theory of mind came into analysis of mind could not attract the
existence as a serious philosophical thesis in philosophers of twentieth century till the
the late 1950‘s. Although this theory was appearance of U. T. Place, H. Feigl and J. J.
introduced by the psychologist E. G. Boring C. Smart. Armstrong acknowledges Smart‘s
in 1933, it took a long duration of time to be influence on his thought with regard to the
accepted as an alternative theory in analysis of mind- body relation. He says,
philosophy. The pioneering works, which ―Professor J. J. C. Smart converted me to the
deserve credit for the acceptance of the view, defended in this book, that mental
philosophical version of this theory in states are nothing but physical states of the
philosophical domain, were - U. T. Place‘s brain. He in his turn has acknowledged the
―Is Consciousness A Brain Process?‖ influence of U. T. Place……………… My
(1956), Herbert Feigl‘s ‗The ―Mental‖ and intellectual debt to them remains profound.‖
the ―Physical‖ (1958) and in 1959 J. J. C. Armstrong categorically and
Smart‘s paper ―Sensations and Brain enthusiastically announced that he was and
Processes‖ (1959). is happy to say that mental states and the
D. Armstrong has great contribution states of the brain are identical, and this
to the Identity theory of mind. In his preface identity is a contingent identity. The Identity
to the book A Materialist Theory of Mind he theory of mind is regarded by many
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admitted that almost from the beginning philosophers as really paradoxical. They say
there were philosophers who were that this theory of mind is very
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materialists about mind. But this materialist extraordinary. In this connection we may

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ISSN 2278-5264

refer the view of A. G. N. Flew who, in physiological or mechanistic; it assumes that


1962 writes: ―In the face of the powerful and mind is bodily process, an activity of the
resolute advocacy now offered this brain. Modern psychology works with this
admittedly paradoxical view can no longer latter theory only. Both are intellectually
be dismissed in such short order.‖ respectable (that is, each has support from
Armstrong too admits that when he highly intelligent people, including
first heard this theory he also found it scientists), and there is certainly no decisive
paradoxical. He also thinks that not only he means available of proving one to be right,
himself but many other philosophers shared the other wrong.‖
the attitude of Flew. But he is sure that this Armstrong believes that to maintain
attitude is confined exclusively to the unity of mind and body, the identity
philosophers only. Like the first year theory explains it in a very simple way.
university students they usually thought that According to him, Brain is the pilot in the
it is not possible to regard mind as the brain vessel as because physically it resides inside
and that is why they regard it as self evident the body. To say that mind is ‗in‘ the body
to hold that the Central – state theory is and to say that mental processes are ‗inner
false. But Armstrong holds that such a view processes‘ are completely natural. He used
of philosophers is not shared by others and it the word ‗in‘ primarily in spatial sense. But
is evident that because of the potentiality, this sense of use of the ‗in‘ must be denied
this theory enjoys wide support outside by the dualist according to whom mind is a
philosophy. mystery and thus in any gross material sense
Armstrong holds that whenever we mind is not in the body.
speak of ‗brains‘, ‗brain-storm‘, ‗brain- Armstrong says that as the attribute
washing‘, ‗brain-child‘, racking one‘s and the behaviourist theories can provide a
brains‘ we actually speak about the mind. simple principle of numerical difference for
And if we ask the people who have general minds, such as, difference of place, so he
education and without having any expects that this can be provided by the
philosophical training that whether mind is Central-state materialism. He also believes
brain or is it separate from brain, many of that the interaction of mind and body can be
them will answer that mind is brain. Some explained by this theory in a very simple
will in return, ask that if mind is not brain way. This theory derives the conclusion that
then what it is. Armstrong believes that there mind and body interact on the ground that
are persons who deny this fact and their brain and body interact. According to
denial is based on theological reasons. On Armstrong, from the implication of the
the contrary, there are scientists and Central–state theory we are allowed to say
particularly the psychologists, who do not that it is not that we have a mind or that we
regard the Central-state theory paradoxical. do not have it, there is no sharp break
Among them Hebb (1958) is a because in a gradual way mind comes into
representative of this group. In his famous being. This conclusion is drawn by
book ‗Text Book of Psychology‘ he writes; Armstrong on the ground that there is
―There are two theories of mind, evolution of the species and development of
speaking very generally. One is animistic, a the individual and, in this process, in a
theory that the body is inhabited by an entity gradual way brain comes into being. Thus
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– the mind or soul – that is quite different Armstrong believes that the especial
from it, having nothing in common with advantage of this theory and also of
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bodily processes. The second theory is

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behaviourism is that they represented the enter into the concept of mind. But what the
world-picture in a simple way. views of central-state theory are with regard
But Armstrong also points out that to this mental feature or how this theory
there is a basic difference between the does justice in regard to mental feature of
Central–state theory and behaviourism. The behaviour is not clear.
Central–state theory admits the existence of The above mentioned problems were
inner state where behaviourism denies. The raised by Armstrong in his book A
Central–state theory holds that these inner Materialist Theory of the Mind. But he also
mental states are physical states of the brain. mentions some other drawbacks of the
It is already mentioned that theory and their remedies. He claims that
Armstrong developed the Identity theory the difficulties of the central-state theory
originally advocated by Place, Feigl and mentioned above will become pale in front
Smart. But before his positive contribution of the present problem that he will raise as
to the theory, he delineated some of the because this is a more powerful line of
serious objections of this theory that might argument. He considers an argument that
be raised by the critics and subsequently he could be regarded as conclusive against the
tried to meet these objections. claim that mind is the brain. Consider the
In the first place he considered the question whether the statement ‗the mind is
argument that any theory of mind to be the brain‘ is a logically necessary truth or
satisfactory must have to admit the logical this statement is simply contingently true.
possibility of disembodied existence of Whether the defender of this theory desires
mind. If the Central–state theory argued that to assimilate the statement with other
mind is the brain then this theory does not statements like ‗An oculist is an eye-doctor‘
admit the disembodied existence of mind as or ‗7+5 is 12‘ on the one side and on the
because there is no brain without body. other side they try to assimilate the
Secondly, an independent existence statement with ‗The morning star is the
of brain states and processes could be evening star‘ or ‗The gene is the DNA
conceived as these seem to be things. Even molecule‘. Armstrong holds that it is not so
their existence could be conceived as, (e.g., easy to answer the above question as
patterns of electrical discharge in space) because it is a dilemma. To him, the
without requiring the existence of any brain. statement ‗The mind is the brain‘ is certainly
But it is not clear how the Central-state not a logically necessary truth. In this
theory can account the mental states because connection he refers Aristotle who
these have no independent existence. delineated brain as an organ which keeps the
Thirdly, regarding intentionality, body cool and nothing more. And in this
i.e., the power of the mental states to refer to description of brain, Aristotle certainly
things other than themselves is not cannot be blamed of denying a necessary
explainable in the account given by a truth, mistake although he committed, it was
Central–state theory. Armstrong believes an empirical mistake. Armstrong suggestion
that this is not a problem only with Central- is that among the contingent statements of
state theory, but no theory prior to it is able identity we must have to find out a model if
to give us a satisfactory solution on this ‗mind is the brain‘ is a true statement. The
problem. statement that ‗the mind is the brain‘ must
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Fourthly, it is found in the theory of be compared with some other contingent


behaviourism that in the some way or other assertion of identity like ―The morning star
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behaviour or disposition to behave does

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is the evening star‘ or ‗The gene is the DNA the meaning of the term ‗brain‘. But in the
molecule‘. case of ‗mind‘ to attempt to give a verbal
Armstrong claims that if it is explanation or ostensive definition of the
admitted that the statement ‗The mind is the meaning of the word is impossible. In that
brain‘, then logically independent case he must depart from a physicalist view
explanations of the meaning of the two point. This problem is a great one that the
constituting words ‗mind‘ and ‗brain‘ must central–state theory is facing.
be possible. In this connection he refers to Armstrong says that in virtue of
the example of a contingent statement that certain physical characteristics of an object
‗the morning star is the evening star‘. Here we call it brain and it is found inside the
the meaning of the two phrases -‗the skull of the people as a sort of certain
morning star‘ and ‗the evening star‘ –can be physical object. But if we treat this physical
explained like this way – a very bright star object also as mind we must have to add
that appears and can be seen on certain some further characteristics to it by virtue of
mornings of a year in the sky is called ‗the which it is so-called. Because, the meaning
morning star‘. Similarly, a very bright star of the word ‗brain‘ and the word ‗mind‘ are
that appears and seen on certain evenings of not same. But the question remains as to
a year in the sky is called ‗the evening star‘. what this further characteristics are that are
Here the meanings of the above mentioned not found in the brain.
two phrases can be given by logically The above mentioned problem is
independent explanations. On the same line stated by Armstrong in another way.
of argument Armstrong mentions another According to him, it is the view of the
statement that ―The gene is the DNA central-state materialism that to be aware of
molecule‖ and he claims this statement to be our mental state is to be aware of mere
a contingent one. Here the meaning of the physical states of the brain. But it is certain
word ‗gene‘ and the word‘ DNA molecule‘ that we are not aware of the mental states as
can be explained in the way that – gene is a the states of the brain. These mental states,
principle that resides within us and because according to Armstrong, are of a quite
of which hereditary characteristics, like peculiar sort – these are mental.
colour of the eye, are transmitted from one One of the physicalists, Paul
generation to another. The phrase ‗the DNA Feyerabend, was daunted by this problem.
molecule‘ can be meaningfully explained by His suggestion on this issue is that the
saying that a certain type of molecule world-view that is recognized by the
constituted by very complex chemicals and materialist does not allow him to state any
the nucleus of the cell is formed by this. statement that may assert or imply the
Thus here also the meanings of the two existence of mind. Thus talking about mind
phrases ‗gene‘ and ‗DNA molecule‘ can be by a true Physicalism is an intellectual loss
given by logically independent explanations. but it should talk simply about the operation
Thus Armstrong‘s conclusion is that of the central nervous system.
to be meaningful to say that ‗The mind is the In order to have an explanation of
brain‘ is to say that the meanings of both the the concept of mind Armstrong refers to the
words ‗mind‘ and ‗brain‘ can be explained psychological way of thinking about man. In
in these ways. He is sure that in that case the picturing man psychologist holds that man is
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word ‗brain‘ will not create any trouble. But an object upon which certain physical
the problem is with the word ‗mind‘. In a stimuli continually act and certain behaviour
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quasi-ostensive way it is possible to explain are elicited from him because of these

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প্রতিধ্বতি the Echo
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stimuli. Thus there is a causal chain Armstrong believes that having an


between the stimulus and response and mind orange after-image is explicated by Smart in
falls in between this causal chain to mediate terms of stimuli alone. Here in a suitable
our response to stimuli. But central-state condition an orange acts upon a person. He
theory says that it is nothing but physical opines that similar line is taken by Place
processes in the central nervous system that also. Contrary to the view of both Place and
falls between the stimulus and response. Smart, Armstrong desires to defend a
This theory even does not believe that mind central-state account of all the mental
is an epiphenomenon of stimulus and concepts. According to him, it is our natural
response. tendency to distinguish between thought or
Thus, according to Armstrong, belief and the expression of thought or belief
solving of the problem of ‗mind‘ is within in words or action, between emotion and the
our hand if we think of the psychologist‘s expression of emotion in action, and also
picture outlined above. From the between the intention or aim and its
psychological point of view a particular expression in action. When something is
mental process is the effect of certain stimuli squeezed out, we literally say that
and also cause of certain responses and both ‗something is expressed‘ as we find that
of these processes are within man. The from olives, oil is expressed. If the same is
concept of mental state is that which is applied to the mind, the picture of the inner
brought about by certain stimuli and which state is that it yieldes or that it brings about
in turn brings about certain responses in a out behaviour. It is sure that if this picture is
man. Armstrong points out that it is science to be rejected, there must be some strong
to discover the exact nature of mind or reason behind it. There is hardly any reason
mental states. He also agrees to the modern that srong to reject that picture.
science the supposition that the central Explaining introspection Armstrong
nervous system or more crudely and says that it helps us being aware of sense-
inaccurately, but more simply, the brain impressions, sensations and mental images.
performs the task of mediator between These are regarded by him as most obtrusive
stimulus and responses. sort of inner items. But it is true that
So far we have explored sometimes we do not have thoughts and
Armstrong‘s analysis of the issue of mind intentions. In that case they may be imagery
and brain. After explaining his own view he without accompanying sensations. In
considers the view of Place and Smart which analysing the position of Place and Smart in
are called the classical exposition of central- this regard Armstrong says, ―I think, indeed,
state materialism. Armstrong points out that that Place‘s and Smart‘s position is a mere
both of these thinkers consider only the side hang-over from the Sensationalism of the
of stimulus, but not response. In this British Empiricists which attempts to reduce
connection he quotes Smart (1959), all actual mental items to impressions,
―When a person says, ‗I see a yellowish- images and sensations.‖
orange after-image‘, he is saying something Armstrong holds that although both
like that: ‗There is something going on Place and Smart did not give an account of
which is like what is going on when I have all mental concepts but subsequently Smart
my eyes open, am awake, and there is an has changed his views and accepts all
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orange illuminated in good light in front of mental concepts in Central-State account.


me, that is, when I really see an orange‘.‖ Armstrong believes that if someone admits
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inner mental states he will have to give all

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the mental concepts in a central account and different accounts of the mind that have
it is actually a theoretical economy. been advanced through the ages.
Armstrong says that the original ground According to Armstrong, primitive
chosen by Place and Smart on perception is view about the mind or spirit is that it is
inadequate as they explain it in terms of the breath which makes a difference between a
characteristic effects of certain stimuli. This living man and a corpse. While making
point is regarded by Armstrong as partial difference between the two, this theory
truth. A full truth about perception, makes difference between man and other
according to him, is that a person can do sorts of things. Man differs from other living
certain things. In that case a person can things in essential respects. A living man‘s
systematically discriminate between certain behaviour is extremely different from other
classes of objects in his behaviour. A things, but the difference between corpse
person‘s lacking in perceptual powers is and other material object is little one.
picked up by certain inefficiency in his Moreover, the most essential features which
conduct. So, according to Armstrong, both make a living man different from a corpse is
stimuli and responses are equally important his breath. This breath or air is the spirit or
in perception. mind which is responsible for inner principle
After considering the views of Place of man‘s unique behaviour.
and Smart Armstrong has given his own Other suggestions about the nature of
view on the concept of mental state. He the mind are that it is a flame in the body or
says, it may be said that a collection of atoms
―The concept of mental state is which are specially smooth, mobile and
primarily the concept of a state of the person scattered throughout the members of the
apt for bringing about a certain sort of body. Again, mind is thought of as a
behaviour.‖ spiritual substance, or regarded as a set of
Armstrong does not regard that special properties of the body. These
mind is behaviour but he points out that properties cannot be reduced to the physico-
mind is the cause of behaviour. This does chemical properties of matter. The
not make him a patron of behaviourism. He irreducible properties are supposed by the
denies himself to be a proponent of Central-state Materialism as a physico-
behaviourism as he forbids us to identify chemical working of the central nervous
mind with behaviour. He identifies mind system.
with the inner principle of behaviour. Armstrong says that many features
Armstrong holds that for the sake of the statement ‗The mind is the brain‘ can
of argument if we accept the view that to be understood by a very good model
talk about mental state is to talk about inner provided by the statement ‗The gene is the
states of the person apt for bringing about DNA molecule‘. The concept of the ‗gene‘
certain sort of behaviour then obvious was introduced by Brian Medlin to Biology.
questions come up about the nature of these Mandel holds that this gene is responsible
inner states and what these inner causes are. for producing certain characteristics in
Armstrong says that to answer this question animals or persons. In explaining the nature
is not an easy task and no logical analysis of gene, Armstrong holds that, different sort
can help us in this regard. In his view only a of answers are possible. One of them is that
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high-level scientific speculation can solve the gene might have been an immaterial
this problem. But yet he puts forward principle. Moreover, genes are responsible
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for the colour of our eyes. Biologist‘s

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conclusion regarding gene is that, for the ‗mental process‘ Place means the process in
production of heredity characteristics it the brain and nothing more. But the
plays a vital role and this conclusion they dispositional mental states are not
have drawn from experiment on the recognized by him as states of the brain.
substance that is found at the centre of cells: Dispositional state is causally dependent on
deoxyribo-nucleic acid. This identification the structure of the entity which bears this
of the gene and the DNA is sufficiently disposition, but in no way it is identical with
certain although it is impossible on the part the structure of the entity. Again, disposition
of anybody to observe directly nor one could has no existence apart from its structural
ever hope to observe in practice the causal underpinnings otherwise it will become a
chain from the gene to the colouring of the peculiar entity.
eyes. From this observation Armstrong‘s With regard to the notion of mental
assertion regarding central-state theory is propensities, such as, believing a certain
that, ―….once it is granted that the concept proposition to be true, or wanting something
of a mental state is the concept of a state of to come about, or intending to do something,
the person apt for the production of certain there are arguments that these belong to a
sorts of behaviour, the identification of these different category apart from mental
states with physico-chemical states of the capacities. Because in those cases none but
brain is, in the present state of knowledge, the individual himself has privileged access
nearly as good a bet as the identification of to his own dispositional mental states. in this
gene with the DNA molecule.‖ connection Place says, ―But this is only
With this conclusion Armstrong because in these cases stating what you
declares that his preliminary sketch of the believe, asking for what you want, and
central-state is complete with this version. stating your intentions are in themselves
Thus the Central-state materialism of manifestations of the dispositions in which
Armstrong identifies beliefs and desires with believing, wanting and intending consist‖
states of the brain and in this regard Smart Armstrong also rejects the argument
agreed with him. But Place does not agree that we have privileged access to our beliefs
with this view. Place is rather against the and desires. According to Armstrong, there
attempts to extend identity theory to are persons who may admit that it cannot be
dispositional states like beliefs and desires. logically guaranteed that introspective
His argument was that we have no awareness is free from mistakes but at the
privileged access to our beliefs and desires. same time maintain that to our own current
Place firmly believes that it is inner states we have a logically privileged
fundamentally sound to analyse the access. But this view is denied by
cognitive concepts like ‗knowing‘, Armstrong. According to him, it may be
‗believing‘, ‗understanding‘, ‗remembering‘ that, someone‘s inner states can be
in terms of disposition to behave. The same understood by the person himself as because
also true in case of volitional concepts, like he himself is logically ultimate authority of
‗wanting‘ and ‗intending‘. He further says his own inner states, but in that case, there is
that in the case of these dispositional mental every possibility of his being mistaken. Thus
states it is necessary to give a different Armstrong concludes,
account of the mind-brain relation. This ―So it seems that, once incorrigibility
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account, according to him, is different from is given up, logically privileged access
that of mental processes which he refers by cannot be sustained. No doubt we have a
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the term ‗consciousnesses‘. By the term privileged access (at times) to our own

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mental states, but it is an empirically


privileged access"

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 Armstrong, D.M. 1968a: A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London, Routledge. Second
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 Armstrong, D.M. 1968b: ‗The Headless Woman Illusion and the Defence of Materialism‘,
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 Armstrong, D.M. 1999: The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction, Boulder,
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 Armstrong, D.M., Martin, C.B. and Place, U.T. 1996: Dispositions: A Debate, T. Crane (ed.),
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 Armstrong,.M. 1961: Perception and the Physical World, London, Routledge.
 Beakley, B. and Ludlow, P. (ed): 2007: The Philosophy of Mind, Classical Problems/
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 Block, N. (ed) 1980: Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Cambridge, M.A:
Harvard University
 Philosophical Review, vol. LXXI, 1962.
 Searle, J. 2004: Mind, A Brief Introduction, New York, Oxford University Press.

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