[G.R. No. 87193. June 23, 1989.

JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON
CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT,
SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, respondents.

J .L. Misa & Associates for petitioner.

Lladoc, Huab & Associates for private respondent.

D E CI S IO N

CRUZ, J :p

Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of

Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27,
1988, the league of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League),
represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal
capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of
Frivaldo's election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino
citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20,1983. In
his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in
the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses
that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against
President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself
as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law
Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines
after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. He also
argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo
warranto petition that should have been filed within ten days from his
proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omhibus Election Code.
The League, moreover, was not a proper party because it was not a voter and so
could not sue under the said section. prLL

Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the
respondent Commission on Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20,
1988, to set the case for hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration
was denied in another Order dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this
Court in a petition forcertiorari and prohibition to ask that the said orders be
set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion. Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a temporary order
against the hearing on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same
time required comments from the respondents.

In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that

Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine
citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore
not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their
petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent
Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and
void ab initio because of his alienage. Even if their petition were to be considered
as one for quo warranto, it could not have been filed within ten days from
Frivaldo's proclamation because it was only in September 1988 that they
received proof of his naturalization. And assuming that the League itself was not
a proper party, Estuye himself, who was suing not only for the League but also
in his personal capacity, could nevertheless institute the suit by himself alone.

Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the
contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not
repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien,
he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure
this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution,
the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in
the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election
Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was
not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed
that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as
governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.

In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his
naturalization as an American citizen was not "impressed with voluntariness." In
support he cited the Nottebohm Case, [1955 I.C.J. 4; 49 A.J.I.L. 396 (1955)]
where a German national's naturalization in Liechtenstein was not recognized
because it had been obtained for reasons of convenience only. He said he could
not have repatriated himself before the 1988 elections because the Special
Committee on Naturalization created for the purpose by LOI No. 270 had not
yet been organized then. His oath in his certificate of candidacy that he was a
natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his
active participation in the 1987 congressional elections had divested him of
American citizenship under the laws of the United States, thus restoring his
Philippine citizenship. He ended by reiterating his prayer for the rejection of the
move to disqualify him for being time-barred under Section 253 of
the Omnibus Election Code. LLpr

Considering the importance and urgency of the question herein raised, the
Court has decided to resolve it directly instead of allowing the normal circuitous
route that will after all eventually end with this Court, albeit only after a long
delay. We cannot permit this delay. Such delay will be inimical to the public
interest and the vital principles of public office to be here applied.

It is true that the Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over this
question as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective provincial and city
officials. However, the decision on Frivaldo's citizenship has already been made
by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically
claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. We assume this stance was taken by him
after consultation with the public respondent and with its approval. It therefore
represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that we may now review.
Exercising our discretion to interpret the Rules of Court and the Constitution,
we shall consider the present petition as having been filed in accordance with
Article IX-A, Section 7, of the Constitution, to challenge the aforementioned
Orders of the COMELEC.

The basic question we must resolve is whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a
citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18,1988, as
provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition are
merely secondary to this basic question.

The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the
Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the
Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42
of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must
be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency
where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a
qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines,
this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1,
of the Constitution.

In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo

described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting
mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that
he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following
certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of
California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the
Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

September 23, 1988

 TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Our records show that JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, born on October

20, 1915, was naturalized in this Court on January 20, 1983, and
issued Certificate of Naturalization No. 11690178.

Petition No. 280225.

Alien Registration No. A23 079 270.

Very truly yours,

WILLIAM L. WHITTAKER
Clerk

by:

(Sgd.)
ARACELI V. BARENG
Deputy Clerk

This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he expressly admitted it in

his answer. Nevertheless, as earlier noted, he claims it was "forced" on him as a
measure of protection from the persecution of the Marcos government through
his agents in the United States. cdll

The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the
enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a
consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His
feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and
voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.

There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as
Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it
necessary — nor do they claim to have been coerced — to abandon their
cherished status as Filipinos. They did not take the oath of allegiance to the
United States, unlike the petitioner who solemnly declared "on oath, that I
absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or which I have
heretofore been a subject or citizen," meaning in his case the Republic of the
Philippines. The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of those
Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner, held fast to their Philippine
citizenship despite the perils of their resistance to the Marcos regime.

The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law
principle of effective nationality which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar.
This principle is expressed in Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the
Conflict of Nationality Laws as follows: prcd

Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one nationality
shall be treated as if he had only one. Without prejudice to the application
of its law in matters of personal status and of any convention in force, a
third State shall, of the nationalities which any such person possesses,
recognize exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the country
in which he is habitually and principally resident or the nationality of the
country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact most
closely connected.

Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of Guatemala for 34 years

when he applied for and acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one month
before the outbreak of World War II. Many members of his family and his
business interests were in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which had declared
war on Germany, arrested Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties on the
ground that he was a German national. Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on his
behalf, as its citizen, against Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held
Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with which he was more closely
connected than with Liechtenstein. cdphil

That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it dealt with a conflict
between the nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state. No third
state is involved in the case at bar; in fact, even the United States is not actively
claiming Frivaldo as its national. The sole question presented to us is whether or
not Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines under our own laws, regardless of
other nationality laws. We can decide this question alone as sovereign of our own
territory, conformably to Section 1 of the said Convention providing that "it is
for each State to determine under its law who are its nationals."

It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his naturalization in

Liechtenstein whereas in the present case Frivaldo is rejecting his naturalization
in the United States.

If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine

citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of
our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725,
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation.

While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless
claims he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation.
He claims that by actively participating in the elections in this country, he
automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States.
Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him and the
United States as his adopted country. It should be obvious that even if he did lose
his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have
the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had
earlier renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of the loss of
his naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual.

Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI
270 because the Special Committee provided for therein had not yet been
constituted seems to suggest that the lack of that body rendered his
repatriation unnecessary. That is far-fetched if not specious. Such a conclusion
would open the floodgates, as it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have
renounced this country to claim back their abandoned citizenship without
formally rejecting their adopted state and reaffirming their allegiance to the
Philippines.

It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends
that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already
effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal
declaration the law envisions — surely, Philippine citizenship previously
disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet
been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait
until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.

The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be
dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are
seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of governor
because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public
office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
challenged. If, say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner during her
term and by her act or omission acquires his nationality, would she have a right
to remain in office simply because the challenge to her title may no longer be
made within ten days from her proclamation? It has been established, and not
even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered only
eight months after his proclamation and his title was challenged shortly
thereafter.

This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor
in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that
he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of
the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of
this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by
the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in
this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict
application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in
the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only,
abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. LexLib

It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen
is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it
should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and
renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours,
for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once
rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if
repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and
unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is

hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED
from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered
to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of
the said province once this decision becomes final and executory. The temporary
restraining order dated March 9, 1989, is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (C .J .), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,

Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ ., concur.

Sarmiento, J ., took no part.

Cortes, J ., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J ., concurring:

I concur in the pragmatic approach taken by the Court. I agree that when the
higher interests of the State are involved, the public good should supersede any
procedural infirmities which may affect a petition filed with the Commission on
Elections. I fail to see how the Court could allow a person who by his own
admissions is indubitably an alien to continue holding the office of Governor of
any province. prcd

It is an established rule of long standing that the period fixed by law for the
finding of a protest — whether quo warranto or election contest — is
mandatory and jurisdictional. 1

As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul the petitioner's election
and proclamation should have been filed within ten days after the proclamation
of election results. 2 The purpose of the law in not allowing the filing of protests
beyond the period fixed by law is to have a certain and definite time within
which petitions against the results of an election should be filed and to provide
summary proceedings for the settlement of such disputes. 3 The Rules of Court
allow the Republic of the Philippines to file quo warranto proceedings against
any public officer who performs an act which works a forfeiture of his
office. 4 However, where the Solicitor General or the President feel that there are
no good reasons to commence quo warranto proceedings, 5 the Court should
allow a person like respondent Estuye or his league to bring the action. Cdpr

I must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limited to a clear case of an

alien holding an elective public office. And perhaps in a clear case of disloyalty to
the Republic of the Philippines. 6 Where the disqualification is based on age,
residence, or any of the many grounds for ineligibility, 7 I believe that the
ten-day period should be applied strictly.

The pragmatic approach is also shown by the fact that the Court found it
inexpedient to wait for the final decision of COMELEC. This step is most unusual
but considering the total lack of any serious grounds for the petitioner's claim of
having regained his Philippine citizenship, I am constrained to concur in the
procedure pro hac vice.

||| (Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 87193, [June 23, 1989], 255
PHIL 934-947)

[G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996.]

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.

[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996.]

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Juanito G. Arcilla and Teodoro M. Jumamil for Juan
G. Frivaldo.

Felix Carao, Jr., Ferdinand Laguna, Gavinoo Barlin and Bernardo P.

Fernandez for Raul Lee.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; QUALIFICATION REQUIRED FOR ALL

ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS. — The Local Government Code of
1991 [Republic Act No. 7160] expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a
qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor.
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective
public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than
to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall
govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an
official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his
proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. The
law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER,
even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that
the voter requirement was included as another qualification (aside from
"citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the
official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern.
i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province . . . where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the
Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It
does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration — not the actual
voting — is the core of this "qualification". In other words, the law's purpose in
this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually
registered in the area he seeks to govern — and not anywhere else.

2. ID.; ID.; MANNERS OF REACQUISITION UNDER PHILIPPINE LAWS. — Under

Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization or by repatriation.

3. ID.; ID.; IMMIGRATION LAW; P.D. 725 CREATED A RIGHT AND REMEDY
TO REACQUIRE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP NOT ONLY FOR THE BENEFIT OF
FILIPINO WOMEN WHO MARRIED ALIENS BEFORE THE 1973
CONSTITUTION TOOK EFFECT BUT ALSO OF OTHER NATURAL BORN
FILIPINO WHO LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. — A reading of P.D.
725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a new
remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble,P.D.
725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost
their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the
existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) avail of repatriation until "after the
death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status" and who
could neither be benefited by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a
Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship . . ."
because "such provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino
women who had married aliens before said constitution took effect." Thus, P.D.
725 granted a new right to these women — the right to re-acquire Filipino
citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior
to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provide a new remedy and a
new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine
citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship," because prior to
the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo
the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent
ofP.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the
simplified procedure of repatriation.

4. ID.; ID.; REPATRIATION; REQUIREMENTS THEREOF ARE LESS TEDIOUS

AND CUMBERSOME COMPARED TO NATURALIZATION. — The requirements
of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are
they tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D. 725 itself requires very little of an
applicant, and even the rules and regulations to implement the said decree were
left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in
naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry into Philippine political
life, in repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is
merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN MAY BE GIVEN A RETROACTIVE EFFECT; CASE AT BAR.
— While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time
that Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law
itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation
granted under said law to Frivaldoon June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have
retroactive to the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason
for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative
authority that the law should apply to past events — i.e., situations and
transactions existing even before the law came into being — in order to benefit
the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy
and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such
legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is
all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective
manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such
law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and
should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned,
there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary
intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that
damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result
from giving retroactivity to his repatriation.

6. ID.; ID.; THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE DOES NOT SPECIFY WHEN SUCH
QUALIFICATION SHALL BE POSSESSED. — Under Sec. 39 of the Local
Government Code, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular
date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for
residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency immediately
preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of
age on election day). Even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal)
construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government
Code speaks of "Qualifications" of 'ELECTIVE OFFICIALS', not of candidates.
Literally, such qualifications unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the
case of age and residence — should thus be possessed when the "elective [or
elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the
start of his term. Section 39, par. (a) (thereof) speaks of "elective local official"
while par. (b) to (f) refer to "candidates." The citizenship requirement in the
Local Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as
of the time he is proclaimedand at the start of the term of office to which he
has been elected.

7. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; REPEAL OF LAW; BY SUBSEQUENT ONES.

— Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones [Art. 7, Civil Code of the
Philippines] and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express
repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum —
based on the copy furnished us by Lee — did not categorically and/or impliedly
state that PD 725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any legal
effect. In fact, she did not even mention it specifically by its number or text.

8. ID.; ID.; BY IMPLICATION IS NOT FAVORED; EXCEPTION. — It is a basic rule

of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An
implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously
demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently
inconsistent that they cannot co-exist". The memorandum of then President
Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every
pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory Provisions of
the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her
law-making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed
to the Special Committee to hall the acceptance and processing of applications
for repatriation pending whatever "judgment the first Congress under
the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other words, the former President did
not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress — once created — to deal
with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should have
unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she
carefully couched her presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated the
intention of "the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound
discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any other
interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being
proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon
statutory construction but on common sense as well.

9. ID.; THE LAW PRESUMES THAT THE LAW MAKING-BODY INTENDED

RIGHT AND JUSTICE TO PREVAIL. — In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is to be presumed that the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail. [Art. 10, Civil Code of the Philippines)
10. CIVIL LAW; RETROSPECTIVE OPERATIONS OF STATUTES; WHEN
EFFECTIVE. — It is true that under Art. 4 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
"(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But
there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is
CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
According to TOLENTINO, curative statutes are those which undertake to cure
errors and irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative
proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which
otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some
statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement . They
operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in
operation. Agpalo, [Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., pp.
270-271] on the other hand, says that curative statutes are "healing acts . . .
curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations . . . (and)
are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb
certain evils. . . . By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive . . . (and)
reach back to past events to correct errors or irregularities and to render valid
and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the
purpose the parties intended." On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws,
i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not
create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the
remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal
meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the
retrospective operation of statutes.

11. POLITICAL LAW; OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE; PROVIDED REMEDY TO

QUESTION INELIGIBILITY OF A CANDIDATE. — Section 253 of the Omnibus
Election Codegives any voter, presumably including the defeated candidate, the
opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate. This
is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to contest
before the COMELEC an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet
the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code.
Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "within ten days after
proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the
issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the Commission.

12. ID.; ID.; PETITION TO DENY DUE COURSE OR TO CANCEL A CERTIFICATE

OF CANDIDACY UNDER SECTION 78 IS MERELY DIRECTORY. — Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No.
6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for
disqualifications even after the elections.

13. ID.; ELECTIONS; THE RULE IS THE INELIGIBILITY OF A CANDIDATE

RECEIVING MAJORITY VOTES DOES NOT ENTITLE THE ELIGIBLE CANDIDATE
RECEIVING THE NEXT HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES TO BE DECLARED
ELECTED. — "The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving
majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest
number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate
cannot be deemed elected to the office."

14. ID.; ID.; ELECTORAL LAWS SHOULD BE LIBERALLY AND EQUITABLY

CONSTRUED TO GIVE FULLEST EFFECT TO THE MANIFEST WILL OF OUR
PEOPLE. — This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the
electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our
people, for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and
spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise
stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign
will. Consistently, we have held: ". . . (L)aws governing election contests must be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public
officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections." In any action
involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court
must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect
to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective
offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully
challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly
demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional
and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to
the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the
very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution
and laws so zealously protect and promote. The real essence of justice does not
emanate from quibbling over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the
spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate
development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and
eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of
the law in order to evoke substantial justice in the larger social context
consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation approximating venerability in
Philippine political life.

15. ID.; INTERNATIONAL LAW; A STATE DETERMINES ONLY THOSE WHO

ARE ITS OWN CITIZENS — NOT WHO ARE THE CITIZENS OF OTHER
COUNTRIES. — Since our courts are charged only with the duty of the
determining who are Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question
of who are or who are not Americans. It is basic in international law that a
State determines ONLY those who are its own citizens — not who are the
citizens of other countries.

PUNO, J., Concurring Opinion:

1. POLITICAL LAW; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES;

SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE, CONSTRUED. — The sovereignty of our people
is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution. For this reason, it appears as
the first in our declaration of principles and state policies. Thus, Section 1 of
Article II of our fundamental law proclaims that "[t]he Philippines is a
democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." The same principle served as the
bedrock of our 1973 and 1935 Constitutions. [The 1987 Constitution added
the word "democratic" in the statement of the principle.] It is one of the few
principles whose truth has been cherished by the Americans as self-evident.
Section 4, Article IV of the U.S. Constitution makes it a duty of the Federal
government to guarantee to every state a "republican form of government."
With understandable fervor, the American authorities imposed republicanism as
the cornerstone of our 1935 Constitution then being crafted by its Filipino
farmers. Borne out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution, our 1987
Constitution is more people-oriented. Thus, Section 4 of Article II provides as a
state policy that the prime duty of the Government is "to serve and protect the
people." Section 1, Article XI also provides that ". . . public officers . . . must at all
times be accountable to the people . . . " Sections 15 and 16 of Article XIII define
the role and rights of people's organizations. Section 5(2) of Article XVI
mandates that "[t]he state shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist
consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights in the performance
of their duty." And Section 2 of Article XVII provides that "amendments to this
Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative . . ." All these provisions and more are intended to breathe more life to
the sovereignty of our people. To be sure, the sovereignty of our people is not a
kabalistic principle whose dimensions are buried in mysticism. Its metes and
bounds are familiar to the framers of our Constitutions. They knew that in its
broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme, the just summi imperu,
the absolute right to govern. Former Dean Vicente Sinco states that an essential
quality of sovereignty is legal omnipotence, viz: "Legal theory establishes certain
essential qualities inherent in the nature of sovereignty. The first is legal
omnipotence. This means that the sovereign is legally omnipotent and absolute
in relation to other legal institutions. It has the power to determine exclusively
its legal competence. Its powers are original, not derivative. It is the sole judge of
what it should do at any given time." Citing Barker, Principles of Social and
Political Theory, p. 59 (1952 ed.), he adds that a more amplified definition of
sovereignty is that of "a final power of final legal adjustment of all legal issues."
The U.S. Supreme Court expressed the same thought in the landmark case
of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, where it held that ". . . sovereignty itself is,
of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our
system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government,
sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all
government exists and acts."

2. ID.; ID.; REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY DISTINGUISHED FROM PURE

DEMOCRACY. — In our Constitution,the people established a representative
democracy as distinguished from a pure democracy. Justice Isagani Cruz
explains ". . . A republic is a representative government, a government run by
and for the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people govern
themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is representation and
renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries who
derive their mandate for the people and act on their behalf, serving for a
limited period only, after which they are replaced or retained, at the option of
their principal. Obviously, a republican government is a responsible government
whose officials hold and discharge their position as a public trust and shall,
according to the Constitution, 'at all times be accountable to the people' they
are sworn to serve. The purpose of a republican government it is almost needless
to state, is the promotion of the common welfare according to the will of the
people themselves."

3. ID.; ELECTION CASES; THE COURT SHOULD STRIVE TO ALIGN THE WILL
OF THE LEGISLATURE WITH THE WILL OF THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE. — In
election cases, we should strive to align the will of the legislature as expressed in
its law with the will of the sovereign people as expressed in their ballots. For law
to reign, it must respect the will of the people. For in the eloquent prose of Mr.
Justice Laurel, ". . . an enfranchised citizen is a particle of popular sovereignty
and is the ultimate source of established authority." (Moya v. del Fierro, 69
Phil. 199) The choice of the governed on who shall be their governor merits the
highest consideration by all agencies of government. In cases where the
sovereignty of the people is at stake, we must not only be legally right but also
politically correct. We cannot fail by making the people succeed.

DAVIDE, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion"

1. POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991; ELECTION; WHEN

THE PRESCRIBED QUALIFICATION SHALL BE POSSESSED. — Justice Davide
departs from the view in the ponencia is that Section 39 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 does not specify the time when the citizenship
requirement must be met, and that being the case, then it suffices that
citizenship be possessed upon commencement of the term of the office involved.
Section 39 actually prescribes the qualifications ofelective local officials and not
those of an elected local official. These adjectives are not synonymous, as
the ponencia seems to suggest, the first refers to the nature of the office, which
requires the process of voting by the electorate involved; while the second refers
to a victorious candidate for an elective office. The section unquestionably refers
to elective — not elected — local officials. It falls under Title Two
entitled ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; under Chapter 1 entitled Qualifications and
Election; and paragraph (a) thereof begins with the phrases "An elective local
official," while paragraphs (b) to (f) thereof speak of candidates. It is thus obvious
that Section 39 refers to no other than the qualifications of candidates for
elective local offices and their election. Hence, in no way may the section be
construed to mean that possession of qualifications should be reckoned from the
commencement of the term of office of the elected candidate. It is not at all true
that Section 39 does not specify the time when the citizenship requirement
must be possessed. I submit that the requirement must be satisfied, or that
Philippine citizenship must be possessed, not merely at the commencement of
the term, but at an earlier time, the latest being election day itself. Section 39
is not at all ambiguous nor uncertain that it meant this to be, as one basic
qualification of an elective local official is that he be "A REGISTERED VOTER IN
THE BARANGAY, MUNICIPALITY, CITY OR PROVINCE . . . WHERE HE
INTENDS TO VOTE." This simply means that he possesses all the qualifications to
exercise the right of suffrage. The fundamental qualification for the exercise of
this sovereign right is the possession of Philippine citizenship. No less than the
Constitution makes it the first qualification.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; AVAILABLE REMEDIES ON QUESTIONS OF INELIGIBILITY FOR

PUBLIC OFFICE. — Quo warranto is not the sole remedy available to question a
candidate's ineligibility for public office. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code allows the filing of a petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate
of candidacy on the ground that any material representation contained therein
as required by Section 74, is false. Section 74, in turn, requires that the person
filing the certificate of candidacy must state inter alia, that he is eligible for the
office, which means that he has all the qualifications (including, of course,
fulfilling the citizenship requirement) and none of the disqualifications as
provided by law. The petitioner under Section 78 may be filed at any time not
later than 25 days from the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Rule 25 of the
Revised COMELEC rules of procedure allows the filing of a petition for
disqualification on the ground of failure to possess all the qualifications of a
candidate as provided by the Constitution or by existing laws, "any day after
the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation."

3. ID.; CITIZENSHIP; STEPS FOR THE REACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP BY

REPATRIATION. — The steps to reacquire Philippine Citizenship by repatriation
under P.D. No. 725 are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee;
and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved. It is only
UPON TAKING THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE that the applicant is deemed ipso
jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the
oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then it should
not have explicitly provided otherwise.
4. ID.; INTERNATIONAL LAW; STATELESSNESS, CONSTRUED. — Statelessness
may be either de jure, which is the status of individuals stripped of their
nationality by their former government without having all opportunity to
acquired another; or de facto, which is the status of individuals possessed of a
nationality whose country does not give them protection outside their own
country, and who are commonly, albeit imprecisely, referred to as refugees
(JORGE R. COQUIA, et al., Conflict of Laws Cases, Materials and Comments,
1995, ed., 290). Under Chapter I, Article 1 of the United Nations Convention
Regarding the Status of Stateless Persons (Philippine Treaty Series, Compiled
and Annotated by Haydee B. Yorac, vol. III, 363), a stateless person is defined as
"a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation
of its law.

5. ID.; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; DOCTRINE OF

PEOPLE'S SOVEREIGNTY, CONSTRUED. — The doctrine of people's sovereignty
is foundedon the principles of democracy and republicanism and refers
exclusively to the sovereignty of the people of the Philippines. Section 1 of Article
II of the 1987 Constitution is quite clear on this. And the Preamble makes it
clear when it solemnly opens it with a clause "We, the sovereign Filipino
people. . . " Thus, the sovereigntyis an attribute of the Filipino people as one
people, one body. That sovereign power of the Filipino people cannot be
fragmentized by looking at it as the supreme authority of the people of any of
the political subdivisions to determine their own destiny; neither can we convert
and treat every fragment as the whole. In such a case, this Court would provide
the formula for the division and destruction of the State and render the
Government ineffective and inutile.

D E CI S IO N

PANGANIBAN, J : p
 The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who
should be declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon —

(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of

votes in three successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court to
be disqualified to hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and who now
claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation;

(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who
claims that the votes cast in favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that
the electorate should be deemed to have intentionally thrown away their
ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number of valid votes; or

(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was

not voted directly to the position of governor, but who according to
prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said post inasmuch as, by the
ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested office has
occurred"?

In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new

doctrines on repatriation, clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing
jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds the superiority of
substantial justice over pure legalisms.

G.R. No. 123755

This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court
for certiorari and preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution of
the respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec), First Division, 1
promulgated on December 19, 1995 2 and another Resolution of
the Comelec en banc promulgated February 23, 1996 3 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his

Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8,
1995 elections. OnMarch 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another
candidate, filed a petition 4 with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028
praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public
office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and
that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second
Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution 5 granting the petition
with the following disposition: 6

"WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and

declares that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of
Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a citizen of the
Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidacy is
cancelled."

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted

upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and
he was voted for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995,
the Comelec en banc 7 affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second
Division.

The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the

election returns and a Certificate of Votes 8 dated May 27, 1995 was issued
showing the following votes obtained by the candidates for the position of
Governor of Sorsogon:

Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060

Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440

Raul R. Lee 53,304

Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925

On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental)

petition 9 praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of
Sorsogon.
 In an order 10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to
the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en banc directed "the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of
proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in
the province of Sorsogon on June 29, 1995 . . ." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the
evening of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.

On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, 11

docketed as SPC No. 95-317, praying for the annulment of the June 30,
1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged
that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of
allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation
under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization
in September 1994 had been granted". As such, when "the said order (dated
June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released and received
by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no
more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In
the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo
vs. Comelec, 12 the Vice-Governor — not Lee — should occupy said position
of governor.

On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the

herein assailed Resolution 13 holding that Lee, "not having garnered the
highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as
duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest
number of votes, and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by
repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 725 . . . (is) qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon"; thus:

"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division),

therefore RESOLVES to GRANT the Petition.

Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the

proclamation of Raul R. Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered
 annulled, being contrary to law, he not having garnered the highest
number of votes to warrant his proclamation.

Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R.

Lee, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to immediately
reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass, proclaim
petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon
having garnered the highest number of votes, and he having reacquired
his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to hold the
office of Governor of Sorsogon.

Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P.

Blg. 881), the Clerk of the Commission is directed to notify His
Excellency the President of the Philippines, and the Secretary of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this resolution
immediately upon the due implementation thereof."

On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which

was denied by the Comelec en banc in its Resolution 14
promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26, 1996, the present
petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining order,
this Court issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter
alia directed the parties "to maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the
filing of this petition."

The Issues in G.R. No. 123755

Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand briefly be capsulized in

the following propositions" 15 :

"First — The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in

form and substance to warrant the exercise by the COMELEC of its
jurisdiction with the result that, in effect, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and deciding said petition;
 Second — The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was
a continuing condition and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be
elected to and to hold the Office of Governor;

Third — The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid

nor is the effect thereof retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify
him to hold the Office of Governor; and

Fourth — Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully

supports the validity of petitioner's proclamation as duly elected
Governor of Sorsogon."

G.R. No. 120295

This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec,

the first two of which are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:

1. Resolution 16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May

1, 1995, disqualifying Frivaldo from running for governor of

Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections "on the ground that he is
not a citizen of the Philippines";

2. Resolution 17 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on May

11, 1995; and

3. Resolution 18 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated

also on May 11, 1995 suspending the proclamation of, among
others, Frivaldo.

The Facts and the Issue

The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No.
123755. However, Frivaldo assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a
different ground: that under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
is reproduced hereinunder:

"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of

candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required
 under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time
not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and
hearing,not later than fifteen days before the election." (Emphasis
supplied.)

the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were
not rendered "within the period allowed by law", i.e., "not later than fifteen
days before the election."

Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to

act on the petition for disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior
to the election as provided by law is a jurisdictional defect which renders the
said Resolutions null and void.

By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos.

120295 and 123755 since they are intimately related in their factual
environment and are identical in the ultimate question raised, viz., who
should occupy the position of governor of the province of Sorsogon.

On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties
and required them thereafter to file simultaneously their respective
memoranda.

The Consolidated Issues

From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated

as follows:

1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it

seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and
to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so,
from when?

2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino

citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold
the governorship of Sorsogon?
 3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory
petition in SPC No. 95-317 considering that said petition is not "a
pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case"?

4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and

legal in light of existing jurisprudence?

5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction

in promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of which
prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of Sorsogon, considering
that they were not rendered within the period referred to in Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before
the elections"?

The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation

The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the
threshold legal issue in this case. All the other matters raised are secondary to
this.

The Local Government Code of 1991 19 expressly requires Philippine

citizenship as a qualification for elective local officials, including that of
provincial governor, thus:

"Sec. 39. Qualifications. — (a) An elective local official must be a

citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality,
city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the
district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one
(1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read
and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or

member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or
member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be
at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.

xxx xxx xxx

 Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court 20 as a
non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent upon him to show that he has
reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the qualifications prescribed
under the said statute (R.A. 7160).

Under Philippine law, 21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of

Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R.
No. 104654 22 and during the oral argument in this case that he tried to
resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the bill allowing him
to do so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several
members of the House of Representatives" due, according to him, to the
"maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case, his attempt
at naturalization was rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional,
substantial and procedural defects.

Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly

elected governor by the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000
votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the
same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared a non-Filipino and
thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging his popular mandate.
Now, he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of
Sorsogon and a favorable decision from theCommission on Elections to boot.
Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully passed through the third and
last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725,
with no less than the Solicitor General himself, who was the prime opposing
counsel in the previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for
co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause (in addition to his
able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance
under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not
disputed. Hence, he insists that he — not Lee — should have been proclaimed
as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of
Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and
unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of votes in the elections and
since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship.

En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted with

serious defects, which we shall now discuss in seriatim.

First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed",
asserting that "then President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers
under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant
of citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances as the same poses
a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the
exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment
of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution", adding that in her
memorandum dated March 27, 1987 to the members of the Special
Committee on Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree
No. 725, President Aquino directed them "to cease and desist from
undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of
responsibility as defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated
April 11, 1975, as amended." 23

This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 24 cannot by any stretch of

legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal
of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones 25 and a repeal
may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was made
because then President Aquino in her memorandum — based on the copy
furnished us by Lee — did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D.
725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In
fact, she did not even mention it specifically by its number or text. On the
other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by
implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is
convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly
repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist". 26
 The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as
a legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive
even under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor
should be regarded as an exercise of her law-making powers. At best, it could
be treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special Committee to halt
the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending
whatever "judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might
make. In other words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left
it to the first Congress — once created — to deal with the matter. If she had
intended to repeal such law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of
referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her
presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the
present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to
leave the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of
the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to the
Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon statutory
construction but on common sense as well.

Second. Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the
repatriation proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was
"filed onJune 29, 1995 . . . (and) was approved in just one day or on June
30, 1995 . . .", which "prevented a judicious review and evaluation of the
merits thereof." Frivaldocounters that he filed his application for repatriation
with the Office of the President in Malacañang Palace on August 17, 1994.
This is confirmed by the Solicitor General. However, the Special Committee
was reactivated only on June 8, 1995, when presumably the said
Committee started processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he filled
up and re-submitted the FORM that the Committee required. Under these
circumstances, it could not be said that there was "indecent haste" in the
processing of his application.
 Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special
Committee on Naturalization was intended solely for the personal interest of
respondent," 27 the Solicitor General explained during the oral
argument on March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply baseless as there
were many others who applied and were considered for repatriation, a list of
whom was submitted by him to this Court, through a Manifestation 28
filed on April 3, 1996.

On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the

presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the
presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not been
successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were
speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were
necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation under P.D. No.
725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome.
In fact, P.D. 725 29 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the
rules and regulations to implement the said decree were left to the Special
Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in naturalization
where an alien covets a first-time entry into Philippine political life, in
repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely
seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was
undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his
country and his province prior to his naturalization in the United States — a
naturalization he insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches
of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience embrace — and
who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-establishment of democratic
space, wasted no time in returning to his country of birth to offer once more
his talent and services to his people.

So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor
General, were granted repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively
against the existence of favoritism vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any
rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should have been
pursued before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the Office of the
President, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Third. Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to

be valid, nevertheless it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30,
1995 whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local
Government Code "must exist on the date of his election, if not when the
certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our decision in G.R. 104654 30 which
held that "both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require
that only Philippine citizens can run and be elected to Public office." Obviously,
however, this was a mere obiter as the only issue in said case was
whether Frivaldo's naturalization was valid or not — and NOT the effective
date thereof. Since the Court held his naturalization to be invalid, then the
issue of when an aspirant for public office should be a citizen was NOT
resolved at all by the Court. Which question we shall now directly rule on.

Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official
must be:

* a citizen of the Philippines;

* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . .

where he intends to be elected;

* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election;

* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."

* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least

twenty-three (23) years of age on election day."

From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any
particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike
that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency
immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three
years of age on election day).
 Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an
elective public office, 31 and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is
none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to
another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory
thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only
upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to
begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 — the
very day 32 the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) began
— he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and
to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short,
at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is
the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our
law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was
enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal)
construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government
Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of candidates.
Why then should such qualification be required at the time of election or at
the time of the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally,
such qualifications — unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of
age and residence — should thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected]
official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of
his term — in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling
in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, 33 if the purpose of the
citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end
up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation,
that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by
construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of
proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.

But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the
oral argument 34 to the effect that the citizenship qualification should be
possessed at the time the candidate (or for that matter the elected official)
registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the official
to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a
"registered voter". And, under the law 35 a "voter" must be a citizen of the
Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter — much less
a validly registered one — if he was not a citizen at the time of such
registration.

The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the
requirement. If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed
prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter,
then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law
abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended
CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being
a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter
requirement was included as another qualification (aside from "citizenship"),
not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be
registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e.,
the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province . . . where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the
Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It
does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration — not the actual
voting — is the core of this "qualification". In other words, the law's purpose
in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually
registered in the area he seeks to govern — and not anywhere else.

Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized — and Lee has
not disputed — that he "was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his
registration as a voter has been sustained as valid by judicial declaration . . .
In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995." 36

So too, during the oral argument, his counsel stead- fastly maintained
that "Mr. Frivaldo has always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has
voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted again in 1995. In fact, his
eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his eligibility
as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the
previous elections including on May 8, 1995. 37

It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where

he intended to be elected.

There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be
reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election
or date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus
Election Code 38 gives any voter, presumably including the defeated
candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of
a candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a
remedy on how to contest before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility
arising from failure to meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39
of the Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed
of "within ten days after proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it
is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of
by the Commission. And since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation
(8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a
citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the
same day, then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he
unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately
preceding elections and such oath had already cured his previous
"judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible.

But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the
repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his
application onAugust 17, 1994.

It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, 39 "(l)aws shall
have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are
settled exceptions 40 to this general rule, such as when the statute is
CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.

According to Tolentino, 41 curative statutes are those which undertake

to cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative
proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which
otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some
statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement .
They operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive
in operation. Agpalo, 42on the other hand, says that curative statutes are
"healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing
obligations . . . (and ) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in
existing laws, and curb certain evils . . . By their very nature, curative
statutes are retroactive . . . (and) reach back to past events to correct errors
or irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which
would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."

On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes

relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take
away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning
of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective
operation of statutes. 43

A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right,

and also provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws.
Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many
Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to
aliens" and who could not, under the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended)
avail of repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the
termination of their marital status" and who could neither be benefited by
the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino woman who
marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship . . ." because "such
provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had
married aliens before said constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted
a new right to these women — the right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship
even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D.
725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedy and a new
right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine
citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior
to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to
undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the
advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship
under the simplified procedure of repatriation.

The Solicitor General 44 argues:

"By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs.
CA, 96 SCRA 342), since they are intended to supply defects, abridge
superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs.
Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).

In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the
existing naturalization law, specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married
Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their
husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by
naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the
rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by
naturalization.

Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the

aforementioned legal aberrations and thus its provisions are considered
essentially remedial and curative."

In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the

preamble, it is unarguable that the legislative intent was precisely to give the
statute retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective operation is given to a
statute or amendment where the intent that it should so operate clearly
appears from a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms
thereof." 45 It is obvious to the Court that the statute was meant to "reach
back" to those persons, events and transactions not otherwise covered by
prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that
citizenship is a political and civil right equally as important as the freedom of
speech, liberty of abode, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative
intent to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the fullest
effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute must be so
construed as to make it effect the evident purpose for which it was enacted,
so that if the reason of the statute extends to past transactions , as well as to
those in the future, then it will be so applied although the statute does not in
terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some vested right or violate
some constitutional guaranty." 46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725,
which did not specify any restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of
repatriation granted therein.

At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity
of P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June
5, 1975, whileFrivaldo lost his Filipino citizenship much later, on January
20, 1983, and applied for repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994?

While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time
that Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law
itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive effect, but even the
repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be
deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17,
1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of
the legislative authority that the law should apply to past events — i.e.,
situations and transactions existing even before the law came into being — in
order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby
enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of
citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and
expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a
retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions
subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted
to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of
date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that
would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the
legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to
anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving;
retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result
the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right
or breach of some constitutional guaranty.

Being a former Filipino who has served the people

repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and
whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted
by his repatriation.

Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would

prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive
effect, and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the
processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former
Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldo — having already renounced his
American citizenship — was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their
control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended
right and justice to prevail. 47

And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process,
act upon and grant applications for repatriation within relatively short spans
of time after the same were filed. 48 The fact that such interregna were
relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of prejudice to the
government as a result of giving retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the
mind of the Court, direct prejudice to the government is possible only where
a person's repatriation has the effect of wiping out a liability of his to the
government arising in connection with or as a result of his being an alien, and
accruing only during the interregnum between application and approval, a
situation that is not present in the instant case.

And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already
twice frustrated, should now prevail. Under the circumstances, there is
nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's repatriation as having
become effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on August 17, 1994.
This being so, all questions about his possession of the nationality qualification
— whether at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of
election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March
20, 1995) would become moot.

Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a

registered voter would also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered
as having been repatriated — i.e., his Filipino citizenship restored — as of
August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed
validated as of said date.

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an

American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him
dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would
disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?" 49 We answer
this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold
that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of
allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his
Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long
abandoned his American citizenship — long before May 8, 1995. At
best, Frivaldowas stateless in the interim — when he abandoned and
renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino
citizenship." 50

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December

19, 1995: 51

"By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his
American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995.
Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government."

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long
before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee.
Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive
upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or
abuse. 52

The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship a Continuing Disqualification?

Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution 53 of

the Comelec Second Division in SPA No. 95-028 as affirmed in
toto by Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final
and executory after five (5) days or on May 17, 1995, no restraining order
having been issued by this Honorable Court." 54 Hence, before Lee "was
proclaimed as the elected governor on June 30, 1995, there was already a
final and executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds that this
Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes were legally "correct")
declaring Frivaldo an alien have also become final and executory way before
the 1995 elections, and these "judicial pronouncements of his political status
as an American citizen absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from
running for, and holding any public office in the Philippines."

We do not agree.

It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No.

87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the
1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the
1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no
longer be changed. In the words of the respondentCommission (Second
Division) in its assailed Resolution: 55

"The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided
that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the
purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections. However, there is no record of
any 'final judgment' of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for
the May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commissionsaid in its Order of
June 21, 1995 (implemented on June 30, 1995), directing the
proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen
'having been declared by the Supreme Court in its Order dated March 25,
1995, not a citizen of the Philippines.' This declaration of the Supreme
Court, however, was in connection with the 1992 elections."

Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot

govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may
subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of
the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner
of Immigration, 56 we held:

"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable

in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally
not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
again, as the occasion demands."

The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317

Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain

the petition in SPC No. 95-317 because the only "possible types of
proceedings that may be entertained by the Comelec are a pre-proclamation
case, an election protest or a quo warranto case". Again, Lee reminds us that
he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No.
95-317 questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6, 1995 —
"beyond the 5-day reglementary period." Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's
"recourse was to file either an election protest or a quo warranto action."

This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution 57 has given

the Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective. . .
provincial . . . officials." Instead of dwelling at length on the various petitions
that Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may entertain,
suffice it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's
authority to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations — of
which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is one. 58 Thus, in Mentang
vs. COMELEC, 59 we ruled:

"The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of

office, a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are
aware of cases holding that pre-proclamation controversies may no
longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidate has
been proclaimed. (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion
vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.)
This rule, however, is premised on an assumption that the proclamation
is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of
office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to make such
declaration of nullity. (citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883;
Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)"

The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation

must "be done within ten (10) days following the proclamation." Inasmuch
as Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation,
there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the
same.

The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid?

Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for
the following reasons:
 First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC, 60 "the fact
remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino
vs. COMELEC, 61 Lee is "a second placer, . . . just that, a second placer."

In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the

pronouncement of this Court in the aforesaid Labo 62 case, as follows:

"The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in
fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their
votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate may
be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by
notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in
which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of
votes may be deemed elected."

But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:

"But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has
not been shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was
notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less the electorate as
having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even
allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10,
1992 to be voted for the office of the city mayor as its resolution dated
May 9, 1992 denying due course to petitioner Labo's certificate of
candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the final outcome of
this case."

The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling

appropriate in this case because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical
situation as Labo was in 1992 when the Comelec's cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy was not yet final on election day as there was in both
cases a pending motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued
an (omnibus) resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and
several others can still be voted for in the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he
was.
 Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show
that the electorate of Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law"
of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to "bring such awareness within the
realm of notoriety;" in other words, that the voters intentionally wasted
their ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was ineligible.
If Labo has any relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor — and not Lee —
should be proclaimed, since in losing the election, Lee was, to
paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of the people" of Sorsogon.
This is the emphatic teaching of Labo:

"The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving

majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated
candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office."

Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably

re-acquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number
of votes in the 1995 elections, he — not Lee — should be proclaimed. Hence,
Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be corrected.

The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the Election Code Mandatory?

In G.R. No. 120295. Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of

the Comelec (Second Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en
banc Resolution of May 11, 1995 disqualifying him for want of citizenship
should be annulled because they were rendered beyond the fifteen (15) day
period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which reads as
follows:

"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of

candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time
 not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after notice and hearing,not
later than fifteen days before the election." (emphasis supplied.)

This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are
deemed superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First
Division)on December 19, 1995, affirmed en banc 63 on February 23,
1996, which both upheld his election. At any rate, it is obvious that Section
78 is merely directory asSection 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes
the Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after
the elections, thus:

"SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has

been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong." (emphasis supplied)

Refutation of
Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent

In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
argues that President Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should
be viewed as a suspension (not a repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But
whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal is a purely academic distinction
because the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or abrogate an
existing law. The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the
first Frivaldo case; 64 viz, "(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473
and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship maybe reacquired
by . . . repatriation". He also contends that by allowingFrivaldo to register
and to remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court
abetted a "mockery" of our two previous judgments declaring him a
non-citizen. We do not see such abetting or mockery. The retroactivity of his
repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured whatever defects there may
have been in his registration as a voter for the purpose of the 1995 elections.
Such retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992,
which were the subjects of such previous rulings.

Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole
remedy to question the ineligibility of a candidate, citing the Comelec's
authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allowing the denial
of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of a false material representation
therein as required by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states his
disagreement with our holding that Section 78 is merely directory. We really
have no quarrel. Our point is that Frivaldowas in error in his claim in G.R. No.
120295 that the Comelec Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and
May 11, 1995 were invalid because they were issued "not later than fifteen
days before the election" as prescribed by Section 78. In dismissing the
petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec did not commit
grave abuse of discretion because "Section 6 of R.A. 6646 authorizes
the Comelec to try and decide disqualifications even after the elections." In
spite of his disagreement with us on this point, i.e., that Section 78 "is
merely directory", we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide nonetheless
votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295". One other point. Loong, as quoted in
the dissent, teaches that a petition to deny due course under Section 78
must be filed within the 25-day period prescribed therein. The present case
however deals with the period during which the Comelec may decide such
petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after the fifteen
day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a
decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections is valid
but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of time.
There is no inconsistency nor conflict.

Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given
the unique factual circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given
retroactive effect. He argues that such retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in
the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the second Frivaldo) decision
did not directly involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship. If we
may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes
of determining his qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is
settled. But his supervening repatriation has changed his political status —
not in 1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections.

Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was
stateless prior to his repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation or
abandonment is not a ground to lose American citizenship." Since our courts
are charged only with the duty of the determining who are Philippine
nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are not
Americans. It is basic in international law that a State determines ONLY
those who are its own citizens — not who are the citizens of other countries.
65 The issue here is: the Comelec made a finding of fact that Frivaldo was
stateless and such finding has not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or
whimsical. Thus, following settled case law, such finding is binding and final.

The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic
margins to Frivaldo in all three previous elections, should be declared winner
because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an American was publicly known."
First, there is absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public" knowledge.
Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be true post facto only of the
last two previous elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court
were/are still deliberating on his nationality before, during and after the
1995 elections. How then can there be such "public" knowledge?
 Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government
Code refers to the qualifications of elective local officials, i.e., candidates, and
not electedofficials, and that the citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of
that section] must be possessed by candidates, not merely at the
commencement of the term, but by election day at the latest. We see it
differently. Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while
par. (b) to (f) refer to "candidates". If the qualifications under par. (a) were
intended to apply to "candidates" and not elected officials, the legislature
would have said so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the
paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant that the citizenship qualification
should be possessed at election day or prior thereto, it would have specifically
stated such detail, the same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) for other
qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc.

Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect

to Frivaldo's repatriation on the ground, among others, that the law
specifically provides that it is only after taking the oath of allegiance that
applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do
not question what the provision states. We hold however that the provision
should be understood thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the
applicant is deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship, which
reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and intents to have
retroacted to the date of his application therefor.

In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the
word "elective" in reference to Section 39 of the Local Government Code, as
well as regarding Mr. Justice Davide's thesis that the very wordings of P.D.
725 suggest non-retroactivity, were already taken up rather extensively
earlier in this Decision.

Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must
be the first to uphold the Rule of Law." We agree — we must all follow the
rule of law. But that is NOT the issue here. The issue is how should the law be
interpreted and applied in this case so it can be followed, so it can rule!

At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and

perception of how to interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal or
liberal; the letter or the spirit; the naked provision or its ultimate purpose;
legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of social
conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters' obvious choice. In
applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular
sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed,
to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon would
constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an unacceptable assault upon
this Court's conscience.

EPILOGUE

In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local

Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of
the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he
has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect
up to the present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor
impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have
been properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of
the remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to
resume his political status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his
unique situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and political
aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is
to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor, during
the pendency of which he was stateless, he having given up his U.S.
nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement
of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and
should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his
reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as
a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well.
The foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of
the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to
run for and hold public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our
previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear
and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.

This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the
electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our
people, 66 for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life
and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot.
Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of
the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:

". . . (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed

to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may

not be defeated by mere technical objections (citations omitted)." 67

The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection,
defense and refuge, in deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has
repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in
order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the
possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert
utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the
will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective
offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully
challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly
demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic 68 to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and
thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately
create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic
traditions that ourConstitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In
this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.

In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to find fault with
his cause. The Court could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of
his repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to his failure to show his
citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or,
it could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was
stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual
citizenship as a disqualification "from running for any elective local position."
But the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over
patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of
the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social
edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic,
technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke
substantial justice in the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's
unique situation approximating venerability in Philippine political life.
Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the
dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his
loyalty and dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned
to this land, and sought to serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon
overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He took an oath of allegiance to
this Republic every time he filed his certificate of candidacy and during his
failed naturalization bid. And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated
tenacity and sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of birth
despite several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in
truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention and burning
desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81
years. Such loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose
cannot be loston this Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle
would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease and
plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But he opted,
nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once more his
struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal
interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favor. And in the final
analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon
most certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming
choice.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:

(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed
Resolutions of the respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.

(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot
and academic. In any event, it has no merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Melo, Vitug, Kapunan and Torres,

JJ., concur.

Padilla, Regalado, Romero and Bellosillo, JJ., pro hac vice.

Narvasa, C.J. and Mendoza, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

PUNO, J., concurring:

I concur with the path-breaking ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban

which is pro-people and pierces the myopia of legalism. Upholding the
sovereign will of the people which is the be-all and the end-all of
republicanism, it rests on a foundation that will endure time and its tempest.

The sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987

Constitution. For this reason, it appears as the first in our declaration of
principles and state policies. Thus, section 1 of Article II of our fundamental
law proclaims that "[t]he Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them." The same principle served as the bedrock of our 1973 and 1935
Constitutions. 1 It is one of the few principles whose truth has been cherished
by the Americans as self-evident. Section 4, Article IV of the U.S.
Constitution makes it a duty of the Federal government to guarantee to
every state a "republican form of government." With understandable fervor,
the American authorities imposed republicanism as the cornerstone of
our1935 Constitution then being crafted by its Filipino framers. 2

Borne out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution, our 1987
Constitution is more people-oriented. Thus, section 4 of Article II provides as
a state policy that the prime duty of the Government is "to serve and protect
the people." Section 1, Article XI also provides that ". . . public officers . . .
must at all times be accountable to the people . . ." Sections 15 and 16 of
Article XIII define the role and rights of people's organizations. Section 5(2) of
Article XVI mandates that "[t]he state shall strengthen the patriotic spirit
and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights
in the performance of their duty." And Section 2 of Article XVII provides that
"amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative . . ." All these provisions and more are intended to
breathe more life to the sovereignty of our people.

To be sure, the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle

whose dimensions are buried in mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar
to the framers of our Constitutions. They knew that in its broadest sense,
sovereignty is meant to be supreme, the jus summi imperu, the absolute right
to govern. 3 Former Dean Vicente Sinco 4 states that an essential quality of
sovereignty is legal omnipotence, viz: "Legal theory establishes certain
essential qualities inherent in the nature of sovereignty. The first is legal
omnipotence. This means that the sovereign is legally omnipotent and
absolute in relation to other legal institutions. It has the power to determine
exclusively its legal competence. Its powers are original, not derivative. It is
the sole judge of what it should do at any given time." 5 Citing Barker, 6 he
adds that a more amplified definition of sovereignty is that of "a final power
of final legal adjustment of all legal issues." The U.S. Supreme Court expressed
the same thought in the landmark case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 7 where it
held that ". . . sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the
author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers
are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with
the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts."

In our Constitution,the people established a representative democracy

as distinguished from a pure democracy. Justice Isagani Cruz explains: 8

"xxx xxx xxx

A republic is a representative government, a government run by

and for the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people govern
themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is representation and
renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries
who derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf,
serving for a limited period only, after which they are replaced or
retained, at the option of their principal. Obviously, a republican
government is a responsible government whose officials hold and
discharge their position as a public trust and shall, according to the
Constitution, 'at all times be accountable to the people' they are sworn to
serve. The purpose of a republican government it is almost needless to
state, is the promotion of the common welfare according to the will of
the people themselves. "

I appreciate the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Davide. I agree that

sovereignty is indivisible but it need not always be exercised by the people
together, all the time. 9 For this reason, the Constitution and our laws
provide when the entire electorate or only some of them can elect those who
make our laws and those who execute our laws. Thus, the entire electorate
votes for our senators but only our district electorates vote for our
congressmen, only our provincial electorates vote for the members of our
provincial boards, only our city electorates vote for our city councilors, and
only our municipal electorates vote for our councilors. Also, the entire
electorate votes for our President and Vice-President but only our provincial
electorates vote for our governors, only our city electorates vote for our
mayors, and only our municipal electorates vote for our mayors. By defining
and delimiting the classes of voters who can exercise the sovereignty of the
people in a given election, it cannot be claimed that said sovereignty has been
fragmented.

It is my respectful submission that the issue in the case at bar is not

whether the people of Sorsogon should be given the right to defy the law by
allowingFrivaldo to sit as their governor. Rather, the issue is: whether the will
of the voters of Sorsogon clearly choosing Frivaldo as governor ought to be
given a decisive value considering the uncertainty of the law on when a
candidate ought to satisfy the qualification of citizenship. The uncertainty of
law and jurisprudence, both here and abroad, on this legal issue cannot be
denied. In the United States, 10 there are two (2) principal schools of
thought on the matter. One espouses the view that a candidate must possess
the qualifications for office at the time of his election. The other ventures the
view that the candidate should satisfy the qualifications at the time he
assumes the powers of the office. I am unaware of any Philippine decision
that has squarely resolved this difficult question of law. The ponencia of Mr.
Justice Panganiban adhered to the second school of thought while Mr. Justice
Davide dissents.

I emphasize the honest-to-goodness difference in interpreting our

law on the matter for this is vital to dispel the fear of Mr. Justice Davide that
my opinion can bring about ill effects to the State. Mr. Justice Davide's fear is
based on the assumption that Frivaldo continues to be disqualified and we
cannot allow him to sit as governor without transgressing the law. I do not
concede this assumption for as stressed above, courts have been sharply
divided by this mind boggling issue. Given this schism, I do not see how we can
derogate on the sovereignty of the people by according more weight to the
votes of the people of Sorsogon.

Mr. Justice Davide warns that should the people of Batanes stage a
rebellion, we cannot prosecute them "because of the doctrine of people's
sovereignty." With due respect, the analogy is not appropriate. In his
hypothetical case, rebellion is concededly a crime, a violation of Article 134
of the Revised Penal Code, an offense against the sovereignty of our people. In
the case at bar, it cannot be held with certitude that the people of Sorsogon
violated the law by voting for Frivaldoas governor. Frivaldo's name was in the
list of candidates allowed by COMELEC to run for governor. At that time
too, Frivaldo was taking all steps to establish his Filipino citizenship. And even
our jurisprudence has not settled the issue when a candidate should possess
the qualification of citizenship. Since the meaning of the law is arguable then
and now, I cannot imagine how it will be disastrous for the State if we tilt the
balance in the case at bar in favor of the people of Sorsogon.

In sum, I respectfully submit that the sovereign will of our people should
be resolutory of the case at bar which is one of its kind, unprecedented in our
political history. For three (3) times, Frivaldo ran of the province of Sorsogon.
For two (2) times, he was disqualified on the ground of citizenship. The
people of Sorsogon voted for him as their governor despite his disqualification.
The people never waffled in their support for Frivaldo. In 1988, they gave
him a winning margin of 27,000; in 1992, they gave him a winning spread
of 57,000; in 1995, he posted a margin of 20,000. Clearly then, Frivaldo is
the overwhelming choice of the people of Sorsogon. In election cases, we
should strive to align the will of the legislature as expressed in its law with the
will of the sovereign people as expressed in their ballots. For law to reign, it
must respect the will of the people. For in the eloquent prose of Mr. Justice
Laurel, ". . . an enfranchised citizen is a particle of popular sovereignty and is
the ultimate source of established authority.'' The choice of the
governed on who shall be their governor merits the highest consideration by
all agencies of government. In cases where the sovereignty of the people is at
stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct. We cannot
fail by making the people succeed.

DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:

After deliberating on the re-formulated issues and the conclusions

reached by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, I
find myself unable to join him.

I agree with petitioner Lee that Frivaldo's repatriation was void, but
not on the ground that President Corazon C. Aquino's 27 March 1987
memorandum "effectively repealed" P.D. No. 725. In my view, the said
memorandum only suspended the implementation of the latter decree
by divesting the Special Committeeon Naturalization of its authority to
further act on grants of citizenship under LOI No. 270, as amended; P.D. No.
836, as amended; P.D. No. 1379; and "any other related laws, orders,
issuances and rules and regulations." A reading of the last paragraph of the
memorandum can lead to no other conclusion, thus:

In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the Special

Committee on Naturalization, are hereby directed to cease and desist
from undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of
responsibility, as defined in Letter of Instruction No. 270 dated April 11,
1975 as amended, Presidential Decree No. 836 dated December 3,
1975, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1379 dated May 17,
1978, relative to the grant of citizenship under the said laws, and any
other related laws, orders, issuances and rules and regulations. (emphasis
supplied)
 It is self-evident that the underscored clause can only refer to those
related to LOI No. 270, P.D. No. 836, and P.D. No. 1379. There is no doubt
in my mind thatP.D. No. 725 is one such "related law" as it involves the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by repatriation and designates the
Special Committee on Naturalization created under LOI No. 270 to receive
and act on (i.e., approve or disapprove) applications under the said decree.
The power of President Aquino to suspend these issuances by virtue of the 27
March 1987 memorandum is beyond question considering that under
Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, she exercised legislative
power until the Congress established therein convened on the fourth Monday
of July 1987.

I disagree with the view expressed in the ponencia that the

memorandum of 27 March 1987 was merely a declaration of "executive
policy," and not an exercise of legislative power. LOI No. 270, P.D. No.
836, P.D. No. 1379 and "any other related laws," such as P.D. No. 725,
were issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos in the exercise of his legislative
powers — not executive power. These laws relate to the acquisition (by
naturalization) and reacquisition (by repatriation) of Philippine citizenship,
and in light of Sections 1(4) and 3, Article IV of the 1987
Constitution (naturalization and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship shall
be in accordance with law), it is indubitable that these subjects are a matter
of legislative prerogative. In the same vein, the creation of the Special
Committee on Naturalization by LOI No. 270 and the conferment of the
power to accept and act on applications under P.D. No. 725 are
clearly legislative acts.

Accordingly, the revocation of the cease and desist order and

the reactivationor revival of the Committee can be done only by legislative
fiat, i.e., by Congress, since the President had long lost his authority to
exercise "legislative power." Considering that Congress has not seen it fit to do
so, the President cannot, in the exercise of executive power, lift the cease and
desist order nor reactivate/reconstitute/revive the Committee. A multo
fortiori, the Committee cannot validly acceptFrivaldo's application for
repatriation and approve it.

II

Even assuming arguendo that Frivaldo's repatriation is valid, it did not

cure his lack of citizenship." I depart from the view in
the ponencia that Section 39 of the Local Government Code of 1991 does
not specify the time when the citizenship requirement must be met, and that
being the case, then it suffices that citizenship be possessed upon
commencement of the term of the office involved; therefore,
since Frivaldo "re-assumed" his Philippine citizenship at 2:00 p.m. on 30
June 1995 and the term of office of Governor commenced at 12:00 noon of
that day, he had, therefore, complied with the citizenship requirement.

In the first place, Section 39 actually prescribes the qualifications

of elective local officials and not those of an elected local official. These
adjectives are not synonymous, as the ponencia seems to suggest. The first
refers to the nature of the office, which requires the process of voting by the
electorate involved; while the second refers to a victorious candidate for an
elective office. The section unquestionably refers to elective — not elected —
local officials. It falls under Title Two entitled ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; under
Chapter 1 entitled Qualifications and Election; and paragraph (a) thereof
begins with the phrase "An elective local official," whileparagraphs (b) to (f)
thereof speak of candidates. It reads as follows:

SEC. 39. Qualifications — (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of

the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and
write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
 (b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the
sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least
twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.

(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of independent

component cities component cities, or municipalities must be at least
twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.

(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang

panlungsod or sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of
age on election day.

(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the

sangguniang barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of
age on election day.

(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15)
years of age but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election
day (emphasis supplied)

It is thus obvious that Section 39 refers to no other than the qualifications of

candidates for elective local offices and their election. Hence, in no way may
the section be construed to mean that possession of qualifications should be
reckoned from the commencement of the term of office of the elected
candidate.

For another, it is not at all true that Section 39 does not specify the
time when the citizenship requirement must be possessed. I submit that the
requirement must be satisfied, or that Philippine citizenship must be
possessed, not merely at the commencement of the term, but at an earlier
time, the latest being election day itself. Section 39 is not at all ambiguous
nor uncertain that it meant this to be, as one basic qualification of an elective
local official is that he be "A REGISTERED VOTER IN THE BARANGAY,
MUNICIPALITY, CITY OR PROVINCE . . . WHERE HE INTENDS TO VOTE."
This simply means that he possesses all the qualifications to exercise the right
of suffrage. The fundamental qualification for the exercise of this sovereign
right is the possession of Philippine citizenship. No less than the
Constitution makes it the first qualification, as Section 1, Article V thereof
provides:

Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the

Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen
years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election . . . (emphasis supplied)

And Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg.
881) expressly provides for the qualifications of a voter. Thus:

SEC. 117. Qualifications of a voter. — Every citizen of the

Philippines, not otherwise disqualified by law, eighteen years of age or
over, who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the city
or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election, may be a registered voter. (emphasis
supplied)

It is undisputed that this Court twice voided Frivaldo's election as

Governor in the 1988 and 1992 elections on the ground that for lack of
Philippine citizenship — he being a naturalized citizen of the United States of
America — he was DISQUALIFIED to be elected as such and to serve the
position (Frivaldo vs. Commission onElections, 174 SCRA 245
[1989], Republic of the Philippines vs. De la Rosa, 232 SCRA 785 [1994]).
This disqualification inexorably nullified Frivaldo's registration as a voter and
declared it void ab initio. Our judgments therein were self-executory and no
further act, e.g., a COMELEC order to cancel his registration as a voter or the
physical destruction of his voter's certificate, was necessary for the
ineffectivity. Thus, he was never considered a registered voter for
the elections of May 1992, and May 1995, as there is no showing
that Frivaldo registered anew as a voter for the latter elections. Even if he
did — in obvious defiance of his decreed disqualification — this did not make
him a Filipino citizen, hence it was equally void ab initio. That he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections and was even allowed to vote
therein were of no moment. Neither act made him a Filipino citizen nor
nullified the judgments of this Court. On the contrary, said acts made a
mockery of our judgments. For the Court now to validate Frivaldo's
registration as a voter despite the judgments of disqualification is to modify
the said judgments by making their effectivity and enforceability
dependent on a COMELEC order cancelling his registration as a voter,
or on the physical destruction of his certificate of registration as a voter
which, of course, was never our intention. Moreover, to sanction Frivaldo's
registration as a voter would be to sacrifice substance in favor of form (the
piece of paper that is the book of voters or list of voters or voter's ID), and
abet the COMELEC's incompetence in failing to cancel Frivaldo's registration
and allowing him to vote.

The second reason in the ponencia as to why the citizenship

disqualification should be reckoned not from the date of the election nor the
filing of the certificate of candidacy, but from the date of proclamation, is
that the only available remedy to question the ineligibility (or disloyalty) of a
candidate is a petition forquo warranto which, under Section 253 of
the Omnibus Election Code, may be filed only within ten days from
proclamation and not earlier.

I beg to differ.

Clearly, quo warranto is not the sole remedy available to question a

candidate's ineligibility for public office. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code allows the filing of a petition to deny due course to or cancel the
certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation
contained therein, as required by Section 74, is false. Section 74, in turn,
requires that the person filing the certificate of candidacy must
state, inter alia, that he is eligible for the office, which means that he has all
the qualifications (including, of course, fulfilling the citizenship requirement)
and none of the disqualifications as provided by law. The petition under
Section 78 may be filed at any time not later than 25 days from the filing of
the certificate of candidacy. The section reads in full as follows:

SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of

candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later
than fifteen days before the election.

This remedy was recognized in Loong vs. Commission on Elections (216

SCRA 760, 768 [1992]), where this Court held:

Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain

candidate fails to file the petition within the 25-day period prescribed by
Section 78 of the Code for whatever reasons, the election laws do not
leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the
disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo
warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of
the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Code. Section 1, Rule
21 of the ComelecRules of Procedure similarly provides that any voter
contesting the election of any regional, provincial or city official on the
ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines
may file a petition for quo warranto with the Electoral Contest
Adjudication Department The petition may be filed within ten (10) days
from the date the respondent is proclaimed (Section 2).

Likewise, Rule 25 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows

the filing of a petition for disqualification on the ground of failure to possess
all the qualifications of a candidate as provided by the Constitution or by
existing laws, "any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy
 but not later than the date of proclamation." Sections 1 and 3 thereof
provide:

Rule 25 — Disqualification of Candidates.

SECTION 1. Grounds for Disqualification. — Any candidate who

does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for
by the Constitutionor by existing law or who commits any act declared
by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate.

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 3. Period to File Petition. — The petition shall be filed

any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not
later than the date of proclamation.

While the validity of this rule insofar as it concerns petitions for

disqualification on the ground of lack of all qualifications may be doubtful, its
invalidity is not in issue here.

In this connection, it would seem appropriate to take up the last issue

grappled within the ponencia, viz., is Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Codemandatory? The answer is provided in Loong.

We also do not find merit in the contention of respondent Commission that in

the light of the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646, a petition
to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed even
beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, as long as it is
filed within a reasonable time from the discovery of the ineligibility.

Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 are here re-quoted:

SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification case. — Any candidate who

has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court
 or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.

SEC. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a

Certificate of Candidacy. — The procedure hereinabove provided
shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881.

It will be noted that nothing in Sections 6 or 7 modifies or alters the 25-day

period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for filing the appropriate action to
cancel a certificate of candidacy on account of any false representation made
therein. On the contrary, said Section 7 affirms and reiterates Section 78 of
the Code.

We note that Section 6 refers only to the effects of a disqualification case which
may be based on grounds other than that provided under Section 78 of the
Code. But Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 also makes the effects referred to in
Section 6 applicable to disqualification cases filed under Section 78 of the Code.
Nowhere in Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 is mention made of the
period within which these disqualification cases may be filed. This is because
there are provisions in the Code which supply the periods within which a
petition relating to disqualification of candidates must be filed, such as Section
78, already discussed, and Section 253 onpetitions for quo warranto.

I then disagree with the asseveration in the ponencia that Section 78 is

merely directory because Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes
the COMELEC to try and decide petitions for disqualification even
after elections. I submit that Section 6 refers to disqualifications under
Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Codeand consequently modifies
Section 72 thereof. As such, the proper court or the COMELEC are granted
the authority to continue hearing the case after the election, and during the
pendency of the case, suspend the proclamation of the victorious candidate, if
the evidence against him is strong. Sections 12, 68, and 72 of the Code
provide:

SEC. 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by

competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by
final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense
for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen
months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to
be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary
pardon or granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be

deemed removed upon declaration by competent authority that said
insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a
period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same
period he again becomes disqualified.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or

protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent
court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or
other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or
public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of
terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an
amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or
made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and
104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs
d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing
as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any
person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this
Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
 immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971 EC)

SEC. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. —

The Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of
disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final
decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in
which the disqualification is sought.

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be

disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of
the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his
proclamation and assumption to office.

III

Still assuming that the repatriation is valid, I am not persuaded by the

arguments in support of the thesis that Frivaldo's repatriation may be given
retroactive effect, as such goes against the spirit and letter of P.D. No. 725.
The spirit adheres to the principle that acquisition or re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship is not a right, but a mere privilege. Before the advent
of P.D. No. 725, only the following could apply for repatriation: (a) Army,
Navy, or Air Corps deserters; and (b) a woman who lost her citizenship by
reason of her marriage to an alien after the death of her spouse (Section
2[2], C.A. No. 63). P.D. No. 725 expanded this to include Filipino women
who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens even before the
death of their alien husbands, or the termination of their marital status and
to natural-born Filipino citizens who lost their Philippine citizenship but
subsequently desired to reacquire the latter.

Turning now to the letter of the law, P.D. No. 725 expressly provides
that repatriation takes effect only after taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, thus:
 . . . may reacquire Philippine citizenship . . . by applying with the
Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No.
270, and, if theirapplications are approved, taking the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, AFTER WHICH THEY SHALL
BE DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.
(italicization and capitalization supplied for emphasis)

Clearly then, the steps to reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation

under the decree are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee;
and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved. It is
only UPON TAKING THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE that the applicant is
deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had
intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the
application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise.

This theory in the ponencia likewise dilutes this Court's pronouncement

in the first Frivaldo case that what reacquisition of Filipino citizenship
requires is an act "formally rejecting [the] adopted state and reaffirming . . .
allegiance to the Philippines." That act meant nothing less than taking of the
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. If we now take this
revision of doctrine to its logical end, then it would also mean that
if Frivaldo had chosen and reacquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization
or through Congressional action, such would retroact to the filing of the
petition for naturalization or the bill granting him Philippine citizenship. This
is a proposition which both the first and second Frivaldo cases soundly
rejected.

The other reason adduced in the ponencia in support of the proposition

that P.D. No. 725 can be given retroactive effect is its alleged curative or
remedial nature.

Again, I disagree. In the first place, by no stretch of legal hermeneutics

may P.D. No. 725 be characterized as a curative or remedial statute:
 Curative or remedial statutes are healing acts. They are remedial
by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing
obligations. The rule in regard to curative statutes is that if the thing
omitted or failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect sought to
be removed or made harmless, is something the legislature might have
dispensed with by a previous statute, it may do so by a subsequent one.

Curative statutes are intended to supply defects, abridge

superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils. They are intended to
enable a person to carry into effect that which they have designed and
intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some
statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid
that which, before the enactment of the statute, was invalid. (RUBEN E.
AGPALO, Statutory Construction, Second ed. [1990], 270-271,
citations omitted).

P.D. No. 725 provides for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship lost
through the marriage of a Filipina to an alien and through naturalization in a
foreign country of natural-born Filipino citizens. It involves then the
substantive, nay primordial, right of citizenship. To those for whom it is
intended, it means, in reality, the acquisition of "a new right," as
the ponencia cannot but concede. Therefore, it may not be said to merely
remedy or cure a defect considering that one who has lost Philippine
citizenship does not have the right to reacquire it. As earlier stated, the
Constitution provides that citizenship, once lost, may only be reacquired in
the manner provided by law. Moreover, it has also been observed that:

The idea is implicit from many of the cases that remedial statutes
are statutes relating to procedure and not substantive rights. (Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, Vol. 3, Third ed. [1943], § 5704 at 74, citations
omitted).

If we grant for the sake of argument, however, that P.D. No. 725 is a
curative or remedial statute, it would be an inexcusable error to give it a
retroactive effect since it explicitly provides the date of its effectivity. Thus:
 This Decree shall take effect immediately.

Done in the city of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our
Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy five.

Nevertheless, if the retroactivity is to relate only to the reacquisition of

Philippine citizenship, then nothing therein supports such theory, for as the
decree itself unequivocally provides, it is only after taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines that the applicant is DEEMED TO
HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.

IV

Assuming yet again, for the sake of argument, that taking the oath of
allegiance retroacted to the date of Frivaldo's application for repatriation,
the same could not be said insofar as it concerned the United States of
America, of which he was a citizen. For under the laws of the United States of
America, Frivaldo remained an American national until he renounced his
citizenship and allegiance thereto at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995, when he
took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Section 401 of
the Nationality Act of 1940 of the United States of America provides that a
person who is a national of the United States of America, whether by birth or
naturalization, loses his nationality by, inter alia, "(b) Taking an oath or
making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign
state (SIDNEY KANSAS, U.S. Immigration Exclusion and Deportation and
Citizenship of the United States of America. Third ed., [1948] 341-342). It
follows then that on election day and until the hour of the commencement of
the term for which he was elected — noon of 30 June 1995 as per Section
43 of the Local Government Code — Frivaldo possessed dual citizenship, viz.,
(a) as an American citizen, and (b) as a Filipino citizen through the adoption
of the theory that the effects of his taking the oath of allegiance were
retrospective. Hence, he was disqualified to run for Governor for yet another
reason: possession of dual citizenship, in accordance with Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code.
 V

The assertion in the ponencia that Frivaldo may be considered

STATELESS on the basis of his claim that he "had long renounced and had
long abandoned his American citizenship — long before May 8, 1985" — is
untenable, for the following reasons: first, it is based on Frivaldo's unproven,
self-serving allegation; second, informal renunciation or abandonment is not
a ground to lose American citizenship; and third, simply put, never did the
status of a STATELESS person attach toFrivaldo.

Statelessness may be either de jure, which is the status of individuals

stripped of their nationality by their former government without having an
opportunity to acquire another; or de facto, which is the status of individuals
possessed of a nationality whose country does not give them protection
outside their own country, and who are commonly, albeit imprecisely,
referred to as refugees (JORGE R. COQUIA, et al., Conflict of Laws Cases,
Materials and Comments. 1995 ed., 290)

Specifically, under Chapter 1, Article 1 of the United Nations

Convention Regarding the Status of Stateless Persons (Philippine Treaty;
Series, Compiled and Annotated by Haydee B. Yorac, vol. III, 363), a stateless
person is defined as "a person who is not considered as a national by any
State under the operation of its law." However, it has not been shown that
the United States of America ever ceased to consider Frivaldo its national at
any time before he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on 30 June 1995.

VI

Finally, I find it in order to also express my view on the concurring

opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I am absolutely happy to join him in
his statement that "[t]he sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of
the 1987 Constitution" and that the said Constitution is "more people-
oriented," "borne [as it is] out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution." I
would even go further by saying that this Constitution
is pro-God (Preamble), pro-people (Article II, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 15, 16;
Article XI, Section I; Article XII, Sections 1, 6; Article XIII, Sections 1, 11, 15,
16, 18; Article XVI, Sections 5(2), 6), pro-Filipino (Article XII, Sections 1, 2,
10, 11, 12, 14. Article XIV, Sections 1, 4(2), 13; Article XVI, Section
11), pro-poor (Article II, Sections 9, 10, 18, 21; Article XII, Sections 1,
2[3]; Article XIII, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13), pro-life (Article
II, Section 12), and pro-family (Article II, Section 12; Article XV).

Nevertheless, I cannot be with him in carrying out the principle of

sovereignty beyond what I perceive to be the reasonable constitutional
parameters. The doctrine of people's sovereignty is founded on the principles
of democracy and republicanism and refers exclusively to the sovereignty of
the people of the Philippines. Section 1 of Article II is quite clear on this, thus:

SECTION 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.

Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them.

And the Preamble makes it clear when it solemnly opens it with a clause "We,
the sovereign Filipino people . . ." Thus, this sovereignty is an attribute of the
Filipino people as one people, one body.

That sovereign power of the Filipino people cannot be fragmentized by

looking at it as the supreme authority of the people of any of the political
subdivisions to determine their own destiny; neither can we convert and
treat every fragment as the whole. In such a case, this Court would provide
the formula for the division and destruction of the State and render the
Government ineffective and inutile. To illustrate the evil, we may consider the
enforcement of laws or the pursuit of a national policy by the executive
branch of the government, or the execution of a judgment by the courts. If
these are opposed by the overwhelming majority of the people of a certain
province, or even a municipality, it would necessarily follow that the law,
 national policy, or judgment must not be enforced, implemented, or executed
in the said province or municipality. More concretely, if, for instance, the vast
majority of the people of Batanes rise publicly and take up arms against the
Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to the said
Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any
part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces, or depriving
the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their
powers or prerogatives, then those who did so — and which are composed of
the vast majority of the people of Batanes — a political subdivision — cannot
be prosecuted for or be held guilty of rebellion in violation of Article 134 of
the Revised Penal Code because of the doctrine of peoples' sovereignty. Indeed,
the expansion of the doctrine of sovereignty by investing upon the people of a
mere political subdivision that which the Constitution places in the entire
Filipino people, may be disastrous to the Nation.

So it is in this case if we follow the thesis in the concurring opinion. Thus,

simply because Frivaldo had obtained a margin of 20,000 votes over his
closest rival, Lee, i.e., a vast majority of the voters of Sorsogon had expressed
their sovereign will for the former, then this Court must yield to that will and
must, therefore, allow to be set aside, for Frivaldo, not just the
laws on qualifications of candidates and elective officials and naturalization
and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, but even the final and binding
decisions of this Court affecting him.

This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law. I vote then to
DISMISS G.R. No. 120295 and GRANT G.R. No. 123755.

||| (Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120295, 123755, [June 28,
1996], 327 PHIL 521-598)

[G.R. No. 86564. August 1, 1989.]

 RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS
LARDIZABAL, respondents.

Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner.

Rillera and Quintana for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; QUO WARRANTO; PETITION FILED TIMELY. — The

Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the petition
for quo warranto was filed on time. We agree with the respondents that the fee
was paid during the ten-day period as extended by the pendency of the petition
when it was treated by the COMELEC as a pre-proclamation proceeding which
did not require the payment of a filing fee. At that, we reach this conclusion
only on the assumption that the requirement for the payment of the fees in quo
warranto proceedings was already effective. There is no record that Res. No.
1450 was even published; and as for Res. No. 1996, this took effect only on
March 3, 1988, seven days after its publication in the February 25, 1988 issues
of the Manila Chronicle and the Philippine Daily Inquirer, or after the petition
was filed.

2. ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF FILING FEES NECESSARY FOR CONFERMENT OF

JURISDICTION; COURT MAY ALLOW PAYMENT WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME.
— It is true that in the Manchester Case, we required the timely payment of the
filing fee as a precondition for the timeliness of the filing of the case itself. In Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, however, this Court, taking into account the
special circumstances of that case, reiterated the rule that the trial court
acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed filing
fee. However, this court may allow the payment of the said fee within a
reasonable time. In the event of non-compliance therewith, the case shall be
dismissed. The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure adopted on June 20, 1988.

3. CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTION; RESOLUTION ON THE MERITS INSTEAD OF

REMANDING THE CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS;
AS DEMANDED BY THE DICTATES OF JUSTICE. — Remand of the case to the
lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the court is
in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many
occasions, the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious administration of
justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the
trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not
be subserved by the remand of the case or when public interest demands an
early disposition of the case or where the trial court had already received all the
evidence of the parties.

4. ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA NOT APPLICABLE TO QUESTIONS

OF CITIZENSHIP; DEFENSE TO BE SEASONABLY INVOKED. — There is also the
claim that the decision can no longer be reversed because of the doctrine of res
judicata, but this too must be dismissed. This doctrine does not apply to
questions of citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several cases. Moreover, it does
not appear that it was properly and seasonably pleaded, in a motion to dismiss
or in the answer, having been invoked only when the petitioner filed his reply to
the private respondent's comment. Besides, one of the requisites of res judicata,
to wit, identity of parties, is not present in this case.

5. POLITICAL LAW; NATURALIZATION; ACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP BY

NATURALIZATION. — The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an
Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine
citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically
ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia
because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process,
simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a
condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance
and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance.

6. ID.; CITIZENSHIP; MODES OF LOSING PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. — CA No.

63 enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among
these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of
citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the
petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this connection that under Article IV,
Section 5, of the present Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to
the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

7. ID.; ID.; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE TO A FOREIGNER NOT AN

AUTOMATIC RESTORATION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. — Even if it be
assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was
annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was
bigamous, that circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine
citizenship. His divestiture of Australian citizenship does not concern us here.
That is a matter between him and his adopted country. What we must consider
is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship and
willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The
possibility that he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he
claims, does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of
the Philippines.

8. ID.; ID.; MEANS OF REACQUIRING PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. — Under CA

No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear
in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine
citizenship by any of these methods.

9. ID.; ID.; LACK OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE DAY OF LOCAL

ELECTIONS; GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION AS A CANDIDATE FOR
MAYOR. — The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local
elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not
even a qualified voter under the Constitutionitself because of his alienage. He was
therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City under Section 42 of
the Local Government Code.

10. ID.; ELECTION; QUALIFICATIONS OF CANDIDATE FOR PUBLIC OFFICE,

CONTENDING REQUIREMENTS. — The probability that many of those who
voted for the petitioner may have done so in the belief that he was qualified only
strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify the
qualifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications are continuing
requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office
itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting
requirements were not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in the first
place on the day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified from running as
mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.

11. ID.; ELECTION; CANDIDATE OBTAINING THE SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER

OF VOTES; NOT QUALIFIED TO REPLACE THE DISQUALIFIED
CANDIDATE; SANTOSRULING REVERSED. — Finally, there is the question of
whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition,
can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was
obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City. Re-examining Santos v.
Commission on Election, 137 SCRA 740 the Court finds, and so holds, that it
should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, which
represents the more logical and democratic rule. There the Court held it would
be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed
right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of
votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their
ballots that they do not choose him.
 D E CI S IO N

CRUZ, J :p

The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the Commission on Elections

from looking into the question of his citizenship as a qualification for his office
as Mayor of Baguio City. The allegation that he is a foreigner, he says, is not
the issue. The issue is whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to
conduct any inquiry into this matter, considering that the petition for quo
warranto against him was not filed on time. cdphil

It is noteworthy that this argument is based on the alleged tardiness

not of the petition itself but of the payment of the filing fee, which the
petitioner contends was an indispensable requirement. The fee is, curiously
enough, all of P300.00 only. This brings to mind the popular verse that for
want of a horse the kingdom was lost. Still, if it is shown that the petition
was indeed filed beyond the reglementary' period, there is no question that
this petition must be granted and the challenge abated.

The petitioner's position is simple. He was proclaimed mayor-elect of

Baguio City on January 20, 1988. The petition for quo warranto was filed
by the private respondent on January 26,1988, but no filing fee was paid on
that date. This fee was finally paid on February 10, 1988, or twenty-one
days after his proclamation. As the petition by itself alone was ineffectual
without the filing fee, it should be deemed filed only when the fee was paid.
This was done beyond the reglementary period provided for under Section
253 of the Omnibus Election Code reading as follows:

SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any voter contesting the
election of a Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or
city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines shall files sworn petition for quo warranto with the
Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the result of the
election.
 The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is required under
Rule 36, Section 5, of the Procedural Rules of the COMELEC providing that
—

Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto shall be given due course without
the payment of a filing fee in the amount of Three Hundred Pesos
(P300.00) and the legal research fee as required by law.

and stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence holding that the payment
of the filing fee is essential to the timeliness of the filing of the petition itself.
He cites many rulings of the Court to this effect, specifically Manchester v.
Court of Appeals. 1

For his part, the private respondent denies that the filing fee was paid
out of time. In fact, he says, it was filed ahead of time. His point is that when
he filed his "Petition for Quo Warranto with Prayer for Immediate
Annulment of Proclamation and Restraining Order or Injunction" on January
26, 1988, the COMELEC treated it as a pre-proclamation controversy and
docketed it as SPC Case No. 88-288. No docket fee was collected although it
was offered. It was only on February 8, 1988, that the COMELEC decided to
treat his petition as solely for quo warranto and re-docketed it as EPC Case
No. 88-19, serving him notice on February 10, 1988. He immediately paid
the filing fee on that date.

The private respondent argues further that during the period when the
COMELEC regarded his petition as a pre-proclamation controversy, the time
for filing an election protest or quo warranto proceeding was deemed
suspended under Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Code. 2 At any rate,
he says, Rule 36, Section 5, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure cited by the
petitioner, became effective only on November 15, 1988, seven days after
publication of the said Rules in the Official Gazette pursuant to Section 4,
Rule 44 thereof. 3 These rules could not retroact to January 26,1988, when
he filed his petition with the COMELEC.
 In his Reply, the petitioner argues that even if the Omnibus Election
Code did not require it, the payment of filing fees was still necessary under
Res. No. 1996 and, before that, Res. No. 1450 of the respondent COMELEC,
promulgated on January 12, 1988, and February 26, 1980, respectively.
To this, the private respondent counters that the latter resolution was
intended for the local elections held on January 30, 1980, and did not apply
to the 1988 local elections, which were supposed to be governed by the
first-mentioned resolution. However, Res. No. 1996 took effect only on
March 3, 1988, following the lapse of seven days after its publication as
required by RA No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of
1987, which became effective on January 5,1988. Its Section 30 provides in
part:

Sec. 30. Effectivity of Regulations and Orders of the Commission. — The

rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission shall take effect on
the seventh day after their publication in the Official Gazette or in at
least (2) daily newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.

The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that
the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. We agree with the
respondents that the fee was paid during the ten-day period as extended by
the pendency of the petition when it was treated by the COMELEC as a
pre-proclamation proceeding which did not require the payment of a filing
fee. At that, we reach this conclusion only on the assumption that the
requirement for the payment of the fees in quo warranto proceedings was
already effective. There is no record that Res. No. 1450 was even published;
and as for Res. No. 1996, this took effect only on March 3, 1988, seven days
after its publication in the February 25, 1988 issues of the Manila Chronicle
and the Philippine Daily Inquirer, or after the petition was filed. cdasia

The petitioner forgets Tañada v. Tuvera 4 when he argues that the

resolutions became effective "immediately upon approval" simply because it
was so provided therein. We held in that case that publication was still
necessary under the due process clause despite such effectivity clause.

In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and
whatever delay there may have been is not imputable to the private
respondent's fault or neglect. It is true that in the Manchester Case, we
required the timely payment of the filing fee as a precondition for the
timeliness of the filing of the case itself. InSun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Asuncion, 5 however, this Court, taking into account the special
circumstances of that case, declared:

This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court acquires jurisdiction
over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed filing fee. However,
the court may allow the payment of the said fee within a reasonable time.
In the event of non-compliance therewith, the case shall be dismissed.

The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure adopted on June 20, 1988, thus:

Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees. — If the fees above prescribed

are not paid, the Commission may refuse to take action thereon until
they are paid and may dismiss the action or the proceeding. (Emphasis
supplied.)

The Court notes that while arguing the technical point that the petition
for quo warranto should be dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee on time,
the petitioner would at the same time minimize his alleged lack of citizenship
as "a futile technicality." It is regrettable, to say the least, that the
requirement of citizenship as a qualification for public office can be so
demeaned. what is worse is that it is regarded as an even less important
consideration than the reglementary period the petitioner insists upon.

This matter should normally end here as the sole issue originally raised
by the petitioner is the timeliness of the quo warranto proceedings against
him. However, as his citizenship is the subject of that proceeding, and
considering the necessity for an early resolution of that more important
question clearly and urgently affecting the public interest, we shall directly
address it now in this same action.

The Court has similarly acted in a notable number of cases, thus:

From the foregoing brief statement of the nature of the instant case, it
would appear that our sole function in this proceeding should be to
resolve the single issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that the motion for new trial of the GSIS in question should indeed
be deemed pro forma. But going over the extended pleadings of both
parties, the Court is immediately impressed that substantial justice may
not be timely achieved, if we should decide this case upon such a technical
ground alone. We have carefully read all the allegations and arguments of
the parties, very ably and comprehensively expounded by evidently
knowledgeable and unusually competent counsel, and we feel we can
better serve the interests of justice by broadening the scope of our inquiry,
for as the record before us stands, we see that there is enough basis for us
to end the basic controversy between the parties here and now,
dispensing, however, with procedural steps which would not anyway

affect substantially the merits of their respective claims. 6

xxx xxx xxx

While it is the fault of the petitioner for appealing to the wrong court and
thereby allowing the period for appeal to lapse, the more correct
procedure was for the respondent court to forward the case to the
proper court which was the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.
Considering, however, the length of time that this case has been pending,
we apply the rule in the case of Del Castillo v. Jaymalin, (112 SCRA 629)
and follow the principle enunciated in Alger Electric, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, (135 SCRA 37) which states:

". . . it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always

strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving
no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful
purpose will be served if this case is remanded to the trial court
 only to have its decision raised again to the Intermediate Appellate
Court and from there to this Court." (p. 43)

Only recently in the case of Beautifont, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et

al. (G.R. No. 50141, January 29,1988), we stated that:

". . . But all those relevant facts are now before this Court.
And those facts dictate the rendition of a verdict in the petitioner's
favor. There is therefore no point in referring the case back to the
Court of Appeals. The facts and the legal propositions involved will
not change, nor should the ultimate judgment. Considerable time
has already elapsed and, to serve the ends of justice, it is time that
the controversy is finally laid to rest. (See Sotto v. Samson, 5 SCRA
733; Republic v. Paredes, 108 Phil. 57; Lianga Lumber Co. v.
Lianga Timber Co., Inc., 76 SCRA 197; Erico v. Heirs of Chigas, 98
SCRA 575; Francisco v. City of Davao, 12 SCRA 628; Valencia v.
Mabilangan, 105 Phil. 162). 'Sound practice seeks to accommodate
the theory which avoids waste of time, effort and expense, both to
the parties and the government, not to speak of delay in the
disposal of the case (of: Fernandez v. Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 597). A
marked characteristic of our judicial set-up is that where the
dictates of justice so demand . . . the Supreme Court should act,
and act with finality.' (Li Siu Liat v. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039,
1046, citing Samal v. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and U.S. v. Gimenez, 34
Phil. 74). In this case, the dictates of justice do demand that this

Court act, and act with finality." 7

xxx xxx xxx

Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is
not necessary where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based
on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public
interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved
actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for
further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be
subserved by the remand of the case or when public interest demands an
 early disposition of the case or where the trial court had already received

all the evidence of the parties. 8

This course of action becomes all the more justified in the present case
where, to repeat for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public
office.

We also note in his Reply, the petitioner says:

In adopting private respondent's comment, respondent COMELEC

implicitly adopted as "its own" private respondent's repeated assertion
that petitioner is no longer a Filipino citizen. In so doing, has not
respondent COMELEC effectively disqualified itself, by reason of
prejudgment, from resolving the petition for quo warranto filed by
private respondent still pending before it? 9

This is still another reason why the Court has seen fit to rule directly on
the merits of this case.

Going over the record, we find that there are two administrative
decisions on the question of the petitioner's citizenship. The first was rendered
by the Commission on Elections on May 12, 1982, and found the petitioner
to be a citizen of the Philippines. 10 The second was rendered by the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation on September 13, 1988, and
held that the petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines. 11

The first decision was penned by then COMELEC Chairman Vicente

Santiago, Jr., with Commissioners Pabalate, Savellano and Opinion
concurring in full and Commissioner Bacungan concurring in the dismissal of
the petition "without prejudice to the issue of the respondent's citizenship
being raised a new in a proper case. "Commissioner Sagadraca reserved his
vote, while Commissioner Felipe was for deferring decision until
representations shall have been made with the Australian Embassy for official
verification of the petitioner's alleged naturalization as an Australian.
 The second decision was unanimously rendered by Chairman Miriam
Defensor-Santiago and Commissioners Alano and Geraldez of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation. prLL

It is important to observe that in the proceeding before the COMELEC,

there was no direct proof that the herein petitioner had been formally
naturalized as a citizen of Australia. This conjecture, which was eventually
rejected, was merely inferred from the fact that he had married an
Australian citizen, obtained an Australian passport, and registered as en alien
with the CID upon his return to this country in 1980.

On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into account the official
statement of the Australian Government dated August 12, 1984, through
its Consul in the Philippines, that the petitioner was still an Australian citizen
as of that date by reason of his naturalization in 1976. That statement 12 is
reproduced in full as follows:

I, GRAHAM COLIN WEST, Consul of Australia in the Philippines, by virtue

of a certificate of appointment signed and sealed by the Australian
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs on 19 October 1983, and
recognized as such by Letter of Patent signed and sealed by the
Philippines Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs on 23 November 1983, do
hereby provide the following statement in response to the Subpoena
Testificandum dated 9 April 1984 in regard to the Petition for
disqualification against RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO (SPC No. 84-73).
and do hereby certify that the statement is true and correct.

STATEMENT

A) RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO, date of birth 23 December 1934, was

married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen. As the spouse of an
Australian citizen, he was not required to meet normal requirements for
the grant of citizenship and was granted Australian citizenship by
Sydney on 28 July 1976.

B) Any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian

citizenship must take an oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of
allegiance. The wording of the oath of affirmation is: "I. . . ., renouncing all
other allegiance . . . .," etc. This need not necessarily have any effect on his
former nationality as this would depend on the citizenship laws of his
former country.

C) The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in

Sydney on 27 June 1980 on the ground that the marriage had been
bigamous.

D) According to our records LABO is still an Australian citizen.

E) Should he return to Australia, LABO may face court action in respect

of Section 50 of Australian Citizenship Act 1948 which relates to the
giving of false or misleading information of a material nature in respect
of an application for Australian citizenship. If such a prosecution was
successful, he could be deprived of Australian citizenship under Section
21 of the Act.

F) There are two further ways in which LABO could divest himself of
Australian citizenship:

(i) He could make a declaration of Renunciation of Australian

citizenship under Section 18 of the Australian Citizenship Act, or

(ii) If he acquired another nationality, (for example, Filipino)

by a formal end voluntary act other than marriage, then he would
automatically lose his Australian citizenship under Section 17 of
the Act.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MAY HAND AND SEAL

OF THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, MANILA, THIS 12TH DAY OF APRIL
1984.

DONE AT MANILA IN THE PHILIPPINES.

(Signed)

GRAHAM C. WEST

Consul
 This was affirmed later by the letter of February 1, 1988, addressed to
the private respondent by the Department of Foreign Affairs reading as
follows: 13

Sir:

With reference to your letter dated 1 February 1988, I wish to inform

you that inquiry made with the Australian Government through the
Embassy of the Philippines in Canberra has elicited the following
information:

1) That Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. acquired Australian

citizenship on 28 July 1976.

2) That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for Australian

citizenship had to either swear an oath of allegiance or make an
affirmation of allegiance which carries a renunciation of "all other
allegiance."

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of Foreign Affairs:

(SGD) RODOLFO SEVERINO, JR

Assistant Secretary

The decision also noted the oath of allegiance taken by every naturalized
Australian reading as follows:

OATH OF ALLEGIANCE

I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, swear by Almighty God that I

will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second,
Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors according to law, and that I will
faithfully observe the laws of Australia and fulfill my duties as an Australian
citizen. 14

and the Affirmation of Allegiance, which declares:

AFFIRMATION OF ALLEGIANCE
 I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, solemnly and sincerely promise
and declare that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty
Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors
according to law, and that I will faithfully observe the Laws of Australia
and fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen. 15

The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the above evidence.
Neither does he deny that he obtained Australian Passport No. 754705,
which he used in coming back to the Philippines in 1980, when he declared
before the immigration authorities that he was an alien and registered as
such under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-323985. 16 He later asked
for the change of his status from immigrant to a returning former Philippine
citizen and was granted Immigrant Certificate of Residence No. 223809. 17
He also categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia in a number
of sworn statements voluntarily made by him and. even sought to avoid the
jurisdiction of the barangay court on the ground that he was a foreigner. 18

The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly dismisses all these acts
as "mistakes" that did not divest the petitioner of his citizenship, although, as
earlier noted, not all the member joined in this finding. We reject this ruling
as totally baseless. The petitioner is not an unlettered person who was not
aware of the consequences of his acts, let alone the fact that he was assisted
by counsel when he performed these acts.

The private respondent questions the motives of the COMELEC at that

time and stresses Labo's political affiliation with the party in power then, but
we need not go into that now.

There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be reversed
because of the doctrine of res judicata, but this too must be dismissed. This
doctrine does not apply to questions of citizenship, as the Court has ruled in
several cases. 19 Moreover, it does not appear that it was properly and
seasonably pleaded, in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, having been
invoked only when the petitioner filed his reply 20 to the private respondent's
comment. Besides, one of the requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of
parties, is not present in this case.

The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national

in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is
irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a
Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he
was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in
his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for
such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the
Affirmation of Allegiance, both quoted above. Renouncing all other allegiance,
he swore "to be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the
Second, Queen of Australia. . . . , and to fulfill his duties as an Australian
citizen." cdll

The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him
at worst only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine
citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot stand against the clear
provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign
country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an
oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all
of which are applicable to the petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this
connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution,
"Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law."

Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization

in Australia was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the
Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance alone did not
automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of Australian
citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his
adopted country. What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and
freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced
the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he may have been
subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has
been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.

Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship

may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim,
that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does
not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly
conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he has
complied with PD No. 725, providing that:

. . . (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship

may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying
with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of
Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the
necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which
they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The
Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel
their certificate of registration. (Emphasis supplied.)

That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation rejected

his application for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration. And
that is also the reason we must deny his present claim for recognition as a
citizen of the Philippines.

The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections
on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a
qualified voter under the Constitution itself because of his alienage. 21 He was
therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City under Section 42
of the Local Government Code providing in material part as follows:
 Sec. 42. Qualifications. — (1) An elective local official must be a citizen of
the Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on election day, a
qualified voter registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city or
province where he proposes to be elected, a resident therein for at least
one year at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, and able
to read and write English, Pilipino, or any other local language or dialect.

The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile

technicality" that should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio City
who elected him by a "resonant and thunderous majority." To be accurate, it
was not as loud as all that, for his lead over the second-placer was only about
2,100 votes. In any event, the people of that locality could not have, even
unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code
and the Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner
owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless
individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside
over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that
privilege over their countrymen.

The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may
have done so in the belief that he was qualified only strengthens the
conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify the qualifications for
the office now held by him. These qualifications are continuing requirements;
once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed
forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were not
subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of
the election. The petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and,
although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such. LLpr

Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent,

who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He
cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest
number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people
of Baguio City.

The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on

Elections, 22 decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second
was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was
disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all
disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That
decision was supported by eight members of the Court then, 23 with three
dissenting 24 and another two reserving their vote.25 One was on official
leave. 26

Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should
be reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, 27 which
represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated
the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes, 28 was
supported by ten members of the Court, 29 without any dissent, although one
reserved his vote, 30 another took no part, 31 and two others were an
leave. 32 There the Court held:

". . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the

constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and
imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which
have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose
him.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who
have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that
office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government
that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared
carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes
cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is
later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he
 was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the
second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective
office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may
not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there.
However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary
political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the
sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they
should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.

It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride in
his status as such and cherish this priceless gift that, out of more than a
hundred other nationalities, God has seen fit to grant him. Having been so
endowed, he must not lightly yield this precious advantage, rejecting it for
another land that may offer him material and other attractions that he may
not find in his own country. To be sure, he has the right to renounce the
Philippines if he sees fit and transfer his allegiance to a state with more
allurements for him. 33 But having done so, he cannot expect to be welcomed
back with open arms once his taste for his adopted country turns sour or he
is himself disowned by it as an undesirable alien.

Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily

recovered after its renunciation. It may be restored only after the returning
renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the country he has abjured
and he solemnly affirms once again his total and exclusive loyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines. This may not be accomplished by election to public
office.

WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a

citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to
serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE his office and
surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City once this decision
becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining order dated January
31, 1989, is LIFTED.
 Fernan, C . J ., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado,
JJ ., concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J ., concurring:

As in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections (G. R. No. 87193,

June 23, 1989) and inspite of what would otherwise be insuperable
procedural obstacles, I am constrained to concur in the Court's decision so
forcefully and felicitously written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. I do so
because I cannot see how the Court can countenance a citizen of a foreign
country or one who has renounced Filipino citizenship sitting as the mayor of
one of the most important cities in the Philippines. dctai

What was raised to the Court was only the issue of the COMELEC's
jurisdiction to inquire into the citizenship of the petitioner. Ordinarily, we
would have limited ourselves to sustaining the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
and remanding the case for further proceedings and the rendition of a
decision. Under Section 7, Article XI-A of the Constitution, a decision, order,
or ruling of the COMELEC may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof. No decision on the petitioner's citizenship has been rendered and no
decision can, as yet, be elevated to us for review. I, therefore, reiterate my
statement in Frivaldo that my concurrence is limited only to cases involving
citizenship and disloyalty but not to any of the many other grounds for
disqualification cited in my concurring opinion.

Our decision to disqualify the petitioner is particularly distressing to me

because I am impressed by the singular achievements in the beautification of
Baguio City, in the peace and order situation, and in the resurgence of civic
 pride so visible to anyone who has gone up to Baguio since Mr. Labo assumed
the mayorship. However, I see no other way this case can be resolved except
by adopting a pragmatic approach. It is beyond dispute that a non-citizen
cannot be the mayor of Baguio City. I join the rest of the Court.

||| (Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 86564, [August 1, 1989], 257
PHIL 1-23)

[G.R. No. 105111. July 3, 1992.]

RAMON L. LABO, Jr., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

and ROBERTO ORTEGA, respondents

[G.R. No. 105384. July 3, 1992.]

ROBERTO C. ORTEGA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS and RAMON L. LABO, Jr., respondents.

Oscar C . Fernandez, Ricardo C . Tangalin and Romeo Q. Baliton for Ramon L.

Labo.

Roberto Fangayen, Dominador R. Santiago for Roberto Ortega.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ONE'S CASE;

NOT DENIED IN CASE AT BAR. — Petitioner also faults the Comelec for the
supposed proceedings in SPA No. 92-029 which denied him adequate
opportunity to present a full-dress presentation of his case. Thus: a) only one (1)
day was set for hearing of the case; i.e., May 4, 1992; b) two days later, May 6,
1992 the hearing was set; c) instead of holding a hearing, the Comelec issued
the questioned resolution on May 9, 1992. If only to refresh the mind of
petitioner Labo, as well as that of his counsel, records disclose that that
summons were issued by respondent Comelec as early as March 27, 1992
followed by a telegram on April 1, 1992, petitioner chose to ignore the same.
Came April 15, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed a motion to declare petitioner
Labo in default. Over extending him (Labo) the benefit of due process
respondent Comelec issued another order dated April 24, 1992, this time
directing the Acting City Election Registrar of Baguio to personally serve the
summons. The alleged delay in the resolution of SPA No. 92-029 can only be
attributed to petitioner Labo and no one else.

2. ID.; ID.; REACQUISITION THEREOF, MUST BE PROVED BY

PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE; NOT SATISFIED IN CASE AT BAR. —
Petitioner cites the 1980 US case of Vance v Terrazas (444 US 252), wherein
it was held that in proving expatriation act and an intent to relinquish
citizenship must be proved by preponderance of evidence. Suffice it to state that
petitioner has already pleaded Vance in his motion for reconsideration in
Labo v. Comelec. Having been previously passed upon, the Court sees no pressing
need to re-examine the same and make a lengthy dissertation thereon. At any
rate, the fact remains that he has not submitted in the instant case any
evidence, if there be any, to prove his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
either before this Court or the Comelec. On this score alone, We find no grave
abuse of discretion committed by respondent Comelec in cancelling his (Labo's)
certificate of candidacy and declaring that he is NOT a Filipino citizen pursuant
to our ruling in the long case of Labo v. Comelec (supra).

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE MADE THROUGH ELECTION. — We reiterate what

we have stated in Labo v. Comelec (supra), viz.,: "Under CA No. 62, as amended
by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record
nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by
any of these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization
or to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. . . ."
Petitioner Labo's status has not changed in the case at bar. To reiterate, he
(Labo) was disqualified as a candidate for being an alien. His election does not
automatically restore his Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is an
indispensable requirement for holding public office (Sec. 39, Local Government
Code).

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; MERE APPLICATION THEREOF, DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY

AMOUNT TO REACQUISITION. — Petitioner takes pain in raising a new
argument not litigated before the respondent Comelec. Petitioner claims that he
has reacquired his Filipino citizenship by citing his application for reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship filed before the Office of the Solicitor General pursuant
to PD 725 and Letter of Instruction No. 270. To date, however, and despite
favorable recommendation by the Solicitor General, the Special Committee on
Naturalization has not yet acted upon said application for repatriation. Indeed,
such fact is even admitted by petitioner. In the absence of any official action or
approval by the proper authorities, a mere application for repatriation does not,
and cannot, amount to an automatic reacquisition of the applicant's Philippine
citizenship.

5. ELECTION LAW; EFFECT OF DISQUALIFICATION CASES; RULE. —

Petitioner Labo claims, however, that Sec 72 of the Omnibus Election Code
"operates as legislatively mandated special repatriation proceeding" and that it
allows his proclamation as the winning candidate since the resolution
disqualifying him was not yet final at the time the election was held. The Court
finds petitioner Labo's strained argument quixotic and untenable. In the first
place, Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code has already been repealed by Sec. 6
of RA No. 6646, to wit: "Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate
who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court
or the Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complaint or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of
such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong." A perusal of the
above provision would readily disclose that the Comelec can legally suspend the
proclamation of petitioner Labo, his reception of the winning number of votes
notwithstanding, especially so where, as in this case. Labo failed to present any
evidence before the Comelec to support his claim of reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.

6. LOCAL GOVERNMENT; QUALIFICATIONS OF LOCAL OFFICIALS;

PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP; NOT SATISFIED IN CASE AT BAR. — One of the
qualifications of an elective official is that he must be a citizen of the Philippines.
Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental
qualification for the contested office. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable
requirement for holding an elective office. As mandated by law: "An elective
local official must be a citizen of the Philippines."

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; NON-SATISFACTION THEREOF; CANNOT BE CURED BY THE

ELECTORATE ALONE. — The issue here is citizenship and/or Labo's alienage —
the very essence which strikes at the very core of petitioner Labo's qualification
to assume the contested office, he being an alien and not a Filipino citizen. The
fact that he was elected by the majority of the electorate is of no moment. As
we have held in Frivaldo v. Commission on election (174 SCRA 245 [1989]):
". . . The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this
patent violation of the salutary rule, limiting public office and employment only
to the citizens of this country. The qualification prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously,
this rule requires strict application, when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a
person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total
loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to
any other state."

8. ID.; ID.; DISQUALIFICATION OF A CANDIDATE; DOES NOT ENTITLE THE

CANDIDATE WITH THE NEXT HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTE TO THE POSITION.
— Whether the disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the candidate (Ortega)
receiving the next highest number of votes to be proclaimed as the winning
candidate for mayor of Baguio City. While Ortega may have garnered the
second highest number of votes for the office of city mayor, the fact remains
that he was the choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly
voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the belief that he was then
qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification
does not make respondent Ortega the mayor-elect. This is the import of the
recent case of Abella v. Comelec (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), wherein we held that:
"while it is true that SPA No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due
course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before
Larrazabal could be proclaimed, the fact remains that the local elections on Feb.
1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a
bone fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief
that she was a qualified candidate for the position of governor . Her votes was
counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that
petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. . . . What
matters is that in the event a candidate for an elected position who is voted for
and who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified for not possessing
the eligibility requirements at the time of the election as provided by law, the
candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes for the same position
cannot assume the vacated position." The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a
candidate receiving majority of votes does not entitle the eligible candidate
receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or
defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON THEREFOR. — It is therefore incorrect to argue
that since a candidate has been disqualified, the votes intended for the
disqualified candidates should, in effect be considered null and void. This would
amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. At the
risk of being repetitious, the people of Baguio City opted to elect petitioner
Labo bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the
honest belief that Labo was then qualified to be the person to whom they would
entrust the exercise of the powers of the government. Unfortunately, petitioner
Labo turned out to be disqualified and cannot assume the office. Whether or not
the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot be installed, under no
circumstances can a minority or defeated candidate be deemed elected to the
office. Surely, the 12,602 votes cast for petitioner Ortega is not a larger
number than the 27,471 votes cast for petitioner Labo (as certified by the
Election Registrar of Baguio City).

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The
rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of
a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.
In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy
of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their
votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of
votes may be deemed elected. But this is not the situation obtaining in the
instant dispute. It has not been shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner
Labo was notoriously known as the ineligible candidate, much less the electorate
as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed
by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution dated may 10, 1992 to be
voted for the office of the city mayor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992
denying due course to petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy has not yet
become final and subject to the final outcome of this case. As aforesaid, the
ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does entitle the candidate
receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. Ortega failed
to satisfy the necessary requisite of winning the election either by a majority or
mere plurality of votes sufficient to elevate him in public office as mayor of
Baguio City. Having lost in the election for mayor, petitioner Ortega was
obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.

11. ID.; VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR; SHOULD BE FILLED BY

THE VICE-MAYOR. — As a consequence of petitioner's ineligibility, a permanent
vacancy in the contested office has occurred. This should now be filled by the
vice-mayor, in accordance with Sec. 44 of the Local Government Code.

D E CI S IO N

BIDIN, J :
p

This is the second time 1 that this Court is called upon to rule on the citizenship
of Ramon Labo, Jr., who, believing that he is a Filipino citizen, launched his
candidacy for mayor of Baguio City in the last May 11, 1992 elections by filing
his certificate of candidacy on March 23, 1992.

Petitioner Roberto Ortega (GR No. 105384), on the other hand, also filed his
certificate of candidacy for the same office on March 25, 1992. prLL

Shortly after petitioner Labo filed his certificate of candidacy, petitioner Ortega
filed on March 26, 1992, filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo before
the Commission on Elections (Comelec), docketed as SPA No. 92-029, seeking
to cancel Labo's certificate of candidacy on the ground that Labo made a false
representation when he stated therein that he (Labo) is a "natural-born" citizen
of the Philippines.

Summons in the disqualification case was issued by the Comelec on March 27,
1992 to petitioner Labo followed by a telegram dated April 1, 1992, requiring
him to file his Answer within three (3) non-extendible days but the latter failed
to respond.

On April 15, 1992, Ortega filed a motion to declare Labo in default for failure
to file his Answer. cdphil

On April 24, 1992, the Comelec issued another order directing the Election
Registrar of Baguio City to personally deliver the summons. On May 4, 1992,
the disqualification case was set for reception of evidence. At the said hearing,
Ortega presented the decision of this Court in Labo v. Commission on Elections
(176 SCRA 1 [1989]) declaring Labo not a citizen of the Philippines. Labo, on
the other hand, though represented by counsel, did not present any evidence. It
was only on May 5, 1992 that petitioner submitted his Answer claiming
Filipino citizenship.

On May 9, 1992, respondent Comelec issued the assailed resolution, the

dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it

hereby resolves, to grant the petition; respondent's (Labo's) certificate of
candidacy is hereby DENIED due course and ordered CANCELLED; the
City Election Registrar of Baguio City is hereby directed to delete the
name of the respondent (Labo) from the list of candidates for City Mayor
of Baguio City." (Rollo, pp. 47-48; GR No. 105111)

On the same date, Labo filed a motion to stay implementation of said resolution
until after he shall have raised the matter before this Court.

On May 10, 1992, respondent Comelec issued an Order which reads:

"Acting on the 'Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Clarification', filed by

respondent (Labo) on May 9, 1992, the Commission resolves that the
decision promulgated on May 9, 1992 disqualifying respondent Ramon L.
Labo, Jr., shall become final and executory only after five (5) days from
promulgation pursuant to Rule 18, Section 13, Paragraph (b) of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure.
 "Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue to be voted upon as
candidate for City Mayor of Baguio City on May 11, 1992 subject to the
final outcome of this case in the event the issue is elevated to the Supreme
Court either on appeal or certiorari." (Rollo, p. 53; GR No. 105111;
emphasis supplied)

On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec resolved, motu proprio, to suspend the
proclamation of Labo in the event he wins in the elections for the City Mayor of
Baguio. (Rollo, pp. 64-65; GR No. 105111)

On May 15, 1992, petitioner Labo filed the instant petition for review docketed
as GR No. 105111 with prayer, among others, for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to set aside the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent
Comelec; to render judgment declaring him as a Filipino citizen; and to direct
respondent Comelec to proceed with his proclamation in the event he wins in
the contested elections.

On the same date, or on May 15, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed before the
Comelec an urgent motion for the implementation of its May 9, 1992
resolution cancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy. prLL

After an exchange of pleadings, respondent Comelec, in its resolution dated May

26, 1992, denied Ortega's motion in view of the pending case (GR No. 105111)
earlier filed by Labo of the same nature before this Court.

On June 1, 1992, Ortega filed a petition for mandamus docketed as GR No.

105384 praying for the implementation of the Comelec's May 9, 1992
resolution.

Petitioner Ortega argues that respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of

discretion when it refused to implement its May 9, 1992 resolution
notwithstanding the fact that said resolution disqualifying Ramon Labo has
already become final and executory.

After the parties have submitted their respective pleadings, the Court, on June
16, 1992, Resolved to consider the case submitted for decision.
 I. GR No. 105111

In essence, it is the contention of petitioner Labo that he is a Filipino citizen.

Alleging lack of trial on the merits as well as the lack of opportunity to be heard
in Labo v. Commission on Elections (supra), it is the submission of petitioner that
he can prove his Filipino citizenship.

Petitioner cites the 1980 US case of Vance v. Terrazas (444 US 252), wherein
it was held that in proving expatriation, an expatriating act and an intent to
relinquish citizenship must be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

Petitioner contends that no finding was made either by the Commission on

Immigration or the Comelec as regards his specific intent to renounce his
Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner also faults the Comelec for the supposed abbreviated proceedings in
SPA No. 92-029 which denied him adequate opportunity to present a
full-dress presentation of his case. Thus: a) only one (1) day was set for hearing
of the case, i.e., May 4, 1992; b) two days later, May 6, 1992 the hearing was
set; c) instead of holding a hearing, the Comelec issued the questioned resolution
on May 9, 1992.

If only to refresh the mind of petitioner Labo, as well as that of his counsel,
records disclose that summons were issued by respondent Comelec as early
March 27, 1992 followed by a telegram on April 1, 1992. But petitioner chose
to ignore the same. Came April 15, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed a motion to
declare petitioner Labo in default. Over-extending him (Labo) the benefit of due
process, respondent Comelec issued another order dated April 24, 1992, this
time directing the Acting City Election Registrar of Baguio to personally serve
the summons. The alleged delay in the resolution of SPA No. 92-029 can only
be attributed to petitioner Labo and no one else. This, the respondent Comelec
in its resolution dated May 9, 1992 stated:
"On May 4, 1992, the Acting Regional Election Registrar called this case
for reception of evidence. Surprisingly, while as of that date respondent
had not yet filed his Answer, a lawyer appeared for him.

"The petitioner (Ortega) presented the certificate of candidacy of

respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., which contained in item 9 thereof the
verified statement that respondent is a 'natural-born' Filipino citizen. To
prove that respondent is not a Filipino citizen, petitioner submitted the
decision of the Supreme Court in 'Ramon L. Labo, Jr., petitioner, v.
Comelec, et al.,' GR No. 86564, August 1, 1989, the dispositive portion
of which states:

"WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon L. (sic) Labo, Jr. is hereby

declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City.
He is ordered to VACATE his office and surrender the same to the
Vice-Mayor of Baguio City once this decision becomes final and
executory." cdrep

"No evidence was adduced for the respondent as in fact he had no

Answer as of the hearing.

"On May 5, 1992, respondent (Labo) filed his verified Answer, insisting
that he is a Filipino citizen and continue to maintain and preserve his
Filipino citizenship; that he does not hold an Australian citizenship; that
the doctrine of res judicata does not apply in citizenship; and that
'existing facts support his continuous maintenance and holding of
Philippine citizenship' and 'supervening events now preclude the
application of the ruling in the Labo v. Comelec case and the respondent
(Labo) now holds and enjoys Philippine citizenship.'

"No evidence has been offered by respondent to show what these existing
facts and supervening events are to preclude the application of the Labo
decision." (emphasis supplied)
 "The Commission is bound by the final declaration that respondent is not
a Filipino citizen. Consequently, respondent's verified statement in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a "natural-born" Filipino citizen is a
false material representation." (Rollo, pp. 45-48; GR No. 105111)

Up to this moment, petitioner Labo still failed to submit a scintilla of proof to

shore his claim before this Court that he has indeed reacquired his Philippine
citizenship.

Instead, petitioner relies in the US case of Vance v. Terrazas (supra). Suffice it to

state that petitioner has already pleaded Vance in his motion for
reconsideration in Labo v. Comelec (supra; Rollo. p. 375). Having been previously
passed upon, the Court sees no pressing need to re-examine the same and make
a lengthy dissertation thereon.

At any rate, the fact remains that he has not submitted in the instant case any
evidence, if there be any, to prove his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
either before this Court or the Comelec. On this score alone, We find no grave
abuse of discretion committed by respondent Comelec in cancelling his (Labo's)
certificate of candidacy and declaring that he is NOT a Filipino citizen pursuant
to our ruling in the 1989 case of Labo v. Comelec (supra). LLphil

Petitioner Labo claims however, that Sec. 72 2 of the Omnibus Election Code
"operates as a legislatively mandated special repatriation proceeding" and that
it allows his proclamation as the winning candidate since the resolution
disqualifying him was not yet final at the time the election was held.

The Court finds petitioner Labo's strained argument quixotic and untenable. In
the first place, Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code has already been repealed
by Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646, to wit:

"Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been

declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and
the votes case for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate
is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election,
 the Court or the Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of
the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong." (emphasis supplied)

A perusal of the above provision would readily disclose that the Comelec can
legally suspend the proclamation of petitioner Labo, his reception of the winning
number of votes notwithstanding, especially so where, as in this case, Labo failed
to present any evidence before the Comelec to support his claim of reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship.

Furthermore, we need only reiterate what we have stated in Labo v. Comelec

(supra), viz.,:

"Under CA No. 63, as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship

may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner
claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these
methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization or to
any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. . . ." LLpr

Petitioner Labo's status has not changed in the case at bar. To reiterate, he
(Labo) was disqualified as a candidate for being an alien. His election does not
automatically restore his Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is an
indispensable requirement for holding public office (Sec. 39, Local Government
Code).

Still, petitioner takes pains in raising a new argument not litigated before the
respondent Comelec. Petitioner claims that he has reacquired his Filipino
citizenship by citing his application for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
filed before the Office of the Solicitor General pursuant to PD 725 and Letter of
Instruction No. 270 3(Rollo, pp. 116-119; GR No. 105111).

To date, however, and despite favorable recommendation by the Solicitor

General, the Special Committee on Naturalization had not yet acted upon said
application for repatriation. Indeed, such fact is even admitted by petitioner. In
the absence of any official action or approval by the proper authorities, a mere
application for repatriation does not, and cannot, amount to an automatic
reacquisition of the applicant's Philippine citizenship.

II. GR No. 105384

Petitioner Ortega submits that since this Court did not issue a temporary
restraining order as regards the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec
cancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy, said resolution has already become
final and executory. Ortega further posits the view that as a result of such
finality, the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes should be
declared Mayor of Baguio City.

We agree with Ortega's first proposition.

At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition (GR No. 105111) on May 15,
1992, the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling his (Labo's)
certificate of candidacy had already become final and executory a day earlier, or
on May 14, 1992, said resolution having been received by petitioner Labo on
the same day it was promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992 and in the interim no
restraining order was issued by this Court.

Thus, Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

"Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of

candidacy —

xxx xxx xxx

"(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five
(5) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, be final and
executory unless stayed by the Supreme Court." (emphasis supplied)

A similar provision is also found in Sec. 3, Rule 39 of the Comelec Rules of

Procedure, to wit:
 "Sec. 3. Decisions final after five days. — Decisions in pre-proclamation
cases and petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of
candidacy, to declare a candidate as nuisance candidate or to disqualify a
candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall become final and
executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation, unless
restrained by the Supreme Court." (emphasis supplied)

The resolution cancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is

not a Filipino citizen having acquired finality on May 14, 1992 constrains Us to
rule against his proclamation as Mayor of Baguio city.

To begin with, one of the qualification of an elective official is that he must be a

citizen of the Philippines. Thus, the Local Government Code provides:

"Sec. 39. Qualifications. — (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of

the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and
write Filipino or any other local language or dialect." (emphasis supplied)

Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental
qualification for the contested office. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable
requirement for holding an elective office. As mandated by law: "An elective
local official must be a citizen of the Philippines." llcd

The issue here is citizenship and/or Labo's alienage — the very essence which
strikes at the very core of petitioner Labo's qualification to assume the contested
office, he being an alien and not a Filipino citizen. The fact that he was elected
by the majority of the electorate is of no moment. As we held in Frivaldo v.
Commission on Elections (174 SCRA 245 [1989]):

". . . The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not
excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and
employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications
 prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The
will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the
candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application
when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the
Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country
only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state."

This brings us to the second issue raised by petitioner Ortega, i.e., whether the
disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the candidate (Ortega) receiving the
next highest number of votes to be proclaimed as the winning candidate for
mayor of Baguio City.

We hold in the negative. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not

necessarily entitle petitioner Ortega as the candidate with the next highest
number of votes to proclamation as the mayor of Baguio City.

We make mention of petitioner Ortega because in his petition, he alleges that:

". . . the May 11, 1992 elections were held with both herein petitioner
(Roberto Ortega) and respondent LABO having been voted for the
position of Mayor and unofficial results indicate that if the name of
respondent LABO were deleted from the list of candidates, herein
petitioner (Ortega) will be entitled to be proclaimed as Mayor-elect of
Baguio City." (Rollo, p. 7, GR No. 105384; emphasis supplied)

and further prays this Court "to proclaim as the Mayor-elect of Baguio City
the candidate who may have garnered the most number of votes after the
exclusion of the name of respondent candidate LABO." (Rollo, p. 15, Ibid.)
Implicit, therefore, is petitioner Ortega's desire to be proclaimed Mayor-elect
of Baguio City.

As discussed hereunder, however, the Court finds Ortega's prayer devoid of

merit.
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the
office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign
will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of
mayor in the belief that he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City
and his subsequent disqualification does not make respondent Ortega the
mayor-elect. This is the import of the recent case of Abella v. Comelec (201
SCRA 253 [1991]), wherein we held that:

"While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny
due course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed
before Larrazabal could be proclaimed, the fact remains that the local
elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with
Larrazabal considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the
province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified
candidate for the position of governor. Her votes was counted and she
obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that petitioner lost
in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. . . . What matters is
that in the event a candidate for an elected position who is voted for and
who obtains the highest number of votes is disqualified for not possessing
the eligibility requirements at the time of the election as provided by law,
the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes for the
same position cannot assume the vacated position." (emphasis supplied)

Our ruling in Abellaapplies squarely to the case at bar and we see no compelling
reason to depart therefrom. Like Abella, petitioner Ortega lost in the election.
He was repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously not the choice of the
people of Baguio City. Cdpr

Thus, while respondent Ortega (GR No. 105111) originally filed a

disqualification case with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to
deny due course to petitioner's (Labo's) candidacy, the same did not deter the
people of Baguio City from voting for petitioner Labo, who, by then, was
allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon, the resolution for his
disqualification having yet to attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78, Omnibus
Election Code).

And in the earlier case of Labo v. Comelec (supra), We held:

"Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent,

who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor.
He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second
highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of
the people of Baguio City.

"The latest ruling of the Court in this issue is Santos v. Commission on

Elections, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate
who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning
rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate,
were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default.
That decision was supported by eight members of the Court then
(Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De
la Fuente, Alampay, and Aquino, JJ., concurring) with three dissenting
(Teehankee, acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera) and another
two reserving their votes (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr.). One was on official
leave (Fernando, C.J.,)

"Re-examining that decision, the court finds, and so holds, that it should
be reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Santos (136 SCRA
435), which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case,
which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs.
Paredes (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members of the Court
(Gutierrez, Jr., J., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos,
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and
Alampay, JJ., concurring), without any dissent, . . . There the Court held:

'. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the

constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has
not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a
winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the
 majority of which have positively declared through their ballots
that they did not choose him.

'Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those
who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election
for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms
of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure
can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or
plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris
2nd, S. 243, p. 676)

'The fact that a candidate who obtained the highest number of

votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office
to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate
who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the
winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified,
or non-eligible person may be valid to vote the winner into office or
maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which
clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the
matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated
as stray, void or meaningless.'"

The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes
does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes
to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed
elected to the office.

Indeed, this has been the rule in the United States since 1849 (State ex rel.
Dunning v. Giles, 52 Am. Dec. 149).

It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified, the
votes intended for the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be considered null
and void. This would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom
sovereignty resides. At the risk of being repetitious, the people of Baguio City
opted to elect petitioner Labo bona fide, without any intention to misapply
their franchise, and in the honest belief that Labo was then qualified to be the
person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of the
government. Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out to be disqualified and
cannot assume the office.

Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot be
installed, under no circumstances can a minority or defeated candidate be
deemed elected to the office. Surely, the 12,602 votes cast for petitioner Ortega
is not a larger number than the 27,471 votes cast for petitioner Labo (as
certified by the Election Registrar of Baguio City; rollo, p. 109; GR No.
105111).

The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in
law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the
realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity
and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or
throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the
next higher number of votes may be deemed elected.

But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been
shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an
ineligible candidate, much less the electorate as having known of such fact. On
the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the Comelec
itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the city
mayor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying due course to petitioner
Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the final
outcome of this case. LexLib

As aforesaid, the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not

entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected. Ortega failed to satisfy the necessary requisite of winning the election
either by a majority or mere plurality of votes sufficient to elevate him in public
office as mayor of Baguio City. Having lost in the election for mayor, petitioner
Ortega was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.

As a consequence of petitioner's ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the

contested office has occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor, in
accordance withSec. 44 of the Local Government Code, to wit:

"Chapter 2. Vacancies and Succession.

"Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor,

Vice-Governor, Mayor and Vice-Mayor. — (a) If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the office of thegovernor or mayor, the vice-governor or the
vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. . . .
(emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioners
both being ineligible for the Office of the City Mayor of Baguio City and in view
of the vacancy created in said office, the vice-mayor elect of said city in the May
11, 1992 elections is hereby declared Mayor of Baguio City after proclamation
by the City Board of Canvassers. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C .J ., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ ., concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J ., concurring and dissenting:

There is no need for me to discuss Mayor Ramon L. Labo, Jr.'s reacquisition of

Philippine citizenship. In the first case brought to us, Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 176
SCRA 1 [1989], I dissented from the resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration.
It is my view that since Mayor Labo never validly acquired Australian citizenship,
he never lost his Philippine citizenship. His oath of allegiance to Australia was
null and void because he was not qualified to be an Australian citizen. This is
clear from the certification of Australia's Embassy officials. To me, a null and
void act cannot have the positive and serious effect of stripping a Filipino of his
natural-born citizenship. cdasia

Labo's taking an oath as citizen of a foreign country was based on his marriage
to a citizen of that country. It turns out, however, that Labo's marriage was
bigamous and void because his Australian wife had an existing valid marriage
when she tied the knot with him. Not being married to her, Labo could not
become an Australian. Not being qualified to become an Australian citizen, his
oath of allegiance to that country was a meaningless act. It should not deprive
him of his Philippine citizenship. I cannot believe that Mayor Labo gave up his
citizenship in order to acquire a stateless status.

I, however, concur in the Court's reiteration of the rule that it is the vice-mayor
elect who succeeds the disqualified mayor-elect and not the losing candidate for
mayor.

I have to be consistent with my ponencia in Geronimo v. Santos, 136 SCRA

435 [1985]. The Geronimo ruling is even more applicable to this case because
on May 11, 1992, the day of the elections, Labo was not yet disqualified. He
was allowed to vote and to be voted for. The COMELEC decision disqualifying
him became final and executory only on May 14, 1992. In the meantime, the
citizens of Baguio had already stated who was their choice for Mayor. He had
already been elected.

I would like to repeat some observations made in my dissent in the

first Labo case:

xxx xxx xxx

 "I agree with the Court that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride
in his status as such and cherish this priceless gift that, out of more than
a hundred other nationalities, God has seen fit to grant it to him. We love
the Philippines; it is the land of our birth; it is the home of our people.
The emotions kindled by loved of country cannot be described.

"But precisely because of the inestimable value of Philippine citizenship,

we should never declare a Filipino as having lost his citizenship except
upon the most compelling consideration.

"Let us be realistic. There must be over two million Filipinos who are
scattered all over the world desperately trying to earn a living. They
endure loneliness and separation from loved ones, bear with racial
discrimination, suffer rape and other forms of abuse, brave the perils of
foreign cultures, and put up with the failings of their own Government in
looking after their welfare. Being in foreign countries, most of them
yearn for their homeland and realize what they have lost. Only now do
they appreciate what they used to take for granted.

"If some of them may have been forced by circumstances to seemingly

renounce their citizenship, let us not summarily condemn them."

xxx xxx xxx

Citizenship is a political and civil right no less important than freedom of speech,
liberty of abode, right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and other
basic guarantees of the Bill of Rights.

In deciding cases involving citizenship, I believe that the presumptions should be

in favor of its retention and against its loss. We apply this principle to cases
involving civil liberties. We should also apply it to a sincere invocation of
Philippine citizenship. We should not lightly strip a person of his natural born
status but should accord to him every possible interpretation consistent with the
exercise of a right that was vested in him from birth. cdasia

In view of the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the petition and to order the
proclamation and assumption of office of Baguio Mayor Ramon Labo, Jr.
||| (Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 105111, 105384, [July 3,
1992])

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 83820. May 25, 1990.]

JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in

Cebu), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO
MARIO RENNER OSMEÑA,respondents.

Rufino B. Requina for petitioner.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for private respondent.

D E CI S IO N

PARAS, J : p

Before Us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Commission

on Elections (COMELEC) dated June 11, 1988, which dismissed the petition for
the disqualification of private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña as candidate for
Provincial Governor of Cebu Province. cdll

The facts of the case are briefly as follows:

On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed his
certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial
Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.
On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP
Laban, for short), as represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as
its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the
disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a
Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.

On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a

Certificate issued by the then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner
Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent is an American
and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and
Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on
March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").

The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to temporarily enjoin the Cebu
Provincial Board of Canvassers from tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in
favor of private respondent and proclaiming him until the final resolution of the
main petition.

Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board
to continue canvassing but to suspend the proclamation.

At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the petitioner presented
the following exhibits tending to show that private respondent is an American
citizen: Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1 of the Bureau of
Immigration signed by private respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "B");
Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 in the name of private respondent
dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "C"); Permit to Re-enter the Philippines dated
November 21, 1979 (Exh. "D"); Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated
January 3, 1980 (Exh. "E"). (pp. 117-118, Rollo).

Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen,

alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and
son of the late President Sergio Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and
subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he
has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone
out of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered
voter in the Philippines since 1965. (pp. 107-108, Rollo)

On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers

to proclaim the winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of
votes, private respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu.

Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition
for disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient
proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen. cdrep

Hence, the present petition.

The petition is not meritorious.

There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a

registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy
was filed can be raised under the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:

"(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:

'Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of

candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time
not later than twenty five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after the notice and hearing,
not later than fifteen days before the election.

and

"(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:

'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any voter contesting the
election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial,
or city officer on the ground of inelligibility or of disloyalty to the
 Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo
warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of
the results of the election."

The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy on
November 19, 1987 and that the petitioner filed its petition for disqualification
of said private respondent on January 22, 1988. Since the petition for
disqualification was filed beyond the twenty five-day period required in Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that said petition was filed out of
time.

The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannot also be treated
as a petition for quo warranto under Section 253 of the same Code as it is
unquestionably premature, considering that private respondent was proclaimed
Provincial Governor of Cebu only on March 3, 1988.

However, We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the respondent's

citizenship and qualification to hold the public office to which he has been
proclaimed elected. There is enough basis for us to rule directly on the merits of
the case, as the COMELEC did below.

Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and,

therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of
Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing
evidence.

In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct
proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the
modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by
naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship;
and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or
laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent
Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned
hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the
United States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private
respondent was issued alien certificate of registration and was given clearance
and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is
an American and "being an American", private respondent "must have taken
and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws."
(p. 81, Rollo)

Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and
who are not. Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws
of the United States does not concern Us here.

By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private
respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove
that private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated,
however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.

The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al., (G.R. No. 87193, June
21, 1989) and Ramon L. Labo v. COMELEC et al. (G.R. No. 86564, August 1,
1989) are not applicable to the case at bar.

In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized as a citizen of the
United States in 1983 per certification from the United States District Court,
Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P.
Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was naturalized in the United
States but claimed that he was forced to embrace American citizenship to
protect himself from the persecution of the Marcos government. The Court,
however, found this suggestion of involuntariness unacceptable, pointing out
that there were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as
Frivaldo who did not find it necessary to abandon their status as Filipinos.
Likewise, in the case of Labo, records show that Labo was married to an
Australian citizen and that he was naturalized as an Australian citizen in 1976,
per certification from the Australian Government through its Consul in the
Philippines. This was later affirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs.

The authenticity of the above evidence was not disputed by Labo. In fact, in a
number of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that he was a citizen
of Australia. LexLib

In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the Philippines, therefore,
disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon and Mayor of
Baguio City, respectively, the Court considered the fact that by their own
admissions, they are indubitably aliens, no longer owing any allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines since they have sworn their total allegiance to a
foreign state.

In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath
of allegiance of the United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and
subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral
process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a
candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino
and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.

In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that
because Osmeña obtained Certificates of Alien Registration as an American
citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he,
Osmeña should be regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship.
To Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not follow). Considering the
fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere
fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is
not still a Filipino. Thus, by way of analogy, if a person who has two brothers
named Jose and Mario states or certifies that he has a brother named Jose, this
does not mean that he does not have a brother named Mario; or if a person is
enrolled as student simultaneously in two universities, namely University X and
University Y, presents a Certification that he is a student of University X, this
does not necessarily mean that he is not still a student of University Y. In the
case of Osmeña, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he
is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships.
Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to
tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider
that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express", it
stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when
there is no renunciation, either "express" or "implied ".

Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual allegiance of

citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law" (Art.
IV, Sec. 5) has no retroactive effect. And while it is true that even before
the 1987 Constitution, Our country had already frowned upon the concept of
dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it actually existed. Be it noted further
that under the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual citizenship or allegiance
shall be dealt with by a future law. Said law has not yet been enacted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the

Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., took no part

Gutierrez, Jr., J., My stand in the cases of Willie Yu v. Miriam Defensor Santiago,
et al. (G.R. No. 83882, January 24, 1989) and Ramon Labo, Jr. v. Commission
on Elections(G.R. 86564, August 2, 1989) is clear. I regret, however, that I
cannot participate in this case because one of the principal counsels is my
relative by affinity within the fourth civil degree.

Gancayco, J., is on official leave.

Cortes, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J ., dissenting:

I join the dissent of Messrs. Justices Isagani A. Cruz and Teodoro R. Padilla.

While it may be that dual citizenship usually results from accident of birth, a
choice will have to be made by the individual concerned at some point in time in
his life, involving as it does the priceless heritage of citizenship.

That election was made by private respondent when, in 1958, at the age of 24,
and in 1979, at 45, he obtained Alien Certificates of Registration. Registration
as an alien is a clear and unambiguous act or declaration that one is not a
citizen. If, in fact, private respondent was merely compelled to so register
because of the "uncooperativeness" of the past regime, he could have, under the
new dispensation, asked for the cancellation of those Alien Certificates and
abandoned his alienage, specially before he ran for public office in 1988.

The 1987 Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that "dual allegiance of

citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law"
(Article IV, Section 5). That statement is but a reaffirmation of an innate
conviction shared by every Filipino. The law referred to need not be awaited for
one to consider giving up the legal convenience of dual citizenship.

Accordingly, I vote to grant the Petition.

CRUZ, J ., dissenting:

I join Mr. Justice Padilla in his dissent.

It seems to me that when a person voluntarily registers as an alien, he is in

effect affirming that he is not a citizen. The terms "citizen" and "alien" are
mutually exclusive from the viewpoint of municipal law, which is what really
matters in the case at bar. Under this discipline, one is either a citizen of the
local state or he is not; and the question is resolved on the basis of its own laws
alone and not those of any other state.

One of the several modes of losing Philippine citizenship under C.A. No. 63 is by
"express renunciation" thereof. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989, there was such renunciation when
the petitioner took an oath as a naturalized citizen of the United States in which
he renounced all allegiance to all other states. In the case of Labo v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 86546, August 1, 1989, the petitioner not only took a
similar oath after his naturalization in Australia but also executed other
documents in which he stated that he was not a Filipino.

The fact that his naturalization was later revoked did not also invalidate his
disavowal of Philippine citizenship. "Express renunciation" is a separate mode of
losing Philippine citizenship and is not necessarily dependent on "naturalization
in a foreign country," which is another and different mode.

When a person rejects and divorces his wife to enter into a second marriage, he
cannot say he still loves her despite his desertion. The undeniable fact is that he
has left her for another woman to whom he has totally and solemnly
transferred his truth. It does him no credit when he protests he married a
second time simply for material convenience and that his heart still belongs to
the wife he has abandoned. At worst, it would reveal his sordid and deceitful
character.

By the same token, professing continued allegiance to the Philippines after

renouncing it because of its meager resources, or for other ulterior and equally
base reasons, is to me a paltry form of patriotism. It is a sop to the repudiated
state and a slight to the adopted state. No matter how noble this attitude may
appear to others, it is to me nothing less than plain and simple hypocrisy that
we should not condone, let alone extol.

Coming now to the case at bar, I note first of all that no naturalization is
involved here as the private respondent claims to be a citizen both of the
Philippines and of the United States. The question I think we must answer is:
Was there an express renunciation of Philippine citizenship by the private
respondent when he knowingly and voluntarily registered as an alien with the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation in 1958 and in 1979?.

In Yu v. Commission of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No. 83882, January

24, 1989, I made the following observations in a separate opinion:

Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has
expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The evidence on this point
is in my view rather meager. Express renunciation of citizenship as a
made of losing citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and
deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and consequences. I
do not think the "commercial documents he signed" suggest such
categorical disclaimer.

That case is distinguished from the one before us now in that Yu did not ask the
Philippine government to register him as an alien. Gov. Osmeña did.

It is my opinion that if the governor had confined himself to simply seeking and
using an American passport, these acts could not have by themselves alone
constituted a repudiation of Philippine citizenship. The problem, though, is that
he did more than enjoy this legal convenience. What he actually did was register
with the Philippine government as an alien within its own territory, presumably
so he could be insulated from the jurisdiction it exercises over its nationals. This
was a voluntary act. As a citizen of the Philippines, he was not required to
register as an alien. Nevertheless, he chose to do so of his own free will. By this
decision, he categorically asked the Republic of the Philippines to treat him as an
American and not a Filipino, choosing to be an alien in this land that was willing
to consider him its own.

C.A. No. 63 does not necessarily require that the express renunciation of
Philippine citizenship be made in connection with the naturalization of the
erstwhile Filipino in a foreign country. Renunciation may be made
independently of naturalization proceedings. Moreover, no sacramental words
are prescribed by the statute for the express renunciation of Philippine
citizenship. As long as the repudiation is categorical enough and the preference
for the foreign state is unmistakable, as in the case at bar, Philippine citizenship
is lost.

The private respondent would have his cake and eat it too, but this can never be
allowed where Philippine citizenship is involved. It is a gift that must be deserved
to be retained. The Philippines for all her modest resources compared to those of
other states, is a jealous and possessive mother demanding total love and loyalty
from her children. It is bad enough that the love of the dual national is shared
with another state; what is worse is where he formally rejects the Philippines,
and in its own territory at that, and offers his total devotion to the other state.

I am aware of the praiseworthy efforts of Gov. Osmeña to improve the province

of Cebu, and also, I should add, of the commendable record of Gov. Frivaldo and
Mayor Labo in the administration of their respective jurisdictions. But that is
not the point. The point is that it is not lawful to maintain in public office any
person who, although supported by the electorate, is not a Filipino citizen. This is
a relentless restriction we cannot ignore.

Regretfully, therefore, I must vote to GRANT the petition.

PADILLA, J ., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent.

I start from the premise that the private respondent Emilio Mario Renner
Osmeña enjoyed at one time dual citizenship, i.e., Philippine and U.S.
citizenships. He was born in the Philippines of a Filipino father and an American
(U.S.) mother. However, his sworn applicationfor alien registration dated 21
November 1979 (Exh. B) filed with the Philippine immigration authorities was,
in my view, an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. As held
in Board of Immigration Commissioners vs. Go Callano, 1 express renunciation
means a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left
to inference or implication.

Nothing can be more distinct and explicit than when a dual citizenship holder —
like the private respondent of age, and with full legal capacity to act, voluntarily
and under oath applies with the Philippine Government for registration as an
alien, insofar as his intention not to remain a Filipino citizen is concerned. And
because of that distinct and explicit manifestation of desire to be considered an
alien in the Philippines, the Philippine immigration authorities issued to private
respondent Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 dated 21 November
1979 (Exh. C), Permit to Re-enter the Philippines No. 122018 dated 21
November 1979 (Exh. D) and Immigration Certificate of Clearance No.
D-146483 dated 3 January 1980 (Exh. E) 2

All the foregoing documents issued by the Philippine immigration authorities to

the private respondent at his request are predicated on the proposition that
private respondent is an alien under Philippine laws. It should also be mentioned
that, while not marked as exhibit in the case at bar, private respondent was
likewise issued in Cebu City Native Born Certificate of Residence No. 115883 on
21 November 1979 (as verified from Immigration records). This document,
copy of which is attached hereto as Annex A, is again predicated on the
proposition that private respondent is a duly-registered alien (American)
residing in the Philippines.

Another relevant document that merits attention is the Application for

Re-entry Permit executed and signed by private respondent on 3 January
1980, again under oath,and verified from the records at the CID, wherein
private respondent expressly stated that he is a U.S. national. The importance of
this document cannot be underestimated. For, if private respondent believed
that he is a Filipino citizen, he would not have executed said Application for
Re-entry Permit, since it is the right of every Filipino citizen to return to his
country (the Philippines). The fact, therefore, that private respondent executed
said sworn Application for Re-entry Permit, copy of which is attached hereto as
Annex B, is again an abundant proof that he himself, no less, believed that he
was, as he continuous to be, a resident alien (American) in the Philippines.

It will further be noted that earlier, or in 1958, private respondent had already
registered as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration under the Alien
Registration Act of 1950 (RA 562). Section 1 of said Act provides:

"SECTION 1. Aliens residing in the Philippines shall, within thirty days

after the approval of this Act, apply for registration, in the case of those
residing in the City of Manila, at the Bureau of Immigration and in the
case of those residing in other localities at the office of the city or
municipal treasurers, or at any other office designated by the

President. . . . ." 3 (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, per certification of the Commissioner of Immigration and

Deportation Miriam Defensor-Santiago (Exh. A), issued on 26 January 1988,
private respondent had been issued ACR No. B-21-448 and ICR No. 13391 on
27 and 28 March 1958 respectively. He, therefore, registered himself in the
Philippines as an alien twice; first, in the year 1958, when he was 24 years old
and again in 1979, when he was 45 years old. By twice registering under oath
as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration, private respondent thereby clearly,
distinctly and explicitly manifested and declared that he was an alien (and,
therefore, not a Filipino citizen) residing in the Philippines and under its laws.

At this point, and to be objectively fair to the private respondent, a clarification

should be made. In his Comment on the Petition at bar (Rollo, p. 81), it is stated
by his counsel that he (private respondent) was born in
1934 — hence, our mathematical conclusion that when he first registered as an
alien in 1958, he was 24 years old and in 1979 when he re-registered as an
alien, he was 45 years old. However, private respondent's immigration records
disclose that he was born in 1938 (not in 1934). On the assumption that the
year 1938 is the correct year of birth of private respondent (and that his
alleged year of birth, 1934, as stated in his Comment at bar is erroneous), then
in 1958, when he first registered as an alien, he was 20 years old, while in
1979 when he re-registered as an alien, he was 41 years old.

Still, his first registration as an alien (at age 20) has to be taken, in my view, as
an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship, because (1) at that time, he
was almost 21 years old — the age of majority, and (2) more importantly,
under the applicable Alien Registration Act (RA 562), an alien 14 years or
over has to register in person (and not through his parents or guardian). It
provides:

"The parent or legal guardian of an alien who is less than fourteen years
of age, shall have the duty of registering such alien: Provided, That
whenever any such alien attains his fourteenth birthday in the Philippines
he shall, within fifteen days thereafter, apply in person for registration."
(Sec. 1, par. 2)

I take the above provision to mean that the choice by a dual nationality holder
on whether to remain a Filipino citizen or an alien has to be made at age 14,
and private respondent (although a bit late) made the notice in 1958 (at age
20) in favor of his U.S. citizenship.

If all the foregoing acts of express renunciation of Philippine citizenship had been
made or filed by private respondent elsewhere (not with the Philippine
Government), there could perhaps be some room for contention that vis-a-vis
the Philippine Government, private respondent had not renounced his
Philippine citizenship. But said acts of express renunciation were filed with the
Philippine Government and done right in the Philippines. In turn, the Philippine
Government, through the immigration authorities, accepted and acted on
private respondent's aforesaid representations, and registered and documented
him TWICE as an alien under Philippine law.

The policy of our laws has been, and with laudable reason, to discourage dual
citizenship, because this condition or status assumes as a necessary complement
thereofdual allegiance at the same time to two (2) different countries. As early
as 16 September 1947, a unanimous Supreme Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Sabino Padilla in the celebrated case of Tan Chong vs. Secretary of
Labor, rejected the principle of jus soli as determinative of Philippine citizenship,
for the following reason, among others:

". . . . Citizenship, the main integrate element of which is allegiance, must

not be taken lightly. Dual allegiance must be discouraged and prevented.
But the application of the principle of jus soli to persons born in this
country of alien parentage would encourage dual allegiance which in the
long run would be detrimental to both countries of which such persons

might claim to be citizens." 4

This policy found later expression in the 1987 Constitution which now provides
—

"Sec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizen is inimical to the national interest and

shall be dealt with by law." (Article IV)

Dual citizenship, in my considered opinion, must be eschewed. While having the

"best of two (2) worlds" may be the result of birth or other factors accidentally
brought about, the "dual citizen" has to make a choice at one time or another.
Having two (2) citizenships is, as I see it, similar in many ways to having two (2)
legal spouses, when as a matter of principle and sound public policy, fealty to
only one (1) spouse is both compelling and certainly desirable.

Gordon and Rosenfield in their book on Immigration Law and Procedure state:

"Dual nationality is universally recognized as an undersirable

phenomenon. It inevitably results in questionable loyalties and leads to
international conflicts. . . . Dual nationality also makes possible the use of
citizenship as a badge of convenience rather than of undivided loyalty.
And it impairs the singleness of commitment which is the hallmark of
citizenship and allegiance. A person should have a right to choose his own
nationality, and this choice should be honored by all countries. However,
he should not be entitled to claim more than one
nationality." 5 (Emphasis supplied)
Private respondent made a deliberate and decisive choice when he asked the
Philippine Government — which, like many other countries, considers dual
allegiance as against national or public interest — to register him at least twice
(and, therefore, unmistakably) as an alien in this country. That choice pro
tanto was a renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. The choice must be
respected as a conscious and knowledgeable act of a discerning, distinguished
and respected person who must be presumed to have known the full import of
his acts.

Finally, the last thing that should be said against the Court is that it is
inconsistent in its rulings. In the light of its recent decision in G.R No. 86565
(Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections, et al.), I see no valid
justification for holding Mr. Labo an alien under Philippine law while holding
private respondent herein a Filipino citizen. For, as the majority states: "In fact,
in a number of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that he was a
citizen of Australia" (p. 7, Decision). And that is exactly what private respondent
did. In a number of sworn statements, he declared that he was a citizen of the
United States.

To Mr. Labo, the Court said, "so be it, you are an Australian," yet to the private
respondent, despite such sworn statements that he is a U.S. citizen, the Court
says, "never mind those sworn statements, you are still a Filipino." Sauce for the
goose, as the saying goes, is sauce for the gander. The doctrinal basis of the
Court's decisions should be built on the merits, not on distinctions that really
make no difference.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare the private

respondent not a Filipino citizen by his own acts of express renunciation of such
citizenship.

SARMIENTO, J ., concurring:
The majority seems agreed that the private respondent has acquired American
citizenship, only that he did not necessarily lose his Filipino citizenship. The
important question, however, inheres in how he obtained American citizenship. I
find that there is a dearth of facts here.

For, if the private respondent became an American by naturalization, he has

lost Filipino citizenship (Com. Act No. 63; Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
87193, June 21, 1989; Labo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989).
If he, however, became one by the application of the principle of jus soli, it is by
force of circumstances rather than choice. But he does not lose his Filipino
citizenship, if he were otherwise born of Filipino parents.

In the absence of evidence, we can not presume that he had ceased to be a

citizen of the Philippines, simply because he is, at the same time, a citizen of the
United States. There must be a clear showing that he lost his Filipino citizenship
by any of the means enumerated by Commonwealth Act No. 63. The fact that
he had obtained an alien certificate of registration, standing alone, does not
amount to "express renunciation."

Feliciano, J., concurs.

||| (Aznar v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 83820, [May 25, 1990], 264
PHIL 307-331)