12 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. Law 183

NOTE: Un articulo interesante con respecto a la Titulacion de Propiedas en el
Peru y el Bajo Hualla como manera de alcanzar un desarrollo sostenible asi como
detener el sembrio de coca.
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Terms: (Peru Property Rights)
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Copyright (c) 1995 Arizona Board of Regents

Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law
SPRING, 1995
12 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. Law 183
LENGTH: 20136 words
ARTICLE: MYTHS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
NAME: Steven E. Hendrix*
BIO:
* Steven E. Hendrix is the Resource Tenure, Legal and Policy Advisor with the Land Tenure Center, University of
Wisconsin-Madison, and is an Honorary Fellow of the Institute for Legal Studies, University of Wisconsin Law School. He holds Law
Degrees from the University of Wisconsin and the Universidad Mayor de San Andres (La Paz, Bolivia). The opinions expressed here are
those of the author. The author wishes to thank John R. McKenna, Susana Lastarria, William C. Thiesenhusen, Jonathan Adams R. and Paul
Stoller for their comments and suggestions.
SUMMARY:
... Land titling has been promoted as the key to broad-based sustainable growth in many developing countries. ... It
has supported titling efforts through the "Instituto Libertad y Progreso" (ILP) in El Salvador, institutional support to
the Lands and Survey Department in Guyana, the Small Farmer Titling Project in Honduras, the Agrarian Settlement
and Productivity Project in Costa Rica, the Agricultural Land Markets Project in Jamaica, the Central Selva Resource
Management Project in Peru, and the Land Titling Project in Ecuador, among other projects. ... In Ecuador, for
example, data appear to show that acquisition of clear title has little impact on behavior: there was little or no
difference between titled and untitled land with regard to (1) use of agricultural inputs, (2) investment in infrastructure,
(3) credit use, (4) investment of cash savings, and (5) crop yields. ... Hernando de Soto Polar, president of the ILD,
wishes to expand the institute's rural titling program to the Upper Huallaga Valley of Peru (UHV) to stop coca
production. ...
TEXT:
[*183] Land titling has been promoted as the key to broad-based sustainable growth in many developing countries.
Proponents claim titling automatically leads to increased security of ownership, greater credit, investment and
productivity, protection from fraud, and other benefits. Titles can make people quit planting coca in the jungles of Peru
or prevent a civil war. However, empirical studies do not sustain these conclusions. The impact of land titling depends
on many local factors such as custom, geography, resources, law, and history. A closer examination of empirical
studies reveals a complex and nuanced reality with conditional or contingent impacts on economic growth. Indeed,
property formalization without regard to these factors may be detrimental to historically disadvantaged groups. To be
sure, titling is a highly important ingredient to a more general strategy for development. New technologies are
dramatically lowering survey costs, making titling more affordable. But the true impact of titling should not be
overstated, nor should other factors be ignored. Such an overemphasis would give policymakers unrealistic
expectations about the way in which titling does impact on broadly based economic growth.
I. INTRODUCTION
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12 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. Law 183, *183
Are property rights and titling the keys to resolving the issues of poverty and underdevelopment in the Third
World? Mark Schneider, Agency for International Development (AID) Assistant Administrator for Latin America has
argued unequivocally:
One only has to look at the tragedy of events in Chiapas to illustrate the gravity of failing to address land security
for the poor. There are also few issues as potentially destructive to our hopes for consolidating democracy and
achieving sustainable development than the denial of [*184] access to land and property rights for the poor. . . .
Formalizing land ownership gives a sense of purpose, a stake in society and a seat in the community council. It also is
the key to unlocking the door to rural credit, to new technology and to the infrastructure for rural development . . .
[AID] is pledged . . . to promote land security for the poor. . . . n1
With much of development literature focused on land reform, land policy, and titling, one might reasonably
conclude that a causal relationship has been established between property rights, titling, and economic development. n2
[*185] However, a closer examination of empirical literature exposes the generalizations, misconceptions, and myths
associated with property rights and land titling. While titling of property can have positive effects, the real world
reveals a complex and nuanced reality with conditional or contingent impacts on economic growth. That is to say titling
may have positive economic benefits contingent upon other conditions also being met.
Land is often held informally, that is, without title. n3 Why do people lack title? There are a number of reasons.
Some may lack title because it may cost more to register the land than the land is worth. Others may lack title because
registration requires repeated and expensive travel to a capital city. Still others are squatters and do not occupy the land
legally. And others do not understand the registration process itself. n4 The international development and academic
community has vigorously debated over what exactly happens, however, when property is registered under title.
Based in part on a belief in the positive effects of property registration programs, AID has promoted land titling and
registration. It has supported titling efforts through the "Instituto Libertad y Progreso" (ILP) in El Salvador, n5
institutional support to the Lands and Survey Department in Guyana, n6 the Small [*186] Farmer Titling Project in
Honduras, n7 the Agrarian Settlement and Productivity Project in Costa Rica, n8 the Agricultural Land Markets Project
in Jamaica, n9 the Central Selva Resource Management Project in Peru, n10 and the Land Titling Project in Ecuador,
n11 among other projects. n12 The World Bank has similar titling, registry, or land rationalization efforts in Venezuela,
n13 Ecuador, [*187] Guatemala, n14 El Salvador, n15 Nicaragua, n16 Paraguay, n17 and Bolivia. n18 The Inter-
American Development Bank has promoted titling of land in Venezuela, n19 Trinidad and Tobago, n20 and Guyana.
n21
This Article attempts to sort out what we know and what we don't know about land formalization. It summarizes
some of the most important myths or generalizations found in the literature and offers some explanations for conflicting
hypotheses.
II. THE MYTHS
A. Myth #1: When It Comes To Land, Property Rights Are Embodied In Formalized Titles As Evidence Of Ownership.
n22
Titles are one method to secure property ownership and to provide a feeling of ownership security. n23 There are
alternative methods to prove ownership, [*188] however. Landholders often have at least some degree of
documentation to support their claim to the land. Proof of ownership or property rights can include a will, a sales
contract, prescription, and even mere possession. n24 Indeed, even in the United States, land is often acquired not only
by deed transfer, but also by descent, condemnation, and adverse possession. n25 Thus, even persons without a
registered deed may have some security or proof of ownership in their real property. n26
On the other hand, the person who has "title" to property does not necessarily hold all ownership rights in that
Page 3
property. Ownership is often composed of a "bundle of rights" or, in other words, many specific rights to do certain
things with the land. n27 In most of Latin America, agrarian reform beneficiaries may have title to their land, but often
cannot sell, mortgage, lease, or otherwise transfer their "title" without some sort of government authorization. n28 In
this context, formalized title clearly does not give complete ownership rights.
[*189] In some cases, property registration may not ever be the "best" method to obtain property security:
(a) It may not be cost effective. In rural Peru, for example, some areas are titled to the municipality rather than to
individuals. n29 Within the municipalities, local custom insures property security.
As an alternative approach to titling land to the municipality, some have suggested "parallel registries" as a means
to title land individually while still having lower registration costs and less bureaucracy than the standard registration
system. Parallel registries are lists of property recorded outside the normal registry process. They often do not require
many of the legal formalities, such as surveying or valuation, which increase the expenses of standard registries. Hence,
the strongest argument for a parallel registry is its low cost. Yet these registries, by definition, are a redundancy of
effort, since they "parallel" an already existing registry. n30 Furthermore, parallel registries may lack official
recognition and may not be of use in gaining access to credit since mortgages must be recorded in the standard registry.
In addition, where the parallel registry conflicts with the standard registry, the latter is likely to prevail. Thus, the
parallel registry gives a lower level of tenure security than standard registries and often does not provide the basic
benefits of registration. n31 The arguments for a parallel registry are often [*190] really arguments for reform of the
standard registry and would more appropriately be channeled to that end.
(b) It may not be the most respected by the local inhabitants or it may be contrary to their custom. Under
indigenous systems in Africa, for example, traditional land ownership rules are often viewed as quite sufficient to
provide security of ownership in most cases. n32 In fact, formalized titling may provide too much security, allowing an
owner to maintain a claim on land even when he does not utilize it. n33
(c) It may lead to property insecurity for the current owner. Titled property can be taken away for a land reform,
unpaid debts, and unpaid taxes. Titled property can also be easily sold off in case of squandering of assets. If titled
land serves as collateral, then foreclosure and land loss is a real possibility. Threat of land loss is, of course, supposed
to mitigate nonpayment problems associated with credit contracts. But in a stochastic agricultural environment which
lacks insurance markets, the farmer faces a genuine probability of loss of titled and mortgaged parcels due to factors
entirely beyond the farmer's control. n34
(d) It may be irrelevant. In Nicaragua during the early 1990s, even titled landowners lacked security of ownership
because of political indecision. n35 Objectively, insecurity may arise not only from the absence of a legal document
defining a right, but also from the existence of multiple documents describing the same rights over a piece of land for
different people or entities at the same time. Subjectively, a rising probability of land rights loss even for " titled"
individuals brings insecurity. These conditions arise when society's rules of tenure change or when the power of one
group to defend its rights wanes and the power of a [*191] competing group increases. n36 In Nicaragua, with
decreased political power among the Sandinistas during the 1990s, property holders who benefited from agrarian reform
feel this insecurity and fear losing land titled to them. As of June 1994, the Nicaraguan Government was reviewing
7,185 rural properties and 5,207 urban properties for possible return to former owners. n37
While formal titling may be the best vehicle to secure ownership in other cases, these examples illustrate the need for
situation-specific examination of the propriety and design of any property securitization plan. Furthermore, the
expenses of titling must be weighed in each given locality against the increased level of security titles provide over
existing documents which also evidence ownership rights and interests.
B. Myth #2: Titles Provide Indisputable Proof Of Ownership As Well As Protection From Uncertainty And Fraud. n38
Page 4
Property records are no guarantee against uncertainty or fraud. n39 One has only to look at the United States for an
example of the shortcomings of a property recording system. There are some defects of title under the U.S. system that
even a perfect abstract or certificate of title will not disclose because hidden defects or risks simply cannot be
discovered by examining public records. n40 Because the U.S. system is so extremely complex, n41 buyers of land -- or
their lenders -- demand insurance against the possibility that they receive something other than that which they assume
they are buying. n42 Thus, the inefficient [*192] system works only because individuals purchase safeguards against
system failure. n43
In deed registry "notice" jurisdictions, such as most of the United States, Peru, Bolivia, Guatemala, Venezuela and
other countries, the government does not guarantee ownership of land simply because a document to it is registered. n44
Rather, the law provides that if a document is recorded, that inscription provides constructive notice of the transaction to
everyone. If the document is not recorded, it is effective only between the contracting parties despite lack of
registration. n45 Against a bona fide purchaser, it is worthless. Further, the government does not guarantee the
truthfulness of the contents of the recorded document. Consequently, deed recording systems fall short of providing
indisputable proof of ownership, much less protection from uncertainty n46 and fraud.
Any registry system is only as good as the maps it is based on. Many registry titling systems, including most of the
standard, formal systems in Latin America, record the boundaries of land using north, south, east, and west coordinates.
n47 If property boundaries are not exactly rectangular, or if they do not exactly face north-south and east-west, this
system of description of land produces gaps and overlaps. This means land can be legally and formally titled twice or
not at all, depending on the location of the property. n48 Thus, even the formal registry systems create uncertainty of
tenure in many cases simply by the way they are designed, even in the absence of fraud or negligence. This makes field
verification and mapping essential ingredients in any land titling program designed to reduce tenure insecurity.
[*193] Adverse possession can also extinguish property ownership, even without transfer of documentary title.
Through this mechanism, the paper title may remain with the original owner, but a new owner has legally become
vested with the property rights in question.
In sum, given the design and structure of many deed notice systems, the methodology followed for property
boundary description, and the functioning of adverse possession in the legal system, titles often cannot give indisputable
proof of ownership. Furthermore, it is doubtful any system can be designed to prevent all types of fraud.
C. Myth #3: When People Have Formalized Titles, They Feel That Their Property Is Under Their Own Legal Control.
Therefore, They Have The Incentive To Invest Their Intelligence And Work On Its Improvement. n49
Some have alleged that families with titled property have higher incomes or invest more than those with untitled
property. n50 But to conclude from this correlation that titling brings about the increase in income or investment is
misleading. In many cases, persons with valuable and productive land are more likely and able to undertake the process
of registering and titling their land. On the other hand, families on marginal land or engaged in subsistence agriculture
are not likely to register their land. Stated in more succinct terms, productive land is generally titled because it is
valuable, not valuable merely because it is titled. n51
Evaluations of titling programs do not support the conclusion that titling necessarily provides incentives to increase
production. In Ecuador, for example, data appear to show that acquisition of clear title has little impact on behavior:
there was little or no difference between titled and untitled land with regard to (1) [*194] use of agricultural inputs, (2)
investment in infrastructure, (3) credit use, (4) investment of cash savings, and (5) crop yields. The data are more
surprising because the titled land received more visits from an agricultural engineer than the untitled lands did. n52
In Africa, data are insufficient to confirm that titling leads to higher productivity. n53 One study in Kenya actually
found, surprisingly, that input levels are highest on farms without title. The study claimed that the total value of inputs
on titled farms averages less than half of that on farms operated without title or under other arrangements. However,
Page 5
differences in input levels arise primarily from differences in labor application, which constitutes over half of the value
of total inputs per farm acre. Untitled farms report nearly three times the family labor hours applied on titled farms for
example, and nearly half again as much as that applied when there were other tenure arrangements. n54
Interestingly, researchers found in Costa Rica that exactly where tenure rights are ambiguous, farmers plant trees.
They do so as a means to prolong their possession of a parcel. As a result, landowners often react against this
possibility by refusing to allow tenants to plant trees, regarding this as an attempt on the part of the tenant to tie down
the land indefinitely. n55 Similar results were uncovered in Haiti. n56 This does not appear to be the case, however, in
Zambia, Burundi, Uganda, or Malawi. n57
In other cases, the absence of secure title to land may result in diminished incentive to invest in property.
Similarly, in some cases persons without title may invest less "sweat equity" -- time and effort -- into their land. n58
Reports often conclude that the lack of secure title to land, especially for small-holders, is a major constraint on the
development of agriculture in Latin America. n59 In Costa Rica, for example, a study showed that there can be a
significant positive relationship between greater tenure security and the level of income per farm. In [*195] other
words, as farms are titled, productivity may increase under some circumstances. n60
Land-titling may also provide incentives to individual landowners to engage in environmentally and agriculturally
sound practices. n61 People who have security in their land tenure may depend less on forest reserves and may be more
willing to plant trees and other long-term crops on their private land. n62 Conversely, if landowners lose secure private
title, they often lose their incentive to plant trees. n63 A study of short-term contract renters in the southern Honduran
highlands reviewed farmers who had insecure tenure on very small plots. The study showed that these farmers
exhibited the poorest of conservation practices. They tended to grow mostly annual crops, to farm the worst and
steepest property, to burn crop residues, and to clear the land of all trees. In contrast, small-holders who owned their
properties used more intensive agricultural techniques. They preserved trees, constructed rock-wall barriers to prevent
erosion, and followed other soil conservation measures. n64
Similarly, a study in Amazonia found that "the lack of secure title and the precarious de facto hold over land
mean[t] that reinvestment in erosion control, fertilizer, and irrigation are . . . both costly and irrational." n65 According
to another study, property titling may lead to enhanced rational irrigation schemes. n66 [*196] Watershed management
may also be improved, as one conference concluded in Haiti. n67
Curiously, a study in Burundi found that tree-planting on long-term, securely-held property was not statistically
different than on temporarily-held parcels. This refutes the hypothesis that purchased parcels are more likely to have
been planted than borrowed lands. In that study researchers found that occupants who plant have almost always
borrowed the land from parents for many years. n68 Also, other cases of tree-planting involved planting by owners of
the land, while the land was under occupancy by a relative. n69 It appears the family relationship patterns may create
strong incentives, stronger perhaps that the presence or lack of formal legal documents.
In conclusion, people with titles do not necessarily invest more in their land. Data from a variety of countries give
us a mixed bag of inconclusive results. A more nuanced understanding of tenure security must take into account a
variety of influences and factors at the local level.
D. Myth #4: Formalized Titles Open The Door To Credit. n70
Mortgages on land require that property offered as collateral be registered. Thus, persons without title have no
formal opportunity to borrow against the equity in their land. n71 Policymakers then assume that formalized titles are
the key to open the door to credit. This is not entirely accurate for three reasons.
First, it is important to recognize that land is not the only source of credit. Other forms of collateral such as farm
equipment, expected produce, accounts receivable, buildings, and movable property can substitute for formal title to
Page 6
property. Land, however, is often the preferred form of collateral. And if credit is made available without collateral, it
is likely to be for a shorter term or at a higher interest rate to reflect the greater degree of risk involved. Still, depending
on local circumstances, the easiest door to credit may be through one of these alternatives, rather than mortgage-based
lending.
Studies in Costa Rica, Thailand, and St. Lucia confirm that titles have a positive impact in expanding the
availability of cheaper and longer-term credit. n72 [*197] However, only when lack of title is the single biggest
remaining constraint to credit will provision of land titles lead to a greater use of credit; in cases where the market is
also constrained by other factors such as risk, liquidity, or other influences, formal titling may not have much impact.
In Honduras, for example, titling was not a factor in determining behavioral changes in investments in new coffee
plantation and infrastructure, orientation of family labor toward farm production, yields, use of production technology,
or total production. n73 In Peru, under the Instituto Libertad y Democracia (Institute for Liberty and Democracy, ILD)
"Popular Mortgage" program that allowed new titleholders to mortgage their houses to get capital, the ILD processed
only twenty mortgages before closing. n74 Thus, global generalizations about the impact of titling on credit can be quite
misleading.
Second, asset-based lending may still be possible even without formal titles. In Nigeria, certificates of occupation
can function as collateral against various types of loans, including bank mortgages and commercial agricultural credit.
n75 Thus, under some conditions, it is possible to create asset-based lending even in environments that lack modern
titling and registry system. The Nigerian example illustrates yet another way to open the door to credit without
necessarily using a titling project.
Third, those with title to land do not necessarily receive increased access to credit as a result of their formalized
tenure status. "The empirical evidence from Africa suggests that land registration has had very little effect on
investment demand. Title appears to have increased lenders' security, but financial markets appear to be reallocating
credit among titled borrowers, without substantially increasing aggregate credit supply." n76 Those "making policy for
African agriculture should not be misled by the theoretically derived promise that registration will unleash a torrent of
investment in agriculture." n77 In Cochabamba, Bolivia, empirical data reveal tenure security is not correlated strongly
with credit use either. n78 Thus, even titling programs may not open the door to credit.
[*198] How do we reconcile these divergent data and results? It appears that in economies where factor markets
-- land, labor, and capital -- are functioning relatively well, land titling may lead to increases in credit and investment.
n79 Such is the case typically in commercially developed areas of Latin America. In economies where factor markets
are less efficient, loosing a land market constraint may not automatically lead to increases in credit or investment
because other factors prevent improvement. This second scenario appears to be the case in much of Africa. n80
In sum, there is no necessary, automatic increase in credit that results from titling. n81 Whether titling will lead to
increased credit depends on local market conditions.
E. Myth #5: "Formal title gives the poor of the Amazon Basin legal alternatives to selling coca leaves to drug
traffickers." n82
Experts debate endlessly how to eradicate the drug problem, and U.S. and Latin American governments have taken
steps against cultivation, refining, trafficking, selling, buying, consuming, and money laundering. In the fight against
cultivation, policymakers advance several solutions, including legalization, repression, government-sponsored coca
purchases, and titling. n83 Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori has stated:
What keeps the farmer from switching to other legitimate crops? The lack of clear title to the land discourages the
investment of effort and time in the production of crops of greater value. The lack of title means you can't use the land
to get the credit you may need to switch to the new crop. . . .
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...
. . . Farmers who lack title to their land naturally avoid sowing crops which require more investment and more time
to reap the rewards. [*199] So those farmers are making a rational -- if horrible -- decision when they grow coca. n84
The Ministry of Agriculture has found that the market for land in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley is very active.
Sometimes, land just registered has been found to be once again abandoned. n85 Thus, land is constantly changing
hands. Continuous effort keeping land registries accurate in this dynamic climate is required. This has been done. n86
To adapt the system to their needs, local campesinos have used the "certificate of ownership" as a quasi-title. The
certificate can be transferred or sold in an inexpensive legal process that takes less than a week and can be completed in
the local community, with use of the existing, formal process. n87 Thus, it appears that the procedural delays associated
with land titling are not nearly as important to the landholder, as opposed to urban property holders that may prefer title
formally registered in the public registry. n88 Complying with all formalities may actually slow down a market which
has adapted well.
The Instituto Libertad y Democracia advocates titling as a powerful weapon to restrict coca production n89 and
espouses property rights as the key to economic enfranchisement of the poor. n90 To achieve secure property rights, the
ILD has created a hipoteca popular (a popular mortgage instrument) which includes (1) property and possession
registration, (2) right of possession and use, and (3) [*200] credit insurance. n91 Former U.S. Ambassador James H.
Michel, then head of the Latin America Bureau of the Agency for International Development, said, "The ILD's greatest
contribution has been and continues to be thinking about and finding practical ways to give effect to the role of the
individual, to the entrepreneurial energy within the informal sector of the economy and to citizen participation in
rulemaking and economic development." n92 In general, the ILD's ideas have been very well received. n93
Hernando de Soto Polar, president of the ILD, wishes to expand the institute's rural titling program to the Upper
Huallaga Valley of Peru (UHV) to stop coca production. n94 He advocates three principles: (1) we should differentiate
between common growers of coca and the narcotraffickers, n95 (2) the Peruvian people will support efforts to stop the
funding of terrorism with drug money and the corruption of the Peruvian state, n96 and (3) the coca-growing regions
need institutional reforms including secure property rights. n97 More specifically, the ILD and President Fujimori have
recommended the following for the UHV:
1. Create secure property rights by giving farmers title to their land through the ILD-developed Rural Property
Registry which can be easily extended to the coca growing areas. Fact: Only ten percent of rural Peru is currently titled.
2. Deregulate the markets for other crops so that Peruvian farmers can produce and sell alternative crops,
competitively. Fact: It takes [*201] forty-five days to go through the thirty-six administrative steps at seven agencies
to export an alternative crop.
3. Establish democratic institutions to foster citizen participation in and feedback to the rulemaking process, thus
allowing the law to reflect, rather than restrict, the will of the people. n98
The UHV has been plagued by both rampant coca production and infiltration by the most notorious terrorist group
in Peru, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). Titling land, the ILD notes, will decrease the popularity of Sendero
Luminoso. The ILD points out that in prior Peruvian titling projects the new landholders became conservative in their
political views after becoming property owners; insurgents lost local support. "Sendero is fragile," the ILD asserts. n99
The ILD cites its own titling project in urban Lima where ILD credits its own titling initiative as responsible for the
drop in support for the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, MRTA).
Yet, the prospects for immediate implementation of an ILD plan in the UHV are bleak since the ILD will not begin any
program in the UHV until the region is clear of Sendero Luminoso. n100
Even if the ILD went into the UHV with its titling efforts, however, it is doubtful they would have any effect on
Page 8
Sendero Luminoso. Unlike Lima, the poor population of the UHV is already a conservative, property-holding people.
Landowners have between ten and thirty hectares apiece, making them an affluent and conservative group by national
standards. As a result, they do not particularly support Sendero Luminoso in the first place; unlike Lima where some
segments of the poor supported MRTA, Sendero is in the UHV not out of popular support, but to tax coca production to
finance its operations in other areas of Peru where it does have a large base of support. n101 In the ILD urban titling
case, "titles" were given to previously landless persons who supported the urban guerrilla group MRTA, most popular
among the poor. In the UHV, the target group members already have land with formal titles or certificates. In short,
titling in the UHV will probably have no effect on Sendero Luminoso.
The ILD notes that as campesinos get titles, they will have access to credit. And credit will enable them to finance
crop substitutions. n102 This view ignores four important facts about the UHV: (1) The Agrarian Reform Bank does not
[*202] require titles for access to credit, only certificates of possession, which nearly all campesinos already have. (2)
The Agrarian Reform Bank is nearly bankrupt and is in the process of elimination. It has no money to lend even to
those with title. With the instability in the region, it is doubtful that any private capital will flow in either. (3) Coca
production by local residents in the UHV provides much easier financing than traditional credit. (4) Lack of investment
by local residents is not the result of a lack of credit -- it is driven by chronic instability and the absence of economically
viable alternatives to coca.
The ILD maintains that titling functionally does not exist in the UHV. It contends that aerial mapping will be
necessary as well as cadastres. The ILD suggests creating a "streamlined" registry system which will involve far fewer
bureaucratic steps and allow people to get title to land they currently possess. n103 For example, fully detailed maps are
not needed, according to the ILD. Rather, the registration process could be "informalized" so that only "essential" data
and steps are required. n104
Contrary to ILD's supposition, titling, aerial photography, and mapping do exist in the UHV and are relatively
up-to-date and working well. It may be true that as little as ten percent of the rural land in Peru is titled. But in the
UHV, nearly all agricultural land is already titled. An additional, less exact system would create legal uncertainty as to
which system was the correct one. It also would provide less information to the users.
The ILD suggests that restrictions on land rights be eliminated, allowing the owner to sell and partition the land.
n105 The reality of the UHV is that landowners already have at their disposal a legal system which allows for the
transfer of land. With respect to the ability to partition land, the ten hectare limitation was imposed to prevent
minifundios -- excessively small farms. Parcels of land smaller than ten hectares are viable only for coca production.
Thus, partition of lands beyond a certain point may encourage coca cultivation.
Even assuming that eliminating restrictions on land under the ILD hypothesis would stimulate the land market, is
such an end desirable? The more active the land market, the more likely that resources will be allocated to their most
economically efficient use. n106 In the UHV, this means coca production. The ILD approach, therefore, may actually
promote use of land for growing coca.
The ILD would not give title to campesinos holding land in fragile areas. Instead, it would give them title to
alternative lands which are appropriate for the farming of legal crops. n107 This assumes that there is unclaimed, "free"
land available for distribution. Unfortunately, this is not so. Data affirm that there is [*203] almost no available land
in the UHV. n108 New land could presumably be created by parceling existing plots. But this would lead to
diseconomies of scale and ever-decreasing lot sizes -- the minifundio problem.
The ILD proposal would relocate coca producers or compensate them for leaving coca production. Relocation of
coca growers to valley agricultural lands also assumes that the coca growers do not already have land in the valley.
Again, this is not the case. Some coca growers may actually have abandoned land in the fertile valleys. They climb the
hillsides in search of land better suited to coca. If denied access to the hillside land, such growers could return to their
original land and would not need additional compensation.
Page 9
Relocation schemes have other undesirable effects. For example, some farmers in the UHV originally refused to
produce coca. Because of insecurity in the region, lack of educational opportunities for their children, or possibly
deficiencies in the infrastructure, the farmers moved their families to nearby towns. Consequently, they could not
protect their lands. Instead, they left them fallow or simply planted a crop and returned periodically for maintenance
and eventual harvest. n109 In the absence of some of these non-coca-producing farmers, Sendero has sent in an afiliado
-- associate -- to occupy the land, steal the crops, and plant coca. Should we now "normalize" the tenancy, giving the
land to the current occupant? This seems to violate everyone's sense of justice and would be acceptable only to Sendero
Luminoso.
The ILD's mention of debureaucratization is well taken in Peru, where over-regulation has inhibited many
businesses. Yet, by noting the legal steps required to export, the ILD creates the illusion that the UHV would be
capable of exporting were it not for the bureaucratic titling and regulatory processes. Yet, even if all campesinos had
the alternative ILD title today and all export restrictions were lifted, the producers would not be able to export. They
lack infrastructure, security, credit, and technology. In addition, exporting makes little business sense when the
domestic market needs servicing. Thus, the ILD-Fujimori observation on market and export over-regulation would
appear to have little relevance to the realities of the region.
Robert Litan, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, has been critical of the ILD proposal's ability to deter coca
production:
[L]et us suppose that we provide property rights and the program takes off. What do economics tell you about what
will happen? All things being equal, as some people leave coca, the supply of coca will diminish and the price of coca
will rise. What are conditions of entry into coca growing? I suspect there is relatively free entry, requiring a peasant
only to cut down forests and plant the crop. Assuming there is a relatively limitless supply of land on which to grow
coca, what would [*204] happen in a simplified world is that as some leave coca, others will enter. At the end of the
day, the new equilibrium would probably involve a lot more legitimate crops being grown if we solve all the
impediments de Soto has talked about, but the same amount of coca. We will have improved agriculture in Peru, which
is a net plus, but the drug problem will not be solved. There are some variables, of course. If the marginal costs of
going into coca go up, this will restrain entry. I suspect, though, that the only way to get people out of coca in Peru are
the old remedies we all know about, i.e., making it more risky to be in that business through increased law enforcement.
In summary, while it seems to me that the Fujimori initiative is good, I am skeptical it will solve the drug problem
without the other measures I have mentioned. n110
Coca growers are motivated by the high profits associated with coca production. n111 De Soto Polar states: "Only a
very small area of the land which could be used for coca is actually cultivated. The idea is to convert the whole area to
private property, but property that is controlled and where offenders can be punished." n112 Yet, coca growers will not
abandon lucrative coca production simply because government "policy" has now made production of other crops a bit
more attractive. Instead, titling of coca-producing lands may lend coca production a stamp of legitimacy and official
recognition.
The ILD has also focused on work in the urban areas by cooperating with so-called "base" or community groups.
This emphasis has a strong populist or "democratic" appeal. One problem in the UHV, however, is identifying the base
group: Who or what is it? Sometimes the base leaders only represent the views of some inhabitants, not all. Some base
leaders have been accused of corruption, and in the UHV, some may be senderistas. n113
The ILD has met unquestionable success in the projects it has undertaken in urban Lima. The key to its positive
reception in urban areas seems to be its efforts to include the people in decision making and in reducing the often
burdensome bureaucracy. The UHV, however, demands a more detailed, critical look. Still, with the ILD's urban
experience, the institute could make important contributions in the areas of democratization and debureaucratization in
the UHV. This, in turn, would stimulate the natural economic abilities of the valley. In this way, the ILD's strengths
could be tapped while capitalizing on existing structures.
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In short, the ILD's proposed antinarcotics titling plan will not accomplish its goal for the following reasons: Coca
producers are motivated not by the legal [*205] formality of titles but by economic interest; the ILD plan does not
properly consider titling and registration efforts already in place -- nearly all of the Upper Huallaga Valley, notorious
for high-yielding cultivation, is already titled under the formal system; the dynamic of land markets and coca production
in the region; and the role of Sendero Luminoso. Lastly, coca can be and is grown on extremely fragile forest lands. To
protect these lands, the government should not grant titles to them, because this would not protect the land but would
simply result in coca farmers with land titles. n114
Governments have adopted many strategies to cut coca production, but no one single scheme has proven adequate.
The current strategy is probably the best -- making coca an economically unattractive good to produce relative to other
agricultural commodities. This end can be accomplished through a multifaceted approach combining efforts to cut
production with attempts to decrease demand. To be successful, Peru will need to improve the property registry base
created by the Peruvian Department of Agriculture as one element of a broader package that includes roads, bridges,
electricity, phones, basic education, university extension, credit, and access to appropriate agricultural technologies.
Repression via police or military patrol can play a role by increasing the costs associated with coca production. Yet, it
is not likely to succeed without corresponding efforts -- including research and extension programs -- to make
alternative crop-producing activities economically viable. In other words, without other changes, police activity alone
is unlikely to increase the costs of production coca to the point where it is more cost-effective to produce potatoes or
other crops.
Despite all the foregoing, the analysis of the coca problem would be intellectually dishonest if it were to disregard
the driving force of coca production -- demand. The proposed solutions listed above are designed to make alternatives
to coca production less expensive and more lucrative, while increasing the costs of coca production. But, as long as
demand remains high, they are likely to prove futile, as the profit margin remains tremendous. In sum, simply giving
formal title to the poor of the Amazon Basin in the hope that they will not plant coca is illusory.
F. Myth #6: Secure Land Ownership Will Contribute To Political Stability And Democracy, And Therefore Should Be
Used As A Counter-Insurgency Tool Or An Anti-Revolutionary Force.
Law professor Roy Prosterman first popularized this theory in discussions concerning Vietnam and later in El
Salvador. De Soto Polar has more recently [*206] picked up Prosterman's hypothesis in other contexts. n115 The
"Prosterman" position is a very difficult one to prove or disprove. In a nutshell, it states that an effective "land reform"
program will reduce the appeal of revolution. n116 Unfortunately, the theory cannot really be tested as stated. In the
first place, what is an "effective land reform" program? The plain fact is that there has been no single definition of a
"land reform strategy." In El Salvador, some critics would argue that the land reform contemplated was not far-reaching
enough. n117 Thus, according to them, the Prosterman hypothesis was not really tested in El Salvador. Even if we
could settle on a definition, has an "effective land reform" strategy been carried out anywhere? Most Latin American
and Caribbean countries have carried out land reform to some degree. In El Salvador, the contemplated land reform
program was not fully implemented. Thus, once again, it could be argued that the Prosterman hypothesis was not
properly tested. In short, our experience does not prove or disprove Prosterman's view. His position remains a mere
theory.
Neither review of the literature nor independent research have revealed conclusive data confirming or denying the
idea that land reform contributes to political stability. A conclusive test would be nearly impossible to design! n118
However, a great deal of anecdotal evidence supports the conclusion that land reform or land access policies usually
have a positive impact on social stability. For example, Prosterman, Riedinger, and Temple have stated that:
[*207] [L]andless peasants have provided the rank and file support for most of the great twentieth-century
revolutions -- those, in particular, of Mexico, Russia, China and Vietnam. They have played a similar role in many
lesser blood-lettings, such as the revolutions in Cuba, Ethiopia, and Bolivia, and the failed insurgencies in Kenya,
Malaysia, and the Philippines. The problems of landlessness are heavily implicated in many other episodes of upheaval
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and civil strife, ranging from the civil war in Spain to the overthrow of the Shah in Iran. n119
In nearly all cases, land reform has been undertaken when the "have-nots" begin to threaten direct action -- at least
political -- if land reform is not forthcoming. n120 In this sense, land reform nearly always has a counter-revolutionary
flavor. n121 Theoretically, formal landowners may have significant incentives to participate in democratic society.
Insecure landholders have less to lose from engaging in counter-societal behavior. n122 Samuel Huntington argues that
"a suffering peasantry is profoundly revolutionary; when peasants own land of their own, in contrast, they are a
generally conservative force in politics." n123 The relationship between conflict and land reform is well described in
recent works concerning Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. n124 The general consensus of these studies seems to
be that land reform has not gone nearly far enough to prevent conflict. For example, in El Salvador one percent of the
landowners still control forty-one percent of the farmland, while sixty percent of farm workers are landless or nearly so.
n125 These studies argue in conclusion that had land reform taken place earlier, the conflicts would not have taken place.
More specifically, with regard to Prosterman's view and its implementation in El Salvador, Martin Diskin,
Professor of Anthropology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, writes:
Prosterman's arguments seldom entered into the empirical detail crucial to making a reform succeed. Nowhere in
his writing is there any appreciation of the complexities of the Salvadoran land tenure system, a [*208] knowledge of
how credit is provided to the sector, or the availability and adaptability of help from the extension-service. But the
point -- that giving land to smallholders will deprive the opposition . . . of possible recruits -- fits [the goal of] rolling
back communism. . . . n126
Diskin's argument seems to be that land reform, properly implemented, would de-radicalize the peasantry, just as
Prosterman claimed. However, land reform in El Salvador was not properly implemented because it did not take into
account other factors which impact on the land tenure system, Diskin appears to say.
Rupert Scofield, a consultant with Rural Development Services, Inc., argues strongly that land reform is still
needed to avert further land-based conflicts in Central America, especially in Guatemala and Honduras. n127 With
regard to Prosterman and El Salvador, Scofield writes:
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the El Salvador land-reform program is the speed with which it was
conceived and executed. Indeed, the bulk of the post facto criticism leveled at the decree starts with the notion that the
Salvadoran and foreign advisors authoring the decree operated in isolation, and with incomplete or false information
regarding the proposed beneficiaries and expropriatees of the process. n128
In short, tenure concerns probably play a factor in political stability. n129 To say revolutionaries gain their support
by espousing formalization of property rights is not supported by evidence and probably goes too far. But agrarian
reform and titling may form one element in a broader package of measures to promote participatory development and
reduce the incentives for insurgency.
III. THE REALITY BEHIND THE MYTHS
Having attempted to clarify some of the claims of impact for titling property, the following interpretations of
empirical data and recommendations place the formalization of property rights within the broader context of
democratization and economic development. They also take into account factors [*209] such as overlapping or
secondary rights to land that may be ignored by many titling programs.
A. Recommendation #1: Titling Should Be One Element Of A Broader Development Strategy.
While titling of property may give security, other factors may make investment less attractive. Inappropriate
banking policies, n130 lack of credit and technical assistance, n131 imperfect market factors, and pricing of inputs and
products all play a role. n132 For example, a titling project in Honduras found a dramatic increase in credit available for
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agriculture to newly titled property, as opposed to property in a control group (left untitled), although some of the
increase may be attributable to other factors in addition to titling. n133 Interestingly, however, farmer behavior in such
areas as investments in new coffee plantation and infrastructure, orientation of family labor toward farm production,
yields, use of production technology and overall production, did not change between titled and untitled groups engaged
in agricultural production. n134 Consequently, we cannot assume that titling alone will automatically lead to increased
credit access or investment. "These results underline the need for a wide variety of programs for improving the
productivity of agriculture, one of which may be the titling of untitled farmers." n135
Empirical evidence from Africa suggests that registration of property without economic opportunities is not
propitious. Registration costs for agricultural land produce very little change in agricultural production. Registration
seems best viewed as a policy to assist in the evolution of land tenure institutions already [*210] under way, rather
than as a policy to stimulate fundamental changes in economic behavior. n136
Titling does have a role as an element of a broader program for democratization of the political economy.
However, titling itself is not likely to be effective as a sole instrument for social reorganization. David Stanfield, a
researcher with the University of Wisconsin Land Tenure Center, notes that linking titling reform with reform in the
banking sector could provide greater participation in the political economy, especially if the reform included the
development of banks specifically capable of dealing with small-scale agriculture. n137
B. Recommendation #2: Property Records Must Be Maintained And Legal Boundaries Must Be Enforced.
Titling is typically part of a broader registration reform process, n138 one which requires technical expertise. n139
The reform process is indispensable for maintaining a modern cadastral land information system -- a database used for
property taxation, zoning, and land use purposes. Maintenance of property records and the land information system
over time is crucial for an active and transparent land market. In addition, land-titling and formalization efforts are
useless without subsequent legal enforcement of boundaries. n140 In the absence of maintenance and boundary
enforcement, the entire registration and formalization process is jeopardized. n141
[*211] C. Recommendation #3: The Method Of Titling Should Follow Standardized Principles Adapted To The
Specific Conditions Of A Country.
One of the primary goals of property registry reform is to provide a legal framework for economic markets. n142
For a legal framework to inspire investor confidence, potential investors must perceive that a solid, high quality
institutional basis is in place. This argues for appropriate compensation for land registry employees, as well as other
incentives to prevent corruption and encourage professionalism. It also means that all system users should be treated
equally and receive equal service. This service should be delivered in a transparent fashion, meaning that the rules are
clear and well-publicized, and that documents are open to public inspection. Accuracy standards should never be
compromised simply to demonstrate results, as this would undermine confidence in the results generated. As a rule, it is
never cheaper than now to make such infrastructural investments in quality. In short, reform projects should do it right
the first time.
The methodology of land formalization should reflect national conditions. In Honduras, for instance, a report
showed that much of the property there went unregistered, despite titling efforts. n143 This was due to: (1) the legal
restrictions on titling parcels smaller than five hectares and (2) lingering suspicions of the government's intentions by
the peasantry. Interestingly, data from Honduras also show a continued use of "customary" rather than legal procedures
for land transactions even after land had been titled through a titling project. n144
The method of titling should also be tailored to fit distinctive regions within a country. For example, peri-urban
areas may have a higher property value, and so justify prioritization in titling. In contrast, rural areas may have lower
property values. Therefore, as far as immediate economic impact is concerned, it may be logical to prioritize the
recording of high value urban properties over less expensive ones. However, equal standards may need to be applied in
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order to not undercut the institutional credibility of the cadastral system.
In summary, a new institutional mindset is required. A logical first step is to get a physical description with
georeferencing in place at the national level. Second, the georeferenced cadastral system and the property registry
system should be linked, if not merged. Third, unnecessary bureaucratic steps to property registration must be
eliminated.
[*212] D. Recommendation #4: Development Programs Should Be Attentive To Both Private And Public Needs.
The role security of ownership plays in economic development is important, but should not be overstated. The
necessity of balancing social needs against private security of ownership may ultimately limit the optimal level of
security. n145 In El Salvador, for instance, article 106 of the Constitution guarantees the government the right to take
private property for public benefit, provided there is compensation. In the United States, the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution performs this same function, as does article 8(13) of the Constitution in the Dominican Republic, and
articles 39 and 40 of the Guatemalan Constitution. In a like manner, all development programs should be attentive to
both needs.
Grenville Barnes, a researcher with the University of Wisconsin Land Tenure Center, lists some of the potential
benefits of land titling to public and private sectors. Barnes notes that Thailand, Costa Rica, and St. Lucia show
increased investment in land and availability of cheap, long-term credit. Costa Rica reveals increased investment in
agricultural inputs as a result of titling. Brazil and Ecuador confirm increased productivity, and in Ecuador, higher farm
income. In a number of places marketability of land improved as a result of titling. Potential public sector benefits
include: improved land administration, public planning and development capabilities, improved land valuation
capability, facilitating land acquisition for public projects, providing a better basis for land use control, and other
benefits. n146
After an analysis of the benefits of titling, Barnes provides an extensive look at the costs of land titling projects in
Latin America and the Caribbean. Costs are generally the best-documented aspects of a titling project, but they are
almost always portrayed in general budgetary terms. n147 Barnes compares and contrasts costs in Honduras, Ecuador,
and St. Lucia. He recommends, in great detail, how several analytical constructs may be used to evaluate the costs and
benefits of titling projects. Efficiency, for example, would measure the number of parcels per team month or hectares
per team month. Cost per title or per area titled and the maintainability of those documents would also be considered.
Quality factors measure the accuracy, precision, and completeness of land tenure information, while complexity of
institutional, environmental, and tenurial circumstances is also considered. The utility of system data is calculated
based on the potential number of uses for data. Barnes also lists a number of factors which can frustrate the realization
of the benefits from land titling. n148
[*213] In short, Barnes does not say that the benefits of titling projects always exceed the costs. Instead, he states
that:
The quick "band-aid" solutions envisaged by many titling projects are in most cases inadequate for the
accomplishment of the long-term goals associated with tenure security. It is recommended that a long-term program
mentality be adopted in place of the short-term project counterpart which is characteristic of current [land titling]
implementation efforts. n149
In Japan, a land titling and nationwide cadastre project, which is viewed as quite successful, cost one year's
property tax revenue to generate. n150 Japan realized that long-term, public-private approaches are most effective. In
sum, governments must realize that the true costs and benefits of registry programs are not clear in two years or even
ten, but rather in twenty or thirty years, and build in the costs of institutional investments and maintenance.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the cost-benefit equation is dynamic. While only a few years ago, survey
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costs in a given region may have exceeded property values, circumstances may have changed such that today a survey
may be feasible. New technologies such as global positioning systems (GPS), geographic information systems (GIS),
and remote sensing are making cost-benefit calculations from a few years ago obsolete. While benefits in terms of
information applications are booming, costs may be steady or falling. This may mean that the world is entering an era
in which cadastral institutions may insist on high quality geographic data. The impacts of titling may need to be
revisited, as technology continues its advance. n151 These changes either have made or will make highly accurate,
compatible data for surveys of even small plots more affordable, provided the appropriate technology is selected and
institutions are streamlined and professionalized.
[*214] E. Recommendation #5: The Process Of Land Titling Should Be Sequenced And Take Into Account The
Under-Represented And Historically Disadvantaged.
The titling formalization process can have negative impacts. Indigenous populations, women, n152 secondary right
holders, and absentee land holders n153 may be excluded from the system. A World Bank project working with
lowland, forest-dwelling indigenous people in Brazil found that "land regularization in and of itself will not be sufficient
to protect indigenous peoples' land security. [Thus, e]ven in those projects where large amounts of land [we]re set
aside, indigenous people remain[ed] vulnerable to the destruction of their resource base and cultural integrity." n154
Persons without title will receive a lesser value for their land or will have difficulty selling it, and investors will not
purchase land in which they have no security, or will pay little for it. n155 The recent titling project in Honduras
demonstrated that the value of titled land increased more than the value of untitled land. n156
Titling converts land into a commodity which can be bought and sold. Some critics have argued that giving titles to
the poor places them at greater risk of losing their land. Titling, they believe, is a method which enables the elite to
obtain access to land. In cases where small farmers have lesser access to factor [*215] and product market channels
than do large farmers, market economics may help push the poor off their land.
Yet whether the poor retain their land or are pushed off is a function of two important questions: (a) Is there any
correlation between farm size and farm productivity, that is, are small farms more productive or vice versa? and (b)
Does the market allocate resources toward or away from small-holders?
1. Is There Any Correlation Between Farm Size And Farm Productivity, That Is, Are Small Farms More
Productive?
Clarification of the Question: Conflicting data exist with respect to this important question because the question
itself is an ambiguous one. There are really two questions involved: (1) What is the production relationship of amount
produced to inputs actually used in the production process? and (2) What is the degree of utilization of the available
land resources and the related use of labor on small versus large estates? n157
Empirical Data: With regard to the first issue, data have shown that the returns to scale are approximately constant
in developing country agriculture and, therefore, neutral with respect to the more general issue of farm size as related to
productivity. In fact, it is common to observe even large plantations repeating on a grand scale the operations carried
out by the single farmer on a small family establishment, so that changes in efficiency with increasing scale should not
be anticipated. n158
It is the second issue -- that of utilization -- that is perhaps the most important one:
In an agricultural structure composed of very large estates holding most of the land on the one hand, and a large
number of small farms on the other, agricultural production tends to be below its maximum potential level because land
is underused on the large farms, while excess labor without opportunity for fully productive work is crowded onto the
small farm sector (or in the landless labor force). n159
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Dwight Steen, a development officer with the Agency for International Development, asserts:
Concentration of land holdings per se may not be detrimental to the economic social and political development of a
country. However, concentration of holdings in situations where land is under-utilized and [*216] under conditions of
abundant rural labor, coupled with a lack of non-farm employment opportunities (characteristic of the Central American
countries), may indeed prove to be a major obstacle to increased economic development. n160
In Latin America, a number of studies support the conclusion that small farmers -- characterized by intensive land
use -- are more productive than their larger counterparts -- characterized by under-utilization of land. n161 This
expected inverse relationship between farm size and various measures of production per land unit was recently
reaffirmed in a study in Brazil. n162 Productivity is greater on small farms because of their intensity of resource use,
even though large farms are characterized by high-valued export crops and greater yields. n163
Studies from Jamaica yield similar results. There, the best land in the country is held in large estates, which have
been extensively farmed. Yet this land has had the lowest level of return per acre, despite the fact that its owners have
the physical and financial resources to make it produce more intensively. In contrast, small farmers situated on
hillsides, performing both land and labor intensification practices -- making small amounts of agricultural land more
productive -- have contributed a higher return per unit of land and provide greater returns in terms of foreign exchange
saved, by producing foodstuffs which would otherwise have to be imported. n164
The World Bank has studied lot size and productivity not only for owner-operated farms, but also for rented
properties. The study found that, all other things remaining constant, a tenant's optimal effort per hectare is a
decreasing [*217] function of the size of the plot he cultivates. n165 In other words, the more land the tenant farms, the
less production per hectare he realizes.
The notion that land reform can be justified using both equity and productivity considerations has been referred to
as the "Institutional School" of thought. n166 The School developed out of the perceived shortcomings of traditional
development theory, which tended to look at agrarian reform as strictly an effort to achieve equity among a society's
members. n167
The dynamic growth of Latin [American] agriculture became that of large-scale export production wherein more
capital intensive technologies promoted the concentration of landholdings of increasing size. Unsurprisingly, the
displacement of peasant farmers from the land and the substitution of capital for labor in the choice of technologies
became the dual accompaniment of growth. . . . The innovative approach provided by the [Institutional School's]
reformulation of development theory indicated that both growth and equity could and should occur together. n168
While the factors that appear to underlie the high yields per land unit on small farms should eventually come into
play whenever a large farm is split into small ones, such productivity also depends on the operators. n169 The pay-off to
dividing the land into small farms and increasing its productivity also depends on how long the country will have a
surplus of labor at low opportunity cost. The administrative capacity to support small farms must be developed in
countries that have a history of neglecting them. n170 To remedy this situation, credit and educational extension
programs could be offered to assist the small farmer.
Because of technological progress and the Green Revolution in recent decades, the inverse relationship between
productivity and farm size appears to be changing. n171 Still, data from Brazil and India indicate that, even after new
Green Revolution technologies have been introduced, output per farm area tends to decline as farm size increases. n172
Economies of scale in terms of technology, credit markets, labor supervision, and labor markets are affecting the
historically [*218] inverse relationship, and possibly eliminating the advantages of breaking up large estates. n173
In as much [sic] as this is the case, one can argue that there are no productivity gains to be made by breaking up the
larger farms through land reform. In this respect the presence of internal and external economies of scale on large farms
would be ignored only at the risk of a loss of efficiency. n174
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Of course, this is true only if the large estates are fully utilized. And, land reform can be justified for social equality
reasons as well as for enhanced efficiency.
In any event, we should not assume that small-holders will necessarily be more productive with their land.
Whether the poor operate under a favorable competitiveness regime vis-a-vis larger farms is an empirical question and
one that will vary with changes in soil quality, access to markets, type of agriculture, and availability of agricultural
extension services, among other factors. In this line of inquiry, transaction costs are a key consideration. For example,
in Latin America, it is common to find very large and very small units of land coexisting. Due to market rigidities --
lack of title, for example -- it is difficult for wealthier individuals to consolidate multiple small-holdings. Similarly, it is
difficult for small-holders to buy a small piece of land from a much larger unit due to subdivision and legal costs. n175
Depending on local market variations and imperfections, benefits of returns to scale might generate a competitive
position that favors either large-holders or small-holders. If we assume a competitiveness structure where the poor are
not in a competitive position vis-a-vis large-holders, then the market rigidities actually work to shelter the poor from
being overtaken in the market. Removal of the barriers to property alienation -- for example, a program to improve
titling and reduce registration costs -- may actually cause the market to push the poor off their land. In other words,
under these circumstances, formalizastion by titling of property can in fact accelerate the exit of small-holders.
In summary, where small-holders are less efficient, all other factors aside, we should expect market forces to
reallocate land from small-holders to large-holders when market barriers are removed. Conversely, where small-holders
are more efficient, we should expect the market to allocate land in their favor as market facilitation measures are
introduced.
[*219] 2. Does The Market Allocate Resources Toward Or Away From Small-Holders?
The land market is often the most imperfect input market in the agriculture sector. n176 In all countries, land
markets are more distorted than the markets for labor and capital, and land markets in the Latin American and
Caribbean region are even less likely than those of the United States or Western Europe to meet the hypothetical
conditions for a perfectly competitive market. n177 Thus, predicting how this market functions is problematic. And,
despite high levels of interest in the subject, very little empirical work has been undertaken.
The few land market studies in existence show mixed results. In Venezuela, one empirical study concluded that
those with superior access to credit have faired better in the land market. n178 In parts of Guatemala, another empirical
study found that land reform beneficiaries tend to hang on to their property, even when given the legal power to buy and
sell their property without restriction. There, the true threat was from inheritance, which divided estates among children
and in that way created increasingly smaller lots. n179 In the northern and central highland areas of Ecuador, another
study found that from 1964 to 1991, the land market has in general reallocated resources from large-holders to
small-holders. n180 In Paraguay, a recent empirical study found that where small-holders were more competitive, they
gained land. Conversely, where small-holders were not competitive, they lost land. The level of access to preferential
credit for large-holders seemed to determine whether small-holders were competitive or not in Paraguay. n181
In the African context, some research has concluded that market or legal barriers in a land market actually produce
inequities in land distribution. Those with access to the legal system -- the more affluent -- use the system to their
advantage. These individuals are likewise protected in their transactions, since their social status ensures that no legal
or societal counter-measures will be taken against them. Further inequality arises where governments recognize sales
only [*220] by people from a particular group -- like chiefs -- or where transactions in land involve complex
procedures with uncertain results. Influential individuals and civil servants can use their knowledge of the law to
acquire land at the expense of the poorer and less knowledgeable. n182
3. At What Point In The Development Process Should Titling Be Used To Benefit The Poor?
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Market imperfections often determine whether the small-holders are competitive or not vis-a-vis larger
estate-holders. n183 This fact argues for purposely sequencing policy interventions to promote participation by
historically disadvantaged groups. For example, where large-holders receive credit subsidies making them more
competitive, a titling program could have the effect of pushing the poor off their land. A more appropriate approach
would be to sequence reform of the credit sector first, to place the poor on a level playing field with the more affluent.
Only then should land be titled. The creation of linkages between titling and banking reforms may result in greater
participation in the political economy, particularly if the reform includes credit access programs tailored to small scale
agriculture. n184 Titling land in reverse order in this context could push the poor off their land. Consequently, whether
land titling is a good idea or not depends on an empirical analysis of the competitiveness regime of small-holders and
the proper sequencing of policy interventions. n185
F. Recommendation #6: Land Registration Programs Should Be Employed For A Positive Environmental Impact.
Land tenure policies are relevant to resource management in a number of ways. For example, without well-defined
property boundaries, it is difficult to imagine how nature reserves and parks can protect themselves from encroachment
by squatters and land invaders. In Honduras, a titling project was successful in providing, for the first time, detailed
information concerning the distribution of landholdings located in national and ejidal land. n186 One study in particular
[*221] showed that people who have been farmers, including cattle ranchers practicing extensive grazing, consider the
creation of national park boundaries as limiting their "traditional rights" to use these lands. n187 In Honduras, property
delineations have proved helpful for development project design in areas such as soil and water conservation, watershed
management programs, technological transfer oriented toward particular crops, and poverty alleviation programs
addressing fragmentation of land. n188
Titling around reserves, combined with access by farmers to affordable agricultural intensification technologies,
helps stabilize land use in surrounding areas. n189 This in turn generally produces several results. First, it reduces the
incentives for land invasion. People sometimes invade reserves because of "land hunger." n190 Titling of property may
thus allow people to purchase land in titled areas, diminishing the need for invasion of reserves. This has the effect of
decreased pressure on the reserves. Second, it reduces the pressure to invade reserves in search of wood. In these
instances, buffer zones surrounding land reserves are an important tool. n191 These buffer zones offer agro-forestry
projects or wood lots around reserves. In Madagascar, for example, these lots took away the uniqueness of the reserves
as a supplier of wood. People then had access to the wood without invading the reserves. n192
In a study in Uganda, residents of a forest reserve and a game reserve were compared. n193 These two groups had
differing expectations of their tenure rights and behaved accordingly: people on the game reserve felt secure in their
rights, and planted trees, mulched soils, and built permanent structures, while those in the forest reserve had temporary
housing and engaged in short-term agricultural [*222] practices, using the land as an extractive resource. The
difference between these groups was security of ownership. In the African context, security of ownership is a
subjective function of law, custom, and practice, including titling. In more formalized, economically developed
contexts such as Latin American, formal titling probably takes on a much greater importance relative to custom or
practice. Titling of property surrounding the reserve may promote investment in renewable resources in those areas.
This in turn may relieve some of the pressure to invade reserves. In other words, land security in outside property will
encourage the use of outside property as an alternative to the reserve. This was also found to be the case in Madagascar.
n194
Lack of access to quality land may increase general environmental degradation. n195 One report concluded that
unequal resource distribution and its relationship to the environment is a function of disparate demands on resources by
user groups; the poor have a proximate, direct effect on resource destruction, while the impact of those who own ample
land and water is indirect but just as destructive, if not more so. William C. Thiesenhusen, Director of the University of
Wisconsin Land Tenure Center, says "Indeed, it appears that if the environmental problem is ever to be alleviated, the
lock which large landlords have on most of the productive resources in some Third World areas must be substantially
modified or broken through land reform." n196
Page 18
Problems of deforestation, for example, probably need to be solved in the major farming regions of the countries
involved, far from the site of actual resource damage. n197 In Kenya, fertilizer and chemical input levels are highest on
titled farms. Thus, one study concluded that tenure security in the form of a title provided an incentive to invest in the
maintenance of soil fertility. n198 The World Bank's projects are heading in the direction of linking land regularization
efforts to the promotion of sustainable development programs that incorporate indigenous peoples' knowledge of natural
resource management and environmental conservation. n199
[*223] IV. CONCLUSION
The equity value of titling and its impact on productivity and investment are often functions of cultural and local
customary practices and the perception of what titling means in that local community. In some regions, cultural and
local customary practices will limit the benefits to be derived from titling. In the Caribbean and in much of Africa, for
example, titling has not been used historically to secure property. Therefore, titling may have little impact on the small
farmer, primarily because titling is not perceived as effecting a change in local communities.
Land titling is not a panacea. It is likely to impact each country differently, depending upon custom, geography,
resources, law, and history. n200 Each country, and perhaps even regions within countries, should be carefully evaluated
on a case-by-case basis to determine whether titling is the most cost-effective method to promote broad-based,
sustainable, and environmentally sound economic development.
And finally, as with any other proposed reform, integrity is of the essence. Today, democratization is an important
policy objective for international donor agencies as well as governments. n201 In many countries, public institutions do
not inspire the confidence of many citizens. Yet, without building public confidence in governmental institutions, the
democratization process will be undercut. This fact argues for an institutional approach to any type of reform which
emphasizes the quality and credibility of the functions of government. Such an approach will generate synergism for
professionalism in other parts of government and will flow over into the private sector. Institutional reform including
land titling should generate values that can be extended and respected.
Legal Topics:
For related research and practice materials, see the following legal topics:
Real Property LawFinancingMortgages & Other Security InstrumentsMortgagee's InterestsReal Property LawPriorities
& RecordingTitle RegistrationReal Property LawZoning & Land UseGrowth Control
FOOTNOTES:
n1 Mark Schneider, Agency for International Development [AID] Assistant Administrator for Latin America, Address at "Property for the
Poor: The Path to Development" Conference, Washington, DC (Apr. 12, 1994). The reference to Chiapas refers to a peasant uprising in
southern Mexico which began on January 1, 1994. One of the main issues in that uprising was land rights and inequitable land distribution
in the State of Chiapas.
n2 Hernando de Soto stated:
Today, only about 25 of the 185 nations of the world have made the jump to a developed market economy.
I predict that in the next 150 years the countries joining these 25 will be those that spend their energies ensuring that property rights are
widespread and protected by law, rather than those that continue to focus on macroeconomic policy.
. . . Without formal property, a modern market economy cannot exist. . . .

Page 19
Until property formalization is put at the top of the developing world's agenda, the long-run prospects for economic reform will remain
poor.
Hernando de Soto, Third World Ought to Hear Dogs Bark, Sacramento Bee, Jan. 2, 1994, at F01 [hereinafter Third World]. See also
Hernando de Soto, The Missing Ingredient, Economist, Sept. 11, 1993, at 8 [hereinafter The Missing Ingredient]. Hernando de Soto also
claimed that the invisible hand of Adam Smith was no longer invisible, because it is called property rights, and used the word "magic" to
describe the effects of property law regularization. Hernando de Soto Address at "Property for the Poor: The Path to Development"
Conference, Washington, DC (Apr. 12, 1994) [hereinafter de Soto Address].
The views of de Soto have been officially backed by Presidents Reagan and Bush. In 1987, AID Administrator Alan Woods listed
promotion of de Soto's work as one of his three most important goals. With AID's help, de Soto has traveled the world promoting his
approach. Tina Rosenberg, So-So De Soto: A Peruvian Phony, The New Republic, Oct. 7, 1991, at 21. The de Soto-AID link was carried
into the 1990s. In 1990, the Institute of Liberty and Democracy [hereinafter ILD] had a $ 10 million four-year contract with AID which
covered research and sent de Soto to conferences. Battling the Third World's Vestiges, 22 The Nat'l J. 2130 (1990). See also Comments by
AID Administrator Ronald W. Roskins in Agency for International Development, Congressional Presentation Fiscal Year 1993, 27 (1992)
(noting the work of the Institute for Liberty and Democracy as one of three "truly impressive" examples of AID-supported activities); and
Comments by James H. Michel, Assistant Administrator for Latin America, & Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs, U.S. State Department, in Toward a Peaceful Revolution: Institute for Liberty and Democracy 1, 6 (1991). George
A. Truitt et al. note that "[The AID Peru] Mission considers that this project is a model of support for the new democratic transformations in
the Third World." George A. Truitt et al., AID Evaluation Summary 5 (June 3, 1992) (internal AID report, on file with author). This support
appeared to be reaffirmed by the Clinton Administration. See Schneider, supra note 1; Timothy Wirth, Counselor, U.S. State Department, &
Brian Atwood, AID Administrator, Addresses at "Property for the Poor: The Path to Development" Conference, Washington, DC (Apr. 12,
1994). Contra, Council on Hemispheric Affairs and the Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource Center, National Endowment for
Democracy: A Foreign Policy Branch Gone Awry 53, 60 (1990).
n3 For example, one study in Jamaica noted that 40% of the country's land parcels were outside the formal registry process. See David
Stanfield, Land and Capital Markets in Jamaica 3 (1991) (Land Tenure Center Report: All "Land Tenure Center Reports" and "Land Tenure
Center Papers," along with other documents as indicated herein, are available from the Land Tenure Center Library, University of
Wisconsin-Madison, 1357 University Avenue, Madison, WI 53715; Phone (608) 262-5098; Fax: (608) 262-2141 [hereinafter referred to as
the "Land Tenure Center Library"]).
n4 See, e.g., Richard Barrows & Michael Roth, Land Tenure and Investment in African Agriculture 19 (1989) (Land Tenure Center Report).
n5 AID Cooperative Agreement with the Institute for Liberty and Democracy n Lima, Peru, Jan. 10, 1992 (on file with author).
n6 Steven E. Hendrix, Land Tenure in Guyana: A Rapid Appraisal Report with Recommendations on Policy Formulation and Registry
Modernization for the A.I.D. P.L. 480 Program 14 (1993) (Land Tenure Center Report).
n7 David Stanfield, Edgar Nesman, Mitchell Seligson & Alexander Coles, The Honduras Land Titling and Registration Experience (1990)
(Land Tenure Center Report); See also David Stanfield, Ricardo Zeledon, Santiago Moquete, Alexander Coles, Mario Fandino, Lily
Caballero & Randy Stringer, Land Titling in Honduras: A Midpoint Evaluation of the Small Farmer Titling Project in Honduras (1986)
(Land Tenure Center Report).
n8 John Strasma, Alexander Coles & Virginia Lambert, Land Market Profile: Costa Rica 27-29 (1989) (Land Tenure Center Report).
Page 20
n9 Stanfield, supra note 3; Norman Singer, Grenville Barnes, J. David Stanfield & Harry Armstrong, Land Policy in Jamaica: The
Modernization of Land Market Institutions (1991) (Land Tenure Center Report).
n10 Agency for International Development [hereinafter AID], Country Development Strategy Statement: FY 1989: Peru 41-45 (1988)
(available from the Agency for International Development, AID/CDIE, Washington, DC 20037).
n11 Development Associates Inc. [hereinafter DAI], Ecuador Land Titling Project Evaluation (1990) (Report prepared for the Agency for
International Development, available at the Agency for International Development, AID/CDIE, Washington, DC 20037).
n12 It is difficult to evaluate the success of these projects in terms of "before and after" studies. Such studies would require time series data
-- surveys made before the start of projects as well as after the completion of the projects so that data could be compared. This was not the
standard practice. For example, in St. Lucia, a one-time survey of the land was made prior to titling the entire country. Thus, there is little
data to confirm or deny that titling affects investment, credit, use of technology, and so on. However, data was available in Honduras, as
presented in Stanfield, Nesman, Seligson & Coles, supra note 7.
n13 See generally Ministerio de Agricultura y Cria, Oficina Nacional de Catastro, Proyecto do Actualizacion y Ejecucion del Catastro Rural
(1992) (available from the Land Tenure Center Library); World Bank, Venezuela Land Markets, Land Reform, and Rural Land Ownership
28-38 (1993).
n14 Gustavo Cruz L., Propuesta de lineamientos metodologicos para la automatizacion del registro de la propiedad (1994) (Report
submitted to and available from the World Bank).
n15 Conference on Registry Modernization, San Salvador, El Salvador (May 16, 1994) sponsored by the Housing Ministry of the
Government of El Salvador and the World Bank.
n16 J. David Stanfield, An Analysis of the Current Situation Regarding Land Tenure in Nicaragua 26-27 (1994) (Land Tenure Center
Report).
n17 The Paraguay Natural Resources Management Project includes support for indigenous communities including land acquisition and
regularization of titles. The executing agency is the Ministry of Agriculture.
Page 21
n18 Grenville Barnes, Technical and Institutional Issues Related to Land Tenure, Titling and the Cadastre in Bolivia (1992) (Report
submitted to the World Bank, available at the Land Tenure Center Library).
n19 Inter-American Development Bank, Agriculture Sector Investment Program: Loan Proposal 12-13 (1992) (available from the
Inter-American Development Bank).
n20 David Stanfield & Norman Singer, Land Rationalization and Development Programme (1992) (Land Tenure Center Report).
n21 Steven E. Hendrix & Leon Rockcliffe, The Deeds Registry in Guyana and its Legal and Institutional Framework: Views Toward
Promoting Transaction Efficiency 2 (1994) (Land Tenure Center Report).
n22 Hernando de Soto writes: " When it comes to land, property rights are embodied in formalized titles." The Missing Ingredient, supra
note 2, at 8. Many seem to believe that land without title is "illegal." See, e.g., Mark Schneider, supra note 1 (emphasizing helping the poor
cross "from de facto land holdings to legal property ownership"). In fact, de Soto seems to use "formalized property" and "legal property"
interchangeably. See de Soto Address, supra note 2.
n23 De Soto has stated that in countries with Roman law systems, registration is even more important than in Anglo-Saxon law
jurisdictions. He claims Justinian's interpretation of Roman Law and Property Registration was carried forward to Latin America. This
Roman Law, according to de Soto, recognized the rights of individual holders of property under a formal system. de Soto Address, supra
note 2. Interestingly, however, it should be noted that a public property registry was quite unknown in Roman law and was not part of any
interpretation by Justinian. The Romans had no distinction between ownership and possession, and had no property registry. Barry
Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law 104-5 (1992). Thus, de Soto's tracing of formal versus informal property back even to Roman
history seems misplaced. Interestingly, however, if de Soto did want to trace property registration into biblical history, Genesis' story of
Abraham's purchase of his Hebron burial case is historically accurate in its description of legal formality of the era, which required a writing.
Archaeologists have found that the ancient Syrians used to store their legal documents near city gates as a way to give publicity to
transactions. See, e.g., John Romer, Testament: The Bible and History 25 (1988).
n24 Gershon Feder and Raymond Noronha note:
The term "security" is often misunderstood in the literature. When it refers to the ability to use land for a certain period and for a
defined purpose without disturbance, security of possession is usually ensured under indigenous systems. It is clear that in most
Sub-Saharan African societies, land under cultivation by an allottee cannot be taken away.
Gershon Feder & Raymond Noronha, Land Rights Systems and Agricultural Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2 The World Bank Res.
Observer 143, 158-59 (1987).
Still, "ownership" and "property rights" in this context would not necessarily include the right to sell property.
Page 22
n25 Raymond J. Werner & Robert Kratovil, Real Estate Law 58 (10th ed. 1993).
n26 Customary practice often provides the landholder with the feeling of security, despite the lack of a title. See Alexander Coles, Land
Transactions and the Land Titling Project in Honduras 12-13 (1989) (Land Tenure Center Report).
n27 John Bruce, A Review of Tenure Terminology 2 (1993) (Land Tenure Center Report). This holds true for both common law and civil
code jurisdictions.
n28 See, e.g., Steven E. Hendrix, Innovaciones a la legislacion agraria en America Latina: Los casos de Peru, Honduras, Mexico y
Nicaragua 23-24 (1994).
n29 Group registration can greatly diminish the number of registration units and thus the survey and registration costs. Possession rights or
leases to individuals can then be managed in a simple fashion, even perhaps by oral agreement, within customary systems, or by drafting
simple rules within a group. Alternatively, sketching boundaries on an aerial photo can also be used. See Gerhard Larsson, Land
Registration and Cadastral Systems 125 (1991).
n30 The Instituto Nacional de Transformacion Agraria in Guatemala maintains a registry of properties parallel to the "Registro General de
la Propiedad." Unfortunately, neither registry is now efficient or cost-effective. Steven E. Hendrix, D. David Moyer & Ronald S. Strochlic,
La Reforma del Registro de la Propiedad en Guatemala: Informe de Situacion con Recomendaciones 22 (1992) (LAC TECH Report,
available at the Land Tenure Center Library).
n31 The ILD has created a parallel registry in Peru. See Ernst & Young, Institute for Liberty and Democracy: Assessment Report for the
First Year of the Cooperative Agreement With the U.S. Agency for International Development 15 (1990). This is an example of where the
implementation strategy itself may mitigate the anticipated benefits of property registration. First, the ILD has titled land only in
non-agricultural zones where there are fewer disputes. Yet it is precisely where property is insecure that titles have their greatest impact.
Second, the ILD has relied on existing maps and building plans for data without field verification: the ILD inputs this data into its
computerized system. Yet the level of confidence in that data is low. One expert compared this methodology with wallpapering over an
earthquake-damaged structure: it appears sound but remains structurally flawed. Interview with John R. McKenna, Cadastral Expert, The
World Bank, Washington, DC (April 11, 1994). A similar methodology was tried by the Instituto Libertad y Progreso [hereinafter ILP] in
El Salvador, which used the Peruvian designed "REGIS-P" software with related computer equipment. See, e.g., ILP Presenta un metodo
avanzado para catastro, La Prensa, Dec. 9, 1993, at 18. However, about 95% of the original computer program has been abandoned or
replaced, and the resulting system is a much more conventional registry. The ILP registry is not parallel and functions as a sub-unit of the
traditional registry. Gerhard Larsson argues that conversion of data from older registries can only be accomplished without considerable
field work when the bulk of the referred land units have already been defined on maps. Larsson, supra note 29, at 105. Not using field data
means that the poor must accept a judicial process that gives them less security and fewer rights than their more affluent neighbors, who can
buy into the standard, more exact registry system. A more equitable approach would be to reform the existing registry system to allow all
access to the protection of the law on an equitable basis.
n32 Frank Place, The Role of Land and Tree Tenure on the Adoption of Agroforestry Technologies: A Summary and Synthesis 2-4 (1994)
Page 23
(Land Tenure Center Report).
n33 T. Verhelst, Customary Land Tenure as a Constraint on Agricultural Development: A Re-Evaluation, 2 Cultures et Development 627,
638-39 (1970), cited in John W. Bruce, Land Tenure Issues in Project Design and Strategies for Agricultural Development in Sub-Saharan
Africa 30 (1985) (Land Tenure Center Report).
n34 Michael Carter, Book Review, 32 J. Dev. Econ. 216, 217 (1990) (reviewing Gershon Feder, Tongroj Onchan, Youngyuth Chalamwong
& Chira Hongladarom, Land Policies and Farm Productivity in Thailand (1988)).
n35 Steven E. Hendrix, La Crisis Politica y Derecho Inmobiliario en Nicaragua, 29 Comp. Jur. Rev. 25 (1992). See also J. David Stanfield
& Steven E. Hendrix, Ownership Insecurity in Nicaragua, 22 Cap. U. L. Rev. 1 (1994).
n36 Stanfield & Hendrix, supra note 35, at 1.
n37 Stanfield, supra note 16, at 6.
n38 Hernando de Soto states registered titles afford the "holders indisputable proof of ownership, and protection from uncertainty and
fraud." Third World, supra note 2, at F01. See also The Missing Ingredient, supra note 2, at 8; and de Soto Address, supra note 2.
n39 Suits for fraud or misrepresentation have been in the U.S. courts for years. See Werner & Kratovil, supra note 25, at 193.
n40 Id. at 236. Such defects include: forgery, insanity and minority, and marital status incorrectly given.
n41 To begin with, each state has its own constitution, laws, and court decisions governing property law. Id. at 1. Also, in the United
States, there are various types of deeds (quitclaim deeds, warranty deeds, and deeds of bargain and sale) giving varying levels of security or
ownership interest. Id. at 63. It is estimated that the United States will spend $ 90 billion dollars during the years 1986-2000 on the
collection and management of spatially related information. Peter F. Dale & John D. McLaughlin, Land Information Management 2 (1990).
n42 De Soto does not appear to understand the levels of uncertainty created by the registry system in the United States. He writes: "In the
Page 24
United States, property rights are grounded in unambiguous titles and registration." Hernando de Soto, The World: A Voice from Latin
America, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1990, at § 4, p. 2.
n43 In 1980 alone, $ 1.26 billion dollars was spent on title insurance in the United States. Larsson, supra note 29, at 53.
n44 See Werner & Kratovil, supra note 25, at 241. In England or under the Torrens system, the information contained in registries is
guaranteed. In the unlikely event of fraud or error, anyone inadvertently injured by incorrect data in the registry can be compensated. Dale
& McLaughlin, supra note 41, at 24. However, these systems require very expensive investments in surveying and mapping, and
consequently have had difficulty being implemented in less developed countries. See, e.g., Hendrix, supra note 6, at 17.
n45 Roger Bernhardt, Real Property 315 (1993). See also Werner & Kratovil, supra note 25, at 89.
n46 Complex problems arise if the grantor has some impairment like old age, mental weakness, ignorance, or illness, making the grantor
incapable of engaging in the transaction. In this case, a recorded transaction may be set aside through proper court proceedings. Werner &
Kratovil, supra note 25, at 66.
n47 J. David Stanfield, Rural Land Market Implications of Titling and Registration Programs in the Latin America and Caribbean Region 5
(1991) (Land Tenure Center Report).
n48 A similar phenomena occurs in the United States. Werner & Kratovil, supra note 25, at 258-59.
n49 The Missing Ingredient, supra note 2, at 8.
n50 Hernando de Soto states "In Peru, investment in property tends to increase nine-fold when squatters obtain formalized title to their
homes, and in Costa Rica, farmers who are formally titled have much higher incomes than those who do not." Third World, supra note 2, at
F01. In Ecuador, one study found that titled landholders had a farm income 2.7 times greater than untitled property holders. U.S. Agency
for International Development, Ecuador Land Titling Project 9 (1985) (available from the Agency for International Development,
AID/CDIE, Washington, DC 20037). See also Albert Alex Forsyth, The ILD's Property Rights Program 2 (1990) (paper prepared for the
Workshop on Regularizing the Informal Land Development Process, U.S.A.I.D., Washington, DC). Hernando de Soto claimed that
agricultural income at least doubled due to titling under ILD projects, and the value of that property doubled in a single year (and 9 times
over 10 years!) as a result of the titling. de Soto Address, supra note 2.
n51 Eric B. Shearer, Susana Lastarria-Cornhiel & Dina Mesbah, The Reform of Rural Land Markets in Latin America and the Caribbean:
Page 25
Research, Theory, and Policy Implications 43-45 (1991) (Land Tenure Center Paper Number 141).
n52 Id. citing James S. Boster, Mitchell A. Seligson, Katherine Terrell, & Jose V. Zevallos, Land Tenure Security in Ecuador: A
Preliminary Study of Cayambe and Pedro Moncayo (1989).
n53 Feder & Noronha, supra note 24, at 160.
n54 Michael R. Carter, Keith D. Wiebe & Benoit Blarel, Tenure Security for Whom? Differential Impacts of Land Policy in Kenya 11
(1991) (Land Tenure Center Report).
n55 John W. Bruce & Louise Fortmann, Agroforestry: Tenure and Incentives 6 (1989) (Land Tenure Center Paper No. 135).
n56 Peter C. Bloch, Virginia Lambert & Norman Singer, Land Tenure Issues in Rural Haiti: Review of the Evidence 67 (1988) (Land
Tenure Center Research Paper 94).
n57 Place, supra note 32, at 5-6.
n58 In Costa Rica it was concluded that the presence of tenure security, particularly a full title to land, substantially accounted for higher
farm performance. Grenville Barnes, A Comparative Evaluation Framework for Cadastre-Based Land Information Systems (CLIS) in
Developing Countries 29 (1990) (Land Tenure Center Report).
n59 Stanfield, Nesman, Seligson & Coles, supra note 7, at 34. The Sub-Saharan Africa case is examined in Feder & Noronha, supra note
24, at 157.
n60 Peter Dorner & Bonnie Saliba, Interventions in Land Markets to Benefit the Rural Poor 23 (1981) (Land Tenure Center Research Paper
No. 74). See also Feder & Noronha, supra note 24, at 160.
n61 See generally Bloch, Lambert & Singer, supra note 56; William C. Thiesenhusen, Land Tenure and the Environmental Debate (1989)
(Land Tenure Center Report); and William C. Thiesenhusen, Implications of the Rural Land Tenure System for the Environmental Debate:
Page 26
Three Scenarios, 26 J. Dev. Areas 1 (1991) [hereinafter Implications]. Nevertheless, no tenure system, not even one providing registered
freehold interests, is fail safe against destructive land use. For example, farmers may at some time need to maximize short-term production
in order to survive, despite long- term resource costs. See John Bruce, Land Tenure Issues in Project Design and Strategies for Agricultural
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa at ix (1985) (Land Tenure Center Report).
n62 Bruce & Fortmann, supra note 55. For the African case regarding forestry, fuel wood, and resource conservation projects, see Bruce,
supra note 61.
n63 This conclusion was documented in Gerald Murray, Mountain Peasants of Honduras: Guidelines for the Reordering of Smallholding
Adaptation to the Pine Forest (1981) (report available at the Land Tenure Center Library).
n64 Noted by Thiesenhusen, Implications, supra note 61, at 13 (citing Susan C. Stonich, Dynamics of Social Processes and Environmental
Destruction: A Central American Case Study, 15 Population & Dev. Rev. 284, 289 (1989)).
n65 Id. (citing Marianne Schmink & Charles H. Wood, The 'Political Ecology' of Amazonia, in Peter Little & Michael Horowitz with A.
Endre Nyerges, Lands at Risk in the Third World: Local Level Perspectives 41 (1987)).
n66 Peter C. Bloch, Land Tenure Issues in River Basin Development in Sub-Saharan Africa 26 (1986) (Land Tenure Center Report).
n67 Peter C. Bloch, Workshop on Land Tenure Issues in Watershed Management (Camp-Perrin, Haiti) (1988) (Land Tenure Center
Report).
n68 Place, supra note 32, at 2-4.
n69 Id.
n70 The Missing Ingredient, supra note 2, at 11.
n71 Hernando de Soto states: "Without property rights, you cannot get credit from the banks. . . ." Guido de Bruin, Development: Problems
Page 27
and Promises in the 'Informal' Economy, Inter Press Serv., Jan. 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. Hernando de Soto
made similar comments in his address at "Property for the Poor: The Path to Development" conference. de Soto Address, supra note 2.
n72 Barnes, supra note 58, at 29.
n73 Stanfield, Nesman, Seligson & Coles, supra note 7, at 28-33.
n74 Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 21.
n75 Feder & Noronha, supra note 24, at 159.
n76 Barrows & Roth, supra note 4, at 24.
n77 Id. Barrows and Roth describe the African market. They maintain that in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Uganda little evidence exists to
support the hypothesis that registration has increased investment in agriculture. Further, there is no evidence in these African markets that
the demand for capital increases if tenure is changed to freehold. Id. at 19. Barrows and Roth state, "Small farmers generally appear
unwilling to risk their land for credit, and banking procedures impose high costs on smaller borrowers. . . . Credit is biased toward larger,
more influential farmers." Id.
n78 James T. Riordan, Identifying the Key Variables: A Multivariate Analysis of the Cochabamba Rural Household Survey Data 10 (1994)
(LAC TECH Project Report, available at the Land Tenure Center Library).
n79 This appears to be the case in Thailand, for example. See Tongroj Onchan, Informal Rural Finance in Thailand, in Dale W. Adams &
Delbert A. Fitchett, Informal Finance in Low-Income Countries 103, 112 (1992).
n80 Barrows & Roth, supra note 4.
n81 This conclusion appears to cohere with the criticism of de Soto in a book review of The Other Path. An Informal Way to Grow,
Economist, Feb. 18, 1989, at 95 (reviewing Hernando de Soto, The Other Path).
Page 28
n82 Third World, supra note 2, at F01. See also The Missing Ingredient, supra note 2, at 11.
n83 Steven E. Hendrix, Interplay among Land Law and Policy, the Environment, the War on Drugs, Narcoterrorism, and Democratization:
Perspectives on Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley 16-24 (1993) (Land Tenure Center Paper 150).
n84 Alberto Fujimori, National Press Club Luncheon Speaker Alberto Fujimori, President of Peru, National Press Club, Washington DC
(Sept. 18, 1991) (transcript available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File).
n85 Id.
n86 Interview with Jose Corbera, former Director of the Agrarian Reform from 1978 to 1981, in Lima, Peru (June 26, 1991).
n87 Interview with Ing. Manuel Cristobal Nunez, Program Director for Cadastres and Titling, Department of Agriculture, Office of Titling,
UHV, and Ing. Carlos Mendoza Mejia, also of the Peruvian Department of Agriculture, Office of Titling, UHV in Lima, Peru (June 28,
1991). The process involves writing a minuto [minute] of the transaction with the public notary, creating a "public" document which
evidences the change in ownership. Id.
n88 An exception to this is found where a landholder wishes to sell only a portion of his land. The notary will not approve the deal unless
the resulting lots are each greater than 10 ha, the minimum legal requirement to prevent minifundios. Id.
n89 Hernando de Soto, Peru's Ex-Drug Czar on Cocaine: The Supply Side, Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1992, at A11 [hereinafter Peru's Ex-Drug
Czar]. See also Steven E. Hendrix, supra note 83. Hernando de Soto himself has never been to the Upper Huallaga Valley, but sees titling
for this area as a panacea. Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 21. De Soto notes: "Investment will only take place if the farmer is confident of
ownership to the future returns from investment." Peru: Property Rights Key to Coca Eradication in Peru, Reuter Textline, Mar. 8, 1990,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
n90 Instituto Liberated y Democracia, Update, Apr. 1990, at 6.

Page 29
n91 Id. See also Instituto Libertad y Democracia, Update, July 1990.
n92 Comments by Hernando de Soto in Instituto Libertad y Democracia, Toward a Peaceful Revolution: Report on the First Annual
Program Review Conference 1 (1991).
n93 See, e.g., David Asman, A Break in the Dark Clouds that Hover over Peru, Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1991, at A13.
n94 Peru's Ex-Drug Czar, supra note 89, at A11.
n95 de Soto, supra note 92. See also Roberto MacLean, Ambassador of Peru, Washington, DC, Peru: A Better Future, Newsweek, Mar. 2,
1992, at 19 (affirming the distinction between growers and refiners of coca).
n96 de Soto, supra note 92, at 5.
n97 Id. at 5-6. Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, U.S. Department of State, commenting on the official
State Department view of the ILD approach to counternarcotics, stated:
If you can make $ 10,000 per hectare growing coca leaf in the Upper Huallaga Valley of Peru, you are not going to grow macadamia
nuts or cut flowers. However, if you make it economical to go into an alternative crop, but bureaucratic obstacles prevent you from
competing, it is a Pyrrhic victory. I think Mr. de Soto's approach is very positive. We're working very closely with him and with the
Fujimori government. The kind of comprehensive approach he envisions is exactly what we believe in.
Id. at 8-9.
n98 Instituto Libertad y Democracia, ILD In Brief, Nov. 1990, at 1. President Fujimori has adopted these ideas.
n99 Mariano Cornejo, Interview with Albert Forsyth and Mariano Cornejo B., the Instituto Libertad y Democracia, and William Binns,
Special Projects Officer, Agency for International Development, in Lima, Peru (June 27, 1991) (referring to the ILD project in Huacan).
n100 Id.
Page 30
n101 Interview with William A. Binns, Special Projects Officer, Agency for International Development, in Lima, Peru (June 26, 1991).
n102 Cornejo, supra note 99.
n103 Id.
n104 Albert Forsyth, Interview with Albert Forsyth and Mariano Cornejo B., supra note 99.
n105 Id.
n106 Shearer, Lastarria-Cornhiel & Mesbah, supra note 51, at vii.
n107 Cornejo, supra note 99.
n108 Nunez & Mendoza Mejia, supra note 87.
n109 This polemic was suggested during a meeting with William Binns. Binns, supra note 101.
n111 Binns, supra note 101.

Page 31
n113 Nunez & Mendoza Mejia, supra note 87. The term senderistas refers to the followers of Sendero Luminoso.
n114 Gustavo Gorriti, a Peruvian journalist, stated: "Giving titles to peasants, what's that going to do? Now you are going to have coca
farmers with land titles." James Brooke, A Peruvian With A Vision Gets Power, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1990, at A3.
n115 De Soto asserts that the Viet Cong in the 1960s and the Shining Path today make gains among peasants by promoting property rights.
Third World, supra note 2, at F01. De Soto also claims: "Two of the things that Shining Path does out there are to protect property rights
and provide justice. . . . These are things that the Viet Cong did too. The Peruvian state doesn't." Eugene Robinson, Peruvian Guerilla
Group Launches Urban 'Final Campaign', Wash. Post, Apr. 21, 1992, at A1, A16. Some academics have termed the de Soto
titling-counterinsurgency hypothesis as 'the war path' (referencing use of the word "path" in the title of de Soto's book, The Other Path, and
his new foundation, the Path to Property). Incredibly, Hernando de Soto went as far as to say that police human rights abuses, illegal
searches and seizures, and oppressive intrusiveness by police in Latin America are in large measure due to the lack of registered property,
which results in a diminished data base for police. He concedes that this view is not found in any academic literature. He also credited a
titling program with increasing President Alan Garcia's popularity from a 6% approval rating at the start of a program to a rating of 22% as
the program got underway. See de Soto Address, supra note 2.
n116 The Kissinger Commission recommended improving "title registration and the defense of property rights of farmers" and "[w]here
appropriate, initiat[ing] programs of agrarian reform" as a couple of interventions within a variety of coordinated measures to resolve the
political problems of the area. Henry A. Kissinger, The Report of the President's National Bipartisan Commission on Central America 69
(1984).
n117 See, e.g., Martin Diskin, El Salvador: Reform Prevents Change, in William C. Thiesenhusen, Searching for Agrarian Reform in Latin
America 429-50 (1989).
n118 Imagine creating "test" and "control" groups!
n119 Roy L. Prosterman, Jeffrey M. Riedinger & Mary N. Temple, Land Reform and the El Salvador Crisis, 6 Int'l Security 53, 74 (1981)
cited in Peter Dorner, Latin American Land Reforms in Theory and Practice: A Retrospective Analysis 5 (1992).
n120 Peter Dorner notes the cases of Mexico, Bolivia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Cuba, and the Philippines. Dorner, supra note 119, at 3.
n121 Id.
Page 32
n122 Thiesenhusen, supra note 117, at 23.
n123 Id.
n124 Id. See also Dorner, supra note 119.
n125 William C. Thiesenhusen, Evaluation of Land Reforms in Latin America, Lecture at the FAO Conference, Moscow 5 (June 7-14,
1991) (transcript available at the Land Tenure Center Library).
n126 Diskin, supra note 117.
n127 Rupert W. Scofield, Land Reform in Central America, in Agrarian Reform and Grassroots Development: Ten Case Studies 161-71
(Roy L. Prosterman, Mary N. Temple & Timothy M. Hanstad eds., 1990).
n128 Id. at 142-43.
n129 This conclusion appears to cohere with the section on Social Benefits of Property in Edward L. Hudgins, Private Property: The Basis
of Economic Reform in Less Developed Countries, Heritage Foundation Reps., May 24, 1990.
n130 One study in Kenya found that a national titling program did not produce the anticipated increase in agricultural credit due to factors
limiting access of small farmers -- factors unrelated to tenure. See Joy Green, Evaluating the Impact of Consolidation of Holdings,
Individualization of Tenure, and Registration of Title: Lessons from Kenya at v (1987) (Land Tenure Center Report).
n131 Randy Stringer argues convincingly that establishing a land-financing system in Latin American countries may represent a viable
institutional mechanism to assist some landless in overcoming difficulties caused by land market imperfections. See Randy Stringer,
Farmland Transfers and the Role of Land Banks in Latin America 11 (1989) (Land Tenure Center Report); Randy Stringer, A Profile of
Land Markets in Honduras (1989) (Land Tenure Center Report).
n132 Carter, Wiebe & Blarel, supra note 54, at 14, state, based on data collected in Kenya, that: "Returns to land title (in terms of
Page 33
productivity gains) are likely to be higher for farms better situated in terms of market access or other productivity-enhancing characteristics."
n133 Stanfield, Nesman, Seligson & Coles, supra note 7, at 28-33.
n134 Id. at 32.
n135 Id. at 33.
n136 Barrows & Roth, supra note 4, at 24.
n137 AID financing projects exist, for example, in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. See Shearer, Lastarria-Cornhiel &
Mesbah, supra note 51, at 45-54.
n138 For example, the AID Ecuador project involves broader registration reform issues.
n139 For example, the Bar Association and the Property Registrar in Guatemala are consulting with technical experts from Costa Rica in the
design of the titling reform project in Guatemala.
n140 In Brazil, the World Bank found that subsequent to legal demarcation of the land, violations of the boundaries occurred from a variety
of sources, including official acts (revocation of decrees, building of roads through reserves) and incursions into indian lands by poor
colonists who themselves lacked alternatives for access to land and resources. See Alaka Wali & Shelton Davis, Land Regularization in
Special Amerindian Components of Bank-Funded Projects in Lowland South America 17 (1991) (World Bank Report, available from the
World Bank).
n141 Larsson, supra note 29, at 118.
n142 See, e.g., J. David Stanfield & Maksi Raco, Creation of Albanian Land Markets, Land Tenure Center Newsletter, Spring 1994, at 1, 3.
Page 34
n143 Stanfield, Nesman, Seligson & Coles, supra note 7, at 34.
n144 Coles, supra note 26, at 32.
n145 See, e.g., John A. Humbach, Law and a New Land Ethic, J. Land Trust Alliance 13-15, 24 (1990).
n146 Barnes, supra note 58, at 28-31.
n147 Id. at 143.
n148 Id. at 32-34.
n149 Id. at 153.
n150 Dorner & Saliba, supra note 60, at 19.
n151 Stanfield and Raco discuss the work of the Land Tenure Center in Albania. Stanfield & Raco, supra note 142, at 1. That project is
revolutionary in that it has found ways to dramatically lower traditional survey costs, taking full advantage of new technologies. This has
led to broader participation in the land market as well as increased transparency and enhanced administration of government. Id.
n152 Place, supra note 32, at 2-5. See also Bruce & Fortmann, supra note 55, at 7-8 (discussing ownership rights of women); Constantina
Safilios-Rothschild, Women and the Agrarian Reform in Honduras, in Land Reform: Land Settlement and Cooperatives (1983) (bound
report, available from the Land Tenure Center Library); Constantina Safilios-Rothschild, The Impact of Agrarian Reform on Men and
Women in Honduras (1983) (bound report, available from the Land Tenure Center Library); Feder & Noronha, supra note 24, at 157 (citing
cases in Zambia, Nigeria, Kenya, and Senegal); Catherine Besteman, Land Tenure in the Middle Jubba: Customary Tenure and the Effect of
Land Registration 34 (1991) (Land Tenure Center Report); Zongmin Li, Changes in the Role of Rural Women under the Household
Responsibility System: A Case Study of the Impact of Agrarian Reform and Rural Industrialization in Dongyao Village, Hebei Province,
North China (1993) (Land Tenure Center Report).
Page 35
n153 Feder & Noronha, supra note 24, at 157 (discussing the problems of nomadic farmers in Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Sudan).
n154 Wali & Davis, supra note 140, at ii.
n155 Studies in Colombia, Thailand, Honduras, and elsewhere indicate that titled land is worth at least 50 to 100% more than comparable
untitled land. See Herman Felstehausen, Juan Carlos Castaldi & David Stanfield, Urban Land Access by Informal Sector Households in
Honduras (1990) (Land Tenure Center Report).
n156 Stanfield, Nesman, Seligson & Coles, supra note 7, at 21. Similar results were found in Thailand. See Yongyuth Chalamwong &
Gershon Feder, Land Ownership Security and Land Values in Rural Thailand, 790 World Bank Staff Working Papers 57 (1986).
n157 R. Albert Berry & William R. Cline, Agrarian Structure and Productivity in Developing Countries 5 (1979).
n158 Id.
n159 Id. at 7.
n160 Dwight Steen, Agriculture Development Officer with the U.S. Agency for International Development, Land-Related Problems:
Central America 7 (Apr. 1984) (available from the Agency for International Development, AID/CDIE, Washington, DC 20037).
n161 See, e.g., Hans P. Binswanger & Miranda Elgin, What are the Prospects for Land Reform 3 (1988) (World Bank Report No. IDP-21,
available from the World Bank); Berry & Cline, supra note 157, at 7.
n162 William C. Thiesenhusen & Jolyne Melmed-Sanjak, Brazil's Agrarian Structure: Changes From 1970 Through 1980, 18 World Dev.
393-415 (1990). See also John Strasma & Tufio Barbosa, Land Tenure and Agricultural Productivity in the State of Maranhao, Brazil: Some
Empirical Evidence (1992) (Land Tenure Center Report).
n163 Thiesenhusen & Melmed-Sanjak, supra note 162, at 393-415. One recent paper provides a comprehensive, in-depth economic
analysis of this phenomena, integrating land with labor and capital markets. See Michael R. Carter & Dina Mesbah, Economic Theory of
Page 36
Land Markets and its Implications for the Land Access of the Rural Poor, Annex I at 11, cited in Shearer, Lastarria-Cornhiel & Mesbah,
supra note 51.
n164 Randy Stringer, John Bruce & David Stanfield, Reform Among the Smallholders: St. Lucia, Jamaica, and Implications for the
Caribbean, in Thiesenhusen, supra note 117.
n165 Agrarian Reforms in Developing Rural Economies Characterized by Interlinked Credit and Tenancy Market (1980) (World Bank Staff
Working Paper No. 433).
n166 Michael Carter & Jon Jonakin, The Economic Case for Land Reform: An Assessment of the 'Farm Size/Productivity' Relation and Its
Impact on Policy 1 (1987) (available at the Land Tenure Center Library).
n167 Id.
n168 Id.
n169 Berry & Cline, supra note 157, at 3.
n170 Id.
n171 Carter & Jonakin, supra note 166, at 15.
n172 Id. at 22.
n173 Id. at 26-7.

Page 37
n174 Id. at 27-8.
n175 Michael R. Carter, Bradford B. Barham, Dina Mesbah & Denise Stanley, Agro-Exports and the Rural Resource Poor in Latin
America: Policy Options for Achieving Broadly-Based Growth 16 (1993) (Land Tenure Center Report).
n176 Shearer, Lastarria-Cornhiel & Mesbah, supra note 51, at v.
n177 Id.
n178 Olivier Delahaye, Agentes Sociales y Mercado de la tierra agricola: Una Aproximacion a nivel nacional 145 (1990) (unpublished
manuscript, available at the Land Tenure Center Library).
n179 Thomas Schweigert, The Parcelamientos La Maquina and Caballo Blanco-Santa Fe 11-28, 58-59 (1989) (unpublished manuscript,
available from the Land Tenure Center Library).
n180 Carlos Camacho, Evaluacion del Proceso de Cambio en la Tenencia de la Tierra en la Sierra Norte y Central (1964-1991) 13-18 (Nov.
1991) (unpublished manuscript, available at the Land Tenure Center Library).
n181 Michael R. Carter & Eduardo Zegarra, Sequencing Capital and Land Market Reforms for Broadly Based Growth (1994) (unpublished
manuscript, available at the Land Tenure Center Library).
n182 Feder & Noronha, supra note 24, at 156-57 (citing studies in Kenya, Nigeria, and Senegal).
n183 Carter & Zegarra, supra note 181, at 15.
n184 Schneider, supra note 1.

Page 38
n185 Carter & Zegarra, supra note 181, at 17.
n186 Stanfield, Nesman, Seligson & Coles, supra note 7, at 11. In Latin America, "ejidal" land is land that belonged to the municipalities at
the time of colonization, along with other lands acquired by the municipalities. Ejidal land in certain countries like Mexico and Venezuela is
defined as land given to an agrarian population group or center to be directly used by the group's members. Often, the land cannot be
attached, transferred, mortgaged, divided, or sold without elaborate legal procedures.
n187 Gerardo Budowski, The Socio-Economic Effects of Forest Management on the Lives of People Living in the Areas: The Case of
Central America and Some Caribbean Countries, in Socio-Economic Effects and Constraints in Tropical Forest Management 87-102 (E.G.
Hallsworth ed. 1982).
n188 Stanfield, Nesman, Seligson & Coles, supra note 7, at 11.
n189 See, for example, Stonich's observations based on data in Honduras. Implications, supra note 61, at 1.
n190 A study in Uganda found, after an extensive examination of empirical data, that an inactive land market was a major cause for
encroachment in reserves and parks. See John Aluma, Christine Drennon, John Kigula, Steven W. Lawry, E.S.K. Muwanga-Zake & John
Were, Settlement in Forest Reserves, Game Reserves and National Parks in Uganda (1989) (Land Tenure Center Research Paper No. 98). A
study in Nepal found that lack of access to land and the lack of a land reform lead to deforestation and cultivation of marginal land. See
Integrated Development Systems, The Land Tenure System in Nepal 91 (1986).
n191 The case in Niger is discussed in Bruce & Fortmann, supra note 55, at 17.
n192 Sustainable Action for Viable Environmental Management, AID-Madagascar Project Paper (1990) (report available from the U.S.
Agency for International Development, AID/CDIE, Washington, DC 20037).
n193 Aluma et al., supra note 190.
n194 World Bank & the Government of Madagascar, Environmental Action Plan (1989) (available from the World Bank).
Page 39
n195 Implications, supra note 61, at 1.
n196 William C. Thiesenhusen, Have Agricultural Economists Neglected Poverty Issues?, Lecture at the Annual Meetings of the Pakistan
Society of Development Economists, Islamabad 19 (Jan. 5-11, 1991) (transcript available from the Land Tenure Center Library) [hereinafter
Thiesenhusen Lecture]. This comment would seem to apply to Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Haiti. See Implications,
supra note 61, at 1.
n197 Thiesenhusen Lecture, supra note 196, at 19.
n198 Carter, Wiebe & Blarel, supra note 54, at 11.
n199 Wali & Davis, supra note 140, at ii.
n200 Frank Place discusses the importance of non-tenure factors in agroforestry adoption, for example. Place, supra note 32, at 7-10.
n201 The AID Mission Statement includes six principles, including "support for democracy." See Agency for International Development,
Strategies for Sustainable Development 23-28 (1994). Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) has stated that the U.S. seeks "Stable democratic,
pluralistic systems with open, responsive governments in which all people participate and feel a stake." Sen. Patrick Leahy, The Mission of
Foreign Aid in the Post Cold War Era, in Washington, DC 2 (Mar. 17, 1993) (transcript available from the Agency for International
Development, AID/CDIE, Washington, DC 20037). At the Summit of the Americas, three broad themes emerged as the basis for the
summit agenda: "Making Democracy Work," "Making Democracy Prosper," and "Making Democracy Endure." See U.S. Department of
State, Fact Sheet: Summit of the Americas 1-2, Sept. 27, 1994 (available from the Agency for International Development, AID/CDIE,
Washington, DC 20037).

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NOTE: Un articulo interesante con respecto a la Titulacion de Propiedas en el

Print Request: Current Document: 1

Terms: (Peru Property Rights)

Source: US Law Reviews and Journals, Combined

Copyright (c) 1995 Arizona Board of Regents

12 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. Law 183

LENGTH: 20136 words

ARTICLE: MYTHS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

NAME: Steven E. Hendrix*

II. THE MYTHS

D. Myth #4: Formalized Titles Open The Door To Credit. n70

III. THE REALITY BEHIND THE MYTHS

A. Recommendation #1: Titling Should Be One Element Of A Broader Development Strategy.

order to not undercut the institutional credibility of the cadastral system.

[*223] IV. CONCLUSION

n2 Hernando de Soto stated:

. . . Without formal property, a modern market economy cannot exist. . . .

n24 Gershon Feder and Raymond Noronha note:

(Land Tenure Center Report).

n36 Stanfield & Hendrix, supra note 35, at 1.

n37 Stanfield, supra note 16, at 6.

n49 The Missing Ingredient, supra note 2, at 8.

n53 Feder & Noronha, supra note 24, at 160.

n57 Place, supra note 32, at 5-6.

n68 Place, supra note 32, at 2-4.

n70 The Missing Ingredient, supra note 2, at 11.

n72 Barnes, supra note 58, at 29.

n73 Stanfield, Nesman, Seligson & Coles, supra note 7, at 28-33.

n74 Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 21.

n75 Feder & Noronha, supra note 24, at 159.

n76 Barrows & Roth, supra note 4, at 24.

n80 Barrows & Roth, supra note 4.

n90 Instituto Liberated y Democracia, Update, Apr. 1990, at 6.

n94 Peru's Ex-Drug Czar, supra note 89, at A11.

n96 de Soto, supra note 92, at 5.

n102 Cornejo, supra note 99.

n106 Shearer, Lastarria-Cornhiel & Mesbah, supra note 51, at vii.

n107 Cornejo, supra note 99.

n108 Nunez & Mendoza Mejia, supra note 87.

n110 de Soto, supra note 92, at 12.

n111 Binns, supra note 101.

n112 de Soto, supra note 92, at 12.

n118 Imagine creating "test" and "control" groups!

n122 Thiesenhusen, supra note 117, at 23.

n124 Id. See also Dorner, supra note 119.

n126 Diskin, supra note 117.

n128 Id. at 142-43.

n133 Stanfield, Nesman, Seligson & Coles, supra note 7, at 28-33.

n134 Id. at 32.

n135 Id. at 33.

n136 Barrows & Roth, supra note 4, at 24.

n141 Larsson, supra note 29, at 118.

n143 Stanfield, Nesman, Seligson & Coles, supra note 7, at 34.

n144 Coles, supra note 26, at 32.

n146 Barnes, supra note 58, at 28-31.

n147 Id. at 143.

n148 Id. at 32-34.

n149 Id. at 153.

n150 Dorner & Saliba, supra note 60, at 19.

n154 Wali & Davis, supra note 140, at ii.

n169 Berry & Cline, supra note 157, at 3.

n171 Carter & Jonakin, supra note 166, at 15.