In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Subject

Law 311 (Conflict of Laws)

CONFLICT OF LAWS

CASE DIGEST
2005 – 2010

Submitted to:
Atty. Noreen Grace Salise – Gonzaga, CPA

Submitted by:
Azarcon, Ronel
Balanay, Mae Niagara
Budlong, Katrina
Daquipil, Ellen Glae
Delima, Mark Joseph
Lim, Clark Jay
Monteclaro, Jaelein Nicey
Monterola, Marlon
Paler, Marinel June
Salacay, Uri
Sumayod, Francis Anthony

Date Submitted:

October 9, 2017
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2005
1. In The Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia (G.R. No. 148311. Page 3
March 31, 2005)
2. Rimbunan Hijau Group of Companies vs Oriental Wood Processing Corporation (G.R. 4
No. 152228. September 23, 2005)
3. Republic vs Obrecido (G.R. No. 154380. October 5, 2005) 5
2006
4. Republic of the Philippines vs Hon Henrick F. Gingoyon (GR. No. 166429 December 19, 6
2005)
5. Philip Morris Inc. vs Fortune Tobacco Corporation (G.R. No. 158589 June 27, 2006) 8
6. Zoilo Antionio Velez vs Atty. Leonard S. De Vera (A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006) 10
7. Citibank vs. Sabeniano (G.R.No. 156132, October 16, 2006) 11
8. St. Aviation Services Co., vs. Grand International Airways, Inc. (G.R. No. 140288 12
October 23, 2006)
9. PCL Shipping Philippines vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 153031 December 14, 2006) 13
2007
10. Gonzales vs Climax Mining Ltd (GR 161957 January 22, 2007) 14
11. Pioneer Concrete Philippines Inc. vs Todaro(GR 154830 June 8, 2007) 15
12. Valenzuela vs People (GR 160188 June 21, 2007) 16
13. Hulst vs PR Builders Inc (GR 156364 September 3, 2007) 17
14. Regner vs Logarta (G.R. No. 168747 October 19, 2007) 18
15. EDI Staff Builders vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 145587 October 26, 2007) 20
16. Hasegawa vs Kitamura (G.R. No. 149177 November 23, 2007) 21
2008
17. Korea Technologies Co. Ltd. Vs Lederma (GR NO. 143581 January 7, 2008) 23
18. Raytheon International Inc. vs Stockton W. Rouzie Jr. (G.R. No. 162894 February 26, 25
2008)
19. Spouses Domingo M. Belen vs Hon. Pablo R. Chavez (G.R. No. 175334 March 26, 2008) 26
20. Spouses Alfredo D. Valmonte and Maria Lourdes Valmonte vs Clarita Alcala (G.R. No. 27
168667, July 23, 2008)
21. Bienvenido C. Teoco and Juan C. Teoco, Jr. vs Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company 28
(G.R. No. 162333, December 23, 2008)
2009
22. Manuel B. Japson vs COMELEC and Jaime S. Ty (G.R.# 180088 January 19, 2009) 29
23. Cordora vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 176947, February 19, 2009) 30
24. Philips Matthews vs Benjamin A. Taylor and Joselyn A. Taylor (G.R. No. 164584 June 22, 31
2009)
2010
25. Dacasin vs Dacasin (GR. No. 168785 February 5, 2010) 34
26. Ma vs. Fernandez Jr (G.R. No. 183133 July 26, 2010) 35
27. Cargill Inc. vs. Intra Strata Assurance Corporation (G.R. No. 168266 March 15, 2010) 36
28. Mitra v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010) 37
29. Corpuz vs. Santo Tomas (G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010) 38
30. ATCI Overseas Corporation vs. Echin (G.R. No. 178551 October 11, 2010) 39

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 2005
In The Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia

In The Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia

Honora B. Catindig, petitioner
G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005

Facts: Honorato B. Catindig, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994, that her mother
is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and surname; and
that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle
name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed
to Catindig, his surname. Thereafter, the trial court granted the adoption.

Catindig filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be
allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name, however, the the trial
court denied such motion holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use
the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.

Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a
consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle
name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle
name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4)
adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name
should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name Garcia (her mothers surname)
avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of Garcia as her middle name is not
opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.

ISSUE: Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she
is subsequently adopted by her natural father.

HELD: Yes. A man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which
he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is
distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the
convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of
personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name.

The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or
family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to
distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to
which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the
parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law

Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the use of
surname of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or
illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a widow

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 On the basis of the abovementioned provisions, there is no law regulating the use of a middle
name. Even Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known
as An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silent as to what middle
name a child may use.

The middle name or the mothers surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in
case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the
middle name or the mothers surname shall be added.

Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the
Civil Code merely provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. What it only
expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the
adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed
to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of
primary and paramount consideration,[26] hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that: In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not be
allowed to do so.

Rimbunan Hijau Group of Companies vs Oriental Wood Processing Corporation

Rimbunan Hijau Group of Companies and Niugini Lumber Merchants PTY., LTD., petitioners vs.
Oriental Wood Processing Corporation, respondent
G.R. No. 152228 September 23, 2005
470 SCRA 650

Facts: Rimbunan and Niugini are unlicensed foreign corporations who entered into a contract to sell and
export PNG round logs to Oriental Wood Processing (Domestic Corporation) for a total purchase price of
$ 543, 699.52.

These corporations were organized and existing under the laws of Papua New Guinea. Niugini is
Rimbunan’s subsidiary with the same set of directors and officers. Oriental Wood Processing is a private
domestic corporation. “PNG” round logs are mixed group of series of Papua New Guinea round logs.

Oriental Wood only managed to pay $ 199,958 in installments via telegraphic transfers to
Rimbunan’s bank account.

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 When Oriental refused to pay the remaining balance of $ 343.741.52. Rimbunan instituted a
complaint for sum of money against Oriental in the RTC Bulacan. Oriental Filed a motion to dismiss the
following:

a. Rimbunan and Niugini have no legal capacity to sue in our jurisdiction.

b. Rimbunan had been doing business in the Philippines without a license and had made 14
transactions with Oriental involving round logs with a total amount of $4M.

Regional Trial Court of Bulacan ruled in favor of Rimbunan.

Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC on the following grounds, that:
1. Based on the facts, petitioners dealings constituted doing business in the Philippines;
2. Rimbunan and Niugini admitted that their acts and transactions constitute not merely
incidental or casual performance of business but are such character as distinctly to indicate
a purpose on their part to do business in the Philippines.
Rimbunan and Niugini went to Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not Rimbunan and Niugini have legal capacity to sue in our jurisdiction.

Held: Yes, Rimbuna and Niugini have legal capacity to sue because Oriental is estopped from questioning
their capacity when they entered into a contract with Rimbunan.

The rule is that a party is estopped to challenge the personality of a corporation after having
acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. And the ‘doctrine of estoppel to deny
corporate existence applies to foreign as well as to domestic corporations, one who has dealt with a
corporation of foreign of foreign origin as a corporate entity is estopped to deny its existence and
capacity.

Republic vs Obrecido

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner vs. Cipriano Obrecido III, respondent

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

Facts: In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in
the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter In 1986,
Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano
learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial
court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

Issue: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Cipriano’s wife was valid, hence, capacitating him to
remarry under the Philippine laws.

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Held: Yes, the divorce obtained by Cipriano’s wife was valid, hence, capacitating him to remarry under
the Philippine laws. Par. 2, Article 26 of Family Code provides that “Where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.”

The twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: (1) There is a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (2) A valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized
alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites
for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the
"divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

2006
Republic of the Philippines vs Hon Henrick F. Gingoyon

Republic of the Philippines, Represented by Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), and the Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA), Petitioners, vs. Hon. Henrick F. Gingoyon, In his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 117, Pasay City and Philippine International Air Terminalls Co., Inc., Respondents.
GR. No. 166429 December 19, 2005

Facts: The Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III (NAIA 3) was conceived, designed
and constructed to serve as the country’s show window to the world. Regrettably, it has spawned
controversies. Regrettably too, despite the apparent completion of the terminal complex way back it has
not yet been operated. This has caused immeasurable economic damage to the country, not to mention
its deplorable discredit in the international community.

In the Courts December 19, 2005 decision, the majority relied heavily on a strained
interpretation of the 2004 resolution in Agan v. PIATCO and concluded that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
violated Agan. It then ruled that RA 8974 governed the expropriation of the NAIA IPT3. I wrote a
dissenting opinion.

Petitioners are before us again with their motion for partial reconsideration, alleging that the
December 19, 2005 decision requiring prior payment to PIATCO before any government takeover of
NAIA IPT3 will only further delay instead of hasten its opening and operation. According to petitioners,
the decision will also work grave injustice to the government and other lawful claimants to the just
compensation. They specifically identify Takenaka Corporation and Asahikosan Corporation, unpaid

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contractor and supplier of materials in the construction of NAIA IPT3 as lawful claimants to the
compensation due from the expropriation of the facilities. Petitioners call the Courts attention to the
February 18, 2005 and December 2, 2005 orders of the High Court of Justice, Queens Bench Division,
London directing PIATCO to pay Takenaka and Asahikosan approximately US$81,000,000.

Petitioners also assert that Agan does not require prior payment of full compensation before
any government takeover of NAIA IPT3 and that the application of Rule 67 in the expropriation
proceedings does not violate Agan. They further argue that RA 8974 cannot repeal or amend Rule 67.

Takenaka and Asahikosan are also before us with their separate motions for leave to file motion
for partial reconsideration-in-intervention and their respective motions for partial reconsideration-in-
intervention. Both allege that, in an amended complaint dated January 11, 2005 filed by petitioners in
the court a quo, they were impleaded as necessary parties. Without awaiting service of summons, they
separately filed a manifestation and motion, in lieu of answer, manifesting that they did not object to
the taking of NAIA IPT3, provided that they were justly compensated for their respective claims as
unpaid contractor and supplier of materials in the construction of the facility.

They also maintain that the London court rendered two separate money judgments in their
favor against PIATCO which they intend to enforce in Philippine courts. Hence, they prayed that they be
allowed to intervene and establish their claims before any payment is made to PIATCO.

Issue: WON a two separate money judgments rendered by a London Court in favor of Takenaka and
Asahikosan against PIATCO binding in the Philippine courts.

Held: No. While the Government refers to a judgment rendered by a London court in favor of
Takenaka and Asahikosan against PIATCO in the amount of US$82 Million, it should be noted that this
foreign judgment is not yet binding on Philippine courts. It is entrenched in Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure that a foreign judgment on the mere strength of its promulgation is not yet
conclusive, as it can be annulled on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.1 It is likewise recognized in Philippine jurisprudence and
international law that a foreign judgment may be barred from recognition if it runs counter to public
policy.

"Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public
policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied." Bank of America v.
American Realty Corp., 378 Phil. 1279, 1296 (1999); citing Philippine Conflict of Laws, Eight Edition,
1996, Paras, page 46. See also Querubin v. Querubin, 87 Phil. 124, 133. (1950), Mijares v. Ranada, G.R.
No. 139325, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 397, 410.

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 Philip Morris Inc. vs Fortune Tobacco Corporation

Philip Morris Inc., Benson and Hedges (Canada), Inc., and Fabriques De Tabac Reunies, S.A., (now
known as Philip Morris Production S.A.), petitioner vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, respondent
G.R. No. 158589 June 27, 2006

Facts: Petitioner Philip Morris, Inc., a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Virginia,
United States of America, is, per Certificate of Registration No. 18723 issued on April 26, 1973 by the
Philippine Patents Office (PPO), the registered owner of the trademark "MARK VII" for cigarettes.
Similarly, petitioner Benson & Hedges (Canada), Inc., a subsidiary of Philip Morris, Inc., is the registered
owner of the trademark "MARK TEN" for cigarettes as evidenced by PPO Certificate of Registration No.
11147. And as can be seen in Trademark Certificate of Registration No. 19053, another subsidiary of
Philip Morris, Inc., the Swiss company Fabriques de Tabac Reunies, S.A., is the assignee of the trademark
"LARK," which was originally registered in 1964 by Ligget and Myers Tobacco Company. On the other
hand, respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation, a company organized in the Philippines, manufactures
and sells cigarettes using the trademark "MARK."

Petitioners filed a complaint with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction alleging that
they are foreign corporations not doing business in the Philippines and are suing on an isolated
transaction. They averred that the countries in which they are domiciled grant to corporate or juristic
persons of the Philippines the privilege to bring action for infringement, without need of a license to do
business in those countries. Petitioners likewise manifested that they are registered owners of the
trademark "MARK VII" and "MARK TEN" for cigarettes as evidenced by the corresponding certificates of
registration and an applicant for the registration of the trademark "LARK MILDS". They further claimed
that they have registered the aforementioned trademarks in their respective countries of origin and
that, by virtue of the long and extensive usage of the same, these trademarks have already gained
international fame and acceptance. Imputing bad faith on the part of the respondent, petitioners
claimed that the respondent, without any previous consent from any of the petitioners, manufactured
and sold cigarettes bearing the identical and/or confusingly similar trademark "MARK". Accordingly, they
argued that respondent’s use of the trademark "MARK" in its cigarette products have caused and is
likely to cause confusion or mistake, or would deceive purchasers and the public in general into buying
these products under the impression and mistaken belief that they are buying petitioners’ products.

In addition, petitioners assert that, as corporate nationals of member-countries of the Paris

Union, they can sue before Philippine courts for infringement of trademarks, or for unfair competition,
without need of obtaining registration or a license to do business in the Philippines, and without
necessity of actually doing business in the Philippines. To petitioners, these grievance right and
mechanism are accorded not only by Section 21-A of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 166, as amended, or the
Trademark Law, but also by Article 2 of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,
otherwise known as the Paris Convention.

Respondent filed its Answer xxx denying *petitioners’+ material allegations and averred among
other things that "MARK" is a common word, which cannot particularly identify a product to be the
product of the [petitioners]

The lower court ruled that the petitioners have no capacity to sue and there was no
infringement of the petitioner’s trademarks. This was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal.

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Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners, as Philippine registrants of trademarks, are entitled to enforce
trademark rights in this country; and
2. Whether or not respondent has committed trademark infringement against petitioners by its
use of the mark "MARK" for its cigarettes, hence liable for damages.

Held:

1. No. Contrary to what petitioners suggest, the registration of trademark cannot be deemed
conclusive as to the actual use of such trademark in local commerce. As it were, registration does not
confer upon the registrant an absolute right to the registered mark. The certificate of registration
merely constitutes prima facie evidence that the registrant is the owner of the registered mark.
Evidence of non-usage of the mark rebuts the presumption of trademark ownership, as what happened
here when petitioners no less admitted not doing business in this country.

Most importantly, we stress that registration in the Philippines of trademarks does not ipso
facto convey an absolute right or exclusive ownership thereof. To borrow from Shangri-La International
Hotel Management, Ltd. v. Development Group of Companies, Inc. trademark is a creation of use and,
therefore, actual use is a pre-requisite to exclusive ownership; registration is only an administrative
confirmation of the existence of the right of ownership of the mark, but does not perfect such right;
actual use thereof is the perfecting ingredient.

Therefore, with the failure to present evidence to support their allegation that their respective
countries indeed grant Philippine corporations reciprocal or similar privileges by law and there was no
actual use of their trademark here in the Philippines since they are foreign corporations not doing
business in the Philippines, the petitioners are barred from maintaining any action in Philippine courts
pursuant to Section 133 of the Corporation Code.

2. No. The Court is not persuaded by the petitioners’ contention. In Mighty Corporation v. E & J
Gallo Winery,53 the Court held that the following constitute the elements of trademark infringement in
accordance not only with Section 22 of R.A. No. 166, as amended, but also Sections 2, 2-A, 9-A54 and 20
thereof:

a. a trademark actually used in commerce in the Philippines and registered in the principal
register of the Philippine Patent Office,
b. is used by another person in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or advertising of
any goods, business or services or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion
or mistake or to deceive purchasers or others as to the source or origin of such goods or
services, or identity of suchbusiness; or such trademark is reproduced, counterfeited, copied or
colorably imitated by another person and such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable
imitation is applied to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements
intended to be used upon or in connection with such goods, business or services as to likely
cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers,
c. the trademark is used for identical or similar goods, and
d. such act is done without the consent of the trademark registrant or assignee.lawphil.net

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 As already found herein, while petitioners have registered the trademarks "MARK VII," "MARK
TEN" and "LARK" for cigarettes in the Philippines, prior actual commercial use thereof had not been
proven. In fact, petitioners’ judicial admission of not doing business in this country effectively belies any
pretension to the contrary.

Likewise, we note that petitioners even failed to support their claim that their respective marks
are well-known and/or have acquired goodwill in the Philippines so as to be entitled to protection even
without actual use in this country in accordance with Article 6bis55 of the Paris Convention

For lack of convincing proof on the part of the petitioners of actual use of their registered
trademarks prior to respondent’s use of its mark and for petitioners’ failure to demonstrate confusing
similarity between said trademarks, the dismissal of their basic complaint for infringement and the
concomitant plea for damages must be affirmed.

Zoilo Antionio Velez vs Atty. Leonard S. De Vera

Zoilo Antionio Velez, complainant vs Atty. Leonard S. De Vera, respondent

A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006

Facts: An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California,
docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera handled
involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by
the elder Willis (father of Julius who was given authority by the son to control the case because the
latter was then studying in San Diego California) for the release of the funds in settlement of the case.
Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of the case which he then deposited to his personal
account.

The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be
suspended from the practice of law for three years; and Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar
which resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of California.

Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he misappropriated
his client's funds as the latter's father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to use the same and that,
unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this explanation notwithstanding the fact that the
elder Willis testified under oath that he "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days."

By insisting that he was authorized by his client's father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds,
Atty. de Vera has impliedly admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own personal use.

In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainant's allegation in the latter's memorandum that he
(de Vera) received US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he deposited said amount in his
personal account and not in a separate trust account and that, finally, he spent the amount for personal
purposes

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Issue: WON the recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing alone, is
not proof of malpractice.

Held: No. As decided in the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In The Territory of Guam
of Atty. Leon G. Maquera, if the circumstance presents us a foreign judgment of suspension against a
Filipino lawyer, it does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines as the
acts giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and suspension in the Philippine
jurisdiction. It merely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer. However, in herein
case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the recommendation by the
hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not constitute prima facie evidence of unethical
behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts upon which the
recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that
these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law.

Citibank vs. Sabeniano

Citibank, N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank) and Investors Finance Corporation, doing business
under the name and style of FNCB Finance, petitioners vs. Modesta R. Sabeniano, respondent
G.R.No. 156132, October 16, 2006
504 SCRA 378

Facts: Petitioner Citibank is a banking corporation duly authorized under the laws of the USA to do
commercial banking activities in the Philippines and FNCB Finance was an affiliate company of petitioner
specifically handling money market placement for its clients. Sabeniano was a client of both petitioners
Citibank and FNCB Finance. Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners claiming to have
substantial deposits, the proceeds of which were supposedly deposited automatically and directly to
respondent’s account with the petitioner Citibank and that allegedly petitioner refused to do so despite
repeated demands. Petitioner alleged that respondent obtained several loans from the former and in
default, Citibank exercised its right to set-off respondent’s outstanding loans with her deposits and
money. One of the respondent’s money which Citibank applied against her loans are from her dollar
accounts with Citibank – Geneva in Switzerland pursuant to an alleged Declaration of Pledge executed
by respondent to its favor.

The RTC declared the act illegal, null and void and ordered the petitioner to refund the amount
plus interest, ordering Sabeniano, on the other hand to pay Citibank her indebtedness. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision modifying it to entirely be in favor of the respondent.

Issue: Whether or not the action of the petitioner in applying respondent’s dollar accounts in Citibank
– Geneva, Switzerland was valid.

Ruling: No, it was not valid. Certain principles of private international law should be considered herein
because the property pledged was in the possession of an entity in a foreign country, namely, Citibank-
Geneva. In the absence of any allegation and evidence presented by petitioners of the specific rules and
laws governing the constitution of a pledge in Geneva, Switzerland, they will be presumed to be the

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same as Philippine local or domestic laws; this is known as processual presumption. Upon closer scrutiny
of the Declaration of Pledge, this Court finds the same exceedingly suspicious and irregular.

First of all, it escapes this Court why petitioner Citibank took care to have the Deeds of
Assignment of the PNs notarized, yet left the Declaration of Pledge unnotarized. Second, petitioner
Citibank was unable to establish the date when the Declaration of Pledge was executed. Third, the
Declaration of Pledge was irregularly filled-out. It was constituted in favor of Citibank, N.A. The pledge,
therefore, made no sense, the pledgor and pledgee being the same entity. Lastly, respondent denied
that it was her signature on the Declaration of Pledge. She claimed that the signature was a forgery.

Therefore, this Court declares that the remittance of respondent's dollar accounts from
Citibank-Geneva and the application thereof to her outstanding loans with petitioner Citibank was
illegal, and null and void. Petitioner Citibank is obligated to return to respondent the amount taken from
her Citibank-Geneva accounts, and, at the same time, respondent continues to be obligated to
petitioner Citibank for the balance of her outstanding loans.

St. Aviation Services Co., vs. Grand International Airways, Inc.

St. Aviation Services Co., petitioner vs. Grand International Airways, Inc., respondent
G.R. No. 140288 October 23, 2006
(505 SCRA 30)

Facts: Petitioner St. Aviation Services Co. is a foreign corporation based in Singapore engaged in the
manufacture, repair, and maintenance of airplanes and aircrafts while respondent Grand International
Airways, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in airline operations. Both parties executed an
agreement in Singapore for the maintenance and modification of respondent's aircrafts. This agreement
also contained that the "construction, validity and performance thereof" shall be governed by the laws
of Singapore. Both parties further agreed to submit any suit arising from their agreement to the non-
exclusive jurisdiction of Singapore courts.

Respondent subsequently defaulted in paying petitioner for its services after repeated demands
which caused the latter to file with the High court of Singapore an action for collection of sum of money.
Upon motion, the court issued a Writ of Summons which was served extraterritorially upon respondent
with the assistance of the sheriff of Pasay City but respondent failed to answer despite receipt thereof.
The Singapore High Court then rendered a judgment by default against respondent.

Petitioner later filed with the RTC of Pasay City a Petition for Enforcement of Judgment for
which respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Singapore High Court did not acquire
jurisdiction over him and thus decision was void for having been made in violation of his right to due
process. The motion was denied but was granted by the CA. Hence, the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari.

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Issue: Whether or not the Singapore High Court acquired jurisdiction over respondent by the service
of summons upon its office in the Philippines and thus making the judgment by default in said foreign
court enforceable in the Philippines.

Held: Yes. Generally, matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process
upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum, which in this case is the
law of Singapore. Here, petitioner moved for leave of court to serve a copy of the Writ of Summons
outside Singapore. In an Order dated December 24, 1997, the Singapore High Court granted "leave to
serve a copy of the Writ of Summons on the Defendant by a method of service authorized by the law of
the Philippines xxx” This service of summons outside Singapore is in accordance to the Rules of Court of
Singapore.

In the Philippines, jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of summons by the sheriff, his
deputy or other proper court officer either personally by handing a copy thereof to the defendant or by
substituted service. In this case, the Writ of Summons issued by the Singapore High Court was served
upon respondent at its office in Pasay City. Considering that the Writ of Summons was served upon
respondent in accordance with our Rules, jurisdiction was acquired by the Singapore High Court over its
person. Clearly, the judgment of default rendered by that court against respondent is valid.

PCL Shipping Philippines vs. NLRC

PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc. and U-Ming Marine Transport Corporation, petitioners vs. National Labor
Relations Commission and Steve Rusel, respondents
G.R. No. 153031 December 14, 2006
511 SCRA 44

Facts: Rusel was employed by PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc. for and in behalf of its foreign principal, U-
Ming Marine Transport Corporation. He joined the vessel MV Cemtex General for a contract period of 12
months but shortly thereafter, Rusel injured his ankle when he slipped while cleaning the vessel’s
kitchen. A request for medical examination was denied by the captain. After feeling unbearable pain in
his ankle, Rusel jumped off the vessel using a life jacket and swam to the shore to get his ankle treated
where he was confined at a hospital for 8 days. He was then fetched by an agent of the vessel and was
required to board a plane bound for the Philippines.

Rusel filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners before the arbitration branch of
the NLRC. In their answer, the latter alleged that Rusel deserted his employment by jumping off the
vessel. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of Rusel finding him to have been unjustly repatriated.
Subsequent appeals to the NLRC and CA affirmed the said decision. Hence, the present petition.

PCL Shipping contended that Rusel is guilty of abandonment when he jumped off the ship but at
the same time, they also contend that they had the right to pre-terminate respondent's employment
under POEA Memorandum Circular No. 41. Petitioners however admit that they did not inform private

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respondent in writing for the termination and no formal investigation was conducted, and claims that
such requirements of notice and hearing applies strictly only when the employment is within the
Philippines and that these need not be strictly observed in cases of international maritime or overseas
employment.

Issue: Whether or not the twin requirements of notice and hearing need not be strictly followed if
employment is not within the Philippines as contended by petitioner.

Held: No, the Court does not agree. The provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor Code which
afford protection to labor apply to Filipino employees whether working within the Philippines or abroad.
Moreover, the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs
in this jurisdiction. In the present case, it is not disputed that the Contract of Employment entered into
by and between petitioners and private respondent was executed here in the Philippines with the
approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Hence, the Labor Code
together with its implementing rules and regulations and other laws affecting labor apply in this case.

2007
Gonzales vs Climax Mining Ltd

Jorge Gonzales and Panel of Arbitrators, petitioers vs Climax Mining Ltd., Climax – Arimco Mining
Corp., and Autralasian Philippines Mining Inc., respondents
GR 161957 January 22, 2007

Facts: This is a consolidation of two petitions rooted in the same disputed Addendum Contract entered
into by the parties. In one case, the Court held that the DENR Panel of Arbitrators had no jurisdiction
over the complaint for the annulment of the Addendum Contract on grounds of fraud and violation of
the Constitution and that the action should have been brought before the regular courts as it involved
judicial issues. Gonzales averred that the DENR Panel of Arbitrators Has jurisdiction because the case
involves a mining dispute that properly falls within the ambit of the Panel’s authority.

Respondents Climax Mining Ltd., et al., on the other hand, seek reconsideration/clarification on
the decision holding that the case should not be brought for arbitration under R.A. No. 876. They
argued that the arbitration clause in the Addendum Contract should be treated as an agreement
independent of the other terms of the contract, and that a claimed rescission of the main contract does
not avoid the duty to arbitrate. On another case, Gonzales challenged the order of the RTC requiring him
to proceed with the arbitration proceedings while the complaint for the nullification of the Addendum
Contract was pending before the DENR Panel of Arbitrators. He contended that any issue as to the
nullity, inoperativeness, or incapability of performance of the arbitration clause/agreement raised by
one of the parties to the alleged arbitration agreement must be determined by the court prior to
referring them to arbitration.

While Climax-Arimco contended that an application to compel arbitration under Sec. 6 of R.A.
No. 876 confers on the trial court only a limited and special jurisdiction, i.e., a jurisdiction solely to

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determine (a) whether or not the parties have a written contract to arbitrate, and (b) if the defendant
has failed to comply with that contract.

Issue: Whether or not arbitration is proper even though issues of validity and nullity of the Addendum
Contract and, consequently, of the arbitration clause were raised.

Held: The court rules on the affirmative.

The doctrine of separability or severability enunciates that an arbitration agreement is

independent of the main contract. The arbitration agreement is to be treated as a separate agreement
and the arbitration agreement does not automatically terminate when the contract of which it is part
comes to an end. The separability of the arbitration agreement is especially significant to the
determination of whether the invalidity of the main contract also nullifies the arbitration clause. Indeed,
the doctrine denotes that the invalidity of the main contract, also referred to as the “container”
contract, does not affect the validity of the arbitration agreement. Irrespective of the fact that the main
contract is invalid, the arbitration clause/agreement still remains valid and enforceable.

The validity of the contract containing the agreement to submit to arbitration does not affect
the applicability of the arbitration clause itself. A contrary ruling would suggest that a party’s mere
repudiation of the main contract is sufficient to avoid arbitration. That is exactly the situation that the
separability doctrine, as well as jurisprudence applying it, seeks to avoid. The Court added that when it
declared that the case should not be brought for arbitration, it should be clarified that the case referred
to is the case actually filed by Gonzales before the DENR Panel of Arbitrators, which was for the
nullification of the main contract on the ground of fraud, as it had already been determined that the
case should have been brought before the regular courts involving as it did judicial issues.

Pioneer Concrete Philippines Inc. vs Todaro

Pioneer Concrete Philippines Inc., Pioneer Philippines Holdings, and Philip J. Klepzig, petitioners vs
Antonio D. Todaro, respondent
GR 154830 June 8, 2007

Facts: Pioneer International Limited (PIL), an Australian company engaged in the ready-mix concrete
business, established herein petitioner PCPI to undertake its business in the Philippines. PIL contacted
respondent Todaro and asked if the latter is available to join them in their intention to establish plant
operations in the country to which the latter agreed. Subsequently, PIL and Todaro came to an
agreement wherein the former consented to engage the services of the latter as consultant for 2-3
months, after which he would be employed as manager of concrete operations should PIL decide to
invest in the Philippines. PIL started its operation however it refused to comply with its undertaking to
employ Todaro on a permanent basis. Respondent thus filed a complaint for sum of money and
damages against petitioner. Petitioner meanwhile contends that the case should fall with the NLRC as
the damages arose from an alleged breach of employment contract. Both the trial court and CA ruled in
favor of respondent.

Issue: Whether or not there is employer-employee relationship between PIL and respondent.

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Held: No. In the present case, no employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners and
respondent. In fact, in his complaint, private respondent is not seeking any relief under the Labor Code,
but seeks payment of damages on account of petitioners’ alleged breach of their obligation under their
agreement to employ him. It is settled that an action for breach of contractual obligation is intrinsically a
civil dispute. In the alternative, respondent seeks redress on the basis of the provisions of Articles 19
and 21 of the Civil Code. Hence, it is clear that the present action is within the realm of civil law, and
jurisdiction over it belongs to the regular courts.

Valenzuela vs People

Aristotel Valenzuela y Natividad, petitioner vs People of the Philippines and Hon. Court of Appeals,
respondents
GR 160188 June 21, 2007

Facts: Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket
within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago, a security guard who was then
manning his post at the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw Valenzuela, who was wearing
an ID with the mark “Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)” who hauled a push cart with cases of detergent
of “Tide” brand and unloaded them in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. He then
returned inside the supermarket and emerged 5 minutes after with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and
again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space. Thereafter, he left the parking
area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it towards the parking space where Calderon was
waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. As
Lago watched, he proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area and asked
Valenzuela for a receipt of the merchandise but Valenzuela and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot.
Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards. Valenzuela and Calderon were
apprehended at the scene and the stolen merchandise recovered worth P12,090. RTC convicted accused
guilty of consummated theft. But accused invoked the Latin maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit
rea and should be convicted of frustrated theft.

Issue: Whether it is not enough that mens rea be shown to convict the accused?

Held: No. The long-standing Latin maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea supplies an important
characteristic of a crime, that ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a
crime, and accordingly, there can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. Accepted in this
jurisdiction as material in crimes mala in se, mens rea has been defined before as a guilty mind, a guilty
or wrongful purpose or criminal intent, and essential for criminal liability.It follows that the statutory
definition of our mala in se crimes must be able to supply what the mens rea of the crime is, and indeed
the U.S. Supreme Court has comfortably held that a criminal law that contains no mens rea requirement
infringes on constitutionally protected rights.The criminal statute must also provide for the overt acts
that constitute the crime. For a crime to exist in our legal law, it is not enough that mens rea be shown;
there must also be an actus reus.

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 Hulst vs PR Builders Inc

Jacobus Bernhard Hulst, petitioner vs PR Builders Inc., respondent

GR 156364 September 3, 2007

Facts: The Petitioner and his spouse, both Dutch Nationals, entered into a Contract to Sell with PR
Builders, Inc. to purchase a 210-sq m residential unit in the respondent's townhouse project in
Batanagas. When PR Builder's failed to comply with their verbal promise to complete the project, the
spouses Hulst filed a complaint for recession of contract with interest, damages and attorney's fees
before the Housing and Land Regulatory Board (HLURB), which then was granted. A Writ of Execution
was then addressed to the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Tanauan, Batangas, but upon the complaint of
the respondent, the levy was set aside, leaving only the respondent's personal properties to be levied
first.

The Sheriff set a public auction of the said levied properties, however, the respondent filed a
motion to quash Writ of levy on the ground that the sheriff made an over levy since the aggregate
appraised value of the properties at P6,500 per sq m is P83,616,000. Instead of resolving the objection
of the respondent's regarding the auction, the Sheriff proceeded with the auction since there was no
restraining order from the HLURB. The 15 parcels of land was then awarded to Holly Properties Realty at
a bid of P5, 450,653. On the same day, the Sheriff remitted the legal fees and submitted to contracts of
sale to HLURB, however, he then received orders to suspend proceedings on the auction for the reason
that the market value of the properties was not fair. There was disparity between the appraised value
and the value made by the petitioner and the Sheriff, which should've been looked into by the Sheriff
before making the sale. While an inadequacy in price is not a ground to annul such sale, the court is
justified to such intervention where the price shocks the conscience.

Issue: Whether or not the spouses Hulst's request for damages is actionable.

Held: No. Under Article 12, Sec.7 of the 1987 Constitution, foreign nationals, the spouses Hulst, are
disqualified form owning real property. However, under article 1414 of the Civil Code, one who
repudiates the agreement and demands his money before the illegal act has taken place is entitled to
recover. Petitioner is therefore entitled to recover what he has paid, although the basis of his claim for
rescission, which was granted by the HLURB, was not the fact that he is not allowed to acquire private
land under the Philippine Constitution. But petitioner is entitled to the recovery only of the amount of
P3,187,500.00, representing the purchase price paid to respondent. No damages may be recovered on
the basis of a void contract; being nonexistent, the agreement produces no juridical tie between the
parties involved. Further, petitioner is not entitled to actual as well as interests thereon, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

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 Regner vs Logarta

Victoria Regner, petitioner vs Cynthia R. Logarta, Teresa R. Tormis and Cebu Country Club Inc.,
respondents
G.R. No. 168747 October 19, 2007
537 SCRA 277

Facts: Cynthia Logarta and Teresa Tormis were the daughters of Luis Regner in his first marriage with
Anicita Regner. Victoria Regner is the second wife of Luis.

In 1999, Victoria alleged that Cynthia and Teresa with the help of another sibling defrauded Luis, who
was then very ill and was unable to write, into placing his thumbmark into a Deed of Donation. In said
Deed, Luis purportedly donated a Proprietary Ownership Certificate pertaining to membership shares in
the Cebu Country Club. Victoria alleged that said Deed is void because the placing of thumbmark by Luis
was done without the latter’s free will and voluntariness considering his physical state; that it was done
without Luis’s lawyer; that the ratification made by Luis before he died is likewise void because of similar
circumstances.

In the same year, Victoria filed a complaint to annul said deed with the RTC of Cebu. The sheriff
could not deliver the summonses against Cynthia and Teresa because apparently, although they are
Filipinos, they are not residing here; they are residing in California. It was only in the year 2000 that one
of the summonses was served to one of the sisters, Teresa, when she came back to the Philippines.

Teresa immediately filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Victoria failed to prosecute her
case for an unreasonable length of time. Naturally, Victoria opposed the Motion. Teresa, in her
rejoinder, alleged that the case should be dismissed because Cynthia, who is an indispensable party, was
not issued any summons, hence, since an indispensable party is not served with summons, without her
who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter there can be no proper determination of
the case. The trial court ruled in favor of Teresa; this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of Victoria’s complaint is correct.

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court agreed with the arguments presented by Teresa. The Supreme Court
also emphasized:

There are generally two types of actions: actions in rem and actions in personam. An action in
personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability, while an action in rem is an
action against the thing itself, instead of against the person.

The certificate, subject of the donation, is a personal property. The action filed by Victoria is
therefore a personal action. So in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the respondent s,
summons must be served upon them. Further, the certificate is indivisible, Cynthia’s and Teresa’s
interests thereto can only be determined if both are summoned in court.

In personal actions, if the respondents are residents of the Philippines, they may be served
summons in the following order:

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 1. Personal Service;
2. If (1) is not possible, Substituted Service;
3. If respondent can’t be found because he is abroad but still a resident of the Philippines,
by publication with leave of court.

In personal actions still, if the respondents are non-residents, they may be served summons in
the following manner:

1. Personal service through the Philippine embassy;

2. By publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as
the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent
by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or
3. in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.

The above must be with leave of court.

In the case at bar, Cynthia was never served any summons in any of the manners authorized by
the Rules of Court. The summons served to Teresa cannot bind Cynthia. It is incumbent upon Victoria to
compel the court to authorize the extraterritorial service of summons against Cynthia. Her failure to do
so for a long period of time constitutes a failure to prosecute on her part.

What if the petition is an action in rem? What are the applicable rules?

If the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not
essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. If the
defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the country, summons may be served extraterritorially
in the following instances:

1. when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff;

2. when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property within the Philippines, on
which the defendant claims a lien or an interest, actual or contingent;
3. when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and
4. when the defendant non-resident’s property has been attached within the Philippines.

In the above instances, summons may be effected by:

1. personal service out of the country, with leave of court;

2. publication, also with leave of court; or
3. any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

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 EDI Staff Builders vs. NLRC

EDI Staff Builders International Inc., petitioners vs. National Labor Relations Commission and Eleazar S.
Gran, respondents
G.R. No. 145587 October 26, 2007
537 SCRA 409

Facts: In 1993, EDI-Staffbuilders, Inc. (EDI), upon request of Omar Ahmed Ali Bin Bechr Est. (OAB), a
company in Saudi Arabia, sent to OAB resumes from which OAB can choose a computer specialist.
Eleazar Gran was selected. It was agreed that his monthly salary shall be $850.00. But five months into
his service in Saudi Arabia, Gran received a termination letter and right there and then was removed
from his post. The termination letter states that he was incompetent because he does not know the
ACAD system which is required in his line of work; that he failed to enrich his knowledge during his 5
month stay to prove his competence; that he is disobedient because he failed to submit the required
daily reports to OAB. Gran then signed a quitclaim whereby he declared that he is releasing OAB from
any liability in exchange of 2,948.00 Riyal.

When Gran returned, he filed a labor case for illegal dismissal against EDI and OAB. EDI in its
defense averred that the dismissal is valid because when Gran and OAB signed the employment
contract, both parties agreed that Saudi labor laws shall govern all matters relating to the termination of
Gran’s employment; that under Saudi labor laws, Gran’s termination due to incompetence and
insubordination is valid; that Gran’s insubordination and incompetence is outlined in the termination
letter Gran received. The labor arbiter dismissed the labor case but on appeal, the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the arbiter. The Court of Appeals likewise
affirmed the NLRC.

Issue: Whether or not the Saudi labor laws should be applied.

Held: No. The specific Saudi labor laws were not proven in court. EDI did not present proof as to the
existence and the specific provisions of such foreign law. Hence, processual presumption applies and
Philippine labor laws shall be used. Under our laws, an employee like Gran shall only be terminated
upon just cause. The allegations against him, at worst, shall only merit a suspension not a dismissal. His
incompetence is not proven because prior to being sent to Saudi Arabia, he underwent the required
trade test to prove his competence. The presumption therefore is that he is competent and that it is
upon OAB and EDI to prove otherwise. No proof of his incompetence was ever adduced in court. His
alleged insubordination is likewise not proven. It was not proven that the submission of daily track
records is part of his job as a computer specialist. There was also a lack of due process. Under our laws,
Gran is entitled to the two notice rule whereby prior to termination he should receive two notices. In
the case at bar, he only received one and he was immediately terminated on the same day he received
the notice.

Lastly, the quitclaim may not also release OAB from liability. Philippine laws is again applied
here sans proof of Saudi laws. Under Philippine Laws, a quitclaim is generally frowned upon and are
strictly examined. In this case, based on the circumstances, Gran at that time has no option but to sign
the quitclaim. The quitclaim is also void because his separation pay was merely 2,948 Riyal which is
lower than the $850.00 monthly salary (3,190 Riyal).

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 Hasegawa vs Kitamura

Kazuhiro Hasegawa and Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd., petioners vs Minoru Kitamura,
respondent
G.R. No. 149177 November 23, 2007
538 SCRA 26

Facts: Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and
management support in the infrastructure projects national permanently residing in the Philippines. The
agreement provides that Kitamaru was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year. Nippon
assigned Kitamaru to work as the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) project.
When the STAR project was near completion, DPWH engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, this
time for the detailed engineering & construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement
(BBRI) Project. Kitamaru was named as the project manager in the contract.

Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its International Division, informed Kitamaru that the
company had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by
the company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project.

Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that Kitamaru’s
contract was for a fixed term that had expired. Kitamaru then filed for specific performance & damages
w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a MTD.

Nippon’s contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed by & between Japanese
nationals. Thus, the RTC of Lipa City has no jurisdiction. The claim for improper pre-termination of
Kitamaru’s ICA could only be heard & ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of
lex loci celebrationis & lex contractus.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the principle of lex loci celebrationis
was not applicable to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written
agreement put in issue. It held that the RTC was correct in applying the principle of lex loci solutionis.

Issue: Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific
performance & damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be
assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, “the state of the most significant
relationship rule,” or forum non conveniens.

Held: NO. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3 consecutive phases are involved:
jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction & choice of law
are 2 distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this
state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law w/c will
determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not
automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice
of the lex fori will often coincide, the “minimum contacts” for one do not always provide the necessary
“significant contacts” for the other. The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a
transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a
judgment.

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 In this case, only the 1st phase is at issue—jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has various
aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction
over the plaintiff/petitioner, over the defendant/respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of
the case and, in cases involving property, over the res or the thing w/c is the subject of the litigation. In
assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein, Nippon is actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign
authority w/c establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed
by law. It is further determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff
is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an
action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court
or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate
the claims.

In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the RTC is not properly vested by law
w/ jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for a civil case for specific performance & damages is one
not capable of pecuniary estimation & is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. What they rather
raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex
contractus, and the “state of the most significant relationship rule.” The Court finds the invocation of
these grounds unsound.

Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of the place of the ceremony” or the law of the place
where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractusmeans the “law of the
place where a contract is executed or to be performed.” It controls the nature, construction, and validity
of the contract and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended
by them either expressly or implicitly. Under the “state of the most significant relationship rule,” to
ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which state has the most
substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should
consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of
business, or place of incorporation of the parties. This rule takes into account several contacts and
evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be
resolved.

Since these 3 principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute,
they are rules proper for the 2nd phase, the choice of law. They determine which state's law is to be
applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this
case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.

Further, Nippon’s premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they
have not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining which law
should apply, 1st there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring theapplication of the conflict of
laws rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution
of a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded and proved.

It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before
a court or administrative agency, there are 3 alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss
the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume
jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the

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case and take into account or apply the law of some other State or States. The court’s power to hear
cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize
laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formal
agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by foreign sovereigns.

Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the RTC of its
jurisdiction. 1st, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court does not include it as a ground. 2nd, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the
basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the
sound discretion of the RTC. In this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. 3rd, the propriety of
dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle
is more properly considered a matter of defense.

2008
Korea Technologies Co. Ltd. Vs Lerma

Korea Technologies Co. Ltd., petitioner vs. Hon. Alberto A. Lerma, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 256 of Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City and Pacific General Steel Manufacturing
Corporation, respondents
GR NO. 143581 January 7, 2008

Facts: Petitioner Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. (KOGIES) is a Korean corporation which is engaged in the
supply and installation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Cylinder manufacturing plants, while private
respondent Pacific General Steel Manufacturing Corp. (PGSMC) is a domestic corporation. On March 5,
1997, PGSMC and KOGIES executed a Contract whereby KOGIES would set up an LPG Cylinder
Manufacturing Plant in Carmona, Cavite. The contract was executed in the Philippines. On April 7, 1997,
the parties executed, in Korea, an Amendment for Contract No. KLP-970301 dated March 5, 1997
amending the terms of payment. The contract and its amendment stipulated that KOGIES will ship the
machinery and facilities necessary for manufacturing LPG cylinders for which PGSMC would pay USD
1,224,000. KOGIES would install and initiate the operation of the plant for which PGSMC bound itself to
pay USD 306,000 upon the plant’s production of the 11-kg. LPG cylinder samples. Thus, the total
contract price amounted to USD 1,530,000. On October 14, 1997, PGSMC entered into a Contract of
Lease with Worth Properties, Inc. (Worth) for use of Worth’s 5,079-square meter property with a 4,032-
square meter warehouse building to house the LPG manufacturing plant. The monthly rental was PhP
322,560 commencing on January 1, 1998 with a 10% annual increment clause. Subsequently, the
machineries, equipment, and facilities for the manufacture of LPG cylinders were shipped, delivered,
and installed in the Carmona plant. PGSMC paid KOGIES USD 1,224,000. However, gleaned from the
Certificate executed by the parties on January 22, 1998, after the installation of the plant, the initial
operation could not be conducted as PGSMC encountered financial difficulties affecting the supply of
materials, thus forcing the parties to agree that KOGIES would be deemed to have completely complied
with the terms and conditions of the March 5, 1997 contract. For the remaining balance of USD306,000
for the installation and initial operation of the plant, PGSMC issued two post-dated checks: (1) BPI Check
No. 0316412 dated January 30, 1998 for PhP 4,500,000; and (2) BPI Check No. 0316413 dated March 30,
1998 for PhP 4,500,000. When KOGIES deposited the checks, these were dishonored for the reason
PAYMENT STOPPED. Thus, on May 8, 1998, KOGIES sent a demand letter to PGSMC threatening criminal

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action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in case of nonpayment. On the same date, the wife of
PGSMCs President faxed a letter dated May 7, 1998 to KOGIES President who was then staying at a
Makati City hotel. She complained that not only did KOGIES deliver a different brand of hydraulic press
from that agreed upon but it had not delivered several equipment parts already paid for.

Issue: Whether or not the arbitration clause in the contract of the parties should govern.

Held: Yes. Established in this jurisdiction is the rule that the law of the place where the contract is
made governs. Lex loci contractus. The contract in this case was perfected here in the Philippines.
Therefore, our laws ought to govern. Nonetheless, Art. 2044 of the Civil Code sanctions the validity of
mutually agreed arbitral clause or the finality and binding effect of an arbitral award. Art. 2044 provides,
“Any stipulation that the arbitrator’s award or decision shall be final, is valid, without prejudice to
Articles 2038, 2039 and 2040.”

The arbitration clause was mutually and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties. It has not been shown
to be contrary to any law, or against morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. There has
been no showing that the parties have not dealt with each other on equal footing. We find no reason
why the arbitration clause should not be respected and complied with by both parties. In Gonzales v.
Climax Mining Ltd., we held that submission to arbitration is a contract and that a clause in a contract
providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to arbitration is a contract.
Again in Del Monte Corporation-USA v. Court of Appeals, we likewise ruled that [t]he provision to
submit to arbitration any dispute arising therefrom and the relationship of the parties is part of that
contract and is itself a contract.

Having said that the instant arbitration clause is not against public policy, we come to the
question on what governs an arbitration clause specifying that in case of any dispute arising from the
contract, an arbitral panel will be constituted in a foreign country and the arbitration rules of the foreign
country would govern and its award shall be final and binding.

Thus, it can be gleaned that the concept of a final and binding arbitral award is similar to
judgments or awards given by some of our quasi-judicial bodies, like the National Labor Relations
Commission and Mines Adjudication Board, whose final judgments are stipulated to be final and
binding, but not immediately executory in the sense that they may still be judicially reviewed, upon the
instance of any party. Therefore, the final foreign arbitral awards are similarly situated in that they need
first to be confirmed by the RTC.

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 Raytheon International Inc. vs Stockton W. Rouzie Jr.

Raytheon International Inc., petitioner vs Stockton W. Rouzie Jr., respondents

G.R. No. 162894 February 26, 2008

Facts: Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a foreign corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the State of Connecticut, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered
into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in
several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts.
Then, respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI.
After 4 years, respondent filed before the Arbitration branch of the NLRC a suit against BMSI and Rust
International, Inc. (RUST) for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of
employment contract. Labor Arbiter rendered judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to pay respondent's
money claims. Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed
respondent's complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Respondent elevated the case to the SC but
was dismissed. After that, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for damages
before the RTC of La Union. The Complaint named as defendants herein petitioner as well as BMSI and
RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case. The complaint essentially reiterated the
allegation in the labor case that respondent was not paid for his services. The complaint also averred
that BMSI and RUST as well as petitioner itself had combined and functioned as one company.
In its Answer, petitioner alleged that contrary to respondent's claim, it was a foreign corporation
duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and denied entering into any arrangement with
respondent or paying the latter any sum of money. Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which
disclosed that per the written agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as
"Special Sales Representative Agreement," the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by
the laws of the State of Connecticut. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of
failure to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens. It was denied.
Issue: Can the Philippine Court acquire jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding the stipulation that
the same shall be governed by a foreign law?
Held: Yes. That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws
of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for
that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct
concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of
law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the
merits of the case is fair to both parties. The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when
the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before
the trial court.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse
impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties
are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.Petitioner averred foreign elements present in this
case which include 1. BRII and RUST are foreign corporations and respondent Rouzie is an American
citizen, and 2. The evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines. The Court held that these
are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a
factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is within
the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only
after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court's
desistance.

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 Spouses Domingo M. Belen vs Hon. Pablo R. Chavez

Spouses Domingo M. Belen and Dominga P. Belen, petitioner vs Hon. Pablo R. Chavez, Presiding Judge,
RTC- Branch 87, Rosario, Batangas and all others acting under his orders and Spouses Silvestre N. Pacleb
and Patricia A. Pacleb, respondents
G.R. No. 175334 March 26, 2008

Facts: Spouses Pacleb filed an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment against Spouses. Belen.
The summons was served on the Spouses Belen’s purported address in Laguna. Because the Spouses
Belen failed to show up at the pre-trial conference, the RTC allowed ex-parte presentation of evidence.
Spouses Belen subsequently filed an Motion to Dismiss, citing dismissal of the foreign case. For failure to
present a copy of the judgment of dismissal, the Motion to Dismiss was dismissed. Spouses Pacleb
amended the complaint, saying that they withdrew the complaint abroad because of prohibitive costs of
litigation. Spouses Belen again failed to appear in the rescheduled pre-trial conference, which prompted
the RTC to declare them in default and allowed the ex-parte presentation of evidence. In the meantine,
Atty. Alcantara, the counsel for Spouses Belen, died without the RTC being informed of such fact. The
RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Pacleb. A copy of the decision was sent to Atty. Alcantara, but was
returned with the notation “Addressee Deceased.” A copy of the same was then sent to the last known
address of the Spouses Belen in Laguna. Atty. Culvera, the new counsel of Spouses Belen, filed a motion
to quash the writ of execution as well as a notice of appeal. The RTC denied such, as well as his MR. The
CA also ruled against Spouses Belen. The SC sided with Spouses. Belen, saying that, despite the fact that
the court acquired jurisdiction over the Spouses Belen, there was a defective service of the copy of the
RTC decision.

Issue: Did the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners through either the proper
service of summons or the appearance of the late Atty. Alcantara on behalf of Sps. Belen?

Held: Yes, the appearance of of Atty. Alcantara and his filing of numerous pleadings were sufficient to
vest jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners. Through certain acts, Atty. Alcantara was impliedly
authorized by petitioners to appear on their behalf. The action filed against Spouses Belen, prior to the
amendment of the complaint, is for the enforcement of a foreign judgment in a complaint for breach of
contract whereby petitioners were ordered to pay private respondents the monetary award. It is in the
nature of an action in personam because Spouses Pacleb are suing to enforce their personal rights under
said judgment.

In an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident who does not voluntarily
submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons within the state is essential to
the acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. This method of service is possible if such defendant is
physically present in the country. If he is not found therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over
his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him. An exception was laid down
in Gemperle v. Schenker wherein a non-resident was served with summons through his wife, who was a
resident of the Philippines and who was his representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case filed
by him; moreover, the second case was a mere offshoot of the first case.

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 Spouses Alfredo D. Valmonte and Maria Lourdes Valmonte vs Clarita Alcala

Spouses Alfredo D. Valmonte and Maria Lourdes Valmonte, petitioners vs Clarita Alcala or Jane Doe,
reponsdents
(G.R. No. 168667, July 23, 2008)

Facts: The Spouses Alfredo and Maria Lourdes Valmonte are the unregistered owners of Apartment
No. 1411 which they leased to respondent Alcala, since they were migrating to the United States. Due to
Alcala’s subsequent failure to pay the agreed rentals despite written demand, the Spouses Valmonte
filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against her before the Metropolitan Trial Court. As the Spouses
Valmonte were already US citizens at that time, they signed the required Verification/Certification of
Non Forum Shopping of their complaint before a notary public in the State of Washington, and had such
Verification/Certification authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco. The MTC
ruled in favor of the Spouses Valmonte, however, it was reversed by the Regional Trial Court upon
appeal by Alcala.

The Spouses Valmonte filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals, which was
dismissed. The Spouses Valmonte then filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was likewise denied by
the CA on the ground that while the verification/certification was purportedly executed on March 17,
2005, the petition is dated March 31, 2005 in which the petitioner could not have actually read and
understood the petition or attested to the truth of the contents thereof because at the time the
executed the verification/certification, the petition was still inexistent. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Does the variance between the dates of the Verification/Certification that the Spouses
Valmonte executed abroad and the CA petition conclude that they did not read the petition before it
was filed in Court and that the Court should not take judicial notice of such?

Held: No. Generally, a pleading is not required to be verified unless required by law or by the Rules of
Court. One such requirement is found in Section 1 of Rule 42 which requires a party appealing from a
decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to file a verified petition for
review with the CA. Verification, when required, is intended to secure an assurance that the allegations
of a pleading are true and correct; are not speculative or merely imagined; and have been made in good
faith. To achieve this purpose, the verification of a pleading is made through an affidavit or sworn
statement confirming that the affiant has read the pleading whose allegations are true and correct of
the affiants personal knowledge or based on authentic records.

The petitioner has a unique situation as parties residing overseas who are litigating locally
through their local counsel. While these overseas litigants are not excused from complying with our
Rules such as the strict observance of the periods for appeal and the verification requirement, we must
take into account the attendant realities brought into play because they are suing from overseas or via
long distance communications with their counsel. In the verification requirement, there are added
formalities required for the acceptance in the Philippines of statements sworn overseas before foreign
notaries; we require their authentication by our consulates. This is a process whose completion time
may vary depending, among others, on various factors such as the location of the requesting party from
the consulate; the peculiarities of foreign laws on notaries; the volume of transactions in a consulate,
noting particularly the time of year when the authentication is requested; and the mode of sending the
authenticated documents to the Philippines. Apparently compelled by one or a combination of these

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reasons, the petitioners in fact manifested when they filed their petition (on March 31, 2005) that they
were submitting a photostatic copy of the Verification/Certification executed in Washington on March
17, 2005 since the original was still with the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco for authentication.
The Court take judicial notice that the petitioners request for authentication coincided with the
observance of the Holy Week a traditional period of prayer and holidays in the Philippines, for the
Philippines foreign embassies and consulates, and even for Filipinos overseas. The Court find it
significant that, conformably with their Manifestation, the petitioners counsel filed on April 8, 2005 the
duly sworn and authenticated Verification as soon as counsel received it. Under these circumstances,
there is every reason for an equitable and relaxed application of the rules to the petitioner’s situation.

Bienvenido C. Teoco and Juan C. Teoco, Jr. vs Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company

Bienvenido C. Teoco and Juan C. Teoco, Jr., petitioner vs Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company,
respondent
G.R. No. 162333, December 23, 2008

Facts: Lydia T. Co, married to Ramon Co, was the registered owner of two parcels of land. Ramon Co
mortgaged the said parcels of land to Metrobank for a sum of P200,000.00. The properties were sold to
Metrobank in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale under Act No. 3135. One year after the registration of the
Certificates of Sale, the titles to the properties were consolidated in the name of Metrobank for failure
of Ramon Co to redeem the same within the one year period provided for by law. Metrobank filed a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession against Ramon Co and Lydia Co (the spouses Co).
However, since the spouses Co were no longer residing in the Philippines at the time the petition was
filed, the trial court ordered Metrobank, on January 12, 1994 and again on January 26, 1994 to effect
summons by publication against the spouses Co. The brothers Teoco filed an answer-in-intervention
alleging that they are the successors-in-interest of the spouses Co, and that they had duly and validly
redeemed the subject properties within the reglementary period provided by law.

The RTC rendered its decision in favor of the brothers Teoco. According to the RTC, the case
filed by Metrobank should be dismissed since intervenor Juan C. Teoco, Jr., by his tender of P356,297.57
to Metrobank on February 10, 1992, within the reglementary period of redemption of the foreclosed
property, had legally and effectively redeemed the subject properties from Metrobank. The RTC added
that there is another reason for dismissing Metrobank’s petition: the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction
over the spouses Co. The RTC noted that Metrobank published its petition for writ of possession, but did
not publish the writ of summons issued by said court on February 16, 1994.

Metrobank appealed to the CA and ruled in their favor. As regards the question of jurisdiction,
the CA ruled that since the parcels of land in question were already registered in the name of
Metrobank at the time the petition was filed, and since the certificates of title of the spouses Co were
already cancelled, there is no more need to issue summons to the spouses Co. The CA noted that the
best proof of ownership of the parcel of land is a certificate of title. Further, the CA held that the
brothers Teoco were not able to effectively redeem the subject properties, because the amount
tendered was insufficient, and the brothers Teoco have not sufficiently shown that the spouses Co’s
right of redemption through a special power of attorney executed abroad was properly transferred to
them.

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Issue: Whether or not the special power of attorney executed in a foreign country is admissible in
evidence as a public document in our Courts.

Held: A special power of attorney executed in a foreign country is generally not admissible in evidence
as a public document in our courts. when the special power of attorney is executed and acknowledged
before a notary public or other competent official in a foreign country, it cannot be admitted in evidence
unless it is certified as such in accordance with the foregoing provision of the rules by a secretary of
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept of said
public document and authenticated by the seal of his office.

However, Metrobank never challenged either the content, the due execution, or the
genuineness of the assignment of the right of redemption. Consequently, Metrobank is deemed to have
admitted the same. Having impliedly admitted the content of the assignment of the right of redemption,
there is no necessity for a prima facie evidence of the facts there stated. In the same manner, since
Metrobank has impliedly admitted the due execution and genuineness of the assignment of the right of
redemption, a private document evidencing the same is admissible in evidence.

2009
Manuel B. Japson vs COMELEC and Jaime S. Ty

Manuel B. Japson, petitioners vs COMELEC and Jaime S. Ty, respondents

G.R.# 180088 January 19, 2009

Facts: Petitioner Manuel Japzon and private respondent Jaime S. Ty ran for Mayor of the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar in the local elections of 14 May 2007. Japzon instituted before the
COMELEC a Petition to disqualify and/or cancel Ty’s Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material
misrepresentation. He averred that Ty is a US citizen and had been residing in the USA for the last 25
years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy he falsely represented therein that he was a resident of
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar (“Barangay 6”), for one year before 14 May
2007 and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country. While Ty may have applied
for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually resided in Barangay 6 for a period of
one year immediately preceding the date of election. Reacquisition of citizenship does not automatically
establish his domicile at Barangay 6. He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by
Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. Ty
admits that he had indeed lost his Philippine citizenship when he was naturalized as a US citizen.
However, he alleges that prior to the election, he had successfully reacquired his Filipino citizenship as
shown by his act of executing an Oath of Allegiance to RP and a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship. He had also complied with the 1-year residency rule as shown by the following: CTC from
Barangay 6 (March 2006); Passport indicating that his residence is in Barangay 6 (Oct 2005); Registered
voter at Brgy 6 (July 2006). Pending this case, Ty won the elections. COMELEC 1st Division ruled for Ty.
COMELEC En Banc affirmed.

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Issue: Does reacquisition of Ty’s Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 had an automatic impact on his
residence/domicile?

Held: NO. Ty’s reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 had no automatic impact or
effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily
regain his domicile in Barangay 6. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of
choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of
choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth. Ty’s intent to establish a new domicile of choice
in Barangay 6 became apparent when, immediately after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship on 2
October 2005, he applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the
Philippines was Barangay 6. For the years 2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the local
tax jurisdiction of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by paying community tax and
securing CTCs from the said municipality stating therein his address as Barangay 6. Thereafter, Ty
applied for and was registered as a voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct.

Cordora vs. Commission on Elections

Gaudencio M. Cordora, petitioner vs. Commission on Elections and Gustavo S. Tabunting, respondents
G.R. No. 176947, February 19, 2009
580 SCRA 12

Facts: Gaudencio M. Cordora (Cordora) accused Gustavo S. Tambunting (Tambunting) of making false
assertions in his Certificate of Candidacy. Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for
local public office because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements.
Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two instances,
Tambunting claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the Philippines on 16 December 2000 and
upon departure from the Philippines on 17 June 2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates
confirmed that Tambunting acquired American citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii on
2 December 2000. Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any
misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy. To refute Cordora’s claim that Tambunting is not a
natural-born Filipino, Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he was
born of a Filipino mother and an American father. The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US
government after Tambunting’s father petitioned him through INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative)
merely confirmed Tambunting’s citizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambunting’s possession of an
American passport did not mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took an oath
of allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. Tambunting further stated that he has resided in the
Philippines since birth. Tambunting has imbibed the Filipino culture, has spoken the Filipino language,
and has been educated in Filipino schools. Tambunting maintained that proof of his loyalty and devotion
to the Philippines was shown by his service as councilor of Parañaque. The COMELEC Law Department
ruled for Tambunting. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the resolution of the COMELEC
Law Department.

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Issue: Is a candidate disqualified from running for public office by the fact that he has dual citizenship
prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy?

Held: NO. The fact that a candidate has dual citizenship prior to his filing his certificate of candidacy
does not disqualify him from running for public office. Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because
of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo the
naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130 only
served to confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from
the Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where Tambunting claimed
that he is an American. However, the same certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting
claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his
certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not
disqualify him from running for public office.

Philips Matthews vs Benjamin A. Taylor and Joselyn A. Taylor

Philips Matthews, petitioner vs Benjamin A. Taylor and Joselyn A. Taylor, respondents

G.R. No. 164584 June 22, 2009

Facts: On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn
C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn
bought from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at Manoc-Manoc,
Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration of P129,000.00. The sale was allegedly financed by
Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latters funds, constructed improvements thereon and
eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn.
All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna
Celestino, Joselyns sister.

However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. On
June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the
latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with
respect to their Boracay property.

On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an
Agreement of Lease (Agreement) involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual
rental of P12,000.00. The agreement was signed by the parties and executed before a Notary Public.
Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort.

Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his
(Benjamins) consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with
Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the
acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyns
husband, any transaction involving said property required his consent.

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 No Answer was filed, hence, the RTC declared Joselyn and the petitioner in defeault. On March
14, 1994, the RTC rendered judgment by default declaring the Agreement null and void. The decision
was, however, set aside by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 34054. The CA also ordered the RTC to allow the
petitioner to file his Answer, and to conduct further proceedings.

In his Answer, petitioner claimed good faith in transacting with Joselyn. Since Joselyn appeared
to be the owner of the Boracay property, he found it unnecessary to obtain the consent of Benjamin.
Moreover, as appearing in the Agreement, Benjamin signed as a witness to the contract, indicating his
knowledge of the transaction and, impliedly, his conformity to the agreement entered into by his wife.
Benjamin was, therefore, estopped from questioning the validity of the Agreement.

On June 30, 1997, the RTC disposed of the case by rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendants resolving however that the Boracay property is considered as community
property of Benjamin and Joselyn; thus, the consent of the spouses was necessary to validate any
contract involving the property. Benjamins right over the Boracay property was bolstered by the courts
findings that the property was purchased and improved through funds provided by Benjamin. Although
the Agreement was evidenced by a public document, the trial court refused to consider the alleged
participation of Benjamin in the questioned transaction primarily because his signature appeared only
on the last page of the document and not on every page thereof.

On appeal to the CA, petitioner still failed to obtain a favorable decision. In its December 19,
2003 Decision, the CA affirmed the conclusions made by the RTC. The appellate court was of the view
that if, indeed, Benjamin was a willing participant in the questioned transaction, the parties to the
Agreement should have used the phrase with my consent instead of signed in the presence of. The CA
noted that Joselyn already prepared an SPA in favor of Benjamin involving the Boracay property; it was
therefore unnecessary for Joselyn to participate in the execution of the Agreement. Taken together,
these circumstances yielded the inevitable conclusion that the contract was null and void having been
entered into by Joselyn without the consent of Benjamin.

In fine, we are called upon to determine the validity of an Agreement of Lease of a parcel of land
entered into by a Filipino wife without the consent of her British husband. In addressing the matter
before us, we are confronted not only with civil law or conflicts of law issues, but more importantly, with
a constitutional question.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the Agreement of lease entered into by a Filipino wife without the consent of
her British husband is valid.
2. Whether or not the parcel of land subject for lease agreement is the exclusive property of
Joselyn Taylor, a Filipino citizen.

Held: It is undisputed that Joselyn acquired the Boracay property in 1989. Said acquisition was
evidenced by a Deed of Sale with Joselyn as the vendee. The property was also declared for taxation
purposes under her name. When Joselyn leased the property to petitioner, Benjamin sought the
nullification of the contract on two grounds: first, that he was the actual owner of the property since he
provided the funds used in purchasing the same; and second, that Joselyn could not enter into a valid
contract involving the subject property without his consent.

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 The trial and appellate courts both focused on the property relations of petitioner and
respondent in light of the Civil Code and Family Code provisions. They, however, failed to observe the
applicable constitutional principles, which, in fact, are the more decisive.

Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:

Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be

transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the
public domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional provision, they are also disqualified
from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of this constitutional provision is the conservation of
the national patrimony. Our fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands of the
public domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of
which is owned by Filipinos.

In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, we find and so hold that Benjamin has no right to nullify
the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely
prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared
to be the designated vendee in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto.
This is true even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By
entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no
reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject
property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no
capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the
theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal
property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional
prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a
substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or
disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.

In fine, the Agreement of Lease entered into between Joselyn and petitioner cannot be nullified
on the grounds advanced by Benjamin. Thus, we uphold its validity.

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 2010
Dacasin vs Dacasin

Herald Black Dacasin, petitioner vs. Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin, respondent
GR. No. 168785 February 5, 2010
611 SCRA 657

Facts: Herald Dacasin and Sharon Del Mundo wed together in Manila. A daughter named Stephanie
was born to them. Del Mundo sought and obtained a divorce decree against Dacasin in Illinois, USA. The
Illinois court awarded to Sharon the sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for
enforcement purposes. In Manila, the former spouses executed an agreement for the joint custody of
their daughter and chose the Philippine courts as the exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising
therefrom. Sharon undertook to secure an order from the Illinois court relinquishing jurisdiction to
Philippine courts. Herald sued Sharon in the RTC of Makati to enforce their agreement alleging that the
latter exercised sole custody over Stephanie in violation of their agreement. Sharon sought dismissal of
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce
the divorce decree. The RTC granted the motion based on the ground invoked by Sharon, and further
held that the divorce decree is binding on Herald following the nationality rule prevailing in this
jurisdiction. Herald sought reconsideration contending that the divorce decree obtained by Sharon is
void. Thus, the same is no bar to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners suit and enforce the
Agreement on the joint custody of the parties child.

Held: Yes. Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time Herald filed his suit in the trial
court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions
incapable of pecuniary estimation. An action for specific performance, such as Herald’s suit to enforce
the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of actions. Thus, jurisdiction-wise, Herald
went to the right court. Indeed, the trial courts refusal to entertain Herald’s suit was grounded not on its
lack of power to do so but on its thinking that the Illinois courts divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction.
This conclusion is unfounded.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot enforce the Agreement which is contrary
to law. At the time the parties executed the Agreement, Stephanie was under seven years old and
Herald and Sharon were no longer married under the laws of the United States because of the divorce
decree. The relevant Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in law is
undisputed: no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother. Clearly then, the
Agreements object to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime between respondent and petitioner
over their child under seven years old contravenes Philippine law.

As to Herald’s contention that the divorce decree obtained by Sharon is void which is bar to the
trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction, the former cannot rely on the divorce decrees alleged invalidity –
not because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decree violated Illinois law, but
because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse – to support the Agreements enforceability. The
argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel.
Van Dorn v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce
decree obtained abroad.

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 Ma vs. Fernandez Jr

Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr., and Valeriano Cabiling Ma, petitioners vs. Commissioner
Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr., Associate Commissioner Arthel R. Caronogan, Associate Commissioner Jose DL
Cabochan, Associate Commissioner Teodoro B. Delarmente and Associate Franklin Z. Littaua, in their
capacities as Chairman and Members of the Board of Commissioners (Bureau of Immigration) and Mat
G. Catral, respondents
G.R. No. 183133 July 26, 2010
623 SCRA 566

Facts: Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix Cabiling, Valeriano Cabiling, Lechi Ann Ma, Arceli Ma, Nicolas Ma,
and Isidro Ma are children of Felix Ma, a Taiwanese and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina. Pettioners
Felix Jr., Balgameo and Valeriano were all born under the 1935 Philippines Constitution. They were all
raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country for almost 60 years; they spent their whole
lives, studied and received their primary and secondary education in the country. They do not speak nor
understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in Taiwan and do not know any relative of their
father, they have not even traveled abroad; and they have already raised their respective families in the
Philippines. During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien
Certificates of Registration (ACRs). Immediately upon reaching the age of 21, they claimed Philippine
citizenship in accordance with Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that
“those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship, are citizens of the Philippines. Thus, on August 5, 1969, Feliz Jr. executed his
affidavit of election and took his oath of allegiance before then Judge Jose L. Gonzalez. Balgamelo did
the same before a notary public. In 1978, Valeriano took his oath of allegiance before then Judge
Salvador C. Sering, the fact of which the latter attested to in his Affidavit. Having taken their oath of
allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners however failed to have the necessary documents registered
in the Civil Registry as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625. More than 30 years after
they elected Philippine Citizenship that Balgamelo and Felix Jr., did so.

On the other hand, there is no showing that Valeriano complied with registration requirement.
Individual certifications issued by the Office of the City Election Officer, COMELEC show that all of them
are registered voters of Brgy. Washington, Precinct No. 0015A since June 1997 and those records of
pervious registration are no longer available because of the mandatory general registration every 10
years. Moreover, aside from exercising their right of suffrage, Balgamelo is one of the incumbent
Barangay Kagawads in Barangay Washington, Surigao City. The Bureau of Immigration received the
Complaint-Affidavit of a certain Mat G. Catral, alleging that Felix Ma and his seven children are
undesirable and overstaying aliens. Mr. Catral however did not participate in the proceedings and the
Ma family could not believe that the complaint against them was politically motivated because they
strongly supported a candidate in Surigao City in the 2004 National and Local Elections.

Issue: Whether or not public respondents are undocumented and/or improperly document aliens.

Held: NO. Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of
majority. It was only the registration of the documents of election with the civil registry that was
belatedly done.

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 The Supreme Court rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elct
Philippine Citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to complete the statutory
requirements for such election. We are not prepared to state that the mere exercise of suffrage, being
elected public official, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and other similar acts
showing exercise of the Philippine citizenship can take the place of election of citizenship. What we now
say is that where, as in petitioners’ case, the election of citizenship has in fact ben done and
documented within the constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of
election beyond the frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have
publicly, consistently, and continuously been done. The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over
half a century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to
formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship.

Cargill Inc. vs. Intra Strata Assurance Corporation

Cargill Inc., petitioner vs. Intra Strata Assurance Corporation, respondent

G.R. No. 168266 March 15, 2010
615 SCRA 304

Facts: Cargill, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, United
States of America, executed a contract with Northern Mindanao Corporation whereby the latter bound
itself to sell to Cargill, 20,000 to 24,000 metric tons of molasses at the price of $44 per metric ton. The
contract underwent amendment thrice and the latest terms require NMC to put up a performance bond
equivalent to $451,500, the value of only 10,500 metric tons of molasses at the rate of $43 per metric
ton to guarantee its performance to deliver the molasses. In compliance with the terms of the third
amendment, Intra Strata Assurance issued a performance bond of Php 11,287,500 as guarantee for
NMC’s delivery of 10,500 metric tons of molasses as well as a surety bond in the sum of Php 9,978,125
as guarantee for the repayment of the downpayment. However, NMC was able to deliver only 219.551
out of 10,500 metric tons. Thus, Cargill sent demand letters to NMC claiming payment under the
performance and surety bonds. When NMC failed to submit to its demands, Cargill filed against the
former a complaint for sum of money. Both parties entered into a compromise agreement but NMC still
failed to comply with its obligation under the compromise agreement. The trial court rendered
judgment ordering Intra Strata Assurance to pay Cargill the sum of Php 16,993,200 and attorney’s fees in
the sum of Php 200,000.00, and dismissed its counterclaim. On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court,
holding that Cargill, being a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without a license does
not have the capacity to file a suit, and its purchase of molasses were done in pursuance of its basic
business and not just mere isolated transactions.

Issue: Whether or not Cargill has legal capacity to sue before Philippine courts

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Held: Yes. Under Article 123 of the Corporation Code, a foreign corporation must first obtain a license
and a certificate from the appropriate government agency before it can transact business in the
Philippines. Where a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without the proper license, it
cannot maintain any action or proceeding before Philippine courts as provided under Section 133 of the
Corporation Code. In this case, petitioner and NMC amended their contract three times to give a chance
to NMC to deliver to petitioner the molasses, considering that NMC already received the minimum price
of the contract. There is no showing that the transactions between petitioner and NMC signify the intent
of petitioner to establish a continuous business or extend its operations in the Philippines. Cargill merely
imports molasses from NMC without opening an office or appointing an agent in the Philippines. Hence,
it is not doing business in the Philippines and does not need a license before it can maintain any action
or proceeding before Philippine courts.

Mitra v. Commission on Elections

Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra, petitioner vs. Commission on Elections, and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr.,
respondents
G.R. No. 191938 July 2, 2010
622 SCRA 744

Facts: When his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared
cancelled. Mitra was the incumbent Representative of Second District of Palawan. This district was then
included, among other territories, the municipality of Aborlan and Puerto PrincesaCity. He was elected
as a Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City and represented the legislative district for
three-(3) terms immediately before the elections of 2010. On March 26, 2007 or before the end of
Mitra’s second term as Representative of Puerto Princesa City was classified as a highly urbanized city
and thus ceased to be a component city of the province of Palawan. The direct legal consequence of this
new status was the ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City residents from voting of candidates for elective
provincial officials.

On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for
the transfer of his Voter’s Registration Record from Precint No. 03720 of Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto
Princesa City to Sitio Maligaya, Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aburlan, Province of Palawan. He
subsequently filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan. Soon
thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr., (the respondentsfiled a petition
to deny due course or to cancel Mitra’s Certificate of Candidacy.

Issue: Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan.

Held: Yes, Mitra is qualified to run for the position as Governor of Palawan. The Supreme Court ruled
that Mitra did not misrepresent himself and that he met the residency requirement as mandated by the
Constitution. Likewise the COMELEC could not present any legally acceptable basis to include that
Mitra’s statement in his Certificate of Candidacy regarding his residence was a misrepresentation.
Mitra’s domicile of origin was undisputedly Puerto Princesa City. For him to qualify as Governor in light
of the relatively change of status of Puerto Princesa City from a component city to a highly urbanized
city can no longer vote for provincial officials – He had to abandon his domicile of origin and acquire a

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new one within a local government unit where he intended to run, this would be his domicile of choice.
To acquire a domicile of choice, jurisprudence, which the COMELEC correctly invoked requires the
following;

(1) residence or bodily presence in a new locality;

(2) an intention to remain there; and
(3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.[63]

The contentious issues in Mitras case relate to his bodily presence, or the lack of it, in Aborlan,
and the declaration he made on this point. The respondents anchor their cause of action on the alleged
falsity of Mitras statement that he is a resident of Aborlan. To support this contention, the respondents
claim that the construction of the supposed Mitra residence or house, other than the leased premises in
Maligaya Feedmill, has yet to be completed, leaving Mitra with no habitable place in Aborlan. When
Mitra successfully refuted this original claim, the respondents presented sworn statements of Aborlan
residents contradicting Mitras claimed physical residence at the Maligaya Feedmill building in Aborlan.
They likewise point out, by sworn statements, that this alleged residence could not be considered a
house that Mitra could properly consider his residence, on the view that the feedmill place is beneath
what Mitra a three-term congressman and a member of the Mitra political clan of Palawan would
occupy.

Corpuz vs. Santo Tomas

Gerbert R. Corpuz, petitioner vs. Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas and the Solicitor General, respondents
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
628 SCRA 266

Facts: Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino and naturalized Canadian citizen married Filipina Daisylyn
Santo Tomas in Pasig City. Soon after the wedding, Corpuz went back to Canada for work. When he
returned to the Philippines, he was shocked to discover the extramarital affair of his wife. Disheartened,
Corpuz filed a petition for divorce in Canada and obtained a divorce decree from the Superior Court of
Justice therein. Corpuz moved on and met his fiance. Desirous of marrying her, Corpuz went to the Pasig
City Civil Registry Office to register the divorce decree on his and Sto. Tomas’s marriage certificate.
However, an NSO official told him that his marriage with the latter is still subsisting under Philippine law,
and the divorce decree must first judicially recognized by a Philippine court to be enforceable.
Accordingly, Corpuz filed a petition for recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
dissolved with the RTC without any opposition from Santo Tomas. The RTC denied Corpuz’s petition and
concluded that he was not a proper party as he is an alien and only the Filipino spouse can avail of the
remedy under par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code. Corpuz contends that Art. 26 applies as well to the
benefit of the alien spouse and that he is a proper party to the case.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Art. 26 of the Family Code is applicable to aliens such as Corpuz
2. Whether or not the inapplicability of Art. 26 constitutes as a bar for Corpuz from seeking
recognition of the foreign divorce

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Held:

1. No. The provision was included in the law to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying
his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Given the rationale
and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of
the Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
2. No. The unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does
not necessarily strip Corpuz of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree - direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to
clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the
recognition of the foreign judgment. A foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under the rules on evidence together with the aliens applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The records show that Corpuz attached to
his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its
authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. A remand is thus
appropriate given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s obvious
conformity with the petition. At the same time, it will allow other interested parties to oppose
the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

ATCI Overseas Corporation vs. Echin

ATCI Overseas Corporation, Amalia G. Ikdal and Ministry of Public Health – Kuwait, petitioners vs. Ma.
Josefa Echin, respondent
G.R. No. 178551 October 11, 2010
632 SCRA 528

Facts: ATCI Overseas Corporation, in behalf of its principal, the Kuwaiti Ministry of Public Health hired
Josefina Echin as a medical technologist for a period of two (2) years with a monthly salary of $1,200.00
under a MOA. The MOA requires newly hired employees to undergo a probationary period of one (1)
year, and are covered by the Kuwait’s Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2. Less than a week
into her first year of employment, Echin was terminated for not having passed the probationary period.
Echin filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal against ATCI and the Ministry. The Labor
Arbiter found Echin to have been illegally dismissed as there was no showing that there was just cause
to warrant her dismissal. The Labor Arbiter’s ruling was affirmed by the NLRC and the CA. ATCI and its
principal disown liability because Echin’s contract stipulates that her employment shall be governed by
the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait. Thus, they contended that the labor tribunals and CA

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erred in applying Philippine Labor Code provisions governing probationary employment in deciding the
case. The POEA rules in fact accord respect to the rules, customs and practices of the host country.

Issue: What law should govern the employment of Echin

Held: Philippine law. Petitioners’ contentions were unsubstantiated. It is hornbook principle in

international law that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the
law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case, petitioners failed to discharge.
Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign
law is the same as ours. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and
comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. Instead of submitting a copy
of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and translated by Embassy officials thereat, as
required under the Rules, what petitioners submitted were mere certifications attesting only to the
correctness of the translations of the MOA and the termination letter which does not prove at all that
Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti laws, respondent was
validly terminated. These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently prove that
respondent was validly terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws.

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