Civil Procedure dismiss the case. The RTC denied Ting Guan’s motion to dismiss.

dismiss the case. The RTC denied Ting Guan’s motion to dismiss. Ting Guan raised the RTC’s alleged
Handwritten Case Digests lack of jurisdiction over its person as additional ground for the dismissal of the complaint. Ting Guan
insisted that Ms. Fe Tejero, on whom personal service was served, was not its corporate secretary and
1. Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) vs Trinidad Valley was not a person allowed under Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court to receive a summons. The
RTC denied the motion and ruled that Ting Guan had voluntarily submitted to the court’s jurisdiction
Facts: Respondent owned a parcel of land, which the DAR placed under the coverage of RA 6657 and when it raised other arguments apart from lack of jurisdiction in its motion to dismiss.
were subsequently transferred to agrarian reform beneficiaries. Respondent filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), a petition assailing the validity of such act. DAR contended that the RTC had no ISSUE: WON the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Ting Guan.
jurisdiction over the case. RTC ruled that it had jurisdiction. CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. Hence,
this petition. RULING: Yes, the trial court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of Ting Guan. Tejero was not a
corporate secretary and, therefore, was not the proper person to receive the summons under Section
Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the instant case? 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. However, Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the trial court in
view of the procedural recourse that it took before that court. Its voluntary appearance is equivalent to
Ruling: No. Sec. 50 of RA 6657 vests the DAR with exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters service of summons. Furthermore, Ting Guan’s failure to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction over its
involving the implementation of agrarian reform. Petitioner’s allegations assail the acts of the DAR in person in the first motion to dismiss is fatal to its cause. Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the
awarding the CLOAs to the beneficiaries and question the procedure in fixing the compensation. The RTC when it filed a motion to dismiss and a "supplemental motion to dismiss" without raising the RTC’s
case at bar deals with acts of the DAR and the application, implementation, enforcement, or lack of jurisdiction over its person. Failure to raise the issue of improper service of summons in the first
interpretation of RA 6657 - issues which do not involve the "special jurisdiction" of the RTC acting as a motion to dismiss is a waiver of this defense and cannot be belatedly raised in succeeding motions and
Special Agrarian Court. Hence, when the court a quo heard and decided the instant case, it did so pleadings.
without jurisdiction.
4. Tagalog vs. Lim vda. De Gonzales
2. Surviving Heirs of Alfredo Bautista v Lindo
FACTS: Respondents filed with the RTC a Complaint for Recovery of Possession against petitioner.
They allege that Petitioner was their lessee and that he had stopped paying rentals. Petitioner prayed
Facts: Petitioners argue that respondents are estopped from seeking the dismissal of the case, it
for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the action for ejectment and unlawful detainer which
having been filed nine (9) years after the filing of the complaint and after they have actively participated
was beyond the jurisdiction of the RTC. RTC ruled in favor of respondents. CA affirmed said decision.
in the proceedings. Additionally, they allege that an action for repurchase is not a real action, but one
Hence, this petition.
incapable of pecuniary estimation, it being founded on privity of contract between the parties.
Respondents maintain that since the land is no longer devoted to agriculture, the right of repurchase
ISSUE: Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
under CA 141 can no longer be availed of.
RULING: No. The jurisdiction of a particular court is determined by the nature of the action pleaded as
Issues: WON RTC erred in granting the motion for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of
appearing from the allegations in the complaint. Based on the allegations in the complaint, it is clear
jurisdiction over the subject matter?
that the case involves only the issue of physical possession or unlawful detainer as defined in Section
1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. An ejectment suit is brought before the MTC to recover not
Ruling: No. The cause of action to redeem the land is one for specific performance, which is an action
possession de jure but physical possession only or possession de facto, where dispossession has
incapable for pecuniary estimation. While the deeds of sale do not explicitly contain the stipulation that
lasted for not more than one year.
the sale is subject to repurchase by the applicant, still, such legal provision is deemed integrated and
made part of the deed of sale as prescribed by law. Furthermore, even if we treat the action as one
Since the complaint was filed within one year from the expiration of the right to hold possession, this
involving title to real property or an interest therein, the contention that the MTC has jurisdiction will not
case is clearly an unlawful detainer suit within the jurisdiction of the MTC.
prosper even if the value of property is below 20,000 pesos, as respondents actually participated in the
proceedings before the RTC and aggressively defended their position, and by virtue of which they are
Also, neither of the parties brought forth the issue of ownership which was the reason given by the RTC
already barred to question the jurisdiction of the RTC following the principle of jurisdiction by estoppels.
for taking cognizant of the action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and any judgment, order or resolution
issued without it is void and cannot be given any effect. This rule applies even if the issue on
3. Tung Ho Steel Enterprises vs Ting Guan Trading Corporation, 720 SCRA 707
jurisdiction was raised for the first time on appeal or even after final judgment. In this case, Tagalog
raised the issue of jurisdiction in her Answer.
FACTS: Ting Guan was obligated under a contract of sale to deliver heavy metal scrap iron and steel
to Tung Ho. Subsequently, Tung Ho filed an action against Ting Guan for the recognition and
enforcement of the arbitral award before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. Ting Guan moved to

5. UST FACULTY UNION VS UST
FACTS: The Mariño Group filed a complaint with the Office of the Med-Arbiter of the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE), praying for the nullification of the election of the Gamilla Group as
officers of the USTFU. On December 3, 1996, a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) was entered
into by the Gamilla Group and the UST. The CBA superseded an existing CBA entered into by the UST
and USTFU which was intended for the period of June 1, 1993 to May 31, 1998.
ISSUE: WON the Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error when it
manifestly overlooked relevant facts not disputed by the parties which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion and in rendering a judgment that is based on a misapprehension of facts.
RULING: NO. Petitioner makes several allegations that UST committed ULP. The onus probandi falls
on the shoulders of petitioner to establish or substantiate such claims by the requisite quantum of
evidence. In the petition at bar, petitioner miserably failed to adduce substantial evidence as basis for
the grant of relief.
5. UST FACULTY UNION VS UST – NEW ONE
FACTS: [UST] sought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It contended
that the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary
arbitrators because it involves the interpretation and implementation of the provisions of the CBA; and
the conflict must be resolved as grievance under the CBA and not as unfair labor practice.
ISSUE: WON the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING: No, the LA has no jurisdiction over the present case. Jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations of the complaint. In the present case, USTFU alleged that UST committed unfair labor
practice in its blatant violation of the economic provisions of the 1996-2001 CBA, and subsequently, the
2001-2006 and 2006-2011 CBAs. Interpretations of the CBA’s provisions on economic benefits,
specifically those concerning the fund. Therefore, it was clearly error for the LA to assume jurisdiction
over the present case. The case should have been resolved through the voluntary arbitrator or panel of
voluntary arbitrators. Article 217(c) of the Labor Code provides that the Labor Arbiter shall refer to the
grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as provided in the CBA those cases that involve the
interpretation of said agreements.
7. ARIGO VS. SWIFT
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014
Facts: Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the
provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental,
Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology.
ISSUE: Whether this Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit any pleading
or manifestation in this case
HELD: No. The principle of State Immunity bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the
persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling. The alleged act or omission resulting in the
unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing
official military duties. It is not immunity from the observance of the law, rather immunity from the
exercise of territorial jurisdiction. However, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not
acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded
or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of
immunity of the State from suit.
8. Eduardo Monsanto vs. Lim. G.R. No. 178911, September 17, 2014
Facts:
In a letter, Pag-IBIG questioned the anomalous auction by the sheriff. It was re-assigned to Judge
Usman’s sala. Pag-IBIG informed the trial court that Eduardo had commenced paying monthly
amortizations; that Pag-IBIG is withdrawing its Petition for Extra-judicial Foreclosure. Lim, the winning
bidder, claimed that the period had elapsed without Eduardo redeeming the subject property; as such,
he is already entitled to the issuance of a writ of possession. RTC Branch 28 denied Petitioner’s motion
and ruled that the extrajudicial foreclosure with Lim as the winning bidder is in order and that De
Guzman did not abuse his authority. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
Issue: Whether or not a complaint was actually filed?
Ruling: No. Petition dismissed. RTC Branch 28 did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.
There was no proper initiatory pleading that was filed before the trial court. Moreover there were no
docket fees paid. Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket
fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
To stress, Pag-IBIG’s letter could not be considered as a formal complaint or petition. First, the parties
to the case were not identified. Second, the so-called claim or cause of action was not properly
mentioned or specified. Third, the letter miserably failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 7,
Rules of Court. The letter bore no caption; it was not even assigned a docket number; the parties were
not properly identified; the allegations were not properly set forth; no particular relief is sought; in fact,
only the intervention of Executive Judge Monsanto is requested; it was not signed by a counsel; and
most of all, there is no verification or certification against forum-shopping.
9. Antonio Garcia vs Ferro Chemical Inc.
SUMMARY: The respondent, Ferro Chemicals Inc, filed an appeal as to the civil aspect of the case to the
Court of Appeals while filing, together with the Makati City prosecutors office, a petition for certiorari
over the same case. The CA granted the appeal of the respondent while the Supreme Court dismissed
the petition for certiorari.
FACTS: The shares of stock included in the contract of sale entered into between Antonio Garcia and
Ferro Chemicals, Inc., were sold at public auction in payment of Antonio’s debt. Thus, Antonio was
charged with estafa under Article 318 (Other Deceits) of the Revised Penal Code for allegedly
misrepresenting to Ferro Chemicals, Inc. that the shares subject of the contracts entered into were free
from all liens and encumbrances. RTC acquitted him. CA ruled in favor of respondents. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether the act of Ferro Chemicals, Inc. in filing the notice of appeal before the Court of
Appeals and the petition for certiorari assailing the same trial court decision amounted to forum
shopping
HELD: Yes. The requisites for Forum Shopping have been met.
1. There is identity of parties. Petitioner and are both parties in the appeal before the CA and the
petition for certiorari before this court.
2. There is identity of the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in both actions. At a glance, it may
appear that Ferro Chemicals, Inc. asserted different rights: The appeal before the Court of Appeals is
purely on the civil aspect of the trial court’s decision while the petition for certiorari before this court is
allegedly only on the criminal aspect of the case. However, the civil liability asserted by Ferro
Chemicals, Inc. before the Court of Appeals arose from the criminal act. It is in the nature of civil liability
ex delicto. Ferro Chemicals, Inc. did not reserve the right to institute the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability ex delicto or institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case.
3. As to the third requisite, this court’s decision in G.R. No. 130880 affirming the trial court’s decision
acquitting the accused for lack of an essential element of the crime charged amounts to res judicata to
assert the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense.
Litigants cannot avail themselves of two separate remedies for the same relief in the hope that in one
forum, the relief prayed for will be granted. This is the evil sought to be averted by the doctrine of non-
forum shopping, and this is the problem that has happened in this case.
10. Aurora De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp.
Facts: It was discovered that the DENR issued free patents covering portions of respondent’s property
to several persons including the petitioner de Pedro. The RTC issued an order declaring as nullity the
titles and free patents issued to all defendants in respondent’s complaint, including the free patent
issued to De Pedro. Petitioner argued that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her person
because of improper and defective service of summons. De Pedro pointed out that summons was not
personally served upon her.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner?
Ruling: Yes. Although the sheriff’s return was defective in that there was no detail of the sheriffs effort
to personally serve summons upon petitioner, What cannot be denied is the fact that petitioner was
already notified of respondent’s action for annulment of petitioner’s title when she filed a motion for new
trial and, later, a petition for certiorari. At that time, petitioner was deemed, for purposes of due process,
to have been properly notified of the action involving her title to the property. Thus, when petitioner
erroneously filed her motion for new trial and petition for certiorari instead of an action for annulment of
judgment, she was deemed to have voluntarily participated in the proceedings against her title.
11. Angeles vs CA
FACTS: A complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage, foreclosure sale, reconveyance and
damages was filed by spouses Coronels against herein petitioner Angeles and others in the RTC.
Petitioner was evicted from the subject property as a result of the enforcement of the Writ of Execution
Pending Appeal. Petitioner filed a Petition for Contempt with the CA alleging that the OIC Martin defied
the trial court’s order to elevate the records of case to the CA and acted in collusion with the Coronels
to ensure that the latter obtain execution pending appeal. The CA ruled that the petition should have
been filed with the court a quo.
ISSUE: WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the case.
RULING: No, the CA is correct in dismissing such case. If the respondent public officers should be
punished for their perceived defiance or failure to abide by the trial court’s directives and processes,
then the contempt charge should have been initiated in the court a quo, and not in the CA. Sections 4
and 5, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court state, respectively, that “proceedings for indirect contempt may be
initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed” and “where the charge
for indirect contempt has been committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or
higher rank, or against an officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such court.”
12.PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE, INC. VS. FAR EAST BANK
Facts: Pinausukan had debts from Far East Bank (Now BPI), who commenced proceedings for the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages securing said obligations. This prompted Petitioner to apply
for a TRO. The RTC dismissed the case for failure to prosecute, and the order attained finality.
Pinausukan learned that Atty. Michael Dale Villaflor, its counsel, had not informed it about the order of
dismissal of the case. Pinausukan brought a petition for annulment in the CA. Pinausukan asserts that
Atty. Villaflor constituted professional misconduct amounting to EXTRINSIC FRAUD, properly
warranting the annulment of their case’s dismissal.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for annulment of judgment grounded on extrinsic fraud should be
granted by the CA.
Ruling: No. Pinausukan’s petition for annulment was substantively and procedurally defective.
The procedural defect in Pinausukan’s petition was its failure to submit together with the petition the
affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the cause of action.
The substantive defect related to the neglect of Atty. Villaflor do not constitute extrinsic fraud as
contemplated under Rule 47. By its nature, extrinsic fraud related to a cause that is collateral in
character, it relates to an act of the prevailing party which is committed outside of the case. Even in the
presence of fraud, annulment will not lie unless the fraud is committed by the adverse party, not by
one’s own lawyer.
13. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,V. SILICON PHILIPPINES, INC.

Facts:
Respondent filed an application for Tax Refund in the amount of 21 Million pesos for the alleged
unutilized input tax in the second quarter of 1998. Afterwards, since there was no final action taken by
Petitioner on Respondent’s claim for refund, Respondent filed a Petition for Review before the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA). CTA only granted 8 Million pesos. CA granted Respondent’s original claim of 21
Million pesos. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review.
Issue:
W/N the CTA has acquired jurisdiction thereby entitling the Respondent to a Tax Refund
Ruling:
NO. Section 112 (D) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 provides that the CIR has 120
days to act on Petitions for Tax Refunds. Upon the Commissioner’s denial or inaction over such
Petition, an aggrieved party has 30 days, to perfect an appeal to the CTA. Otherwise, the judicial claim
shall prescribe as filed out of time. When Respondent filed its claim, and its corresponding judicial
claim, the NIRC was already in effect and the strict observance in applying Section 112 of said Code is
proper. Therefore, when Respondent was unable to observe the 30-day period, a dismissal of his
appeal with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction was warranted.
14. Villagracia vs. 5th district Sharia Court
Facts: Roldan Mala purchased a parcel of land from Canete. When the land was surveyed, it was found
that Villegracia occupied the parcel of land covered by Mala's certificate of title. They failed to settle and
Mala filed an action to recover possession of the parcel of land with respondent 5th Sharia district
court. Petitioner argued that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of Mala's action for recovery of possession of a parcel of land.
Issue: Whether a Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try, and decide a real action where one of the
parties is a non-Muslim if the District Court decides the action applying the provisions of the Civil Code
of the Philippines
Ruling: No, Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts over real
actions not arising from customary contracts is concurrent with that of existing civil courts. However,
this concurrent jurisdiction over real actions "is applicable solely when both parties are Muslims".
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, with
Vivencio not being a Muslim. Therefore, all the proceedings before respondent Shari’a District Court,
including the service of summons on Vivencio, are void.
15. Tumpag vs. Tumpag
FACTS:
Esperanza Tumpag (petitioner) filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages against
Samuel Tumpag (respondent) before the RTC for occupying land of the Plaintiff for more than TEN (10)
years. Defendant refused to vacate said portion he has occupied inspite of repeated demands from
Plaintiff. Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: failure to state a cause
of action; that the action was barred by prior judgment; and lack of jurisdiction. RTC dismissed the
case. CA nullified the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint should be dismissed because of petitioner’s failure to allege in the
complaint the assessed value of the disputed property (also considering that a copy of Declaration of
Real Property showing the property’s assessed value was attached to the complaint).
RULING:
No. Generally, the court should only look into the facts alleged in the complaint to determine whether a
suit is within its jurisdiction. There may be instances, however, when a rigid application of this rule may
result in defeating substantial justice or in prejudice to a party’s substantial right. In the present case,
we find reason not to strictly apply the abovementioned general rule, and to consider the facts
contained in the Declaration of Real Property attached to the complaint in determining whether the RTC
had jurisdiction over the petitioner’s case. A mere reference to the attached document could facially
resolve the question on jurisdiction and would have rendered lengthy litigation on this point
unnecessary.
16. Zacarias vs. Anacay
Facts: Zacarias filed a complaint for Ejectment with Damages or Unlawful Detainer case in MCTC of
Cavite against respondents Anacay and members of her household, who entered the subject property
and occupied the same. When demanded to vacate, respondents refused. MCTC dismissed the
complaint and ruled in favor of respondents Anacay. The case was appealed to the RTC but reversed
the inferior court's decision. It was appealed to the CA but reversed the RTC's decision. The CA held
that the MCTC clearly had no jurisdiction over the case as the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the MCTC has jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case?
Held:
No. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party
clearly within the class of cases for which Section 1 of Rule 70 which provides a summary remedy and
must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction.
The complaint filed by the petitioner failed to alleged the cause of action for unlawful detainer as it does
not describe possession by the respondents being initially legal or tolerated by the petitioner and which
became illegal upon termination by the petitioner of such lawful possession. Thus, the complaint did not
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the MCTC had no
jurisdiction over the case. The complaint filed by the petitioner does not state how the entry was
affected and when the dispossession started, the remedy should either be accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria.
17. Lanuza vs. BF Corporation
Facts: BF Corporation filed a collection complaint with the RTC against Shangri-La and the members of
its board of directors, as the latter failed to pay for the construction of Shangri-La Mall. The dispute was
submitted for arbitration as stipulated in the parties’ contract. Shangri-La filed an omnibus motion and
BF Corporation an urgent motion for clarification, both seeking to clarify the term, "parties," and whether
Shangri-La's directors should be included in the arbitration proceedings and served with separate
demands for arbitration. Petitioners filed their comment on Shangri-La's and BF Corporation's motions,
praying that they be excluded from the arbitration proceedings for being non-parties to Shangri-La's
and BF Corporation's agreement.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners should be made parties to the arbitration proceedings?
Ruling: Yes. A corporation's representatives are generally not bound by the terms of the contract
executed by the corporation. However, there are instances when the distinction between personalities
of directors, officers, and representatives, and of the corporation, are disregarded. When there are
allegations of bad faith or malice against corporate directors or representatives, it becomes the duty of
courts or tribunals to determine if these persons and the corporation should be treated as one.
When the directors are impleaded in a case against a corporation, alleging malice or bad faith on their
part in directing the affairs of the corporation, complainants are effectively alleging that the directors
and the corporation are not acting as separate entities. Complainants effectively pray that the corporate
veil be pierced because the cause of action between the corporation and the directors is the same.
Complainants have no choice but to institute only one proceeding against the parties. Under the Rules
of Court, filing of multiple suits for a single cause of action is prohibited. Institution of more than one suit
for the same cause of action constitutes splitting the cause of action, which is a ground for the
dismissal of the others.
18. Zuniga-Santos vs Santos Gran
Facts: Petitioner Eliza Zuñiga-Santos filed a Complaint for annulment of sale and revocation of title
against respondents Maria Divina Gracia Santos-Gran (Gran) and the Register of Deeds of Marikina
City. She discovered that her properties were transferred in Gran’s name, the alleged daughter of her
second husband whose birth certificate was forged to make it appear so. Gran filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground the Amended Complaint failed to state a cause of action as the void and voidable
documents sought to be nullified were not properly identified nor the substance thereof set forth. RTC
dismissed. CA Affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of petitioner’s Amended Complaint should be sustained.
Ruling: Yes. A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or
defense asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusions of fact, or conclusions of law. The
claim that the sale was effected through “voidable and void documents” partakes merely of a
conclusion of law that is not supported by any averment of circumstances that will show why or how
such conclusion was arrived at. In fact, what these “voidable and void documents” are were not
properly stated and/or identified. Hence, by merely stating a legal conclusion, the Amended Complaint
presented no sufficient allegation upon which the Court could grant the relief petitioner prayed for.
Thus, said pleading should be dismissed on the ground of failure to state cause of action, as correctly
held by the RTC.
19. Penta Pacific Realty Corporation vs. Ley Construction
Facts: The petitioner owned the 25th floor of the Pacific Star Building in Makati City, which was leased
by Ley Construction. It was agreed upon by the parties that in case of default in monthly rentals, the
petitioner may repossess the property. Later, the respondent expressed his intention to purchase the
entire property, whereby they executed a contract to sell and a reservation agreement. Respondent
made partial payment but failed to pay the monthly amortizations. The petitioner expressed to cancel
the contract to sell and the reservation agreement, and demanded that the respondent pay the rentals.
The respondent failed to pay the rentals and did not vacate the premises, leading the petitioner to file
an ejectment complaint against the former. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner, ordering the
respondent to pay the rentals and to vacate the area. CA affirmed the RTC's decision.
Issue: Whether or not the MeTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
The allegations of the complaint made out a case of unlawful detainer, vesting the MeTC with exclusive
original jurisdiction over the complaint. As alleged therein, the cause of action of the petitioner was to
recover possession of the subject property from the respondent upon the latter’s failure to comply with
the former’s demand to vacate the subject property after the latter’s right to remain thereon terminated
by virtue of the demand to vacate. Indeed, the possession of the latter, although lawful at its
commencement, became unlawful upon its non-compliance with the former’s demand to vacate.
The jurisdiction of the MeTC was not ousted by the fact that what was ultimately proved as to how entry
by the respondent had been made or when the dispossession had started might have departed from
that alleged in the complaint. As earlier stated, jurisdiction over the subject matter was determined from
the allegations of the complaint, which clearly set forth a cause of action for unlawful detainer
20. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs Ley Construction and Development Corporation
Facts: Plaintiff issued a Letter of Credit in favor of Supplier, Global Enterprises Limited, in the amount
of USD 802,500.00. The letter of credit covered the importation by defendant LCDC of 15,000 metric
tons of Iraqi cement from Iraq. The latter negotiated its Letter of Credit to bank Credit Suisse of Zurich.
The cement that was to be imported through the opening of the subject Letter of Credit never arrived in
the Philippines. The obligation covered by the subject Letter of Credit has long been overdue and
unpaid despite demands. Plaintiff then instituted the instant complaint for recovery of payments,
inclusive of interest and penalty and other costs. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss by way of
demurrer to evidence. RTC granted the demurrer. CA found no merit in the Bank’s appeal.
Issue: W/N there is a cause of action?
Ruling: A cause of action has three essential elements: (1) the existence of a legal right in favor of the
plaintiff; (2) a correlative legal duty of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) an act or omission by
such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff with a resulting injury or damage to the plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for the recovery of relief from the defendant.
In this case, however, even the legal rights of the Bank and the correlative legal duty of LCDC have not
been sufficiently established by the Bank in view of the failure of the Bank’s evidence to show the
provisions and conditions that govern its legal relationship with LCDC, particularly the absence of the
provisions and conditions supposedly printed at the back of the Application and Agreement for
Commercial Letter of Credit. Even assuming arguendo that there was no impropriety in the negotiation
of the Letter of Credit and the Bank’s cause of action was simply for the collection of what it paid under
said Letter of Credit, the Bank did not discharge its burden to prove every element of its cause of action
against LCDC.
21. Sps. Crisologo v JEWN Industrial Corp.
Facts: JEWM filed a separate action for cancellation of lien with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction before RTC-Br. 14 to prevent the public sale of the subject land. “The Register of Deeds of
Davao City, Sheriff Robert Medialdea, John and Jane Does and all persons acting under their direction"
were impleaded as defendants. Spouses Crisologo filed a Very Urgent Manifestation, questioning the
authority of the Court to restrain the execution proceedings. This was opposed by JEWM on the ground
that the Spouses were not parties in the case. No motion to intervene was, however, filed as the
Spouses believed that it was unnecessary since they were already the John and Jane Does named in
the complaint. RTC-Br. 14 denied Spouses Crisologo’s Omnibus Motion and granted JEWM’s writ of
preliminary injunction. CA affirmed decision of RTC-Br. 14.
Issue: WON CA correctly ruled that RTC-Br. 14 acted without grave abuse of discretion in failing to
recognize Spouses Crisologo as indispensable parties in the case for cancellation of lien?
Ruling: No. In an action for the cancellation of memorandum annotated at the back of a certificate of
title, the persons considered as indispensable include those whose liens appear as annotations
pursuant to Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529. Spouses Crisologo’s liens were indeed annotated at the
back of TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676. Thus, as persons with their liens annotated, they stand to be
benefited or injured by any order relative to the cancellation of annotations in the pertinent TCTs. In
other words, they are as indispensable as JEWM itself in the final disposition of the case for
cancellation, being one of the many lien holders. As indispensable parties, Spouses Crisologo should
have been joined as defendants in the case.
22. Republic v. NOMBOKU PEAK Inc.
FACTS: Namboku is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of providing manpower services
to various clients. Namboku filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari and a Motion to Expunge on the
ground that the Secretary of Labor is a mere nominal party who has no legal standing to participate or
prosecute the case. It argued that the Secretary of Labor should have refrained from filing the said
Motion for Reconsideration and should have maintained the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
ISSUE: Whether the Secretary of Labor, a quasi-judicial officer, has locus standi to appeal the decision
he rendered to a higher court for review
RULING: No. The Secretary of Labor is not the real party-in interest vested with personality to file the
present petitions. A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, only real parties-in-interest who participated in the litigation of the case before the CA can
avail of an appeal by certiorari. The case emanated from the petitions for certification election filed with
the Med-Arbiter and subsequently appealed to the Secretary of Labor. As the officer who rendered the
decision now subject of these cases, the Secretary of Labor should have remained impartial and
detached from the time the cases reached her until the same were being scrutinized on appeal.
23. Magallanes vs Palmer Asia Inc, G.R. No. 205179, July 18, 2014
FACTS: Andrews International Product. Inc (Andrews) filed a case against its employee sales agent
Magallanes for violation of BP 22. Pending such case, Palmer Asia (Palmer) entered into an agreement
with Andrews whereby all the business of Andrews was going to be handled by Palmer. During hearing,
the counsel of Palmer appeared on behalf of Andrews. Magallanes assailed that Palmer is not a real
party in interest. MeTC 62 denied Magallanes’ motion for lack of merit. RTC ruled in favor of
Magallanes because “the x x x complaining juridical entity has not fully established the existence of a
debt by Mr. Magallanes in its favor.” CA modified decision of the RTC and ruled against Magallanes.
ISSUE: Whether or not Palmer is a real party-in-interest.
RULING: No. The real party in this case is Andrews. Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court
means material interest or an interest in use to be affected by the decree of judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved.
Although Andrews relinquished control of its business to Palmer, it was never dissolved and thus
remained existing. The Corporation Code provides that a corporation can only be dissolved in two
ways, voluntary and involuntary. In the case of Andrews, no document was presented that majority of
its Board of Directors passed a resolution terminating its corporate life. No complaint was also filed with
the SEC to involuntarily terminate the same, thus, for all intents and purposes, it is still existing
although not operational.
24. Association of Flood Victims v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioners Association of Flood Victims and Jaime Aguilar Hernandez (Hernandez) filed with this Court
a special civil action for certiorari and/or mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners
assert that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued Minute Resolution No.
12-0859. Furthermore, petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel publication of
the COMELEC Minute Resolution.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners have capacity to sue.
RULING: NO.
Petitioner Association of Flood Victims is an unincorporated association not endowed has no juridical
personality and thus, cannot sue in the name of the association. If an association has no juridical
personality, then all members of the association must be made parties in the civil action.
There is no showing that petitioner Hernandez is validly authorized to represent petitioner Association
of Flood Victims. Since petitioner Association of Flood Victims has no legal capacity to sue, petitioner
Hernandez, who is filing this petition as a representative of the Association of Flood Victims, is likewise
devoid of legal personality to bring an action in court. Neither can petitioner Hernandez sue as a
taxpayer because he failed to show that there was illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation or
that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.

25. GERONIMO v. CA
FACTS: Respondent spouses Estela and Rodolfo Calderon filed a complaint before the HLURB for
specific performance and issuance of cease and desist order for damages against Spouses Geronimo
who erected a building in their lot. The building turned out to be their church and that the noise therein
allegedly affected respondents’ health and caused inconvenience. HLURB rendered a decision in favor
of respondents. CA affirmed decision of HLURB. Petitioners averred that the HLURB has no jurisdiction
over the case which primarily involves abatement of nuisance, primarily lodged with the regular courts,
and that they, (petitioner spouses Geronimo), are not real parties thereof for the reason that the action
filed is also against SACC (name of the petitioner's church) and the Silverland Subdivision Assoiation.
ISSUE:
(1) WON HLURB has jurisdiction over the case
(2) WON Petitioners Spouses Geronimo are indispensable parties in this case
HELD:
(1) Yes. Respondents sued to stop the church activities inside the subdivision which is in contravention
of the residential use of the subdivision lots. Respondents properly filed their complaint before the
HLURB. The HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the
subdivision developer and the lot buyer, or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to
comply with its contractual and statutory obligations to make the subdivision a better place to live in.
(2) Yes. Petitioners are indispensable parties for they were the ones who built and operate the church
inside the subdivision and without them no final determination can be had of the action. Petitioners are
the ones who will be affected by the judgment. In fact, they are the ones who are prohibited from using
the subject property as a church.
26. City of Lapu-lapu v. PEZA
Facts: These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari the City of Lapu-Lapu and the Province
of Bataan separately filed against the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA).
In G.R. No. 184203, the City of Lapu-Lapu (the City) assails the Court of Appeals’ decision dated
January 11, 2008 and resolution dated August 6, 2008, dismissing the City’s appeal for being the
wrong mode of appeal. The City appealed the Regional Trial Court, Branch 111, Pasay City’s decision
finding the PEZA exempt from payment of real property taxes.
In G.R. No. 187583, the Province of Bataan (the Province) assails the Court of Appeals’ decision dated
August 27, 2008 and resolution dated April 16, 2009, granting the PEZA’s petition for certiorari. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 115, Pasay City gravely abused its
discretion in finding the PEZA liable for real property taxes to the Province of Bataan.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the City of Lapu-Lapu’s appeal for raising pure
questions of law;
2. Whether the Regional Trial Court, Branch 111, Pasay City had jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide
the City of Lapu-Lapu’s petition for declaratory relief;
3. Whether the petition for injunction filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 115, Pasay City, is a
local tax case appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals;
HELD:
1. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the City of Lapu-Lapu’s appeal for raising pure
questions of law pursuant to Rule 50, Section 2 of the Rules of Court. The issue of whether the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay had jurisdiction over the PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief is a
question of law, jurisdiction being a matter of law. The issue of whether the PEZA is a government
instrumentality exempt from payment of real property taxes is likewise a question of law since this
question is resolved by examining the provisions of the PEZA’s charter as well as other laws relating to
the PEZA.
2. The Regional Trial Court of Pasay had no jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the PEZA’s petition for
declaratory relief against the City of Lapu-Lapu. A petition for declaratory relief must satisfy six
requisites:
1) The subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents and the validity
thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the
documents in question; 4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one
between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.
We rule that the PEZA erred in availing itself of a petition for declaratory relief against the City. The
City had already issued demand letters and real property tax assessment against the PEZA, in violation
of the PEZA’s alleged tax-exempt status under its charter. The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995,
the subject matter of PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief, had already been breached. The trial
court, therefore, had no jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief.
3. The Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over the PEZA’s petition for certiorari against the Province
of Bataan. The PEZA’s petition for certiorari may be treated as an appeal. First, the petition for
certiorari was filed within the 15-day reglementary period for filing an appeal. Second, the petition for
certiorari raised errors of judgment. Third, there is sufficient reason to relax the rules given the
importance of the substantive issue However, the PEZA’s petition for certiorari was filed before the
wrong court. The PEZA should have filed its petition before the Court of Tax Appeals.
27. Fernandez v. Villegas
FACTS:
In an ejectment case filed by Lourdes Fernandez and Cecilia Sapno against Norma Villegas, an appeal
was sought by the plaintiff Fernandez and which was denied on the ground that the verification and
certification against forum shopping was defective since it was only signed by Lourdes in violation of
Sec. 5 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court which requires all the plaintiffs to sign the same. There was no
showing that Lourdes was authorized and that there was no special power of attorney either; hence,
CA dismissed the appeal by plaintiff.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in dismissing outright the CA petition due to a defective verification and
certification against forum shopping.
HELD:
Yes. SC granted plaintiff’s petition and remanded the case to the CA. The lone signature of Lourdes on
the verification attached to the CA petition constituted substantial compliance with the rules and that the
petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common interest in the property subject of the action,
the fact that only one of the petitioners executed the verification or certification of forum shopping will
not deter the court from proceeding with the action.
28. Fuji Television Network Inc. v. Arlene Espiritu
FACTS:
Arlene Espiritu filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with NLRC against her employer Fuji Television
Network Inc. Arlene filed a manifestation before the SC stating that the court may not take jurisdiction
over the case since Fuji failed to authorize Corazon E. Acerden to sign the verification.
ISSUE: WON the petition for review should be dismissed as Corazon E. Acerden, the signatory of the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping of the petition, had no authority to sign the
verification and certification on behalf of Fuji.
RULING: No. Section 4(e) of Rule 45 requires that petitions for review should "contain a sworn
certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42." Section 5
of the same rule provides that failure to comply with any requirement in Section 4 is sufficient ground to
dismiss the petition. In its petition for review on certiorari, Fuji attached Hideaki Ota’s secretary’s
certificate authorizing Shuji Yano and Jin Eto to represent and sign for and on behalf of Fuji. The
secretary’s certificate was duly authenticated by Sulpicio Confiado, Consul-General of the Philippines in
Japan. Likewise attached to the petition is the special power of attorney executed by Shuji Yano,
authorizing Corazon to sign on his behalf. The verification and certification against forum shopping was
signed by Corazon. Thus, Fuji substantially complied with the requirements of verification and
certification against forum shopping.
29. Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap Inc. v. Sec. Jesse Robredo
FACTS:
Petitioners directly filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus before the SC, seeking to compel the
public respondents LGUs to first secure an eviction and/or demolition order from the court prior the
implementation of Sec. 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 which authorize evictions and demolitions without
any court order when (1) persons or entities occupy danger areas and (2) persons or entities where
government infrastructure projects are about to be implemented. They argue that the said law offends
their right to due process. Public respondents prayed for an outright dismissal of the petition for its
serious procedural defects and for violation the principle of hierarchy of courts.
ISSUE: WON petition should be dismissed?
RULING:
YES. Petitioners have disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to the Court with their
petition for prohibition and mandamus. They appear to have forgotten that the SC is a court of last
resort, not a court of first instance. The hierarchy of courts should serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for Rule 65 petitions. The concurrence of jurisdiction among the SC, CA and RTC to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction does not
give the petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of forum.
Furthermore, petitioners wrongly availed of a petition for prohibition and mandamus. The law clearly
shows that the acts complained of are beyond the scope of a petition for prohibition and mandamus.
The use of the permissive word “may” implies that the public respondents have discretion when their
duty to execute evictions and/or demolitions shall be performed
30. Candelaria vs RTC City of San Fernando, G.R. No.173861
Facts: During an alleged buy-bust operation, petitioners were arrested for delivering, with the intention
to sell, five cases of counterfeit Fundador Brandy. They were formally charged with violation of
Republic Act No. 8293 or the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines. Petitioners filed a Motion to
Suppress/Exclude Evidence on the ground that evidence the prosecution intended to present were
obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. This is
considering that at the time the alleged counterfeit products were seized, they were neither committing
nor attempting to commit a crime in the presence of the arresting officers as to justify the conduct of
search and seizure following their unlawful arrest. RTC denied their motion; hence a petition for
certiorari under rule 65 was filed.
Issue: Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying the petitioner’s motion to set the case for suppression hearing.
Ruling: No. In every special civil action under Rule 65, a party shows that his or her resort to such
extraordinary remedy is justified by the absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. He must allege in his petition and establish facts to show that any
other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate. In the case at bar, Petitioner failed to do so.
It is undisputed that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case and the person of the petitioners. As such,
any perceived error in its interpretation of the law and its assessment of evidence is correctible by
appeal, not certiorari, as the same would only be considered an error of judgment and not of
jurisdiction.
31. Vergara v. Otadoy
FACTS:
Atty. Otadoy filed a motion to postpone the pre-trial conference to April 20, 2007. He claimed that on
March 4, 2007, he was invited to deliver a lecture at the National Annual Lectureship of the Church of
Christ on March 11-14, 2007. Without waiting for a ruling on his motion, Atty. Otadoy proceeded to
attend the lecture in Zamboanga. At the pre-trial conference, the petitioners’ counsel opposed the
motion to postpone the pre-trial conference arguing that Atty. Otadoy failed to file a pre-trial brief and
that his motion was filed late. The petitioners’ counsel moved that he be allowed to present his
evidence ex parte as stated in Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Atty. Otadoy’s motion to postpone
the pretrial conference.

Held: No. Under Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, the counsels and the parties are mandated to appear at
pre-trial. Their non-appearance may be excused only if there is a valid cause or if a representative
appears on their behalf. If the defendant fails to appear, the RTC may allow the plaintiff to present
evidence ex parte and may render judgment based on it. A motion for postponement is a privilege and
not a right. The movant should not assume that his motion would be granted. Atty. Otadoy’s failure to
attach proof that he attended the alleged lectureship weighs heavily against him. Thus, we find that he
did not sufficiently establish a valid cause to postpone the pre-trial conference.

Rules of procedure are with us to ensure prompt, speedy, and orderly dispensation of justice. When
procedural rules are at the point of being abused, such as when the litigant fails to establish a valid
cause to postpone the proceedings, procedural rules cannot and must not be brushed aside.