Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Chapter 14
Reflections on t h e
Parad oxes of Mode rni t y
A Conversation with James March
A Critical Rationality
It did not require the arrival of postmodernism to note the exaggerated and mythologi-
cal nature of the Western faith in rationality and the claims made on its behalf. From the
philosopher David Hume to liberal skeptics such as Bertrand Russell, Karl Popper, and
Ernest Gellner, critical rationalists have unmasked the illusory nature of the “Heavenly
City” promised by uncritical advocates of rationality. What they, and others, have
revealed is the misleading hubris and dangerous consequences of an exaggerated faith
in the ability of “modernity projects” to define and deliver a “one best way” of thought
and action (Scott 1999) and bring about order and control in human affairs (Smart 1999;
Wagner 2012).
Within organizational studies, these insights have been reflected in Herbert Simon’s
critique of equating the application of “procedural” rationality with the attainment of
“substantive” rationality (Simon 1976), and they have informed critiques of classical,
Richard Badham 279
A Predictable Irrationality
Yet, despite awareness of the limitations and dangers of exaggerated views of what
rational thought and action can deliver, the faith in rationality remains strong and influ-
ential, fueled by great hopes (Brunsson 2006) and embodied in urgent quests (Bauman
2013). Even critical rationalists, far from decrying or denigrating the use of rationality in
any thoroughgoing fashion, actually do the opposite, using logic and evidence to reveal
the illusory and counterproductive character of exaggerated and misleading claims
made on rationality’s behalf.
Within organizational studies, this is exemplified in the focus on systematically
identifying sources of “predictable irrationality” (Ariely 2010) as a guide for decision-
making and action. This has been a central and enduring component of March’s work.
His critique of the profit-maximizing and perfect-knowledge assumptions of neo-
classical models of decision-making, and their replacement by a behavioral theory of
the firm, was part of an attempt to provide an improved understanding of actual behav-
ior. His garbage can model of decision-making was not intended to legitimate chaos
but, rather, discern predictable patterns in actual decision-making behavior (Cohen,
March, and Olsen 2012: 25; March in Coutu 2006: 86). His analyses of the “hot stove
effect” and the advantages of a “technology of foolishness” were not intended to dismiss
the value of experience or technologies of reason, and replace them with recommenda-
tions for “silliness” (March in Contu 2006: 87) or establish a “Mardi Gras for reason”
(March 1988: 261), but to remind us that while experience may be the “best teacher” it is
not a “good one” (March 2010: 115), and that a playful relaxation of the rules of reasoned
intelligence may assist us in exploring the goals we wish to pursue (March 1988). Nor
was his contrast between “exploitation” and “exploration” a simple critique of a conserv-
ative and narrowly rationalistic exploitation in favor of a radical romance of explora-
tion, but an argument for recognizing the inevitable tensions between the two, the need
for balance, and the dilemmas of calculating trade-offs. In all these areas, what March
has argued for is greater rational understanding of the character of rational thought and
action, informed reflection on the claims made on its behalf, and a balanced apprecia-
tion of its contributions and limitations.
The paradox of rationality remains, however, even within those committed to a
rational appreciation of the limits of rationality, as they are seduced into exaggerating
the degree to which their tempered rationalism reveals the “one best way” (the “Real
and the Rational,” the “Good” and the “True”), overstating the certainty of the knowl-
edge they provide about means and their understanding and realization of the goals to
be pursued. As the sociologist Peter Berger once aptly remarked, our cultural assump-
tions confront us not only as a law from without, but also a conscience from within—
the seductive religion of rationality often creeps unsuspecting into even the work of its
heretics.
In regard to both means and ends, Herbert Simon and James March were similarly
critical of omniscient views of rational behavior in modern organizations. However,
there are significant disparities in how consistently and extensively they follow through
on their critical rationality. Herbert Simon, for example, frustrated that the concept
of bounded rationality and descriptive behavioral studies of decision-making were
regarded by economists as “outside the Pale” (Simon 1978: 345), focused on persuading
his economics colleagues by developing and empirically supporting a superior theory to
replace it. In the process he became a self-proclaimed prophet “prepared to preach the
heresies of bounded rationality to economists . . . in season and out’ (cited in Khurana
2011: 263).
In contrast, March is much more tentative in his claims and sanguine in his expec-
tations. March presents the garbage can as a model not the model of organizations, a
partial viewpoint on behaviors that are “characteristic of any organization in part—part
of the time . . . describ[ing] a portion of almost any organization’s activities, but will not
describe all of them” (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972: 1). March is consistently aware of
how the interpretation and take-up of theories, academic and otherwise, is an emer-
gent and social process. All ideas, he notes, “are incorrigible progeny with endless trans-
formative capabilities to annoy and delight their previous authors” (Cohen, March, and
Olsen 2012: 23). Discussing the garbage can model, he remarks that it is most likely to
be influential in situations of complexity and in times of chaos. (Cohen et al. 2012: 29).
Reflecting on “post-heroic” theories of leadership, March playfully, yet pertinently,
observes that while “Carlyle said that leaders determined the course of history [and]
Tolstoy said that leaders had nothing to do with the course of history,” in organizational
life “leaders are more inclined to believe in Carlyle in good times and Tolstoy in bad
times” (Cohen and March 1974: 203).
Most significantly, March is also nuanced and reflective in his observations about the
partial, complex, and uneven take-up of more critical views of rationality within eco-
nomics and organizational studies. Within the domain of micro-economics, he argues,
the take-up has been substantial and effective. However, outside this domain, more rec-
ognition and acceptance is given to the rhetoric of such critiques (as a rational analysis
providing certain “truths” about micro-economic behavior) than is given to their theo-
ries (which challenge the rationalistic assumptions that often lie unquestioned in organ-
izational behavior, marketing, strategy and so on). As a result, he observes, concepts
such as “ ‘bounded rationality,’, ‘exploration and exploitation,’ ‘garbage cans’ . . . have
become common part of the education, but their precise implications for practice have
been generally less clear and less explored.” “As a result,” and perhaps predictably, “much
of the teaching of topics such as leadership, innovation, and entrepreneurship that might
have pointed to new ways of understanding such phenomena have become instead an
echo of an earlier pursuit of ‘best practice’ ” (Augier and March 2011: 232; March 1978).
Richard Badham 281
What this analysis of March’s work reveals, therefore, is a constant tension within the
contemporary faith in and pursuit of rationality. On the one hand, the exaggerated and
omniscient assumptions of a confident Rationality, assumed to reveal “one best way”
of thought and action, have been brought into question by a critical rationality that has
uncovered inherent ambiguity, plurality, and uncertainty in the means to be employed,
and fluidity, conflict, and unpredictable emergence in the goals to be pursued. On the
other hand, there is a temptation to interpret the insights of such a critical rationality
as a new “one best way,” certain in its knowledge of the workings of a pragmatic ration-
ality (or predictable irrationality) and confident in the utility and value of its insights.
As Kenneth Burke noted in his classic phrase, “Even humility can go to their head”! (in
Rueckert 1983: 272).
Richard Badham 283
A Productive Hypocrisy
As exemplified in the classic analyses of Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Brunsson (1989),
in order to secure the legitimacy required from external institutional regulators and
resource providers, and cope with the competing demands of multiple internal and
external stakeholders, proclamations of rational organization and delivery divorced
from actual implementation, may be a requirement for individual success and organiza-
tional survival. Moreover, and crucially, the effort of leaders, followers, and their organ-
izations required to overcome the challenges of life in overcoming obstacles and getting
things done requires confidence and commitment in their enterprise. As March puts it,
“great commitments require great hopes” (March 2007). Without a faith in the benefi-
cial outcome of rationally informed striving, such efforts are likely to be undermined.
As March puts it, it may be more desirable for individuals and organizations to strive
to achieve more through a “false positive” that exaggerates their rationality and signifi-
cance, than to undermine their motivation through a “false negative.” Moreover, there
is a further positive advantage in striving to attain unrealistic yet desirable aspirations,
even if it is impossible to live up to these ideals in practice, “in full consciousness, not
in hopes of fulfilling the precepts—for they would not want to do that—but in hopes of
acting in a better way than they would without the struggle.” (March 1980: 28). Finally,
there is an unpredictability in symbolic actions and the unfolding of events, that means
that short-term instrumental hypocrisy may lead to the development of actions, values,
and commitments that have beneficial effects that transcend their short-term motiva-
tions. In the long run the proclamation of social values, and the encouragement of one-
self and others to live up to them, may lead to unpredicted and beneficial results.
of themselves and others to the significance of their actions. There are drawbacks in not
being able to acknowledge this “confusion and ambivalence” (March in Coutu 2006: 21).
The dominant omniscient ideology can be used for self-aggrandizement, social manip-
ulation, and cover up. It can also mislead and delude, as it encourages hubris and path-
ological optimism, followed by excessive cynicism when such hopes are dashed. It also
leads to a lack of openness about the symbolic dimension of managerial work.
However, because of the symbolic importance of their work, and the decisions they
make, leaders are required to spend a considerable part of their time on symbolic
actions. More information is regularly collected than is used, time and resources are
spent on strategy and policy development that are not followed up, and considerable
time is spent on displays of command of information and competence, holding meet-
ings, developing procedures, and sending memos with the purpose of symbolizing
visions of control (March 1994). Moreover, an essential component of this symbolic dis-
play is that it is not admitted or recognized as such. Managers and leaders partake, and
have to partake, in such activities, yet deny their symbolic activity, to themselves as well
as others. March reminds us that managers with successful careers and subject to reg-
ular performance reviews marking their progress, are inclined to believe and require
reassurance in their capabilities and effects. Such symbolic actions are constitutive of
decision-making processes and the identities of those involved. As March remarks, it
“is not that symbols are important to politics, although they certainly are. Rather, the
argument is the reverse—politics is important to symbols, and a primary contribution
of politics to life is in the development of meaning” (March and Olsen 1983: 292).
Richard Badham 285
the pursuit of strategic alignment secures and reassures leaders in their faith, followers
in their effectiveness, and reflects the modernist creed of achieving progress through
rational intentional action. It also draws on built-up frustrations at the dysfunctionali-
ties and personal intrusions of established bureaucratic regimes.
Over time, however, leaders’ attention tends to shift, strategic crises and the stress of
events distract them, multiple networks of power and interest begin to have an effect,
reorganization initiatives are traded off for political favors, garbage can processes begin
to create a complex and watered down set of projects, and initial enthusiasm is replaced
by a lack of systematic attention to implementation or rigorous evaluation of prog-
ress. At this point, the dominant rhetoric of administration begins to be replaced by an
equally well known and sacred “rhetoric of realpolitik,” the voice of the epilogue, with its
language of political constituencies, complex interest representation, and struggle. This
rhetoric draws cultural support from suspicion of naive utopian reformers, appreciation
of human weakness, and the cynicism of the less successful and that generated by expe-
riences of well-documented high failure rates.
In the face of this (inevitable) saga, March and Olsen (1983: 292) recommends
acceptance rather than denial of reorganization as “a domain of rhetoric, trading,
problematic attention and symbolic action” and, in a sense, riding the cyclical saga. In
reaction against understandable temptations toward hubris and disillusion, or simple
programmatic approaches to “improving implementation,” they recommend an “intel-
ligent” and tempered leadership approach based on long-term strategic incremental-
ism, legitimacy building, and opportunity taking in what March and Cohen describe,
somewhat tongue in cheek, as an exercise in “civic education” with long-term unpre-
dictable outcomes.
The second example is provided in March and Sutton’s (1997) analysis of the schizo-
phrenia that besets business school researchers called upon, and yet skeptical of, provid-
ing certain knowledge and practical advice on the cultural and structural initiatives that
are likely to increase organizational performance. On the one hand, the success of busi-
ness schools, and the identities and careers of many within them, depends on their exist-
ence as a “culture of advice givers.” The success of this enterprise justifies the schools’
institutional status, generates institutional and research support because of their rele-
vance for business, attracts MBA students, and ensures the marketability of individual
and organizational consultancy services, lectures, and publications. On the other hand,
they are also a “culture of research workers,” cognizant of ambiguity, and committed to
a research agenda that critically interrogates all studies and claims to have identified
factors leading to organizational performance (which are often correlational and retro-
spective). And herein lies the tension. The adherents to the culture of advice givers have
to disconnect their work from much of the serious critical and qualified research under-
taken on organizations and the prescriptions they offer, or which are offered to them.
In tandem, the culture of research workers has to separate their research and insights
from the committed knowledge claims and prescriptive remedies provided by their
advice-giving colleagues. Yet each are dependent on the other—the research workers for
the financial inputs and institutional status that supports their research, and the advice
givers for the academic authority and expert legitimacy provided by the rigor and stand-
ing of their research-worker colleagues.
In the face of this contradiction, March and Sutton (1997: 705) advocate resisting the
“temptation of finding a resolution,” arguing that there is “no neat solution for neatness
itself would be a claim that an essential dilemma has been overcome.” In contrast to
the twin “pathologies” of regarding rigorous academic thought as a “dispensable schol-
arly pretense” or the withdrawal of scholarship into the “relatively safe activities of prov-
ing theorems, contemplating conundrums, and writing poetry” (March and Sutton
1997: 204), they argue for a more elegant stance of accepting the tension between sup-
porting a social mythology that provides confidence and meaning and pointing to the
probable falsity of such beliefs, acknowledging rather than running away from an inev-
itable “tension between saying more than we know and understanding how little we can
know” (March and Sutton 1997: 704).
Of Plumbing and Poetry
In memorably pointing out, somewhat tongue in cheek, the more mundane “plumbing”
aspects of management as “making sure the toilets work and that there is somebody
to answer the telephone” (March and Weil 2005: 99), March lists a variety of routine
and sensible managerial activities required to keep organizations’ running. We might
also add to this list, the equally sensible and pragmatic “muddling through” advice that
he offers leaders from his observations on leadership in ambiguity (Cohen and March
1974). There is no space here to do justice to these reflections but they represent a valua-
ble contribution to reflections on the pragmatics of management and leadership. March
is at pains, however, to avoid any romantic “heroic” view of leadership. On the one
hand, he points to the role of chance and circumstance in determining organizational
Richard Badham 287
outcomes, whatever activities leaders undertake. On the other hand, he challenges the
myth of individual effectivity, using metaphors of routine “light bulb” selection and the
relative equivalence of Olympians in the 100-meter sprint to question reliance on singu-
larly bright “lights” or overemphasis on the exceptional talents of individuals.
While aligning with post-heroic views of leadership in emphasizing the “prosaic
duties of leadership,” concerned more with routine and plumbing than heroic achieve-
ments, March is also concerned with the ability of leaders to exemplify and foster an
“exuberance for life,” deploying the “gifts of a poet, in order to find meaning in action
and render life attractive” (March and Weil 2005: 98; cf. Grint 2001; March 2006b;
March 2013). As he puts it, good leadership involves recognizing “beauty as well as truth,
the appreciation of complexity as well as simplicity, the pursuit of contradiction as well
as coherence, the achievement of grace as well as control” (March and Weil 2005: 121).
While recognizing that for many this “verbiage seems much too romantic for a cynical
age,” he goes on to argue “some recent observations of organizations suggest that such a
vision may be more common than we realize,” and it is to three sets of such observations
that we now turn (Augier 2004).
messages that not only inevitably mean more than (s)he intended to say but are created
and appreciated in awareness of this phenomenon.
Richard Badham 289
from intelligent action. This is represented in his consistent refusal to avoid the twin
temptations of responding to this dilemma by either uncritically supporting or arro-
gantly dismissing either the rituals, rhetorics, strategies, and techniques of rationality or
romantic and existential critiques of dogmatic commitment to what March (2003: 205),
citing John Stuart Mill, terms the “completeness of a limited man.”
Conclusion
It would be a surprise indeed if there were not paradoxical tensions in how we under-
stand and approach paradox. One of the purposes of this chapter has been to draw on
the work of James March to stimulate reflection on such issues, with a particular focus
on how it addresses three embedded paradoxes of modernity—of rationality, perfor-
mance, and meaning. In conclusion, we will draw out some tentative implications of
March’s analysis for those adopting a paradox perspective within organizational studies.
In regard to the study of paradoxes, what the paradox of rationality sensitizes us to
is the existence of pressures to provide a rational and certain view of the nature of such
paradoxes and the value of the knowledge that is produced about them, while simulta-
neously recognizing the ambiguous, uncertain, and provisional nature of such knowl-
edge claims and the fluid, contested, and emergent nature of the purposes for which they
are employed. There are pressures to avoid or deny this tension, rather than live with and
work through it, with all too understandable temptations to become either unreflective
paradox hunters seeking out, capturing, and taming paradoxes for domesticated view-
ing or consumption or indulgent paradox romantics celebrating absurdity, complex-
ity, and mess. Living with this paradox may be assisted by acknowledging the paradox
of rationality and, in awareness of the tensions it generates, providing a tempered and
self-critical diagnosis of situational paradoxes and the outcomes of their surfacing and
recognition. Such a stance may pursue and celebrate the insights obtained while recog-
nizing that such findings represent at best “a modest beginning, as awareness of para-
doxes and their interactions . . . complicates our very understanding of management”
(Lüscher and Lewis 2008: 238).
What the paradox of performance prepares us for is the challenge of communicating
this understanding, to ourselves as well as others, as we (and others) wish to be moti-
vated by the certainties we assert and uncover but also have to be made pragmatically
aware of and communicate our uncertainties if we are to grapple effectively with the
issues involved and, ultimately, give a resonant social performance. As Lüscher and
Lewis went on to argue, adopting a paradox perspective in organizations requires cour-
age, as managers seeking to navigate flexibly and contribute productively to change in
adopting such a stance may be seen as inconsistent and unclear by their subordinates.
A similar challenge of reception and performance exists for those seeking to communi-
cate the paradoxical tensions in adopting a paradox perspective within organizational
studies. The schizophrenic tour de force that March notes in regard to business school
Richard Badham 291
produced by some magical wand that eliminates conflict, but by unending confronta-
tion of the inconsistent voices of a demanding soul.”
A COMMENT
James G. March, professor emeritus, Stanford University
“Flattery”, my father used to say, “does not have to be believed to be enjoyed.” I am
not sure that Richard Badham intended his essay as flattery, but I certainly enjoyed
it as such. I have often quoted T. S. Eliot’s response to a comment on “The Love Song
of J. Alfred Prufrock”: “the analysis of ‘Prufrock’ . . . was an attempt to find out what
the poem meant––whether that was what I had meant it to mean or not. And for that
I was grateful.”
I am similarly grateful to Professor Badham.
Professor Badham has identified a set of themes from my work, themes that
I think I would also identify. I suspect he exaggerates the consistency of what
I have said in more than fifty years and fits me more into contemporary debate
than I am comfortable being fit; but I think he has read the writings carefully and
with understanding. It is, of course, somewhat embarrassing to see the extent to
which my many thousands of words can be compressed to a few thousand, and
I find it easy to imagine that not everything I have written finds precise expression
in the chapter.
As the Badham chapter suggests, I believe that life (including the life of scholar-
ship) is much too serious to be sustained without a healthy dose of amusement and
skepticism about our efforts to comprehend it. As I have observed from time to time,
the destiny of each of us is death, of the species extinction, and of ideas supersession.
Those destinies can be resisted with distinction and splendor, but they need not be
mourned, particularly in this context.
What Professor Badham describes is an enduring effort to celebrate schol-
arship as a monument to human foolishness, as testimony to the willingness of
ordinary humans to confront the paradoxes and contradictions of human exist-
ence with neither great success nor unbearable despair. As I have engaged in
the struggles that make us human, I hope that I both have seen the elements of
absurdity in the struggles and also have taken pleasure, not only in our moments
of apparent triumph but also in the beauties (when they are such) of our appar-
ent failures.
February 2016
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