A.M. No.

MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002

(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)

MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.

PUNO, J.:

Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a
sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent
judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite
marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.

They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed
away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast properties" left
by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a
retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy. 1âwphi 1.nêt

Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.

On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court
Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court
Administrator required respondent judge to comment.

In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain
Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000.
Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize
the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17
February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the
rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua.
Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request
he acceded.

Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the
documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the
requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to
another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery
of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion.
He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who
just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage
license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void.
Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the
afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo
but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to
his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.

Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid
despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered
by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the
Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize
her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was because of her
prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed
this administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge,
she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.

Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for
Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license
shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.

It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no
record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it
cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record of their
marriage.

On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could
communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of
her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In
a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed respondent judge that
their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death
Certificate of his previous spouse.

The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November 2000,
found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license
and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be
imposed on respondent judge.

We agree.

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial court
judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction
as defined by the Supreme Court. 1âwphi1.nêt

The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,1 respondent judge held office
and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte.
However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte
which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We
held that:

"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is
authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An
appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are
complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity
in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity
of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative
liability."2 (Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of
solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further
held that:

"The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in
the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant
with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While magistrates
may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent
judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly
prejudiced the status of married persons."3

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may
not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage
license. In People vs. Lara,4 we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage
license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an
iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives
the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess
such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge
acted in gross ignorance of the law. 1âw phi 1.nêt

Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This
Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not
necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the
prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be
undermined.5 Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or personal matters.
They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or
another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a
matter which involves the Court's constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power
may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the integrity and
dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.6

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,

vs.

JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

ROMERO, J.:p

The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted
evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he
contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.

First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first
wife.

Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds
office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del
Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa,
which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos,
located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.

In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the office
and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's
"lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same
person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit
on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge
Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.

In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having
solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and
Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of
Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for
almost seven years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the
marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family
Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary
within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.

The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were
considered sufficient for a resolution of the case. 2

Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been
sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's
answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's
malfeasance.

The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states
that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was
solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado,
Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla,
Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed
by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that
they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Peñaranda in September 1983;
that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Peñaranda left the
conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost
seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida
Peñaranda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony.
We do not agree.

Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:

A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage

shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in
the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis added.)

There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and
simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to
contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated
into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous
marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance
with pertinent provisions of law.

In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his
first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda.
Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have
accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has
resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, " The
following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not falling
under Article 41."

The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction,
covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:

Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in
open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general,
consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of
marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with
Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in
writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having solemnized
the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction.
As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or
courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this
effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in the
remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was
made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. 4

More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the
solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory
provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the
authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith
will not invalidate the marriage.

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to
do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice
or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages,
regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who
are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not
beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of
the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. 5

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he
was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced
authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of
civil law.

Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal
principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated,
prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension
of the law.

The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law
they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in
understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles like the ones involved in instant case. 6 It is not too much to expect them to know and
apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed,
compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at
times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited
ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of
married persons.

The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there
being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.

The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month
suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and
therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts
said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to
cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED

for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.

[G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000]

FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN FERNANDO,
PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY, respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review is the decision dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
[1]

G.R. CV No. 44144, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court
[2]

of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the petition for declaration of absolute

[3]

nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.

Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted

marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in
Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two
[4]

children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were born on July 8, 1975 and
February 14, 1978,respectively. [5]

The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in

Apalit, Pampanga, and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They
operated a lumber and hardware business in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. [6]

On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the
spouses lived separately, and their two children were in the custody of their
mother. However, their son Frederick transferred to his father's residence at
Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15,1988, and from then on, lived with his
father. [7]

On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, docketed
as Civil Case No. 7900 before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga. Later, upon motion of petitioner, the action was later amended to
a petition for separation of property on the grounds that her husband
abandoned her without just cause; that they have been living separately for
more than one year; and that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement dated September 29, 1983, containing the rules that would govern
the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. Judgment was rendered
[8]

dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of

separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed
by the spouses. The trial court also granted custody of the children to
[9]

Filipina.
[10]

In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her
husband, docketed as Criminal Case No. 88-68006, before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. Filipina testified that in the afternoon of May 15, 1988, she
went to the dental clinic at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband
but operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San Fernando,
Pampanga. While she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her and
continued playing with the family computer. Filipina got mad, took the
computer away from her son, and started spanking him. At that instance,
Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son, and punched her in the different
parts of her body. Filipina also claimed that her husband started choking her
when she fell on the floor, and released her only when he thought she was
dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions on different parts of
her body as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband, evidenced by a
Medical Certificate issued by a certain Dr. James Ferraren. She said it was
not the first time Fernando maltreated her. [11]

The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision dated April 26,
[12]

1990, convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries,
and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment. Edpmis

Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private
respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 8273,on the following grounds: (1)
repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent
against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her husband without justifiable
cause for more than one year. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, in its decision dated December 4,1991, granted the petition on
[13]

the grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a
decree of legal separation. It awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll
to petitioner, and their son Frederick to respondent.

On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute

[14]

nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity.

She points out that the final judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in
her favor, in her petitions for separation of property and legal separation, and
Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led to the conviction of
her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological
incapacity. She also cites as manifestations of her husband's psychological
incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her
without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3)
refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy himself.
Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological incapacity of her husband
existed from the time of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest
thereafter.
[15]

The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision dated[16]

December 9, 1993, denied the petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of

absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of
the respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not constitute psychological
incapacity which may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage. Lexjuris

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the
trial court. In the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 21, 1996, it
[17]

ruled that the testimony of petitioner concerning respondent's purported

psychological incapacity falls short of the quantum of evidence required to
nullify a marriage celebrated with all the formal and essential requisites of law.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to show that the
alleged psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at the time of the
celebration of their marriage in 1973. It reiterated the finding of the trial court
that the couple's marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten years
from the date of the celebration of their marriage. And prior to their separation
in 1983, they were living together harmoniously. Thus, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the lower court which it found to be in accordance
with law and the evidence on record. [18]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals

[19]

denied in its resolution dated November 21, 1996. [20]

Hence, this appeal by certiorari wherein petitioner now raises the following
[21]

issues: Jurismis

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ON
THE DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE PARTIES'
MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT DISPUTED BY
 RESPONDENT FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE
LICENSE THERETO;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY
STATING THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY
APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT CONSTITUTE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS WOULD JUSTIFY
NULLIFICATION OF HER MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein
respondent];

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY
STATING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE
ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE HAD
EXISTED OR WERE PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR
MARRIAGE WAS CELEBRATED IN 1973;Jjjuris

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LOWER
COURT THAT THERE IS A REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN
TO THE COURT BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH
RESPECT TO HIS CHILDREN AND ALSO BELIEVES THAT
RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT A
REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND

5.WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V.COURT OF

APPEALS (240 SCRA 20) IS APPLICABLE HERETO. [22]

In sum, two issues are to be resolved: justice

1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is

void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the
ceremony; and

2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the

time of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute
nullity.

Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack
of a valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. It appears that,
according to her, the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the
date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different
and incongruous. Jksm

Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the
first time on appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and
justice, in a number of instances, we have relaxed observance of procedural
[23]

rules, noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect
and promote substantive rights of litigants. We said that certain rules ought
not to be applied with severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for
their existence would be defeated. Hence, when substantial justice plainly
[24]

requires, exempting a particular case from the operation of technicalities

should not be subject to cavil. In our view, the case at bar requires that we
[25]

address the issue of the validity of the marriage between Fillipina and
Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of a
marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated and
violent conflict between the parties. Note, however, that here the pertinent
facts are not disputed; and what is required now is a declaration of their
effects according to existing law.

Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for
annulment of marriage before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of
the marriage license and the celebration of the marriage itself would lead to
the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning,
she points out that these critical dates were contained in the documents she
submitted before the court. The date of issue of the marriage license and
marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage
contract which was attached as Annex "A" in her petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as
Exhibit "A" in the course of the trial. The date of celebration of their marriage
[26]

at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is

admitted both by petitioner and private respondent, as stated in paragraph
three of petitioner's petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
before the trial court, and private respondent's answer admitting it. This fact
[27]

was also affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on January 22, 1993, during her
direct examination, as follows: Es m
[28]

ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were
married on November 15,1973?

FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.

November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in
both their son's and daughter's birth certificates, which are also attached as
Annexes " B" and "C" in the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibits "B" and "C"
in the course of the trial. These pieces of evidence on record plainly and
[29]

indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no
marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence
renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows
that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona,
Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in
Carmona. [30]

Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that
indeed petitioner did not expressly state in her petition before the trial court
that there was incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of their
marriage and the date of the issuance of their marriage license. From the
documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on September
17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15,
1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted
without a marriage license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying
these dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this
[31]

case. There being no claim of an exceptional character, the purported

marriage between petitioner and private respondent could not be classified
among those enumerated in Articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. We thus
[32]

conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between
petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning. Es msc

We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only
photocopies. So are the birth certificates of their son Frederick and daughter
Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were marked as Exhibits
during the course of the trial below, which shows that these have been
examined and admitted by the trial court, with no objections having been
made as to their authenticity and due execution. Likewise, no objection was
interposed to petitioner's testimony in open court when she affirmed that the
date of the actual celebration of their marriage was on November 15, 1973.
We are of the view, therefore, that having been admitted in evidence, with the
adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these documents are deemed
sufficient proof of the facts contained therein. [33]

The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent

need no longer detain us. It is mooted by our conclusion that the marriage of
petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the
time their marriage was solemnized. Esmm is

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial

Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, dated December 9,1993 as well as the
Decision promulgated on May 21, 1996 by the Court of Appeals and its
Resolution dated November 21, 1996, in CA-G.R. No. 44144 are set aside.
The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina
Yap and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for
lack of marriage license at the time of celebration. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 167746 August 28, 2007

RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing
the Decision1of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying
petitioner’s appeal and affirming the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for
annulment of marriage.

The antecedent facts are:

A petition for annulment of marriage3 was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara
alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage
license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a
marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain Rev.
Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel.4They got married on the same
day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the
San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise
celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in
Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of
Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the
said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988,
they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be
issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding
marriage contract5 and its entry on file.6
Answering petitioner’s petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their
marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification
from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioner’s representation,
respondent gave birth to their first child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to
another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992.7 Petitioner has a mistress with
whom he has three children.8 Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade
prosecution for concubinage.9 Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against
petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.10 Respondent prays
that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.

On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing as
follows:

The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;

2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00)
per month as support for their two (2) children on the first five (5) days of each month; and

3. To pay the costs.11

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioner’s appeal. His
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April
2005.12

The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued
and petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the parties’
marriage contract being a public document is a prima facie proof of the questioned marriage under
Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.13

In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:

a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the
Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on record that
there was no marriage license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the marriage.

b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight to the
Marriage License No. 7054133 despite the fact that the same was not identified and offered
as evidence during the trial, and was not the Marriage license number appearing on the face
of the marriage contract.

c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to apply the
ruling laid down by this Honorable Court in the case of Sy vs. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No.
127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).

d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to relax the
observance of procedural rules to protect and promote the substantial rights of the party
litigants.14

We deny the petition.

Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated,
there was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and
dealt with a "fixer" who arranged everything for them.15 The wedding took place at the stairs in
Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the
marriage belongs.16 He and respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage
license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the
respondent was a resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite, cannot be given weight because the certification states that "Marriage License number
7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario"17 but their marriage
contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.

The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was
the law in effect at the time of its celebration.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)18 in relation to Article 58 of the
same Code.19

Article 53 of the Civil Code20 which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties
states:

Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement
and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.21

Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage.
The cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for
considering the marriage void are clear-cut.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,22 the Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of
due search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182
was issued to the parties. The Court held that the certification of "due search and inability to find" a
record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a
marriage license that would render the marriage void ab initio.

In Cariño v. Cariño,23 the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased Santiago S. Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of
petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. The court
held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of
the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage
license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the
marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.

In Sy v. Court of Appeals,24 the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost one
year after the ceremony took place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable
conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.

In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the marriage
void.

Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of
a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on
the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar
that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between
the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was
also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.25 The certification moreover is precise in
that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto
Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the
parties herein.

The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:

This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No.
7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8,
1982.

This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal
purpose or intents it may serve.26

This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the
issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business.27 The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes
conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of
doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its
lawfulness.28 Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license
was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.29

Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that
neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no
sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a
city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage
license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for
publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage.30 An
irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.31

Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification
of the Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No.
7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is
number 7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the
same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the
overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may read either as 7054133 or
7054033. It therefore does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of
said marriage license to the parties.

Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands,32 petitioner cannot
pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took
place without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place
because he "initiated it."33 Petitioner is an educated person. He is a mechanical engineer by
profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and
voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to
extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable
to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a
mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad faith.34

Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than one year
utilizing the same marriage license. There is no claim that he went through the second wedding
ceremony in church under duress or with a gun to his head. Everything was executed without nary a
whimper on the part of the petitioner.
lavvphi1

In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San Jose de
Manuguit Church the marriage contract executed during the previous wedding ceremony before the
Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in petitioner’s testimony as follows—

WITNESS

As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the wedding.

COURT

What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San Jose de
Manuguit church.

WITNESS

I don’t remember your honor.

COURT

Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?

WITNESS

I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and I don’t
know if it is good enough for the marriage and they accepted it your honor.

COURT
In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with you already
a Marriage Contract?

WITNESS

Yes your honor.

COURT

That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the Marriage
Contract issued which Marriage License is Number 7054033.

WITNESS

Yes your honor.35

The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took place
at that time. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby
cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding.36

Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a "fixer" who arranged
everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a
Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the
officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the
absence of any showing to the contrary.37 Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to
investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil
registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the
competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has
fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.38

Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the
marriage.39 Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The
Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
presumption is of great weight.

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied for lack of merit. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL,
INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after
his death?

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were
born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One
year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years
and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage
of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case
was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have
no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of
marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed
the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the
following issues:

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is
already dead;

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null
and void ab initio;

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage
after it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their
father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code
which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that
the allegations in the petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading
which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion
of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
(FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the
time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the
Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in
relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration
of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public
is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and
is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code
considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not just
an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is
dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no
license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage
due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the
marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in
the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of
gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy
and exempt them from that requirement.

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have
attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs to be
resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to
warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year
continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married,
which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation
period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five
years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a
cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage
to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted
back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for
the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of
the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no
third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise,
if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties
were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every
single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to
nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is
required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that
anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it
known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:

Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
 Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil
registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .

Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or
brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in
the application for a marriage license. . . .

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of
multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently
contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the
exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised
Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the
having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and
adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived
with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time
Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for
five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage
at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with
each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of
the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the
spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as
"husband and wife".

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to
the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their
father's marriage void after his death?

Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by
analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of
marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at
anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods
and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the
court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken
place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free
cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be
assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally.
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those
declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or
ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void
marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of
the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally
conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.

Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital
bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong
premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that
their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either
extinguished nothing.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish
the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to
their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely
necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all
concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage
had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of
either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage
void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage
which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the
parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab
initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration
of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the
same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action
or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
1âwphi1

heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a

criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the
Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo
City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said
case is ordered REINSTATED. 1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,

vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No.
69166,2 declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2)
that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent
court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.

Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus
they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September
1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in
sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license
had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they
executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband
and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C.
Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites.
Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes
and did not live together as husband and wife.

On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since
the child’s birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government
dentist and from her private practice.

On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City (trial court.3 In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner
and that the latter has "reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as his wife
and Reinna Tricia as his child."4

Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since
the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by
respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible
administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice
from his parents before he got married. He also averred that they never lived together as husband
and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.

In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared
petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion
when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child when
the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child.

The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be
subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the
child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties’ marriage. In addition, the Court of
Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation,
as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent,
saying that petitioner’s "forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation
and reward him of his being irresponsible."6 Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated
7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of
the child.

The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the
trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same
case. There was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it
that there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for
declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon
petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the
instant proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the obligation
of petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of the marriage apparently and voluntarily
entered into by petitioner and respondent.7 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the
legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March
1995 between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly annulled by a competent
court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs against the appellant.8

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of
Appeals.9 Hence this petition.

Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent
because as shown by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated
without a marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license,
contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and respondent never lived together as
husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the
absence of a marriage license.10 Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for the
appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action for support
and not an action for annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner
argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their marriage since it was
validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant action for support. Citing several
authorities,11 petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus,
there is no necessity to institute another independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between the parties. The refiling of another case for declaration of nullity where the same
evidence and parties would be presented would entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be
time-consuming for the parties, and would increase the burden of the courts.12 Finally, petitioner
claims that in view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of the child’s
paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to file their respective comments on the petition.13

In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the
finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate
court, she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only
be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. With regard to the
filiation of her child, she pointed out that compared to her candid and straightforward testimony,
petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual encounters.
Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner strongly
objected to being subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation.15

For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for the trial
court to declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for support.
Citing the case of Niñal v. Bayadog,16 it states that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in
an action for support, since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid
marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the proceedings in the trial court showed that
the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, and
that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly held
that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid.17 In addition, the OSG agrees with
the findings of the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to
support.18

Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to
determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and
second, whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.

Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of
the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked.19 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, we held:

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment
need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.20

Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,21 the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority
to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits.
Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to
prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.22

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable.23 In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent
did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an
affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years.24 However, respondent
herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination,
thus—

ATTY. CARPIO:

Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and wife
for the last five years on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.25

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for
a marriage license.26 In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact,
there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they
could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They
were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a
marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.

Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s illegitimate daughter, and therefore
entitled to support.

Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.28

The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an
affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the
child, thus stating:

1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on

November 3, 1995 at Better Living, Parañaque, Metro Manila;30

We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:

That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only by
the testimony of the latter, but also by respondent’s own admission in the course of his
testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they were
sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latter’s house or clinic. At times, they would go
to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became pregnant
which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent
claims that he was merely forced to undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of
the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1" and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and
 "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2" and "H," "H-1" to "H-3").
In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is seen putting the wedding
ring on petitioner’s finger and in another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent is
seen in the act of kissing the petitioner.31

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179474

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for
Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa
Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between
Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.

The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City
Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage license, Jose
and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them
had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years.

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with
Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not
execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same. According to
Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in
Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to
accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her
brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man
bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the
papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However,
Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had
learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the
man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted
marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of
Felisa’s house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage
contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.

In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of their
marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the
legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him
on account of their age difference.5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to
Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31
August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she
filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and
Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman
found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the
penalty of suspension from service for one year without emolument.7

On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:

WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties,
this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration.
Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].9

The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between
Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the story as
implausible, and rationalized that:

Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a
blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as
they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the
pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put
him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill
them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to "discover" that
the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem
to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.]

[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he acknowledged
Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized statement of assets
and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is
now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as
the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the only reason
why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just
but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have
written instead the name of his sister.

When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her
name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November
29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the
signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N.
taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she
believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The testimony of
his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.10

Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action had prescribed. It cited Article
8711 of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:

That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud,
trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at
the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage
contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.12

Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a
Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The
dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the
circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 8614 of the Civil
Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for annulment
of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The
Court of Appeals struck down Jose’s appeal in the following manner:

Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his
consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4)
and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the
consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party
within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force
or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987
then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment of marriage.
However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to
Felisa.15

Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void
ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 7616 of
the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage
between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. The
Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived
together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the
marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained therein. In this
manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer
over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said
affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment
to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument that neither he nor Felisa
was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of
Appeals, Article 5617 of the Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the
marriage must belong to the solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect. The prescription was
established only in Article 718 of the Family Code which does not govern the parties’ marriage.

Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His
1avv phi 1

central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage
license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular,
Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the
affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.

The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it
rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one
entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.

Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.19

In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Niñal v.
Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:

In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried,
they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each other, the
Supreme Court ruled as follows:

"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the
date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of
the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and
it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every
single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to
nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is
required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that
anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it
known to the local civil registrar.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license, save
marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage
between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it
is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.21

Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court
rendered a Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa’s motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals’
Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition
for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate court’s Amended
Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of
uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.23

The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its Petition,
to wit:

RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF

HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.

II

RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD
NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.

III

RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE

FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24

Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Niñal.25 She
differentiates the case at bar from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing
prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa
adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and
an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the
declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.

For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered
ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the
Philippines and Felisa.

The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that
a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Court’s ruling in
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit
executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the
Republic’s position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the
marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was
not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines
that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully
obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated
statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition,
the Republic posits that the parties’ marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized
under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and
must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic
adduces the following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12
May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by
the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had
lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2 May
1988, indicating Felisa’s name as his wife.

The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit
under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.

It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986,
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53
of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:

ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)

Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued
by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save
marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article
75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence
flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.30 This is in stark
contrast to the old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the
marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code
is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government
official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.32

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III,
comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the
point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages,33 (3)
ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or
pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34

The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code,
which provides:

ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the
age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and
other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a
marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from
legalizing their status.36

It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of
maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years;
and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other."37 One of the central issues in the
Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties
have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void
ab initio for lack of a marriage license.

We answer in the affirmative.

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability
of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as
a general rule, should be strictly38 but reasonably construed.39 They extend only so far as their
language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather
than the exception.40 Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not
curtail the former or add to the latter by implication.41 For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a
sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that,
being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the
law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other.
The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of
cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The
minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the
law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed
with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a
mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting
parties shall state the requisite facts42 in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state
in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting
parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and
Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their
marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced to her by
her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution.44 The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986
when Jose commenced to live in her house.45

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year
requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or
falsehood of the alleged facts.46Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this
Court’s review.47 It is already well-settled that:

The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A
recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the
administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in every
instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual
findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the
record or based on substantial evidence.48

Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to
exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’
affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage
between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither
did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a
marriage license.

Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no
applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with
reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.49 Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.50 The present case does not involve an apparent
marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and
Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to
institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the
instant consolidated Petitions.

In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that every intendment of law or fact leans
towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the
effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the
requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under
exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of
the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and
unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a
prerequisite for a valid marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just
the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.53 To permit a
false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If
this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive
schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not
be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as
required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the
marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all.
Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and
Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement
for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in
the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is
as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose
should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his
wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for
application where there is a law.54 There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is
set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent
that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability.55

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from
assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa
had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to Rufina
Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of
nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisa’s marriage
was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void
ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any
time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.57 It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity
that is unbroken.58

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7
November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-
Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No.
86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008,
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.

The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the
absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No.
269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his
marriage to Gloria.

In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued
at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this
information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.

At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in
1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the
Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was
at his mother-in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-
law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some
ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of
said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not
know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not
go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In
July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their
marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage
license number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the
marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another
marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads
as follows:

11 July 2003

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License
No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on
January 19, 1993.

No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS
GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.

This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it
may serve.7

On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and
2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on
whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel.8

Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was
issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9

Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are
issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and
signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that
Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January
19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the same serial number, namely
9969967, to any other person.11

For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo
Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.

Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay
captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he
solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on
January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and
Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is
familiar with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage
license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his
secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that
office.17

Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and
Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin
to secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the
same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further testified that he did not know where the marriage
license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage
contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the
solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21

Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and
that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She testified
that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license,
and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house with the
application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their house,
showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz,
the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage
license, and that she was told that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona.25 She also
testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26

As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of
the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in
the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her
testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.

The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract
bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing
a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house
and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an
application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with
the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their
residence.28

Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria
Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30

Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she
did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who
celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese.31

The Ruling of the RTC

In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued
by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License
No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and
Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the
place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family
Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack
of a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on
January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent
declaring as follows:

1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent
Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;

2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the
respondent even if no property was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity
of the marriage of the parties.

3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics
Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their respective civil registries the marriage
contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9,
1993 in Manila.

SO ORDERED.34

Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same,
prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.

The Ruling of the CA

In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE

PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A
 MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS
ONE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID

MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE
CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES
BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT
THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS
THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY

LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE
COURT BELOW.35

The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of
the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage
license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be
accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary
evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the
requisites laid down by law.37

It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA
also considered that the parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only
instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy.38

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October
2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in
Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo
Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.

SO ORDERED.39

Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but the same was denied by the
CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41

Hence, this petition.

Grounds in Support of Petition

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN

CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY
 INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURT’S OWN FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND

SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY
OF MARRIAGE.42

The Ruling of this Court

The petition is meritorious.

As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209,
or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would
apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article
45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.

There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal
requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor
is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2,
Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid
marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had
been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the
marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license.
To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested
certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such
certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an
official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.

In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-
issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:

The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not
to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers
charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data.44

The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value,
as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed
was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and
Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple,
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967
was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do
not appear in the document.

In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not comply
with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification, and
since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent
search had been conducted and thus the certification could not be given probative value.

To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals.45 It is worth noting
that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage
license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely
stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in their
records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a
diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court to apply.

Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty
has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil
Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption
must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage
License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said
license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the
registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.

It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She
failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where,
admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best
witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she
presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in
Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license,
having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria
and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where
the license came from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who
could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present
this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.

It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the
marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage
license could have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria
inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license
issued for her and Syed.

In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the certification of
the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove
the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the
marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a
valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been
secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is
that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the
marriage license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by
the respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on
the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a
copy of the alleged marriage license.

To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were
validly married. To quote the CA:

Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and
appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by
law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity was even issued by
the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee
admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were
presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other
members of appellant’s family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant
where the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which
shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.

xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea
Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before
he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the
Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only
after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for
contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We
are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom
and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.50

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage
contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the
Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code
also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those
exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having
been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.1âwphi1

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives
are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make
up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight
of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him,
as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage
license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision
dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the
marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.