Nonlinear Dyn
DOI 10.1007/s11071-015-2126-x
ORIGINAL PAPER
Efficient three-party authenticated key agreements based on
Chebyshev chaotic map-based Diffie–Hellman assumption
Tian-Fu Lee
Received: 2 September 2014 / Accepted: 24 April 2015
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
Abstract An efficient and secure three-party authen-
ticated key agreement protocol is proposed to enable
two users to establish a common secret key for exchang-
ing confidential and authenticated information with the
help of a trusted server. The proposed protocol only
employs extended chaotic maps and hash operations,
i.e., it does not require a server public key, symmetric
cryptosystems, time-consuming modular exponential
computations, or time-consuming modular exponen-
tial computations and scalar multiplications on elliptic
curve. A round-efficient version of the proposed pro-
tocol is also implemented by rearranging and sending
the messages in parallel. The session security of the
proposed protocol is based on the Chebyshev chaotic
map-based Diffie–Hellman assumption. Compared to
related chaotic map-based approaches, the proposed
protocol not only requires lower computational cost,
but also has fewer transmissions.
Keywords Chebyshev chaotic maps · Network
protocols · Authentication · Network security
T.-F. Lee (B)
Department of Medical Informatics, Tzu Chi University,
No. 701, Zhongyang Road, Sec. 3, Hualien 97004,
Taiwan, ROC
e-mail: tflee@ismail.csie.ncku.edu.tw;
jackytflee@mail.tcu.edu.tw
1 Introduction
Authenticated key agreement protocols enable two
communication parties to create a mutual-authenticated
session key based on their shared long-life secret key.
The session key can then be used to construct a secure
channel for exchanging confidential and authenticated
information. Two-party authenticated key agreement
protocols are mainly used in client–server environ-
ments in which all users (clients) share secret keys or
passwords with a server [1–6]. A three-party authen-
ticated key agreement protocol consists of a trusted
server and two communication clients. These two com-
munication clients need the help of the server to estab-
lish a session key. Since two-party authenticated key
agreement protocols are inconvenient for key man-
agement, three-party authenticated key agreement pro-
tocols were developed for mutual communications
among large number of clients [7–12].
Recent studies show that cryptosystems that use
chaotic map operations are more efficient than those
that use modular exponential computations and scalar
multiplications on elliptic curve. Additionally, the
Chebyshev polynomials and their enhancements pro-
vide the semi-group property and the commutative
property, and they are subject to the discrete loga-
rithm problem and the Diffie–Hellman problem [13–
16]. Thus, several recent studies have proposed chaotic
map-based authenticated key agreement protocols to
enhance computational efficiency. For example, Xiao
123

et al. [17] in 2005 proposed a new two-party key agree-
ment protocol using chaotic maps. Later, Alvarez [18]
demonstrated the security weakness in the protocol of
Xiao et al., and several improved protocols [19–22]
were proposed to enhance the security of the proto-
col of Xiao et al. In 2010, Guo and Zhang [23] stated
that the malicious participant can determine the shared
secret key alone in [19,21,22] such that their two-party
protocols cannot satisfy the contributory nature of key
agreement protocols. Guo and Zhang also proposed a
new chaotic map-based two-party key agreement pro-
tocol without using smart cards. In 2013, the security
weakness in the protocol of Guo and Zhang was demon-
strated by He and Khan [24], and the improved proto-
cols were proposed by [25] and [26]. Besides, Niu and
Wang [27] in 2011 developed a three-party authen-
ticated key agreement protocol using chaotic maps
to address the weaknesses of the chaotic map-based
protocol developed by Tseng et al. [28]. Later, many
improved chaotic map-based alternative protocols were
proposed to solve security weaknesses and efficiency
problems in the Niu et al.’s protocol [29–33]. Lai et
al. [34] in 2012 proposed an enhanced chaotic map-
based three-party authenticated key agreement proto-
col which uses symmetric cryptosystems. Later, Zhao
et al. [35] proposed an alternative protocol to address
the weaknesses of the Lai et al.’s protocol. Addition-
ally, Lee et al. [36], Xie et al. [37] in 2013 and Hu
and Zhang [38] developed extended chaos-based three-
party authenticated key agreement protocols that used
server public keys and symmetric cryptosystems to
reduce transmissions and improve security. Wang and
Luan [39] in 2013 then proposed an efficient extended
chaos-based three-party authenticated key agreement
protocol using symmetric cryptosystems. The proto-
col of Wang and Luan does not require a server public
key and reduces the number of transmissions. Farash
and Attari in 2014 [40] proposed an extended chaotic
map-based three-party authenticated key agreement
protocol using password authentication. Their proto-
col does not require server public keys and symmetric
cryptosystems. However, the numerous transmissions
required by their scheme reduce communication effi-
ciency. Therefore, most of these three-party authen-
ticated key agreement protocols either require server
public keys and symmetric cryptosystems or are inef-
ficient in communications and computations.
This study proposes an efficient and secure three-
party authenticated key agreement protocol, whose ses-
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T.-F. Lee
sion key security is based on the extended chaotic
map-based Diffie–Hellman problem. A round-efficient
version of the proposed protocol is also implemented
by rearranging and sending the messages in parallel.
The proposed protocol does not require a server public
key, symmetric cryptosystems, time-consuming modu-
lar exponential computations, or scalar multiplications
on an elliptic curve. Only extended chaotic maps and
hash operations are used, which increases computa-
tional efficiency. The proposed protocol also publicly
exchanges the factors for generating the session key in
clients and validates the factors using hash operations.
Thus, the proposed protocol requires fewer messages
and fewer communication rounds. Compared to related
approaches, the proposed protocol has higher security,
lower computational cost, and a lower number of trans-
missions.
The remainder of this investigation is organized as
follows. Section 2 describes the underlying primitives
used in this investigation. Section 3 presents the pro-
posed efficient extended chaotic map-based three-party
key agreement protocol. Section 4 presents the results
of the security and performance evaluation. Finally,
Sect. 5 draws conclusions.
2 Preliminaries
This section lists notations and describes the underlying
primitives used in this study, which include Chebyshev
chaotic maps, the extended chaotic map-based discrete
logarithm and Diffie–Hellman problems. Table 1 lists
the notations used throughout this work.
(1) Chebyshev chaotic maps [13–15]. The Chebyshev
polynomial Tn (x) is a polynomial in x of degree n,
defined by the following relation:
Tn (x) = cos nθ, where x = cos θ.
The recurrence relation of Tn (x) is defined as:
Tn (x) = 2x Tn−1 (x) − Tn−2 (x),
for any n ≥ 2, with T0 (x) = 1 and T1 (x) = x.
The Chebyshev polynomial satisfies the semi-
group property and thus satisfies:
Tr (Ts (x)) = Tsr (x) = Ts (Tr (x)),
for s, r ∈ Z + .
The Chebyshev chaotic property: Chebyshev poly-
nomial map Tn :[−1, 1] → [−1, 1] of degree n > 1,
Efficient three-party authenticated key agreements

Table 1 Notation 3 The proposed three-party authenticated key

agreement protocol based on extended chaotic
A, B Two communication parties
maps
S A trusted authentication
server
This section presents the proposed efficient three-
K A, K B K A is a long-term secret
key shared between A and party authenticated key agreement protocol based on
S. K B is a long-term extended chaotic maps. A round-efficient version of
secret key shared between the protocol is also implemented. Figure 1 shows the
B and S proposed three-party authenticated key agreement pro-
T The predetermined legal tocol, which functions as follows.
time interval of
transmission delay
h(.) A collision free one-way
hash function [41] 3.1 The proposed efficient three-party authenticated
A → B: M A sends message M to B
key agreement protocol
through a common
channel 1. A → B: M1 = {A, B, X A , μ AS , T A }
M1 , M2 Message M1 concatenates A chooses a random number a and computes X A =
to message M2 Ta (x)mod p, μ AS = H (K A , X A , T A ), where T A
is the current timestamp. Then, A sends M1 =
{A, B, X A , μ AS , T A } to B.
2. B → S: M2 = {A, B, X A , μ AS , T A , X B , μ B S ,
is a chaotic map with its invariant density TB , μ B A }
   Similarly, after receiving A’s request, B chooses
f ∗ (x) = 1 π 1 − x 2 , a random number b and computes X B = Tb (x)
mod p, μ B S = H (K B , X B , TB ), where TB is the
for Lyapunov exponent ln n > 0. current timestamp. Additionally, B computes the
session key K AB = Tb (X A )mod p and a key con-
For enhanced Chebyshev polynomials, the semi- firmation message μ B A = H (K AB , X B , X A , T A )
group property and the commutative under composi- and then sends M2 = {A, B, X A , μ AS , T A , X B ,
tion still hold on interval (−∞, +∞) [16]. That is, μ B S , TB , μ B A } to S.
Tn (x) ≡ (2x Tn−1 (x) − Tn−2 (x))mod p, 3. S → A: M3 = {μ S A , μ S B , X B , μ B A }
where n ≥ 2, x ∈ (−∞, +∞), and p is a large prime S checks |TS − T A | ≤ T and |TS − TB | ≤ T,
number. Then, where TS is the time for S to receive the request
Tr (Ts (x)) ≡ Tr s (x) ≡ Ts (Tr (x))mod p message. Next, S authenticates Aand B by ver-
holds. ifying μ AS and μ B S , respectively. If successful,
Additionally, the enhanced Chebyshev polynomials then Scomputes μ S A = H (A, B, K A , X A , X B , T A )
still exhibit the extended chaotic map-based discrete and μ S B = H (A, B, K B , X A , X B , TB ) and sends
logarithm and Diffie–Hellman problems [16,30,42], M3 = {μ S A , μ S B , X B , μ B A } to A.
which are described as follows. 4. A → B: M4 = {μ S B , μ AB }
A authenticates S and validates X B by veri-
(2) Extended chaotic map-based discrete logarithm fying μ S A . Next, A computes the session key
problem: Given x, y, and p, finding the integer K AB = Ta (X B )mod p and checks the key confir-
r satisfying y = Tr (x)mod p is computationally mation message μ B A . If successful, then A cre-
infeasible. ates another key confirmation message μ AB =
(3) Extended chaotic map-based Diffie–Hellman prob- H (K AB , X A , X B , TB ) for B and sends M4 =
lem: Given Tu (x), Tv (x), T (·), x, and p, where {μ S B , μ AB } to B.
u, v ≥ 2, x ∈ (−∞, +∞), and p is a large 5. Finally, B authenticates S and validates X A by ver-
prime number, calculating Tu·v (x) ≡ Tu (Tv (x)) ≡ ifying μ S B . B also verifies the key confirmation
Tv (Tu (x))mod p is computationally infeasible. message μ AB .

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Fig. 1 Proposed efficient
three-party authenticated
key agreement protocol
3.2 The proposed round-efficient three-party key
agreement protocol
The proposed round-efficient protocol reorders the
messages and sends them in parallel. The protocol can
be performed in three rounds as follows.
1. A → B: A, B, X A , T A
A → S: A, B, X A , μ AS , T A
2. B → A: A, B, X B , μ B A , TB
B → S: A, B, X B , μ B S , TB
3. S → A: μ S A
S → B: μ S B
A → B: μ AB
4 Security and performance analyses
This section analyzes the security and performance of
the proposed protocol and compares them with those of
other related three-party authenticated key agreement
protocols.
4.1 Security analyses
This subsection discusses the security features of the
proposed protocol, including providing mutual authen-
tication, session key security, the contributory prop-
erty of key agreements, data integrity, perfect forward
secrecy and known-key security, and resisting replay
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T.-F. Lee
attacks, impersonation attacks, and man-in-the-middle
attacks.
(1) Mutual authentication
After receiving request message M2 = {A, B, X A ,
μ AS , T A , X B , μ B S , TB , μ B A } from A and B in step
3, S has secret key K A shared with A and secret key
K B shared with B and can authenticate A and B by
verifying μ AS and μ B S , respectively, where μ AS =
H (K A , X A , T A ), μ B S = H (K B , X B , TB ), and T A
and TB are the timestamps. Additionally, A authen-
ticates S and validates X B by verifying μ S A =
H (A, B, K A , X A , X B , T A ), μ S B = H (A, B, K B ,
X A , X B , TB ), and B authenticates S and validates
X A by verifying μ S B = H (A, B, K B , X A , X B ,
TB ), respectively. Finally, A and B authenticate
each other by verifying key confirmation messages
μ B A and μ AB , where μ B A = H (K AB , X B , X A ,
T A ) and μ AB = H (K AB , X A , X B , TB ).
(2) Session key security
Given X A = Ta (x)mod p, X B = Tb (x)mod p,
T (·), x, and p, the session key K AB = Ta (X B )
mod p = Tb (X A )mod p cannot be determined with-
out the knowledge of a and b because of the Cheby-
shev chaotic map-based Diffie–Hellman problem.
Thus, session key security is considered a Cheby-
shev chaotic map-based Diffie–Hellman problem
and is computationally infeasible.
(3) The contributory property of key agreements
Session key security under the proposed proto-
col is based on the Chebyshev chaotic map-based
Efficient three-party authenticated key agreements
Diffie–Hellman problem. User B fails to com-
pute a and b satisfying Ta (x) ≡ Ta (x)mod p
and Tb (Ta (x)) ≡ Tb (Ta (x)) ≡ Ta0 ·b0 (x)mod p,
where Ta0 ·b0 (x)mod p represents a used session key.
That is, none can use the method described by Berg-
amo et al. [15] to predetermine a session key. Since
A and B must determine a session key together, the
proposed protocol satisfies the contributory prop-
erty of key agreements.
(4) Data integrity
Messages communicated under the proposed pro-
tocol contain their own checksums. M1 contains
μ AS ; M2 contains μ AS and μ B S ; M3 contains μ S A
and μ S B ; and M4 contains μ S B , where μ AS =
H (K A , X A , T A ), μ B S = H (K B , X B , TB ), μ S A =
H (A, B, K A , X A , X B , T A ), μ S B = H (A, B, K B ,
X A , X B , TB ). Finally, users can verify X A and
X B by checking μ B A and μ AB , where μ B A =
H (K AB , X B , X A , T A ) and μ AB = H (K AB , X A ,
X B , TB ). That is, none can modify any communi-
cating message without the knowledge of K A and
K B . Therefore, the proposed protocol provides data
integrity and security against modification attacks.
(5) Perfect forward secrecy
Since the temporary random numbers a and b
are randomly and independently selected among
executed protocols, a compromised secret key
K A (or K B ) does not compromise previous session
keys K AB (= Ta·b (x)mod p). Thus, the proposed
protocol has perfect forward secrecy.
(6) Known-key security
Session key security under the proposed proto-
col is based on the Chebyshev chaotic map-based
Diffie–Hellman problem. The session keys K AB =
Ta·b (x)mod p generated in different runs are inde-
pendent among protocol executions since a and b
are randomly selected and independent among pro-
tocol executions. That is, a compromised session
key cannot be used to derive another key. Thus,
the proposed protocol is secure against known-key
attacks.
(7) Resisting replay attacks
Since the protocol embeds timestamps T A and
TB in communicating messages μ AS , μ B S , μ S A ,
and μ S B , where μ AS = H (K A , X A , T A ), μ B S =
H (K B , X B , TB ), μ S A = H (A, B, K A , X A , X B ,
T A ), and μ S B = H (A, B, K B , X A , X B , TB ), an
adversary trying to replay the previous login mes-
sages containing μ AS and μ B S generates a failed
login, which is detected by server S. Similarly,
when an adversary tries to replay the previous
response messages from S containing μ S A and
μ S B , the failed messages are detected by A and B,
respectively. Thus, the proposed protocol exhibits
the freshness of communicating messages and
resists replay attacks.
(8) Resisting impersonation attacks
Since the protocol uses timestamps for mutual
authentication and freshness of communicating
messages, an adversary attempting to impersonate
a legal user can be detected without the long-term
secret keys K A and K B .
(9) Resisting intruder-in-the-middle attacks
An adversary attempting to interrupt messages and
to substitute them with his/her own messages such
that the communication parties compute the wrong
session key can be detected since the hash val-
ues μ AS and μ S A provide mutual authentication
of S and A, μ B S and μ S B provide mutual authen-
tication of S and B, and μ AB and μ B A provide
mutual authentication of A and B, Therefore, the
proposed protocol is secure against intruder-in-the-
middle attacks.
4.2 Performance analyses and comparisons
Table 2 compares the performance measures of the pro-
posed protocol with those of related three-party authen-
ticated key agreement protocols [34–40]. The first com-
parison item is modular exponential operations, where
C denotes the time of executing a Chebyshev polyno-
mial operation. The S denotes the time of executing
a symmetric encryption/decryption operation, and H
denotes the time of executing a one-way hash function
operation.
The first comparison item is computational cost. The
proposed protocol only employs the Chebyshev poly-
nomial and hash function operations and requires fewer
Chebyshev polynomial operations compared to related
protocols. Therefore, the proposed protocol requires
less computational cost than those of related protocols.
The second comparison item is the number of mes-
sages and rounds in transmission. Whereas the proto-
cols proposed by Lee et al. [36], Hu and Zhang [38],
and Wang and Luan [39] only require four messages in
transmission, the proposed protocol only requires four
messages and three rounds. These protocols and the
123
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Table 2 Performance comparisons with related protocols
Protocols Lai et al. [34] Zhao et al. [35] Lee et al. [36] Xie et al. [37] Hu and Wang and Farash and Proposed
Zhang [38] Luan [39] Attari [40] protocol

Computation
A 3C + S + 6H 2C + S + 6H 3C + 4H 3C + 2S + 5H 3C + 5H 2C + S + 2H 3C + 4H 2C + 4H
B 3C + S + 6H 2C + S + 6H 3C + 4H 3C + 2S + 5H 3C + 6H 2C + S + 2H 3C + 4H 2C + 4H
S 2C + 2S + 8H 2C + 2S + 8H 2C + 7H 2C + 4S + 4H 2C + 7H 2S 4C + 4H 4H
Total 8C + 2S + 18H 4C + 4S + 20H 8C + 15H 8C + 8S + 14H 8C + 18H 4C + 4S + 4H 10C + 12H 4C + 12H
Transmission messages/rounds 7m/- 7m/- 4m/- 5m/- 4m/- 4m/- 6m/- 4m/3r
Mutual authentication Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Resisting possible attacks No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No server’s public keys Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
No symmetric encryptions/decryptions No No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
T.-F. Lee
Efficient three-party authenticated key agreements
proposed protocol require fewer transmissions com-
pared to other protocols.
Further comparisons included mutual authentica-
tion, resisting possible attacks, server public key
requirements, and symmetric encryptions/decryptions.
Like the protocol developed by Farash and Attari [40],
the proposed protocol provides mutual authentication,
resists possible attacks, and does not require public keys
and symmetric encryptions/decryptions.
Besides, the three-party authenticated key agree-
ment protocols in [10,11] and [12] are developed using
the Diffie–Hellman key exchange. The proposed pro-
tocol in this paper is developed using the extended
chaotic map Diffie–Hellman key exchange. The Diffie–
Hellman key exchange and the extended chaotic map
Diffie–Hellman key exchange have similar properties.
For example, revealing the factors for generating the
session key does not compromise the session key so
that users can publicly exchange the factors for gener-
ating the session key. However, the cryptosystem using
chaotic maps operations is more efficient than the cryp-
tosystem using modular exponential computations and
scalar multiplications on elliptic curve. Additionally,
both the protocols in [10] and [11] are protocols with
password authentication and allow users to communi-
cate securely over public networks simply using easy-
to-remember passwords. But the protocol in [11] is
verifier-based and requires server’s public key. More-
over, the protocol in [12] and the proposed protocol
in this paper are authenticated using long-term secret
keys. However, the protocol in [12] requires symmetric
encryptions/decryptions. The proposed protocol does
not require maintaining server’s public keys and sym-
metric encryptions/decryptions. Therefore, compared
with the protocols in [10–12], the proposed protocol
is suitable for different practical environments and is
more efficient.
Therefore, the proposed protocol provides more
efficient computations and transmissions compared to
related protocols and is more secure against potential
attacks. Additional advantages are that server public
keys and symmetric encryptions/decryptions are not
required.
5 Conclusions
In the efficient three-party authenticated key agree-
ment protocol presented in this study, session key
security is based on Chebyshev chaotic map-based
Diffie–Hellman assumption and implements its round-
efficient version. The proposed protocol does not
require time-consuming modular exponential compu-
tations and scalar multiplications on elliptic curve
and is developed using extended chaotic map hash
operations. Compared to related chaotic map-based
approaches, the proposed protocol does not require
public key cryptosystems and symmetric encryption/
decryption algorithms, resists possible attacks, and
is efficient in computations and in transmissions.
Although the proposed protocol still requires extra
equipment such as smart cards and RFID tags for stor-
ing a long-term secret key, these devices are now widely
used. Therefore, the proposed protocol is superior to
related protocols and is suitable for implementation in
the current environment.
Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank the editor
and the anonymous referees for their valuable comments. This
research was financially/partially supported by Ministry of Sci-
ence and Technology of the Republic of China, Taiwan, under
Contract No. MOST 103-2221-E-320 -003 and TCRPP103008.
Ted Knoy is appreciated for his editorial assistance.
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