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A Denial of Theological Determinism

J. W. Wartick
December 12, 2011

https://jwwartick.com/2011/12/12/theo-determ-false/

It was not too long ago that I read a book by John Frame, a respected
Calvinist theologian, entitled No Other God: A Response to Open
Theism. In my review of that book, I wrote, “Interestingly, while I went
in reading this book looking for some good arguments against Open
Theism, I came out with the realization that theological determinism is
a far more dangerous doctrine indeed.” It is time to address theological
determinism more fully.

The Debate

There are many sides to the debate over the content of and/or level
of determination entailed by of God’s omniscience. Briefly, I will
summarize what I see as the four major positions:

1. Open Theism- Open Theists hold that the future is, in some
sense, “open” to the extent that even God doesn’t know for sure
what will happen. God knows everything that might happen,
and so can plan for every contingency.
2. Theological Determinism- Essentially, the view that God, in His sovereignty, has determined
everything which will happen. It is generally paired with compatibilism, the view that, despite God’s
determining of creaturely action, those creatures are still responsible for their behavior.
3. Molinism- The “middle knowledge” perspective holds that God knows counterfactuals of creaturely
freedom–God knows what anyone will do in any situation–and so comprehensively knows the future.
However, molinists hold that God does not determine what will happen, He merely foreknows it.
4. “Bare Omniscience”- Those who hold this view basically fall into a combination of the previous
three categories–mixing and matching as they will.

The Biblical Evidence

I’m only briefly going to operate under a claim which I’m sure will be quite contentious for all involved, so
I will qualify it heavily:

P1: The Biblical data about God’s omniscience lacks the philosophical development to settle the issue.

Now, this claim is very qualified: essentially I’m claiming that any one of the four positions discussed only
briefly above can claim some kind of Biblical justification. Do I personally think they are all equal? Not at
all, actually. But I do think that each position can put forth at least a few passages to try to justify their
position. Thus, my suggestion is that the issue needs to be settled philosophically, not exegetically.

Some may latch onto this claim and rejoice, arguing that “J.W. has clearly rejected the Bible! [insert series
of Bible verses]!” Such a strategy is wrongheaded for a number of reasons, foremost among them is the
forcing of [cited verses] into a preconceived philosophical paradigm. I’m not arguing that the Bible cannot
or does not reveal philosophical development. Rather, my argument is that on this issue, the Bible does not
present a specific picture. Certainly, there are those who will disagree and say, “Well J.W. is just wrong!
The Bible clearly states [favored position]!” It is not here my purpose to enter into a proof-text vs. proof-text
argument. Rather, I wish to argue that determinism cannot be true and therefore one of the other positions
must be the case. Given that most theologians grant there at least a few verses to support any of the previous
positions, I think this is a safe qualification.
Against Determinism

I have argued extensively elsewhere for molinism and against open theism, and it is high time I turn my
sights against determinism. I feel that theological determinism is, at best, philosophically untenable. At
worst, it is incoherent. I shall put forth three theses to press my claim:

P2: Theological determinism’s only way to preserve creaturely responsibility (and thus save God from
responsibility for causing evil) is compatibilism, which is incoherent.

Compatibilism, essentially, is the claim that God determines all things, and people are responsible for their
actions.

I confess that, on the face of it, I struggle to understand compatibilism of any sort. But rather than giving in
to a lack of imagination, I will seek to understand how theological determinists present compatiblism. Paul
Helm, a Calvinist philosopher for whom I have great respect, writes “…God, though responsible, is not to
blame for bringing about an evil act on the part of a human being if he has good reason for bringing such an
act about, which he must have” (Helm, 164, cited below). Helm argues that God is the sufficient cause for
all actions, but not the necessary cause of them. Because of this, Helm holds that “God may be ‘responsible’
for evil in some sense, but this does not mean that he is morally culpable” (Ibid, 164).

Again, I don’t see any way for this to work. First, if God really is the sufficient cause for evils, then it is
extremely difficult to see how God would not be culpable. Sufficient causation implies exactly what it seems
to: that God’s action alone is sufficient to bring about the evil. Yet Helm seems to think that because he
holds that God is not a necessary condition for the evil actions, this removes God from responsibility.

Again, this seems to be exactly backwards, for at least a couple reasons. If God is the sufficient cause of all
things, then that means that for any evil I can imagine (let’s say the Holocaust), one need only to refer to
God to reveal its cause. Now Helm would hold that humans are the necessary conditions for this evil to
occur. In other words, while God may have determined it to be such that the Holocaust would occur, it
would not have occurred had there not been creatures to bring it about. But if this is the case, then it seems
God is indeed squarely to blame for such evils because, after all, God is not only the sufficient cause of the
events, but He also created the necessary conditions and set them up in such a way that these events would
occur.

Other theological determinists take two supposedly different approaches to the problem. Some argue that
because of total depravity, human wills are in fact free. In other words, humans are incapable of choosing
good, but that does not mean they are not free or responsible because they continue to freely choose evil.
This tactic does not seem to work, however, because theological determinists must also hold that God made
humans in such a way that they would not desire good. In other words, God made these people totally
depraved to begin with. Thus, those who disagree with determinists could counter by once more asking,
“But isn’t God responsible for causing humans to only be free to choose evil anyway?”

The other tactic is to argue that while God is cause of all things, people themselves are the secondary cause.
So while God might sustain my existence and even determine that I should do evil, it is I who do evil, not
God. I am a creature, and I bring about the evil. God and I are separate entities, so it follows (on this view)
that God is not the cause of evil. Now this view is really no different from Helm’s view explained above, but
with less philosophical terminology. The problems with it are the same. Suppose we grant that it is the
secondary causes, not God, which bring about evil. Whence these secondary causes? Why do these
secondary causes act as they do? According to theological determinism, God created, ordained, and sustains
these secondary causes. When a being brings about evil, that being acts secondarily–they are not themselves
God. But God ordained and caused the world to be such that theses secondary causes would act in exactly
the way in which they do. The secondary causes themselves are caused to act by God. So we have only
pushed the problem back one step. Why would God cause secondary causes to do evil? It seems God would
certainly be culpable for such evils.
Finally, a brief survey of those theological determinists who take the determinism seriously seems to
confirm that God is the cause of evil. John Frame, for example, writes:

“The uniform witness of Scripture is that the evils of this life come from God” (Frame, cited below, 140).

“…[I]t is important to see that God does in fact bring about the sinful behavior of human beings, whatever
problems that may create in our understanding” (68).

John Calvin himself wrote, in the Institutes:

When, therefore, they perish in their corruption, they but pay the penalties of
that misery in which ADAM FELL BY THE PREDESTINATION OF GOD ,
and dragged his posterity headlong after him. Is he not, then, unjust who so
cruelly deludes his creatures? Of course, I admit that in this miserable
condition wherein men are now bound, all of Adam’s children have fallen BY
GODS WILL. And this is what I said to begin with, that we must always at
last return to the sole decision of God’s will, the cause of which is hidden in
him.

It seems, therefore, that theological determinists, when consistent, acknowledge


that God causes evil, and indeed wills it. The main reason given is some kind of
mystery or hiddenness. I conclude this section with the observation that, despite attempts to the contrary,
theological determinism must hold that God causes evil.

P3: Theological determinism is not a “lived” philosophy.

One of the tests for a philosophy–and I should think a theology in particular–is whether it is livable. If
something is true, it should reflect reality. Theological determinism holds that every action I take is
determined by God. I have found that in practice, I have not yet run into any theological determinist who
agrees that they live as though their lives are determined. When bad things happen to them, they are
distressed; when relatives are in danger, they pray for the danger to pass without harm; etc. Yet if
theological determinism is true, none of these things would matter–all things are determined already. Even
were one to pray, that prayer itself would have been determined, along with the outcome. Therefore,
theological determinism seems to be unlivable.

P4: If theological determinism is true, I cannot know that it is true. It is therefore self-refuting.

Finally, even if none of the above arguments seem convincing, P4, at least, seems devastating to theological
determinism. The argument itself is remarkably simple:

1) If I am determined by non-rational factors to have belief x, then I cannot rationally hold x.

2) On theological determinism, I am determined by non-rational factors to have any given belief.

3) Therefore, on theological determinism, I cannot rationally hold any given belief.

4) Therefore, if theological determinism is true, then I cannot rationally hold that theological determinism is
true.

It seems to me that this argument is quite powerful. If theological determinism is true, then my beliefs are
determined by God. That includes the belief I currently have that theological determinism is false. However,
suppose I believed theological determinism were true. In that case, I have been determined by God to
believe theological determinism is true. In fact, my act of deliberating and coming to believe that
determinism is true would, itself, be determined. Thus, I cannot rationally hold theological determinism to
be true (this argument can be attributed to a podcast from William Lane Craig, though I can’t track down the
reference).

Given these reasons, it seems that there are some quite sound objections to theological determinism. Given
that there are other positions with at least some Biblical support, it seems theological determinism should be
abandoned. The position makes God the author of sin (contrary to the objections of its supporters), it is
unlivable, and it is incoherent.

Sources

Paul Helm, Eternal God: A Study of God Without Time (New York, NY: Oxford, 2010), 2nd edition.

John Frame, No Other God: A Response to Open Theism (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2001).

Image Credit: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Caen_palaisdejustice_peristyle.jpg

SDG.