G.R. No.
L-18164 January 23, 1967 The first question for determination therein is whether or not the
WILLIAM F. GEMPERLE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
HELEN SCHENKER and PAUL SCHENKER as her
husband, defendants-appellees.
Gamboa & Gamboa for plaintiff-appellant.
A. R. Narvasa for defendants-appellees.
CONCEPCION, C. J.:
Appeal, taken by plaintiff, William F. Gemperle, from a decision of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing this case for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of defendant Paul Schenker and for
want of cause of action against his wife and co-defendant, Helen
Schenker said Paul Schenker "being in no position to be joined with
her as party defendant, because he is beyond the reach of the
magistracy of the Philippine courts."
The record shows that sometime in 1952, Paul Schenker-
hereinafter referred to as Schenker — acting through his wife and
attorney-in-fact, Helen Schenker — herein-after referred to as Mrs.
Schenker — filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a
complaint — which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-2796 thereof
— against herein plaintiff William F. Gemperle, for the enforcement
of Schenker's allegedly initial subscription to the shares of stock of
the Philippines-Swiss Trading Co., Inc. and the exercise of his
alleged pre-emptive rights to the then unissued original capital
stock of said corporation and the increase thereof, as well as for an
accounting and damages. Alleging that, in connection with said
complaint, Mrs. Schenker had caused to be published some
allegations thereof and other matters, which were impertinent,
irrelevant and immaterial to said case No. Q-2796, aside from being
false and derogatory to the reputation, good name and credit of
Gemperle, "with the only purpose of attacking" his" honesty,
integrity and reputation" and of bringing him "into public hatred,
discredit, disrepute and contempt as a man and a businessman",
Gemperle commenced the present action against the Schenkers for
the recovery of P300,000 as damages, P30,000 as attorney's fees,
and costs, in addition to praying for a judgment ordering Mrs.
Schenker "to retract in writing the said defamatory expressions". In
due course, thereafter, the lower court, rendered the decision
above referred to. A reconsiderating thereof having been denied,
Gemperle interposed the present appeal.
Alva J. Hill for petitioner.
lower court had acquired jurisdiction over the person of Schenker.
Admittedly, he, a Swiss citizen, residing in Zurich, Switzerland, has
not been actually served with summons in the Philippines, although
the summons address to him and Mrs. Schenker had been served
personally upon her in the Philippines. It is urged by plaintiff that
jurisdiction over the person of Schenker has been secured through
voluntary appearance on his part, he not having made a special
appearance to assail the jurisdiction over his person, and an
answer having been filed in this case, stating that "the defendants,
by counsel, answering the plaintiff's complaint, respectfully aver",
which is allegedly a general appearance amounting to a submission
to the jurisdiction of the court, confirmed, according to plaintiff, by a
P225,000 counterclaim for damages set up in said answer; but this
counterclaim was set up by Mrs. Schenker alone, not including her
husband. Moreover, said answer contained several affirmative
defenses, one of which was lack of jurisdiction over the person of
Schenker, thus negating the alleged waiver of this defense.
Nevertheless, We hold that the lower court had acquired jurisdiction
over said defendant, through service of the summons addressed to
him upon Mrs. Schenker, it appearing from said answer that she is
the representative and attorney-in-fact of her husband
aforementioned civil case No. Q-2796, which apparently was filed
at her behest, in her aforementioned representative capacity. In
other words, Mrs. Schenker had authority to sue, and had actually
sued on behalf of her husband, so that she was, also, empowered
to represent him in suits filed against him, particularly in a case, like
the of the one at bar, which is consequence of the action brought by
her on his behalf.
Inasmuch as the alleged absence of a cause of action against Mrs.
Schenker is premised upon the alleged lack of jurisdiction over the
person of Schenker, which cannot be sustained, it follows that the
conclusion drawn therefore from is, likewise, untenable.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from should be, is hereby,
reversed, and the case remanded to the lower court for
proceedings, with the costs of this instance defendants-appellees. It
is so ordered.
G.R. No. 47517 June 27, 1941
IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, petitioner,
vs.
MAMERTO ROXAS, ET AL., respondents.
DeWitt, Perkins & Ponce Enrile for respondent Judge and
respondent Perkins.
Ross, Lawrence, Selph & Carrascoso, Jr., for respondent Benguet
Consolidated Mining Co.
LAUREL, J.:
On July 5, 1938, the respondent Eugene Arthur Perkins, filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the
Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for the recovery of the sum
of P71,379.90, consisting of dividends which have been declared
and made payable on 52,874 shares of stock registered in his
name, payment of which was being withheld by the company, and
for the recognition of his right to the control and disposal of said
shares, to the exclusion of all others. To the complaint, the
company filed its answer, alleging, by way of defense, that the
withholding of plaintiff's right to the disposal and control of the
shares was due to certain demands made with respect to said
shares by the petitioner herein. Idonah Slade Perkins, and by one
George H. Engelhard. The answer prays that the adverse claimants
be made parties to the action and served with notice thereof by
publication, and that thereafter all such parties be required to
interplead and settle the rights among themselves.
On September 5, 1938, the trial court ordered the respondent,
Eugene Arthur Perkins, to include in his complaint as parties
defendants petitioner, Idonah Slade Perkins, and George H.
Engelhard. The complaint was accordingly amended and in addition
to the relief prayed for in the original complaint, respondent Perkins
prayed that petitioner Idonah Slade Perkins and George H.
Engelhard be adjudged without interest in the shares of stock in
question and excluded from any claim they assert thereon.
Thereafter, summons by publication were served upon the non-
resident defendants, Idonah Slade Perkins and George H.
Engelhard, pursuant to the order of the trial court. On December 9,
1938, Engelhard filed his answer to the amended complaint, and on
January 8, 1940, petitioner's objection to the court's jurisdiction over
her person having been overruled by the trial court and by this court
in G. R. No. 46831, petitioner filed her answer with a cross-
complaint in which she sets up a judgment allegedly obtained by
her against respondent, Eugene Arthur Perkins, from the Supreme
Court of the State of New York, wherein it is declared that she is the
sole legal owner and entitled to the possession and control of the
shares of stock in question together with all the cash dividends
declared thereon by the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company,
and prays for various affirmative reliefs against the respondent. To
the answer and cross-complaint thus filed, the respondent, Eugene
Arthur Perkins, filed a reply and an answer in which he sets up
several defenses to the enforcement in this jurisdiction of the
judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New York above
alluded to. Instead of demurring to the reply on either of the two
grounds specified in section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
petitioner, Idonah Slade Perkins, on June 5, 1940, filed a demurrer
thereto on the ground that "the court has no jurisdiction of the
subject of the action," because the alleged judgment of the
Supreme Court of the State of New York is res judicata.
Petitioner's demurrer having been overruled, she now filed in this
court a petition entitled "Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus,"
alleging that "the respondent judge is about to and will render
judgment in the above-mentioned case disregarding the
constitutional rights of this petitioner; contrary to and annulling the
final, subsisting, valid judgment rendered and entered in this
petitioner's favor by the courts of the State of New York, ... which
decision is res judicata on all the questions constituting the subject
matter of civil case No. 53317, of the Court of First Instance of
Manila; and which New York judgment the Court of First Instance of
Manila is without jurisdiction to annul, amend, reverse, or modify in
any respect whatsoever"; and praying that the order of the
respondent judge overruling the demurrer be annulled, and that he
and his successors be permanently prohibited from taking any
action on the case, except to dismiss the same.
The only question here to be determined, therefore, is whether or
not, in view of the alleged judgment entered in favor of the
petitioner by the Supreme Court of New York, and which is claimed
by her to be res judicata on all questions raised by the respondent,
Eugene Arthur Perkins, in civil case No. 53317 of the Court of First
Instace of Manila, the local court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action in the said case. By jurisdiction over the subject
matter is meant the nature of the cause of action and of the relief
sought, and this is conferred by the sovereign authority which
organizes the court, and is to be sought for in general nature of its
powers, or in authority specially conferred. In the present case, the
amended complaint filed by the respondent, Eugene Arthur Perkins,
in the court below alleged the ownership in himself of the conjugal
partnership between him and his wife, Idonah Slade Perkins; that
the petitioner, Idonah Slade Perkins, and George H. Engelhard
assert claims to and interests in the said stock adverse to Eugene
Arthur Perkins; that such claims are invalid, unfounded, and made
only for the purpose of vexing, hindering and delaying Eugene
Arthur Perkins in the exercise of the lawful control over and use of
said shares and dividends accorded to him and by law and by
previous orders and decrees of this court; and the said amended
complaint prays, inter alia, "that defendant Benguet Consolidated
Mining Company be required and ordered to recognize the right of
the plaintiff to the control and disposal of said shares so standing in
his name to the exclusion of all others; that the additional
defendants, Idonah Slade Perkins and George H. Engelhard, be
each held to have no interest or claim in the subject matter of the
controversy between plaintiff and defendant Benguet Consolidated
Mining Company, or in or under the judgment to be rendered herein
and that by said judgment they, and each of them be excluded
therefrom; and that the plaintiff be awarded the costs of this suit
and general relief." The respondent's action, therefore, calls for the
adjudication of title to certain shares of stock of the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company, and the granting of affirmative
reliefs, which fall within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Manila. (Vide: sec. 146, et seq., Adm. Code, as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 145; sec. 56, Act No. 136, as
amended by Act No. 400.)
Similarly, the Court of First Instance of Manila is empowered to
adjudicate the several demands contained in petitioner's cross-
complaint. The cross-complaint sets up a judgment allegedly
recovered by Idonah Slade Perkins against Eugene Arthur Perkins
in the Supreme Court of New York and by way of relief prays:
(1) Judgment against the plaintiff Eugene Arthur Perkins
in the sum of one hundred eighty-five thousand and four
hundred dollars ($185,400), representing cash dividends
paid to him by defendant Benguet Consolidated Mining
Co. from February, 1930, up to and including the dividend
of March 30, 1937.
(2) That plaintiff Eugene Arthur Perkins be required to
deliver to this defendant the certificates representing the
48,000 shares of capital stock of Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co. issued as a stock dividend on the 24,000
shares owned by this defendant as described in the
judgment Exhibit 1-A.
(3) That this defendant recover under that judgment
Exhibit 1-A interest upon the amount of each cash
dividend referred to in that judgment received by plaintiff
Eugene Arthur Perkins from February, 1930, to and
including the dividend of March 30, 1937, from the date of
payment of each of such dividends at the rate of 7 per
cent per annum until paid.
(4) That this defendant recover of plaintiff her costs and
disbursements in that New York action amounting to the
sum of one thousand five hundred eighty-four and 20/00
dollars ($1,584.20), and the further sum of two thousand
dollars ($2,000) granted her in that judgment Exhibit 1-A
as an extra allowance, together with interest.
(5) For an order directing an execution to be issued in
favor of this defendant and against the plaintiff for
amounts sufficient to satisfy the New York judgment
Exhibit 1-A in its entirety, and against the plaintiff and the
defendant Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. for such
other amounts prayed for herein as this court may find to
be due and payable by each of them; and ordering them
to comply with all other orders which this court may issue
in favor of the defendant in this case.
(6) For the costs of this action, and
(7) For such other relief as may be appropriate and
proper in the premises.
In other words, Idonah Slade Perkins in her cross-complaint
brought suit against Eugene Arthur Perkins and the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company upon the alleged judgment of the
Supreme Court of the State of New York and asked the court below
to render judgment enforcing that New York judgment, and to issue
execution thereon. This is a form of action recognized by section
309 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 47, Rule 39, Rules
of Court) and which falls within the general jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, to adjudicate, settled and determine.
The petitioner expresses the fear that the respondent judge may
render judgment "annulling the final, subsisting, valid judgment
rendered and entered in this petitioner's favor by the courts of the
State of New York, ... which decision is res judicata on all the
questions constituting the subject matter of civil case No. 53317,"
and argues on the assumption that the respondent judge is without
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cause. Whether or not the
respondent judge in the course of the proceedings will give validity
and efficacy to the New York judgment set up by the petitioner in
her cross-complaint is a question that goes to the merits of the
controversy and relates to the rights of the parties as between each
other, and not to the jurisdiction or power of the court. The test of
jurisdiction is whether or not the tribunal has power to enter upon
the inquiry, not whether its conclusion in the course of it is right or
wrong. If its decision is erroneous, its judgment case be reversed
on appeal; but its determination of the question, which the petitioner
here anticipates and seeks to prevent, is the exercise by that court
— and the rightful exercise — of its jurisdiction.
The petition is, therefore, hereby denied, with costs against the
petitioner. So ordered.
45 F.2d 426 (1930)
HEINE
v.
NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO.
No. 10465.
District Court, D. Oregon.
December 1, 1930.
C. T. Haas and E. B. Seabrook, both of Portland, Or., for plaintiff.
Huntington, Wilson & Huntington and Clark & Clark, all of Portland,
Or., for defendant.
BEAN, District Judge.
This is one of a series of cases pending in this court against the
New York Life Insurance Company and the Guardian Insurance
Company, each of which is a New York corporation, to recover on
some two hundred and forty life insurance policies made and
issued by the defendants in Germany, in favor of German citizens
and subjects, and payable in German marks. The policies of the
New York Life Insurance Company were issued prior to August 1,
1914, and those of the Guardian prior to May 1, 1918. As a
condition to their right to do business in Germany, the insurance
companies were required to and did submit to the supervision and
control of the German insurance officials, to invest the reserves
arising from German policies in German securities, and to establish,
and they do now maintain, an office in that country with a resident
representative or agent upon whom service of process can be
made.
The actions now pending are brought and prosecuted in the name
of, or as assignee of the insured by, certain parties in the United
States and Germany, under an irrevocable power of attorney, by
which they are authorized and empowered to sue for, collect,
receive, and receipt for all sums due or owing under the policies, or
compromise the same in consideration of an assignment and
transfer to them of the undivided 25 per cent. interest in the policies
and all rights accruing thereunder.
None of the parties to the litigation are residents or inhabitants of
this district. The plaintiffs reside in, and are citizens of, the republic
of Germany. The defendants are corporations organized and
existing under the laws of New York, with their principal offices in
that state, with statutory agents in Oregon, upon whom service can
be made. None of the causes of action arose here, nor do any of
the material witnesses reside in the district, nor are any of the
records of the defendant companies pertaining to the policies in suit
in the district, but such records are either at the home office in New
York or at their offices in Germany. The courts of Germany and
New York are open and functioning and competent to take
jurisdiction of the controversies, and service can be made upon the
defendants in either of such jurisdictions. To require the defendants
to defend the actions in this district would impose upon them great
and unnecessary inconvenience and expense, and probably
compel them to produce here (three thousand miles from their
home office) numerous records, books, and papers, all of which are
in daily use by it in taking care of current business.
In addition, it would no doubt consume months of the time of this
court to try and dispose of these cases, thus necessarily
disarranging the calendar, resulting in delay, inconvenience, and
expense to other litigants who are entitled to invoke its jurisdiction.
Under these circumstances, the defendants, while conceding that
the court has jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter, urges
that it should refuse, in its discretion, to exercise such jurisdiction.
I unhesitatingly concur in this view, for, as said by Mr. Justice
Holmes in Cuba Railroad Co. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 32 S. Ct.
132, 133, 56 L. Ed. 274, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 40: "It should be
remembered that parties do not enter into civil relations in foreign
jurisdictions in reliance upon our courts. They could not complain if
our courts refused to meddle with their affairs, and remitted them to
the place that established and would enforce their rights. * * * The
only just ground for complaint would be if their rights and liabilities,
when enforced by our courts, should be measured by a different
rule from that under which the parties dealt."
*427 It is apparent that the plaintiffs are seeking by these actions to
impose on the defendants a liability under a different rule than "that
under which the parties dealt."
The courts of Germany have ruled that any person seeking to
recover on a civil contract made in Germany prior to August, 1924,
and payable in marks, can only recover on the basis provided in the
monetary law of 1924. Manifestly the plaintiffs are not proceeding
on any such theory.
It is argued by the plaintiffs that, because the court has jurisdiction
of the subject-matter and the parties, it has no discretion, but
should proceed with the case, regardless of where the cause of
action arose, or the law by which it is controlled, or the residence or
convenience of the parties and witnesses, or the difficulty the court
would encounter in attempting to interpret and enforce a foreign
contract, or the interference with the other business of the court.
But that is a matter resting in its discretion. It may retain jurisdiction,
or it may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, decline to do so, as
the circumstances suggest. The courts have repeatedly refused, in
their discretion, to entertain jurisdiction of causes of action arising in
a foreign jurisdiction, where both parties are nonresidents of the
forum. Gregonis v. Philadelphia & R. Coal & Iron Co., 235 N.Y. 152,
139 N.E. 223, 32 A. L. R. 1, and note; Pietraroia v. New Jersey &
Hudson River Ry. & Ferry Co., 197 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E. 120;
Gregonis v. P. & R. Coal & Iron Co., 235 N.Y. 152, 139 N.E. 223,
32 A. L. R. 1; Stewart v. Litchenberg, 148 La. 195, 86 So. 734;
Smith v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 14 Allen (96 Mass.) 336-343;
National Telephone Mfg. Co. v. Du Bois, 165 Mass. 117, 42 N.E.
510, 30 L. R. A. 628, 52 Am. St. Rep. 503; Collard v. Beach, 81
App. Div. 582, 81 N.Y.S. 619; Great Western Railway Co. v. Miller,
19 Mich. 305; Disconto Gesellschat v. Umbreit, 127 Wis. 651, 106
N.W. 821, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1045, 115 Am. St. Rep. 1063.
As said by Mr. Justice Bradley in The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 5
S. Ct. 860, 864, 29 L. Ed. 152: "Circumstances often exist which
render it inexpedient for the court to take jurisdiction of
controversies between foreigners in cases not arising in the country
of the forum; as, where they are governed by the laws of the
country to which the parties belong, and there is no difficulty in a
resort to its courts; or where they have agreed to resort to no other
tribunals * * * not on the ground that it has not jurisdiction, but that,
from motives of convenience, or international comity, it will use its
discretion whether to exercise jurisdiction or not."
See, also, Charter Shipping Co. v. Bowring, 281 U.S. 515, 50 S. Ct.
400, 74 L. Ed. 1008.
These, in my judgment, are cases of that kind. They are actions
brought on causes of action arising in Germany. The contract of
insurance was made and to be paid there and in German currency.
It is to be construed and given effect according to the laws of the
place where it was made. 22 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.)
1350. The courts of this country are established and maintained
primarily to determine controversies between its own citizens and
those having business there, and manifestly the court may protect
itself against a flood of litigation over contracts made and to be
performed in a foreign country, where the parties and witnesses are
nonresidents of the forum, and no reason exists why the liability, if
any, cannot be enforced in the courts of the country where the
cause of action arose, or in the state where the defendant was
organized and has its principal offices. True, the courts of New York
have declined to exercise jurisdiction over actions brought on
insurance policies similar to those in suit. Higgins v. N. Y. Ins. Co.,
220 App. Div. 760, 222 N.Y.S. 819, and Von Nessen-Stone v. N. Y.
Life Ins. Co.[1] But that affords no reason why this court should do
so. It is to me unthinkable that residents and citizens of Germany
may import bodily into this court numerous actions against a
nonresident defendant, on contracts made and payable in
Germany, and insist as a matter of right that, because it has
obtained jurisdiction of the defendant by service of its statutory
agent, the taxpayers, citizens, and residents of the district having
business in the court should stand aside and wait the conclusion of
the case, where, as here, the courts of Germany and of the home
state of the defendant are open and functioning.
Judge Tucker, in the state court of Multnomah county, in an able
and well-considered opinion in a case brought on one of the
German policies (Kahn v. New York), reached the same conclusion.
Motion allowed.
G.R. No. L-32636 March 17, 1930
In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased.
A.W. FLUEMER, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANNIE COUSHING HIX, oppositor-appellee.
C.A. Sobral for appellant.
Harvey & O' Brien and Gibbs & McDonough for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix
appeals from a decision of Judge of First Instance Tuason denying
the probate of the document alleged to by the last will and
testament of the deceased. Appellee is not authorized to carry on
this appeal. We think, however, that the appellant, who appears to
have been the moving party in these proceedings, was a "person
interested in the allowance or disallowance of a will by a Court of
First Instance," and so should be permitted to appeal to the
Supreme Court from the disallowance of the will (Code of Civil
Procedure, sec. 781, as amended; Villanueva vs. De Leon [1925],
42 Phil., 780).
It is theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in
Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his
residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Verginia
Code, Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1690, and
as certified to by the Director of the National Library. But this was
far from a compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction
do not prove themselves in our courts. the courts of the Philippine
Islands are not authorized to take American Union. Such laws must
be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.)
Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no was
printed or published under the authority of the State of West
Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the
officer having charge of the original, under the sale of the State of
West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract
from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged
will was executed.
In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The
only evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony of the
petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will
was acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two
competent witnesses, of that these witnesses subscribed the will in
the presence of the testator and of each other as the law of West
Virginia seems to require. On the supposition that the witnesses to
the will reside without the Philippine Islands, it would then the duty
of the petitioner to prove execution by some other means (Code of
Civil Procedure, sec. 633.)
It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator
had his domicile in West Virginia and not establish this fact
consisted of the recitals in the CATHY will and the testimony of the
petitioner. Also in beginning administration proceedings orginally in
the Philippine Islands, the petitioner violated his own theory by
attempting to have the principal administration in the Philippine
Islands.
While the appeal pending submission in this court, the attorney for
the appellant presented an unverified petition asking the court to
accept as part of the evidence the documents attached to the
petition. One of these documents discloses that a paper writing
purporting to be the was presented for probate on June 8, 1929, to
the clerk of Randolph Country, State of West Virginia, in vacation,
and was duly proven by the oaths of Dana Wamsley and Joseph L.
MAdden, the subscribing witnesses thereto , and ordered to be
recorded and filed. It was shown by another document that, in
vacation, on June 8, 1929, the clerk of court of Randolph Country,
West Virginia, appointed Claude W. Maxwell as administrator, cum
testamento annexo, of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix,
deceased. In this connection, it is to be noted that the application
for the probate of the will in the Philippines was filed on February
20, 1929, while the proceedings in West Virginia appear to have
been initiated on June 8, 1929. These facts are strongly indicative
of an intention to make the Philippines the principal administration
and West Virginia the ancillary administration. However this may
be, no attempt has been made to comply with Civil Procedure, for
no hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to have
been proved and allowed in West Virginia has been requested.
There is no showing that the deceased left any property at any
place other than the Philippine Islands and no contention that he
left any in West Virginia.
Reference has been made by the parties to a divorce purported to
have been awarded Edward Randolph Hix from Annie Cousins Hix
on October 8, 1925, in the State of West specific pronouncements
on the validity or validity of this alleged divorce.
For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be
affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
G.R. No. L-12105 January 30, 1960
TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased. PHILIPPINE
TRUST CO., executor-appellee,
vs.
MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and
MARY LYDIA BOHANAN, oppositors-appellants.
Jose D. Cortes for appellants.
Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita for appellee.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Hon. Ramon San Jose, presiding, dismissing the objections filed by
Magdalena C. Bohanan, Mary Bohanan and Edward Bohanan to
the project of partition submitted by the executor and approving the
said project.
On April 24, 195 0, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon.
Rafael Amparo, presiding, admitted to probate a last will and
testament of C. O. Bohanan, executed by him on April 23, 1944 in
Manila. In the said order, the court made the following findings:
 According to the evidence of the opponents the testator
was born in Nebraska and therefore a citizen of that
state, or at least a citizen of California where some of his
properties are located. This contention in untenable.
Notwithstanding the long residence of the decedent in the
Philippines, his stay here was merely temporary, and he
continued and remained to be a citizen of the United
States and of the state of his pertinent residence to
spend the rest of his days in that state. His permanent
residence or domicile in the United States depended
upon his personal intent or desire, and he selected
Nevada as his homicide and therefore at the time of his
death, he was a citizen of that state. Nobody can choose
his domicile or permanent residence for him. That is his
exclusive personal right.
Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O.
Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of the
United States and of the State of Nevada and declares
that his will and testament, Exhibit A, is fully in
accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada and
admits the same to probate. Accordingly, the Philippine
Trust Company, named as the executor of the will, is
hereby appointed to such executor and upon the filing of
a bond in the sum of P10,000.00, let letters testamentary
be issued and after taking the prescribed oath, it may
enter upon the execution and performance of its trust.
(pp. 26-27, R.O.A.).
It does not appear that the order granting probate was ever
questions on appeal. The executor filed a project of partition dated
January 24, 1956, making, in accordance with the provisions of the
will, the following adjudications: (1) one-half of the residuary estate,
to the Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. in trust only for the benefit of testator's grandson
Edward George Bohanan, which consists of several mining
companies; (2) the other half of the residuary estate to the testator's
brother, F.L. Bohanan, and his sister, Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share
and share alike. This consist in the same amount of cash and of
shares of mining stock similar to those given to testator's grandson;
(3) legacies of P6,000 each to his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert
Bohana, and his daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in three
yearly installments; (4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of
P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000; Beulah Fox, P4,000;
and Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000;
It will be seen from the above that out of the total estate (after
deducting administration expenses) of P211,639.33 in cash, the
testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of
stock of several mining companies and to his brother and sister the
same amount. To his children he gave a legacy of only P6,000
each, or a total of P12,000.
The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children question
the validity of the testamentary provisions disposing of the estate in
the manner above indicated, claiming that they have been deprived
of the legitimate that the laws of the form concede to them.
The first question refers to the share that the wife of the testator,
Magdalena C. Bohanan, should be entitled to received. The will has
not given her any share in the estate left by the testator. It is argued
that it was error for the trial court to have recognized the Reno
divorce secured by the testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena C.
Bohanan, and that said divorce should be declared a nullity in this
jurisdiction, citing the case of Querubin vs.Querubin, 87 Phil., 124,
47 Off. Gaz., (Sup, 12) 315, Cousins Hiz vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 852,
Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 and Gorayeb vs. Hashim, 50 Phil.,
22. The court below refused to recognize the claim of the widow on
the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a
citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without requiring
him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife. Section 9905 of
Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 provides:
Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound
mind, may, by last will, dispose of all his or her estate,
real and personal, the same being chargeable with the
payment of the testator's debts.
Besides, the right of the former wife of the testator, Magdalena C.
Bohanan, to a share in the testator's estafa had already been
passed upon adversely against her in an order dated June 19,
1955, (pp. 155-159, Vol II Records, Court of First Instance), which
had become final, as Magdalena C. Bohanan does not appear to
have appealed therefrom to question its validity. On December 16,
1953, the said former wife filed a motion to withdraw the sum of
P20,000 from the funds of the estate, chargeable against her share
in the conjugal property, (See pp. 294-297, Vol. I, Record, Court of
First Instance), and the court in its said error found that there exists
no community property owned by the decedent and his former wife
at the time the decree of divorce was issued. As already and
Magdalena C. Bohanan may no longer question the fact contained
therein, i.e. that there was no community property acquired by the
testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan during their converture.
Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and
Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909, and
that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922; that sometime in
1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this marriage
was subsisting at the time of the death of the testator. Since no
right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in
the State of Nevada and since the court below had already found
that there was no conjugal property between the testator and
Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter can now have no longer claim to
pay portion of the estate left by the testator.
The most important issue is the claim of the testator's children,
Edward and Mary Lydia, who had received legacies in the amount
of P6,000 each only, and, therefore, have not been given their
shares in the estate which, in accordance with the laws of the
forum, should be two-thirds of the estate left by the testator. Is the
failure old the testator to give his children two-thirds of the estate
left by him at the time of his death, in accordance with the laws of
the forum valid?
The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the
testator died in 1944, expressly provides that successional rights to
personal property are to be earned by the national law of the
person whose succession is in question. Says the law on this point:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in
respect to the order of succession as well as to the extent
of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is in question, whatever may
be the nature of the property and the country in which it is
found. (par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same
as par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil Code.)
In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it
was decided that the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada
because he had selected this as his domicile and his permanent
residence. (See Decision dated April 24, 1950, supra). So the
question at issue is whether the estementary dispositions,
especially hose for the children which are short of the legitime given
them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is not
disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all
his properties by will (Sec. 9905, Complied Nevada Laws of
1925, supra). It does not appear that at time of the hearing of the
project of partition, the above-quoted provision was introduced in
evidence, as it was the executor's duly to do. The law of Nevada,
being a foreign law can only be proved in our courts in the form and
manner provided for by our Rules, which are as follows:
SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. — An official
record or an entry therein, when admissible for any
 purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy tested by the officer having the legal
custody of he record, or by his deputy, and accompanied,
if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. . . . (Rule
123).
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court
below and we have found that during the hearing on October 4,
1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of
P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905,
Compiled Nevada Laws. was introduced in evidence by appellant's
(herein) counsel as Exhibits "2" (See pp. 77-79, VOL. II, and t.s.n.
pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said laws
presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the
Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January 23,
1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (se Records, Court of First
Instance, Vol. 1).
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not
dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of
Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to
hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of
the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of
by us, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing
of the project of partition.
As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of
testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of
the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that
the national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada,
already indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose of all his
property according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the
court approving the project of partition made in accordance with the
testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby affirmed, with
costs against appellants.
G.R. No. L-35694 December 23, 1933
ALLISON G. GIBBS, petitioner-appelle,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, oppositor-
appellant.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF
MANILA, respondent-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellants.
Allison D. Gibbs in his own behalf.
BUTTE, J.:
This is an appeal from a final order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, requiring the register of deeds of the City of Manila to
cancel certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, covering
lands located in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, and issue in
lieu thereof new certificates of transfer of title in favor of Allison D.
Gibbs without requiring him to present any document showing that
the succession tax due under Article XI of Chapter 40 of the
Administrative Code has been paid.
The said order of the court of March 10, 1931, recites that the
parcels of land covered by said certificates of title formerly
belonged to the conjugal partnership of Allison D. Gibbs and Eva
Johnson Gibbs; that the latter died intestate in Palo Alto, California,
on November 28, 1929; that at the time of her death she and her
husband were citizens of the State of California and domiciled
therein.
It appears further from said order that Allison D. Gibbs was
appointed administrator of the state of his said deceased wife in
case No. 36795 in the same court, entitled "In the Matter of the
Intestate Estate of Eva Johnson Gibbs, Deceased"; that in said
intestate proceedings, the said Allison D. Gibbs, on September
22,1930, filed an ex parte petition in which he alleged "that the
parcels of land hereunder described belong to the conjugal
partnership of your petitioner and his wife, Eva Johnson Gibbs",
describing in detail the three facts here involved; and further
alleging that his said wife, a citizen and resident of California, died
on November 28,1929; that in accordance with the law of California,
the community property of spouses who are citizens of California,
upon the death of the wife previous to that of the husband, belongs
absolutely to the surviving husband without administration; that the
conjugal partnership of Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs,
deceased, has no obligations or debts and no one will be
prejudiced by adjucating said parcels of land (and seventeen others
not here involved) to be the absolute property of the said Allison D.
Gibbs as sole owner. The court granted said petition and on
September 22, 1930, entered a decree adjucating the said Allison
D. Gibbs to be the sole and absolute owner of said lands, applying
section 1401 of the Civil Code of California. Gibbs presented this
decree to the register of deeds of Manila and demanded that the
latter issue to him a "transfer certificate of title".
Section 1547 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code
provides in part that:
Registers of deeds shall not register in the registry of
property any document transferring real property or real
rights therein or any chattel mortgage, by way of
gifts mortis causa, legacy or inheritance, unless the
payment of the tax fixed in this article and actually due
thereon shall be shown. And they shall immediately notify
the Collector of Internal Revenue or the corresponding
provincial treasurer of the non payment of the tax
discovered by them. . . .
Acting upon the authority of said section, the register of deeds of
the City of Manila, declined to accept as binding said decree of
court of September 22,1930, and refused to register the transfer of
title of the said conjugal property to Allison D. Gibbs, on the ground
that the corresponding inheritance tax had not been paid.
Thereupon, under date of December 26, 1930, Allison D. Gibbs
filed in the said court a petition for an order requiring the said
register of deeds "to issue the corresponding titles" to the petitioner
without requiring previous payment of any inheritance tax. After due
hearing of the parties, the court reaffirmed said order of September
22, 1930, and entered the order of March 10, 1931, which is under
review on this appeal.
On January 3, 1933, this court remanded the case to the court of
origin for new trial upon additional evidence in regard to the
pertinent law of California in force at the time of the death of Mrs.
Gibbs, also authorizing the introduction of evidence with reference
to the dates of the acquisition of the property involved in this suit
and with reference to the California law in force at the time of such
acquisition. The case is now before us with the supplementary
evidence.
For the purposes of this case, we shall consider the following facts
as established by the evidence or the admissions of the parties:
Allison D. Gibbs has been continuously, since the year 1902, a
citizen of the State of California and domiciled therein; that he and
Eva Johnson Gibbs were married at Columbus, Ohio, in July 1906;
that there was no antenuptial marriage contract between the
parties; that during the existence of said marriage the spouses
acquired the following lands, among others, in the Philippine
Islands, as conjugal property:lawphil.net
1. A parcel of land in the City of Manila represented by transfer
certificate of title No. 20880, dated March 16, 1920, and registered
in the name of "Allison D. Gibbs casado con Eva Johnson Gibbs".
2. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by transfer
certificate of title No. 28336, dated May 14, 1927, in which it is
certified "that spouses Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs are
the owners in fee simple" of the land therein described.
3. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by transfer
certificate of title No. 28331, dated April 6, 1927, which it states
"that Allison D. Gibbs married to Eva Johnson Gibbs" is the owner
of the land described therein; that said Eva Johnson Gibbs died
intestate on November 28, 1929, living surviving her her husband,
the appellee, and two sons, Allison J. Gibbs , now age 25 and
Finley J. Gibbs, now aged 22, as her sole heirs of law.
Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code entitled "Tax on
inheritances, legacies and other acquisitions mortis causa" provides
in section 1536 that "Every transmission by virtue of inheritance ...
of real property ... shall be subject to the following tax." It results
that the question for determination in this case is as follows: Was
Eva Johnson Gibbs at the time of her death the owner of a
descendible interest in the Philippine lands above-mentioned?
The appellee contends that the law of California should determine
the nature and extent of the title, if any, that vested in Eva Johnson
Gibbs under the three certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and
28331 above referred to, citing article 9 of the Civil Code. But that,
even if the nature and extent of her title under said certificates be
governed by the law of the Philippine Islands, the laws of California
govern the succession to such title, citing the second paragraph of
article 10 of the Civil Code.
Article 9 of the Civil Code is as follows:
The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition, and legal capacity of persons, are
binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a
foreign country." It is argued that the conjugal right of the
California wife in community real estate in the Philippine
Islands is a personal right and must, therefore, be settled
by the law governing her personal status, that is, the law
of California. But our attention has not been called to any
law of California that incapacitates a married woman from
acquiring or holding land in a foreign jurisdiction in
accordance with the lex rei sitae. There is not the
slightest doubt that a California married woman can
acquire title to land in a common law jurisdiction like the
State of Illinois or the District of Columbia, subject to the
common-law estate by the courtesy which would vest in
her husband. Nor is there any doubt that if a California
husband acquired land in such a jurisdiction his wife
would be vested with the common law right of dower, the
prerequisite conditions obtaining. Article 9 of the Civil
Code treats of purely personal relations and status and
capacity for juristic acts, the rules relating to property,
both personal and real, being governed by article 10 of
the Civil Code. Furthermore, article 9, by its very terms, is
applicable only to "Spaniards" (now, by construction, to
citizens of the Philippine Islands).
The Organic Act of the Philippine Islands (Act of
Congress, August 29, 1916, known as the "Jones Law")
as regards the determination of private rights, grants
practical autonomy to the Government of the Philippine
Islands. This Government, therefore, may apply the
principles and rules of private international law (conflicts
of laws) on the same footing as an organized territory or
state of the United States. We should, therefore, resort to
the law of California, the nationality and domicile of Mrs.
Gibbs, to ascertain the norm which would be applied here
as law were there any question as to her status.
But the appellant's chief argument and the sole basis of the lower
court's decision rests upon the second paragraph of article 10 of the
Civil Code which is as follows:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in
respect to the order of succession as well as to the
amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity
of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is in question, whatever
may be the nature of the property or the country in which
it may be situated.
In construing the above language we are met at the outset with
some difficulty by the expression "the national law of the person
whose succession is in question", by reason of the rather
anomalous political status of the Philippine Islands. (Cf. Manresa,
vol. 1, Codigo Civil, pp. 103, 104.) We encountered no difficulty in
applying article 10 in the case of a citizen of Turkey. (Miciano vs.
Brimo, 50 Phil., 867.) Having regard to the practical autonomy of
the Philippine Islands, as above stated, we have concluded that if
article 10 is applicable and the estate in question is that of a
deceased American citizen, the succession shall be regulated in
accordance with the norms of the State of his domicile in the United
States. (Cf. Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil., 130,
137; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156, 166.)
The trial court found that under the law of California, upon the death
of the wife, the entire community property without administration
belongs to the surviving husband; that he is the absolute owner of
all the community property from the moment of the death of his
wife, not by virtue of succession or by virtue of her death, but by
virtue of the fact that when the death of the wife precedes that of
the husband he acquires the community property, not as an heir or
as the beneficiary of his deceased wife, but because she never had
more than an inchoate interest or expentancy which is extinguished
upon her death. Quoting the case of Estate of Klumpke (167 Cal.,
415, 419), the court said: "The decisions under this section (1401
Civil Code of California) are uniform to the effect that the husband
does not take the community property upon the death of the wife by
succession, but that he holds it all from the moment of her death as
though required by himself. ... It never belonged to the estate of the
deceased wife."
The argument of the appellee apparently leads to this dilemma: If
he takes nothing by succession from his deceased wife, how can
the second paragraph of article 10 be invoked? Can the appellee
be heard to say that there is a legal succession under the law of the
Philippine Islands and no legal succession under the law of
California? It seems clear that the second paragraph of article 10
applies only when a legal or testamentary succession has taken
place in the Philippines and in accordance with the law of the
Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is consulted only in regard to
the order of succession or the extent of the successional rights; in
other words, the second paragraph of article 10 can be invoked
only when the deceased was vested with a descendible interest in
property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.
In the case of Clarke vs. Clarke (178 U. S., 186, 191; 44 Law ed.,
1028, 1031), the court said:
It is principle firmly established that to the law of the state
in which the land is situated we must look for the rules
which govern its descent, alienation, and transfer, and for
the effect and construction of wills and other
conveyances. (United States vs. Crosby, 7 Cranch, 115;
3 L. ed., 287; Clark vs. Graham, 6 Wheat., 577; 5 L. ed.,
334; McGoon vs. Scales, 9 Wall., 23; 19 L. ed., 545;
Brine vs. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 96 U. S., 627; 24 L. ed.,
858.)" (See also Estate of Lloyd, 175 Cal., 704, 705.) This
 fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of
article 10 of our Civil Code as follows: "Personal property
is subject to the laws of the nation of the owner thereof;
real property to the laws of the country in which it is
situated.
It is stated in 5 Cal. Jur., 478:
In accord with the rule that real property is subject to
the lex rei sitae, the respective rights of husband and wife
in such property, in the absence of an antenuptial
contract, are determined by the law of the place where
the property is situated, irrespective of the domicile of the
parties or to the place where the marriage was
celebrated. (See also Saul vs. His Creditors, 5 Martin [N.
S.], 569; 16 Am. Dec., 212 [La.]; Heidenheimer vs.
Loring, 26 S. W., 99 [Texas].)
Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title which
vested in Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of the community
lands here in question must be determined in accordance with
the lex rei sitae.
It is admitted that the Philippine lands here in question were
acquired as community property of the conjugal partnership of the
appellee and his wife. Under the law of the Philippine Islands, she
was vested of a title equal to that of her husband. Article 1407 of
the Civil Code provides:
All the property of the spouses shall be deemed
partnership property in the absence of proof that it
belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Article
1395 provides:
"The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules of law
applicable to the contract of partnership in all matters in which such
rules do not conflict with the express provisions of this chapter."
Article 1414 provides that "the husband may dispose by will of his
half only of the property of the conjugal partnership." Article 1426
provides that upon dissolution of the conjugal partnership and after
inventory and liquidation, "the net remainder of the partnership
property shall be divided share and share alike between the
husband and wife, or their respective heirs." Under the provisions of
the Civil Code and the jurisprudence prevailing here, the wife, upon
the acquisition of any conjugal property, becomes immediately
vested with an interest and title therein equal to that of her
husband, subject to the power of management and disposition
which the law vests in the husband. Immediately upon her death, if
there are no obligations of the decedent, as is true in the present
case, her share in the conjugal property is transmitted to her heirs
by succession. (Articles 657, 659, 661, Civil Code;
cf. also Coronel vs. Ona, 33 Phil., 456, 469.)
It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law of the
Philippine Islands, vested of a descendible interest, equal to that of
her husband, in the Philippine lands covered by certificates of title
Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, from the date of their acquisition to
the date of her death. That appellee himself believed that his wife
was vested of such a title and interest in manifest from the second
of said certificates, No. 28336, dated May 14, 1927, introduced by
him in evidence, in which it is certified that "the spouses Allison D.
Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs are the owners in fee simple of the
conjugal lands therein described."
The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands
aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and
this transmission plainly falls within the language of section 1536 of
Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which levies a
tax on inheritances. (Cf. Re Estate of Majot, 199 N. Y., 29; 92 N. E.,
402; 29 L. R. A. [N. S.], 780.) It is unnecessary in this proceeding to
determine the "order of succession" or the "extent of the
successional rights" (article 10, Civil Code, supra) which would be
regulated by section 1386 of the Civil Code of California which was
in effect at the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs.
The record does not show what the proper amount of the
inheritance tax in this case would be nor that the appellee
(petitioner below) in any way challenged the power of the
Government to levy an inheritance tax or the validity of the statute
under which the register of deeds refused to issue a certificate of
transfer reciting that the appellee is the exclusive owner of the
Philippine lands included in the three certificates of title here
involved.
The judgment of the court below of March 10, 1931, is reversed
with directions to dismiss the petition, without special
pronouncement as to the costs.
G.R. No. L-104776 December 5, 1994
BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B.
EVANGELISTA, and the rest of 1,767 NAMED-COMPLAINANTS,
thru and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty. GERARDO A. DEL
MUNDO, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION'S
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC.
AND/OR ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS
CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 104911-14 December 5, 1994
BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BROWN
& ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. and/or ASIA INTERNATIONAL
BUILDERS CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 105029-32 December 5, 1994
ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDER CORPORATION and BROWN
& ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BIENVENIDO
M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B. EVANGELISTA,
ROMEO PATAG, RIZALINO REYES, IGNACIO DE VERA,
SOLOMON B. REYES, JOSE M. ABAN, EMIGDIO N.
ABARQUEZ, ANTONIO ACUPAN, ROMEO ACUPAN,
BENJAMIN ALEJANDRE, WILFREDO D. ALIGADO, MARTIN
AMISTAD, JR., ROLANDO B. AMUL, AMORSOLO ANADING,
ANTONIO T. ANGLO, VICENTE ARLITA, HERBERT AYO,
SILVERIO BALATAZO, ALFREDO BALOBO, FALCONERO
BANAAG, RAMON BARBOSA, FELIX BARCENA, FERNANDO
BAS, MARIO BATACLAN, ROBERTO S. BATICA, ENRICO
BELEN, ARISTEO BICOL, LARRY C. BICOL, PETRONILLO
BISCOCHO, FELIX M. BOBIER, DIONISIO BOBONGO, BAYANI
S. BRACAMANTE, PABLITO BUSTILLO, GUILLERMO
CABEZAS, BIENVENIDO CADALIN, RODOLFO CAGATAN,
AMANTE CAILAO, IRENEO CANDOR, JOSE CASTILLO,
MANUEL CASTILLO, REMAR CASTROJERES, REYNALDO
CAYAS, ROMEO CECILIO, TEODULO CREUS, BAYANI
DAYRIT, RICARDO DAYRIT, ERNESTO T. DELA CRUZ,
FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, ONOFRE DE RAMA, IGNACIO DE
VERA, MODESTO DIZON, REYNALDO DIZON, ANTONIO S.
DOMINGUEZ, GILBERT EBRADA, RICARDO EBRADA,
ANTONIO EJERCITO, JR., EDUARTE ERIDAO, ELADIO
ESCOTOTO, JOHN ESGUERRA, EDUARDO ESPIRITU,
ERNESTO ESPIRITU, RODOLFO ESPIRITU, NESTOR M.
ESTEVA, BENJAMIN ESTRADA, VALERIO EVANGELISTA,
OLIGARIO FRANCISCO, JESUS GABAWAN, ROLANDO
GARCIA, ANGEL GUDA, PACITO HERNANDEZ, ANTONIO
HILARIO, HENRY L. JACOB, HONESTO JARDINIANO,
ANTONIO JOCSON, GERARDO LACSAMANA, EFREN U. LIRIO
LORETO LONTOC, ISRAEL LORENZO, ALEJANDRO LORINO,
JOSE MABALAY, HERMIE MARANAN, LEOVIGILDO MARCIAL,
NOEL MARTINEZ, DANTE MATREO, LUCIANO MELENDEZ,
RENATO MELO, FRANCIS MEDIODIA, JOSE C. MILANES,
RAYMUNDO C. MILAY, CRESENCIANO MIRANDA, ILDEFONSO
C. MOLINA, ARMANDO B. MONDEJAR RESURRECCION D.
NAZARENO, JUAN OLINDO, FRANCISCO R. OLIVARES,
PEDRO ORBISTA, JR., RICARDO ORDONEZ, ERNIE PANCHO,
JOSE PANCHO, GORGONIO P. PARALA, MODESTO PINPIN,
JUANITO PAREA, ROMEO I. PATAG, FRANCISCO PINPIN,
LEONARDO POBLETE, JAIME POLLOS, DOMINGO PONDALIS,
EUGENIO RAMIREZ, LUCIEN M. RESPALL, GAUDENCIO
RETANAN, JR., TOMAS B. RETENER, ALVIN C. REYES,
RIZALINO REYES, SOLOMON B. REYES, VIRGILIO G. RICAZA,
RODELIO RIETA, JR., BENITO RIVERA, JR., BERNARDO J.
ROBILLOS, PABLO A. ROBLES, JOSE ROBLEZA, QUIRINO
RONQUILLO, AVELINO M. ROQUE, MENANDRO L. SABINO,
PEDRO SALGATAR, EDGARDO SALONGA, NUMERIANO SAN
MATEO, FELIZARDO DE LOS SANTOS, JR., GABRIEL
SANTOS, JUANITO SANTOS, PAQUITO SOLANTE, CONRADO
A. SOLIS, JR., RODOLFO SULTAN, ISAIAS TALACTAC,
WILLIAM TARUC, MENANDRO TEMPROSA, BIENVENIDO S.
TOLENTINO, BENEDICTO TORRES, MAXIMIANO TORRES,
FRANCISCO G. TRIAS, SERGIO A. URSOLINO, ROGELIO
VALDEZ, LEGORIO E. VERGARA, DELFIN VICTORIA, GILBERT
VICTORIA, HERNANE VICTORIANO, FRANCISCO
VILLAFLORES, DOMINGO VILLAHERMOSA, ROLANDO
VILLALOBOS, ANTONIO VILLAUZ, DANILO VILLANUEVA,
ROGELIO VILLANUEVA, ANGEL VILLARBA, JUANITO
VILLARINO, FRANCISCO ZARA, ROGELIO AALAGOS,
NICANOR B. ABAD, ANDRES ABANES, REYNALDO ABANES,
EDUARDO ABANTE, JOSE ABARRO, JOSEFINO ABARRO,
CELSO S. ABELANIO, HERMINIO ABELLA, MIGUEL
ABESTANO, RODRIGO G. ABUBO, JOSE B. ABUSTAN, DANTE
ACERES, REYNALDO S. ACOJIDO, LEOWILIN ACTA,
EUGENIO C. ACUEZA, EDUARDO ACUPAN, REYNALDO
ACUPAN, SOLANO ACUPAN, MANUEL P. ADANA,
FLORENTINO R. AGNE, QUITERIO R. AGUDO, MANUEL P.
AGUINALDO, DANTE AGUIRRE, HERMINIO AGUIRRE,
GONZALO ALBERTO, JR., CONRADO ALCANTARA,
LAMBERTO Q. ALCANTARA, MARIANITO J. ALCANTARA,
BENCIO ALDOVER, EULALIO V. ALEJANDRO, BENJAMIN
ALEJANDRO, EDUARDO L. ALEJANDRO, MAXIMINO
ALEJANDRO, ALBERTO ALMENAR, ARNALDO ALONZO,
AMADO ALORIA, CAMILO ALVAREZ, MANUEL C. ALVAREZ,
BENJAMIN R. AMBROCIO, CARLOS AMORES, BERNARD P.
ANCHETA, TIMOTEO O. ANCHETA, JEOFREY ANI, ELINO P.
ANTILLON, ARMANDRO B. ANTIPONO, LARRY T. ANTONIO,
ANTONIO APILADO, ARTURO P. APILADO, FRANCISCO
APOLINARIO, BARTOLOME M. AQUINO, ISIDRO AQUINO,
PASTOR AQUINO, ROSENDO M. AQUINO, ROBERTO
ARANGORIN, BENJAMIN O. ARATEA, ARTURO V. ARAULLO,
PRUDENCIO ARAULLO, ALEXANDER ARCAIRA, FRANCISCO
ARCIAGA, JOSE AREVALO, JUANTO AREVALO, RAMON
AREVALO, RODOLFO AREVALO, EULALIO ARGUELLES,
WILFREDO P. ARICA, JOSE M. ADESILLO, ANTONIO
ASUNCION, ARTEMIO M. ASUNCION, EDGARDO ASUNCION,
REXY M. ASUNCION, VICENTE AURELIO, ANGEL AUSTRIA,
RICARDO P. AVERILLA, JR., VIRGILIO AVILA, BARTOLOME
AXALAN, ALFREDO BABILONIA, FELIMON BACAL, JOSE L.
BACANI, ROMULO R. BALBIERAN, VICENTE BALBIERAN,
RODOLFO BALITBIT, TEODORO Y. BALOBO, DANILO O.
BARBA, BERNARDO BARRO, JUAN A. BASILAN, CEFERINO
BATITIS, VIVENCIO C. BAUAN, GAUDENCIO S. BAUTISTA,
LEONARDO BAUTISTA, JOSE D. BAUTISTA, ROSTICO
BAUTISTA, RUPERTO B. BAUTISTA, TEODORO S. BAUTISTA,
VIRGILIO BAUTISTA, JESUS R. BAYA, WINIEFREDO
BAYACAL, WINIEFREDO BEBIT, BEN G. BELIR, ERIC B.
BELTRAN, EMELIANO BENALES, JR., RAUL BENITEZ,
PERFECTO BENSAN, IRENEO BERGONIO, ISABELO
BERMUDEZ, ROLANDO I. BERMUDEZ, DANILO BERON,
BENJAMIN BERSAMIN, ANGELITO BICOL, ANSELMO BICOL,
CELESTINO BICOL, JR., FRANCISCO BICOL, ROGELIO BICOL,
ROMULO L. BICOL, ROGELIO BILLIONES, TEOFILO N. BITO,
FERNANDO BLANCO, AUGUSTO BONDOC, DOMINGO
BONDOC, PEPE S. BOOC, JAMES R. BORJA, WILFREDO
BRACEROS, ANGELES C. BRECINO, EURECLYDON G.
BRIONES, AMADO BRUGE, PABLITO BUDILLO, ARCHIMEDES
BUENAVENTURA, BASILIO BUENAVENTURA, GUILLERMO
BUENCONSEJO, ALEXANDER BUSTAMANTE, VIRGILIO
BUTIONG, JR., HONESTO P. CABALLA, DELFIN CABALLERO,
BENEDICTO CABANIGAN, MOISES CABATAY, HERMANELI
CABRERA, PEDRO CAGATAN, JOVEN C. CAGAYAT, ROGELIO
L. CALAGOS, REYNALDO V. CALDEJON, OSCAR C.
CALDERON, NESTOR D. CALLEJA, RENATO R. CALMA,
NELSON T. CAMACHO, SANTOS T. CAMACHO, ROBERTO
CAMANA, FLORANTE C. CAMANAG EDGARDO M. CANDA,
SEVERINO CANTOS, EPIFANIO A. CAPONPON, ELIAS D.
CARILLO, JR., ARMANDO CARREON, MENANDRO M.
CASTAÑEDA, BENIGNO A. CASTILLO, CORNELIO L.
CASTILLO, JOSEPH B. CASTILLO, ANSELMO CASTILLO,
JOAQUIN CASTILLO, PABLO L. CASTILLO, ROMEO P.
CASTILLO, SESINANDO CATIBOG, DANILO CASTRO,
PRUDENCIO A. CASTRO, RAMO CASTRO, JR., ROMEO A. DE
CASTRO, JAIME B. CATLI, DURANA D. CEFERINO, RODOLFO
B. CELIS, HERMINIGILDO CEREZO, VICTORIANO CELESTINO,
BENJAMIN CHAN, ANTONIO C. CHUA, VIVENCIO B. CIABAL,
RODRIGO CLARETE, AUGUSTO COLOMA, TURIANO
CONCEPCION, TERESITO CONSTANTINO, ARMANDO
CORALES, RENATO C. CORCUERA, APOLINAR CORONADO,
ABELARDO CORONEL, FELIX CORONEL, JR., LEONARDO
CORPUZ, JESUS M. CORRALES, CESAR CORTEMPRATO,
FRANCISCO O. CORVERA, FRANCISCO COSTALES, SR.,
CELEDONIO CREDITO, ALBERTO A. CREUS, ANACLETO V.
CRUZ, DOMINGO DELA CRUZ, AMELIANO DELA CRUZ, JR.,
PANCHITO CRUZ, REYNALDO B. DELA CRUZ, ROBERTO P.
CRUZ, TEODORO S. CRUZ, ZOSIMO DELA CRUZ, DIONISIO A.
CUARESMA, FELIMON CUIZON, FERMIN DAGONDON,
RICHARD DAGUINSIN, CRISANTO A. DATAY, NICASIO
DANTINGUINOO, JOSE DATOON, EDUARDO DAVID, ENRICO
T. DAVID, FAVIO DAVID, VICTORIANO S. DAVID, EDGARDO N.
DAYACAP, JOSELITO T. DELOSO, CELERINO DE GUZMAN,
ROMULO DE GUZMAN, LIBERATO DE GUZMAN, JOSE DE
LEON, JOSELITO L. DE LUMBAN, NAPOLEON S. DE LUNA,
RICARDO DE RAMA, GENEROSO DEL ROSARIO, ALBERTO
DELA CRUZ, JOSE DELA CRUZ, LEONARDO DELOS REYES,
ERNESTO F. DIATA, EDUARDO A. DIAZ, FELIX DIAZ,
MELCHOR DIAZ, NICANOR S. DIAZ, GERARDO C. DIGA,
CLEMENTE DIMATULAC, ROLANDO DIONISIO, PHILIPP G.
DISMAYA, BENJAMIN DOCTOLERO, ALBERTO STO.
DOMINGO, BENJAMIN E. DOZA, BENJAMIN DUPA, DANILO C.
DURAN, GREGORIO D. DURAN, RENATO A. EDUARTE,
GODOFREDO E. EISMA, ARDON B. ELLO, UBED B. ELLO,
JOSEFINO ENANO, REYNALDO ENCARNACION, EDGARDO
ENGUANCIO, ELIAS EQUIPANO, FELIZARDO ESCARMOSA,
MIGUEL ESCARMOSA, ARMANDO ESCOBAR, ROMEO T.
ESCUYOS, ANGELITO ESPIRITU, EDUARDO S. ESPIRITU,
REYNALDO ESPIRITU, ROLANDO ESPIRITU, JULIAN
ESPREGANTE, IGMIDIO ESTANISLAO, ERNESTO M.
ESTEBAN, MELANIO R. ESTRO, ERNESTO M. ESTEVA,
CONRADO ESTUAR, CLYDE ESTUYE, ELISEO FAJARDO,
PORFIRIO FALQUEZA, WILFREDO P. FAUSTINO, EMILIO E.
FERNANDEZ, ARTEMIO FERRER, MISAEL M. FIGURACION,
ARMANDO F. FLORES, BENJAMIN FLORES, EDGARDO C.
FLORES, BUENAVENTURA FRANCISCO, MANUEL S.
FRANCISCO, ROLANDO FRANCISCO, VALERIANO
FRANCISCO, RODOLFO GABAWAN, ESMERALDO GAHUTAN,
CESAR C. GALANG, SANTIAGO N. GALOSO, GABRIEL
GAMBOA, BERNARDO GANDAMON, JUAN GANZON, ANDRES
GARCIA, JR., ARMANDO M. GARCIA, EUGENIO GARCIA,
MARCELO L. GARCIA, PATRICIO L. GARCIA, JR., PONCIANO
G. GARCIA, PONCIANO G. GARCIA, JR., RAFAEL P. GARCIA,
ROBERTO S. GARCIA, OSIAS G. GAROFIL, RAYMUNDO C.
GARON, ROLANDO G. GATELA, AVELINO GAYETA,
RAYMUNDO GERON, PLACIDO GONZALES, RUPERTO H.
GONZALES, ROGELIO D. GUANIO, MARTIN V. GUERRERO,
JR., ALEXIS GUNO, RICARDO L. GUNO, FRANCISCO GUPIT,
DENNIS J. GUTIERREZ, IGNACIO B. GUTIERREZ, ANGELITO
DE GUZMAN, JR., CESAR H. HABANA, RAUL G. HERNANDEZ,
REYNALDO HERNANDEZ, JOVENIANO D. HILADO, JUSTO
HILAPO, ROSTITO HINAHON, FELICISIMO HINGADA,
EDUARDO HIPOLITO, RAUL L. IGNACIO, MANUEL L. ILAGAN,
RENATO L. ILAGAN, CONRADO A. INSIONG, GRACIANO G.
ISLA, ARNEL L. JACOB, OSCAR J. JAPITENGA, CIRILO
HICBAN, MAXIMIANO HONRADES, GENEROSO IGNACIO,
FELIPE ILAGAN, EXPEDITO N. JACOB, MARIO JASMIN,
BIENVENIDO JAVIER, ROMEO M. JAVIER, PRIMO DE JESUS,
REYNALDO DE JESUS, CARLOS A. JIMENEZ, DANILO E.
JIMENEZ, PEDRO C. JOAQUIN, FELIPE W. JOCSON, FELINO
M. JOCSON, PEDRO N. JOCSON, VALENTINO S. JOCSON,
PEDRO B. JOLOYA, ESTEBAN P. JOSE, JR., RAUL JOSE,
RICARDO SAN JOSE, GERTRUDO KABIGTING, EDUARDO S.
KOLIMLIM, SR., LAURO J. LABAY, EMMANUEL C. LABELLA,
EDGARDO B. LACERONA, JOSE B. LACSON, MARIO J.
LADINES, RUFINO LAGAC, RODRIGO LAGANAPAN, EFREN M.
LAMADRID, GUADENCIO LATANAN, VIRGILIO LATAYAN,
EMILIANO LATOJA, WENCESLAO LAUREL, ALFREDO
LAXAMANA, DANIEL R. LAZARO, ANTONIO C. LEANO,
ARTURO S. LEGASPI, BENITO DE LEMOS, JR., PEDRO G. DE
LEON, MANOLITO C. LILOC, GERARDO LIMUACO, ERNESTO
S. LISING, RENATO LISING, WILFREDO S. LISING, CRISPULO
LONTOC, PEDRO M. LOPERA, ROGELIO LOPERA, CARLITO
M. LOPEZ, CLODY LOPEZ, GARLITO LOPEZ, GEORGE F.
LOPEZ, VIRGILIO M. LOPEZ, BERNARDITO G. LOREJA,
DOMINGO B. LORICO, DOMINGO LOYOLA, DANTE LUAGE,
ANTONIO M. LUALHATI, EMMANUEL LUALHATI, JR.,
LEONIDEZ C. LUALHATI, SEBASTIAN LUALHATI, FRANCISCO
LUBAT, ARMANDO LUCERO, JOSELITO L. DE LUMBAN,
THOMAS VICENTE O. LUNA, NOLI MACALADLAD, ALFREDO
MACALINO, RICARDO MACALINO, ARTURO V. MACARAIG,
ERNESTO V. MACARAIG, RODOLFO V. MACARAIG,
BENJAMIN MACATANGAY, HERMOGENES MACATANGAY,
RODEL MACATANGAY, ROMULO MACATANGAY, OSIAS Q.
MADLANGBAYAN, NICOLAS P. MADRID, EDELBERTO G.
MAGAT, EFREN C. MAGBANUA, BENJAMIN MAGBUHAT,
ALFREDO C. MAGCALENG, ANTONIO MAGNAYE, ALFONSO
MAGPANTAY, RICARDO C. MAGPANTAY, SIMEON M.
MAGPANTAY, ARMANDO M. MAGSINO, MACARIO S.
MAGSINO, ANTONIO MAGTIBAY, VICTOR V. MAGTIBAY,
GERONIMO MAHILUM, MANUEL MALONZO, RICARDO
MAMADIS, RODOLFO MANA, BERNARDO A. MANALILI,
MANUEL MANALILI, ANGELO MANALO, AGUILES L. MANALO,
LEOPOLDO MANGAHAS, BAYANI MANIGBAS, ROLANDO C.
MANIMTIM, DANIEL MANONSON, ERNESTO F. MANUEL,
EDUARDO MANZANO, RICARDO N. MAPA, RAMON MAPILE,
ROBERTO C. MARANA, NEMESIO MARASIGAN, WENCESLAO
MARASIGAN, LEONARDO MARCELO, HENRY F. MARIANO,
JOEL MARIDABLE, SANTOS E. MARINO, NARCISO A.
MARQUEZ, RICARDO MARTINEZ, DIEGO MASICAMPO,
AURELIO MATABERDE, RENATO MATILLA, VICTORIANO
MATILLA, VIRGILIO MEDEL, LOLITO M. MELECIO, BENIGNO
MELENDEZ, RENER J. MEMIJE, REYNALDO F. MEMIJE,
RODEL MEMIJE, AVELINO MENDOZA, JR., CLARO MENDOZA,
TIMOTEO MENDOZA, GREGORIO MERCADO, ERNANI DELA
MERCED, RICARDO MERCENA, NEMESIO METRELLO, RODEL
MEMIJE, GASPAR MINIMO, BENJAMIN MIRANDA,
FELIXBERTO D. MISA, CLAUDIO A. MODESTO, JR., OSCAR
MONDEDO, GENEROSO MONTON, RENATO MORADA,
RICARDO MORADA, RODOLFO MORADA, ROLANDO M.
MORALES, FEDERICO M. MORENO, VICTORINO A. MORTEL,
JR., ESPIRITU A. MUNOZ, IGNACIO MUNOZ, ILDEFONSO
MUNOZ, ROGELIO MUNOZ, ERNESTO NAPALAN, MARCELO
A. NARCIZO, REYNALDO NATALIA, FERNANDO C.
NAVARETTE, PACIFICO D. NAVARRO, FLORANTE
NAZARENO, RIZAL B. NAZARIO, JOSUE NEGRITE, ALFREDO
NEPUMUCENO, HERBERT G. NG, FLORENCIO NICOLAS,
ERNESTO C. NINON, AVELINO NUQUI, NEMESIO D. OBA,
DANILO OCAMPO, EDGARDO OCAMPO, RODRIGO E.
OCAMPO, ANTONIO B. OCCIANO, REYNALDO P. OCSON,
BENJAMIN ODESA, ANGEL OLASO, FRANCISCO OLIGARIO,
ZOSIMO OLIMBO, BENJAMIN V. ORALLO, ROMEO S.
ORIGINES, DANILO R. ORTANEZ, WILFREDO OSIAS, VIRGILIO
PA-A, DAVID PAALAN, JESUS N. PACHECO, ALFONSO L.
PADILLA, DANILO PAGSANJAN, NUMERIANO PAGSISIHAN,
RICARDO T. PAGUIO, EMILIO PAKINGAN, LEANDRO
PALABRICA, QUINCIANO PALO, JOSE PAMATIAN, GONZALO
PAN, PORFIRIO PAN, BIENVENIDO PANGAN, ERNESTO
PANGAN, FRANCISCO V. PASIA, EDILBERTO PASIMIO, JR.,
JOSE V. PASION, ANGELITO M. PENA, DIONISIO PENDRAS,
HERMINIO PERALTA, REYNALDO M. PERALTA, ANTONIO
PEREZ, ANTOLIANO E. PEREZ, JUAN PEREZ, LEON PEREZ,
ROMEO E. PEREZ, ROMULO PEREZ, WILLIAM PEREZ,
FERNANDO G. PERINO, FLORENTINO DEL PILAR, DELMAR F.
PINEDA, SALVADOR PINEDA, ELIZALDE PINPIN, WILFREDO
PINPIN, ARTURO POBLETE, DOMINADOR R. PRIELA,
BUENAVENTURA PRUDENTE, CARMELITO PRUDENTE,
DANTE PUEYO, REYNALDO Q. PUEYO, RODOLFO O. PULIDO,
ALEJANDRO PUNIO, FEDERICO QUIMAN, ALFREDO L.
QUINTO, ROMEO QUINTOS, EDUARDO W. RACABO,
RICARDO C. DE RAMA, RICARDO L. DE RAMA, ROLANDO DE
RAMA, FERNANDO A. RAMIREZ, LITO S. RAMIREZ, RICARDO
G. RAMIREZ, RODOLFO V. RAMIREZ, ALBERTO RAMOS,
ANSELMO C. RAMOS, TOBIAS RAMOS, WILLARFREDO
RAYMUNDO, REYNALDO RAQUEDAN, MANUEL F. RAVELAS,
WILFREDO D. RAYMUNDO, ERNESTO E. RECOLASO,
ALBERTO REDAZA, ARTHUR REJUSO, TORIBIO M. RELLAMA,
JAIME RELLOSA, EUGENIO A. REMOQUILLO, GERARDO
RENTOZA, REDENTOR C. REY, ALFREDO S. REYES, AMABLE
S. REYES, BENEDICTO R. REYES, GREGORIO B. REYES,
JOSE A. REYES, JOSE C. REYES, ROMULO M. REYES,
SERGIO REYES, ERNESTO F. RICO, FERNANDO M. RICO,
EMMANUEL RIETA, RICARDO RIETA, LEO B. ROBLES, RUBEN
ROBLES, RODOLFO ROBLEZA, RODRIGO ROBLEZA,
EDUARDO ROCABO, ANTONIO R. RODRIGUEZ, BERNARDO
RODRIGUEZ, ELIGIO RODRIGUEZ, ALMONTE ROMEO, ELIAS
RONQUILLO, ELISE RONQUILLO, LUIS VAL B. RONQUILLO,
REYNOSO P. RONQUILLO, RODOLFO RONQUILLO, ANGEL
ROSALES, RAMON ROSALES, ALBERTO DEL ROSARIO,
GENEROSO DEL ROSARIO, TEODORICO DEL ROSARIO,
VIRGILIO L. ROSARIO, CARLITO SALVADOR, JOSE
SAMPARADA, ERNESTO SAN PEDRO, ADRIANO V. SANCHA,
GERONIMO M. SANCHA, ARTEMIO B. SANCHEZ, NICASIO
SANCHEZ, APOLONIO P. SANTIAGO, JOSELITO S.
SANTIAGO, SERGIO SANTIAGO, EDILBERTO C. SANTOS,
EFREN S. SANTOS, RENATO D. SANTOS, MIGUEL SAPUYOT,
ALEX S. SERQUINA, DOMINADOR P. SERRA, ROMEO SIDRO,
AMADO M. SILANG, FAUSTINO D. SILANG, RODOLFO B. DE
SILOS, ANICETO G. SILVA, EDGARDO M. SILVA, ROLANDO C.
SILVERTO, ARTHUR B. SIMBAHON, DOMINGO SOLANO,
JOSELITO C. SOLANTE, CARLITO SOLIS, CONRADO SOLIS,
III, EDGARDO SOLIS, ERNESTO SOLIS, ISAGANI M. SOLIS,
EDUARDO L. SOTTO, ERNESTO G. STA. MARIA, VICENTE G.
STELLA, FELIMON SUPANG, PETER TANGUINOO, MAXIMINO
TALIBSAO, FELICISMO P. TALUSIK, FERMIN TARUC, JR.,
LEVY S. TEMPLO, RODOLFO S. TIAMSON, LEONILO TIPOSO,
ARNEL TOLENTINO, MARIO M. TOLENTINO, FELIPE
TORRALBA, JOVITO V. TORRES, LEONARDO DE TORRES,
GAVINO U. TUAZON, AUGUSTO B. TUNGUIA, FRANCISCO
UMALI, SIMPLICIO UNIDA, WILFREDO V. UNTALAN, ANTONIO
VALDERAMA, RAMON VALDERAMA, NILO VALENCIANO,
EDGARDO C. VASQUEZ, ELPIDIO VELASQUEZ, NESTOR DE
VERA, WILFREDO D. VERA, BIENVENIDO VERGARA,
ALFREDO VERGARA, RAMON R. VERZOSA, FELICITO P.
VICMUNDO, ALFREDO VICTORIANO, TEOFILO P. VIDALLO,
SABINO N. VIERNEZ, JESUS J. VILLA, JOVEN VILLABLANCO,
EDGARDO G. VILLAFLORES, CEFERINO VILLAGERA, ALEX
VILLAHERMOZA, DANILO A. VILLANUEVA, ELITO
VILLANUEVA, LEONARDO M. VILLANUEVA, MANUEL R.
VILLANUEVA, NEPTHALI VILLAR, JOSE V. VILLAREAL,
FELICISIMO VILLARINO, RAFAEL VILLAROMAN, CARLOS
VILLENA, FERDINAND VIVO, ROBERTO YABUT, VICENTE
YNGENTE, AND ORO C. ZUNIGA, respondents.
Gerardo A. Del Mundo and Associates for petitioners.
Romulo, Mabanta, Sayoc, Buenaventura, De los Angeles Law
Offices for BRII/AIBC.
Florante M. De Castro for private respondents in 105029-32.
QUIASON, J.:
The petition in G.R. No. 104776, entitled "Bienvenido M. Cadalin,
et. al. v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration's
Administrator, et. al.," was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court:
(1) to modify the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in POEA
Cases Nos.
L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-779 and L-86-05-460; (2)
to render a new decision: (i) declaring private respondents as
in default; (ii) declaring the said labor cases as a class suit;
(iii) ordering Asia International Builders Corporation (AIBC)
and Brown and Root International Inc. (BRII) to pay the
claims of the 1,767 claimants in said labor cases; (iv)
declaring Atty. Florante M. de Castro guilty of forum-
shopping; and (v) dismissing POEA Case No. L-86-05-460;
and
(3) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of NLRC,
denying the motion for reconsideration of its Resolution dated
September 2, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 8-288).
The petition in G.R. Nos. 104911-14, entitled "Bienvenido M.
Cadalin, et. al., v. Hon. National Labor Relations Commission, et.
al.," was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court:
(1) to reverse the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of
NLRC in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-
10-799 and
L-86-05-460 insofar as it: (i) applied the three-year
prescriptive period under the Labor Code of the Philippines
instead of the ten-year prescriptive period under the Civil
Code of the Philippines; and (ii) denied the
"three-hour daily average" formula in the computation of
petitioners' overtime pay; and
(2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of NLRC,
denying the motion for reconsideration of its Resolution dated
September 2, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 8-25; 26-220).
The petition in G.R. Nos. 105029-32, entitled "Asia International
Builders Corporation, et. al., v. National Labor Relations
Commission, et. al." was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court:
(1) to reverse the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of
NLRC in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-
85-10-779 and
L-86-05-460, insofar as it granted the claims of 149
claimants; and
(2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 21, 1992 of
NLRC insofar as it denied the motions for reconsideration
of AIBC and BRII (Rollo, pp. 2-59; 61-230).
The Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC, which modified
the decision of POEA in four labor cases: (1) awarded monetary
benefits only to 149 claimants and (2) directed Labor Arbiter Fatima
J. Franco to conduct hearings and to receive evidence on the
claims dismissed by the POEA for lack of substantial evidence or
proof of employment.
Consolidation of Cases
G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32 were originally raffled to the
Third Division while G.R. Nos. 104911-14 were raffled to the
Second Division. In the Resolution dated July 26, 1993, the Second
Division referred G.R. Nos. 104911-14 to the Third Division (G.R.
Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, p. 895).
In the Resolution dated September 29, 1993, the Third Division
granted the motion filed in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 for the
consolidation of said cases with G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32,
which were assigned to the First Division (G.R. Nos. 104911-
14, Rollo, pp. 986-1,107; G.R. Nos. 105029-30, Rollo, pp. 369-377,
426-432). In the Resolution dated October 27, 1993, the First
Division granted the motion to consolidate G.R. Nos. 104911-14
with G.R. No. 104776 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, p. 1109; G.R.
Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, p. 1562).
I defaulted by failing to file their answers and to attend the pre-trial
On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M.. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and
Donato B. Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728
other overseas contract workers (OCWs) instituted a class suit by
filing an "Amended Complaint" with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) for money claims arising from
their recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII (POEA Case
No. L-84-06-555). The claimants were represented by Atty. Gerardo
del Mundo.
BRII is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas,
and is engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic
corporation licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and
deploy Filipino workers for overseas employment on behalf of its
foreign principals.
The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the
unexpired portion of the employment contracts, which was
terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the
interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund, interest
on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay;
fringe benefits; refund of SSS and premium not remitted to the
SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties for
committing prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of the
license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 13-14).
At the hearing on June 25, 1984, AIBC was furnished a copy of the
complaint and was given, together with BRII, up to July 5, 1984 to
file its answer.
On July 3, 1984, POEA Administrator, upon motion of AIBC and
BRII, ordered the claimants to file a bill of particulars within ten days
from receipt of the order and the movants to file their answers
within ten days from receipt of the bill of particulars. The POEA
Administrator also scheduled a pre-trial conference on July 25,
1984.
On July 13, 1984, the claimants submitted their "Compliance and
Manifestation." On July 23, 1984, AIBC filed a "Motion to Strike Out
of the Records", the "Complaint" and the "Compliance and
Manifestation." On July 25, 1984, the claimants filed their
"Rejoinder and Comments," averring, among other matters, the
failure of AIBC and BRII to file their answers and to attend the pre-
trial conference on July 25, 1984. The claimants alleged that AIBC
and BRII had waived their right to present evidence and had
conference.
On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the "Motion to
Strike Out of the Records" filed by AIBC but required the claimants
to correct the deficiencies in the complaint pointed out in the order.
On October 10, 1984, claimants asked for time within which to
comply with the Order of October 2, 1984 and filed an "Urgent
Manifestation," praying that the POEA Administrator direct the
parties to submit simultaneously their position papers, after which
the case should be deemed submitted for decision. On the same
day, Atty. Florante de Castro filed another complaint for the same
money claims and benefits in behalf of several claimants, some of
whom were also claimants in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555 (POEA
Case No. 85-10-779).
On October 19, 1984, claimants filed their "Compliance" with the
Order dated October 2, 1984 and an "Urgent Manifestation,"
praying that the POEA direct the parties to submit simultaneously
their position papers after which the case would be deemed
submitted for decision. On the same day, AIBC asked for time to file
its comment on the "Compliance" and "Urgent Manifestation" of
claimants. On November 6, 1984, it filed a second motion for
extension of time to file the comment.
On November 8, 1984, the POEA Administrator informed AIBC that
its motion for extension of time was granted.
On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the
motions for extension of time and asked that AIBC and BRII be
declared in default for failure to file their answers.
On November 20, 1984, AIBC and BRII filed a "Comment" praying,
among other reliefs, that claimants should be ordered to amend
their complaint.
On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order
directing AIBC and BRII to file their answers within ten days from
receipt of the order.
On February 27, 1985, AIBC and BRII appealed to NLRC seeking
the reversal of the said order of the POEA Administrator. Claimants
opposed the appeal, claiming that it was dilatory and praying that
AIBC and BRII be declared in default.
On April 2, 1985, the original claimants filed an "Amended
Complaint and/or Position Paper" dated March 24, 1985, adding
new demands: namely, the payment of overtime pay, extra night
work pay, annual leave differential pay, leave indemnity pay,
retirement and savings benefits and their share of forfeitures (G.R.
No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 14-16). On April 15, 1985, the POEA
Administrator directed AIBC to file its answer to the amended
complaint (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, p. 20).
On May 28, 1985, claimants filed an "Urgent Motion for Summary
Judgment." On the same day, the POEA issued an order directing
AIBC and BRII to file their answers to the "Amended Complaint,"
otherwise, they would be deemed to have waived their right to
present evidence and the case would be resolved on the basis of
complainant's evidence.
On June 5, 1985, AIBC countered with a "Motion to Dismiss as
Improper Class Suit and Motion for Bill of Particulars Re: Amended
Complaint dated March 24, 1985." Claimants opposed the motions.
On September 4, 1985, the POEA Administrator reiterated his
directive to AIBC and BRII to file their answers in POEA Case No.
L-84-06-555.
On September 18, 1985, AIBC filed its second appeal to the NLRC,
together with a petition for the issuance of a writ of injunction. On
September 19, 1985, NLRC enjoined the POEA Administrator from
hearing the labor cases and suspended the period for the filing of
the answers of AIBC and BRII.
On September 19, 1985, claimants asked the POEA Administrator
to include additional claimants in the case and to investigate
alleged wrongdoings of BRII, AIBC and their respective lawyers.
On October 10, 1985, Romeo Patag and two co-claimants filed a
complaint (POEA Case No. L-85-10-777) against AIBC and BRII
with the POEA, demanding monetary claims similar to those subject
of POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. In the same month, Solomon
Reyes also filed his own complaint (POEA Case No. L-85-10-779)
against AIBC and BRII.
On October 17, 1985, the law firm of Florante M. de Castro &
Associates asked for the substitution of the original counsel of
record and the cancellation of the special powers of attorney given
the original counsel.
On December 12, 1985, Atty. Del Mundo filed in NLRC a notice of
the claim to enforce attorney's lien.
On May 29, 1986, Atty. De Castro filed a complaint for money
claims (POEA Case No. 86-05-460) in behalf of 11 claimants
including Bienvenido Cadalin, a claimant in POEA Case No. 84-06-
555.
On December 12, 1986, the NLRC dismissed the two appeals filed
on February 27, 1985 and September 18, 1985 by AIBC and BRII.
In narrating the proceedings of the labor cases before the POEA
Administrator, it is not amiss to mention that two cases were filed in
the Supreme Court by the claimants, namely — G.R. No. 72132 on
September 26, 1985 and Administrative Case No. 2858 on March
18, 1986. On May 13, 1987, the Supreme Court issued a resolution
in Administrative Case No. 2858 directing the POEA Administrator
to resolve the issues raised in the motions and oppositions filed in
POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555 and L-86-05-460 and to decide the
labor cases with deliberate dispatch.
AIBC also filed a petition in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 78489),
questioning the Order dated September 4, 1985 of the POEA
Administrator. Said order required BRII and AIBC to answer the
amended complaint in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. In a resolution
dated November 9, 1987, we dismissed the petition by informing
AIBC that all its technical objections may properly be resolved in
the hearings before the POEA.
Complaints were also filed before the Ombudsman. The first was
filed on September 22, 1988 by claimant Hermie Arguelles and 18
co-claimants against the POEA Administrator and several NLRC
Commissioners. The Ombudsman merely referred the complaint to
the Secretary of Labor and Employment with a request for the early
disposition of POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. The second was filed
on April 28, 1989 by claimants Emigdio P. Bautista and Rolando R.
Lobeta charging AIBC and BRII for violation of labor and social
legislations. The third was filed by Jose R. Santos, Maximino N.
Talibsao and Amado B. Bruce denouncing AIBC and BRII of
violations of labor laws.
On January 13, 1987, AIBC filed a motion for reconsideration of the
NLRC Resolution dated December 12, 1986.
On January 14, 1987, AIBC reiterated before the POEA
Administrator its motion for suspension of the period for filing an
answer or motion for extension of time to file the same until the
resolution of its motion for reconsideration of the order of the NLRC
dismissing the two appeals. On April 28, 1987, NLRC en
banc denied the motion for reconsideration.
At the hearing on June 19, 1987, AIBC submitted its answer to the
complaint. At the same hearing, the parties were given a period of
15 days from said date within which to submit their respective
position papers. On June 24, 1987 claimants filed their "Urgent
Motion to Strike Out Answer," alleging that the answer was filed out
of time. On June 29, 1987, claimants filed their "Supplement to
Urgent Manifestational Motion" to comply with the POEA Order of
June 19, 1987. On February 24, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted
their position paper. On March 4, 1988, claimants filed their "Ex-
Parte Motion to Expunge from the Records" the position paper of
AIBC and BRII, claiming that it was filed out of time.
On September 1, 1988, the claimants represented by Atty. De
Castro filed their memorandum in POEA Case No. L-86-05-460. On
September 6, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted their Supplemental
Memorandum. On September 12, 1988, BRII filed its "Reply to
Complainant's Memorandum." On October 26, 1988, claimants
submitted their "Ex-Parte Manifestational Motion and Counter-
Supplemental Motion," together with 446 individual contracts of
employments and service records. On October 27, 1988, AIBC and
BRII filed a "Consolidated Reply."
On January 30, 1989, the POEA Administrator rendered his
decision in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555 and the other consolidated
cases, which awarded the amount of $824,652.44 in favor of only
324 complainants.
On February 10, 1989, claimants submitted their "Appeal
Memorandum For Partial Appeal" from the decision of the POEA.
On the same day, AIBC also filed its motion for reconsideration
and/or appeal in addition to the "Notice of Appeal" filed earlier on
February 6, 1989 by another counsel for AIBC.
On February 17, 1989, claimants filed their "Answer to Appeal,"
praying for the dismissal of the appeal of AIBC and BRII.
On March 15, 1989, claimants filed their "Supplement to
Complainants' Appeal Memorandum," together with their "newly
discovered evidence" consisting of payroll records.
On April 5, 1989, AIBC and BRII submitted to NLRC their
"Manifestation," stating among other matters that there were only
728 named claimants. On April 20, 1989, the claimants filed their
"Counter-Manifestation," alleging that there were 1,767 of them.
On July 27, 1989, claimants filed their "Urgent Motion for
Execution" of the Decision dated January 30, 1989 on the grounds
that BRII had failed to appeal on time and AIBC had not posted the
supersedeas bond in the amount of $824,652.44.
On December 23, 1989, claimants filed another motion to resolve
the labor cases.
On August 21, 1990, claimants filed their "Manifestational Motion,"
praying that all the 1,767 claimants be awarded their monetary
claims for failure of private respondents to file their answers within
the reglamentary period required by law.
On September 2, 1991, NLRC promulgated its Resolution,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the
POEA in these consolidated cases is modified to the extent
and in accordance with the following dispositions:
1. The claims of the 94 complainants identified and
listed in Annex "A" hereof are dismissed for having
prescribed;
2. Respondents AIBC and Brown & Root are hereby
ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the 149
complainants, identified and listed in Annex "B" hereof,
the peso equivalent, at the time of payment, of the total
amount in US dollars indicated opposite their respective
names;
3. The awards given by the POEA to the 19
complainants classified and listed in Annex "C" hereof,
who appear to have worked elsewhere than in Bahrain
are hereby set aside.
4. All claims other than those indicated in Annex "B",
including those for overtime work and favorably granted
by the POEA, are hereby dismissed for lack of
substantial evidence in support thereof or are beyond
the competence of this Commission to pass upon.
In addition, this Commission, in the exercise of its powers and
authority under Article 218(c) of the Labor Code, as amended
by R.A. 6715, hereby directs Labor Arbiter Fatima J. Franco
of this Commission to summon parties, conduct hearings and
receive evidence, as expeditiously as possible, and thereafter
submit a written report to this Commission (First Division) of
the proceedings taken, regarding the claims of the following:
(a) complainants identified and listed in Annex "D"
attached and made an integral part of this Resolution,
whose claims were dismissed by the POEA for lack of
proof of employment in Bahrain (these complainants
numbering 683, are listed in pages 13 to 23 of the
decision of POEA, subject of the appeals) and,
(b) complainants identified and listed in Annex "E"
attached and made an integral part of this Resolution,
whose awards decreed by the POEA, to Our mind, are
not supported by substantial evidence" (G.R. No.
104776; Rollo, pp. 113-115; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, pp.
85-87; G.R. Nos. 105029-31, pp. 120-122).
On November 27, 1991, claimant Amado S. Tolentino and 12
co-claimants, who were former clients of Atty. Del Mundo, filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court (G.R. Nos. 120741-
44). The petition was dismissed in a resolution dated January 27,
1992.
Three motions for reconsideration of the September 2, 1991
Resolution of the NLRC were filed. The first, by the claimants
represented by Atty. Del Mundo; the second, by the claimants
represented by Atty. De Castro; and the third, by AIBC and BRII.
In its Resolution dated March 24, 1992, NLRC denied all the
motions for reconsideration.
Hence, these petitions filed by the claimants represented by Atty.
Del Mundo (G.R. No. 104776), the claimants represented by Atty.
De Castro (G.R. Nos. 104911-14) and by AIBC and BRII (G.R. Nos.
105029-32).
II
Compromise Agreements
Before this Court, the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro and
AIBC and BRII have submitted, from time to time, compromise
agreements for our approval and jointly moved for the dismissal of
their respective petitions insofar as the claimants-parties to the
compromise agreements were concerned (See Annex A for list of
claimants who signed quitclaims).
Thus the following manifestations that the parties had arrived at a
compromise agreement and the corresponding motions for the
approval of the agreements were filed by the parties and approved
by the Court:
1) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Emigdio
Abarquez and 47 co-claimants dated September 2, 1992
(G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 263-406; G.R. Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp.
470-615);
2) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving petitioner
Bienvenido Cadalin and 82 co-petitioners dated September 3,
1992 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 364-507);
3) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Jose
M. Aban and 36 co-claimants dated September 17, 1992
(G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 613-722; G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 518-626; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp.
407-516);
4) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Antonio
T. Anglo and 17 co-claimants dated October 14, 1992 (G.R.
Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp. 778-843; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
650-713; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 530-590);
5) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Dionisio
Bobongo and 6 co-claimants dated January 15, 1993 (G.R.
No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 813-836; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo,
pp. 629-652);
6) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Valerio
A. Evangelista and 4 co-claimants dated March 10, 1993
(G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 731-746; G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 1815-1829);
7) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimants
Palconeri Banaag and 5 co-claimants dated March 17, 1993
(G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1657-1703; G.R. Nos. 104911-
The facts as found by the NLRC are as follows:
14, Rollo, pp. 655-675);
8) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Benjamin
Ambrosio and 15 other co-claimants dated May 4, 1993 (G.R.
Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 906-956; G.R. Nos. 104911-
14, Rollo, pp. 679-729; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1773-
1814);
9) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Valerio
Evangelista and 3 co-claimants dated May 10, 1993 (G.R.
No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1815-1829);
10) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving petitioner
Quiterio R. Agudo and 36 co-claimants dated June 14, 1993
(G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 974-1190; G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 748-864; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
1066-1183);
11) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Arnaldo
J. Alonzo and 19 co-claimants dated July 22, 1993 (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 1173-1235; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo,
pp. 1193-1256; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 896-959);
12) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Ricardo
C. Dayrit and 2 co-claimants dated September 7, 1993 (G.R.
Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp. 1266-1278; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo,
pp. 1243-1254; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 972-984);
13) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Dante
C. Aceres and 37 co-claimants dated September 8, 1993
(G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1257-1375; G.R. Nos. 104911-
14, Rollo, pp. 987-1105; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp.
1280-1397);
14) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Vivencio V.
Abella and 27 co-claimants dated January 10, 1994 (G.R.
Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, Vol. II);
15) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Domingo B.
Solano and six co-claimants dated August 25, 1994 (G.R.
Nos. 105029-32; G.R. No. 104776; G.R. Nos. 104911-14).
III
We have taken painstaking efforts to sift over the more than
fifty volumes now comprising the records of these cases.
From the records, it appears that the complainants-appellants
allege that they were recruited by respondent-appellant AIBC
for its accredited foreign principal, Brown & Root, on various
dates from 1975 to 1983. They were all deployed at various
projects undertaken by Brown & Root in several countries in
the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, United Arab
Emirates and Bahrain, as well as in Southeast Asia, in
Indonesia and Malaysia.
Having been officially processed as overseas contract
workers by the Philippine Government, all the individual
complainants signed standard overseas employment
contracts (Records, Vols. 25-32. Hereafter, reference to the
records would be sparingly made, considering their chaotic
arrangement) with AIBC before their departure from the
Philippines. These overseas employment contracts invariably
contained the following relevant terms and conditions.
PART B —
(1) Employment Position Classification :————————
—
(Code) :—————————
(2) Company Employment Status :—————————
(3) Date of Employment to Commence on :——————
———
(4) Basic Working Hours Per Week :—————————
(5) Basic Working Hours Per Month :—————————
(6) Basic Hourly Rate :—————————
(7) Overtime Rate Per Hour :—————————
(8) Projected Period of Service
(Subject to C(1) of this [sic]) :—————————
Months and/or
Job Completion
xxx xxx xxx
3. HOURS OF WORK AND COMPENSATION
a) The Employee is employed at the hourly rate and
overtime rate as set out in Part B of this Document.
b) The hours of work shall be those set forth by the
Employer, and Employer may, at his sole option, change
or adjust such hours as maybe deemed necessary from
time to time.
4. TERMINATION
a) Notwithstanding any other terms and conditions of this
agreement, the Employer may, at his sole discretion,
terminate employee's service with cause, under this
agreement at any time. If the Employer terminates the
services of the Employee under this Agreement because of
the completion or termination, or suspension of the work on
which the Employee's services were being utilized, or
because of a reduction in force due to a decrease in scope of
such work, or by change in the type of construction of such
work. The Employer will be responsible for his return
transportation to his country of origin. Normally on the most
expeditious air route, economy class accommodation.
xxx xxx xxx
10. VACATION/SICK LEAVE BENEFITS
a) After one (1) year of continuous service and/or
satisfactory completion of contract, employee shall be
entitled to 12-days vacation leave with pay. This shall
be computed at the basic wage rate. Fractions of a
year's service will be computed on a pro-rata basis.
b) Sick leave of 15-days shall be granted to the
employee for every year of service for non-work
connected injuries or illness. If the employee failed to
avail of such leave benefits, the same shall be forfeited
at the end of the year in which said sick leave is
granted.
11. BONUS
A bonus of 20% (for offshore work) of gross income will
be accrued and payable only upon satisfactory
completion of this contract.
12. OFFDAY PAY
The seventh day of the week shall be observed as a
day of rest with 8 hours regular pay. If work is
performed on this day, all hours work shall be paid at
the premium rate. However, this offday pay provision is
applicable only when the laws of the Host Country
require payments for rest day.
In the State of Bahrain, where some of the individual
complainants were deployed, His Majesty Isa Bin
Salman Al Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain, issued his Amiri
Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1976, otherwise known as
the Labour Law for the Private Sector (Records, Vol.
18). This decree took effect on August 16, 1976. Some
of the provisions of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are
relevant to the claims of the complainants-appellants
are as follows (italics supplied only for emphasis):
Art. 79: . . . A worker shall receive payment for
each extra hour equivalent to his wage
entitlement increased by a minimum of twenty-
five per centum thereof for hours worked during
the day; and by a minimum of fifty per centum
thereof for hours worked during the night which
shall be deemed to being from seven o'clock in
the evening until seven o'clock in the morning. .
..
Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly
day of rest on full pay.
. . . an employer may require a worker, with his
consent, to work on his weekly day of restif
circumstances so require and in respect of
which an additional sum equivalent to 150% of
his normal wage shall be paid to him. . . .
Art. 81: . . . When conditions of work require the
worker to work on any official holiday, he shall
be paid an additional sum equivalent to 150%
of his normal wage.
Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one
year's continuous service with his employer
shall be entitled to leave on full pay for a period
of not less than 21 days for each year
increased to a period not less than 28 days
after five continuous years of service.
A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon
a quantum meruit in respect of the proportion of
his service in that year.
Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a
period of indefinite duration may be terminated
by either party thereto after giving the other
party thirty days' prior notice before such
termination, in writing, in respect of monthly
paid workers and fifteen days' notice in respect
of other workers. The party terminating a
contract without giving the required notice shall
pay to the other party compensation equivalent
to the amount of wages payable to the worker
for the period of such notice or the unexpired
portion thereof.
Art. 111: . . . the employer concerned shall pay
to such worker, upon termination of
employment, a leaving indemnity for the period
of his employment calculated on the basis of
fifteen days' wages for each year of the first
three years of service and of one month's
wages for each year of service thereafter. Such
worker shall be entitled to payment of leaving
indemnity upon a quantum meruit in proportion
to the period of his service completed within a
year.
All the individual complainants-appellants have
already been repatriated to the Philippines at
the time of the filing of these cases (R.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 59-65).
IV
The issues raised before and resolved by the NLRC were:
First: — Whether or not complainants are entitled to the
benefits provided by Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain;
(a) Whether or not the complainants who have
worked in Bahrain are entitled to the above-
mentioned benefits.
(b) Whether or not Art. 44 of the same Decree
(allegedly prescribing a more favorable treatment of
alien employees) bars complainants from enjoying its
benefits.
Second: — Assuming that Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain
is applicable in these cases, whether or not complainants'
claim for the benefits provided therein have prescribed.
Third: — Whether or not the instant cases qualify as a class
suit.
Fourth: — Whether or not the proceedings conducted by
the POEA, as well as the decision that is the subject of
these appeals, conformed with the requirements of due
process;
(a) Whether or not the respondent-appellant was
denied its right to due process;
(b) Whether or not the admission of evidence by the
POEA after these cases were submitted for decision
was valid;
(c) Whether or not the POEA acquired jurisdiction
over Brown & Root International, Inc.;
(d) Whether or not the judgment awards are
supported by substantial evidence;
(e) Whether or not the awards based on the averages
and formula presented by the complainants-
appellants are supported by substantial evidence;
(f) Whether or not the POEA awarded sums beyond
what the complainants-appellants prayed for; and, if
so, whether or not these awards are valid.
Fifth: — Whether or not the POEA erred in holding
respondents AIBC and Brown & Root jointly are severally
liable for the judgment awards despite the alleged finding
that the former was the employer of the complainants;
(a) Whether or not the POEA has acquired
jurisdiction over Brown & Root;
(b) Whether or not the undisputed fact that AIBC was
a licensed construction contractor precludes a finding
that Brown & Root is liable for complainants claims.
Sixth: — Whether or not the POEA Administrator's failure to
hold respondents in default constitutes a reversible error.
Seventh: — Whether or not the POEA Administrator erred
in dismissing the following claims:
a. Unexpired portion of contract;
b. Interest earnings of Travel and Reserve Fund;
c. Retirement and Savings Plan benefits;
d. War Zone bonus or premium pay of at least 100%
of basic pay;
e. Area Differential Pay;
f. Accrued interests on all the unpaid benefits;
g. Salary differential pay;
h. Wage differential pay;
i. Refund of SSS premiums not remitted to SSS;
j. Refund of withholding tax not remitted to BIR;
k. Fringe benefits under B & R's "A Summary of
Employee Benefits" (Annex "Q" of Amended
Complaint);
l. Moral and exemplary damages;
m. Attorney's fees of at least ten percent of the
judgment award;
n. Other reliefs, like suspending and/or cancelling the
license to recruit of AIBC and the accreditation of B &
R issued by POEA;
o. Penalty for violations of Article 34 (prohibited
practices), not excluding reportorial requirements
thereof.
Eighth: — Whether or not the POEA Administrator erred in
not dismissing POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-460 on the
ground of multiplicity of suits (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo,
pp. 25-29, 51-55).
Anent the first issue, NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the
1989 Revised Rules on Evidence governing the pleading and proof
of a foreign law and admitted in evidence a simple copy of the
Bahrain's Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 (Labour Law for the Private
Sector). NLRC invoked Article 221 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, vesting on the Commission ample discretion to use
every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
without regard to the technicalities of law or procedure. NLRC
agreed with the POEA Administrator that the Amiri Decree No. 23,
being more favorable and beneficial to the workers, should form
part of the overseas employment contract of the complainants.
NLRC, however, held that the Amiri Decree No. 23 applied only to
the claimants, who worked in Bahrain, and set aside awards of the
POEA Administrator in favor of the claimants, who worked
elsewhere.
On the second issue, NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for
the filing of the claims of the complainants was three years, as
provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, and not
ten years as provided in Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines nor one year as provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976.
On the third issue, NLRC agreed with the POEA Administrator that
the labor cases cannot be treated as a class suit for the simple
reason that not all the complainants worked in Bahrain and
therefore, the subject matter of the action, the claims arising from
the Bahrain law, is not of common or general interest to all the
complainants.
On the fourth issue, NLRC found at least three infractions of the
cardinal rules of administrative due process: namely, (1) the failure
of the POEA Administrator to consider the evidence presented by
AIBC and BRII; (2) some findings of fact were not supported by
substantial evidence; and (3) some of the evidence upon which the
decision was based were not disclosed to AIBC and BRII during the
hearing.
On the fifth issue, NLRC sustained the ruling of the POEA
Administrator that BRII and AIBC are solidarily liable for the claims
of the complainants and held that BRII was the actual employer of
the complainants, or at the very least, the indirect employer, with
AIBC as the labor contractor.
NLRC also held that jurisdiction over BRII was acquired by the
POEA Administrator through the summons served on AIBC, its
local agent.
On the sixth issue, NLRC held that the POEA Administrator was
correct in denying the Motion to Declare AIBC in default.
On the seventh issue, which involved other money claims not
based on the Amiri Decree No. 23, NLRC ruled:
(1) that the POEA Administrator has no
jurisdiction over the claims for refund of the
SSS premiums and refund of withholding taxes
and the claimants should file their claims for
said refund with the appropriate government
agencies;
(2) the claimants failed to establish that they
are entitled to the claims which are not based
on the overseas employment contracts nor the
Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976;
(3) that the POEA Administrator has no
jurisdiction over claims for moral and
exemplary damages and nonetheless, the
basis for granting said damages was not
established;
(4) that the claims for salaries corresponding to
the unexpired portion of their contract may be
allowed if filed within the three-year prescriptive
period;
(5) that the allegation that complainants were
prematurely repatriated prior to the expiration
of their overseas contract was not established;
and
(6) that the POEA Administrator has no
jurisdiction over the complaint for the
suspension or cancellation of the AIBC's
recruitment license and the cancellation of the
accreditation of BRII.
NLRC passed sub silencio the last issue, the claim that POEA Case
No. (L) 86-65-460 should have been dismissed on the ground that
the claimants in said case were also claimants in POEA Case No.
(L) 84-06-555. Instead of dismissing POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-
460, the POEA just resolved the corresponding claims in POEA
Case No. (L) 84-06-555. In other words, the POEA did not pass
upon the same claims twice.
V petitioners;
G.R. No. 104776
Claimants in G.R. No. 104776 based their petition for certiorari on
the following grounds:
(1) that they were deprived by NLRC and the
POEA of their right to a speedy disposition of
their cases as guaranteed by Section 16,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The POEA
Administrator allowed private respondents to
file their answers in two years (on June 19,
1987) after the filing of the original complaint
(on April 2, 1985) and NLRC, in total disregard
of its own rules, affirmed the action of the
POEA Administrator;
(2) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator
should have declared AIBC and BRII in default
and should have rendered summary judgment
on the basis of the pleadings and evidence
submitted by claimants;
(3) the NLRC and POEA Administrator erred in
not holding that the labor cases filed by AIBC
and BRII cannot be considered a class suit;
(4) that the prescriptive period for the filing of
the claims is ten years; and
(5) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator
should have dismissed POEA Case No. L-86-
05-460, the case filed by Atty. Florante de
Castro (Rollo, pp. 31-40).
AIBC and BRII, commenting on the petition in G.R. No. 104776,
argued:
(1) that they were not responsible for the delay
in the disposition of the labor cases,
considering the great difficulty of getting all the
records of the more than 1,500 claimants, the
piece-meal filing of the complaints and the
addition of hundreds of new claimants by
(2) that considering the number of complaints
and claimants, it was impossible to prepare the
answers within the ten-day period provided in
the NLRC Rules, that when the motion to
declare AIBC in default was filed on July 19,
1987, said party had already filed its answer,
and that considering the staggering amount of
the claims (more than US$50,000,000.00) and
the complicated issues raised by the parties,
the ten-day rule to answer was not fair and
reasonable;
(3) that the claimants failed to refute NLRC's
finding that
there was no common or general interest in the
subject matter of the controversy — which was
the applicability of the Amiri Decree No. 23.
Likewise, the nature of the claims varied, some
being based on salaries pertaining to the
unexpired portion of the contracts while others
being for pure money claims. Each claimant
demanded separate claims peculiar only to
himself and depending upon the particular
circumstances obtaining in his case;
(4) that the prescriptive period for filing the
claims is that prescribed by Article 291 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines (three years) and
not the one prescribed by Article 1144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines (ten years); and
(5) that they are not concerned with the issue
of whether POEA Case No. L-86-05-460
 should be dismissed, this being a private
quarrel between the two labor lawyers (Rollo,
pp. 292-305).
Attorney's Lien
On November 12, 1992, Atty. Gerardo A. del Mundo moved to
strike out the joint manifestations and motions of AIBC and BRII
dated September 2 and 11, 1992, claiming that all the claimants
who entered into the compromise agreements subject of said
manifestations and motions were his clients and that Atty. Florante
M. de Castro had no right to represent them in said agreements. He
also claimed that the claimants were paid less than the award given
them by NLRC; that Atty. De Castro collected additional attorney's
fees on top of the 25% which he was entitled to receive; and that
the consent of the claimants to the compromise agreements and
quitclaims were procured by fraud (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
838-810). In the Resolution dated November 23, 1992, the Court
denied the motion to strike out the Joint Manifestations and Motions
dated September 2 and 11, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp.
608-609).
On December 14, 1992, Atty. Del Mundo filed a "Notice and Claim
to Enforce Attorney's Lien," alleging that the claimants who entered
into compromise agreements with AIBC and BRII with the
assistance of Atty. De Castro, had all signed a retainer agreement
with his law firm (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 623-624; 838-1535).
Contempt of Court
On February 18, 1993, an omnibus motion was filed by Atty. Del
Mundo to cite Atty. De Castro and Atty. Katz Tierra for contempt of
court and for violation of Canons 1, 15 and 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The said lawyers allegedly misled this
Court, by making it appear that the claimants who entered into the
compromise agreements were represented by Atty. De Castro,
when in fact they were represented by Atty. Del Mundo (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 1560-1614).
On September 23, 1994, Atty. Del Mundo reiterated his charges
against Atty. De Castro for unethical practices and moved for the
voiding of the quitclaims submitted by some of the claimants.
G.R. Nos. 104911-14
The claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 based their petition
for certiorari on the grounds that NLRC gravely abused its
discretion when it: (1) applied the three-year prescriptive period
under the Labor Code of the Philippines; and (2) it denied the
claimant's formula based on an average overtime pay of three
hours a day (Rollo, pp. 18-22).
The claimants argue that said method was proposed by BRII itself
during the negotiation for an amicable settlement of their money
claims in Bahrain as shown in the Memorandum dated April 16,
1983 of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain (Rollo, pp. 21-22).
BRII and AIBC, in their Comment, reiterated their contention in G.R.
No. 104776 that the prescriptive period in the Labor Code of the
Philippines, a special law, prevails over that provided in the Civil
Code of the Philippines, a general law.
As to the memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain on the
method of computing the overtime pay, BRII and AIBC claimed that
they were not bound by what appeared therein, because such
memorandum was proposed by a subordinate Bahrain official and
there was no showing that it was approved by the Bahrain Minister
of Labor. Likewise, they claimed that the averaging method was
discussed in the course of the negotiation for the amicable
settlement of the dispute and any offer made by a party therein
could not be used as an admission by him (Rollo, pp. 228-236).
G.R. Nos. 105029-32
In G.R. Nos. 105029-32, BRII and AIBC claim that NLRC gravely
abused its discretion when it: (1) enforced the provisions of the
Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 and not the terms of the employment
contracts; (2) granted claims for holiday, overtime and leave
indemnity pay and other benefits, on evidence admitted in
contravention of petitioner's constitutional right to due process; and
(3) ordered the POEA Administrator to hold new hearings for the
683 claimants whose claims had been dismissed for lack of proof
by the POEA Administrator or NLRC itself. Lastly, they allege that
assuming that the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 was applicable,
NLRC erred when it did not apply the one-year prescription
provided in said law (Rollo, pp. 29-30).
VI
G.R. No. 104776; G.R. Nos. 104911-14; G.R. Nos. 105029-32
All the petitions raise the common issue of prescription although
they disagreed as to the time that should be embraced within the
prescriptive period.
To the POEA Administrator, the prescriptive period was ten years,
applying Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. NLRC
believed otherwise, fixing the prescriptive period at three years as
provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 and G.R. Nos. 104911-14,
invoking different grounds, insisted that NLRC erred in ruling that
the prescriptive period applicable to the claims was three years,
instead of ten years, as found by the POEA Administrator.
The Solicitor General expressed his personal view that the
prescriptive period was one year as prescribed by the Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976 but he deferred to the ruling of NLRC that Article
291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines was the operative law.
The POEA Administrator held the view that:
These money claims (under Article 291 of the
Labor Code) refer to those arising from the
employer's violation of the employee's right as
provided by the Labor Code.
In the instant case, what the respondents
violated are not the rights of the workers as
provided by the Labor Code, but the provisions
of the Amiri Decree No. 23 issued in Bahrain,
which ipso facto amended the worker's
contracts of employment. Respondents
consciously failed to conform to these
provisions which specifically provide for the
increase of the worker's rate. It was only after
June 30, 1983, four months after the brown
builders brought a suit against B & R in Bahrain
for this same claim, when respondent AIBC's
contracts have undergone amendments in
Bahrain for the new hires/renewals
(Respondent's Exhibit 7).
Hence, premises considered, the applicable
law of prescription to this instant case is Article
1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which
provides:
 Art. 1144. The following
actions may be brought
within ten years from the
time the cause of action
accrues:
(1) Upon a written
contract;
(2) Upon an obligation
created by law;
Thus, herein money claims of the complainants
against the respondents shall prescribe in ten
years from August 16, 1976. Inasmuch as all
claims were filed within the ten-year
prescriptive period, no claim suffered the
infirmity of being prescribed (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, 89-90).
In overruling the POEA Administrator, and holding that the
prescriptive period is three years as provided in Article 291 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines, the NLRC argued as follows:
The Labor Code provides that "all money
claims arising from employer-employee
relations . . . shall be filed within three years
from the time the cause of action accrued;
otherwise they shall be forever barred" (Art.
291, Labor Code, as amended). This three-
year prescriptive period shall be the one
applied here and which should be reckoned
from the date of repatriation of each individual
complainant, considering the fact that the case
is having (sic) filed in this country. We do not
agree with the POEA Administrator that this
three-year prescriptive period applies only to
money claims specifically recoverable under
the Philippine Labor Code. Article 291 gives no
such indication. Likewise, We can not consider
complainants' cause/s of action to have
accrued from a violation of their employment
contracts. There was no violation; the claims
arise from the benefits of the law of the country
where they worked. (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo,
pp.
90-91).
Anent the applicability of the one-year prescriptive period as
provided by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, NLRC opined that the
applicability of said law was one of characterization, i.e., whether to
characterize the foreign law on prescription or statute of limitation
as "substantive" or "procedural." NLRC cited the decision
in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company (220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir.
[1955], where the issue was the applicability of the Panama Labor
Code in a case filed in the State of New York for claims arising from
said Code. In said case, the claims would have prescribed under
the Panamanian Law but not under the Statute of Limitations of
New York. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
Panamanian Law was procedural as it was not "specifically
intended to be substantive," hence, the prescriptive period provided
in the law of the forum should apply. The Court observed:
. . . And where, as here, we are dealing with a
statute of limitations of a foreign country, and it
is not clear on the face of the statute that its
purpose was to limit the enforceability, outside
as well as within the foreign country concerned,
of the substantive rights to which the statute
pertains, we think that as a yardstick for
determining whether that was the purpose this
test is the most satisfactory one. It does not
lead American courts into the necessity of
examining into the unfamiliar peculiarities and
refinements of different foreign legal systems. .
. therefore the claims may be brought within ten years as provided by
The court further noted:
xxx xxx xxx
Applying that test here it appears to us that the
libelant is entitled to succeed, for the
respondents have failed to satisfy us that the
Panamanian period of limitation in question
was specifically aimed against the particular
rights which the libelant seeks to enforce. The
Panama Labor Code is a statute having broad
objectives, viz: "The present Code regulates
the relations between capital and labor, placing
them on a basis of social justice, so that,
without injuring any of the parties, there may be
guaranteed for labor the necessary conditions
for a normal life and to capital an equitable
return to its investment." In pursuance of these
objectives the Code gives laborers various
rights against their employers. Article 623
establishes the period of limitation for all such
rights, except certain ones which are
enumerated in Article 621. And there is nothing
in the record to indicate that the Panamanian
legislature gave special consideration to the
impact of Article 623 upon the particular rights
sought to be enforced here, as distinguished
from the other rights to which that Article is also
applicable. Were we confronted with the
question of whether the limitation period of
Article 621 (which carves out particular rights to
be governed by a shorter limitation period) is to
be regarded as "substantive" or "procedural"
under the rule of "specifity" we might have a
different case; but here on the surface of things
we appear to be dealing with a "broad," and not
a "specific," statute of limitations (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp.
92-94).
Claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 are of the view that Article 291
of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which was applied by NLRC,
refers only to claims "arising from the employer's violation of the
employee's right as provided by the Labor Code." They assert that
their claims are based on the violation of their employment
contracts, as amended by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 and
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rollo, G.R. Nos.
104911-14, pp.
18-21). To bolster their contention, they cite PALEA v. Philippine
Airlines, Inc., 70 SCRA 244 (1976).
AIBC and BRII, insisting that the actions on the claims have
prescribed under the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, argue that there
is in force in the Philippines a "borrowing law," which is Section 48
of the Code of Civil Procedure and that where such kind of law
exists, it takes precedence over the common-law conflicts rule
(G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 45-46).
First to be determined is whether it is the Bahrain law on
prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or
a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing law.
Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:
A claim arising out of a contract of employment
shall not be actionable after the lapse of one
 year from the date of the expiry of the contract.
(G.R. Nos. 105029-31, Rollo, p. 226).
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the
forum. Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of
actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed
by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based
upon a foreign substantive law (Restatement of the Conflict of
Laws, Sec. 685; Salonga, Private International Law, 131 [1979]).
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in
the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive,
depending on the characterization given such a law.
Thus in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company, supra, the
American court applied the statute of limitations of New York,
instead of the Panamanian law, after finding that there was no
showing that the Panamanian law on prescription was intended to
be substantive. Being considered merely a procedural law even in
Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum on prescription
of actions.
However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or
substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum
has a "borrowing statute." Said statute has the practical effect of
treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 152-153 [1938]). A "borrowing statute"
directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of
limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law (Siegel,
Conflicts, 183 [1975]). While there are several kinds of "borrowing
statutes," one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the
place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even
though the local statute has not run against it (Goodrich and
Scoles, Conflict of Laws, 152-153 [1938]). Section 48 of our Code
of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides:
If by the laws of the state or country where the
cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is
also barred in the Philippines Islands.
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of
the Philippines. Article 2270 of said Code repealed only those
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedures as to which were
inconsistent with it. There is no provision in the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which is inconsistent with or contradictory to Section 48
of the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras, Philippine Conflict of Laws
104 [7th ed.]).
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be (3) Upon a judgment.
enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in
this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
NLRC, on the other hand, believes that the applicable provision is
Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which in pertinent
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious part provides:
to the forum's public policy (Canadian Northern Railway Co. v.
Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 40 S. Ct. 402, 64 L. ed. 713 [1920]). To
Money claims-all money claims arising from
enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23
employer-employee relations accruing during
of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the
the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within
public policy on the protection to labor.
three (3) years from the time the cause of
action accrued, otherwise they shall be forever
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 barred.
Constitution emphasized that:
xxx xxx xxx
The state shall promote social justice in all
phases of national development. (Sec. 10).
The case of Philippine Air Lines Employees Association v.
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 70 SCRA 244 (1976) invoked by the
The state affirms labor as a primary social claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 is inapplicable to the cases at
economic force. It shall protect the rights of bench (Rollo, p. 21). The said case involved the correct
workers and promote their welfare (Sec. 18). computation of overtime pay as provided in the collective
bargaining agreements and not the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
In article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987
Constitution provides: As noted by the Court: "That is precisely why petitioners did not
make any reference as to the computation for overtime work under
the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Secs. 3 and 4, CA No. 494) and instead
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to
insisted that work computation provided in the collective bargaining
labor, local and overseas, organized and
agreements between the parties be observed. Since the claim for
unorganized, and promote full employment and
pay differentials is primarily anchored on the written contracts
equality of employment opportunities for all.
between the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period provided by
Art. 1144(1) of the New Civil Code should govern."
Having determined that the applicable law on prescription is the
Philippine law, the next question is whether the prescriptive period
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444 as amended
governing the filing of the claims is three years, as provided by the
by R.A. No. 19933) provides:
Labor Code or ten years, as provided by the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
Any action to enforce any cause of action
under this Act shall be commenced within three
The claimants are of the view that the applicable provision is Article
years after the cause of action accrued
1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:
otherwise such action shall be forever barred, .
...
The following actions must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action
The court further explained:
accrues:
The three-year prescriptive period fixed in the
(1) Upon a written contract;
Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444 as
amended) will apply, if the claim for differentials
(2) Upon an obligation created by law; for overtime work is solely based on said law,
 and not on a collective bargaining agreement
or any other contract. In the instant case, the
claim for overtime compensation is not so
much because of Commonwealth Act No. 444,
as amended but because the claim is
demandable right of the employees, by reason
of the above-mentioned collective bargaining
agreement.
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law provides the prescriptive
period for filing "actions to enforce any cause of action under said
law." On the other hand, Article 291 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines provides the prescriptive period for filing "money claims
arising from employer-employee relations." The claims in the cases
at bench all arose from the employer-employee relations, which is
broader in scope than claims arising from a specific law or from the
collective bargaining agreement.
The contention of the POEA Administrator, that the three-year
prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines applies only to money claims specifically recoverable
under said Code, does not find support in the plain language of the
provision. Neither is the contention of the claimants in G.R. Nos.
104911-14 that said Article refers only to claims "arising from the
employer's violation of the employee's right," as provided by the
Labor Code supported by the facial reading of the provision.
VII
G.R. No. 104776
A. As to the first two grounds for the petition in G.R. No. 104776,
claimants aver: (1) that while their complaints were filed on June 6,
1984 with POEA, the case was decided only on January 30, 1989,
a clear denial of their right to a speedy disposition of the case; and
(2) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have declared
AIBC and BRII in default (Rollo, pp.
31-35).
Claimants invoke a new provision incorporated in the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
It is true that the constitutional right to "a speedy disposition of
cases" is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but
extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative
cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial
hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may
demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice.
However, as held in Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., 153 SCRA 153
(1987), "speedy disposition of cases" is a relative term. Just like the
constitutional guarantee of "speedy trial" accorded to the accused
in all criminal proceedings, "speedy disposition of cases" is a
flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the
circumstances of each case. What the Constitution prohibits are
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights
nugatory.
Caballero laid down the factors that may be taken into
consideration in determining whether or not the right to a "speedy
disposition of cases" has been violated, thus:
In the determination of whether or not the right
to a "speedy trial" has been violated, certain
factors may be considered and balanced
against each other. These are length of delay,
reason for the delay, assertion of the right or
failure to assert it, and prejudice caused by the
delay. The same factors may also be
considered in answering judicial inquiry
whether or not a person officially charged with
the administration of justice has violated the
speedy disposition of cases.
Likewise, in Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298, (1991),
we held:
It must be here emphasized that the right to a
speedy disposition of a case, like the right to
speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked
for and secured, or when without cause or
justified motive a long period of time is allowed
to elapse without the party having his case
tried.
Since July 25, 1984 or a month after AIBC and BRII were served
with a copy of the amended complaint, claimants had been asking
that AIBC and BRII be declared in default for failure to file their
answers within the ten-day period provided in Section 1, Rule III of
Book VI of the Rules and Regulations of the POEA. At that time,
there was a pending motion of AIBC and BRII to strike out of the
records the amended complaint and the "Compliance" of claimants
to the order of the POEA, requiring them to submit a bill of
particulars.
The cases at bench are not of the run-of-the-mill variety, such that
their final disposition in the administrative level after seven years
from their inception, cannot be said to be attended by
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays as to violate the
constitutional rights to a speedy disposition of the cases of
complainants.
The amended complaint filed on June 6, 1984 involved a total of
1,767 claimants. Said complaint had undergone several
amendments, the first being on April 3, 1985.
The claimants were hired on various dates from 1975 to 1983. They
were deployed in different areas, one group in and the other groups
outside of, Bahrain. The monetary claims totalling more than US$65
million according to Atty. Del Mundo, included:
1. Unexpired portion of contract;
2. Interest earnings of Travel and Fund;
3. Retirement and Savings Plan benefit;
4. War Zone bonus or premium pay of at least
100% of basic pay;
5. Area Differential pay;
6. Accrued Interest of all the unpaid benefits;
7. Salary differential pay;
8. Wage Differential pay;
 9. Refund of SSS premiums not remitted to
Social Security System;
10. Refund of Withholding Tax not remitted to
Bureau of Internal Revenue (B.I.R.);
11. Fringe Benefits under Brown & Root's "A
Summary of Employees Benefits consisting of
43 pages (Annex "Q" of Amended Complaint);
12. Moral and Exemplary Damages;
13. Attorney's fees of at least ten percent of
amounts;
14. Other reliefs, like suspending and/or
cancelling the license to recruit of AIBC and
issued by the POEA; and
15. Penalty for violation of Article 34
(Prohibited practices) not excluding reportorial
requirements thereof (NLRC Resolution,
September 2, 1991, pp. 18-19; G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 73-74).
Inasmuch as the complaint did not allege with sufficient definiteness
and clarity of some facts, the claimants were ordered to comply with
the motion of AIBC for a bill of particulars. When claimants filed
their "Compliance and Manifestation," AIBC moved to strike out the
complaint from the records for failure of claimants to submit a
proper bill of particulars. While the POEA Administrator denied the
motion to strike out the complaint, he ordered the claimants "to
correct the deficiencies" pointed out by AIBC.
Before an intelligent answer could be filed in response to the
complaint, the records of employment of the more than 1,700
claimants had to be retrieved from various countries in the Middle
East. Some of the records dated as far back as 1975.
The hearings on the merits of the claims before the POEA
Administrator were interrupted several times by the various
appeals, first to NLRC and then to the Supreme Court.
Aside from the inclusion of additional claimants, two new cases
were filed against AIBC and BRII on October 10, 1985 (POEA
Cases Nos.
L-85-10-777 and L-85-10-779). Another complaint was filed on May
29, 1986 (POEA Case No. L-86-05-460). NLRC, in exasperation,
noted that the exact number of claimants had never been
completely established (Resolution, Sept. 2, 1991, G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, p. 57). All the three new cases were consolidated
with POEA Case No. L-84-06-555.
NLRC blamed the parties and their lawyers for the delay in
terminating the proceedings, thus:
These cases could have been spared the long
and arduous route towards resolution had the
parties and their counsel been more interested
in pursuing the truth and the merits of the
claims rather than exhibiting a fanatical
reliance on technicalities. Parties and counsel
have made these cases a litigation of emotion.
The intransigence of parties and counsel is
remarkable. As late as last month, this
Commission made a last and final attempt to
bring the counsel of all the parties (this
Commission issued a special order directing
respondent Brown & Root's resident agent/s to
appear) to come to a more conciliatory stance.
Even this failed (Rollo,
p. 58).
The squabble between the lawyers of claimants added to the delay
in the disposition of the cases, to the lament of NLRC, which
complained:
It is very evident from the records that the
protagonists in these consolidated cases
appear to be not only the individual
complainants, on the one hand, and AIBC and
Brown & Root, on the other hand. The two
lawyers for the complainants, Atty. Gerardo Del
Mundo and Atty. Florante De Castro, have yet
to settle the right of representation, each one
persistently claiming to appear in behalf of
most of the complainants. As a result, there are
two appeals by the complainants. Attempts by
this Commission to resolve counsels'
conflicting claims of their respective authority to
represent the complainants prove futile. The
bickerings by these two counsels are reflected
in their pleadings. In the charges and
countercharges of falsification of documents
and signatures, and in the disbarment
proceedings by one against the other. All these
have, to a large extent, abetted in confounding
the issues raised in these cases, jumble the
presentation of evidence, and even derailed
the prospects of an amicable settlement. It
would not be far-fetched to imagine that both
counsel, unwittingly, perhaps, painted a
rainbow for the complainants, with the
proverbial pot of gold at its end containing
more than US$100 million, the aggregate of the
claims in these cases. It is, likewise, not
improbable that their misplaced zeal and
exuberance caused them to throw all caution to
the wind in the matter of elementary rules of
procedure and evidence (Rollo, pp. 58-59).
Adding to the confusion in the proceedings before NLRC, is the
listing of some of the complainants in both petitions filed by the two
lawyers. As noted by NLRC, "the problem created by this situation
is that if one of the two petitions is dismissed, then the parties and
the public respondents would not know which claim of which
petitioner was dismissed and which was not."
B. Claimants insist that all their claims could properly be
consolidated in a "class suit" because "all the named complainants
have similar money claims and similar rights sought irrespective of
whether they worked in Bahrain, United Arab Emirates or in Abu
Dhabi, Libya or in any part of the Middle East" (Rollo, pp. 35-38).
A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the controversy is
one of common or general interest to many and the parties are so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court
(Revised Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 12).
While all the claims are for benefits granted under the Bahrain Law,
many of the claimants worked outside Bahrain. Some of the
claimants were deployed in Indonesia and Malaysia under different
terms and conditions of employment.
NLRC and the POEA Administrator are correct in their stance that
inasmuch as the first requirement of a class suit is not present
(common or general interest based on the Amiri Decree of the State
of Bahrain), it is only logical that only those who worked in Bahrain
shall be entitled to file their claims in a class suit.
While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the
nature of the claims is the same (for employee's benefits), there is
no common question of law or fact. While some claims are based
on the Amiri Law of Bahrain, many of the claimants never worked in
that country, but were deployed elsewhere. Thus, each claimant is
interested only in his own demand and not in the claims of the other
employees of defendants. The named claimants have a special or
particular interest in specific benefits completely different from the
benefits in which the other named claimants and those included as
members of a "class" are claiming (Berses v. Villanueva, 25 Phil.
473 [1913]). It appears that each claimant is only interested in
collecting his own claims. A claimants has no concern in protecting
the interests of the other claimants as shown by the fact, that
hundreds of them have abandoned their co-claimants and have
entered into separate compromise settlements of their respective
claims. A principle basic to the concept of "class suit" is that
plaintiffs brought on the record must fairly represent and protect the
interests of the others (Dimayuga v. Court of Industrial Relations,
101 Phil. 590 [1957]). For this matter, the claimants who worked in
Bahrain can not be allowed to sue in a class suit in a judicial
proceeding. The most that can be accorded to them under the
Rules of Court is to be allowed to join as plaintiffs in one complaint
(Revised Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 6).
The Court is extra-cautious in allowing class suits because they are
the exceptions to the condition sine qua non, requiring the joinder of
all indispensable parties.
In an improperly instituted class suit, there would be no problem if
the decision secured is favorable to the plaintiffs. The problem
arises when the decision is adverse to them, in which case the
others who were impleaded by their self-appointed representatives,
would surely claim denial of due process.
C. The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 also urged that the POEA
Administrator and NLRC should have declared Atty. Florante De
Castro guilty of "forum shopping, ambulance chasing activities,
falsification, duplicity and other unprofessional activities" and his
appearances as counsel for some of the claimants as illegal (Rollo,
pp. 38-40).
The Anti-Forum Shopping Rule (Revised Circular No. 28-91) is
intended to put a stop to the practice of some parties of filing
multiple petitions and complaints involving the same issues, with
the result that the courts or agencies have to resolve the same
issues. Said Rule, however, applies only to petitions filed with the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. It is entitled "Additional
Requirements For Petitions Filed with the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals To Prevent Forum Shopping or Multiple Filing of
Petitioners and Complainants." The first sentence of the circular
expressly states that said circular applies to an governs the filing of
petitions in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
While Administrative Circular No. 04-94 extended the application of
the anti-forum shopping rule to the lower courts and administrative
agencies, said circular took effect only on April 1, 1994.
POEA and NLRC could not have entertained the complaint for
unethical conduct against Atty. De Castro because NLRC and
POEA have no jurisdiction to investigate charges of unethical
conduct of lawyers.
Attorney's Lien
The "Notice and Claim to Enforce Attorney's Lien" dated December
14, 1992 was filed by Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to protect his
claim for attorney's fees for legal services rendered in favor of the
claimants (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 841-844).
A statement of a claim for a charging lien shall be filed with the
court or administrative agency which renders and executes the
money judgment secured by the lawyer for his clients. The lawyer
shall cause written notice thereof to be delivered to his clients and
to the adverse party (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 37).
The statement of the claim for the charging lien of Atty. Del Mundo
should have been filed with the administrative agency that rendered
and executed the judgment.
Contempt of Court
The complaint of Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to cite Atty. Florante
De Castro and Atty. Katz Tierra for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility should be filed in a separate and
appropriate proceeding.
G.R. No. 104911-14
Claimants charge NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in not
accepting their formula of "Three Hours Average Daily Overtime" in
computing the overtime payments. They claim that it was BRII itself
which proposed the formula during the negotiations for the
settlement of their claims in Bahrain and therefore it is in estoppel
to disclaim said offer (Rollo, pp. 21-22).
Claimants presented a Memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of
Bahrain dated April 16, 1983, which in pertinent part states:
After the perusal of the memorandum of
the Vice President and the Area Manager,
Middle East, of Brown & Root Co. and the
Summary of the compensation offered by the
Company to the employees in respect of the
difference of pay of the wages of the overtime
and the difference of vacation leave and the
perusal of the documents attached thereto i.e.,
minutes of the meetings between the
Representative of the employees and the
management of the Company, the complaint
filed by the employees on 14/2/83 where they
have claimed as hereinabove stated, sample of
the Service Contract executed between one of
the employees and the company through its
agent in (sic) Philippines, Asia International
Builders Corporation where it has been
provided for 48 hours of work per week and an
annual leave of 12 days and an overtime wage
of 1 & 1/4 of the normal hourly wage.
xxx xxx xxx
The Company in its computation reached the
following averages:
A. 1. The average duration of the actual service
of the employee is 35 months for the Philippino
(sic) employees . . . .
2. The average wage per hour for the
Philippino (sic) employee is US$2.69 . . . .
3. The average hours for the overtime is 3
hours plus in all public holidays and weekends.
4. Payment of US$8.72 per months (sic) of
service as compensation for the difference of
the wages of the overtime done for each
Philippino (sic) employee . . . (Rollo, p.22).
BRII and AIBC countered: (1) that the Memorandum was not
prepared by them but by a subordinate official in the Bahrain
Department of Labor; (2) that there was no showing that the
Bahrain Minister of Labor had approved said memorandum; and (3)
that the offer was made in the course of the negotiation for an
amicable settlement of the claims and therefore it was not
admissible in evidence to prove that anything is due to the
claimants.
While said document was presented to the POEA without observing
the rule on presenting official documents of a foreign government
as provided in Section 24, Rule 132 of the 1989 Revised Rules on
Evidence, it can be admitted in evidence in proceedings before an
administrative body. The opposing parties have a copy of the said
memorandum, and they could easily verify its authenticity and
accuracy.
The admissibility of the offer of compromise made by BRII as
contained in the memorandum is another matter. Under Section 27,
Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence, an offer to settle
a claim is not an admission that anything is due.
Said Rule provides:
Offer of compromise not admissible. — In civil
cases, an offer of compromise is not an
admission of any liability, and is not admissible
in evidence against the offeror.
This Rule is not only a rule of procedure to avoid the cluttering of
the record with unwanted evidence but a statement of public policy.
There is great public interest in having the protagonists settle their
differences amicable before these ripen into litigation. Every effort
must be taken to encourage them to arrive at a settlement. The
submission of offers and counter-offers in the negotiation table is a
step in the right direction. But to bind a party to his offers, as what
claimants would make this Court do, would defeat the salutary
purpose of the Rule.
G.R. Nos. 105029-32
A. NLRC applied the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, which provides
for greater benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-
employment contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief that
"where the laws of the host country are more favorable and
beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host country shall
form part of the overseas employment contract." It quoted with
approval the observation of the POEA Administrator that ". . . in
labor proceedings, all doubts in the implementation of the
provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations shall
be resolved in favor of labor" (Rollo, pp. 90-94).
AIBC and BRII claim that NLRC acted capriciously and whimsically
when it refused to enforce the overseas-employment contracts,
which became the law of the parties. They contend that the
principle that a law is deemed to be a part of a contract applies only
to provisions of Philippine law in relation to contracts executed in
the Philippines.
The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC
and BRII themselves, provided that the laws of the host country
became applicable to said contracts if they offer terms and
conditions more favorable that those stipulated therein. It was
stipulated in said contracts that:
The Employee agrees that while in the employ
of the Employer, he will not engage in any
other business or occupation, nor seek
employment with anyone other than the
Employer; that he shall devote his entire time
and attention and his best energies, and
abilities to the performance of such duties as
may be assigned to him by the Employer; that
he shall at all times be subject to the direction
and control of the Employer; and that the
benefits provided to Employee hereunder are
substituted for and in lieu of all other benefits
provided by any applicable law, provided of
course, that total remuneration and benefits do
not fall below that of the host country regulation
or custom, it being understood that should
applicable laws establish that fringe benefits, or
other such benefits additional to the
compensation herein agreed cannot be waived,
Employee agrees that such compensation will
be adjusted downward so that the total
compensation hereunder, plus the non-
waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the
compensation herein agreed (Rollo, pp. 352-
353).
The overseas-employment contracts could have been drafted more
felicitously. While a part thereof provides that the compensation to
the employee may be "adjusted downward so that the total
computation (thereunder) plus the non-waivable benefits shall be
equivalent to the compensation" therein agreed, another part of the
same provision categorically states "that total remuneration and
benefits do not fall below that of the host country regulation and
custom."
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be
interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted it
(Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Margarine-Verkaufs-Union, 93
SCRA 257 [1979]).
Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
The interpretation of obscure words or
stipulations in a contract shall not favor the
party who caused the obscurity.
Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion
where there is already a prepared form containing the stipulations
of the employment contract and the employees merely "take it or
leave it." The presumption is that there was an imposition by one
party against the other and that the employees signed the contracts
out of necessity that reduced their bargaining power (Fieldmen's
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Songco, 25 SCRA 70 [1968]).
Applying the said legal precepts, we read the overseas-employment
contracts in question as adopting the provisions of the Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel thereof.
The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be
governed (Cheshire, Private International Law, 187 [7th ed.]). In
such a case, the foreign law is adopted as a "system" to regulate
the relations of the parties, including questions of their capacity to
enter into the contract, the formalities to be observed by them,
matters of performance, and so forth (16 Am Jur 2d,
150-161).
Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties
may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be
deemed incorporated into their contract "as a set of terms." By such
reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not
become a foreign contract to be governed by the foreign law. The
said law does not operate as a statute but as a set of contractual
terms deemed written in the contract (Anton, Private International
Law, 197 [1967]; Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 702-703,
[8th ed.]).
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties
(Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts, 16 Columbia Journal
of Transnational Law 1, 21 [1977]). Such party expectation is
protected by giving effect to the parties' own choice of the
applicable law (Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., Inc., 151 F. Supp. 465,
467 [1957]). The choice of law must, however, bear some
relationship to the parties or their transaction (Scoles and Hayes,
Conflict of Law 644-647 [1982]). There is no question that the
contracts sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct
connection with the Bahrain law because the services were
rendered in that country.
In Norse Management Co. (PTE) v. National Seamen Board, 117
SCRA 486 (1982), the "Employment Agreement," between Norse
Management Co. and the late husband of the private respondent,
expressly provided that in the event of illness or injury to the
employee arising out of and in the course of his employment and
not due to his own misconduct, "compensation shall be paid to
employee in accordance with and subject to the limitation of the
Workmen's Compensation Act of the Republic of the Philippines or
the Worker's Insurance Act of registry of the vessel, whichever is
greater." Since the laws of Singapore, the place of registry of the
vessel in which the late husband of private respondent served at
the time of his death, granted a better compensation package, we
applied said foreign law in preference to the terms of the contract.
The case of Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 135 SCRA 278 (1985), relied upon by
AIBC and BRII is inapposite to the facts of the cases at bench. The
issue in that case was whether the amount of the death
compensation of a Filipino seaman should be determined under the
shipboard employment contract executed in the Philippines or the
Hongkong law. Holding that the shipboard employment contract
was controlling, the court differentiated said case from Norse
Management Co. in that in the latter case there was an express
stipulation in the employment contract that the foreign law would be
applicable if it afforded greater compensation.
B. AIBC and BRII claim that they were denied by NLRC of their
right to due process when said administrative agency granted
Friday-pay differential, holiday-pay differential, annual-leave
differential and leave indemnity pay to the claimants listed in Annex
B of the Resolution. At first, NLRC reversed the resolution of the
POEA Administrator granting these benefits on a finding that the
POEA Administrator failed to consider the evidence presented by
AIBC and BRII, that some findings of fact of the POEA
Administrator were not supported by the evidence, and that some of
the evidence were not disclosed to AIBC and BRII (Rollo, pp. 35-
36; 106-107). But instead of remanding the case to the POEA
Administrator for a new hearing, which means further delay in the
termination of the case, NLRC decided to pass upon the validity of
the claims itself. It is this procedure that AIBC and BRII complain of
as being irregular and a "reversible error."
They pointed out that NLRC took into consideration evidence
submitted on appeal, the same evidence which NLRC found to
have been "unilaterally submitted by the claimants and not
disclosed to the adverse parties" (Rollo, pp. 37-39).
NLRC noted that so many pieces of evidentiary matters were
submitted to the POEA administrator by the claimants after the
cases were deemed submitted for resolution and which were taken
cognizance of by the POEA Administrator in resolving the cases.
While AIBC and BRII had no opportunity to refute said evidence of
the claimants before the POEA Administrator, they had all the
opportunity to rebut said evidence and to present their
counter-evidence before NLRC. As a matter of fact, AIBC and BRII
themselves were able to present before NLRC additional evidence
which they failed to present before the POEA Administrator.
Under Article 221 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, NLRC is
enjoined to "use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process."
In deciding to resolve the validity of certain claims on the basis of
the evidence of both parties submitted before the POEA
Administrator and NLRC, the latter considered that it was not
expedient to remand the cases to the POEA Administrator for that
would only prolong the already protracted legal controversies.
Even the Supreme Court has decided appealed cases on the merits
instead of remanding them to the trial court for the reception of
evidence, where the same can be readily determined from the
uncontroverted facts on record (Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 190 SCRA 653 [1990];
Pagdonsalan v. National Labor Relations Commission, 127 SCRA
463 [1984]).
C. AIBC and BRII charge NLRC with grave abuse of discretion
when it ordered the POEA Administrator to hold new hearings for
683 claimants listed in Annex D of the Resolution dated September
2, 1991 whose claims had been denied by the POEA Administrator
"for lack of proof" and for 69 claimants listed in Annex E of the
same Resolution, whose claims had been found by NLRC itself as
not "supported by evidence" (Rollo, pp. 41-45).
NLRC based its ruling on Article 218(c) of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, which empowers it "[to] conduct investigation for the
determination of a question, matter or controversy, within its
jurisdiction, . . . ."
It is the posture of AIBC and BRII that NLRC has no authority under
Article 218(c) to remand a case involving claims which had already
been dismissed because such provision contemplates only
situations where there is still a question or controversy to be
resolved (Rollo, pp. 41-42).
A principle well embedded in Administrative Law is that the
technical rules of procedure and evidence do not apply to the
proceedings conducted by administrative agencies (First Asian
Transport & Shipping Agency, Inc. v. Ople, 142 SCRA 542 [1986];
Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, 152 SCRA 219 [1987]).
This principle is enshrined in Article 221 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines and is now the bedrock of proceedings before NLRC.
Notwithstanding the non-applicability of technical rules of procedure
and evidence in administrative proceedings, there are cardinal rules
which must be observed by the hearing officers in order to comply
with the due process requirements of the Constitution. These
cardinal rules are collated in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
VIII
The three petitions were filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court on the grounds that NLRC had committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned
orders. We find no such abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, all the three petitions are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
ANNEX A
LIST OF CLAIMANTS WHO SIGNED QUITCLAIMS
Bienvenido Cadalin Ardon Ello
Antonio Acupan Josefino R. Enano
Benjamin Alejandre Rolando E. Espiritu
Wilfredo Aligada Patricio L. Garcia Jr.
Robert Batica Felino M. Jocson
Enrico Belen Eduardo S. Kolimlim
Guillermo Cabeza Emmanuel C. Labella
Rodolfo Cagatan Ernesto S. Lising
Francisco De Guzman Edilberto G. Magat
Ignacio De Vera Victoriano L. Matilla
Ernesto De la Cruz Renato V. Morada
Reynaldo Dizon Ildefonso C. Muñoz
Ricardo Ebrada Herbert G. Ng
Antonio Ejercito Reynado Oczon
Eduardo Espiritu Romeo Orial
Ernesto Espiritu Ricardo Paguio
Rodolfo Espiritu Emilio Pakingan
Oligario Francisco Ernesto S. Pangan
Antonio Jocson Albert L. Quinto
Alejandro Olorino Romulo M. Reyes
Efren Lirio Leonilo Tiposo
Noel Martinez Manual P. Villanueva
Francis Mediodia Arnaldo J. Alonzo
Luciano Melendez Pastor M. Aquino
Reymundo Milay Ramon Castro
Jose Pancho Graciano Isla
Modesto Pin Pin Renato Matilla
Gaudencio Retana Ricardo B. Morada
Rodelio Rieta, Jr. Pacifico D. Navarro
Jose Robleza Eugenio A. Remonquillo
Nemeriano San Mateo Felix Barcena
Juanito Santos Eliseo Fajardo
Paquito Solanto Sergio S. Santiago
Conrado Solis, Jr. Antonio R. Rodriquez
Menandro Temprosa Luis Val B. Ronquillo
Maximiano Torres Teodorico C. Del Rosario
Francisco Trias Joselito C. Solante
Delfin Victoria Ricardo C. Dayrit
Gilbert Victoria Antonio P. Hilario
Domingo Villahermosa Edgardo O. Salonga
Rogelio Villanueva Dante C. Aceres
Jose M. Aban Reynaldo S. Acojido
Amorsolo S. Anading Esidro M. Aquino
Alfredo S. Balogo Rosendo M. Aquino
Ramon T. Barboza Rodolfo D. Arevalo
Felix M. Bobier Rexy De Leon Ascuncion
Jose H. Castillo Basilio Buenaventura
Emmanuel H. Castillo Alexander Bustamante
Remar R. Castrojerez Virgilio V. Butiong, Jr.
Romeo O. Cecilio Delfin Caballero
Bayani M. Dayrit Danilo M. Castro
Felizardo S. Delos Santos Franscisco O. Corvera
Nestor N. Estava Edgardo N. Dayacap
Rolando M. Garcia Napoleon S. De Luna
Angel D. Guda Benjamin E. Doza
Henry L. Jacob Renato A. Eduarte
Dante A. Matreo Clyde C. Estuye
Renato S. Melo Buenaventura M. Francisco
Resurrecion D. Nazareno Rogelio D. Guanio
Jaime C. Pollos Arnel L. Jacob
Domingo Pondales Renato S. Lising
Eugenio Ramirez Wilfredo S. Lising
Lucien M. Respall Rogelio S. Lopena
Alvin C. Reyes Bernardito G. Loreja
Rizalina R. Reyes Ignacio E. Muñoz
Quirino Ronquillo Romeo C. Quintos
Avelino M. Roque Willafredo Dayrit Raymundo
Pedro L. Salgatar Virgilio L. Rosario
Rodolfo T. Sultan Joselito Santiago
Benedicto E. Torres Ernesto G. Sta. Maria
Sergio A. Ursolino Gavino U. Tuazon
Rogelio R. Valdez Elito S. Villanueva
Dionisio Bobongo Lamberto Q. Alcantara
Crisenciano Miranda Arturo P. Apilado
Ildefonso C. Molina Turiano V. Concepcion
Gorgonio C. Parala Domingo V. Dela Cruz
Virgilio Ricaza Eduardo R. Enguancho
Palconeri D. Banaag Melanio R. Esteron
Bayani S. Bracamante Santiago N. Galoso
Onofre De Rama Joveniano Hilado
Jose C. Melanes Eduardo Hipolito
Romeo I. Patag Romero M. Javier
Valerio A. Evangelista Valentino S. Jocson
Gilbert E. Ebrada Jose B. Lacson
Juanito P. Villarino Armando M. Magsino
Aristeo M. Bicol Avelino O. Nuqui
Quiterio R. Agudo Delmar F. Pineda
Marianito J. Alcantara Federico T. Quiman
Jose Arevalo Alberto M. Redaza
Ramon A. Arevalo Renosa Ronquillo
Jesus Baya Rodolfo Ronquillo
Guillermo Buenconsejo Antonio T. Valderama
Teresito A. Constantino Ramon Valderama
Eduardo A. Diaz Benigno N. Melendez
Emigdio Abarquez Claudio A. Modesto
Herbert Ayo Solomon Reyes
Mario Bataclan Isaias Talactac
Ricardo Ordonez William G. Taruc
Bernardino Robillos Oscar C. Calderon
Francisco Villaflores Pacifico P. Campano
Angel Villarba Eulalio G. Arguelles
Honesto Jardiniano Ben G. Belir
Juan Y. Olindo Cornelio L. Castillo
Hernani T. Victoriano Valeriano B. Francisco
Ubed B. Ello, Sr. Jaime L. Relosa
Ernesto V. Macaraig Alex Q. Villahermosa
Espiritu A. Munoz, Sr. Vivencio V. Abello, Jr.
Rodrigo E. Ocampo Renato C. Corcuera
Rodolfo V. Ramirez Emiliano B. Dela Cruz, Jr.
Ceferino Batitis Esteban B. Jose, Jr.
Augusto R. Bondoc Ricardo B. Martinez
Jaime C. Catli Bienvenido Vergara
Gerardo B. Limuaco, Jr. Pedro G. Cagatan
Macario S. Magsino Francisco Apolinario
Domingo B. Solano Miguel Abestano
Ricardo De Rama Prudencio Araullo
Arturo V. Araullo
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir
of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding
No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among
things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to
reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by
her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria
Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be
enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-
half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton,
etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator
Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March
5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard
Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-
 eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665
Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants,
and no descendants except my above named daughter,
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN
CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about
eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact
that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way
related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by
me, and who, from all information I have now resides in
Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00),
Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for
the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch
of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the
rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine
Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as
any interest which may have accrued thereon, is
exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-
beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now
residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village,
Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the
rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate,
real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or
character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be
possessed at my death and which may have come to me
from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the
executor in his final account and project of partition ratified the
payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed
that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria
Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by
Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her
legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been
declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural
child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of
opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the
laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is
contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of
two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that
the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen
should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire law
thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the
forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in
California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires
that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be
applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having
been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she
is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen
of the United States and of the State of California at the time of his
death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions
in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance
with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the
way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his
property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal.
Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49
Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria
Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for
reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines,
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF
HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR
FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL
FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR
THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE
RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF
THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE
SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE
EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA
IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL
OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of
the United States and of the State of California at the time of his
death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he
was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts
admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate,
the facts of record show that the deceased Edward E.
Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New
as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on
board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of
Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of
California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the
United States and stayed there for the following nine
years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and
was teaching school in Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in
July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again
departed the Philippines for the United States and came
back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years
later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and
came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.
 Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing
stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered
by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned
by the Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during
World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the
United States but returned to the Philippines in
December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI
Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-
Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473,
t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once
more to California shortly after the making of his last will
and testament (now in question herein) which he
executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5,
1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of
Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the
Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New
York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and
since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California
very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and
considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a
home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he would
ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of
California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of
meaning from mere temporary presence to the most
permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to
denote something more than mere physical presence.
(Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he
acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento, California
from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for
the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946
and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen
of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he
declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears
never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by
acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the
following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly
to mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no
domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical other than the private law of the State of California.
meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where
he has never been. And he may reside in a place where
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the
he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between
disposition of personal property? The decision of the court below,
which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one,
sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the
while living in it. But if he went on business which would
California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by
require his presence for several weeks or months, he
will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of
might properly be said to have sufficient connection with
McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant
the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that,
invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California,
if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the
which is as follows:
particular business in hand, not giving up his former
"home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker.
Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where
of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the
simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in domicile.
that place and also an intention to make it one's
domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with many
shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition
to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist and is not denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Code
and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited
that any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of
Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California,
defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case,
follows: should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary
provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State
of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the
question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which
with respect to the order of succession and to the amount is the Philippines.
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various
national law of the person whose succession is under
authors, thus:
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country where said
property may be found. The problem has been stated in this way: "When the
Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a
foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the
internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the
determination of the meaning of the term "national law"is used
totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws
therein.
rules?"
There is no single American law governing the validity of
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan
testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the
court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the
Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and
Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter
in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article
back to Michigan law. But once having determined the
the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is
difficult to see why the reference back should not have
been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have
resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has
so often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents
of the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law
of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back.
Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the
original reference should be the internal law rather than
to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution
avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have
accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis
circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that
point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always
to internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the
objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will
result from adoption of their respective views. And still
more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve
uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute
the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the
litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be
accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the
result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the
forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court
rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against
the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois
courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would
be for the woman. The same result would happen,
though the courts would switch with respect to which
would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two
instances: where the title to land is in question, and
where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In
these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the
land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is
applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only
to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land,
recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every
court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the
parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in
France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts,
England, and France. The question arises as to how this Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has
property is to be distributed among X's next of kin. been advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is
that the court of the forum, in determining the question
before it, must take into account the whole law of the
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts
other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws,
court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate
and then apply the law to the actual question which the
succession to movables calls for an application of the law
rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the
of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's
law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally
last domicile was France, the natural thing for the
been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur.
Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French
296)
statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto
in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An
examination of French law, however, would show that if a The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the
French court were called upon to determine how this reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen
property should be distributed, it would refer the in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-
distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus 531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on
the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules
to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the
of the conflict of laws are to be understood as
French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve
incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the
itself into a French court and apply the Massachusetts
foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws
statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is
as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country'
what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-
means the whole of its law.
called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus
applying its own law.
xxx xxx xxx
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented
which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the
foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the
refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This form of the following theses:
is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this
judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as
Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
regards the application of foreign laws.
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is
to be resorted to as governing a particular case, the (2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary
exists, the court shall respect:
further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict
of laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted
to? This is a question which, while it has been considered (a) The provisions of a foreign law which
by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad
of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and as regards their personal statute, and desires
the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated that said personal statute shall be determined
by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of
"Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an the place where the act in question occurred.
affirmative answer to the question postulated and the
operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would
(b) The decision of two or more foreign
in many cases result in returning the main controversy to
be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 systems of law, provided it be certain that one
C.J.S. 872.) of them is necessarily competent, which agree
 in attributing the determination of a question to
the same system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to
distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who has
died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of
his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of
Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in
accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that
the Belgian law would make the distribution in
accordance with the law of nationality — that is the
English law — he must accept this reference back to his
own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of
laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal
law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of
California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and
appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply
to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of
its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the
domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element
involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that
the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which
follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or
more states, and leaves a will directing the manner of
distribution of the property, the law of the state where he
was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in
deciding legal questions about the will, almost as
completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions
about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the
domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate
in case of intestate succession, the same rules should
determine the validity of an attempted testamentary
dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the
domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the
domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized
as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs
property, and the reason for the recognition as in the
case of intestate succession, is the general convenience
of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point:
'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal
property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid
anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its
origin in that international comity which was one of the
first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business
intercourse and the process of accumulating property
take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical
wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than
ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law of
California. But as above explained the laws of California have
prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein
and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason
demands that We should enforce the California internal law
prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict
of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce
the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so
declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the
law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof
and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents
therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to
the contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946
of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is
the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased
should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained
in the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in
Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the
California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the
reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's
domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil
Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not
domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in
the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not
refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue
incapable of determination because the case will then be like a
football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the
country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his
domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in
the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question
has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law
of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine
law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes
natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera
vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867;
Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs.
Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the
decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important
reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a
citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the
Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in
the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or
identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen,
a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the
provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile,
pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the
internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and
the case returned to the lower court with instructions that the
partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.
Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA
BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A.
Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an
order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964,
approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case
No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas
and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom
he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis,
George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis,
Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet
Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin
G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had
three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the
Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and
expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate
should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a)
$240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his
three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis,
Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing
two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven
surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A.
Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of
San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the
Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid
all the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the
form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3)
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in
satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00,
which it released from time to time according as the lower court
approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the
latter three requesting partial advances on account of their
respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the
executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report
of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter
alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery
to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the
legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma
Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00.
In the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth"
clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the
residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the
testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second
marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis
filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the
ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him,
proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt
submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other
pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an
order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final
account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying
upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for
legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by
the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed
to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas
law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even
discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v.
Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is
usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country,
and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that
the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at
the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict
of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the
domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference
back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory
(lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where
the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties
here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however,
of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not
rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor
even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their
case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable
the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary
successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession;
(b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide
that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may he the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law
of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of
the Civil Code, stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-
quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase,
"notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding
article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art.
17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial
change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art.
16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second
paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be
applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of
this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art.
1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by
the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs
may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not

intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two
wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine
estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern
his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's
intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter
the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867,
870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties
shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with
his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be
ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16
— of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen
of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas,
there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto,
with costs against appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 United States he continued to live in the Philippine Islands, and on
He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be
included in this case as one of the oppositors-appellants;
to file or adopt the opposition of his sisters to the project
of partition; to submit his brief after paying his
proportionate share in the expenses incurred in the
printing of the record on appeal; or to allow him to adopt
the briefs filed by his sisters — but this Court resolved to
deny the motion.
2 concluded, the deceased returned to Manila, where he prospered in
San Antonio, Texas was his legal residence.
3
Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re Testate Estate of
Suntay, 95 Phil. 500.
G.R. No. L-12767 November 16, 1918
In the matter of the estate of EMIL H. JOHNSON. EBBA
INGEBORG JOHNSON, applicant-appellant,
Hartigan & Welch for applicant and appellant.
Hartford Beaumont for Victor Johnson and others as appellees.
Chas. E. Tenney for Alejandra Ibañez de Johnson, personally and
as guardian,
and for Simeona Ibañez, appellees.
STREET, J.:
On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a
naturalized citizen of the United States, died in the city of Manila,
leaving a will, dated September 9, 1915, by which he disposed of
an estate, the value of which, as estimated by him, was P231,800.
This document is an holographic instrument, being written in the
testator's own handwriting, and is signed by himself and two
witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section 618
of the Code of Civil Procedure. This will, therefore, was not
executed in conformity with the provisions of law generally
applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and
hence could not have been proved under section 618.
On February 9, 1916, however, a petition was presented in the
Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for the probate of this
will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a
citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America; that the will
was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and
hence could properly be probated here pursuant to section 636 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. This section reads as follows:
Will made here by alien. — A will made within the
Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state
or country, which is executed in accordance with the law
of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject,
and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his
own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and
recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the
same effect as if executed according to the laws of these
Islands.
The hearing on said application was set for March 6, 1916, and
three weeks publication of notice was ordered in the "Manila Daily
Bulletin." Due publication was made pursuant to this order of the
court. On March 6, 1916, witnesses were examined relative to the
execution of the will; and upon March 16th thereafter the document
was declared to be legal and was admitted to probate. At the same
time an order was made nominating Victor Johnson and John T.
Pickett as administrators of the estate, with the sill annexed. Shortly
thereafter Pickett signified his desire not to serve, and Victor
Johnson was appointed sole administrator.
By the will in question the testator gives to his brother Victor one
hundred shares of the corporate stock in the Johnson-Pickett Rope
Company; to his father and mother in Sweden, the sum of P20,000;
to his daughter Ebba Ingeborg, the sum of P5,000; to his wife,
Alejandra Ibañez, the sum of P75 per month, if she remains single;
to Simeona Ibañez, spinster, P65 per month, if she remains single.
The rest of the property is left to the testator's five children —
Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor, Eleonor and Alberto.
The biographical facts relative to the deceased necessary to an
understanding of the case are these: Emil H. Johnson was born in
Sweden, May 25, 1877, from which country he emigrated to the
United States and lived in Chicago, Illinois, from 1893 to 1898. On
May 9, 1898, at Chicago, he was married to Rosalie Ackeson, and
immediately thereafter embarked for the Philippine Islands as a
soldier in the Army of the United States. As a result of relations
between Johnson and Rosalie Ackeson a daughter, named Ebba
Ingeborg, was born a few months after their marriage. This child
was christened in Chicago by a pastor of the Swedish Lutheran
Church upon October 16, 1898.
After Johnson was discharged as a soldier from the service of the
November 20, 1902, the wife, Rosalie Johnson, was granted a
decree of divorce from him in the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois, on the ground of desertion. A little later Johnson appeared
in the United States on a visit and on January 10, 1903, procured a
certificate of naturalization at Chicago. From Chicago he appears to
have gone to Sweden, where a photograph, exhibited in evidence
in this case, was taken in which he appeared in a group with his
father, mother, and the little daughter, Ebba Ingeborg, who was
then living with her grandparents in Sweden. When this visit was
business and continued to live until his death.
In this city he appears to have entered into marital relations with
Alejandra Ibañez, by whom he had three children, to wit, Mercedes,
baptized May 31, 1903; Encarnacion, baptized April 29, 1906; and
Victor, baptized December 9, 1907. The other two children
mentioned in the will were borne to the deceased by Simeona
Ibañez.
On June 12, 1916, or about three months after the will had been
probated, the attorneys for Ebba Ingeborg Johnson entered an
appearance in her behalf and noted an exception to the other
admitting the will to probate. On October 31, 1916, the same
attorneys moved the court to vacate the order of March 16 and also
various other orders in the case. On February 20, 1917, this motion
was denied, and from this action of the trial court the present
appeal has been perfected.
As will be discerned, the purpose of the proceeding on behalf of the
petitioner is to annul the decree of probate and put the estate into
intestate administration, thus preparing the way for the
establishment of the claim of the petitioner as the sole legitimate
heir of her father.
The grounds upon which the petitioner seeks to avoid the probate
are four in number and may be stated, in the same sequence in
which they are set forth in the petition, as follows:
(1) Emil H. Johnson was a resident of the city of Manila and not a
resident of the State of Illinois at the time the will in question was
executed;
(2) The will is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal
property in the State of Illinois;
(3) The order admitting the will to probate was made without notice
to the petitioner; and
(4) The order in question was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
It cannot of course be maintained that a court of first instance lacks
essential jurisdiction over the probate of wills. The fourth
proposition above stated must, accordingly, be interpreted in
relation with the third and must be considered as a corollary
deduced from the latter. Moreover, both the third and fourth
grounds stated take precedence, by reason of their more
fundamental implications, over the first two; and a logical exposition
of the contentions of the petitioner is expressed in the two following
propositions:
(I) The order admitting the will to probate was beyond the
jurisdiction of the court and void because made without
notice to the petitioner;
(II) The judgment from which the petitioner seeks relief
should be set aside because the testator was not a
resident of the State of Illinois and the will was not in
conformity with the laws of that State.
In the discussion which is to follow we shall consider the problems
arising in this cae in the order last above indicated. Upon the
question, then, of the jurisdiction of the court, it is apparent from an
inspection of the record of the proceedings in the court below that
all the steps prescribed by law as prerequisites to the probate of a
will were complied with in every respect and that the probate was
effected in external conformity with all legal requirements. This
much is unquestioned. It is, however, pointed out in the argument
submitted in behalf of the petitioner, that, at the time the court made
the order of publication, it was apprised of the fact that the
petitioner lived in the United States and that as daughter and heir
she was necessarily interested in the probate of the will. It is,
therefore, insisted that the court should have appointed a date for
the probate of the will sufficiently far in the future to permit the
petitioner to be present either in person or by representation; and it
is said that the failure of the court thus to postpone the probate of
the will constitutes an infringement of that provision of the Philippine
Bill which declared that property shall not be taken without due
process of law.
On this point we are of the opinion that the proceedings for the
probate of the will were regular and that the publication was
sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding
and to allow the will to be probated.
As was said in the case of In re Davis (136 Cal., 590, 596), "the
proceeding as to the probate of a will is essentially one in rem, and
in the very nature of things the state is allowed a wide latitude in
determining the character of the constructive notice to be given to
the world in a proceeding where it has absolute possession of the
res. It would be an exceptional case where a court would declare a
statute void, as depriving a party of his property without due
process of law, the proceeding being strictly in rem, and
the res within the state, upon the ground that the constructive notice
prescribed by the statute was unreasonably short."
In that case the petitioner had been domiciled in the Hawaiian
Islands at the time of the testator's death; and it was impossible, in
view of the distance and means of communication then existing, for
the petitioner to appear and oppose the probate on the day set for
the hearing in California. It was nevertheless held that publication in
the manner prescribed by statute constituted due process of law.
(See Estate of Davis, 151 Cal., 318; Tracy vs. Muir, 151 Cal., 363.)
In the Davis case (136 Cal., 590) the court commented upon the
fact that, under the laws of California, the petitioner had a full year
within which she might have instituted a proceeding to contest the
will; and this was stated as one of the reasons for holding that
publication in the manner provided by statute was sufficient. The
same circumstance was commented upon in
O'Callaghan vs. O'Brien (199 U. S., 89), decided in the Supreme
Court of the United States. This case arose under the laws of the
State of Washington, and it was alleged that a will had been there
probated without the notice of application for probate having been
given as required by law. It was insisted that this was an
infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States. This contention was, however, rejected and it
was held that the statutory right to contest the will within a year was
a complete refutation of the argument founded on the idea of a
violation of the due process provision.
The laws of these Islands, in contrast with the laws in force in
perhaps all of the States of the American Union, contain no special
provision, other than that allowing an appeal in the probate
proceedings, under which relief of any sort can be obtained from an
order of a court of first instance improperly allowing or disallowing a
will. We do, however, have a provision of a general nature
authorizing a court under certain circumstances to set aside any
judgment, order, or other proceeding whatever. This provision is
found in section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as
follows:
Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a
party or his legal representative from a judgment, order or
other proceeding taken against him through his mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; Provided,
That application therefor be made within a reasonable
time, but in no case exceeding six months after such
judgment, order, or proceeding was taken.
The use of the word "judgment, order or other proceeding" in this
section indicates an intention on the part of the Legislature to give a
wide latitude to the remedy here provided, and in our opinion its
operation is not to be restricted to judgments or orders entered in
ordinary contentious litigation where a plaintiff impleads a
defendant and brings him into court by personal service of process.
In other words the utility of the provision is not limited to actions
proper but extends to all sorts of judicial proceedings.
In the second section of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared
that the provisions of this Code shall be liberally construed to
promote its object and to assist the parties in obtaining speedy
justice. We think that the intention thus exhibited should be applied
in the interpretation of section 113; and we hold that the word
"party," used in this section, means any person having an interest in
the subject matter of the proceeding who is in a position to be
concluded by the judgment, order, to other proceeding taken.
The petitioner, therefore, in this case could have applied, under the
section cited, at any time within six months for March 16, 1916, and
upon showing that she had been precluded from appearing in the
probate proceedings by conditions over which she had no control
and that the order admitting the will to probate had been
erroneously entered upon insufficient proof or upon a supposed
state of facts contrary to the truth, the court would have been
authorized to set the probate aside and grant a rehearing. It is no
doubt true that six months was, under the circumstances, a very
short period of time within which to expect the petitioner to appear
and be prepared to contest the probate with the proof which she
might have desired to collect from remote countries. Nevertheless,
although the time allowed for the making of such application was
inconveniently short, the remedy existed; and the possibility of its
use is proved in this case by the circumstance that on June 12,
1916, she in fact here appeared in court by her attorneys and
excepted to the order admitting the will to probate.
It results that, in conformity with the doctrine announced in the
Davis case, above cited, the proceedings in the court below were
conducted in such manner as to constitute due process of law. The
law supplied a remedy by which the petitioner might have gotten a
hearing and have obtained relief from the order by which she is
supposed to have been injured; and though the period within which
the application should have been made was short, the remedy was
both possible and practicable.
From what has been said it follows that the order of March 16,
1916, admitting the will of Emil H. Johnson to probate cannot be
declared null and void merely because the petitioner was
unavoidably prevented from appearing at the original hearing upon
the matter of the probate of the will in question. Whether the result
would have been the same if our system of procedure had
contained no such provision as that expressed in section 113 is a
matter which we need not here consider.
Intimately connected with the question of the jurisdiction of the
court, is another matter which may be properly discussed at this
juncture. This relates to the interpretation to be placed upon section
636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The position is taken by the
appellant that this section is applicable only to wills of liens; and in
this connection attention is directed to the fact that the epigraph of
this section speaks only of the will made here by an alien and to the
further fact that the word "state" in the body of the section is not
capitalized. From this it is argued that section 636 is not applicable
to the will of a citizen of the United States residing in these
Islands.lawphil.net
We consider these suggestions of little weight and are of the
opinion that, by the most reasonable interpretation of the language
used in the statute, the words "another state or country" include the
United States and the States of the American Union, and that the
operation of the statute is not limited to wills of aliens. It is a rule of
hermeneutics that punctuation and capitalization are aids of low
degree in interpreting the language of a statute and can never
control against the intelligible meaning of the written words.
Furthermore, the epigraph, or heading,, of a section, being nothing
more than a convenient index to the contents of the provision,
cannot have the effect of limiting the operative words contained in
the body of the text. It results that if Emil H. Johnson was at the
time of his death a citizen of the United States and of the State of
Illinois, his will was provable under this section in the courts of the
Philippine Islands, provided the instrument was so executed as to
be admissible to probate under the laws of the State of Illinois.
We are thus brought to consider the second principal proposition
stated at the outset of this discussion, which raises the question
whether the order f probate can be set aside in this proceeding on
the other ground stated in the petition, namely, that the testator was
not a resident of the State of Illinois and that the will was not made
in conformity with the laws of that State.
The order of the Court of First Instance admitting the will to probate
recites, among other things:
That upon the date when the will in question was
executed Emil H. Johnson was a citizen of the United
States, naturalized in the State of Illinois, County of Cook,
and that the will in question was executed in conformity
with the dispositions of the law f the State of Illinois.
We consider this equivalent to a finding that upon the date of the
execution of the will the testator was a citizen of the State of Illinois
and that the will was executed in conformity with the laws of that
State. Upon the last point the finding is express; and in our opinion
the statement that the testator was a citizen of the United States,
naturalized in the State of Illinois, should be taken to imply that he
was a citizen of the State of Illinois, as well as of the United States.
The naturalization laws of the United States require, as a condition
precedent to the granting of the certificate of naturalization, that the
applicant should have resided at least five years in the United
States and for one year within the State or territory where the court
granting the naturalization papers is held; and in the absence of
clear proof to the contrary it should be presumed that a person
naturalized in a court of a certain State thereby becomes a citizen
of that State as well as of the United States.
In this connection it should be remembered that the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States declares, in its
opening words, that all persons naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside.
It is noteworthy that the petition by which it is sought to annul the
probate of this will does not assert that the testator was not a citizen
of Illinois at the date when the will was executed. The most that is
said on this point is he was "never a resident of the State of Illinois
after the year 1898, but became and was a resident of the city of
Manila," etc. But residence in the Philippine Islands is compatible
with citizenship in Illinois; and it must be considered that the
allegations of the petition on this point are, considered in their
bearing as an attempt to refute citizenship in Illinois, wholly
insufficient.
As the Court of First Instance found that the testator was a citizen
of the State of Illinois and that the will was executed in conformity
with the laws of that State, the will was necessarily and properly
admitted to probate. And how is it possible to evade the effect of
these findings?
In Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that "the
allowance by the court of a will of real or personal property shall be
conclusive as to its due execution."
The due execution of a will involves conditions relating to a number
of matters, such as the age and mental capacity of the testator, the
signing of the document by the testator, or by someone in his
behalf, and the acknowledgment of the instrument by him in the
presence of the required number of witnesses who affix their
signatures to the will to attest the act. The proof of all these
requisites is involved in the probate; and as to each and all of them
the probate is conclusive. (Castañeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil. Rep.,
426; Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil. Rep., 436; Chiong Joc-
Soy vs. Vaño, 8 Phil. Rep., 119; Sanchez vs. Pascual, 11 Phil.
Rep., 395; Montañano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. Rep., 676.)
Our reported cases do not contain the slightest intimation that a will
which has been probated according to law, and without fraud, can
be annulled, in any other proceeding whatever, on account of any
supposed irregularity or defect in the execution of the will or on
account of any error in the action of the court upon the proof
adduced before it. This court has never been called upon to decide
whether, in case the probate of a will should be procured by fraud,
relief could be granted in some other proceeding; and no such
question is now presented. But it is readily seen that if fraud were
alleged, this would introduce an entirely different factor in the cae.
In Austrua vs. Ventenilla (21 Phil. Rep., 180, 184), it was suggested
but not decided that relief might be granted in case the probate of a
will were procured by fraud.
The circumstance that the judgment of the trial court recites that the
will was executed in conformity with the law of Illinois and also, in
effect, that the testator was a citizen of that State places the
judgment upon an unassailable basis so far as any supposed error
apparent upon the fact of the judgment is concerned. It is, however,
probable that even if the judgment had not contained these recitals,
there would have been a presumption from the admission of the will
to probate as the will of a citizen of Illinois that the facts were as
recited in the order of probate.
As was said by this court in the case of Banco Español-
Filipino vs. Palanca (37 Phil. Rep., 921), "There is no principle of
law better settled than that after jurisdiction has once been
acquired, every act of a court of general jurisdiction shall be
presumed to have been rightly done. This rule is applied to every
judgment or decree rendered in the various stages of the
proceedings from their initiation to their completion
(Voorhees vs. United States Bank, 10 Pet., 314; 35 U. S., 449); and
if the record is silent with respect to any fact which must have
established before the court could have rightly acted, it will be
presumed that such fact was properly brought to its knowledge."
The Court of First Instance is a court of original and general
jurisdiction; and there is no difference in its faculties in this respect
whether exercised in matters of probate or exerted in ordinary
contentious litigation. The trial court therefore necessarily had the
power to determine the facts upon which the propriety of admitting
the will to probate depended; and the recital of those facts in the
judgment was probably not essential to its validity. No express
ruling is, however, necessary on this point.
What has been said effectually disposes of the petition considered
in its aspect as an attack upon the order of probate for error
apparent on the face of the record. But the petitioner seeks to have
the judgment reviewed, it being asserted that the findings of the trial
court — especially on the question of the citizenship of the testator
— are not supported by the evidence. It needs but a moment's
reflection, however, to show that in such a proceeding as this it is
not possible to reverse the original order on the ground that the
findings of the trial court are unsupported by the proof adduced
before that court. The only proceeding in which a review of the
evidence can be secured is by appeal, and the case is not before
us upon appeal from the original order admitting the will to probate.
The present proceedings by petition to set aside the order of
probate, and the appeal herein is from the order denying this relief.
It is obvious that on appeal from an order refusing to vacate a
judgment it is not possible to review the evidence upon which the
original judgment was based. To permit this would operate unduly
to protract the right of appeal.
However, for the purpose of arriving at a just conception of the case
from the point of view of the petitioner, we propose to examine the
evidence submitted upon the original hearing, in connection with
the allegations of the petition, in order to see, first, whether the
evidence submitted to the trial court was sufficient to justify its
findings, and, secondly, whether the petition contains any matter
which would justify the court in setting the judgment, aside. In this
connection we shall for a moment ignore the circumstance that the
petition was filed after the expiration of the six months allowed by
section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The principal controversy is over the citizenship of the testator. The
evidence adduced upon this point in the trial court consists of the
certificate of naturalization granted upon January 10, 1903, in the
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, in connection with certain
biographical facts contained in the oral evidence. The certificate of
naturalization supplies incontrovertible proof that upon the date
stated the testator became a citizen of the United States, and
inferentially also a citizen of said State. In the testimony submitted
to the trial court it appears that, when Johnson first came to the
United States as a boy, he took up his abode in the State of Illinois
and there remained until he came as a soldier in the United States
Army to the Philippine Islands. Although he remained in these
Islands for sometime after receiving his discharge, no evidence was
adduced showing that at the time he returned to the United States,
in the autumn of 1902, he had then abandoned Illinois as the State
of his permanent domicile, and on the contrary the certificate of
naturalization itself recites that at that time he claimed to be a
resident of Illinois.
Now, if upon January 10, 1903, the testator became a citizen of the
United States and of the State of Illinois, how has he lost the
character of citizen with respect to either of these jurisdictions?
There is no law in force by virtue of which any person of foreign
nativity can become a naturalized citizen of the Philippine Islands;
and it was, therefore, impossible for the testator, even if he had so
desired, to expatriate himself from the United States and change
his political status from a citizen of the United States to a citizen of
these Islands. This being true, it is to be presumed that he retained
his citizenship in the State of Illinois along with his status as a
citizen of the United States. It would be novel doctrine to Americans
living in the Philippine Islands to be told that by living here they lose
their citizenship in the State of their naturalization or nativity.
We are not unmindful of the fact that when a citizen of one State
leaves it and takes up his abode in another State with no intention
of returning, he immediately acquires citizenship in the State of his
new domicile. This is in accordance with that provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
which says that every citizen of the United States is a citizen of the
State where in he resides. The effect of this provision necessarily is
that a person transferring his domicile from one State to another
loses his citizenship in the State of his original above upon
acquiring citizenship in the State of his new abode. The acquisition
of the new State citizenship extinguishes the old. That situation, in
our opinion, has no analogy to that which arises when a citizen of
an American State comes to reside in the Philippine Islands. Here
he cannot acquire a new citizenship; nor by the mere change of
domicile does he lose that which he brought with him.
The proof adduced before the trial court must therefore be taken as
showing that, at the time the will was executed, the testator was, as
stated in the order of probate, a citizen of the State of Illinois. This,
in connection with the circumstance that the petition does not even
so much as deny such citizenship but only asserts that the testator
was a resident of the Philippine Islands, demonstrates the
impossibility of setting the probate aside for lack of the necessary
citizenship on the part of the testator. As already observed, the
allegation of the petition on this point is wholly insufficient to justify
any relief whatever.
Upon the other point — as to whether the will was executed in
conformity with the statutes of the State of Illinois — we note that it
does not affirmatively appear from the transaction of the testimony
adduced in the trial court that any witness was examined with
reference to the law of Illinois on the subject of the execution of will.
The trial judge no doubt was satisfied that the will was properly
executed by examining section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of
Illinois, as exhibited in volume 3 of Starr & Curtis's Annotated Illinois
Statutes, 2nd ed., p. 426; and he may have assumed that he could
take judicial notice of the laws of Illinois under section 275 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. If so, he was in our opinion mistaken. that
section authorizes the courts here to take judicial notice, among
other things, of the acts of the legislative department of the United
States. These words clearly have reference to Acts of the Congress
of the United States; and we would hesitate to hold that our courts
can, under this provision, take judicial notice of the multifarious laws
of the various American States. Nor do we think that any such
authority can be derived from the broader language, used in the
same action, where it is said that our courts may take judicial notice
of matters of public knowledge "similar" to those therein
enumerated. The proper rule we think is to require proof of the
statutes of the States of the American Union whenever their
provisions are determinative of the issues in any action litigated in
the Philippine courts.
Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred in
taking judicial notice of the law of Illinois on the point in question,
such error is not now available to the petitioner, first, because the
petition does not state any fact from which it would appear that the
law of Illinois is different from what the court found, and, secondly,
because the assignment of error and argument for the appellant in
this court raises no question based on such supposed error.
Though the trial court may have acted upon pure conjecture as to
the law prevailing in the State of Illinois, its judgment could not be
set aside, even upon application made within six months under
section 113 of the Code of Civil procedure, unless it should be
made to appear affirmatively that the conjecture was wrong. The
petitioner, it is true, states in general terms that the will in question
is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in the
State of Illinois, but this is merely a conclusion of law. The affidavits
by which the petition is accompanied contain no reference to the
subject, and we are cited to no authority in the appellant's brief
which might tent to raise a doubt as to the correctness of the
conclusion of the trial court. It is very clear, therefore, that this point
cannot be urged as of serious moment.
But it is insisted in the brief for the appellant that the will in question
was not properly admissible to probate because it contains
provisions which cannot be given effect consistently with the laws of
the Philippine Islands; and it is suggested that as the petitioner is a
legitimate heir of the testator she cannot be deprived of the legitime
to which she is entitled under the law governing testamentary
successions in these Islands. Upon this point it is sufficient to say
that the probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of its
provisions, the decree of probate being conclusive only as regards
the due execution of the will. (Code of Civil Procedure, secs. 625,
614; Sahagun vs. De Gorostiza, 7 Phil. Rep., 347, 349; Chiong Joc-
Soy vs. Vaño, 8 Phil. Rep., 119, 121; Limjuco vs. Ganara, 11 Phil.
Rep., 393, 395.)
If, therefore, upon the distribution of this estate, it should appear
that any legacy given by the will or other disposition made therein is
contrary to the law applicable in such case, the will must
necessarily yield upon that point and the law must prevail.
Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of this will must be determined by the law of Illinois
and not, as the appellant apparently assumes, by the general
provisions here applicable in such matters; for in the second
paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code it is declared that "legal
and testamentary successions, with regard to the order of
succession, as well as to the amount of the successional rights and
to the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
laws of the nation of the person whose succession is in question,
whatever may be the nature of the property and the country where
it may be situate."
From what has been said, it is, we think, manifest that the petition
submitted to the court below on October 31, 1916, was entirely
insufficient to warrant the setting aside of the other probating the
will in question, whether said petition be considered as an attack on
the validity of the decree for error apparent, or whether it be
considered as an application for a rehearing based upon the new
evidence submitted in the affidavits which accompany the petition.
And in this latter aspect the petition is subject to the further fatal
defect that it was not presented within the time allowed by law.
It follows that the trial court committed no error in denying the relief
sought. The order appealed from is accordingly affirmed with costs.
So ordered.
G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK,
Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges
(Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo), petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A.
MAGNO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March 29, 1974
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp.
Proc. No. 1307). TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1672). PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, administrator-
appellant,
vs.
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL,
SALVADOR GUZMAN, BELCESAR CAUSING, FLORENIA
BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO, GRACIANO LUCERO,
ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MELQUIADES BATISANAN, PEPITO
IYULORES, ESPERIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO ESPADA,
ROSARIO ALINGASA, ADELFA PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO
PACAONSIS, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, the last as
Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307, appellees, WESTERN
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, INC., movant-appellee.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin for Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank.
Manglapus Law Office, Antonio Law Office and Rizal R. Quimpo for
private respondents and appellees Avelina A. Magno, etc., et al.
BARREDO, J.:p
Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction; certiorari to
"declare all acts of the respondent court in the Testate Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307 of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo) subsequent to the order of December 14, 1957 as
null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction"; prohibition
to enjoin the respondent court from allowing, tolerating, sanctioning,
or abetting private respondent Avelina A. Magno to perform or do
any acts of administration, such as those enumerated in the
petition, and from exercising any authority or power as Regular
Administratrix of above-named Testate Estate, by entertaining
manifestations, motion and pleadings filed by her and acting on
them, and also to enjoin said court from allowing said private
respondent to interfere, meddle or take part in any manner in the
administration of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges
(Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the same court and branch); with prayer for
preliminary injunction, which was issued by this Court on August 8,
1967 upon a bond of P5,000; the petition being particularly directed
against the orders of the respondent court of October 12, 1966
denying petitioner's motion of April 22, 1966 and its order of July
18, 1967 denying the motion for reconsideration of said order.
Related to and involving basically the same main issue as the
foregoing petition, thirty-three (33) appeals from different orders of
the same respondent court approving or otherwise sanctioning the
acts of administration of the respondent Magno on behalf of the
testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges.
THE FACTS
On May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City leaving a
will executed on November 22, 1952 pertinently providing as
follows:
FIRST: I direct that all my just debts and
funeral expenses be first paid out of my estate.
SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of
the rest, residue and remainder of my estate,
both personal and real, wherever situated, or
located, to my beloved husband, Charles
Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto him,
my said husband, during his natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall have
the right to manage, control, use and enjoy
said estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby
given the right to make any changes in the
physical properties of said estate, by sale or
any part thereof which he may think best, and
the purchase of any other or additional property
as he may think best; to execute conveyances
with or without general or special warranty,
conveying in fee simple or for any other term or
time, any property which he may deem proper
to dispose of; to lease any of the real property
for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such
deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee
simple title to the interest so conveyed in such
property as he may elect to sell. All rents,
emoluments and income from said estate shall
belong to him, and he is further authorized to
use any part of the principal of said estate as
he may need or desire. It is provided herein,
however, that he shall not sell or otherwise
dispose of any of the improved property now
owned by us located at, in or near the City of
Lubbock, Texas, but he shall have the full right
to lease, manage and enjoy the same during
his lifetime, above provided. He shall have the
right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots
therein. and may sell unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise and
bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder
of my estate, both real and personal, wherever
situated or located, to be equally divided
among my brothers and sisters, share and
share alike, namely:
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon,
Roy Higdon, Saddie Rascoe, Era Roman and
Nimroy Higdon.
FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my
brothers and/or sisters named in item Fourth,
above, prior to the death of my husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, then it is my will and
bequest that the heirs of such deceased
brother or sister shall take jointly the share
which would have gone to such brother or
sister had she or he survived.
SIXTH: I nominate and appoint my said
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to be
executor of this, my last will and testament, and
direct that no bond or other security be
required of him as such executor.
SEVENTH: It is my will and bequest that no
action be had in the probate court, in the
administration of my estate, other than that
necessary to prove and record this will and to
return an inventory and appraisement of my
estate and list of claims. (Pp. 2-4, Petition.)
This will was subsequently probated in aforementioned Special
Proceedings No. 1307 of respondent court on June 28, 1957, with
the widower Charles Newton Hodges being appointed as Executor,
pursuant to the provisions thereof.
Previously, on May 27, 1957, the said widower (hereafter to be
referred to as Hodges) had been appointed Special Administrator,
in which capacity he filed a motion on the same date as follows:
URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION TO ALLOW OR
AUTHORIZE PETITIONER TO CONTINUE
THE BUSINESS IN WHICH HE WAS
ENGAGED AND TO PERFORM ACTS WHICH
HE HAD BEEN DOING WHILE DECEASED
WAS LIVING
Come petitioner in the above-entitled special proceedings, thru his
undersigned attorneys, to the Hon. Court, most respectfully states:
1. — That Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving her
last will and testament, a copy of which is
attached to the petition for probate of the same.
2. — That in said last will and testament herein
petitioner Charles Newton Hodges is directed
to have the right to manage, control use and
enjoy the estate of deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges, in the same way, a provision was
placed in paragraph two, the following: "I give,
devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue
and remainder of my estate, to my beloved
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and
(to) hold unto him, my said husband, during his
natural lifetime."
3. — That during the lifetime of Linnie Jane
Hodges, herein petitioner was engaged in the
business of buying and selling personal and
real properties, and do such acts which
petitioner may think best.
4. — That deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died
leaving no descendants or ascendants, except
brothers and sisters and herein petitioner as
executor surviving spouse, to inherit the
properties of the decedent.
 5. — That the present motion is submitted in
order not to paralyze the business of petitioner
and the deceased, especially in the purchase
and sale of properties. That proper accounting
will be had also in all these transactions.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed
that, petitioner C. N. Hodges (Charles Newton
Hodges) be allowed or authorized to continue
the business in which he was engaged and to
perform acts which he had been doing while
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges was living.
City of Iloilo, May 27, 1957. (Annex "D",
Petition.)
which the respondent court immediately granted in the following
order:
It appearing in the urgent ex-parte motion filed
by petitioner C. N. Hodges, that the business in
which said petitioner and the deceased were
engaged will be paralyzed, unless and until the
Executor is named and appointed by the Court,
the said petitioner is allowed or authorized to
continue the business in which he was
engaged and to perform acts which he had
been doing while the deceased was living.
SO ORDERED.
City of Iloilo May 27, 1957. (Annex "E",
Petition.)
Under date of December 11, 1957, Hodges filed as such Executor
another motion thus:
MOTION TO APPROVE ALL SALES,
CONVEYANCES, LEASES, MORTGAGES
THAT THE EXECUTOR HAD MADE
FURTHER AND SUBSEQUENT
TRANSACTIONS WHICH THE EXECUTOR
MAY DO IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAST
WISH OF THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE
HODGES.
Comes the Executor in the above-entitled
proceedings, thru his undersigned attorney, to
the Hon. Court, most respectfully states:
1. — That according to the last will and
testament of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges, the executor as the surviving spouse
and legatee named in the will of the deceased;
has the right to dispose of all the properties left
by the deceased, portion of which is quoted as
follows:
Second: I give, devise and bequeath all of the
rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both
personal and real, wherever situated, or
located, to my beloved husband, Charles
Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto him,
my said husband, during his natural lifetime.
Third: I desire, direct and provide that my
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall have
the right to manage, control, use and enjoy
said estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby
given the right to make any changes in the
physical properties of said estate, by sale or
any part thereof which he may think best, and
the purchase of any other or additional property
as he may think best; to execute
conveyances with or without general or special
warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any
other term or time, any property which he may
deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the
real property for oil, gas and/or other minerals,
and all such deeds or leases shall pass the
absolute fee simple title to the interest so
conveyed in such property as he may elect to
sell. All rents, emoluments and income from
said estate shall belong to him, and he is
further authorized to use any part of the
principal of said estate as he may need or
desire. ...
2. — That herein Executor, is not only part
owner of the properties left as conjugal, but
also, the successor to all the properties left by
the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. That during
the lifetime of herein Executor, as Legatee has
the right to sell, convey, lease or dispose of the
properties in the Philippines. That inasmuch as
C.N. Hodges was and is engaged in the buy
and sell of real and personal properties, even
before the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, a
motion to authorize said C.N. Hodges was filed
in Court, to allow him to continue in the
business of buy and sell, which motion was
favorably granted by the Honorable Court.
3. — That since the death of Linnie Jane
Hodges, Mr. C.N. Hodges had been buying
and selling real and personal properties, in
accordance with the wishes of the late Linnie
Jane Hodges.
4. — That the Register of Deeds for Iloilo, had
required of late the herein Executor to have all
the sales, leases, conveyances or mortgages
made by him, approved by the Hon. Court.
5. — That it is respectfully requested, all the
sales, conveyances leases and mortgages
executed by the Executor, be approved by the
Hon. Court. and subsequent sales
conveyances, leases and mortgages in
compliances with the wishes of the late Linnie
Jane Hodges, and within the scope of the
terms of the last will and testament, also be
approved;
6. — That the Executor is under obligation to
submit his yearly accounts, and the properties
conveyed can also be accounted for, especially
the amounts received.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed
that, all the sales, conveyances, leases, and
mortgages executed by the Executor, be
approved by the Hon. Court, and also the
subsequent sales, conveyances, leases, and
mortgages in consonance with the wishes of
the deceased contained in her last will and
testament, be with authorization and approval
of the Hon. Court.
City of Iloilo, December 11, 1967.
 (Annex "G", Petition.)
which again was promptly granted by the respondent court on
December 14, 1957 as follows:
ORDER
As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for
the Executor for the reasons stated in his
motion dated December 11, 1957, which the
Court considers well taken all the sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of all
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges executed by the Executor Charles N.
Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said
Executor is further authorized to execute
subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of the properties left by the said
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance
with the wishes conveyed in the last will and
testament of the latter.
So ordered.
Iloilo City. December 14, 1957.
(Annex "H", Petition.)
On April 14, 1959, in submitting his first statement of account as
Executor for approval, Hodges alleged:
Pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of
Court, herein executor of the deceased,
renders the following account of his
administration covering the period from
January 1, 1958 to December 31, 1958, which
account may be found in detail in the individual
income tax return filed for the estate of
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, to wit:
That a certified public accountant has
examined the statement of net worth of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, the assets and
liabilities, as well as the income and expenses,
copy of which is hereto attached and made
integral part of this statement of account as
Annex "A".
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is most
respectfully prayed that, the statement of net
worth of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, the
assets and liabilities, income and expenses as
shown in the individual income tax return for
the estate of the deceased and marked as
Annex "A", be approved by the Honorable
Court, as substantial compliance with the
requirements of the Rules of Court.
That no person interested in the Philippines of
the time and place of examining the herein
accounts be given notice, as herein executor is
the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in
accordance with the last will and testament
already probated by the Honorable court.
City of Iloilo April 14, 1959.
(Annex "I", Petition.)
The respondent court approved this statement of account on April
21, 1959 in its order worded thus:
Upon petition of Atty. Gellada, in representation
of the Executor, the statement of net worth of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, assets and
liabilities, income and expenses as shown in
the individual income tax return for the estate
of the deceased and marked as Annex "A" is
approved.
SO ORDERED.
City of Iloilo April 21, 1959.
(Annex "J", Petition.)
His accounts for the periods January 1, 1959 to December 31, 1959
and January 1, 1960 to December 31, 1960 were submitted
likewise accompanied by allegations identical mutatis mutandis to
those of April 14, 1959, quoted above; and the respective orders
approving the same, dated July 30, 1960 and May 2, 1961, were
substantially identical to the above-quoted order of April 21, 1959.
In connection with the statements of account just mentioned, the
following assertions related thereto made by respondent-appellee
Magno in her brief do not appear from all indications discernible in
the record to be disputable:
Under date of April 14, 1959, C.N. Hodges filed
his first "Account by the Executor" of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of
Networth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1958
annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that
the combined conjugal estate earned a net
income of P328,402.62, divided evenly
between him and the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual
income tax return" for calendar year 1958 on
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting,
under oath, the said estate as having earned
income of P164,201.31, exactly one-half of the
net income of his combined personal assets
and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
(p. 91, Appellee's Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
Under date of July 21, 1960, C.N. Hodges filed
his second "Annual Statement of Account by
the Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr.
C.N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges" as of December 31, 1959 annexed
thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that the
combined conjugal estate earned a net income
of P270,623.32, divided evenly between him
and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income
tax return" for calendar year 1959 on the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath,
the said estate as having earned income of
P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the net
income of his combined personal assets and
that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (pp.
91-92. Appellee's Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
 Under date of April 20, 1961, C.N. Hodges filed
his third "Annual Statement of Account by the
Executor for the Year 1960" of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Net
Worth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1960
annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that
the combined conjugal estate earned a net
income of P314,857.94, divided evenly
between him and the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual
income tax return" for calendar year 1960 on
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting,
under oath, the said estate as having earned
income of P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the
net income of his combined personal assets
and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
(Pp. 92-93, Appellee's Brief.)
Likewise the following:
In the petition for probate that he (Hodges)
filed, he listed the seven brothers and sisters of
Linnie Jane as her "heirs" (see p. 2, Green
ROA). The order of the court admitting the will
to probate unfortunately omitted one of the
heirs, Roy Higdon (see p. 14, Green ROA).
Immediately, C.N. Hodges filed a verified
motion to have Roy Higdon's name included as
an heir, stating that he wanted to straighten the
records "in order the heirs of deceased Roy
Higdon may not think or believe they were
omitted, and that they were really and are
interested in the estate of deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges. .
As an executor, he was bound to file tax
returns for the estate he was administering
under American law. He did file such as estate
tax return on August 8, 1958. In Schedule "M"
of such return, he answered "Yes" to the
question as to whether he was contemplating
"renouncing the will". On the question as to
what property interests passed to him as the
surviving spouse, he answered:
"None, except for
purposes of administering
the Estate, paying debts,
taxes and other legal
charges. It is the intention
of the surviving husband of
deceased to distribute the
remaining property and
interests of the deceased
in their Community estate
to the devisees and
legatees named in the will
when the debts, liabilities,
taxes and expenses of
administration are finally
determined and paid."
Again, on August 9, 1962, barely four months
before his death, he executed an "affidavit"
wherein he ratified and confirmed all that he
stated in Schedule "M" of his estate tax returns
as to his having renounced what was given him
by his wife's will.1
As appointed executor, C.N. Hodges filed an
"Inventory" dated May 12, 1958. He listed all
the assets of his conjugal partnership with
Linnie Jane Hodges on a separate balance
sheet and then stated expressly that her estate
which has come into his possession as
executor was "one-half of all the items" listed in
said balance sheet. (Pp. 89-90, Appellee's
Brief.)
Parenthetically, it may be stated, at this juncture, that We are taking
pains to quote wholly or at least, extensively from some of the
pleadings and orders whenever We feel that it is necessary to do so
for a more comprehensive and clearer view of the important and
decisive issues raised by the parties and a more accurate appraisal
of their respective positions in regard thereto.
The records of these cases do not show that anything else was
done in the above-mentioned Special Proceedings No. 1307 until
December 26, 1962, when on account of the death of Hodges the
day before, the same lawyer, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who had been
previously acting as counsel for Hodges in his capacity as Executor
of his wife's estate, and as such had filed the aforequoted motions
and manifestations, filed the following:
URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION FOR THE
APPOINTMENT OF A
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX
COMES the undersigned attorney for the
Executor in the above-entitled proceedings, to
the Honorable Court, most respectfully states:
1. That in accordance with the Last Will and
Testament of Linnie Jane Hodges (deceased),
her husband, Charles Newton Hodges was to
act as Executor, and in fact, in an order issued
by this Hon. Court dated June 28, 1957, the
said Charles Newton Hodges was appointed
Executor and had performed the duties as
such.
2. That last December 22, 1962, the said
Charles Newton Hodges was stricken ill, and
brought to the Iloilo Mission Hospital for
treatment, but unfortunately, he died on
December 25, 1962, as shown by a copy of the
death certificate hereto attached and marked
as Annex "A".
3. That in accordance with the provisions of the
last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges,
whatever real and personal properties that may
remain at the death of her husband Charles
Newton Hodges, the said properties shall be
equally divided among their heirs. That there
are real and personal properties left by Charles
Newton Hodges, which need to be
administered and taken care of.
4. That the estate of deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges, as well as that of Charles Newton
Hodges, have not as yet been determined or
ascertained, and there is necessity for the
appointment of a general administrator to
liquidate and distribute the residue of the estate
to the heirs and legatees of both spouses. That
in accordance with the provisions of Section 2
of Rule 75 of the Rules of Court, the conjugal
partnership of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles
Newton Hodges shall be liquidated in the
testate proceedings of the wife.
5. That the undersigned counsel, has perfect
personal knowledge of the existence of the last
will and testament of Charles Newton Hodges,
with similar provisions as that contained in the
last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges.
However, said last will and testament of
Charles Newton Hodges is kept inside the vault
or iron safe in his office, and will be presented
in due time before this honorable Court.
6. That in the meantime, it is imperative and
indispensable that, an Administratrix be
appointed for the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
and a Special Administratrix for the estate of
Charles Newton Hodges, to perform the duties
required by law, to administer, collect, and take
charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits,
and estate of both spouses, Charles Newton
Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, as provided
for in Section 1 and 2, Rule 81 of the Rules of
Court.
7. That there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration, because the
last will and testament of deceased, Charles
Newton Hodges, is still kept in his safe or vault,
and in the meantime, unless an administratrix
(and,) at the same time, a Special
Administratrix is appointed, the estate of both
spouses are in danger of being lost, damaged
or go to waste.
8. That the most trusted employee of both
spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C.N.
Hodges, who had been employed for around
thirty (30) years, in the person of Miss Avelina
Magno, (should) be appointed Administratrix of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and at the
same time Special Administratrix of the estate
of Charles Newton Hodges. That the said Miss
Avelina Magno is of legal age, a resident of the
Philippines, the most fit, competent, trustworthy
and well-qualified person to serve the duties of
Administratrix and Special Administratrix and is
willing to act as such.
9. That Miss Avelina Magno is also willing to
file bond in such sum which the Hon. Court
believes reasonable.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is
most respectfully prayed that, Miss AVELINA
A. MAGNO be immediately appointed
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and as Special Administratrix of the
estate of Charles Newton Hodges, with powers
and duties provided for by law. That the
Honorable Court fix the reasonable bond of
P1,000.00 to be filed by Avelina A. Magno.
(Annex "O", Petition.)
which respondent court readily acted on in its order of even date
thus: .
For the reasons alleged in the Urgent Ex-
parte Motion filed by counsel for the Executor
dated December 25, 1962, which the Court
finds meritorious, Miss AVELINA A. MAGNO, is
hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special
Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton
Hodges, in the latter case, because the last will
of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in
his vault or iron safe and that the real and
personal properties of both spouses may be
lost, damaged or go to waste, unless a Special
Administratrix is appointed.
Miss Avelina A. Magno is required to file bond
in the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00), and after having done so, let
letters of Administration be issued to her."
(Annex "P", Petition.)
On December 29, 1962, however, upon
urgent ex-parte petition of respondent Magno
herself, thru Atty. Gellada, Harold, R. Davies,
"a representative of the heirs of deceased
Charles Newton Hodges (who had) arrived
from the United States of America to help in the
administration of the estate of said deceased"
was appointed as Co-Special Administrator of
the estate of Hodges, (pp. 29-33, Yellow -
Record on Appeal) only to be replaced as such
co-special administrator on January 22, 1963
by Joe Hodges, who, according to the motion
of the same attorney, is "the nephew of the
deceased (who had) arrived from the United
States with instructions from the other heirs of
the deceased to administer the properties or
estate of Charles Newton Hodges in the
Philippines, (Pp. 47-50, id.)
Meanwhile, under date of January 9, 1963, the same Atty. Gellada
filed in Special Proceedings 1672 a petition for the probate of the
will of Hodges,2 with a prayer for the issuance of letters of
administration to the same Joe Hodges, albeit the motion was
followed on February 22, 1963 by a separate one asking that Atty.
Fernando Mirasol be appointed as his co-administrator. On the
same date this latter motion was filed, the court issued the
corresponding order of probate and letters of administration to Joe
Hodges and Atty. Mirasol, as prayed for.
At this juncture, again, it may also be explained that just as, in her
will, Mrs. Hodges bequeathed her whole estate to her husband "to
have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural
lifetime", she, at the same time or in like manner, provided that "at
the death of my said husband — I give devise and bequeath all of
the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and
personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among
my brothers and sisters, share and share alike —". Accordingly, it
became incumbent upon Hodges, as executor of his wife's will, to
duly liquidate the conjugal partnership, half of which constituted her
estate, in order that upon the eventuality of his death, "the rest,
residue and remainder" thereof could be determined and
correspondingly distributed or divided among her brothers and
sisters. And it was precisely because no such liquidation was done,
furthermore, there is the issue of whether the distribution of her
estate should be governed by the laws of the Philippines or those of
Texas, of which State she was a national, and, what is more, as
already stated, Hodges made official and sworn statements or
manifestations indicating that as far as he was concerned no
"property interests passed to him as surviving spouse — "except for
purposes of administering the estate, paying debts, taxes and other
legal charges" and it was the intention of the surviving husband of
the deceased to distribute the remaining property and interests of
the deceased in their Community Estate to the devisees and
legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and
expenses of administration are finally determined and paid", that
the incidents and controversies now before Us for resolution arose.
As may be observed, the situation that ensued upon the death of
Hodges became rather unusual and so, quite understandably, the
lower court's actuations presently under review are apparently
wanting in consistency and seemingly lack proper orientation.
Thus, We cannot discern clearly from the record before Us the
precise perspective from which the trial court proceeded in issuing
its questioned orders. And, regretably, none of the lengthy briefs
there is nothing in the record indicating whatever happened to it
submitted by the parties is of valuable assistance in clearing up the
afterwards, except that again, reference thereto was made in the
matter.
appealed order of October 27, 1965, on pages 292-295 of the
Green Record on Appeal, as follows:
To begin with, We gather from the two records on appeal filed by
petitioner, as appellant in the appealed cases, one with green cover
and the other with a yellow cover, that at the outset, a sort of modus
operandi had been agreed upon by the parties under which the
respective administrators of the two estates were supposed to act
conjointly, but since no copy of the said agreement can be found in
the record before Us, We have no way of knowing when exactly
such agreement was entered into and under what specific terms.
And while reference is made to said modus operandi in the order of
September 11, 1964, on pages 205-206 of the Green Record on
Appeal, reading thus:
The present incident is to hear the side of
administratrix, Miss Avelina A. Magno, in
answer to the charges contained in the motion
filed by Atty. Cesar Tirol on September 3,
1964. In answer to the said charges, Miss
Avelina A. Magno, through her counsel, Atty.
Rizal Quimpo, filed a written manifestation.
After reading the manifestation here of Atty.
Quimpo, for and in behalf of the administratrix,
Miss Avelina A. Magno, the Court finds that
everything that happened before September 3,
1964, which was resolved on September 8,
1964, to the satisfaction of parties, was simply
due to a misunderstanding between the
representative of the Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank and Miss Magno and in
order to restore the harmonious relations
between the parties, the Court ordered the
parties to remain in status quo as to their
modus operandi before September 1, 1964,
until after the Court can have a meeting with all
the parties and their counsels on October 3, as
formerly agreed upon between counsels, Attys.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta, Attys. Tirol and
Tirol and Atty. Rizal Quimpo.
In the meantime, the prayers of Atty. Quimpo
as stated in his manifestation shall not be
resolved by this Court until October 3, 1964.
SO ORDERED.
On record is an urgent motion to allow PCIB to
open all doors and locks in the Hodges Office
at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City, to take
immediate and exclusive possession thereof
and to place its own locks and keys for security
purposes of the PCIB dated October 27, 1965
thru Atty. Cesar Tirol. It is alleged in said
urgent motion that Administratrix Magno of the
testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges refused to
open the Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco
Street, Iloilo City where PCIB holds office and
therefore PCIB is suffering great moral damage
and prejudice as a result of said act. It is
prayed that an order be issued authorizing it
(PCIB) to open all doors and locks in the said
office, to take immediate and exclusive
possession thereof and place thereon its own
locks and keys for security purposes;
instructing the clerk of court or any available
deputy to witness and supervise the opening of
all doors and locks and taking possession of
the PCIB.
A written opposition has been filed by
Administratrix Magno of even date (Oct. 27)
thru counsel Rizal Quimpo stating therein that
she was compelled to close the office for the
reason that the PCIB failed to comply with the
order of this Court signed by Judge Anacleto I.
Bellosillo dated September 11, 1964 to the
effect that both estates should remain in status
quo to their modus operandi as of September
1, 1964.
To arrive at a happy solution of the dispute and
in order not to interrupt the operation of the
office of both estates, the Court aside from the
reasons stated in the urgent motion and
opposition heard the verbal arguments of Atty.
Cesar Tirol for the PCIB and Atty. Rizal
Quimpo for Administratix Magno.
After due consideration, the Court hereby
orders Magno to open all doors and locks in
the Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco Street,
Iloilo City in the presence of the PCIB or its
duly authorized representative and deputy clerk
of court Albis of this branch not later than 7:30
tomorrow morning October 28, 1965 in order
that the office of said estates could operate for
business.
Pursuant to the order of this Court thru Judge
Bellosillo dated September 11, 1964, it is
hereby ordered:
(a) That all cash collections should be
deposited in the joint account of the estates of
Linnie Jane Hodges and estates of C.N.
Hodges;
(b) That whatever cash collections that had
been deposited in the account of either of the
estates should be withdrawn and since then
deposited in the joint account of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and the estate of C.N.
Hodges;
(c) That the PCIB should countersign the check
in the amount of P250 in favor of Administratrix
Avelina A. Magno as her compensation as
administratrix of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate
chargeable to the testate estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges only;
(d) That Administratrix Magno is hereby
directed to allow the PCIB to inspect whatever
records, documents and papers she may have
in her possession in the same manner that
Administrator PCIB is also directed to allow
Administratrix Magno to inspect whatever
records, documents and papers it may have in
its possession;
 (e) That the accountant of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges shall have access to all records
of the transactions of both estates for the
protection of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
and in like manner the accountant or any
authorized representative of the estate of C.N.
Hodges shall have access to the records of
transactions of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate
for the protection of the estate of C.N. Hodges.
Once the estates' office shall have been
opened by Administratrix Magno in the
presence of the PCIB or its duly authorized
representative and deputy clerk Albis or his
duly authorized representative, both estates or
any of the estates should not close it without
previous consent and authority from this court.
SO ORDERED.
As may be noted, in this order, the respondent court required that
all collections from the properties in the name of Hodges should be
deposited in a joint account of the two estates, which indicates that
seemingly the so-called modus operandi was no longer operative,
but again there is nothing to show when this situation started.
Likewise, in paragraph 3 of the petitioner's motion of September 14,
1964, on pages 188-201 of the Green Record on Appeal, (also
found on pp. 83-91 of the Yellow Record on Appeal) it is alleged
that:
3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs
of C.N. Hodges, Joe Hodges and Fernando P.
Mirasol acting as the two co-administrators of
the estate of C.N. Hodges, Avelina A. Magno
acting as the administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and Messrs. William
Brown and Ardell Young acting for all of the
Higdon family who claim to be the sole
beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and various legal counsel representing
the aforementioned parties entered into an
amicable agreement, which was approved by
this Honorable Court, wherein the parties
thereto agreed that certain sums of money
were to be paid in settlement of different claims
against the two estates and that the assets (to
the extent they existed) of both estates would
be administered jointly by the PCIB as
administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges and
Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, subject,
however, to the aforesaid October 5, 1963
Motion, namely, the PCIB's claim to exclusive
possession and ownership of one hundred
percent (100%) (or, in the alternative, seventy-
five percent (75%) of all assets owned by C.N.
Hodges or Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the
Philippines. On February 1, 1964 (pp. 934-935,
CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672) this Honorable Court
amended its order of January 24, 1964 but in
no way changed its recognition of the afore-
described basic demand by the PCIB as
administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges to
one hundred percent (100%) of the assets
claimed by both estates.
but no copy of the mentioned agreement of joint administration of
the two estates exists in the record, and so, We are not informed as
to what exactly are the terms of the same which could be relevant
in the resolution of the issues herein.
On the other hand, the appealed order of November 3, 1965, on
pages 313-320 of the Green Record on Appeal, authorized
payment by respondent Magno of, inter alia, her own fees as
administratrix, the attorney's fees of her lawyers, etc., as follows:
Administratrix Magno thru Attys. Raul S.
Manglapus and Rizal. R. Quimpo filed a
Manifestation and Urgent Motion dated June
10, 1964 asking for the approval of the
Agreement dated June 6, 1964 which
Agreement is for the purpose of retaining their
services to protect and defend the interest of
the said Administratrix in these proceedings
and the same has been signed by and bears
the express conformity of the attorney-in-fact of
the late Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. James L.
Sullivan. It is further prayed that the
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges be directed to pay the retailers
fee of said lawyers, said fees made chargeable
as expenses for the administration of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 1641-1642, Vol. V,
Sp. 1307).
An opposition has been filed by the
Administrator PCIB thru Atty. Herminio Ozaeta
dated July 11, 1964, on the ground that
payment of the retainers fee of Attys.
Manglapus and Quimpo as prayed for in said
Manifestation and Urgent Motion is prejudicial
to the 100% claim of the estate of C. N.
Hodges; employment of Attys. Manglapus and
Quimpo is premature and/or unnecessary;
Attys. Quimpo and Manglapus are representing
conflicting interests and the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges should be closed and terminated
(pp. 1679-1684, Vol, V, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Leon P. Gellada filed a memorandum
dated July 28, 1964 asking that the
Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by Attys.
Manglapus and Quimpo be denied because no
evidence has been presented in support
thereof. Atty. Manglapus filed a reply to the
opposition of counsel for the Administrator of
the C. N. Hodges estate wherein it is claimed
that expenses of administration include
reasonable counsel or attorney's fees for
services to the executor or administrator. As a
matter of fact the fee agreement dated
February 27, 1964 between the PCIB and the
law firm of Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta as its
counsel (Pp. 1280-1284, Vol. V, Sp. 1307)
which stipulates the fees for said law firm has
been approved by the Court in its order dated
March 31, 1964. If payment of the fees of the
lawyers for the administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges will cause prejudice to the
estate of C. N. Hodges, in like manner the very
agreement which provides for the payment of
attorney's fees to the counsel for the PCIB will
also be prejudicial to the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges (pp. 1801-1814, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Herminio Ozaeta filed a rejoinder dated
August 10, 1964 to the reply to the opposition
to the Manifestation and Urgent Motion alleging
principally that the estates of Linnie Jane
Hodges and C. N. Hodges are not similarly
situated for the reason that C. N. Hodges is an
heir of Linnie Jane Hodges whereas the latter
is not an heir of the former for the reason that
Linnie Jane Hodges predeceased C. N.
Hodges (pp. 1839-1848, Vol. V, Sp. 1307); that
Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo formally entered
their appearance in behalf of Administratrix of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on June 10,
1964 (pp. 1639-1640, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Manglapus filed a manifestation dated
December 18, 1964 stating therein that Judge
Bellosillo issued an order requiring the parties
to submit memorandum in support of their
respective contentions. It is prayed in this
manifestation that the Manifestation and Urgent
Motion dated June 10, 1964 be resolved (pp.
6435-6439, Vol. VII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a
counter- manifestation dated January 5, 1965
asking that after the consideration by the court
of all allegations and arguments and pleadings
of the PCIB in connection therewith (1) said
manifestation and urgent motion of Attys.
Manglapus and Quimpo be denied (pp. 6442-
6453, Vol. VII, Sp. 1307). Judge Querubin
issued an order dated January 4, 1965
approving the motion dated June 10, 1964 of
the attorneys for the administratrix of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges and agreement
annexed to said motion. The said order further
states: "The Administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges is authorized to issue or
sign whatever check or checks may be
necessary for the above purpose and the
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges is
ordered to countersign the same. (pp. 6518-
6523, Vol VII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a
manifestation and motion dated January 13,
1965 asking that the order of January 4, 1965
which was issued by Judge Querubin be
declared null and void and to enjoin the clerk of
court and the administratrix and administrator
in these special proceedings from all
proceedings and action to enforce or comply
with the provision of the aforesaid order of
January 4, 1965. In support of said
manifestation and motion it is alleged that the
order of January 4, 1965 is null and void
because the said order was never delivered to
the deputy clerk Albis of Branch V (the sala of
Judge Querubin) and the alleged order was
found in the drawer of the late Judge Querubin
in his office when said drawer was opened on
January 13, 1965 after the death of Judge
Querubin by Perfecto Querubin, Jr., the son of
the judge and in the presence of Executive
Judge Rovira and deputy clerk Albis (Sec. 1,
Rule 36, New Civil Code) (Pp. 6600-6606, Vol.
VIII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a
motion for reconsideration dated February 23,
1965 asking that the order dated January 4,
1964 be reversed on the ground that:
1. Attorneys retained must render services to
the estate not to the personal heir;
2. If services are rendered to both, fees should
be pro-rated between them;
3. Attorneys retained should not represent
conflicting interests; to the prejudice of the
other heirs not represented by said attorneys;
4. Fees must be commensurate to the actual
services rendered to the estate;
5. There must be assets in the estate to pay for
said fees (Pp. 6625-6636, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Quimpo for Administratrix Magno of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges filed a motion to
submit dated July 15, 1965 asking that the
manifestation and urgent motion dated June
10, 1964 filed by Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo
and other incidents directly appertaining
thereto be considered submitted for
consideration and approval (pp. 6759-6765,
Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
Considering the arguments and reasons in
support to the pleadings of both the
Administratrix and the PCIB, and of Atty.
Gellada, hereinbefore mentioned, the Court
believes that the order of January 4, 1965 is
null and void for the reason that the said order
has not been filed with deputy clerk Albis of this
court (Branch V) during the lifetime of Judge
Querubin who signed the said order. However,
the said manifestation and urgent motion dated
June 10, 1964 is being treated and considered
in this instant order. It is worthy to note that in
the motion dated January 24, 1964 (Pp. 1149-
1163, Vol. V, Sp. 1307) which has been filed by
Atty. Gellada and his associates and Atty.
Gibbs and other lawyers in addition to the
stipulated fees for actual services rendered.
However, the fee agreement dated February
27, 1964, between the Administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges and Atty. Gibbs which
provides for retainer fee of P4,000 monthly in
addition to specific fees for actual
appearances, reimbursement for expenditures
and contingent fees has also been approved by
the Court and said lawyers have already been
paid. (pp. 1273-1279, Vol. V, Sp. Proc. 1307
pp. 1372-1373, Vol. V, Sp. Proc. 1307).
WHEREFORE, the order dated January 4,
1965 is hereby declared null and void.
The manifestation and motion dated June 10,
1964 which was filed by the attorneys for the
administratrix of the testate estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges is granted and the agreement
annexed thereto is hereby approved.
The administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges is hereby directed to be needed to
implement the approval of the agreement
annexed to the motion and the administrator of
the estate of C. N. Hodges is directed to
countersign the said check or checks as the
case may be.
SO ORDERED.
thereby implying somehow that the court assumed the existence of
independent but simultaneous administrations.
Be that as it may, again, it appears that on August 6, 1965, the
court, acting on a motion of petitioner for the approval of deeds of
sale executed by it as administrator of the estate of Hodges, issued
the following order, also on appeal herein:
Acting upon the motion for approval of deeds of
sale for registered land of the PCIB,
Administrator of the Testate Estate of C. N.
Hodges in Sp. Proc. 1672 (Vol. VII, pp. 2244-
2245), dated July 16, 1965, filed by Atty. Cesar
T. Tirol in representation of the law firms of
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta and Tirol and Tirol
and the opposition thereto of Atty. Rizal R.
Quimpo (Vol. VIII, pp. 6811-6813) dated July
22, 1965 and considering the allegations and
reasons therein stated, the court believes that
the deeds of sale should be signed jointly by
the PCIB, Administrator of the Testate Estate
of C. N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno,
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges and to this effect the PCIB should
take the necessary steps so that Administratrix
Avelina A. Magno could sign the deeds of sale.
SO ORDERED. (p. 248, Green Record on
Appeal.)
Notably this order required that even the deeds executed by
petitioner, as administrator of the Estate of Hodges, involving
properties registered in his name, should be co-signed by
respondent Magno.3 And this was not an isolated instance.
In her brief as appellee, respondent Magno states:
After the lower court had authorized appellee
Avelina A. Magno to execute final deeds of
sale pursuant to contracts to sell executed by
C. N. Hodges on February 20, 1963 (pp. 45-46,
Green ROA), motions for the approval of final
deeds of sale (signed by appellee Avelina A.
Magno and the administrator of the estate of C.
N. Hodges, first Joe Hodges, then Atty.
Fernando Mirasol and later the appellant) were
approved by the lower court upon petition of
appellee Magno's counsel, Atty. Leon P.
Gellada, on the basis of section 8 of Rule 89 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Subsequently, the
appellant, after it had taken over the bulk of the
assets of the two estates, started presenting
these motions itself. The first such attempt was
a "Motion for Approval of Deeds of Sale for
Registered Land and Cancellations of
Mortgages" dated July 21, 1964 filed by Atty.
Cesar T. Tirol, counsel for the appellant,
thereto annexing two (2) final deeds of sale
and two (2) cancellations of mortgages signed
by appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R.
Paulino, Assistant Vice-President and Manager
of the appellant (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No.
1307, Vol. V, pp. 1694-1701). This motion was
approved by the lower court on July 27, 1964.
It was followed by another motion dated August
4, 1964 for the approval of one final deed of
sale again signed by appellee Avelina A.
Magno and D. R. Paulino (CFI Record, Sp.
Proc. No. 1307. Vol. V, pp. 1825-1828), which
was again approved by the lower court on
August 7, 1964. The gates having been
opened, a flood ensued: the appellant
subsequently filed similar motions for the
approval of a multitude of deeds of sales and
cancellations of mortgages signed by both the
appellee Avelina A. Magno and the appellant.
A random check of the records of Special
Proceeding No. 1307 alone will show Atty.
Cesar T. Tirol as having presented for court
approval deeds of sale of real properties
signed by both appellee Avelina A. Magno and
D. R. Paulino in the following numbers: (a)
motion dated September 21, 1964 — 6 deeds
of sale; (b) motion dated November 4, 1964 —
1 deed of sale; (c) motion dated December 1,
1964 — 4 deeds of sale; (d) motion dated
February 3, 1965 — 8 deeds of sale; (f) motion
dated May 7, 1965 — 9 deeds of sale. In view
of the very extensive landholdings of the
Hodges spouses and the many motions filed
concerning deeds of sale of real properties
executed by C. N. Hodges the lower court has
had to constitute special separate expedientes
in Special Proceedings Nos. 1307 and 1672 to
include mere motions for the approval of deeds
of sale of the conjugal properties of the Hodges
spouses.
As an example, from among the very many,
under date of February 3, 1965, Atty. Cesar T.
Tirol, as counsel for the appellant, filed "Motion
for Approval of Deeds of Sale for Registered
Land and Cancellations of Mortgages" (CFI
Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol. VIII, pp.
6570-6596) the allegations of which read:
"1. In his lifetime, the late C. N. Hodges
executed "Contracts to Sell" real property, and
the prospective buyers under said contracts
have already paid the price and complied with
the terms and conditions thereof;
"2. In the course of administration of both
estates, mortgage debtors have already paid
their debts secured by chattel mortgages in
favor of the late C. N. Hodges, and are now
entitled to release therefrom;
"3. There are attached hereto documents
executed jointly by the Administratrix in Sp.
Proc. No. 1307 and the Administrator in Sp.
Proc. No. 1672, consisting of deeds of sale in
favor —
Fernando Cano, Bacolod
City, Occ. Negros
Fe Magbanua, Iloilo City
Policarpio M. Pareno, La
Paz, Iloilo City
Rosario T. Libre, Jaro,
Iloilo City
Federico B. Torres, Iloilo
City
Reynaldo T. Lataquin, La
Paz, Iloilo City
Anatolio T. Viray, Iloilo City
Benjamin Rolando, Jaro,
Iloilo City
and cancellations of mortgages in favor of —
Pablo Manzano, Oton,
Iloilo
Ricardo M. Diana, Dao,
San Jose, Antique
 Simplicio Tingson, Iloilo
City
Amado Magbanua,
Pototan, Iloilo
Roselia M. Baes, Bolo,
Roxas City
William Bayani, Rizal
Estanzuela, Iloilo City
Elpidio Villarete, Molo,
Iloilo City
Norma T. Ruiz, Jaro, Iloilo
City
"4. That the approval of the
aforesaid documents will
not reduce the assets of
the estates so as to
prevent any creditor from
receiving his full debt or
diminish his dividend."
And the prayer of this motion is indeed very
revealing:
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that,
under Rule 89, Section 8 of the Rules of Court,
this honorable court approve the aforesaid
deeds of sale and cancellations of mortgages."
(Pp. 113-117, Appellee's Brief.)
None of these assertions is denied in Petitioner's reply brief.
Further indicating lack of concrete perspective or orientation on the
part of the respondent court and its hesitancy to clear up matters
promptly, in its other appealed order of November 23, 1965, on
pages 334-335 of the Green Record on Appeal, said respondent
court allowed the movant Ricardo Salas, President of appellee
Western Institute of Technology (successor of Panay Educational
Institutions, Inc.), one of the parties with whom Hodges had
contracts that are in question in the appeals herein, to pay
petitioner, as Administrator of the estate of Hodges and/or
respondent Magno, as Administrator of the estate of Mrs. Hodges,
thus:
Considering that in both cases there is as yet
no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution
of properties to whomsoever are entitled
thereto, the Court believes that payment to orders of this nature which are also on appeal herein are the
both the administrator of the testate estate of following:
C. N. Hodges and the administratrix of the
testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges or to
1. Order of March 30, 1966, on p. 137 of the Green Record on
either one of the two estates is proper and
Appeal, approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno
legal.
in favor of appellee Lorenzo Carles on February 24, 1966, pursuant
to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on June 17, 1958, after the
WHEREFORE, movant Ricardo T. Salas can death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims was cancelled by
pay to both estates or either of them. it for failure of Carles to pay the installments due on January 7,
1965.
SO ORDERED.
2. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 139-140, id., approving the deed of
sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Salvador
(Pp. 334-335, Green Record on Appeal.)
Guzman on February 28, 1966 pursuant to a "contract to sell"
signed by Hodges on September 13, 1960, after the death of his
On the other hand, as stated earlier, there were instances when wife, which contract petitioner claims it cancelled on March 3, 1965
respondent Magno was given authority to act alone. For instance, in in view of failure of said appellee to pay the installments on time.
the other appealed order of December 19, 1964, on page 221 of the
Green Record on Appeal, the respondent court approved payments
3. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 167-168, id., approving the deed
made by her of overtime pay to some employees of the court who
of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee
had helped in gathering and preparing copies of parts of the
Purificacion Coronado on March 28, 1966 pursuant to a "contract to
records in both estates as follows:
sell" signed by Hodges on August 14, 1961, after the death of his
wife.
Considering that the expenses subject of the
motion to approve payment of overtime pay
4. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 168-169, id., approving the deed
dated December 10, 1964, are reasonable and
of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Florenia
are believed by this Court to be a proper
Barrido on March 28, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed
charge of administration chargeable to the
by Hodges on February 21, 1958, after the death of his wife.
testate estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges,
the said expenses are hereby APPROVED and
to be charged against the testate estate of the 5. Order of June 7, 1966, on pp. 184-185, id., approving the deed of
late Linnie Jane Hodges. The administrator of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Belcezar
the testate estate of the late Charles Newton Causing on May 2, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by
Hodges is hereby ordered to countersign the Hodges on February 10, 1959, after the death of his wife.
check or checks necessary to pay the said
overtime pay as shown by the bills marked
6. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 211-212, id., approving the deed
Annex "A", "B" and "C" of the motion.
of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Artheo
Thomas Jamir on June 3, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell"
SO ORDERED. signed by Hodges on May 26, 1961, after the death of his wife.
(Pp. 221-222, Green Record on Appeal.) 7. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 212-213, id., approving the deed
of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellees
Graciano Lucero and Melquiades Batisanan on June 6 and June 3,
Likewise, the respondent court approved deeds of sale executed by
1966, respectively, pursuant to "contracts to sell" signed by Hodges
respondent Magno alone, as Administratrix of the estate of Mrs.
on June 9, 1959 and November 27, 1961, respectively, after the
Hodges, covering properties in the name of Hodges, pursuant to
death of his wife.
"contracts to sell" executed by Hodges, irrespective of whether they
were executed by him before or after the death of his wife. The
8. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., approving the was, as admitted by the lower court itself, Hodges executed November 22, 1952 and
deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellees superseded by the particular orders approving appointed C. N. Hodges as Executor of the
Espiridion Partisala, Winifredo Espada and Rosario Alingasa on specific final deeds of sale executed by the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 24-25, Rec.
September 6, 1966, August 17, 1966 and August 3, 1966, appellee, Avelina A. Magno, which are subject Sp. Proc. 1307).
respectively, pursuant to "contracts to sell" signed by Hodges on of this appeal, as well as the particular orders
April 20, 1960, April 18, 1960 and August 25, 1958, respectively, approving specific final deeds of sale executed
(3) On July 1, 1957 this Honorable Court
that is, after the death of his wife. by the appellant, Philippine Commercial and
issued Letters Testamentary to C. N. Hodges
Industrial Bank, which were never appealed by
in the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 30,
the appellee, Avelina A. Magno, nor by any
9. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 137-138, id., approving the deed of Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
party for that matter, and which are now
sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Alfredo
therefore final.
Catedral on March 2, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed
(4) On December 14, 1957 this Honorable
by Hodges on May 29, 1954, before the death of his wife, which
Court, on the basis of the following allegations
contract petitioner claims it had cancelled on February 16, 1966 for Now, simultaneously with the foregoing incidents, others of more
in a Motion dated December 11, 1957 filed by
failure of appellee Catedral to pay the installments due on time. fundamental and all embracing significance developed. On October
Leon P. Gellada as attorney for the executor C.
5, 1963, over the signature of Atty. Allison J. Gibbs in
N. Hodges:
representation of the law firm of Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta, as
10. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 138-139, id., approving the deed
counsel for the co-administrators Joe Hodges and Fernando P.
of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Jose
Mirasol, the following self-explanatory motion was filed: "That herein Executor, (is)
Pablico on March 7, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by
not only part owner of the
Hodges on March 7, 1950, after the death of his wife, which
properties left as conjugal,
contract petitioner claims it had cancelled on June 29, 1960, for URGENT MOTION FOR
but also, the successor to
failure of appellee Pablico to pay the installments due on time. AN ACCOUNTING AND
all the properties left by the
DELIVERY TO
deceased Linnie Jane
ADMINISTRATION OF
11. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., insofar as it Hodges."
THE ESTATE OF C. N.
approved the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor
HODGES OF ALL OF THE
of appellee Pepito Iyulores on September 6, 1966, pursuant to a
ASSETS OF THE (p. 44, Rec. Sp. Proc.
"contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February 5, 1951, before the
CONJUGAL 1307; emphasis supplied.)
death of his wife.
PARTNERSHIP OF THE
DECEASED LINNIE JANE
HODGES AND C N. issued the following order:
12. Order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, id., approving three
deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno, one in favor of HODGES EXISTING AS
appellees Santiago Pacaonsis and two in favor of appellee Adelfa OF MAY 23, 1957 PLUS "As prayed for by Attorney
Premaylon on December 5, 1966 and November 3, 1966, ALL THE RENTS, Gellada, counsel for the
respectively, pursuant to separate "promises to sell" signed EMOLUMENTS AND Executory, for the reasons
respectively by Hodges on May 26, 1955 and January 30, 1954, INCOME THEREFROM. stated in his motion dated
before the death of his wife, and October 31, 1959, after her death. December 11, 1957 which
the court considers well
COMES NOW the co-administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges, Joe Hodges, through taken, all the sales,
In like manner, there were also instances when respondent court
his undersigned attorneys in the above-entitled conveyances, leases and
approved deeds of sale executed by petitioner alone and without
mortgages of all properties
the concurrence of respondent Magno, and such approvals have proceedings, and to this Honorable Court
respectfully alleges: left by the deceased Linnie
not been the subject of any appeal. No less than petitioner points
Jane Hodges are hereby
this out on pages 149-150 of its brief as appellant thus:
APPROVED. The said
(1) On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died executor is further
The points of fact and law pertaining to the two in Iloilo City. authorized to execute
abovecited assignments of error have already subsequent sales,
been discussed previously. In the first conveyances, leases and
(2) On June 28, 1957 this Honorable Court
abovecited error, the order alluded to was mortgages of the
admitted to probate the Last Will and
general, and as already explained before, it properties left by the said
Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane
 deceased Linnie Jane testament of the waste, unless a Special Administratrix is
Hodges in consonance deceased, already appointed."
with the wishes contained probated by this Honorable
in the last will and Court."
(p. 100. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
testament of the latter."
(pp. 81-82. Rec. Sp. Proc.
(10) On December 26, 1962 Letters of
(p. 46, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
Administration were issued to Avelina Magno
1307; emphasis supplied.)
pursuant to this Honorable Court's aforesaid
(7) On May 2, 1961 this Honorable court Order of December 25, 1962
(5) On April 21, 1959 this Honorable Court approved the "Annual Statement of Account By
approved the inventory and accounting The Executor for the Year 1960" submitted
"With full authority to take
submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel through Leon P. Gellada on April 20, 1961
possession of all the
Leon P. Gellada on April 14, 1959 wherein he wherein he alleged:
property of said deceased
alleged among other things
in any province or
That no person interested provinces in which it may
"That no person interested in the Philippines be given be situated and to perform
in the Philippines of the notice, of the time and all other acts necessary for
time and place of place of examining the the preservation of said
examining the herein herein account, as herein property, said
account, be given notice, Executor is the only Administratrix and/or
as herein executor is the devisee or legatee of the Special Administratrix
only devisee or legatee of deceased Linnie Jane having filed a bond
the deceased, in Hodges, in accordance satisfactory to the Court."
accordance with the last with the last will and
will and testament already testament of the
(p. 102, Rec. Sp. Proc.
probated by the Honorable deceased, already
1307)
Court." probated by this Honorable
Court.
(11) On January 22, 1963 this Honorable Court
(pp. 77-78, Rec. Sp. Proc.
on petition of Leon P. Gellada of January 21,
1307; emphasis supplied.). (pp. 90-91. Rec. Sp. Proc.
1963 issued Letters of Administration to:
1307; emphasis supplied.)
(6) On July 30, 1960 this Honorable Court
(a) Avelina A. Magno as Administratrix of the
approved the "Annual Statement of Account" (8) On December 25, 1962, C.N. Hodges died.
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel
Leon P. Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein he
(9) On December 25, 1962, on the Urgent Ex-
alleged among other things: (b) Avelina A. Magno as Special Administratrix
parte Motion of Leon P. Gellada filed only in
of the Estate of Charles Newton Hodges; and
Special Proceeding No. 1307, this Honorable
"That no person interested Court appointed Avelina A. Magno
in the Philippines of the (c) Joe Hodges as Co-Special Administrator of
time and place of the Estate of Charles Newton Hodges.
"Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
examining the herein
Hodges and as Special Administratrix of the
account, be given notice
estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in the latter (p. 43, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
as herein executor is the
case, because the last will of said Charles
only devisee or legatee of
Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron
the deceased Linnie Jane (12) On February 20, 1963 this Honorable
safe and that the real and personal properties
Hodges, in accordance Court on the basis of a motion filed by Leon P.
of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to
with the last will and Gellada as legal counsel on February 16, 1963
for Avelina A. Magno acting as Administratrix of
the Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (pp. 114-
116, Sp. Proc. 1307) issued the following
order:
"... se autoriza a aquella
(Avelina A. Magno) a
firmar escrituras de venta
definitiva de propiedades
cubiertas por contratos
para vender, firmados, en
vida, por el finado Charles
Newton Hodges, cada vez
que el precio estipulado en
cada contrato este
totalmente pagado. Se
autoriza igualmente a la
misma a firmar escrituras
de cancelacion de
hipoteca tanto de bienes
reales como personales
cada vez que la
consideracion de cada
hipoteca este totalmente
pagada.
"Cada una de dichas
escrituras que se otorguen
debe ser sometida para la
aprobacion de este
Juzgado."
(p. 117, Sp. Proc. 1307).
[Par 1 (c), Reply to Motion
For Removal of Joe
Hodges]
(13) On September l6, 1963 Leon P. Gellada,
acting as attorney for Avelina A. Magno as
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, alleges:
3. — That since January,
1963, both estates of
Linnie Jane Hodges and
Charles Newton Hodges
have been receiving in full,
payments for those
"contracts to sell" entered
into by C. N. Hodges
during his lifetime, and the
purchasers have been
demanding the execution
of definite deeds of sale in
their favor.
4. — That hereto attached
are thirteen (13) copies
deeds of sale executed by
the Administratrix and by
the co-administrator
(Fernando P. Mirasol) of
the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and Charles
Newton Hodges
respectively, in compliance
with the terms and
conditions of the
respective "contracts to
sell" executed by the
parties thereto."
(16) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on
information and belief, has paid and still is
(14) The properties involved in the aforesaid
paying sums of money to sundry persons.
motion of September 16, 1963 are all
registered in the name of the deceased C. N.
Hodges. (17) Joe Hodges through the undersigned
attorneys manifested during the hearings
before this Honorable Court on September 5
(15) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on
and 6, 1963 that the estate of C. N. Hodges
information and belief, has been advertising in
was claiming all of the assets belonging to the
the newspaper in Iloilo thusly:
deceased spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C.
N. Hodges situated in Philippines because of
For Sale the aforesaid election by C. N. Hodges wherein
he claimed and took possession as sole owner
of all of said assets during the administration of
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on the
Charles Newton Hodges. ground that he was the sole devisee and
legatee under her Last Will and Testament.
All Real Estate or Personal Property will be
sold on First Come First Served Basis. (18) Avelina A. Magno has submitted no
inventory and accounting of her administration
as Administratrix of the estate
A of Linnie Jane
Hodges and Special Administratrix of the
v
estate of C. N. Hodges. eHowever, from
manifestations made byl Avelina A. Magno and
her legal counsel, Leon P. Gellada, there is no
question she will claim that at least fifty per
cent (50%) of the conjugal assets of the
deceased spouses and the rents, emoluments
and income therefrom belong to the Higdon
family who are named in paragraphs Fourth
and Fifth of the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges (p.
5, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, movant
respectfully prays that this Honorable Court,
after due hearing, order:
(1) Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory
and accounting of all of the funds, properties
and assets of any character belonging to the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N.
Hodges which have come into her possession,
with full details of what she has done with
them;
(2) Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to
the Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges
all of the funds, properties and assets of any
character remaining in her possession;
(3) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication
of the aforesaid issues, Avelina A. Magno to
stop, unless she first secures the conformity of
Joe Hodges (or his duly authorized
representative, such as the undersigned
attorneys) as the Co-administrator and
attorney-in-fact of a majority of the
beneficiaries of the estate of C. N. Hodges:
(a) Advertising the sale and the sale of the
properties of the estates:
(b) Employing personnel and paying them any
compensation.
(4) Such other relief as this Honorable Court
may deem just and equitable in the premises.
(Annex "T", Petition.)
Almost a year thereafter, or on September 14, 1964, after the co-
administrators Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol were replaced
by herein petitioner Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank as
sole administrator, pursuant to an agreement of all the heirs of
Hodges approved by the court, and because the above motion of
October 5, 1963 had not yet been heard due to the absence from
the country of Atty. Gibbs, petitioner filed the following:
MANIFESTATION AND
MOTION, INCLUDING
MOTION TO SET FOR
HEARING AND RESOLVE
"URGENT MOTION FOR
AN ACCOUNTING AND
DELIVERY TO
ADMINISTRATORS OF
THE ESTATE OF C. N.
HODGES OF ALL THE
ASSETS OF THE
CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP OF THE
DECEASED LINNIE JANE
HODGES AND C. N.
HODGES EXISTING AS
OF MAY 23, 1957 PLUS
ALL OF THE RENTS,
EMOLUMENTS AND
INCOME THEREFROM
OF OCTOBER 5, 1963.
COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank (hereinafter referred to as
PCIB), the administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges, deceased, in Special Proceedings No.
1672, through its undersigned counsel, and to
this Honorable Court respectfully alleges that:
1. On October 5, 1963, Joe Hodges acting as
the co-administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges filed, through the undersigned
attorneys, an "Urgent Motion For An
Accounting and Delivery To Administrator of
the Estate of C. N. Hodges of all Of The Assets
Of The Conjugal Partnership of The Deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges Existing
as Of May, 23, 1957 Plus All Of The Rents,
Emoluments and Income Therefrom" (pp. 536-
542, CFI Rec. S. P. No. 1672).
2. On January 24, 1964 this Honorable Court,
on the basis of an amicable agreement entered
into on January 23, 1964 by the two co-
administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges
and virtually all of the heirs of C. N. Hodges (p.
912, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672), resolved the
dispute over who should act as administrator of
the estate of C. N. Hodges by appointing the
PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges (pp. 905-906, CFI Rec. S. P. No. 1672)
and issuing letters of administration to the
PCIB.
3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs
of C. N. Hodges, Joe Hodges and Fernando P.
Mirasol acting as the two co-administrators of
the estate of C. N. Hodges, Avelina A. Magno
acting as the administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges, and Messrs. William
Brown and Ardel Young Acting for all of the
Higdon family who claim to be the sole
beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and various legal counsel representing
the aforenamed parties entered into an
amicable agreement, which was approved by
this Honorable Court, wherein the parties
thereto agreed that certain sums of money
were to be paid in settlement of different claims
against the two estates and that the assets (to
the extent they existed)of both estates would
be administrated jointly by the PCIB as
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges and
Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, subject,
however, to the aforesaid October 5, 1963
Motion, namely, the PCIB's claim to exclusive
possession and ownership of one-hundred
percent (10017,) (or, in the alternative,
seventy-five percent [75%] of all assets owned
by C. N. Hodges or Linnie Jane Hodges
situated in the Philippines. On February 1,
1964 (pp. 934-935, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672)
this Honorable Court amended its order of
January 24, 1964 but in no way changes its
recognition of the aforedescribed basic
demand by the PCIB as administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges to one hundred percent
(100%) of the assets claimed by both estates.
4. On February 15, 1964 the PCIB filed a
"Motion to Resolve" the aforesaid Motion of
October 5, 1963. This Honorable Court set for
hearing on June 11, 1964 the Motion of
October 5, 1963.
5. On June 11, 1964, because the undersigned
Allison J. Gibbs was absent in the United
States, this Honorable Court ordered the
indefinite postponement of the hearing of the
Motion of October 5, 1963.
6. Since its appointment as administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges the PCIB has not been
able to properly carry out its duties and
obligations as administrator of the estate of C.
N. Hodges because of the following acts,
among others, of Avelina A. Magno and those
who claim to act for her as administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges:
(a) Avelina A. Magno
illegally acts as if she is in
exclusive control of all of
the assets in the
Philippines of both estates
including those claimed by
the estate of C. N. Hodges
as evidenced in part by her
locking the premises at
206-208 Guanco Street,
Iloilo City on August 31,
1964 and refusing to
reopen same until ordered
to do so by this Honorable
Court on September 7,
1964.
(b) Avelina A. Magno
illegally acts as though she
alone may decide how the
assets of the estate of
C.N. Hodges should be
administered, who the
PCIB shall employ and
how much they may be
paid as evidenced in party
by her refusal to sign
checks issued by the PCIB
payable to the
undersigned counsel
pursuant to their fee
agreement approved by
this Honorable Court in its
order dated March 31,
1964.
(c) Avelina A. Magno
illegally gives access to
and turns over possession
of the records and assets
of the estate of C.N.
Hodges to the attorney-in-
fact of the Higdon Family,
Mr. James L. Sullivan, as
evidenced in part by the
cashing of his personal
checks.
(d) Avelina A. Magno
illegally refuses to execute
checks prepared by the
PCIB drawn to pay
expenses of the estate of
C. N. Hodges as
evidenced in part by the
check drawn to reimburse
the PCIB's advance of
P48,445.50 to pay the
1964 income taxes
reported due and payable
by the estate of C.N.
Hodges.
7. Under and pursuant to the orders of this
Honorable Court, particularly those of January
24 and February 1, 1964, and the mandate
contained in its Letters of Administration issued
on January 24, 1964 to the PCIB, it has
"full
author
ity to
take
posse
ssion
of all
the
proper
ty of
the
decea
sed C.
N.
Hodge
s
"and to perform all other
acts necessary for the
preservation of said
property." (p. 914, CFI
Rec., S.P. No. 1672.)
8. As administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges, the PCIB claims the right to the
immediate exclusive possession and control of
all of the properties, accounts receivables,
court cases, bank accounts and other assets,
including the documentary records evidencing
same, which existed in the Philippines on the
date of C. N. Hodges' death, December 25,
1962, and were in his possession and
registered in his name alone. The PCIB knows
of no assets in the Philippines registered in the
name of Linnie Jane Hodges, the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges, or, C. N. Hodges,
Executor of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
on December 25, 1962. All of the assets of
which the PCIB has knowledge are either
registered in the name of C. N. Hodges, alone
or were derived therefrom since his death on
December 25, 1962.
9. The PCIB as the current administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges, deceased, succeeded
to all of the rights of the previously duly
appointed administrators of the estate of C. N.
Hodges, to wit:
(a) On December 25,
1962, date of C. N.
Hodges' death, this
Honorable Court appointed
Miss Avelina A. Magno
simultaneously as:
(i) Administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges (p. 102, CFI Rec.,
S.P. No. 1307) to replace
the deceased C. N.
Hodges who on May 28,
1957 was appointed
Special Administrator (p.
13. CFI Rec. S.P. No.
1307) and on July 1, 1957
Executor of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 30,
CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1307).
(ii) Special Administratrix
of the estate of C. N.
Hodges (p. 102, CFI Rec.,
S.P. No. 1307).
(b) On December 29, 1962
this Honorable Court
appointed Harold K.
Davies as co-special
administrator of the estate
of C.N. Hodges along with
Avelina A. Magno (pp.
108-111, CFI Rec., S. P.
No. 1307).
(c) On January 22, 1963,
with the conformity of
Avelina A. Magno, Harold
K. Davies resigned in favor
of Joe Hodges (pp. 35-36,
CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672)
who thereupon was
appointed on January 22,
1963 by this Honorable
Court as special co-
administrator of the estate
of C.N. Hodges (pp. 38-40
& 43, CFI Rec. S.P. No.
1672) along with Miss
Magno who at that time
was still acting as special
co-administratrix of the (i) Conformity of Avelina A.
estate of C. N. Hodges. Magno acting as
"Administratrix of the
Estate of Linnie Jane
(d) On February 22, 1963,
Hodges and Special
without objection on the
Administratrix of the Estate
part of Avelina A. Magno,
of C. N. Hodges";
this Honorable Court
appointed Joe Hodges and
Fernando P. Mirasol as co- (ii) Conformity of Leslie
administrators of the Echols, a Texas lawyer
estate of C.N. Hodges (pp. acting for the heirs of C.N.
76-78, 81 & 85, CFI Rec., Hodges; and
S.P. No. 1672).
(iii) Conformity of William
10. Miss Avelina A. Magno, pursuant to the Brown, a Texas lawyer
orders of this Honorable Court of December acting for the Higdon
25, 1962, took possession of all Philippine family who claim to be the
Assets now claimed by the two estates. only heirs of Linnie Jane
Legally, Miss Magno could take possession of Hodges (pp. 18, 25-33,
the assets registered in the name of C. N. CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672).
Hodges alone only in her capacity as Special
Administratrix of the Estate of C.N. Hodges.
Note: This accounting was approved by this
With the appointment by this Honorable Court
Honorable Court on January 22, 1963 (p. 34,
on February 22, 1963 of Joe Hodges and
CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672).
Fernando P. Mirasol as the co-administrators
of the estate of C.N. Hodges, they legally were
entitled to take over from Miss Magno the full (b) The accounting of Joe
and exclusive possession of all of the assets of Hodges and Fernando P.
the estate of C.N. Hodges. With the Mirasol as of January 23,
appointment on January 24, 1964 of the PCIB 1964, filed February 24,
as the sole administrator of the estate of C.N. 1964 (pp. 990-1000, CFI
Hodges in substitution of Joe Hodges and Rec. S.P. No. 1672 and
Fernando P. Mirasol, the PCIB legally became pp. 1806-1848, CFI Rec.
the only party entitled to the sole and exclusive S.P. No. 1307).
possession of all of the assets of the estate of
C. N. Hodges.
Note: This accounting was approved by this
Honorable Court on March 3, 1964.
11. The PCIB's predecessors submitted their
accounting and this Honorable Court approved
(c) The PCIB and its
same, to wit:
undersigned lawyers are
aware of no report or
(a) The accounting of accounting submitted by
Harold K. Davies dated Avelina A. Magno of her
January 18, 1963 (pp. 16- acts as administratrix of
33, CFI Rec. S.P. No. the estate of Linnie Jane
1672); which shows or its Hodges or special
face the: administratrix of the estate
of C.N. Hodges, unless it
 is the accounting of Harold
K. Davies as special co-
administrator of the estate
of C.N. Hodges dated
January 18, 1963 to which
Miss Magno manifested
her conformity (supra).
12. In the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964, Miss Avelina
A. Magno agreed to receive P10,000.00
"for her services as
administratrix of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges"
and in addition she agreed to be employed,
starting February 1, 1964, at
"a monthly salary of
P500.00 for her services
as an employee of both
estates."
24 ems.
13. Under the aforesaid agreement of January
24, 1964 and the orders of this Honorable
Court of same date, the PCIB as administrator
of the estate of C. N. Hodges is entitled to the
exclusive possession of all records, properties
and assets in the name of C. N. Hodges as of
the date of his death on December 25, 1962
which were in the possession of the deceased
C. N. Hodges on that date and which then
passed to the possession of Miss Magno in her
capacity as Special Co-Administratrix of the
estate of C. N. Hodges or the possession of
Joe Hodges or Fernando P. Mirasol as co-
administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
14. Because of Miss Magno's refusal to comply
with the reasonable request of PCIB
concerning the assets of the estate of C. N.
Hodges, the PCIB dismissed Miss Magno as
an employee of the estate of C. N. Hodges
effective August 31, 1964. On September 1,
1964 Miss Magno locked the premises at 206-
208 Guanco Street and denied the PCIB
access thereto. Upon the Urgent Motion of the
PCIB dated September 3, 1964, this Honorable
Court on September 7, 1964 ordered Miss
Magno to reopen the aforesaid premises at
206-208 Guanco Street and permit the PCIB
access thereto no later than September 8,
1964.
15. The PCIB pursuant to the aforesaid orders
of this Honorable Court is again in physical
possession of all of the assets of the estate of
C. N. Hodges. However, the PCIB is not in
exclusive control of the aforesaid records,
properties and assets because Miss Magno
continues to assert the claims hereinabove
outlined in paragraph 6, continues to use her
own locks to the doors of the aforesaid
premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City
and continues to deny the PCIB its right to
know the combinations to the doors of the vault
and safes situated within the premises at 206-
208 Guanco Street despite the fact that said
combinations were known to only C. N. Hodges
during his lifetime.
16. The Philippine estate and inheritance taxes
assessed the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
were assessed and paid on the basis that C. N.
Hodges is the sole beneficiary of the assets of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges situated in
the Philippines. Avelina A. Magno and her legal
counsel at no time have questioned the validity
of the aforesaid assessment and the payment
of the corresponding Philippine death taxes.
17. Nothing further remains to be done in the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges except to resolve
the aforesaid Motion of October 5, 1963 and
grant the PCIB the exclusive possession and
control of all of the records, properties and
assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
18. Such assets as may have existed of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges were ordered by
this Honorable Court in special Proceedings
No. 1307 to be turned over and delivered to C.
N. Hodges alone. He in fact took possession of
them before his death and asserted and
exercised the right of exclusive ownership over
the said assets as the sole beneficiary of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PCIB
respectfully petitions that this Honorable court:
(1) Set the Motion of October 5, 1963 for
hearing at the earliest possible date with notice
to all interested parties;
(2) Order Avelina A. Magno to submit an
inventory and accounting as Administratrix of
the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Co-
Administratrix of the Estate of C. N. Hodges of
all of the funds, properties and assets of any
character belonging to the deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges which have
come into her possession, with full details of
what she has done with them;
(3) Order Avelina A. Magno to turn over and
deliver to the PCIB as administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges all of the funds,
properties and assets of any character
remaining in her possession;
(4) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication
of the aforesaid issues, order Avelina A. Magno
and her representatives to stop interferring with
the administration of the estate of C. N.
Hodges by the PCIB and its duly authorized
representatives;
(5) Enjoin Avelina A. Magno from working in
the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo
City as an employee of the estate of C. N.
Hodges and approve her dismissal as such by
the PCIB effective August 31, 1964;
(6) Enjoin James L. Sullivan, Attorneys
Manglapus and Quimpo and others allegedly
representing Miss Magno from entering the
premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City
or any other properties of C. N. Hodges without
the express permission of the PCIB;
 (7) Order such other relief as this Honorable located, to my husband,
Court finds just and equitable in the premises. Charles Newton Hodges,
(Annex "U" Petition.) to have and to hold unto
him, my said husband
during his natural lifetime.
On January 8, 1965, petitioner also filed a motion for "Official
Declaration of Heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges Estate" alleging:
THIRD: I desire, direct and
provide that my husband,
COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
Charles Newton Hodges,
(hereinafter referred to as PCIB), as administrator of the estate of
shall have the right to
the late C. N. Hodges, through the undersigned counsel, and to this
manage, control, use and
Honorable Court respectfully alleges that:
enjoy said estate during
his lifetime, and he is
1. During their marriage, spouses Charles hereby given the right to
Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, make any changes in the
American citizens originally from the State of physical properties of said
Texas, U.S.A., acquired and accumulated estate by sale of any part
considerable assets and properties in the thereof which he think
Philippines and in the States of Texas and best, and the purchase of
Oklahoma, United States of America. All said any other or additional
properties constituted their conjugal estate. property as he may think
best; to execute
conveyances with or
2. Although Texas was the domicile of origin of without general or special
the Hodges spouses, this Honorable Court, in warranty, conveying in fee
its orders dated March 31 and December 12,
simple or for any other
1964 (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. ----;
term or time, any property
Sp. Proc. No. 1672, p. ----), conclusively found
which he may deem
and categorically ruled that said spouses had
proper to dispose of; to
lived and worked for more than 50 years in
lease any of the real
Iloilo City and had, therefore, acquired a
property for oil, gas and/or
domicile of choice in said city, which they other minerals, and all
retained until the time of their respective such deeds or leases shall
deaths.
pass the absolute fee
simple title to the interest
3. On November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges so conveyed in such
executed in the City of Iloilo her Last Will and property as he may elect
Testament, a copy of which is hereto attached to sell. All rents,
as Annex "A". The bequests in said will emoluments and income
pertinent to the present issue are the second, from said estate shall
third, and fourth provisions, which we quote in belong to him, and he is
full hereunder. further authorized to use
any part of the principal of
said estate as he may
SECOND: I give, devise need or desire. It is
and bequeath all of the
provided herein, however,
rest, residue and that he shall not sell or
remainder of my estate, otherwise dispose of any
both personal and real,
of the improved property
wherever situated, or now owned by us located
at, in or near the City of
Lubbock, Texas, but he
shall have the full right to
lease, manage and enjoy
the same during his
lifetime, as above
provided. He shall have
the right to sub-divide any
farmland and sell lots
therein, and may sell
unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of
my said husband, Charles
Newton Hodges, I give,
devise and bequeath all of
the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate
both real and personal,
wherever situated or
located, to be equally
divided among my
brothers and sisters, share
and share alike, namely:
"Esta Higdon, Emma
Howell, Leonard Higdon,
Roy Higdon, Sadie
Rascoe, Era Boman and
Nimray Higdon."
4. On November 14, 1953, C. N. Hodges
executed in the City of Iloilo his Last Will and
Testament, a copy of which is hereto attached
as Annex "B ". In said Will, C. N. Hodges
designated his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, as
his beneficiary using the identical language she
used in the second and third provisos of her
Will, supra.
5. On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died
in Iloilo City, predeceasing her husband by
more than five (5) years. At the time of her
death, she had no forced or compulsory heir,
except her husband, C. N. Hodges. She was
survived also by various brothers and sisters
mentioned in her Will (supra), which, for
convenience, we shall refer to as the
HIGDONS.
6. On June 28, 1957, this Honorable Court
admitted to probate the Last Will and
Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges (Annex "A"), and appointed C. N.
Hodges as executor of her estate without bond.
(CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 24-25).
On July 1, 1957, this Honorable Court issued
letters testamentary to C. N. Hodges in the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (CFI Record, Sp.
Proc. No. 1307, p. 30.)
7. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respect
to the order of succession, the amount of
successional rights, and the intrinsic of its
testamentary provisions, should be governed
by Philippine laws because:
(a) The testatrix, Linnie
Jane Hodges, intended
Philippine laws to govern
her Will;
(b) Article 16 of the Civil
Code provides that "the
national law of the person
whose succession is under
consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the
property and regardless of
the country wherein said
property may be found",
shall prevail. However, the
Conflict of Law of Texas,
which is the "national law"
of the testatrix, Linnie Jane
Hodges, provide that the
domiciliary law (Philippine
law — see paragraph
2, supra) should govern
the testamentary
dispositions and
successional rights over
movables (personal
properties), and the law of
the situs of the property
(also Philippine law as to
properties located in the
Philippines) with regards
immovable (real
properties). Thus applying
the "Renvoi Doctrine", as
approved and applied by
our Supreme Court in the
case of "In The Matter Of
The Testate Estate of
Eduard E. Christensen",
G.R. No.
L-16749, promulgated
January 31, 1963,
Philippine law should apply
to the Will of Linnie Jane
Hodges and to the
successional rights to her
estate insofar as
her movable and immovabl
e assets in the Philippines
are concerned. We shall
not, at this stage, discuss
what law should govern
the assets of Linnie Jane
Hodges located in
Oklahoma and Texas,
because the only assets in
issue in this motion are
those within the jurisdiction
of this motion Court in the
two above-captioned
Special Proceedings.
8. Under Philippine and Texas law, the
conjugal or community estate of spouses shall,
upon dissolution, be divided equally between
them. Thus, upon the death of Linnie Jane
Hodges on May 23, 1957, one-half (1/2) of the
entirety of the assets of the Hodges spouses
constituting their conjugal estate pertained
automatically to Charles Newton Hodges, not
by way of inheritance, but in his own right as
partner in the conjugal partnership. The other
one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal estate
constituted the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. This is the only portion of the conjugal
estate capable of inheritance by her heirs.
9. This one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal
assets pertaining to Linnie Jane Hodges
cannot, under a clear and specific provision of
her Will, be enhanced or increased by income,
earnings, rents, or emoluments accruing after
her death on May 23, 1957. Linnie Jane
Hodges' Will provides that "all rents,
emoluments and income from said estate shall
belong to him (C. N. Hodges) and he is further
authorized to use any part of the principal of
said estate as he may need or desire."
(Paragraph 3, Annex "A".) Thus, by specific
provision of Linnie Jane Hodges' Will, "all rents,
emoluments and income" must be credited to
the one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal estate
pertaining to C. N. Hodges. Clearly, therefore,
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, capable of
inheritance by her heirs, consisted exclusively
of no more than one-half (1/2) of the conjugal
estate, computed as of the time of her death on
May 23, 1957.
10. Articles 900, 995 and 1001 of the New Civil
Code provide that the surviving spouse of a
deceased leaving no ascendants or
descendants is entitled, as a matter of right and
by way of irrevocable legitime, to at least one-
half (1/2) of the estate of the deceased, and no
testamentary disposition by the deceased can
legally and validly affect this right of the
surviving spouse. In fact, her husband is
entitled to said one-half (1/2) portion of her
estate by way of legitime. (Article 886, Civil
Code.) Clearly, therefore, immediately upon the
death of Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N. Hodges
was the owner of at least three-fourths (3/4) or
seventy-five (75%) percent of all of the
conjugal assets of the spouses, (1/2 or 50% by
way of conjugal partnership share and 1/4 or
25% by way of inheritance and legitime) plus
all "rents, emoluments and income" accruing to
said conjugal estate from the moment of Linnie
Jane Hodges' death (see paragraph 9, supra).
11. The late Linnie Jane Hodges designated
her husband C.N. Hodges as her sole and
exclusive heir with full authority to do what he
pleased, as exclusive heir and owner of all the
assets constituting her estate, except only with
regards certain properties "owned by us,
located at, in or near the City of Lubbock,
Texas". Thus, even without relying on our laws
of succession and legitime, which we have
cited above, C. N. Hodges, by specific
testamentary designation of his wife, was
entitled to the entirely to his wife's estate in the
Philippines.
12. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides
that "the rights of the successor are transmitted
from the death of the decedent". Thus, title to
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges was
transmitted to C. N. Hodges immediately upon
her death on May 23, 1957. For the
convenience of this Honorable Court, we
attached hereto as Annex "C" a graph of how
the conjugal estate of the spouses Hodges
should be divided in accordance with Philippine
law and the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges.
13. In his capacity as sole heir and successor
to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges as above-
stated, C. N. Hodges, shortly after the death of
Linnie Jane Hodges, appropriated to himself
the entirety of her estate. He operated all the
assets, engaged in business and performed all
acts in connection with the entirety of the
conjugal estate, in his own name alone, just as
he had been operating, engaging and doing
while the late Linnie Jane Hodges was still
alive. Upon his death on December 25, 1962,
therefore, all said conjugal assets were in his
sole possession and control, and registered in
his name alone, not as executor, but as
exclusive owner of all said assets.
14. All these acts of C. N. Hodges were
authorized and sanctioned expressly and
impliedly by various orders of this Honorable
Court, as follows:
(a) In an Order dated May 27, 1957, this
Honorable Court ruled that C. N. Hodges "is
allowed or authorized to continue the business
in which he was engaged, and to perform acts
which he had been doing while the deceased
was living." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, is the only devisee or
p. 11.) legatee of the deceased, in
accordance with the last
will and testament already
(b) On December 14, 1957, this Honorable
probated by the Honorable
Court, on the basis of the following fact, alleged
Court." (CFI Record, Sp.
in the verified Motion dated December 11,
Proc. No. 1307, pp. 77-78;
1957 filed by Leon P. Gellada as attorney for
emphasis supplied.)
the executor C. N. Hodges:
(d) On July 20, 1960, this Honorable Court
That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner
approved the verified "Annual Statement of
of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the
Account" submitted by C. N. Hodges through
successor to all the properties left by the
his counsel Leon P. Gellada on July 21, 1960
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.' (CFI Record,
wherein he alleged, among other things.
Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 44; emphasis supplied.)
"That no person interested
issued the following order:
in the Philippines of the
time and place of
"As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for examining the herein
the Executor, for the reasons stated in his account, be given
motion dated December 11, 1957, which the notice as herein executor
Court considers well taken, all the sales, is the only devisee or
conveyances, leases and mortgages of all the legatee of the deceased
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Linnie Jane Hodges, in
Hodges executed by the Executor, Charles accordance with the last
Newton Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The will and testament ofthe
said Executor is further authorized to execute deceased, already
subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and probated by this Honorable
mortgages of the properties left by the said Court." (CFI Record, Sp.
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance Proc. No. 1307, pp. 81-82;
with the wishes contained in the last will and emphasis supplied.)
testament of the latter." (CFI Record. Sp. Proc.
No. 1307, p. 46; emphasis supplied.)
(e) On May 2, 1961, this Honorable Court
approved the verified "Annual Statement of
24 ems Account By The Executor For the Year 1960"
submitted through Leon P. Gellada on April 20,
1961 wherein he alleged:
(c) On April 21, 1959, this Honorable Court
approved the verified inventory and accounting
submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel "That no person interested in the Philippines be
Leon P. Gellada on April 14, 1959 wherein he given notice, ofthe time and place of examining
alleged among other things, the herein account, as herein executor is the
only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last will
"That no person interested and testament ofthe deceased, already
in the Philippines of the probated by this Honorable Court." (CFI
time and place of
Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 90-91;
examining the herein emphasis supplied.)
account, be given
notice, as herein executor
15. Since C. N. Hodges was the sole and rd (Consolacion Florentino de
exclusive heir of Linnie Jane Hodges, not only Higdo Crisologo, et al., vs.
by law, but in accordance with the dispositions n, Roy Manuel Singson, G. R. No.
of her will, there was, in fact, no need to Higdo L-13876, February 28,
liquidate the conjugal estate of the spouses. n, 1962.)
The entirely of said conjugal estate pertained to Sadie
him exclusively, therefore this Honorable Court Rasco
(b) Article 864, 872 and
sanctioned and authorized, as above-stated, C. e, Era
886 of the New Civil Code
N. Hodges to manage, operate and control all Boma
clearly provide that no
the conjugal assets as owner. n and
charge, condition or
Nimra
substitution whatsoever
y
16. By expressly authorizing C. N. Hodges to upon the legitime can be
Higdo
act as he did in connection with the estate of imposed by a testator.
n."
his wife, this Honorable Court has (1) declared Thus, under the provisions
C. N. Hodges as the sole heir of the estate of of Articles 900, 995 and
Linnie Jane Hodges, and (2) delivered and Because of the facts hereinabove set out there 1001 of the New Civil
distributed her estate to C. N. Hodges as sole is no "rest, residue and remainder", at least to Code, the legitime of a
heir in accordance with the terms and the extent of the Philippine assets, which surviving spouse is 1/2 of
conditions of her Will. Thus, although the remains to vest in the HIGDONS, assuming the estate of the deceased
"estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" still exists as a this proviso in Linnie Jane Hodges' Will is valid spouse. Consequently, the
legal and juridical personality, it had no assets and binding against the estate of C. N. Hodges. above-mentioned provision
or properties located in the Philippines in the Will of Linnie Jane
registered in its name whatsoever at the time of Hodges is clearly invalid
18. Any claims by the HIGDONS under the
the death of C. N. Hodges on December 25, insofar as the legitime of
above-quoted provision of Linnie Jane Hodges'
1962. C. N. Hodges was
Will is without merit because said provision is
concerned, which
void and invalid at least as to the Philippine
consisted of 1/2 of the 1/2
17. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex assets. It should not, in anyway, affect the
portion of the conjugal
"A"), fourth paragraph, provides as follows: rights of the estate of C. N. Hodges or his heirs
estate, or 1/4 of the entire
to the properties, which C. N. Hodges acquired
conjugal estate of the
by way of inheritance from his wife Linnie Jane
"At the death of my said deceased.
Hodges upon her death.
husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, I give, devise and
(c) There are generally
bequeath all of the rest, (a) In spite of the above-
only two kinds of
residue and remainder of mentioned provision in the
substitution provided for
my estate both real and Will of Linnie Jane
and authorized by our Civil
personal, wherever Hodges, C. N. Hodges
Code (Articles 857-870),
situated or located, to be acquired, not merely a
namely, (1) simple or
equally divided among my usufructuary right, but
common substitution,
brothers and sisters, share absolute title and
sometimes referred to
and share alike, namely: ownership to her estate. In
as vulgar substitution
a recent case involving a
(Article 859), and (2)
very similar testamentary
"Esta fideicommissary
provision, the Supreme
Higdo substitution (Article 863).
Court held that the heir
n, All other substitutions are
first designated acquired
Emma merely variations of these.
full ownership of the
Howell The substitution provided
property bequeathed by
, for by paragraph four of
the will, not mere
Leona the Will of Linnie Jane
usufructuary rights.
Hodges is not
fideicommissary
substitution, because there
is clearly no obligation on
the part of C. N. Hodges
as the first heir designated,
to preserve the properties
for the substitute heirs.
(Consolacion Florentino de
Crisologo et al. vs. Manuel
Singson, G. R. No.
L-13876.) At most, it is
a vulgar or simple substitut
ion. However, in order that
a vulgar or simple substitut
ion can be valid, three
alternative conditions must
be present, namely, that
the first designated heir (1)
should die before the
testator; or (2) should not
wish to accept the
inheritance; or (3) should
be incapacitated to do so.
None of these conditions
apply to C. N. Hodges,
and, therefore, the
substitution provided for by
the above-quoted
provision of the Will is not
authorized by the Code,
and, therefore, it is void.
Manresa, commenting on
these kisses of
substitution, meaningfully
stated that: "... cuando el
testador instituyeun primer
heredero, y por
fallecimiento de este
nombra otro u otros, ha de
entenderse que estas
segundas designaciones
solo han de llegar a tener
efectividad en el caso de
que el primer instituido
muera antes que el
testador, fuera o no esta
su verdadera intencion.
...". (6 Manresa, 7 a ed.,
pag. 175.) In other
words, when another heir exclusively the C. N. Hodges estate, is
is designated to inherit anomalous.
upon the death of a first
heir, the second
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed
designation can have
that after trial and reception of evidence, this
effect only in case the first
Honorable Court declare:
instituted heir dies before
the testator, whether or not
that was the true intention 1. That the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges was
of said testator. Since C. and is composed exclusively of one-half (1/2)
N. Hodges did not die share in the conjugal estate of the spouses
before Linnie Jane Hodges, computed as of the date of her death
Hodges, the provision for on May 23, 1957;
substitution contained in
Linnie Jane Hodges' Willis
void. 2. That the other half of the conjugal estate
pertained exclusively to C. N. Hodges as his
share as partner in the conjugal partnership;
(d) In view of the invalidity
of the provision for
3. That all "rents, emoluments and income" of
substitution in the Will, C.
the conjugal estate accruing after Linnie Jane
N. Hodges' inheritance to
Hodges' death pertains to C. N. Hodges;
the entirety of the Linnie
Jane Hodges estate is
irrevocable and final. 4. That C. N. Hodges was the sole and
exclusive heir of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges;
19. Be that as it may, at the time of C. N.
Hodges' death, the entirety of the conjugal
estate appeared and was registered in him 5. That, therefore, the entire conjugal estate of
exclusively as owner. Thus, the presumption is the spouses located in the Philippines, plus all
that all said assets constituted his estate. the "rents, emoluments and income" above-
Therefore — mentioned, now constitutes the estate of C. N.
Hodges, capable of distribution to his heirs
upon termination of Special Proceedings No.
(a) If the HIGDONS wish to enforce their
dubious rights as substituted heirs to 1/4 of the 1672;
conjugal estate (the other 1/4 is covered by the
legitime of C. N. Hodges which can not be 6. That PCIB, as administrator of the estate of
affected by any testamentary disposition), their C. N. Hodges, is entitled to full and exclusive
remedy, if any, is to file their claim against the custody, control and management of all said
estate of C. N. Hodges, which should be properties; and
entitled at the present time to full custody and
control of all the conjugal estate of the
7. That Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix of
spouses.
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as
the HIGDONS, has no right to intervene or
(b) The present proceedings, in which two participate in the administration of the C. N.
estates exist under separate administration, Hodges estate.
where the administratrix of the Linnie Jane
Hodges estate exercises an officious right to
object and intervene in matters affecting
 PCIB further prays for such and other relief as No. 1307, Folio I. pp. 34-40) and the lease any of the real
may be deemed just and equitable in the reglamentary period for filing such claims has property for oil, gas and/or
premises." long ago lapsed and expired without any claims other minerals, and all
having been asserted against the estate of such deeds or leases shall
Linnie Jane Hodges, approved by the pass the absolute fee
(Record, pp. 265-277)
Administrator/Administratrix of the said estate, simple title to the interest
nor ratified by this Honorable Court; so conveyed in such
Before all of these motions of petitioner could be resolved, property as he elect to sell.
however, on December 21, 1965, private respondent Magno filed All rents, emoluments and
6. That the last will and testament of Linnie
her own "Motion for the Official Declaration of Heirs of the Estate of income from said estate
Jane Hodges already admitted to probate
Linnie Jane Hodges" as follows: shall belong to him, and he
contains an institution of heirs in the following
is further authorized to use
words:
any part of the principal of
COMES NOW the Administratrix of the Estate
said estate as he may
of Linnie Jane Hodges and, through need or desire. It is
"SECOND: I give, devise
undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable provided herein, however,
and bequeath all of the
Court most respectfully states and manifests:
rest, residue and that he shall not sell or
remainder of my estate, otherwise dispose of any
1. That the spouses Charles Newton Hodges both personal and real, of the improved property
and Linnie Jane Hodges were American wherever situated or now owned by us located
citizens who died at the City of Iloilo after located, to my beloved at, in or near the City of
having amassed and accumulated extensive husband, Charles Newton Lubbock Texas, but he
properties in the Philippines; Hodges to have and to shall have the full right to
hold unto him, my said lease, manage and enjoy
husband, during his the same during his
2. That on November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane natural lifetime. lifetime, above provided.
Hodges executed a last will and testament (the He shall have the right to
original of this will now forms part of the subdivide any farm land
records of these proceedings as Exhibit "C" THIRD: I desire, direct and and sell lots therein, and
and appears as Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I, pp. provide that my husband, may sell unimproved town
17-18); Charles Newton Hodges, lots.
shall have the right to
manage, control, use and
3. That on May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges enjoy said estate during FOURTH: At the death of
died at the City of Iloilo at the time survived by his lifetime, and, he is my said husband, Charles
her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, and hereby given the right to Newton Hodges, I give,
several relatives named in her last will and make any changes in the devise and bequeath all of
testament; physical properties of said the rest, residue and
estate, by sale of any part remainder of my estate,
4. That on June 28, 1957, a petition therefor thereof which he may think both real and personal,
having been priorly filed and duly heard, this best, and the purchase of wherever situated or
Honorable Court issued an order admitting to any other or additional located, to be equally
probate the last will and testament of Linnie property as he may think divided among my
Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I, pp. best; to execute brothers and sisters, share
24-25, 26-28); conveyances with or and share alike, namely:
without general or special
warranty, conveying in fee
5. That the required notice to creditors and to Esta Higdon, Emma
simple or for any other
all others who may have any claims against the Howell, Leonard Higdon,
term or time, any property
decedent, Linnie Jane Hodges has already Roy Higdon, Sadie
which he may deem
been printed, published and posted (Sp. Proc. proper to dispose of; to
 Rascoe, Era Boman and
Nimroy Higdon.
FIFTH: In case of the
death of any of my
brothers and/or sisters
named in item Fourth,
above, prior to the death of
my husband, Charles
Newton Hodges, then it is
my will and bequest that
the heirs of such deceased
brother or sister shall take
jointly the share which
would have gone to such
brother or sister had she or
he survived."
7. That under the provisions of the last will and
testament already above-quoted, Linnie Jane
Hodges gave a life-estate or a usufruct over all
her estate to her husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, and a vested remainder-estate or the
naked title over the same estate to her relatives
named therein;
8. That after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges
and after the admission to probate of her last
will and testament, but during the lifetime of
Charles Newton Hodges, the said Charles
Newton Hodges with full and complete
knowledge of the life-estate or usufruct
conferred upon him by the will since he was
then acting as Administrator of the estate and
later as Executor of the will of Linnie Jane
Hodges, unequivocably and clearly through
oral and written declarations and sworn public
statements, renounced, disclaimed and
repudiated his life-estate and usufruct over the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
9. That, accordingly, the only heirs left to
receive the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
pursuant to her last will and testament, are her
named brothers and sisters, or their heirs, to
wit: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard
Higdon, Aline Higdon and David Higdon, the
latter two being the wife and son respectively of
the deceased Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe Era Linnie Jane Hodges, continued to be burdened
Boman and Nimroy Higdon, all of legal ages, by charges, expenditures, and other
American citizens, with residence at the State dispositions which are purely personal to him in
of Texas, United States of America; nature, until the death of Charles Newton
Hodges himself on December 25, 1962;
10. That at the time of the death of Linnie Jane
Hodges on May 23, 1957, she was the co- 14. That of all the assets of the combined
owner (together with her husband Charles conjugal estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
Newton Hodges) of an undivided one-half Charles Newton Hodges as they exist today,
interest in their conjugal properties existing as the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is clearly
of that date, May 23, 1957, which properties entitled to a portion more than fifty percent
are now being administered sometimes jointly (50%) as compared to the portion to which the
and sometimes separately by the Administratrix estate of Charles Newton Hodges may be
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and/or the entitled, which portions can be exactly
Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges but determined by the following manner:
all of which are under the control and
supervision of this Honorable Court;
a. An inventory must be
made of the assets of the
11. That because there was no separation or combined conjugal estate
segregation of the interests of husband and as they existed on the
wife in the combined conjugal estate, as there death of Linnie Jane
has been no such separation or segregation up Hodges on May 23, 1957
to the present, both interests have continually — one-half of these assets
earned exactly the same amount of "rents, belong to the estate of
emoluments and income", the entire estate Linnie Jane Hodges;
having been continually devoted to the
business of the spouses as if they were alive;
b. An accounting must be
made of the "rents,
12. That the one-half interest of Linnie Jane emoluments and income"
Hodges in the combined conjugal estate was of all these assets — again
earning "rents, emoluments and income" until one-half of these belong to
her death on May 23, 1957, when it ceased to the estate of Linnie Jane
be saddled with any more charges or Hodges;
expenditures which are purely personal to her
in nature, and her estate kept on earning such
c. Adjustments must be
"rents, emoluments and income" by virtue of
made, after making a
their having been expressly renounced,
deduction of charges,
disclaimed and repudiated by Charles Newton
disbursements and other
Hodges to whom they were bequeathed for life
dispositions made by
under the last will and testament of Linnie Jane
Charles Newton Hodges
Hodges;
personally and for his own
personal account from
13. That, on the other hand, the one-half May 23, 1957 up to
interest of Charles Newton Hodges in the December 25, 1962, as
combined conjugal estate existing as of May well as other charges,
23, 1957, while it may have earned exactly the disbursements and other
same amount of "rents, emoluments and dispositions made for him
income" as that of the share pertaining to and in his behalf since
 December 25, 1962 up to
the present;
15. That there remains no other matter for
disposition now insofar as the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges is concerned but to complete the
liquidation of her estate, segregate them from
the conjugal estate, and distribute them to her
heirs pursuant to her last will and testament.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most
respectfully moved and prayed that this
Honorable Court, after a hearing on the factual
matters raised by this motion, issue an order:
a. Declaring the following persons, to wit: Esta
Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Aline
Higdon, David Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era
Boman and Nimroy Higdon, as the sole heirs
under the last will and testament of Linnie Jane
Hodges and as the only persons entitled to her
estate;
b. Determining the exact value of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges in accordance with the
system enunciated in paragraph 14 of this
motion;
c. After such determination ordering its
segregation from the combined conjugal estate
and its delivery to the Administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges for distribution to
the heirs to whom they properly belong and
appertain.
(Green Record on Appeal, pp. 382-391)
whereupon, instead of further pressing on its motion of January 8,
1965 aforequoted, as it had been doing before, petitioner withdrew
the said motion and in addition to opposing the above motion of
respondent Magno, filed a motion on April 22, 1966 alleging in part
that:
1. That it has received from the counsel for the
administratrix of the supposed estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges a notice to set her "Motion for
Official Declaration of Heirs of the Estate of which are all prejudicial, and which involve no
Linnie Jane Hodges"; issues of fact, all facts involved therein being
matters of record, and therefore require only
the resolution of questions of law;
2. That before the aforesaid motion could be
heard, there are matters pending before this
Honorable Court, such as: 3. That whatever claims any alleged heirs or
other persons may have could be very easily
threshed out in the Testate Estate of Charles
a. The examination
Newton Hodges;
already ordered by this
Honorable Court of
documents relating to the 4. That the maintenance of two separate estate
allegation of Avelina proceedings and two administrators only
Magno that Charles results in confusion and is unduly burdensome
Newton Hodges "through upon the Testate Estate of Charles Newton
... written declarations and Hodges, particularly because the bond filed by
sworn public statements, Avelina Magno is grossly insufficient to answer
renounced, disclaimed and for the funds and property which she has
repudiated life-estate and inofficiously collected and held, as well as
usufruct over the estate of those which she continues to inofficiously
Linnie Jane Hodges'; collect and hold;
b. That "Urgent Motion for 5. That it is a matter of record that such state of
An Accounting and affairs affects and inconveniences not only the
Delivery to the Estate of C. estate but also third-parties dealing with it;"
N. Hodges of All the (Annex "V", Petition.)
Assets of the Conjugal
Partnership of the
and then, after further reminding the court, by quoting them, of the
Deceased Linnie Jane
relevant allegations of its earlier motion of September 14, 1964,
Hodges and C. N. Hodges
Annex U, prayed that:
Existing as of May 23,
1957 Plus All the Rents,
Emoluments and Income 1. Immediately order Avelina Magno to account
Therefrom"; for and deliver to the administrator of the
Estate of C. N. Hodges all the assets of the
conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie
c. Various motions to
Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges, plus all the
resolve the aforesaid
rents, emoluments and income therefrom;
motion;
2. Pending the consideration of this motion,
d. Manifestation of
immediately order Avelina Magno to turn over
September 14, 1964,
all her collections to the administrator
detailing acts of
Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank;
interference of Avelina
Magno under color of title
as administratrix of the 3. Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) closed;
Hodges;
 4. Defer the hearing and consideration of the
motion for declaration of heirs in the Testate
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges until the matters
hereinabove set forth are resolved.
(Prayer, Annex "V" of Petition.)
On October 12, 1966, as already indicated at the outset of this
opinion, the respondent court denied the foregoing motion, holding
thus:
ORDER
On record is a motion (Vol. X, Sp. 1672, pp.
4379-4390) dated April 22, 1966 of
administrator PCIB praying that (1)
Immediately order Avelina Magno to account
for and deliver to the administrator of the estate
of C. N. Hodges all assets of the conjugal
partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges and C. N. Hodges, plus all the rents,
emoluments and income therefrom; (2)
Pending the consideration of this motion,
immediately order Avelina Magno to turn over
all her collections to the administrator PCIB; (3)
Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) closed; and (4)
Defer the hearing and consideration of the
motion for declaration of heirs in the Testate
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges until the matters
hereinabove set forth are resolved.
This motion is predicated on the fact that there
are matters pending before this court such as
(a) the examination already ordered by this
Honorable Court of documents relating to the
allegation of Avelina Magno that Charles
Newton Hodges thru written declaration and
sworn public statements renounced, disclaimed
and repudiated his life-estate and usufruct over
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (b) the urgent
motion for accounting and delivery to the estate
of C. N. Hodges of all the assets of the
conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges existing as of
May 23, 1957 plus all the rents, emoluments
and income therefrom; (c) various motions to
resolve the aforesaid motion; and (d)
manifestation of September 14, 1964, detailing
acts of interference of Avelina Magno under
color of title as administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges.
These matters, according to the instant motion,
are all pre-judicial involving no issues of facts
and only require the resolution of question of
law; that in the motion of October 5, 1963 it is
alleged that in a motion dated December 11,
1957 filed by Atty. Leon Gellada as attorney for
the executor C. N. Hodges, the said executor
C. N. Hodges is not only part owner of the
properties left as conjugal but also the
successor to all the properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.
Said motion of December 11, 1957 was
approved by the Court in consonance with the
wishes contained in the last will and testament
of Linnie Jane Hodges.
That on April 21, 1959 this Court approved the
inventory and accounting submitted by C. N.
Hodges thru counsel Atty. Leon Gellada in a
motion filed on April 14, 1959 stating therein
that executor C. N. Hodges is the only devisee
or legatee of Linnie Jane Hodges in
accordance with the last will and testament
already probated by the Court.
That on July 13, 1960 the Court approved the
annual statement of accounts submitted by the
executor C. N. Hodges thru his counsel Atty.
Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein it is stated
that the executor, C. N. Hodges is the only
devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges; that on May 2, 1961 the Court
approved the annual statement of accounts
submitted by executor, C. N. Hodges for the
year 1960 which was submitted by Atty.
Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein it is stated
that executor Hodges is the only devisee or
legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges;
That during the hearing on September 5 and 6,
1963 the estate of C. N. Hodges claimed all the
assets belonging to the deceased spouses
Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges situated
in the Philippines; that administratrix Magno
has executed illegal acts to the prejudice of the
testate estate of C. N. Hodges.
An opposition (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4415-
4421) dated April 27, 1966 of administratrix
Magno has been filed asking that the motion be
denied for lack of merit and that the motion for
the official declaration of heirs of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges be set for presentation and
reception of evidence.
It is alleged in the aforesaid opposition that the
examination of documents which are in the
possession of administratrix Magno can be
made prior to the hearing of the motion for the
official declaration of heirs of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges, during said hearing.
That the matters raised in the PCIB's motion of
October 5, 1963 (as well as the other motion)
dated September 14, 1964 have been
consolidated for the purpose of presentation
and reception of evidence with the hearing on
the determination of the heirs of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges. It is further alleged in the
opposition that the motion for the official
declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges is the one that constitutes a prejudicial
question to the motions dated October 5 and
September 14, 1964 because if said motion is
found meritorious and granted by the Court, the
PCIB's motions of October 5, 1963 and
September 14, 1964 will become moot and
academic since they are premised on the
assumption and claim that the only heir of
Linnie Jane Hodges was C. N. Hodges.
That the PCIB and counsel are estopped from
further questioning the determination of heirs in
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges at this stage
since it was PCIB as early as January 8, 1965
which filed a motion for official declaration of
heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges that the claim of
any heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges can be
determined only in the administration
proceedings over the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and not that of C. N. Hodges, since the
heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges are claiming her
estate and not the estate of C. N. Hodges.
A reply (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4436-4444)
dated May 11, 1966 of the PCIB has been filed
alleging that the motion dated April 22, 1966 of
the PCIB is not to seek deferment of the
hearing and consideration of the motion for
official declaration of heirs of Linnie Jane
Hodges but to declare the testate estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges closed and for
administratrix Magno to account for and deliver
to the PCIB all assets of the conjugal
partnership of the deceased spouses which
has come to her possession plus all rents and
income.
A rejoinder (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4458-4462)
of administratrix Magno dated May 19, 1966
has been filed alleging that the motion dated
December 11, 1957 only sought the approval
of all conveyances made by C. N. Hodges and
requested the Court authority for all
subsequent conveyances that will be executed
by C. N. Hodges; that the order dated
December 14, 1957 only approved the
conveyances made by C. N. Hodges; that C. N.
Hodges represented by counsel never made
any claim in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
and never filed a motion to declare himself as
the heir of the said Linnie Jane Hodges despite
the lapse of more than five (5) years after the
death of Linnie Jane Hodges; that it is further
alleged in the rejoinder that there can be no
order of adjudication of the estate unless there
has been a prior express declaration of heirs
and so far no declaration of heirs in the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. 1307) has been
made.
Considering the allegations and arguments in
the motion and of the PCIB as well as those in
the opposition and rejoinder of administratrix
Magno, the Court finds the opposition and
rejoinder to be well taken for the reason that so
far there has been no official declaration of
heirs in the testate estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and therefore no disposition of her
estate.
WHEREFORE, the motion of the PCIB dated
April 22, 1966 is hereby DENIED.
(Annex "W", Petition)
In its motion dated November 24, 1966 for the reconsideration of
this order, petitioner alleged inter alia that:
It cannot be over-stressed that the motion of
December 11, 1957 was based on the fact that:
a. Under the last will and
testament of the
deceased, Linnie Jane
Hodges, the late Charles
Newton Hodges was the
sole heir instituted insofar
as her properties in the
Philippines are concerned;
b. Said last will and
testament vested upon the
said late Charles Newton
Hodges rights over said
properties which, in sum,
spell ownership, absolute
and in fee simple;
c. Said late Charles
Newton Hodges was,
therefore, "not only part
owner of the properties left
as conjugal, but also, the
successor to all the
properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges.
Likewise, it cannot be over-stressed that the
aforesaid motion was granted by this
Honorable Court "for the reasons stated"
therein.
Again, the motion of December 11, 1957
prayed that not only "all the sales,
conveyances, leases, and mortgages executed
by" the late Charles Newton Hodges, but also
all "the subsequent sales, conveyances,
leases, and mortgages ..." be approved and
authorized. This Honorable Court, in its order
of December 14, 1957, "for the reasons stated"
in the aforesaid motion, granted the same, and
not only approved all the sales, conveyances,
leases and mortgages of all properties left by
the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by
the late Charles Newton Hodges, but also
authorized "all subsequent sales, conveyances,
leases and mortgages of the properties left by
the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. (Annex
"X", Petition)
and reiterated its fundamental pose that the Testate Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges had already been factually, although not
legally, closed with the virtual declaration of Hodges and
adjudication to him, as sole universal heir of all the properties of the
estate of his wife, in the order of December 14, 1957, Annex G. Still
unpersuaded, on July 18, 1967, respondent court denied said
motion for reconsideration and held that "the court believes that
there is no justification why the order of October 12, 1966 should be
considered or modified", and, on July 19, 1967, the motion of
respondent Magno "for official declaration of heirs of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges", already referred to above, was set for
hearing.
In consequence of all these developments, the present petition was
filed on August 1, 1967 (albeit petitioner had to pay another
docketing fee on August 9, 1967, since the orders in question were
issued in two separate testate estate proceedings, Nos. 1307 and
1672, in the court below).
Together with such petition, there are now pending before Us for
resolution herein, appeals from the following:
1. The order of December 19, 1964 authorizing
payment by respondent Magno of overtime
pay, (pp. 221, Green Record on Appeal)
together with the subsequent orders of January
9, 1965, (pp. 231-232,id.) October 27, 1965,
(pp. 227, id.) and February 15, 1966 (pp. 455-
456, id.) repeatedly denying motions for
reconsideration thereof.
2. The order of August 6, 1965 (pp. 248, id.)
requiring that deeds executed by petitioner to
be co-signed by respondent Magno, as well as
the order of October 27, 1965 (pp. 276-277)
denying reconsideration.
3. The order of October 27, 1965 (pp. 292-
295, id.) enjoining the deposit of all collections
in a joint account and the same order of
February 15, 1966 mentioned in No. 1 above
which included the denial of the
reconsideration of this order of October 27,
1965.
4. The order of November 3, 1965 (pp. 313-
320, id.) directing the payment of attorney's
fees, fees of the respondent administratrix, etc.
and the order of February 16, 1966 denying
reconsideration thereof.
5. The order of November 23, 1965 (pp. 334-
335, id.) allowing appellee Western Institute of
Technology to make payments to either one or
both of the administrators of the two estates as
well as the order of March 7, 1966 (p. 462, id.)
denying reconsideration.
6. The various orders hereinabove earlier
enumerated approving deeds of sale executed
by respondent Magno in favor of appellees
Carles, Catedral, Pablito, Guzman, Coronado,
Barrido, Causing, Javier, Lucero and
Batisanan, (see pp. 35 to 37 of this opinion),
together with the two separate orders both
dated December 2, 1966 (pp. 306-308, and pp.
308-309, Yellow Record on Appeal) denying
reconsideration of said approval.
7. The order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-
336, Yellow Record on Appeal, approving
similar deeds of sale executed by respondent
Magno, as those in No. 6, in favor of appellees
Pacaonsis and Premaylon, as to which no
motion for reconsideration was filed.
8. Lastly, the order of December 2, 1966, on
pp. 305-306, Yellow Record on Appeal,
directing petitioner to surrender to appellees
Lucero, Batisanan, Javier, Pablito, Barrido,
Catedral, Causing, Guzman, and Coronado,
the certificates of title covering the lands
involved in the approved sales, as to which no
motion for reconsideration was filed either.
Strictly speaking, and considering that the above orders deal with
different matters, just as they affect distinctly different individuals or
persons, as outlined by petitioner in its brief as appellant on pp. 12-
20 thereof, there are, therefore, thirty-three (33) appeals before Us,
for which reason, petitioner has to pay also thirty-one (31) more
docket fees.
XIII to XV
It is as well perhaps to state here as elsewhere in this opinion that
in connection with these appeals, petitioner has assigned a total of
seventy-eight (LXXVIII) alleged errors, the respective discussions
and arguments under all of them covering also the fundamental
issues raised in respect to the petition for certiorari and prohibition,
thus making it feasible and more practical for the Court to dispose
of all these cases together.4
The assignments of error read thus:
I to IV
THE ORDER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING
THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF
XVI to XVIII
THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES,
ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C.
ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA,
EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A.
MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND
OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS
TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE
EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
V to VIII
XIX to XXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN
FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G.
IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA,
WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND ROSARIO
ALINGASA, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND
FOR WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER PAID IN
FULL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
ORIGINAL CONTRACTS TO SELL.
IX to XII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF
OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY OF
THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES,
ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C.
ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, WHILE
ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN
FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA
PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO
PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA PREMAYLON
(LOT NO. 104), EXECUTED BY THE
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY
THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL
COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY
HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN
FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA
PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO
PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA PREMAYLON
(LOT NO. 104) COVERING PARCELS OF
LAND FOR WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER PAID
IN FULL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
ORIGINAL CONTRACTS TO SELL.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF
OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY OF
THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON
(LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS,
AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104)
WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
XXII to XXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN
FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES LORENZO
CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO
CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S. GUZMAN,
EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A.
MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND
OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS
TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE
EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XXVI to XXIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
APPROVING THE FINAL DEED OF SALE
EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES,
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO,
ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S.
GUZMAN PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO
SPELL WHICH WERE CANCELLED AND
RESCINDED.
XXX to XXXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF
OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY OF
THE LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO,
ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S.
GUZMAN, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE
COURT.
XXXV to XXXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN
FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA
BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION CORONADO,
EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A.
MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND
OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS
TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE
EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XXXVII to XXXVIII THEM WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF WHICH THEY HAVE
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
NEVER COMPLIED WITH.
APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN
FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA
BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION CORONADO, XLVII to XLIX
ALTHOUGH THEY WERE IN ARREARS IN
THE PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN THE
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING
ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH
THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
THEY EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED,
HODGES, OF HIS RIGHT, EXERCISED
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, IN THE
THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATION, THE
AMOUNT OF P10,680.00 and P4,428.90,
INSTANT APPELLANT, TO CANCEL THE
RESPECTIVELY.
CONTRACTS TO SELL OF THE APPELLEES,
GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS
XXXIX to XL JAMIR AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN, AND
IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF THE
SAID APPELLEES OVER REAL PROPERTY
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING
WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, OF THE CONTRACTUAL RIGHT,
EXERCISED THROUGH HIS L
ADMINISTRATOR, THE INSTANT
APPELLANT, TO CANCEL THE CONTRACTS
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
TO SELL OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA
APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN
BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION CORONADO.
FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR
CAUSING, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE,
XLI to XLIII AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS
OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH
APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN
WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS
FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO
LIFETIME.
LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND
MELQUIADES BATISANAN, EXECUTED BY
THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, LI
COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY
THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL
APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN
COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY
FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR
HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
CAUSING, ALTHOUGH HE WAS IN
ARREARS IN THE PAYMENTS AGREED
XLIV to XLVI UPON IN THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO
SELL WHICH HE EXECUTED WITH THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES,
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
IN THE AMOUNT OF P2,337.50.
APPROVING THE FINAL DEED OF SALE IN
FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO
LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND LII
MELQUIADES BATISANAN, PURSUANT TO
CONTRACTS TO SELL EXECUTED BY
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
APPROVING THE DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR
OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING,
ALTHOUGH THE SAME WAS NOT
EXECUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
RULES OF COURT.
LIII to LXI
LXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK TO
SURRENDER THE OWNER'S DUPLICATE
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE OVER THE
RESPECTIVE LOTS COVERED BY THE
DEEDS OF SALE EXECUTED BY THE
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, IN FAVOR
OF THE OTHER APPELLEES, JOSE
LXVI
PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL,
SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, FLRENIA
BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO,
BELCESAR CAUSING, ARITEO THOMAS
JAMIR, MAXIMA BATISANAN AND
GRACIANO L. LUCERO.
LXII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RESOLVING
THE MOTION OF THE APPELLEE,
WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,
LXVII
DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1965, WITHOUT ANY
COPY THEREOF HAVING BEEN SERVED
UPON THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK.
LXIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HEARING
AND CONSIDERING THE MOTION OF THE
APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY, DATED NOVEMBER 3rd,
LXVIII
1965, ON NOVEMBER 23, 1965, WHEN THE
NOTICE FOR THE HEARING THEREOF WAS
FOR NOVEMBER 20, 1965.
LXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THERE IS NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR
THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF ASSETS THEREOF.
TECHNOLOGY A RELIEF OTHER THAN
THAT PRAYED FOR IN ITS MOTION, DATED
LXIX
NOVEMBER 3, 1965, IN THE ABSENCE OF A
PRAYER FOR GENERAL RELIEF
CONTAINED THEREIN. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
THE PAYMENT OF RETAINER'S FEES OF
LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE
SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED,
LINNIE JANE HODGES.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING
THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF
LXX
TECHNOLOGY, TO CONTINUE PAYMENTS
UPON A CONTRACT TO SELL THE TERMS
AND CONDITIONS OF WHICH IT HAS THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
FAILED TO FULFILL. IMPLEMENTING THE ALLEGED
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE HEIRS OF
THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, AND
THEIR LAWYERS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF THE
LXXI
APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY OVER THE REAL
PROPERTY SUBJECT MATTER OF THE THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
CONTRACT TO SELL IT EXECUTED WITH THE PREMATURE DISTRIBUTION OF
THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON ESTATE ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR
HODGES, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF
COURT. RETAINER'S FEES.
LXXII
LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
CONTINUATION OF PAYMENTS BY THE THAT ALL FINAL DEEDS OF SALE
APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF EXECUTED PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS
TECHNOLOGY, UPON A CONTRACT TO TO SELL ENTERED INTO BY THE
SELL EXECUTED BY IT AND THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES,
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, DURING HIS LIFETIME, BE SIGNED
TO A PERSON OTHER THAN HIS JOINTLY BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A.
LAWFULLY APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR. MAGNO, AND THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK,
AND NOT BY THE LATTER ONLY AS THE
LAWFULLY APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR
OF HIS ESTATE.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
THE PAYMENT OF RETAINER'S FEES
LXXIII
FROM THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL EXPENSES
FROM THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN
THERE IS NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR
ASSETS THEREOF.
LXXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL EXPENSES OF
LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE
SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED,
LINNIE JANE HODGES.
LXXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
THE PREMATURE DISTRIBUTION OF
ESTATE ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR
BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF
LEGAL EXPENSES.
LXXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
THE PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION TO
THE PURPORTED ADMINISTRATRIX OF
THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, THE
INSTANT APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
WHEN THERE IS NEITHER SUCH ESTATE
NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXXVII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
THAT THE FUNDS OF THE TESTATE
ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, BE PLACED IN A JOINT
ACCOUNT OF THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK,
AND THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
WHO IS A COMPLETE STRANGER TO THE
AFORESAID ESTATE.
LXXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
THAT THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
BE GIVEN EQUAL ACCESS TO THE
RECORDS OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF
THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, WHEN SHE IS A COMPLETE
STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID ESTATE.
(Pp. 73-83, Appellant's Brief.)
To complete this rather elaborate, and unavoidably extended
narration of the factual setting of these cases, it may also be
mentioned that an attempt was made by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges
to have respondent Magno removed as administratrix, with the
proposed appointment of Benito J. Lopez in her place, and that
respondent court did actually order such proposed replacement, but
the Court declared the said order of respondent court violative of its
injunction of August 8, 1967, hence without force and effect (see
Resolution of September 8, 1972 and February 1, 1973).
Subsequently, Atty. Efrain B. Trenas, one of the lawyers of said
heirs, appeared no longer for the proposed administrator Lopez but
for the heirs themselves, and in a motion dated October 26, 1972
informed the Court that a motion had been filed with respondent
court for the removal of petitioner PCIB as administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges in Special Proceedings 1672, which removal
motion alleged that 22.968149% of the share of C. N. Hodges had
already been acquired by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges from certain
heirs of her husband. Further, in this connection, in the answer of
PCIB to the motion of respondent Magno to have it declared in
contempt for disregarding the Court's resolution of September 8,
1972 modifying the injunction of August 8, 1967, said petitioner
annexed thereto a joint manifestation and motion, appearing to
have been filed with respondent court, informing said court that in
addition to the fact that 22% of the share of C. N. Hodges had
already been bought by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, as already
stated, certain other heirs of Hodges representing 17.343750% of
his estate were joining cause with the heirs of Mrs. Hodges as
against PCIB, thereby making somewhat precarious, if not possibly
untenable, petitioners' continuation as administrator of the Hodges
estate.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUES IN THE CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION CASES
I appeal. Besides, the settling of such common fundamental issues
As to the Alleged Tardiness
of the Present Appeals
The priority question raised by respondent Magno relates to the
alleged tardiness of all the aforementioned thirty-three appeals of
PCIB. Considering, however, that these appeals revolve around
practically the same main issues and that it is admitted that some of
them have been timely taken, and, moreover, their final results
hereinbelow to be stated and explained make it of no consequence
whether or not the orders concerned have become final by the
lapsing of the respective periods to appeal them, We do not deem it
necessary to pass upon the timeliness of any of said appeals.
II
The Propriety Here of Certiorari and
Prohibition instead of Appeal
The other preliminary point of the same respondent is alleged
impropriety of the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition in
view of the existence of the remedy of appeal which it claims is
proven by the very appeals now before Us. Such contention fails to
take into account that there is a common thread among the basic
issues involved in all these thirty-three appeals which, unless
resolved in one single proceeding, will inevitably cause the
proliferation of more or less similar or closely related incidents and
consequent eventual appeals. If for this consideration alone, and
without taking account anymore of the unnecessary additional
effort, expense and time which would be involved in as many
individual appeals as the number of such incidents, it is logical and
proper to hold, as We do hold, that the remedy of appeal is not
adequate in the present cases. In determining whether or not a
special civil action of certiorari or prohibition may be resorted to in
lieu of appeal, in instances wherein lack or excess of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion is alleged, it is not enough that the
remedy of appeal exists or is possible. It is indispensable that
taking all the relevant circumstances of the given case, appeal
would better serve the interests of justice. Obviously, the longer
delay, augmented expense and trouble and unnecessary repetition
of the same work attendant to the present multiple appeals, which,
after all, deal with practically the same basic issues that can be
more expeditiously resolved or determined in a single special civil
action, make the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, pursued by
petitioner, preferable, for purposes of resolving the common basic
issues raised in all of them, despite the conceded availability of
would naturally minimize the areas of conflict between the parties
and render more simple the determination of the secondary issues
in each of them. Accordingly, respondent Magno's objection to the
present remedy of certiorariand prohibition must be overruled.
We come now to the errors assigned by petitioner-appellant,
Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank, (PCIB, for short) in the
petition as well as in its main brief as appellant.
III
On Whether or Not There is Still Any Part of the Testate
Estate Mrs. Hodges that may be Adjudicated to her brothers
and sisters as her estate, of which respondent Magno is the
unquestioned Administratrix in special Proceedings 1307.
In the petition, it is the position of PCIB that the respondent court
exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion in further
recognizing after December 14, 1957 the existence of the Testate
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and in sanctioning purported acts of
administration therein of respondent Magno. Main ground for such
posture is that by the aforequoted order of respondent court of said
date, Hodges was already allowed to assert and exercise all his
rights as universal heir of his wife pursuant to the provisions of her
will, quoted earlier, hence, nothing else remains to be done in
Special Proceedings 1307 except to formally close it. In other
words, the contention of PCIB is that in view of said order, nothing
more than a formal declaration of Hodges as sole and exclusive
heir of his wife and the consequent formal unqualified adjudication
to him of all her estate remain to be done to completely close
Special Proceedings 1307, hence respondent Magno should be
considered as having ceased to be Administratrix of the Testate
Estate of Mrs. Hodges since then.
After carefully going over the record, We feel constrained to hold
that such pose is patently untenable from whatever angle it is
examined.
To start with, We cannot find anywhere in respondent Order of
December 14, 1957 the sense being read into it by PCIB. The tenor
of said order bears no suggestion at all to such effect. The
declaration of heirs and distribution by the probate court of the
estate of a decedent is its most important function, and this Court is
not disposed to encourage judges of probate proceedings to be
less than definite, plain and specific in making orders in such
regard, if for no other reason than that all parties concerned, like
the heirs, the creditors, and most of all the government, the
devisees and legatees, should know with certainty what are and
when their respective rights and obligations ensuing from the
inheritance or in relation thereto would begin or cease, as the case
may be, thereby avoiding precisely the legal complications and
consequent litigations similar to those that have developed
unnecessarily in the present cases. While it is true that in instances
wherein all the parties interested in the estate of a deceased person
have already actually distributed among themselves their respective
shares therein to the satisfaction of everyone concerned and no
rights of creditors or third parties are adversely affected, it would
naturally be almost ministerial for the court to issue the final order of
declaration and distribution, still it is inconceivable that the special
proceeding instituted for the purpose may be considered
terminated, the respective rights of all the parties concerned be
deemed definitely settled, and the executor or administrator thereof
be regarded as automatically discharged and relieved already of all
functions and responsibilities without the corresponding definite
orders of the probate court to such effect.
Indeed, the law on the matter is specific, categorical and
unequivocal. Section 1 of Rule 90 provides:
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of
residue made. — When the debts, funeral
charges, and expenses of administration, the
allowance to the widow and inheritance tax, if
any, chargeable to the estate in accordance
with law have been paid, the court, on the
application of the executor or administrator, or
of a person interested in the estate, and after
hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of
the estate to the persons entitled to the same,
naming them and the proportions, or parts, to
which each is entitled, and such persons may
demand and recover their respective shares
from the executor or administrator, or any other
person having the same in his possession. If
there is a controversy before the court as to
who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which
each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the
payment of the obligations above mentioned
has been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them give a bond, in a
sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for
the payment of said obligations within such
time as the court directs.
These provisions cannot mean anything less than that in order that
a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased may be
deemed ready for final closure, (1) there should have been issued
already an order of distribution or assignment of the estate of the
decedent among or to those entitled thereto by will or by law, but
(2) such order shall not be issued until after it is shown that the
"debts, funeral expenses, expenses of administration, allowances,
taxes, etc. chargeable to the estate" have been paid, which is but
logical and proper. (3) Besides, such an order is usually issued
upon proper and specific application for the purpose of the
interested party or parties, and not of the court.
... it is only after, and not before, the payment
of all debts, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow, and
inheritance tax shall have been effected that
the court should make a declaration of heirs or
of such persons as are entitled by law to the
residue. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p. 397, citing Capistrano
vs. Nadurata, 49 Phil., 726; Lopez vs. Lopez,
37 Off. Gaz., 3091.) (JIMOGA-ON v.
BELMONTE, 84 Phil. 545, 548) (p. 86,
Appellee's Brief)
xxx xxx xxx
Under Section 753 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, (corresponding to Section 1, Rule
90) what brings an intestate (or testate)
proceeding to a close is the order of distribution
directing delivery of the residue to the persons
entitled thereto after paying the indebtedness,
if any, left by the deceased. (Santiesteban vs.
Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, 370.)
In the cases at bar, We cannot discern from the voluminous and
varied facts, pleadings and orders before Us that the above
indispensable prerequisites for the declaration of heirs and the
adjudication of the estate of Mrs. Hodges had already been
complied with when the order of December 14, 1957 was issued.
As already stated, We are not persuaded that the proceedings
leading to the issuance of said order, constituting barely of the
motion of May 27, 1957, Annex D of the petition, the order of even
date, Annex E, and the motion of December 11, 1957, Annex H, all
aforequoted, are what the law contemplates. We cannot see in the
order of December 14, 1957, so much relied upon by the petitioner,
anything more than an explicit approval of "all the sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of all the properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor Charles N.
Hodges" (after the death of his wife and prior to the date of the
motion), plus a general advance authorization to enable said
"Executor — to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases
and mortgages of the properties left the said deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges in consonance with wishes conveyed in the last will and
testament of the latter", which, certainly, cannot amount to the order
of adjudication of the estate of the decedent to Hodges
contemplated in the law. In fact, the motion of December 11, 1957
on which the court predicated the order in question did not pray for
any such adjudication at all. What is more, although said motion did
allege that "herein Executor (Hodges) is not only part owner of the
properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", it significantly
added that "herein Executor, as Legatee (sic), has the right to sell,
convey, lease or dispose of the properties in the Philippines —
during his lifetime", thereby indicating that what said motion
contemplated was nothing more than either the enjoyment by
Hodges of his rights under the particular portion of the dispositions
of his wife's will which were to be operative only during his lifetime
or the use of his own share of the conjugal estate, pending the
termination of the proceedings. In other words, the authority
referred to in said motions and orders is in the nature of that
contemplated either in Section 2 of Rule 109 which permits, in
appropriate cases, advance or partial implementation of the terms
of a duly probated will before final adjudication or distribution when
the rights of third parties would not be adversely affected thereby or
in the established practice of allowing the surviving spouse to
dispose of his own share of he conjugal estate, pending its final
liquidation, when it appears that no creditors of the conjugal
partnership would be prejudiced thereby, (see the Revised Rules of
Court by Francisco, Vol. V-B, 1970 ed. p. 887) albeit, from the tenor
of said motions, We are more inclined to believe that Hodges meant
to refer to the former. In any event, We are fully persuaded that the
quoted allegations of said motions read together cannot be
construed as a repudiation of the rights unequivocally established in
the will in favor of Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters to whatever
have not been disposed of by him up to his death.
Indeed, nowhere in the record does it appear that the trial court
subsequently acted upon the premise suggested by petitioner. On
the contrary, on November 23, 1965, when the court resolved the
motion of appellee Western Institute of Technology by its order We
have quoted earlier, it categorically held that as of said date,
November 23, 1965, "in both cases (Special Proceedings 1307 and
1672) there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution
of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto." In this
connection, it may be stated further against petitioner, by way of
some kind of estoppel, that in its own motion of January 8, 1965,
already quoted in full on pages 54-67 of this decision, it prayed inter contended by petitioner, We would have no hesitancy in declaring
alia that the court declare that "C. N. Hodges was the sole and them null and void.
exclusive heir of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", which it would
not have done if it were really convinced that the order of December
Petitioner cites the case of Austria vs. Ventenilla, G. R. No. L-
14, 1957 was already the order of adjudication and distribution of
10018, September 19, 1956, (unreported but a partial digest thereof
her estate. That said motion was later withdrawn when Magno filed
appears in 99 Phil. 1069) in support of its insistence that with the
her own motion for determination and adjudication of what should
orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957, the closure of Mrs.
correspond to the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges does not
Hodges' estate has become a mere formality, inasmuch as said
alter the indubitable implication of the prayer of the withdrawn
orders amounted to the order of adjudication and distribution
motion.
ordained by Section 1 of Rule 90. But the parallel attempted to be
drawn between that case and the present one does not hold. There
It must be borne in mind that while it is true that Mrs. Hodges the trial court had in fact issued a clear, distinct and express order
bequeathed her whole estate to her husband and gave him what of adjudication and distribution more than twenty years before the
amounts to full powers of dominion over the same during his other heirs of the deceased filed their motion asking that the
lifetime, she imposed at the same time the condition that whatever administratrix be removed, etc. As quoted in that decision, the order
should remain thereof upon his death should go to her brothers and of the lower court in that respect read as follows:
sisters. In effect, therefore, what was absolutely given to Hodges
was only so much of his wife's estate as he might possibly dispose
En orden a la mocion de la administradora, el
of during his lifetime; hence, even assuming that by the allegations
juzgado la encuentra procedente bajo la
in his motion, he did intend to adjudicate the whole estate to
condicion de que no se hara entrega ni
himself, as suggested by petitioner, such unilateral act could not
adjudicacion de los bienes a los herederos
have affected or diminished in any degree or manner the right of his
antes de que estos presten la fianza
brothers and sisters-in-law over what would remain thereof upon his
correspondiente y de acuerdo con lo prescrito
death, for surely, no one can rightly contend that the testamentary
en el Art. 754 del Codigo de Procedimientos:
provision in question allowed him to so adjudicate any part of the
pues, en autos no aparece que hayan sido
estate to himself as to prejudice them. In other words, irrespective
nombrados comisionados de avaluo y
of whatever might have been Hodges' intention in his motions, as
reclamaciones. Dicha fianza podra ser por un
Executor, of May 27, 1957 and December 11, 1957, the trial court's
valor igual al de los bienes que correspondan a
orders granting said motions, even in the terms in which they have
cada heredero segun el testamento. Creo que
been worded, could not have had the effect of an absolute and
no es obice para la terminacion del expediente
unconditional adjudication unto Hodges of the whole estate of his
el hecho de que la administradora no ha
wife. None of them could have deprived his brothers and sisters-in-
presentado hasta ahora el inventario de los
law of their rights under said will. And it may be added here that the
bienes; pues, segun la ley, estan exentos de
fact that no one appeared to oppose the motions in question may
esta formalidad os administradores que son
only be attributed, firstly, to the failure of Hodges to send notices to
legatarios del residuo o remanente de los
any of them, as admitted in the motion itself, and, secondly, to the
bienes y hayan prestado fianza para responder
fact that even if they had been notified, they could not have taken
de las gestiones de su cargo, y aparece en el
said motions to be for the final distribution and adjudication of the
testamento que la administradora Alejandra
estate, but merely for him to be able, pending such final distribution
Austria reune dicha condicion.
and adjudication, to either exercise during his lifetime rights of
dominion over his wife's estate in accordance with the bequest in
his favor, which, as already observed, may be allowed under the POR TODO LO EXPUESTO, el juzgado
broad terms of Section 2 of Rule 109, or make use of his own share declara, 1.o: no haber lugar a la mocion de
of the conjugal estate. In any event, We do not believe that the trial Ramon Ventenilla y otros; 2.o, declara
court could have acted in the sense pretended by petitioner, not asimismo que los unicos herederos del finado
only because of the clear language of the will but also because Antonio Ventenilla son su esposa Alejandra
none of the interested parties had been duly notified of the motion Austria, Maria Ventenilla, hermana del
and hearing thereof. Stated differently, if the orders of May 27, 1957 testador, y Ramon Ventenilla, Maria Ventenilla,
and December 4, 1957 were really intended to be read in the sense Ramon Soriano, Eulalio Soriano, Jose Soriano,
Gabriela Ventenilla, Lorenzo Ventenilla,
 Felicitas Ventenilla, Eugenio Ventenilla y
Alejandra Ventenilla, en representacion de los
difuntos Juan, Tomas, Catalino y Froilan,
hermanos del testador, declarando, ademas
que la heredera Alejandra Austria tiene
derecho al remanente de todos los bienes
dejados por el finado, despues de deducir de
ellos la porcion que corresponde a cada uno
de sus coherederos, conforme esta mandado
en las clausulas 8.a, 9.a, 10.a, 11.a, 12.a y
13.a del testamento; 3.o, se aprueba el pago
hecho por la administradora de los gastos de la
ultima enfermedad y funerales del testador, de
la donacion hecha por el testador a favor de la
Escuela a Publica del Municipio de
Mangatarem, y de las misas en sufragio del
alma del finado; 4.o, que una vez prestada la
fianza mencionada al principio de este auto, se
haga la entrega y adjudicacion de los bienes,
conforme se dispone en el testamento y se
acaba de declarar en este auto; 5.o, y,
finalmente, que verificada la adjudicacion, se
dara por terminada la administracion,
revelandole toda responsabilidad a la
administradora, y cancelando su fianza.
ASI SE ORDENA.
Undoubtedly, after the issuance of an order of such tenor, the
closure of any proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person cannot be but perfunctory.
In the case at bar, as already pointed out above, the two orders
relied upon by petitioner do not appear ex-facie to be of the same
tenor and nature as the order just quoted, and, what is more, the
circumstances attendant to its issuance do not suggest that such
was the intention of the court, for nothing could have been more
violative of the will of Mrs. Hodges.
Indeed, to infer from Hodges' said motions and from his statements
of accounts for the years 1958, 1959 and 1960, A Annexes I, K and
M, respectively, wherein he repeatedly claimed that "herein
executor (being) the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in
accordance with the last will and testament already probated," there
is "no (other) person interested in the Philippines of the time and
place of examining herein account to be given notice", an intent to
adjudicate unto himself the whole of his wife's estate in an absolute
manner and without regard to the contingent interests of her
brothers and sisters, is to impute bad faith to him, an imputation income of his combined personal assets and
which is not legally permissible, much less warranted by the facts of that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (pp.
record herein. Hodges knew or ought to have known that, legally 91-92, id.)
speaking, the terms of his wife's will did not give him such a right.
Factually, there are enough circumstances extant in the records of
Under date of April 20, 1961, C. N. Hodges
these cases indicating that he had no such intention to ignore the
filed his third "Annual Statement of Account by
rights of his co-heirs. In his very motions in question, Hodges
the Executor for the year 1960" of the estate of
alleged, thru counsel, that the "deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died
Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Net
leaving no descendants and ascendants, except brothers and
Worth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the Estate of
sisters and herein petitioner, as surviving spouse, to inherit the
Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1960
properties of the decedent", and even promised that "proper
annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that
accounting will be had — in all these transactions" which he had
the combined conjugal estate earned a net
submitted for approval and authorization by the court, thereby
income of P314,857.94, divided of Linnie Jane
implying that he was aware of his responsibilities vis-a-vis his co-
Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual
heirs. As alleged by respondent Magno in her brief as appellee:
evenly between him and the estate income tax
return" for calendar year 1960 on the estate of
Under date of April 14, 1959, C. N. Hodges Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the
filed his first "Account by the Executor" of the said estate as having earned income of
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net
"Statement of Networth of Mr. C. N. Hodges income of his combined personal assets and
and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (pp.
December 31, 1958 annexed thereto, C. N. 92-93, id.)
Hodges reported that the combined conjugal
estate earned a net income of P328,402.62,
In the petition for probate that he (Hodges)
divided evenly between him and the estate of
filed, he listed the seven brothers and sisters of
Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed
Linnie Jane as her "heirs" (see p. 2, Green
an "individual income tax return" for calendar
ROA). The order of the court admitting the will
year 1958 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
to probate unfortunately omitted one of the
reporting, under oath, the said estate as having
heirs, Roy Higdon (see p. 14, Green ROA).
earned income of P164,201.31, exactly one-
Immediately, C. N. Hodges filed a verified
half of the net income of his combined personal
motion to have Roy Higdon's name included as
assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
an heir, stating that he wanted to straighten the
Hodges. (p. 91, Appellee's Brief.)
records "in order (that) the heirs of deceased
Roy Higdon may not think or believe they were
Under date of July 21, 1960, C. N. Hodges filed omitted, and that they were really and are
his second "Annual Statement of Account by interested in the estate of deceased Linnie
the Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane Jane Hodges".
Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr.
C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane
Thus, he recognized, if in his own way, the separate identity of his
Hodges" as of December 31, 1959 annexed
wife's estate from his own share of the conjugal partnership up to
thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the
the time of his death, more than five years after that of his wife. He
combined conjugal estate earned a net income
never considered the whole estate as a single one belonging
of P270,623.32, divided evenly between him
exclusively to himself. The only conclusion one can gather from this
and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
is that he could have been preparing the basis for the eventual
Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income
transmission of his wife's estate, or, at least, so much thereof as he
tax return" for calendar year 1959 on the estate
would not have been able to dispose of during his lifetime, to her
of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath,
brothers and sisters in accordance with her expressed desire, as
the said estate as having earned income of
intimated in his tax return in the United States to be more
P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the net
extensively referred to anon. And assuming that he did pay the
corresponding estate and inheritance taxes in the Philippines on the
basis of his being sole heir, such payment is not necessarily
inconsistent with his recognition of the rights of his co-heirs. Without
purporting to rule definitely on the matter in these proceedings, We
might say here that We are inclined to the view that under the
peculiar provisions of his wife's will, and for purposes of the
applicable inheritance tax laws, Hodges had to be considered as
her sole heir, pending the actual transmission of the remaining
portion of her estate to her other heirs, upon the eventuality of his
death, and whatever adjustment might be warranted should there
be any such remainder then is a matter that could well be taken
care of by the internal revenue authorities in due time.
It is to be noted that the lawyer, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who signed
the motions of May 27, 1957 and December 11, 1957 and the
aforementioned statements of account was the very same one who
also subsequently signed and filed the motion of December 26,
1962 for the appointment of respondent Magno as "Administratrix of
the Estate of Mrs. Linnie Jane Hodges" wherein it was alleged that
"in accordance with the provisions of the last will and testament of
Linnie Jane Hodges, whatever real properties that may remain at
the death of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, the said
properties shall be equally divided among their heirs." And it
appearing that said attorney was Hodges' lawyer as Executor of the
estate of his wife, it stands to reason that his understanding of the
situation, implicit in his allegations just quoted, could somehow be
reflective of Hodges' own understanding thereof.
As a matter of fact, the allegations in the motion of the same Atty.
Gellada dated July 1, 1957, a "Request for Inclusion of the Name of
Roy Higdon in the Order of the Court dated July 19, 1957, etc.",
reference to which is made in the above quotation from respondent
Magno's brief, are over the oath of Hodges himself, who verified the
motion. Said allegations read:
1. — That the Hon. Court issued orders dated
June 29, 1957, ordering the probate of the will.
2. — That in said order of the Hon. Court, the
relatives of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
were enumerated. However, in the petition as
well as in the testimony of Executor during the
hearing, the name Roy Higdon was mentioned,
but deceased. It was unintentionally omitted
the heirs of said Roy Higdon who are his wife
Aline Higdon and son David Higdon, all of age,
and residents of Quinlan, Texas, U.S.A.
3. — That to straighten the records, and in
order the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may
not think or believe they were omitted, and that
they were really and are interested in the
estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, it is
requested of the Hon. Court to insert the
names of Aline Higdon and David Higdon, wife
and son of deceased Roy Higdon in the said
order of the Hon. Court dated June 29, 1957.
(pars. 1 to 3, Annex 2 of Magno's Answer —
Record, p. 260)
As can be seen, these italicized allegations indicate, more or less,
the real attitude of Hodges in regard to the testamentary
dispositions of his wife.
In connection with this point of Hodges' intent, We note that there
are documents, copies of which are annexed to respondent
Magno's answer, which purportedly contain Hodges' own solemn
declarations recognizing the right of his co-heirs, such as the
alleged tax return he filed with the United States Taxation
authorities, identified as Schedule M, (Annex 4 of her answer) and
his supposed affidavit of renunciation, Annex 5. In said Schedule M,
Hodges appears to have answered the pertinent question thus:
2a. Had the surviving spouse the right to
declare an election between (1) the provisions
made in his or her favor by the will and (11)
dower, curtesy or a statutory interest? (X) Yes (
) No
2d. Does the surviving spouse contemplate
renouncing the will and electing to take dower,
curtesy, or a statutory interest? (X) Yes ( ) No
3. According to the information and belief of the
person or persons filing the return, is any
action described under question 1 designed or
contemplated? ( ) Yes (X) No (Annex 4,
Answer — Record, p. 263)
and to have further stated under the item, "Description of property
interests passing to surviving spouse" the following:
None, except for purposes of administering the
Estate, paying debts, taxes and other legal
charges. It is the intention of the surviving
husband of deceased to distribute the
remaining property and interests of the
deceased in their Community Estate to the
devisees and legatees named in the will when
the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of
administration are finally determined and paid.
(Annex 4, Answer — Record, p. 263)
In addition, in the supposed affidavit of Hodges, Annex 5, it is
stated:
I, C. N. Hodges, being duly sworn, on oath
affirm that at the time the United States Estate
Tax Return was filed in the Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges on August 8, 1958, I renounced
and disclaimed any and all right to receive the
rents, emoluments and income from said
estate, as shown by the statement contained in
Schedule M at page 29 of said return, a copy of
which schedule is attached to this affidavit and
made a part hereof.
The purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and
confirm, and I do hereby ratify and confirm, the
declaration made in Schedule M of said
return and hereby formally disclaim and
renounce any right on my part to receive any of
the said rents, emoluments and income from
the estate of my deceased wife, Linnie Jane
Hodges. This affidavit is made to absolve me
or my estate from any liability for the payment
of income taxes on income which has accrued
to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges since the
death of the said Linnie Jane Hodges on May
23, 1957. (Annex 5, Answer — Record, p. 264)
Although it appears that said documents were not duly presented
as evidence in the court below, and We cannot, therefore, rely on
them for the purpose of the present proceedings, still, We cannot
close our eyes to their existence in the record nor fail to note that
their tenor jibes with Our conclusion discussed above from the
circumstances related to the orders of May 27 and December 14,
1957. 5 Somehow, these documents, considering they are
supposed to be copies of their originals found in the official files of
the governments of the United States and of the Philippines, serve
to lessen any possible apprehension that Our conclusion from the
other evidence of Hodges' manifest intent vis-a-vis the rights of his
co-heirs is without basis in fact.
Verily, with such eloquent manifestations of his good intentions
towards the other heirs of his wife, We find it very hard to believe
that Hodges did ask the court and that the latter agreed that he be
declared her sole heir and that her whole estate be adjudicated to
him without so much as just annotating the contingent interest of
her brothers and sisters in what would remain thereof upon his
demise. On the contrary, it seems to us more factual and fairer to
assume that Hodges was well aware of his position as executor of
the will of his wife and, as such, had in mind the following
admonition made by the Court in Pamittan vs. Lasam, et al., 60
Phil., 908, at pp. 913-914:
Upon the death of Bernarda in September,
1908, said lands continued to be conjugal
property in the hands of the defendant Lasam.
It is provided in article 1418 of the Civil Code
that upon the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, an inventory shall immediately be
made and this court in construing this provision
in connection with section 685 of the Code of
Civil Procedure (prior to its amendment by Act
No. 3176 of November 24, 1924) has
repeatedly held that in the event of the death of
the wife, the law imposes upon the husband
the duty of liquidating the affairs of the
partnership without delay (desde luego)
(Alfonso vs. Natividad, 6 Phil., 240; Prado vs.
Lagera, 7 Phil., 395; De la Rama vs. De la
Rama, 7 Phil., 745; Enriquez vs. Victoria, 10
Phil., 10; Amancio vs. Pardo, 13 Phil., 297;
Rojas vs. Singson Tongson, 17 Phil., 476;
Sochayseng vs. Trujillo, 31 Phil., 153; Molera
vs. Molera, 40 Phil., 566; Nable Jose vs. Nable
Jose, 41 Phil., 713.)
In the last mentioned case this court quoted
with approval the case of Leatherwood vs.
Arnold (66 Texas, 414, 416, 417), in which that
court discussed the powers of the surviving
spouse in the administration of the community
property. Attention was called to the fact that
the surviving husband, in the management of
the conjugal property after the death of the
wife, was a trustee of unique character who is
liable for any fraud committed by him with
relation to the property while he is charged with
its administration. In the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, he had wide powers (as
the law stood prior to Act No. 3176) and the
high degree of trust reposed in him stands out
more clearly in view of the fact that he was the
owner of a half interest in his own right of the
conjugal estate which he was charged to
administer. He could therefore no more acquire
a title by prescription against those for whom
he was administering the conjugal estate than
could a guardian against his ward or a judicial
administrator against the heirs of estate.
Section 38 of Chapter III of the Code of Civil
Procedure, with relation to prescription,
provides that "this chapter shall not apply ... in
the case of a continuing and subsisting trust."
The surviving husband in the administration
and liquidation of the conjugal estate occupies
the position of a trustee of the highest order
and is not permitted by the law to hold that
estate or any portion thereof adversely to those
for whose benefit the law imposes upon him
the duty of administration and liquidation. No
liquidation was ever made by Lasam — hence,
the conjugal property which came into his
possession on the death of his wife in
September, 1908, still remains conjugal
property, a continuing and subsisting trust. He
should have made a liquidation immediately
(desde luego). He cannot now be permitted to
take advantage of his own wrong. One of the
conditions of title by prescription (section 41,
Code of Civil Procedure) is possession "under
a claim of title exclusive of any other right". For
a trustee to make such a claim would be a
manifest fraud.
And knowing thus his responsibilities in the premises, We are not
convinced that Hodges arrogated everything unto himself leaving
nothing at all to be inherited by his wife's brothers and sisters.
PCIB insists, however, that to read the orders of May 27 and
December 14, 1957, not as adjudicatory, but merely as approving
past and authorizing future dispositions made by Hodges in a
wholesale and general manner, would necessarily render the said
orders void for being violative of the provisions of Rule 89
governing the manner in which such dispositions may be made and
how the authority therefor and approval thereof by the probate court
may be secured. If We sustained such a view, the result would only
be that the said orders should be declared ineffective either way
they are understood, considering We have already seen it is legally
impossible to consider them as adjudicatory. As a matter of fact,
however, what surges immediately to the surface, relative to PCIB's
observations based on Rule 89, is that from such point of view, the
supposed irregularity would involve no more than some non-
jurisdictional technicalities of procedure, which have for their
evident fundamental purpose the protection of parties interested in
the estate, such as the heirs, its creditors, particularly the
government on account of the taxes due it; and since it is apparent
here that none of such parties are objecting to said orders or would
be prejudiced by the unobservance by the trial court of the
procedure pointed out by PCIB, We find no legal inconvenience in
nor impediment to Our giving sanction to the blanket approval and
authority contained in said orders. This solution is definitely
preferable in law and in equity, for to view said orders in the sense
suggested by PCIB would result in the deprivation of substantive
rights to the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, whereas reading
them the other way will not cause any prejudice to anyone, and,
withal, will give peace of mind and stability of rights to the innocent
parties who relied on them in good faith, in the light of the peculiar
pertinent provisions of the will of said decedent.
Now, the inventory submitted by Hodges on May 12, 1958 referred
to the estate of his wife as consisting of "One-half of all the items
designated in the balance sheet, copy of which is hereto attached
and marked as "Annex A"." Although, regrettably, no copy of said
Annex A appears in the records before Us, We take judicial notice,
on the basis of the undisputed facts in these cases, that the same
consists of considerable real and other personal kinds of properties.
And since, according to her will, her husband was to be the sole
owner thereof during his lifetime, with full power and authority to
dispose of any of them, provided that should there be any
remainder upon his death, such remainder would go to her brothers
and sisters, and furthermore, there is no pretension, much less any
proof that Hodges had in fact disposed of all of them, and, on the
contrary, the indications are rather to the effect that he had kept
them more or less intact, it cannot truthfully be said that, upon the
death of Hodges, there was no more estate of Mrs. Hodges to
speak of. It is Our conclusion, therefore, that properties do exist
which constitute such estate, hence Special Proceedings 1307
should not yet be closed.
Neither is there basis for holding that respondent Magno has
ceased to be the Administratrix in said proceeding. There is no
showing that she has ever been legally removed as such, the
attempt to replace her with Mr. Benito Lopez without authority from
the Court having been expressly held ineffective by Our resolution
of September 8, 1972. Parenthetically, on this last point, PCIB itself
is very emphatic in stressing that it is not questioning said
respondent's status as such administratrix. Indeed, it is not clear
that PCIB has any standing to raise any objection thereto,
considering it is a complete stranger insofar as the estate of Mrs.
Hodges is concerned.
It is the contention of PCIB, however, that as things actually stood
at the time of Hodges' death, their conjugal partnership had not yet
been liquidated and, inasmuch as the properties composing the
same were thus commingled pro indiviso and, consequently, the
properties pertaining to the estate of each of the spouses are not
yet identifiable, it is PCIB alone, as administrator of the estate of
Hodges, who should administer everything, and all that respondent
Magno can do for the time being is to wait until the properties
constituting the remaining estate of Mrs. Hodges have been duly
segregated and delivered to her for her own administration.
Seemingly, PCIB would liken the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges to a party having a claim of ownership to some properties
included in the inventory of an administrator of the estate of a
decedent, (here that of Hodges) and who normally has no right to
take part in the proceedings pending the establishment of his right
or title; for which as a rule it is required that an ordinary action
should be filed, since the probate court is without jurisdiction to
pass with finality on questions of title between the estate of the
deceased, on the one hand, and a third party or even an heir
claiming adversely against the estate, on the other.
We do not find such contention sufficiently persuasive. As We see
it, the situation obtaining herein cannot be compared with the claim
of a third party the basis of which is alien to the pending probate
proceedings. In the present cases what gave rise to the claim of
PCIB of exclusive ownership by the estate of Hodges over all the
properties of the Hodges spouses, including the share of Mrs.
Hodges in the community properties, were the orders of the trial
court issued in the course of the very settlement proceedings
themselves, more specifically, the orders of May 27 and December
14, 1957 so often mentioned above. In other words, the root of the
issue of title between the parties is something that the court itself
has done in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction. And since in the
ultimate analysis, the question of whether or not all the properties
herein involved pertain exclusively to the estate of Hodges depends
on the legal meaning and effect of said orders, the claim that
respondent court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and
decide the said issue is incorrect. If it was within the competence of
the court to issue the root orders, why should it not be within its
authority to declare their true significance and intent, to the end that
the parties may know whether or not the estate of Mrs. Hodges had
already been adjudicated by the court, upon the initiative of
Hodges, in his favor, to the exclusion of the other heirs of his wife
instituted in her will?
At this point, it bears emphasis again that the main cause of all the of Section 2 of Rule 78 which expressly provides that "The executor
present problems confronting the courts and the parties in these of an executor shall not, as such, administer the estate of the first
cases was the failure of Hodges to secure, as executor of his wife's testator." It goes without saying that this provision refers also to the
estate, from May, 1957 up to the time of his death in December, administrator of an executor like PCIB here.
1962, a period of more than five years, the final adjudication of her
estate and the closure of the proceedings. The record is bare of any
We are not unmindful of the fact that under Section 2 of Rule 73,
showing that he ever exerted any effort towards the early
"When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or
settlement of said estate. While, on the one hand, there are enough
wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered,
indications, as already discuss that he had intentions of leaving
and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate
intact her share of the conjugal properties so that it may pass
proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died,
wholly to his co-heirs upon his death, pursuant to her will, on the
the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or
other hand, by not terminating the proceedings, his interests in his
intestate proceedings of either." Indeed, it is true that the last
own half of the conjugal properties remained commingled pro-
sentence of this provision allows or permits the conjugal partnership
indiviso with those of his co-heirs in the other half. Obviously, such
of spouses who are both deceased to be settled or liquidated in the
a situation could not be conducive to ready ascertainment of the
testate or intestate proceedings of either, but precisely because
portion of the inheritance that should appertain to his co-heirs upon
said sentence allows or permits that the liquidation be made in
his death. Having these considerations in mind, it would be giving a
either proceeding, it is a matter of sound judicial discretion in which
premium for such procrastination and rather unfair to his co-heirs, if
one it should be made. After all, the former rule referring to the
the administrator of his estate were to be given exclusive
administrator of the husband's estate in respect to such liquidation
administration of all the properties in question, which would
was done away with by Act 3176, the pertinent provisions of which
necessarily include the function of promptly liquidating the conjugal
are now embodied in the rule just cited.
partnership, thereby identifying and segregating without
unnecessary loss of time which properties should be considered as
constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges, the remainder of which her Thus, it can be seen that at the time of the death of Hodges, there
brothers and sisters are supposed to inherit equally among was already the pending judicial settlement proceeding of the
themselves. estate of Mrs. Hodges, and, more importantly, that the former was
the executor of the latter's will who had, as such, failed for more
than five years to see to it that the same was terminated earliest,
To be sure, an administrator is not supposed to represent the
which was not difficult to do, since from ought that appears in the
interests of any particular party and his acts are deemed to be
record, there were no serious obstacles on the way, the estate not
objectively for the protection of the rights of everybody concerned
being indebted and there being no immediate heirs other than
with the estate of the decedent, and from this point of view, it
Hodges himself. Such dilatory or indifferent attitude could only spell
maybe said that even if PCIB were to act alone, there should be no
possible prejudice of his co-heirs, whose rights to inheritance
fear of undue disadvantage to anyone. On the other hand, however,
depend entirely on the existence of any remainder of Mrs. Hodges'
it is evidently implicit in section 6 of Rule 78 fixing the priority
share in the community properties, and who are now faced with the
among those to whom letters of administration should be granted
pose of PCIB that there is no such remainder. Had Hodges secured
that the criterion in the selection of the administrator is not his
as early as possible the settlement of his wife's estate, this problem
impartiality alone but, more importantly, the extent of his interest in
would not arisen. All things considered, We are fully convinced that
the estate, so much so that the one assumed to have greater
the interests of justice will be better served by not permitting or
interest is preferred to another who has less. Taking both of these
allowing PCIB or any administrator of the estate of Hodges
considerations into account, inasmuch as, according to Hodges'
exclusive administration of all the properties in question. We are of
own inventory submitted by him as Executor of the estate of his
the considered opinion and so hold that what would be just and
wife, practically all their properties were conjugal which means that
proper is for both administrators of the two estates to act conjointly
the spouses have equal shares therein, it is but logical that both
until after said estates have been segregated from each other.
estates should be administered jointly by representatives of both,
pending their segregation from each other. Particularly is such an
arrangement warranted because the actuations so far of PCIB At this juncture, it may be stated that we are not overlooking the
evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent to exclude the other fact that it is PCIB's contention that, viewed as a substitution, the
heirs of Mrs. Hodges from their inheritance. Besides, to allow PCIB, testamentary disposition in favor of Mrs. Hodges' brothers and
the administrator of his estate, to perform now what Hodges was sisters may not be given effect. To a certain extent, this contention
duty bound to do as executor is to violate the spirit, if not the letter, is correct. Indeed, legally speaking, Mrs. Hodges' will provides
neither for a simple or vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the
Civil Code nor for a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863
thereof. There is no vulgar substitution therein because there is no
provision for either (1) predecease of the testator by the designated
heir or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to accept the
inheritance, as required by Article 859; and neither is there a
fideicommissary substitution therein because no obligation is
imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate or any part
thereof for anyone else. But from these premises, it is not correct to
jump to the conclusion, as PCIB does, that the testamentary
dispositions in question are therefore inoperative and invalid.
The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it views the
said disposition exclusively in the light of substitutions covered by
the Civil Code section on that subject, (Section 3, Chapter 2, Title
IV, Book III) when it is obvious that substitution occurs only when
another heir is appointed in a will "so that he may enter into
inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted," (Article
857, id.) and, in the present case, no such possible default is
contemplated. The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not
substitutes for Hodges because, under her will, they are not to
inherit what Hodges cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what
he would not dispose of from his inheritance; rather, therefore, they
are also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject,
however, to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as
Hodges was concerned and correspondingly suspensive with
reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law. It is partially resolutory,
since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be
owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute
dominion over them6 only during his lifetime, which means that
while he could completely and absolutely dispose of any portion
thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not free to
do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon his
death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that
contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-
law to the inheritance, although vested already upon the death of
Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become operative upon the
occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence
of any remainder of her estate then.
Contrary to the view of respondent Magno, however, it was not the
usufruct alone of her estate, as contemplated in Article 869 of the
Civil Code, that she bequeathed to Hodges during his lifetime, but
the full ownership thereof, although the same was to last also
during his lifetime only, even as there was no restriction whatsoever
against his disposing or conveying the whole or any portion thereof
to anybody other than himself. The Court sees no legal impediment
to this kind of institution, in this jurisdiction or under Philippine law,
except that it cannot apply to the legitime of Hodges as the
surviving spouse, consisting of one-half of the estate, considering
that Mrs. Hodges had no surviving ascendants nor descendants.
(Arts. 872, 900, and 904, New Civil Code.)
But relative precisely to the question of how much of Mrs. Hodges'
share of the conjugal partnership properties may be considered as
her estate, the parties are in disagreement as to how Article 16 of
the Civil Code7 should be applied. On the one hand, petitioner
claims that inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges was a resident of the
Philippines at the time of her death, under said Article 16, construed
in relation to the pertinent laws of Texas and the principle of renvoi,
what should be applied here should be the rules of succession
under the Civil Code of the Philippines, and, therefore, her estate
could consist of no more than one-fourth of the said conjugal
properties, the other fourth being, as already explained, the legitime
of her husband (Art. 900, Civil Code) which she could not have
disposed of nor burdened with any condition (Art. 872, Civil Code).
On the other hand, respondent Magno denies that Mrs. Hodges
died a resident of the Philippines, since allegedly she never
changed nor intended to change her original residence of birth in
Texas, United States of America, and contends that, anyway,
regardless of the question of her residence, she being indisputably
a citizen of Texas, under said Article 16 of the Civil Code, the
distribution of her estate is subject to the laws of said State which,
according to her, do not provide for any legitime, hence, the
brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are entitled to the remainder of
the whole of her share of the conjugal partnership properties
consisting of one-half thereof. Respondent Magno further maintains
that, in any event, Hodges had renounced his rights under the will
in favor of his co-heirs, as allegedly proven by the documents
touching on the point already mentioned earlier, the genuineness
and legal significance of which petitioner seemingly questions.
Besides, the parties are disagreed as to what the pertinent laws of
Texas provide. In the interest of settling the estates herein involved
soonest, it would be best, indeed, if these conflicting claims of the
parties were determined in these proceedings. The Court regrets,
however, that it cannot do so, for the simple reason that neither the
evidence submitted by the parties in the court below nor their
discussion, in their respective briefs and memoranda before Us, of
their respective contentions on the pertinent legal issues, of grave
importance as they are, appear to Us to be adequate enough to
enable Us to render an intelligent comprehensive and just
resolution. For one thing, there is no clear and reliable proof of what
in fact the possibly applicable laws of Texas are. 7* Then also, the
genuineness of documents relied upon by respondent Magno is
disputed. And there are a number of still other conceivable related
issues which the parties may wish to raise but which it is not proper
to mention here. In Justice, therefore, to all the parties concerned,
these and all other relevant matters should first be threshed out
fully in the trial court in the proceedings hereafter to be held therein
for the purpose of ascertaining and adjudicating and/or distributing
the estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her duly
probated will.
To be more explicit, all that We can and do decide in connection
with the petition for certiorari and prohibition are: (1) that regardless
of which corresponding laws are applied, whether of the Philippines
or of Texas, and taking for granted either of the respective
contentions of the parties as to provisions of the latter, 8 and
regardless also of whether or not it can be proven by competent
evidence that Hodges renounced his inheritance in any degree, it is
easily and definitely discernible from the inventory submitted by
Hodges himself, as Executor of his wife's estate, that there are
properties which should constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges and
ought to be disposed of or distributed among her heirs pursuant to
her will in said Special Proceedings 1307; (2) that, more
specifically, inasmuch as the question of what are the pertinent
laws of Texas applicable to the situation herein is basically one of
fact, and, considering that the sole difference in the positions of the
parties as to the effect of said laws has reference to the supposed
legitime of Hodges — it being the stand of PCIB that Hodges had
such a legitime whereas Magno claims the negative - it is now
beyond controversy for all future purposes of these proceedings
that whatever be the provisions actually of the laws of Texas
applicable hereto, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is at least, one-fourth
of the conjugal estate of the spouses; the existence and effects of
foreign laws being questions of fact, and it being the position now of
PCIB that the estate of Mrs. Hodges, pursuant to the laws of Texas,
should only be one-fourth of the conjugal estate, such contention
constitutes an admission of fact, and consequently, it would be in
estoppel in any further proceedings in these cases to claim that
said estate could be less, irrespective of what might be proven later
to be actually the provisions of the applicable laws of Texas; (3) that
Special Proceedings 1307 for the settlement of the testate estate of
Mrs. Hodges cannot be closed at this stage and should proceed to
its logical conclusion, there having been no proper and legal
adjudication or distribution yet of the estate therein involved; and (4)
that respondent Magno remains and continues to be the
Administratrix therein. Hence, nothing in the foregoing opinion is
intended to resolve the issues which, as already stated, are not
properly before the Court now, namely, (1) whether or not Hodges
had in fact and in law waived or renounced his inheritance from
Mrs. Hodges, in whole or in part, and (2) assuming there had been
no such waiver, whether or not, by the application of Article 16 of
the Civil Code, and in the light of what might be the applicable laws
of Texas on the matter, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is more than the
one-fourth declared above. As a matter of fact, even our finding
above about the existence of properties constituting the estate of
Mrs. Hodges rests largely on a general appraisal of the size and
extent of the conjugal partnership gathered from reference made
thereto by both parties in their briefs as well as in their pleadings
included in the records on appeal, and it should accordingly yield,
as to which exactly those properties are, to the more concrete and
specific evidence which the parties are supposed to present in
support of their respective positions in regard to the foregoing main
legal and factual issues. In the interest of justice, the parties should
be allowed to present such further evidence in relation to all these
issues in a joint hearing of the two probate proceedings herein
involved. After all, the court a quo has not yet passed squarely on
these issues, and it is best for all concerned that it should do so in
the first instance.
Relative to Our holding above that the estate of Mrs. Hodges
cannot be less than the remainder of one-fourth of the conjugal
partnership properties, it may be mentioned here that during the
deliberations, the point was raised as to whether or not said holding
might be inconsistent with Our other ruling here also that, since
there is no reliable evidence as to what are the applicable laws of
Texas, U.S.A. "with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights" that may be willed by a testator
which, under Article 16 of the Civil Code, are controlling in the
instant cases, in view of the undisputed Texan nationality of the
deceased Mrs. Hodges, these cases should be returned to the
court a quo, so that the parties may prove what said law provides, it
is premature for Us to make any specific ruling now on either the
validity of the testamentary dispositions herein involved or the
amount of inheritance to which the brothers and sisters of Mrs.
Hodges are entitled. After nature reflection, We are of the
considered view that, at this stage and in the state of the records
before Us, the feared inconsistency is more apparent than real.
Withal, it no longer lies in the lips of petitioner PCIB to make any
claim that under the laws of Texas, the estate of Mrs. Hodges could
in any event be less than that We have fixed above.
It should be borne in mind that as above-indicated, the question of
what are the laws of Texas governing the matters herein issue is, in
the first instance, one of fact, not of law. Elementary is the rule that
foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of and have to be
proven like any other fact in dispute between the parties in any
proceeding, with the rare exception in instances when the said laws
are already within the actual knowledge of the court, such as when
they are well and generally known or they have been actually ruled
upon in other cases before it and none of the parties concerned do
not claim otherwise. (5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, p.
41, 1970 ed.) In Fluemer vs. Hix, 54 Phil. 610, it was held:
It is the theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in
Elkins West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his
residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Virginia
govern. To this end, there was submitted a copy of section 3868 of
Acts 1882, c. 84 as found in West Virginia Code, Annotated, by
Hogg Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1960, and as certified to by the
Director of the National Library. But this was far from a compliance
with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove
themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are
not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various
States of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts.
(In re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the
requirements of the law were not met. There was no showing that
the book from which an extract was taken was printed or published
under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in
section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract
from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge
of the original, under the seal of the State of West Virginia, as
provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence
was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West
Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed."
No evidence of the nature thus suggested by the Court may be
found in the records of the cases at bar. Quite to the contrary, the
parties herein have presented opposing versions in their respective
pleadings and memoranda regarding the matter. And even if We
took into account that in Aznar vs. Garcia, the Court did make
reference to certain provisions regarding succession in the laws of
Texas, the disparity in the material dates of that case and the
present ones would not permit Us to indulge in the hazardous
conjecture that said provisions have not been amended or changed
in the meantime.
On the other hand, in In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, We
held:
Upon the other point — as to whether the will
was executed in conformity with the statutes of
the State of Illinois — we note that it does not
affirmatively appear from the transcription of
the testimony adduced in the trial court that any
witness was examined with reference to the
law of Illinois on the subject of the execution of
will. The trial judge no doubt was satisfied that
the will was properly executed by examining
section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois,
as exhibited in volume 3 of Starr & Curtis's
Annotated Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed., p. 426; and
he may have assumed that he could take
judicial notice of the laws of Illinois under
section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If
so, he was in our opinion mistaken. That
section authorizes the courts here to take
judicial notice, among other things, of the acts
of the legislative department of the United
States. These words clearly have reference to
Acts of the Congress of the United States; and
we would hesitate to hold that our courts can,
under this provision, take judicial notice of the
multifarious laws of the various American
States. Nor do we think that any such authority
can be derived from the broader language,
used in the same section, where it is said that
our courts may take judicial notice of matters of
public knowledge "similar" to those therein
enumerated. The proper rule we think is to
require proof of the statutes of the States of the
American Union whenever their provisions are
determinative of the issues in any action
litigated in the Philippine courts.
Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial
court may have erred in taking judicial notice of
the law of Illinois on the point in question, such
error is not now available to the petitioner, first,
because the petition does not state any fact
from which it would appear that the law of
Illinois is different from what the court found,
and, secondly, because the assignment of
error and argument for the appellant in this
court raises no question based on such
supposed error. Though the trial court may
have acted upon pure conjecture as to the law
prevailing in the State of Illinois, its judgment
could not be set aside, even upon application
made within six months under section 113 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, unless it should
be made to appear affirmatively that the
conjecture was wrong. The petitioner, it is true,
states in general terms that the will in question
is invalid and inadequate to pass real and
personal property in the State of Illinois, but
this is merely a conclusion of law. The
affidavits by which the petition is accompanied
contain no reference to the subject, and we are
cited to no authority in the appellant's brief
which might tend to raise a doubt as to the
correctness of the conclusion of the trial court.
It is very clear, therefore, that this point cannot
be urged as of serious moment.
It is implicit in the above ruling that when, with respect to certain
aspects of the foreign laws concerned, the parties in a given case
do not have any controversy or are more or less in agreement, the
Court may take it for granted for the purposes of the particular case
before it that the said laws are as such virtual agreement indicates,
without the need of requiring the presentation of what otherwise
would be the competent evidence on the point. Thus, in the instant
cases wherein it results from the respective contentions of both
In its main brief dated February 26, 1968, PCIB asserts:
parties that even if the pertinent laws of Texas were known and to
be applied, the amount of the inheritance pertaining to the heirs of
Mrs. Hodges is as We have fixed above, the absence of evidence
to the effect that, actually and in fact, under said laws, it could be
otherwise is of no longer of any consequence, unless the purpose
is to show that it could be more. In other words, since PCIB, the
petitioner-appellant, concedes that upon application of Article 16 of
the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, the amount of the
estate in controversy is just as We have determined it to be, and
respondent-appellee is only claiming, on her part, that it could be
more, PCIB may not now or later pretend differently.
To be more concrete, on pages 20-21 of its petition herein, dated
July 31, 1967, PCIB states categorically:
Inasmuch as Article 16 of the Civil Code
provides that "intestate and testamentary
successions both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found", while the law of Texas (the
Hodges spouses being nationals of U.S.A.,
State of Texas), in its conflicts of law rules,
provides that the domiciliary law (in this case
Philippine law) governs the testamentary
dispositions and successional rights over
movables or personal properties, while the law
of the situs (in this case also Philippine law with
respect to all Hodges properties located in the
Philippines), governs with respect to
immovable properties, and applying therefore
the 'renvoi doctrine' as enunciated and applied
by this Honorable Court in the case of In re
Estate of Christensen (G.R. No. L-16749, Jan.
31, 1963), there can be no question that
Philippine law governs the testamentary
dispositions contained in the Last Will and
Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges, as well as the successional rights to
her estate, both with respect to movables, as
well as to immovables situated in the
Philippines.
The law governing successional rights.
As recited above, there is no question that the
deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, was an
American citizen. There is also no question that
she was a national of the State of Texas,
U.S.A. Again, there is likewise no question that
she had her domicile of choice in the City of
Iloilo, Philippines, as this has already been
pronounced by the above-cited orders of the
lower court, pronouncements which are by
now res adjudicata (par. [a], See. 49, Rule 39,
Rules of Court; In re Estate of Johnson, 39
Phil. 156).
The subject of successional rights.
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides:
"Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary
successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found."
Thus the aforecited provision of the Civil Code
points towards the national law of the
deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, which is the
law of Texas, as governing succession "both
with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions ...".
But the law of Texas, in its conflicts of law
rules, provides that the domiciliary law governs
the testamentary dispositions and successional
rights over movables or personal property,
while the law of the situs governs with respect
to immovable property. Such that with respect
to both movable property, as well as
immovable property situated in the Philippines,
the law of Texas points to the law of the
Philippines.
Applying, therefore, the so-called "renvoi
doctrine", as enunciated and applied by this
Honorable Court in the case of "In re
Christensen" (G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 31,
1963), there can be no question that Philippine
law governs the testamentary provisions in the
Last Will and Testament of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the
successional rights to her estate, both with
respect to movables, as well as immovables
situated in the Philippines.
Under Philippine law, as it is under the law of
Texas, the conjugal or community property of
the spouses, Charles Newton Hodges and
Linnie Jane Hodges, upon the death of the
latter, is to be divided into two, one-half
pertaining to each of the spouses, as his or her
own property. Thus, upon the death of Linnie
Jane Hodges, one-half of the conjugal
partnership property immediately pertained to
Charles Newton Hodges as his own share, and
not by virtue of any successional rights. There
can be no question about this.
Again, Philippine law, or more specifically,
Article 900 of the Civil Code provides:
If the only survivor is the
widow or widower, she or
he shall be entitled to one-
half of the hereditary
estate of the deceased
spouse, and the testator
 may freely dispose of the
other half.
If the marriage between
the surviving spouse and
the testator was
solemnized in articulo
mortis, and the testator
died within three months
from the time of the
marriage, the legitime of
the surviving spouse as
the sole heir shall be one-
third of the hereditary
estate, except when they
have been living as
husband and wife for more
than five years. In the
latter case, the legitime of
the surviving spouse shall
be that specified in the
preceding paragraph.
This legitime of the surviving spouse cannot be
burdened by a fideicommisary substitution (Art.
864, Civil code), nor by any charge, condition,
or substitution (Art, 872, Civil code). It is clear,
therefore, that in addition to one-half of the
conjugal partnership property as his own
conjugal share, Charles Newton Hodges was
also immediately entitled to one-half of the half
conjugal share of the deceased, Linnie Jane
Hodges, or one-fourth of the entire conjugal
property, as his legitime.
One-fourth of the conjugal property therefore
remains at issue.
In the summary of its arguments in its memorandum dated April 30,
1968, the following appears:
Briefly, the position advanced by the petitioner
is:
a. That the Hodges spouses were domiciled
legally in the Philippines (pp. 19-20, petition).
This is now a matter of res adjudicata (p. 20,
petition).
b. That under Philippine law, Texas law, and
the renvoi doctrine, Philippine law governs the
successional rights over the properties left by
the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 20-21,
petition).
c. That under Philippine as well as Texas law,
one-half of the Hodges properties pertains to
the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges (p. 21,
petition). This is not questioned by the
respondents.
d. That under Philippine law, the deceased,
Charles Newton Hodges, automatically
inherited one-half of the remaining one-half of
the Hodges properties as his legitime (p. 21,
petition).
e. That the remaining 25% of the Hodges
properties was inherited by the deceased,
Charles Newton Hodges, under the will of his
deceased spouse (pp. 22-23, petition). Upon
the death of Charles Newton Hodges, the
substitution 'provision of the will of the
deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, did not operate
because the same is void (pp. 23-25, petition).
f. That the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges,
asserted his sole ownership of the Hodges
properties and the probate court sanctioned
such assertion (pp. 25-29, petition). He in fact
assumed such ownership and such was the
status of the properties as of the time of his
death (pp. 29-34, petition).
Of similar tenor are the allegations of PCIB in some of its pleadings
quoted in the earlier part of this option.
On her part, it is respondent-appellee Magno's posture that under
the laws of Texas, there is no system of legitime, hence the estate
of Mrs. Hodges should be one-half of all the conjugal properties.
It is thus unquestionable that as far as PCIB is concerned, the
application to these cases of Article 16 of the Civil Code in relation
to the corresponding laws of Texas would result in that the
Philippine laws on succession should control. On that basis, as We
have already explained above, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is the
remainder of one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties,
considering that We have found that there is no legal impediment to
the kind of disposition ordered by Mrs. Hodges in her will in favor of
her brothers and sisters and, further, that the contention of PCIB
that the same constitutes an inoperative testamentary substitution
is untenable. As will be recalled, PCIB's position that there is no
such estate of Mrs. Hodges is predicated exclusively on two
propositions, namely: (1) that the provision in question in Mrs.
Hodges' testament violates the rules on substitution of heirs under
the Civil Code and (2) that, in any event, by the orders of the trial
court of May 27, and December 14, 1957, the trial court had already
finally and irrevocably adjudicated to her husband the whole free
portion of her estate to the exclusion of her brothers and sisters,
both of which poses, We have overruled. Nowhere in its pleadings,
briefs and memoranda does PCIB maintain that the application of
the laws of Texas would result in the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges not
inheriting anything under her will. And since PCIB's representations
in regard to the laws of Texas virtually constitute admissions of fact
which the other parties and the Court are being made to rely and
act upon, PCIB is "not permitted to contradict them or subsequently
take a position contradictory to or inconsistent with them." (5 Moran,
id, p. 65, citing Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Sta. Ana vs.
Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018).
Accordingly, the only question that remains to be settled in the
further proceedings hereby ordered to be held in the court below is
how much more than as fixed above is the estate of Mrs. Hodges,
and this would depend on (1) whether or not the applicable laws of
Texas do provide in effect for more, such as, when there is no
legitime provided therein, and (2) whether or not Hodges has validly
waived his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges.
In the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by some
members of the Court that to avoid or, at least, minimize further
protracted legal controversies between the respective heirs of the
Hodges spouses, it is imperative to elucidate on the possible
consequences of dispositions made by Hodges after the death of
his wife from the mass of the unpartitioned estates without any
express indication in the pertinent documents as to whether his
intention is to dispose of part of his inheritance from his wife or part
of his own share of the conjugal estate as well as of those made by
PCIB after the death of Hodges. After a long discussion, the
consensus arrived at was as follows: (1) any such dispositions
made gratuitously in favor of third parties, whether these be
individuals, corporations or foundations, shall be considered as
intended to be of properties constituting part of Hodges' inheritance
from his wife, it appearing from the tenor of his motions of May 27
and December 11, 1957 that in asking for general authority to make
sales or other disposals of properties under the jurisdiction of the
court, which include his own share of the conjugal estate, he was
not invoking particularly his right over his own share, but rather his
right to dispose of any part of his inheritance pursuant to the will of
his wife; (2) as regards sales, exchanges or
other remunerative transfers, the proceeds of such sales or the
properties taken in by virtue of such exchanges, shall be
considered as merely the products of "physical changes" of the
properties of her estate which the will expressly authorizes Hodges
to make, provided that whatever of said products should remain
with the estate at the time of the death of Hodges should go to her
brothers and sisters; (3) the dispositions made by PCIB after the
death of Hodges must naturally be deemed as covering only the
properties belonging to his estate considering that being only the
administrator of the estate of Hodges, PCIB could not have
disposed of properties belonging to the estate of his wife. Neither
could such dispositions be considered as involving conjugal
properties, for the simple reason that the conjugal partnership
automatically ceased when Mrs. Hodges died, and by the peculiar
provision of her will, under discussion, the remainder of her share
descended also automatically upon the death of Hodges to her
brothers and sisters, thus outside of the scope of PCIB's
administration. Accordingly, these construction of the will of Mrs.
Hodges should be adhered to by the trial court in its final order of
adjudication and distribution and/or partition of the two estates in
question.
THE APPEALS
A cursory examination of the seventy-eight assignments of error in
appellant PCIB's brief would readily reveal that all of them are
predicated mainly on the contention that inasmuch as Hodges had
already adjudicated unto himself all the properties constituting his
wife's share of the conjugal partnership, allegedly with the sanction
of the trial court per its order of December 14, 1957, there has
been, since said date, no longer any estate of Mrs. Hodges of
which appellee Magno could be administratrix, hence the various
assailed orders sanctioning her actuations as such are not in
accordance with law. Such being the case, with the foregoing
resolution holding such posture to be untenable in fact and in law
and that it is in the best interest of justice that for the time being the
two estates should be administered conjointly by the respective
administrators of the two estates, it should follow that said
assignments of error have lost their fundamental reasons for being.
There are certain matters, however, relating peculiarly to the
respective orders in question, if commonly among some of them,
which need further clarification. For instance, some of them
authorized respondent Magno to act alone or without concurrence
of PCIB. And with respect to many of said orders, PCIB further
claims that either the matters involved were not properly within the
probate jurisdiction of the trial court or that the procedure followed
was not in accordance with the rules. Hence, the necessity of
dealing separately with the merits of each of the appeals.
Indeed, inasmuch as the said two estates have until now remained
commingled pro-indiviso, due to the failure of Hodges and the lower
court to liquidate the conjugal partnership, to recognize appellee
Magno as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges
which is still unsegregated from that of Hodges is not to say,
without any qualification, that she was therefore authorized to do
and perform all her acts complained of in these appeals, sanctioned
though they might have been by the trial court. As a matter of fact, it
is such commingling pro-indiviso of the two estates that should
deprive appellee of freedom to act independently from PCIB, as
administrator of the estate of Hodges, just as, for the same reason,
the latter should not have authority to act independently from her.
And considering that the lower court failed to adhere consistently to
this basic point of view, by allowing the two administrators to act
independently of each other, in the various instances already noted
in the narration of facts above, the Court has to look into the
attendant circumstances of each of the appealed orders to be able
to determine whether any of them has to be set aside or they may
all be legally maintained notwithstanding the failure of the court a
quo to observe the pertinent procedural technicalities, to the end
only that graver injury to the substantive rights of the parties
concerned and unnecessary and undesirable proliferation of
incidents in the subject proceedings may be forestalled. In other
words, We have to determine, whether or not, in the light of the
unusual circumstances extant in the record, there is need to be
more pragmatic and to adopt a rather unorthodox approach, so as
to cause the least disturbance in rights already being exercised by
numerous innocent third parties, even if to do so may not appear to
be strictly in accordance with the letter of the applicable purely
adjective rules.
Incidentally, it may be mentioned, at this point, that it was principally
on account of the confusion that might result later from PCIB's
continuing to administer all the community properties,
notwithstanding the certainty of the existence of the separate estate
of Mrs. Hodges, and to enable both estates to function in the
meantime with a relative degree of regularity, that the Court ordered
in the resolution of September 8, 1972 the modification of the
injunction issued pursuant to the resolutions of August 8, October 4
and December 6, 1967, by virtue of which respondent Magno was
completely barred from any participation in the administration of the
properties herein involved. In the September 8 resolution, We
ordered that, pending this decision, Special Proceedings 1307 and
1672 should proceed jointly and that the respective administrators
therein "act conjointly — none of them to act singly and
independently of each other for any purpose." Upon mature
deliberation, We felt that to allow PCIB to continue managing or
administering all the said properties to the exclusion of the
administratrix of Mrs. Hodges' estate might place the heirs of
Hodges at an unduly advantageous position which could result in
considerable, if not irreparable, damage or injury to the other
parties concerned. It is indeed to be regretted that apparently, up to
this date, more than a year after said resolution, the same has not
been given due regard, as may be gleaned from the fact that
recently, respondent Magno has filed in these proceedings a motion
to declare PCIB in contempt for alleged failure to abide therewith,
notwithstanding that its repeated motions for reconsideration
thereof have all been denied soon after they were filed.9
Going back to the appeals, it is perhaps best to begin first with what
appears to Our mind to be the simplest, and then proceed to the
more complicated ones in that order, without regard to the
numerical sequence of the assignments of error in appellant's brief
or to the order of the discussion thereof by counsel.
Assignments of error numbers
LXXII, LXXVII and LXXVIII.
These assignments of error relate to (1) the order of the trial court
of August 6, 1965 providing that "the deeds of sale (therein referred
to involving properties in the name of Hodges) should be signed
jointly by the PCIB, as Administrator of Testate Estate of C.N.
Hodges, and Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the Testate
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and to this effect, the PCIB should
take the necessary steps so that Administratrix Avelina A. Magno
could sign the deeds of sale," (p. 248, Green Rec. on Appeal) (2)
the order of October 27, 1965 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the foregoing order, (pp. 276-277, id.) (3) the
other order also dated October 27, 1965 enjoining inter alia, that
"(a) all cash collections should be deposited in the joint account of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and estate of C. N. Hodges, (b)
that whatever cash collections (that) had been deposited in the
account of either of the estates should be withdrawn and since then
(sic) deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and the estate of C. N. Hodges; ... (d) (that) Administratrix
Magno — allow the PCIB to inspect whatever records, documents
and papers she may have in her possession, in the same manner
that Administrator PCIB is also directed to allow Administratrix
Magno to inspect whatever records, documents and papers it may
have in its possession" and "(e) that the accountant of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges shall have access to all records of the
transactions of both estates for the protection of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges; and in like manner, the accountant or any authorized
representative of the estate of C. N. Hodges shall have access to
the records of transactions of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate for the
protection of the estate of C. N. Hodges", (pp. 292-295, id.) and (4)
the order of February 15, 1966, denying, among others, the motion
for reconsideration of the order of October 27, 1965 last referred to.
(pp. 455-456, id.)
As may be readily seen, the thrust of all these four impugned orders
is in line with the Court's above-mentioned resolution of September
8, 1972 modifying the injunction previously issued on August 8,
1967, and, more importantly, with what We have said the trial court
should have always done pending the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership of the Hodges spouses. In fact, as already stated, that
is the arrangement We are ordering, by this decision, to be
followed. Stated differently, since the questioned orders provide for
joint action by the two administrators, and that is precisely what We
are holding out to have been done and should be done until the two
estates are separated from each other, the said orders must be
affirmed. Accordingly the foregoing assignments of error must be,
as they are hereby overruled.
Assignments of error Numbers LXVIII
to LXXI and LXXIII to LXXVI.
The orders complained of under these assignments of error
commonly deal with expenditures made by appellee Magno, as
Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Hodges, in connection with her
administration thereof, albeit additionally, assignments of error
Numbers LXIX to LXXI put into question the payment of attorneys
fees provided for in the contract for the purpose, as constituting, in
effect, premature advances to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges.
More specifically, assignment Number LXXIII refers to
reimbursement of overtime pay paid to six employees of the court
and three other persons for services in copying the court records to
enable the lawyers of the administration to be fully informed of all
the incidents in the proceedings. The reimbursement was approved
as proper legal expenses of administration per the order of
December 19, 1964, (pp. 221-222, id.) and repeated motions for
reconsideration thereof were denied by the orders of January 9,
1965, (pp. 231-232, id.) October 27, 1965, (p. 277, id.) and
February 15, 1966. (pp. 455-456, id.) On the other hand,
Assignments Numbers LXVIII to LXXI, LXXIV and LXXV question
the trial court's order of November 3, 1965 approving the
agreement of June 6, 1964 between Administratrix Magno and PCIB insists, however, that said agreement of June 6, 1964 is not
James L. Sullivan, attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, as for legal services to the estate but to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, or,
Parties of the First Part, and Attorneys Raul Manglapus and Rizal at most, to both of them, and such being the case, any payment
R. Quimpo, as Parties of the Second Part, regarding attorneys fees under it, insofar as counsels' services would redound to the benefit
for said counsel who had agreed "to prosecute and defend their of the heirs, would be in the nature of advances to such heirs and a
interests (of the Parties of the First Part) in certain cases now premature distribution of the estate. Again, We hold that such
pending litigation in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo —, more posture cannot prevail.
specifically in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672 —" (pp. 126-
129, id.) and directing Administratrix Magno "to issue and sign
Upon the premise We have found plausible that there is an existing
whatever check or checks maybe needed to implement the
estate of Mrs. Hodges, it results that juridically and factually the
approval of the agreement annexed to the motion" as well as the
interests involved in her estate are distinct and different from those
"administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges — to countersign the
involved in her estate of Hodges and vice versa. Insofar as the
said check or checks as the case maybe." (pp. 313-320, id.),
matters related exclusively to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB, as
reconsideration of which order of approval was denied in the order
administrator of the estate of Hodges, is a complete stranger and it
of February 16, 1966, (p. 456, id.) Assignment Number LXXVI
is without personality to question the actuations of the administratrix
imputes error to the lower court's order of October 27, 1965,
thereof regarding matters not affecting the estate of Hodges.
already referred to above, insofar as it orders that "PCIB should
Actually, considering the obviously considerable size of the estate
counter sign the check in the amount of P250 in favor of
of Mrs. Hodges, We see no possible cause for apprehension that
Administratrix Avelina A. Magno as her compensation as
when the two estates are segregated from each other, the amount
administratrix of Linnie Jane Hodges estate chargeable to the
of attorney's fees stipulated in the agreement in question will
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges only." (p. 294, id.)
prejudice any portion that would correspond to Hodges' estate.
Main contention again of appellant PCIB in regard to these eight
And as regards the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges who ought to be the
assigned errors is that there is no such estate as the estate of Mrs.
ones who should have a say on the attorney's fees and other
Hodges for which the questioned expenditures were made, hence
expenses of administration assailed by PCIB, suffice it to say that
what were authorized were in effect expenditures from the estate of
they appear to have been duly represented in the agreement itself
Hodges. As We have already demonstrated in Our resolution above
by their attorney-in-fact, James L. Sullivan and have not otherwise
of the petition for certiorari and prohibition, this posture is incorrect.
interposed any objection to any of the expenses incurred by Magno
Indeed, in whichever way the remaining issues between the parties
questioned by PCIB in these appeals. As a matter of fact, as
in these cases are ultimately resolved, 10 the final result will surely
ordered by the trial court, all the expenses in question, including the
be that there are properties constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges
attorney's fees, may be paid without awaiting the determination and
of which Magno is the current administratrix. It follows, therefore,
segregation of the estate of Mrs. Hodges.
that said appellee had the right, as such administratrix, to hire the
persons whom she paid overtime pay and to be paid for her own
services as administratrix. That she has not yet collected and is not Withal, the weightiest consideration in connection with the point
collecting amounts as substantial as that paid to or due appellant under discussion is that at this stage of the controversy among the
PCIB is to her credit. parties herein, the vital issue refers to the existence or non-
existence of the estate of Mrs. Hodges. In this respect, the interest
of respondent Magno, as the appointed administratrix of the said
Of course, she is also entitled to the services of counsel and to that
estate, is to maintain that it exists, which is naturally common and
end had the authority to enter into contracts for attorney's fees in
identical with and inseparable from the interest of the brothers and
the manner she had done in the agreement of June 6, 1964. And as
sisters of Mrs. Hodges. Thus, it should not be wondered why both
regards to the reasonableness of the amount therein stipulated, We
Magno and these heirs have seemingly agreed to retain but one
see no reason to disturb the discretion exercised by the probate
counsel. In fact, such an arrangement should be more convenient
court in determining the same. We have gone over the agreement,
and economical to both. The possibility of conflict of interest
and considering the obvious size of the estate in question and the
between Magno and the heirs of Mrs. Hodges would be, at this
nature of the issues between the parties as well as the professional
stage, quite remote and, in any event, rather insubstantial. Besides,
standing of counsel, We cannot say that the fees agreed upon
should any substantial conflict of interest between them arise in the
require the exercise by the Court of its inherent power to reduce it.
future, the same would be a matter that the probate court can very
well take care of in the course of the independent proceedings in
Case No. 1307 after the corresponding segregation of the two
subject estates. We cannot perceive any cogent reason why, at this
stage, the estate and the heirs of Mrs. Hodges cannot be
represented by a common counsel.
Now, as to whether or not the portion of the fees in question that
should correspond to the heirs constitutes premature partial
distribution of the estate of Mrs. Hodges is also a matter in which
neither PCIB nor the heirs of Hodges have any interest. In any
event, since, as far as the records show, the estate has no creditors
and the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes, except those
of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, have already been
paid, 11 no prejudice can caused to anyone by the comparatively
small amount of attorney's fees in question. And in this connection,
it may be added that, although strictly speaking, the attorney's fees
of the counsel of an administrator is in the first instance his
personal responsibility, reimbursable later on by the estate, in the
final analysis, when, as in the situation on hand, the attorney-in-fact
of the heirs has given his conformity thereto, it would be idle effort
to inquire whether or not the sanction given to said fees by the
probate court is proper.
For the foregoing reasons, Assignments of Error LXVIII to LXXI and
LXXIII to LXXVI should be as they are hereby overruled.
Assignments of error I to IV,
XIII to XV, XXII to XXV, XXXV
to XXX VI, XLI to XLIII and L.
These assignments of error deal with the approval by the trial court
of various deeds of sale of real properties registered in the name of
Hodges but executed by appellee Magno, as Administratrix of the
Estate of Mrs. Hodges, purportedly in implementation of
corresponding supposed written "Contracts to Sell" previously
executed by Hodges during the interim between May 23, 1957,
when his wife died, and December 25, 1962, the day he died. As
stated on pp. 118-120 of appellant's main brief, "These are: the,
contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges,
and the appellee, Pepito G. Iyulores executed on February 5, 1961;
the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton
Hodges, and the appellant Esperidion Partisala, executed on April
20, 1960; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles
Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Winifredo C. Espada, executed
on April 18, 1960; the contract to sell between the deceased,
Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Rosario Alingasa,
executed on August 25, 1958; the contract to sell between the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Lorenzo
Carles, executed on June 17, 1958; the contract to sell between the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Salvador S. Consequently, the payments made by the appellees should be
Guzman, executed on September 13, 1960; the contract to sell considered as payments to the estate of Mrs. Hodges which is to be
between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, distributed and partitioned among her heirs specified in the will.
Florenia Barrido, executed on February 21, 1958; the contract to
sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the
The five deeds of sale predicated on contracts to sell executed
appellee, Purificacion Coronado, executed on August 14, 1961; the
Hodges during the lifetime of his wife, present a different situation.
contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges,
At first blush, it would appear that as to them, PCIB's position has
and the appellee, Graciano Lucero, executed on November 27,
some degree of plausibility. Considering, however, that the
1961; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton
adoption of PCIB's theory would necessarily have tremendous
Hodges, and the appellee, Ariteo Thomas Jamir, executed on May
repercussions and would bring about considerable disturbance of
26, 1961; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles
property rights that have somehow accrued already in favor of
Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Melquiades Batisanan,
innocent third parties, the five purchasers aforenamed, the Court is
executed on June 9, 1959; the contract to sell between the
inclined to take a pragmatic and practical view of the legal situation
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Belcezar
involving them by overlooking the possible technicalities in the way,
Causing, executed on February 10, 1959 and the contract to sell
the non-observance of which would not, after all, detract materially
between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee,
from what should substantially correspond to each and all of the
Adelfa Premaylon, executed on October 31, 1959, re Title No.
parties concerned.
13815."
To start with, these contracts can hardly be ignored. Bona fide third
Relative to these sales, it is the position of appellant PCIB that,
parties are involved; as much as possible, they should not be made
inasmuch as pursuant to the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband was
to suffer any prejudice on account of judicial controversies not of
to have dominion over all her estate during his lifetime, it was as
their own making. What is more, the transactions they rely on were
absolute owner of the properties respectively covered by said sales
submitted by them to the probate court for approval, and from
that he executed the aforementioned contracts to sell, and
already known and recorded actuations of said court then, they had
consequently, upon his death, the implementation of said contracts
reason to believe that it had authority to act on their motions, since
may be undertaken only by the administrator of his estate and not
appellee Magno had, from time to time prior to their transactions
by the administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges. Basically, the
with her, been allowed to act in her capacity as administratrix of one
same theory is invoked with particular reference to five other sales,
of the subject estates either alone or conjointly with PCIB. All the
in which the respective "contracts to sell" in favor of these appellees
sales in question were executed by Magno in 1966 already, but
were executed by Hodges before the death of his wife, namely,
before that, the court had previously authorized or otherwise
those in favor of appellee Santiago Pacaonsis, Alfredo Catedral,
sanctioned expressly many of her act as administratrix involving
Jose Pablico, Western Institute of Technology and Adelfa
expenditures from the estate made by her either conjointly with or
Premaylon.
independently from PCIB, as Administrator of the Estate of Hodges.
Thus, it may be said that said buyers-appellees merely followed
Anent those deeds of sale based on promises or contracts to sell precedents in previous orders of the court. Accordingly, unless the
executed by Hodges after the death of his wife, those enumerated impugned orders approving those sales indubitably suffer from
in the quotation in the immediately preceding paragraph, it is quite some clearly fatal infirmity the Court would rather affirm them.
obvious that PCIB's contention cannot be sustained. As already
explained earlier, 11* all proceeds of remunerative transfers or
It is quite apparent from the record that the properties covered by
dispositions made by Hodges after the death of his wife should be
said sales are equivalent only to a fraction of what should constitute
deemed as continuing to be parts of her estate and, therefore,
the estate of Mrs. Hodges, even if it is assumed that the same
subject to the terms of her will in favor of her brothers and sisters, in
would finally be held to be only one-fourth of the conjugal properties
the sense that should there be no showing that such proceeds,
of the spouses as of the time of her death or, to be more exact,
whether in cash or property have been subsequently conveyed or
one-half of her estate as per the inventory submitted by Hodges as
assigned subsequently by Hodges to any third party by acts inter
executor, on May 12, 1958. In none of its numerous, varied and
vivos with the result that they could not thereby belong to him
voluminous pleadings, motions and manifestations has PCIB
anymore at the time of his death, they automatically became part of
claimed any possibility otherwise. Such being the case, to avoid
the inheritance of said brothers and sisters. The deeds here in
any conflict with the heirs of Hodges, the said properties covered by
question involve transactions which are exactly of this nature.
the questioned deeds of sale executed by appellee Magno may be
treated as among those corresponding to the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, which would have been actually under her control and
administration had Hodges complied with his duty to liquidate the
conjugal partnership. Viewing the situation in that manner, the only
ones who could stand to be prejudiced by the appealed orders
referred to in the assignment of errors under discussion and who
could, therefore, have the requisite interest to question them would
be only the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, definitely not PCIB.
It is of no moment in what capacity Hodges made the "contracts to
sell' after the death of his wife. Even if he had acted as executor of
the will of his wife, he did not have to submit those contracts to the
court nor follow the provisions of the rules, (Sections 2, 4, 5, 6, 8
and 9 of Rule 89 quoted by appellant on pp. 125 to 127 of its brief)
for the simple reason that by the very orders, much relied upon by
appellant for other purposes, of May 27, 1957 and December 14,
1957, Hodges was "allowed or authorized" by the trial court "to
continue the business in which he was engaged and to perform
acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living",
(Order of May 27) which according to the motion on which the court
acted was "of buying and selling personal and real properties", and
"to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages
of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in
consonance with the wishes conveyed in the last will and testament
of the latter." (Order of December 14) In other words, if Hodges
acted then as executor, it can be said that he had authority to do so
by virtue of these blanket orders, and PCIB does not question the
legality of such grant of authority; on the contrary, it is relying on the
terms of the order itself for its main contention in these cases. On
the other hand, if, as PCIB contends, he acted as heir-adjudicatee,
the authority given to him by the aforementioned orders would still
suffice.
As can be seen, therefore, it is of no moment whether the
"contracts to sell" upon which the deeds in question were based
were executed by Hodges before or after the death of his wife. In a
word, We hold, for the reasons already stated, that the properties
covered by the deeds being assailed pertain or should be deemed
as pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges; hence, any supposed
irregularity attending the actuations of the trial court may be invoked
only by her heirs, not by PCIB, and since the said heirs are not
objecting, and the defects pointed out not being strictly jurisdictional
in nature, all things considered, particularly the unnecessary
disturbance of rights already created in favor of innocent third
parties, it is best that the impugned orders are not disturbed.
In view of these considerations, We do not find sufficient merit in
the assignments of error under discussion.
Assignments of error V to VIII,
XVI to XVIII, XXVI to XXIX, XXXVII
to XXXVIII, XLIV to XLVI and LI.
All these assignments of error commonly deal with alleged non-
fulfillment by the respective vendees, appellees herein, of the terms
and conditions embodied in the deeds of sale referred to in the
assignments of error just discussed. It is claimed that some of them
never made full payments in accordance with the respective
contracts to sell, while in the cases of the others, like Lorenzo
Carles, Jose Pablico, Alfredo Catedral and Salvador S. Guzman,
the contracts with them had already been unilaterally cancelled by
PCIB pursuant to automatic rescission clauses contained in them,
in view of the failure of said buyers to pay arrearages long overdue.
But PCIB's posture is again premised on its assumption that the
properties covered by the deeds in question could not pertain to the
estate of Mrs. Hodges. We have already held above that, it being
evident that a considerable portion of the conjugal properties, much
more than the properties covered by said deeds, would inevitably
constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges, to avoid unnecessary legal
complications, it can be assumed that said properties form part of
such estate. From this point of view, it is apparent again that the
questions, whether or not it was proper for appellee Magno to have
disregarded the cancellations made by PCIB, thereby reviving the
rights of the respective buyers-appellees, and, whether or not the
rules governing new dispositions of properties of the estate were
strictly followed, may not be raised by PCIB but only by the heirs of
Mrs. Hodges as the persons designated to inherit the same, or
perhaps the government because of the still unpaid inheritance
taxes. But, again, since there is no pretense that any objections
were raised by said parties or that they would necessarily be
prejudiced, the contentions of PCIB under the instant assignments
of error hardly merit any consideration.
Assignments of error IX to XII, XIX
to XXI, XXX to XXIV, XXXIX to XL,
XLVII to XLIX, LII and LIII to LXI.
PCIB raises under these assignments of error two issues which
according to it are fundamental, namely: (1) that in approving the
deeds executed by Magno pursuant to contracts to sell already
cancelled by it in the performance of its functions as administrator
of the estate of Hodges, the trial court deprived the said estate of
the right to invoke such cancellations it (PCIB) had made and (2)
that in so acting, the court "arrogated unto itself, while acting as a
probate court, the power to determine the contending claims of third
parties against the estate of Hodges over real property," since it has
in effect determined whether or not all the terms and conditions of
the respective contracts to sell executed by Hodges in favor of the
buyers-appellees concerned were complied with by the latter. What
is worse, in the view of PCIB, is that the court has taken the word of
the appellee Magno, "a total stranger to his estate as determinative
of the issue".
Actually, contrary to the stand of PCIB, it is this last point regarding
appellee Magno's having agreed to ignore the cancellations made
by PCIB and allowed the buyers-appellees to consummate the
sales in their favor that is decisive. Since We have already held that
the properties covered by the contracts in question should be
deemed to be portions of the estate of Mrs. Hodges and not that of
Hodges, it is PCIB that is a complete stranger in these incidents.
Considering, therefore, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges and her heirs
who are the real parties in interest having the right to oppose the
consummation of the impugned sales are not objecting, and that
they are the ones who are precisely urging that said sales be
sanctioned, the assignments of error under discussion have no
basis and must accordingly be as they are hereby overruled.
With particular reference to assignments LIII to LXI, assailing the
orders of the trial court requiring PCIB to surrender the respective
owner's duplicate certificates of title over the properties covered by
the sales in question and otherwise directing the Register of Deeds
of Iloilo to cancel said certificates and to issue new transfer
certificates of title in favor of the buyers-appellees, suffice it to say
that in the light of the above discussion, the trial court was within its
rights to so require and direct, PCIB having refused to give way, by
withholding said owners' duplicate certificates, of the corresponding
registration of the transfers duly and legally approved by the court.
Assignments of error LXII to LXVII
All these assignments of error commonly deal with the appeal
against orders favoring appellee Western Institute of Technology.
As will be recalled, said institute is one of the buyers of real
property covered by a contract to sell executed by Hodges prior to
the death of his wife. As of October, 1965, it was in arrears in the
total amount of P92,691.00 in the payment of its installments on
account of its purchase, hence it received under date of October 4,
1965 and October 20, 1965, letters of collection, separately and
respectively, from PCIB and appellee Magno, in their respective
capacities as administrators of the distinct estates of the Hodges
spouses, albeit, while in the case of PCIB it made known that "no
other arrangement can be accepted except by paying all your past
due account", on the other hand, Magno merely said she would
"appreciate very much if you can make some remittance to bring
this account up-to-date and to reduce the amount of the obligation."
(See pp. 295-311, Green R. on A.) On November 3, 1965, the
Institute filed a motion which, after alleging that it was ready and
willing to pay P20,000 on account of its overdue installments but
uncertain whether it should pay PCIB or Magno, it prayed that it be
"allowed to deposit the aforesaid amount with the court pending
resolution of the conflicting claims of the administrators." Acting on
this motion, on November 23, 1965, the trial court issued an order,
already quoted in the narration of facts in this opinion, holding that
payment to both or either of the two administrators is "proper and
legal", and so "movant — can pay to both estates or either of them",
considering that "in both cases (Special Proceedings 1307 and
1672) there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution
of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto."
The arguments under the instant assignments of error revolve
around said order. From the procedural standpoint, it is claimed that
PCIB was not served with a copy of the Institute's motion, that said
motion was heard, considered and resolved on November 23,
1965, whereas the date set for its hearing was November 20, 1965,
and that what the order grants is different from what is prayed for in
the motion. As to the substantive aspect, it is contended that the
matter treated in the motion is beyond the jurisdiction of the probate
court and that the order authorized payment to a person other than
the administrator of the estate of Hodges with whom the Institute
had contracted.
The procedural points urged by appellant deserve scant
consideration. We must assume, absent any clear proof to the
contrary, that the lower court had acted regularly by seeing to it that
appellant was duly notified. On the other hand, there is nothing
irregular in the court's having resolved the motion three days after
the date set for hearing the same. Moreover, the record reveals that
appellants' motion for reconsideration wherein it raised the same
points was denied by the trial court on March 7, 1966 (p. 462,
Green R. on A.) Withal, We are not convinced that the relief granted
is not within the general intent of the Institute's motion.
Insofar as the substantive issues are concerned, all that need be
said at this point is that they are mere reiterations of contentions
We have already resolved above adversely to appellants' position.
Incidentally, We may add, perhaps, to erase all doubts as to the
propriety of not disturbing the lower court's orders sanctioning the
sales questioned in all these appeal s by PCIB, that it is only when
one of the parties to a contract to convey property executed by a
deceased person raises substantial objections to its being
implemented by the executor or administrator of the decedent's
estate that Section 8 of Rule 89 may not apply and, consequently,
the matter has, to be taken up in a separate action outside of the
probate court; but where, as in the cases of the sales herein
involved, the interested parties are in agreement that the
conveyance be made, it is properly within the jurisdiction of the
probate court to give its sanction thereto pursuant to the provisions
of the rule just mentioned. And with respect to the supposed
automatic rescission clauses contained in the contracts to sell
executed by Hodges in favor of herein appellees, the effect of said
clauses depend on the true nature of the said contracts, despite the
nomenclature appearing therein, which is not controlling, for if they
amount to actual contracts of sale instead of being mere unilateral
accepted "promises to sell", (Art. 1479, Civil Code of the
Philippines, 2nd paragraph) thepactum commissorium or the
automatic rescission provision would not operate, as a matter of
public policy, unless there has been a previous notarial or judicial
demand by the seller (10 Manresa 263, 2nd ed.) neither of which
have been shown to have been made in connection with the
transactions herein involved.
Consequently, We find no merit in the assignments of error
Number LXII to LXVII.
SUMMARY
Considering the fact that this decision is unusually extensive and
that the issues herein taken up and resolved are rather numerous
and varied, what with appellant making seventy-eight assignments
of error affecting no less than thirty separate orders of the court a
quo, if only to facilitate proper understanding of the import and
extent of our rulings herein contained, it is perhaps desirable that a
brief restatement of the whole situation be made together with our
conclusions in regard to its various factual and legal aspects. .
The instant cases refer to the estate left by the late Charles Newton
Hodges as well as that of his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, who
predeceased him by about five years and a half. In their respective
wills which were executed on different occasions, each one of them
provided mutually as follows: "I give, devise and bequeath all of the
rest, residue and remainder (after funeral and administration
expenses, taxes and debts) of my estate, both real and personal,
wherever situated or located, to my beloved (spouse) to have and
to hold unto (him/her) — during (his/her) natural lifetime", subject to
the condition that upon the death of whoever of them survived the
other, the remainder of what he or she would inherit from the other
is "give(n), devise(d) and bequeath(ed)" to the brothers and sisters
of the latter.
Mrs. Hodges died first, on May 23, 1957. Four days later, on May
27, Hodges was appointed special administrator of her estate, and
in a separate order of the same date, he was "allowed or authorized
to continue the business in which he was engaged, (buying and
selling personal and real properties) and to perform acts which he
had been doing while the deceased was living." Subsequently, on
December 14, 1957, after Mrs. Hodges' will had been probated and
Hodges had been appointed and had qualified as Executor thereof,
upon his motion in which he asserted that he was "not only part
owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to
all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", the trial
court ordered that "for the reasons stated in his motion dated
December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken, ... all the
sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by
the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor,
Charles Newton Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said
Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the
said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes
contained in the last will and testament of the latter."
Annually thereafter, Hodges submitted to the court the
corresponding statements of account of his administration, with the
particularity that in all his motions, he always made it point to urge
the that "no person interested in the Philippines of the time and
place of examining the herein accounts be given notice as herein
executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased in
accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the
Honorable Court." All said accounts approved as prayed for.
Nothing else appears to have been done either by the court a
quo or Hodges until December 25, 1962. Importantly to be the
provision in the will of Mrs. Hodges that her share of the conjugal
partnership was to be inherited by her husband "to have and to hold
unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime" and that "at
the death of my said husband, I give, devise and bequeath all the
rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal,
wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my
brothers and sisters, share and share alike", which provision
naturally made it imperative that the conjugal partnership be
promptly liquidated, in order that the "rest, residue and remainder"
of his wife's share thereof, as of the time of Hodges' own death,
may be readily known and identified, no such liquidation was ever
undertaken. The record gives no indication of the reason for such
omission, although relatedly, it appears therein:
1. That in his annual statement submitted to
the court of the net worth of C. N. Hodges and
the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, Hodges
repeatedly and consistently reported the
combined income of the conjugal partnership
and then merely divided the same equally
between himself and the estate of the
 deceased wife, and, more importantly, he also,
as consistently, filed corresponding separate
income tax returns for each calendar year for
each resulting half of such combined income,
thus reporting that the estate of Mrs. Hodges
had its own income distinct from his own.
2. That when the court a quo happened to
inadvertently omit in its order probating the will
of Mrs. Hodges, the name of one of her
brothers, Roy Higdon then already deceased,
Hodges lost no time in asking for the proper
correction "in order that the heirs of deceased
Roy Higdon may not think or believe they were
omitted, and that they were really interested in
the estate of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges".
3. That in his aforementioned motion of
December 11, 1957, he expressly stated that
"deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no
descendants or ascendants except brothers
and sisters and herein petitioner as the
surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the
decedent", thereby indicating that he was not
excluding his wife's brothers and sisters from
the inheritance.
4. That Hodges allegedly made statements and
manifestations to the United States inheritance
tax authorities indicating that he had renounced
his inheritance from his wife in favor of her
other heirs, which attitude he is supposed to
have reiterated or ratified in an alleged affidavit
subscribed and sworn to here in the Philippines
and in which he even purportedly stated that
his reason for so disclaiming and renouncing
his rights under his wife's will was to "absolve
(him) or (his) estate from any liability for the
payment of income taxes on income which has
accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges",
his wife, since her death.
On said date, December 25, 1962, Hodges died. The very next day,
upon motion of herein respondent and appellee, Avelina A. Magno,
she was appointed by the trial court as Administratrix of the Testate
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings No. 1307
and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton
Hodges, "in the latter case, because the last will of said Charles
Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe and that the real
and personal properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or
go to waste, unless Special Administratrix is appointed," (Order of
December 26, 1962, p. 27, Yellow R. on A.) although, soon enough,
on December 29, 1962, a certain Harold K. Davies was appointed
as her Co-Special Administrator, and when Special Proceedings
No. 1672, Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, was opened,
Joe Hodges, as next of kin of the deceased, was in due time
appointed as Co-Administrator of said estate together with Atty.
Fernando P. Mirasol, to replace Magno and Davies, only to be in
turn replaced eventually by petitioner PCIB alone.
At the outset, the two probate proceedings appear to have been
proceeding jointly, with each administrator acting together with the
other, under a sort of modus operandi. PCIB used to secure at the
beginning the conformity to and signature of Magno in transactions
it wanted to enter into and submitted the same to the court for
approval as their joint acts. So did Magno do likewise. Somehow,
however, differences seem to have arisen, for which reason, each
of them began acting later on separately and independently of each
other, with apparent sanction of the trial court. Thus, PCIB had its
own lawyers whom it contracted and paid handsomely, conducted
the business of the estate independently of Magno and otherwise
acted as if all the properties appearing in the name of Charles
Newton Hodges belonged solely and only to his estate, to the
exclusion of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, without
considering whether or not in fact any of said properties
corresponded to the portion of the conjugal partnership pertaining
to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. On the other hand, Magno made her
own expenditures, hired her own lawyers, on the premise that there
is such an estate of Mrs. Hodges, and dealth with some of the
properties, appearing in the name of Hodges, on the assumption
that they actually correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. All of
these independent and separate actuations of the two
administrators were invariably approved by the trial court upon
submission. Eventually, the differences reached a point wherein
Magno, who was more cognizant than anyone else about the ins
and outs of the businesses and properties of the deceased spouses
because of her long and intimate association with them, made it
difficult for PCIB to perform normally its functions as administrator
separately from her. Thus, legal complications arose and the
present judicial controversies came about.
Predicating its position on the tenor of the orders of May 27 and
December 14, 1957 as well as the approval by the court a quo of
the annual statements of account of Hodges, PCIB holds to the
view that the estate of Mrs. Hodges has already been in effect
closed with the virtual adjudication in the mentioned orders of her
whole estate to Hodges, and that, therefore, Magno had already
ceased since then to have any estate to administer and the
brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges have no interests whatsoever
in the estate left by Hodges. Mainly upon such theory, PCIB has
come to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition
praying that the lower court's orders allowing respondent Magno to
continue acting as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges in
Special Proceedings 1307 in the manner she has been doing, as
detailed earlier above, be set aside. Additionally, PCIB maintains
that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will instituting her brothers and
sisters in the manner therein specified is in the nature of a
testamentary substitution, but inasmuch as the purported
substitution is not, in its view, in accordance with the pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code, it is ineffective and may not be
enforced. It is further contended that, in any event, inasmuch as the
Hodges spouses were both residents of the Philippines, following
the decision of this Court in Aznar vs. Garcia, or the case of
Christensen, 7 SCRA 95, the estate left by Mrs. Hodges could not
be more than one-half of her share of the conjugal partnership,
notwithstanding the fact that she was citizen of Texas, U.S.A., in
accordance with Article 16 in relation to Articles 900 and 872 of the
Civil Code. Initially, We issued a preliminary injunction against
Magno and allowed PCIB to act alone.
At the same time PCIB has appealed several separate orders of the
trial court approving individual acts of appellee Magno in her
capacity as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, such as,
hiring of lawyers for specified fees and incurring expenses of
administration for different purposes and executing deeds of sale in
favor of her co-appellees covering properties which are still
registered in the name of Hodges, purportedly pursuant to
corresponding "contracts to sell" executed by Hodges. The said
orders are being questioned on jurisdictional and procedural
grounds directly or indirectly predicated on the principal theory of
appellant that all the properties of the two estates belong already to
the estate of Hodges exclusively.
On the other hand, respondent-appellee Magno denies that the trial
court's orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 were meant to be
finally adjudicatory of the hereditary rights of Hodges and contends
that they were no more than the court's general sanction of past
and future acts of Hodges as executor of the will of his wife in due
course of administration. As to the point regarding substitution, her
position is that what was given by Mrs. Hodges to her husband
under the provision in question was a lifetime usufruct of her share
of the conjugal partnership, with the naked ownership passing
directly to her brothers and sisters. Anent the application of Article
16 of the Civil Code, she claims that the applicable law to the will of
Mrs. Hodges is that of Texas under which, she alleges, there is no
system of legitime, hence, the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less
than her share or one-half of the conjugal partnership properties.
She further maintains that, in any event, Hodges had as a matter of
fact and of law renounced his inheritance from his wife and,
therefore, her whole estate passed directly to her brothers and
sisters effective at the latest upon the death of Hodges.
In this decision, for the reasons discussed above, and upon the
issues just summarized, We overrule PCIB's contention that the
orders of May 27, 1957 and December 14, 1957 amount to an
adjudication to Hodges of the estate of his wife, and We recognize
the present existence of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, as consisting of
properties, which, while registered in that name of Hodges, do
actually correspond to the remainder of the share of Mrs. Hodges in
the conjugal partnership, it appearing that pursuant to the pertinent
provisions of her will, any portion of said share still existing and
undisposed of by her husband at the time of his death should go to
her brothers and sisters share and share alike. Factually, We find
that the proven circumstances relevant to the said orders do not
warrant the conclusion that the court intended to make thereby
such alleged final adjudication. Legally, We hold that the tenor of
said orders furnish no basis for such a conclusion, and what is
more, at the time said orders were issued, the proceedings had not
yet reached the point when a final distribution and adjudication
could be made. Moreover, the interested parties were not duly
notified that such disposition of the estate would be done. At best,
therefore, said orders merely allowed Hodges to dispose of portions
of his inheritance in advance of final adjudication, which is implicitly
permitted under Section 2 of Rule 109, there being no possible
prejudice to third parties, inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges had no
creditors and all pertinent taxes have been paid.
More specifically, We hold that, on the basis of circumstances
presently extant in the record, and on the assumption that Hodges'
purported renunciation should not be upheld, the estate of Mrs.
Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters consists of one-fourth
of the community estate of the spouses at the time of her death,
minus whatever Hodges had gratuitously disposed of therefrom
during the period from, May 23, 1957, when she died, to December
25, 1962, when he died provided, that with regard to remunerative
dispositions made by him during the same period, the proceeds
thereof, whether in cash or property, should be deemed as
continuing to be part of his wife's estate, unless it can be shown
that he had subsequently disposed of them gratuitously.
At this juncture, it may be reiterated that the question of what are
the pertinent laws of Texas and what would be the estate of Mrs.
Hodges under them is basically one of fact, and considering the
respective positions of the parties in regard to said factual issue, it
can already be deemed as settled for the purposes of these cases
that, indeed, the free portion of said estate that could possibly
descend to her brothers and sisters by virtue of her will may not be
less than one-fourth of the conjugal estate, it appearing that the
difference in the stands of the parties has reference solely to the
legitime of Hodges, PCIB being of the view that under the laws of
Texas, there is such a legitime of one-fourth of said conjugal estate
and Magno contending, on the other hand, that there is none. In
other words, hereafter, whatever might ultimately appear, at the
subsequent proceedings, to be actually the laws of Texas on the
matter would no longer be of any consequence, since PCIB would
anyway be in estoppel already to claim that the estate of Mrs.
Hodges should be less than as contended by it now, for admissions
by a party related to the effects of foreign laws, which have to be
proven in our courts like any other controverted fact, create
estoppel.
In the process, We overrule PCIB's contention that the provision in
Mrs. Hodges' will in favor of her brothers and sisters constitutes
ineffective hereditary substitutions. But neither are We sustaining,
on the other hand, Magno's pose that it gave Hodges only a lifetime
usufruct. We hold that by said provision, Mrs. Hodges
simultaneously instituted her brothers and sisters as co-heirs with
her husband, with the condition, however, that the latter would have
complete rights of dominion over the whole estate during his
lifetime and what would go to the former would be only the
remainder thereof at the time of Hodges' death. In other words,
whereas they are not to inherit only in case of default of Hodges, on
the other hand, Hodges was not obliged to preserve anything for
them. Clearly then, the essential elements of testamentary
substitution are absent; the provision in question is a simple case of
conditional simultaneous institution of heirs, whereby the institution
of Hodges is subject to a partial resolutory condition the operative
contingency of which is coincidental with that of the suspensive
condition of the institution of his brothers and sisters-in-law, which
manner of institution is not prohibited by law.
We also hold, however, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by
her brothers and sisters could be more than just stated, but this
would depend on (1) whether upon the proper application of the
principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the
pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that Hodges had no legitime
as contended by Magno, and (2) whether or not it can be held that
Hodges had legally and effectively renounced his inheritance from
his wife. Under the circumstances presently obtaining and in the
state of the record of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in a
position to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of
these two issues, and We, therefore, reserve said issues for further
proceedings and resolution in the first instance by the court a quo,
as hereinabove indicated. We reiterate, however, that pending such
further proceedings, as matters stand at this stage, Our considered
opinion is that it is beyond cavil that since, under the terms of the
will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband could not have anyway legally
adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole share
of their conjugal partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part
thereof during his lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of
which Magno is the uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than
one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, as of the time of
her death, minus what, as explained earlier, have
been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third
persons since then, for even if it were assumed that, as contended
by PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil Code and applying renvoi the
laws of the Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable, such one-
fourth share would be her free disposable portion, taking into
account already the legitime of her husband under Article 900 of the
Civil Code.
The foregoing considerations leave the Court with no alternative
than to conclude that in predicating its orders on the assumption,
albeit unexpressed therein, that there is an estate of Mrs. Hodges
to be distributed among her brothers and sisters and that
respondent Magno is the legal administratrix thereof, the trial court
acted correctly and within its jurisdiction. Accordingly, the petition
for certiorari and prohibition has to be denied. The Court feels
however, that pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
and the determination of the specific properties constituting her
estate, the two administrators should act conjointly as ordered in
the Court's resolution of September 8, 1972 and as further clarified
in the dispositive portion of its decision.
Anent the appeals from the orders of the lower court sanctioning
payment by appellee Magno, as administratrix, of expenses of
administration and attorney's fees, it is obvious that, with Our
holding that there is such an estate of Mrs. Hodges, and for the
reasons stated in the body of this opinion, the said orders should be
affirmed. This We do on the assumption We find justified by the
evidence of record, and seemingly agreed to by appellant PCIB,
that the size and value of the properties that should correspond to
the estate of Mrs. Hodges far exceed the total of the attorney's fees
and administration expenses in question.
With respect to the appeals from the orders approving transactions
made by appellee Magno, as administratrix, covering properties
registered in the name of Hodges, the details of which are related
earlier above, a distinction must be made between those predicated
on contracts to sell executed by Hodges before the death of his
wife, on the one hand, and those premised on contracts to sell
entered into by him after her death. As regards the latter, We hold
that inasmuch as the payments made by appellees constitute
proceeds of sales of properties belonging to the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, as may be implied from the tenor of the motions of May 27
and December 14, 1957, said payments continue to pertain to said
estate, pursuant to her intent obviously reflected in the relevant
provisions of her will, on the assumption that the size and value of
the properties to correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges would
exceed the total value of all the properties covered by the impugned
deeds of sale, for which reason, said properties may be deemed as
pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. And there being no
showing that thus viewing the situation, there would be prejudice to
anyone, including the government, the Court also holds that,
disregarding procedural technicalities in favor of a pragmatic and
practical approach as discussed above, the assailed orders should
be affirmed. Being a stranger to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB
has no personality to raise the procedural and jurisdictional issues
raised by it. And inasmuch as it does not appear that any of the
other heirs of Mrs. Hodges or the government has objected to any
of the orders under appeal, even as to these parties, there exists no
reason for said orders to be set aside.
DISPOSITIVE PART
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is
hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition in G. R. Nos. L-27860
and L-27896, and AFFIRMING, in G. R. Nos. L-27936-37 and the
other thirty-one numbers hereunder ordered to be added after
payment of the corresponding docket fees, all the orders of the trial
court under appeal enumerated in detail on pages 35 to 37 and 80
to 82 of this decision; the existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges, with respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as
administratrix thereof is recognized, and it is declared that, until
final judgment is ultimately rendered regarding (1) the manner of
applying Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines to the
situation obtaining in these cases and (2) the factual and legal issue
of whether or not Charles Newton Hodges had effectively and
legally renounced his inheritance under the will of Linnie Jane
Hodges, the said estate consists of one-fourth of the community
properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the death of the
wife on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had already
gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until
his death, provided, first, that with respect to remunerative
dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall continue to be part of the
wife's estate, unless subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third
parties by the husband, and second, that should the purported
renunciation be declared legally effective, no deductions
whatsoever are to be made from said estate; in consequence, the
preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967, as amended on October 4
and December 6, 1967, is lifted, and the resolution of September 8,
1972, directing that petitioner-appellant PCIB, as Administrator of
the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in Special
Proceedings 1672, and respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in
Special Proceedings 1307, should act thenceforth always
conjointly, never independently from each other, as such
administrators, is reiterated, and the same is made part of this
judgment and shall continue in force, pending the liquidation of the
Separate Opinions
conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses and the
determination and segregation from each other of their respective
estates, provided, that upon the finality of this judgment, the trial
court should immediately proceed to the partition of the presently
combined estates of the spouses, to the end that the one-half share
thereof of Mrs. Hodges may be properly and clearly identified; FERNANDO, J., concurring:
thereafter, the trial court should forthwith segregate the remainder
of the one-fourth herein adjudged to be her estate and cause the I concur on the basis of the procedural pronouncements in the
same to be turned over or delivered to respondent for her exclusive opinion.
administration in Special Proceedings 1307, while the other one-
fourth shall remain under the joint administration of said respondent
and petitioner under a joint proceedings in Special Proceedings TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
1307 and 1672, whereas the half unquestionably pertaining to
Hodges shall be administered by petitioner exclusively in Special I concur in the result of dismissal of the petition for certiorari and
Proceedings 1672, without prejudice to the resolution by the trial prohibition in Cases L-27860 and L-27896 and with the affirmance
court of the pending motions for its removal as administrator12; and of the appealed orders of the probate court in Cases L-27936-37.
this arrangement shall be maintained until the final resolution of the
two issues of renvoi and renunciation hereby reserved for further
hearing and determination, and the corresponding complete I also concur with the portion of the dispositive part of the judgment
segregation and partition of the two estates in the proportions that penned by Mr. Justice Barredo decreeing the lifting of the Court's
may result from the said resolution. writ of preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967 as amended on
October 4, and December 6, 19671 and ordering in lieu thereof that
the Court's resolution of September 8, 19722 which directed
Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a that petitioner-appellant PCIB as administrator of C. N. (Charles
quo are directed to adhere henceforth, in all their actuations in Newton) Hodges' estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 and respondent-
Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, to the views passed and ruled appellee Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of Linnie Jane Hodges'
upon by the Court in the foregoing opinion. estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) should act always conjointly never
independently from each other, as such administrators, is reiterated
Appellant PCIB is ordered to pay, within five (5) days from notice and shall continue in force and made part of the judgment.
hereof, thirty-one additional appeal docket fees, but this decision
shall nevertheless become final as to each of the parties herein It is manifest from the record that petitioner-appellant PCIB's primal
after fifteen (15) days from the respective notices to them hereof in contention in the cases at bar belatedly filed by it with this Court
accordance with the rules. on August 1, 1967 (over ten (10) years after Linnie Jane Hodges'
death on May 23, 1957 and (over five (5) years after her husband
C.N. Hodges' death on December 25, 1962 — during which time
Costs against petitioner-appellant PCIB.
both estates have been pending settlement and distribution to the
decedents' respective rightful heirs all this time up to now) — that
Zaldivar, Castro, Esguerra and Fernandez, JJ., concur. the probate court per its order of December 14, 1957
(supplementing an earlier order of May 25, 1957)3 in granting C. N.
Hodges' motion as Executor of his wife Linnie's estate
Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur in the
result. to continue their "business of buying and selling personal and real
properties" and approving "all sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages" made and to be made by him as such executor under
his obligation to submit his yearly accounts in effect declared him
as sole heir of his wife's estate and nothing remains to be done
except to formally close her estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) as her
estate was thereby merged with his own so that nothing remains of
it that may be adjudicated to her brothers and sisters as her
designated heirs after him,4 — is wholly untenable and deserves
scant consideration.
Aside from having been put forth as an obvious afterthought much
too late in the day, this contention of PCIB that there no longer
exists any separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges after the probate
court's order of December 14, 1957 goes against the very acts and
judicial admissions of C.N. Hodges as her executor whereby he
consistently recognized the separate existence and identity of his
wife's estate apart from his own separate estate and from his own
share of their conjugal partnership and estate and "never
considered the whole estate as a single one belonging exclusively
to himself" during the entire period that he survived her for over five
(5) years up to the time of his own death on December 25,
19625 and against the identical acts and judicial admissions of PCIB
as administrator of C.N. Hodges' estate until PCIB sought in 1966
to take over both estates as pertaining to its sole administration.
PCIB is now barred and estopped from contradicting or taking a
belated position contradictory to or inconsistent with its previous
admissions 6 (as well as those of C.N. Hodges himself in his
lifetime and of whose estate PCIB is merely an administrator)
recognizing the existence and identity of Linnie Jane
Hodges' separate estate and the legal rights and interests therein of
her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs in her will.
PCIB's petition for certiorari and prohibition to declare all acts of the
probate court in Linnie Jane Hodges' estate subsequent to its order
of December 14, 1957 as "null and void for having been issued
without jurisdiction" must therefore be dismissed with the rejection
of its belated and untenable contention that there is no longer any
estate of Mrs. Hodges of which respondent Avelina Magno is the
duly appointed and acting administratrix.
PCIB's appeal7 from the probate court's various orders recognizing
respondent Magno as administratrix of Linnie's estate (Sp. Proc No.
1307) and sanctioning her acts of administration of said estate and
approving the sales contracts executed by her with the various
individual appellees, which involve basically the same primal issue
raised in the petition as to whether there still exists a separate
estate of Linnie of which respondent-appellee Magno may continue
to be the administratrix, must necessarily fail — a result of the
Court's main opinion at bar that there doesexist such an estate and
that the two estates (husband's and wife's) must be
administered cojointly by their respective administrators (PCIB and
Magno).
The dispositive portion of the main opinion
The main opinion disposes that:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING
PREMISES, judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the petition in G. R. Nos. L-27860
and L-27896, and AFFIRMING, in G. R. Nos.
L-27936-37 and the other thirty-one numbers
hereunder ordered to be added after payment
of the corresponding docket fees, all the orders
of the trial court under appeal enumerated in
detail on pages 35 to 37 and 80 to 82 of this
decision:
The existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges, with respondent-appellee
Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix thereof
is recognized, and
It is declared that, until final judgment is
ultimately rendered regarding (1) the manner of
applying Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines to the situation obtaining in these
cases and (2) the factual and legal issues of
whether or not Charles Newton Hodges has
effectively and legally renounced his
inheritance under the will of Linnie Jane
Hodges, the said estate consists of one-
fourthof the community properties of the said
spouses, as of the time of the death of the wife
on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband
had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of
third persons from said date until his death,
provided, first, that with respect
to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds
thereof shall continue to be part of the wife's
estate, unless subsequently disposed
of gratuitously to third parties by the husband,
and second, that should the
purported renunciation be declared legally
effective, no deduction whatsoever are to be
made from said estate;
In consequence, the preliminary injunction of
August 8, 1967, as amended on October 4 and
December 6, 1967, is lifted and
the resolution of September 8, 1972, directing
that petitioner-appellant PCIB, as Administrator
of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton
Hodges in Special Proceedings 1672, and
respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges in Special Proceedings 1307,
should act thenceforth always conjointly, never
independently from each other, as such
administrators, is reiterated, and the same
is made part of this judgment and shall
continue in force, pending the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses
and the determination and segregation from
each other of their respective estates;
provided, that upon the finality of this judgment,
the trial court should immediately proceed to
the partition of the presently combined estates
of the spouses, to the end that the one-
half share thereof of Mrs. Hodges may be
properly and clearly identified;
Thereafter, the trial court should forthwith
segregate the remainder of the one-
fourth herein adjudged to be her estate and
cause the same to be turned over or delivered
to respondent for her exclusive
administration in Special Proceedings 1307,
while the other one-fourth shall remain under
the joint administrative of said respondent and
petitioner under a joint proceedings in Special
Proceedings 1307 and 1672, whereas
the half unquestionably pertaining
to Hodges shall be administered by petitioner
exclusively in Special Proceedings 1672,
without prejudice to the resolution by the trial
court of thepending motions for its removal as
administrator;
And this arrangement shall be
maintained until the final resolution of the two
issues of renvoi and renunciation hereby
reserved for further hearing and determination,
and the corresponding completesegregation
and partition of the two estates in the
 proportions that may result from the said
resolution.
Generally and in all other respects, the parties
and the court a quo are directed to adhere
henceforth, in all their actuations in Special
Proceedings 1307 and 1672, to the views
passed and ruled upon by the Court in the
foregoing opinion.8
Minimum estimate of Mrs. Hodges' estate:
One-fourth of conjugal properties.
The main opinion in declaring the existence of a separate estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges which shall pass to her brothers and sisters
with right of representation (by their heirs) as her duly designated
heirs declares that her estate consists as
a minimum (i.e. assuming (1) that under Article 16 of the Philippine
Civil Code C. N. Hodges as surviving husband was entitled to one-
half of her estate as legitime and (2) that he had not effectively and
legally renouncedhis inheritance under her will) of "one-fourth of the
community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the
death of the wife on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband
had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from
said date until his death," with the proviso that proceeds
of remunerative dispositions or sales for valuable consideration
made by C. N. Hodges after his wife Linnie's death shall continue to
be part of her estate unless subsequently disposed of by
him gratuitously to third parties subject to the condition, however,
that if he is held to have validly and effectively renounced his
inheritance under his wife's will, no deductions of any dispositions
made by Hodges even if gratuitously are to be made from his wife
Linnie's estate which shall pass intact to her brothers and sisters as
her designated heirs called in her will to succeed to her estate upon
the death of her husband C. N. Hodges.
Differences with the main opinion
I do not share the main opinion's view that Linnie Jane Hodges
instituted her husband as her heir under her will "to have dominion
over all her estate during his lifetime ... as absolute owner of the
properties ..."9 and that she bequeathed "the whole of her estate to
be owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir
with absolute dominion over them only during his lifetime, which
means that while he could completely and absolutely dispose of
any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was
not free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might
remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of
that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-
in-law to the inheritance, although vested already upon the death of
Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become operative upon the
occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence
of any remainder of her estate then." 10
As will be amplified hereinafter, I do not subscribe to such a view
that Linnie Jane Hodges willed "full and absolute ownership" and
"absolute dominion" over her estate to her husband, but rather that
she named her husband C. N. Hodges and her brothers and sisters
as instituted heirs with a term under Article 885 of our Civil Code, to
wit, Hodges as instituted heir with a resolutory term whereunder his
right to the succession ceased in diem upon arrival of
the resolutory term of his death on December 25, 1962 and her
brothers and sisters as instituted heirs with a suspensive term
whereunder their right to the succession commenced ex die upon
arrival of the suspensive term of the death of C. N. Hodges on
December 25, 1962.
Hence, while agreeing with the main opinion that the proceeds of all
remunerative dispositions made by C. N. Hodges after his wife's
death remain an integral part of his wife's estate which she willed to
her brothers and sisters, I submit that C. N. Hodges
could not validly make gratuitous dispositions of any part or all of
his wife's estate — "completely and absolutely dispose of any
portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself" in the
language of the main opinion, supra — and thereby render
ineffectual and nugatory her institution of her brothers and sisters
as her designated heirs to succeed to her whole estate "at the
death of (her) husband." If according to the main opinion, Hodges
could not make such gratuitous "complete and absolute
dispositions" of his wife Linnie's estate "mortis causa," it would
seem that by the same token and rationale he was likewise
proscribed by the will from making such dispositions of Linnie's
estate inter vivos.
I believe that the two questions of renvoi and renunciation should
be resolved preferentially and expeditiously by the probate
court ahead of the partition and segregation of the minimum one-
fourth of the conjugal or community properties constituting Linnie
Jane Hodges' separate estate, which task considering that it is now
seventeen (17) years since Linnie Jane Hodges' death and her
conjugal estate with C. N. Hodges has remained unliquidated up to
now might take a similar number of years to unravel with the
numerous items, transactions and details of the sizable estates
involved.
Such partition of the minimum one-fourth would not be final, since if
the two prejudicial questions of renvoi and renunciation were
resolved favorably to Linnie's estate meaning to say that if it should
be held that C. N. Hodges is not entitled to any legitime of her
estate and at any rate he had totally renounced his inheritance
under the will), then Linnie's estate would consist not only of the
minimum one-fourth but one-half of the conjugal or community
properties of the Hodges spouses, which would require again the
partition and segregation of still another one-fourth of said.
properties to complete Linnie's separate estate.
My differences with the main opinion involve further the legal
concepts, effects and consequences of the testamentary
dispositions of Linnie Jane Hodges in her will and the question of
the best to reach a solution of the pressing question of expediting
the closing of the estates which after all do not appear to involve
any outstanding debts nor any dispute between the heirs and
should therefore be promptly settled now after all these years
without any further undue complications and delays and distributed
to the heirs for their full enjoyment and benefit. As no consensus
appears to have been reached thereon by a majority of the Court, I
propose to state views as concisely as possible with the sole end in
view that they may be of some assistance to the probate court and
the parties in reaching an expeditious closing and settlement of the
estates of the Hodges spouses.
Two Assumptions
As indicated above, the declaration of the minimum of Mrs. Hodges'
estate as one-fourth of the conjugal properties is based on two
assumptions most favorable to C. N. Hodges' estate and his heirs,
namely (1) that the probate court must accept the renvoi or
"reference back" 11 allegedly provided by the laws of the State of
Texas (of which state the Hodges spouses were citizens) whereby
the civil laws of the Philippines as the domicile of the Hodges
spouses would govern their succession notwithstanding the
provisions of Article 16 of our Civil Code (which provides that the
national law of the decedents, in this case, of Texas, shall govern
their succession) with the result that her estate would consist of no
more than one-fourth of the conjugal properties since the legitime of
her husband (the other one-fourth of said conjugal properties or
one-half of her estate, under Article 900 of our Civil Code) could not
then be disposed of nor burdened with any condition by her and (2)
that C.N. Hodges had not effectively and legally renounced his
inheritance under his wife's will.
These two assumptions are of course flatly disputed by respondent-
appellee Magno as Mrs. Hodges' administratrix, who avers that the
law of the State of Texas governs her succession and
does not provide for and legitime, hence, her brothers and sisters
are entitled to succeed to the whole of her share of the conjugal
properties which is one-halfthereof and that in any event, Hodges
had totally renounced all his rights under the will.
The main opinion concedes that "(I)n the interest of settling the
estates herein involved soonest, it would be best, indeed, if these
conflicting claims of the parties were determined in these
proceedings." It observes however that this cannot be done due to
the inadequacy of the evidence submitted by the parties in the
probate court and of the parties' discussion, viz, "there is no clear
and reliable proof of what the possibly applicable laws of Texas are.
Then also, the genuineness of the documents relied upon by
respondent Magno [re Hodges' renunciation] is disputed." 12
Hence, the main opinion expressly reserves resolution and
determination on these two conflicting claims and issues which it
deems "are not properly before the Court
now," 13 and specifically holds that "(A)ccordingly, the only question
that remains to be settled in the further proceedings hereby ordered
to be held in the court below is how much more than as fixed above
is the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and this would depend on (1) whether
or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for more,
such as, when there is no legitime provided therein, and (2)
whether or not Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance
from Mrs. Hodges." 14
Suggested guidelines
Considering that the only unresolved issue has thus been narrowed
down and in consonance with the ruling spirit of our probate law
calling for the prompt settlement of the estates of deceased
persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to the residue
by way of inheritance — considering that the estates have been
long pending settlement since 1957 and 1962, respectively — it
was felt that the Court should lay down specific guidelines for the
guidance of the probate court towards the end that it may expedite
the closing of the protracted estates proceedings below to the
mutual satisfaction of the heirs and without need of a dissatisfied
party elevating its resolution of this only remaining issue once more
to this Court and dragging out indefinitely the proceedings.
After all, the only question that remains depends for its
determination on the resolution of the two questions
of renvoiand renunciation, i.e. as to whether C. N. Hodges can
claim a legitime and whether he had renounced the inheritance. But
as already indicated above, the Court without reaching a consensus
which would finally resolve the conflicting claims here and now in
this case opted that "these and other relevant matters should first
be threshed out fully in the trial court in the proceedings hereinafter
to be held for the purpose of ascertaining and/or distributing the
estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her duly
probated will." 15
The writer thus feels that laying down the premises and principles
governing the nature, effects and consequences of Linnie Jane
Hodges' testamentary dispositions in relation to her conjugal
partnership and co-ownership of properties with her husband C. N.
Hodges and "thinking out" the end results, depending on whether
the evidence directed to be formally received by the probate court
would bear out that under renvoi C. N. Hodges was or was not
entitled to claim a legitime of one-half of his wife Linnie's estate
and/or that he had or had not effectively and validly renounced his
inheritance should help clear the decks, as it were, and assist the
probate court in resolving the onlyremaining question of how much
more than the minimum one-fourth of the community properties of
the Hodges spouses herein finally determined should be awarded
as the separate estate of Linnie, particularly since the views
expressed in the main opinion have not gained a consensus of the
Court. Hence, the following suggested guidelines, which needless
to state, represent the personal opinion and views of the writer:
1. To begin with, as pointed out in the main opinion, "according to
Hodges' own inventory submitted by him as executor of the estate
of his wife, practically all their properties were conjugal which
means that the spouses have equal shares therein." 16
2. Upon the death of Mrs. Hodges on May 23, 1957, and the
dissolution thereby of the marriage, the law imposed upon Hodges
as surviving husband the duty of inventorying, administering and
liquidating the conjugal or community property. 17 Hodges failed to
discharge this duty of liquidating the conjugal partnership and
estate. On the contrary, he sought and obtained authorization from
the probate court to continue the conjugal partnership's business of
buying and selling real and personal properties.
In his annual accounts submitted to the probate court as executor
of Mrs. Hodges' estate, Hodges thus consistentlyreported the
considerable combined income (in six figures) of the conjugal
partnership or coownership and then divided the
same equally between himself and Mrs. Hodges' estate and as
consistently filed separate income tax returns and paid the income
taxes for each resulting half of such combined income
corresponding to his own and to Mrs. Hodges' estate. 18
(Parenthetically, he could not in law do this, had he adjudicated
Linnie's entire estate to himself, thus supporting the view advanced
even in the main opinion that "Hodges waived not only his rights to
the fruits but to the properties themselves." 19
By operation of the law of trust 20 as well as by his own
acknowledgment and acts, therefore, all transactions made by
Hodges after his wife's death were deemed for and on behalf of
their unliquidated conjugal partnership and community estate and
were so reported and treated by him.
3. With this premise established that all transactions of Hodges
after his wife's death were for and on behalf of
their unliquidated conjugal partnership and community estate, share
and share alike, it should be clear that no gratuitousdispositions, if
any, made by C. N. Hodges from his wife Linnie's estate should
be deducted from her separateestate as held in the main opinion.
On the contrary, any such gratuitous dispositions should be
charged to his own share of the conjugal estate since he had no
authority or right to make any gratuitous dispositions of Linnie's
properties to the prejudice of her brothers and sisters whom she
called to her succession upon his death, not to mention that the
very authority obtained by him from the probate court per its orders
of May 25, and December 14, 1957 was to continue the conjugal
partnership's business of buying and selling real properties for the
account of their unliquidated conjugal estate and co-ownership,
share and share alike and not to make any free dispositions of
Linnie's estate.
4. All transactions as well after the death on December 25, 1962 of
Hodges himself appear perforce and necessarily to have been
conducted, on the same premise, for and on behalf of
their unliquidated conjugal partnership and/or co-ownership, share
and share alike — since the conjugal partnership remained
unliquidated — which is another way of saying that such
transactions, purchases and sales, mostly the latter, must be
deemed in effect to have been made for the respective estates of
C. N. Hodges and of his wife Linnie Jane Hodges, as both estates
continued to have an equal stake and share in the conjugal
partnership which was not only left unliquidated but continued as a
co-ownership or joint business with the probate court's approval by
Hodges during the five-year period that he survived his wife.
This explains the probate court's action of requiring that deeds of
sale executed by PCIB as Hodges' estate's administrator be
"signed jointly" by respondent Magno as Mrs. Hodges' estate's
administratrix, as well as its order authorizing payment by lot
purchasers from the Hodges to either estate, since "there is as yet
no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to
whomsoever are entitled thereto." 22
And this equally furnishes the rationale of the main opinion for
continued conjoint administration by the administrators of the two
estates of the deceased spouses, "pending the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership," 23since "it is but logical that both estates
should be administered jointly by the representatives of both,
pending their segregation from each other. Particularly ... because
the actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit
groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from
their inheritance." 24 5. Antly by the representatives of both,
pending their segregation from each other. Particularly ... because
the actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit
groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from
their inheritance." 24
5. As stressed in the main opinion, the determination of
the only unresolved issue of how much more than the minimum
of one-fourth of the community or conjugal properties of the Hodges
spouses pertains to Mrs. Hodges' estate depends on the twin
questions of renunciation and renvoi. It directed consequently that
"a joint hearing of the two probate proceedings herein involved" be
held by the probate court for the reception of "further evidence" in
order to finally resolved these twin questions. 25
(a) On the question of renunciation, it is believed that all that the
probate court has to do is to receive formally in evidence the
various documents annexed to respondent Magno's answer at
bar, 26 namely: Copy of the U.S. Estate Tax Return filed on August
8, 1958 by C. N. Hodges for his wife Linnie's estate wherein he
purportedly declared that he was renouncing his inheritance under
his wife's will in favor of her brothers and sisters as co-heirs
designated with him and that it was his "intention (as) surviving
husband of the deceased to distribute the remaining property and
interests of the deceased in their community estate to the devisee
and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and
expenses of administration are finally determined and paid;" 27 and
The affidavit of ratification of such renunciation (which places him
in estoppel) allegedly executed on August 9, 1962 by C. N. Hodges
in Iloilo City wherein he reaffirmed that "... on August 8, 1958,
I renounced and disclaimed any and all right to receive the rents,
emoluments and income from said estate" and further declared that
"(T)he purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and confirm, and I do
hereby ratify and confirm, the declaration made in schedule M of
said return and hereby formally disclaim and renounce any right on
my part to receive any of the said rents, emoluments and
income from the estate of my deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges.
This affidavit is made to absolve me or my estate from any liability
for the payment of income taxes on income which has accrued to
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges since the death of the said Linnie
Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957." 28
(b) On the question of renvoi, all that remains for the probate court
to do is to formally receive in evidence duly authenticated copies of
the laws of the State of Texas governing the succession of Linnie
Jane Hodges and her husband C. N. Hodges as citizens of said
State at the time of their respective deaths on May 23,
1957 and December 25, 1962. 29
6. The text and tenor of the declarations by C. N. Hodges
of renunciation of his inheritance from his wife in favor of her other
named heirs in her will (her brothers and sisters and their
respective heirs) as ratified and reiterated expressly in his affidavit
of renunciation executed four years later for the avowed purpose
of not being held liable for payment of income taxes on income
which has accrued to his wife's estate since her death indicate a
valid and effective renunciation.
Once the evidence has been formally admitted and its genuineness
and legal effectivity established by the probate court, the
renunciation by C. N. Hodges must be given due effect with the
result that C. N. Hodges therefore acquired no part of his
wife's one-half share of the community properties since he removed
himself as an heir by virtue of his renunciation. By simple
substitution then under Articles 857 and 859 of our Civil
Code 30 and by virtue of the will's institution of heirs, since "the heir
originally instituted C. N. Hodges) does not become an heir" 31 by
force of his renunciation, Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters whom
she designated as her heirs upon her husband's death are called
immediately to her succession.
Consequently, the said community and conjugal properties would
then pertain pro indiviso share and share alike to their respective
estates, with each estate, however, shouldering its own expenses
of administration, estate and inheritance taxes, if any remain
unpaid, attorneys' fees and other like expenses and
the net remainder to be adjudicated directly to the decedents'
respective brothers and sisters (and their heirs) as the heirs duly
designated in their respective wills. The question of renvoi becomes
immaterial since most laws and our
laws permit such renunciation of inheritance.
7. If there were no renunciation (or the same may somehow be
declared to have not been valid and effective) by C. N. Hodges of
his inheritance from his wife, however, what would be the
consequence?
(a) If the laws on succession of the State of Texas do provide
for renvoi or "reference back" to Philippine law as the domiciliary
law of the Hodges' spouses governing their succession, then
petitioners' view that Mrs. Hodges' estate would consist only of the
minimum of "one-fourth of the community properties of the said
spouses, as of the time of (her) death on May 23, 1957" would have
to be sustained and C. N. Hodges' estate would consist of three-
fourths of the community properties, comprising his own one-half
(or two-fourths) share and the other fourth of Mrs. Hodges' estate
as the legitime granted him as surviving spouse by Philippine
law (Article 900 of the Civil Code) which could not be disposed of
nor burdened with any condition by Mrs. Hodges as testatrix.
(b) If the laws on succession of the State of Texas do not provide
for such renvoi and respondent Magno's assertion is correct that
the Texas law which would then prevail, provides for no legitime for
C. N. Hodges as the surviving spouse, then respondent Magno's
assertion that Mrs. Hodges' estate would consist of one-half of the
community properties (with the other half pertaining to C. N.
Hodges) would have to be sustained. The community and conjugal
properties would then pertain share and share alike to their
respective estates, with each estate shouldering its own expenses
of administration in the same manner stated in the last paragraph of
paragraph 6 hereof. .
8. As to the nature of the institution of heirs made by Mrs. Hodges
in her will, the main opinion holds that "(T)he brothers and sisters of
Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for Hodges; rather, they are also
heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges," but goes further and
holds that "it was not the usufruct alone of her estate ... that she
bequeathed to Hodges during his lifetime, but the full
ownership thereof, although the same was to last also during his
lifetime only, even as there was no restriction against his disposing
or conveying the whole or any portion thereof anybody other than
himself" and describes Hodges "as universal and sole
heir with absolute dominion over Mrs. Hodges' estate (except over
their Lubbock, Texas property ), 32 adding that "Hodges was not
obliged to preserve anything for them" (referring to Mrs. Hodges'
brothers and sisters as instituted co-heirs). 33
Contrary to this view of the main opinion, the writer submits that the
provisions of Mrs. Hodges' will did not grant to C.N. Hodges "full
ownership" nor "absolute dominion" over her estate, such that he
could as "universal and sole heir" by the mere expedient
of gratuitously disposing to third persons her whole estate during
his lifetime nullify her institution of her brothers and sisters as his
co-heirs to succeed to her whole estate "at the death of (her)
husband," deprive them of any inheritance and make his own
brothers and sisters in effect sole heirs not only of his own estate
but of his wife's estate as well.
Thus, while Linnie Jane Hodges did not expressly name her
brothers and sisters as substitutes for Hodges because she willed
that they would enter into the succession upon his death, still it
cannot be gainsaid, as the main opinion concedes, "that they are
also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject however
to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was
concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference to his
brothers and sisters-in-law." 34
Hence, if Hodges is found to have validly renounced his
inheritance, there would be a substitution of heirs in fact and in law
since Linnie's brothers and sisters as the heirs "simultaneously
instituted" with a suspensive term would be called immediately to
her succession instead of waiting for the arrival of suspensive term
of Hodges' death, since as the heir originally instituted he does not
become an heir by force of his renunciation and therefore they
would "enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally
instituted" (Hodges) under the provisions of Article 857 and 859 of
our Civil Code, supra, 35 thus accelerating their succession to her
estate as a consequence of Hodges' renunciation.
Consequently, Linnie Jane Hodges willed that her husband C.N.
Hodges would "during his natural lifetime ... manage, control,
use and enjoy said estate" and that only "all rents,
emoluments and income" alone shall belong to him. She further
willed that while he could sell and purchase properties of her estate,
and "use any part of the principal estate," such principal
notwithstanding "any changes in the physical properties of said
estate"(i.e. new properties acquired or exchanged) would still
pertain to her estate, which at the time of his death would pass
in full dominion to her brothers and sisters as the ultimate sole and
universal heirs of her estate. 36
The testatrix Linnie Jane Hodges in her will thus principally
provided that "I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue
and remainder of my estate, both personal and real ... to my
beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold
with him ... during his natural lifetime;" 37 that "(he) shall have the
right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his
lifetime, ... to make any changes in the physical properties of said
estate, by sale ... and the purchase of any other or additional
property as he may think best ... . All rents,
emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him and
he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said
estate as he may need or desire, ... he shall not sell or otherwise
dispose of any of the improved property now owned by us, located
at ... City of Lubbock, Texas ... . He shall have the right
to subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein, and may
sell unimproved town lots;" 38 that "(A)t the death of my said
husband, Charles Newton, I give, devise and bequeath all of the
rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and real, ...
to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and
share alike, namely: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon,
Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Roman and Nimroy Higdon;" 39 and
that "(I)n case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters
...prior to the death of my husband ... the heirs of such
deceased brother or sister shall take jointly the share which would
have gone to such brother or sister had she or he survived." 40
Such provisions are wholly consistent with the view already fully
expounded above that all transactions and sales made by
Hodges after his wife Linnie's death were by operation of the law
of trust as well as by his own acknowledgment and acts deemed for
and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership and
community estate, share and share alike, with the
express authorization of the probate court per its orders of May 25,
and December 14, 1957 granting Hodges' motion to continue the
conjugal partnership business of buying and selling real estate even
after her death. By the same token, Hodges could not conceivably
be deemed to have had any authority or right to
dispose gratuitously of any portion of her estate to whose
succession she had called her brothers and sisters upon his death.
9. Such institutions of heirs with a term are expressly recognized
and permitted under Book III, Chapter 2, section 4 of our Civil Code
dealing with "conditional testamentary dispositions and
testamentary dispositions with a term." 41
Thus, Article 885 of our Civil Code expressly provides that:
ART 885. The designation of the day or time
when the effects of the institution of an heir
shall commence or cease shall be valid.
In both cases, the legal heir shall be
considered as called to the succession until the
arrival of the period or its expiration. But in the
first case he shall not enter into possession of
the property until after having given sufficient
security, with the intervention of the instituted
heir.
Accordingly, under the terms of Mrs. Hodges' will, her husband's
right to the succession as the instituted heir ceased in diem, i.e.
upon the arrival of the resolutory term of his death on December 25,
1962, while her brothers' and sisters' right to the succession also as
instituted heirs commenced ex die, i.e. upon the expiration of the
suspensive term (as far as they were concerned) of the death of C.
N. Hodges on December 25, 1962 . 42
As stated in Padilla's treatise on the Civil Code, "A term is a period
whose arrival is certain although the exact date thereof may be
uncertain. A term may have either a suspensive or a resolutory
effect. The designation of the day when the legacy "shall
commence" is ex die, or a term with a suspensive effect, from a
certain day. The designation of the day when the legacy "shall
cease" is in diem or a term with a resolutory effect, until a certain
day." He adds that "A legacy based upon a certain age or upon
the death of a person is not a condition but a term. If the arrival of
the term would commence the right of the heir, it is suspensive. If
the arrival of the term would terminate his right, it is resolutory" and
that "upon the arrival of the period, in case of a suspensive term,
the instituted heir is entitled to the succession, and in case of a
resolutory term, his right terminates." 43
10. The sizable estates herein involved have now been pending
settlement for a considerably protracted period (of seventeen years
counted from Linnie's death in 1957), and all that is left to be done
is to resolve the only remaining issue (involving the two questions
of renunciation and renvoi) hereinabove discussed in order to close
up the estates and finally effect distribution to the deceased
spouses' respective brothers and sisters and their heirs as the heirs
duly instituted in their wills long admitted to probate. Hence, it is
advisable for said instituted heirs and their heirs in turn 44 to come
to terms for the adjudication and distribution to them pro-indiviso of
the up to now unliquidated community properties of the estates of
the Hodges spouses (derived from their unliquidated conjugal
partnership) rather than to get bogged down with the formidable
task of physically segregating and partitioning the two estates with
the numerous transactions, items and details and physical changes
of properties involved. The estates proceedings would thus be
closed and they could then name their respective attorneys-in-fact
to work out the details of segregating, dividing or partitioning
the unliquidated community properties or liquidating them — which
can be done then on their own without further need of intervention
on the part of the probate court as well as allow them meanwhile to
enjoy and make use of the income and cash and liquid assets of
the estates in such manner as may be agreed upon between them.
Such a settlement or modus vivendi between the heirs of the
unliquidated two estates for the mutual benefit of all of them should
not prove difficult, considering that it appears as stated in the main
opinion that 22.968149% of the share or undivided estate of C. N.
Hodges have already been acquired by the heirs of Linnie Jane
Hodges from certain heirs of her husband, while certain other heirs
representing 17.34375% of Hodges' estate were joining cause with
Linnie's heirs in their pending and unresolved motion for the
removal of petitioner PCIB as administrator of Hodges'
estate, 45 apparently impatient with the situation which has
apparently degenerated into a running battle between the
administrators of the two estates to the common prejudice of all the
heirs.
11. As earlier stated, the writer has taken the pain of suggesting
these guidelines which may serve to guide the probate court as well
as the parties towards expediting the winding up and closing of the
estates and the distribution of the net estates to the instituted heirs
and their successors duly entitled thereto. The probate court should
exert all effort towards this desired objective pursuant to the
mandate of our probate law, bearing in mind the Court's admonition
in previous cases that "courts of first instance should exert
themselves to close up estate within twelve months from the time
they are presented, and they may refuse to allow any
compensation to executors and administrators who do not actively
labor to that end, and they may even adopt harsher measures." 46
Timeliness of appeals and imposition of
thirty-one (31) additional docket fees
Two appeals were docketed with this Court, as per the two records
on appeal submitted (one with a green cover and the other with a
yellow cover). As stated at the outset, these appeals involve
basically the same primal issue raised in the petition for certiorari as
to whether there still exists a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
which has to continue to be administered by respondent Magno.
Considering the main opinion's ruling in the affirmative and that her
estate and that of her husband (since they jointly
comprise unliquidated community properties) must be
administered conjointly by their respective administrators (PCIB and
Magno), the said appeals (involving thirty-three different orders of
the probate court approving sales contracts and other acts of
administration executed and performed by respondent Magno on
behalf of Linnie's estate) have been necessarily overruled by the
Court's decision at bar.
(a) The "priority question" raised by respondent Magno as to the
patent failure of the two records on appeal to show on their face
and state the material data that the appeals were timely taken expeditiously resolved or determined in a single special civil action"
within the 30-day reglamentary period as required by Rule 41, (for which a single docket fee is required) as stated in the main
section 6 of the Rules of Court, has been brushed aside by the opinion. 51 Considering the importance of the basic issues and the
main opinion with the statement that it is "not necessary to pass magnitude of the estates involved, however, the writer has pro hac
upon the timeliness of any of said appeals" since they "revolve vice given his concurrence to the assessment of the said thirty-one
around practically the same main issues and ... it is admitted that (31) additional appeal docket fees.
some of them have been timely taken." 47 The main opinion thus
proceeded with the determination of the thirty-three appealed
MAKALINTAL, C.J., concurring:
orders despite the grave defect of the appellant PCIB's records on
appeal and their failure to state the required material data showing
the timeliness of the appeals. I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Teehankee, which in turn
agrees with the dispositive portion of the main opinion of Justice
Barredo insofar as it dismisses the petition for certiorari and
Such disposition of the question of timeliness deemed as
prohibition in Cases L-27860 and L-27896 and affirms the appealed
"mandatory and jurisdictional" in a number of cases merits the
orders of the probate court in cases L-27936-37.
writer's concurrence in that the question raised has been
subordinated to the paramount considerations of substantial justice
and a "liberal interpretation of the rules" applied so as not to However, I wish to make one brief observation for the sake of
derogate and detract from the primary intent and purpose of the accuracy. Regardless of whether or not C. N. Hodges was entitled
rules, viz "the proper and just determination of a litigation"48 — to a legitime in his deceased wife's estate — which question, still to
which calls for "adherence to a liberal construction of the procedural be decided by the said probate court, may depend upon what is the
rules in order to attain their objective of substantial justice and of law of Texas and upon its applicability in the present case — the
avoiding denials of substantial justice due to procedural said estate consists of one-half, not one-fourth, of the conjugal
technicalities." 49 properties. There is neither a minimum of one-fourth nor a
maximum beyond that. It is important to bear this in mind because
the estate of Linnie Hodges consists of her share in the conjugal
Thus, the main opinion in consonance with the same paramount
properties, is still under administration and until now has not been
considerations of substantial justice has likewise overruled
distributed by order of the court.
respondents' objection to petitioner's taking the recourse of "the
present remedy of certiorari and prohibition" — "despite the
conceded availability of appeal" — on the ground that "there is a The reference in both the main and separate opinions to a one-
common thread among the basic issues involved in all these thirty- fourth portion of the conjugal properties as Linnie Hodges' minimum
three appeals — (which) deal with practically the same basic issues share is a misnomer and is evidently meant only to indicate that if
that can be more expeditiously resolved or determined in a single her husband should eventually be declared entitled to a legitime,
special civil action . . . " 50 then the disposition made by Linnie Hodges in favor of her
collateral relatives would be valid only as to one-half of her share,
or one-fourth of the conjugal properties, since the remainder, which
(b) Since the basic issues have been in effect resolved in the
constitutes such legitime, would necessarily go to her husband in
special civil action at bar (as above stated) with the dismissal of the
absolute ownership, unburdened by any substitution, term or
petition by virtue of the Court's judgment as to the continued
condition, resolutory or otherwise. And until the estate is finally
existence of a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
settled and adjudicated to the heirs who may be found entitled to it,
the affirmance as a necessary consequence of the appealed orders
the administration must continue to cover Linnie's entire conjugal
approving and sanctioning respondent Magno's sales contracts and
share.
acts of administration, some doubt would arise as to the propriety of
the main opinion requiring the payment by PCIB of thirty-one
(31) additional appeal docket fees. This doubt is further enhanced
by the question of whether it would make the cost of appeal unduly
expensive or prohibitive by requiring the payment of a separate
appeal docket fee for each incidental order questioned when the
resolution of all such incidental questioned orders involve
basically one and the same main issue (in this case, the existence Separate Opinions
of a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges) and can be more
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
I concur on the basis of the procedural pronouncements in the
opinion.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur in the result of dismissal of the petition for certiorari and
prohibition in Cases L-27860 and L-27896 and with the affirmance
of the appealed orders of the probate court in Cases L-27936-37.
I also concur with the portion of the dispositive part of the judgment
penned by Mr. Justice Barredo decreeing the lifting of the Court's
writ of preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967 as amended on
October 4, and December 6, 19671 and ordering in lieu thereof that
the Court's resolution of September 8, 19722 which directed
that petitioner-appellant PCIB as administrator of C. N. (Charles
Newton) Hodges' estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 and respondent-
appellee Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of Linnie Jane Hodges'
estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) should act always conjointly never
independently from each other, as such administrators, is reiterated
and shall continue in force and made part of the judgment.
It is manifest from the record that petitioner-appellant PCIB's primal
contention in the cases at bar belatedly filed by it with this Court
on August 1, 1967 (over ten (10) years after Linnie Jane Hodges'
death on May 23, 1957 and (over five (5) years after her husband
C.N. Hodges' death on December 25, 1962 — during which time
both estates have been pending settlement and distribution to the
decedents' respective rightful heirs all this time up to now) — that
the probate court per its order of December 14, 1957
(supplementing an earlier order of May 25, 1957)3 in granting C. N.
Hodges' motion as Executor of his wife Linnie's estate
to continue their "business of buying and selling personal and real
properties" and approving "all sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages" made and to be made by him as such executor under
his obligation to submit his yearly accounts in effect declared him
as sole heir of his wife's estate and nothing remains to be done
except to formally close her estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) as her
estate was thereby merged with his own so that nothing remains of
it that may be adjudicated to her brothers and sisters as her
designated heirs after him,4 — is wholly untenable and deserves
scant consideration.
Aside from having been put forth as an obvious afterthought much
too late in the day, this contention of PCIB that there no longer
exists any separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges after the probate
court's order of December 14, 1957 goes against the very acts and
judicial admissions of C.N. Hodges as her executor whereby he
consistently recognized the separate existence and identity of his
wife's estate apart from his own separate estate and from his own
share of their conjugal partnership and estate and "never
considered the whole estate as a single one belonging exclusively
to himself" during the entire period that he survived her for over five
(5) years up to the time of his own death on December 25,
19625 and against the identical acts and judicial admissions of PCIB
as administrator of C.N. Hodges' estate until PCIB sought in 1966
to take over both estates as pertaining to its sole administration.
PCIB is now barred and estopped from contradicting or taking a
belated position contradictory to or inconsistent with its previous
admissions 6 (as well as those of C.N. Hodges himself in his
lifetime and of whose estate PCIB is merely an administrator)
recognizing the existence and identity of Linnie Jane
Hodges' separate estate and the legal rights and interests therein of
her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs in her will.
PCIB's petition for certiorari and prohibition to declare all acts of the
probate court in Linnie Jane Hodges' estate subsequent to its order
of December 14, 1957 as "null and void for having been issued
without jurisdiction" must therefore be dismissed with the rejection
of its belated and untenable contention that there is no longer any
estate of Mrs. Hodges of which respondent Avelina Magno is the
duly appointed and acting administratrix.
PCIB's appeal7 from the probate court's various orders recognizing
respondent Magno as administratrix of Linnie's estate (Sp. Proc No.
1307) and sanctioning her acts of administration of said estate and
approving the sales contracts executed by her with the various
individual appellees, which involve basically the same primal issue
raised in the petition as to whether there still exists a separate
estate of Linnie of which respondent-appellee Magno may continue
to be the administratrix, must necessarily fail — a result of the
Court's main opinion at bar that there doesexist such an estate and
that the two estates (husband's and wife's) must be
administered cojointly by their respective administrators (PCIB and
Magno).
The dispositive portion of the main opinion
The main opinion disposes that:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING
PREMISES, judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the petition in G. R. Nos. L-27860
and L-27896, and AFFIRMING, in G. R. Nos.
L-27936-37 and the other thirty-one numbers
hereunder ordered to be added after payment
of the corresponding docket fees, all the orders
of the trial court under appeal enumerated in
detail on pages 35 to 37 and 80 to 82 of this
decision:
The existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges, with respondent-appellee
Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix thereof
is recognized, and
It is declared that, until final judgment is
ultimately rendered regarding (1) the manner of
applying Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines to the situation obtaining in these
cases and (2) the factual and legal issues of
whether or not Charles Newton Hodges has
effectively and legally renounced his
inheritance under the will of Linnie Jane
Hodges, the said estate consists of one-
fourthof the community properties of the said
spouses, as of the time of the death of the wife
on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband
had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of
third persons from said date until his death,
provided, first, that with respect
to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds
thereof shall continue to be part of the wife's
estate, unless subsequently disposed
of gratuitously to third parties by the husband,
and second, that should the
purported renunciation be declared legally
effective, no deduction whatsoever are to be
made from said estate;
In consequence, the preliminary injunction of
August 8, 1967, as amended on October 4 and
December 6, 1967, is lifted and
the resolution of September 8, 1972, directing
that petitioner-appellant PCIB, as Administrator
of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton
Hodges in Special Proceedings 1672, and
respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges in Special Proceedings 1307,
should act thenceforth always conjointly, never
independently from each other, as such
administrators, is reiterated, and the same
is made part of this judgment and shall
continue in force, pending the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses
and the determination and segregation from
each other of their respective estates;
provided, that upon the finality of this judgment,
the trial court should immediately proceed to
the partition of the presently combined estates
of the spouses, to the end that the one-
half share thereof of Mrs. Hodges may be
properly and clearly identified;
Thereafter, the trial court should forthwith
segregate the remainder of the one-
fourth herein adjudged to be her estate and
cause the same to be turned over or delivered
to respondent for her exclusive
administration in Special Proceedings 1307,
while the other one-fourth shall remain under
the joint administrative of said respondent and
petitioner under a joint proceedings in Special
Proceedings 1307 and 1672, whereas
the half unquestionably pertaining
to Hodges shall be administered by petitioner
exclusively in Special Proceedings 1672,
without prejudice to the resolution by the trial
court of thepending motions for its removal as
administrator;
And this arrangement shall be
maintained until the final resolution of the two
issues of renvoi and renunciation hereby
reserved for further hearing and determination,
and the corresponding completesegregation
and partition of the two estates in the
proportions that may result from the said
resolution.
Generally and in all other respects, the parties
and the court a quo are directed to adhere
henceforth, in all their actuations in Special
Proceedings 1307 and 1672, to the views
passed and ruled upon by the Court in the
foregoing opinion.8
Minimum estimate of Mrs. Hodges' estate:
One-fourth of conjugal properties.
The main opinion in declaring the existence of a separate estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges which shall pass to her brothers and sisters
with right of representation (by their heirs) as her duly designated
heirs declares that her estate consists as
a minimum (i.e. assuming (1) that under Article 16 of the Philippine
Civil Code C. N. Hodges as surviving husband was entitled to one-
half of her estate as legitime and (2) that he had not effectively and
legally renouncedhis inheritance under her will) of "one-fourth of the
community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the
death of the wife on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband
had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from
said date until his death," with the proviso that proceeds
of remunerative dispositions or sales for valuable consideration
made by C. N. Hodges after his wife Linnie's death shall continue to
be part of her estate unless subsequently disposed of by
him gratuitously to third parties subject to the condition, however,
that if he is held to have validly and effectively renounced his
inheritance under his wife's will, no deductions of any dispositions
made by Hodges even if gratuitously are to be made from his wife
Linnie's estate which shall pass intact to her brothers and sisters as
her designated heirs called in her will to succeed to her estate upon
the death of her husband C. N. Hodges.
Differences with the main opinion
I do not share the main opinion's view that Linnie Jane Hodges
instituted her husband as her heir under her will "to have dominion
over all her estate during his lifetime ... as absolute owner of the
properties ..."9 and that she bequeathed "the whole of her estate to
be owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir
with absolute dominion over them only during his lifetime, which
means that while he could completely and absolutely dispose of
any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was
not free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might
remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of
that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-
in-law to the inheritance, although vested already upon the death of
Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become operative upon the
occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence
of any remainder of her estate then." 10
As will be amplified hereinafter, I do not subscribe to such a view
that Linnie Jane Hodges willed "full and absolute ownership" and
"absolute dominion" over her estate to her husband, but rather that
she named her husband C. N. Hodges and her brothers and sisters
as instituted heirs with a term under Article 885 of our Civil Code, to
wit, Hodges as instituted heir with a resolutory term whereunder his
right to the succession ceased in diem upon arrival of
the resolutory term of his death on December 25, 1962 and her
brothers and sisters as instituted heirs with a suspensive term
whereunder their right to the succession commenced ex die upon
arrival of the suspensive term of the death of C. N. Hodges on
December 25, 1962.
Hence, while agreeing with the main opinion that the proceeds of all
remunerative dispositions made by C. N. Hodges after his wife's
death remain an integral part of his wife's estate which she willed to
her brothers and sisters, I submit that C. N. Hodges
could not validly make gratuitous dispositions of any part or all of
his wife's estate — "completely and absolutely dispose of any
portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself" in the
language of the main opinion, supra — and thereby render
ineffectual and nugatory her institution of her brothers and sisters
as her designated heirs to succeed to her whole estate "at the
death of (her) husband." If according to the main opinion, Hodges
could not make such gratuitous "complete and absolute
dispositions" of his wife Linnie's estate "mortis causa," it would
seem that by the same token and rationale he was likewise
proscribed by the will from making such dispositions of Linnie's
estate inter vivos.
I believe that the two questions of renvoi and renunciation should
be resolved preferentially and expeditiously by the probate
court ahead of the partition and segregation of the minimum one-
fourth of the conjugal or community properties constituting Linnie
Jane Hodges' separate estate, which task considering that it is now
seventeen (17) years since Linnie Jane Hodges' death and her
conjugal estate with C. N. Hodges has remained unliquidated up to
now might take a similar number of years to unravel with the
numerous items, transactions and details of the sizable estates
involved.
Such partition of the minimum one-fourth would not be final, since if
the two prejudicial questions of renvoi and renunciation were
resolved favorably to Linnie's estate meaning to say that if it should
be held that C. N. Hodges is not entitled to any legitime of her
estate and at any rate he had totally renounced his inheritance
under the will), then Linnie's estate would consist not only of the
minimum one-fourth but one-half of the conjugal or community
properties of the Hodges spouses, which would require again the
partition and segregation of still another one-fourth of said.
properties to complete Linnie's separate estate.
My differences with the main opinion involve further the legal
concepts, effects and consequences of the testamentary
dispositions of Linnie Jane Hodges in her will and the question of
the best to reach a solution of the pressing question of expediting
the closing of the estates which after all do not appear to involve
any outstanding debts nor any dispute between the heirs and
should therefore be promptly settled now after all these years
without any further undue complications and delays and distributed
to the heirs for their full enjoyment and benefit. As no consensus
appears to have been reached thereon by a majority of the Court, I
propose to state views as concisely as possible with the sole end in
view that they may be of some assistance to the probate court and
the parties in reaching an expeditious closing and settlement of the
estates of the Hodges spouses.
Two Assumptions
As indicated above, the declaration of the minimum of Mrs. Hodges'
estate as one-fourth of the conjugal properties is based on two
assumptions most favorable to C. N. Hodges' estate and his heirs,
namely (1) that the probate court must accept the renvoi or
"reference back" 11 allegedly provided by the laws of the State of
Texas (of which state the Hodges spouses were citizens) whereby
the civil laws of the Philippines as the domicile of the Hodges
spouses would govern their succession notwithstanding the
provisions of Article 16 of our Civil Code (which provides that the
national law of the decedents, in this case, of Texas, shall govern
their succession) with the result that her estate would consist of no
more than one-fourth of the conjugal properties since the legitime of
her husband (the other one-fourth of said conjugal properties or
one-half of her estate, under Article 900 of our Civil Code) could not
then be disposed of nor burdened with any condition by her and (2)
that C.N. Hodges had not effectively and legally renounced his
inheritance under his wife's will.
These two assumptions are of course flatly disputed by respondent-
appellee Magno as Mrs. Hodges' administratrix, who avers that the
law of the State of Texas governs her succession and
does not provide for and legitime, hence, her brothers and sisters
are entitled to succeed to the whole of her share of the conjugal
properties which is one-halfthereof and that in any event, Hodges
had totally renounced all his rights under the will.
The main opinion concedes that "(I)n the interest of settling the
estates herein involved soonest, it would be best, indeed, if these
conflicting claims of the parties were determined in these
proceedings." It observes however that this cannot be done due to
the inadequacy of the evidence submitted by the parties in the
probate court and of the parties' discussion, viz, "there is no clear Hodges and "thinking out" the end results, depending on whether
and reliable proof of what the possibly applicable laws of Texas are. the evidence directed to be formally received by the probate court
Then also, the genuineness of the documents relied upon by would bear out that under renvoi C. N. Hodges was or was not
respondent Magno [re Hodges' renunciation] is disputed." 12 entitled to claim a legitime of one-half of his wife Linnie's estate
and/or that he had or had not effectively and validly renounced his
inheritance should help clear the decks, as it were, and assist the
Hence, the main opinion expressly reserves resolution and
probate court in resolving the onlyremaining question of how much
determination on these two conflicting claims and issues which it
more than the minimum one-fourth of the community properties of
deems "are not properly before the Court
the Hodges spouses herein finally determined should be awarded
now," 13 and specifically holds that "(A)ccordingly, the only question
as the separate estate of Linnie, particularly since the views
that remains to be settled in the further proceedings hereby ordered
expressed in the main opinion have not gained a consensus of the
to be held in the court below is how much more than as fixed above
Court. Hence, the following suggested guidelines, which needless
is the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and this would depend on (1) whether
to state, represent the personal opinion and views of the writer:
or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for more,
such as, when there is no legitime provided therein, and (2)
whether or not Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance 1. To begin with, as pointed out in the main opinion, "according to
from Mrs. Hodges." 14 Hodges' own inventory submitted by him as executor of the estate
of his wife, practically all their properties were conjugal which
means that the spouses have equal shares therein." 16
Suggested guidelines
2. Upon the death of Mrs. Hodges on May 23, 1957, and the
Considering that the only unresolved issue has thus been narrowed
dissolution thereby of the marriage, the law imposed upon Hodges
down and in consonance with the ruling spirit of our probate law
as surviving husband the duty of inventorying, administering and
calling for the prompt settlement of the estates of deceased
liquidating the conjugal or community property. 17 Hodges failed to
persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to the residue
discharge this duty of liquidating the conjugal partnership and
by way of inheritance — considering that the estates have been
estate. On the contrary, he sought and obtained authorization from
long pending settlement since 1957 and 1962, respectively — it
the probate court to continue the conjugal partnership's business of
was felt that the Court should lay down specific guidelines for the
buying and selling real and personal properties.
guidance of the probate court towards the end that it may expedite
the closing of the protracted estates proceedings below to the
mutual satisfaction of the heirs and without need of a dissatisfied In his annual accounts submitted to the probate court as executor
party elevating its resolution of this only remaining issue once more of Mrs. Hodges' estate, Hodges thus consistentlyreported the
to this Court and dragging out indefinitely the proceedings. considerable combined income (in six figures) of the conjugal
partnership or coownership and then divided the
same equally between himself and Mrs. Hodges' estate and as
After all, the only question that remains depends for its
consistently filed separate income tax returns and paid the income
determination on the resolution of the two questions
taxes for each resulting half of such combined income
of renvoiand renunciation, i.e. as to whether C. N. Hodges can
corresponding to his own and to Mrs. Hodges' estate. 18
claim a legitime and whether he had renounced the inheritance. But
(Parenthetically, he could not in law do this, had he adjudicated
as already indicated above, the Court without reaching a consensus
Linnie's entire estate to himself, thus supporting the view advanced
which would finally resolve the conflicting claims here and now in
even in the main opinion that "Hodges waived not only his rights to
this case opted that "these and other relevant matters should first
the fruits but to the properties themselves." 19
be threshed out fully in the trial court in the proceedings hereinafter
to be held for the purpose of ascertaining and/or distributing the
estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her duly By operation of the law of trust 20 as well as by his own
probated will." 15 acknowledgment and acts, therefore, all transactions made by
Hodges after his wife's death were deemed for and on behalf of
their unliquidated conjugal partnership and community estate and
The writer thus feels that laying down the premises and principles
were so reported and treated by him.
governing the nature, effects and consequences of Linnie Jane
Hodges' testamentary dispositions in relation to her conjugal
partnership and co-ownership of properties with her husband C. N.
3. With this premise established that all transactions of Hodges
after his wife's death were for and on behalf of
their unliquidated conjugal partnership and community estate, share
and share alike, it should be clear that no gratuitousdispositions, if
any, made by C. N. Hodges from his wife Linnie's estate should
be deducted from her separateestate as held in the main opinion.
On the contrary, any such gratuitous dispositions should be
charged to his own share of the conjugal estate since he had no
authority or right to make any gratuitous dispositions of Linnie's
properties to the prejudice of her brothers and sisters whom she
called to her succession upon his death, not to mention that the
very authority obtained by him from the probate court per its orders
of May 25, and December 14, 1957 was to continue the conjugal
partnership's business of buying and selling real properties for the
account of their unliquidated conjugal estate and co-ownership,
share and share alike and not to make any free dispositions of
Linnie's estate.
4. All transactions as well after the death on December 25, 1962 of
Hodges himself appear perforce and necessarily to have been
conducted, on the same premise, for and on behalf of
their unliquidated conjugal partnership and/or co-ownership, share
and share alike — since the conjugal partnership remained
unliquidated — which is another way of saying that such
transactions, purchases and sales, mostly the latter, must be
deemed in effect to have been made for the respective estates of
C. N. Hodges and of his wife Linnie Jane Hodges, as both estates
continued to have an equal stake and share in the conjugal
partnership which was not only left unliquidated but continued as a
co-ownership or joint business with the probate court's approval by
Hodges during the five-year period that he survived his wife.
This explains the probate court's action of requiring that deeds of
sale executed by PCIB as Hodges' estate's administrator be
"signed jointly" by respondent Magno as Mrs. Hodges' estate's
administratrix, as well as its order authorizing payment by lot
purchasers from the Hodges to either estate, since "there is as yet
no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to
whomsoever are entitled thereto." 22
And this equally furnishes the rationale of the main opinion for
continued conjoint administration by the administrators of the two
estates of the deceased spouses, "pending the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership," 23since "it is but logical that both estates
should be administered jointly by the representatives of both,
pending their segregation from each other. Particularly ... because
the actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit
groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from
their inheritance." 24 5. Antly by the representatives of both,
pending their segregation from each other. Particularly ... because
the actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit
groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from
their inheritance." 24
5. As stressed in the main opinion, the determination of
the only unresolved issue of how much more than the minimum
of one-fourth of the community or conjugal properties of the Hodges
spouses pertains to Mrs. Hodges' estate depends on the twin
questions of renunciation and renvoi. It directed consequently that
"a joint hearing of the two probate proceedings herein involved" be
held by the probate court for the reception of "further evidence" in
order to finally resolved these twin questions. 25
(a) On the question of renunciation, it is believed that all that the
probate court has to do is to receive formally in evidence the
various documents annexed to respondent Magno's answer at
bar, 26 namely: Copy of the U.S. Estate Tax Return filed on August
8, 1958 by C. N. Hodges for his wife Linnie's estate wherein he
purportedly declared that he was renouncing his inheritance under
his wife's will in favor of her brothers and sisters as co-heirs
designated with him and that it was his "intention (as) surviving
husband of the deceased to distribute the remaining property and
interests of the deceased in their community estate to the devisee
and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and
expenses of administration are finally determined and paid;" 27 and
The affidavit of ratification of such renunciation (which places him
in estoppel) allegedly executed on August 9, 1962 by C. N. Hodges
in Iloilo City wherein he reaffirmed that "... on August 8, 1958,
I renounced and disclaimed any and all right to receive the rents,
emoluments and income from said estate" and further declared that
"(T)he purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and confirm, and I do
hereby ratify and confirm, the declaration made in schedule M of
said return and hereby formally disclaim and renounce any right on
my part to receive any of the said rents, emoluments and
income from the estate of my deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges.
This affidavit is made to absolve me or my estate from any liability
for the payment of income taxes on income which has accrued to
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges since the death of the said Linnie
Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957." 28
(b) On the question of renvoi, all that remains for the probate court
to do is to formally receive in evidence duly authenticated copies of
the laws of the State of Texas governing the succession of Linnie
Jane Hodges and her husband C. N. Hodges as citizens of said
State at the time of their respective deaths on May 23,
1957 and December 25, 1962. 29
6. The text and tenor of the declarations by C. N. Hodges
of renunciation of his inheritance from his wife in favor of her other
named heirs in her will (her brothers and sisters and their
respective heirs) as ratified and reiterated expressly in his affidavit
of renunciation executed four years later for the avowed purpose
of not being held liable for payment of income taxes on income
which has accrued to his wife's estate since her death indicate a
valid and effective renunciation.
Once the evidence has been formally admitted and its genuineness
and legal effectivity established by the probate court, the
renunciation by C. N. Hodges must be given due effect with the
result that C. N. Hodges therefore acquired no part of his
wife's one-half share of the community properties since he removed
himself as an heir by virtue of his renunciation. By simple
substitution then under Articles 857 and 859 of our Civil
Code 30 and by virtue of the will's institution of heirs, since "the heir
originally instituted C. N. Hodges) does not become an heir" 31 by
force of his renunciation, Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters whom
she designated as her heirs upon her husband's death are called
immediately to her succession.
Consequently, the said community and conjugal properties would
then pertain pro indiviso share and share alike to their respective
estates, with each estate, however, shouldering its own expenses
of administration, estate and inheritance taxes, if any remain
unpaid, attorneys' fees and other like expenses and
the net remainder to be adjudicated directly to the decedents'
respective brothers and sisters (and their heirs) as the heirs duly
designated in their respective wills. The question of renvoi becomes
immaterial since most laws and our
laws permit such renunciation of inheritance.
7. If there were no renunciation (or the same may somehow be
declared to have not been valid and effective) by C. N. Hodges of
his inheritance from his wife, however, what would be the
consequence?
(a) If the laws on succession of the State of Texas do provide
for renvoi or "reference back" to Philippine law as the domiciliary
law of the Hodges' spouses governing their succession, then
petitioners' view that Mrs. Hodges' estate would consist only of the
minimum of "one-fourth of the community properties of the said
spouses, as of the time of (her) death on May 23, 1957" would have
to be sustained and C. N. Hodges' estate would consist of three-
fourths of the community properties, comprising his own one-half
(or two-fourths) share and the other fourth of Mrs. Hodges' estate
as the legitime granted him as surviving spouse by Philippine
law (Article 900 of the Civil Code) which could not be disposed of
nor burdened with any condition by Mrs. Hodges as testatrix.
(b) If the laws on succession of the State of Texas do not provide
for such renvoi and respondent Magno's assertion is correct that
the Texas law which would then prevail, provides for no legitime for
C. N. Hodges as the surviving spouse, then respondent Magno's
assertion that Mrs. Hodges' estate would consist of one-half of the
community properties (with the other half pertaining to C. N.
Hodges) would have to be sustained. The community and conjugal
properties would then pertain share and share alike to their
respective estates, with each estate shouldering its own expenses
of administration in the same manner stated in the last paragraph of
paragraph 6 hereof. .
8. As to the nature of the institution of heirs made by Mrs. Hodges
in her will, the main opinion holds that "(T)he brothers and sisters of
Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for Hodges; rather, they are also
heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges," but goes further and
holds that "it was not the usufruct alone of her estate ... that she
bequeathed to Hodges during his lifetime, but the full
ownership thereof, although the same was to last also during his
lifetime only, even as there was no restriction against his disposing
or conveying the whole or any portion thereof anybody other than
himself" and describes Hodges "as universal and sole
heir with absolute dominion over Mrs. Hodges' estate (except over
their Lubbock, Texas property ), 32 adding that "Hodges was not
obliged to preserve anything for them" (referring to Mrs. Hodges'
brothers and sisters as instituted co-heirs). 33
Contrary to this view of the main opinion, the writer submits that the
provisions of Mrs. Hodges' will did not grant to C.N. Hodges "full
ownership" nor "absolute dominion" over her estate, such that he
could as "universal and sole heir" by the mere expedient
of gratuitously disposing to third persons her whole estate during
his lifetime nullify her institution of her brothers and sisters as his
co-heirs to succeed to her whole estate "at the death of (her)
husband," deprive them of any inheritance and make his own
brothers and sisters in effect sole heirs not only of his own estate
but of his wife's estate as well.
Thus, while Linnie Jane Hodges did not expressly name her
brothers and sisters as substitutes for Hodges because she willed
that they would enter into the succession upon his death, still it
cannot be gainsaid, as the main opinion concedes, "that they are
also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject however
to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was
concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference to his
brothers and sisters-in-law." 34
Hence, if Hodges is found to have validly renounced his
inheritance, there would be a substitution of heirs in fact and in law
since Linnie's brothers and sisters as the heirs "simultaneously
instituted" with a suspensive term would be called immediately to
her succession instead of waiting for the arrival of suspensive term
of Hodges' death, since as the heir originally instituted he does not
become an heir by force of his renunciation and therefore they
would "enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally
instituted" (Hodges) under the provisions of Article 857 and 859 of
our Civil Code, supra, 35 thus accelerating their succession to her
estate as a consequence of Hodges' renunciation.
Consequently, Linnie Jane Hodges willed that her husband C.N.
Hodges would "during his natural lifetime ... manage, control,
use and enjoy said estate" and that only "all rents,
emoluments and income" alone shall belong to him. She further
willed that while he could sell and purchase properties of her estate,
and "use any part of the principal estate," such principal
notwithstanding "any changes in the physical properties of said
estate"(i.e. new properties acquired or exchanged) would still
pertain to her estate, which at the time of his death would pass
in full dominion to her brothers and sisters as the ultimate sole and
universal heirs of her estate. 36
The testatrix Linnie Jane Hodges in her will thus principally
provided that "I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue
and remainder of my estate, both personal and real ... to my
beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold
with him ... during his natural lifetime;" 37 that "(he) shall have the
right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his
lifetime, ... to make any changes in the physical properties of said
estate, by sale ... and the purchase of any other or additional
property as he may think best ... . All rents,
emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him and
he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said
estate as he may need or desire, ... he shall not sell or otherwise
dispose of any of the improved property now owned by us, located
at ... City of Lubbock, Texas ... . He shall have the right
to subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein, and may
sell unimproved town lots;" 38 that "(A)t the death of my said
husband, Charles Newton, I give, devise and bequeath all of the
rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and real, ...
to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and
share alike, namely: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon,
Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Roman and Nimroy Higdon;" 39 and
that "(I)n case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters
...prior to the death of my husband ... the heirs of such
deceased brother or sister shall take jointly the share which would
have gone to such brother or sister had she or he survived." 40
Such provisions are wholly consistent with the view already fully
expounded above that all transactions and sales made by
Hodges after his wife Linnie's death were by operation of the law
of trust as well as by his own acknowledgment and acts deemed for
and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership and
community estate, share and share alike, with the
express authorization of the probate court per its orders of May 25,
and December 14, 1957 granting Hodges' motion to continue the
conjugal partnership business of buying and selling real estate even
after her death. By the same token, Hodges could not conceivably
be deemed to have had any authority or right to
dispose gratuitously of any portion of her estate to whose
succession she had called her brothers and sisters upon his death.
9. Such institutions of heirs with a term are expressly recognized
and permitted under Book III, Chapter 2, section 4 of our Civil Code
dealing with "conditional testamentary dispositions and
testamentary dispositions with a term." 41
Thus, Article 885 of our Civil Code expressly provides that:
ART 885. The designation of the day or time
when the effects of the institution of an heir
shall commence or cease shall be valid.
In both cases, the legal heir shall be
considered as called to the succession until the
arrival of the period or its expiration. But in the
first case he shall not enter into possession of
the property until after having given sufficient
security, with the intervention of the instituted
heir.
Accordingly, under the terms of Mrs. Hodges' will, her husband's
right to the succession as the instituted heir ceased in diem, i.e.
upon the arrival of the resolutory term of his death on December 25,
1962, while her brothers' and sisters' right to the succession also as
instituted heirs commenced ex die, i.e. upon the expiration of the
suspensive term (as far as they were concerned) of the death of C.
N. Hodges on December 25, 1962 . 42
As stated in Padilla's treatise on the Civil Code, "A term is a period
whose arrival is certain although the exact date thereof may be
uncertain. A term may have either a suspensive or a resolutory
effect. The designation of the day when the legacy "shall
commence" is ex die, or a term with a suspensive effect, from a
certain day. The designation of the day when the legacy "shall
cease" is in diem or a term with a resolutory effect, until a certain
day." He adds that "A legacy based upon a certain age or upon
the death of a person is not a condition but a term. If the arrival of
the term would commence the right of the heir, it is suspensive. If
the arrival of the term would terminate his right, it is resolutory" and
that "upon the arrival of the period, in case of a suspensive term,
the instituted heir is entitled to the succession, and in case of a
resolutory term, his right terminates." 43
10. The sizable estates herein involved have now been pending
settlement for a considerably protracted period (of seventeen years
counted from Linnie's death in 1957), and all that is left to be done
is to resolve the only remaining issue (involving the two questions
of renunciation and renvoi) hereinabove discussed in order to close
up the estates and finally effect distribution to the deceased
spouses' respective brothers and sisters and their heirs as the heirs
duly instituted in their wills long admitted to probate. Hence, it is
advisable for said instituted heirs and their heirs in turn 44 to come
to terms for the adjudication and distribution to them pro-indiviso of
the up to now unliquidated community properties of the estates of
the Hodges spouses (derived from their unliquidated conjugal
partnership) rather than to get bogged down with the formidable
task of physically segregating and partitioning the two estates with
the numerous transactions, items and details and physical changes
of properties involved. The estates proceedings would thus be
closed and they could then name their respective attorneys-in-fact
to work out the details of segregating, dividing or partitioning
the unliquidated community properties or liquidating them — which
can be done then on their own without further need of intervention
on the part of the probate court as well as allow them meanwhile to
enjoy and make use of the income and cash and liquid assets of
the estates in such manner as may be agreed upon between them.
Such a settlement or modus vivendi between the heirs of the
unliquidated two estates for the mutual benefit of all of them should
not prove difficult, considering that it appears as stated in the main
opinion that 22.968149% of the share or undivided estate of C. N.
Hodges have already been acquired by the heirs of Linnie Jane
Hodges from certain heirs of her husband, while certain other heirs
representing 17.34375% of Hodges' estate were joining cause with
Linnie's heirs in their pending and unresolved motion for the
removal of petitioner PCIB as administrator of Hodges'
estate, 45 apparently impatient with the situation which has
apparently degenerated into a running battle between the
administrators of the two estates to the common prejudice of all the
heirs.
11. As earlier stated, the writer has taken the pain of suggesting
these guidelines which may serve to guide the probate court as well
as the parties towards expediting the winding up and closing of the
estates and the distribution of the net estates to the instituted heirs
and their successors duly entitled thereto. The probate court should
exert all effort towards this desired objective pursuant to the
mandate of our probate law, bearing in mind the Court's admonition
in previous cases that "courts of first instance should exert
themselves to close up estate within twelve months from the time
they are presented, and they may refuse to allow any
compensation to executors and administrators who do not actively
labor to that end, and they may even adopt harsher measures." 46
Timeliness of appeals and imposition of
thirty-one (31) additional docket fees
Two appeals were docketed with this Court, as per the two records
on appeal submitted (one with a green cover and the other with a
yellow cover). As stated at the outset, these appeals involve
basically the same primal issue raised in the petition for certiorari as
to whether there still exists a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
which has to continue to be administered by respondent Magno.
Considering the main opinion's ruling in the affirmative and that her
estate and that of her husband (since they jointly
comprise unliquidated community properties) must be
administered conjointly by their respective administrators (PCIB and
Magno), the said appeals (involving thirty-three different orders of
the probate court approving sales contracts and other acts of
administration executed and performed by respondent Magno on
behalf of Linnie's estate) have been necessarily overruled by the
Court's decision at bar.
(a) The "priority question" raised by respondent Magno as to the
patent failure of the two records on appeal to show on their face
and state the material data that the appeals were timely taken
within the 30-day reglamentary period as required by Rule 41,
section 6 of the Rules of Court, has been brushed aside by the
main opinion with the statement that it is "not necessary to pass
upon the timeliness of any of said appeals" since they "revolve
around practically the same main issues and ... it is admitted that
some of them have been timely taken." 47 The main opinion thus
proceeded with the determination of the thirty-three appealed
orders despite the grave defect of the appellant PCIB's records on
appeal and their failure to state the required material data showing
the timeliness of the appeals.
Such disposition of the question of timeliness deemed as
"mandatory and jurisdictional" in a number of cases merits the
writer's concurrence in that the question raised has been
subordinated to the paramount considerations of substantial justice
and a "liberal interpretation of the rules" applied so as not to
derogate and detract from the primary intent and purpose of the
rules, viz "the proper and just determination of a litigation"48 —
which calls for "adherence to a liberal construction of the procedural
rules in order to attain their objective of substantial justice and of
avoiding denials of substantial justice due to procedural
technicalities." 49
Thus, the main opinion in consonance with the same paramount
considerations of substantial justice has likewise overruled
respondents' objection to petitioner's taking the recourse of "the
present remedy of certiorari and prohibition" — "despite the
conceded availability of appeal" — on the ground that "there is a
common thread among the basic issues involved in all these thirty-
three appeals — (which) deal with practically the same basic issues
that can be more expeditiously resolved or determined in a single
special civil action . . . " 50
(b) Since the basic issues have been in effect resolved in the
special civil action at bar (as above stated) with the dismissal of the
petition by virtue of the Court's judgment as to the continued
existence of a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
the affirmance as a necessary consequence of the appealed orders
approving and sanctioning respondent Magno's sales contracts and
acts of administration, some doubt would arise as to the propriety of
the main opinion requiring the payment by PCIB of thirty-one
(31) additional appeal docket fees. This doubt is further enhanced
by the question of whether it would make the cost of appeal unduly
expensive or prohibitive by requiring the payment of a separate
appeal docket fee for each incidental order questioned when the
resolution of all such incidental questioned orders involve
basically one and the same main issue (in this case, the existence
of a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges) and can be more
expeditiously resolved or determined in a single special civil action"
(for which a single docket fee is required) as stated in the main
opinion. 51 Considering the importance of the basic issues and the
magnitude of the estates involved, however, the writer has pro hac
vice given his concurrence to the assessment of the said thirty-one
(31) additional appeal docket fees.
MAKALINTAL, C.J., concurring:
I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Teehankee, which in turn
agrees with the dispositive portion of the main opinion of Justice
Barredo insofar as it dismisses the petition for certiorari and
prohibition in Cases L-27860 and L-27896 and affirms the appealed
orders of the probate court in cases L-27936-37.
However, I wish to make one brief observation for the sake of
accuracy. Regardless of whether or not C. N. Hodges was entitled
to a legitime in his deceased wife's estate — which question, still to
be decided by the said probate court, may depend upon what is the
law of Texas and upon its applicability in the present case — the
said estate consists of one-half, not one-fourth, of the conjugal
properties. There is neither a minimum of one-fourth nor a
maximum beyond that. It is important to bear this in mind because
the estate of Linnie Hodges consists of her share in the conjugal
properties, is still under administration and until now has not been
distributed by order of the court.
The reference in both the main and separate opinions to a one-
fourth portion of the conjugal properties as Linnie Hodges' minimum
share is a misnomer and is evidently meant only to indicate that if
her husband should eventually be declared entitled to a legitime,
then the disposition made by Linnie Hodges in favor of her
collateral relatives would be valid only as to one-half of her share,
or one-fourth of the conjugal properties, since the remainder, which
constitutes such legitime, would necessarily go to her husband in
absolute ownership, unburdened by any substitution, term or
condition, resolutory or otherwise. And until the estate is finally
settled and adjudicated to the heirs who may be found entitled to it,
the administration must continue to cover Linnie's entire conjugal
share.
G.R. No. L-11759 March 16, 1917
CAYETANO LIM and MARCIANO LIM, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, respondent-
appellee.
Williams, Ferrier and SyCip for appellants.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The real question raised on this appeal is whether the Insular
Collector of Customs may lawfully deny entry into the Philippine
Islands to two children aged 8 and 14 years, respectively, under
and by authority of the Chinese Immigration, Laws, it appearing that
the children arrived at the Port of Manila accompanied by and in the
custody of their mother, a Filipino woman; that they were born in
China, out of lawful wedlock; and that their father was a Chinese
person.
It is contended, on behalf of the Insular Collector of Customs, that
these children being Chinese persons are denied the right of
entrance into the Philippine Islands under the express terms of the
Chinese immigration laws. On the other hand, it is urged on behalf
of the children that they are entitled to enter, regardless of the
provisions of the Chinese immigration laws, since the admitted
facts, as it is said, disclose that they are citizens of the Philippine
Islands; and for the further reason, that their mother, who is entitled
to their custody and charged with their maintenance and education,
is clearly entitled to take up her residence in the Philippine Islands
and should not be required, to that end, to abandon her minor
children.
Without discussing or deciding any of the contentions of the parties
as to the rights of citizenship of these children, actual or inchoate,
we are of opinion that by analogous reasoning to that upon which
the Supreme Court of the United States held that the wives and
minor children of Chinese merchants domiciled in the United States
may enter that country without certificates, these children must be
held to be entitled to enter the Philippine Islands with their mother,
for the purpose of taking up their residence here with her, it
appearing that she is natural guardian, entitled to their custody and
charged with their maintenance and education. (U. S. vs. Gue Lim,
176 U. S. 459.)
In the case just cited the court said:
While the literal construction of the section would require
a certificate, as therein stated, from every Chinese
person, other than a laborer, who should come into the
country, yet such a construction leads to what we think
an absurd result, for it requires a certificate for a wife of a
merchant, among others, in regard to whom its would be
impossible to give the particulars which the statute
requires shall be stated in such certificate.
"Nothing is better settled," says the present Chief Justice,
in Lau Ow Bew vs. United States (144 U. S., 59) "than
that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such
as will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possible,
so as to avoid and unjust or an absurd conclusion.
The purposes of the sixth section, requiring the
certificate, was not to prevent the persons named in the
second article of the treaty from coming into the country,
but to prevent Chinese laborers from entering under the
guise of being one of the classes permitted by the treaty.
It is the coming of Chinese laborers that the act is aimed
against.
It was said in the opinion in the Lau Ow Bew case, in
speaking of the provisions that the sole evidence
permissible should be the certificate: "This rule of
evidence was evidently prescribed by the amendment as
a means of effectually preventing the violation or evasion
of the prohibition against the coming of Chinese laborers.
It was designed as a safeguard to prevent the unlawful
entry of such laborers, under the pretense that they
belong to the merchant class or to some other of the
admitted classes."
It was also held in that case that although the literal
wording of the statute of 1884, section six, would require
a certificate in the case of a merchant already domiciled
in the United States and who had left the country for
temporary purposes, animo revertendi, yet its true and
proper construction did not include his case, and the
general terms used in the act were limited to those
persons to whom Congress manifestly intended to apply
them, which would be those who were about to come to
the United States for the first time, and not to those
Chinese merchants already domiciled in the United
States who had gone to China for temporary purposes
only, with the intention of returning. The case of Wan
Shing vs. United States (140 U. S., 24), was referred to,
and attention called to the fact that the appellant therein
was not a merchant but a laborer, who had acquired no
commercial domicile in this county, and was clearly within
the exception requiring him to procure and produce the
certificate specified in the act. The rule was approved,
and the differences in the two cases pointed out by the
Chief Justice.
To hold that a certificate is required in this case is to
decide that the woman cannot come into this country at
all, for it is not possible for her to comply with the act,
because she cannot in any event procure the certificate
even by returning to China. She must come in as the wife
of her domiciled husband or not at all. The act was never
meant to accomplish the result of permanently excluding
the wife under the circumstances of this case, and we
 think that, properly and reasonably construed, it does not
do so. If we hold that she is entitled to come in as the
wife, because the true construction of the treaty and the
act permits it, there is no provision which makes the
certificate the only proof of the fact that she is such wife.
In the case of the minor children, the same result must
follow as in that of the wife. All the reasons which favor
the construction of the statute as exempting the wife from
the necessity of procuring a certificate apply with equal
force to the case of minor children of a member or
members of the admitted classes. They come in by
reason of their relationship to the father, and whether
they accompany or follow him, a certificate is not
necessary in either case. When the fact is established to
the satisfaction of the authorities that the person claiming
to enter, either as wife or minor child, is in fact the wife or
minor child of one of the members of the class mentioned
in the treaty as entitled to enter, them that person in
entitled to admission without the certificate.
We are not advised of any provision of Chinese law which
differentiates the status of infant children, born out of lawful
wedlock, from that of similar children under the laws in force in the
Philippine Islands. We assume, therefore, that in China as well as
in the Philippine Islands such children have the right to look to their
mother for their maintenance and education, and that she is entitled
to their custody and control in fulfilling the obligations towards them
which are imposed upon her, not only by the natural impulses of
love and affection, but also by the express mandate of the law. And
it having been held on the highest authority that the general terms
of the Act were limited to those to whom Congress manifestly
intended to apply them as set forth in the foregoing opinion, and
that "nothing is better settled than that statutes should receive a
sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative
intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion," we are of opinion that the Chinese Immigration Laws
should not be construed so as to exclude infant children of a
Filipino mother, born out of lawful wedlock, seeking entrance to the
Philippine Islands for the purpose of taking up their residence with
her in her native land.
It has been suggested that such a ruling opens the door to fraud
and evasion, but we are not much impressed with the force of this
suggestion, knowing as we do that the immigration authorities have
been furnished by the law with peculiarly effective machinery for its
enforcement, well calculated to defeat any attempt to make an
unauthorized or improper use of so manifestly reasonable an
exception from the literal construction and application of its general vs.
provisions. A. L. YATCO, Collector of Internal Revenue of the
Philippines, defendant-appellee.
Some confusion seems to have arisen in the court below as to the
precise nature and effect of the somewhat inartificial pleadings Ross, Selph, Carrascoso and Janda for appellants.
upon which these proceedings were submitted. The case appears Office of the Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta and Assistant
to have been submitted upon an answer to an order to show cause Solicitor General Rafael Amparo for appellee.
why a writ of habeas corpus should not issue upon the petition filed
on behalf of the infant children. In the form in which the answer is
couched, there is much in the contention of the appellee that the
trial court should have treated the answer as in substance and
effect a demurrer to the petition, admitting the truth of the facts
alleged therein, but praying judgment as to whether it sets forth PERFECTO, J.:
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and to justify the
issuance of the writ. We are inclined to think, however, that the
understanding of the parties and of the court below was that the On July 17, 1937, plaintiffs filed a complaint praying that the
amount of P343,298.72, paid by them as inheritance tax, be
answer should be treated rather as in the nature of a return to a writ
of habeas corpus, accepting as true the allegations of the petition refunded to them as follows: P40,480 to A. W. Beam, P151,409.36
but maintaining the legality of the detention upon the facts thus to A. W. Beam, Jr. and P151,409.36 to Eugenia Beam.
submitted. Without considering at this time whether in habeas
corpus proceedings the respondent may, without consent of court, In March, 1938, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts from
demur to, instead of answering an order to show cause why the writ which the following can be gathered:
should not issue, and without considering or deciding the course
which should be pursued where a respondent attempts to file a
That on or before April 26, 1937, the Collector of Internal Revenue
demurrer to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in lieu of the
declared and assessed the following items of property of A. W.
return prescribed by the statute to the writ when actually issued; we
Beam and Lydia McKee Beam at the time of the death of the latter
treat the answer to the order to show cause in the case at bar as
on October 18, 1934, at P8,100,544.91:
we think the parties and the court below understood it should be
treated, that is to say, as in substance and effect the return which
the Insular Collector desired to make to the writ of habeas corpus 15,000 shares of stock of Beam Investment Company, evidenced
issued or assumed to have been issued in response to the petition by Certificates Nos. 2, 15 and 25 issued to and in the name of Lydia
on behalf of the children held in custody by him. McKee Beam;
We conclude, therefore, that, it appearing that the respondent 88,163 shares of stock of Beam Investment Company, evidenced
Collector of Customs is detaining the petitioners under an by Certificates Nos. 11, 23 and 24 issued to and in the name of A.
erroneous construction of the immigration laws, and it appearing W. Beam;
from the facts disclosed by the administrative proceedings that
these children are entitled to admission into the Philippine Islands,
the order entered in the court below should be reversed, and in lieu 500 shares of stock of Benguet Consolidated Mining Company,
thereof an order should be entered directing the discharge of these evidenced by Certificate No. 3342 issued to and in the name of A.
children from the custody of the Insular Collector of Customs, with W. Beam;
the costs in both instances, de officio. So ordered.
2,080 shares of stock of Balatoc Mining Company, evidenced by
G.R. No. 48122 October 29, 1948 Certificates Nos. 600, 614 and 809 issued to and in the name of A.
W. Beam;
A. W. BEAM, A. W. BEAM, Jr., and EUGENIA BEAM, the latter
5,000 shares of stock of Beam Investment Company evidenced by
two assisted by their guardian ad litem,
Certificates Nos. 17 and 26 issued to and in the name of A. W.
John W. Haussermann, plaintiffs-appellants,
Beam, Junior;lawphil.net
Deposit of P2,933.18 in Manila Building and Loan Association in the
name and to the credit of A. W. Beam, Junior;
5,000 shares of stock of Beam Investment Company, evidenced by
Certificates Nos. 19 and 27 issued to and in the name of Eugenia
Beam;
Deposit of P2,933.18 in Manila Building and Loan Association in the
name and to the credit of Eugenia Beam.
One-half thereof, appraised at P4,050,272.46, was the estate to the
deceased Lydia McKee Beam located in the Philippines and
transmitted to plaintiffs and to Syrena McKee and Rose P. McKee
by virtue of inheritance, devise, or bequest, gifts mortis causa or
advance in anticipation of inheritance, and the collector assessed
and demanded inheritance taxes thereon as follows:
Heirs Share Tax
A. W. Beam P532,375.00 P40,480.00
A. W. Beam, Jr. 1,749,448.73 151,409.36
Eugenia Beam 1,749,448.73 151,409.36
Syrena McKee 10,000.00 200.00
Rose T. McKee 10,000.00 200.00
P4,050,272.46 P343,698.72
On April 26, 1937, plaintiffs, together with Syrena McKee and Rose
T. McKee, both sister of Lydia Mckee Beam, paid respectively the
amounts assessed and demanded by the collector, aggregating
P343,698.72, under protest that was overruled by the collector on
May 11, 1937.
A. W. Beam is of age but the other two plaintiffs are minors and are
assisted by their guardian ad litem, John W. Haussermann.
On her death in the State of California on October 8, 1934, Lydia
McKee Beam left a last will and testament which, after due and
regular proceedings, was admitted to probate in the superior court
of the State of California for the County of Almeda.
Lydia McKee Beam was the wife of A. W. Beam from their marriage
in 1913 until her death, and the other two plaintiffs are the
legitimate children of said marriage. Plaintiffs are, and since birth,
have been, and Lydia McKee Beam was, throughout of her life,
citizens of the United States of America. A. W. Beam was for many
years, beginning from year 1902, a resident domiciled in the
Philippines.
On April 18, 1934, A. W. Beam, with his wife Lydia and daughter
Eugenia, left the Philippines for California and arrived at San
Francisco on May 9, 1934, and since such arrival neither said Lydia
nor any of the plaintiffs have been in the Philippines, except A. W.
Beam who was in the Philippines from December 20, 1936, to
January 15, 1937.
At the time of the death of Lydia McKee Beam, she and plaintiffs
owned separately and severally, according to plaintiffs, and jointly
with Lydia McKee Beam and A. W. Beam, according to defendant,
the following properties:
LYDIA MCKEE BEAM: 15,000 shares of stock of Beam
Investment Company, evidenced by Certificates Nos. 2,
15 and 25 issued to and in the name of Lydia McKee
Beam;
A. W. BEAM: 88,163 shares of stock of Beam Investment
Company, evidenced by Certificates Nos. 11, 23 and 24
issued to and in the name of A. W. Beam; 500 shares of
stock of Benguet Consolidated Mining Company,
evidenced by Certificate No. 3342 issued to and in the
name of A. W. Beam; 2,080 shares of stock of Balatoc
Mining Company, evidenced by Certificates Nos. 600,
614 and 809 issued to and in the name of A. W. Beam;
A. W. BEAM, JUNIOR: 5,000 shares of stock of Beam
Investment Company evidenced by Certificates Nos. 17
and 26 issued to and in the name of A. W. Beam, Junior;
Deposit of P2,933.18 in Manila Building and Loan
Association in the name and to the credit of A. W. Beam,
Junior;
EUGENIA BEAM: 5,000 shares of stock of Beam
Investment Company, evidenced by Certificates Nos. 19
and 27 issued to and in the name of Eugenia Beam;
Deposit of P2,933.18 in Manila Building and Loan
Association in the name and to the credit of Eugenia
Beam.
The Beam Investment Company, the Balatoc Mining Company and
the Manila Building and Loan Association are, and were at all times
mentioned in the amended complaint, corporations organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines. The Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company is, and was at all times mentioned in
the amended complaint, a sociedad anonima organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines.
The above-listed properties were acquired in the Philippines during
and within the period from the marriage of A. W. Beam to Lydia
McKee Beam in 1913 to April 18, 1934. A. W. Beam has been, and
was up to April 18, 1934, the Vice-President and Assistant General
Manager of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a
member of the Board of Directors of said company and of the
Balatoc Mining Company. He was also, and up to the present, is,
the President of Beam Investment Company.
Prior to his departure from the Philippines on April 18, 1934, with
his wife and his daughter Eugenia, A. W. Beam filed an application
for a tax clearance certificate with the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
On September 30, 1940, the lower court rendered decision
dismissing the complaint with costs against the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs appealed.
Appellants complain that the lower court dismissed the complaint
on factual conclusions dealing with points not at issue between the
parties. They allege that the issue of fact, under the pleadings, was
between the appellants' contention that A. W. Beam and deceased
wife were residents and citizens of California on October 18, 1934,
and appellee's contention that their Philippine residence and
domicile extended to October 18, 1934, and sometime later, and
there was no issue as to whether or not said A. W. Beam changed
his residence and domicile in 1923 from the Philippines to California
and, therefore, the lower court erred in finding that appellant
became a resident and citizen of California in 1923.
Appellee alleges that it has been his original theory from the
inception of the action that the plaintiffs were and continued to be
California citizens and that they are not entitled to recover on the
ground that according to California law the property acquired by A.
W. Beam in one-half thereof belongs to the deceased and passed
by succession to her heirs subject to the inheritance tax, and said
theory is borne out by the following allegation of the amended
answers filed on September 2, 1937:
That under the Inheritance Tax Law, the defendant
demanded and collected from the plaintiffs the sum of
P343,698.72 alleged in the complaint, which had been
 assessed on the amount of P4,050,272.46, value of the
estate of said Lydia McKee, located and having business
situs in the Philippines, and transmitted to the plaintiffs by
virtue of inheritance. (Pages 15, 16, record on appeal;
emphasis supplied.)
That the law of the State of California in effect at the time
of the death of Lydia McKee Beam provided that, upon
the death of a wife, one-half of the community property
shall go to the surviving spouse, the other half being
subject to the testamentary disposition of the decedent,
and that in the absence thereof, that half shall go to the
surviving spouse by inheritance.
The last paragraph reproduces only the penultimate paragraph of
the original answer dated October 11, 1937.
The allegations necessarily include by implication the allegation of
California citizenship so that the California law may be invoked as
the personal law of the deceased applicable to her personal
property in the Philippines in accordance with article 10 of the Civil
Code.
The finding of the lower court is fully supported by the testimonies
of A. W. Beam and John W. Haussermann, wherein the first stated
that in 1923 he bought a house in Oakland, California, and used it
as a residence until December, 1930, when he built another in
Piedmont, California, which he has used and occupied as a
residence since then, and his children were in school in California
and Mrs. Beam wanted to be with them and made a home for them,
and it was his intention to live in California and from 1923 on, his
family spent most of their time in California, where he himself used
to take long vacations, and that he never really intended to live
permanently in the Philippines, while Haussermann testified that A.
W. Beam left the Philippines somewhere along 1923 and 1924
when he established a home for his wife and children on Kenmore
Avenue, Oakland, and he went there frequently.
We are of opinion that, upon the pleadings and the evidence, the
lower court did not err in finding that A. W. Beam and wife became
residents and citizens of California in 1923.
On the other hand, appellee maintains that, because the burden of
proof is on the plaintiffs to establish their right to recover, in view of
the fact that they had failed to establish that right based on their
alleged Utah citizenship, the dismissal of the complaint is fully
justified, and the defendant is entitled to take advantage of the
plaintiff's failure to present sufficient proof and of the evidence
adduced by themselves.
Plaintiff pleaded Utah citizenship to invoke the laws of the state
which, it is alleged, is to the effect that properties acquired by the
spouses during marriage belong to them separately, and the Utah
citizenship was thus put in issue in view of the general denial of
appellee and his special defense predicated on the California law.
The evidence of the plaintiff on the Utah citizenship consists
exclusively in the deposition of A. W. Beam wherein he states that
he was born in Nevada in 1878; he lived with his parents in Nevada
until 1883 and then in Utah until 1898, when he enlisted in the
army; and that upon his discharge from the army in San Francisco
in 1889 he returned to, and stayed in, Utah, until he came to the
Philippines in 1902. As contended by appellee, the evidence does
not sufficiently prove the Utah citizenship claimed by said appellant.
There is no evidence that he ever returned to Utah, or has any
interest in that estate, or that he ever intended to return there.
Where plaintiffs themselves show a state of facts upon which they
should not recover, whether defendant pleaded such fact as a
defense or not, their claim should be dismissed. Evidence
introduced without objection becomes property of the case and all
the parties are amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects
resulting from the evidence.
Appellants complain that they were not given opportunity to present
evidence regarding the fact found by the lower court that plaintiff A.
W. Beam became in 1923 a resident and citizen of California has
no merit, because plaintiffs had in fact the opportunity, and taken
advantage of it, to present all the facts which, according to them,
would entitle them to recover and they cannot complain of their
failure to present more evidence than that appearing in the record.
As a matter of fact, the evidence upon which the lower court
concluded that A. W. Beam became resident and citizen of
California in 1923, consists in the testimony of A. W. Beam himself
and his witness John W. Haussermann.
Appellants contend that no evidence whatsoever has been adduced
to prove the California law of community property and that the trial
court should not have taken into consideration the provision of said
law as quoted in the memorandum filed by the Solicitor General.
Appellee alleges that there is no dispute that California is a
community property state, citing 31 C. J., 12 and the decision in
Osorio vs. Posadas (56 Phil., 748 and 756). Appellants themselves
assert that, in the absence of proof as to what the California law is,
the presumption would militate against them, because when a
foreign law is pleaded and no evidence has been presented as to
said law it is presumed that the same is the law of the forum. (Yan
Ka Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil., 46; Lim vs. Collector of
Internal Revenue, 36 Phil., 472; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil., 876.)
Accordingly, the properties in question which have been acquired
by A.W. Beam and wife during their marriage, should be considered
as community property and upon the death of the wife, the one that
belonged to her passed by succession to her heirs, in accordance
with the provisions of articles 1401, 1407 and 1426 of the Civil
Code, and therefore is subject to the inheritance tax collected by
appellee.
Appellants contended that A. W. Beam has not become a resident
and citizen of California since 1923 and that the evidence points out
that he changed his residence from the Philippines to California
between the time he left Manila for Piedmont on April 18, 1934, and
the time of his wife's death on October 18, 1934. Appellants point to
the testimony of A. W. Beam that his departures before 1934 were
without intention of permanently abandoning his home in the
Philippines, while when he left on April 18, 1934, he had no
intention of returning, for which reason he brought his car and all
his household belongings with him, and to the testimonies of Robert
B. Dell, John W. Haussermann, W. H. Taylor, W. H. Lawrence.
These testimonies, all hearsay, except that A. W. Beam himself,
notwithstanding, cannot change the effect of A. W. Beam's
testimony to the effect that in 1923 he bought a house in Oakland,
California, used it as a residence until December 1930, when he
built another house in Piedmont, California, which he used and
occupied as a residence from that time to the present, and that his
children were in school in California and Mrs. Beam wanted to be
with them and make a home for them, and from 1923 on his family
spent most of their time in California. He also testified that "he
never really intended permanently to live in the Philippines all my
life." Under the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the
Federal Constitution, "all persons born or naturalized in the United
States are subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the state wherein they reside."
A. W. Beam became citizen of California in 1923 when he
established therein a permanent residence for him and his family.
One's personal presence at the new domicile is not
necessary when the intent to change has been
manifested and carried out by sending his wife and family
there. (19 C. J., 425.)
As correctly stated by appellee, even granting appellant's
contention that the deceased became a resident of California only
in 1934, she was a citizen of that state at the time of her death and
her national law applicable to the case, in accordance with article
10 of the Civil Code, is the law of California which, in the absence
of contrary evidence, is to be presumed to be the same as the
Philippine law.
The question raised by appellants regarding the situs of the
properties in question, has no merit in view of the express
provisions of section 1536 of the Revised Administrative Code,
specifying shares issued by any corporation or sociedad
anonima organized in the Philippines among properties subject to
inheritance tax. The pronouncement of the lower court that the
actual situs of the shares in question is in the Philippines is fully
supported by the evidence as, according to the testimony of John
W. Haussermann, the corresponding certificates of stock were in
the Philippines before and after the death of Mrs. Beam, the owners
were represented by proxy at the stockholders' meetings and their
shares voted by their attorney in fact who had the power to collect
dividends corresponding to the share.
The questions raised by appellants that are premised on the Utah
citizenship of A. W. Beam and his deceased wife cannot be
countenanced after we have concluded that the lower court
declared correctly that they became California citizens since 1923.
The lower court's decision is affirmed with costs against appellants.
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO,
administrator, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is
in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition.
Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The
court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his
participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval
of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's
business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the
declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and
the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition
and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until
the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish
laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in
question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will
which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality,
for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of
the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in
respect to the order of succession as well as to the
amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity
of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is in question, whatever
may be the nature of the property or the country in which
it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary
dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch
as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws
are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws,
they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim
and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws
are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he desires to be given an
opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he
assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval
of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony
requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such
laws does not constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial
court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted
ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no
abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There
is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the
testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary
dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in
force, must be complied with and executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect
was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the
exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is
one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into
consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the
second clause of the will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a
Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred
upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by
nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a
considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands
where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I
now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my
property and everything in connection with this, my will,
be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in
force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my
relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and
cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will
favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with
this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the
condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's
will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee
who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his
attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the
testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary
to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good
morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not
 prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever,
even should the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores
the testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the civil
Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to
govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited,
is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is
unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding
the law which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the
legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions
and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that
said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed
that the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to
include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees,
and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator
is approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement as to
costs.
So ordered.
G.R. No. L-11622 January 28, 1961
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
vs.
DOUGLAS FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, and the COURT OF
TAX APPEALS, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-11668 January 28, 1961.
DOUGLAS FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, petitioner,
vs.
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, and the COURT
OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.
BARRERA, J.: of P52.200.00, instead of P43,500.00. After allowing the deductions
claimed by the ancillary administrator for funeral expenses in the
amount of P2,000.00 and for judicial and administration expenses
This case relates to the determination and settlement of the
in the sum of P5,500.00, the Collector assessed the state the
hereditary estate left by the deceased Walter G. Stevenson, and
amount of P5,147.98 for estate tax and P10,875,26 or inheritance
the laws applicable thereto. Walter G. Stevenson (born in the
tax, or a total of P16,023.23. Both of these assessments were paid
Philippines on August 9, 1874 of British parents and married in the
by the estate on June 6, 1952.
City of Manila on January 23, 1909 to Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson
another British subject) died on February 22, 1951 in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A. whereto he and his wife moved and On September 27, 1952, the ancillary administrator filed in
established their permanent residence since May 10, 1945. In his amended estate and inheritance tax return in pursuance f his
will executed in San Francisco on May 22, 1947, and which was reservation made at the time of filing of the preliminary return and
duly probated in the Superior Court of California on April 11, 1951, for the purpose of availing of the right granted by section 91 of the
Stevenson instituted his wife Beatrice as his sole heiress to the National Internal Revenue Code.
following real and personal properties acquired by the spouses
while residing in the Philippines, described and preliminary
In this amended return the valuation of the 210,000 shares of stock
assessed as follows:
in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. was reduced from 0.38
per share, as originally declared, to P0.20 per share, or from a total
Gross Estate valuation of P79,800.00 to P42,000.00. This change in price per
share of stock was based by the ancillary administrator on the
Real Property — 2 parcels of land in Baguio, market notation of the stock obtaining at the San Francisco
covered by T.C.T. Nos. 378 and 379 P43,500.00 California) Stock Exchange six months from the death of
Personal Property Stevenson, that is, As of August 22, 1931. In addition, the ancillary
(1) 177 shares of stock of Canacao Estate at administrator made claim for the following deductions:
P10.00 each 1,770.00
(2) 210,000 shares of stock of Mindanao Funeral expenses ($1,04326) P2,086.52
Mother Lode Mines, Inc. at P0.38 per share 79,800.00 Judicial Expenses:
(3) Cash credit with Canacao Estate Inc. 4,870.88 (a) Administrator's Fee P1,204.34
(4) Cash, with the Chartered Bank of India, (b) Attorney's Fee 6.000.00
Australia & China 851.97
(c) Judicial and Administration
Total Gross Assets P130,792.85 expenses as of August 9, 1952 1,400.05
8,604.39
On May 22, 1951, ancillary administration proceedings were Real Estate Tax for 1951 on Baguio
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the settlement real properties (O.R. No. B-1 686836) 652.50
of the estate in the Philippines. In due time Stevenson's will was
Claims against the estate:
duly admitted to probate by our court and Ian Murray Statt was
($5,000.00) P10,000.00 P10,000.00
appointed ancillary administrator of the estate, who on July 11,
1951, filed a preliminary estate and inheritance tax return with the Plus: 4% int. p.a. from Feb. 2 to 22,
reservation of having the properties declared therein finally 1951 22.47 10,022.47
appraised at their values six months after the death of Stevenson.
Preliminary return was made by the ancillary administrator in order Sub-Total P21,365.88
to secure the waiver of the Collector of Internal Revenue on the
inheritance tax due on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao In the meantime, on December 1, 1952, Beatrice Mauricia
Mother Lode Mines Inc. which the estate then desired to dispose in Stevenson assigned all her rights and interests in the estate to the
the United States. Acting upon said return, the Collector of Internal spouses, Douglas and Bettina Fisher, respondents herein.
Revenue accepted the valuation of the personal properties declared
therein, but increased the appraisal of the two parcels of land
located in Baguio City by fixing their fair market value in the amount
On September 7, 1953, the ancillary administrator filed a second
amended estate and inheritance tax return (Exh. "M-N"). This return
declared the same assets of the estate stated in the amended
return of September 22, 1952, except that it contained new claims
for additional exemption and deduction to wit: (1) deduction in the
amount of P4,000.00 from the gross estate of the decedent as
provided for in Section 861 (4) of the U.S. Federal Internal Revenue
Code which the ancillary administrator averred was allowable by
way of the reciprocity granted by Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as then held by the Board of Tax Appeals
in case No. 71 entitled "Housman vs. Collector," August 14, 1952;
and (2) exemption from the imposition of estate and inheritance
taxes on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode
Mines, Inc. also pursuant to the reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of
the National Internal Revenue Code. In this last return, the estate
claimed that it was liable only for the amount of P525.34 for estate
tax and P238.06 for inheritance tax and that, as a consequence, it
had overpaid the government. The refund of the amount of
P15,259.83, allegedly overpaid, was accordingly requested by the
estate. The Collector denied the claim. For this reason, action was
commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondents,
as assignees of Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson, for the recovery of
said amount. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 1125, the case was
forwarded to the Court of Tax Appeals which court, after hearing,
rendered decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
In fine, we are of the opinion and so hold that: (a) the
one-half (½) share of the surviving spouse in the conjugal
partnership property as diminished by the obligations
properly chargeable to such property should be deducted
from the net estate of the deceased Walter G. Stevenson,
pursuant to Section 89-C of the National Internal
Revenue Code; (b) the intangible personal property
belonging to the estate of said Stevenson is exempt from
inheritance tax, pursuant to the provision of section 122
of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to the
California Inheritance Tax Law but decedent's estate is
not entitled to an exemption of P4,000.00 in the
computation of the estate tax; (c) for purposes of estate
and inheritance taxation the Baguio real estate of the
spouses should be valued at P52,200.00, and 210,000
shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc.
should be appraised at P0.38 per share; and (d) the
estate shall be entitled to a deduction of P2,000.00 for
funeral expenses and judicial expenses of P8,604.39.
From this decision, both parties appealed.
The Collector of Internal Revenue, hereinafter called petitioner
assigned four errors allegedly committed by the trial court, while the
assignees, Douglas and Bettina Fisher hereinafter called
respondents, made six assignments of error. Together, the
assigned errors raise the following main issues for resolution by this
Court:
(1) Whether or not, in determining the taxable net estate of the
decedent, one-half (½) of the net estate should be deducted
therefrom as the share of tile surviving spouse in accordance with
our law on conjugal partnership and in relation to section 89 (c) of
the National Internal revenue Code;
(2) Whether or not the estate can avail itself of the reciprocity
proviso embodied in Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue
Code granting exemption from the payment of estate and
inheritance taxes on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao
Mother Lode Mines Inc.;
(3) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the deduction of
P4,000.00 allowed by Section 861, U.S. Internal Revenue Code in
relation to section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code;
(4) Whether or not the real estate properties of the decedent
located in Baguio City and the 210,000 shares of stock in the
Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc., were correctly appraised by the
lower court;
(5) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the following deductions:
P8,604.39 for judicial and administration expenses; P2,086.52 for
funeral expenses; P652.50 for real estate taxes; and P10,0,22.47
representing the amount of indebtedness allegedly incurred by the
decedent during his lifetime; and
(6) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the payment of interest
on the amount it claims to have overpaid the government and to be
refundable to it.
In deciding the first issue, the lower court applied a well-known
doctrine in our civil law that in the absence of any ante-nuptial
agreement, the contracting parties are presumed to have adopted
the system of conjugal partnership as to the properties acquired
during their marriage. The application of this doctrine to the instant
case is being disputed, however, by petitioner Collector of Internal
Revenue, who contends that pursuant to Article 124 of the New
Civil Code, the property relation of the spouses Stevensons ought
not to be determined by the Philippine law, but by the national law
of the decedent husband, in this case, the law of England. It is
alleged by petitioner that English laws do not recognize legal
partnership between spouses, and that what obtains in that
jurisdiction is another regime of property relation, wherein all
properties acquired during the marriage pertain and belong
Exclusively to the husband. In further support of his stand,
petitioner cites Article 16 of the New Civil Code (Art. 10 of the old)
to the effect that in testate and intestate proceedings, the amount of
successional rights, among others, is to be determined by the
national law of the decedent.
In this connection, let it be noted that since the mariage of the
Stevensons in the Philippines took place in 1909, the applicable law
is Article 1325 of the old Civil Code and not Article 124 of the New
Civil Code which became effective only in 1950. It is true that both
articles adhere to the so-called nationality theory of determining the
property relation of spouses where one of them is a foreigner and
they have made no prior agreement as to the administration
disposition, and ownership of their conjugal properties. In such a
case, the national law of the husband becomes the dominant law in
determining the property relation of the spouses. There is, however,
a difference between the two articles in that Article 1241 of the new
Civil Code expressly provides that it shall be applicable regardless
of whether the marriage was celebrated in the Philippines or abroad
while Article 13252 of the old Civil Code is limited to marriages
contracted in a foreign land.
It must be noted, however, that what has just been said refers to
mixed marriages between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. In the
instant case, both spouses are foreigners who married in the
Philippines. Manresa,3 in his Commentaries, has this to say on this
point:
La regla establecida en el art. 1.315, se refiere a las
capitulaciones otorgadas en Espana y entre espanoles.
El 1.325, a las celebradas en el extranjero cuando alguno
de los conyuges es espanol. En cuanto a la regla
procedente cuando dos extranjeros se casan en Espana,
o dos espanoles en el extranjero hay que atender en el
primer caso a la legislacion de pais a que aquellos
pertenezean, y en el segundo, a las reglas generales
consignadas en los articulos 9 y 10 de nuestro Codigo.
(Emphasis supplied.)
If we adopt the view of Manresa, the law determinative of the
property relation of the Stevensons, married in 1909, would be the
English law even if the marriage was celebrated in the Philippines,
both of them being foreigners. But, as correctly observed by the
Tax Court, the pertinent English law that allegedly vests in the
decedent husband full ownership of the properties acquired during
the marriage has not been proven by petitioner. Except for a mere
allegation in his answer, which is not sufficient, the record is bereft
of any evidence as to what English law says on the matter. In the
absence of proof, the Court is justified, therefore, in indulging in
what Wharton calls "processual presumption," in presuming that the
law of England on this matter is the same as our law.4
Nor do we believe petitioner can make use of Article 16 of the New
Civil Code (art. 10, old Civil Code) to bolster his stand. A reading of
Article 10 of the old Civil Code, which incidentally is the one
applicable, shows that it does not encompass or contemplate to
govern the question of property relation between spouses. Said
article distinctly speaks of amount of successional rights and this
term, in speaks in our opinion, properly refers to the extent or
amount of property that each heir is legally entitled to inherit from
the estate available for distribution. It needs to be pointed out that
the property relation of spouses, as distinguished from their
successional rights, is governed differently by the specific and
express provisions of Title VI, Chapter I of our new Civil Code (Title
III, Chapter I of the old Civil Code.) We, therefore, find that the
lower court correctly deducted the half of the conjugal property in
determining the hereditary estate left by the deceased Stevenson.
On the second issue, petitioner disputes the action of the Tax Court
in the exempting the respondents from paying inheritance tax on
the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines,
Inc. in virtue of the reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, in relation to Section 13851 of the
California Revenue and Taxation Code, on the ground that: (1) the
said proviso of the California Revenue and Taxation Code has not
been duly proven by the respondents; (2) the reciprocity
exemptions granted by section 122 of the National Internal
Revenue Code can only be availed of by residents of foreign
countries and not of residents of a state in the United States; and
(3) there is no "total" reciprocity between the Philippines and the
state of California in that while the former exempts payment of both
estate and inheritance taxes on intangible personal properties, the
latter only exempts the payment of inheritance tax..
To prove the pertinent California law, Attorney Allison Gibbs,
counsel for herein respondents, testified that as an active member
of the California Bar since 1931, he is familiar with the revenue and
taxation laws of the State of California. When asked by the lower
court to state the pertinent California law as regards exemption of
intangible personal properties, the witness cited article 4, section
13851 (a) and (b) of the California Internal and Revenue Code as
published in Derring's California Code, a publication of the Bancroft-
Whitney Company inc. And as part of his testimony, a full quotation
of the cited section was offered in evidence as Exhibits "V-2" by the
respondents.
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice
of them.5 Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.6
Section 41, Rule 123 of our Rules of Court prescribes the manner
of proving foreign laws before our tribunals. However, although we
believe it desirable that these laws be proved in accordance with
said rule, we held in the case of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v.
Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471, that "a reading of sections 300 and 301 of our
Code of Civil Procedure (now section 41, Rule 123) will convince
one that these sections do not exclude the presentation of other
competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law." In that
case, we considered the testimony of an attorney-at-law of San
Francisco, California who quoted verbatim a section of California
Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force at the time
the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish
the existence of said law. In line with this view, we find no error,
therefore, on the part of the Tax Court in considering the pertinent
California law as proved by respondents' witness.
We now take up the question of reciprocity in exemption from
transfer or death taxes, between the State of California and the
Philippines.F
Section 122 of our National Internal Revenue Code, in pertinent
part, provides:
... And, provided, further, That no tax shall be collected
under this Title in respect of intangible personal property
(a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident
of a foreign country which at the time of his death did not
impose a transfer of tax or death tax of any character in
respect of intangible personal property of citizens of the
Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if
the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was
a resident at the time of his death allow a similar
exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every
character in respect of intangible personal property
owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that
foreign country." (Emphasis supplied).
On the other hand, Section 13851 of the California Inheritance Tax
Law, insofar as pertinent, reads:.
"SEC. 13851, Intangibles of nonresident: Conditions.
Intangible personal property is exempt from the tax
imposed by this part if the decedent at the time of his
death was a resident of a territory or another State of the
United States or of a foreign state or country which then
imposed a legacy, succession, or death tax in respect to
intangible personal property of its own residents, but
either:.
(a) Did not impose a legacy, succession, or death tax of
any character in respect to intangible personal property of
residents of this State, or
(b) Had in its laws a reciprocal provision under which
intangible personal property of a non-resident was
exempt from legacy, succession, or death taxes of every
character if the Territory or other State of the United
States or foreign state or country in which the
nonresident resided allowed a similar exemption in
respect to intangible personal property of residents of the
Territory or State of the United States or foreign state or
country of residence of the decedent." (Id.)
It is clear from both these quoted provisions that the reciprocity
must be total, that is, with respect to transfer or death taxes of any
and every character, in the case of the Philippine law, and to
legacy, succession, or death taxes of any and every character, in
the case of the California law. Therefore, if any of the two states
collects or imposes and does not exempt any transfer, death,
legacy, or succession tax of any character, the reciprocity does not
work. This is the underlying principle of the reciprocity clauses in
both laws.
In the Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or resident, or non-
resident with properties therein, there are imposed upon his estate
and its settlement, both an estate and an inheritance tax. Under the
laws of California, only inheritance tax is imposed. On the other
hand, the Federal Internal Revenue Code imposes an estate tax on
non-residents not citizens of the United States,7 but does not
provide for any exemption on the basis of reciprocity. Applying
these laws in the manner the Court of Tax Appeals did in the instant
case, we will have a situation where a Californian, who is non-
resident in the Philippines but has intangible personal properties
here, will the subject to the payment of an estate tax, although
exempt from the payment of the inheritance tax. This being the
case, will a Filipino, non-resident of California, but with intangible
personal properties there, be entitled to the exemption clause of the
California law, since the Californian has not been exempted from
every character of legacy, succession, or death tax because he is,
under our law, under obligation to pay an estate tax? Upon the
other hand, if we exempt the Californian from paying the estate tax,
we do not thereby entitle a Filipino to be exempt from a similar
estate tax in California because under the Federal Law, which is
equally enforceable in California he is bound to pay the same, there
being no reciprocity recognized in respect thereto. In both
instances, the Filipino citizen is always at a disadvantage. We do
not believe that our legislature has intended such an unfair situation
to the detriment of our own government and people. We, therefore,
find and declare that the lower court erred in exempting the estate
in question from payment of the inheritance tax.
We are not unaware of our ruling in the case of Collector of Internal
Revenue vs. Lara (G.R. Nos. L-9456 & L-9481, prom. January 6,
1958, 54 O.G. 2881) exempting the estate of the deceased Hugo H.
Miller from payment of the inheritance tax imposed by the Collector
of Internal Revenue. It will be noted, however, that the issue of
reciprocity between the pertinent provisions of our tax law and that
of the State of California was not there squarely raised, and the
ruling therein cannot control the determination of the case at bar.
Be that as it may, we now declare that in view of the express
provisions of both the Philippine and California laws that the
exemption would apply only if the law of the other grants an
exemption from legacy, succession, or death taxes of every
character, there could not be partial reciprocity. It would have to be
total or none at all.
With respect to the question of deduction or reduction in the amount
of P4,000.00 based on the U.S. Federal Estate Tax Law which is
also being claimed by respondents, we uphold and adhere to our
ruling in the Lara case (supra) that the amount of $2,000.00 allowed
under the Federal Estate Tax Law is in the nature of a deduction
and not of an exemption regarding which reciprocity cannot be
claimed under the provision of Section 122 of our National Internal
Revenue Code. Nor is reciprocity authorized under the Federal
Law. .
On the issue of the correctness of the appraisal of the two parcels
of land situated in Baguio City, it is contended that their assessed
values, as appearing in the tax rolls 6 months after the death of
Stevenson, ought to have been considered by petitioner as their fair
market value, pursuant to section 91 of the National Internal
Revenue Code. It should be pointed out, however, that in
accordance with said proviso the properties are required to be
appraised at their fair market value and the assessed value thereof
shall be considered as the fair market value only when evidence to
the contrary has not been shown. After all review of the record, we
are satisfied that such evidence exists to justify the valuation made
by petitioner which was sustained by the tax court, for as the tax
court aptly observed:
"The two parcels of land containing 36,264 square meters
were valued by the administrator of the estate in the
Estate and Inheritance tax returns filed by him at
P43,500.00 which is the assessed value of said
properties. On the other hand, defendant appraised the
same at P52,200.00. It is of common knowledge, and this
Court can take judicial notice of it, that assessments for
real estate taxation purposes are very much lower than
the true and fair market value of the properties at a given
time and place. In fact one year after decedent's death or
in 1952 the said properties were sold for a price of
P72,000.00 and there is no showing that special or
extraordinary circumstances caused the sudden increase
from the price of P43,500.00, if we were to accept this
value as a fair and reasonable one as of 1951. Even
more, the counsel for plaintiffs himself admitted in open
court that he was willing to purchase the said properties
at P2.00 per square meter. In the light of these facts we
believe and therefore hold that the valuation of
P52,200.00 of the real estate in Baguio made by
defendant is fair, reasonable and justified in the
premises." (Decision, p. 19).
In respect to the valuation of the 210,000 shares of stock in the
Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc., (a domestic corporation),
respondents contend that their value should be fixed on the basis of
the market quotation obtaining at the San Francisco (California)
Stock Exchange, on the theory that the certificates of stocks were
then held in that place and registered with the said stock exchange.
We cannot agree with respondents' argument. The situs of the
shares of stock, for purposes of taxation, being located here in the
Philippines, as respondents themselves concede and considering
that they are sought to be taxed in this jurisdiction, consistent with
the exercise of our government's taxing authority, their fair market
value should be taxed on the basis of the price prevailing in our
country.
Upon the other hand, we find merit in respondents' other contention
that the said shares of stock commanded a lesser value at the
Manila Stock Exchange six months after the death of Stevenson.
Through Atty. Allison Gibbs, respondents have shown that at that
time a share of said stock was bid for at only P.325 (p. 103, t.s.n.).
Significantly, the testimony of Atty. Gibbs in this respect has never
been questioned nor refuted by petitioner either before this court or
in the court below. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we
are, therefore, constrained to reverse the Tax Court on this point
and to hold that the value of a share in the said mining company on
August 22, 1951 in the Philippine market was P.325 as claimed by
respondents..
It should be noted that the petitioner and the Tax Court valued each
share of stock of P.38 on the basis of the declaration made by the
estate in its preliminary return. Patently, this should not have been
the case, in view of the fact that the ancillary administrator had
reserved and availed of his legal right to have the properties of the
estate declared at their fair market value as of six months from the
time the decedent died..
On the fifth issue, we shall consider the various deductions, from
the allowance or disallowance of which by the Tax Court, both
petitioner and respondents have appealed..
Petitioner, in this regard, contends that no evidence of record exists
to support the allowance of the sum of P8,604.39 for the following
expenses:.
1) Administrator's fee P1,204.34
2) Attorney's fee 6,000.00
3) Judicial and Administrative expenses 2,052.55
Total Deductions P8,604.39
An examination of the record discloses, however, that the foregoing
items were considered deductible by the Tax Court on the basis of
their approval by the probate court to which said expenses, we may
presume, had also been presented for consideration. It is to be
supposed that the probate court would not have approved said
items were they not supported by evidence presented by the estate.
In allowing the items in question, the Tax Court had before it the
pertinent order of the probate court which was submitted in
evidence by respondents. (Exh. "AA-2", p. 100, record). As the Tax
Court said, it found no basis for departing from the findings of the
probate court, as it must have been satisfied that those expenses
were actually incurred. Under the circumstances, we see no ground
to reverse this finding of fact which, under Republic Act of California
National Association, which it would appear, that while still living,
Walter G. Stevenson obtained we are not inclined to pass upon the
claim of respondents in respect to the additional amount of P86.52
for funeral expenses which was disapproved by the court a quo for
lack of evidence.
In connection with the deduction of P652.50 representing the
amount of realty taxes paid in 1951 on the decedent's two parcels
of land in Baguio City, which respondents claim was disallowed by
the Tax Court, we find that this claim has in fact been allowed.
What happened here, which a careful review of the record will
reveal, was that the Tax Court, in itemizing the liabilities of the
estate, viz:
1) Administrator's fee
2) Attorney's fee
3) Judicial and Administration expenses as of August 9,
1952
Total
added the P652.50 for realty taxes as a liability of the estate, to the
P1,400.05 for judicial and administration expenses approved by the
court, making a total of P2,052.55, exactly the same figure which
was arrived at by the Tax Court for judicial and administration
expenses. Hence, the difference between the total of P9,256.98
allowed by the Tax Court as deductions, and the P8,604.39 as
found by the probate court, which is P652.50, the same amount
allowed for realty taxes. An evident oversight has involuntarily been
made in omitting the P2,000.00 for funeral expenses in the final
computation. This amount has been expressly allowed by the lower
court and there is no reason why it should not be. .
We come now to the other claim of respondents that pursuant to
section 89(b) (1) in relation to section 89(a) (1) (E) and section
89(d), National Internal Revenue Code, the amount of P10,022.47
should have been allowed the estate as a deduction, because it
represented an indebtedness of the decedent incurred during his
lifetime. In support thereof, they offered in evidence a duly certified
claim, presented to the probate court in California by the Bank of
California National Association, which it would appear, that while
still living, Walter G. Stevenson obtained a loan of $5,000.00
secured by pledge on 140,000 of his shares of stock in the
Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. (Exhs. "Q-Q4", pp. 53-59,
record). The Tax Court disallowed this item on the ground that the
local probate court had not approved the same as a valid claim
against the estate and because it constituted an indebtedness in
respect to intangible personal property which the Tax Court held to
be exempt from inheritance tax.
For two reasons, we uphold the action of the lower court in
disallowing the deduction.
Firstly, we believe that the approval of the Philippine probate court
of this particular indebtedness of the decedent is necessary. This is
so although the same, it is averred has been already admitted and
approved by the corresponding probate court in California, situs of
the principal or domiciliary administration. It is true that we have
here in the Philippines only an ancillary administration in this case,
but, it has been held, the distinction between domiciliary or principal
administration and ancillary administration serves only to
distinguish one administration from the other, for the two
P1,204.34
proceedings are separate and independent.8 The reason for the
ancillary administration is that, a grant of administration does not ex
6,000.00
proprio vigore, have any effect beyond the limits of the country in
which it was granted. Hence, we have the requirement that before a
2,052.55
will duly probated outside of the Philippines can have effect here, it
P9,256.89
must first be proved and allowed before our courts, in much the
same manner as wills originally presented for allowance
therein.9 And the estate shall be administered under letters
testamentary, or letters of administration granted by the court, and
disposed of according to the will as probated, after payment of just
debts and expenses of administration.10 In other words, there is a
regular administration under the control of the court, where claims
must be presented and approved, and expenses of administration
allowed before deductions from the estate can be authorized.
Otherwise, we would have the actuations of our own probate court,
in the settlement and distribution of the estate situated here, subject
to the proceedings before the foreign court over which our courts
have no control. We do not believe such a procedure is
countenanced or contemplated in the Rules of Court.
Another reason for the disallowance of this indebtedness as a
deduction, springs from the provisions of Section 89, letter (d),
number (1), of the National Internal Revenue Code which reads:
(d) Miscellaneous provisions — (1) No deductions shall
be allowed in the case of a non-resident not a citizen of
the Philippines unless the executor, administrator or
anyone of the heirs, as the case may be, includes in the
return required to be filed under section ninety-three the
value at the time of his death of that part of the gross
estate of the non-resident not situated in the Philippines."
In the case at bar, no such statement of the gross estate of the non-
resident Stevenson not situated in the Philippines appears in the
three returns submitted to the court or to the office of the petitioner
Collector of Internal Revenue. The purpose of this requirement is to
enable the revenue officer to determine how much of the
indebtedness may be allowed to be deducted, pursuant to (b),
number (1) of the same section 89 of the Internal Revenue Code
which provides:
(b) Deductions allowed to non-resident estates. — In the
case of a non-resident not a citizen of the Philippines, by
deducting from the value of that part of his gross estate
which at the time of his death is situated in the
Philippines —
(1) Expenses, losses, indebtedness, and taxes. — That
proportion of the deductions specified in paragraph (1) of
subjection (a) of this section11 which the value of such
part bears the value of his entire gross estate wherever
situated;"
In other words, the allowable deduction is only to the extent of
the portion of the indebtedness which is equivalent to the proportion
that the estate in the Philippines bears to the total estate wherever
situated. Stated differently, if the properties in the Philippines
constitute but 1/5 of the entire assets wherever situated, then only
1/5 of the indebtedness may be deducted. But since, as heretofore
adverted to, there is no statement of the value of the estate situated
outside the Philippines, no part of the indebtedness can be allowed
to be deducted, pursuant to Section 89, letter (d), number (1) of the
Internal Revenue Code.
For the reasons thus stated, we affirm the ruling of the lower court
disallowing the deduction of the alleged indebtedness in the sum of
P10,022.47.
In recapitulation, we hold and declare that:
(a) only the one-half (1/2) share of the decedent
Stevenson in the conjugal partnership property
constitutes his hereditary estate subject to the estate and
inheritance taxes;
(b) the intangible personal property is not exempt from
inheritance tax, there existing no complete total
reciprocity as required in section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, nor is the decedent's estate
entitled to an exemption of P4,000.00 in the computation
of the estate tax;
(c) for the purpose of the estate and inheritance taxes,
the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother
Lode Mines, Inc. are to be appraised at P0.325 per
share; and
 (d) the P2,000.00 for funeral expenses should be
deducted in the determination of the net asset of the
deceased Stevenson.

In all other respects, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is

affirmed.

Respondent's claim for interest on the amount allegedly overpaid, if

any actually results after a recomputation on the basis of this
decision is hereby denied in line with our recent decision
in Collector of Internal Revenue v. St. Paul's Hospital (G.R. No. L-
12127, May 29, 1959) wherein we held that, "in the absence of a
statutory provision clearly or expressly directing or authorizing such
payment, and none has been cited by respondents, the National
Government cannot be required to pay interest."

WHEREFORE, as modified in the manner heretofore indicated, the

judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed in all other respects
not inconsistent herewith. No costs. So ordered.