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Rule 57 - Preliminary Attachment 2. Professional Video v. TESDA, G.R. No.

155504,
26 June 2009, 591 SCRA 83
1. PCL Industries v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
147970, 31 March 2006, 486 SCRA 214 Facts: In 1999, TESDA, an instrumentality of the
government established under R.A. No. 7796 (the
Facts: Private respondent filed a complaint with the TESDA Act of 1994) and attached to the DOLE to
RTC for Sum of Money with Preliminary Attachment develop and establish a national system of skills
against herein petitioner for the latter's failure to standardization, testing, and certification in the
comply with the terms of the sale of various ink country.
materials, and to pay its obligations despite repeated To fulfill this mandate, it sought to issue
verbal and written demands. security-printed certification and/or identification
Apparently thereafter, petitioner was served polyvinyl (PVC) cards to trainees who have passed the
with summons together with the Writ of Preliminary certification process.
Attachment which propriety of its issuance attachment Professional Video Inc. (PROVI) signed and
stood as it was as the motion to discharge the writ was executed the “Contract Agreement Project PVC ID
denied. Card issuance” for the provision of goods and services
In the meantime, petitioner filed its Answer in the printing and encoding of the PVC cards. PROVI
with Counterclaim claiming that the various printing ink was to provide TESDA with the system and equipment
materials delivered to it by private respondent were compliant with the specifications defined in the
defective but nothing was done to solve the matter. proposal. In return, TESDA would pay PROVI a
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered specified sum of money after TESDA’s acceptance of
its Decision favoring herein appellee, which judgment the contracted goods and services. PPOVI alleged that
was appealed to the CA. The appellate court affirmed TESDA has still an outstanding balance and still
the RTC judgment, holding that there was sufficient remains unpaid.
evidence to prove that herein petitioner had the TESDA claims that it entered the Contract
intention of defrauding private respondent when it Agreement and Addendum in the performance of its
contracted the obligation because it agreed to pay governmental function to develop and establish a
within 30 days from the date of purchase but once the national system of skills standardization, testing, and
merchandise was in its possession, it refused to pay. certification; in the performance of this governmental
function, TESDA is immune from suit.
Issue: Whether the mere failure to pay an obligation
upon falling due and despite several demands is Issue: Can TESDA be sued without its consent?
enough to warrant the issuance of the harsh
provisional remedy of preliminary attachment under Held: TESDA, as an agency of the State, cannot be
Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. sued without its consent. The rule that a state may not
be sued without its consent is embodied in Section 3,
Ruling:The issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution and has been an
Attachment was improper. To sustain an attachment established principle that antedates this Constitution. It
on Section 1(d), Rule 57, it must be shown that the is as well a universally recognized principle of
debtor in contracting the debt or incurring the international law that exempts a state and its organs
obligation intended to defraud the creditor. The fraud from the jurisdiction of another state.
must relate to the execution of the agreement and The principle is based on the very essence of
must have been the reason which induced the other sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can
party into giving consent which he would not have be no legal right as against the authority that makes
otherwise given. To constitute a ground for the law on which the right depends. It also rests on
attachment in Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of reasons of public policy. That public service would be
Court, fraud should be committed upon contracting the hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign
obligation sued upon. A debt is fraudulently contracted authority could be subjected to law suits at the
if at the time of contracting it the debtor has a instance of every citizen and, consequently, controlled
preconceived plan or intention not to pay. Fraud is a in the uses and dispositions of the means required for
state of mind and need not be proved by direct the proper administration of the government.
evidence but may be inferred from the circumstances The proscribed suit that the state immunity
attendant in each case. principle covers takes on various forms, namely: a suit
Fraudulent intent not to honor the admitted against the Republic by name; a suit against an
obligation cannot be inferred from the debtor's inability unincorporated government agency; a suit against a
to pay or to comply with the obligations. government agency covered by a charter with respect
Petition partly GRANTED. Writ of Preliminary to the agencys performance of governmental
Attachment is ordered LIFTED. In all other respects, functions; and a suit that on its face is against a
the CA Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. government officer, but where the ultimate liability will
fall on the government. In the present case, the writ of
attachment was issued against a government agency
covered by its own charter.
As discussed above, TESDA performs
governmental functions, and the issuance of
certifications is a task within its function of developing
and establishing a system of skills standardization,
testing, and certification in the country. From the motivated by malice in entering into the 2001
perspective of this function, the core reason for the agreement
existence of state immunity applies i.e., the public  CA - the trial court gravely abused its
policy reason that the performance of governmental discretion when it ordered the discharge of the writ of
function cannot be hindered or delayed by suits, nor attachment without requiring petitioners to post a
can these suits control the use and disposition of the counter-bond
means for the performance of governmental functions.
Issue: Whether the writ of attachment issued by the
3. Metro Inc. et al v. Lara’s Gifts, G.R. No. 171741, trial court was improperly issued such that it may be
27 November 2009, 606 SCRA discharged without the filing of a counter-bond
175
Ruling:No merit.
FACTS:Laras Gifts and Decors Inc. (LGD) and Metro,  The writ of attachment was improperly issued
Inc. are corporations engaged in the business of because respondent’s amended complaint failed to
handicrafts. Luis and Lara Maria R. Villafuerte are the allege specific acts or circumstances constitutive of
president and vice-president of LGD. Frederick Juan fraud.
and Liza Juan are the principal officers of Metro, Inc.  To sustain an attachment on this ground, it
 Petitioners and respondents agreed that must be shown that the debtor in contracting the debt
respondents would endorse to petitioners purchase or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the
orders received by respondents from their buyers in creditor. The fraud must relate to the execution of the
the United States of America in exchange for a 15% agreement and must have been the reason which
commission, to be shared equally by respondents and induced the other party into giving consent which he
James R. Paddon (JRP), LGDs agent. would not have otherwise given. To constitute a
 R filed a complaint against petitioners for sum ground for attachment in Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the
of money and damages with a prayer for the issuance Rules of Court, fraud should be committed upon
of a writ of preliminary attachment. contracting the obligation sued upon. A debt is
 R filed an amended complaint alleging that fraudulently contracted if at the time of contracting it
petitioners defrauded them in the amount of the debtor has a preconceived plan or intention not to
$521,841.62. pay, as it is in this case
 R also prayed for P1,000,000 as moral  The applicant for a writ of preliminary
damages, P1,000,000 as exemplary damages and attachment must sufficiently show the factual
10% of the judgment award as attorney’s circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent
fees. Respondents also prayed for the issuance of a intent cannot be inferred from the debtor’s mere non-
writ of preliminary attachment payment of the debt or failure to comply with his
 The TC granted R prayer and issued the writ obligation.
of attachment against the properties and assets of  The rule that when the writ of attachment is
petitioners issued upon a ground which is at the same time the
 P filed a motion to discharge the writ of applicants cause of action, the only other way the writ
attachment can be lifted or dissolved is by a counter-bond[21] is
 P argued that the writ of attachment should be applicable in this case. It is clear that in respondents
discharged on the following grounds: (1) that the 2001 amended complaint of fraud is not only alleged as a
agreement was not a valid contract because it did not ground for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
show that there was a meeting of the minds between attachment, but it is also the core of respondent’s
the parties; (2) assuming that the 2001 agreement was complaint. The fear of the Court of Appeals that
a valid contract, the same was inadmissible because R petitioners could force a trial on the merits of the case
failed to authenticate it in accordance with the Rules on the strength of a mere motion to dissolve the
on Electronic Evidence; (3) that R failed to substantiate attachment has a basis.
their allegations of fraud with specific acts or deeds
showing how petitioners defrauded them; and (4) that 4. Torres v. Satsatin, G.R. No. 166759, 25
respondents failed to establish that the unpaid November 2009, 605 SCRA 453
commissions were already due and demandable.
 TC granted P motion and lifted the writ of Facts:Siblings Torres (petitioners) each owned
attachment. adjacent 20,000 square meters track of land in
 R filed a motion for reconsideration, however Dasmariñas, Cavite. Nicanor Satsatin, through
denied by TC. petitioners’ mother Agripina Aledia, was able to
 R filed a petition for certiorari before the Court convince the siblings to sell their property and
of Appeals authorize him via SPA, to negotiate for its sale.
 Petitioners filed a motion for Nicanor offered to sell the properties to Solar
reconsideration. In its 2 March 2006 Resolution, the Resources, to which Solar allegedly agreed to buy the
Court of Appeals denied the motion. three parcels of land plus the property of one Rustica
 TC respondents failed to sufficiently show that Aledia for P35,000,000. Petitioners claimed that Solar
petitioners were guilty of fraud either in incurring the has already paid the entire purchase price, however
obligation upon which the action was brought, or in the Nicanor only remitted P9, 000,000 out of the P28,
performance, found no proof that petitioners were 000,000 sum they are entitled to and that Nicanor had
acquired a house and lot and a car (which he
registered in the names of his children). Despite the authority to act in any manner against the defendant.
repeated verbal and written demands, Nicanor failed to Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the
remit the balance prompting the petitioners to file a defendant.
complaint for sum of money against the family
Satsatin. At the time the trial court issued the writ of
Petitioners filed an Ex Parte Motion for the attachment on November 15, 2002, it can validly to do
Issuance of a Writ of Attachment, alleging among other so since the motion for its issuance can be filed “at the
things, that respondent was about to depart the commencement of the action or at any time before
country and that they are willing to post a bond fixed entry of judgment.” However, at the time the writ was
by court. After filing a Motion for Deputation of Sheriff, implemented, the trial court has not acquired
which the RTC granted, it issued a Writ of Attachment jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent since
(WOA) on November 15. On November 19, after no summons was yet served upon them. The proper
serving a copy of the WOA upon the Satsatins, the officer should have previously or simultaneously with
sheriff levied their real and personal properties. On the implementation of the writ of attachment, served a
November 21, the summons and copy of complaint copy of the summons upon the respondents in order
was served upon the respondents. Respondents filed for the trial court to have acquired jurisdiction upon
their answer and a Motion to Discharge Writ of them and for the writ to have binding effect.
Attachment, claiming, among others, that: the bond Consequently, even if the writ of attachment was
was issued before the issuance of WOA, the WOA validly issued, it was improperly or irregularly enforced
was issued before the summons was received. and, therefore, cannot bind and affect the respondents.
Respondents posted a counter-bond for the lifting of Moreover, again assuming arguendo that the
WOA, which was denied along with MR. Aggrieved, writ of attachment was validly issued, although the trial
they filed with CA a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus court later acquired jurisdiction over the respondents
and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and TRO by service of the summons upon them, such belated
under Rule 65. CA ruled in favor of respondents and service of summons on respondents cannot be
denied petitioners’ MR hence the petition for review on deemed to have cured the fatal defect in the
certiorari with the SC. enforcement of the writ. The trial court cannot
enforce such a coercive process on respondents
Issue:Whether the CA erred in finding that RTC was without first obtaining jurisdiction over their
guilty of GADALEJ in the issuance and implementation person. The preliminary writ of attachment must be
of the WOA served after or simultaneous with the service of
Held:No. A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as summons on the defendant whether by personal
a provisional remedy issued upon order of the court service, substituted service or by publication as
where an action is pending to be levied upon the warranted by the circumstances of the case. The
property or properties of the defendant therein, the subsequent service of summons does not confer a
same to be held thereafter by the sheriff as security for retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction
the satisfaction of whatever judgment that might be 5. Lim v. Lazaro, G.R. No. 185734, 3 July 2013, 700
secured in the said action by the attaching creditor SCRA 547
against the defendant.
In the case at bar, the CA correctly found that there FACTS:Petitioner Lim Jr filed a complaint for a sum of
was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in preliminary attachment against the respondent Sps
approving the bond posted by petitioners despite the Lazaro. The RTC granted the writ of preliminary
fact that not all the requisites for its approval were attachment application and upon the posting of the
complied with. In accepting a surety bond, it is required bond issued the corresponding writ on
necessary that all the requisites for its approval are October 14, 2005. 3 parcels of land owned by the
met; otherwise, the bond should be rejected. respondent spouses were levied upon.
Moreover, in provisional remedies, particularly  The parties later entered into a Compromise
that of preliminary attachment, the distinction between Agreement whereby Sps. Lazaro agreed to pay Lim,
the issuance and the implementation of the writ of Jr. the amount of P2,351,064.80 on an installment
attachment is of utmost importance to the validity of basis, following a schedule of payments covering the
the writ. The distinction is indispensably necessary to period from September 2006 until October 2013. The
determine when jurisdiction over the person of the RTC rendered a decision on the basis of the
defendant should be acquired in order to validly compromise.
implement the writ of attachment upon his person.  Sps. Lazaro then filed an Omnibus Motion,
In Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, this Court held seeking to lift the writ of preliminary attachment
that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment annotated on the subject TCTs.
involves three stages: first, the court issues the order In granting the Motion, the RTC ruled that a writ of
granting the application; second, the writ of attachment preliminary attachment is a mere provisional or
issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and ancillary remedy, resorted to by a litigant to protect and
third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, preserve certain rights and interests pending final
it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of judgment. Considering that the case had already been
the defendant be first obtained. However, once the considered closed and terminated by the rendition of
implementation of the writ commences, the court must the decision based on the compromise agreement, the
have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for writ of preliminary attachment should be lifted and
without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and quashed.
 In fine, the Court holds that the writ of
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of preliminary preliminary attachment subject of this case should be
attachment was properly lifted. restored and its annotation revived in the subject
TCTs, re-vesting unto Lim, Jr. his preferential lien over
HELD:NO. By its nature, preliminary attachment, the properties covered by the same as it were before
under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court (Rule 57), is an the cancellation of the said writ. Lest it be
ancillary remedy applied for not for its own sake but to misunderstood, the lien or security obtained by an
enable the attaching party to realize upon the relief attachment even before judgment, is in the nature of a
sought and expected to be granted in the main or vested interest which affords specific security for the
principal action; it is a measure auxiliary or incidental satisfaction of the debt put in suit.30 Verily, the lifting
to the main action. As such, it is available during its of the attachment lien would be tantamount to an
pendency which may be resorted to by a litigant to abdication of Lim, Jr.’s rights over Sps. Lazaro’s
preserve and protect certain rights and interests during properties which the Court, absent any justifiable
the interim, awaiting the ultimate effects of a final ground therefor, cannot allow.
judgment in the case. In addition, attachment is also
availed of in order to acquire jurisdiction over the 6. Olib v. Pastoral, G.R. No. 81120, 20 August 1990,
action by actual or constructive seizure of the property 188 SCRA 692
in those instances where personal or substituted Facts:On November 13, 1981, Corazon M. Navia sued
service of summons on the defendant cannot be Petitioners, for dissolution of their partnership and
effected. other reliefs, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
 In this relation, while the provisions of Rule 57 a preliminary attachment.The petition was granted
are silent on the length of time within which an resulting in the attachment of 6 parcels of land
attachment lien shall continue to subsist after the belonging to the petitioners, along with stocks of
rendition of a final judgment, jurisprudence dictates merchandise in their bodega. The writ was amended
that the said lien continues until the debt is paid, or the excluding the merchandise.
sale is had under execution issued on the judgment or On May 16, 1985, the petitioners filed a motion
until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment to discharge the preliminary attachment on the ground
discharged or vacated in the same manner provided that the attachment bond executed for one year from
by law. November 1983 had already lapsed. Judge Miguel S.
 Applying these principles, the Court finds that Rallos of the RTC of Agusan del Norte and Butuan
the discharge of the writ of preliminary attachment City ruled in favor of Petitioners.
against the properties of Sps. Lazaro was improper. On July 20, 1987, the petitioners moved for the
Records indicate that while the parties have entered discharge of the writ of preliminary attachment. Navia
into a compromise agreement which had already been filed an opposition, contending that as she had
approved by the RTC in its January 5, 2007 Amended perfected her appeal to the Court of Appeals, the trial
Decision, the obligations thereunder have yet to be court no longer had any jurisdiction over the case.
fully complied with – particularly, the payment of the On August 24, 1987, Judge Edelwina C. Pastoral, who
total compromise amount of P2,351,064.80. Hence, had succeeded Judge Rallos denied the motion on the
given that the foregoing debt remains unpaid, the ground invoked in the opposition.
attachment of Sps. Lazaro’s properties should have The petitioners moved for reconsideration
continued to subsist. however it was denied. Petitioners filed another MFR
In the earlier case of Chemphil Export & Import insisting that (a) the attachment had been
Corporation v. CA, the Court ruled that a writ of automatically discharged under Rule 57, Section 19;
attachment is not extinguished by the execution of a and (b) the attachment bond had already lapsed for
compromise agreement between the parties. In that non-payment of the premiums. They were rebuffed
case the Court held thus: again. They then came before this Court, contending
The case at bench admits of peculiar character that the respondent court committed grave abuse of
in the sense that it involves a compromise agreement. discretion in denying their motion.
The parties to the compromise agreement should not Issues:
be deprived of the protection provided by an 1. WON the attachment bond had already lapsed for
attachment lien especially in an instance where one non-payment of the premiums.
reneges on his obligations under the agreement, as in 2. WON the attachment had been automatically
the case at bench, where Antonio Garcia failed to hold discharged under Rule 57 Section 19
up his own end of the deal, so to speak.
 If we were to rule otherwise, we would in effect Held:
create a back door by which a debtor can easily First Issue: No
escape his creditors. Consequently, we would be Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy
faced with an anomalous situation where a debtor, in by which the property of an adverse party is taken into
order to buy time to dispose of his properties, would legal custody, either at the commencement of an
enter into a compromise agreement he has no action or at any time thereafter, as a security for the
intention of honoring in the first place. The purpose of satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by
the provisional remedy of attachment would thus be the plaintiff or any proper party. 8
lost. It would become, in analogy, a declawed and It is an auxiliary remedy and cannot have an
toothless tiger. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; independent existence apart from the main suit or
citations omitted) claim instituted by the plaintiff against the defendant. 9
Being merely ancillary to a principal proceeding, the
attachment must fail if the suit itself cannot be A Motion to Dismiss and/or Opposition to the
maintained as the purpose of the writ can no longer be application for a writ of Preliminary Injunction by herein
justified. respondent La Tondeña Inc. was filed by petitioner on
The consequence is that where the main July 27, 1983.
action is appealed, the attachment which may have
been issued as an incident of that action is also Thereafter, petitioner Traders Royal Bank filed
considered appealed and so also removed from the with the Intermediate Appellate Court a petition for
jurisdiction of the court a quo. The attachment itself certiorari and prohibition, with application for a writ of
cannot be the subject of a separate case independent preliminary injunction, to annul and set aside the Order
of the principal action because the attachment was dated September 28, 1983 of the respondent Regional
only an incident of such action. Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch IX, issued in
Coming now to the argument that the Civil Case No. 7003-M; to dissolve the writ of
attachment was automatically lifted because of the preliminary injunction dated October 6, 1983 issued
non-payment of the premium on the attachment bond, pursuant to said order; to prohibit respondent Judge
the Court feels it is time again to correct a common from taking cognizance of and assuming jurisdiction
misimpression. The rule is that the bond is not deemed over Civil Case No. 7003-M, and to compel private
respondent La Tondeña, Inc., and Ex- Oficio Provincial
Second Issue: No Sheriff of Bulacan to return the disputed alcohol to
The order of attachment is considered their original location at Remco's ageing warehouse at
discharged only where the judgment has already Calumpit, Bulacan.
become final and executory and not when it is still on
appeal. The obvious reason is that, except in a few In its decision, the Intermediate Appellate
specified cases, execution pending appeal is not Court dismissed the petition for lack of legal and
allowed. factual basis, holding that the respondent Judge did
not abuse his discretion in issuing the Order of
7. Traders Royal Bank v. IAC, L-66321, 31 October September 28, 1983 and the writ of preliminary
1984, 133 SCRA 141 injunction dated October 3, 1983. citing the decision in
Detective and Protective Bureau vs. Cloribel (26 SCRA
Facts: Sometime on March 18, 1983 herein petitioner 255). Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the
Traders Royal Bank instituted a suit against the respondent court denied the same in its resolution
Remco Alcohol Distillery, Inc. REMCO before the dated February 2, 1984.
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, for recovery of the
sum of P2,382,258.71 obtaining therein a writ of pre Issue:Whether the respondent judge acted without
attachment directed against the assets and properties jurisdiction in authorizing the issuance of a writ of
of Remco Alcohol Distillery, Inc. preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction,
which enjoined the sheriff of Pasay City from
On May 12, 1982, private respondent La interferring with La Tondeña's right to enter and
Tondeña, Inc. filed a complaint-in- intervention in said withdraw the barrels of alcohol and molasses from
Civil Case No. 9894, alleging among others, that 'it had Remco's ageing warehouse and from conducting the
made advances to Remco Distillery Inc. which totalled sale thereof.
P3M and which remains outstanding as of date' and Held: There is no question that the action filed by
that the 'attached properties are owned by La private respondent La Tondeña, Inc., as third-party
Tondeña, Inc. claimant, before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan
wherein it claimed ownership over the property levied
Subsequently, private respondent La Tondeña, upon by Pasay City Deputy Sheriff Edilberto Santiago
Inc., without the foregoing complaint-in- intervention is sanctioned by Section 14, Rule 57 of the Rules of
having been passed upon by the Regional Trial Court, Court. Thus —
Branch CX, (Pasay City), filed in Civil Case No. 9894-
P a "Motion to Withdraw" dated October 8, 1983, If property taken be claimed by any person other
praying that it be allowed to withdraw alcohol and than the party against whom attachment had been
molasses from the Remco Distillery Plant and which issued or his agent, and such person makes an
motion was granted per order of the Pasay Court affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession
dated January 27, 1983, authorizing respondent La thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title,
Tondeña, Inc. to withdraw alcohol and molasses from and serves such affidavit upon the officer while the
the Remco Distillery Plant at Calumpit, Bulacan. latter has possession of the property, and a copy
thereof upon the attaching creditor, the officer shall
On July 19, 1983, private respondent La not be bound to keep the property under the
Tondeña Inc. instituted before the Regional Trial Court, attachment, unless the attaching creditor or his
Branch IX, Malolos, Bulacan presided over by agent, on demand of said officer, secures aim
Respondent Judge, Civil Case No. 7003-M, in which it against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater
asserted its claim of ownership over the properties than the value of the property attached. In case of
attached in Civil Case No. 9894-P, and likewise prayed disagreement as to such value, the same shall be
for the issuance of a writ of Preliminary Mandatory and decided by the court issuing the writ of attachment.
Prohibitory Injunction. The officer shall not be liable for damages, for the
taking or keeping of such property, to any such
third-party claimant, unless such a claim is so made
and the action upon the bond brought within one  RTC resolved the pending incidents and
hundred and twenty (120) days from the date of the required the petitioners to justify their motion to
filing of said bond. But nothing herein contained discharge the attachment
shall prevent such third person from vindicating his  During pre-trial, respondents requested
claim to the property by proper action ... additional time to file a supplemental motion to justify
their earlier motions which was granted and gave
The foregoing rule explicitly sets forth the petitioners ten (10) days from receipt within which to
remedy that may be availed of by a person who claims comment or opposed it
to be the owner of property levied upon by attachment,  RTC issued an order lifting the attachment to
viz: to lodge a third- party claim with the sheriff, and if which respondent Erlinda filed a motion for
the attaching creditor posts an indemnity bond in favor reconsideration
of the sheriff, to file a separate and independent action  Petition for certiorari is granted
to vindicate his claim (Abiera vs. Court of Appeals, 45  P subsequent motion for reconsideration was
SCRA 314). And this precisely was the remedy denied.
resorted to by private respondent La Tondeña when it  R judge issued an Order directing respondent
filed the vindicatory action before the Bulacan Court. Erlinda to file a new attachment bond in the amount of
P35,000,000.00 and petitioners to file a counterbond
Generally, the rule that no court has the power within ten days from notice of the filing and approval of
to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees the bond of respondent Erlinda. Petitioners moved for
of a concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal the reconsideration of the said Order which respondent
power to grant the injunctive relief sought by injunction, judge denied and granted a period of fifteen days for
is applied in cases where no third-party claimant is respondent Erlinda to file an attachment bond
involved, in order to prevent one court from nullifying  Erlinda filed her attachment bond on June 25,
the judgment or process of another court of the same 2009 in the amount of P35,000,000.00
rank or category, a power which devolves upon the  P filed a motion for extension of time to comply
proper appellate court . 2 The purpose of the rule is to and/or file the appropriate pleading and to hold in
avoid conflict of power between different courts of abeyance the reinstatement of the writ of attachment
coordinate jurisdiction and to bring about a harmonious  P filed a motion to admit bank property in lieu
and smooth functioning of their proceedings. of counterbond which was opposed by respondent
Erlinda
It is further argued that since private  R judge denied petitioners' motion in the
respondent La Tondeña, Inc., had voluntarily assailed Order, issued an Order reinstating the Writ of
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Pasay Court by Attachment dated March 1, 2001 for failure of
filing a motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 9894-P, petitioners to file the required counterbond, and issued
the denial or dismissal thereof constitutes a bar to the an amended Reinstated Writ of Attachment directing
present action filed before the Bulacan Court. respondent Sheriff Oscar L. Rojas (hereafter
respondent Sheriff) to attach the real estate or
8. Luzon Development Bank v. Krishnan, G.R. No. personal properties of petitioners in the amount of
203530, 13 April 2015, 755 P28,597,472.70. On June 30, 2011, the sheriff served
SCRA 358 the Notice of Garnishment and the Amended
Reinstated Writ of Attachment
FACTS:  P filed an urgent motion to recall, suspend or
 Petitioners Luzon Development Bank, Tomas hold in abeyance and re-examination of the amended
Clemente, and Oscar Ramirez are the respondents in reinstated writ of preliminary attachment
the complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and  P filed this petition for certiorari
Damages filed by respondent Erlinda Khrishnan  CA–dismissed petitioners' certiorari petition
 Erlinda claimed that she is a client of and affirmed the Orders of the RTC reinstating the Writ
respondent bank wherein she maintained several of Attachment for failure of petitioners to file the
accounts including time deposits. required counter-bond.
 Erlinda presented her Time Deposits
Certificates amounting to P28,597,472.70 for payment Issue:Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's
because they have become due, petitioners refused to decision which denied petitioners' motion praying that
honor them for the reason that they were fraudulent. bank property be deposited in lieu of cash or a
 Respondent Erlinda likewise applied for a counter-bond
Preliminary Writ of Attachment which the RTC granted
 By virtue of the writ, petitioner bank's accounts Ruling:We rule in the negative.Section 2, Rule 57 of
in BPI Family Bank, Calamba, Laguna and in the the Rules of Court explicitly states that "[a]n order of
Central Bank were garnished. attachment may be issued either ex parte or upon
 P filed an urgent ex-parte Motion to Recall motion with notice and hearing by the court in which
Quash and/or Lift Attachment or Garnishment (in the action is pending, or by the Court of Appeals or the
excess of amounts in the writ). Supreme Court, and must require the sheriff of the
 R opposed the motion. court to attach so much of the property in the
 P filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the Philippines of the party against whom it is issued, not
substitution of their garnished account exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy
the applicant's demand, unless such party makes
deposit or gives a bond as hereinafter provided in founded in or granted by law." Any hint of doubt or
an amount equal to that fixed in the order, which dispute on the asserted legal right precludes the grant
may be the amount sufficient to satisfy the applicant's of preliminary injunctive relief.For suits attacking the
demand or the value of the property to be attached as validity of laws or issuances with the force and effect of
stated by the applicant, exclusive of costs."it is law, as here, the applicant for preliminary injunctive
evidently clear that once the writ of attachment has relief bears the added burden of overcoming the
been issued, the only remedy of the petitioners in presumption of validity inhering in such laws or
lifting the same is through a cash deposit or the filing issuances. These procedural barriers to the issuance
of the counter-bond. of a preliminary injunctive writ are rooted on the
Rule 58 - Preliminary Injunction equitable nature of such relief, preserving the status
1. Filipino Metals v. Secretary of Trade and quo while, at the same time, restricting the course of
Industry, G.R. No. 157498, 15 July 2005, 463 SCRA unmistakable legal right" on the part of respondent to
616 receive the "protection of a writ of preliminary
injunction."
Facts:EO 156 issued by President Arroyo on Respondent elevated the case to the Court of
December 12, 2002, imposes a partial ban on the Appeals in a certiorari petition.
importation of used motor vehicles. The ban is part of CA: Granted the certiorari and set aside the
several measures EO 156 adopts to "accelerate the RTC’s order reinstated its Order of 27 November 2008.
sound development of the motor vehicle industry in the Petitioners are now before the CA with having
Philippines." In Executive Secretary v. Southwing committed an error of law in reinstating the preliminary
Heavy Industries, Inc. and two related petitions, we injunctive writ for respondent. They argue that
found EO 156 a valid executive issuance enforceable Southwing controls the case, precluding the CA from
throughout the Philippine customs territory, except in recognizing a clear legal right of respondent to import
the Subic Special Economic and Freeport Zone in used motor vehicles.
Zambales by virtue of its status as a "separate Respondent counters that the doctrinal import
customs territory" under Republic Act No. 7227. of Southwing was weakened by the subsequent
issuance of EO 418, allegedly repealing EO 156.
Respondent invokes our minute Resolution of 15
Respondent Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc.
November 2010 denying the petition as judicial
(respondent), a corporation engaged in the importation
confirmation of the supposed repeal.
of used motor vehicles via the ports of Aparri, Cagayan
and San Fernando, La Union, sued the government in
Issue: The question is whether action of the
the RTC of Appari, to declare invalid EO 156,
defendants even before adverse judgment is rendered
impleading petitioner public officials as
against them.
respondents. Respondent attacked EO 156 for (1)
Respondent sought preliminary injunctive relief
having been issued by President Arroyo ultra vires; (2)
as ancillary to its principal cause of action to invalidate
trenching the Due Process and Equal Protection
EO 156. Respondent’s attack on EO 156, however,
Clauses of the Constitution; and (3) having been
comes on the heels of Southwing where we passed
superseded by Executive Order No. 418 (EO
upon and found EO 156 legally sound, albeit
418), issued by President Arroyo on 4 April 2005,
overextended in application. We found EO 156 a valid
modifying the tariff rates of imported used motor
police power measure addressing an "urgent national
vehicles. Respondent sought a preliminary injunctive
concern":
writ to enjoin, litis pendentia, the enforcement of EO
There is no doubt that the issuance of the ban
156.
to protect the domestic industry is a reasonable
exercise of police power. The deterioration of the local
RTC: Acting on respondent’s application for motor manufacturing firms due to the influx of imported
preliminary injunctive remedy, the trial court granted used motor vehicles is an urgent national concern that
relief, initially by issuing a TRO followed by a writ of needs to be swiftly addressed by the President. In the
preliminary injunction granted in its Order of 27 exercise of delegated police power, the executive can
November 2008. On petitioners’ motion, however, the therefore validly proscribe the importation of these
trial court reconsidered its Order and lifted the vehicles
injunctive writ on 7 July 2010. The trial court grounded
its ruling on Southwing which it considered as negating 2. Power Sites v. United Neon, G.R. No. 163406, 24
any "clear and November 2009, 605 SCRA 196

the Court of Appeals erred in granting preliminary In Power Sites and Signs, Inc. vs. United Neon, the
injunctive relief to respondent to enjoin enforcement of Supreme Court stated that there is no “irreparable
EO 156. injury” as understood in law. Rather, the damages
alleged by the petitioner, namely, “immense loss in
Held: Yes profit and possible damage claims from clients” and
It is a deeply ingrained doctrine in Philippine the cost of the billboard which is “a considerable
remedial law that a preliminary injunctive writ under amount of money” is easily quantifiable, and certainly
Rule 58 issues only upon a showing of the applicant’s does not fall within the concept of irreparable damage
"clear legal right" being violated or under threat of or injury as described in Social Security Commission v.
violation by the defendant. "Clear legal right," within Bayona, 115 Phil. 105, 110 (1962)
the meaning of Rule 58, contemplates a right "clearly
3. Hernandez v. NAPOCOR, G.R. No. 145328, 23
March 2006, 485 SCRA 166 WhilethePetitionwaspendingbeforetheCA,thetrialco
urtorderedthe
Sometimein1996,RespondentNationalPowerCorpor issuanceofawritofpreliminaryinjunctiontostopNapocorfr
ationbeganthe ominstallinghigh-
constructionof29steelpolesinconnectionwithits230kilo- voltagecablesandfromenergizingandtransmittinghigh-
voltSucat-Araneta- voltageelectriccurrent throughthosecables.
BalintawakPowerTransmissionProject.Thesepoles,eac
hofwhichwas53.4meters OnMay3,2000,theCAreversedthetrialcourt’sOrderon
high,weretosupportoverheadtensioncablesthatwouldp thegroundthat
assthroughDasmariñas Section1ofPresidentialDecree1818clearlyproscribedinj
Village,MakatiCity,wherepetitioners’homeswerelocate unctionsagainst
d. infrastructureprojects.ItfurthercitedSupremeCourtCircu
Troubleensuedwhenpetitionersdiscoveredsomescie lars2-91and13-
ntificstudies,findingthat 93datedMarch15,1991,andMarch5,1993,respectively.
electromagneticfieldscreatedbyhigh-
voltagepowerlinescouldcausearangeof PetitionersfiledtheinstantPetition,contendingthatthep
illnessesfromcancertoleukemia.Inaprivilege speech, roscriptioninPD1818shouldnotbeappliedtocasesofextr
Representative Francis Joseph emeurgency,suchaswhentherightto
G.Escuderodenouncedthecavalier manner in which healthandsafetywashangingonthebalance.
Napocor had ignored
safetyandconsultationrequirements.Anexplanationwas Issue:Whetherthetrialcourtmaytemporarilyrestrainorpr
demandedby eliminarily
RepresentativeArnulfoFuentebella,chairpersonof the enjoinNapocorfromconstructingandoperatingthe29stee
HouseCommitteeonEnergy. lpolesortowers,
Respondentadmittedthatitwasstillnegotiatingwithpetitio notwithstandingPresidentialDecree1818
ners,andthatithadcome
upwithfouroptionstoaddresstheproblem:transfertheline, Ruling:
maintaina12-meter The Court granted the
distancefromthevillage,constructanundergroundline,orr petition.ItheldthattheprohibitioncontainedinPresidential
eroutealongC-5and Decree1818extendedonlytotheissuanceofinjunctionsor
SouthLuzonExpressway.Thesenegotiationsresultedina restrainingordersagainst
nimpasse. administrativeacts,incontroversiesinvolvingfactsorthee
OnMarch9,2000,petitionersfiledaComplaintforDamage xerciseofdiscretionin
swithPrayerfor technicalcases.Itdidnotcovercontroversiesinvolvingque
theIssuanceofaTemporaryRestrainingOrderand/oraWri stionsoflaw,asthose involvedintheinstantcase.
tofPreliminary InjunctionagainstNapocor.Judge
Francisco B.IbayissuedanOrdertemporarily
restrainingitfromenergizingandtransmittinghigh- WhatPresidentialDecree1818aimedtoavertwastheu
voltageelectriccurrentthroughtheproject.ThisOrderwas ntimelyfrustrationof
extendedfrom2daysto18days. governmentinfrastructureprojects,particularly by
provisional remedies.Otherwise,
RespondentfiledwiththeCourtofAppeals(CA)aPetitio thegreatergoodwouldsufferfromthedisruptionofthepurs
nforCertiorariwith uitofessential
PrayerforTROandPreliminaryInjunctionandsoughtthedi governmentprojectsorthefrustrationoftheeconomicdev
smissalofthe elopmenteffortofthe
Complaint,onthegroundthatthetrialcourthadnojurisdicti nation.PDNo.1818,however,wasnotmeanttobeablanke
on. ItcitedSection1 tprohibitionthatwould
ofPresidentialDecreeNo.1818,whichstates: disregardthefundamentalrighttothehealth,safetyandwel
Section 1. No Court in the Philippines shall l-beingof a community, guaranteedbytheConstitution.
have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, Indeed, the prohibition was not
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory absolute.Itonlyprohibitedthecourtsfrom
injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy issuinginjunctionsagainstadministrativeactsinvolvingfa
involving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, ctsortheexerciseof
forest or other natural resource development project discretionintechnicalcases.Outsidethisdimension,theS
of the government, or any public utility operated upremeCourtdeclaredthat
by the government, including among other public courtscouldnotbepreventedfromexercisingtheirpowerto
utilities for transport of the goods or restrainorprohibit
commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to administrativeactsincasesinvolvingquestionsoflaw.
prohibit any person or persons, entity or government Theinstantcontroversyinvolvedquestionsof
official from proceeding with or continuing the law.Petitionersraisedtheissues of whether
execution or implementation of any such project, or therewasaviolationof their
the operation of such public utility or pursuing any constitutionallyprotectedrighttohealth,andwhetherresp
lawful activity necessary for such execution, ondenthadindeedviolatedtheLocalGovernmentCodepr
implementation or operation. ovisiononpriorconsultationwithaffectedcommunities.Th
esequestionsoflawremovedthecasefromtheprotective G.G. Sportswear, the parties amended the real estate
mantleofPresidentialDecree1818. mortgages to include such loan. Petitioner G.G.
Moreover,theissuancebythetrialcourtofapreli Sportswear was unable to pay its loans.
minaryinjunctionfoundlegal On March 15, 2005 respondent BDO told G.G.
supportinSection3ofRule58oftheRulesofCourt,which Sportswear in a letter that the bank transferred on that
merelyrequireda date its past due loan obligation with the bank, totaling
probableviolationoftheapplicant’srightsandatendency US$12,257,581.31 as of December 31, 2004, to
torenderthejudgment Philippine Investment One (SPV-AMC), Inc. (PIO),
ineffectual.Inthecaseatbar,therewasadequateeviden including all interest, fees, charges, penalties, and
ceonrecordtojustifythe securities/collaterals, if any. This was followed by BDO
conclusionthattheNAPOCORprojectwouldprobablyi Certification[2] dated April 21, 2005 that it has
mperilthehealthandsafetyof petitioners. assigned, conveyed, transferred and sold to PIO, on a
First,petitionerspresentedcopiesofstudieslin without recourse basis, all its rights, title, benefits and
kingtheincidenceofillnesses, interest to the Loan Receivables of G.G. Sportswear.
suchascancerandleukemia,toexposuretoelectromag Subsequently, however, respondent BDO
neticfields. applied with the Ex Officio Sheriff of Makati for the
Second,theNapocorbrochureonitsQuezonpo foreclosure of the properties that petitioners G.G.
werprojecthadaprovisionthat Sportswear and Gidwani mortgaged with the bank.
powerlinesshouldbelocatedwithinsafedistancesfromre The notice of sheriffs sale scheduled the auction of the
sidencesbecauseofthe dangerconcomitantwithhigh- properties on May 31, 2007 but this was subsequently
voltagepower. rescheduled to July 18, 2007. At any rate, the sheriff
Third,documentsonrecordshowedthatrespo auctioned off the Aranda property to BDO on June 21,
ndenthadmaderepresentations 2007.
thatitwaslookingintothepossibilityof relocating On July 16, 2007, two days before the
theproject,andthatithadeven undertakenaseriesof rescheduled auction of the Bel-Air property, petitioners
negotiationsandmeetingswithpetitioners.Thesedocum G.G. Sportswear and Gidwani filed an action with the
ents Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, in Civil Case 07-
andnegotiationssuggestedthattheirhealthconcernswer 631,[4] to annul the foreclosure, hold respondent BDO
efarfromimaginary.If in indirect contempt, award damages, and enjoin
therewasindeednocauseforconcern,itwouldnothaveco further foreclosure by TRO and preliminary injunction.
meupwithoptionsto address their woes.Neither would They alleged that, as a result of BDOs transfer of G.G.
Representative Escudero have fired away strong Sportswears loan receivables to PIO in 2005, BDO lost
wordsof censure inhisprivilegedspeech. the right to foreclose.
Whileitwastruethattheissueof In its answer, respondent BDO denied
whetherthetransmissionlinesweresafewas transferring petitioner G.G. Sportswears loan
essentiallyevidentiaryinnatureandpertainedtothevery receivables to PIO, stating that the April 21, 2005
meritsof theactionbelow, Certification it issued was a mere general certification
theCourtfoundthatthepossibilityof that did not specify which of several loan receivables
healthrisksfromexposuretoelectromagnetic were sold to PIO. BDO in fact transferred to Philippine
radiationwaswithintherealmof ascientificscaleof Asset Investment, which entity was subsequently
probability.Itheldthatthere taken over by respondent PIO, only P290,820.00 out
wassufficientbasisonrecordengenderingacloudof of G.G. Sportswears total loan.[6] BDO attached
doubtoverthedangerposedby Certifications from itself and from PIO to the effect that
theprojectuponthelivesof the credits secured by the Aranda and Bel-Air
petitioners.Indeed,probabilitywasenoughforinjunction properties had not been transferred to PIO. The latter
toissueasaprovisionalremedy.Incontrast,injunctionas filed an answer of the same tenor.
amainactionwasresortedto On August 7, 2007 the RTC issued an
whenoneneededtoestablishabsolutecertaintyasbasis order,[9] denying petitioners G.G. Sportswear and
forafinalandpermanent Gidwanis applications for TRO and preliminary
injunction.Pendingthefinaldeterminationof injunction. They filed a motion for reconsideration and
thetrialcourtonthemaincase,itwasprudentto preserve a motion to inhibit the presiding judge, but on October
the status quo. 11, 2007 the RTC denied both motions. This prompted
G.G. Sportswear and Gidwani to file a special civil
action of certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP 101799, assailing the RTC orders mainly
4. G.G. Sportswear v. BDO, G.R. No. 184434, 8 based on the proposition that respondent BDO had
February 2010, 612 SCRA 47 lost its right to foreclose the mortgages when it
assigned its rights to PIO.
Facts:On April 22, 1994 petitioners G.G. Sportswear On June 26, 2008 the CA rendered judgment,
Manufacturing Corp. (G.G. Sportswear) and Naresh dismissing the petition for lack of merit. It denied on
Gidwani mortgaged a lot in Aranda, Makati, and a August 29, 2008 petitioners G.G. Sportswear and
house and lot in Bel-Air Village, also in Makati, to Gidwanis subsequent motion for reconsideration,
Equitable-PCI Bank, now the respondent Banco de prompting them to file the present petition for review.
Oro Unibank, Inc. (BDO), to secure a P20,357,000.00
loan to G.G. Sportswear. On April 25, 1996, to secure Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the
an additional P11,643,000.00 loan that BDO gave RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
denied petitioners G.G. Sportswear and Gidwanis there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
application for TRO and preliminary injunction despite consequences which cannot be remedied under any
the banks apparent assignment of its credit to another standard of compensation. Here, since there is a valid
entity. cause to foreclose on the mortgages, petitioners G.G.
Sportswear and Gidwani cannot claim that the
Held:Petitioners G.G. Sportswear and Gidwani point irreparable damage they wanted to prevent by their
out that BDOs March 15, 2005 letter and its April 21, application for preliminary injunction is the loss of their
2005 certification show that the bank already properties to auction sale. Their real injury, if it turns
transferred to PIO all its rights to the loan receivables out that the right to foreclose belongs to PIO rather
of G.G. Sportswear. Thus, BDO lost its right to than to BDO, is payment of the proceeds of the auction
foreclose the mortgages on the properties that secured sale to the wrong party rather than to their creditor. But
the unpaid loans, thus, entitling petitioners to an order this kind of injury is purely monetary and is
enjoining the foreclosures. Further, petitioners claim compensable by an appropriate judgment against
that BDO bloated G.G. Sportswears outstanding BDO. It is not in any sense an irreparable injury.
obligation such that it was being made to pay more
through the foreclosure than was actually due. 5. Borja v. Salcedo, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-03-1746
The test for issuing a TRO or an injunction is (formerly OCA IPI No. 10-
whether the facts show a need for equity to intervene 1225-RTJ), 26 September 2003, 412 SCRA 110
in order to protect perceived rights in equity.[14] In
general, a higher court will not set aside the trial courts FACTS:
grant or denial of an application for preliminary  In a Complaint, Roger F. Borja accuses
injunction unless it gravely abused its discretion as Presiding Judge Zorayda H. Salcedo of the RTC (Br
when it lacks jurisdiction over the action, ignores 32) of San Pablo City of gross ignorance of the law
relevant considerations that stick out of the parties and grave abuse of discretion in issuing a temporary
pleadings, sees the facts with a blurred lens, ignores restraining order (TRO) in Civil Case No. SP-5775
what is relevant, draws illogical conclusions, or simply (01), without complying with the 1997 Rules of Civil
acts in random fashion. Procedure.
Injunction may be issued only when the  Complainant claims that the procedure
plaintiff appears to be entitled to the main relief he followed by respondent Judge violated Rule 58 Section
asks in his complaint. This means that the plaintiffs 4 [b-c-d], 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the
allegations should show clearly that he has a cause of following grounds:
action. This means that he enjoys some right and that (a) Being a multi-sala court, it is the Executive
the defendant has violated it. And, where the Judge that may issue an ex-parte TRO good for 72
defendant is heard on the application for injunction, the hours
trial court must consider, too, the weight of his (b) The notice of raffle was not preceded or
opposition. contemporaneously accompanied, by service of
Did the allegations of the parties and the summons, with the complaint or initiatory pleading and
documents they attached to their pleadings give ample the applicants affidavit and bond.
justification for the issuance of a TRO or preliminary (c) Respondent Judge who was assigned to
injunction order to stop the foreclosure sale of the Bel- the case did not conduct the required summary
Air property? Two considerations militate against it: hearing with notice and in the presence of the parties
First. The mortgaged properties were due for within 24 hours after the Sheriffs return of service
foreclosure. Admittedly, petitioner G.G. Sportswear and/or the records are received by the branch selected
had defaulted on the loans secured by the subject by raffle.
mortgages. Petitioners had, therefore, no right to (d) The TRO was issued ex-parte without the
complain about losing their properties to foreclosure. required bond and without alleging that the matter is of
Second. The issue of which party owns the extreme urgency and applicant would suffer grave or
loan receivables and, consequently, had the right to irreparable injury.
foreclose the mortgages is essentially an issue (e) Complainant did not ask for the issuance of
between BDO and PIO. This issue is the concern of a preliminary injunction on January 4, 2001 in the
petitioners G.G. Sportswear and Gidwani but only to morning.
the extent that they are entitled to ensure that the  Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo,
proceeds of the foreclosure sale were paid to the right informed complainant that the subject matter of his
party. complaint is judicial in nature hence it shall be denied
For the above reasons, it cannot be said that due course as there are judicial remedies available
petitioners G.G. Sportswear and Gidwani have under the Rules of Court yet to be exhausted.
established a right to the main relief they want,  Complainant argues that when the law
namely, the arrest of the foreclosure sale of their transgressed is elementary, as in the instant case, the
mortgaged properties after they had admitted not failure to know or observe it constitutes gross
paying their loans. As for their claim that BDO had ignorance of the law
bloated G.G. Sportswears outstanding obligation, the  respondent judge submitted her comment and
remedy if this turns out to be true is to direct BDO to apologized for the delay in its submission explaining
return the excess proceeds with damages as the that she, as well as her husband, underwent cataract
circumstances may warrant. operation
What is more, the provisional remedy of  She likewise emphasized her denial of
preliminary injunction may only be resorted to when partiality, ignorance of the law, bias and so forth being
attributed to her by complainant for the reverse is true immediately. Under such circumstance, the executive
as it has been (her) desire to always observe judge shall issue the TRO effective only for seventy-
impartiality, fairness, and dedication in the two (72) hours from its issuance. The executive judge
administration of justice is then required to summon the parties to a
 Judge Salcedo issued a Temporary conference, during which the case should be raffled in
Restraining Order their presence. Before the expiry of the seventy-two
 Defendant Borja filed a Motion to Inhibit Judge hours, the presiding judge to whom the case was
Herradura [Salcedo] from the case and which the latter raffled shall conduct a summary hearing to determine
granted whether the TRO can be extended for another period
 Defendant Brion filed a Motion to Dissolve until a hearing on the pending application for
Temporary Restraining Order anchored on the ground preliminary injunction can be held
that the TRO was issued in violation of Rule 58,  In the present case, there is neither allegation
Section 4(d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and nor proof that respondent judge was motivated by bad
is therefore a patent nullity faith, fraud, dishonesty, corruption or any other ill-
 The undersigned resolved the Motion to motive.
Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order; The  Where this Court pronounced that the failure of
undersigned dissolved the TRO because it was issued respondent therein, as an Executive Judge, to abide
in violation of Supreme Court by Administrative Circular No. 20-95 in issuing the
 The undersigned humbly submits that as TRO constituted grave abuse of authority, misconduct,
aforestated, Judge Salcedo inhibited herself from the and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of
case which was thereafter re-raffled to the sala of the justice for which reason, a fine of P5,000.00 was
undersigned. The motion to Dissolve TRO had to be imposed on respondent judge
resolved. there is neither allegation nor proof that respondent
 this Court referred the case to the Office of the judge was motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty,
Court Administrator for evaluation, report and corruption or any other ill-motive
recommendation  Respondent judge had earlier been apprised
 R judge failed to comply with Administrative of the provisions of Administrative Circular No. 20-95
Circular No. 20-95. No order setting a summary and therefore, it cannot be said that she is ignorant of
hearing on the application for temporary restraining the law. For her conscious disregard of a a basic rule
order was furnished the defendants on the issuance of a TRO, Judge Salcedo must be
 A TRO may however be issued ex-parte if the held administratively liable not for gross ignorance of
matter is of such extreme urgency that grave injustice the law but for grave abuse of authority and conduct
and irreparable injury will arise unless it is issued prejudicial to the proper administration of justice
immediately. Under such circumstances, the executive
judge shall issue the TRO effective only for seventy- 6. Solid Builders, Inc. v. China Banking Corp., G.R.
two (72) hours from its issuance. But such a No. 179665, 3 April 2013, 695
procedure is not applicable to respondent judge SCRA 101
because she is not the executive judge of RTC,
San Pablo City Facts: China Banking Corporation (CBC) granted
 Recommendation of OCA several loans to Solid Builders, Inc. (SBI). To secure
(1) OCA IPI No. 01-1225-RTJ be RE-DOCKETED as a the loans, Medina Foods Industries, Inc. (MFII)
regular administrative matter; executed in CBC’s favor several surety agreements
(2) Respondent Judge Zorayda H. Salcedo, RTC, and contracts of real estate mortgage over parcels of
Branch 32, San Pablo City be fined for her failure to land in the Loyola Grand Villas in Quezon City and
comply with Administrative Circular No. 20-95, with a New Cubao Central in Cainta, Rizal. Subsequently,
warning that a repetition of similar acts in the future SBI proposed to CBC a scheme through which SBI
shall be dealt with more severely; and would sell the mortgaged properties and share the
(3) The explanation of Judge Marivic T. Balisi-Umali, proceeds with CBC on a 50-50 basis until such time
then RTC Judge, Branch 30, San Pablo City that the whole obligation would be fully paid. SBI also
be ACCEPTED for being meritorious proposed that there be partial releases of the
certificates of title of the mortgaged properties without
Issue: Whether the TRO can be extended for another the burden of updating interests on all loans.
period until a hearing in the pending application for In a letter dated March 20, 2000 addressed to
preliminary injunction can be conducted CBC, SBI requested the restructuring of its loans, a
reduction of interests and penalties.
Ruling: In response, CBC sent SBI a letter dated April
 The application for a TRO shall be acted upon 17, 2000 stating that the loans had been completely
only after all parties are heard in a summary hearing restructured effective March 1, 1999 when SBI signed
conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the a new promissory note. Since interest payment has not
records are transmitted to the branch selected by been made, no re-pricing is possible.
raffle. The records shall be transmitted immediately Subsequently, in a letter dated September 18, 2000,
after raffle. CBC demanded SBI to settle its outstanding account
 A TRO can be issued ex parte if the matter is within ten days from receipt thereof.
of such extreme urgency that grave injustice and On October 5, 2000, claiming that the
irreparable injury will arise unless it is issued interests, penalties and charges imposed by CBC were
iniquitous and unconscionable and to enjoin CBC from
initiating foreclosure proceedings, SBI and MFII filed a breach of contractual obligation which tainted its hands
Complaint “To Compel Execution of Contract and for and disqualified it from availing of the equitable
Performance and Damages, With Prayer for Writ of remedy of preliminary injunction.
Preliminary Injunction and Ex-Parte Temporary As SBI is not entitled to the issuance of a writ
Restraining Order” in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of of preliminary injunction, so is MFII. The accessory
Pasig City which was granted. follows the principal. The accessory obligation of MFII
Here, SBI and MFII basically claim a right to as accommodation mortgagor and surety is tied to
have their mortgaged properties shielded from a SBI’s principal obligation to CBC and arises only in the
possible foreclosure by CBC on the ground that the event of SBI’s default.
interest rate and penalty charges imposed by CBC on
the loans availed of by SBI are iniquitous and Rule 60 – Replevin
unconscionable.
1. Rivera v. Vargas, G.R. No. 165895, 5 June 2009,
ISSUE: Whether or not plaintiffs have the right to ask 588 SCRA 529
for an injunctive writ in order to prevent defendant
bank from taking over their properties. FACTS:Petitioner avers that the writ of replevin was
served upon and signed by the security guard on duty
Held: NO. This Court has recently reiterated the where the rock-crushing plant to be seized was located
general principles in issuing a writ of preliminary contrary to the sheriff’s return stating that both the writ
injunction in Palm Tree Estates, Inc. v. Philippine and the summons was served upon petitioner. Nine (9)
National Bank: days after the writ was served on the security guard,
At times referred to as the “Strong Arm of petitioner filed an answer to the complaint
Equity,” we have consistently ruled that there is no accompanied by a prayer for the approval of her
power the exercise of which is more delicate and redelivery bond. The RTC, however, denied the
which calls for greater circumspection than the redelivery bond for having been filed beyond the five-
issuance of an injunction. It should only be extended in day mandatory period prescribed in Sections 5 and 6
cases of great injury where courts of law cannot afford of Rule 60.
an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages; “in  Petitioner argues in the case at bar via the
cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very petition on Rule 45 that the RTC committed grave
clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience abuse of discretion in denying her counterbond on the
bear strongly in complainant’s favor; where there is a ground that it was filed out of time. She contends that
willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff’s right against the mandatory five-day period did not even begin to
his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a run in this case due to the improper service of the writ
continuing one, and where the effect of the mandatory of replevin, contrary to Section 4 of Rule 60.
injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain a
preexisting continuing relation between the parties, Issue: WON the denial of counterbond filed beyond
recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, the 5 day mandatory period is erroneous considering
than to establish a new relation.” the writ was improperly served.
A writ of preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary event which must be granted only in the Held: Yes.Before a final judgment, property cannot be
face of actual and existing substantial rights. The duty seized unless by virtue of some provision of law. The
of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of Rules of Court, under Rule 60, authorizes such seizure
preliminary injunction is to determine whether the in cases of replevin. However, a person seeking a
requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction are remedy in an action for replevin must follow the course
present in the case before it. In this connection, a writ laid down in the statute, since the remedy is penal in
of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the nature. When no attempt is made to comply with the
status quo ante, upon the applicant’s showing of two provisions of the law relating to seizure in this kind of
important requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to action, the writ or order allowing the seizure is
be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought erroneous and may be set aside on motion by the
to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be adverse party.
proven that the violation sought to be prevented would  The process regarding the execution of the
cause an irreparable injury. writ of replevin in Section 4 of Rule 60 is unambiguous:
The basis of the right claimed by SBI and MFII the sheriff, upon receipt of the writ of replevin and prior
remains to be controversial or disputable as there is to the taking of the property, must serve a copy thereof
still a need to determine whether or not, upon to the adverse party (petitioner, in this case) together
consideration of the various circumstances with the application, the affidavit of merit, and the
surrounding the agreement of the parties, the interest replevin bond. The reasons are simple, i.e., to provide
rates and penalty charges are unconscionable. proper notice to the adverse party that his property is
Therefore, such claimed right cannot be considered being seized in accordance with the court’s order upon
clear, actual and subsisting. In the absence of a clear application by the other party, and ultimately to allow
legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ the adverse party to take the proper remedy
constitutes grave abuse of discretion. consequent thereto.
In addition, the default of SBI and MFII to pay  Service of the writ upon the adverse party is
the mortgage indebtedness disqualifies them from mandatory in line with the constitutional guaranty on
availing of the equitable relief that is the injunctive writ.
SBI’s default or failure to settle its obligation is a
procedural due process and as safeguard against dated April 13, 1994, directing Asst. City Prosecutor
unreasonable searches and seizures. Bonifacio Barrera to conduct an investigation for
 In the case at bar since the writ was invalidly determination whether or not there was collusion
served, petitioner is correct in contending that there is between the parties and to submit his report
no reckoning point from which the mandatory five-day thereon. On April 28, 1994, Asst. City Prosecutor
period shall commence to run. Barrera filed his Report stating that there seems to be
 The writ must satisfy proper service in order to no collusion between the parties.
be valid and effective: i.e. it should be directed to the The trial court then set the case for
officer who is authorized to serve it; and it should be hearing. The lone witness was Adriana herself. She
served upon the person who not only has the testified that her marriage with Jose was arranged by
possession or custody of the property involved but who her parents in the traditional Chinese way; that her
is also a party or agent of a party to the action. married life was abnormal because Jose very seldom
Consequently, a trial court is deemed to have acted came home, never worked for a living and instead kept
without or in excess of its jurisdiction with respect to asking for money from her to buy his sports cars; that
the ancillary action of replevin if it seizes and detains a she was also the one spending for all the expenses of
personalty on the basis of a writ that was improperly their only child, John Paul. After her testimony, counsel
served, such as what happened in this case. for Adriana formally offered the documentary evidence.
No evidence was presented regarding the amount of
Petitioner’s proper remedy should have been to file a support needed by John Paul or the capacity of Jose
motion to quash the writ of replevin or a motion to to give support.
vacate the order of seizure. Nevertheless, petitioner’s On June 23, 1994, Adriana filed an Urgent
filing of an application for a redelivery bond, while not Motion to Re-Openon the ground that she was able to
necessary, did not thereby waive her right to question secure additional new evidence which were significant,
the improper service. material and indispensable. On July 6, 1994, the trial
court granted the motion to re-open the case and held
The trial for the main action shall continue. a hearing for the reception of additional evidence. The
Respondent may, however, file a new application for Pasay RTC admitted into evidence the Marriage
replevin should he choose to do so. Contract dated May 25, 1977 between Jose and one
Celia Santiago, and another Marriage Contract
Rule 61 - Support Pendente Lite dated May 6, 1982 between Jose and one Evan
Lock, showing that Jose had been married twice
before he married Adriana in 1984.
1. Lam v. Chua, G.R. No. 131286, 18 March 2004,
426 SCRA 29 RTC- declares the marriage between petitioner
Adriana Chua and respondent Jose Lam null and void
for being bigamous by nature.
Facts:The case commenced on March 11, 1994 upon
On November 3, 1994, Jose filed a Motion for
the filing of a petition for declaration of nullity of
Reconsideration thereof but only insofar as the
marriage by Adriana Chua against Jose Lam in the
decision awarded monthly support to his son in the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch
amount of P20,000.00. He argued that there was
109). Adriana alleged in the petition that: she and Jose
already a provision for support of the child as
were married on January 13, 1984; out of said
embodied in the decision dated February 28, 1994 of
marriage, they begot one son, John Paul Chua Lam;
the Makati RTC wherein he and Adriana agreed to
Jose was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
contribute P250,000.00 each to a common fund for the
the essential marital obligations of marriage but said
benefit of the child, to wit:
incapacity was not then apparent; such psychological
incapacity of Jose became manifest only after the Nothing herein shall diminish the rights and
celebration of the marriage when he frequently failed obligations of both parties with respect to their son. In
to go home, indulged in womanizing and irresponsible the best interest of the child, the Second Party shall
activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal retain care and custody, subject to visitation rights by
partnership of gains; in order to save what was left of the First Party to be exercised through mutual
the conjugal properties, she was forced to agree with arrangements.
Jose on the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of It is hereby agreed by the First Party and the
gains and the separation of present and future Second Party that the First Party and the Second Party
properties; said agreement was approved by the shall initially contribute P250,000.00 each to a
Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 149) in a common fund, to be increased as required, to be used
Decision dated February 28, 1994; they had long been solely and exclusively for the benefit of their son. Said
separated in bed and board; they have agreed that the common fund shall be managed and administered by
custody of their child will be with her, subject to the Second Party, subject to periodic accounting, until
visitation rights of Jose. Adriana prayed that the the son reaches majority age.
marriage between her and Jose be declared null and Jose further alleged in his motion that his
void but she failed to claim and pray for the support of contribution to the common fund had even amounted
their child, John Paul. to P500,000.00.
Summons was duly served on Jose Lam On August 22, 1995, the Pasay RTC issued an
on March 22, 1994. Despite the lapse of fifteen days Order denying Jose Lams motion for reconsideration
after service of summons, no responsive pleading was ruling that the compromise agreement entered into by
filed by him. Hence, the trial court issued an Order the parties and approved by the Makati RTC before
the marriage was declared null and void ab initio by
the Pasay RTC, is of no moment and cannot limit Second, the Pasay RTC did not give Jose an
and/or affect the support ordered by the latter court. opportunity to be present on July 6, 1994 for the
CA- On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s presentation of evidence by Adriana and to refute the
decision in all respect. same. Although copy of the motion filed on June 23,
1994 with a notice of hearing on June 27, 1994 was
Issue:Whether the compromise agreement between sent to Jose, the record does not show that he
petitioner and Adriana is a bar to any further award of received the notice in due time; neither does the
support in favor of their child John Paul? record show that he was notified of the subsequent
hearing held on July 6, 1994 where Adriana presented
Held:Thus, there is no merit to the claim of Jose that the marriage certificates and claimed for the support of
the compromise agreement between him and Adriana, their child sans the presence of Jose.
as approved by the Makati RTC and embodied in its Third, the records do not show that petitioner
decision dated February 28, 1994 in the case for was sent a copy of the Order dated July 6,
voluntary dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains, 1994 wherein the trial court granted the Urgent Motion
is a bar to any further award of support in favor of their to Re-Open of respondent Adriana and forthwith
child John Paul. The provision for a common fund for allowed her to present her evidence to prove that
the benefit of their child John Paul, as embodied in the petitioner herein contracted previous marriages with
compromise agreement between herein parties which different women.
had been approved by the Makati RTC, cannot be Fourth, the evidence presented by respondent
considered final and res judicata since any judgment regarding her claim for support for John Paul is
for support is always subject to modification, glaringly insufficient and cannot be made a valid basis
depending upon the needs of the child and the upon which the Pasay RTC could have determined the
capabilities of the parents to give support. monthly amount of P20,000.00 for the support to be
Having settled the issue on the authority of the given to John Paul by petitioner Jose.
trial court to award support for the child in an action for A party who has been declared in default is
declaration of nullity of marriage of the childs parents, entitled to service of substantially amended or
this Court will now discuss the propriety of the supplemental pleadings.Considering that in cases of
proceedings conducted by the Pasay RTC and the declaration of nullity of marriage or annulment of
decision it rendered, as affirmed by the Court of marriage, there can be no default pursuant to Section
Appeals. 6, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Courtin relation to
The Court notes four circumstances that taint Article 48 of the Family Code, it is with more reason
the regularity of the proceedings and the decision that petitioner should likewise be entitled to notice of
rendered by the trial court. all proceedings.
First, the only ground alleged in the petition for Furthermore, the lower courts are reminded of the
declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Adriana with ruling of the Court in Asian Transmission Corporation
the Pasay RTC is the psychological incapacity of Jose vs. Canlubang Sugar Estates,to wit:
without any prayer for the support of her child. Adriana It is a general principle of law that a court
presented, formally offered her evidence in support of cannot set itself in motion, nor has it power to decide
the petition and submitted the case for decision as questions except as presented by the parties in their
of May 12, 1994.[14] But on a motion to re-open filed pleadings. Anything that is decided beyond them is
by her on June 23, 1994, the trial court set the case for coram non-judice and void. Therefore where a court
reception of evidence on July 6, 1994 and enters a judgment or awards relief beyond the prayer
subsequently allowed Adriana to present evidence of of the complaint or the scope of its allegations the
two previous marriages contracted by Jose with other excessive relief is not merely irregular but is void for
women to prove that the marriage between Adriana want of jurisdiction, and is open to collateral attack.
and Jose was null and void for being bigamous. It is The appellate court also ruled that a judgment
only at the July 6, 1994 hearing that respondent of a court upon a subject within its general jurisdiction,
Adriana first claimed support for John Paul when she but which is not brought before it by any statement or
testified in open court. claim of the parties, and is foreign to the issues
The petition of Adriana was, in effect, submitted for its determination, is a nullity. (Emphasis
substantially changed by the admission of the supplied)
additional evidence. The ground relied on for nullity of Pursuant to the foregoing principle, it is a
the marriage was changed from the psychological serious error for the trial court to have rendered
incapacity of Jose to that of existence of previous judgment on issues not presented in the pleadings as
marriages of Jose with two different women with an it was beyond its jurisdiction to do so. The amendment
additional claim for support of the child. Such of the petition to reflect the new issues and claims
substantial changes were not reflected in the petition against Jose was, therefore, indispensable so as to
filed with the trial court, as no formal amendment was authorize the court to act on the issue of whether the
ever made by Adriana except the insertion of the marriage of Jose and Adriana was bigamous and the
handwritten phrase And for respondent to support the determination of the amount that should have been
child of petitioner in an amount this Honorable Court awarded for the support of John Paul. When the trial
may deem just and reasonable found at the ultimate court rendered judgment beyond the allegations
paragraph of the petition, as allowed by the Pasay contained in the copy of the petition served upon Jose,
RTC. There is nothing on record to show that petitioner the Pasay RTC had acted in excess of its jurisdiction
Jose was notified of the substantial changes in the and deprived petitioner Lam of due process.
petition of Adriana.
Insofar as the declaration of nullity of the null and void, likewise only insofar as the matter on
marriage between Adriana and Jose for being support is concerned.
bigamous is concerned, the decision rendered by the Let the records of Civil Case No. 94-0331 be
Pasay RTC could be declared as invalid for having remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
been issued beyond its jurisdiction. Nonetheless, (Branch 109) which is DIRECTED to reopen the trial of
considering that Jose, did not assail the declaration of Civil Case No. 94-0331 with respect to the claim of
nullity of his marriage with Adriana in his motion for Adriana Chua against Jose Lam for the support of
reconsideration which he filed with the Pasay RTC. In John Paul Chua Lam and conduct hearings for further
the petitions he filed in the Court of Appeals and with reception of evidence for the proper determination of
us, he likewise did not raise the issue of jurisdiction of the proper amount of support to be awarded to the
the Pasay RTC to receive evidence and render child John Paul Chua Lam.
judgment on his previous marriages with other woman
which were not alleged in the petition filed by Rule 62 – Interpleader
Adriana. Petitioner Jose is estopped from questioning
the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Adriana 1. Makati Dev’t. Corp. v. Tanjuatco, G.R. L-26443,
and therefore, the Court will not undo the judgment of 25 March 1969, 27 SCRA 401
the Pasay RTC declaring the marriage of Adriana and
Jose null and void for being bigamous. It is an Facts:On February 21, 1963, said plaintiff and
axiomatic rule that while a jurisdictional question may defendant Pedro C. Tanjuatco entered into a contract
be raised at any time, this, however, admits of an whereby the latter bound himself to construct a
exception where estoppel has supervened. reinforced concrete covered water reservoir, office and
Consequently, the Court will only resolve the pump house and water main at Forbes Park, Makati,
lone issue raised by Jose in the present petition for Rizal, furnishing, inter alia, the materials necessary
review on certiorari which is the award of support for therefor. Before making the final payment of the
his child, John Paul. consideration agreed upon, plaintiff inquired from the
The matter of support is a question that may suppliers of materials, who had called its attention to
be raised and threshed out before the Makati RTC as it unpaid bills therefor of Tanjuatco, whether the latter
was the court that approved the Compromise had settled his accounts with them. In response to this
Agreement, or before the Pasay RTC where the inquiry, Concrete Aggregates, Inc. — hereinafter
petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of referred to as the Supplier — made a claim in the sum
marriage is filed. In the interest of orderly of P5,198.75, representing the cost of transit-mixed
administration of justice, the Court deems it proper that concrete allegedly delivered to Tanjuatco. With his
the issue on support should be resolved by the Pasay consent, plaintiff withheld said amount from the final
RTC where the claim for support of the child was payment made to him and, in view of his subsequent
initiated by Adriana. failure to settle the issue thereon with the Supplier, on
The trial courts action of merely ordering in September 16, 1955, plaintiff instituted the present
open court during the July 6, 1994 hearing that a action, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, against
prayer for support be written and inserted in the Tanjuatco and the Supplier, to compel them "to
petition filed by respondent Adriana does not constitute interplead their conflicting claims."
proper amendment and notice upon petitioner Jose. On October 4, 1965, Tanjuatco moved to
Consequently, herein petitioner Jose was deprived of dismiss the case, upon the ground that the court had
due process when the trial court proceeded to hear the no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the litigation,
case on a motion to re-open and render judgment the amount involved therein being less than
without giving Jose the requisite notice and the P10,000.00. 1 Finding this motion "to be well-taken",
opportunity to refute the new claim against him. the lower court granted the same, over plaintiffs
Verily, the manner by which the trial court opposition thereto, and, accordingly, issued an order,
arrived at the amount of support awarded to John Paul dated November 16, 1965, dismissing the case,
was whimsical, arbitrary and without any basis. without costs. Hence, this appeal, in which plaintiff
Such being the case, the Court has no other maintains that the subject-matter of this litigation is not
recourse but to reverse the decision of the Court of the aforementioned sum of P5,198.75, but the right to
Appeals and Pasay RTC insofar as the award of compel the defendants "to litigate among themselves"
support is concerned and order the remand of the case in order to protect the plaintiff "against a double
to Pasay RTC for further proceedings as to the issue vexation in respect to one liability."
regarding support.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on Held: We find no merit in this contention. There is no
certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution question in this case that plaintiff may compel the
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 51107, defendants to interplead among themselves,
dated June 11, 1997 and October 27, concerning the aforementioned sum of P5,198.75. The
1997, dismissing the appeal and denying the motion only issue is who among the defendants is entitled to
for reconsideration, respectively, are hereby SET collect the same. This is the object of the action, which
ASIDE but only insofar as the award of support in favor is not within the jurisdiction of the lower court. As a
of John Paul Chua Lam is concerned. The Decision matter of fact, on May 25, 1966 the Supplier sued
dated August 4, 1994 and the Order of the Regional Tanjuatco, in Civil Case No. 149173 of the Municipal
Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109), dated August Court of Manila, for the recovery of said amount of
22, 1995, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE for being P5,198.75, and the decision therein will settle the
question as to who has a right to the sum withheld by  Atty. Ana L.A. Peralta was only authorized to
plaintiff herein. "initiate and represent [Zuellig Pharma] in the civil
The latter relies upon Rule 63 of the present proceedings for consignation of rental payments to be
Rules of Court, prescribing the procedure in cases of filed against Lui Enterprises, Inc. and/or [the Philippine
interpleading, and section 19 of Rule 5 of said Rules of Bank of Communications
Court, which, unlike section 19 of Rule 4 of the Old  Lui Enterprises filed nullification case against
Rules, omits the Rules on Interpleading among those the Philippine Bank of Communications with respect to
made applicable to inferior courts. This fact does not several properties it dationed to the bank in payment of
warrant, however, the conclusion drawn therefrom by its obligations
plaintiff herein. To begin with, the jurisdiction of our  The property leased by Zuellig Pharma was
courts over the subject-matter of justiciable among those allegedly dationed to the Philippine Bank
controversies is governed by Rep. Act No. 296, as of Communications
amended, pursuant to which 2 municipal courts shall  Lui Enterprises cited a writ of preliminary
have exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases "in injunction
which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of  By virtue of the writ of preliminary injunction,
the property in controversy", amounts to not more than Lui Enterprises argued that it should continue
"ten thousand pesos." Secondly, "the power to define, collecting the rental payments from its lessees until the
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various nullification of deed of dation in payment case was
courts" belongs to Congress 3 and is beyond the rule- resolved
making power of the Supreme Court, which is limited  Judge orders, the Philippine Bank of
to matters concerning pleading, practice, and Communications and all its attorneys, representatives,
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the agents and any other persons assisting the bank, are
practice of law. 4 Thirdly, the failure of said section 19 directed to restrain from conducting auction sale on the
of Rule 5 of the present Rules of Court to make its Properties of Lui Enterprises
Rule 63, on interpleading, applicable to inferior courts,  Zuellig Pharma filed its oppositionto the motion
merely implies that the same are not bound to follow to dismiss. It argued that the motion to dismiss should
Rule 63 in dealing with cases of interpleading, but may be denied for having been filed late
apply thereto the general rules on procedure
 Under Rule 16, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of
applicable to ordinary civil action in said courts. Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss should be filed
within the required time given to file an answer to the
complaint, which is 15 days from service of summons
on the defendant
 Lui Enterprises’ claim that the interpleader
case was filed without authority, Zuellig Pharma
argued that an action interpleader "is a necessary
consequence of the action for consignation
2. Lui Enterprises v. Zuellig Pharma, G.R. No.  With respect to the nullification of deed of
193494, 12 March 2014, 719 SCRA dation in payment case, Zuellig Pharma argued that its
88 pendency did not bar the filing of the interpleader case.
 Under the writ of preliminary injunction, auction
FACTS: sale of Lui Enterprises’ properties, the proceeds of
 On March 9, 1995, Lui Enterprises, Inc. and which were supposed to satisfy its obligations to the
Zuellig Pharma Corporation entered into a 10-year Philippine Bank of Communications
contract of lease4over a parcel of land located in Barrio  The Regional Trial Court of Makati found that
Tigatto, Buhangin, Davao City. Lui Enterprises failed to file its motion to dismiss within
 Zuellig Pharma received a letter from the the reglementary period
Philippine Bank of Communications. Claiming to be the  Lui Enterprises did not move for the
new owner of the leased property, the bank asked reconsideration thus heard the interpleader case
Zuellig Pharma to pay rent directly without Lui Enterprises’ participation
 Due to the conflicting claims of Lui Enterprises  Despite having been declared in default, Lui
and the Philippine Bank of Communications over the Enterprises filed the manifestation with prayer
rental payments, Zuellig Pharma filed a complaintfor  Plaintiffs move for execution or implementation
interpleader of the Order
 Zuellig Pharma prayed that it be allowed to  status quo order was a necessary implement
consign in court its succeeding monthly rental of the writ of preliminary injunction follows the plaintiff's
payments and that Lui Enterprises and the Philippine right to collect and receive rental payments which he
Bank of Communications be ordered to litigate their enjoyed prior to the filing of this case, must be
conflicting claims respected and protected and maintained until the case
 Philippine Bank of Communications filed its is resolved
answer  Status quo simply means the last actual
 Lui Enterprises filed a motion to dismisson the peaceable uncontested status that preceded the actual
ground that Zuellig Pharma’s alleged representative controversy
did not have authority to file the complaint for  Lui Enterprises appealed to the Court of
interpleader on behalf of the corporation Appeals, however found insufficient
 As to the denial of Lui Enterprises’ motion to All of the requisites must be present.145 Absent one
dismiss, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court. requisite, there is no litis pendentia.146
The Court of Appeals found that Lui Enterprises filed In this case, there is no litis pendentia since there is no
its motion to dismiss four days late identity of parties in the nullification of deed of dation in
 With respect to Lui Enterprises’ motion to set payment case and the interpleader case. Zuellig
aside order of default, the Court of Appeals found that Pharma is not a party to the nullification case filed in
Lui Enterprises failed to show the excusable the Davao trial court.
negligence that prevented it from filing its motion to  There is also no identity of rights asserted and
dismiss on time reliefs prayed for. Lui Enterprises filed the first case to
 the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court nullify the deed of dation in payment it executed in
since "Zuellig Pharma x x x was constrained to file the favor of the Philippine Bank of Communications.
action for interpleader with consignation in order to Zuellig Pharma subsequently filed the interpleader
protect its interests case to consign in court the rental payments and
 Lui Enterprises filed a motion for extinguish its obligation as lessee. The interpleader
reconsideration case was necessary and was not instituted to harass
either Lui Enterprises or the Philippine Bank of
Issue:Whether the annulment of deed of dation in Communications.
payment pending in the Regional Trial Court of Davao Thus, the pending nullification case did not bar the
barred the subsequent filing of the interpleader case in filing of the interpleader case.
the Regional Trial Court of Makati  Lui Enterprises cited Progressive Development
Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals147 as authority to
Ruling:The nullification of deed in dation in payment
set aside the subsequently filed interpleader case. In
case did not bar the filing of the interpleader case. Litis
this cited case, petitioner Progressive Development
pendentia is not present in this case.
Corporation, Inc. entered into a lease contract with
 Lui Enterprises allegedly filed for nullification of Westin Seafood Market, Inc. The latter failed to pay
deed of dation in payment with the Regional Trial rent. Thus, Progressive Development Corporation, Inc.
Court of Davao. It sought to nullify the deed of dation repossessed the leased premises, inventoried the
in payment through which the Philippine Bank of movable properties inside the leased premises, and
Communications acquired title over the leased scheduled the public sale of the inventoried properties
property. Lui Enterprises argued that this pending as they agreed upon in their lease contract.
nullification case barred the Regional Trial Court of
 In this case, the nullification of deed of dation
Makati from hearing the interpleader case. Since the
in payment case was filed by Lui Enterprises against
interpleader case was filed subsequently to the
the Philippine Bank of Communications. The
nullification case, the interpleader case should be
interpleader case was filed by Zuellig Pharma against
dismissed.
Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of
Under Rule 16, Section 1, paragraph (e) of the 1997
Communications. A different plaintiff filed the
Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss may be
interpleader case against Lui Enterprises and the
filed on the ground of litis pendentia:
Philippine Bank of Communications. Thus, there is no
identity of parties, and the first requisite of litis
Section 1. Grounds. – Within the time for but before pendentia is absent.
filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting Since two requisites of litis pendentia are absent, the
a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of nullification of deed of dation in payment case did not
the following grounds: bar the filing of the interpleader case.
(e)That there is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause; Rule 63 - Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies
Litis pendentia is Latin for "a pending suit.” It exists 1. Aquino v. Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, 29
when "another action is pending between the same September 2014, 737 SCRA 145
parties for the same cause of actionx x x.” The
subsequent action is "unnecessary and
FACTS: Petitioner is the president and chief executive
vexatious"142 and is instituted to "harass the
officer of Boracay Island West Cove Management
respondent [in the subsequent action]."
Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove). On January 7,
2010, the company applied for a zoning compliance
The requisites of litis pendentia are:
with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan. While
(1)Identity of parties or at least such as the company was already operating a resort in the
represent the same interest in both actions; area, and the application sought the issuance of a
(2)Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed building permit covering the construction of a three-
for, the reliefs being founded on the same storey hotel over a parcel of land measuring 998 sqm.
facts; and located in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay
(3)The identity in the two cases should be Island, Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest
such that the judgment that may be rendered Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT)
in one would, regardless of which party is issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
successful, amount to res judicata in the Resources (DENR) in favor of Boracay West Cove.
other.144 Through a Decision on Zoning dated January
20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning Administrator denied
petitioner’s application on the ground that the An action for declaratory relief presupposes
proposed construction site was within the “no build that there has been no actual breach of the
zone” demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131 instruments involved or of the rights arising
(Ordinance). thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for
Petitioner appealed the denial action to the declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative
Office of the Mayor but despite follow up, no action statement of the rights and obligations of the parties
was ever taken by the respondent mayor. A Cease under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in
and Desist Order was issued by the municipal the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and
government, enjoining the expansion of the resort, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach
on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, thereof, it may be entertained before the breach or
Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it
and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel. refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with remedy for ending controversies that have not reached
prayer for injunctive relief with the CA Alleging that the the state where another relief is immediately available;
order was issued and executed with grave abuse of and supplies the need for a form of action that will set
discretion. controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation
PETITIONER CONTENTION: The hotel of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission
cannot summarily be abated because it is not a of wrongs.
nuisance per se, given the hundred million peso-worth In the case at bar, the petition for declaratory
of capital infused in the venture. And the Municipality relief became unavailable by EO 10’s enforcement and
of Malay, Aklan should have first secured a court order implementation. The closure and demolition of the
before proceeding with the demolition. hotel rendered futile any possible guidelines that may
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The be issued by the trial court for carrying outthe
demolition needed no court order because the directives in the challenged EO 10. Indubitably, the CA
municipal mayor has the express power under the erred when it ruled that declaratory relief is the proper
Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of remedy given such a situation.
illegally constructed buildings.
CA RULING: The CA dismissed the petition 2.Monetary Board v. Philippine Veterans Bank,
and ruled that the special writ of certiorari can only be G.R. No. 189571, 21 January 2015,
directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising 746 SCRA 508
judicial or quasi-judicial functions and since the
issuance of EO 10 was done in the exercise of FACTS:
executive functions, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial The Philippine Veterans Bank, pursuant to its
functions, certiorari will not lie. Instead, the proper mandate to provide financial assistance to veterans
remedy for the petitioner, according to the CA, is to file and teachers under Republic Acts 3518 and 7169,
a petition for declaratory relief with the Regional Trial established pension loans for bona fide veterans and
Court. beneficiaries, as well as salary loan products for
Petitioner sought reconsideration but this was denied teachers. As these clientele do not have security other
by the CA through the challenged Resolution. than their continuing good health or employment, to
secure their loans, the PVB devised a program by
Issue: charging a premium, a higher fee known as Credit
a. Whether or not declaratory relief is still available to Redemption Fund (CRF) from the borrowers. Special
petitioner; Trust Funds were established by PVB for the loans of
b. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the its clientele and in case of death of the borrower, the
respondent mayor was performing neither a judicial fees charged from him and credited to the trust funds
nor quasi-judicial function when he ordered the closure will be used to fully pay the loan.
and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel; Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas found that PVB’s
collection of the CRF violated Section 54 of Republic
Held: Act No. 8791 which prohibited banks from directly
a. Declaratory relief no longer viable engaging in insurance business as insurer. Thus, it
Resolving first the procedural aspect of the case, We wrote the PVB to inform it that CRF is a form of
find merit in petitioner’s contention that the special writ insurance, based on opinion by the Insurance
of certiorari, and not declaratory relief, is the proper Commission and should be discontinued. PVB then
remedy for assailing EO 10. As provided under Sec. 1, stopped collecting the fees.
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court: The Monetary Board issued MB Resolution
No. 1139 directing the PVB’s Trust and Investment
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. – Any Department to return to the borrowers all the balances
person interested under a deed, will, contract or other of the CRF; and to preserve the records of borrowers
written instrument, whose rights are affected by a who were deducted CRF pending resolution of ruling
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance or any of the Office of the General Counsel of the BSP. The
other governmental regulation may, before breach or BSP denied PVB’s request for reconsideration, hence
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate it filed a petition for declamatory relief before the RTC
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of of Makati City.
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of The Monetary Board moved to dismiss the
his rights or duties, thereunder. petition, citing that the petition should not prosper
because of the prior breach of PVB by Section 54 of
RA 8791. The RTC dismissed the petition for legislature, which affects the rights of private parties
declaratory relief, ruling that the issue of whether or through either adjudication or rule making. The very
not PVB violated Section 54 of Republic Act 8791 definition of an administrative agency includes its
should be resolved in an ordinary civil action, not a being vested with quasi-judicial powers.
declaratory relief. o It recognizes the need for the active
Almost year later, it filed a Motion to Admit intervention of administrative agencies in matters
Motion for Reconsideration, stating that it did not calling for technical knowledge and speed in
receive a copy of the order until September 3, 2008, countless controversies, which cannot possibly be
which the Monetary Board opposed, alleging that per handled by regular courts.
certification by the Philippine Postal Corporation, the
order was served on respondent on October 17, 2007.  A “quasi-judicial function” is a term which
The RTC ruling on the motion for applies to the action, discretion, etc. of public
reconsideration, reversed itself and ruled that the administrative officers or bodies, who are
collection of the CRF by PVB did not constitute required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
engaging in the issuance business as an insurer, existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
hence not a violation of Section 54 of RA 8791. conclusions from them, as a basis for their
Accordingly, it declared MB Resolution No. 1189 null official action and to exercise discretion of a
and void. Its motion for reconsideration denied, it filed judicial nature.
before the Supreme Court a petition for review on
certiorari to contest the RTC decision, on the issue of  Lastly, also worth noting is the fact that the
whether or not the petition for declaratory relief is court a quo’s Order dated September 24,
proper. 2007, which dismissed respondent’s petition
for declaratory relief, had long become final
ISSUE:Was the petition for declaratory relief proper? and executory.
o To recall, said Order was duly served
on and received by respondent on October 17,
2007, as evidenced by the Certification issued
HELD: by the Philippine Postal Corporation. Almost a
 Declaratory relief is an action by any person year later, however, or on October 15, 2008,
interested in a deed, will, contract or other written respondent moved for reconsideration of the
instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine court a quo’s Order of dismissal, claiming it
any question of construction or validity arising from the received a copy of said Order only on
instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute; September 3, 2008.
and for a declaration of his rights and duties o Thus, respondent’s self-serving claim
thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such should not have prevailed over the
a petition is the question of construction or validity of Certification issued by the Philippine Postal
provisions in an instrument or statute Corporation. It was error for the trial court to
 In CJH Development Corporation v. Bureau of entertain it for the second time despite the
Internal Revenue, the SC that in the same manner that lapse of almost a year before respondent filed
court decisions cannot be the proper subjects of a its motion for reconsideration against said
petition for declaratory relief, decisions of quasi- Order.
judicial agencies cannot be subjects of a petition
for declaratory relief for the simple reason that if a 3. SJS v. Lina, G.R. No. 160031, 18 December 2008,
party is not agreeable to a decision either on 574 SCRA 462
questions of law or of fact, it may avail of the
various remedies provided by the Rules of Court. Facts:
 In this case, the decision of the BSP Monetary  Petitioner, a registered political party, filed a
Board cannot be a proper subject matter for a petition petition for declaratory relief against Sec Lina (later on
for declaratory relief. The BSP Monetary Board is a impleaded other respondents; look at the title) for the
quasi-judicial agency and the MB resolution it issued proper construction of Section 90(a) of LGC which
was in its exercise of quasi-judicial powers or provides:
functions. o “All governors, city and municipal
o The authority of the petitioners to issue the mayors are prohibited from practicing their
questioned MB Resolution emanated from its profession or engaging in any other occupation
powers under Section 37 of RA No. 7653 and other than the exercise of their functions as local
Section 66 of RA No. 8791 to impose, at its chief executives.”
discretion, administrative sanctions, upon any bank  The DILG, thru OSG, moved for the dismissal
for violation of any banking law. arguing that (1) petitioner had no legal standing, (2)
o The nature of the BSP Monetary Board as a there is no judicial controversy, (2) declaratory relief is
quasi-judicial agency, and the character of its not the proper remedy.
determination of whether or not appropriate  RTC dismissed the petition for declaratory
sanctions may be imposed upon erring banks, as relief. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
an exercise of quasi-judicial function
Issue: WON the petition for declaratory relief will
 A quasi-judicial agency or body is an organ of
government other than a court and other than a prosper – NO. Petition denied.
In the petition filed with the trial court, passing of the law were classified by petitioners as
petitioner failed to allege the ultimate facts which comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted
satisfy these requisites. Not only that, as admitted by against it form "Team Buhay".
the petitioner, the provision the interpretation of which During oral arguments, respondents conceded
is being sought has already been breached by the that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for
respondents. Declaratory relief cannot thus be by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the
availed of. tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013
elections, but not of politicians who helped in the
Ruling: passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for
1. The Court agrees that petitioner has locus that election.
standing; however, the action for declaratory relief is On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil
an inappropriate remedy to enforce compliance with V. Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of
Section 90 of LGC. Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign
Materials addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop
2. The appearance of incumbent city or municipal Vicente M. Navarra. The election officer ordered the
mayors and provincial governors, who are actors in tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from receipt
movies and TV programs enhances their income but for being oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615
reduces considerably the time they should devote their provides for the size requirement of two feet (2’) by
constituents. This in violation of Section 90 of LGC three feet (3’)
and Sec 7 of the Code of Conduct and Ethical On February 25, 2013, petitioners replied10
Standars for Public Officials and Employees. Their requesting, among others, that (1) petitioner Bishop be
appearance further gives them undue advantage in given a definite ruling by COMELEC Law Department
future eletions over their opponents who are not regarding the tarpaulin; and (2) pending this opinion
actors. (take note that there is nothing in the and the availment of legal remedies, the tarpaulin be
dispositive portion ordering the respondents to allowed to remain.
desists from being actors. Kasi mali remedy) On February 27, 2013, COMELEC Law
Department issued a letter12 ordering the immediate
3. Indeed, an action for declaratory relief should removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be
be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a constrained to file an election offense against
contract or other written instrument, and whose rights petitioners. The letter of COMELEC Law Department
are affected by a statute, an executive order, a was silenton the remedies available to petitioners.
regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy Issue: Whether petitioners violated the hierarchy of
is to interpret or to determine the validity of the written courts doctrine and jurisprudential rules governing
instrument and to seek a judicial declaration of the appeals from COMELEC decisions.
parties rights or duties thereunder Held: Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for all acts
For the action to prosper, it must be shown of the COMELEC. Rule 65 is applicable especially to
that (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the raise objections relating to a grave abuse of discretion
controversy is between persons whose interests are resulting in the ouster of jurisdiction.22 As a special
adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legal civil action, there must also be a showing that there be
interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
judicial determination. course of the law.
Respondents contend that the assailed notice
Rule 64 - Review of Judgments and Final Orders and letter are not subject to review by this court,
and Resolutions of the Commission on Elections whose power to review is "limited only to final
and the Commission on Audit decisions, rulings and orders of the COMELEC En
Banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or
1. Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. quasi-judicial power." Instead, respondents claim that
205728, 21 January 2015, 747 SCRA 1 the assailed notice and letter are reviewable only by
COMELEC itself pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 2(3)
Facts: On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two of the Constitution24 on COMELEC’s power to decide
(2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the all questions affecting elections.
San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin In the present case, petitioners are not
was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. candidates seeking for public office. Their petition is
They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral filed to assert their fundamental right to expression.
within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the Furthermore, all these cases cited by
message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the respondents pertained to COMELEC’s exercise of its
Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power. This case pertains
10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the to acts of COMELEC in the implementation of its
present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading regulatory powers. When it issued the notice and
"Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either letter, the COMELEC was allegedly enforcingelection
"(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro- laws.
RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark. The electoral
candidates were classified according to their vote on
the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise
known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the
Rule 65 – Certiorari
PETITIONER CONTENTION: The hotel cannot
1. Aquino v. Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, 29 summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per
September 2014, 737 SCRA 145 se, given the hundred million peso-worth of capital
infused in the venture. And the Municipality of Malay,
DOCTRINE: Based on law and jurisprudence, the Aklan should have first secured a court order before
office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order proceeding with the demolition.
the closing and demolition of establishments. This RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The demolition
power granted by the LGC, as earlier explained, We needed no court order because the municipal mayor
believe, is not the same power devolved in favor of the has the express power under the Local Government
LGU under Sec. 17 (b)(2)(ii), as above-quoted, which Code (LGC) to order the removal of illegally
is subject to review by the DENR. The fact that the constructed buildings.
building to be demolished is located within a forestland
under the administration of the DENR is of no moment, Issue:
for what is involved herein, strictly speaking, is not an 1. Whether or not judicial proceedings are conducted
issue on environmental protection, conservation of first before the LGU can order the closure and
natural resources, and the maintenance of ecological demolition of the property in question.
balance, but the legality or illegality of the structure. 2. Whether or not declaratory relief is still available to
Rather than treating this as an environmental issue petitioner;
then, focus should not be diverted from the root cause
of this debacle compliance. Ruling:
1. Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a
Facts:Petitioner is the president and chief executive particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a
officer of Boracay Island West Cove Management nuisance per se.
Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove) in which applied Despite the hotel’s classification as a
for a zoning compliance with the municipal government nuisance per accidens, however, we still find in this
of Malay, Aklan. case that the LGU may nevertheless properly order the
While the company was already operating a hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the exercise of
resort in the area, and the application sought the police power and the general welfare clause, property
issuance of a building permit covering the construction rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land located in burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the
Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay Island, government. Otherwise stated, the government may
Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest Land Use enact legislation that may interfere with personal
Agreement for Tourism Purposes issued by the liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to
Department of Environment and Natural Resources promote the general welfare.
(DENR) in favor of Boracay West Cove. Under the law, insofar as illegal constructions
Through a Decision on Zoning dated January are concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the
20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning Administrator denied requirement of due notice and hearing, order their
petitioner’s application on the ground that the closure and demolition.
proposed construction site was within the “no build One such piece of legislation is the LGC,
zone” demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131. which authorizes city and municipal governments,
Petitioner appealed the denial action to the acting through their local chief executives, to issue
Office of the Mayor but despite follow up, no action demolition orders. Under existing laws, the office of the
was ever taken by the respondent mayor. A Cease mayor is given powers not only relative to its function
and Desist Order was issued by the municipal as the executive official of the town; it has also been
government, enjoining the expansion of the resort, and endowed with authority to hear issues involving
on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, property rights of individuals and to come out with an
Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure effective order or resolution thereon.20 Pertinent
and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel. herein is Sec. 444 (b) (3) (vi) of the LGC, which
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with empowered the mayor to order the closure and
prayer for injunctive relief with the CA Alleging that the removal of illegally constructed establishments for
order was issued and executed with grave abuse of failing to secure the necessary permits.
discretion. However, the CA dismissed the petition
solely on procedural ground, i.e., the special writ of 2. Declaratory relief no longer viable
certiorari can only be directed against a tribunal, Resolving first the procedural aspect of the
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial case, We find merit in petitioner's contention that the
functions and since the issuance of EO 10 was done in special writ of certiorari, and not declaratory relief, is
the exercise of executive functions, and not of judicial the proper remedy for assailing EO 10. As provided
or quasi-judicial functions, certiorari will not lie. under Sec. 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court:
Instead, the proper remedy for the petitioner, SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person
according to the CA, is to file a petition for declaratory interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
relief with the Regional Trial Court. instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute,
Petitioner sought reconsideration but this was executive order or regulation, ordinance or any other
denied by the CA. on February 3, 2014 through the governmental regulation may, before breach or...
challenged Resolution. Hence, the instant petition violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
raising arguments on both procedure and substance. Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of inclusion in the list of considered applicants and
his rights or duties, thereunder. x x x (emphasis protesting the inclusion of applicants who did not pass
added) the prejudicature examination. The petitioner was
An action for declaratory relief presupposes informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a
that there has been no actual breach of the letter3 dated February 3, 2014, that his protest and
instruments involved or of the rights arising reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en banc.
thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for However, its decision not to include his name in the list
declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative of applicants was upheld due to the JBC's long-
statement of the rights and obligations of... the parties standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to
under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in second-level courts to, among others, incumbent
the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and judges who have served in their current position for at
not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach least five years, and since the petitioner has been a
thereof, it may be entertained before the breach or judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from
violation of the statute, deed or contract to which... it the list. This caused the petitioner to take recourse to
refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical this Court
remedy for ending controversies that have not reached
the state where another relief is immediately available; ISSUE:WON the writ of certiorari and prohibition
and supplies the need for a form of action that will set cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its
controversies at rest before they lead to... a principal function under the Constitution to recommend
repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is not a
commission of wrongs. tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function
In the case at bar, the petition for declaratory
relief became unavailable by EO 10's enforcement and Held:The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
implementation. The closure and demolition of the tenable. "The present Rules of Court uses two special
hotel rendered futile any possible guidelines that may civil actions for determining and correcting grave
be issued by the trial court for carrying out the abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
directives in the... challenged EO 10. Indubitably, the jurisdiction.
CA erred when it ruled that declaratory relief is the In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not
proper remedy given such a situation. fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer
Petitioner could have filed, as an alternative, a exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the
petition for mandamus to compel the respondent process of selecting and screening applicants, the JBC
mayor to exercise discretion and resolve the neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity
controversy pending before his office. There is indeed nor assumed unto itself any performance of judicial or
an exception to the rule that... matters involving quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the
judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a writ formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the
of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel policy that the petitioner now assails, is necessary and
action in those matters, when refused. Whether or not incidental to the exercise of the JBC's constitutional
the decision would be for or against petitioner would mandate, a determination must be made on whether
be for the respondent mayor to decide,... for while the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion
mandamus may be invoked to compel the exercise of amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
discretion, it cannot compel such discretion to be and enforcing the said policy.
exercised in a particular way.[21] What would have Besides, the Court can appropriately take
been important was for the respondent mayor to cognizance of this case by virtue of the Court's power
immediately resolve the case for petitioner to... be able of supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides
to go through the motions that the zoning clearance that the power of supervision is the power of oversight,
application process entailed or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties.
Following this definition, the supervisory
2.Villanueva v. Judicial & Bar Council, G.R. No. authority of the Court over the JBC is to see to it that
211833, 7 April 2015, 755 SCRA the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures.
182 Thus, when the policies of the JBC are being attacked,
then the Court, through its supervisory authority over
Facts: The petitioner was appointed on September 18, the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter and
2012 as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules
Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed
Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's policy. It is
first-level court. On September 27, 2013, he applied for essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that
the vacant position of Presiding Judge in the following the applicant should have a clear legal right to the
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City; thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of
Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, the respondent to perform the act required. The
Agusan Del Sur In a letter2 dated December 18, 2013, remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies
JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty,
Nomination, informed the petitioner that he was not not a discretionary one.14 Clearly, the use of
included in the list of candidates for the said stations. discretion and the performance of a ministerial act are
On the same date, the petitioner sent a letter, through mutually exclusive. Clearly, to be included as an
electronic mail, seeking reconsideration of his non- applicant to second-level judge is not properly
compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it involves the Herein petitioner, which represents the
exercise of sound discretion by the JBC businesses and enterprises within the Clark Freeport
The petition for declaratory relief is improper. Zone, filed the instant petition alleging that
"An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion in
person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or issuing RR 2-2012. It argues that by imposing the VAT
other written instrument, and whose rights are affected and excise tax on the importation of petroleum and
by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an petroleum products from abroad and into the Freeport
ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy or Economic Zones, RR 2-2012 unilaterally revoked
includes the interpretation and determination of the the tax exemption granted by RA No. 7227 and RA No.
validity of the written instrument and the judicial 9400 to the businesses and enterprises operating
declaration of the parties' rights or duties thereunder." within the Subic Special Economic Zone and Clark
In this case, the petition for declaratory relief Freeport Zone.
did not involve an unsound policy. Rather, the petition This petition for certiorari prays for the
specifically sought a judicial declaration that the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction
petitioner has the right to be included in the list of to annul and set aside RR 2-2012 issued by the
applicants although he failed to meet JBC's five-year Department of Finance upon recommendation of the
requirement policy. Again, the Court reiterates that no BIR.
person possesses a legal right under the Constitution
to be included in the list of nominees for vacant judicial Issue:W/N the Secretary of Finance acted with grave
positions. The opportunity of appointment to judicial abuse of discretion in issuing RR 2-2012 that imposes
office is a mere privilege, and not a judicially VAT and excise tax on the importation of petroleum
enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any and petroleum products from abroad and into Freeport
person or Economic Zones, as it is claimed to have unilaterally
revoked tax exemption granted by RA 7227 and RA
Furthermore, the instant petition must 9400.
necessarily fail because this Court does not have
original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief Held:The SC denied the petition for being an
even if only questions of law are involved.18 The improper remedy.
special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the FIRSTLY, a petition for certiorari under Rule
exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
to Section 1919 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as is a special civil action that may be invoked ONLY
amended by R.A.No. 7691 against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory or quasi-judicial functions. Before a tribunal, board, or
duty over the JBC and in the exercise of its expanded officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is
judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some
present petition. But in any event, even if the Court will specific rights of persons or property under which
set aside procedural infirmities adverse claims to such rights are made, and the
controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a
3. Clark Investors and Locators Association, Inc. v. tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and
Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 200670, 6 July authority to determine the law and adjudicate the
2015, 761 SCRA 586 respective rights of the contending parties.
In determining whether a Revenue Regulation
Facts:On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA No. is quasi-legislative in nature, the legal basis of the
7227 which mandated the accelerated conversion of Secretary of Finance in the issuance thereof must be
the Clark and Subic military reservations into special examined. RR 2-2012 was issued by the Secretary of
economic zones. Based on Section 12 (c) of the said Finance based on Section 244 of the NIRC. Section
law, in lieu of national and local taxes, all businesses 244 is an express grant of authority to the Secretary of
and enterprises operating within the Subic Special Finance to promulgate all needful rules and regulations
Economic Zone shall pay a preferential gross income for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the
tax rate of five percent (5%). In addition, Section 12 (b) NIRC. And since RR 2-2012 was issued by the
also provides that such businesses and enterprises Secretary of Finance based on Section 244 of the
shall be exempt from the payment of all taxes and NIRC, such administrative issuance is therefore
duties on the importation of raw materials, capital, and quasi-legislative in nature which is outside the
equipment into the Subic Special Economic Zone. scope of a petition for certiorari.
This tax and fiscal incentives under RA No. 7227was SECONDLY, Supreme Court explained that it
further extended to the Clark Freeport Zone upon could not be denied that even if the petition is filed as a
enactment of RA No. 9400 on March 20, 2007. This certiorari, in real essence, it seeks the declaration by
made the businesses and enterprises within the Clark the High Court of the unconstitutionality and
Freeport Zone exempt from the payment of all taxes illegality of the questioned rule, thus partaking the
and duties on the importation of raw materials, capital nature, in reality, of one for declaratory relief over
and equipment. which the SC has only appellate, not original,
On February 17, 2012, the Dept. of Finance, jurisdiction.
upon recommendation of the BIR, issued RR 2-2012 LASTLY, although the SC, the CA and the RTC have
which imposed VAT and excise tax on the importation concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
of petroleum and petroleum products from abroad and prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
into the Freeport or Economic Zones. corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not
give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice the subject property is a Family Home which is exempt
of court forum, as hierarchy of courts must be from execution, forced sale or attachment.
respected. That hierarchy is determinative of the  RTC issued the assailed Order denying
venue of appeals, and also serves as a general petitioner Alfredos Motion
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for  RTC held that:In the case at bar, the mortgage
the extraordinary writs. transaction happened on May 9, 1997 (Exhibit D), after
A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's the effectivity of the Family Code.
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be  Petitioner Alfredo and his spouse Arsenia filed
allowed only when there are special and important with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration; again
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in denied by the RTC.
the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a  Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of
policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon Appeals on a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
the Court's time and attention which are better devoted assailing and seeking the nullification and the setting
to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to aside of the denial of his Motion to Stop Writ of
prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. Possession.
 Appellate court resolved to dismiss the
4. Tagle v. Equitable PCI, G.R. No. 172299, 22 April petition, stating thus: The instant petition is not
2008, 552 SCRA 424 accompanied by (i) the order denying petitioners
motion to exempt from foreclosure of mortgage; and
Facts:This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the (ii) a relevant and pertinent document, i.e., motion to
Revised Rules of Court was filed by petitioner Alfredo exempt from foreclosure of mortgage (Sec. 1, Rule 65,
Tagle (petitioner Alfredo). in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 46, 1997 Rules of Civil
 Petitioner Alfredo urges the Court to set aside, Procedure).
on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting  Alfredo moved for the reconsideration,
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which denied petitioner however denied for lack of merit.
Alfredos Motion to Stop Writ of Possession. He prays  Petitioner once more filed a Motion for
that this Court certify for review with prayer for Reconsideration of the appellate courts
preliminary injunction to stop the writ of possession of  Court of Appeals promulgated the last of
the property located at Concepcion Subdivision, its Resolutions, denying, as expected, petitioner
Baliuag, Bulacan and embraced in Transfer Certificate Alfredos Second Motion for Reconsideration stating
of Title that: “Appellant has not cured the formal defects of the
 According to petitioner Alfredo, the subject petition noted in Our resolution dated September 6,
property is registered in his name and was constituted 2005. And, more importantly, a second motion for
as a Family Home in accordance with the provisions of reconsideration of a final order is not allowed”
the Family Code. He and his wife Arsenia Bautista  The subject motion for reconsideration is
Tagle (Arsenia) never mortgaged the subject property DENIED
to respondent Equitable PCI Bank whether before or  Petitioner filed the instant petition designating
after the subject property was constituted as their it in both the caption and the body as one
Family Home. for certiorari under Rule 65 of the RRC. He anchors
 It was Josefino Tagle (Josefino), who was not the present petition on the sole issue whether or not
the owner of the subject property, who mortgaged the the subject property subject of the mortgage being a
same with respondent E-PCI. Josefino was religiously family home is exempt from foreclosure of mortgage
paying the installments on his mortgage obligation and  Respondent E-PCI counters that the petition at
had paid more than half. Josefino, however, passed bar must be dismissed on the following grounds:
away. Petitioner Alfredo was then forced to assume First, petitioner Alfredos Petition
Josefinos outstanding mortgage obligation. Even as for Certiorari with this Court failed to comply with the
petitioner Alfredo was already paying Josefinos technical requirements of the Rules of Court for
mortgage obligation in installments, respondent E-PCI petitions for certiorari in that (a) the present petition
still foreclosed the mortgage on the subject property. was filed out of time considering that the 60-day period
 On the other hand, respondent E-PCI recounts within which to file the same was reckoned from
that the subject property was formerly registered in the receipt of the 11 April 2006 Resolution denying
name of petitioner Alfredo. It was mortgaged, pursuant petitioner Alfredos second Motion for Reconsideration,
to a Special Power of Attorney executed by petitioner instead of the 16 February 2006 Resolution denying
Alfredo, to secure the obligation of the spouses his first Motion for Reconsideration; (b) petitioner
Josefino and Emma Tagle with respondent E- Alfredo did not allege in the present petition that the
PCI. Respondent E-PCI foreclosed the mortgage on Court of Appeals acted without or in excess of its or his
the subject property upon default in payment by jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
spouses Josefino and Emma, and upon the expiration to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed his
of the period of redemption, caused the consolidation petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 for failure to attach
and transfer of the title to the subject property in its thereto certified true copies of the 4 April 2005 RTC
name. Consequently, respondent E-PCI filed with the Order denying his Motion to Stop Writ of Possession,
RTC a Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession of as well as the very motion subject of the assailed
the subject property, which was docketed as LRC order; (c) the present petition lacks the proper
Case No. P-71-2004. Petitioner Alfredo, however, filed verification and is considered an unsigned pleading
a Motion to Stop Writ of Possession on the ground that which produces no effect whatsoever; and (d) the
present petition requested for the issuance of an the appellate court. There were no remaining issues to
injunction without stating the grounds therefor. be resolved in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461. Consequently,
Second, petitioner Alfredos second Motion for the proper remedy available to petitioner Alfredo then
Reconsideration filed with the Court of Appeals is was to file before this Court a Petition for Review
prohibited by law, as a second motion for on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution is Court of the assailed Resolutions of the Court of
clearly disallowed by Sec. 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Appeals, and not a special civil action for certiorari.
Court, as amended. From the foregoing discussion, it is fairly
And third, granting arguendo that the petition obvious that the third requisite for a petition
at bar was properly filed by petitioner Alfredo with this for certiorari is wanting, that is, there must be no
Court, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the Petition for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 for the ordinary course of law. The availability to petitioner
failure of petitioner Alfredo to submit the required Alfredo of the remedy of a petition for review
documents on certiorari from the assailed Resolutions of the Court
 Respondent E-PCI then concludes that the of Appeals effectively barred his right to resort to a
present Petition for Certiorari was filed not to question petition for certiorari. Basic is the rule that a writ
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals but as a vain of certiorari will not issue where the remedy of appeal
hope of appealing the Order dated April 4, 2005 issued is available to an aggrieved party. A remedy is
by the RTC considered "plain, speedy and adequate" if it will
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects
Issue:W/N the present Petition for Certiorari filed of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is the agency. In this case, appeal was not only available but
proper remedy for petitioner Alfredo to avail of in also a speedy and adequate remedy. Moreover,
seeking the reversal of the three Resolutions of the petitioner Alfredo failed to show circumstances that
Court of Appeals would justify a deviation from the general rule as to
make available to him a petition for certiorari in lieu of
Ruling:The instant Petition making an appeal.
for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner failed to show any valid reason why
the issue raised in his petition for certiorari could not
 The three Resolutions of the Court of Appeals have been raised on ordinary appeal by certiorari. He
dated 6 September 2005, 16 February 2006 and 11 simply argued that the appellate court gravely abuse
April 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461, are its discretion which amounted to lack or excess of
hereby AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against jurisdiction in dismissing his petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
petitioner Alfredo Tagle. 90461 and not finding that the subject property
 A petition for certiorari is governed by Rule 65 covered by the Writ of Possession was a Family
of the Revised Rules of Court, which reads: Home, hence, exempt from execution or forced
Section 1-Petition for certiorari. When any sale. He did not give a single explanation as to why the
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi- errors committed by the Court of Appeals cannot
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of [its possibly be cured by ordinary appeal under Rule 45 of
or his] jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion the Revised Rules of Court.
amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, The remedies of appeal in the ordinary course
and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and of law and that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a Revised Rules of Court are mutually exclusive and not
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in alternative or cumulative.
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and To be sure, once again, we take this
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or opportunity to distinguish between a Petition for
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or Review on Certiorari (an appeal by certiorari) and a
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and Petition for Certiorari (a special civil action/an original
justice may require. action for Certiorari), under Rules 45 and 65,
The petition shall be accompanied by a respectively, of the Revised Rules of Court. Madrigal
certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution Transport Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents Corporation,[43] summarizes the distinctions between
relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn these two remedies, to wit:
certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy
third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not
A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the errors of judgment.
correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Such cannot be used for any other CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power of
purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the inferior review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its
court within the bounds of its jurisdiction. original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of
In the case at bar, the assailed Resolutions of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower
courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of the original
the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner Alfredos
suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original and
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 were final orders.
independent action that was not part of the trial that
They were not interlocutory because the proceedings
were terminated; and left nothing more to be done by had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order
complained of. The parties to an appeal are the Petitioner moved to reconsider the February
original parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to 12, 1997 Order which was granted by the trial court in
a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved party (who the Order of October 10, 1997. The trial court set aside
thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower the February 12, 1997 Order and affirmed the
court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing December 13, 1996 Resolution granting the annulment
parties (the public and the private respondents, of the marriage and directed the parties to submit an
respectively). inventory of their conjugal assets.
Thereafter, private respondent submitted an
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or inventory of conjugal assets which included their Ayala
final orders and those that the Rules of Court so Alabang Village house and lot. Petitioner manifested
declared are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, that the conjugal abode be adjudicated in his favor
an original action for certiorari may be directed against considering that he was awarded the custody of the
an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an children while private respondent was adjudged to be
appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal the party in bad faith.
or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy. The trial court ordered that the conjugal
properties which include the conjugal abode, certificate
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals of stock and motor vehicle, should be sold and the
should be filed within fifteen days from the notice of proceeds thereof be divided equally between the
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record parties. Respondent filed a motion for execution of the
on appeal is required, the appellant must file a notice August 4, 1999 resolution,while on November 18,
of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days 1999, petitioner prayed for its reconsideration. On
from the said notice of judgment or final order. A March 15, 2000, the trial court declared that the
petition for review should be filed and served within August 4, 1999 resolution has become final. A writ of
fifteen days from the notice of denial of the decision, or execution was accordingly issued on March 17, 2000.
of the petitioners timely filed motion for new trial or Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari
motion for reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, before the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the
the petition should be filed also within fifteen days from August 4, 1999 Resolution and the March 17, 2000
the notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of Writ of Execution.
the petitioners motion for new trial or motion for The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
reconsideration. and held that the August 4, 1999 Resolution of the trial
court had long become final and executory for failure
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari of petitioner to file a timely motion for reconsideration
should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice or appeal. It also denied petitioners motion for
of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new reconsideration.
trial or motion for reconsideration was timely filed, the Petitioner then elevated the case to the
period shall be counted from the denial of the motion. Supreme Court. Thereafter, petitioner filed a
Manifestation and Motion clarifying that what he filed
As to the Need for a Motion for on September 22, 2003 was a motion to forfeit the
Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is share of the private respondent in the net profits of the
generally required prior to the filing of a petition for conjugal properties and not a motion to amend an
certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity order, and praying that the same motion be resolved
to correct the alleged errors. Note also that this motion by the trial court. Petitioner contends that filing a
is a plain and adequate remedy expressly available motion for reconsideration before recourse to the
under the law. Such motion is not required before special civil action of certiorari would be futile because
appealing a judgment or final order. the trial court had already ordered the execution of the
judgment, citing the case of Guevarra v. Court of
Appeals. He claims that the trial court was amply given
5. Cervantes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166755, opportunity to correct itself when he filed the
18 November 2005, 475 SCRA Manifestation and Motion clarifying the August 2, 2004
562 Order.

Facts: On December 6, 1995, petitioner filed a petition Issue: Whether Rule 65 applies in the case at bar.
for annulment of marriage and custody of minor
children before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa Held: Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
City, Branch 276, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-194. provides: SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When
The trial court resolved to grant the annulment of the any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
marriage based on private respondents psychological quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
incapacity, award to petitioner the custody of the minor of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
children, and order the liquidation of the conjugal discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
properties. and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
Private respondent filed a Motion for adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
Reconsideration/New Trial and to Admit Answer which person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the trial court granted in an order dated February 12, the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
1997. In addition, private respondent was awarded praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
visitation rights over the minor children. modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and file a motion for reconsideration is misplaced. Although
justice may require. we held in Guevarra that a motion for reconsideration
The petition shall be accompanied by a may be dispensed with in cases of urgency like when
certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution the trial court had ordered the execution of the
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents judgment, this circumstance must be clearly shown by
relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn the petitioner as a concrete, compelling and valid
certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the reason, and not just leave it for the courts to ascertain.
third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
As held in Flores v. Sangguniang 6. Concepcion v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178624, 30
Panlalawigan of Pampanga, the plain and adequate June 2009, 591 SCRA 420
remedy referred to in the foregoing Rule is a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed Order or Resolution, Facts: A petition for certiorari filed by Jose
the filing of which is an indispensable condition to the Concepcion, Jr. (petitioner) seeking to set aside the En
filing of a special civil action for certiorari, subject to Banc Resolution dated 02 April
certain exceptions, to wit: 2007 and Order dated 8 May 2007 of respondent
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; The petition cites and quotes the assailed
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari rulings, then recites that on January 5, 2007, the
proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon National Citizens Movement for Free Elections
by the lower court, or are the same as those raised (NAMFREL) filed a Petition for Accreditation to
and passed upon in the lower court; Conduct the Operation Quick Count with the
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the COMELEC. The present petitioner then the
resolution of the question and any further delay would incumbent Punong Barangay of Barangay Forbes
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the Park, Makati City was one of the signatories of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the action is NAMFREL petition in his capacity as the National
perishable; Chairman of NAMFREL.
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion Records of past political exercises show that
for reconsideration would be useless; on election day, the Commission on Elections usually
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due receive numerous complaints
process and there is extreme urgency for relief; against barangay officials entering polling places and
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an interfering in proceedings of the BEIs thereby causing
order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief not only delay in the proceedings, but also political
by the trial court is improbable; tension among the BEIs, the voters and the watchers
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court in the polling place.
are a nullity for lack of due process; Thus, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7798
(h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in that provides the following:
which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and Section 3 of EO No. 94 - No barangay official
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law shall be appointed as member of the Board of Election
or public interest is involved. Inspectors or as official watcher of each duly
An examination of the records, specifically the registered major political party or any socio-civic,
petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals, religious, professional or any similar organization of
reveals that petitioner not only failed to explain his which they may be members.
failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the August
27, 2004 Order of the trial court; he also failed to show …and then prohibiting:
sufficient justification for dispensing with the 1. The appointment of barangay officials which
requirement. Neither did he show that the case falls includes the Punong Barangay, Barangay Kagawad,
under any of the above exceptions. It was only in the Barangay Secretary, Barangay Treasurer, and
motion for reconsideration of the November 22, 2004 Barangay Tanod, as Chairman/person and/or Member
Resolution of the Court of Appeals and in the instant of the BEIs or as official watcher of any candidate, duly
petition that he explained why he dispensed with the registered major political party, or any similar
filing of prior motion for reconsideration. organization, or any socio-civic, religious, professional
It must be emphasized that a writ of certiorari [sic], in the May 14, 2007 National and Local
is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of Elections. The prohibition extends
right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial to barangay officials, employees and tanods, who are
discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari members of accredited citizen’s arms.
must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in 2. The barangay officials, employees
accordance with the provisions of the law and the and tanods from staying inside any polling place,
Rules.[24] Petitioner may not arrogate to himself the except to cast their vote. Accordingly, they should
determination of whether a motion for reconsideration leave the polling place immediately after casting their
is necessary or not. To dispense with the requirement vote.
of filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner must The COMELEC ruled on NAMFRELs petition
show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for for accreditation and find it meritorious. There is,
doing so,[25] which petitioner failed to do. Thus, the however, one important condition that must be fulfilled
Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition. by the petitioner before its accreditation as citizens’
Moreover, petitioners reliance in the case of arm could legally take effect. Accordingly, Mr. Jose S.
Guevarra v. Court of Appeals[26] to justify the failure to Concepcion, Jr., the National Chairman of NAMFREL,
must first be removed both as a member and overall intervened, too, before the COMELEC as an affected
Chairman of said organization. As correctly pointed out party in NAMFRELs Manifestation and Request for
by the oppositor, Mr. Concepcion, being the Barangay Examination. As a last recourse, the petitioner could
Chairman of Barangay Forbes Park, Makati City, have expressly stated before this Court the procedural
cannot be a member much more the overall chairman problems he faced and asked that we suspend the
of the citizens arm such as NAMFREL. This is rules based on the unusual circumstances he could
explicitly provided for in COMELEC Resolution No. have pointed out. None of these actions, however,
7798 took place. Instead, the petitioner simply questioned
NAMFREL filed a Manifestation and Request the COMELECs April 2, 2007 Resolution without
for Re-Examination that: (1) contains information explaining to this Court his reason for using Rule 65 as
regarding NAMFRELs reorganization and its new set his medium, and from there, proceeded to attack the
of officers showing that the petitioner had stepped validity of COMELEC Resolution 7798. Under these
down as National Chair and had been replaced by a questionable circumstances, we cannot now recognize
new Chair; (2) manifests NAMFRELs acceptance of the petitioner as a party-in-interest who can directly
the conditional grant of its petition for accreditation; assail the COMELECs April 2, 2007 Resolution in an
and (3) includes NAMFRELs request for a re- original Rule 65 petition before this Court.
examination without further arguments of the April 2, Although Section 1 of Rule 65 provides that
2007 Resolution as it specifically affected the the special civil action of certiorari may be availed of
petitioners membership with NAMFREL. In this by a "person aggrieved" by the orders or decisions of a
Manifestation and Request for Re-examination, tribunal, the term "person aggrieved" is not to be
NAMFREL outlined its various objections and construed to mean that any person who feels injured
concerns on the legality or validity of Resolution 7798. by the lower courts order or decision can question the
The COMELEC, in its Order noted the said courts disposition via certiorari. To sanction a
information relating to NAMFRELs current officers, and contrary interpretation would open the floodgates to
denied the request to examine its (COMELECs) numerous and endless litigations which would
interpretation. The COMELEC reasoned out that undeniably lead to the clogging of court dockets and,
Resolution is clear, and NAMFREL had not presented more importantly, the harassment of the party who
any convincing argument to warrant the requested prevailed in the lower court.
examination. The petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
Instead of a direct reaction from NAMFREL, however, is not available to any person who feels
the petitioner filed the present petition, ostensibly injured by the decision of a tribunal, board or officer
questioning the COMELECs April 2, 2007 Resolution, exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The
butactually raising issues with respect to Resolution person aggrieved under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can
7798. avail of the special civil action of certiorari pertains only
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to one who was a party in the proceedings before the
defends the validity of Resolution 7798. court a quo.
The courts dismiss the petition for blatant The real party in interest who stands to benefit
misuse of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petition or suffer from the judgment in the suit must prosecute
mentions three legal instruments related with the case, or defend an action. We have held that interest means
namely: (1) EO No. 94, (2) COMELECs Resolution material interest, an interest in issue that the decision
(3) COMELEC Resolution 7798, issued pursuant to will affect, as distinguished from mere interest in the
EO No. 94 and which in turn is the basis of the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.
COMELEC’s Resolution. The second fatal defect lies in the petitions
The petitioner now seeks to assail, in his thrust; it opened with and professed to be an express
individual capacity, a challenge to the COMELECs adjudicatory April 2, 2007
COMELEC adjudicatory resolution (i.e., the April 2, Resolution, but in its arguments solely attacks and
2007 Resolution) for its adverse effects on him when prays for the partial nullity of COMELEC Resolution
he was not a party to that case. NAMFREL is not a 7798 issued in the exercise of the COMELECs rule
party to the present petition. Thus, the present petition making power. This approach is fatally defective
is clearly the petitioners own initiative, and NAMFREL, because the petition thereby converts an express
the direct party in the COMELECs April 2, challenge of an adjudicatory resolution made without
2007 Resolution, has absolutely no participation. the requisite standing into a challenge for the nullity of
a regulation through an original Rule 65 petition
Issue: Whether the petitioner misuse Rule 65 of the for certiorari.
Rules of Court. What is significant in appreciating this defect in
the petition is the legal reality that the petitioner was
Ruling:The above features of the petition render it not without any viable remedy to directly challenge
fatally defective. The first defect lies in the petitioner’s Resolution 7798. A stand-alone challenge to the
personality to file a petition for certiorari to address an regulation could have been made through appropriate
adjudicatory resolution of the COMELEC in which he mediums, particularly through a petition for declaratory
was not a party to, and where the direct party, relief with the appropriate Regional Trial Court under
NAMFREL, does not even question the assailed the terms of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, or through
resolution. It would have been another matter if a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 to prevent the
NAMFREL had filed the present petition with the implementation of the regulation, as the petitioner
petitioner as intervenor because of his personal might have found appropriate to his situation. As
interest in the COMELEC ruling. He could have already mentioned, a challenge can likewise be made
in the course of validly contesting an adjudicatory general warrants. Thus, the properties seized under
order of the COMELEC. Such challenge, however, the said warrants were ordered released to petitioners.
cannot be made in an original petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 dissociated from any PLDT moved for reconsideration, but its
COMELEC action made in the exercise of its quasi- motion was denied on the ground that it had failed to
judicial functions. get the conformity of the City Prosecutor prior to filing
the motion, as required under Section 5, Rule 110 of
7. Worldwide Web Corporation v. People, G.R. Nos. the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
161106 and 161266, 13
January 2014, 713 SCRA 18 Petitioners separately moved for
reconsideration of the CA ruling which was
Facts:Petitioners filed the present Petitions under Rule subsequently denied.
45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Decision and
the Resolution of the CA reversing the quashal of the Issue:PLDT assailed the quashal orders via an appeal
search warrants previously issued by the RTC. rather than a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
The applications for warrants to search the
office premises of petitioner WWC, and of petitioner Ruling:An order quashing a search warrant, which
Planet Internet, alleged to be conducting illegal toll was issued independently prior to the filing of a
bypass operations, which amounted to theft and criminal action, partakes of a final order that can be the
violation of PD No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized proper subject of an appeal.
Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone
Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Petitioners also claim that since the RTC ruling
Meters and Other Acts), to the damage and prejudice on the motions to quash was interlocutory, it cannot be
of PLDT. appealed under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. PLDT
should have filed a Rule 65 petition instead. Petitioners
Petitioners also committed theft, because cite, as authority for their position, Marcelo v. de
through their misuse of PLDT phone lines/numbers Guzman. The Court held therein as follows:
and equipment and with clear intent to gain, they
illegally stole business and revenues that rightly But is the order of Judge de Guzman denying
belong to PLDT. Moreover, they acted contrary to the the motion to quash the search warrant and to return
letter and intent of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7925, the properties seized thereunder final in character, or
because in bypassing the IGF of PLDT, they evaded is it merely interlocutory?
the payment of access and bypass charges in its favor
while “piggy-backing” on its multi-million dollar facilities In Cruz vs. Dinglasan, this Court, citing
and infrastructure, thus stealing its business revenues American jurisprudence, resolved this issue thus:
from international long distance calls. Further, Where accused in criminal proceeding has
petitioners acted in gross violation of Memorandum petitioned for the return of goods seized, the order of
Circular No. 6-2-92 of the National restoration by an inferior court is interlocutory and
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) prohibiting hence, not appealable; likewise, a denial, by the US
the use of customs premises equipment (CPE) without District Court, of defendant’s petition for the return of
first securing type approval license from the latter. the articles seized under a warrant is such an
interlocutory order.
The RTC granted the application for search
warrants. Accordingly, the warrants were issued A final order is defined as one which disposes
against the office premises of petitioners, authorizing of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular
police officers to seize various items. proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to
Over a hundred items were seized, including enforce by execution what has been determined; on
15 central processing units (CPUs), 10 monitors, the other hand, an order is interlocutory if it does not
numerous wires, cables, diskettes and files, and a dispose of a case completely, but leaves something
laptop computer. Planet Internet notes that even more to be done upon its merits.
personal diskettes of its employees were confiscated;
and areas not devoted to the transmission of Tested against this criterion, the search
international calls, such as the President’s Office and warrant issued xxx is indisputably of interlocutory
the Information Desk, were searched. Voltage character because it leaves something more to be
regulators, as well as reserve and broken computers, done in the said criminal case, i.e., the determination
were also seized. of the guilt of the accused therein.

Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu, and Planet Petitioners’ reliance upon Marcelo is
Internet filed their respective motions to quash the misplaced.
search warrants.
An application for a search warrant is a judicial
The RTC granted the motions to quash on the process conducted either as an incident in a main
ground that the warrants issued were in the nature of criminal case already filed in court or in anticipation of
one yet to be filed. Whether the criminal case (of which
the search warrant is an incident) has already been projects in the areas illegally occupied by the
filed before the trial court is significant for the purpose petitioners
of determining the proper remedy from a grant or  Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 authorize
denial of a motion to quash a search warrant. evictions and demolitions without any court order
when:
Where the search warrant is issued as an o persons or entities occupy danger areas such
incident in a pending criminal case, as it was in as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps,
Marcelo, the quashal of a search warrant is merely riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public
interlocutory. There is still “something more to be done places suchas sidewalks, roads, parks, and
in the said criminal case, i.e., the determination of the playgrounds; and
guilt of the accused therein.” o persons or entities occupy areas where
government infrastructure projects with available
In contrast, where a search warrant is applied funding are about to be implemented.
for and issued in anticipation of a criminal case yet to
be filed, the order quashing the warrant (and denial of  On March 23, 2012, the petitioners directly
a motion for reconsideration of the grant) ends the filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus before
judicial process. There is nothing more to be done the Court, seeking to compel the respondents to first
thereafter. secure an eviction and/or demolition order from the
Thus, the CA correctly ruled that Marcelo does court prior to their implementation of Section 28 (a)
not apply to this case. Here, the applications for search and (b) of RA 7279.
warrants were instituted as principal proceedings and  Petitioners argue that they have:
not as incidents to pending criminal actions. When the o No plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
search warrants issued were subsequently quashed by ordinary course of law.
the RTC, there was nothing left to be done by the trial o the respondents gravely abused their
court. Thus, the quashal of the search warrants were discretion in implementing Section 28 (a) and (b) of
final orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal may be RA 7279 which are patently unconstitutional for
properly taken therefrom. warranting demolition without any court order.
(Section 6, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution
expressly prohibits the impairment of liberty of
8. Kalipunan v. Robredo, G.R. No. 200903, 22 July abode unless there is a court order.)
2014, 730 SCRA 322 o Violate their right to adequate housing, a
universal right recognized in Article 25 of Universal
PETITIONER: Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. Declaration ofHuman Rights and Section 2 (a) of
represented by its VP, Carlito Badion, et al RA 7279.
o Insist that they stand to be directly injured by
RESPONDENTS: Jessie Robredo in his capacity as the respondents’threats of evictions and demolitions
Secretary of DILG, et al had previously conducted evictions and demolitions
in a violent manner, contrary to Section 10, Article
SUMMARY: Petitioners reside in the cites of San 13 of the 1987 Constitution.
o Also contend that the transcendental public
Juan, Navotas and Quezon. LGU has a infrasture
importance of the issues raised in this case clothes
project that requires the eviction and demolition of them with legal standing.
illegally occupied areas by the petitioners. Petitioners
filed a case which argues that respondents must first  Respondent’s case:Respondents prays for the
secure an eviction and/or demolition order from the outright dismissal of the petition for its serious
court prior to their implementation of Section 28 (a) procedural defects:
and (b) of RA 7279 and argued that the said RA was  Petitioners Ignored the hierarchy of courts
unconstitutional.  Petitioners incorrectly availed themselves of a
petition for prohibition and mandamus in assailing the
constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279
DOCTRINE: To justify judicial review to be conducted
o For a writ of prohibition is merely to prevent
by the Judicial department, the petitioners
the public respondent’s usurpation of power or
must establish facts that are necessarily linked
to the jurisdictional problem they presented in improper assumption of jurisdiction, on the other
hand, a writ of mandamus only commands the
this case.
public respondent to perform his ministerial
functions.
Facts:
 The members of petitioners were/are
 The petitioners failed to particularly state the
occupying parcels of land owned by and located in the
grave abuse of discretion that the Mayor of Navotas
cities of San Juan, Navotas and Quezon. allegedly committed.
 These LGUs sent the petitioners notices of  The petition does not present any justiciable
eviction and demolition pursuant to Section 28 (a) and controversy since the City of Navotas had already
(b) of RA 7279 in order to give way to the
successfully evicted the petitioners in San Roque,
implementation and construction of infrastructure
Navotas
 Petition was filed out of time since the  Petitioners fail to show the necessity of
petitioners were personally notified of the intended examining the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and
eviction and demolition on September 23, 2011 (b) of RA 7279 in the light of Sections 1 and 6, Article 3
 He further asserts that his faithful of the 1987 Constitution. In the case of Magkalas v.
implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279, NHA, this Court had already ruled on the validity of
which are presumed to be constitutional, cannotbe evictions and demolitions without any court order.
equated to grave abuse of discretion.  The petitioners failed to substantiate their
allegations that the public respondents gravely abused
Issues: their discretion in implementing Section 28 (a) and (b)
(1) Whether the petition should be dismissed for of RA 7279. Instead, they merely imputed jurisdictional
serious procedural defects – YES abuse to the public respondents through general
(2) Whether Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 are averments in their pleading, but without any basis to
violative of Sections 1 and 6, Article 3 of the 1987 support their claim.
Constitution - NO
(3) Whether or not the petion may be subject to Mandamus
Judicial Review –NO
1. Calim v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 156527, 5March
Ruling: Petition is dismissed 2007, 517 SCRA 412

RATIO: Facts:
(1). Petitioner Nemesio M. Calim operates Eastern
 The petitioners violated the principle of Laguna Tours and Tourist Services in Siniloan,
hierarchy of courts when they directly filed the petition Laguna. Private respondent Roberto J. Acoba was the
before the Court. Vice-Mayor of Siniloan, Laguna. On the other hand,
 The petitioners appear to have forgotten that private respondents Paul Simon Z Go Homer R.
the Supreme Court is a court of last resort, not a court Serrano, Felipe A. Em, Eligio R. de Leon, Felipe V.
offirst instance. Castro, Gaudencio C. Salay, Andres V. Quintero,
 The petitioners wrongly availed themselves of Hector A. Maneja, and Sedfrey B. Realeza were
a petition for prohibition and mandamus.For a writ of councilors of the Sangguniang Bayan of Siniloan,
prohibition is merely to prevent the public respondent’s Laguna.
usurpation of power or improper assumption of On 23 November 2001, petitioner filed a
jurisdiction, on the other hand, a writ of mandamus Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the Deputy
only commands the public respondent to perform his Ombudsman for Luzon against private respondents for
ministerial functions. violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
 The use of the permissive word "may" implies amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt
that the public respondents have discretion when their Practices Act, and Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No.
duty to execute evictions and/or demolitions shall be 6713. The case was docketed as OMB-1-01-1121-K.
performed. Where the words of a statute are clear, Petitioner alleged, inter alia, that on or
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its about 22 July 2001, he was given a mayors permit
literal meaning and applied without attempted from the municipal government of Siniloan, Laguna, for
interpretation. his tours and tourist services business. On 31 July
2001, he applied for the registration of his business
(2). name with the Regional Office of the Department of
 The resolution of the constitutionality of Trade and Industry in San Pablo City, initially
Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 is not the lis mota indicating therein as first priority the
(the cuase of the suit or action) of the case. name, Mabuhay Tours and Tourist Services for his
business. He was, however, advised by the aforesaid
(3). office to change the name to Eastern Laguna Tours
 The petition fails show the essential requisites and Tourist Services, and thereafter, was issued a
that would warrant the Court’s exercise of judicial Certification of Registration thereon on 29 August
review which are: 2001. He informed Municipal Mayor Guillermo
(1) the existence of an actual case or L. Acero, through the Municipal Business License
controversy involving a conflict of legal rights Office, of the fact of change of the
susceptible of judicial determination; name Mabuhay Tours and Tourist Services to Eastern
(2) the existence of personal and substantial Laguna Tours and Tourist Services.
interest on the part ofthe party raising the On 1 February 2002, six of the eleven private
constitutional question; respondents, namely, Felipe A. Em, Noel Laberinto,
(3) recourse to judicial review is made at the Homer Serrano, Eligio de Leon, Hector A. Maneja, and
earliest opportunity; and Sedfrey Realeza filed a joint Counter Affidavit.
(4) theresolution of the constitutional question Meanwhile, private respondents Vice-Mayor
must be necessary to the decision of the case. Roberto J. Acoba, Paul Simon Go, Gaudencio
 The petitioner who claims the Salay and Andres Quintero filed a Rejoinder,averring
unconstitutionality of a law has the burden of showing similar arguments as raised in the Counter-Affidavit
first that the case cannot be resolved unless the previously filed by their co-private
disposition of the constitutional question that he raised respondents. Reiterating their prayer that the
is unavoidable. Complaint against them be dismissed for utter lack of
merit, they maintained thattheir action taken as such powers are virtually free from executive,
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Siniloan, legislative or judicial intervention.The rationale of this
Laguna, inrecommending the cancellation of the rule is based not only upon respect for the
mayor’s permit granted to petitioner was a product of investigatory and prosecutory powers that the Office of
due deliberation and investigation. They insisted the Ombudsman is granted under the present
that petitioner failed to prove that he was authorized to Constitution,but upon practicality as well; otherwise,
engage as a common carrier to offer daily tours to the functions of the courts would be perilously bound
Metro Manila and Baguio from Siniloan, Laguna. by numerous petitions assailing the result of the
Hence, in openly engaging in the business of transport investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office, in
services, petitioner violated the terms and conditions of much the same way that the courts would be saturated
the mayors permit. if compelled to review the prosecutors exercise of
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, discretion each time they decide to file an information
recommended the dismissal of petitioners Complaint or dismiss a complaint.The discretion to prosecute or
for lack of probable cause. dismiss a complaint filed before it is lodged in the
Petitioner filed the instant Petition Office of the Ombudsman itself. To compel the
for Mandamus, seeking to compel the public Ombudsman to further pursue a criminal case against
respondents to file the appropriate information for the private respondents, as petitioner would have it, is
violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713, outside the ambit of the courts.
against private Corollary, Section 2, Rule II of the Rules of
respondents Sangguniang Bayan members Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman which
of Siniloan, Laguna. runs:
Sol-Gen dismissed for lack of merit. SEC. 2. Evaluation. Upon evaluating the
complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend
Issue:Whether the public respondents unlawfully whether it may be:
neglected to perform an act which the law specifically a) Dismissed outright for want of palpable
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office? merit;
b) referred to respondent for comment;
Held: NO. c) Indorsed to the proper government office or
It is elementary that mandamus applies as a agency this has jurisdiction over the case
remedy only where petitioners right is founded clearly d) forwarded to the appropriate office or official
on law and not when it is doubtful.In varying language, for fact-finding investigation;
the principle echoed and reechoed is that legal rights e) Referred for administrative adjudication; or
may be enforced by mandamus only if those rights are f) Subjected to a preliminary investigation.
well-defined, clear and certain.A writ of mandamus can
be issued only when petitioner’s legal right to the And is reinforced by Section 3, Rule III of the
performance of a particular act which is sought to be same Rules, hereby quoted:
compelled is clear and complete.A clear legal right is a
right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable SEC. 3. How initiated. An administrative case
as a matter of law.Mandamus, therefore, is employed may be initiated by a written complaint under oath
to compel the performance, when refused, of a accompanied by affidavits of witnesses and other
ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a evidences in support of the charge. An administrative
discretionary duty. proceeding may also be ordered by the Ombudsman
Mandamus will not issue to control or review or the respective Deputy Ombudsman on his initiative
the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the or on the basis of a complaint originally filed as a
law imposes upon said public officer the right and duty criminal action or a grievance complaint or request for
to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in assistance.
which he is required to act.It is his judgment that is to Clearly provides the Office of the Ombudsman
be exercised and not that of the court. with wide latitude of discretion in determining what and
Essentially, what petitioner attacks in the which acts to prosecute criminally and/or
instant Petition for Mandamus is the order of the Office administratively. In the instant case, the Office of the
of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in admonishing Deputy Ombudsman opted, based on the evidence on
the private respondents. The case partakes of an hand, to only administratively admonish the private
administrative disciplinary nature. respondents, a penalty which is in fine tune with the
Herein, petitioner was not able to establish his mandate of Rule IV, Section 52 (C) (13) of the Uniform
entitlement to a writ of mandamus. Petitioner fails to Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
demonstrate that he has a clear legal right to compel which provides:
the public respondents to file criminal information SEC. 52.Classification of Offenses.
against the private respondents. Settled is the rule that Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties
the Supreme Court will not interfere with the are classified into grave, less grave or light, depending
Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory on their gravity or depravity and effects on the
and prosecutory powers without good and compelling government service.
reasons to indicate otherwise.Said exercise of powers
is based upon his constitutional mandateand the C. The following are light offenses with
courts will not interfere in its exercise.Courts have corresponding penalties:
upheld the wide latitude of investigatory and
prosecutorial powers that the Ombudsman enjoys; and
13. Failure to act promptly on letters and first, denied the demurrer to evidence. However, it
requests within fifteen (15) days from receipt, except granted the same on petitioner’s motion for
as otherwise provided in the rules implementing the reconsideration. Respondent’s motion for
code of conduct and ethical standards for public reconsideration of this latter order was denied. Hence,
officials and employees: 1st Offense >Reprimand; 2nd the petition was dismissed.
Offense > Suspension for one (1) to thirty (30) Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the
days; 3rd Offense > Dismissal. appellate court. The CA initially denied the appeal for
lack of merit. Respondent moved for reconsideration.
A graver reason that impels this court to reject The appellate court granted the motion, set aside its
petitioner’s plea is the mode taken by petitioner in earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the
elevating the case to this court. In the case of Fabian production of the will and the payment of attorney’s
v. Desierto, this court ruled that appeals, if fees. It ruled this time that respondent was able to
availing,from decisions of the Office of the show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases her possession the holographic will. Dissatisfied with
should be brought to the Court of Appeals under the this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for
provisions of Rule 43[ of the Rules of reconsideration. The appellate court denied this
Court. In Lanting v. Ombudsman,we underscored the motion. Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought
catena of cases subsequent to the Fabian ruling, thus: the matter before this Court, contending in the main
In Fabian v. Desierto, we held that only that the petition for mandamus is not the proper
appeals from the decisions of the Office of the remedy and that the testimonial evidence used by the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.
should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the
provisions of Rule 43 (of the 1997 Revised Rules of Issue:Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy
Civil Procedure). We reiterated this ruling in Namuhe of the respondent.
vs. Ombudsman and recently in Barata vs. Abalos, Jr.
and Coronel vs AnianoDesierto, as Ombudsman, and Held: The Court cannot sustain the CA’s issuance of
Pedro Sausal, Jr. the writ.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court
There is, verily, a limited applicability of this of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the
courts pronouncement in Fabian. The Fabian ruling state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court,
does not extend to orders or decisions of the tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person
Ombudsman in criminal cases. Kuizon v. requiring the performance of a particular duty therein
Ombudsmanand Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the specified, which duty results from the official station of
Ombudsman (Visayas), instructed that petitions for the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation
certiorari questioning the Ombudsman’s orders or of law. This definition recognizes the public character
decisions in criminal cases should be filed in the of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it
Supreme Court and not the Court of Appeals. This is may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the
the prevailing rule. The Office of the Deputy performance of duties in which the public has no
Ombudsman, in admonishing the private respondents, interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who
deemed the matter to be one in the nature of an seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
administrative disciplinary case. The petitioner, in filing performance of a public duty, most especially when the
the instant Petition for Mandamus before this Court, public right involved is mandated by the Constitution.
took a route that is antagonistic to prevailing rules and As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if
jurisprudence. WHEREFORE, under the foregoing the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
premises, the instant Petition for Mandamus is unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
DISMISSED. the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust
or station.
2.Uy Kiao Eng v. Lee, G.R. No. 176831, 15 January The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue
2010, 610 SCRA 211 to compel an official to do anything which is not his
duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to
Facts: Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by
mandamus with damages against his mother Uy Kiao law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which
Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial
compel petitioner to produce the holographic will of his doubt exists, although objection raising a mere
father so that probate proceedings for the allowance technical question will be disregarded if the right is
thereof could be instituted. Respondent had already clear and the case is meritorious. As a rule,
requested his mother to settle and liquidate the mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the
patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or
respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so person against whom the action is taken unlawfully
without any justifiable reason. Petitioner denied that neglected the performance of an act which the law
she was in custody of the original holographic will and specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office,
that she knew of its whereabouts. The RTC heard the trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or
case. After the presentation and formal offer of person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from
respondent’s evidence, petitioner demurred, the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he
contending that her son failed to prove that she had in is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to
her custody the original holographic will. The RTC, at the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should
have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it Ø The respondent heirs filed a manifestation of
must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform waiving their objections to petitioners power to
the act required. expropriate their properties, thereafter trial court
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the declares plaintiff has a right to expropriate the
principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce
contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not properties of the defendant heirs and appointed 3
lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not commissioners who ascertain the just compensation
lie against an individual unless some obligation in the of the said properties be fixed at PHP 11, 200.00 per
nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The square meter.
writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against Ø Petitioner NHA filed 2 motion for reconsideration
an individual.] The writ of mandamus lies to enforce that assails inclusion of lots 12, 13 and 19 as well as
the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would
the amount of just compensation, however the
be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases
relating to the public and to the government; hence, it respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the
is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative trial courts partial judgment but the trial court issued an
character, mandamus is not used for the redress of omnibus order to deny the motion of respondent
private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the granting the petitioner’s motion and of just
public. compensation.
Moreover, an important principle followed in Ø Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
the issuance of the writ is that there should be no
for certiorari. Thereafter, heirs filed a motion for
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law other than the remedy of mandamus execution since the trial court move for the entry of the
being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be partial judgment as modified by the omnibus order.
issued only in cases where the usual modes of Ø The Court of Appeals rendered dismissal of the
procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to petition for certiorari on the ground of partial judgment
afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, and omnibus order became a final and executory when
mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is
petitioner failed to appeal.
generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed,
the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound Ø The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
discretion of the court. then it was denied by the court. The courts of appeals
In the instant case, the Court, without serve on petitioner for a notice of levy pursuant to writ
unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation of Execution and a Notice of third garnishment from
involved here—the production of the original the Land bank of the Philippines.
holographic will—is in the nature of a public or a
Issue:
private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus
cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there 1. Whether or not the state can be compelled and
lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the coerced by the courts to continue with its inherent
ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent power of eminent domain.
has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the 2. Whether or not judgment has become final and
production of the original for purposes of probate. The executory and if estoppel or laches applies to
Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from government.
instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the
will whether the same is in his possession or not. 3. Whether or not writs of execution and
There being a plain, speedy and adequate garnishment may be issued against the state in an
remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production expropriation where in the exercise of power of
of the subject wills, the remedy of mandamus cannot eminent domain will not serve public use or purpose
be availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee
lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court
grants the demurrer.

Ruling:
Rule 67 – Expropriation Ø The state as represented by the NHA for housing
project can continue its inherent power of eminent
1. National Housing v. Heirs Guivelondo, G.R. No. domain provided that the just compensation for the
154411, 19 June 2003, 404 SCRA 389 property sought is taken. After the rendition of such
order the plaintiff shouldn’t be permitted to dismiss or
Facts: discontinue such proceedings except on such terms of
Ø NHA filed with RTC of Cebu Branch 11 a complaint the court be equitable.
as amended regarding the eminent domain against Ø The order was final after the non-appealing of the
Heirs of Guivelondo docketed as civil case. petitioner as the lawful right to expropriate the
Ø The petitioner alleged that defendant heirs et. al properties of respondent heirs of Guivelondo.
were the rightful private owners of the land which the Ø Petitioner NHA are not exempt from garnishment or
petitioner intends to develop a socialized housing execution, although it is public in character since it is
project. arbitrary and capricious for a government entity to
initiate expropriation proceedings that seize a private In its letter of December 20, 1994, respondent
owner’s property. reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of
Ø Petition was DENIED and the trial court’s decision petitioner's property is "to provide sports and
denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss expropriation recreational facilities to its poor residents."
proceeding was AFFIRMED. Its injunctive relief Subsequently, on February 21, 1995,
against the levy and garnishment of its funds and respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for
personal properties was also DENIED. The temporary expropriation.
Restraining Order was LIFTED On April 25, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to
Ø In order to resolve the issue of the propriety of the dismiss the complaint.
garnishment against petitioners’ funds and personal On May 7, 1996, the trial court issued an
properties, there is a need to first determine its true Order denying the Motion to Dismiss, on the ground
character as a government entity. Generally, funds and that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the
properties of the government cannot be the object of property for the sports and recreational activities of the
garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be residents of Pasig.
sued had been previously granted and the state
liability adjudged Issues:Whether there is indeed a genuine necessity
Ø The universal rule that where the State gives its for the taking of the property
consent to be sued by private parties either by general
or special law, it may limit claimants action only up to Ruling:The right to take private property for public
the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of purposes necessarily originates from "the necessity"
execution and that the power of the Courts ends when and the taking must be limited to such necessity the
the judgment is rendered, since government funds and very foundation of... the right to exercise eminent
properties may not be seized under writs of execution domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must
or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on be of a public character. Moreover, the ascertainment
obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of the necessity must precede or accompany and not
of public funds must be covered by the corresponding follow the taking of the land.
appropriation as required by law. The functions and Necessity within the rule that the particular
public services rendered by the State cannot be property to be expropriated must be necessary, does
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or
of public funds from their legitimate and specific practical necessity, such as would combine the
objects, as appropriated by law. greatest benefit to the public with the least
Ø However, if the funds belong to a public inconvenience and expense to the condemning party
corporation or a government-owned or controlled and the property owner consistent with such benefit.
corporation which is clothed with a personality of its Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of
own, separate and distinct from that of the Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine
government, then its funds are not exempt from necessity to expropriate petitioner's property.
garnishment Our scrutiny of the records shows that the
Certification issued by the Caniogan BarangayCouncil,
2. Masikip v. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 136349, 23 indicates that the intended beneficiary is the
January 2006, 479 SCRA 391 Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a
private, non-profit organization, not the residents of
Facts:Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the
Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the
registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of
said Association are desirous of having their own
4,521 square meters located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan,
private playground and recreational facility. Petitioner's
Pasig City, Metro Manila.
lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose
In a letter dated January 6, 1994, the then
is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The
Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig, respondent,
necessity has not... been shown, especially
notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500
considering that there exists an alternative facility for
square meter portion of her property to be used for the
sports development and community recreation in the
"sports development and recreational activities" of the
area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all
residents... of Barangay Caniogan.
residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.
On May 2, 1994, petitioner sent a reply to
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is
respondent stating that the intended expropriation of
GRANTED.
her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and
oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient
Principles:Where the taking by the State of private
nor suitable to "provide land opportunities to deserving
property is done for the benefit of a small community
poor sectors of our... community."
which seeks to have its own sports and recreational
facility, notwithstanding that there is such a  CA granted the petitioner, stating that the
recreational facility only a short distance away, such remedies sought are alternative and not
taking cannot be considered to be for public use. Its cumulative. Thus, in denying the demurrer, RTC
expropriation is not valid. committed grave abuse of discretion.
 Petitioner filed MR but it was denied. Hence, this
petition.
3. Republic v. Ortigas and Co. Ltd. Partnership,
Issues &Ratio.
G.R. No. 171496, 3 March 2014, 717 SCRA 601
1. WON collection suit should be dismissed –
YES
Rule 68 - Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage
Section 3, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
1. BPI Family v. Coscolluela, G.R. No. 167724, 27
Procedure provides that a party may not institute one
June 2006, 493 SCRA 472
suit for a single cause of action, and, if two or more
suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of
Facts action, the filing of one on a judgment upon the merits
 Respondent and her late husband Oscar in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of
obtained an agricultural sugar crop loan from Far others. The law does not permit the owner of a single
East Bank & Trust Co. (later merged with BPI) of entire cause of action or an entire or indivisible
for crop years 1997 and 1998. In the book of Far demand to divide and split the cause to make it the
East, the loan account was treated as a single subject of several actions.
account, and evidenced by 67 promissory notes. The true rule which determined whether a
 Sps. Coscolluela executed a real estate party has only a single and entire cause of action is
mortgage in favor of FEBTC over their parcel of whether the entire amount arises from one and the
land as security of loans on credit same act or contract or the several parts arise from
accommodation obtained and those that may distinct and different acts. As gleaned from the plain
be obtained. terms of the REM, the real estate of respondent served
 Under the terms and conditions of the real estate as a continuing security liable for obligations already
mortgage, in the event of failure to pay the obtainer and obligations obtained thereafter. In this
mortgage obligation or any portion thereof, the case, the action of petitioner is anchored on one and
entire principal, interest, penalties, and other the same cause: the nonpayment of respondent.
charges shall be immediately due; and Far East Though the debt may be covered by several
mat foreclose the same extra judicially. promissory notes and is covered by a real estate
 For failure to settle outstanding obligation on the mortgage, the latter is subsidiary to the former and
maturity dates, Far East sent a final demand both refer to one and the same obligation. A mortgage
letter to respondent demanding payment. creditor may institute two alternative remedies against
 Since respondent failed to settle her obligation, the debtor, either to collect debt or to foreclose
Far East filed a petition for the extrajudicial mortgage, but not both.
foreclosure of the mortgaged property, but only
only for 31 of the promissory notes. DECISION.
 During pendency of said case, Far East filed a WHEREFORE instant petition is dismissed for lack of
complaint for collection of money representing merit.
the amounts for the 36 other promissory notes.
 In respondent’s answer, she alleged that the 2. Monzon v. Sps. Relova, G.R. No. 171827, 17
complaint was barred by litis pendentia for the September 2008, 565 SCRA 514
pending petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure
of the REM. Facts: On 18 October 2000, the spouses James and
 Petitioner presented a loan officer as sole Maria Rosa Nieves Relova and the spouses
witness, who testified that respondent were Bienvenido and Eufracia Perez, respondents before
granted a loan, which was a “single loan this Court, filed against Atty. Ana Liza Luna, Clerk of
account.” Court of Branch 18 of the RTC of Tagaytay City, and
 Respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence herein petitioner Teresita Monzon an initiatory pleading
contending that the loan officer’s admission, that captioned as a Petition for Injunction. The case, which
there is only one loan account secured by the was filed before the same Branch 18 of the RTC of
REM thus barred the personal action for Tagaytay City, was docketed as Civil Case No. TG-
collection. She insisted that the filing of said 2069.
complaint should be dismissed. In their Petition for Injunction, respondents
 Petitioner opposed the demurrer, stating that alleged that Monzon executed a promissory note in
each promissory note constituted a separate favor of the spouses Perez for the amount of
contract. P600,000.00, with interest of five percent per month,
 The trial court denied the demurrer on the payable on or before 28 December 1999. This was
ground that each note covered a loan distinct secured by a 300-square meter lot in Barangay
from the others. Kaybagal, Tagaytay City. Denominated as Lot No. 2A,
 Respondent filed MR but denied, prompting her this lot is a portion of Psu-232001, covered by Tax
to file a certiorari petition under Rule 65 with CA. Declaration No. 98-008-1793. On 31 December 1998,
Monzon executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the pertinent provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on
said parcel of land in favor of the spouses Perez. Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments. Rule
On 23 October 1999, the Coastal Lending 68 of the Rules, captioned Foreclosure of Mortgage,
Corporation extrajudicially foreclosed the entire 9,967- governs judicial foreclosure sales. On the other hand,
square meter property covered by Psu-232001, Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, otherwise
including the portions mortgaged and subsequently known as "An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property
sold to respondents. According to the Petition for under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real
Injunction, Monzon was indebted to the Coastal Estate Mortgages," applies in cases of extrajudicial
Lending Corporation in the total amount of foreclosure sales of real estate mortgages.
P3,398,832.35. The winning bidder in the extrajudicial Unlike Rule 68, which governs judicial
foreclosure, Addio Properties Inc., paid the amount of foreclosure sales, neither Act No. 3135 as amended,
P5,001,127.00, thus leaving a P1,602,393.65 residue. nor A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 grants to junior
According to respondents, this residue amount, which encumbrancers the right to receive the balance of the
is in the custody of Atty. Luna as Branch Clerk of purchase price. The only right given to second
Court, should be turned over to them pursuant to mortgagees in said issuances is the right to redeem
Section 4, Rule 68 of the Revised Rules of Civil the foreclosed property pursuant to Section 6 of Act
Procedure. No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, which
The Decision also mentioned that the Order provides:
allowing the ex parte presentation of evidence by
respondents was due to the continuous and incessant Sec. 6. Redemption. In all cases in which an
absences of petitioner and counsel. extrajudicial sale is made under the special power
On 25 April 2002, Monzon filed a Notice of hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors in
Appeal, which was approved by the trial court. Monzon interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of
claims that the RTC gravely erred in rendering its said debtor, or any person having a lien on the
Decision immediately after respondents presented property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of
their evidence ex parte without giving her a chance to trust under which the property is sold, may redeem
present her evidence, thereby violating her right to due the same at any time within the term of one year
process of law. from and after the date of the sale; and such
redemption shall be governed by the provisions of
Issue: Whether respondents Petition for Injunction had sections four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred
failed to state a cause of action. and sixty- six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure,
in so far as these are not inconsistent with this Act.
Held: Section 4, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, which
is the basis of respondents alleged cause of action Even if, for the sake of argument, Rule 68 is to
entitling them to the residue of the amount paid in the be applied to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages,
foreclosure sale, provides as follows: such right can only be given to second mortgagees
SEC. 4. Disposition of proceeds of sale.The who are made parties to the (judicial) foreclosure.
amount realized from the foreclosure sale of the While a second mortgagee is a proper and in a sense
mortgaged property shall, after deducting the costs of even a necessary party to a proceeding to foreclose a
the sale, be paid to the person foreclosing the first mortgage on real property, he is not an
mortgage, and when there shall be any balance or indispensable party, because a valid decree may be
residue, after paying off the mortgage debt due, made, as between the mortgagor and the first
the same shall be paid to junior encumbrancers in mortgagee, without regard to the second mortgage;
the order of their priority, to be ascertained by the but the consequence of a failure to make the second
court, or if there be no such encumbrancers or there mortgagee a party to the proceeding is that the lien of
be a balance or residue after payment to them, then to the second mortgagee on the equity of redemption is
the mortgagor or his duly authorized agent, or to the not affected by the decree of foreclosure.
person entitled to it. A cause of action is the act or omission by
However, Rule 68 governs the judicial which a party violates the right of another. A cause of
foreclosure of mortgages. Extra-judicial foreclosure of action exists if the following elements are present: (1)
mortgages, which was what transpired in the case at a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
bar, is governed by Act No. 3135,[11] as amended by under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
Act No. 4118, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7353, obligation on the part of the named defendant to
Section 18 of Republic Act No. 7906, and Section 47 respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or
of Republic Act No. 8791. A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, issued omission on the part of such defendant violative of the
on 14 December 1999, provides for the procedure to right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
be observed in the conduct of an extrajudicial obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the
foreclosure sale. Thus, we clarified the different types latter may maintain an action for recovery of
of sales in Supena v. Dela Rosa, to wit: damages.[17] In view of the foregoing discussions, we
Any judge, worthy of the robe he dons, or any find that respondents do not have a cause of action
lawyer, for that matter, worth his salt, ought to know against Atty. Ana Liza Luna for the delivery of the
that different laws apply to different kinds of sales subject amounts on the basis of Section 4, Rule 68 of
under our jurisdiction. We have three different types of the Rules of Court, for the reason that the foregoing
sales, namely: an ordinary execution sale, a judicial Rule does not apply to extrajudicial foreclosure of
foreclosure sale, and an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. mortgages.
An ordinary execution sale is governed by the
Rule 69 – Partition proceed with the trial and if the decision be adverse to
the movant, the remedy is to take an appeal from said
1. Balo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129704, 30 decision, assigning as one of the errors therefore the
September 2005, 471 SCRA 227 denial of the motion to dismiss.
CA denied the MR. Hence this petition for review
Facts: A complaint for Judicial Partition of Real under Rule 45 of the ROC.
Properties and Accounting with Damages was filed by
private respondent Josefina Garrido against petitioners Issue: Whether or not the action for judicial partition
before the RTC. She alleged in her COMPLAINT that: and accounting has prescribed, was waived, or was
Private respondent and petitioners are the co-owners otherwise abandoned.
of undivided parcels of land located at Mayorga, Leyte.
The described parcels of lands were originally Ruling:
owned by the spouses Eugenio Balo, Sr. and Ma. No. It is noteworthy that the motion to dismiss
Pasagui-Balo and they were survived by their 2 filed by the petitioners, did, not Ipso facto establish
children: Ulpiano, Sr. and Maximino (deceased) prescription. Dismissal prior to answer
The lands were inherited into two (2) equal is premature. An action for partition is at once an
shares by their 2 children; action for declaration of co-ownership and for
Plaintiff is the daughter of the late Maximino Balo and segregation and conveyance of a determine portion of
Salvacion Sabulao, who after her father’s death, had the properties involved. If the defendant asserts
inherited her father’s share of the inheritance; exclusive title over the property, the action for partition
Ulpiano Balo, Sr. aside from being the son of Eugenio should not be dismissed. Rather, the court should
Balo, Sr., is married to Felicidad Superio, and is the resolve the case and if the plaintiff is unable to sustain
father of all the other defendants in this case; his claimed status as a co-owner, the court should
Immediately upon the death of Eugenio Sr., dismiss the action, not because the wrong remedy was
petitioners took possession of the properties without availed of, but because no basis for requiring the
her knowledge and consent. defendant to submit to partition. If, on the other hand,
She requested for the properties’ fair the court after trial should find the existence of co-
and equal partition, but petitioners refused her ownership among the parties, the court may and
proposal. should order the partition of the properties in the same
In lieu of an Answer, petitioners filed a MTD on action.
the following grounds:(1)Failure to state a COA for
failing to allege that she is a legitimate child and to 2. Quintos v. Nicolas, G.R. No. 201252, 16 June
allow her to inherit from the estate in representation of 2014, 726 SCRA 482
her father would be to permit intestate succession Facts:
by an illegitimate child.(2)The complaint does not show Petitioners and respondents are siblings. In
that the estate of the spouses Eugenio and Maria Balo 1999, both their parents passed away, leaving to their
have been settled and its obligations have been 10 children ownership over the subject property. An
paid.(3)The properties enumerated in the action for partition was subsequently brought before
Complaint were proceeded against by way the RTC. However, for failure of the parties and their
of execution to satisfy a judgment against Eugenio and counsels to appear despite due notice, the case was
Maria Balo. Subsequently, defendant Ulpiano dismissed.
repurchased the said properties and has been, Thereafter, the respondent siblings executed a
together with his children, openly, exclusively and Deed of Adjudication to transfer the property in favor of
adversely in possession of the real estate properties in the 10 siblings. As a result, the old TCT was cancelled
question. and the Registry of Deeds issued a new one. The
The RTC denied the MTD for lack of merit. respondents subsequently sold their 7/10 undivided
No evidence may be alleged or considered to share in favor of the spouses Candelario.
test the sufficiency of the complaint except the very The petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of
facts pleaded therein. It would be improper to inject Title and Damages against the respondents.
into the allegation, facts not alleged and use them as Respondents countered that petitioners’ cause
basis for the decision on the motion. of action was already barred by estoppel when
The Court is not permitted to go beyond and sometime in 2006, one of petitioners offered to buy the
outside of the allegations in the complaint for data or 7/10 undivided share of the respondent siblings. They
facts. point out that this is an admission on the part of
Therefore, the allegation of illegitimacy and petitioners that the property is not entirely theirs. In
claim of absolute ownership are modifications and addition, they claimed that Bienvenido and Escolastica
unreasonable inferences. If there is doubt to the truth Ibarra mortgaged the property but because of financial
of the facts averred in the complaint, the Court does constraints, respondent spouses Candelario had to
not dismiss thecomplaint but requires an answer and redeem the property in their behalf. Not having been
proceeds to hear the case on the merit. repaid by Bienvenido and Escolastica, the Candelarios
COURT OF APPEALS’ RULING (PetCert): CA accepted from their co-respondents their share in the
accordingly dismissed the same because: An subject property as payment. Lastly, respondents
order denying a MTD is basically interlocutory in sought, by way of counterclaim, the partition of the
character and cannot be the proper subject of a property.
petition for certiorari. The proper procedure is to The RTC dismissed the petitioner’s complaint,
ruling that the respondent siblings were entitled to their
respective shares and that the subsequent transfer of In the case at bar, the co-ownership, as
interest in favor of the respondent spouses Candelario determined by the trial court, is still subsisting 30-70 in
was upheld. Likewise, the court ordered the partition favor of respondent spouses Candelario.
of the subject lots between the herein plaintiffs and the
Consequently, there is no legal bar preventing herein
defendants-spouses Candelarios.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. respondents from praying for the partition of the
Issues: property through counterclaim.
1. Whether or not the petitioners were able to prove 3. The CA erred in approving the Agreement
ownership over the property; for Subdivision
2. Whether or not the respondents’ counterclaim for Agreement of Subdivision allegedly executed
partition is already barred by laches or res judicata; by respondent spouses Candelario and petitioners
and cannot serve as basis for partition, for, as stated in the
3. Whether or not the CA was correct in approving the pre-trial order, herein respondents admitted that the
subdivision agreement as basis for the partition of the
agreement was a falsity and that petitioners never took
property.
part in preparing the same.It, therefore, lacked the
Ruling: essential requisite of consent.
The petition is meritorious in part. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
1. Petitioners were not able to prove equitable petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed
title or ownership over the propertyFor an action to Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must G.R. CV No. 98919 dated July 8, 2013 and November
concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a 22, 2013, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED with
legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property
MODIFICATION. The case is hereby REMANDED to
subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting the RTC, Branch 68 in Camiling, Tarlac for purposes of
cloud on the title must be shown to be in fact invalid or partitioning the subject property in accordance with
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
validity or efficacy. In the case at bar, the CA correctly
observed that petitioners’ cause of action must Rule 70 - Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
necessarily fail mainly in view of the absence of the
first requisite. 1. Acaylar v. Harayo, G.R. No. 176995, 30 July 2008,
Their alleged open, continuous, exclusive, and 560 SCRA 624
uninterrupted possession of the subject property is
belied by the fact that respondent siblings, in 2005, Facts: Danilo Harayo filed a complaint with the MTCC
entered into a Contract of Lease with the Avico against Pablo Acaylar, son of the spouses Acaylar for
Lending Investor Co. over the subject lot without any forcible entry. He alleged that he acquired the property
from the spouses Acaylar by virtue of a Deed of Sale
objection from the petitioners.
executed on September 14 2004 and took possession
The cardinal rule is that bare allegation of title of the property at the same day.
does not suffice. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff
to establish his or her case by preponderance of Pablo countered that the subject property is a
evidence portion of the entire property owned by his parents. He
2. The counterclaim for partition is not barred is in possession the entire property since 1979 and he
by prior judgment. built his house on the property and farmed the land.
Harayo cannot definitely claim which portion of the
Dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 entire property he was able to buy from the spouses
of the Rules of Court cannot defeat the right of a co- since the same was not clearly delineated. He
owner to ask for partition at any time, provided that presented an Affidavit of Zoila Acaylar attesting that
there is no actual adjudication of ownership of shares she sold the subject property to him for consideration
yet. Pertinent hereto is Article 494 of the Civil Code. and she did not give Pablo authority to either
Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule administer or remain on the subject property.
17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to co-owners under
Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To MTCC rendered a Decision awarding to Danilo
construe otherwise would diminish the substantive the possession of the property, giving credence to
right of a co-owner through the promulgation of Danilo's claim that he took immediate possession after
procedural rules. Substantive law cannot be amended the execution of the Deed of Sale. On appeal, RTC
by a procedural rule. This further finds support in Art. affirmed the award of possession in favor of Harayo
496 of the New Civil Code. and declared that the sale of the subject property by
Thus, for the Rules to be consistent with spouses Acaylar vested ownership and possession of
statutory provisions, We hold that Art. 494, as cited, is said property in Harayo, thus Acaylar's acts of entering
an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court of subjectproperty constitute forcible entry. CA denied
to the effect that even if the order of dismissal for Acaylar's motion for reconsideration.
failure to prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with
prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without prejudice. Issue: Whether or not there is forcible entry or
unlawful detainer.
the parties that would qualify the case as one of
RulingNo. We had long settled that the only question unlawful detainer.
that the courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings
is - who is entitled to the physical or material Issues: 1. Whether the complaint satisfies the
possession of the property; and they should not jurisdictional requirements for a case of unlawful
involve the question of ownership or of possession de detainer properly cognizable by the MTC
jure, which is to be settled in the proper court and in a
proper action. Hence the Deed of Sale conferring Held:YES. Well-settled is the rule that what
ownership of the subject property upon Harayo is determines the nature of an action as well as which
irrelevant in the case presented. The Deed of Sale did court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the
not automatically place him in physical possession of complaint and the character of the relief sought. In
the property. Javelosa vs. Court of the Appeals, it was held that the
allegation in the complaint that there was unlawful
In Affidavits of Zoila Acaylar, we find that withholding of possession is sufficient to make out a
Pablo was in peaceful possession of the subject case for unlawful detainer. It is equally settled that in
property prior to its sale to Harayo. Even if Pablo was an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the
not authorized by Zoila as administrator, his defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from
possession was not opposed and was, thus, tolerated the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, without necessarily
by his parents. employing the terminology of the law. Hence, the
phrase “unlawful withholding” has been held to imply
In Arcal v. Court of Appeals, The rule is that possession on the part of defendant, which was legal
possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession in the beginning, having no other source than a
becomes unlawful upon demand to vacate made by contract, express or implied, and which later expired
the owner and the possessor by torelance refuses to as a right and is being withheld by defendant. In
comply with such demand. Rosanna B. Barba vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court held that a simple allegation that the defendant
In this case, there is no showing that either is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is
Zoila or Harayo made an express demand upon Pablo sufficient. Based on this premise, the allegation in the
to vacate the property. In the absence of an oral or Complaint that: “despite demand to vacate, the
written demand, Pablo’s possession of the subject defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said
property has yet to become unlawful. The absence of lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said
demand to vacate precludes us from treating this case, lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of
originally instituted as one for forcible entry, as one of their lots;” is already sufficient to constitute an unlawful
unlawful detainer, since demand to vacate is detainer case.
jurisdictional in an action for unlawful detainer. Likewise, the case of Co Tiamco vs. Diaz
provides for a liberal approach in considering the
2. Ross-Rica v. Sps Ong, G.R. No. 132197, 16 sufficiency of a complaint for unlawful detainer, thus:
August 2005, 467 SCRA 35 “The principle underlying the brevity and
simplicity of pleadings in forcible entry and unlawful
Facts:The spouses Ong are the original owners of 3 detainer cases rests upon considerations of public
parcels of land which they occupy. They sold it to policy. Cases of forcible entry and detainer are
Mandaue Prime Estate Realty, which then sold it to summary in nature, for they involve perturbation of
Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. The spouses Ong filed social order which must be restored as promptly as
an action to annul the sale and transfer of property to possible and, accordingly, technicalities or details of
Mandaue Prime Estate Realty and at present, the case procedure should be carefully avoided.”
is still pending. In the meantime, an ejectment case
was filed against spouses Ong in the MTC, which ruled 2.Whether the case should be considered as one for
against the latter. On appeal to the RTC, the judgment accion reivindicatoria, and thus the jurisdiction would
was affirmed by a decision dated March 1, 1997. The lie with the RTC:
spouses Ong received a copy of the decision on April
28, 1997. NO. The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is
The spouses Ong first filed a Notice of Appeal the recovery of ownership of real property.
with the RTC (May 8, 1997) but on the very next day This differs from accion publiciana where the
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied issue is the better right of possession or possession de
on June 23, 1997. The spouses Ong received a copy jureand accion interdictal where the issue is material
of the order on July 9, 1997. On July 24, 1997 possession or possession de facto. In an action for
respondents filed with the CA a motion for an unlawful detainer, the question of possession is
additional 10 days to file their Petition for Review, primordial, while the issue of ownership is generally
which they would eventually file on July 30, 1997. unessential. Petitioners, in all their pleadings, only
The CA gave their petition for review due sought to recover physical possession of the subject
course and reversed the decision of the RTC on the property. The mere fact that they claim ownership over
finding that the action filed was not one for unlawful the parcels of land as well did not deprive the MTC of
detainer based on two grounds: that the allegations fail jurisdiction to try the ejectment case. Even if
to show that petitioners were deprived of possession respondents claim ownership as a defense to the
by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and complaint for ejectment, the conclusion would be the
that there is no contract, express or implied, between same, for mere assertion of ownership by the
defendant in an ejectment case will not oust the "Sinumpaang Salaysay", are more consistent withan
municipal court of its summary jurisdiction. This Court action for forcible entry which should have been filed
in Ganadin vs. Ramos stated that if what is prayed for within one year from the discovery of the alleged entry.
is ejectment or recovery of possession, it does not Since petitioner was deprived of the physical
matter if ownership is claimed by either party. possession of her property through illegal means and
Therefore, the pending actions for Declaration of the complaint was filed after the lapse of one year from
Nullity of Deed of Sale and Transfer Certificates of her discovery thereof, the MCTC ruled that it has no
Title and quieting of title in Civil Case No. MAN-2356 jurisdiction over the case.
will not abate the ejectment case. On appeal to the RTC, petitioner argued that
unlawful detainer was the proper remedy considering
In Drilon vs. Gaurana, this Court ruled that the that she merely tolerated respondents’ stay in the
filing of an action for reconveyance of title over the premises after demand to vacate was made upon
same property or for annulment of the deed of sale them, and they had in fact entered into an agreement
over the land does not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction and she was only forced to take legal action when
to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case respondents reneged on their promise to vacate the
before it, the rationale being that, while there may be property after the lapse of the period agreed upon.
identity of parties and subject matter in the forcible In reversing the MCTC, the RTC pointed out
entry case and the suit for annulment of title and/or that in her complaint, petitioner did not state that
reconveyance, the rights asserted and the relief respondents entered her property through stealth and
prayed for are not the same. strategy but that petitioner was in lawful possession
and acceded to the request of respondents to stay in
The long settled rule is that the issue of the premises until May 2008 but respondents’ reneged
ownership cannot be the subject of a collateral attack. on their promise to vacate the property by that time. It
held that the suit is one for unlawful detainer because
In Apostol vs. Court of Appeals, this Court had the respondents unlawfully withheld the property from
the occasion to clarify this: “. . . Under Section 48 of petitioner after she allowed them to stay there for one
Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall year.
not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, The MCTC and CA both ruled that the
modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for allegations in petitioner’s complaint make out a case
that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the for forcible entry but not for unlawful detainer.
validity of the title of the respondents can only be
assailed in an action expressly instituted for that ISSUE: Whether the MTCT and CA was correct?
purpose. Whether or not the petitioners have the right
to claim ownership over the property is beyond the Held: In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a
power of the court a quo to determine in an action for complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for
unlawful detainer.” unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the
3. Zacarias v. Anacay, G.R. No. 202354, 24 defendant was by contract with or by toleranceof the
September 2014, 736 SCRA 508 plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal
Facts: The present controversy stemmed from a upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination
complaint for Ejectment with Damages/Unlawful ofthe latter’s right of possession;
Detainer filed on December 24, 2008 by petitioner (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in
Amada Zacarias thru her son and attorney-in-fact, possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of
Cesar C. Zacarias, against the above-named the enjoyment thereof; and
respondents, Victoria Anacay and members of her (4) within one year from the last demand on
household. Said respondents are the occupants of a defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted
parcel of land with an area of seven hundred sixty-nine the complaint for ejectment.16
(769) square meters, situated at Barangay Lalaan 1st, In this case, the Complaint alleged the
Silang, Cavite and covered by Tax Declaration No. 18- following: 3. Plaintiff is the owner of that parcel of land
026-01182 in the name of petitioner and issuedby situated at Barangay Lalaan 1st, Silang, Cavite with an
Municipal Assessor Reynaldo L. Bayot on August 31, area of SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY NINE (769)
2007. SQUARE METERS, and covered by Tax Declaration
The parties were ordered to proceed to the No. 18-026-01182 issued by the Municipal Assessor of
Philippine Mediation Center pursuant to Section 2(a), Silang, Cavite. Copy of said tax declaration is hereto
Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as attached as Annex "B"; 4. Plaintiff was in lawful
amended. Mediation was unsuccessful and thus the possession and control over the subject property. She
case was returned to the court. had it planted to Bananas and other fruit bearing trees.
The MCTC held that the allegations of the However, sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that
complaint failed to state the essential elements of an the defendants have entered the subject property and
action for unlawful detainer as the claim that petitioner occupied the same; 5. Consequently, Plaintiff
had permitted or tolerated respondents’ occupation of demanded that they leave the premises. The
the subject property was unsubstantiated. It noted that defendants requested for time toleave and she
the averments in the demand letter sent by petitioner’s acceded to said request. The defendants committed to
counsel that respondents entered the property through vacate the subject property by the end of May, 2008;
stealth and strategy, and in petitioner’s own 6. Inspite of several repeateddemands, defendants
unjustifiably refused to vacate the subject premises light that this Court finds that the Court of Appeals
prompting the Plaintiff to seek the assistance of a correctly found that the municipal trial court had no
lawyer who wrote them a FORMAL and FINAL jurisdiction over the complaint.
DEMAND to vacate the premises and to pay The complaint in this case is similarly defective
reasonable compensation for their illegal use and as it failed to allege how and when entry was effected.
occupancy of the subject property. A copy of the The bare allegation of petitioner that "sometime in
DEMAND LETTER is hereto attached as Annex "C"; 7. May, 2007, she discovered that the defendants have
Plaintiff also referred this matter to the Lupon enterep the subject property and occupied the same",
Tagapamayapa of Barangay Lalaan 1st for possible as correctly found by the MCTC and CA, would show
conciliation but to no avail as the defendants still that respondents entered the land and built their
refused to vacate the subject property. Thus, the said houses thereon clandestinely and without petitioner's
Barangay issued a CERTIFICATION TOFILE ACTION, consent, which facts are constitutive of forcible entry,
as evidenced by a copy thereto attached as Annex "D"; not unlawful detainer. Consequently, the MCTC has no
The above complaint failed to allegea cause of jurisdiction over the case and the RTC clearly erred in
action for unlawful detainer as it does not describe reversing the lower court's ruling and granting reliefs
possession by the respondents being initially legal or prayed for by the petitioner.
tolerated by the petitioner and which became illegal Lastly, petitioner's argument that the CA
upon termination by the petitioner of suchlawful gravely erred in nullifying a final and executory
possession. Petitioner’s insistence that she actually judgment of the RTC deserves scant consideration.
tolerated respondents’ continued occupation after her It is well-settled that a court's jurisdiction may
discovery of their entry into the subject premises is be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
incorrect. As she had averred, she discovered appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by
respondents’occupation in May 2007. Suchpossession law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court
could not have been legal from the start as it was to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the
without her knowledge or consent, much less was it action.20 Indeed, a void judgment for want of
based on any contract, express or implied. We stress jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the
that the possession ofthe defendant in unlawful source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All
detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating
expiration or termination of the right to possess. from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never
In Valdez v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled become final and any writ of execution based on it is
that where the complaint did not satisfy the void.
jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful
detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction 4. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres v. Heirs
over the case. Thus: of Abella, G.R. No. 143510, 23 November 2005, 476
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is SCRA 1
essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance
must have been present right from the start of the Facts: The property in dispute is a parcel of land with
possession which is later sought to be recovered. an area of one hectare located beside the Peñafrancia
Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the Basilica in Naga City.It is covered by Tax Declaration
start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an No. 004.1152 in the name of herein respondents, the
improper remedy. As explained in Sarona v. Villegas: heirs of Don Manuel I. Abella. According to herein
But even where possession preceding the suit petitioner Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres
is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction should be (petitioner) said parcel of land had been donated to
made. him by respondents sometime in 1981, in exchange for
If right at the incipiencydefendant’s possession masses to be offered once a month in perpetuity for
was with plaintiff’s tolerance, we do not doubt that the the eternal repose of the soul of Don Manuel I. Abella.
latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue Respondents, on the other hand, vehemently deny
before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, such allegation and counter that petitioner encroached
within one year from the date of the demand to vacate. and fenced off the subject parcel of land without their
In the instant case, the allegations in the consent.
complaint do not contain any averment of fact that In the action for forcible entry instituted by the
would substantiate petitioners’ claim that they Heirs of Manuel Abella (ABELLA, for short) against the
permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by Roman Catholic Archbishop of Nueva Caceres
respondents. The complaint contains only bare (ARCHBISHOP, for short) before the Municipal Trial
allegations that "respondents without any color of title Court of Naga City.
whatsoever occupies the land in question by building The complaint is ordered dismissed for lack of
their house in the said land thereby depriving merit and the petition for preliminary mandatory
petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing has injunction is denied for being already moot and
been said on how respondents’ entry was effected or academic.
how and when dispossession started. Admittedly, no The RTC affirmed the court’s decision. Abella
express contract existed between the parties. This appealed its decision to the CA. The Court of Appeals
failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional affirmed the decision of this Court (Branch 22) by
facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the denying Abella’s petition for review.
complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement ABELLA filed another case against the
of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal ARCHBISHOP, for "Quieting of Title" involving the
trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.It is in this same property subject matter of MTC Civil Case No.
8479 (Forcible Entry). The Court (Branch 24) rendered subject matter of a separate case of annulment of title
judgment in Civil Case No. 89-1802 in favor of filed by respondent.
ABELLA. One of the exceptions to the principle of
The Decision in Civil Case No. 89-1802 was immutability of final judgments is the existence of
appealed by the ARCHBISHOP to the Court of supervening events. Supervening events refer to facts
Appeals and was affirmed. which transpire after judgment has become final and
The ARCHBISHOP appealed the Decision of executory or to new circumstances which
the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. The developed after the judgment has acquired finality,
appeal was dismissed in a minute resolution holding including matters which the parties were not aware of
that there was "no reversible error committed by the prior to or during the trial as they were not yet in
appellate court." existence at that time.
The ARCHBISHOP moved to execute the In the case at bar, the new circumstance which
Decision in the Forcible Entry case, but the respondent developed after the finality of the judgment in the
MTC denied the motion for execution. Upon denial by forcible entry is the fact that the decision in the case
the MTC of petitioner’s motion for execution, he filed a for quieting of title had also attained finality and
petition for certiorari and mandamus. conclusively resolved the issue of ownership over the
Herein petitioner again elevated the case subject land, and the concomitant right of possession
straight to CA via a petition for review on certiorari. thereof. Verily, to grant execution of the judgment in
The CA held that the decision for Forcible Entry has the forcible entry case would work injustice on
become final and executory earlier than in Civil Case respondents who had been conclusively declared the
for Quieting of Title. The finality of the decision in the owners and rightful possessors of the disputed land.
quieting of title, declaring the respondents as the true
owner of the subject property is a supervening event
that renders the judgment in the forcible entry, 5. Sunflower Neighborhood Association v. Court of
awarding possession to petitioner, notwithstanding its Appeals, G.R. No. 136274, 3 September 2003, 410
finality, unenforceable by execution. Petitioner moved SCRA 318
for reconsideration of the Decision but, a Resolution
was issued denying the same. Facts:Private respondent Elisa Maglaqui-Caparas, in
her capacity as executrix of the testate estate of
Issue:Whether or not the final and executory judgment Macaria Maglaqui, filed on March 16, 1993 a complaint
in the case for quieting of title wherein respondents for unlawful detainer (Civil Case No. 8550) against
were adjudged to be the owners of the subject Alfredo Mogar and 46 other personswho were
property is a supervening event that justifies the occupying several parcels of land (Lots 1-A, B, C, E, F
suspension or non-enforcement of the final judgment and G) in Yellow Ville, United Paraaque Subdivision
in the previous case for forcible entry. IV, Metro Manila. These parcels of land are covered by
individual transfer certificates of titleregistered in the
Ruling:The Court finds the petition unmeritorious. name of Macaria Maglaqui, private respondents’
The theory advanced by petitioner from the mother.
very beginning is that he is entitled to possession of The MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 78,
the disputed property as the owner thereof because eventually decided in favor of private respondent. On
the property was transferred to him by virtue of an appeal, the decision of the MeTC was affirmed by the
onerous donation made by respondents. Thus, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 66.
petitioner’s alleged right of possession is premised on Mogar et al. elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
his claim of ownership. He cannot change his theory but their petition was dismissed by the appellate court
when the case is on review, by presenting another on December 12, 1994. After the dismissal became
theory that is inconsistent with his allegations during final, a writ of demolition was issued by the MeTC of
the proceedings below. Petitioner cannot contradict Paraaque City, Branch 78. The writ, however, was not
himself by saying first that respondents had agreed to immediately implemented because the case was
transfer to him the ownership over the property, only to transferred to Branch 77 of the same court. On
say later that what respondents granted to him was the February 6, 1997, Mogar et al. filed a petition with the
right to possess the property. Petitioner is bound by RTC of Paraaque City, Branch 257, presided over by
the statements he made while the case was being Judge Rolando G. How to enjoin the implementation of
heard in the lower courts. the writ of demolition. However, this petition was
The rule is well-settled that points of law, denied and subsequently, an alias writ of demolition
theories, issues and arguments not adequately was issued by Judge Vivencio G. Lirio of MeTC
brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, Branch 77, the court of origin.
and ordinarily will not be considered by a reviewing The alias writ of demolition was, again, not
court as they cannot be raised for the first time on executed, this time due to the ex parte issuance of a
appeal because this would be offensive to the basic writ of preliminary injunction by Judge Amelita
rules of fair play, justice and due process. Tolentino, in connection with the expropriation case
(Civil Case No. 96-0253) filed by the Municipality of
Disquisition on the issue of ownership in Paraaque against the Testate Estate of Macaria
ejectment cases, as in the case at bar, is only Maglaqui.
provisional to determine who between the parties has Meanwhile, another group of persons
the better right of possession. It is, therefore, not occupying portions of the parcels of land (Lots I-F and
conclusive as to the issue of ownership, which is the I-G) subject of the unlawful detainer case organized
themselves into the Sunflower Neighborhood do not have any right to occupy the property of
Association (Sunflower), the petitioner herein. On respondent. Petitioner does not dispute the ownership
November 18, 1996, Sunflower, represented by one of the parcels of land in question. In fact, it even
Floro Aragan, filed a complaint for admitted that the subject property is owned by Macaria
prohibition/injunction with preliminary injunction against Maglaqui, mother of private respondent.Petitioner
private respondent also with the RTC of Parañaque failed to establish any right which would entitle its
City, Branch 257. Sunflower argued that its members members to occupy the land in any capacity, whether
should be excluded from the demolition order as they as lessees, tenants and the like. Petitioners only
were not parties to the original unlawful detainer case. defense against the eviction and demolition orders is
To include their houses in the demolition would be to their supposed non-inclusion in the original detainer
deprive them of due process. This time Judge How case. This defense, however, has no legal support
granted the injunction and ordered the exclusion of the since its members are trespassers or squatters who
houses belonging to petitioner from demolition. are bound by the judgment.
Thus, private respondent filed a petition for Petitioners’ argument that the parcels of land
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the Court of occupied by its members (Lots I-F and I-G) were not
Appeals (CA GR SP No. 46861) assailing both the included in the original ejectment complaint has no
injunction orders issued by Judge Tolentino in the basis. The complaint private respondent filed with the
expropriation case and by Judge How in the prohibition MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 78, clearly included
case. Lots I-F and I-G as part of the subject matter under
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private litigation in the unlawful detainer case.Thus,
respondent holding that, as the judgment in the petitioners’ members, together with all the parties in
unlawful detainer case had already become final, the the unlawful detainer case, must vacate the disputed
execution could not be enjoined. Consequently, the land.
MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 77 issued another The Court commiserates with respondent,
alias writ of demolition on September 14, 1998. already in her twilight years, who has been unlawfully
In order to stay the execution of the writ of deprived of her land for a good number of years. Thus,
demolition, Sunflower filed on January 7, 1999 an we exhort the court of origin to execute this decision
urgent motion in this Court for the issuance of a status with reasonable dispatch, consistent with the
quo order. This we granted in a resolution dated requirements of Section 28 of RA 7279 and EO 152,
January 20, 1999. Prior to the issuance of our on eviction and demolition.
resolution, however, the writ of demolition was WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the
implemented on January 14, 1999. Petitioner thus filed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No.
a motion to allow its members to return to the 46861 is AFFIRMED.
premises, which we granted in another resolution
dated April 28, 1999. Thereafter, we required both
parties to submit their memoranda. Rule 71 - Contempt
Sometime in November 1998, the group of 1. Inonog v. Ibay, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2175, 28 July
Mogar et al. filed in this Court a petition for review of 2009, 594 SCRA 168
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA GR SP No.
46861. However, we dismissed the same on January Facts:This administrative complaint came about when
18, 1999 for failure of said petitioners to comply with Judge Francisco B. Ibay cited complainant in contempt
certain procedural requirements, including their failure of court simply because the latter parked his vehicle at
to submit a certification of non-forum shopping. the parking space served for him. In the exercise of his
For its part, petitioner Sunflower likewise contempt power, not only did respondent deny the
assailed the same decision of the Court of Appeals in complainant his right to be heard but also convicted
this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of him in contempt of court based on a very loose and
the Revised Rules of Court. flimsy reason.
Respondent judge initiated the proceeding for
Issue:Whether petitioners’ members, who were not indirect contempt by issuing an order dated March 18,
parties to the unlawful detainer case, may be ejected 2005 in Criminal Case Nos. 02-1320, 02-3046, 02-
from the land subject of this case. 3168-69, and 03-392-393, entitled People v. Glenn
Fernandez, et al., directing the complainant to show
Held:YES. It is well-settled that, although an ejectment cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
suit is an action in personam wherein the judgment is The said order read:
binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and For intentionally parking car with plate no. WDH 804 at
given an opportunity to be heard, the judgment the parking space reserved for the undersigned
becomes binding on anyone who has not been Presiding Judge, thereby causing the delay in the
impleaded if he or she is: (a) a trespasser, squatter or promulgation of the Decisions in the above-entitled
agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the cases driver Butch Inonog, c/o Permit Division, this
property to frustrate the judgment; (b) a guest or City, is hereby ordered to appear before this Court at
occupant of the premises with the permission of the 10:30 A.M., March 18, 2005 and show cause why he
defendant; (c) a transferee pendente lite; (d) a should not be cited for Contempt for delaying the
sublessee; (e) a co-lessee or (f) a member of the administration of justice.
family, relative or privy of the defendant.
In the case at bar, the records show that Issue:Whether or not respondent judge acted with
petitioners members are trespassers or squatters who grave abuse of discretion?
 In the instant case, the indirect contempt
proceedings was initiated by respondent Go through a
Ruling:The phrase “improper conduct tending, directly Manifestation with Omnibus Motion.It was based on
or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the the aforesaid Motion that the appellate court issued a
administration of justice” is so broad and general that it Resolution dated 19 November 2003, requiring
encompasses wide spectrum of acts that could petitioner Atty. Regalado to show because why she
constitute indirect contempt. However, the act of should not be cited for contempt.
complainant in parking his car in a slot allegedly  Clearly, respondent Go’s Manifestation with
reserved for respondent judge does not fall under this Omnibus Motion was the catalyst which set everything
category. There was no showing that he acted with in motion and led to the eventual conviction of Atty.
malice and/or bad faith or that he was improperly Regalado. It was respondent Go who brought to the
motivated to delay the proceedings of the court by attention of the appellate court the alleged misbehavior
making use of the parking slot supposedly reserved for committed by petitioner Atty. Regalado. Without such
respondent judge. We cannot also say that the said act positive act on the part of respondent Go, no indirect
of complainant constitutes disrespect to the dignity of contempt charge could have been initiated at all.
the court. In sum, the incident is too flimsy and  We cannot, therefore, argue that the Court of
inconsequential to be the basis of an indirect contempt Appeals on its own initiated the indirect contempt
proceeding. charge without contradicting the factual findings made
by the very same court which rendered the questioned
2. Regalado v. Go, G.R. No. 167988, 6 February resolution.
2007, 514 SCRA 616  In the present case, the appellate court could
not have acquired knowledge of petitioner Atty.
Facts: The present controversy stemmed from the Regalado’s misbehavior without respondent Go’s
complaint of illegal dismissal filed before the Labor Manifestation with Omnibus Motion reiterating the
Arbiter by herein respondent Antonio S. Go against alleged deceitful conduct committed by the former.
Eurotech Hair Systems, Inc. (EHSI), and its President Thus, the instant case was not initiated by the court
Lutz Kunack and General Manager Jose E. Barin. The motu proprio.
Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent Go was illegally  The manner upon which the case at bar was
dismissed from employment. The NLRC rendered a commenced is clearly in contravention with the
Decision reversing the Labor Arbiter’s decision and categorical mandate of the Rules (a verified petition
declaring that respondent Go’s separation from which has complied with the requirements of initiatory
employment was legal for it was attended by a just pleadings must be filed). Respondent Go filed a
cause and was validly effected by EHSI, Kunack and Manifestation with Omnibus Motion, which was
Barin. Aggrieved, respondent Go elevated the adverse unverified and without any supporting particulars and
decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals documents. Such procedural flaw notwithstanding, the
promulgated a Decision setting aside the ruling of the appellate court granted the motion and directed
NLRC and reinstating the decision of the Labor Arbiter petitioner Atty. Regalado to show cause why she
adjudging EHSI, Kunack and Barin guilty of illegal should not be cited for contempt. Upon petitioner Atty.
dismissal. Regalado’s compliance with the appellate court’s
 EHSI, Kunack and Barin were able to receive directive, the tribunal proceeded in adjudging her guilty
a copy of the decision through registered mail on 17 of indirect contempt and imposing a penalty of fine,
July 2003 while respondent Go received his copy on completely ignoring the procedural infirmities in the
21 July 2003. commencement of the indirect contempt action.
 On 16 July 2003, after the promulgation of the  Evidently, the proceedings attendant to the
Court of Appeals decision but prior to the receipt of the conviction of petitioner Atty. Regalado for indirect
parties of their respective copies, the parties decided contempt suffered a serious procedural defect to which
to settle the case and signed a Release Waiver and this Court cannot close its eyes without offending the
Quitclaimwith the approval of the Labor Arbiter. fundamental principles enunciated in the Rules that
 In view of the amicable settlement, the Labor we, ourselves, had promulgated.
Arbiter, on the same day, issued an Orderdismissing
the illegal dismissal case with prejudice. After the
receipt of a copy of the Court of Appeals decision,
respondent Go, through counsel, filed a Manifestation
with Omnibus Motion seeking to nullify the Release
Waiver and Quitclaim on the ground of fraud, mistake
or undue influence. Acting on the motions, the
appellate court issued a Resolutionannulling the Order
of the Labor Arbiter dated 16 July 2003 for lack of
jurisdiction.

Held: Indirect contempt proceedings may be initiated


only in two ways: (1) motu proprio by the court; or (2)
through a verified petition and upon compliance with
the requirements for initiatory pleadings. Procedural
requirements as outlined must be complied with.