4.

Co Kim Chan vs Valdez Tan Keh 75 Phil (1945)

Facts of the case:

Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court

of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation,

Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation

issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and

judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no

jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the

defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).

The court resolved three issues:

1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation

were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation;

2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared

that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of

the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines

free of enemy occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and

proceedings of the courts;

3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts

could continue hearing the cases pending before them.

Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto

government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the

Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments,

supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.

Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed

by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for “the existence of a state of

insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the
regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been

necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.

The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase “processes of

any other government” and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and

judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation.

IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto

governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated,

then it could not have been MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be

in violation of international law.

A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute ought never to be construed to violate

the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”

Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great

mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such

construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and

unequivocal words.”

Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets

and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean

that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of any other governments.”

In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use

by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the

Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and

courts of Japan.

It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, “law once established continues until

changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE

OF SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.

Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the
laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws

creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that

the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein

before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating

and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.

DECISION:

Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to

take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.

Summary of ratio:

1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue

even during occupation unless repealed.

2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial

proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations.

3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it.

***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and

control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the

rightful government)

through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a

territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force)

through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country

who rise in insurrection against the parent state)

24.Callado vs. IRRI 244 SCRA 210

Facts:

Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI. One day while driving an IRRI

vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.

Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by the IRRI's

Human Resource Development Department Manager. In view of the findings, he was charged

with:

(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor;

(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to supervisors the failure of the vehicle to

start because of a problem with the car battery, and

(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.

Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him. However, IRRI

issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal

suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process

by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it invokes such diplomatic

immunity and privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner,

not having waived the same.

While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order

issued by the Institute to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives its

immunity," and, accordingly, considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in

resolving the case.

The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal and, finding that IRRI did not waive its

immunity, ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the complaint

dismissed.

In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of the IRRI as an international organization

granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the case at bench

inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of

dismissed employees in relation to P.D. 1620."

Issue:

Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an employer-

employee relationship?

Held: No.

P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:

Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and

administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the

Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.

The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. There is in this case "a categorical

recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys immunities accorded to

international organizations, which determination has been held to be a political question

conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarrass a political department of Government.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers

that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look

beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of

diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in

the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate

suggestion by the principal law officer of the government or other officer acting under his

direction.
The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their

functions by the agencies concerned.

The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-

General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.

In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its immunity, signifying that

such waiver is discretionary on its part.