Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
topicon and its originality as an instrument. Apart from this relation, The
Great Ideas, though to some extent readable in itself, does not perform
the function for which it was created to show that the 443 works which
comprise Volumes 4 to 54 can be seen and used as something more than a
collection of books.
Thegreat books are pre-eminently those which have given the western
tradition its life and light. The unity of this set of books does not consist
problems. It is claimed for this set of great books that all the works in it
are significantly related to one another and that, taken together, they ade-
quately present the ideas and issues, the terms and topics, that have made
the western tradition what it is. More than a collection of books, then, this
set is a certain kind of whole that can and should be read as such.
The Great Ideas results from and records such a reading of the great
books. The aim of this "syntopical reading" was to discover the unity and
trary,it only
lays down the lines along which a syntopical reading of the
great books can be done, and shows why and how it should be done. The
xi
xii THE GREAT IDEAS
various uses of the Syntopicon, described in Section III of this Preface, all
derive fromprimary purpose to serve as a guide to the reading of
its
tween the greatest minds of western civilization on the themes which have
concerned men in every epoch, and which cover the whole range of man's
It was with these considerations in mind that the editors called The
Great Ideas a Syntopicon of the great books literally, a collection of the
topics which are the main themes of the conversation to be found in the
ing of the ideas that are the important common terms of discussion; and,
then, by an enumeration of the topics that are the various particular points
about which the discussion of each of these ideas revolves.
The of this work The Great Ideas, a Syntopicon of Great
full title
Bool(s of the Western World thus indicates not only that its structure
consists of terms and topics, but also that it functions as a guide to the
great books from which its terms and topics are drawn. But the title may
fail to indicate another equally important function which the Syntopicon
performs when it is taken together with the great books. By serving as a
it does more than trans-
guide to the syntopical reading of the great books,
form them from a mere collection of books into a unified whole; it trans-
forms them into a new kind of encyclopaedic whole a new kind of
reference library. Without
any way interfering with all the values the
in
opinion contained in the great books, the Syntopicon, in the editors* opin-
ion, creates an intellectual instrument which is comparable to, though
quite distinct from, the dictionary and the encyclopaedia. The dictionary
is a basic reference work in the sphere of language. The general encyclo-
paedia is a basic reference work concerned with all
in the sphere of fact,
edge. The Syntopicon these two volumes taken together with the rest of
the set is a basic reference work in the sphere of ideas, comprehending the
wisdom and understanding accumulated thus far in all major fields of
inquiry. As its utility is realized, it will, the editors hope, take its
place
beside the dictionary and the encyclopaedia in a triad of fundamental ref-
erence works.
topical treatment of one of the basic terms or concepts in the great books.
As the Table of Contents indicates, the chapters are arranged in the alpha-
betical order of these 102 terms or concepts: from ANGEL to LOVE in Vol-
ume I, and from MAN to WORLD in Volume II.
as a whole.
xiv THE GREAT IDEAS
(1) INTRODUCTION. Each chapter begins with an essay which com-
ments on the various meanings of the idea under consideration, and takes
note of the problems it has raised and the controversies it has occasioned
in the tradition of western thought.
The Introduction to a great idea is designed to serve as a guide to its
topics and, through them, to the content of the references. For certain of
the most important topics, it frequently provides, in the words of the au-
thors themselves, a foretaste of the great conversation contained in the
be found in the great books on the idea of that chapter. It exhibits the in-
ternal structure of the idea by presenting its topics in relation to one an-
other. There are about 3000 topics in the Syntopicon as a whole, an average
of 30 to a chapter, though the actual number varies from as few as six top-
The 3000 topics provide a statement of the scope and variety of subjects
with which the great books deal in a substantial and significant fashion.
Since the topics are divided among 102 chapters, according to the great
ideas under which they fall, the user of the Syntopicon can find a particu-
lar topic by turning to the chapter on the idea which is a central term ex-
pressed in the statement of that topic or, if not actually present in the
Almost all the topics involve one or more terms other than the name of
'the great idea under which they fall. Hence, by consulting the Inventory
of Terms, the user of the Syntopicon can ascertain whether the particular
Since the references to the great books are organized by topics, the indi-
vidual topic, rather than a great idea, is the elementary unit of the Syntop-
icon. From the standpoint of the references, the great ideas are collec-
tions of topics. The same is true of all the other terms listed in the Inven-
tory of Terms. For each of these, one or more topics are the headings un-
der which the discussion of the subject can be found in the great books.
The user of the Syntopicon must, therefore, always use a topic rather than
a term to discover what the great books have to say on a particular subject.
However, with the help of the Inventory of Terms, he can always use a
term to find the topics which either state or approximately, represent the
subject of his interest.
For the convenience of the reader, the Outline of Topics in each chap-
ter is keyed to the pages of the Reference section which immediatelyfol-
lows. In the Outline, the number to the right of a particular topic indicates
subject. For each topic they by volume and page, the relevant works
locate,
and passages in Great Boo\s of the Western World. There are about
163,000 references in the Syntopicon as a whole, an average of 1500 to a
chapter, though the actual number varies from as few as 284 references
Under each topic, the references are arranged in the order in which the
authors and their works appear in Great Bool^s of the Western World.
References to the Bible, when present, are always placed first. The order
of references enables the user of the Syntopicon either to follow the dis-
cussion of some theme through the great books in the historical sequence,
or to select particular authors or the authors of a particular period, accord-
standing of earlier ones, on which they are based or with which they take
issue.
the reader, almost at a glance, to follow any one of a wide variety of pro-
cedures.
A brief explanatory note, repeated at the beginning of every Reference
section, gives the minimum necessary directions for going from the refer-
ences to the passages to which they refer. For the sake of brevity, it offers
only such information as is uniform for all of the works cited. If the
reader wishes complete information concerning the way in which each
particular work is cited, he will find this set forth, by authors and titles, in
the Explanation of Reference Style, which immediately follows this Pref-
ace (see pg. xxxiii) and is also printed, for the reader's convenience, at the
section and gives examples of the usual typographical form of the refer-
ences.
Only one further point requires comment here. In some chapters, a few
topics contain no references. These topics serve in the Outline as headings
for other topics grouped analytically under them. The user of the Syn-
topicon who wants to know what the great books have to say on a partic-
ular subject, and finds that subject represented by a topic without reference
PREFACE xvfl
the subject of the topic in a given chapter to which topics in other chapters
are related or similar.
The phrasing of the Cross-References enables the reader to determine
whether the topics in the other chapters mentioned are similar or related
to the topic in this chapter. The related topics will usually offer a quite
different set of references.
The user of the Syntopicon will find that topics in different chapters
often resemble one another, both in their phrasing and in the references
set forth under them. In a few cases they are identical or almost identical.
But similar topics will usually differ in their reference content because the
meaning of a topic is partly determined by the idea under which it falls,
and by the surrounding topics which form its context. Hence, in most
cases, the reader who turns to similar topics in other chapters will find
some proportion of different references.
Boofa of the Western World; and second, works by other authors. Each
group is listed chronologically. Whenever they are available, translations
always indicated by the use of English titles; these are usually accom-
The 102 lists of Additional Readings, each constructed for the idea and
topics of a particular chapter, contain in all 2603 titles by 1181 authors. For
the convenience of the reader, the authors and titles in the 102 separate
lists of Additional Readings are compiled into a single list in the Bibliog-
alphabetical order and the works of each author are listed alphabetically
under name. In addition, the Bibliography provides useful information
his
concerning authors and works, such as birth and death dates of authors,
date and place of writing or publication, names of editors or translators,
names of publishers, and names of standard collections in which individual
works appear. A note, preceding the Bibliography, explains the principles
of its construction.
inquiry. It does so by citing, for each term listed, the topics in which that
PREFACE xix
term is a principal element. It cites these by giving the name of the chapter
in which the topic appears, and the number of the topic in that chapter.
The reader can find the topic in which he is interested by looking in the
Inventory for the term or terms that would appear in a statement of the
subject.
The user of the Syntopicon may have a broader interest than can be ex-
important concepts as well. Since the Inventory of Terms cites all the top-
ics in which each term is significantly involved, it enables the reader to
investigate the whole range of the discussion in the great books relevant to
that term.
Among the terms listed in the Inventory are the names of the 102
The
1800 terms in the Inventory are listed alphabetically, and for each
term the relevant topics are
cited in the alphabetical order of the chapters
in which the topics occur. Sometimes the topics are divided into two
But, finding a number of topics cited there, he must choose among them.
There are two ways for him to proceed: (i) he can examine the topics
one after another, until he finds the one which satisfies him as a state-
ment of the subject; or (2) he can use the names of the chapters in which
the topics occur as a clue to finding the topic which states the subject of
xx THE GREAT IDEAS
his inquiry. Since the content of particular topics is
largely determined by
the idea under which they fall, the chapter names will quite frequently
explained elsewhere (see Appendix II, Section I); but here it should be
said that it does not represent a judgment by the editors that the 102 terms
selected by them are the only concepts or ideas which have notable sig-
nificance in the tradition of western thought. The Inventory of Terms
manifests exactly the opposite judgment. Its 1800 words or phrases express
probably not before. The editors decided to make the essay on the Syn-
topicon's construction an appendix to the work, rather than burden the
Preface with an account of the methods employed and an exposition of
PREFACE xxi
the principles adopted. While freeing the Preface from the burden of
fuller explanations, they neverthelesshoped to provide systematic an-
swers to questions which might arise in the reader's mind as a result of
as an instrument of
liberal education, through the aid it can give to a cer-
topicon, and their function in the structure of the whole, includes some
indication of how it
may be used as a reference book. Here we are con-
cerned with general character as a reference work, as evidenced by the
its
signed to help the reader who comes to them with inquiries on particular
subjects. If, in addition to answering the questions he brings, they raise
further questions in his mind and excite him to further inquiries, which,
in turn, they are able to satisfy, they are more than answer-books. They are
ommended by these references that the person who consults the Syntopi-
con finds the answer to his question, What do the great books have to say
on this subject ?
variety of the inquiries the Syntopicon is able to satisfy, can be seen only
The references which constitute this guide do not tell the reader what the
great books have to say on a particular subject. They only tell him where
to read in the great books in order to discover for himself the thought
and opinion, the imagination and emotion, in which the authors of these
books have expressed their minds on this or that particular subject. For
this reason it was said earlier in this Preface that only when it is taken to-
gether with the great books themselves, does the Syntopicon create a ref-
erence library in the sphere of thought and opinion.
While this is true for the primary type of question which the Syntopi-
con designed to answer through its system of references to the great
is
books, it is not true, at least not to the same extent, for the subordinate
The question, What themes have been discussed in the tradition of west-
ern thought under this idea? is answered in the first instance by the Out-
line of Topics in the chapter on each of the great ideas. If the reader be-
comes interested in the actual content of the discussion under one or more
of these topics, he will then be asking the primary sort of question, to
which the references, assembled under these topics, provide the beginning
of an answer, and the great books the fullness of it.
The question, To which of the other great ideas is this idea related and
how is it related? is answered by the Cross-References in the chapter on
each of the great ideas. The Cross-References enumerate the topics in
other chapters which are related to the topics covered by the idea in ques-
tion. The introductory essay on the idea also usually contains references
to other Introductions in which related ideas are considered.
By reading
the Introduction and examining the Cross-References, a person can use the
Syntopicon to discover, at least initially, the connections between one great
idea and others.
The question, What boo\s other than those published in this set contain
important discussions of this idea? is answered, to some extent, by the
Additional Readings listed in the chapter on each of the great ideas.
The question, What
the history of the idea, its various meanings, and
is
by the Introduction to the chapter on each of the great ideas. Here as be-
fore, if the reader's interest is aroused to further inquiry, the topics, the
references under them, the passages in the great books referred to, and the
books listed in the Additional Readings, provide the means for a fuller ex-
With respect to its 102 essays on the great ideas, the Syntopicon is first
of all a book to be read. These essays are arranged in the alphabetical or-
der of the ideas, but they need not be read in that order. Each is intended
to be intelligible in itself, independently of the others.
The reader can therefore begin according to his interests with any one of
the Introductions to the great ideas. No matter where he begins, he will
find that the reading of no other Introduction is
presupposed. But he will
also find that each Introduction traces some of the connections between
the particular idea which it treats and other great ideas.
xxiv THE GREAT IDEAS
With whatever idea he begins, the introductory essay will at least sug-
gest other ideas as subjects of related interest. These in turn will turn his
attention to, and may arouse his interest in, still others. Since each of the
tegral parts of the Syntopicon, the Introductions to the great ideas are not
intended to satisfy the reader's interest, but rather to arouse it, and then
direct it to the great books. The name "Introduction" specifies the func-
tion these essays were designed to perform. When they function effective-
ly as introductions to the Outlines of Topics and the References, they im-
plement the use of the Syntopicon, not simply as a reference book, but as
an instrument of liberal education.
Neither of these two types of reading can ever be a substitute for the
other, nor can either be taken as sufficient in itself. On the contrary, each
isincomplete without the other. Those who begin by reading in the great
books and reading them syntopically must eventually read at least some
of them Those who have already read some of the great books
integrally.
topicon functions differently and the syntopical reading of the great books
serves a different purpose.
FOR THE BEGINNING READER in the extreme person who has read
case, a
none of the great books a syntopical reading, done in accordance with
the references under even a few topics, works in three ways: initiatively,
It assumes only that every educable mind has some interest in one or more
of the themes, problems, or ideas on which the great books touch.
A syntopical reading may also work suggestively. Starting from a read-
er's existing interest in a particular topic, it
may arouse or create an interest
in other topics related to those which
reading in the great
initiated his
topic may also impel the reader to look beyond the passages cited. Except
xxvi THE GREAT IDEAS
when they cite whole works, the references passages which neces-
cite
sarily exist in a context, ultimately the context of the whole book. Few of
these passages are absolutely self-contained. For few of them can it be said
that it will be finally satisfactory to read them without looking further
into the author's thought. Hence, proceeding along the natural lines of
his own interests, the be led from reading small parts of cer-
reader may
tain books to reading larger parts and, eventually, to reading whole books.
If this process is repeated, each syntopical reading may occasion and stimu-
late a more and more extensive integral reading of the great books.
be found cited under two or more topics will have its instructive effect.
As relevant to distinct topics, the passage must have an amplitude of
meaning which the reader will come to perceive when he interprets it
somewhat differently in relation to different topics. Such multiple inter-
-PREFACE xxvii
pretation not only is a basic exercise in the art of reading, but also tends
to make the mind habitually alert to the many strains of meaning which
any rich or complex passage can contain.
In this description of the ways in which a syntopical reading instructs in
the art of reading the great books, we have emphasized only the influence
of the topic under which the reading is done and the effect of reading one
IF WE TURN NOW FROM THE BEGINNING READER to the more mature student
or scholar in the extreme case, a person who has read through many, if
not all, of the great books we shall see that a syntopical reading works
in a different way. It no longer need function initiatively or suggestively;
nor, for the competent reader, need it serve instructively, to develop skill
in the art of reading. But it does provide the occasion and the materials
for a more intensive and
reading of passages already read; and it
critical
book can be read through many times without the attainment of such
complete mastery that the reader knows the relevance of every passage in
it to every theme it touches. On the contrary, the integral reading of a
great book, even when done more than once, seldom reveals even a large
part of its meaning. Only the most intensive scholarly study of a particu-
lar book or author ever arrives at such mastery.
Short of that, reading a great book through one or more times will in-
read with that particular subject in mind will these passages, hitherto
unobserved, be found.
xxviii THE GREAT IDEAS
The truth of this can be verified by accomplished readers of the great
books if they will examine, under particular topics, passages from books
they have already read or even studied to some extent. Unless their previ-
ous reading of the books was done in the light of the particular intellec-
tual interest represented by this topic, they are likely to find some passages
that they never saw before, or at least never fully recognized as having
the significance they take on when read syntopically in the light of this
topic and in relation to other works and passages relevant to the same
theme.
The Syntopicon can thus serve those who have already done, to a greater
or less extent,an integral reading of the great books. The method of syn-
topical reading not only provides a different and rewarding way of read-
ing them, but also carries the study of them to deeper and deeper levels of
understanding. overcomes the defects of the ordinary integral reading
It
makes possible the close study of each work in relation to all the problems
or issues on which it bears.
other books which bear upon the problem more or less directly.
It does not seem an exaggeration to say that a person who has done all
think independently about it, because he knows what thinking has been
done. For the scholar, already advanced in his research on a given problem,
it may still be possible for the Syntopicon to serve some good purpose as
a reminder or a check; it
may even uncover a neglected passage, or throw
new light upon one by placing it in the context of other passages.
WHAT HAS JUST BEEN SAID about the studious or scholarly use of the Syn-
topicon suggests how it may serve as an instrument in teaching the great
books, or in using them as teaching materials. For the most part, the great
books enter the curricula of schools and colleges engaged in liberal
textbooks.
suggests some, if not all, of the topics which deserve to be studied, and
some, if not all, of the works which deserve to be read in whole or part
It thus provides a set of materials organized so as to be adaptable to the
method and interest of the individual teacher. For example, at one ex-
treme, the teacher can use the Syntopicon merely as a guide to supplemen-
tary reading; at the other extreme, he c&n ^se it to construct his own set
What has already been said about the use of the Syntopicon by the s
ous student, or even the advanced scholar, in the sphere of a partici
problem or subject matter, obviously covers part of the Syntopicon's uti
as an instrument of research or discovery. But there are three special ty
of inquiry for the pursuit of which the Syntopicon seems to be especi;
adapted.
The first the study of the history of ideas. The chapter
of these is
each of the 102 great ideas presents the record of thought in the fonr
references to the great books, organized under each topic. Since the
erences are arranged in the order in which the authors and works app
in the set of great books, and since, with few exceptions, this is a stri<
lar period rather than a particular author. Within this limitation, the i
torical interest may extend to all the great and near-great minds v
formed the thought of this period, as well as to all the ideas with wh
they dealt. So far as the formative minds of the particular period are re{
sented by authors of the great books and by other authors cited in
Additional Readings, the Synt^ijpon can assist such research. Instead
using its references vertically, t&m one end of the tradition to the otl
as would the student of the history of aa idea, the student of an epoch
tion; he would examine the materials referred to under every idea or topic
which appeared to have been considered by the minds of that period.
In these three types of historical inquiry, the Syntopicon is at best an
auxiliary instrument in the service of scholarship. If it proves to be more
than that for the ordinary student, it will probably be less than that for
the accomplished scholar whose documentary resources in a particular
field are more extensive than those from which the Syntopicon is con-
parts:
I, General Typographical Style
II. Style of Bible References
III. Punctuation, Symbols, Abbreviations
IV. Table of Authors, Titles, and Author's Divisions Cited
above the examples call attention to the five elements commonly present
in the construction of the references.
xxxiii
xxxiv THE GREAT IDEAS
part, section, chapter, paragraph, line number. The phrase "author's divi-
sions" does not necessarily mean divisions made by the author; they
may have been made by an editor of his work.
Author's divisions are given only for some works, according as, in the
example, do not.
For some works, author's divisions are completely given, as for Locke.
For other works, only the most important or largest divisions are given.
Thus for Rabelais only the book but not the chapter is given.
Line numbers, in brackets, are given for all works of poetry, including
those published in prose translations. For Goethe's Faust, the line num-
bers cited refer to the lines of the English translation as well as to the lines
of the original German. For other poetical works in translation the
works of Homer, the Greek dramatists, Lucretius, Virgil, and Dante the
line numbers cited refer to the lines of the works in their original lan-
guages; for these works, the line numbers printed on the pages of this
edition furnish only an approximate indication of the location of the
equivalent lines in the English translation. For all poetical works written
in English, the line numbers are the numbers of the English lines. In the
In references to the works of Aristotle (in Volumes 8 and 9), the figures
and letters enclosed in the brackets signify the page, column, and approxi-
mate line in the Berlin edition of the Greek text edited by Immanuel
Bekker. In references to the American State Papers (in Volume 43),
REFERENCE STYLE xxxv
the bracketed line numbers refer to the lines on the pages of this
edition only.
umns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand column, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the
right-hand column. These half and quarter page sections are based on
divisions of a full text page.
Page sections give the page numbers and locate the sections of the page
in which the passage referred to begins and ends. For example, in the
reference:
the passage cited begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the
lower half of page 119. In the reference:
the passage cited begins in the lower half of the left-hand column of page
163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand column of page 164.
In references to works printed in two columns, the format of the page
xxxvi THE GREAT IDEAS
sometimes places continuous reading matter in the a and c sections of the
upper half of the page, or in the b and d sections of the lower half of the
page. This occurs when a work or an author's division begins in the lower,
or ends in the upper, half of the two-column page. Where continuous read-
means that the work cited begins in the lower half of page 64 and ends in
the upper half of page 77.
Footnotes or notes are sometimes specifically cited by themselves in the
references, in which case the page sections given correspond to their loca-
tion on the pages referred to. When a footnote or a note is not specifically
cited, the page sections given mark the beginning and the end of the text
referred to. The reader is expected to consult the footnotes or notes indi-
cated in the body of that text.
Chaucer's works (in Volume 22) are printed in two columns; the inside
column of each page contains the Middle English text, the outside column
a Modern English version. Since both columns contain equivalent pas-
sages, the references to this volume employ page sections (a and b) which
divide each page only into an upper and a lower half.
verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by
a (D), follows. For example:
numbers; and a comma separates the numbers of verses in the same chap-
ter. For example:
OLD TESTAMENT :
Genesis, 1:12-14; 9:1-11
only a part of the whole work or of the author's division indicated. For
example, in the references:
14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 36a-b; 44d-45c
the passages from Plutarch are only a part of Lycurgus, and the passage
from Swift is only a few pages from Part II of Gulliver's Travels.
When the title of a work, or an author's division of a work, is not
separated by a comma from the page sections which follow, the reference
is to the whole work or to the whole of the indicated author's division.
(2) Symbols
esp: The abbreviation "esp" precedes one or more especially relevant
passages which are contained within the page boundaries of a larger pas-
(3) Abbreviations
appearance.
In the references, the name of the author is
frequently given in short-
ened form. In this table, their full names are given, followed by their life
dates when these are ascertainable. Because some volumes contain the
works of two or more authors who may be separated by centuries, the
order in which the authors are cited in the references sometimes departs
from the strict chronological order. The life dates help the reader to place
The table also includes a notation of the author's divisions that are used
A dash in the column headed "Author's Divisions Cite,d" means that references
to the work or works in question cite page sections only. Where the author's divisions
cited are the same for several titles, they are named only once, either opposite the set
of titles as a whole, or opposite the last title in the group.
Titles m
brackets are collective titles which appear on the title page of the work,
but do not appear in the references. The names of the authors of The Federalist (in
Volume 43) are bracketed because they do not appear in the references.
HOMER
The Iliad The Odyssey BOOK, Line
Ajax
Rhesus Electra
Hippolytus Hecuba
Alcestis Heracles Mad
Heracleidae The Phoenician Maidens
The Suppliants Orestes
Charmides Phaedo
Lysis Gorgias
Laches The Republic
Protagoras Timaeus
Euthydemus Crittas
Cratylus Parmenides
Phaedrus Theaetetus
Ion Sophist
Symposium Statesman
Meno Philebus
Euthyphro Laws
Apology The Seventh Letter
except Republic
Crito and Laws, BOOK
REFERENCE STYLE xli
Categories
CHAPTER, Line
Interpretation On Interpretation
Prior Analytics
Topics
9 ARISTOTLE
History of Animals
BOOK, CHAPTER,
Partsof Animals On the Parts of Animals
Motion of Animals On the Motion of Animals
CHAPTER, Line
Gait of Animals On the Gait of Animals
Generation of Animals On the Generation of Animals
Ethics Nicomachean Ethics BOOK, CHAPTER, Line
Politics
10 HIPPOCRATES (continued)
11 EUCLID (ft.
c. 300 B.C.)
Sphere and Cylinder On the Sphere and Cylinder, BOOK, DEFINITION, ASSUMPTION,
Books HI PROPOSITION, COROLLARY, LEMMA
Measurement of a Circle PROPOSITION
Conoids and Spheroids On Conoids and Spheroids DEFINITION, LEMMA, PROPOSITION
Lycurgus Nicias
Numa Pompihus Crassus
Poplicola Eumenes
Poplicola- Solon Pophcola and Eumenes-Sertorius Eumenes and
Solon Compared Sertonus Compared
Themistocles Agesilaus
Camtllus Pompey
Pericles Agesilaus-Pompey Agesilaus and
Fabius Pompey Compared
Fabius-Periclcs Fabius and Alexander
Pericles Compared Caesar
Alcibiades Phocion
Conolanus Cato the Younger
Alcibiades -Coriolanus Alcibiades Agis
and Conolanus Compared Cleomenes
Timokon Tiberius Gracchus
Lysander Galba
Sulla Otho
Lysander-Sutta Lysander and
Sulla Compared
xliv THE GREAT IDEAS
The Almagest
17 PLOTINUS (205-270)
First-Sixth Ennead- -The Stx Enneads TRACTATE, CHAPTER
27 SHAKESPEARE, WILLIAM
Othello Othello, the Moor of Venice Henry VIII The Famous History
II Penseroso Younger
Arcades Mr. Cyriac\ Stynner To Mr. Cyriacf(
Areopagitica
Demonstration
Triangle
41 GIBBON, EDWARD
Decline and Fall The Decline and Fall of the
Roman Empire (continued), Chapters 41-71
REFERENCE STYLE xlix
Liberty On Liberty
Representative Government
Utilitarianism
Relation to Sex
Capital
)
The Origin and Development of Repression
INTRODUCTION
by a long tradition of reli- of its existence; and, so considered, it functions
INFLUENCED
gious symbolism in painting and poetry, our as an hypothesis in political and economic
imagination responds to the word "angel" by thought. Whatsort of being an angel would be
if one existed can likewise serve as an hypothe-
picturing a winged figure robed in dazzling
white and having the bodily aspect of a human sis in the examination of a wide
variety of
being. theoretical problems.
This image, common to believers and unbe- The idea of angels does in fact serve in pre-
lievers, contains features which represent some cisely this way as an analytical tool. It
sharpens
of the elements of meaning in the abstract con- our understanding of what man is, how his mind
ception of angels as this is found in the writings operates, what the soul is, what manner of ex-
of Jewish and Christian theologians and in re- istence and action anything would have apart
lated discussions by the philosophers. The hu- from matter. Hence it
suggests how matter and
man appearance suggests that angels, like men, its motions in time and space determine the
are persons; that they are most essentially char- characteristics of corporeal existence. Pascal's
acterized by their intelligence. The wings sug- remark that "man is neither angel nor brute,
and the unfortunate thing is that he who would
gest the function of angels their service as
messengers from God to man. The aura of light act the angel acts the brute" points to the
which surrounds them signifies, according to different conceptions of man which result from
established conventions of symbolism, the spir- supposing him to be either angel or brute rather
ituality of angels. It suggests that to imagine than neither. Such views of human nature, con-
angels with bodies is to use a pictorial metaphor. sidered in the chapters on ANIMAL and MAN,
Another interpretation might be put upon cannot be fully explored without reference to
this aura of light if one considers the role which theories of the human mind or soul in its rela-
the notion of angel has played in the history of tion to matter and to body. As the chapters on
thought. Wherever that notion has entered in- MIND and SOUL indicate, theories carrying the
to discussions of God and man, of matter, names of Plato and Descartes, which attribute
mind, and soul, of knowledge and love, and to the human mind or soul the being and pow-
even of time, space, and motion, it has cast ers of a purely spiritual substance or entity,
light upon these other topics. The illumination seem to place man in the company of the angels.
which has been and can be derived from the In this tradition Locke applies the word "spir-
idea of angels as a special kind of being or nature its" equally to human minds and to supra-
isin no way affected by doubts or denials of human intelligences.
their existence.
Whether such beings exist or not, the fact IT WOULD BE misleading to suppose that the
that they are conceivable has significance for idea of angels is
primarily a construction of the
theory and analysis. Those who do not believe philosophers a fiction invented for their ana-
in the existence or even the possible exist- lytical purposes; or that itis
simply their con-
enceof Utopias nevertheless regard them as ception of a supra-mundane reality, concerning
fictions useful analytically in appraising ac- the existence and nature of which they dispute.
cepted realities. What an ideal society would be In the literature of western civilization, angels
like can be considered apart from the question first appear by name or reference in the Old
THE GREAT IDEAS
and the New Testaments. Readers of the Bible Old Testament, which the Church of England
will remember many scenes in which an angel holdeth for Canonical, from which we can con-
of the Lord performs the mission of acquainting clude, there is, or hath been created, any per-
man with God'j> will. Among the most memor- manent thing (understood by the name o[ Spirit
able of such occasions are the visits of the angels or Angel) that hath not quantity and, in . . .
to Abraham and Lot and the angelic ministry sum, which is not (taking Body for that which
of Gabriel in the Annunciation to Mary. issomewhat or somewhere) Corporeal."
In one book of the Bible, Tobias (Tobit, as All the passages can be interpreted, Hobbes
it is called in the King James Apocrypha), one thinks, simply in the sense in which "angel"
of the leading characters is the angel Raph- means "messenger" and "most often, a messen-
ael. Through most of the story he appears as ger of God," which signifies "anything thai
a man, but at the end, after he has accomplished makes known his extra-ordinary presence." If,
his mission, he reveals his identity. "I am the instead of existing only when they carry God's
angel Raphael," he declares, word to men, the angels are supposed to have
one of the seven, who stand before the Lord. permanent being, then they must be corporeal.
And when they had heard these things they were As "in the resurrection men shall be permanent
troubled; and being seized with fear they fell upon and not incorporeal," Hobbes writes, "so there-
the ground on their face.
fore also are the angels ... To men that under-
And the angel said to them. Peace be to you.
stand the signification of these words, substance
Fear not.
For when I was with you, I was there by the will and incorporeal"'and mean by "incorporeal"
of God: bless ye him and sing praises to him. having no body at all, not just a subtle body
I seemed to eat and to drink with you; but I use
the words taken together "imply a contradic-
an invisible meat and drink, which cannot be seen
tion." Hence Hobbes argues that to say "an
by men.
It is time therefore that I return to him that sent angel, or spirit, is (in that sense) an incorporeal
me. ... substance, is to say in effect that there is no
And when he had said these things, he was taken
angel or spirit at all.
Considering therefore the
and they could see him no more.
from their sight; word angel m the Old Testa-
signification of the
As A RESULT of scriptural exegesis and commen- ment, and the nature of dreams and visions that
tary, the angels become a fundamental topic
for
happen to men by the ordinary way of nature,"
Jewish theologians from Philo to Maimomdes, Hobbes concludes that the angels are "nothing
and for such Christian theologians as Augustine, but supernatural apparitions of the fancy, raised
Scotus Engena, Gregory the Great, Aquinas, by the special and extraordinary operation of
Luther, Calvin, Pascal, and Schleiermacher. God, thereby to make his presence and com-
They figure in the great poetry of the Judaeo- mandments known to mankind, and chiefly to
Christian tradition in the Divine Comedy of his own people."
Dante, in Paradise Lost of Milton, and in Locke seems to take the exactly opposite po-
Chaucer's Canterbury Tales and Goethe's Faust. sition. Asserting that we have "no clear or
The philosophers, especially in the iyth and distinct idea of substance in general," he does
1 8th centuries, are motivated by Scripture or not think spirits any less intelligible than bodies.
provoked by theology to consider the existence, "The idea of corporeal substance" he writes, "is
the nature, and the activity of angels. Hobbes, as remote from our conceptions and apprehen-
for example, attacks the supposition that angels sions, as thatof spiritual substance or spirit; and
arc immaterial on the ground that the notion therefore, from our not having any notion of
of incorporeal substance is self-contradictory, the substance of spirit, we can no more con-
and undertakes to re-interpret all the scriptural clude its non-existence, than we can, for the
passages in which angels are described as spirits. same deny the existence of body." Just
reason,
After examining a great many, he says that "to as we form the complex idea of bodies by sup-
mention all the places of the Old Testament posing their qualities, such as figure and motion,
where the name of Angel is found, would be or color and weight, to co-exist in some sub-
too long. Therefore to comprehend them all at stratum; so by supposing the activities we find
once, I say, there is no text in that part of the in ourselves such as "thinking, understanding,
CHAPTER 1: ANGEL
willing,knowing, and the power of beginning (the bestower and creator of forms), and pet>
motion, etc." -to co-exist in some substance, haps for angels or intelligences at once to recog-
"we are able to frame the complex idea of an nize forms affirmatively at the first glance of
immaterial spirit" contemplation."
Not only does Locke think that "we have as
clear a perception and notion of immaterial sub- UNLIKE Most of the great ideas with which
stances as we have of material," but he also we are concerned, the idea of angel seems to be
finds the traditional doctrine of a hierarchy of limited in its historical scope. It is not
merely
angels quite acceptable to reason. "It is not im- that since the i8th century the discussion has
possible to conceive, nor repugnant to reason, dwindled, but also that the idea makes no ap-
that there may be many species of spirits, as pearance in the great books of pagan antiquity
much separated and diversified one from an- certainly not in the strict sense of the term,
other by distinct properties whereof we have whereby "angel" signifies a creature of God,
no ideas, as the species of sensible things are dis- spiritual in substance and nature, and playing
tinguished one from another by qualities which a role in the divine government of the universe.
we know and observe in them." There are, nevertheless, analogous concep-
Locke goes even further beyond the mere tions in the religion and philosophy of the an-
possibility of angels to the likelihood of their cients;and in philosophy at least, the points of
His reasoning resembles the
real existence. tra- resemblance between the analogous concepts
ditional argument of the theologians on this dif- are sufficiently strong to establish a continuity
ficult point. "When we consider the infinite of discussion. Furthermore, elements in the
power and wisdom of the Maker," he writes, thought of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus exer-
"we have reason to think that it is suitable to cise a critical influence on Judaeo-Christian
the magnificent harmony of the Universe, and angelology.
the great design and infinite goodness of the Gibbon relates how the early Christians made
Architect, that the species of creatures should the connection between the gods of polytheism
also, by gentle degrees, ascend upward from us and their doctrine about angels. "It was the
toward his infinite perfection, as we see they universal sentiment both of the church and of
gradually descend from us downwards." heretics," he writes, "that the daemons were
Such speculations concerning the existence the authors, the patrons, and the objects of
and the order of angels are usually thought to idolatry. Those rebellious spirits who had been
be the province of the theologian rather than degraded from the rank of angels, and cast
the philosopher. But Bacon, like Locke, does down into the infernal pit, were still permitted
not think it unfitting for the philosopher to in- to roam upon the earth, to torment the bodies
quire into such matters. In natural theology and to seduce the minds of sinful men. The
for him a part of philosophyBacon thinks it is daemons soon discovered and abused the nat-
improper "from the contemplation of nature, ural propensity of the human heart towards
and the principles of human reason, to dispute devotion, and, artfully withdrawing the adora-
or urge anything with vehemence as to the tion of mankind from their Creator, they
mysteries of faith." But "it is otherwise," he usurped the place and honors of the Supreme
declares, "as to the nature of spirits and angels; Deity."
thisbeing neither unsearchable nor forbid, but In the polytheistic religions of antiquity, the
in a great part level to the human mind on demi-gods or inferior deities are beings supe-
account of their affinity." rior in nature and power to man. "The poly-
He does not further instruct us concerning theistand the philosopher, the Greek and the
1
angels in the Advancement of Learning, but in barbarian," writes Gibbon, "were alike accus-
the Novum Organum he throws light on their tomed to conceive a long succession, an infinite
nature as well as ours by touching on one char- chain of angels, or daemons, or deities, or aeons,
acteristic difference between the human and or emanations, issuing from the throne of light."
the angelic mind. Discussing there the theory of In Plato's Symposium, for example, Diotima
THE GREAT IDEAS
twecn the divine and the mortal . . . and inter- arc they an order of knowers as well as a realm
prets between gods and men, conveying and of knowables? Can they be regarded as sub-
taking across to the gods the prayers and sacri- stances ? And do they have a mode of ac-
if so,
fices of men, and to men the commands and re- tion appropriate to their mode of being action
pliesof the gods; he is the mediator who spans which is other than knowing, action which in
the chasm which divides them." Love, Diotima some way impinges on the course of events or
explains,is
only one of "these spirits and inter- the motions of the physical world ?
mediate powers*' which "are many and diverse." Plotinus answers affirmatively that the pure-
Such demi-gods are intermediate by their ly intelligible beings are also pure intelligences,
very nature. Although superhuman in knowl- but he does not conceive them as having any
edge and action, they still are not completely power or action except that of knowledge. An-
divine. Occupying a place between men and other answer to these questions given in antiq-
They are links in what has come to be called writes, "that besides the simple spatial move-
"the great chain of being." ment of the universe, which we
say that the
The analogy with the angels arises primarily first and unmovable substance produces, there
from of hierarchy. Both pagan and
this fact are other spatial movements those of the
Christian religions believe in an order of super- planets which are eternal (for a body which
superhuman beings graded in
natural or at least moves in a circle moves eternally), each of these
perfection and power. In both, these beings movements also must be caused by a substance,
serve as messengers from the gods to men; they both unmovable in itself and eternal." These
act sometimes as guardians or protectors, some- secondary movers, Aristotle thinks, are "of the
times as traducers, deceivers, and enemies of same number as the movements ol the stars,"
man. But the analogy cannot be carried much and not only must they be eternal and unmov-
further than this. The angels, according to able, as is the prime mover, but also "without
Christian teaching, arc not inferior gods, or magnitude" or immaterial.
even demi-gods. As compared with the "inter- Plato offers an alternative hypothesis that
mediate spirits" of pagan religion, they are less the celestial bodies are alive and have souls.
human in character, as well as less divine. This hypothesis, like Aristotle's, tends in the
Nevertheless, the reader of the great poems of Middle Ages to be restated in terms of the
antiquity will find a striking parallelism be- theory of angels. Aquinas reports Augustine as
tween the heavenly insurrection which under- thinking that "if the heavenly bodies are really
lies the action of Prometheus Bound and the living beings, their souls must be akin to the
angelic warfare in Paradise Lost. angelic nature." He himself holds that "spirit-
ual substances are united to them as movers to
IN THE WRITINGS of Plato, Aristotle, and Ploti- things moved," the proof of which, he says,
nus, philosophical inquiry turns from the sensi- "lies in the fact that whereas nature moves to
ble world of material things to consider the ex- one fixed end, in which having attained it, it
istence and nature of an order of purely intelli- rests; this does not appear in the movement of
gible beings. As there is an inherent connection the heavenly bodies. Hence it follows that they
between being perceptible to the senses and be- aremoved by some intellectual substances."
ing material, so that which is purely intelligible The question whether intelligences govern
must be completely immaterial. If ideas exist the planets also occupies the attention of an
independently in their own right and apart astronomer like Kepler. Although he denies
from knowing or thinking minds then they any need for such intelligences among other
constitute such an order of purely intelligible reasons because planetary motion is not circular
entities, but elliptical he argues that the celestial
At this point a number of difficult questions movements are the work either "of the natural
arise. Are the intelligibles also intelligences, *>., power of the bodies, or else a work of the soul
CHAPTER 1: ANGEL
acting uniformly in accordance with those bod- sweetness of that most happy contemplation of
ily powers." But whether or not they are to be Thyself. cleaving dose unto Thee, placed be-
. .
regarded as movers* as well as knotvers and know- yond the rolling vicissitudes of times." It is
all
ablest the intelligences represent for ancient and for this reason that the angels are spoken of as
by the theological doctrine of angels which de- erally significant issues concerning the nature of
veloped in mediaeval thought. space and quantity, and their relation to causal-
The extent of this doctrine may be judged ity. He points out that a body occupies place in
from the fact that the Summa Theologica of a circumscribed fashion, />., its dimensive
Aquinas contains a whole treatise on the angels, quantity is contained within the space; whereas
as well as additional questions on the speech of "an angel is said to be in a corporeal place by
angels, their hierarchies and orders, the division application of the angelic power in any manner
between the good and the bad angels, and whatever to the place. ... An incorporeal sub-
their action on men the guardianship of the stance virtually contains the thing with which it
good angels and the assaults of the demons. comes into contact, and is not contained by it."
That these additional questions are contained To an objector who thinks that since, unlike
in the treatise on divine government throws bodies, angels do not fill a place, several can be
some light on their theological significance. in the same place at the same time, Aquinas re-
The primary fact about the angelic nature is plies that two angels cannot be in the same
immateriality. An angel is immaterial both in place because "it is impossible for two complete
its substantial being and in its characteristic ac- causes to be immediately the cause of one and
tivity which, says Aquinas, is "an altogether the same thing." Since an angel is where he
immaterial mode of operation." Being imma- acts,and since by the power of his action he
terial, they are also incorruptible. "Nothing is contains the place at which he acts, "there can-
corrupted except by its form being separated not be but one angel at one place."
from the matter . Consequently," Aquinas
. .
Angels are also said to go from one place to
writes, "a subject composed of matter and form another without traversing the intervening
ceases to be actually when the form is separated space and without the lapse of time. Consider-
from the matter. But if the form subsists in its ing their immateriality, such action is less re-
own being, as happens in the angels, it cannot markable for angels to perform than is the ac-
lose its being." To signify that they are intelli- tion of electrons, which, according to modern
gences existing apart from matter, the angels quantum mechanics, jump from outer to inner
are sometimes called "subsisting forms" and orbits of the atom without taking time or pas-
sometimes "separate substances." sing through inter-orbital space.
Although they are imperishable in being and The immateriality of angels has other conse-
have immortal life, the angels are not, like God, quences which throw comparative light on the
truly eternal. "That heaven of heavens which conditions of corporeal existence. In the world
Thou crcatedst in the beginning is some intellec- of physical things we ordinarily think of a
tual creature," Augustine writes, but it is in species as including a number of individuals.
"no ways cocternal unto Thee." As created, the While all men have the same specific nature,
angels have a beginning. Yet, while not eternal, they differ numerically or individually. But be-
neither are they temporal creatures in contin- cause angels are immaterial substances, it is
ual flux, but, according to Augustine, they held that each angel is a distinct species.
THE GREAT IDEAS
number," Aquinas explains, "agree in form but as they are exalted to see. Those other loves,
are distinguished materially. If, therefore, the which go around them, are called Thrones of
angels are not composed of matter and form . . . the divine aspect, because they terminated the
. The next
it follows that it is
impossible for two angels to first triad.. .
triad, that in like man-
be of one species." ner bourgeons in this sempiternal spring which
Furthermore, as Aquinas states in another the nightly Aries despoils not, perpetually sing
place,among "incorporeal substances there can- Hosannah with three melodies, which sound in
not be diversity of number without diversity the three orders of joy ... first Dominations,
of species and inequality of nature." Each and then Virtues; the third order is of Powers.
species is necessarily higher or lower than
an- Then in the two penultimate dances, the Prin-
other, so that the society of angels isa perfect cipalities and Archangels circle; the last is
hierarchy in which each member occupies a dis- wholly of Angelic sports. These orders all gaze
tinct rank. No two
angels are equal as, on the upward, and downward so prevail, that towards
supposition that they share in the same specific God all are drawn, and all draw."
humanity, all men are. Yet such names as "sera-
phim" and "cherubim" and the distinction be- THE THEORY of angels raises many questions
tween archangels and angels indicate an organi- regarding the similarity and difference between
zation of spiritual substances into various them and disembodied souls. But for compari-
groups according to the tradition, into nine son with men, perhaps the most striking conse-
orders or subordinate hierarchies. quences of the theory of angels as bodiless in-
The nine orders or ranks of angelic being are telligences concern the manner of their knowl-
described by Dante in the Paradtso as dis- edge and government. The comparison can be
tinct circles of love and light. Using these meta- made on quite different views of the nature of
phors he thus reports his vision of the heavenly man and the soul. In fact, diverse conceptions
hierarchy. "I saw a Point which was raying out of man or the soul can themselves be compared
light so keen that the sight on which' it blazes by reference to the angelic properties which
must needs close because of its intense bright- one conception attributes to human nature and
ness. . . .
Perhaps as near as a halo seems to another denies.
girdle the lightwhich paints it, when the vapor Lacking bodies, the angels are without sense-
that bears it is most dense, at such distance perception and imagination. Not being im-
around the Point a circle of fire was whirling so mersed in time and motion, they do not'reason
rapidly that it would have surpassed that mo- or think discursively as men do by reasoning
tion which most swiftly girds the world; and from premises to conclusion. Whereas "human
this was girt around by another, and that by intellects," according to Aquinas, "obtain their
the third, and the third then by the fourth, by perfection in the knowledge of truth by a kind
the fifth the fourth, and then by the sixth the of movement and discursive intellectual opera-
fifth. Thereon the seventh followed, so wide- tion ... as they advance from one known thing
spread now
compass that the messenger of
in to another," the angels, "from the knowledge
Juno entire would be narrow to contain it. So of a known principle .
straightway perceive
. .
the eighth and ninth." as known all its consequent conclusions with . . .
Beatrice explains to him how the relation of no discursive process at all." Their
knowledge
the circles to one another and to the Point is intuitive and immediate, not by means of
which is God depends upon their measure of concepts abstracted from experience or other-
love and whereby there is "in each
truth, wise formed, but through the archetypal ideas
heaven a marvellous agreement with its Intelli- infused inthem at their creation by God. That
gencc, of greater to more and of smaller to less." is why, Aquinas goes on to say, angels "are
She then amplifies her meaning: "The first cir- called intellectual beings" as contrasted with
cles have shown to thec the Seraphim and the such rational natures as "human souls which ac-
Cherubim. Thus swiftly they follow their own quire knowledge of truth discursively." If men
bonds, in order to liken themselves to the Point "possessed the fulness of intellectual light, like
as most they can, and they can in proportion the angels, then in the first
grasping of princi-
CHAPTER 1: ANGEL
at once the writers of The Federalist remark that "if
they would
s>les comprehend their
vhole range, by perceiving whatever could be men were angels, no government would be
easoned out from them." necessary." If they had considered that the an-
would appear from this that conceptions of
It gelic society is governed by love alone
and
he human intellect which minimize its depend- without force, they might have said, "if men
ence on sense and imagination, and which em- were angels, no coercion would be necessary in
Dhasize the intuitive rather than the discursive their government."
:haracter ofhuman thought, attribute angelic
x)wer to man. The same may be said of theories ONE OF THE GREAT theological dogmas asserts
)f human knowledge which account for its ori- that,from the beginning, the angels are divided
terms of innate ideas or implanted prin- into two hosts the good and evil spirits. The
gin in
another example of the attribution sin of Lucifer, or Satan, and his followers is that
:iples. Still
of disobedience, or rebellion against God, moti-
angelic properties to man
>f is to be found in
he supposition that human beings can commu- vated by a pride which refuses to be satisfied
ncate with one another by telepathy. The an- with being less than God. As Satan himself says,
ict of will and without any exterior means of Warring in Heav'n against Heav'ns matchless King.
rommunication. ... All his good prov'd ill in me,
And wrought but malice; lifted up so high
Lacking bodies, the angels are without bodily
I 'sdeind subjection, and thought one step higher
-motions, free from the human conflict be-
Would set me highest, and in a moment quit
ween reason and passion, and completely di-
The debt immense of endless gratitude . . .
grateful recognition of the Goodness which had "To be as God" Aquinas explains, "can be un-
nade them apt for intelligence so great, where- derstood in two ways: first, by equality; sec-
ore their vision was exalted with illuminant ondly, by likeness. An angel could not seek to
and by their merit, so that they have full be as God in the first way, because by natural
;race
ind steadfast will." Yet their vision and love of knowledge he knew that this was impossible . . .
jod is not equal. In heaven "the Primal Light And even supposing it were possible, it would
hat irradiates it all is received in it
by as many be against natural desire, because there exists in
nodes as are the splendors with which the everything the natural desire to preserve its
ove, has no need for the application of coercive It must be in the other way, then, Aquinas
orce, for angels are ordered to one another in Chinks, that Satan sinned by wishing to be like
uch a way that no misunderstandings or God. But this requires further explanation. "To
greements can occur among them. The philo-
desire to be as God according to likeness can
ophical anarchist proposes the ideal of a
whg happen in two ways. In one way, as to that
eems, therefore, to be angelicizing men, or at God. And so, if anyone desire in this way to be
sast to be wishing for heaven on earth. Con- Godlike, he commits no sin; provided that he
8 THE GREAT IDEAS
say, that he may obtain it from God. But he commanded to." If it were otherwise, the war-
would sin were he to desire to be like God even farebetween the powers of light and darkness
in the right way, but of his own power, and not would have to be construed as a battle between
of God's, In another way, he may desire to be equals, which, according to Christian ortho-
like God some respect which is not natural
in doxy, is the Manichean heresy that regards the
to one; e.g., if one were to desire to create world as the battle ground of the forces of good
heaven and earth, which is proper to God, in and evil.
which desire there would be sin." The word "angelic" usually has the connota-
In this last way, Aquinas asserts, "the devil tion of perfect moral goodness, but that must
desired to be as God. Not that he desired to not lead us to forget that the demons are an-
resemble God by being subject to no one else gelic in their nature although of a diabolical or
absolutely, for thus he would be desiring his evil will. Nor should the fact of Satan's subser-
own non-being, since no creature can exist ex- vience to God
cause us to forget that Christian
cept by participating under God." But he "de- theology tries not to underestimate the power
sired as the last end of his beatitude something of the devil in his goings and comings on earth.
which he could attain by virtue of his own na- Satan tried to tempt even Christ, and through-
ture, turning his appetite away from the super- out the New Testament the destruction of the
natural beatitude which is attained by God's diabolical influence over men occupies a promi-
grace." nent place. The intervention of the devil in
In the original sin of Lucifer and the other man's life provides, if not the theme, the back-
fallen angels, as well as in all subsequent inter- ground of Goethe's Faust.
vention by Satan or his demons in the affairs As the theory of demonic influences and dia-
of men, lie the theological mysteries of the ori- bolical possession is an integral part of the tra-
gin of evil in a world created by God's love and ditional doctrine of angels, so, in modern times,
goodness, and of the liberty of those creatures demonology has been a major focus of attack
who, while free, can only do God's will. As in- upon theological teaching concerning spirits.
dicated in the chapter on SIN, the fall of Adam Moralists have thought it
possible to explain
from grace and innocence involves the same human depravity without recourse to the se-
mysteries. Man's destiny is connected with the ductions of the devil, and psychiatrists have
career of Lucifer in traditional Christian teach- thought it possible for men to go mad or to
ing, not only on the side of sin, but also with behave as if bewitched without the help of evil
regard to man's redemption salvation replac- spirits. The idea of the devil, according to
ing the fallen angels by the souls of the elect in Freud, is a religious fiction "the best way out
the heavenly choir. in acquittal of God" for those who try "to rec-
Among the most extraordinary moments in oncile the undeniable existence . . . of evil with
our literature are those in which Lucifer talks His omnipotence and supreme goodness."
with God about mankind, as in Paradise Lost, The characteristic skepticism of our age has
or about a particular man, as in the Book of been directed against the belief in angels gener-
Job or in the Prologue in Heaven in Faust. doubt by satire or denies by argu-
ally. It casts
Their pagan parallel is the speech of Prome- ment the existence of spirits both good and evil.
theus to a silent Zeus, but Prometheus, un- Yet, arguments considered, it may be won-
all
like Satan, is man's benefactor and he can defy dered whether the existence of angels or, in
Zeus because the Fates, whose secret he philosophical terms, the existence of pure intelli-
knows, rule over the gods. Lucifer, on the gences -is or is not still a genuine issue. Or are
contrary, seems always to be in the service of there two issues here, one philosophical and the
God. When
he appears to Ivan in the Brothers other theological, one to be resolved or left un-
Karamazov, he protests, "I love men genuinely resolved on the level of argument, the other to
, . . and against the gram I serve to produce be answered dogmatically by the declarations
events and do what is irrational because I am of a religious faith?
CHAPTER 1: ANGEL
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. Inferior deities or demi-gods in polytheistic religion 10
30, The first creatures of God: their place in the order of creation
3. The angelic hierarchy: the inequality, order, and number of the angels and their
relation to one another
4. Comparison of angels with men and with disembodied souls: their relation to the
blessed in the heavenly choir
14
5. The distinction and comparison of the good and the bad angels
50. The origin of the division between angels and demons: the sin of Lucifer or
Satan 15
5& The society of the demons: the rule of Satan over the powers of darkness
6a. The ministry of the good angels in the affairs of men: guardianship
63. The intervention of the demons in the affairs of men: temptation, possession 16
70. Warfare between the powers of light and darkness: their struggle for dominion
over man
8. Criticism and satire with respect to the belief in angels and demons
10 THE GREAT IDEAS
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to For example, in 4 HOMER Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES -Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 1 16 and ends in the lower half of page 1 19. When the text is
in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
printed
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the mam divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK 11 [265-283! 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS. The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
14 PLUTARCH: Numa Pompilius, 50d-51c; 57b- 273b; Q 65, A 4, ANS 342b-343c; Q 79, A 4
58a / Coriolanus, 189a-c / Aemilius Paulus, 417a-418c; A 10, ANS 423d-424d; Q 84, A 4,
220d-221b / Pelopidas, 238a-b; 239d-240c / ANS and REP 1,3 444d-446b; Q 87, A i, ANS
268a-d / Dion, 781d-782a
Aristides, and REP 3 465a-466c; Q 88, A i, ANS 469a-
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK n, 35d-36a; BK m, 471c; Q no, A i, REP 3 564c-565d; Q 115, A i,
59d-60c / Histories, BK 11, 214d-215a; BK iv, ANS 585d-587c
293b-294a; BK v, 294d-296a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART HI SUPPL,
17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR ix, CH 9 70d-72a Q 92, A i, ANS and REP 9-10 1025c-1032b
passim / Third Ennead, TR v 100c-106b / Fourth 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, n [112-
Ennead, TR HI, CH 14 149d-150a / Fifth 123] 109a; xxvin [1-78] 148d-149c; xxix [13-
Enncad, TR vin, CH 3, 241a; CH 10 244c-245a 45] 150b-c
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK i-x 129a-322a,c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART HI, 174b-176d; PART
passim; BK xvm, CH 8-19 475d-482c; CH 21 iv, 258b-260c
A i, ANS 256a-257b; Q 50, A 3, ANS and REP 3 NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 18:10 /John, 1:51 /
272a-273b; Q 51, A 3, REP 3 277a-278c; o 52, Acts, 23:8 / Hebrews, 1-2 esp 1:1-8, 2:1-9 /
A 2 279b-280a; Q 66, A 2, ANS 345d-347b; Q 70, 1 Peter, 3:22 / Revelation, 5:11-14 (Z)) Apoc-
A 3 365b-367a; Q 76, A 6, REP 3 396a-d; Q no, alypse, 5:11-14
A i, REP 2-3 564c-565d; A 3, ANS 566d-567b; 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK xii 99b-110d; BK
Q 115, A 4, REP i 589d-590c; Q 117, A 4, REP i xin par 4 lllc / City of God, BK xi 322b,d-
t
114] 149d-150a; xxix [67-84] 151a; [127-145] APOCRYPHA: Tobit, 12:15-21 (D) OT, Tobias,
151c-d 12:15-21
14 THE GREAT IDEAS 4/o 5
A4, ANS 476c-477a; A 7, REP 2 478d-479c;
(3. The conception of angels in Judaeo-Cbristian 93, A 3 493d-494c; Q 97, A i, ANS 513c-514c;
Q
doctrine. 5g. The angelic hierarchy: the Q 108, A i, ANS 552c-553c; A 8 561a*562a;
inequality, order, and number of the angels Q 117, A 2 597c-598c; PART i-n, Q 2, A 3,
and their relation to one another.) REP i 617b-618a; Q 4, A 5, REP 6 632c-634b;
NEW TESTAMENT: Colossians, 1:16 / / Thessa- Q 5, A i, REP i 636d-637c
Ionian* , 4:16 (D) / Thessalonians, 4:15 / He- 20 AQUINAS. Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 50,
brews, 12:22-23 / Jude, 9 / Revelation, 5:11 A 6 lla-12a; Q 51, A i, ANS and REP 2 12b-13c;
(D) Apocalypse, 5:11 PART ii-n, Q 5, A 2 411b~412a; PART in, Q 6,
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK xn, par 12, 102a; A 3, REP 2 742a-743a; Q 8, A 4 759b-d; PART
par 31, 106c-d / City of God, BK vm, CH 24,
HI SUPPL, Q 69, A 3, REP 5 887d-889c; Q 70,
283b; BK xxn, CH 30, 617c A 3, CONTRARY 897d-900d; Q 89, A 3 1007d-
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 47, 1008b; A 8 1011b'1012a; Q 95, A 4 1046d-
A 2, ANS 257b-258c; Q 50, AA 3-4 272a-274b; 1047d; Q 96, A 9 1062d-1063b; Q 99, A 3
Q 63, A 7 331c-332b; A 9, REP 3 333b-d; QQ 1081d-1083a
106-109 545c-564b; PART i-n, Q 4, A 5, REP 6 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, iv [28-48]
632c-634b Ilia; vn [121-148] 116b-c; vm
[22-39] 116d-
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 8, 117a; xix [40-66] 135c-d; xxi [73-102] 139a-b;
A 4 759b-d xxix [13-36] 150b-c; xxxi 153b-154c; xxxn
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, n [112- [85-ii4]155c-d
138] 109a; xxviii 148d-l50b; xxix [127-145]
27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT n, sc n [314-322]
151c-d 43d
30 BACON Advancement of Learning, 17d
: 30 BACON Advancement of Learning, 80d-81a /
:
Ephesians, 2:1-3; 6:12 / Hebrews, 2:13-15 / Numbers, 20:16; 22:22-35 /Joshua, 5:13-15
/ John, 3:8-12 / Revelation, 2:9,13; 9:1-11; (D) Josue, 5:13-16 / Judges, 2:1-4; 6:ii-24;i3
18:2 (D) Apocalypse, 2:9,13; 9:1-11; 18:2 / II Samuel, 24:15-17 (D) II Kings, 24:15-
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xx, CH n 541a-c 17/7 Kings, i9:5-8-(D) /// Kings, 19:5-8 /
/ Christian Doctrine, BK in, CH 37, 673d-674a // Kings, i9,'32-35-(D) IV Kings, 19:32-35
19 AQUINAS:Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 63, / 1 Chronicles, 21:11-30 (D) I Paralipomcnon,
AA 8-9 332c-333d; Q 109 562a-564b 21:11-30 / // Chronicles, 32:21 (D) II Para-
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL la-52d esp vin lipomenon, 32:21 / Psalms, 34:7; 35:5-6; 91:10-
[65)-ix [103] llc-13b, xvni [19-39] 25c-d, 13 (D) Psalms, 33:8; 34:5-6; 90:10-13 /
xxi-xxiii 30a-34c, xxvin [1-42] 41b-c, xxxiv Isaiah, 6:6-7; 37 3^~(^) Isatas 6:6-7; 37:36
:
t
(D) Apocalypse, 1:1; 7-11; 14.6-20; 15-18; tans, 2.18 / I Peter, 5:8-9 / Revelation, 2:10;
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other discussions relevant to the theory of angels, see ETERNITY 43; IDEA ic; KNOWLEDGE
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boofy of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
Halo, Q 16; De Anima, A 7 JOHN REYNOLDS, Inquiries Concerning the State and
.On Spiritual Creatures, AA 1-3, 5-8 Economy of the Angelical Worlds
SWEDENBORG Angelic Wisdom Concerning the Dwme
. De Substantiis Separates
Providence
DANTE. Convivio (The Banquet), SECOND TREATISE,
VOLTAIRE. "Angels," in A Philosophical Dictionary
CH5-7 SCHLEIERMACHFR The Christian Faith, par 42-45
MACHIAVELLI. Belfagor
W. SCOTT. Letters on Demonology and Witchcraft
J, H. NEWMAN. "The Powers of Nature," in VOL u,
II.
Parochial and Plain Sermons
PHILO JUDAEUS. On the Cherubim HEINE. Gods in Exile
PROCLUS. The Elements of Theology, (M) LOTZE. Microcosmos, BK ix, CH 2
"DJONYSIUS". On the Celestial Hierarchy MICHELET. Satanism and Witchcraft
ERIGENA. De Divisione Naturae, BK i (4, 7-9), n (6, FRAZER. The Golden Bough, PART iv, BK i, CH 4;
22), iv (7-9), v (13) PART VI PART VII, CH 4-7
;
MAIMONIDES. The Guide for the Perplexed, PART i, WENDELL. "Were the Witches of Salem Guiltless?"
CH 49; PART n, CH 2-7 in Stelligeri
BONAVENTURA. Breviloquium, PART n (6-8) LEA. Materials Toward a History of Witchcraft
R. BACON. Opus Majus, PART VH FRANCE. The Revolt of the Angels
ALBO. The Boof( of Principles (Sefer ha-Ilfarim), BK FARNELL. Greef( Hero Cults and Ideas of Immortality
II, CH 12 WILLIAMS. The Place of the Lion
CALVIN. Institutes of the Christian Religion, BK i, GLOVER. "The Daemon Environment," in Grec\
CH 14 (3) Byways
LUTHER, Table Tal{ ZILBOORG. The Medical Man and the Witch During
DONNE. Aire and Angells the Renaissance
SUAREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae, xn (14), VONIER. The Angels
xxxiv (3, 5), xxxv, XLI (2), LI (3-4) C. S. LEWIS. Out of the Silent Planet
MARLOWB. The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus . The Sci&vtape Letters
Chapter r ANIMAL
INTRODUCTION
ALPHABETICAL ordering places ANIMAL his own traits, his intelligence and freedom,
Zi. after ANGEL in thislist of ideas. There even hismoral qualities and political propensi-
isa third term which belongs with these two ties. Nevertheless, he has seldom ceased to re-
and, but for the alphabet, might have come be- gard himself as the paragon of animals, possess-
tween them. That term is MAN. ing in a higher degree than other animals the
These three terms and a fourth, GOD, characteristic properties of all.
which rounds out the comparison are con- There are exceptions to this, however. Ani-
joined in Shakespeare's statement of what is mals have been glorified by man for skeptical
upon himself. "What a piece of work is man!" Montaigne, for example, doubts that man
says Hamlet, "How noble in reason! how infi- can lay claim to any special attributes or excel-
nite in faculty! in form and moving, how ex- lences, and further suggests that, in some par-
press and admirable! in action, how like an an- ticulars at least, men are less able and
less noble
share with the angels, through the possession of tion the works that surpass all we can do by na-
intellect, the dignity of being a person. As his ture and art" ? We have no grounds for believ-
understanding of himself has varied, so has he ing that "beasts, by natural and compulsory
altered his conception of what it is to be an tendency, do the same things that we do by our
animal. choice and industry." Rather "we ought," he
In terms of a conception of personality which continues, "from like effects, to conclude like
involves the attributes of reason and free will, faculties, and consequently confess that the
man has legally, as well as morally and meta- same reason, the same method, by which we op-
physically, drawn a sharp line between persons erate, are common with them, or that they have
and things, and placed brute animals in the others that are better."
class of things. According to the principle of Nor can we excuse our presumption of su-
this distinction, being alive or even being sen- periority by the fact that we are compelled to
sitive does not give animals, any more than look at animals from our human point of view.
plants and stones, the dignity or status of per- "When I play with my cat," Montaigne writes,
sons. "who knows whether I do not make her more
When man's animality either in terms of sport than she makes We mutually divert
me?
his biological affinities or his evolutionary ori- one another with our monkey tricks; if I have
ginshas seemed an adequate definition of his my hour to begin or to refuse, she also has hers."
nature, man has attributed to animals many of Suppose animals were to tell us what they
19
20 THE GREAT IDEAS
thought of us. "The defect that hinders com- animals, never to plants. On either approach
munication betwixt them and us, why may it the issue remains whether plants and animals
not be on our part as well as theirs? 'Tis yet to are different in kind, not merely in degree.
opposed to "rational" animal. For that matter, mals, are performed by animals in a distinctive
the same holds true whenever man is conceived manner. If plants manifest all the vital powers
as just an animal, paragon or not. Animals are or activities present in animals; or if in func-
brute only when man is not only when to be tions common to both, animals differ only in
human is somehow more than an animal,
to be degree, then the scale of life would seem to be a
different in kind, not merely in degree. continuous gradation rather than a hierarchy.
Satirists like Swift idealize an animal nature The opposite position, which affirms a differ-
to berate the folly and depravity of man. In his ence in kind and consequently a hierarchy, is
last voyage, Gulliver finds in the land of the taken by Aristotle. In his biological writings, as
Houyhnhnms a race of human- looking crea- well as in his treatise On the Soul, he draws a
tures, the Yahoos, who by contrast with their sharp line between plant and animal life by ref-
noble masters, the horses, are a miserable and erence to faculties or functions absent in the one
sorry lot. Here it is the Yahoos who are brutes, and found in the other. Aristotle first points out
bereft as they are of the intelligence and virtue that "living may mean thinking or perception
which grace the splendid Houyhnhnms. or local movement and rest, or movement in the
and growth. Hence,"
sense of nutrition, decay,
THE COMPARISON of men and animals takes still he goes on, "we think of plants also as living,
another direction in the allegories of fable and for they are observed to possess in themselves
poetry. From Aesop to the mediaeval Bestiaries, an originative power through which they in-
there is the tradition of stories in which animals crease or decrease in all spatial directions; they
arc personified in order to teach a moral lesson. grow up and down, and everything that grows
In the Divine Comedy Dante uses specific ani- increases its bulk alike in both directions or in-
mals to symbolize the epitome of certain pas- deed in all, and continues to live so long as it
sions, vices, and virtues. The intent of his alle- can absorb nutriment."
gory is, however, never derogatory to man as This leads him to assign to plants what he
man. But when Machiavelli allegorizes the qual- calls a nutritive or vegetative soul, whereby
itiesrequired for political power, he advises the they have the three basic faculties common to
prince "knowingly to adopt the beast" and "to all nutrition, growth, and repro-
living things
choose the fox and the lion." This tends to re- duction. But Aristotle does not find in plants
duce human society to the ungle where strength
j any evidence of the functions performed by
and guile compete for supremacy. animals, such as sensation, appetite, and local
The comparison of men and animals fails to motion. These are the characteristic powers of
touch the distinction, or lack of distinction, be- the animal soul, called by him the "sensitive
tween animals and plants. This is basic to the soul" because sensation is the source both of
definition or conception of animal nature. As in animal desire and animal movement.
the case of men and animals, this problem can Galen follows Aristotle in this distinction. In
be approached in two ways: cither torn the side hisNatural Faculties he limits his investigations
of plant life, and with respect to those functions to the functions common to all living things.
which seem to be common to all living things; He uses theword "natural" for those effects,
or from the side of animal life, and with respect such as "growth and nutrition common to
. . .
to those functions which seem to belong only to plants as well as animals,"' which, in his view,
CHAPTER 2: ANIMAL 21
are opposed to such activities as "feeling and The fact that organisms exist which do not
voluntary motion .
peculiar to animals," that
. .
readily fall into either classification may signify
he of the soul," or "psychic." It
calls "effects continuity rather than separation between plants
may seem surprising at first that Galen's study and animals; but it may also be taken to mean
of nutrition, growth, and reproduction not that more acute observations are required to
only of the functions themselves but of the classify these so-called "intermediate forms."
bodily organs and processes involved in these Plant tropisms may or may not require us to
functions should be restricted to their mani- deny that sensitivity belongs to animals alone.
festation in animals, and not in plants as well. The apparent local motion of plants may be a
The reason may be that for the naturalists of mode of growth or a random movement rather
antiquity, the biological functions of vegetable than a directed change from place to place; and
matter did not yield their secrets readily enough the attachment to place of apparently station-
to observation. A treatise on plants, not written ary animals, such as barnacles and mussels, may
by Aristotle but attributed to his school, be- be different from the immobility of rooted
clearly manifest, in plants it is hidden and less AGAINST THE BACKGROUND of these major issues
evident," concerning plants, animals, and men as con-
This view of the world of living things as di- tinuous or radically distinct forms of life, the
vided into the two great kingdoms of plant and study of animal organisms their anatomy and
animal life prevailed through centuries of spec- physiology acquires much of its critical
sig-
ulation and But from the time that
research. nificance.
Aristotle began the work of classification, it has Anatomy is an ancient science. Several sur-
been realized that there exist numerous exam- of Hippocrates display an exten-
gical treatises
ples of what Bacon called "bordering instances sive knowledge of the human skeletal structure
. . . such as exhibit those species of bodies which and the disposition of some of the organs of the
appear to be composed of two species, or to be human body. The dissection of animals, as well
the rudiments between the one and the other." as gross observation, provides Aristotle with a
Within the last hundred years the difficulty basis for the comparative anatomy of different
of classifying such specimens, particularly those species of animal. For Galen as well as Aris-
which seem to between plant and animal,
fall totle, much of this anatomical study was mo-
has raised the question whether the traditional tivated by an interest in the structure and rela-
distinction can be maintained. "If we look even tion of the organs involved in the local motion
to the two main divisions, namely, to the ani- of the body as a whole, and in local motions
mal and vegetable kingdoms," writes Darwin, within the body, such as the motions of the
"certain low forms are so far intermediate in alimentary or reproductive systems.
character that naturalists have disputed to which It remains for a later investigator, schooled in
kingdom they should belong." Yet Darwin the tradition of ancient biology, to make the
does not find the evidence available to him suf- startling discovery of the circulation of the
ficient to determine whether all
living things blood through the motions of the heart. Harvey
have descended "from one primordial form" or not only does this, but he also suggests the
whether the evolution of life is to be represented functional interdependence of respiration and
in two distinct lines of development. circulation, based on his observation of the in-
Since Darwin's day the researches of scien- timate structural connections between heart,
tists like Loeb and Jennings on the behavior of arteries, veins, and lungs. His contribution is at
micro-organisms, and the phenomena of tro- once a departure from and a product of the
pisms (e.g., the sunflower's turning toward the scientific tradition in which he worked, for
sun), and the study of what appears to be local though his conclusions arc radically new, he
motion in plants, have contributed additional reaches them by a method of research and rea-
evidence relevant to the issue. It is, however, soning which follows the general principles of
still considered open and arguable. Aristotle and Galen. His insistence, moreover,
22 THE GREAT IDEAS
on the necessity of finding a functional purpose duction, with all the relevant considerations of
for an organic structure stands as the classic sexual differentiation and sexual characteristics,
lem of the act of generation itself, its causes and writings, for example, of Harvey, Darwin, and
consequences, especially the phenomena of em- William James.
bryonic development, Harvey's treatise reads
partly as a conversation with Aristotle, and ANOTHER INTEREST which runs through the
partly as the record of original observations un- whole tradition of man's study of animals lies
dertaken experimentally. in the problem of their classification both
"Respect for our predecessors and for antiq- with respect to the principles of taxonomy it-
uity at large," he writes, "inclines us to defend and also in the systematic effort to con-
self,
their conclusions to the extent that love of struct schemes whereby the extraordinary va-
truth will allow.Nor do I think it becoming in riety of animal types can be reduced to order.
us to neglect and make little of their labors and In this field Aristotle and Darwin are the two
conclusions, who bore the torch that has lighted great masters. If the names of Buffon and Lin-
us to the shrine of philosophy." The ancients, naeus also deserve to be mentioned, it must be
in his opinion, "by their unwearied labor and with the double qualification that they are fol-
variety of experiments, searching into the na- lowers of Aristotle on the one hand, and pre-
ture of things, have left us no doubtful light cursors of Darwin on the other.
to guide us in our studies." Yet, Harvey adds, The Aristotelian classification is most fully
"no one of a surety will allow that all truth was set forth in the History of Animals. There one
engrossed by the ancients, unless he be utterly kind of animal is distinguished from another by
ignorant of the many remarkable discoveries
. . .
many "properties": by locale or habitat; by
that have lately been made in anatomy." Re- shape and color and size; by manner of locomo-
ferring to his own method of investigation, he tion, nutrition, association, sensation; by or-
proposes as a "safer way to the attainment of ganic parts and members; by temperament, in-
knowledge" that "in studying nature," we stinct, or characteristic habits of action. With
*
'question things themselves rather than by respect to some of these properties, Aristotle
turning over books." treatsone kind of animal as differing from an-
It is particularly with respect to animal gen- other by a degree by more or less of the same
eration that the great books exhibit continuity trait.With respect to other properties, he finds
in the statement of basic problems in biology, the difference to consist in the possession by one
as well as indicate the logical conditions of their species of a trait totally lacking in another. He
solution. The issue of spontaneous generation speaks of the lion as being more "ferocious**
1*
as opposed to procreation runs through Aris- than the wolf, the crow as more "cunning
totle, Lucretius,Aquinas, Harvey, and Dar- than the raven; but he also observes that the
win* The problem of sexual and asexual repro- cow has an "organ of digestion" which the spi-
CHAPTER 2: ANIMAL 23
der lacks, the lizard an "organ of locomotion" wide opposition in value between analogical or
which the oyster lacks. The sponge lives in one adaptive characters, and characters of true af-
manner so far as "locale" is concerned, and the finity." Furthermore, "the importance of cm-
viper in another; reptiles have one manner of bryological characters and of rudimentary or-
locomotion, birds another. So ample were Aris- gans in classification" becomes "intelligible on
totle's data and so expert were his classifica- the view that a natural arrangement must be
tions, that the major divisions and sub-divisions genealogical." By reference to "this element of
of his scheme remain intact in the taxonomy descent," not only shall we be able to "under-
constructed by Linnaeus. stand what is meant by the Natural System,"
The radical character of Darwin's departure but also, Darwin adds, "our classifications will
from the Lmnaean classification stems from a come to be, as far as they can be so made, gene-
difference in principle rather than a correction alogies; and then truly give what
will
may be
of observational errors or inadequacies. Where called the plan of creation."
Aristotle and all taxonomists before Darwin Whereas the Aristotelian classification is static
classify animals by reference to their similarities in principle, havingno reference to temporal
and differences, Darwin makes
inferred geneal- connections or the succession of generations,
ogy or descent the primary criterion in terms the Darwinian is dynamic almost a
moving
of which he groups animals into varieties, spe- picture of the ever-shifting arrangement of ani-
cies, genera, and larger phyla. mals according to their affinities through com-
Naturalists, according to Darwin, "try to ar- mon ancestry or their diversities through ge-
range the species, genera, and families in each netic variation. Connected with this opposition
class,on what is called the Natural System. But between static and dynamic principles of clas-
what is meant by this system? Some authors sification is a deeper conflict between two ways
look at it merely as a scheme for arranging to- of understanding the nature of scientific classi-
gether those living objects which are most alike, fication itself.
and for separating those which arc most unlike. The point at issue is whether the classes which
. The ingenuity and utility of this system are
. . the taxonomist constructs represent distinct
indisputable," but Darwin thinks that its rules natural forms. Do they exist independently as
cannot be explained or its difficulties overcome objects demanding scientific definition or are
except "on the view that the Natural System is the scientist's groupings somewhat arbitrary
founded on descent with modification that and artificial? Do they divide and separate
the characters which naturalists consider as what in nature is more like a continuous distri-
showing true affinity between any two or more bution with accidental gaps and unevennesses ?
unconsciously seeking, and not some unknown and the difference between natural and arbi-
plan of creation, or the enunciation of general trary systems of classification.
propositions, and the mere putting together On these matters Aquinas and Locke have
and separating objects more or less alike." much to say, as well as Aristotle and Darwin.
In Darwin's opinion, classification "must be Fuller discussion of such questions is to be found
1
Only by the principle of descent "the one TION. Insofar as problems of classification and
certainly known cause of similarity in organic the nature of species have a bearing on evolu-
beings" can we arrange "all organic beings tion, they are treated in that chapter, as are the
throughout all time in groups under groups"; related issues of continuity or hierarchy in the
see "the nature of the relationships by which all world of living things, and of difference in de-
living and extinct organisms are united by com- gree or tynd as between plants and animals, ani-
plex, radiating, and circuitous lines of affinities mals and men. The last two problems also occur
into a few grand classes"; and understand "the in the chapters on LIFE and MAN.
24 THE GREAT IDEAS
ON THE THEME of comparisons between ani- many strings; and the joints, but
nerves, but so
mals and men, two further points should be somany wheels, giving motion to the whole
noted. body?" The animal is thus pictured as an elab-
The first concerns the soul of animals. When orate system of moving parts, inflexibly de-
soul conceived as the principle or source of
is termined to behave in certain ways under the
life in whatever is alive, plants and animals can impact of stimulation by external forces.
be said to have souls. Like Aristotle, Augustine The doctrine of the animal automaton is
gence has its throne." animals seem to follow also from the theory
Though he also follows Aristotle in defining that the soul, even in the case of man, is ma-
three kinds of soul, Aquinas distinguishes four terial or a function of matter. According to
grades of life, and in so doing differentiates be- those who, like Lucretius, hold this view, the
tween perfect and imperfect animals. "There are phenomena of life, sensation, and thought can
some living things," he writes, "in which there be explained by the movement of atomic par-
exists only vegetative power, as the plants. ticles and their interaction.
There are others in which with the vegetative The second point concerns the relation be-
there exists also the sensitive, but not the loco- tween instinct and intelligence in animals. The
motive power; such are immovable animals, as nature of animal instincts (or innate habits) is
There are others which besides this
shellfish. considered in the chapters on EMOTION and
have locomotive power, as perfect animals, HABIT, as is the nature of animal intelligence
which require many things for their life, and in the chapters on MAN and REASONING. But
consequently movement to seek the neces- here we face the issue whether instinct func-
saries of life from a distance. And there are tions in animals, as reason does in man, to meet
some living things which with these have in- the exigencies of life; or whether in both,
tellectual power namely, men." though varying in degree, intelligence cooper-
On this theory, man, viewed in terms of his ates with instinct to solve the problems of ad-
animal nature, is a perfect animal. Viewed in justment to environment.
terms of his reason or intellect, he stands above Those who, like Aquinas, regard instinct and
the highest animals. Yet having a soul is not reason as the alternative and exclusive means
peculiar to man, just as being alive, or sensi- which God provides for the ends of animal and
tive, or mobile, is not. But when, as with Des- human life, necessarily tend to interpret ani-
cartes, soul is identified with intellect as "a mal behavior in all its detail as pre-determined
thing which thinks, that is to say a mind ... or by elaborate endowments. Accord-
instinctive
an understanding, or a reason" and, in addi- ingly, animal behavior, even when voluntary
tion, soul conceived as a spiritual and im-
is rather than purely the action of physiological
mortal substance, then the conclusion seems reflexes, is said not to be free, or an expression of
to follow that animals do not have souls. free choice on the part of the animal; for, as
For Descartes, the theory of the animal as a ispointed out in the chapter on WILL, Aquinas
machine or automaton follows as a further cor- callsbehavior "voluntary" if it involves some
ollary. "If there had been such machines, pos- knowledge or consciousness of the objects to
sessing the organsand outward form of a mon- which it is directed.
key or some other animal without reason," Instinctive behavior, such as an animal's
Descartes claims that "we should not have had flight from danger or its pursuit of food or a
any means of ascertaining that they were not mate, involves sense-perception of the objects
of the same nature as those animals." Hobbes of these actions, as well as feelings or emotions
likewise would account for all the actions of about them. But though it is "voluntary" in
animal on mechanical principles. "For what
life the sense in which Aquinas uses that word, in-
is the heart, but a spring," he asks, "and the stinctive behavior is, according to him, the
CHAPTER 2: ANIMAL 25
1
exact opposite of action based upon free will. with foresight of its 'end just so far as that end
It completely determined by the inborn pat-
is
may have fallen under the animal's cognizance."
tern of the instinct. It may vary in operation If instinct, in animals or men, were sufficient
with the circumstances of the occasion, but it for solving the problems of survival, there
does not leave the animal the freedom to act would be no need for what James calls "sagac-
or not to act, or to act this way rather than ity" on the part of animals, or of learning from
Such freedom of choice, Aquinas holds,
that. experience. Like Montaigne, James assembles,
depends on reason's ability to contemplate al- anecdotes to show that animals exercise their
ternatives, to none of which is the human will wits and learn from experience. "No matter
bound by natural necessity. how wellendowed an animal may originally be
Aquinas does not limit human reason and in the way of instincts," James declares, "his
will to a role analogous to theone he ascribes resultant actions will be much modified if the
and emotion in animal life. Their
to instinct instincts combine with experience, if in addi-
power enables man to engage in speculative tion to impulses he have memories, associations,
thought and to seek remote ends. Never- inferences, and expectations, on any consider-
theless, on the level of his biological needs, man able scale,"
must resort to the use of his reason and will where In his consideration of "the intellectual con-
other animals are guided by instinct. "Man trast between brute and man," fames places
has by nature," Aquinas writes, "his reason and "the most elementary single difference between
his hands,which are the organs of organs, since the human mind and that of brutes" in the
Others, like Darwin, James, and Freud, seem stincts are much moremodified by learning
to take a different view. They attribute in- and experience than the instincts of other ani-
stinct to men as well as to animals. In their mals, as in turn the higher animals show much
opinion instinctively determined behavior is
greater variability in their instinctive behavior
influenced by intelligence, and affected by than do lower organisms.
memory and imagination, in animals as well as It is not necessary to deny that men alone
in men. They recognize, however, that instinct have reason in order to affirm that, in addition
predominates in some of the lower forms of to instinct, animals have intelligence in some
animal life, and acknowledge that the contribu- proportion to the development of their sensi-
tion of intelligence is great only among the tive powers, especially their memory and im-
more highly developed organisms. agination. The position of Aristotle and Aqui-
"Man has a far greater variety of impulses nas seems to involve both points. But if we at-
than any lower animal," writes James; "and any tribute the extraordinary performances of ani-
*
one of these impulses taken in itself, is as blind* mals to their intelligence alone, rather than
as the lowest instinct can be; but, owing to primarily to instinct, then we are led to con-
man's memory, power of reflection, and power clude with Montaigne that they possess not
of inference, they come each one to be felt by merely a sensitive intelligence, but a reasoning
him, after he has once yielded to them and ex- intellect.
perienced their results in connection with a "Why does the spider make her web tighter
foresight of those results." On
the same grounds, in one place and slacker in another?" Mon-
James argues that "every instinctive act, in an ani- taigne asks. "Why now one sort of knot and
*
mal with memory, must cease to be blind" after then another, if she has not deliberation,
being once repeated, and must be accompanied thought, and conclusion?" And in another
26 THE GREAT IDEAS
place he asks, "What is there in our intelli- The use, or even the exploitation, of animals
gence that we do not see in the operations of by man seems to be justified by the inferiority
animals? Is there a polity better ordered, the of the brute to the rational nature. As plants
offices better distributed, and more inviolably exist for the sake of animals, so animals, accord-
observed and maintained than that of bees? ing to Aristotle, "exist for the sake of man, the
Can we imagine that such and so regular a dis- tame for use and food, the wild, if not all, at
tribution of employments can be carried on least the greater part of them, for food, and for
without reason and prudence?" the provision of clothing and various instru-
ments." Aristotle's conception of the natural
GREGARIOUSNESS in animals and the nature of slave, discussed in the chapter on SLAVERY,
animal communities are considered in the chap- uses the domesticated animal as a kind of
ter on STATE, in connection with the formation model for the treatment of human beings as
of human society. But so far as human society tools or instruments.
itself isconcerned, the domestication of ani- Though he does not share Aristotle's view
mals signifies an advance from primitive to that some men are by nature slaves, Spinoza
civilized life and an increase in the wealth and takes a comparable position with regard to
power of the tribe or city. man's domination and use of animals. "The
Aeschylus includes the taming of animals law against killing animals," he writes, "is
among the gifts of Prometheus, who "first based upon an empty superstition and woman-
brought under the yoke beasts of burden, who ish tenderness, rather than upon sound reason.
by draft and carrying relieved men of their A proper regard, indeed, to one's own profit
hardest labors . . .
yoked the proud horse to teaches us to unite in friendship with men, and
the chariot, teaching him obedience to the not with brutes, nor with things whose nature
reins, to be the adornment of wealth and lux- is different from human nature ... I
by no
ury." The Mad pays eloquent testimony to the means deny," he continues) "that brutes feel,
change in the quality of human life which ac- but I do deny that on this account it is unlaw-
companied the training of animals to respond ful for us to consult our own
by using profit
to human command. Homer's reference to them for our pleasure and treating them as is
Castor as "breaker of horses" indicates the most convenient to us, inasmuch as they do not
sense of conquest or mastery which men felt agree m nature with us."
when they subdued wild beasts; and the oft- But other moralists declare that men can be-
repeated Homeric epithet "horse- taming," friend animals, and insist that charity, if not
which intended as a term of praise for both
is
justice, should control man's treatment of
the Argives and the Trojans, implies the rise of beasts. Nor is such contrary teaching confined
a people from barbarous or primitive condi- to Christianity, or to the maxims of St. Francis,
tionstheir emancipation from the discom- who would persuade men to love not only their
fortsand limitations of animal life. neighbors as themselves, but all of God's crea-
Aristotle points out that one mark of wealthy tures. Plutarch, for instance, argues that al-
men is "the number of horses which they keep, though "law and justice we cannot, in the na-
for they cannot afford to keep them unless they ture of things, employ on others than men,"
are rich." For the same reason, he explains, nevertheless, "we may extend our goodness and
"in old times the cities whose strength lay in charity even to irrational creatures." In kind-
their cavalry were oligarchies." ness to dumb animals he finds the mark of the
Legend and history are full of stories of the "gentle nature"- the sign of a man's humane-
loyalty and devotion of animals to their human ness. "Towards human beings as they have
masters, and of the reciprocal care and affection reason, behave in a social spirit," says Marcus
which men have given them. But, motivated as Aurelius; but he also writes: "As to animals
it is by their
utility for economic or military which have no reason, and generally all things
purposes, the breaking of animals to human will and objects, do thou, since thou hast reason and
also frequently involves a violent or wanton they have none, make use of them with a gen-
misuse. erous and liberal spirit."
CHAPTER 2: ANIMAL 27
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGB
1 . General theories about the animal nature 29
i a. Characteristics of animal life: the animal soul
ib. The distinction between plants and animals in faculty and function: cases difficult
to classify
20. Continuity and discontinuity in the scale of animal life: gradation from lower
to higher forms
36
4. Animal movement
50. The ducts, channels, and conduits involved in interior bodily motions
5^. The circulatory system: the motions of the heart, blood, and lymph 39
y. The glandular system: the glands of internal and external secretion
5*. The alimentary system : the motions of the digestive organs in the nutritive process
28 THE GREAT IDEAS
PAGB
5. The brain and nervous system: the excitation and conduction of nervous impulses 40
6. Animal nutrition
(3) The reproductive cells and secretions: semen and catamenia, sperm and egg
43
(4) The mating of animals: pairing and copulation
cf.
The care and feeding of infant offspring: lactation
10. Heredity and environment: the genetic determination of individual differences and
similarities
13. The attribution of human qualities or virtues to animals: personification in allegory '
and satire
48
CHAPTER 2: ANIMAL 29
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to, For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS. One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included m
the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES- The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ m title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; eg, OLD TESTA-
MENT. Nehemiah, 7 45 (D) 77 Esdras, 7 46.
SYMBOLS. The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference, "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
1. General theories about the animal nature 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par n 74a-b /
City of God, BK vii, CH 23, 256b-c
la. Characteristics of animal life: the animal 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 18,
soul A i Q 72, A i, REP i 368b-369d,
104c-105c;
7 PLATO- Cratylus, 93c-d / Phaedo, 233b-c / Q A 3 380c-381b; A 6, REP i 383c-384c;
75,
Republic, BK x, 440b-c/ Timaeus, 476d-477a,c Q 78, A i 407b-409a; Q 118, A i 600a-601c;
8 ARISTOTLE- Metaphysics, BK v, CH 8 [ioi7 b io- PART i-n, Q 17, A 2, REP 2 687d-688b
17] 538b / Soul 631a-668d esp BK n, CH 2 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL,
Q 79, A i, ANS 951b-953b
9ARIS1OTLF. History of Animals, BK i, CH i 21 DANTE. Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xxv
a b
[487 io-488 29] 7d-9d; BK vin, CH i 114b,d- [34-78] 91d-92a
b
115b/ Parts ofAnimals, BK i, CH i [64i*33- io] 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK in,
164b-c; CH 5 [645^4-646*5] 169c-d; BK m, 138a-b; 192d
CH 5 [667b 2i~32] 196a / Motion of Animals, 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 302d-303a / On
CH 6-1 1 235d-239d esp CH 10 238c-239a / Animal Generation, 369d-370b; 372b; 384d-
Generation of Animals, BK i, CH 23 [73i 24-b 8] ft
390b passim; 403d-404b; 418b-419d; 431b-
271c-d; BK n, CH 3 [736*24-737*19] 276d-278a; 434a esp 433c-d; 456b-458a esp 457a-d; 488d-
CH 5 [74i B 6-3i] 282a-b 496d
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH i 167a-b; 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 48, 186a
CH 12 172d-173c 31 DESCARTES: Rules, xn, 19d-20a / Discourse,
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK HI [94-416] PART v, 56a-b; 59a-60c / Objections and
31b35c Replies, 156a-d; 208c; 226a-d
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK in, SECT 16, 262d; 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH ix,
BK ix, SECT 9 292b-d SECT 12 140c; CH xxvn, SECT 3-5 219d-220c
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 855a-b passim; BK HI, CH vi, SECT 33 278b-c
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR i, CH n 5b-c / 53 JAMES: Psychology, 4a-6b; 8a-14b passim, esp
Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 23 153d-154b llb-12a; 47b-52a passim
30 THE GREAT IDEAS la(l) to la(3)
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 337c-d
(1. General theories about the animal nature, la. 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 244a-245b
Characteristics of animal life: the animal 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 261c-262a; 301c-
soul.) 302a; 397d-398a; 402b-c; 406c; 432c-434c
54 FREUD: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 651d- passim; 447b-d; 474a-b; 480a-482b passim;
657d esp 651d-652c, 655b<656a / New Intro- 529a-b; 553d-554a; 568d-569b; 595b-596a
ductory Lectures, 85la-c esp 595d
53 JAMES. Psychology, 8a; 9b-13a passim, esp 13a;
la(l) Animal sensitivity: its degrees and differ-
27a-42b passim
entiations 54 FREUD: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 647a-
7 PLATO: Ttmaeus, 453b-454a 648a
b
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK u, CH 2 [4i3 i-i3]
643c-d; [414*1-3] 644a; BK n, CH 5-BK in, la(2) Animal memory, imagination, and in-
209a-c; CH n [692*22-27] 224b-c / Motion of ANS 106b-107c; Q 78, A i, ANS and REP 4 407b-
Animals, CH 6-n 235d-239d / Ethics, BK in, 409a
CH 8 [iii6b23-ni7*9] 363a-c; CH 10 [1118*17- 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK in,
b b
8] 364d-36Sa; BK VH, CH 6 [ii49 30-36] 400c; 192d
CH 12 [1153*27-35] 404c-d 31 DESCARTES: Rules, xn, 19d-20a
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK in, CH 6 202d- 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH ix,
203a;cH8,206b-c SECT n 140b-c; SECT 13 140d
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [136-160] 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 279a-280c; 37ld-
31d-32a; [288-322] 33d-34b; [741-753] 39c-d 372c
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK xi [745-760] 348b; BK xn 53 JAMES: Psychology, 10a-12b esp 12a b; 699a
[5-n]354a
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 23, 154b la(5) Sleeping and waking in animals
b
19 AQUINAS: Summa PART i, Q 59,
Theologica, [487*io-488 29] 7d-9d; BK iv, CH 9 62a-63c;
A 3, ANS 308b-309a; Q 76, A 5, REP 4 394c- BK v-vi 65a-106d esp BK v, CH 8 [542*18^2]
396a; Q 79, A 8, REP 3 421c-422b; Q 83, A i, 68d-69a; BK vin-ix 114b,d-158d esp BK vm,
b
ANS 436d-438a; Q 96, A i, ANS and REP 4 CH [588^3-589*9] H5b, CH 12 [596 20-28]
I
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 339-344 233a-b / Vacuum, and REP 3 672a-c; Q 13, A 2 esp REP 3 673c-
357a-358a 674c; Q 15, A 2, ANS 682a-c; Q 16, A 2, REP 2
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH ix, 684d-685b; Q 17, A 2, REP 3 687d-688b; Q 40,
SECT 12-15 140c-141a; CH x, SECT 10 143c-d; A 3 794c-795a; Q 41, A i, REP 3 798b-d; Q 46,
CH xi, SECT 4-11 144d-146a passim; CH xxvn, A 4, REP 2 815b-d
SECT 8 221a-222a; SECT 12 223a-b; BK in, 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 50,
CH vi, SECT 12 271d-272b; BK iv, CH xvi, A 3, REP 2 8b-9a
SECT 12, 370c-371a; CH xvn, SECT i 371c-d 22 CHAUCER: Nun's Priest's Tale [15,282-287]
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 457b / Manciple's Tale [17,104-144] 490a-b
u407b-408a 23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, PART n, lOOa-c
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT ix 487 b- 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK iv,
488c; SECT xii, DIV 118, 504c 247d-248b
36 SWIFT: Gullwer, PART iv 135a-184a esp 151b- 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 184a-b; 216b-219a
152a, 159b-160a 26 SHAKESPEARE: Henry V, ACT i, sc n [187-204]
38 ROUSSEAU; Inequality, 337d-338a; 341d-342a 535d~536a
/ Social Contract, BK i, 393b-c 27 SHAKESPEARE: Timon of Athens, ACT iv, sc
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 6d-8b HI [320-348] 414b-c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 199c-200c; 235c-d / Prcf. 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 339a-b;
Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 372a-b / 346a-347d; 349a-350a; 361c-362a; 402 a- d;
Judgement, 479a-c; 584d-585c; 602b,d [fn i] 405c-406a; 428a-c; 476b*477b
\eto2b CHAFER 2: ANIMAL 35
V
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 144a-b; 146b-147a; vm, CH i [588 b 4]-CH 2 [590*18] 114d-116c /
283b-284a; 289b-292a Parts of Animals, BK i, CH 2-4 165d-168c; CH 5
b b
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 66a-69c passim; [645 2o-28] 169c-d; BK in, CH 6 [669 y-i4]
82d-85c; 108d-lllb; 119a-135a,c esp 119a- 198a Generation of Animals, BK i, CH i
/
b
122d, 134d-135a,c / Descent of Man, 287d- [7i5*i8- 25] 255b-d; BK n, CH i [732*13-
~
b
289a; 304b-310d esp 308a-310a; 312c-d; 733 i7] 272c-274a; BK in, CH ii
369b-371b; 456b-457c; 463a-464b; 470d-475c 302c-d / Politics, BK iv, CH 4
passim, esp 475c; 504d-507a passim, esp 506c; 489d-490a
583a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3,
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 499c-500c A 4, REP 1 16d-17c; Q 50, A 4, REP i 273b-274b;
53 JAMES: Psychology, 49b-50a; 68a-73b; 700a- QQ 71-72 367a-369d
711a; 724a-b; 730a-b; 890b-891b [fn 3] 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 468b-
54 FREUD: Narcissism, 401a-c / Instincts, 412b- 469b
415d / General Introduction, 615b-616c / Be- 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 27,
yond the Pleasure /V;r/^,650c-662b esp 651d- 158b-c; APH 30 159c-d
654a / Group Psychology, 684d-686c esp 684d- 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK in, CH vi
685b / Ego and Id, 711c-712a / New Introduc- 268b-283a passim, esp SECT 7 270b, SECT 36-
tory Lectures, 846a-851d esp 846b-d, 849c- 37 279a-b; CH xi, SECT 19-20 304b-d
850a, 851a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 193a-200c / Judgement,
579b-c
le. The conception of the animal as a machine 48 MELVILLE: Moby DicJ(, 95b-105b
or automaton 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 24a-b; 25d-29a
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i esp 28c-29a; 30d-31d; 63d-64d; 207a-212c;
b
[64o 5-i8j 163a-b / Motion of Animals, CH 7 215b-217b; 224d-225b; 228c-229a,c; 238b-
b
[70i i-i3] 236d-237a / Generation of Animals, 239a; 241d-242a / Descent of Man, 331a-34ld
b b
BK it, CH i
(734 3~ 20] 275a-b; CH 5 [74i 5-io] esp 331b-333a, 337a-338c; 342a-350b passim,
282c esp342a-b
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK n, CH 3,
185a-b 2b. Analogies of structure and function among
23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, INTRO, 47a different classes of animals
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART v, 56a-b; 59a- 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK ii, CH 14
60c / Objections and Replies, 156a-d; 226a-d [98*20-23] 134a / Youth, Life, and Breathing
33 PASCAL: Pens&s, 340 233a 714a-726d passim
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK H, CH x, 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals 7a-158d esp
SECT 10 143c-d; CH xi, SECT n 145d-146a; BK i, CH 1-6 7a-13a, BK n, CH i 19b,d-23d,
CH xxvn, SECT 5 220b-c BK iv, CH S-BK v, CH i 59d-66a, BK vm, CH i
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 337d-338a 114b,d-115b / Parts of Animals 161a-229d pas-
42 KANT: Judgement, 558b-559a; 575b-578a; BK CH CH b
sim, esp i, 4 167d-168c, 5 [645 i-
578d-582c 646*5] 169b-d / Gait of Animals 243a-252a,c /
50 MARX: Capital, 190d [fn i] Generation of Animals 255a-331a,c esp BK n,
51 TptsTOY: War and Peace, BK x, 449b-c; CH i 272a-276a
EPILOGUE H, 689c-690a 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK in, CH 2 199d-
53 JAMBS: Psychology, 3b*6b passim, esp 5b-6b; 200a
lla-12a; 47b-52b esp 51a-52a; 84a-94b; 700a- 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 274b-d; 277b-
706b esp 705a-706b 278d; 280c-283a; 299b-302c / On Animal
36 THE GREAT IDEAS
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK i-iv 7a-
(2. The classification of animals. 2b. Analogies
65a,c esp BK i, CH 1^6 7a-13a / Parts of Ani-
of structure and junction among different mate, BK Ji-iv 170a-229d
claues oj animals.) 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 91,
Generation, 336b-d; 338a-496d esp 449a-454a, A 3 486b-487d
463d-464a, 468b-472c 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK iv,
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 27, 157b- 271a-272d
15Sc 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 343b-345d;
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK HI, CH vi, 377c-380c passim; 485a-d
SECT 12 271d-272b 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 52b-c /
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT ix, DIV 82 Novum Organum, BK n, APH 7 139c-140a
487b-c 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART v, 56b*57a
42 KANT: Judgement, 579 b-c 42 KANT: Judgement, 579b-c
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick^ 273a-b; 279b 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic^, 243b-252a
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 75b-78c; 82d-94c; 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 14c-15b passim;
112b-113c; 212d-215a; 217b-219d; 225c-228c; 85d-87b; 89b-90c; 217b-219d / Descent of
238c-239a/ Descent of Man, 255a~265d; 271c- Man, 255c-265a passim; 266a-c; 271c-274d;
275c; 279a-284b; 331a-335a; 338d-340c pas- 278c-284b
sim ;348b-c 54 FREUD: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 647a-
648a
2c. Continuity and discontinuity in the scale of
animal gradation from lower to
life: ^. Physical elements of the animal body: kinds
higher forms oftissue
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1:20-25 7 PLATO: Timaeus, 468a-469d
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK H, CH 2 [413^-10] 643c; 8 ARISTOTLE: BK IV,CH 10 [389*19-
Meteorology,
[414*1-3] 644a; BK in, CH n [433^32-434*9] 23] 493b; CH n [389^7-18] 493c-d; CH 12
b
666d; CH 12 [434 o-3o] 667c-d / Sense and the 493d-494d
Sensible, CH i
[436^12-437*17] 673c-674a; CH 5 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK i, CH i
b BK CH 2
[44 3 i7- 44 5*3] 681c-682d [486*5-15] 7a; [487*1-10] 7d; in,
b b
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK vm, CH i [5ii i-io] 35a; CH 5 [515*27]-^ 20 [52i i7]
114b,d-115b / Partsof Animals, BK iv, CH 10 39c-46c / Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i [640 b n-
b B
[686 23-687 i] 218b-c / Generation ofAnimals, , 24] 163a-b; BK n, CH i [646*7]-^ 2 [648*20]
b
BK n, CH i [732*i3-733 b i7] 272c-274a 170a-172c; CH 3 {649 22J-cH 9 [655^6] 174b-
19 AQUINAS: Summa PART i, Q 18,
Theologica, 181d; BK in, CH 2 [663^2-36] 191b-c /
A 2, REP i ANS 106b-107c;
105c'106b; A 3, Generation of Animals, BK i, CH i [715*8-11]
Q 50, A 4, REP i 273b-274b; Q 71, A i, REP 4-5 255a; CH 18 [722 a i8- b i] 262a-b; BK n, CH 6
b
367a-368b; Q 72, A i, REP i 368b-369d; Q 76, [743*i- i8] 284b-d
A 5, REP 3394c-396a; Q 78, A i, ANS and REP 4 10GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 6 169c-
407b-409a 170c; BK n, CH 6 188c-191a; BK HI, CH n
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 336b-d; 207d-208b; CH 15, 215a-b
400d-401a; 412c-413a 20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART HI SUPPL,
:
2 (525 b n-i4] 51d; CH 4 [528*1-30] 54d-55b; 3</. The utility or adaptation of bodily struc-
tures
CH 7 [532 ft3i-b 5] 59b; BK vn, CH 10 [587**! 1-18]
113d-114a / Parts of Animals, BK 11, CH 6 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK iv, CH 4
b b b
176d-177c; CH [653*34- 2] 178d;
7 CH 8 [528 29~529*i] 55d; CH 5 [530 i9~24] 57c;
b b b
BK ix, CH 37 [62o io~33] 146b-c; [622 9~i5] b
[653 3o]-CH 9 [655 io] 179b-181c; BK in, CH
1-2 188b,d-191d; CH 4 [666*17-22] 194c-d; BK 148a / Parts of Animals, BK n-iv 170a-229d
b
iv,CH 5 [679 i3~35] 209d-210a; CH 10 [690*5- passim / Gait of Animals 243a-252a,c esp CH i
29] 221d-222b; CH 12 [695*1-26] 226c-227a; 243a-b / Generation of Animals, BK i, CH 2
CH 13 [696 b i-7] 228a-b / Motion of Animals, a b
[7i6 i8- 2] 256b-c; CH 4-13 257a-260b; BK iv,
b
CH i [698 a i5-b 9] 233b-c / Gait of Animals, CH i
[765 33~766*io] 307a-b; BK v, CH 8
CH ii 248d-249a / Generation of Animals, BK 330b-331a,c
b b
ii, CH
7 44 28-745 9] 286a-d
6 [
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 6, 170b-c;
10 HIPPOCRATES: Injuries of the Head, par 1-2 CH 10 171b-172b; CH 13, 173d-174d; BK u,
63b,d-64c; par 18 69a-b / Fractures 74b,d-91d CH 4, 187c-d; BK in, CH 3 200a-201a; CH 8
esp par 2-4 75a-76c, par 9-12 78c-80a, par 18 205a-207b; CH n 207d-208b
82b~c, par 20 83a, par 37 89a-b / Articulations 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK iv [823-857]
91b,d-121d passim / Instruments of Reduction 55a-b; BK v [837-877] 72a-c
121b,d-130d passim, esp par i 121b,d-122c 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XXH, CH 24,
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK in, CH 15, 610c-611b
215a-b 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 269a-b; 299b-
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 132c; 304a,c / On Animal Generation, 390b-c; 401 b;
SECOND DAY, 187b-188c, 195c-d 402c;418b-c;453c-454c
28 HARVEY. On Animal Generation, 443d-444c 34 NEWTON* Optics, BK in, 529a
48 MELVILLE. Moby Dic1{, 333b<338a 48 MELVILLE. Moby Dici(, 227b-228a; 277b-
49 DARWIN. Origin of Species, 15a-b; 94a; 107a- 279b
113c passim, 217b-219d / Descent of Man, 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, Ic; lOd-llb; 38c;
263c-264d; 273a, 280c-282c 41c-44c esp 43a-b, 43d-44a; 66a-68b; 82d-
98a,c esp 97b-98a,c; 103c-113c; 115c-116b;
3c. The visceral organs 225c-228c / Descent of Man, 258b-259a; 320b,
7 PLATO. Timaeus, 466a-468a 532d-543d
8 ARISTOTLE Metaphysics, BK vn, CH 10 53 JAMES: Psychology, 701a
b
[io35 26-28] 559b / Soul, BK ii, CH 8 [420^3-
4. Animal movement
27] 652a-b / Sleep, CH 3 [458*14-19] 701c /
b
Youth, Life, and Breathing, CH 3 [468 28]-cH
b
4 [469 2o] 715b-716b; CH 14 720d-721a
4a. Comparison of animal movement with other
9 ARISIOILE. History of Animals, BK i, CH 16-17 kinds of local motion
16d-19d, BK ii, en I5-BK in, CH i 28b-35a; 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vni, CH 4 [254^2-33]
BK in, CH 3 [513*22-39] 36d-37a; CH 13-15 339a-b / Heavens, BK n, CH 2 376b-377c
44a-c; BK iv, CH i [524^-22] 50a-c; CH 2 9 ARISTOTLE- Motion of Animals, CH i 233a-c;
b a
[526 22-527 2o] 53b-d; CH 3-7 54b-59d pas- CH 4 [700*5-27] 235b-c; en 6 235d-236b; CH 7
b b
sim / Parts of Animals, BK in, CH 4 193a-195d; [70i i]-CH 8 [702 i2] 236d-238a
CH 6-14 197b-205c; BK iv, CH 1-5 205b,d-213b 19 AQUINAS- Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 18,
/ Generation of Animals, BK i, CH 3-16 256c- A i, REP 1-3 104c-105c; Q 70, A 3 365b-367a
261b passim 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART v, 59a-d
10 HIPPOCRATES Ancient Medicine, par 22 8a-d /
. 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH
Sacred Disease, 156a xxvn, SECT 4-5 220a-c
10 GALEN. Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 13 173d- 49 DARWIN- Origin of Species, 115b
177a, BK in, CH 8 205a-207b; CH n 207d-208b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 4a-6b
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL,
Q 80, A 2, ANS 957c-958b
4b. The cause of animal movement: voluntary
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK and involuntary movements
i,
209a-b
12,
28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 288d / Circula- 3/. The excretory system: the motions of elim-
tion of the Shod, 320a-b / On Animal Genera- ination
396c-d; 435a-c; 451b; 461b; 464c-d;
tion, 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK HI, CH 15
487c-488a 44b-c; BK iv, CH i
[524*9-14] 49d; BK vi,
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART v, PREF 451a-452c OH 20 b
[574 i9-25] lOOb-c; BK vn, CH 10 [587*
b
34 NEWTON: Optics, BK in, 538a 27-33] 113c; BK vin, CH 5 [594 2i~a6] 120d;
40 THE GREAT IDEAS 5g to 6b
(5. Local motion within the animal body. 5/. The 6. Animal nutrition
excretory system: the motions of elimination.)
BK ix, CH 45 [63ob7-i7] 155d-156a / Parts of 6a. The nature of the nutriment
b OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1-29-30
Animals, BK in, CH 7 [6yo 2^]-cH 9 [672*26]
^y-^S] 5 ARISTOPHANES. Peace [1-172] 526a-527 d
l
199b-201a; CH 14 204d-205c; BK
iv, CH i [676*29-35] 206a; CH 2 206b-207b; 7 PLATO: Timaeus, 469d-470a; 471d-472a
CH 5 [679-5-32] 209a-c; CH 10 [689*3-34] 220d- 8 ARISTOTLE: Generation and Corruption. BK i,
221 b / Generation of Animals, BK i, CH 13 CH 5 [322*4-28] 419d-420b / Metaphysics, BK
b b
[7i9 29-72o*n] 259d-260a i, CH 3 [983 i9-25] 501d-502a / Soul, BK n,
10 HIPPOCRATES: Airs, Waters, Places, par 9 12d- CH 4 [4i6 a i8-b 3i] 646c-647b / Sense and the
b s
13b / Prognostics, par 11-12 21c-22b Sensible, CH 4 [44i 24-442 i2] 679b-d
10 GALEN. Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 13, 1 73d- 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK i, CH i
b
175d; CH 15-17 179d-183d; BK H, CH 2 184b- [488*15-20] 9a,' BK III, CH 20 [52I 2l]-CH 21
a
185a; BK HI, CH 5 202c-d; CH 12-13 208b 213b [523*13] 46d-48c; BK vm, CH 2 [59o i8]-cH 11
b
1Q AQUINAS- Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 119, [596 i9] 116d-122d; CH 21 [60^25-34] 129d;
A i, REP i 604c-607b BK ix, CH i [6o8 b i9]-cH 2 [6iob i9] 134a-136b;
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART HI SUPPL, CH 9 140a-b / Parts of Animals, BK n, CH 4
Q 80, A 2, REP i 957c-958b; A 3, ANS and REP 2 [651*12-19] 176a / Generation of Animals, BK
958b-959c iv, CH 8 [777*4-19] 319a-b / Politics, BK i, CH 8
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i, [1256*18-30] 450a; [1256^1-20] 450b-c
16c-18b; BK in, 138b-c; BK iv, 293a-b; 310d- 10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 3-8 Id-
311d 3b, par 13-15 4c-5d / Regimen in Acute Dis-
28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 273b-c; 283a-b eases, par 4 27c-28a; par 14-17 32c-34c;
/ On Animal Generation, 344b-345a; 351a-b; APPENDIX, par 18 41a-d
356c-d; 380c 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 2, 168a~b;
36 SWIFT- Gulliver, PART i, 26a-b CH lo-n 171b-172d; BK n, CH 8, 191b-193d
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i, esp 192d-193b
45c-d 12 LUCRETIUS- Nature of Things, BK iv [633-672]
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, lllb-c; 120b-c 52c-53a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 97,
5g. The brain and nervous system: the excita- A 3, REP 2 515a-d; A 4 515d-516d; Q 119, A i
tion and conduction of nervous im- 604c-607b
pulses 24 RABELAIS. Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK in,
9ARismTLE:Parts of Animals, BK n, CH 7 138b
CH 10 [656*i4~b 28] 182b-183a
177c-179a; 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 378b-d;
10 HIPPOCRATES: Sacred Disease, 156a-160b 398d-399c; 408c-d; 409c-d; 414a-b; 435a-
10 GALEN- Natural Faculties, BK n, CH 6 188c- 438b, 439a-440a; 448a-c; 461a-d, 463b-466b;
191a 486c-d, 487c-488a; 494a-496d esp 494b,
16 KEPLLR: Epitome, BK iv, 855a b 495c-496a
17 PLOHNUS: Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 23, 153d- 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK 11, APH 50,
154a 193b-c
19 AQUINAS. Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 99, 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 337d
A i, ANS 519b-520a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 49b-d 6b. The process of nutrition: ingestion, diges-
24 RABFLAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK in, tion, assimilation
190a-c 7 PLATO: Timaeus, 467d-468a; 471c-472a
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 456b-458a 8 ARISTOTLE: Meteorology, BK iv, CH 2 [379b io-
b
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XH, 19d-20a / Discourse, 24] 483d-484a / Soul, BK n, CH 4 [4i6*i8- 29]
PART v, 58d-59a / Meditations, vi, 102a-d / 646c-647b / Sleep, CH 3 699b-701d passim
Objections and Replies, 156a-d 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK VIH, CH 4
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART v, PREF 451a-452c [594*11-21] 120a-b; CH 6 [595*6-13] 121a; CH
b
34 NEWTON: Optics, BK in, 518b-519b; 522a-b 17 [6oo 7~i2] 126c / Parts of Animals, BK 11,
CH b
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 540a-541a,c 3 [65o*i- i3] 174c-175b; BK
CH i HI,
b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 2b-3a; 8a-67b csp 9b-17a, [66i*36- i2] 188b; CH 3 191d-193a; CH 14
b
42a-b, 46b-47a; 70a-77b esp 70a-71a; 152a- 203b-205c; BK iv, CH 3 [677 3o]-cn 4 [678*20]
207d-208a; CH n [69o 20-69i*i] 222d-223a;
b
153a; 497a-501b esp 500b-501b; 694a-695a;
a b
698b-699a; 705a-b; 758b-759a; 827b-835a [69i 28- 27] 223c-d
54 FREUD Hysteria, 87a / Interpretation ofDreams, 10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par n 4b /
351c-352d; 363c-364b; 378a-b / Instincts, Regimen in Acute Diseases, APPENDIX, par 18
413a-d / Unconscious, 431d / Beyond the 41a-d
Pleasure Principle, 646b-649d / Ego and Id, 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 2 167b-
700a-b 168c; CH 7-12 170c-173c esp CH 10-11 171b*
CHAPTER 2: ANIMAL 41
b
BK 11, CH i [735*13-23] 275d-276a; CH 3 [539*i5- i3] 65b-66a; CH n
[543^8-19] 70b;
b CH 15 [5 4 6 b i7-547*i] 73c; CH 15 [5 4 7 b i2]-cH
[7S7*35- 7] 278b; CH A '[739^4-741*2] 280d-
b b
281d; CH 6 [744 32~745 9] 286a-d; BK iv, CH 4 16 [548^] 74b-75b; CH 19 [550^1-551*13]
b B b b
[77i 33~772 i] 313d / Politics, BK vn, CH 4 77d-78a; [55i i9-552 27] 78c-79c; CH 21
b b
[1326*35-40] 530c [553*i6- 2] 80a-b; CH 31 [556 25]-cn 32
b
10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 3 ld-2b [557 i4] 83c-84b; BK vi, CH 15-16 95a-96a /
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 1-2, 167a- Generation of Animals, BK i, CH i [715*18-
d; CH 5 169b-c; CH 7 170c-171a; BK n, CH 3, 716*2] 255b-256a;CH 16 [721*3-11] 260d-261a;
b
186c-d BK CH i [732 8-i4] 272d-273a; CH 3 [737*1-
ii,
Q 80, A 2, REP 2 957c-958b; A 3, ANS 958b- 8c(5) Factors aflFecting fertility and sterility
959c; A 4, ANS and REP 2,4-5 959c-963a 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK in, CH n
b
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xxv [5i8 i-3] 43a; BK v, CH n [54^21-31] 70c;
[37-51] 91d CH 14 71b-73b; BK vn, CH i [58i b 22]-cn 3
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK in, [583*25] 107b-108d passim; CH 5 [585*33]-^ 6
b b
144b; 189b [585 29] lllb-d; BK ix, CH 50 [63 i 19-632*32]
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 269b-d 157a-c / Generation of Animals, BK i, CH 4
b
28 HARVEY On Animal Generation, 338a-d 340c-
: ; [7i7*29~ 5] 257b; CH 7 258a-b; CH 18 [725*4-
CH b
342d, 347d-348d; 353a-363d; 365a; 383d- 726*7] 265a-266a; 19 [727 6-26] 267c-268a;
CH 4 b
407a esp 402d-405c; 417a-429c; 461d-472c; BK ii, [739*26-35] 280b; CH 7 (746 i2]-CH
473c-d 8 [749*5] 287d-290a,c; BK in, CH i [749^6-
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 192a~b 750*13] 291a-b; BK iv, CH 2 [767*13-35] 308c-
49 DARWIN- Descent of Man, 257c; 372b-c d; CH 5 [77^29-33] 315d / Politics, BK vn, CH
54 FREUD: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 653b-c; 16 [i335*7-b i] 540a-c
655b-d / New Introductory Lectures, 853d-854c 10 HIPPOCRATES Airs, Waters, Places, par 3 9c-
:
b b
[542 3o-33] 69c; BK VI,CH 3 [562*24~ 2] 88c-d;
9b. The nourishment of the embryo or foetus CH ii [566*15-16] 92b; CH 12 (566b6-8) 92c-d;
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK v, CH 18 CH 19 [573 b i9-32] 99c-d; CH 20 [574^5-26]
b
[550*16-24] 77a; BK CH
j 87c-88d;
vi, CH 10 lOOc; CH 22 t575 34-57 6*3l lolc CH 3 (579* ?
b b
[564 26-565*u] 91a-b; [565*2-10] 91c-d; CH 20-21] 104d; en 31 (579*34~ i2) 105a-b; CH
b
13 [568*1-4] 94a; BK vn, CH 8 112c-113a / 33-35 105c-106a; CH 37 (58o io-2o] 106b-c;
b
Generation of Animals, BK i, CH 22 [730*33^9] BK vn, CH 4 (584 26-585*27] UOc-lllb / Parts
270d; BK n, CH 4 [740*17-741*2] 281a-d; CH 7 ofAninufifi BK iv, CH 10 [688*28^25] 220a-c /
[745*22-746*28] 287a-c; BK in, CH i [751*6-7] Generation of Animals, BK i, CH 18 [723b 9~i6]
b
CH 2 [752*24^28] 293b-294a; [753*36-
292ft;, 263c-d; CH 20 {728 33-729*2o] 269a-b; BK iv,
b
754*15] 294c-295b; CH 3 [754 i~755*6] 295c- CH 4-5 3IIc-3l6c
CHAPTER 2: ANIMAL 45
BK b
10 HIPPOCRATES: Aphorisms, SECT v, par 38 139a III, CH 20 [52I 2l]-CH 21 [523*13] 46d-48cj
a b b
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 363a; 382d- BK v, CH 18 [550 32- 6J 77b-c, CH 22 [553 24~
b
384a; 481 a; 482 b; 482d-483a; 484b; 488a; 554 6] 80c-81b; CH 26-27 82a-c; CH 33
488c [55 8a 4 ]~ CH 34 [55 8b 4l 84d-85a,c; BK vi, CH 4
b
88d-89b; CH 6-9 89c-90d; CH 12 (566 i6-
9e. The period of gestation: parturition, de- b
567*7] 92d-93a; CH 14 [568 13-569*4] 94c-
livery, birth b
9Sa, CH 20 [574 7-i3] lOOb; CH 21 [575 9~i2]
b
b
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 25:24-26; 38:27-30 / lOlb, CH 22 [576 n-i2] 102a-b; CH 26-27
Job, 39:1-4 103d; CH 33 [580*2-5] 105c-d; BK vu, CH 3
APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 7:2 (D) OT, [583*26-33] 108d-109a; CH 5 [585*29-33] lllb;
Boo\ of Wisdom, 7 .2 CH ii 114a,c; BK vm, CH i [588b 3 1-589*3]
6 HERODOTUS- History, BK in, 112d-113b; BK 115b; BK ix, CH 4 [6n*9]-CH 5 [611*21] 136d;
vi, 197b-c; 198b-d CH 7 [612^6-613*16] 138od; CH 8 [613^-33]
9 ARISTOTLE. History of Animals, BK v, CH n b
139a-c; CH n [6i4 3i~34] 140c; CH 29 143c-d;
b
[543 i4-i7] 70b; CH 12 [544*1-3] 70c; CH 14 CH 32-34 144b-145c passim; CH 37 [62i*2i-b i]
b b b
[54 5 6-9 72b; [540 i-i4l 73a-b; CH 17 [549*
] 146d-147a; CH 49 [63i i3-i7] 156d-157a /
14-20] 76a; [549^-13] 76b-c; CH 18 [550*26- Parts of Animals, BK iv, CH 10 [688*i9-b 34]
b
29] 77b, [55o 6-i4] 77c; CH 20 [553*2-11] 79d; 219d-220d / Generation of Animals, BK in, CH
BK vi, CH 2 [559 b n-i6] 86b; [56o b i7-24J 87a- 2 [752 b i7-753*i7] 293d-294b; CH 10 [759*36-
b b
b; CH 4 [562 i5~3i] 89a; CH 10 [565*22-31] 8] 300c; BK iv, CH 8 318b-319c / Politics,
91c, [565^4-32] 92a; CH n [566*15-16] 92b; BK i, CH 8 [i256 b 7~i5] 450b-c; BK vu, CH 17
b
CH 12 [566 i9-2o] 92d; CH 13 [567*28^27] [1336*3-22] 541a-b
b
93c-d; CH 17 96b-97b; CH 18 [572 3i-573*32] 12 LUCRETIUS- Nature of Things, BK v [806-815]
b a b
98d-99a, CH 19 [573 2i] 99c; CH 20 [574 2o- 7J 71c
b 28 HARVEY Motion of the Heart, 288d / On
lOOa-b; CH 21 [575*25-29] lOla; CH 22 [575
26-27] lOlc, [576*21-25] 101d-102a; CH 23 Animal Generation, 350c-d; 361b-362c; 381 b-
a b a
[577 24- io] 102d-103a; CH 26 [578 io]-cH 29 382d; 402a-b; 439a-d; 461b; 464c-d; 487c-
b a
[578 i8] 103d-104b; CH 30 [579 i9]-CH 31 488a
b b
[579 5] 104d-105a; CH 33 [579 3i]-cn 35 33 PASCAL: Weight of Air, 415a
[580*19] 105c-106a; BK VH, CH i [582*16-21] 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH vn, SECT 78-80
b b
107d; CH 3 [583 n]-cH 4 [584 25] 109b-110c; 42b-43a
CH 9 [586 b 26]-cn 10 [587^] 113a-d; BK vin, 36 STHRNL- Tristram Shandy, 316b
CH 21 [603*34-604*3] 129d; CH 24 [604*29- 38 ROUSSEAU- Inequality, 336a-b; 337b; 340c
605*1] 130c / Generation of Animals, BK i, CH 44 ROSWELL- Johnson, 510b-c
n [719*2-30] 259a-b; BK n, CH 8 [748*27-31] 48 MELVILLE Moby Dtc{, 286b-287b
b
289c; BK in, CH 2 [752 io- i7] 293a-d, BK iv,
ft
49 DARWIN. Origin of Species, HOc-lllb / De-
CH 4 [772 b 5-n] 314b-c; CH 6 [775*28^2] scent of Man, 289d-290a; 339d-340c; 441c-d;
317b-c, CH 8 [777*22]-cH 10 [778*12] 319b- 443b-444a
320a,c / Politics, BK vu, CH 16 [1335*11-22] 51 TOLSIOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE i, 661 d;
b
540a; [H35 i2-i9] 540c 662c-d
10 HIPPOCRATES: Airs, Waters, Places, par 4-5 53 JAMES- Psychology, 709a-710a
lOa-d; par 7, lla-c / Aphorisms, SECT v, par 54 FREUD- New Introductory Lectures, 854c
29-62 138d-139d
10 GALEN- Natural Faculties, BK in, CH 3 200a- 9g. Characteristics of the offspring at birth
201a; CH 12, 208c-d 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK vi, CH 20
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i, [574*20-29] lOOa; CH 30 [579*2i]-cH 31 [579*9]
5c-6b; 8c-9c 104d-105b; CH 33 [580*4]-^ 35 [580*29]
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 343d; 353a- 105d-106a / Generation of Animals, BK iv, CH 6
b; 381b-382d; 406a-b; 458c-459d; 476c [774*5-775*6] 316c-317a; BK v 320a-331a,c
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 268a-b; 270a-274a passim
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 254a-255a; 287a-b 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 222b-223b
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 94a / Descent of 53 JAMES: Psychology, 49b-50a; 691a-b; 710a
Man, 341b,d [fn 32], 384b-c
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK iv, 180d-183b 10. Heredity and environment: the genetic
54 FREUD: Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, determination of individual differences
737c-738a passim and similarities
7 PLATO: Republic, BK in, 340b-341a
9f. The care and feeding of infant offspring: 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK vi, CH 19
lactation b a
CH 29 [57^26-30]
[573 32-574 9l 99d; 104c;
7 PLATO: Republic, BK v, 362b-c BKjvn, CH 6 [585*29-586*14] llld-112b / Parts
9 ARISTOTLE History of Animals, BK n, CH
: i
of Animals, BK i, CH i [640*14-28] 162c-d;
b
[500*13-33] 22b-c; CH 13 [504 22-27] 27a-b; [641*27-39] 164d-165a; CH 17 [72i*i4]-cH 18
46 THE GREAT IDEAS ll/o [la
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 181a-206a,c esp
(10. Heredity and environment: the genetic de- 181a-184d, 196a-199d, 204d-206a,c; 231b-c;
termination of individual differences and 237c-238b
similarities.)
1 \b. The relation between animals and their
[724*13] 261c-264b; BK iv, CH i [766^-12]
environments
307d; CH 3-4 308d-315b / Politics, BK n, CH 3
b
[1262*14-24] 457a; BK vn, CH 16 [i335 i7-i9] 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK iv, 129a-b
540c 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK n, CH 8 [i98 b i6-33]
10 HIPPOCRATES: Airs, Waters, Places, par 14 275d-276a / Longevity 710a-713a,c passim
15a-b / Sacred Disease, 155d-156a 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK i, CH i
b
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK HI [741-753] [487*i4~ 33] 8a-d; BK HI, CH 12 [519*3-19]
39c-d; BK iv [1209-1232] 60a-b 43d-44a; CH 21 [522^2-523*1] 47d-48a; BK
19 AQUINAS; Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 119, iv, 5 [530^9-24] 57c; BK v, CH
CH [543 i9- n b
144b-c / Generation of Animals, BK in, CH n 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents > 791 d-
b
302c-d
[76i 9-24] 792a
12 LUCRETIUS- Nature of Things, BK n [532-540]
21d 12. The treatment of animals by men
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, QQ 71-
\2a. The taming of animals
72 367a-369d
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK vn [387-498] 225b- 4 HOMER: Odyssey, BK iv [625-637] 205c
228a 5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound [459-468] 44d
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 630b-c [n 43] 5 SOPHOCLES Antigone [332-352] I34a
:
6:34-44; 11:1-11 / Lu^e, 19:29-38 / John, 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK xvn [426-455] 126c-d; BK
12:14-15 / I Corinthians, 9:9 / / Timothy, 5:18 xix [399-424] 141a,c; BK xxm [272-286] 164a
4 HOMER: Iliad 3a-179d passim, esp BK i
[428- / Odyssey, BK xvn [290-327] 280a-c
471] 7c-8a, BK[394-431] 14a-b, [760-779]
ii 5 ARISTOPHANES: Birds [294-382] 545d-547b
17c-d, BK iv [104-111] 25a, BK v [191-208] 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 5b-d
32a-b, BK xxin [262-611] 164a-167c / Odyssey, 9 ARISIOTLL: History of Animals, BK ix, CH 44
BK in [418-463] 197b-d; BK xi [23-50] 243b-c; [630*9-12] 155b; CH 48 [631*7-10] 156b-c
BK xn [260-419] 252d-254c 14 PLUTARCH: Pericles, 121a-b / Marcus Cato,
5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound [459-468] 44d 278d-279c / Alexander, 562b; 570a-b
5 ARISTOPHANES: Peace [1-181] 526a-528a / 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PARI n-n, Q 25,
Birds [294-382] 545d-547b; [1076-1087] 556a-b A 3 502c-503b
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK 11, 57b-58b; 59b-c; 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 206b-208a; 224c-225b;
62c-64c; BK m, 95b-c; llld'112c; 113c-d; BK 227b-228b
iv, 127d-128a; 146d-147a; BK v, 183b-d 26 SHAKESPEARE: Two Gentlemen of Verona, ACT
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK HI, CH 20 iv, sc iv [1-42] 248b-d
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The general discussion of the grades of life and the kinds of soul, see LIFE AND DEATH 3, 3b;
SOUL 2c-2c(3).
Other considerations of the issue concerning continuity or discontinuity in the relation of
plants, animals, and men, as well as between living and non-living things, see EVOLUTION
3e, 7a~7b; LIFE AND DEATH 2, 33; MAN la-ic; NATURE 3b; SENSE 2a.
The comparison of men and animals, or of different species of animals, with respect to
sensitivity, memory, imagination, and intelligence, see MEMORY AND IMAGINATION i;
MIND 3a~3b; REASONING la; SENSE 20-20.
The general theory of instinct, see HABIT 3-36; and for the emotional aspect of instincts, see
EMOTION ic.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boofy of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
place,
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
GALEN. On of Parts
the Utility IV
HOBBES. Concerning Body, PART iv, CH 25 T. H. HUXLEY. Methods and Results, v
GOETHE. Metamorphose der Pflanzen FRAZER. The Golden Bough, PART v, CH 9, 13-17
WUNDT. Outlines
of Psychology, (19)
II.
JENNINGS. Behavior of the Lower Organisms
Aesop's Fables SHERRINGTON. The Integrative Action of the Nervous
THEOPHRASTUS. Enquiry into Plants System
OVID. Metamorphoses DRIESCH. The Science and Philosophy ofthe Organism
PLINY. Natural History HENDERSON. The Fitness of the Environment
VESALIUS. The Epitome KOEHLER. The Mentality of Apes
SUAREZ. Disputatwnes Metaphysicae, XLIV (3) D. W. THOMPSON. On Growth and Form
LA FONTAINE. Fables LOEB. The Organism as a Whole
LINNAEUS. Systema Naturae ,Forced Movements, Tropisms and Animal
LAMETTRIE. Man a Machine Conduct
CONDILLAC. Traite des animaux J. S. HALDANE and J. G. PRIESTLEY. Respiration
SCHWANN. Microscopical Researches into the Accord- NEEDHAM. Order and Life
ance in the Structure and Growth of Animals and WHITEHEAD. Modes of Thought, LECT vn-vm
Plants LARGE. The Advance of the Fungi
LOTZE. Microcosmos, BK i, CH 5 WIENER. Cybernetics
Chapter y. ARISTOCRACY
INTRODUCTION
r
T"" f
HE forms of government have been vari- speak of "the elite" and "the four hundred";
JL ously enumerated, differently classified, or we follow Marx and Engels in thinking of the
and given quite contrary evaluations in the "feudal aristocracy" as the class "that was
great books of political theory. In the actual ruined by the bourgeoisie." The Communist
history of political institutions, as well as in the Manifesto wastes little sympathy on the aristo-
tradition of political thought, the major prac- crats who, while seeking an ally in the prole-
with respect to the forms of govern-
tical issues tariat, forgot that "they [too] exploited under
ment the open, the ideals to be
choices circumstances and conditions that were quite
sought, or the evils to be remedied have shifted different." For Marx and Engels, the aristoc-
with the times. racy and the bourgeoisie alike represent the
In an earlier day not merely in ancient propertied classes, but they differ in the man-
times, but as late as the i8th century the ner in which they came by their property and
form of government called "aristocracy" pre- power. The landed gentry and the feudal no-
sented a genuine alternative to monarchy, and bility got theirs largely by inheritance, the
set a standard by which the defects and infir- bourgeoisie by industry and trade.
mities of democracy were usually measured. If Today, for the most part, we call a man an
aristocracy was not always regarded as the ideal "aristocrat" justly or unjustly, he claims a
if,
form of government, the principle of aristoc- right to certain social distinctions or privileges.
racy always entered into the definition of the We seldom use that word today to indicate a
political ideal. man who deserves special political status or pre-
Today, both in theory and practice, aristoc- eminence, though we do sometimes use it to
racy is at the other end of the scale. For a name the proponent of any form of government
large part of mankind, and for the political which rests upon the political inequality of
philosopher as well as in prevailing popular men.
sentiment, aristocracy (together with mon- Since the discussion of aristocracy in the
50
CHAPTER 3: ARISTOCRACY 51
the one or the many exercise political power the Eleatic Stranger declares in the Statesman,
and dominate the state. By this criterion of "a far greater and more ruinous error than any
number, aristocracy is always differentiated adherence to written law."
from monarchy and democracy. Taking the division of governments accord-
Though he uses the word "oligarchy" to ing to number, "the principle of law and the
name what others call "aristocracy," Locke absence of law will bisect them all." Monarchy
defines the three forms of government by refer- divides into "royalty and tyranny" depending
ence to numbers. When
the majority them- on whether "an individual rules according to
selves exercise the whole power of the commu- law ... or governs neither by law nor by cus-
nity, Locke says, "then the form of the govern- tom, but pretends that he can only act for
. . .
ment is a perfect democracy."they put When the best by violating the laws, while in reality
"the power of making laws into the hands of a appetite and ignorance are the motives." By
few select men . then it is an oligarchy; or
. . the same criterion, the rule of the few divides
else into the hands of one man, and then it is "into aristocracy, which has an auspicious
a monarchy." Kant proceeds similarly, though name, and oligarchy." While democracy is sub-
again in somewhat different language. "The re- ject to the same division, Plato makes the same
lation of the supreme power to the people," he name apply to both its good and bad forms.
says, "is conceivable in three different forms: The second way in which aristocracy differs
either one in the state rules over all; or some, from oligarchyis also
brought out in the States'
united in relation of equality with each other, man. Since "the science of government," ac-
rule over all the others; or all together rule cording to Plato, is "among the greatest of all
over each individually, including themselves. sciences and most difficult to acquire . . .
any
The form of the state is therefore either auto- true form of government can only be supposed
tative distinctions like these are only super- ence." Because of this demand for "science,"
ficial and do not afford the concept of the which presupposes virtue and competence in
thing." The criterion of number does not seem ruling, monarchy and aristocracy came to be
to suffice when other forms of government defined as government by the single best man
are considered. It fails to distinguish monarchy or by the few best men in the community.
from tyranny or despotism, which may consist A
high degree of competence or virtue is,
of rule by one man, as has usually been the case however, not the only mark by which the few
historically. Number alone likewise fails to dis- may be distinguished from the many. The
tinguish aristocracy from oligarchy. In the de- possession of wealth or property in any size-
liberations of the Medean conspirators, which able amount also seems to divide a small class
Herodotus reports or invents, the rule of "a in the community from the rest, and Plato at
certain number of the worthiest" is set against times refers to aristocracy simply as the govern-
both democracy and monarchy and identified ment of the rich. Yet if wealth is the criterion
How, then, shall aristocracy be
as "oligarchy." by which the few are chosen to govern, then
distinguished from oligarchy? oligarchy results, at least in contrast to that
There seem to be two answers to this ques- sense of aristocracy in which the criterion is
tion. In the Statesman* Plato adds to the char- excellence of mind and character. Aristocracy
acteristic of number the "criterion of law and is called aristocracy, writes Aristotle, "either
the absence of law." The holders of political because the rulers are the best men, or because
power, whatever their number, may govern they have at heart the best interests of the state
either according to the established laws, or by and of the citizens."
arbitrary caprice in violation of them. "To go By these additional criteria never by num-
against the laws, which are based upon long ex- bers alonethe ancients conceive aristocracy.
perience, and the wisdom of counsellors who When it is so defined, it always appears to
have graciously recommended them and per- be a good form of government, but never the
suaded the multitude to pass them, would be," only good form, or even the best. The same
52 THE GREAT IOTAS
criteria also place monarchy among the good pariahs, Aristotle makes liberty the other mark
forms, and at least in Plato's Statesman^- of democracy freemen having, apart from
all
mocracy is a third good form, when it is lawful wealth or virtue, an equal claim to political
government by the many, the many being com- status. As "the principle of an aristocracy is
petent or virtuous to some degree. In this triad virtue," Aristotle writes, so wealth is the prin-
of good forms, aristocracy ranks second-best, ciple "of an oligarchy, and freedom of a de-
because government by one man is supposed to mocracy."
be more efficient, or because, in the hierarchy To the defenders of democracy, ancient or
of excellence, the few may be superior, but only modern, aristocracy and oligarchy stand to-
the one can be supreme. Aristotle, however, gether, at least negatively, in their denial of
seems to rank aristocracy above monarchy. the principle of equality. To the defenders of
"If we call the rule of many men, who are all aristocracy, oligarchy is as far removed as de-
of them good, aristocracy, and the rule of one mocracy, since both oligarchy and democracy
man royalty," he writes, "then aristocracy will neglect or underestimate the importance of
be better for states than royalty." virtue in organizing the state. Yet oligarchy
more than democracy is the characteristic per-
THE INTRODUCTION of democracy into the com- version of aristocracy. It also puts government
parison tends to complicate the discussion. Not in the hands of the few, but it substitutes
only are the many usually the poor, but they wealth for virtue as the criterion. The demo-
are also seldom considered pre-eminent in vir- cratic critic of aristocracy usually calls atten-
tue or competence. According to the way in tion to the way in which oligarchy tries to wear
which either wealth or human excellence is dis- the mask of aristocracy. However far apart aris-
tributed, both oligarchy and aristocracy organ- tocracy and oligarchy be in definition, he
may
ize the political community in terms of inequal- insists that in actual practice they tend to be-
ities in status, power, and privilege. This fact come identical, in proportion as wealth, or
leads Rousseau, for example, to use the different noble birth, or social class is taken as the sign
kinds of inequality among men as a basis for of intrinsic qualities which are thought to de-
peoples, where "the young bowed without tocracy has ever existed in purity of principle
question to the authority of experience." Elec- they deny that the governing few have ever
tive aristocracy arose "in proportion as artificial been chosen solely for their virtue. Machiavelh
inequality produced by institutions became assumes it to be a generally accepted fact that
predominant over natural inequality, and rich- "the nobles wish to rule and oppress the people
es or power were put before age." This form, in . and give vent to their ambitions/' Mon-
. .
Rousseau's opinion, is "the best, and is aris- tesquieu, although more optimistic about the
tocracy properly so called." The third, which possibility of a truly virtuous aristocracy, rec-
ischaracterized as "the worst of all govern- ognizes its tendency to profit at the expense of
ments," came about when "the transmission of the people. To overcome this he would have
the father's power along with his goods to his the laws make it "an essential point . . that .
children, by creating patrician families, made the nobles themselves should not levy the taxes
This emphasis upon inequality radically sep- kinds of commerce . . . and abolish the right of
arates aristocracy from democracy. From Aris- primogeniture among the endnobles, to the
totle down to Montesquieu, Rousseau, and our that by a continual division of the inheritances
bwn day, equality has been recognized as the their fortunes may be always upon a level."
distinctive element of democracy. Disregarding But perhaps the strongest attack upon aris-
slaves who, for the ancients, were political tocracy in all of the great political boob is
CHAPTER 3: ARISTOCRACY 53
made by Mill in his Representative Government. Then said all the trees unto the bramble, Come
thou, and reign over us.
He admits that "the governments which have
And the bramble said unto the trees, If in truth ye
been remarkable in history for sustained mental anoint me king over you, then come and put your
ability and vigour in the conduct of affairs have trust in my shadow: and if not, let fire come out of
generally been aristocracies." But he claims the bramble, and devour the cedars of Lebanon.
prosperity or happiness of the general body of honor have no attraction for them," necessity,
the citizens, and were often wholly incompati- Socrates says, "must be laid upon them, and
ble with it." When their actions are dictated by they must be induced to serve from fear of
"sinister interests," as frequently happens, the punishment. . . . Now the worst part of the
aristocratic class "assumes to themselves an punishment is that he who refuses to rule is lia-
endless variety of unjust privileges, sometimes ble to be ruled by one who is worse than him-
benefiting their pockets at the expense of the self. And the fear of this, as I conceive, induces
people,sometimes merely tending to exalt the good to take office . . not under the idea
.
them above others, or, what is the same thing that they are going to have any benefit or en-
in different words, to degrade others below joyment themselves, but as a necessity, and
themselves." because they are not able to commit the task
Yet except by those political thinkers who of ruling to anyone who is better than them-
deny the distinction between good and bad selves, or indeed as good."
aristocracy is dismissed as an ideal which can out recourse to the distinction between govern-
never be fully realized, the aristocratic princi- ment by laws and government by men.
ple reappears as a counsel of perfection in the It has already been noted that in the States-
improvement of other forms of government. man Plato makes respect for the laws and vio-
Eveivso, one difficulty remains, which tends lation of the laws the marks of good and bad
to prevent aristocracy from being realized in government respectively. But he also proposes
practice, quite apart from any question of its that "the best thing of all is not that the law
soundness in principle. It lies in the reluctance should rule, but that a man should rule, sup-
of the best men to assume the burdens of public posing him to have wisdom and royal power."
office. The parable told in the Book of Judges The imperfections of law could then be avoided,
applies to aristocracy as much as to monarchy. because one or a few men of almost superhuman
wisdom would govern their inferiors even as
The went forth on a time to anoint a king
trees
the gods could direct the affairs of men without
over them; and they said unto the olive tree, Reign
the aid of established laws. But if no man is a
thou over us.
But the olive tree said unto them, Should I leave god in relation to other men, then, in Plato's
my sweetness, and my good fruit, and go to be rule by men is discussed in the chapters on
promoted over the trees
?
CONSTITUTION and MONARCHY. But here we
Then said the trees unto the vine, Come thou, must observe how the difference between these
and reign over us.
two types of rule affects the understanding of
And the vine said unto them, Should I leave my
wine, which cheereth God and man, and go to be
all other forms of government. This can be seen
republican government on the other. ple is possessed of the supreme power," thus
There are passages in which Aristotle regards including both democracy and aristocracy. In
absolute rule by one or a few superior men as both, laws, not men, are supreme, but the spirit
the divine or godlike form of government. of the laws is different. In democracy, the
When one man or a few excel "all the others to- "spring," or principle, "by which it is made to
gether in virtue, and both rulers and subjects act," is virtue resting on equality; in aristoc-
are fitted, the one to rule, the others to be racy, "moderation is the very soul ... a mod-
ruled/' it is right, in Aristotle's opinion, for the eration . . . founded on virtue, not that which
government to be royal or absolute rather than proceeds from indolence and pusillanimity."
political or constitutional whether one man Hegel's comment on this theory deserves men-
rules or a few. "Royal rule is of the nature of an tion. "The fact that 'moderation' is cited as the
aristocracy," he says. "It is based upon merit, principle of aristocracy," he writes, "implies
whether of the individual or of his family." the beginning at this point of a divorce between
But in other passages Aristotle seems to re- public authority and private interest."
gard absolute government as a despotic regime, For Aristotle, in contrast to Montesquieu,
appropriate to the family and the primitive the two major types of constitution are the
tribe, but not to the state, in which it is better democratic and the oligarchical, according as
for equals to rule and be ruled in turn. In either free-birth or wealth is made the chief qualifica-
case, it makes a difference to the meaning of tion for citizenship and public office. Aristoc-
aristocracy differs from monarchy only on the no further than the attempt to unite the free-
point of numbers the few as opposed to the dom of the poor and the wealth of the rich,"
one. Otherwise, aristocracy and monarchy are he points out that "there are three grounds on
defended in the same way. The defense usually which men claim an equal share in the govern-
takes one of two directions. One line of argu- ment, freedom, wealth, and virtue."
ment which stems from Plato and Aristotle When the fusion goes no further than the
claims that inequality in wisdom or virtue be- attempt to unite the freedom of the poor and
tween ruler and ruled justifies absolute rule by the wealth of the rich, "the admixture of the
the superior. The other line is followed by those two elements," Aristotle says, is "to be called a
who, like Hobbes, maintain that since sover- polity."But sometimes the mixture of democ-
eignty is absolute, unlimited, and indivisible, racy with oligarchy may include an ingredient
the difference between kinds of government of aristocracy, as in "the distribution of offices
"consisteth not in the difference of Power, but according to merit." The union of these three
in the difference ofConvenience, or Aptitude elements "is to be called aristocracy or the
to produce the Peace, and Security of the peo- government of the best," and "more than any
ple." When they are conceived as forms of ab- other form of government, except the true and
solute government, aristocracy and monarchy the ideal," has, in Aristotle's judgment, "a
it
are attacked for the same reason; to those who name." Polity and aristocracy, as
right to this
regard absolutism or despotism in government mixed constitutions, are fusions of some of the
as unjust because it violates the basic
equality same elements; hence, he says, it is "obvious
of men, an absolute monarchy and a despotic that they are not very unlike."
aristocracy are both unjust.
Aristocracy, however, can also be conceived BEGINNING IN the i8th century, and with the
as a form or aspect of constitutional govern- rise of representative government, the discus-
CHAFFER 3: ARISTOCRACY 55
sion of aristocracy as a distinct form of govern- it is also claimed by Hamilton, Madison, and
ment largely super-ceded by the consideration
is Jay to be a necessary safeguard for popular gov-
of the role which the aristocratic principle plays ernment. The senate, for instance, is not only
in the development of republican institutions. to provide elder statesmen, but is also to serve
The writers of The Federalist^ for example, as "a salutary check on the government . . .
respond in several places to the charge that the [which] doubles the security to the people, by
constitution which they are defending shows requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies
tendencies toward aristocracy or oligarchy. Yet in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the
in their consideration and defense of the new ambition or corruption of one would otherwise
instrument of government as essentially repub- be sufficient," The electoral college aims di-
lican, they frequently appeal to principles that rectly at placing the immediate election of the
are aristocratic in nature. president in the hands of "men most capable
In giving their own meanings to the terms of analyzing the qualities adapted to the sta-
"republic" and "pure democracy" that is, tion . . , under circumstances favorable to de-
government by elected representatives on the liberation." In addition it may serve as an
one hand, and by the direct participation of the "obstacle opposed to cabal, intrigue, and
. . .
whole people on the other the Federalists also corruption," which are the "most deadly ad-
give an aristocratic bent to the very notion of versaries of republican government."
representation. They seem to share the opinion In all these respects, as well as in the restric-
of Montesquieu that "as most citizens have tions on suffrage which it
permitted the states
sufficient ability to choose, though unqualified to impose, the unamended American constitu-
to be chosen, so the people, though capable of tion appears to have adopted an aristocratic
calling others to account for their administra- principle in government. Whether the motiva-
tion, are incapable of conducting administra- tion of its proponents was fact simply aris- m
tions themselves." tocratic, or whether it was partly or even
Thus Madison praises "the delegation of the leadership being the right
largely oligarchical
government ... to a small number of citizens of men
of "good" family and substantial prop-
elected by the rest" as tending "to refine and ertywill always be a question to be decided
enlarge the public views, by passing them in the light of the documents and the relevant
through the medium of a chosen body of citi- historic evidence.
voice, pronounced by the representatives of with regard to the extension of suffrage, John
the people, will be more consonant to the pub- Stuart Mill appears to be no less concerned
lic good than if
pronounced by the people than they are to introduce aristocratic elements
themselves, convened for the purpose." into the structure of representative govern-
On such a view, the people's representatives ment.
in the legislature, or other branches of govern- According to Mill, two grave dangers con'
ment, are supposed to be not their minions, front a democracy: "Danger of a low grade of
but their betters. For the American constitu- intelligence in the representative body, and
tionalists, as for Edmund Burke, the represent- in the popular opinion which controls it; and
ative serves his constituents by making inde- danger of class legislation on the part of the
pendent decisions for the common good, not by numerical majority." Claiming that much of
doing their bidding. This theory of representa- the blame for both dangers lies in the rule of
tion, to which Mill and other democratic think- the majority, Mill looks for means to overcome
ers agree in part, supposes that the representa- the situation in which "the numerical majority
tive knows better than his constituents what is . . . alone possess practically any voice in the
for their good. State."
The effort to ensure leadership by superior His major remedy was a system of propor-
men may involve the aristocratic principle, yet tional representation. This would supposedly
56 THE GREAT IDEAS
constitute a democratic improvement by secur- than another is to see some necessity for the
ing representation for "every minority in the admixture of democratic and aristocratic prin-
* 1
whole nation ... on principles of equal justice. ciples in constructing a political constitution.
But it may also serve to increase an aristocratic But the issue is whether distributive justice re-
element, since "affords the best security for
it quires, as a matter of right, that the best men
the intellectual qualifications desirable in the should rule or hold public office.
representatives." This would be brought about Some political philosophers, like Plato and
by making possible the election of "hundreds Aristotle, tend to take the aristocratic view
of able men of independent thought, who that men of superior ability have a right to
would have no chance whatever of being chosen govern that for them to be ruled by their in-
by the majority," with the result that Parlia- feriors would be unjust. This theory places
ment would contain the "very elite of the greater emphasis on the inequality than on
country." the equality of men. Their democratic oppo-
To make still more certain that men of su- nents insist that the equality of men as men is
perior political intelligence exert an effect upon the fundamental fact and the only fact hav-
government, Mill also proposes a plurality of ing a bearing on the just distribution of suffrage.
votes for the educated and the establishment of That certain individuals have superior aptitude
an upper legislative chamber based on a spe- for the exercise of political authority does not
ing a "government of the best," but also be- equality inhuman nature. The selection of the
cause they are designed to prevent a govern- best men for public office is, on this theory, not
ment based on a majority of "manual labour- a matter of justice, but of expediency or pru-
ers" with the consequent danger of "too low a dence.
standard of political intelligence." Another issue concerns the weight to be given
the opinion of the majority as against the
THE ISSUES RAISED by the theory of aristocracy, opinion of the wise or the expert when, as
or by the aristocratic principle in government, frequently happens, these opinions diverge or
seem to be basically the same in all centuries, conflict.As the chapter on OPINION indicates,
however different the terms or the context in the experts themselves disagree about the
which they are expressed. Even when, as today, soundness of the popular judgment.
a purely aristocratic form of government does Where Thucydides believes that "ordinary
not present a genuine political alternative to men usually manage public affairs better than
peoples who have espoused democracy, there their more gifted fellows," because "the latter
remains the sense that pure or unqualified de- are always wanting to appear wiser than the
mocracy is an equally undesirable extreme. The laws," Herodotus observes that "it seems easier
qualifications proposed usually add an aristo- to deceive the multitude than one man."
cratic leaven. Where Hegel holds it to be "a dangerous and a
One concerns the equality and in-
issue false prejudice, that the People alone have rea-
equality of men. The affirmation that all men son and insight, and know what justice is,"
are created equal does not exclude a recognition John Jay declares that "the people of any coun-
of their individual inequalities the wide di- try (if, like the Americans, intelligent and well-
versity of human talents and the uneven dis- informed) seldom adopt and steadily persevere
tribution of intelligence and other abilities. for many years in an erroneous opinion respect-
Nor does it mean that all men use their native ing their interests," and Hamilton adds that
endowments to good purpose or in the same "the people commonly intend \hz public good."
degree to acquire skill or knowledge or virtue. Sometimes the same author seems to take
To grasp the double truththat no man is both sides of the
issue, as Aristotle does when,
more human than another, though
essentially though he says that "a multitude is a better
one may have more of certain human abilities judge of many things than any individual," he
CHAPTER 3: ARISTOCRACY 57
yet prefers government by the one or few who present ambiguity. We have already noted it in
are eminent in wisdom or virtue. Each side, considering the reality of the line between aris-
perhaps, contributes only part of the truth, tocracy and oligarchy. The agreement or dis-
Certamly those who acknowledge a political agreement of Mill and Aristotle, of Burke and
wisdom in the preponderant voice of the many, Plato, of Hamilton and Paine, of Veblen and
but who also recognize another wisdom in the Pareto, or fohn Dewey and Matthew Arnold
trained differently or more extensively than There is also an artificial aristocracy founded on
their fellow citizens? Shall vocational educa- wealth and birth* without either virtue or tal-
tion be given to the many, and liberal educa- ents; for with these it would belong to the first
tion be reserved for the few? class. The natural aristocracy I consider as the
These questions provide some measure of the most precious gift of nature, for the instruc-
extent to which anyone's thinking is aristo- tion, the trusts, the government of society . . .
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAOB
1. The general theory and evaluation of aristocracy 58
\a. Aristocracy as a good form of government
6. The selection of the best men for public office: the aristocratic theory of representation
in modern constitutional government
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 J MAES -.Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the
page.
For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS. One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nchemiah, 7:45 (D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
1. The general theory and evaluation of aris toe- la. Aristocracy as a good form of government
racy OLD TESTAMENT- Exodus, 18-13-26 / Deuteron-
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK HI, 107c-108c omy, 1.9-17 / Proverbs, 29.2
7 PLATO: Republic, BK ii-vn, 316a-401d / APOCRYPHA- Ecclesiasticus, 10:1-2 (D) OT,
Statesman, 598b-604b / Laws, BK HI, 665c- Ecclesiasticus, 10.1-2
666c; 669d-672a 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK in, 107d-108a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK viii, CH 10 [n6ob 32- 6 TmjcYDiDES'.Peloponnetian War, BK iv, 478d-
n6i a2] 413a-b; CH 11
ft
BK vi, 34d-35a; BK vin, 56b-57c; BK xn, A 4, ANS 229b-230c; Q 105, A i, ANS 307d-
90b*c; BK xv, 109a-b; BK xvm, 125a-b 309d
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 359a-c / Social Con- 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK n t 4a;
tract, BK in, 410b-c; 415d; 418c; BK iv, 427a-d 6b-8c; BK v, 21d-22c; BK vin, 52c; BK xi,
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 81c-d 71d-72b; 75b-d; 76c-77c
42 KANT: Science of Right, 450a-452 esp 450b-d 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 81c*d
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 39, 125b-d 42 KANT: Science of Right, 439c-440a; 450a-d
43 MILL: "Representative Government* 363b-369b 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 39, 125b-d; NUMBER
passim; 387c-d 63, 194b-195b; NUMBER 71, 216a-b
60 THE GREAT IDEAS 2<r/o3
b
[n6o 32-i 161*2] 413a-b / Politics, BK n, CH 10
The
[i272*27- io] 468c-469a; CH n 469a-470b;
(2. relation of aristocracy to other jorms of b
7 PLATO- Republic, BK vi, 380b-c / Statesman, 6. The selection of the best men for public
598b-604b / Seventh Letter, 806d-807b office:the aristocratic theory of repre-
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK in, CH 10 [1281*29-38] sentation in modern constitutional gov-
ernment
479a; CH 13 [1284*3-18] 482a-b;cn 15 [1286*7-
b
8] 484b-d; CH 17 486c-487a esp [1288*5-14] OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 41:33-40 / Exodus,
486c-d 18:13-26 / Deuteronomy, 1-9-18 / Judges esp
23 HOB BBS: leviathan, PART iv, 273a-c 9:8-15 / / Samuel, 1:1-25:1 (D) I Kings,
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH xvni, SECT 199- 1:1-25:1 / / Kings, 3 5 -i5_(D) /// Kings,
:
APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 38:24-34 (D) OT, d; BK in, 425b-c; BK iv, 478d; BK vi, 520b-c
Ecclesiasticus, 38 125-39 7 PLATO: Protagoras, 44d-45b / Republic, BK 11,
7 PLATO: Republic, BK ii-in, 320c-339a; BK vi- 319a-320c; BK in, 339b-341a; BK v, 369c-
vii, 383b-401d csp BK VH, 389d-401d / 370a; BK vi, 373c-375b; 3S3b-d; BK vn,
62 THE GREAT IDEAS 6 to 7
46b; CH VIH, SECT 105-112 48c-51b passim sc in [33-54] IQSc/ All's Well That Ends Well,
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART i, 28b-29a; PART n, ACT n, sc in [115-151] 152c-153a / Coriolanus
73a-b 351a-392a,c esp ACT i, sc i [1-47] 351a-d, ACT
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK n, 4d-5a; 11, sc i [1-106] 361a-362a
BK in, 10c-lla; BK v, 21d-22c; BK xi, 71a~72b 36 SWIFT: Gulltver, PART n, 73a-76b; PART iv,
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK in, 412b-c; 157a-158b
BK iv, 427a-d 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirtt of Laws, BK n, 6b-7c;
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK iv, 269d-271d; BK v, 23a-25a; BK vn, 45b-c; BK xi, 76c-84c
BK v, 309c-311c 38 ROUSSEAU: Political Economy, 369c-d / Social
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 61d-62a Contract, BK in, 418c-d [fn 2]
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. ARTICLE i, SECT 2
: 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK in, 165b-181a,c
[11-16] lib; SECT 3 [67-72] 12a; ARTICLE n, passim
SECT i 14b-15a; SECT 2 [424-439] 15b; 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 61d-62a
AMENDMENTS, XII 18d-C 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 71d-73c passim;
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 3, 33d-34a; NUMBER 217d-219a; 387d-390b passim; 427d-428a;
10, NUMBER 28, 98a; NUMBER 35,
51d-53a; 452d-456a,c esp 452d-453a,c, 453a-b; 570d;
113a-114b; NUMBER 52-63 165a-195b passim, 574b-582c; 588a-589a
csp NUMBER 57, 176d-177a; NUMBER 68 205b- 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 17, 70a-d
207a; NUMBER 76-77, 225a-229b 43 MILL: Representative Government, 363d-364d
43 MILL: Liberty, 290d-291a; 320c-322a / Repre- 46 HEGEL: Philosophy ofHistory, PART n, 277c-d;
sentative Government, 336b-337a; 338a-b; PART in, 285b-d; 310a-c; PART iv, 368b-d
341d-424c passim, csp 363b-366a, 384a-387d; 50 MARX: Capital, 355d-364a csp 356a-357a,
439d-442a 359a-c
44 BoswELL:/oAmo, 125c-d; 141a; 178b-c; 191c 50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 419b,d;
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 279, 420b-c; 423d-424b; 429c-430b
94b-c; par 291-295 97d-99a; par 308 102c- 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK ix, 384c-388a,c
CHAPTER 3: ARISTOCRACY 63
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The general theory of the forms of government, see GOVERNMENT 2-ae.
Other chapters on particular forms of government, see CONSTITUTION; DEMOCRACY; MON-
ARCHY; OLIGARCHY; TYRANNY; and for the conception of the ideal state, see STATE 6-6b.
The comparison of aristocratic with democratic theories of education, see EDUCATION 8d.
Discussions of the role of virtue in political theory, in relation to citizenship and public
office, see CITIZEN 5; VIRTUE AND VICE j-jd.
Another discussion of the theory of representation, see CONSTITUTION 9-o,b.
The role of honor in the organization of the state, and the theory of timocracy, see HONOR 43.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Eoo^s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals, These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
Monarchy .
Aristocracy and Evolution
FILMER. Patriarcha T. VEBLEN. The Theory of the Leisure Class
HARRINGTON. Oceana SANTAYANA. Reason in Society, CH 4
SEVIGNE. Letters BOUGL. Essais sur le regime des castes
A. SIDNEY. Discourses Concerning Government SOREL. Reflexions on Violence
MILLAR. Observations Concerning the Distinction of WENDELL. The Privileged Classes
Ran^s in Society SHAW. Socialism and Superior Brains
PAINE. Common Sense WELLS. The New Machiavelli
J. ADAMS. A Defense ofthe Constitutions of Govern- WEBER. Essays in Sociology, PART iv
ment of the United States of America PONSONBY. The Decline of Aristocracy
JEFFERSON. Notes on the State of Virginia P. E. MORE. Aristocracy and Justice
SIEYES. An Essay on Privileges PARETO. The Mind and Society
GODWIN. An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, BRYCE. Modern Democracies, PART i, CH 7; PART in,
BK v, CH lo-n, 13 CH75
BURKE. An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs DEWEY. The Public and Its Problems
. Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe MAIRET. Aristocracy and the Meaning of Class Rule
. Letter to a Noble Lord TAWNEY. Equality
AUSTEN. Pride and Prejudice BERGSON. Two Sources
of Morality and Religion,
J. MILL. An Essay on Government, in-v CH pp 62-82
i,
STENDHAL. The Red and the Blac^ J. B. S. HALDANE. The Inequality of Man
INTRODUCTION
word "art" has a range of meanings The ancient and traditional meanings are all
THE
which may be obscured by the current present in our daily vocabulary. In our thought
disposition to use the word in an extremely the first connotation of "art" is fine art; the m
restricted sense. Incontemporary thought, art thought of all previous eras the useful arts
is most readily associated with beauty; yet its came first. As late as the end of the i8th cen-
historic connections with utility and knowledge tury, Adam Smith follows the traditional usage
are probably more intimate and pervasive. which begins with Plato when, in referring to
The prevalent popular association reflects a the production of a woolen coat, he says: "The
tendency in the i9th century to annex the shepherd, the sorter of the wool, the wool-
theory of art to aesthetics. This naturally led comber or carder, the dyer, the scribbler, the
to the identification of art with one kind of art spinner, the weaver, the fuller, the dresser,
the so-called "fine arts," "beaux arts" or with many others, must all join their different
"Schone Kunste" (arts of the beautiful). The arts in order to complete even this homely
contraction of meaning has gone so far that the production."
word "art" sometimes signifies one group of In the first great conversation on artthat
the fine arts painting and sculptureas in presented in the Platonic dialogues we find
the common phrase "literature, music, and useful techniques and everyday skills typify-
the fine arts." This restricted usage has be- ing art, by reference to which all other skills
come so customary that we ordinarily refer to are analyzed. Even when Socrates analyzes the
a museum of art or to an art exhibit in a art of the rhetorician, as in the Gorgias, he con-
manner which seems to assume that the woid stantly turns to the productions of the cobbler
"art" exclusively the name for something
is and the weaver an%to the procedures of the
which can be hung on a wall or placed on a husbandman and the physician. If the liberal
pedestal. arts are praised as highest, because the logician
A moment's thought will, of course, correct or rhetorician wor||s in the medium of the soul
the assumption. We are not unfamiliar with the rather than in matter, they are called arts "only
the reference is to the production of useful The Promethean gift of fire to men, which
things. Our discussions of liberal education raisedthem from a brutish existence, carried
should require us to consider the liberal arts with it various
techniques for mastering matter
which, however defined or enumerated, are the basic useful arts. Lucretius, writing in
supposed to constitute skills of mind. We rec- a line that goes from Homer through Thucy-
ognize that "art" is the root of "artisan" as dides and Plato to Bacon, Adam Smith, and
well as "artist." We thus discern the presence Rousseau, attributes the progress of civilization
of skill in even the lowest forms of productive and the difference between civilized and primi-
labor. Seeing it also as the root of "artifice" tive society to thedevelopment of the arts and
and "artificial," we realize that art is dis- sciences. "Ships and tillage, walls, laws, arms,
tinguished from and sometimes even opposed roads, dress, and all such like things, all the
to nature. prizes, all the elegancies too of life without
CHAPTER 4: ART
exception, poems, pictures, and the chiselling to produce that result. Hence even in the case
of fine-wrought statues, all these things prac- of the shoe or the statue, art seems to be
ticed together with the acquired knowledge of primarily in the mind and work of the cobbler
the untiring mind taught men by slow degrees or sculptor and only derivatively in the objects
as they advanced on the way step by step." produced.
At the beginning of this progress Lucretius Aristotle, in defining art as a "capacity to
places man's discovery of the arts of metal- make, involving a true course of reasoning,"
working, domesticating animals, and cultivat- identifies it with making as distinct from doing
ing the soil. "Metallurgy and agriculture," says and knowing. Though art, like science and
Rousseau, "were the two arts which produced moral action, belongs to the mind and involves
this great revolution" the advance from prim- experience and learning, imagination and
itive to civilized life.The fine arts and the thought, it is distinct from both in aiming at
speculative sciences come last, not first, in the production, in being knowledge othow to make
progress of civilization. something or to obtain a desired effect. Science,
The fine arts and the speculative sciences on the other hand, is
knowledge that something
complete human life. They are not necessary is the case, or that a thing has a certain nature.
except perhaps for the good life. They are Knowledge is sometimes identified with science^
the dedication of human leisure and its best to the exclusion of art or skill; but we depart
fruit.The leisure without which they neither from this narrow notion whenever we recognize
could come into being nor prosper is found that skill consists in knowing how to make some-
produced by human work that skill of mind body is in servile subjection to the soul, and
which directs the hand in its manipulation of man as regards his soul is free. On the other
matter. Art is both in the artist and in the work hand, those sciences which are not ordained to
of art in the one as cause* in the other as the any suchlike work, are called sciences simply,
effect.
What is effected is a certain ennoble- and not arts."
ment of matter, a transformation produced The discussion of medicine in the great books
not merely by the hand of man, but by his throws light on the relation of art and science,
thought or knowledge. in their origin as well as their development.
The more generic meaning of art seems to Hippocrates writes of medicine as both an art
be that of art a cause rather than as effect. and a science. In his treatise on Ancient Medicine,
There are many spheres of art in which no he says, "It appears to me necessary to every
tend rather to speak of the art of the navi- and drink, and to his other occupations, and:
gator or the general. So, too, in medicine and what are the effects of each of them on every
teaching, jpe look upon the health or knowledge one. And it is not enough to know simply tha,t
which results frorn healing or teaching as natural. cheese a bad article of food, as disagreeing
is
We do not find *tt in them, but rather in the with whoever eats of it to satiety, but what
skill of the healer or teacher who has sort of disturbance it creates, and wherefore*
66 THE GREAT IDEAS
and with what principle in man it disagrees. . . . which others may use to put their own talent
Whoever does not know what effect these to the test."
things produce upon a man, cannot know the Granting that there is no art without science,
consequences which result from them, nor how is the reverse true, and is science possible with-
to apply them." As a science, medicine in- out art ? The question has two meanings. First,
volves knowledge of the causes of disease, the are there arts peculiarly indispensable to the
different kinds of diseases, and their charac- development of science? Second, does every
teristic courses. Without such knowledge, di- science generate a correlative art and through
agnosis, prognosis, and therapy would be a it work productively ?
matter of guesswork of chance, as Hippocrates Traditionally, the liberal arts have been con-
says or at best the application of rule-of- sidered indispensable to science. This has been
thumb in the light of past experience. held to be particularly true of logic. Because
But the scientific knowledge does not by it- they were intended to serve as the instrument
self make a man a healer, a practitioner of med- or the art for all the sciences, Aristotle's logical
icine. The practice of medicine requires art in treatises, which constitute the first systematic
addition to science art based on science, but treatment of the subject, deserve the title Or-
going beyond science in formulating general ganon which they traditionally carry. Bacon's
rules for the guidance of practice particular m Novum Organum was in one sense an effort to
cases. The habit of proceeding according to supply a new logic or art for science, and to
rules derived from science distinguishes for institute a renovation of the sciences by the
Galen the artist in medicine from the mere experimental method.
empiric. The antithesis of artist and empiric As an art, logic consists of rules for the con-
suggesting the contrast between operation duct of the mind in the processes of inquiry,
by tested rule and operation by trial and inference, definition, and demonstration, by
error parallels the antithesis between scientist which sciences are constructed. Scientific meth-
with which the art deals. This does not mean combining many techniques and using many
that an individual cannot acquire the habit of products of art: the water-clock, the inclined
an art without being taught the relevant scien- plane, and the pendulum of Galileo; the prisms,
tific knowledge. An art can be learned by prac- mirrors, and lenses of Newton.
tice; skill can be formed by repeated acts. But The second question whether all sciences
the teacher of an art cannot direct the learning have related arts and through them productive
without setting rules for his pupils to follow; power raises one of the great issues about the
and ifthe truth or intelligibility of the rules nature of scientific knowledge, discussed in the
is questioned, the answers will come from the chapters on PHILOSOPHY and SCIENCE.
science underlying the art. For Francis Bacon, and to some extent Des-
According to Kant, "every art presupposes cartes, art is the necessary consequence of sci-
rules which are laid down as the foundation ence.At the beginning of the Novum Organum>
which first enables a product if it is to be called Bacon declares that "knowledge and human
one of art, to be represented as possible.** In power are synonymous since the ignorance of
the case of "fine art," which he distinguishes the cause frustrates the effect; for nature
is
only
from other kinds of art as being the product of subdued by submission, and that which in con-
"genius," Kant claims that it arises only from templative philosophy corresponds with the
"atalent for producing that for which nodefinite cause, in practical science becomes the rule."
ftifecan be given." Yet he maintains that a The distinction Bacon makes here between the
"rule" is still at its basis and may be "gathered speculative and practical parts of knowledge
from the performance, i.e., from the product, corresponds to the distinction between science
CHAPTER 4: ART 67
and art, or as we sometimes say, "pure and directed to the necessities of life, others to
applied sdence." He opposes their divorce from recreation, the inventors of the latter were nat*
one another. If science is the indispensable foun- urally always regarded as wiser than the in-
dation of art and consists in a knowledge of ventors of the former, because their branches
causes, art in Bacon's view is the whole fruit did not aim at utility. Hence, when all such in-
of science, for it applies that knowledge to the ventions were already established, the sciences
itsdevelopment are directed to the establish- the places where meH first began to have lei-
ment of man's "empire over creation" which sure. ... So that the man of experience is
"is founded on the arts and sciences alone." thought to be wiser than the possessors of any
Just as the present state of the arts accounts sense-perception whatever, the artist wiser than
for "the immense difference between men's the man of experience, the master-worker than
most polished countries of Europe,
lives in the the mechanic, and the theoretical kinds of
and in any wild and barbarous region of the knowledge to be more of the nature of Wisdom
new Indies," so further advances in science tjian
the productive." That the theoretic sci*
promise the untold power of new inventions ences are useless, in the sense of not providing
and techniques. merrVith the necessities or pleasures of life, is a
On Bacon's view, not only the value, but mark of their superiority. They give what is
even the validity, of scientific knowledge is to better than such utility the insight and un-
be measured by its productivity. A useless nat- derstanding which constitute wisdom.
ural science a science of nature which cannot The Baconian reply condemns the concep-
be used to control nature is unthinkable. With tion that there can be knowledge which is
the exception of mathematics, every science merely contemplation of the truth. It an-
has its appropriate magic or special productive nounces the revolution which, for John Dewey,
power. Even metaphysics, in Bacon's concep- ushered in the modern world. The pragmatic
tion of it, has its "true natural magic, which theory of knowledge had its origin in a concep-
is that great liberty and latitude of opera- tion of science at every point fused with art.
tion which dependeth upon the knowledge of
forms." THE ANCIENTS, trying to understand the nat*
The opposite answer to the question about ural phenomena of change and generation,
science and art is
given by Plato, Aristotle, and found that the processes of artistic production
others who distinguish between speculative and provided them with an analytic model. Through
productive sciences. They differ from Bacon on understanding how he himself worked in mak-
the verbal level by using the word "practical" ing things, man might come to know how na-
for those sciences which concern moral and ture worked.
they call "productive," but under either name tion occur. The plan or idea in the artist's mind
these are the sciences of making rather than comes, through his manipulation of matter, to
doing sciences which belong in the sphere of be embodied and realized objectively. To the
art rather than prudence. But the significant ancients a number of different causes or factors
difference lies in the evaluation of the purely seemed to be involved in every artistic produc-
speculative sciences which consist in knowledge tionmaterial to be worked on; the activity
for its own sake, divorced from art and morals, of the artist at work; the form in his mind
or from the utilities of production and the which he sought to impose on the matter, thus
necessities of action. transforming it; and the purpose which moti-
In tracing the history of the sciences, Aris- vated his effort.
totle notes that those men who first found the In the medical tradition from Aristotle
useful arts were thought wise and superior. through Galen to Harvey, there is constant
"But as more arts were invented, and some were emphasis upon the artistic activity of nature.
68 THE GREAT IDEAS
Galen continually argues against those who do artistworks on is entirely passive with respect
not conceive Nature as an artist, Harvey con- to the change he wishes to produce. The artistic
sciously compares the activity of nature in result is in this sense entirely of his making.
biological generation to that of an artist. "Like The realm of art, or of the artificial, is then
a potter she first divides her material, and then opposed to the natural and differentiated from
indicates the head and trunk and extremities; it. Kant, for whom art is distinguished from
like a painter, she first sketches the parts in nature "as making is from acting or operating
outline, and then fills them in with colours; in general," claims that "by right, it is only
or like the ship-builder, who first lays down his production through freedom, i.e., through an
keel by way of foundation, and upon this raises act of will that places reason at the basis of its
the ribs and roof or deck: even as he builds his action, that should be termed art." Conse-
vessel does nature fashion the trunk of the body quently, art is that which would not have come
and add the extremities.'* into being without human intervention. The
Of all
natural changes, the one most closely man-made object is
produced by man, not in
generation, especially the production of living by the reason which makes him free.
things by living things. In both cases,
a new Animals other than man are apparently pro-
individual seems to come into being, But upon ductive, but the question is whether they can
further examination, artistic production and be called "artists." "A
spider conducts opera-
natural generation reveal significant differences tions that resemble those of a weaver, and a
differences which divide nature from art, bee puts to shame many an architect in the
ducing a rabbit, a horse, a horse. But in artistic speak metaphorically, on the basis of
artists
production, the product has, not the form of what Kant calls "an analogy with art ... As
the artist, but the form he has conceived in his soon as we call to mind," he continues, "that
mind and which he seeks to objectify. Further- no rational deliberation forms the basis of their
more, in generation, and in other natural changes labor, we sec at once that it is a product of their
as well the ma t ter which undergoes change seems
, nature (of instinct), and it is only to their
to have in itself a tendency to become what it Creator that we ascribe it as art."
changes into, as for example the acorn naturally This in turn leads to the question whether
tends to become an oak, whereas the oaken natureitself is a work of art. "Let me suppose,"
wood does not have in itself any tendency to the Eleatic Stranger says in the Sophist, "that
become a chair or a bed. The material the things which are said to be made by nature
CHAPTER 4: ART
are the work of divine art, and that things vine workmanship, the line we are able to draw
which are made by man out of these are the between the realms of art and nature becomes
work of human art. And so there are two kinds shadowy or sharp.
of making and production, the one human and
the other divine.'* THE DISCUSSIONS OF ART in the great books af-
If we suppose that the things of nature are ford materials from which a systematic classi-
originally made by a divine mind, how does fication of the arts might be constructed, but
their production differ from the work of hu- only fragments of such a classification are ever
man artists, or fromgeneration?
biological explicitly presented.
One answer, given in Plato's Timaeus, con- For example, the seven liberal arts are enu-
ceives the original production of things as a merated by various authors, but their distinc-
fashioning of primordial matter in the patterns tion from other arts, and their ordered relation
set by the eternal archetypes or ideas. In conse- to one another, do not receive full explication.
is no treatment of
quence, the divine work would be more like There grammar, rhetoric,
human artistry than either would be like nat- and logic (or dialectic) to parallel Plato's con-
ural reproduction. The emanation of the world sideration of arithmetic, geometry, music, and
from the One, according to Plotmus, and the astronomy in the Republic, nor is there any
production of things out of the substance of analysis of the relation of the first three arts
God in Spinoza's theory, appear, on the other to the other four traditionally organized as
hand, to be more closely analogous to natural the tnvtum and the quadnvium.
ma^e the heaven and the earth ?" And he answers: cussion in the tradition of the great books that
"It was not as a human artificer, forming one the consideration of them must be distributed
body from another, according to the discretion among a number of chapters, such as LOGIC,
of his mind, which can in some way invest with RHETORIC, LANGUAGE (for the discussion of
such a form, as it seeth in itself by its inward grammar), and MATHEMATICS.
eye . . .
Verily, neither in the heaven, nor in The principles of classification of the fine
the earth, didst Thou make heaven and earth; arts are laid down by Kant from "the analogy
nor in the or waters, seeing these also be-
air, which art bears to the mode of expression of
long to the heaven and the earth; nor in the which men avail themselves in speech, with a
whole world didst Thou make the whole world; view to communicating themselves to one
because there was no place where to make it, another as completely as possible." Since such
before it was made, that it might be ... For expression "consists in word, gesture, and
what is, but because Thou art ? Therefore Thou tone," he finds three corresponding fine arts:
sparest, and they were made, and in Thy Word "the art of speech, formative art, and the art
Thou madest them." According to this view, of the play of sensations." In these terms he
human art cannot be called creative, and God analyzes rhetoric and poetry, sculpture, archi-
cannot be called an artist, except metaphor- tecture, painting and landscape gardening, and
ically. music.
The issue concerning various theories of cre- A different principle of division is indicated
ation, or of the origin of the universe, is dis- in the opening chapters of Aristotle's Poetics.
cussed in the chapter on WORLD. But here we The principle that all art imitates nature sug-
must observe that, according to the view we gests the possibility of distinguishing and re-
take of the similitude between human and di- lating the various arts according to their char-
70 THE GREAT IDEAS
actcristic differences as imitations -by refer- artificial product. Fruits and grains would grow
ence to the object imitated and to the medium without the intervention of the farmer, yet
and manner in which it is imitated by the poet, the farmer helps them to grow more abundantly
sculptor or painter, and musician. "Color and and regularly. Health and knowledge are
form," Aristotle writes, "are used as means by natural effects, even though the arts of medi-
some . . . who imitate and portray many things cine and teaching may aid in their production.
by their aid, and the voice isused by others. . . . These arts, more fully discussed in the chap-
analysis it
suggests. in the other, the things which the artist makes
making and house-building imitations of na- For the most part, the industrial arts are of
ture in the same sense as poetry and music? the second sort. They transform dead matter
Does the way in which the farmer, the physi- into commodities or tools. The arts which co-
cian, and the teacher imitate nature distinguish operate with nature usually work with living
these three arts from the way in which a statue matter, as in agriculture, medicine, and teach-
is an imitation, or poem, or a house? ing. The distinction seems warranted and clear.
The Aristotelian dictum about art imitating Yet it is cut across by Adam Smith's division
nature has, of course, been as frequently chal- of labor into productive and non-productive.
lenged as approved. Apart from the issue of The work of agriculture is associated with in-
its truth, the theory of art as imitation poses dustry in the production of wealth, but what-
many questions which Aristotle left unanswered. ever other use they may have, physicians and
If there are answers in the great books, they teachers, according to Smith, do not directly
are there by implication rather than by state- augment the wealth of nations.
ment. If to the foregoing we add the division of the
THE MOST FAMILIAR distinction between arts tional distinctions are covered. This last di-
that between the useful and the fine is also the vision had its origin in the recognition that
one most frequently made in modern discus- some arts, like sculpture and carpentry, could
sion. The criterion of the distinction needs little not effect their products except by shaping
explanation. Some of man's productions are matter, whereas some arts, like poetry or logic,
intended to be used; others to be contemplated were free from matter, at least in the sense that
or enjoyed. To describe them in terms of imi- they worked productively in symbolic medi-
tation, the products of the useful arts must be ums. But by other principles of classification,
said to imitate a natural function (the shoe, for poetry and sculpture are separated from logic
example, the protective function of calloused and carpentry, as fine from useful art. Logic,
skin). The
imitation merely indicates the use, along with grammar, rhetoric, and the mathe-
and it is the use which counts. But in the pro- matical arts, is separated from poetry and
ducts of the fine arts, the imitation of the form, sculpture, as liberal from fine art. When the
quality, or other aspect of a natural object is word "liberal" is used to state this last distinc-
considered to be the source of pleasure. tion, its meaning narrows. It signifies only the
The least familiar distinction among the arts speculative arts, or arts concerned with pro-
is implied in any thorough discussion, yet its cesses of thinking and knowing.
divisions are seldom, if ever, named. Within The adequacy of any classification, and the
the sphere of useful art, some arts work toward intelligibility of its principles, must stand the
a result which can hardly be regarded as an test of questions about particular arts. The
CHAPTER 4: ART 71
great books frequently discuss the arts of ani- THE OTHER MAJOR controversy concerns the
mal husbandry and navigation, the arts of regulation of the arts by the state for human
cooking and hunting, the arts of war and gov- welfare and the public good.
ernment. Each raises a question about the na- Here, as before, the fine arts (chiefly poetry
ture of art in general, and challenges any anal- and music) have been the focus of the debate.
ysis of the arts to classify them and explain It is worth noting, however, that a
parallel
their peculiarities. , problem of political regulation occurs in the
sphere of the industrial arts. On the question
THERE ARE TWO OTHER major issues which have of state control over the production and dis-
been debated mainly with respect to the fine tribution of wealth, Smith and Marx represent
arts. extreme opposites, as Milton and Plato are poles
One, already mentioned, concerns the imi- apart on the question of the state's right to
tative character of art. The opponents of imi- censor the artist's work. In this debate, Aris-
tation do not deny that there may be some totle stands on Plato's side in many particulars,
human voice registering the course of the emo- poetry but 'hymns to the gods and praises of
tions. Nevertheless, the motivation of artistic famous men" must be banned from the State;
creation deeper, it is said, than a desire to
lies "for if you go beyond this and allow the
imitate nature, or to find some pleasure in such honeyed muse to enter, either in epic or lyric
resemblances. verse, not law and the reason of mankind,
According to Tolstoy, the arts serve pri- which by common consent have ever been
marily as a medium of spiritual communica- deemed the best, but pleasure and pain will be
tion, helping to create the ties of human the rulers in our State." Such a view pre-
brotherhood. According to Freud, it is emotion supposes a certain theory of the fine arts and
or subconscious expression, rather than imita- of their influence on the citizens and the whole
tion or communication, which is the deepest character of the community. Yet because both
spring of art; the poet or artist "forces us to Plato and Aristotle judge that influence to be
become aware of our inner selves in which the far from negligible, they do not see any reason
same impulses are extant even though they
still in individual liberty for the state to refrain
are suppressed." Freud's theory of sublimation from interfering with the rights of the artist
of emotion or desire through art seems to con- for the greatergood of the community.
nect with Aristotle's theory of emotional ca- To Milton and Mill, the measure of the
tharsis or purgation. But Freud is
attempting does not affect the question
artist's influence
to account for the origin of art, and Aristotle of the freedom of the arts from political or ec-
is
trying to describe an effect proper to its en- While admitting the
clesiastical interference.
mystery the spontaneous product of inspi- They espouse the cause of freedom for the
ration, of a divine madness, the work of un- artist to express or communicate his work and
fathomable genius. We encounter this notion for the community to receive from him what-
first, but not last, in Plato's Ion. ever he has to offer.
72 THE GREAT IDEAS
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
2a. Causation in art and nature: artistic production compared with natural generation
ib. The role of matter and form in artistic and natural production 74
2C. The natural and the artificial as respectively the work of God and man
3.
Art as imitation 75
4. Diverse classifications of the arts: useful and fine, liberal and servile
6b. The liberal arts as productive of science: means and methods of achieving knowl-
edge 77
6c. Art as the application of science: the productive powers of knowledge
7.
The enjoyment of the fine arts
78
9.
The useful arts 80
ship
1 1.
Myths and theories concerning the origin of the arts
84
12. The history of the arts: progress in art as measuring stages of civilization
CHAWER 4: ART . 73
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers m heavy type, whicji are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number I2d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the Upper and Tower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
thepage. Forexample,in 7 PLATO- Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the mam divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, brackets, are given in cer- m
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7*45 (D} II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xxn, CH 24, tion compared with natural generation
610a-c / Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 30 '
b
csp CH 8 [i99*8- 7J 276b-d / Generation and
b 2b. The role of matter and form in artistic and
Corruption, BK n, CH 9 [33 5 i 8-336*13] 437b-d
natural production
/ Meteorology, BK iv, CH 12 [390^2-14] 494c /
Metaphysics, BK i, CH 6 [988*1-7] 506a; CH 9 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK i, CH 7 [191*7-12]
a b
[992*29-34] 510c; BK vi, CH i [1025^8-27] 266d; BK n, CH i [i93 9- i9] 269b-270a; CH 2
b
547d; BK VH, CH 7-9 555a-558a; BK ix, CH 2 [i94*2i- i3J 270c-271a; CH 3 271a-272c /
571c-572a; CH 5 573a-c; BK xi, CH 7 [1064*10- Metaphysics, BK i, CH 6 [988*1-7] 506a; BK
b
[1405*3-9] 655b; CH 10 [i4io 5~8] 662c /
Poetics, CH 17 [1455*22-36] 690c
6a. The comparison and distinction of art and
10 HIPPOCRATES' Ancient Medicine la-9a,c esp science
par 1-8 la-3b / Articulations, par 10, 94d 7 PLATO. Republic, BK vi, 386d-388a; BK vn,
13 VIRGIL: Eclogues, iv [1-3] 14a; vi [1-12] 19a 391b-398c, BK x, 427c-434c / Laws, BK iv,
/ Aeneid, BK i [i-n] 103a; BK vn [37-44] 684b-685a
237a 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK n, CH 19
14 PLUTARCH: Demosthenes, 692d-695d BK n, CH 2 [194*21-
[100*6-9] 136c / Physics,
b
17 PLOTINUS: Fifth Ennead, TR vin, CH i 239b- i3] 270c-271a / BK i, CH i
Metaphysics,
240a [980^5-982*1] 499b-500b; BK vi, CH i
b
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 68,
:
[io25 i8-28] 547d; BK xi, CH 7 [1064*10-18]
A 4, REP i 91b-92c 592b-c
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, n [7-9] 2c; 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 1-2 339a-d; BK
b
xxxn [1-12] 47c; PURGATORY, i [1-12] 53a; in, CH 3 [ni2*30- io] 358b-c; BK vi, CH 3
b
xxiv [49-63] 90a-b; xxix [37-42] 98a; PARA- [ii39 i4~i8] 388b; CH 4 [1140*10-16] 388d;
b
DISE, i
[1-36] 106a-b; n [1-18] 107d; [91-105] CH 5 [ii40*33~ 2] 389b; CH 7 390a-d
108d; xvni [70-117] 134b-d csp [109-111] 10 HIPPOCRATES: Regimen in Acute Diseases, par
134d; xxii [112-123] 140d; xxm [55-69] 3 27a-c
141d-142a 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR vin, CH 3-4
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART iv, 262c 130a-131a
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i, 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 16,
BK in, 129c-d
2d-3a,c; A i, ANS 94b-95c
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 52d-53a; 309c-310c; 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n,
450d-451a; 523c-524a; 532a-b Q 57 A 3 ANS an(^ REP J 3 37b-38a; A 4,
26 SHAKESPEARE: Midsummer-Night's Dream, ANS and REP 2 38a-39a; Q 95, A 2, ANS 227c-
ACT v, sc i [1-27] 370d-371a / Henry V, PRO- 228c
LOGUE 532b,d; ACT in, PROLOGUE 543c-d 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 333a-b
6b to 6c CHAPTER 4: ART 77
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 5b-6a; 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 56b; 58a-61a;
48d-49b; 50c-51d; 53a-b 65c-d
31 DESCARTES: Rules, i, la-b / Discourse, PART 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 69d-77a passim; 240c-
vi, 61b-d 242a;446d-450a
34 NEWTON- Principles, la-b 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 331a-337a,c
42 KANT: Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 388d / 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 56b-69c
Judgement, 463a-464c; 515b-c; 523d-524a; esp 56b-58c / Novum Organum, PREF 105a-
526a-527b esp 527a-b 106d; BK i 107a-136a,c esp APH 11-26 107d-
43 MILL. Utilitarianism, 445c-d 108d, APH 39-69 109c-116b, APH 103-106
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART rv, 346c- 127d-128c / New Atlantis, 210d-214d
348a 31 DESCARTES: Rules la-40a,c esp x 15d-17a /
53 JAMES- Psychology, 687a-688a; 863a-866a Discourse 41a-67a,c esp PART i, 41d-42b, PART
54 FREUD New Introductory Lectures, 874c-875a n, 46c-48b, PART in, 50b-51a, PART iv, 52a,
PART vi, 61d-62c / Meditations, i 75a-77c /
6b. The liberal arts as productive of science: and Replies, 128a-129a / Geometry,
Objections
means and methods of achieving knowl- BK i, 295a-298b; BK n, 304a-305a; BK in, 353a
edge 33 PASCAL- Pensees, 1-4 171a-172d / Vacuum,
7 PLATO Protagoras, 50d-52d; 57a-c / Phaedrus, 355a-358b passim; 365b-366a / Great Experi-
134a-d; 139d-140b / Meno, 179d-183c / Gor- ment 382a~389b / Geometrical Demonstration,
gias, 252a-262a / Republic, BK vi, 386d-388a; 430a-434a; 442a-446b
BK VH, 391b-398c / Parmemdes, 491a-d / 34 NEW ION: Principles, BK in, RULES 270a-271b;
Theaetetus, 525d-526b / Sophist, 571a-c / LEMMA 5 338b-339a; GENERAL SCHOL, 371b-
Statesman, 594d-595d / Philebus, 610d-613a; 372a / Optics, BK in, 542a; 543a-544a
633a~635a / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d 35 LOCK F- Human Understanding, IN IRQ, SECT
8 ARISTOILE. Prior Analytics, BK i, CH 30 63d- 4-7 94a-95c; BK iv, CH in, SECT 18-20 317d-
64b / Posterior Analytics 97a-137a,c esp BK i, 319c; CH vii, sccr n 340a-342d; CH xii, SECT
CH 1-3 97a-100a, BK n, CH i-io 122b,d-128d / 1-8 358c-360c passim; SLCT 14-15 362d-363b;
b
524c; CH 4 [ioo5 35-ioo6*28] 525a-c; BK xi, b, 319c-321b; 329a-330c
CH 3 589a-d, CH 5 [106^34-1062*19] 590a-c; 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 103c-104a
BK xni, CH 2 [io77 b i]-cH 3 [1078*32] 608d- 43 MILL: Liberty, 283d-284d; 287c-288c
b
609d, CH 4 [io78 i8-32] 610b-c / Soul, BK i, 45 LAVOISIER- Elements of Chemistry, PREF, lc-2d
CH i 631a-632d; BK n, CH 4 [415*14-22] 645b-c 45 FOURIER. Theory of Heat, 172a-173b
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i 45 FARADAY Researches in Electricity, 659a; 774d-
161a-165d / Ethics, BK i, CH 3 339d-340b; 775a
CH 7 [io98*20-b 8] 343c-344a; BK vi, CH 3 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 31
388b-c / Politics, BK i, CH i [1252*18-24] 445b 19c-20a
/ Rhetoric, BK i, CH 2 [1358*3-33] 597d- 50 MARX: Capital, lOa-lld
598b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 175a-176a; 385a-b; 674a-
11 ARCHIMEDES: Method, 569b-570a 675b; 677b; 687a; 862a-865a; 869a-878a
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 7 112b-113d; 54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 879c;
CH 17 122d-124a; BK n, CH 25 174b-c 881b-c
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR in 10a-12b
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 20-24 6a- 6c. Art as the application of science: the pro-
7a / City of God, BK vm, CH 3-4 266a-267c ductive powers of knowledge
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 3d-4c, 120a; 126d- 104, A 4, ANS 306d-307c
131d esp 127d-128a; 256a; 291d-292c; 311d- 21 DANTE. Divine Comedy, PARADISE, xni [91-
312a; 321b-325a; 394d-395c; 499a-b; 509a- 108] 126b-c
510a,c; 542b-548d esp 542b-543a 23 MACHIAVELLI Prince la-37d
:
42 KANT: Science of Right, 453d-454c / Judge- 23HoBBEs: leviathan, INTRO 47a-d; PART i,
ment, 502d-504b 67d-68a; 80d-81a; 82b-d; PART n, 112d; 122b-
43FtDERALisr: NUMBER 8, 44c-45a; 45d-46a; 124b, 127a-130a; 148c-159c; 164a,c
NUMBER 25, 91a-b 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK HI,
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART iv, 343d- 131b,d-133b
344a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 3a-5a; 324c-326b esp
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 52c-53c; 54c- 326a-b; 437b-c; 450d-451a; 451d-452d
55c; BK n, 88b-89b; 92c-93d; 96c-97c; BK HI, 26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard II, ACT in, sc iv [29-
135c-137c; 144d-146d; BK v, 208c-210b; BK 66] 340c-d
VH, 278a-287a; BK ix, 350d-354a; 358b-365c; 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART n, 217a-b;
BK x, 389a-391c; 405a-b; 421c-426a; 430b- 331a-336a
432c; 440c-443b; 445d-448c; 449c; BK xi, 30 BACON. Advancement of Learning, 4c-7c; 23a-
470d-475a; BK xm, 563a-571a; BK xm-xiv, 26a; 54a-b; 93c-95a
582a-590c; BK xiv, 609a-613d; BK xv, 618b- 32 MILTON. Paradise Lost, BK iz
[430-456] 120b-
621b 121a
33 PASCAL: Pensles, 82 186b-188b; 291-338 225a-
94.The arts of government 233a passim
OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 18:13-26 35 LOCKE: Toleration, 9b
5 ARISTOPHANES: Knights [147-222] 471d-472c / 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART H, 78a-b; PART in,
Lysistrata [506-586] 589c-590d 112a-115b; PART iv, 157a-158a
6 THUCYDIDES Peloponnesian War, BK i, 366d
: 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, 3b-d;
7 PLATO: Protagoras, 43b-47c / Euthydemus, BK H-V 4a-33a,c; BK vi, 40a-b; 43c-d; BK
75c-76b / Ion, 147d-148a,c / Meno, 188b- vin, 51a-53c; BK xi, 69a-75a; BK xn, 93c-
190a,c / Gorgias, 285a-292b / Republic, BK 96a,c; BK xix, 135a-141a; BK xxvi, 214b,d;
m-iv, 339b-347a; BK vi, 382a-c; BK VH, BK xxix 262a-269a,c
390c-391b/ Critias, 479c / Thtaetetus, 531a-b / 38 ROUSSEAU: Political Economy 367a-385a,c esp
Statesman 580a-608d esp 585c-586a, 598b- 370c-d / Social Contract, BK n, 400c-406a;
608d / Laws, BK iv, 679a-c BK HI, 409d-410a; 412c-414d
10 to
x
CHAPTER 4: ART 83
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 24b,d-32d passim; 26 SHAKESPEARE: Two Gentlemen of Verona, ACT
48a; 61d-63b; 142c-144a; 153c-157c csp 155b, HI, sc n [66-95] 245a-b / Richard H, ACT v, sc
157c; 240b-255d passim; 284a-c; 288b-289a; v [41-63] 350a-b / Merchant of Venice, ACT v,
338d-344a,c esp 338d-339a, 343a-c; 577a~578c sc i [66-88] 431b-c
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 102c~103a; 176c- 27 SHAKESPEARE: Measure for Measure, ACT iv,
177c; 504c-505c sc i
[1-15] 192c
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 35, 113b-c; NUMBER 37, 29 CERVANTES: Don
Quixote, PART i, la-3b;
119c-120a, NUMBER 62, 190b-d 12b-16c; 184a-187c; 189d-193c; PART 11, 427c-
43 MILL: Liberty, 322a-b / Representative Govern- 429d
w<?/tf,327b,d-328d;331b-c, 338d-339a; 356b- 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 4c-6c; 38c-
362c passim; 411d-412a; 442a-d / Utilitarian- 39a; 78a-d; 79c-80a
ism, 445c-d 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART i, 43a-b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART n, 275d- 32 MILTON Paradise Lost, BK ix [1-47] 247a-248a
276a; PART iv, 360b-c; 361d-362a / Areopagitica, 385a-386b
51 TOLSTOY- War and Peace, BK vi, 238c-243d; 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 11 173b-174a
260a-262a; BK ix, 350d-354a 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV i
53 JAMES: Psychology, 201a 451a-b
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, xviib-xviiia
10. The moral and political significance of the 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 250b-251a
arts 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 253d-254d
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK iv, 17b-
lOa. The influence of the arts on character and 18d
citizenship: the role of the arts in the 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 365c-366b
training of youth 39 SMITH Wealth of Nations, BK v, 337d-343d;
5 ARISTOPHANES: Acharnians [626-658] 462b-d 347c-d
Wasps [1009-1070] 519d-520c / Frogs [1008-
/ 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 3a-b; 79a-b; 94a-b;
1098] 576b-577c; [1482-1533] 581d-582a,c 629a-b
7 PLATO Protagoras, 46b-c / Phaedrus, 140a-d / 41 GIBBON '.Decline and Fall, 40d-41a; 225a-226a
Symposnim, 156b-c / Gorgtas, 280d-282b / esp 225c; 300a-b; 573a-574b
Republic, BK ii-nr, 320c-339a; BK iv, 344b-d; 42 K\NT: Judgement, 521b-523c; 586d-587a
BK vii 388a~401d esp 389d-398c; BK x, 427c- 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 158a-b; 259b-c, 308b-d
434c / Timaeus, 455a-c / Laws, BK n 653a- 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART n, 259b-c;
663d; BK in, 675c-676b; BK v, 696b-d, BK 263d-265c; 267b-268b; 276a-d; PART iv,
vn, 717b-728b 347b-d
9 ARISTOTLL* Politics, BK vn, CH 17 [1336*30- 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 47b-48d; BK
b
24] 541b-d; BK vni 542a-548a,c n, 64d-65d; BK iv, 172d-173d; BK vni, 316b-
12 AURELIUS- Meditations, BK i, SECT 7, 253c 321d;324b-325d
13 VIRGIL Acneid, BK i [441-493] 115a-116b; BK 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 582a-b / War
vi [847-853] 233b-234a; BK vni [608-731]
'
and Death, 762c
275a-278b
14 PLUTARCH Lycurgus, 33d-34a; 43b-d / Solon, 0. The political regulation of the arts for the
76a / Pericles, 121a-122b / Timoleon, 195a-b / common good: the problem of censor-
Demetrius, 726a-d ship
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK xiv, 146b-d 5 ARISTOPHANES: Acharnians [366-382] 459c-d;
16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly [480-508] 460d-461a
BK i, 510a-b
Spheres, 7 PLATO: Republic, BK II-IH, 320c-339a; BK iv,
17 PLOTINUS First Ennead, TR HI, CH 1-2 lOa-d
:
344b-d; BK x, 427c-434c esp 432d-434c /
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 20-22 6a-c; Statesman, 601c-602c / Laws, BK n 653a-663d;
par 25-27 7a-d; BK in, par 2-4 13c-14b; BK x, BK HI, 675c-676b; BK vn, 717b-730c; BK vni,
par 49-53 83c-85a / City of God, BK i, CH 31- 731d-732c; BK xi, 782d<783b
33 147d-149a; BK H, CH 8-14 153d-157c; BK 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 1-2 339a-d / Poli-
b
CH 26-27 202a-203c / Christian Doctrine,
iv, tics, BK vn, CH 17 [i336 i2-23] 541c-d
(10. Tb* moral awl political significance of the 12. The history of the arts: progress in art as
arts. \Qb. The political regulation of the measuring stages of civilization
arts for the common good: the problem of 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK iv [104-111] 25a; BK ix
censorship.) [185-189] 59a; BK xi [15-46] 72b-c; BK xvm
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART i, 13b-16c; [368-617] 133d-136d/ Odyssey,vKix [105-115]
117d-119d; 184a-187c 230b
30 BACON: New Atlantis, 214a-b 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 5b; 5d-6a; BK n,
32 MILTON: Areopagitica 381a-412b csp 384b- 49d-50a; 75b-76a; BK in, 102c; BK vn, 220d-
389a, 398a-b 221b
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 253d-254d 6 TwjcvniDES.Peloponnesian War, BK i,350b-d
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK iv, 17b- 7 PLATO: Crttias, 479d / Statesman, 602b-c /
18d; BK xn, 90b-c Laws, BK n, 654c-655b; BK in, 675c-676b
39 SMITH- Wealth of Nations, BK v, 347c-d 8 ARISTOTLE: Sophistical Refutations, CH 34
b b
40 GIBBON- Decline and Pall, 148a [i83 i6-i84 8] 253a-d / Metaphysics, BK i,
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 220b-221b; 223a-c / CH i [98i b i3-24] SOOa; BK xn, CH 8 [i074b ii]
Science of Right, 425c-426a 605a
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ARTICLE i, SECT 8 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 7 [1098*21-25]
[214-217] 13b; AMENDMENTS, i 17a 343c-d / Politics, BK n, CH 8 [1268^3-1269*29]
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 43, 139d-140a 464d-465b / Rhetoric, BK in, CH i [1403^5-
43 MILL: Representative Government, 368d-369b 1404^9] 653b,d-654c / Poetics, CH 4-5 682c-
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 259b-c; 300c-301a csp 684a
301a-d [fn i] 10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 1-4 la-
2c; par 12 4b-c
11. Myths and theories concerning the origin 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [324-337]
of the arts 65b-c; [925-1160] 73b-76b; [1241-1457] 77b-
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 4:20-22; 10:8-9 / 80a,c
/ Chronicles, 4:14 (/)) / Paralipomenon, 4-14 13 VIRGIL: Georgics, i [121-146] 40b-41a
5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound 40a-51d 14 PLUTARCH: Pericles, 127a-129b / Marcellus,
12 CHAPTER 4: ART 85
42 KANT: Judgement, 586a-587a in, 312c-d; PART iv, 323c-d; 335a-d; 346c-
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ARTICLE i, SECT 8 348a
[214-217] 13b 49 DARWIN- Origin of Species, 13c; 19c-d / De-
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 43, 139d-140a scent of Man, 278a-279a; 320a-321a; 329a-
43 MILL: Representative Government, 367b-c 330a,c; 349b-d; 569d
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 70d-71b; 307c-d; 380d- 50 MARX: Capital, 86b-c csp 86d [fn 4]; 181d
381a; 406c, 408d-409a; 446d [fn 3l
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 69, 50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 420d-
30b; PART in, par 356 113a-b / Philosophy of 421a; 421d
History, INTRO, 153a-b, 182b-c, 185a-186a; 53 JAMES- Psychology, 727b
PARF i,219b-c; 229b-d, 243d-244c; 247c- 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 776c-
248d, 251a-b; 253b-c; PART n, 259a-282d esp 780b esp 779a-b / New Introductory Lectures,
261b, 267b-268b, 276a-d, 277d-278a; PART 882d883b
CROSS-REFERENCES
For- The conception of art as a habit of mind or an intellectual virtue, see HABIT 53, 5d; VIRTUE
AND VICE 23(2).
The applications of science in the useful arts, see KNOWLEDGE 8a; PHYSICS 5; SCIENCE ib(i),
3b; and for the dependence of science on art, see PHYSICS 43; SCIENCE ^b, 6a.
The distinction between art and prudence and the spheres of making and doing, sec
PRUDENCE 2b.
Other discussions of art and nature, see NATURE 2a; and for the comparison of artistic pro-
duction, natural generation, and divine creation, see FORM id(i)-id(2); WORLD 4e(i).
Experience as a source of art, see EXPERIENCE 3; for the distinction between artist and
empiric, see EXPERIENCE 33; and for the opposition between art and chance, see CHANCE 5.
The enjoyment of beauty in nature and in art, see BEAUTY
PLEASURE AND PAIN 4c(i) and
2; ;
for discussions of the aesthetic judgment or the judgment of taste, see BEAUTY 5.
Other considerations of the educational influence of the arts, see EDUCATION 4d; POETRY 93;
VIRTUE AND VICE 4d(4); and for the problem of political regulation or censorship of art,
see EMOTION 5e; POETRY 9b.
More extended treatments of the liberal arts, see LANGUAGE 4-8; LOGIC; MATHEMATICS;
RHETORIC; and for an analysis of one of the fine arts, see POETRY.
Discussions of the useful and industrial arts, see EDUCATION 5a~5b; LABOR 2b; MEDICINE;
PROGRESS 3C, 43, 6a; STATE 8d-8d(3); WAR AND PEACE lo-iof; WEALTH 3C~3d.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booths of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
HUME. Ofthe Rise and Progress ofthe Arts and Sciences GOETHE. Poetry and Truth
ROUSSEAU. Discourse on the Arts and Sciences . Travels in Italy
A. SMITH. "Of the Affinity Between Music, Danc- . Conversations with Ec^ermann
ing and Poetry," in Essays Philosophical and . Maxims and Reflections
Literary J. S. MILL. A System of Logic, BK vi, CH n
86 THE GREAT IDEAS
TOLSTOY. What Is Art? LOTZE. Microcosmos, BK vin, CH 3
FREUD. Leonardo da Vinci BURCKHARDT. The Civilization of the Renaissance in
The Theme of the Three Caskfts
.
Italy
The Moses of Michelangelo
. RUSKIN. Modern Painters
. A Childhood Memory from "Dichtung und .The Stones of Venice
Wahrheit" Sesame and Lilies
.
INTRODUCTION
ASTRONOMY could take its place in this immense persistence. They calculated and pre-
1\ catalog of ideas on the ground that several dicted. They turned their predictions to use
of the great books are monuments of astronom- through the priestly office of prophecy to fore-
ical science,exemplifying the imaginative and tell eclipses, tides, and
and they em-
floods,
analytical powers which have made it one of the ployed their calculations in the mundane arts of
most remarkable triumphs of the human mind. navigation and surveying to guide travel and
Its claim might further be supported by the fixboundaries. But they did not, like the Greeks,
fact that other great books of mathematics, develop elaborate theories which sought to or-
physics, theology, and poetry have a context ganize all the observed facts systematically.
of astronomical imagery and theory. But the in- With the Greeks, the down-to-earth, every-
clusion of astronomy can be justified by what is day utility ofastronomy seems to count for
perhaps an even more significant fact, namely, less than its speculative grandeur. The dignity
that astronomical speculation raises problems which they confer upon astronomy among the
and suggests conclusions which have critical rel- disciplines reflects the scope and majesty of its
evance for the whole range of the great ideas. subject matter. The Greek astronomer, con-
Man has used astronomy to measure, not only cerned as he with figuring motions that range
is
the passage of time or the course of a voyage, through the whole of space and are as old as
but also his position in the world, his power of time or as interminable, takes for his object the
knowing, his relation to God. When man first structure of the cosmos.
turns from himself and his immediate earthly Aristotle and Plato pay eloquent tribute to
surroundings to the larger universe of which he the special worth of astronomy. In the opening
is a part, the object which presses on his vision chapters of his Metaphysics^ Aristotle associates
is the overhanging firmament with its luminous astronomical inquiry with the birth of philos-
bodies, moving with great basic regularity and, ophy. "Apart from usefulness," he says, "men
upon closer observation, with certain perplex- delight ... in the sense of sight" and, he adds,
ing irregularities. Always abiding and always "it is owing to their wonder that men both now
changing, the firmament, which provides man begin and at first began to philosophise." They
with the visible boundary of his universe, also wondered first about "the obvious difficulties,"
becomes for him a basic, in fact an inescapable, but little by little they advanced to "greater
object of contemplation. matters," and "stated difficulties about the . . .
Careful and precise astronomical observa- phenomena of the moon and sun and stars, and
tions antedate the birth of astronomy as a about the genesis of the universe." In his own
science. The early interestin the heavenly bod- philosophical thought, Aristotle's treatise On
ies and their motions is often attributed to the the Heavens is not
only one of the basic natural
usefulness of the predictions which can be made sciences, but certain of its principles have gen-
from a knowledge of celestial phenomena. eral significance for all the other parts of his
Whether their motive was entirely utilitar- physical science.
ian, or partly religious and speculative, the A
wider view of the importance of astronomy
Egyptians and Babylonians, we learn from is taken
by Plato. In the Timaeus, he dwells on
Herodotus, undertook patient study of the "the higher use and purpose for which God has
heavens. They observed and recorded with given eyes to us. ... Had we never seen the
87
88 THE GREAT IDEAS
stars, and the sun, and the heaven," Timaeus Copernicus, and Kepler, for all their differences
says, "none of the words which we have spoken
on points of scientific theory, seem to concur in
about the universe would ever have been ut- reaffirming Plato's conception of the bearing of
tered. . God invented and gave us sight," he
. . their science on religion and morals. Lucretius
continues, "to the end that we might behold and Augustine, on the other hand, while not
the courses of intelligence in the heaven, and agreeing with each other, seem to disagree with
apply them to the courses of our own intelli- Plato. In the tradition of western thought, they
gence which are akin to them, the unperturbed represent different types of opposition to the
to the perturbed; and that we, learning them Platonic view.
and partaking of the natural truth of reason, Where Plato and his followers, including re-
might imitate the absolutely unerring courses ligious Christians like Copernicus and Kep-
of God and regulate our own vagaries." ler, hold that true piety profits from astronom-
For Plato, then, man's intellectual relation to ical study, Lucretius hopes that astronomy may
the heavens does more than initiate philosophy. help to freemen from religious superstitions. If
*
Man's self-rule, his purity and peace of soul, is when they 'gaze on the heavenly quarters of the
at stake in that relation. That is one reason why, great upper world" and direct their thoughts
in both the Republic and. the Laws, Plato makes "to the courses of the sun and moon," they do
astronomy a required part of the curriculum so with "a mind at peace" because they see only
for the education of rulers. "He who has not the workings of natural law and no evidences of
contemplated the mind of nature which is said a controlling power in the will of the gods, then
to exist in the stars and seen the connection
. . . men achieve the natural piety of the scientist
of music with these things, and harmonized different m
the opinion of Lucretius from the
them all with laws and institutions, is not able," false worship which is based on fear.
the Athenian Stranger says in the Laws, "to From his own experiences in dealing with the
give a reason for such things as have a reason." astronomy of the Mamchean sect in relation to
Plato considers the opposition to astronomy their religious doctrine, Augustine insists that
on religious grounds by those who think that the teachings of religion in no way depend upon
men who approach phenomena by the
celestial astronomy. He denies that such knowledge is in
methods of astronomy "may become godless any way essential to true piety. Though a man
because they see ... things happening by ne- does not know "even the circles of the Great
cessity, and not by an intelligent will accom- Bear, yet is it folly to doubt," he writes, "that
is in a better state than one who can measure
plishing good." His answer points out that one he
of the "two things which lead men to believe in the heavens and number the stars, and poise the
the gods ... is the argument fiom the order of elements, yet neglecteth Thee 'Who hast made
the motion of the stars and of all things under all things m number, weight, and measure.' "
the dominion of the mind which ordered the When Faustus, the leader of the Mamcheans,
universe." It was a false understanding of these "was found out to have taught falsely of the
matters which "gave rise to much atheism and heaven and stars, and of the motions of the sun
perplexity." and moon (although these dungs pertain not to
the doctrine of religion)," his religious teach-
THE ISSUES RAISED by Plato concerning the im- ings, according to Augustine, inevitably suffered
portance of astronomy for purification and pi- ridicule because of his pretension that they de-
ety, for education and politics, run through the rived support from a science of the heavenly
tradition of western thought. Though they are bodies. Augustine would disengage theology
somewhat transformed in the context of Jewish from astronomy. His position anticipates that
and Christian beliefs, and altered by later de- later taken by Cardinal Barbenni who, during
velopments in the science of astronomy itself, the controversy over the Copernican hypothe-
they remain as matters on which an author's sis,is reported to have told Galileo that as-
strong assent or dissent forcefully reflects his tronomy and religion have quite separate tasks,
whole intellectual position. the one teaching how the heavens go, the other
On the one hand, astronomers like Ptolemy, how to go to heaven.
CHAPTER 5: ASTRONOMY 89
Still another point of view on the importance courses of our own intelligence." But in one
of astronomy represented in the skeptical and
is passage of Freud we find an almost complete re-
humanist attitude of Montaigne. "I am very turn to the Platonic insight. "Order has been
well pleased with the Milesian girl," he remarks, imitated from nature," he writes; "man's ob-
"who . . advised the philosopher Thales rather
. servations of the great astronomical periodici-
to look to himself than to gaze at heaven." In ties not only furnished him with a model, but
saying this, or in quoting with approval the formed the ground plan of his first
attempts to
question asked of Pythagoras by Anaximenes introduce order into his own life."
many other enemies of life, shall I go cudgel logical phenomena seem to cross the line be-
my brains about the world's revolutions?" tween astronomy and astrology. Sometimes the
Kant can be as critical as Montaigne of the influence upon man and his actions is found in
frailty of human knowledge. "The investiga- the constellations attending a nativity; some-
tions and calculations of the astronomers," he times it is a particular influence of the sort still
writes, have shown us "the abyss of our igno- signified by the meaning of the word "lunacy";
rance in relation to the universe." But Kant an and sometimes omens and auguries are read in
astronomer himself as well as a moralist does the aspect of the heavens.
not, therefore, advise us to forsake the study of The chapters on PROPHECY and SIGN AND
the heavens. On
the contrary, he recommends SYMBOL deal with the issues raised by astrol-
itnot only for its scientific value, but for its
ogy. Problems more closely associated with
moral significance. astronomical science and speculation are treat-
"Two things," Kant declares in a passage ed in other chapters. The cosmological prob-
which has become famous, "fill the mind with lem of the origin of the material universe
ever new and increasing admiration and awe, is discussed in the chapters on ETERNITY,
the oftener and more steadily we reflect on TIME, and WORLD; the question of its size in the
them: the starry heavens above and the moral chapter on SPACE; the question of whether the
law within." The two fit
together to produce a celestial spheres are themselves alive or are
single effect. Astronomy with its view "of a moved by intelligences or spirits in the chapters
countless multitude of worlds annihilates, as it on ANGEL and SOUL; and the question of the
were, my importance as an animal creature." nature of the heavenly bodies in the chapter on
in the development of astronomy, and of phys- tation of the Copernican revolution fits all the
ics and natural science generally. documents in the case. Freud may be accurately
The Copernican revolution did not take place reporting a popular feeling which, since the 1 8th
by the improvement and enlargement of astro- century, has become a widespread consequence
nomical observations alone, nor even by the ef- of Copernican and post-Copermcan astronomy.
fect of these on alternative mathematical for- But in earlier centuries when the Ptolemaic
mulations. If it had not been accompanied by system prevailed, or even after Copernicus, the
the radical shift from ancient to modern physics appraisal of man's rank seems to depend more
especially with regard to the diversity or uni- upon the position he occupies in the hierarchy
formity of the world's matter the Copernican of God's creatures below the angels and above
hypothesis concerning the celestial motions the brutes than upon the place or motion of
would have been no more than a mathematical the earth, or the size of the world.
alternative to the Ptolemaic hypothesis. Coper- Boethius, for example, finds the Ptolemaic
nicus seems to advance it only as such, but in the universe large enough to remind man of the
hands of Kepler, Galileo, and Newton it be- infinitesimal space he occupies. Dante, too,
comes much more than that. They, rather than comments on the smallness of the earth in the
Copernicus, seem to accomplish the revolution scheme of things. When in his visionary travel
connected with his name. Dante reaches the Empyrean, he looks down
When their contribution is neglected or in- upon the earth and "with my sight," he tells us,
adequately grasped, the Copernican revolution "I returned through all and each of the seven
appears to be, as is often popularly supposed, spheres, and saw this globe, such that I smiled at
its mean semblance; and that counsel I
merely a shift in astronomical theory. The prob- approve
lem being to organize mathematically the ap- as best which holds it of least account."
parent motions of the heavens, Copernicus of- Kepler, a passionate Copernican deeply con-
fers an alternative solution to that of Ptolemy. cerned with the human significance of astron-
Instead of treating the earth as stationary and omy, can be found arguing that the new hy-
central in the cosmic system, Copernicus at- pothesis involves something more fitting for
tributes three motions to the earth by treating man than the old. In his last argument in de-
it as a planet which revolves around the sun, fense of the Copernican view against that of
spins on its axis, and varies the inclination of its Tycho Brahe as well as that of Ptolemy, he de-
axis with reference to the sun. clares, "it was not fitting that man, who was
What is usually supposed to be revolutionary going to be the dweller in this world and its
about this hypothesis is its effect on man's esti- contemplator, should reside in one place as in a
mate of himself and his place or rank in the closed cubicle. ... It was his office to move
universe. On either of the rival hypotheses, the around by means of
in this very spacious edifice
apparent motions of the heavens remain unal- the transportation of the Earth his home." In
tered, but not man's conception of himself, of order properly to view and measure the parts
his earth, or of the universe in which the earth's of his world, the astronomer "needed to have
orbit cuts so small a figure. As Kant suggests, the Earth a ship and its annual voyage around
man's stature seems to shrink. He becomes "a the sun."
mere speck in the universe" which has been en- Yet the very fact that Kepler argues in this
larged to infinity, or at least to an unimaginable manner may be interpreted as indicating his
immensity. He is displaced from its center to sense of the drastic implications for man of the
become a wanderer with his planet. Humanity's altered structure of the universe. Kepler may
self-esteem, according to Freud, was thus for even be thought to announce the problem of the
the time deeply wounded; he refers to the
first so-called"Copernican revolution" when, in de-
theory that "is associated in our minds with the nying that the earth can any longer "be reck-
'
name of Copernicus" as the 'first great outrage" oned among the primary parts of the great
CHAPTER 5: ASTRONOMY 91
world," since it is only a part of a part, i.e., the gnawing loneliness, born of the doubt that so
planetary region, he deliberately adds the quali- vast a cosmosif cosmos it is rather than chaos
fication: "But I am speaking now of the Earth can have been beneficently designed as man's
in so far as it is a part of the edifice of the world, habitation.
and not of the dignity of the governing crea-
tures which inhabit it." WHATEVER THE TRUTH about the effect of the
Whether or not it was the traumatic blow to Copernican theory in the order of opinion, im-
the human ego which Freud conjectures, there agination, and feeling, it did produce a direct
can be little doubt that the shift from Ptolemy result on the intellectual plane. It, more than
to Copernicus involved a real shock to the imag- any other single factor, led to the overthrow of
ination.The Ptolemaic system conforms to the certain crucial doctrines which had been linked
look of the world, which is indeed the reason together in the physics and astronomy of Aris-
the one used in practical courses in
why it is still totle; it thus radically changed the fundamen-
navigation. Here again Kepler defends Coperni- tal principles in terms of which man had under-
cus by explaining why "our uncultivated eye- stood the order and unity of nature. That scien-
sight" cannot be other than deceived and why tific event deserves not
only the name but the
it "should learn from reason" to understand fame of the "Copernican revolution."
that things are really different from the way they The revolution in the realm of theory goes
appear. much deeper than the substitution of one math-
A certain disillusionment may result from ematical construction for another to describe
this affirmation repeated by every schoolboy the motions of the world's great bodies. As
who is taught the Copernican system that, de- Freud points out, the heliocentric hypothesis
spite what we see, the sun does not move around associated with the name of Copernicus was
the earth, and the earth both rotates and re- known to the Alexandrian astronomers of anti-
volves. It undermines the trust men placed in quity. It is, for example, attributed to Aris-
their senses and the belief that science would tarchus by Archimedes in the Sand-Reckoner.
describe the world as they saw it. In order to As far as the earth's rotation
is concerned,
place rather than in another." When he regards plausible supposition of a rotating earth be-
the world's immensity as "the greatest sensible comes "altogether absurd" when we consider
mark of the almighty power of God," Pascal ex- the speed and direction of the motions of bodies
periences an awe which for him is qualified by within the earth'sown atmosphere. His strong-
reverence. Other men may experience the same estcount against the supposition is that it does
feeling, but less with reverence than with a not conform to the Aristotelian physics which
92 THE GREAT IDEAS
distinguishes between natural and violent mo- Two other observations exercise a decisive
tions, assigns certain fixed directions to the nat- influence on Aristotle's theory. The naked eye
ural motions of each of the four elements of sees no type of change in the heavenly bodies
matter, and denies that these elementary kinds other than local motion or change of place. Un-
of terrestrial matter enter into the composition like terrestrial bodies, they do not appear to
of the heavenly bodies. come into being or perish; they do not change
That Aristotle's physics and cosmology lie at in size or quality. Furthermore, whereas the
the very heart of the issue is confirmed by the natural local motion of sub-lunary bodies ap-
way in which Kepler later argues for the Coper- pears to approximate the path of a straight line,
nican theory against Ptolemy. He does not de- the local motion of the celestial bodies appears
fend its truth on the ground that it accounts for to be circular rather than rectilinear.
observable facts which the Ptolemaic hypoth- To cover these observations, Aristotle's the-
esis cannot handle. Nor does he prefer it merely ory posits a different kind of matter for celestial
because it is
mathematically the simpler hy- and terrestrial bodies. An
incorruptible matter
pothesis. On the contrary, he specifically notes must constitute the great orbs which are sub-
that anything which can be claimed on math- ject to local motion alone and have the most
ematical grounds for Copernicus over Ptolemy perfect kind of local motion that of a circle.
can be equally claimed for Tycho Brahe over Since they are subject to generation and cor-
Ptolemy. (Brahe's theory was that while the ruption, to change of quality and quantity, and
other planets revolve around the sun, the sun, are in local motion along straight lines, terres-
with its planets, revolves around a stationary trial bodies are of a corruptible matter.
earth.) According to Kepler, the truth of these The interconnection of all these points is
competing theories must finally be judged phys- marked by Aquinas when he summarizes Aris-
ically, not mathematically and when the ques-
j totle's doctrine. "Plato and all who preceded
tion is
put that way, as it is not by Copernicus Aristotle," he writes, "held that all bodies are
himself, Copernicans like Kepler, Galileo, and of the nature of the four elements" and con-
Newton take issue with what had been asso- sequently "that the matter of all bodies is the
ciated with the Ptolemaic theory the physics same. But the fact of the incorruptibility of
of Aristotle. some bodies was ascribed by Plato, not to the
condition of matter, but to the will of the
IN ORDER TO EXAMINE this issue,
necessary it is artificer, God. . , . This theory," Aquinas con-
to state briefly here certain features of Aris- tinues, "Aristotle disproves by the natural
totle's physics which are more fully discussed movements of bodies. For since he says that
in the chapters on CHANGE, ELEMENT, ME- the heavenly bodies have a natural movement,
CHANICS, and PHYSICS. different from that of the elements, it follows
Just as Ptolemy's astronomy conforms to that they have a different nature from them.
what we see as we look at the heavens, so Aris- For movement in a circle, which is
proper to
totle's physics represents a too simple conform- the heavenly bodies, not by contraries, where-
is
ity with everyday sense-experience. We observe as the movements of the elements are mutually
fire rising and stones falling. Mix earth, air, and opposite, one tending upwards, another down-
water in a closed container, and air bubbles will wards. . And as generation and corruption
. .
rise to the top, while the particles of earth will are from contraries, it follows that, whereas the
sink to the bottom. To cover a multitude of elements are corruptible, the heavenly bodies
similar observations, Aristotle develops the are incorruptible."
theory of the natural motions and places of the The same points which Aquinas relates in his
four terrestrial elements earth, air, fire, and defense of the Aristotelian theory, Kepler also
water. Since bodies move naturally only to at- puts together when he expounds that theory in
tain their proper places, the great body which order to attack it and the Ptolemaic astronomy
is the earth, already at the bottom of all
things, which tries to conform to it.
"By what argu-
need not move at all.
Being in its proper place, ments did the ancients establish their opinion
it is by nature stationary. which is the opposite of yours?" he asks. "By
CHAPTER 5: ASTRONOMY 93
four arguments in especial: (i) From the na- Ignoring the supposition that simplicity must
ture of moveable bodies. (2) From the nature be judged differently in different spheres, Co-
of the motor virtue. (3) From the nature of the pernicus challenges Ptolemy on his own grounds
place in which the movement occurs. (4) From when he proposes "simpler hypotheses" to fit
the perfection of the circle." He then states each "the movements of the heavens." But in doing
of these arguments, and answers each in turn. so,he seems to adopt the traditional view of the
mathematical character of astronomical hy-
WHAT is EXTRAORDINARY about Kepler's attack potheses. Yet, as will appear, he does not adopt
upon the Ptolemaic astronomy cannot be un- this view in the unqualified form in which
derstood without examining Ptolemy's defense Osiander states it in his Preface to the Revolu-
of his theory, a defense which Copernicus meets tions of the Heavenly Spheres.
in Ptolemy's own terms rather than, as Kepler "It the job of the astronomer," Osiander
is
does, by going outside them. writes, "to use painstaking and skilled observa-
Though his expressed intention was to con- tion in gathering together the history of the
struct a mathematical theory of the celestial celestial movements, and then since he cannot
motions which would also conform to Aris- by any of reasoning reach the true causes
line
recognized that the complications he had been whatever causes or hypotheses he pleases, such
compelled to add in order "to save the appear- that, by the assumption of these causes, these
ances" left him with a theory that did not con- same movements can be calculated from the
form to Aristotle's doctrine of the perfect cir- and for the
principles of geometry, for the past
cular motion of the heavenly spheres. Instead future too.
of abandoning Aristotle's physics, he defended "It is not necessary," he adds, "that these
histheory on the ground that astronomy, being hypotheses should be true, or even probable;
mathematical rather than physical, could ad- it is
enough if they provide a calculus which
mit such "unrealistic" complications if they fits When for one and the
the observations.
served the purposes of calculation and of "sav- same movement varying hypotheses arc pro-
ing the appearances." posed, as eccentricity or epicycle for the move-
In the thirteenth and last book of the Alma- ment of the sun, the astronomer much prefers
gest> when he faces the fact that his mathemat- to take the one which is easiest to grasp."
ical devices have become exceedingly difficult What distinguishes Kepler from both Ptol-
and strained from the point of view of the emy and Osiander is the way in which he is
Aristotelian reality Ptolemy writes: "Let no concerned with the truth of alternative hypoth-
one, seeing the difficulty of our devices, find eses in astronomy. He looks upon the truth of
why should it seem strange that such compli- flatly declares that "astronomy is part of phys-
cations can come about in the movements of ics."And in the opening pages of the fourth
heavenly things?" We ought not to judge the book, he insists that astronomy has not one,
simplicity of heavenly things by comparison but "two ends: to save the appearances and to
with what seems to be simple in the explanation contemplate the true form of the edifice of the
of earthly phenomena. "We should instead World." He follows this immediately by ob-
judge their simplicity from the unchangeable- serving that, if astronomy had only the first
ness of the natures in the heavens and their end, Tycho Brahe's theory would be as satis-
movements. For thus they would all appear factory as that of Copernicus.
simple, more than those things which seem so Early in his scientific career, before writing
here with us." the Epitome, Kepler asserts that "one cannot
94 THE GREAT IDEAS
leave to the astronomer absolute license to feign on the earthor of the earth, such as Gilbert's
no matter what hypotheses." He complains that theory of the magnetic fields generated by the
astronomers "too often . . . constrain their earth's axial rotation could be equally true oi
physics to test the consequences of competing Englishman William Gilbert," writes Kepler;
hypotheses which are equally good mathemat- "for in that book, although the author did not
"You must seek the foundations of your
ically.
believe that the Earth moved nevertheless
. . .
very posing of this problem itself depended on the plane of earthly physics. That is precisely
the insight that terrestrial and celestial me- what Newton finally does when, in the enun-
chanics can proceed according to the same prin- Third Rule of reasoning in natural
ciation of his
ciples and laws. That insight entailed the com- philosophy, he dryly but explicitly completes
plete overthrow of the ancient physics, with its the Copernican Revolution. Those "qualities
division of the universe into two distinct parts, of bodies . . . which are found to belong to all
having different kinds of matter and different bodies within the reach of our experiments,
laws of motion. are," Newton maintains, "to be esteemed the
universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever,"
COPERNICUS, WHO, despite Osiander's apolo- In the bifurcated world of ancient theory,
getics, believed his theory to be true, did not astronomy had a very special place among the
himself face the great point at issue in the natural sciences, proportionate to the "glory
Copernican revolution the material uniform- of the heavens." But with Newton it could be
ity of the physical universe. We shall subse- completely merged into a general mechanics
quently consider the question of the truth of whose laws of motion have universal applica-
astronomical hypotheses, but whether or not tin. That merger, begun by Newton, has been
Copernicus and the Copernicans had in their perfected since his day. The last obstacle to the
own day a right to believe their theory true, generalization lay in the apparent discrepancies
it was the acceptance of the Copernican hy- between electrical phenomena on the subatomic
pothesis as true which led Kepler and Galileo scale and gravitational phenomena on the astro-
to deny the truth of Aristotelian physics. nomic scale. But in our own time the unified field
If the earth is not at the center and station- equations of Einstein's theory of relativity em-
ary, then the basic doctrine of a natural direc- brace the very large and the very small motions
tion in motion and a natural place of rest for of matter within a single conceptual scheme,
the various elements is
completely upset. If the with radical consequences for the revision oi
earth is one of the planets, then anything true the Newtonian or classical mechanics.
CHAPTER 5: ASTRONOMY 95
But the unification of nature which Kepler Darwin has the power to explain
argues, if it
began and Newton completed, when set against several large classes of facts, which "it can
Aristotle's physics, may be even more radical. hardly be supposed that a false theory would
Newton's theory, because of the amazing way explain" in so satisfactory a manner. Darwin
inwhich it covered the widest variety of phe- defends the theory of natural selection as having
nomena by the simplest, most universal for- such power. To those who object that "this is
*
ferently in every part." exhibit the essential pattern of that kind of nat-
Whateverposition we take today concerning ural science which has, in modern times, come
the kind of truth which is possessed by hypoth- to be called "mathematical physics." Though
eses in mathematical physics, we now demand, that phrase may be modern, the ancients recog-
in the spirit of the three Copernicans Kepler, nized the special character of the sciences which
terous, superstitious, none of which it was. than music is with audible tones. Music is
Finally, from the point of view of our under- rather the arithmetic of harmonies, astronomy
standing of natural science itself, the astro- the geometry of motions. But in the Timaeus
nomical controversy we have been considering Plato turns mathematical formulae and calcula-
is almost an archetypical model. It is necessary, tions to use in telling what he calls "a likely
of course, to appreciate the real achievement of story" concerning the formation and structure
Ptolemy as well as of Copernicus and Kepler in of the sensible world of becoming. Here rather
order to realize how genuine and difficult the than in the Republic we have, according to
issues were. Facts unknown to all of them may Whitehead, the initial conception of mathe-
now have closed the dispute decisively, but matical physics as well as deep insight into its
lately not
supported by any direct evidence." and it is for this reason that Aquinas later calls
But the absence of direct evidence does not such disciplines "mixed and intermediate
leave a scientific theory without foundation, sciences."
96 THE GREAT IDEAS
The development of astronomy from Plato Milky Way an infinity of small stars whose
in the
and Aristotle through Ptolemy, Copernicus, more abundant splendor has made us recognize
and Kepler to Galileo and Newton thus con- the real cause of this whiteness."
stitutesan extraordinary set of "case histories"
for the study of what J. B. Conant calls the BECAUSE IT is a mixed science, both empirical
"tacticsand strategy "of science, and especially and mathematical, astronomy advances not
mathematical physics. But astronomy has one only with the improvement and enlargement
peculiar feature which distinguishes it from of observation, but also with new insights or
other branches of mathematical physics. It is developments in mathematics. Kant gives us
empirical rather than experimental. The astron- striking examples of how the work of the pure
omer does not control the phenomena he ob- mathematicians contributes to the advance of
serves. He does not, like the physicist, chemist, physics and astronomy. Their discoveries are
or physiologist, produce an isolated system of often made without any knowledge of their ap-
events by means of the laboratory arts. plication to natural phenomena. "They inves-
Harvey comments on this aspect of astron- tigated the properties of the parabola," he
omy when he proposes an experiment that will writes, "in ignorance of the law of terrestrial
enable the physiologist to do what the astron- gravitation which would have shown them its
omer cannot do, namely, deliberately prepare application to the trajectory of heavy bodies.
phenomena for examination by the senses. The . . So again they investigated the properties of
.
astronomer must be content with the appear- the ellipse without a suspicion that a gravitation
ances as they are given. Defending psycho- was also discoverable in the celestial bodies, and
"on the ground that it
analysis against attack without knowing the law that governs it as the
admits of no experimental proof," Freud points distance from the point of attraction varies, and
out that his critics "might have raised the same that makes the bodies describe this curve in free
matically superior theory a greater claim to of the phenomena it fits or saves, it might seem
truth. So far as reality is concerned, it is
only, to be so, for by its consilience it accounts for
in Plato's words, "a likely story"; or asAquinas phenomena that the Ptolemaic theory cannot
points out with reference to the geocentric But though this may cause us to reject
handle.
hypothesis, "the theory of eccentrics and epi- the unsuccessful hypothesis, docs it establish
cycles is considered as established because there- beyond doubt the truth of the successful one ?
by the sensible appearances of the heavenly Or, to put the question another way, is not our
movements can be explained; not however, as judgment here a comparative one rather than
if this reason were sufficient, since some other absolute? Are we saying more than that one
quite amazing virtue of fitting other sets of ourselves to the more modest statement that,
observations not originally thought to be re- as the better hypothesis, it simply tells a more
lated to the phenomena for which the hypoth- likely story about reality?
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PACB
1. The end, dignity, and utility of astronomy 99
2b. The use of hypotheses: the heliocentric and geocentric theories 100
30. Formal archetypal causes: the number and the music of the spheres
4.
The relation of astronomy to the other liberal arts and sciences: the place of astronomy
in the educational curriculum
5. Astronomy and cosmology: the theory of the world or universe as reflecting astronomi-
cal conceptions
98 THE GREAT IDEAS
PAGE
6. Astronomy and theology: astronomy as affecting views of God, creation, the divine
plan, and the moral hierarchy 102
7. Astronomy and the measurement of time: calendars and clocks; days and seasons
o/.
The comets and meteors
11. The influence of the stars and planets upon the character and actions of men
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which arc the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, m4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 1 16a-l 19b, the passage
.
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, m 7 PLATO. Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the mam divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference, line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
:
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7 45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS- The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
8c(3) The laws of celestial motion: celestial 9. The particular heavenly bodies
mechanics
16 KEPLER- Epitome, BK iv, 888a-895b passim, 9a. The sun: its position, distance, size, and mass
897a-907a passim, esp 897a, 904b-905a; 933a- OLD TESTAMENT- Joshua, 10:12-14 (D) Josuc,
952a passim; BK v, 975a-979b / Harmonies of 10:12-14 / Psalms, 136:7-8 (D) Psalms,
the World, 1018a-b; 1019b-1020b 135:7-8 / Isaiah, 13:9-11; 30:26; 60:19-20
34 NEWTON- Principles, BK i, PROP 1-3 and SCHOL (D) Isaias, 13:9-11; 30:26; 60:19-20 / Joel,
32b-35b; PROP 4, COROL vi 36a; PROP 11-13 2:10,31; 3-15 / Amos, 8:9
42b-46a esp PROP n 42b-43b; PROP 15 46b- APOCRYPHA- Ecclesiasticus, 43:1-5 (D) OT,
47a; PROP 17 48b-50a; BK n, PROP 51-53 and Ecclesiasticus, 43:1-5
SCHOL 259a-267a, BK in 269a-372a passim, esp NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 24:29-30 / MarJ^
RULE i-in 270a-271a, PHENOMENON I-PROP 7 13:24-25/1^,23:44-45
272a-282b, PROP 13 286a-b, PROP 35, SCHOL 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK n, 53d-54b; 79c;
320b-324a, PROP 40 337b-338a, GENERAL BK iv, 130d-l3la
SCHOL, 369a, 371b-372a 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK n, 394c
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 9, 7 PLATO: Cratylus, 98a / Apology, 204d-205a /
454c-d Republic, BK vi, 385c-386c / Timaeus, 451b-d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 8d [fn 2] 8 ARISTOTLE: Heavens, BK n, CH 7 [289*26-35]
b b
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xni, 563b; 380d; CH 12 [29i 29~292 27]383c-384b; CH 13
EPILOGUE ii, 694d-695c [293^4-294*12] 385c / Meteorology, BK i, CH 8
b
[345 i-9] 451c-d
8d.The creation of the heavens 11 ARCHIMEDES: Sand-Reckoner, 520a-b
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1:1-8,14-19; 2-1-4 / 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [564-574]
Nehemiah, 9:6 (D) // Esdras, 9:6 /Job, 26*7; 68b-c; [592-704] 68d-70b; [751-771] 70d-71a
37:18; 38 / Psalms, 8:3-4; r 9 :i 89:11; 102:25; 14 PLUTARCH: Pericles, 138d
136:5-9; 148:1-6 (D) Psalms, 8:4-5; 18-2; 16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK in 77a-107a; BK v,
88:121101:26; 135:5-9; i
$\i-6/ Proverbs, y 19', 171b-182b; BK vi, 215a-222b
8:27 / Jeremtah, 31:35; 51:15 (D) Jeremtas, 16 COPERNICUS Revolutions of the Heavenly
:
NEW TESTAMENT: Acts, 14:15; 17:24 (D) Acts, BK iv, 710b-714a; 716a-731a
14:14; 17:24 / Hebrews, 1:10 / // Peter, 3:5 / 16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 854b-856a; 857b-
Revelation, 14:7 -(D) Apocalypse, 14:7 860b; 873a-876a; 882a-883b; 885b-886b;
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 450c-452b 895b-905a; 907b-916a passim / Harmonies of
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vin, CH i [25i b i3-i9J the World, 1014b-1016a; 1080b-1085b
335b / Heavens, BK i, CH 10-12 370d-375d 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK in, CH 15, 176d-
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i 177a
[64^13-29] 164c-d 19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 70, A i,
:
Q 86, A 2, ANS and REP 1-2 993c-994d; Q 91, BK vii, par 8-ro 45d-47a / City of God, BK in,
A i, REP i 1016b-1017c; A 2, ANS and REP 1,4 CH 15, 176d-177a; BK v, CH 1-7 207d-212c /
1017c-1020c; A 3, REP 2 1020d-1022c BK n, CH 21-23 647a-648d
Christian Doctrine,
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, vn [121- 19 AQUINAS: SummaTheologica, PART i, Q 70,
141] 116b-c; x [7-21] 120b-c; xm [52-78] A 2, REP i 364b-365a; Q 86, A 4, REP 2-3 463d-
126a-b 464d; Q 96, A 3, ANS 512a-c; Q 115, A 4 589d-
22 CHAUCER: franklin's Tale [11,343-347] 356b 590c; A 5, REP i 590d-591c; Q 116, A i, ANS
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK v, 105a-b 592d-593d; PART i-n, Q 9, A 5 660d-662a
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 416a; 427b- 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, vir (67-96]
d; 428c-429a lOb-c; PURGATORY, xvi [52-84] 77b-d; PARA-
12 to 13 CHAPTER 5: ASTRONOMY 109
DISE, iv [49-63] lllb; vin [1-12] 116d; [91- 14 PLUTARCH: Aemilius Paulus, 220d-221b
148] 117d-118c; xin [52-78] 126a-b; xxn [112- 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK xv, 176a
123] 140d 16 KEPLER: Harmonies of the World, 1080b-
22 CHAUCER- Knight's Tak [2438-2482] 200a-b 1085b
/ Tale of Man of Law [4610-4623] 237b; l7PLoiiNus: Fourth Ennead, TR iv, CH 24-26
[4715-4735] 239b-240a / Wife of Bath's Pro- 170b-171d
logue [6187-6202] 266a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q n,
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i, A 3, REP i 49a-c; Q 67, A 4, ANS 352a-354a;
66b-67d; BK n, 69b,d-70d; BK in, 136c-137c; 115, A 3, REP i 588c-589c
176a>b; BK iv, 267c-d 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISP, iv [49-63]
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 18d-20d; 213d-215a; lllb; vin [1-12] 116d
246d-247c 22 CHAUCER: Knight's Tale [2209-2482] 196b-
26 SHAKESPEARE: Julius Caesar, ACT i, sc n 200b / Franklin's Tale [11,339-393] 356b-357a
[139-141] 570d 25 MONTAIGNL- Essays, 246d-247c
27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT i, sc i [113-125] 27 SHAKESPEARE: Antony and Cleopatra, ACT iv,
30d-31a / Othello, ACT v, sc n [105-111] 240b sc ix [5-18] 340c-d
King Lear, ACT i, sc n [112-166] 249a-c;
/ 35 BERKELEY. Human Knowledge, SECT 94
ACT iv, sc in [34-37] 272a 431b-c
28 GILBLRT- Loadstone, BK in, 73a 40 GIBBON Decline and Fall, 59c-60a, 81d; 93b-
29 CERVANIES: Don Quixote, PART i, 94c; PART d; 346d-347a
n, 222c 41 GIBBON- Decline and Fall, 226a-b; 227c
30 BACON: Advancement of learning, 14b-c; 54c- 46 HFGEL- Philosophy of History, PART i, 238d-
55a 239a; 252a-c
32 MILTON: Christs Nativity [125-140] 4b-5a / 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART n [7900-7950] 192b-
Arcades [61-73] 26b / Comus [93-144] 35b-36b 193b; [8034-8043] 195b; [8078-8081] 196b;
/ Paradise Lost, BK i [594-599] 106b, BK vin [8285-8302] 202a
[511-514] 243b, BK x [657-661] 288b
33 PASCAL Pensees, 173 203b-204a 13. The history of astronomy
36 SWIFT. Gulliver, PART in, 98a-b 5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound [442-461]
36 Si ERNE. Tristram Shandy, 194b-195a; 332a- 44c-d
334b;407b-408b 6 HERODOTUS- History, BK n, 49d-50a; 65b; 79c
47 GOETHE PART n [4947-4976] 122b-
Faust, 7 PLATO- Phaedrus, 138c-d / /fyo%>',204d-205a
123a, [6667-6670] 163b / Statesman, 586c-589c / Laws, BK vii, 728b-
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vin, 340d- 730d; BK xn, 797b-798b
341a,c 8 ARISTOTLE- Heavens, BK i, CH 3 [270^2-26]
361d-362a, en 10 370d-371d, BK n, CH 1-2
12. The worship of the earth, sun, moon, and 375b,d-377c; en 12 [292*6-9] 383c; CH 13
stars 384d-387d / Meteorology, BK i, CH 6 449b-
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 37*9-10 / Deuteron- 450b; CH 8 451b-452d, BK n, CH i
[354*27-32]
omy, 4 17:3 / II Kings, 2 3 '4-5, 1 1
19; (D) 460b / Metaphysics, BK i, en 2 (982 b ii-i7J
IV Kings, 23-4-5,11 / Jeremiah, 8-1-2; 10-2 500d; BK xn, CH 8 603b-605a
(D) Jeremias, 8-1-2; 10:2 / Ezefyel, 8 16 (D) 11 ARCIIIMLDES- Sand-Reckoner, 520a-b
Ezechiel, 8.16 / Zephaniah, 1:4-5 (D) Soph- 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [720-730]
onias, 1-4-5 70c
APOCRYPHA Wisdom of Solomon, 13*1-9 (D) 14 PLUTARCH- Romulus, 20b-c / Numa Pompi-
OT, Bool( of Wisdom, 13.1-9 / Baruch, 6:60- lius, 55a-b / 74a / Pericles, 138d
Solon,
69- (D) OT, Baruch, 6-60-68 / 220d-221b / Lysander,
Aemilius Paulus,
5 SOPHOCLES- Antigone [332-340] 134a 358d-359c / Nicias, 435b-d
5 EURIPIDES: Orestes [1625-1693] 410b-d 16 PTOLEMY- Almagest, BK HI, 77a-83a; BK iv,
5 ARISTOPHANES: Clouds [563-626] 495c-496b 109a-110b; BK vii, 223a*232b passim; BK ix,
/ Peace [406-416] 530d 272a-b
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 31a-b; 48c; BK 16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly
vii, 226c Spheres, 508a
7 PLATO: Apology, 204d-205a / Laws, BK vn, 16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 861b-863a; 888b-
728b-730d; BK xn, 797b-798b 891b; 907b-910a; 929a-933a passim; 955a
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK XH, CH 8 [io74b i- 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK v, par 3-6 27c-
14] 604d-605a 28c
9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Animals, BK i, CH 2 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 32,
256b
[716*15-20] A i, REP 2 175d-178a
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [581-660] 22 CHAUCER: Miller's Tale [3187-3212] 212b-213a
22b-23b; BK v [396-411] 66b; [821-836] 71d- 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK n,
72a 69d-70a
110 THE GREAT IDEAS 13
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The discussion of related disciplines, see MATHEMATICS; MECHANICS; PHYSICS.
The consideration of mathematical physics, see MATHEMATICS 50; MECHANICS 3; PHYSICS
ib, 3; SCIENCE 5c.
Other treatments of observation and measurement in natural science, see EXPERIENCE 5-50;
MECHANICS 2a; PHYSICS 3, 43, 4d; QUANTITY 6-6c; SCIENCE 5a~5b; SENSE 5.
The logic of hypotheses and their verification in scientific method, see HYPOTHESIS 40-^;
PHYSICS 4b; PRINCIPLE 30(2); SCIENCE 56.
The general consideration of scientific method, see LOGIC 4b; REASONING 6c; SCIENCE
5-5*-
The distinction between formal and efficient causes, see CAUSE la; and for the role of causes
and causal explanation in natural science, see CAUSE 5b; NATURE 3c; PHYSICS 2b;
SCIENCE 4C.
The consideration of certain mathematical forms used in astronomy, see QUANTITY 3b(i)-
3b(2), 3 c(2).
Other discussions of celestialand terrestrial mechanics, see MECHANICS 4a, 5f-5f(2), 6c.
The theory of gravitation and the problem of action-at-a-distance, see MECHANICS 6d(i)-
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booty of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and otherconcerning the publication of the works cited, consult
facts
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas,
INTRODUCTION
r seems good to one man may seem evil to anoth-
"p RUTH, goodness, and beauty form a triad
r
JL of terms which have been discussed to- er.What seems ugly or false may also seem
gether throughout the tradition of western beautiful or true to different men or to the
thought. same man at different times.
They have been called "transcendental" on Yet it is not altogether true that these three
the ground that everything which is is in some terms have always suffered the same fortunes.
measure or manner subject to denomination For Spinoza goodness and beauty are subjec-
as true or false, good or evil, beautiful or ugly. tive, but not truth. Because he "has persuaded
But they have been assigned to special
also himself that all things which exist are made for
spheres of being or subject matter the true him," man, Spinoza says, judges that to be "of
to thought and logic, the good to action and the greatest importance which is most useful to
morals, the beautiful to enjoyment and aes- him, and he must esteem that to be of surpass-
thetics. ing worth by which he is most beneficially
They have been called "the three fundamen- affected." The
notions of good and evil, beauty
tal values" with the implication that the worth and do not conform to anything in the
ugliness,
of anything can be exhaustively judged by nature of things. "The ignorant," says Spinoza,
reference to these three standards and no nevertheless, "call the nature of a thing good,
others. But other terms, such as pleasure or evil,sound, putrid, or corrupt just as they are
utility,have been proposed, either as additional affectedby it. For example, if the motion by
values or as significant variants of the so-called which the nerves are affected by means of ob-
fundamental three; or even sometimes as more jects represented to the eye conduces to well-
fundamental. Pleasure or utility, for
example, being, the objects by which it is caused are
has been held by men like Spinoza or Mill to be called beautiful', while those exciting a con-
the ultimate criterion of beauty or goodness. trary motion are called deformed"
Truth, goodness, and beauty, singly and to-
gether, have been the focus of the age-old con- BEAUTY HAS BEEN most frequently regarded as
troversy concerning the absolute and the rela- subjective, or relative to the individual judg-
tive, the objective and the subjective, the uni- ment. The familiar maxim, de gustibus non dis-
versal and the individual. At certain times it has putandum, has its original application in the
been thought that the distinction of true from sphere of beauty rather than truth and good-
false,good from evil, beautiful from ugly, has ness. "Truth is
disputable," Hume writes, "not
its basis and warranty in the very nature of taste . . . No man reasons concerning another's
things, and that a man's judgment of these mat- beauty; but frequently concerning the justice
ters is measured for
soundness or accuracy by
its or injustice of his actions." Thus even when it
its
conformity to fact. At other times the oppo- was supposed that judgments of the true and
site position has been dominant. One meaning the good could have a certain absoluteness or
of the ancient saying that man is the measure of universality or at least be considered as some-
allthings applies particularly to the true, good, thing about which men might reach agreement
and beautiful. Man measures truth, goodness, through argument opinions about beauty
and beauty by the effect things have upon him, were set apart as useless to dispute. Beauty
according to what they seem to him to be. What being simply a matter of individual taste, it
112
CHAPTER 6; BEAUTY 113
could afford no basis for argument or reasoning of these related problems. The degree to which
no objective ground for settling differences the three problems must be considered inter-
of opinion. dependently is determined by the extent to
From the ancient skeptics down to our own which each of the three terms requires the con-
day, men have noted the great variety of traits, text of the other two for its definition and anal-
often sharply opposed, which have been con- ysis*
sidered beautiful at different times and places.
"We fancy its forms," Montaigne says of beau- BEAUTY is, PERHAPS, not definable in any strict
ty, "according to our appetite and liking . . . sense of definition. But there have been, never-
Indians paint it black and tawny, with great theless, many attempts to state, with the brevi-
swollen big flat noses, and load the carti-
lips, ty of definition, what beauty is. Usually notions
lage betwixt the nostrils with great rings of gold ,
of goodness, or correlative notions of desire and
to make it hang down to the mouth ... In love, enter into the statement.
Peru, the greatest ears are the most beautiful, Aquinas, for example, declares that "the
and they stretch them out as far as they can by beautiful is the same as the good, and they
art ... There are, elsewhere, nations that take differ in aspect only. . . The notion of good is
.
great care to blacken their teeth, and hate to that which calms the desire, while the notion
see them white; elsewhere, people that paint is that which calms the desire,
of the beautiful
j
square, and cannot swallow a god in the form er, Aquinas defines the beautiful as "that which
of a ball." pleases upon being seen" (id quod visum placet).
Like Montaigne, Darwin gives an extensive Hence, he continues, "beauty consists in due
account of the things men have found beauti- proportion, for the senses delight in things duly
ful,many of them so various and contradictory proportioned . because the sense too is a
. .
that it would seem there could be no objective sort of reason, asis every cognitive power/'
stitutes the experience of beauty? Can the same pleased by objects which should elicit that re-
tirely the result of the way an individual feels? another conception, must also be understood in
Aquinas appears to meet this difficulty by the general context of his theory of knowledge,
specifying certain objective elements of beau- and his analysis of such terms as good, pleasure,
ty, or "conditions," as he calls them. "Beauty and desire. His definition, like that of Aquinas,
includes three conditions," he writes: "integ- calls an object beautiful if it satisfies the ob-
rity or perfection,
since those things which are server in a very special way not merely pleas-
impaired are by that very fact ugly; due pro- ing his senses, or satisfying his desires, in the
portion or harmony and lastly, brightness or
\ ways in which things good as means or ends fit
clarity,
whence things are called beautiful which a man's interests or purposes. The beautiful,
have a bright color." Quite apart from indi- according to Kant, "pleases immediately . . .
vidual reactions, objects may differ in the de- apart from all interest" The pleasure that re-
gree to which they possess such properties- sults from its contemplation "may be said to be
traits which are capable of pleasing or displeas- the one and only disinterested and free delight;
differ in the degree to which they possess good universal, i.e. man," yet at the
valid for every
rven as objects differ in the degree to which universal concept." In other words, "all judge-
they possess the elements of beauty. Once ments of taste are singular judgements"; they
igam in the controversyconcerning the objec- are without concept in the sense that they,do
tivity or subjectivity of beauty, there seems to not apply to a class of objects. Nevertheless,
be a middle ground between the two extreme they have a certain universality and are not
positions, which insists upon a beauty intrinsic merely the formulation of a private judgment.
to the object but does not deny the relevance When "we call the object beautiful," Kant
}f differences in individual sensibility. says, "we
believe ourselves to be speaking with
William James would seem to be indicating a universal voice, and lay claim to the concur-
juch a position when, in his discussion of aes- rence of every one, whereas no private sensa-
rhetic principles, he declares: "We are once and tion would be decisive except for the observer
or all so made that when certain impressions alone and his liking."
:ome before our mind, one of them will seem to In saying that aesthetic judgments have sub-
:allfor or repel the others as its companions." jective, not objective, universality, and in hold-
\s an example, he cites the fact that "a note ing that the beautiful is the object of a neces-
tounds good with its third and fifth." Such an sary satisfaction, Kant also seems to take the
icsthetic judgment certainly depends upon in- middle position which recognizes the subjec-
Jividual sensibility, and, James adds, "to a cer- tivity of the aesthetic judgment without deny-
ain extent the principle of habit will explain ing that beauty is somehow an intrinsic prop-
it]."But he also points out that "to explain all erty of objects. With regard to its subjective
testhetic judgements in this way would be ab- character, Kant cites Hume to the effect that
CHAFFER 6: BEAUTY 115
"although critics arc able to reason more plau- thetic" has progressively narrowed, until now
sibly than cooks, they must still share the same itrefers almost exclusively to the appreciation
fate." The universal character of the aesthetic of works of fine art, where before it connoted
judgment, however, keeps it from being com- any experience of the beautiful, in the things
pletely subjective and Kant goes to some length of nature as well as in the works of man.
to refute the notion that in matters of the beau- The question is raised, then, whether natural
tiful one can seek refuge in the adage that/ beauty, or the perception of beauty in nature,
"every one has his own taste.*' I
involves the same elements and causes as beau-
The fact that the aesthetic judgment re- ty in art. Is the beauty of a flower or of a flower
quires universal assent, even though the uni- ing field determined by the same factors as the
versal rule on which it is based cannot be beauty of a still life or a landscape painting?
formulated, does not, of course, preclude the The affirmative answer seems to be assumcc
failure of the object to win such assent from in a large part of the tradition. In his discus
many individuals. Not all men have good taste sion of the beautiful in the Poetics^ Aristotle
or, having it, have it to the same degree. explicitly applies the same standard to botr
nature and art. "To be beautiful," he writes
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS selective "a living creature, and every whole made up
rather than exhaustive -show the connection of parts, must not only present a certain ordei
between definitions of beauty and the problem in its arrangement of parts, but also be of a
of aesthetic training. In the traditional discus- certain magnitude." Aristotle's notion that art
sion of the ends of education, there is the prob- imitates nature indicates a further relation be-
lem of how to cultivate good taste the ability tween the beautiful in art and nature. Unity,
to discriminate critically between the beautiful proportion, and clarity would then be elements
and the ugly. common to^ beauty in its every occurrence,
If beauty is
entirely subjective, entirely a though these elements may be embodied dif-
matter of individual feeling, then, except for ferently in things which have a difference in
conformity to standards set by the customs of their mode of being, as do natural and artificial
depend upon a theory of the beautiful which ticularly from the fact that "nature ... in her
avoids both extremes, and which permits the beautiful products displays herself as art, not as
educator to aim at a development of individual a mere matter of chance, but, asit were,
design-
sensibilities in accordance with objective cri- edly, according to a law-directed arrangement."
teria of taste. The fact that natural things and works of art
stand in a different relation to purpose or in-
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS also provide terest is for Kant an immediate indication that
background for the problem of beauty in na- their beauty is Their susceptibility
different.
ture and in art. As indicated in the chapter on to disinterested enjoyment is not the same. Yet
ART, the consideration of art in recent times for Kant, as for his predecessors, nature pro-
tends to become restricted to the theory of the vides the model or archetype which art fol-
fine arts. So too the consideration of beauty has lows, and he even speaks of art as an "imi-
become more and more an analysis of excellence tation" of nature.
in poetry, music, painting,and sculpture. In The Kantian discussion of nature and art
consequence, the meaning of the word "aes- moves into another dimension when it con-
116 THE GREAT IDEAS
siders the distinction between the beautiful ject through both knowledge and love. Here
and the sublime. We must look for the sub- again the context of meaning favors the align-
lime, Kant says, "not ... in works of art ... ment of beauty with love, at least for theories
nor yet in things of nature, that in their very which make beauty primarily an object of con-
concept import a definite end, e.g. animals of templation. In Plato and Plotinus, and on
a recognized natural order, but in rude nature another level in the theologians, the two con-
merely as involving magnitude." In company siderations of love and beauty fuse together
with Longinus and Edmund Burke, Kant char- inseparably.
acterizes the sublime by reference to the limi- It is the "privilege of beauty," Plato thinks,
tations of human powers. Whereas the beauti- to offer man the readiest access to the world of
ful "consists in limitation," the sublime "im- ideas. According to the myth in the Phaedrus,
mediately involves, or else by its presence pro- the contemplation of beauty enables the soul
"may appear, indeed, in point of form to con- intellectual in its aim, is described by Plato as
travene the ends of our power of judgement, identical with love.
to be ill-adapted to our faculty of presentation, The observer of beauty "is amazed when he
and to be, as it were, an outrage on the imagi- seesanyone having a godlike face or form,
nation." which is the expression of divine beauty; and
Made aware of his own weakness, man is at first a shudder runs through him, and again
dwarfed by nature's magnificence, but at that the old awe steals over him; then looking upon
very moment he is also elevated by realizing the face of his beloved as of a god, he reverences
his ability to appreciate that which is so much him, and he were not afraid of being thought
if
greater than himself. This dual mood signal- a downright madman, he would sacrifice to his
izes man's experience of the su^iine. Unlike beloved as to the image of a god." When the
the enjoyment of beauty, it is neither disin- soul bathes herself "in the waters of beauty, her
terested nor devoid of moral tone. constraint is loosened, and she is refreshed, and
has no more pangs and pains." This state of
TRUTH is USUALLY connected with perception the soul enraptured by beauty, Plato goes on
and thought, the good with desire and action. to say, "is by men called love."
Both have been related to love and, in different Sharply opposed to Plato's intellectualiza-
ways, to pleasure and pain. All these terms nat- tion of beauty is that
conception which con-
urally occur in the traditional discussion of nects with sensual pleasure and sexual attrac-
it
beauty, partly by way of definition, but also tion. WhenDarwin, for instance, considers the
partly in the course of considering the faculties sense of beauty, he confines his attention almost
engaged in the experience of beauty. entirely to the colors and sounds used as "at-
Basic here is the question whether beauty is tractions of the opposite sex." Freud, likewise,
an object of love or desire. The meaning of while admitting that "psycho-analysis has less
any answer will, of course, vary with different to say about beauty than about most things,"
conceptions of desire and love. claims that "its derivation from the realms of
Desire is sometimes thought of as funda- sexual sensation . . . seems certain."
mentally acquisitive, directed toward the ap- Such considerations may not remove beauty
propriation of a good; whereas love, on the from the sphere of love, but, as the chapter on
contrary, aims at no personal aggrandizement LOVE makes clear, love has many meanings,
but rather, with complete generosity, wishes and is of many sorts. The beautiful which is
only the well-being of the beloved. In this sexually attractive is the object of a love which
context, beauty seems to be more closely asso- is almost identical with desire sometimes with
ciated with a good that is loved than with a lust and certainly involves animal impulses
good desired. and bodily pleasures. "The taste for the beau-
Love, moreover, is more akin to knowledge tiful," writes Darwin, "at least as far as female
tharf is desire. The
act of contemplation is beauty is concerned, is not of a special nature in
sometimes understood as a union with the ob- the human mind."
CHAPTER 6: BEAUTY 117
On the other hand, Darwin attributes to of ideas; the great poems which crystallize
man alone an aesthetic faculty for the appre- beauty in a scene, in a face, in a deed; and,
ciation of beauty apart from love or sex. No above all, the writings of the theologians which
other animal, he thinks, is "capable of admiring do not try to do more than suggest the ineffable
such scenes as the heavens at night, a beautiful splendor of God's infinite beauty, a beauty
landscape, or refined music; but such high fused with truth and goodness, all absolute in
tastes are acquired through culture and depend the one absolute perfection of the divine be-
on complex associations; they are not enjoyed ing."The Divine Goodness," observes Dante,
by barbarians or by uneducated persons." For "which from Itself spurns all envy, burning in
Freud, however, the appreciation of such beau- Itself so sparkles that It displays the eternal ,
gible objects, and its relation to the sensible end will suddenly perceive a nature of won-
beauty of material tilings. Plotinus, holding drous beauty . . .
beauty absolute, separate,
that beauty of every kind comes from a "form" simple, and everlasting, which without diminu-
or "reason," traces the "beauty which is in tion and without increase, or any change, is
bodies," as well as that "which is in the soul" imparted to the ever-growing and perishing
to source in the "eternal intelligence." This)
its beauties of all other things. He who from these,
"intelligible beauty" lies outside the range ascending under the influence of true love, be-
1
of]
is not far from
even as beyond the reach of sense-/ gins to perceive that beauty,
1
desire it is
Primarily concerned with other subjects, my dear Socrates," she concludes, "is the life
many of the great books make only an indirect above all others which man should live, in thtf
contribution to the theory of beauty the moral :
contemplation of beauty absolute."
treatises which consider the spiritual beauty of For Plotinus the degrees of beauty corre-
a noble man or of a virtuous character; the spond to degrees of emancipation from matter.
cosmologies of the philosophers or scientists "The more it goes towards matter the . . .
which find beauty in the structure of the world feebler beauty becomes." A
thing is ugly only
the intelligible, not sensible, order of the because, "not dominated by a form and reason,
universe; the mathematical works which ex- the matter has not been completely informed
hibit, and sometimes enunciate, an awareness by the idea." If a thing could be completely
of formal beauty in the necessary connection "without reason and form," it would be "abso-
118 THE GREAT IDEAS
lute ugliness." But whatever exists possesses the type of supernatural knowledge promised
form and reason to some extent and has some to the souls of the blessed the beatific vision in
share of the effulgent beauty of the One, even which God is beheld intuitively, not known
as has some share through emanation in its
it discursively, and which knowledge united
in
overflowing beingthe grades of beauty, as of with love is the principle of the soul's union
Even
separated from a continuous scale of and on the natural level, every experience of
beauty, the extreme terms the beauty of God beauty in nature or art, in sensible things or
and the beauty of the least of finite things in ideas occasions something /% an act of
have similitude for a theologian like Aquinas, vision, a moment
of contemplation, of enjoy-
Thc word visum in his definition of the beauti- ment detached from desire or action, and clear
(id quod visum
fill placet^ "that which pleases without the articulations of analysis or the
upon being seen") is the word used to signify demonstrations of reason.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The general theory of the beautiful 1
19
la. The beautiful and the good: beauty as a kind of fitness or order
id. The distinction between the beautiful and the sublime 121
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers
numbers of the passages referred For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
to.
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, m 53 JAMES Psychology 116a-119b, the passage
:
',
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
printed
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, m 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
Bi RLE REFERENCES The references are to book, chapter, and verse, When the King James
:
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
b
A 4, REP i 25d-26c; Q 91, A 3, REP 3 486b-487d; CH 7 [1072*23-^4] 602b-c; [i072 30-ic>73*2]
b
PART I-H, Q 27, A i, REP 3 737b-d 603a; BK xm, CH 3 [io78*3i- 6] 609d-610a
120 THE GREAT IDEAS Ibto \c
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART ii-n, Q
(1. The general theory of the beautiful la. The 1 80, A 2, REP m
3 608c-609c, PART SUPPL,
beautiful and the good: beauty as a kind of Q 94, A i, REP 2 1040d-1041b
fitness or order.) 27 SHAKESPEARE: Sonnets, xiv 588b; LIV 594c
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH 5 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART i, 184b-d
[645*4-^6] 168d-169a / Ethics, BK iv, CH 2 35 HUME* Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 5,
[1122*34-1123*33] 369a-370b passim / Politics, 452d-453a
BK vii, CH 4 [1326*30-35] 530c / Poetics, CH 7 42 KANT: Judgement, 476a-479d esp 479a-d;
b a
[i45o 23-i45i i5J 685b-c 484d-485b; 496d; 501d-502a; 518a-d; 521b-
12EpiCTETUs: Discourses, BK in, CH i 175a- 523c;525a-c
177c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART n, 266a-
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK n, SECT i 256b,d 267a; 278a c; PART iv, 346d-347a
14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 47a 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK vi,
16 KEPLER* Epitome, BK iv, 868b 153b-d
17 PLOTINUS- First Ennead, TR vi 21a-26a / Fifth 53 JAMES: Psychology, 865b-866a; 886b-888a
Ennead, TR v, CH 12, 234a-c; TR vm 239b-246c 54 FREUD. New Introductory Lectures, 880b
/ Sixth Ennead, TR vn, CH 22 332d-333b
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK n, par 12 llc-d; \c. The elements of beauty: unity, proportion,
BK iv, par 20 24b-c; par 24-27 25b-26a; BK clarity
vn, par 23 50b-c/ City of God, BK xxn, CH 24, 7 PLATO. Republic, BK in, 333b-334b; BK iv,
610c-611b 342b-c / Ttmaeus, 448a-c; 474d-475a / Sophist,
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 5, 561b-d / Statesman, 594a-c / Philebus, 630d-
A 4, REP i 25d-26c; Q 91, A 3 486b-487d; Q 96, 631 d, 637c-638a / Laws, BK n, 660a-661b
A 3, REP 3 512a-c; PART i-n, Q 27, A i, REP 3 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vn, CH 3 [
631d / Laws, BK n, 654a-656c; BK vir, 720c-d 180, A 2, REP 3 608c-609c; PART HI SUPPL, Q
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK vi, CH 7 [146*21-32] 94, A i, REP 2 1040d-1041b
200a-b 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xi [79-
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH 5 xxvi [91-126] 93d-94b
120] 69c-70a;
[645*4-26] 168d-169a / Ethics, BK in, CH 10 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK iv,
A CH
[in8 i-i6] 364c / Politics, BK vm, 3 273d-274a
b 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 230b-231c
[i}37 27-i3}829] 543a-c; CH 5 [1340*24-29]
545d / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 6 [i362b 5~9] 603b 26 SHAKESPEARE: Merchant of Venice, ACT v, sc
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK in, SECT 2 259d- i
[98-110] 431d
260a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PARTi, APPENDIX, 371b-372d
Q 27, A i, REP 3 737b-d; Q 32, A 8, ANS 764c- 471b-473a; 476a-495a,c; 513b-516b; 516d-
765b 517c; 524d-525a; 540a-546d
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 62a-c 44 Bos WELL: Johnson, 202 b; 362 b-c
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART i, 184b-d 46 HEGEL, Philosophy of History, INTRO, 185c-d;
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, APPENDIX, 371d PART ii, 264b-268c; 280b-c
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 32 176a-b 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 95a-d / Descent of
42 KANT. Judgement, 471d-473a; 476a-495a,c esp Man, 301c-302a; 462d-463a; 569c; 571c-577d
488a-489a; 502d-503d; 516d-518d; 527b-528c esp 575d, 577b-c; 595c>596a
esp 527d-528a; 537a-539d 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK iv, 191b-192b;
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 220b-c; BKvm,318a-320b
PART ii, 267b-268b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 755b-757b; 886b-888a
47 GOETHE: Faust, PART n [8697-8811] 211b-
214a; [11,288-303] 274b-275a
6. The role of the beautiful in education
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 95a-d / Descent of 7 PLATO: Symposium, 167a-d / Gorgias, 261a-c
Man, 301d-302a; 568d-571b passim; 577b-d / Republic, BK H-III, 320c-334b esp BK in,
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK iv, 190d-192b 333b-334b; BK vm, 409d / Laws, BK ii 653a-
53 TAMES: Psychology, 157a; 755a-757b esp 663d; BK in, 675c-676b; BK vn, 720c-d
755a-b; 886b 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK vm, CH 3 542d-543d,
54 FREUD: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 643c / CH 5-7 544c-548a,c
Civilization and Its Discontents, 775b 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK iv, CH n, 242a-d
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR in, CH 1-2 lOa-d;
5. Judgments of beauty: the objective and the TR vi 21a-26a / Fifth Ennead, TR ix, CH 2
subjective in aesthetic judgments or 246d-247b
judgments of taste 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK vn, par 23 50b-c
7 PLATO: Ion 142a-148a,c / Symposium, 167a-d 33 PASCAL: Penstes, 381 238b
/ Gorgias, 261a-c / Republic, BK m, 333b-334b 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 24a
7to7c CHAPTER 6; BEAUTY 123
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 300a-b 16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 853b-887a passim,
42 KANT: Judgement, 462b-d; 485b-491c; 493a-b; esp 863b-872b / Harmonies of the World,
513d-514b, 521b-523c; 528b-c; 548c-549d; 1023b-1085b esp 1049b-1050a, 1071b, 1077b-
586d-587a 1080b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 185c-d; 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR ix, CH 17 76b-
PARF ii, 267a-268b; PART iv, 346d-347a 77a / Third Ennead, TR n, CH 3 83d-84c; CH
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 302a-b, 595c- 10-14 88a-89d / Fifth Ennead, TR vm, CH 8-9
596a 243c-244c; CH 12-13 245c-246c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 288a; 757a-b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK vn, par 16-23
48c-50c; BK x, par 8-10 73b-74a / City of God,
7. Intelligible beauty BK v, CH ii 216c-d, BK vm, CH 6 268d<269c;
BK x, CH 14 307c-308a; BK xi, CH 4, 324a-b;
la.The beauty of God CH 18 331d-332a, CH 22-2} 333d-335c; BK xn,
OLD TESTAMENT: Psalms, 27.4; 90 17; 93, 97 6 CH 4-5 344b-345b; BK xxii, CH 24 609a-612a
(D) Psalms, 26:4, 89:17; 92, 96:6 / Isaiah, / Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 4 625b-c
28.5, J3:i5-i7-(0) Isaias, 28.5; 33:15-17 / 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 19,
Zechariah, 9.17 (D) Zachanas, 9:17 A 9, REP 2 116d-117d; Q 23, A 8, REP 2 140a-
APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 13;11-5 (D) 141a, Q 66, A i 343d-345c; Q 74, A 3, REP 3
OT, Boo!( of Wisdom, 13:1-5 375a-377a,c
7 PLATO. Symposium, 167a-d 20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL,
.
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other discussions of the relation of beauty to goodness and truth, see GOOD AND EVIL ic;
TRUTH ic; and for the relation of grades of beauty to degrees of perfection in being, sec
BEING 33.
Unity, order, and proportion as elements of beauty, sec RELATION 50.
The consideration of beauty as an object of love or desire, see DESIRE 2b; LOVE id.
The theory of the aesthetic judgment or the judgment of taste, see SENSE 6; and for the
controversy over the objectivity and universality of such judgments, see CUSTOM 93;
RELATION 6c; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 70.
The problem of cultivating good taste and critical judgment in the field of the fine arts, see
ART 7b; POETRY 8a-8b.
The context of the comparison of beauty in nature and in art, sec ART 23-3; NATURE aa, 5d;
PLEASURE AND PAIN 40(1).
Consideration of the kind of knowledge which is involved in the apprehension of beauty, see
KNOWLEDGE 63(2), 6c(i).
Another discussion of sensible and intelligible beauty, sec SENSE 6; and for the intelligible
beauty of God and of the universe, see GOD 4h; WORLD 6d.
CHAPTER 6: BEAUTY 125
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boofy of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups*
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
T" HE words "is" and "(is) not" arc probably
/fc T
philosophy. Though it often leads to subtleties,
JL the words most frequently used by anyone. it also keeps the philosopher in deepest touch
They are unavoidable, by implication at least, with common sense and the speculative wonder
in every statement. They have, in addition, of all men.
a greater range of meaning than any other
words. As A TECHNICAL concept in philosophy, being
Their manifold significance seems to be of a has been called both the richest and the empti-
very special kind, for whatever is said not to be est of all terms in the vocabulary of thought.
inone sense of being can always be said to be in Both remarks testify to the same fact, namely,
another of its senses. Children and practiced that the highest abstraction, the most uni-
it is
liars know this. Playing on the meanings of be- versal of predicates, and the most pervasive
ing, or with "is" and "not," they move smooth- subject of discussion.
ly from fact to fiction, imagination to reality, William James is in that long line of philoso-
or truth to falsehood. phers which began with the early Greeks when
Despite the obviousness and commonplace- he points out that "in the strict and ultimate
ness of the questions which arise with any con- sense of the word 'existence,' everything which
sideration of the meanings of "is," the study of can be thought of at all exists as some sort of
being is a highly technical inquiry which only object, whether mythical object, individual
philosophers have pursued at length. Berkeley thinker's object, or object in outer space and
gives one reason why they cannot avoid this for intelligence at large." Even things which do
task. "Nothing seems of more importance," he not really exist have being insofar as they are
says, "towards erecting a firm system of sound objects of thought things remembered which
and real than to lay the begin-
knowledge . . . once existed, things conceivable which have
ning in a distinct explication of what is meant the possibility of being, things imaginary which
being. Not all philosophers ask these questions; jects; but "being" divides something or any-
nor do all who ask such questions thing from nothing and, as we have seen, even
approach or
formulate them in the same way. Nevertheless, applies to nothing.
the attempt to answer them is a task peculiar to "All other names," Aquinas writes, "arc
126
CHAPTER 7: BEING 127
either less universal, or, if convertible with it, in this sense, 'being* becomes the richest of
add something above it at least in idea; hence terms the one which has the greatest ampli-
in a certain way they inform and determine tude of meaning.
it." The concepts which such words express
have, therefore, a restricted universality. They BOTH WAYS OF thinking about being are rele-
apply to all things of a certain fynd, but not to vant to the problem of the relations among the
all things^ things of every kind or type. With various meanings of 'being.' Both are also re-
the exception of a few terms inseparably associ- lated to the problem of whether being is one or
ated with 'being' (or, as Aquinas says, converti- many the problem first raised by the Eleatics,
ble with it), only being is common to all kinds exhaustively explored in Plato's ParmcntdeSj
of things. When every other trait peculiar to a and recurrent in the thought of Plotinus, Spi-
thing is removed, its being remains the fact noza, and Hegel.
that it is in some sense. The two problems are connected. If every-
If we start with a particular of any sort, clas- thing that is exists only as a part of being as a
sifying it
progressively according to the char- whole, or if the unity of being requires every-
acteristics which it shares with more and more thing to be the same in being, then whatever
things, we come at last to being. According to do not multiply the mean-
diversities there are
this method of abstraction, which Hegel fol- ings of being.Although he speaks of substance
lows in his Science of Logic, 'being' is the empti- rather than of being, Spinoza argues that
est of terms precisely because it is the com- "there cannot be any substance excepting God,
monest. It signifies the very least that can be and consequently none other can be con-
thought of anything. On this view, if all we are ceived." From this it follows that "whatever
told of something is that it isthat it has being is, is in God, and nothing can be or be con-
a determinate nature. Abstracted from every- of infinite attributes, each one of which ex-
thing else, 'being' has only the positive meaning presses eternal and infinite essence," it is ab-
of excluding 'non-being.' surd, in Spinoza's opinion, to think of any
There is an opposite procedure by which the other substance. "If there were any substance
term being has the maximal rather than the besides God, it would have to be explained,"
minimal significance. Since whatever else a he says, "by some attribute of God, and thus
thing is, it is a being, its being lies at the very two substances would exist possessing the same
heart of its nature and underlies all its other attribute," which is impossible.
cartes defines two kinds of finite substance. that which potentially or actually."
'is'
"That substance in which thought immediately All these senses of being, according to Aris-
resides, I call Mind," he writes; and "that sub- totle, "refer to one starting point," namely,
stance, which is the immediate subject of ex- substance, or that which has being in and of
tension in space, and of the accidents that pre- itself. "That which is primarily, /.., not a m
suppose extension, e.g., figure, situation, move- qualified sense," he writes, "must be a sub-
ment in space, etc., is called Body." All these stance." But when he also says that "that
substances, and even their accidents, have be- which primarily is the 'what' which indi-
'is'
ing, but not being of the same kind or to the cates the substance of a thing," he seems to be
same degree. "There are," according to Des- using the words "substance" and "essence"
cartes, "diverse degrees of reality, or (the qual- interchangeably. This, in turn, seems to be re-
ity of being an) entity. For substance has more lated to the fact that, although Aristotle dis-
reality than accident or mode; and infinite sub- tinguishes between actual and potential being,
stance has more than finite substance." Its be- and between necessary or incorruptible and
ing independent, theirs dependent.
is
contingent or corruptible beings, he, like Plato
The issue between Spinoza and Descartes a and unlike Aquinas, Descartes, or Spinoza,
single substance or many is
only one of the does not consider whether the essence and exist-
separate existences, but though both are, in able not to exist, whereas a necessary being
this sense, plurahsts, being seems to have one cannot not exist. A contingent being is, there-
meaning for Plato, many for Aristotle. fore, one whose essence can be divorced from
According to Plato's distinction between be- existence; a necessary being, one which must be
ing and becoming, only the immutable es- precisely because its essence is identical with
sences, the eternal ideas, are beings, and though its existence. But the explicit recognition of a
they are many in number, they all belong to real distinction between essence and existence
one realm and possess the same type of being. seems to be reserved for the later theologians
But for Aristotle, not only do perishable as well and philosophers who conceive of an infinite
as imperishable substances exist; not only is
being, as Aristotle does not.
there sensible and mutable as well as immaterial The infinity of a being lies not only in its
and eternal being; but the being which sub- possession of all perfections, but even more
stances possess is not the same as that of acci- fundamentally in its requiring no cause outside
dents; essential is not the same as accidental itself for its own existence. "That thing," says
being; potential being is not the same as being Aquinas, "whose being differs from its essence,
actual; and to be is not the same as to be con- must have its being caused by another That
ceived, that is, to exist in reality is not the which has being, but is not being, isa being by
same as to exist in mind. participation." Where Aristotle makes sub-
CHAPTER 7: BEING
stance the primary type of being, and the being qua being both what it is and the prop-
1*
"starting-point of all its other meanings, erties which belong to it qua being."
Aquinas makes the infinite being of God, As pointed out in the chapter on META-
whose very essence it is to be, the source of PHYSICS, it is an historical accident that this
all finite and participated beings, in which there inquiry concerning being came to be called
is a
composition of existence and essence, "metaphysics," That is the name which, ac-
or "of that whereby they are and that which cording to legend, the ancient editors gave to a
they are" collection of writings in which Aristotle pur-
Since "being itself is that whereby a thing sued this inquiry. Since they came after the
is," being belongs to God primarily and to all books on physics, they were called "meta-
other things according to modes of derivation physics" on the supposition that Aristotle in-
or participation. God and his creatures can be tended the discussion of being to follow his
called "beings" but, Aquinas points out, not in treatise on change and motion.
the identically same sense, nor yet with utter If one were to invent a word to describe the
diversity of meaning. A
similarity a sameness- science of being,it would be
"ontology," not
m-diversity or analogy obtains between the "metaphysics" or even "theology." Yet "meta-
unqualified being of God and the being of all physics" has remained the traditionally accept-
other things, which have being subject to vari- ed name for the inquiry or science which goes
ous qualifications or limitations. beyond physics or all of natural science in
All other questions about being are affected that it asks about the very existence of things,
by the solution of these basic problems con- and their modes of being. The traditional con-
cerning the unity of being, the kinds of being, nection of metaphysics with theology, discussed
and the order of the various kinds. If they are in the chapters on THEOLOGY and META-
solved in one way in favor of unity certain PHYSICS, seems to have its origin in the fact
questions are not even raised, for they are gen- that Aristotle's treatiseon being passes from a
uine only on the basis of the other solution consideration of sensible and mutable substan-
which finds being diverse. The discussion, in the ces to the problem of the existence of imma-
chapters on SAME AND OTHER, and on SIGN terial beings, and to the conception of a divine
AND SYMBOL, of sameness, diversity, and anal- being, purely actual, absolutely immutable.
ogy is, therefore, relevant to the problem of In a science intended to treat "of that which
how things are at once alike and unlike in being. is
primarily, and to which all the other cate-
gories of being are referred, namely, substance,"
THE GREEKS, NOTABLY Plato and Aristotle, Aristotle says, "we must first sketch the nature
began the inquiry about being. They realized of substance." Hence he begins with what he
that after all other questions are answered, calls "the generally recognized substances.
there still remains the question, What does it These are the sensible substances." He post-
mean to say of anything that it tsor is not} After pones until later his critical discussion of "the
we understand what it means for a thing to be Ideas and the objects of mathematics, for some
a man, or to be alive, or to be a body, we must say these are substances in addition to the sen-
still consider what it means for that thing sim- sible substances"; yet he directs his whole in-
ply to be in any way at all; or to be in one sense, quiry to the ultimate question "whether there
and not to be in another. arc or are not any besides sensible substances,"
The discussion of being, in itself and in rela- His attempt to answer this question in the
tion to unity and truth, rest and motion, runs twelfth book makes it the theological part of
ject matter, and which he sometimes calls "first Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz, deal with
philosophy" and sometimes "theology." It be- many, if not all, major points in the analysis
longs to this science, he declares, "to consider of being which the Greek philosophers initi-
130 THE GREAT IDEAS
atcd and the mediaeval theologians developed. Freedom, and Immortality, and it aims at
Later philosophers, whose mam concern is with showing that the second conception, conjoined
the origin and validity of human knowledge, with the first, must lead to the third as a neces-
come to the traditional metaphysical questions sary conclusion."
through an analysis, not of substance or essence, Hegel, on the other hand, does not approach
existence or power, but of our ideas of substance the problem of being or reality through a cri-
and power. tique of knowledge. For Hegel, as for Plotinus
This transformation of the ancient problem before him, the heart of metaphysics lies in
of being is stated by Berkeley in almost epi- understanding that "nothing is actual except
grammatic form. Considering "what is meant the Idea" or the Absolute, "and the great thing
ence, out of the minds or thinking things which tinus calls the absolute, not the Idea, but the
perceive them." Locke, too, although he does All-one, yet he tries to show that the One is the
not identify being with perception, makes the principle, the light, and the life of all things,
same shift on the ground that "the first step just as Hegel reduces everything to a manifes-
towards satisfying several inquiries the mind of tation of the underlying reality of the Absolute
man was apt to run into, was to make a survey Idea.
of our understandings, examine our own
own Despite all such changes in terminology, de-
powers, and see to what things they were spite radical differences in philosophical princi-
philosopher become primarily those of the rela- anyone who goes beyond physics, or natural
tion of our definitions to real and nominal es- philosophy, is a question about being or exist-
sences, the conditions of our knowledge of ex- ence. It may or may not be asked explicitly,
istence, and the identification of the real and but it is
always present by implication.
ideal with perceptible matters of fact and intel- The question about God, for example, or
ligible relations between ideas. free will or immortality, is first of all a
question
For Kant the basic distinction is between about whether such things exist, and how they
the sensible and supra-sensible, or the phenom- exist. Do they have reality or are they only
enal and noumenal, realms of being. From an- fictions of the mind ? Similarly, questions about
other point of view, Kant considers the being the infinite, the absolute, or the unconditioned
of things in themselves apart from human ex- are questions about that primary reality apart
perience and the being of natural things or, from whose existence nothing else could be or
what is the same for him, the things of experi- be conceived, and which therefore has an exist-
ence. The former are unconditioned, the latter ence different from the things dependent on it
conditioned, by the knowing mind which is for their being. Here again the first
question is
them to the understanding a priori" Having for the topics outlined here, under which the
obtained these "conditions," we can ascend references to the great books are assembled,
through them "until we reach the uncondi- would be to make it almost co-extensive in scope
tioned, that the principles." It is with these
is, with the sum of many other Introductions all,
ideas of pure reason that metaphysics, accord- in fact, which open chapters dealing with meta-
ing to Kant, properly deals. Instead of being, its physical concepts or problems.
object consists in "three grand ideas: God, It is to be expected, of course, that the special
CHAPTER 7: BEING 131
problems of the existence of God, of an immor- criticisms. Yet his opponents tried to preserve
tal soul, and of a free will should be treated in the reality of change, without having to accord
the chapters on GOD, IMMORTALITY, and WILL. it the fullness of being. The Greek atomists, for
But it may not be realized that such chapters example, think that change cannot be explained
as CAUSE, ETERNITY, FORM, INFINITY, IDEA, except in terms of permanent beings in feet
MATTER, ONE AND MANY, SAME AND OTHER, eternal ones. Lucretius, who expounds their
RELATION, UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR all views, remarks that in any change "something
these and still others cited in the Cross-Refer- unchangeable must remain over, that all things
ences below include topics which would have be not utterly reduced to nothing; for when-
to be discussed here if we were to try to cover ever a thing changes and quits its proper limits,
all relevant considerations. at once this change of state is the death of that
Reasons of economy and intelligibility dic- which was before." The "something unchange-
tate the opposite course. Limiting the scope of able" is
thought to be the atom, the absolutely
this Introduction to a few principal points in indivisible, and hence imperishable, unit of
the theory of being, we can also exhibit, matter. Change does not touch the being of the
through the relation of this chapter to others, atoms, "but only breaks up the union amongst
the interconnection of the great ideas. The var- them, and then joins anew the different ele-
ious modes of being (such as essence and exist- ments with others; and thus it comes to
pass
ence, substance and accident, potentiality and that all
things change" that is, all things com-
actuality, the real and the ideal) and the basic posite, not the simple bodies of solid singleness
correlatives of being (such as unity, goodness, "when the clashings, motions, arrangement,
truth) are, therefore, left for fuller treatment position, and shapes of matter change about."
in other contexts. But two topics deserve fur- In a conversation with Cratylus, who favors
ther attention here. One is the distinction be- the Herachtean theory of a universal flux, Soc-
tween being and becoming, the other the rela- "How can that be a real thing which
rates asks,
petrated by the senses. Galen, for instance, knowledge, and knowing is to know the nature
charges the Sophists with "allowing that bread of being," Socrates leads him to see the correla-
in turning into blood becomes changed as re- tion of being, not- being, and becoming with
gards sight, taste, and touch," but denying knowledge, ignorance, and opinion. "If opinion
that "this change occurs in reality." They ex- and knowledge are distinct faculties then the
plain it away, he says, as "tricks and illusions of sphere of knowledge and opinion cannot be the
our senses which are affected now in one
. . . same ... If being is the subject matter of
way, now in another, whereas the underlying knowledge, something else must be the subject
substance does not admit of any of these matter of opinion." It cannot be not-being, for
changes." "of not-being ignorance was assumed to be the
The familiar paradoxes of Zeno are reductio necessary correlative."
ad absurdum arguments to show that motion is Since "opinion is not concerned either with
unthinkable, full of self-contradiction. The way being or with not- being" because it is obviously
of truth, according to Parmemdes, Zeno's mas- intermediate between knowledge and igno-
ter in the Eleatic school, lies in the insight that rance, Socrates concludes that "if anything ap-
whatever is always was and will be, that noth- peared to be of a sort which is and is not at the
ing comes into being out of non-being, or same time, that sort of thing would appear also
passes out of being into nothingness. to lie in the interval between pure being and
The doctrine of Parmenides provoked many absolute not-being," and "the corresponding
132 THE GREAT IDEAS
faculty is neither knowledge nor ignorance, but If to exist is to be completely actual, then
will be found in the interval between them.'* changing things and change itself do not fully
This "intermediate flux" or sphere of becom- exist. They exist only to the extent that they
ing, this "region of the many and the variable," have actuality. Yet potentiality, no less than
can yield only opinion. Being, the realm of the actuality, is a mode of being. That potentiality
"absolute and eternal and immutable [Ideas]," power or capacity belongs to being seems
is the only object that one "may be said to also to be affirmed by the Eleatic Stranger in
know." Plato's Sophist. "Anything which possesses any
Aristotle would seem to agree with Plato sort of power to affect another, or to be affected
that change "partakes equally of the nature of by another," he says, "if only for a single mo-
being and not-being, and cannot rightly be ment, however trifling the cause and however
termed either, pure and simple." He points slight the effect, has real existence ... I hold,"
out that his predecessors, particularly the Eleat- he adds, "that the definition of being is simply
ics,held change to be impossible, because they power."
believed that "what comes to be must do so The basic issue concerning being and becom-
either from what is or from what is not, both of ing, and the issue concerning eternal as opposed
which are impossible." It is impossible, so they to mutable existence, recur again and again in
argued, since "what is cannot come to be (be- the tradition of western thought. They are in-
cause it is already), and from what is not noth- volved in the distinction between corruptible
ing could have come to be." Aristotle concedes and incorruptible substances (which is in turn
the cogency of this argument on one condition, connected with the division of substances into
namely, that the terms 'being' and 'not-being' corporeal and spiritual), and with the nature of
are taken "without qualification." But his God as the only purely actual, or truly eternal,
whole point is that they need not be taken with- being. They are implicit in Spinoza's distinc-
out qualification and should not be, if we wish tion between natura naturans and natura natu-
to explain change rather than make a mystery rata, and in his distinction between God's
of it. knowledge of things under the aspect of eter-
The qualification Aristotle introduces rests nity and man's temporal view of the world in
on the distinction between two modes of being process. They are relevant to Hegel's Absolute
the potentiality and actuality correlative Idea which, while remaining fixed, progressively
with matter and form. This makes it possible reveals itself in the ever-changing face of nature
for him to maintain that "a thing may come to andhistory. In our own day these issues engage
be from what not ... in a qualified sense." He
is Dewey, Santayana, and Whitehead in contro-
illustrates his meaning by the example of the versy, as yesterday they engaged Bradley,
bronze, which from a mere lump of metal comes William James, and Bergson.
to be a statue under the hands of the artist. The
bronze, he says, was "potentially a statue," and As ALREADY NOTED, Plato's division of reality
the change whereby it came to be actually a into the realms of being and becoming has a
statue the process between potentiality and
is
bearing on his analysis of knowledge and opin-
actuality. While the change is going on, the ion. The division relates to the distinction be-
bronze is neither completely potential nor fully tween the intelligible and the sensible, and be-
actual in respect of being a statue. tween the opposed qualities of certainty and
Like Plato, Aristotle recognizes that there is probability, or necessity and contingency, in
"something indefinite" about change. "The our judgments about things. The distinctions
reason," he explains, "is that it cannot be between essence and existence and between
classed simply as a potentiality or as an actuali- substance and accident separate aspects or
tya thing that merely capable of having a
is modes of being which function differently as
certain size is not undergoing change, nor yet objects for the knowing mind.
a thing that is actually of a certain size." Change Aristotle, for example, holds that "there can
is "a sort of actuality, but incomplete hard . . . be no scientific treatment of the accidental . . .
And," he adds, "Plato was in a sense not wrong ultimate reality we can know. "The secondary
in ranking sophistic as dealing with that which sensible qualities," he writes, "are nothing but
is For the arguments of the sophists deal,
not. the powers" which corporeal substances have
we may say, above all, with the accidental." "to produce several ideas in us by our sense,
That the accidental is "akin to non-being," which ideas" unlike the primary qualities
Aristotle thinks may be seen in the fact that "are not in the things themselves, otherwise
"things which are in another sense come into than as anything is in its cause."
being and pass out of being by a process, but Hobbes exemplifies still another view. "A
things which are accidentally do not." But man can have no thought," he says, "represent-
though he rejects the accidental as an object of ing anything not subject to sense." Hobbes
science, he does not, like Plato or Plotmus, ex- does not object to calling bodies "substances,"
clude the whole realm of sensible, changing but thinks that when we speak of "an incorpo-
things from the sphere of scientific knowledge. realbody, or (which is all one) an incorporeal
For him, both metaphysics and physics treat of substance," we talk nonsense; "for none of these
sensible substances, the one with regard to their things ever have, or can be incident to sense;
mutable being, the other with regard to their but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit
being mutable their becoming or changing. (without any signification at all) from deceived
For Plotmus, on the other hand, "the true Philosophers, and deceived, or deceiving,
sciences have an intelligible object and contain Schoolmen."
no notion of anything sensible." They are di- He enumerates other absurdities, such as "the
rected, not "to variable things, suffering from giving of names of bodies to accidents, or of
all sorts of changes, divided in space, to which accidents to bodies," e.g., by those who say
the name of becoming and not being belongs," that "extension is
body." Criticism of the fallacy
but to the "eternal being which is not divided, of reification the fallacy first pointed out
by
existing always in the same way, which is not Ockham and criticized so repeatedly in con-
born and does not perish, and has neither space, temporary semantics also appears in Hobbes*
place, nor situation
but rests immovable in
. . .
warning against making substances out of ab-
itself." stractions or univcrsals "by giving the names of
truly know and "we give the general name sub- to demonstration, it
attempts to formulate the
stance" to "the supposed, but unknown, sup- conditions of valid reasoning about matters of
port of those qualities we find existing." Some fact or real existence. But it has seldom been
of these sensible accidents are what Locke calls supposed that reality exhausts the objects of
"primary qualities" the powers or potentiali- our thought or knowledge. We can conceive
ties by which things affect one another and also possibilities not realized in this world. We can
our senses. imagine things which do not exist in nature.
But to the extent that our senses fail to dis- The meaning of reality of real as opposed
cover "the bulk, texture, and figure of the mi- to purely conceptual or ideal being is derived
nute parts of bodies, on which their constitu- from the notion of thinghood, of having being
tions and differences depend, we are fain to outside the mind, not merely in it. In tradition-
make use of their secondary qualities, as the al controversies about the existence of ideas
The judgment of the reality of a thing, lames "is thus anchored in the Ego. That is the
. . .
thinks, involves "a state of consciousness sui hook from which the rest dangles, the absolute
gcnerts" about which not much can be said support. And as from a painted hook it has
"in the way of internal analysis." The focus of been said that one can only hang a painted
this problem in modern times is indicated by chain, so conversely from a real hook only a
James' phrasing of the question, "Under what real chain can properly be hung. Whatever things
circumstances do we think things real?" And have intimate and continuous connection with my
James gives a typically modern answer to the life are things of whose reality I cannot doubt.
moment possess, is the ultimate of ultimates for with respect to being or the modes of being.
our belief. 'As sure as I exist!' this is our utter- They are such antitheses as realism and ideal-
most warrant for the being of all other things. ism; materialism and spiritualism; monism, du-
As Descartes made the indubitable reality of alism, and pluralism; even atheism and theism.
the cogito go bail for the reality of all that the Undoubtedly, no great philosopher can be so
cogtto involvedj so all of us, feeling our own simply boxed. Yet the opposing isms do indi-
present reality with absolutely coercive force, cate the great speculative issues which no mind
ascribe an but equal degree of reality, first to
all can avoid if it pursues the truth or seeks the
whatever things we lay hold on with a sense of ultimate principles of good and evil.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PACE
1. Diverse conceptions of being and non-being: being as a term or concept; the meanings
of wand is not 136
40. Being as the pervasive object of mind, and the formal object of the first philoso-
phy, metaphysics, or dialectic 140
4^. Being measure of truth in judgments of the mind: clarity and distinctness
as the
as criteria of the reality of an idea
5. Being and becoming: the reality of change; the nature of mutable being
fa. The distinction between essence and existence: existence as the act of being
(5) Substance as subject to change and to different kinds of change: the role of
accidents or modifications 145
(6) The nature and kinds of accidents or modifications
jc. The distinction between potentiality and actuality: possible and actual being 146
(1) The order of potentiality and actuality
yd. The distinction between real and ideal being, or between natural being and
being in mind
(1) The being of the possible 148
(2) The being of ideas, universals, rights
je. The distinction between appearance and reality, between the sensible and supra-
sensible, between the phenomenal and noumenal orders
8r. Essence or substance as the object of definition: real and nominal essences
Sd. The role of essence in demonstration: the use of essence, property, and accident
in inference 152
8?. The accidental in relation to science and definition
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a-l 19b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
printed
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 16} and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SFCT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
:
and I )ouay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows, eg., OLD TESTA-
MLNT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7.46.
SYMBOLS. The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv 51b-54b / 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, DBF 2 355a; DEP 6
Meditations, iv, 89c~d / Objections and Replies, 355b; PROP 5-16 356b-362a
139b-c;214d-215a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK in, CH HI,
31 SPINOZA; Ethics, PART PROP n, DEMONST,
i, SECT 19 259c-260a
358d; SCHOL, 359a; PART n, PROP 40, SCHOL i 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 43d-44a; 49c-51d esp
387b388a 51c-d; 99a-101b; 107b-c; 173b-177b; 193a-
33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 432 b 200c
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK HI, CH vn, 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 218c;
SECT i 283a-b 224a-b; 232d; 237d-238a
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 2-3 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xiv, 608a-b
413b-d; SECT 17 416a-b; SECT 45-46 421b-c;
SECT 48 422a; SECT 81 428c-d; SECT 88-91 2a. Infinite being and the plurality of finite
b
215b-216a;406b [989 2i-99o*8] 507d-508a; CH 9 508c-511c;
BK n, CH i [993 b i9-3i] S12a-b; BK iv, CH 4
3. Being and good b a
[ioo8 32-ioo9 5] 528b; BK ix, CH 9 [1051*4-
OLD TESTAMFNT: Genesis, i 22] 577a-b; BK xn, CH 5 [1071*30-36] 601a;
NEW TESTAMENT: / 'Timothy, 4 4 CH 7 602a-603b; CH 10 605d-606d; BK xm,
7 PLATO- Phaedrus, 124c-125b / Republic, BK CH 2 [io77*i4~ b i4J 608b-609a, BK xiv, CH 4
*
vi-vn, 383d-398c / Timaeus, 447b-448b [i09i*29]-CH 5 [1092*17] 624a-625a / Soul,
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK vi, CH 5 [143*9-12] BK in, CH 4 [429 a 29-b 4] 661c-d
196c; CH 6 [i45 i9-27] 198d-199a; CH 8 [146^- 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH 5
tt
b
I47 n] 200c-201a; CH 12 [i49 3i-39J 204b-c /
ft
[644^0 -645*5] 168c-d / Generation of Animals,
Generation and Corruption, BK n, CH 10 BK n, CH i [73^24-33] 272a-b / Ethics, BK i,
b
[336 28-3o] 438d / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 6 en 6 [1096*17-23] 341b-c
b
[988*8-16! 506a-b; CH 7 [988 6-i6] 506c-d; 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK vi [724-751] 230b-231a
CH 9 [992*29-34! 510c; BK xn, CH 7 602a- 17 PLOHNUS. First Ennead, TR vn, CH 1-2 26a-d;
14b-15b; A 2, ANS 15c-16a; A 7, REP 2 19a-c; 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR vi, CH 7 24c-25a /
QQ 4-6 20c-30d passim; Q n, A 4 49d-50b; Fifth Ennead, TR vm, CH 9, 244b-c; TR ix, CH i
Q A 6, REP i 98b-d; Q 18, A 3 106b-107c;
16, 246c-d
19, A 8 116a-d; Q 22, A 4, ANS 131c-132b; Q
Q 18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 5
23, A 5, REP 3 135d-137d; Q 25, A 6, ANS and 625d-626a
REP 1,3 149a-150a; Q 36, A 2, ANS 192a-194c; 19 AQUINAS : Summa
Theologica, PART i, Q 5
Q 42, A i, REP 1-2 224b-225d; Q 44, A i, ANS 23b-28b; Q 16, A 4, ANS and REP 1-2 97a-c;
238b-239a; Q 47, A 2 257b-258c; Q 48, A 2, Q 19, A i, ANS 108d-109c; Q 20, A 2, ANS and
ANS and REP 3 260c-261b; Q 50, A i, ANS and REP 4 121b 122a; Q 48, A i, ANS and REP 4
REP i 269b-270a; A 2, REP i 270a-272a; A 3, 259b-260c; PART i-ii, Q i, A 8 615a-c; Q 2,
ANS 272a-273b; Q 57, A i, ANS 295a-d; Q 65, A 5, ANS and REP 3 618d-619c; Q 8, A i, ANS
A 2, ANS and REP 3 340b-341b; Q 70, A 3, REP 2 and REP 3 655b-656a; Q 22, A 2, ANS 72lc-
365b-367a; Q 75, A 7 384d-385c; Q 76, A 3, 722c; Q 27, A 3 738c-739c; Q 29, A i, RBP i
ANS 391a-393a; A 4, REP 3 393a-394c; Q 77, 745a-c; A 5 747c-748b
A 2 401b-d; A 4, REP i 403a-d; Q 79, A 9, REP 3 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, i
[103-142]
422b-423d; Q 82, A 3, ANS 433c-434c; Q 93, 107b-d
A 3 493d-494c; Q 106, A 4, ANS 548b-549a; 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 73a-c
Q 108, A 4 555b-d; Q 118, A 2, REP 2 601c- 31 SPINOZA- Ethics, PART in, PROP 4-9 398d-
603b; PART I-H, Q i, A 4, REP i 612a-613a; Q 399c; PROP 12-13 400b-d; PA RT i v PROP 19-22
2, A 5, REP 2 618d-619c; A 8, REP i 621c-622b; 429d-430c
Q 3, A 7, ANS 628a-d; Q 18, AA 1-4 694a- 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 224a-
696d passim 225b; 233d-234b
20 AQUINAS Swnma Theologica, PART i-n, Q 52,
A i, ANS 15d-18a; Q 71, A 3, REP i 107c-l08b; 4. Being and truth
Q 85, A 4 181b-d; PART ii-n, Q 23, A 3, REP 3 7 PLATO Euthydemus, 71c-74a / Cratylus, 86a;
485a-d; PART in, Q 7, A 9, ANS 751d-752c; 113b-114a,c / Phaedrus, 124c-126c / Republic,
PART III SUPPL, Q 74, A I, REP 3 925C-926C BK vi,386b-388a; BK ix,423b-424a / Ttmaeus,
21 DANTE. Divine Comedy, PARADISE, i
[103-142] 447a-d / Parmemdes, 508d / Theaetetus, 534d-
107b-d; ii [112-148] 109a-b; vn [64-75] U5d- 536a; 537a-c / Sophist, 561d-577b / Philebus,
116a; [121-148] 116b-c; xin [52-87] 126a-b; 634b-635b / Seventh Letter, 809c-810c
xxvin [64-72] 149b-c; xxix [13-36] 150b-c 8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 3 [i6 b i9~26]
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 52d / Medi- 25d-26a / Prior Analytics, BK i, CH 36 [48*40-
b
tations, m, 84a-b / Objections and Replies, g] 66d / Metaphysics, BK n, CH i 511b,d-
llld'112a; 121d-122c; AXIOM vi 132a; 139b-c; 512b; BK v, CH 7 [1017*31-34] 538a; CH 29
b
211b-d [io24 i6-26] 546c-d; BK vi, CH 4 550a,c; BK
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, APPENDIX, 372c-d; ix, CH 10 577c-578a,c
PART iv, PREF 422b,d-424a; PART v, PROP 40, 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR vm, CH 8 132d-
DEMONST462C 133c / Fifth Ennead, TR in, CH 5, 218b; TR v,
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK v [468-490] 185b- CH 1-2 228b-229d; TR vi, CH 6 237b-d
186a 18 AUGUSTINE Confessions, BK in, par 10 15b-d;
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xxi, BK v, par 5 28b-c; BK vn, par 16-23 48c-50c /
SECT 2 178c; CH xxin, SECT 28 211b-d; SECT City of God, BK xi, CH 10, 328c-d/ Christian
36 213c-d; BK in, CH vi, SECT 11-12 271b- Doctrine, BK CH 34 634b-c
i,
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 206d-207c / judgement, A 4, REP 2 16d-17c; Q 14, A 9, REP i 83b-d;
556b-558b; 566d-567a Q 16 94b-100d; Q 17, A i lOOd-lOld; A 4, REP
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 224a-d; 1-2 103c-104b; Q 18, A 4, REP 3 107d-108c;
233b-235a; 237d-238d Q 44, A i, ANS 238b-239a; Q 79, A 9, REP 3
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 217c 422b-423d; Q 119, A i, ANS 604c<607b; PART
53 IAMES: Psychology, 639a-645b csp 641b-644a i-ii, Q 3, A 7, ANS 628a-d; Q 22, A 2, ANS 721c-
[985*28] 502d-503c; CH 7 [988*^-16] 506c-d; ii, PROP SCHOL 376d-377a; PROP 20-21
10,
BK xii, CH 7 602a-603b; CH 10 605d-606d 382d-383a; PROP 32 385c; PROP 43 388c-389b;
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK ix, CH 7 [i 167^4- PROP 44, COROL 2 and DBMONST 390a
CH 9 a b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv^ CH v,
1168*18] 421b-c; [ii7o i4- i9] 423d-
424b - - SEcr8330d
140 THE GREAT IDEAS
CH b
/ Interpretation, 3 [i6 i9~26] 25d-26a /
(4.Being and truth.) Prior Analytics, BK n, CH 2 (53 b ii-r26] 72d-73a
42 KANT' Pure Reason, 36a-37b; 91d-93b; 102c- / Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 19 (8i b i7-24)
103a lllc-d / Physics, BK CH i 2S9a-b / Meta-
i,
d; BK iv, SECT 36 266d; SECT 42-43 267b, NEW TESTAMENT: Acts, 14:15; 17.22-32 (D)
SECi*46267c; BK v, SECT 23 272b;BK vi, sucr Acts, 17.22-32 / Romans, 11:36 /
14 14;
15 275a-b; BK vu, SECI 18 281a; SECT 49-50 Colossians, 1.16-17 / Hebrews, 1:10 / Revela-
282d-283a, BK vin, SECT 6 285d-286a; BK ix, tion, 4 *i i
(D) Apocalypse, 4.11
SECT 19 293b, SECT 35-36 294d-295a; UK \, 7 PLATO Timaeus, 447b-448a / Laws, BK x,
SECT 7 297b-c 760a-765d esp 763d-764a
16 KEPLER: Harmonies of the World, lOSlb 8 ARISTOTLE. Posterior Analytics, BK 11, CH 1-2
b
17 PLOIINUS Second Ennead, TR i, en 3-4 36b- 122b,d-123c; CH 7 [92 i8-25] 126d; CH 8-12
37b, TR iv, CH 6 51d-52a; TR v 57d-60c passim 127a-131b / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 7 [988 b 5~i6]
TR n, CH 1-2 82c-83d; R vi,
/ Third Ennead, j 506c-d,CH 9 [99i b i~9] 509c-d; en 10 511c-d;
CH 7-19 110d-119a/ Fifth Ennead, TR vin, en BK CH i [993 b 27~3i] 512a-b, BK v, CH 8
n,
b
12-13 245c-246c / Sixth Ennead, IR i, en 17 -22 [ioi7 io-i7] 538b; BK vu, CH 17 565a-566a,c;
261c-264c; CH 25-30 265b-268c; TR in 281a- BK xii, CH 6-7 601b-603b / Soul, BK n, CH 4
b
297b esp CH 1-8 281a-285d, CH 21-27 293a- [4i5 n-i4]645d
297a; IR v, CH 2 306a-b 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i
18 AUGUSTINE* Confessions, BK in, par 10 15b-d, [640*4-9] 162b
BK iv, par 15-19 23a-24b; BK vu, par 1-7 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 14, 120d-
43b-45d; par 16-23 48c-50c, BK xi, par 6 121a
90c-d, BK xn, par 3-6 99d-100c esp par 6, 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 10 3b-c /
lOOc; par 8, lOlb; par 15 102b-c; par 24-26 Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 32 633c-d
104c 105b; par 28 105c-d, BK xin, par 48 124a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 2,
/ Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 9 627a; BK n, CH A 3, ANS 12c-14a; Q 3, A 4, ANS 16d-17c; A 5,
38 654b-c REP 2 17c-18b; Q 5, A 2, REP 1-2 24b-25a; Q 8,
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q A
2, 3,
A i 34d-35c; A 2, ANS 35c-36b; A 3, ANS and
ANS 12c-14a, Q 4, A i, REP i 20d-21b, Q A
9, i, REP i 36b-37c; A 4, ANS 37c-38c; Q 9, A 2,
ANS 38c-39c; Q 10, A 4, REP 3 43b-44b; A
5, ANS 39c-40d; Q 14, A 8 82c-83b; QQ 44-46
ANS 44b-45c; Q 26, A i, REP 2 150b-c; o 29, 238a-255d; Q 57, A 2, ANS and REP 2 295d-
A i, REP 4 162a-163b; Q 65, A 4 342b-343c; 297a; Q 61, A i 3l4d-315b; Q 65 339a-343c;
Q 86, A 3 463 b-d; PART i-n, Q io r A i, REP 2 Q 75, A 6, REP 2 383c-384c; Q 104 534c-538c;
662d-663d Q 105, A 3, ANS 540c-S41b; A 5, ANS 542a-
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 543b; PART i-n, Q 1 8, A 4, ANS 696b-d
no, A 2, REP 3 349a-d; PART in, Q 62, A 4, 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 443b-c
REP 2 861a-862a; PART in SUPPL, Q 91, A 3, 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART v, 55d-56a /
REP 2 1020d-1022c Meditations^ in, 87c-d / Objections and Re-
22 CHAUCER: Knight'sTale [2987-3040] 209a-210a AXIOM ix 132b; 213b-d
plies,
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 292a-294b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, DBF i 355a; PROP 17,
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 52d / Objec- SCHOL 362c-363c; PROP 24-29 365a-366c;
tions and Replies, 212a PROP 33 367b-369a; PART n, PROP 6-7 374d-
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, DBF 2 355a; PART n, 375c; PROP to, SCHOL 3764-377a; PROP 45,
PROP 31 385b*q , SCHOL 390b
142 THE GREAT IDEAS 7 to Ib
[601-640] 230a-231a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xv,
Ib. The distinction between substance and
SECT 12 165b-c; CH xxvi, SECT 1-2, 217a-c attribute, accidentor modification: inde-
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 2-4 pendent and dependent being
413b-414a; SECT 25-33 417d-419a; SECT 36 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 2 [i*20-b 9] 5b-c;
419c-d; SECT 45-46 421b-c; SECT 48 422a; CH 5 6a-9a; CH 7 [8*i2-b 24] 13a-d / Topics,
SECT 88-91 430a-431a; SECT 146-150 442a- BK v, CH 4 [i33 b i5-i34*4] 184d-185b / Sophis-
443b tical Refutations, CH 7 [169*33-36] 233a; CH 22
b
HUME: Human [i78 37-i79 io] 246c / Physics, BK i, CH 2
ft
35 Understanding, SECT vin, DIV
74, 484a [i 85*2o]-cH 3 [i 87*10] 260a-262a / Metaphysics,
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 140b,d-145c; 177b-179b BK i, CH 9 [990^22-991*2] 509a; [992^8-24]
b
/ Practical Reason, 334b-337a,c 511a; BK iv, CH 4 [ioo7*2o- i8] 526c-527a;
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 245d- BK v, CH 7 [1017*23-31] 537d-538a; CH n
246c [1019*1-14] 540a; BK vn, CH 3 [1029*7-26]
551c-d; CH 4-6 552b-555a; BK vin, CH 3
7. The divisions or modes of being b
[io43 i8-24] 568a-b; CH 4 [1044^-20] 569b;
BK ix, CH i [1045^8-32] 570b; CH 7 [1049*19-
la. The distinction between essence and exist- b
i] 574d-575a; BK x, CH 2 580b-d; BK xn, CH
ence: existence as the act of being i
[1069*18-25] 598a; CH 4-5 599d-601a; CH 7
b
OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 3-14 [io72 4-i3] 602c-d
8 ARISTOTLE Metaphysics, BK ix, CH
:
3 [1047 '30- 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK n, CH 2
b b
2] 572c [6 4 8 35]-cH 3 [649^2] 173b-174b
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR vn, CH 6 122a-d 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK xn, SECT 30,
132b-c; 158b-162a passim; 217d-218a A 2, ANS and REP 3 2b-4a; Q 50, A 2 7c-8a; Q
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, DBF 8 355c; AXIOM 52, A i, ANS 15d-18a; Q 53, A 2, REP 3 21a*d;
7 3$5d; PROP 7 356c; PROP 8, SCHOL 2 356d- Q 66, A 4, ANS 78c-79b; PART n-n, Q 23, A 3,
357d; PROP n 358b-359b; PROP 17, SCHOL, REP 3 485a*d; PART in, Q 2, A i, ANS 710a-
363 b-c; PROP 20 363d-364a; PROP 24-25 365a- 711c; PART in SUPPL, Q 70, A i, ANS 893d-
b; PROP 34 369a; PART n, DBF 2 373b; AXIOM i 895d; Q 79, A i, REP 4 951b-953b; Q 83, A 3,
373c; PART HI, PROP 7 399a; PART iv, DBF 3 ANS 978c-980d
424a 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK i, APH 66, 114d-
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK in, CH v, 115a
SECT 1-6 263d-265a; BK iv, CH ix, SECT 1 349a 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART i, 41d; PART iv,
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 179c-182b; 191<M92b 52d / Meditations, in 81d-89a passim, esp
7b(\) to 7b(2) CHAPTER 7: BEING 143
87b-88c / Objections and Replies, DBF v 130b-c ; 287d-290a; BK iv, CH vi, SECT 4-16 331d-336d
DBF ix 130d; 135b-136b; 136c; 139b-c; 153d; passim, esp SECT n 334b-335b
162d-165d; 170d; 211b-c; 228c-229c 35 BERKELEY: Human
Knowledge, SECT 6-7
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, DBF 3-5 355b; AXIOM 414b-c; SECT 26-27 418a-b; SBCT 73 427b-c;
1-2 355c-d; PROP 1-9 355d-357d; PROP 10, SECT 88-91 430a-431a; SECT 135-136 440a-b;
SCHOL 358a-b; PROP 19 363c-d; PROP 20, SECT i39440d
COROL 2 364a; PROP 21-23 364a-365a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15b-c; 63a; 63d-64a;
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH in, 69c-72c;74b-76c;81b-83b;86c-87b;91d-93b;
SECT 19 117c-d; BK n, CH xii, SECT 3-6 147d- 95a-d; lOOd-lOlb; 121a-128b; 131c-d; 137a-
148c; CH xni, SECT 17-20 152a-d; CH xxin 140c; 162b-163a; 186b-d / Judgement, 565b-d;
204a-214b esp SECT 1-15 204a-208d;cH xxxn, 566d-567a
SECT 24 247c-d; BK in, CH ix, SECT 12-13 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 146
287d-288d 55c-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d-
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 1-7 157b; PART i, 211a-c; 227d-228a
413a-414c; SECT 25-33 417d-419a passim; 53 JAMES: Psychology, 221b; 223a
SECT 49 422b; SECT 73-78 427b-428b; SECT
88-91 430a-431a; SECT 101-102 432c-433a
7^(2) Corporeal and spiritual substances, com-
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 33a-d; 74b-76c; 130b- posite and simple substances: the kinds
133c esp 131c-d; 140b,d-143a / Practical
of substance in relation to matter and
form
Reason, 310d-311d / Judgement, 529c-530a;
550a-551a,c; 566b-d; 580c-d 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK i, CH 7 265b 267a;
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 26 BK 11, CH i 268b,d-270a; BK iv, CH 2 288b-
121a-b; 39 122d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 289a / Heavens, BK i, CH 9 [277 b 26-278 b 9]
160c-161a; PART i, 211a-c 369a-d; BK iv, CH 4 [312*12-17] 403d / Gen-
53 JAMES Psychology, 572a-b
: eration and Corruption, BK i, CH 3 413c-416c /
15, SCHOL 360b-361d; PROP 19 363c-d; PART 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica PART i, Q 3 t
Q 88, A 2, REP 4 471c-472c; Q 104, A i, ANS and 37b; CH 8 39c-d; TR iv, CH 6 51d-52a / Fourth
REP i 534c-536c; Q 115, A i 585d-587c; A 3, Ennead, TR vn, CH 10-12 198d-200a
REP 2 588c-589c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologtca, PART i, Q 9, A 2
20 AQUINAS- Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 52, 39c-40d; Q 10, A 2, REP 1-2 41d-42c; A 3, ANS
A i, ANS 15d-18a; PART n-n, Q 24, A n, ANS and REP i 42c-43b; AA 5-6 44b-46d; Q 18, A 3,
498b-499c; PART in, Q 2, A i, ANS and REP 2 REP 3 106b-107c; Q 22, A 2, ANS 128d-130d;
710a-711c; PART in SUPPL, Q 69, A i, ANS and Q 46, A i, REP 2-3 250a-252d; Q 48, A 2, ANS
REP 2 885c-886c; Q 79, A 2, REP 2 953b-955c; and REP 3 260c-261b; Q 50, A 5 274b-275a;
Q 92, A i, ANS 1025c-1032b Q 63, A i, REP 2 325c-326c; Q 66, A 2 345d-
21 DANTE Divine Comedy, PARADISE, vn [121- 347b; Q 68, A i, ANS 354a-355c; Q 75, A 6
148] 116b-c; xxix [13-36] 150b-c 383c-384c; Q 76, A 3, REP 1-2 391a-393a, Q 97,
23 HOBBES. leviathan, PART in, 172a-177c; PART A i 513c-514c; A 4 515d-516d; Q 104, A i, REP
iv, 258b 261a; 269d-271b 1,3 534c-536c; Q 113, A 2, ANS 576d-577d;
30 BACON- Advancement of Learning, 17b-d / PART I-II, Q 22, A I, REP 3 720d-721C
Novum Organum, BK n, APR 37 168d-169c 20 AQUINAS- Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 49,
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 51d-52a / A 4, ANS 5a-6a; Q 85, A 6 182d-184a; PART
Meditations, vi 96b-103d / Objections and Re- n-n, Q 24, A n, ANS 498b-499c; PART in
plies, DBF vi-vin 130c-d; 153c-155c SUPPL, Q 91, A i 1016b-1017c; AA 4-5 1022d-
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PARI i, PROP 15 360a-361d; 1025b
PART n, PROP 1-2 373d-374a; PROP 6 374d- 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, vn [64-84]
375a; PROP 7, SCHOL 375b-c 115d-116a;[i2i-i48]116b-c;xm[52-87]126a-b
35 LOCKE- Human Understanding, BK n, CH xin, 31 DESCARTFS- Objections and Replies, 127c-d
SECT 16-18 151d-152c; CH xv, SECT n 165a-b; 31 SPINOZ\. Ethics, PART i, PROP 6-8 356b-357d;
CH xxi, SECT 2-4 178c-179c; CH xxin, SECT 5 PROP 12-13 359b-d; PROP 15, SCHOL, 361d
205a-b; SECT 15-37 208c-214b; CH XXVII,SECT 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK i [116-156] 96a-
2 219b-c; BK in, CH x, SFCT 15 295a-c; BK iv, 97a; BK n [94-105] 113a b; BK vi [320-347]
CH in, SECT 6 313c-315b; CH x, SECT 9-19 203a-b; [430-436] 205b
351b-354c passim; rn xvi, SECT 12, 370c-371a 33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 358a
35 BERKELEY- Human Knowledge, SFCT 1-29 34 NEWTON: Optics, BK in, 541b
413a-418c, SECT 35-38 419c-420a; SECT 47-50 35 LOCKE Human Understanding, BK in, CH HI,
421c-422c; SECT 67-81 426b-428d, SECT 86 91 SECT 19, 259c
429c-431a passim; SECT 133-142 439c-441c 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 141
42 KANT: Pure Reason, lOOd-lOlb; 121a-128b; 441a-b
186b-d; 203d-204c / Judgement, 557c-558b; 42 KANT- Pure Reason, 121a-128b; 203d-204c /
565b-d; 566d-567a Practical Reason, 348d-349a
46 H EC. EL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d- 53 JAMES: Psychology, 221b-222b; 224a-b
157b; 160c-161a; 165a-b; PART i, 227d-228a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 118b-119b passim; 220b- 76(4) Extension and thought as dependent
226a csp 221a-223a substances or as attributes of infinite sub-
stance
Corruptible and incorruptible substances 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 51d-52a /
8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 13 [23*18-26] Meditations,vi 96b-103d / Objections and
35b-c / Heavens, BK i, CH 1-3 359a-362a; CH 9 Replies,DBF vi-vin 130c-d; PROP iv 133c;
[279*12^4] 370b-d; BK i, CH IO-BK n, CH i 135d-136b; 152d 155d esp 153c-155c; 224d-
370d-376a; BK in, CH 6 396a~c / Metaphysics, 225d; 231a-232d; 248b
BK in, CH 2 [996*21-28] 514d; BK iv, CH 5 31 SPINOZA: Ethics^ PART i, PROP 14, COROL 2
b
[1009*36-39] 528d; BK v, CH 5 [ioi5 9-i6] 360a; PART n, DBF 1-2 373a-b; PROP 1-2 373d-
b
536a; BK ix, CH 8 [i05o 5]-cH 9 [1051*21] 374a; PROP 5-6 374c-375a; PROP 7, SCHOL
576b-577b; BK x, CH 10 586c-d; BK xi, CH 6 375b-c
b
[1063*10-17] 591b; BK xn, CH i [io69*30- 2] 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xin,
b
598b-c; CH 2 [io69 24~27J 598d-599a; CH 3 SECT 1 8 152a-c
[1070*20-27] 599c; CH 6-8 601b-605a; CH 10 42 KANT: Judgement, 580c-d
7b(5) to CHAPTER 7: BEING 145
7$(5) Substance as subject to change and to 76(6) The nature and kinds of accidents or
different kinds of change: the role of modifications
accidents or modifications b
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 2 [i*2o- 9J 5b-c;
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 5 (4*io-b i9] 8b-9a CH 4 5d-6a; CH 5 1
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xu, DIV Third Ennead, TR vi, CH 7, llla-b; CH 1 1, 113b-
122 505c-d c; CH 14-15 115b-116c; TR ix, CH 3, 137d-138a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 503a-b; 572a-b; 650b-651a / Sixth Ennead, TR i, CH 15-22 260c-264c
19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A i,
:
7c. The distinction between potentiality and ANS 14b-15b; A 8, ANS 19d-20c; Q 4, A i, REP 2
actuality: possible and actual being 20d-21b; A 2, ANS 21b-22b; Q 9, A i, ANS
8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 9 [i9
a
6-b 4] 29b- 38c-39c; Q ir, A 2, REP i 47d-48d; Q 25, A i,
d; CH 13 [23*18-26] 35b-c / Topics, BK v, CH 8 REP 2 143d-144c; Q 94, A 3, ANS 504a-505a;
b
[i38 27~i 39*9] 191c-d / Physics, BK HI, en 1-3 PART i-n, Q 2, A 7, ANS 620d-621c; Q 3, A 2,
278a-280c; BK iv, CH 9 [217^20-^26] 297a-c / ANS 623a-624b; Q 9, A i, ANS 657d~658d; Q 22,
Heavens, BK in, CH 2 [30 1^33-302*9 ] 393b / A 2, REP i 721c-722c
Metaphysics, BK iv, CH 5 [1009*22-39] 528d; 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 50,
BK v, CH 2 [1014*7-9] 534b; [1014*19-25] A 2, REP 3 7c-8a; Q 71, A 3 107c-108b; PART in,
b
534b-c; CH 7 [ioi7*}5- 9] 538a-b; CH 12 540b- Q 10, A 3, ANS 769d-771b
541b; BK ix 570b,d-578a,c; BK xn, CH 2 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, i [103-142]
b
[io69 i5-34] 598d-599a; CH 5 600b-601a; BK 107b-d; xin [52-87] 126a-b; xxix [22-36] 150c
xin, CH 3 [1078*21-31] 609d; CH 10 [1087*10-
7c(2) Types of potency and degrees of actu-
25] 619c / Soul, BK n, CH 2 [414*14-28] 644b-c;
CH 5 [417*2-418*6] 647c-648d ality
b
17 PLOTINUS Second Ennead, TR v 57d-60c / 8 ARISTOTLE- Interpretation, CH 13 [22 35-2}*i7]
Third Ennead, TR vi, CH 8-19 lllc-119a; TR ix, 34d-35b / Physics, BK in, CH 6 [206*18-24]
CH 3, 137d-138a / Sixth Ennead, TR i, CH 15-17 284c; BK iv, en i [208^-209*1] 287b-c; BK
b a
260c-261d; CH 25-30 265b-268c; TR in, CH 22, vii, CH 3 [247 i~248 6] 330b-d; BK vni, CH 4
b
293d 294a; CH 27 296b-297a [255*3o- 3i] 340a-c / Heavens, BK iv, CH 3
b
18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 35, [3io 22-3ii*i2] 402b-c / Metaphysics, BK v,
653c CH 12 540b-541b; BKIX, CH 1-9 570b,d-577c;
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 2, BK xn, CH 5 600b-601a / Soul, BK n, CH i
A ANS 12c-14a; Q 3, A i, ANS 14b-15b; A 2,
3, [412*6-12] 642a; [412*22-28] 642b; BK in, CH
ANS 15c-16a; A 4, ANS 16d-17c; A 5, ANS 17c- 4-5 661 b- 662 d / Sense and the Sensible, CH 4
b
18b; A 6, ANS 18c-19a; A 7, ANS 19a-c; A 8, [44i i6-2 4 ] 679b
ANS 19d-20c; Q 4, A i 20d-21b; A 2, ANS 21b- 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK n, CH i [ii03*26-b24]
22b; Q 5, A i 23c-24a; A 2, REP 2 24b-25a; 348d-349b; CH 5 [1106*7-10] 351c
A 3, REP 3 25a-d; Q 6, A 3, REP i 29c-30b; 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR v 57d-60c
Q 7, A 2, REP 3 31d-32c; Q 9, A i, ANS and 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 10 3b-c /
REP i 38c-39c; A 2, ANS 39c-40d; Q n, A i, Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 8 626c-627a
REP 2 46d-47d; Q 14, A 2 76d-77d; A 3, ANS 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 4,
77d-78b; A 4, ANS 78b-79a; Q 18, A i, ANS A 2, ANS 21b-22b; Q 5, A i, REP i 23c-24a; Q 14,
104c-105c; A 3, REP i 106b-107c; A 4, REP A 2, ANS and REP 2-3 76d-77d; Q 18, A 3, ANS
3 107d-108c; Q 25, A i, REP i 143d-144c; and REP i 106b-107c; Q 25 143c-150a; Q 48,
Q 45, A 5, REP 3 245c-247a; Q 46, A i, REP A 4, ANS 262a-263a; Q 50, A 2 270a-272a; Q 52,
i 250a-252d; Q 54, A i, ANS 285a-d; A 3, ANS AA 1-2 278d-280a; Q 58, A i 300c-301a; Q 63,
and REP 2 286c-287b; Q 75, A i, ANS and A i, REP i 325c-326c; Q 66, A 2 345d-347b;
REP 2 378b-379c; Q 86, A 3 463b-d; Q 115, Q 75, A 5 382a-383b; A 6, REP 2 383c-384c;
A i, ANS and REP 1,4 585d-587c; PART i-n, Q 77, A i 399c-401b; A 3 401d-403a; A 6 404c-
Q 10, A i, REP 2 662d-663d; Q 27, A 3 738c- 405c; Q 79, A 2 414d-416a; A 10 423d-424d;
739c Q 87, A 2, ANS 466c-467b; Q 92, A 4, REP 3
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, HI, 86d-87a 491 b-d; Q 104, A 4, REP 2 538a-c; Q 105, A 5,
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, DBF 4 424a ANS 542a-543b; PART i-n, Q 3, A 2, ANS and
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 90c-91a / Practical Reason, REP i 623a 624b; Q 10, A i, REP 2 662d-663d;
291a-292a / Judgement, 570c-571c Q 22, A i 720d-721c
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d- 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 49,
157b; 160d-161c; 178a-179d A 3 4b-5a; Q 50, A 2 7c-8a; A 6 lla-12a; Q 51,
to 7d CHAPTER 7: BEING 147
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 49, A 5, REP 2 715a-716b; PART in SUPPL, Q 82,
A 4, ANS and REP i 5a-6a; Q 85, A 6 182d-184a; A 3 % ANS and REP 2 971a-972d
PART in, Q 2, A i, ANS and REP 2 710a-711c; 23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, PART i, 53c; PART in,
PART in SUPPL, Q 82, A i, REP 2 968a-970c; 172a-d; PART iv, 262a-d; 270a-c
Q 92, A i, ANS 1025c-1032b 26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard //, ACT v, sc v [1-41]
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy PARADISE,
',
i [121-141] 349d-350a
107c-d 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote esp PART i, la-8c,
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 384c-d; 18d-22a, PART n, 285a-288c
494a-b 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, 71d-72a; in, 83b-
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 212a 86a; v, 93a-94a / Objections and Replies, 108b-
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d- 109d; 121a-c; DEF m-iv 130b; AXIOM v 131d-
157b 132a; 157b-158a; 212c-213a
148 THE GREAT IDEAS 7d(\) to 7d(2)
240b-246c csp 242c-244b / Republic, BK v-vi,
(l.Tbcdiwionsormodcto/btmg, 1<J, Tt* dis- 368c-388a; BK ix-x, 426d-429c / Timaeus,
tinction between real and ideal being, or
447a-d; 457h-458a / Parmenides, 486c-491a
between natural being and being in mind.)
csp 489a-c / Sophist, 567b; 570a-574c / Phile-
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, APPENDIX 369b-372d bus, 610d-613a / Seventh Letter, 809c-810b
191b-192a; 302a; 639a-645b csp 640a, 644b~ IR vi, CH 3 62b-d / Third Ennead, TR vin, CH
645b; 659a-660b; 851b-852a; 865b-866a; 8 132d-133c / Fifth Ennead, TR v, CH i, 229a;
868 b; 879b-886a esp 881a-882a; 889a-890a TR vn 238a-239b; TR ix, CH 5-8 248a-250a /
54 FREUD. General Introduction, 597d-598a Sixth Ennead, TR v, CH 5-8 307a-308c
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 9, 3a /
The being of the possible
7</(l) City of God, BK vin, CH 6, 269b-c
7 PLATO: Republic, BK v-vi, 368c-383a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 8,
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK ix, CH 3 572a-c / A 4, REP i 37c-38c; Q 14, PREAMBLE 75c-d;
Soul, BK in, CH 4 [429*18-23] 661c Q 15 91b-94a; Q 16, A 7, REP 2 99a-d; Q 18,
17 PLOTINUS Second Ennead, TR v, CH 4-5 59c-
: A 4 107d-108c; Q 29, A 2, REP 4 163b-164b;
60c Q 44, A 3 240b-241a; Q 47, A i, REP 2 256a-
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 7, A 2, 257b; Q 55 288d-291d; Q 57, AA 1-2 295a-
ANS and REP 3 31d-32c; Q 9, A 2, ANS 39c-40d; 297a; Q 65, A 4 342b-343c; Q 76, A 2, REP 4
Q 14, A 2, REP 3 76d-77d; A 9, REP i 83 b-d; 388c-391a; Q 79, A 3, ANS 416a-417a; Q 84, AA
A 13, REP 2-3 86d-88c; Q 18, A 4, REP 3 107d- 1-7 440d-450b; Q 85, A i, ANS and REP 1-2
108c; Q 46, A i, REP 1-2 250a-252d 451c-453c; A 2, ANS and REP 2 453d-455b;
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 33, SCHOL i A 3, REP 1,4 455b-457a; A 8, ANS 460b-461b;
367c-d; PART n, PROP 8 375c-376a Q 86, A 4, REP 2 463d-464d; Q 87, A i, ANS
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, Ic 465a-466c; Q 88, A i, ANS 469a-471c; A 2,
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 85d-88a; 95a-tf; 97a-b; ANS 47lc-472c; Q 105, A 3, ANS 540c-541b;
176d-177a; 179c-180c / Judgement, 550a-578a Q no, A i REP 3 564c-565d; A 2, ANS 565d
t
esp 550c-d, 552c<d, 555a-b, 564a-565b, 568a- 566d; Q 115, A i, ANS 585d-587c; A 3, REP
c, 569a, 570c-575b 2 588c-589c; PART I-H, Q 29, A 6, ANS 748b-
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 153a~c; 749a
156d-157b; 178a-179d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART HI, Q 2,
53 JAMES: Psychology, 233b [fn i); 301b-302a A 5, REP 2 7l5a-716b; Q 4, A 4, ANS and REP 2
733a-734a; PART in SUPPL, Q 92, A i, ANS
14(2) The being of ideas, universals, rights 1025c-1032b
7 PLATO: Cratylus, 87d-89a; 113c-114a,c / 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 55b-c; 59d; PART
Phaedo, 224a-225a; 228d-230c; 231b-232b; iv, 262a-b
70(3) to 7^(4) CHAPTER 7: BEING 149
b b
508a~c; CH 9 [99i 9-992 i8] 509d-511a; BK in, SECT i 214d-215b; SECT 10 216d-217a; CH xxx,
CH i [995 b i3-i8] 514a; [996*13-15] 514c; CH 2 SECT 4 238d-239a
b
[997^12-998*19] 516b-d; CH 5 [iooi 26]-cn 6 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT n, 415a
b b
[ioo2 25] 520c-521c; BK vn, CH 2 [io28 i8-28] 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 24a-33d esp 31d-32c;
b a
551a-b; CH 10 [iO35 32-io36 i2] 559b-c; CH 61a-64a esp 62d-63c; 72c-85d; 99a-108a,c;
n [io36b32-i 037*4] 560b-c; BK xi, CH 2 119b
b
[io6o*36- i9] 588c-d; CH 3 [1061*29^4] 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156b-c
150 THE GREAT IDEAS 7</(5) to 8*
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK n, par 10 lla-b;
(Id. The distinction between real and ideal being, BK in, par 10 15b-d; BK vn, par 23 50b-c;
or between natural being and being in BK x, par 13 74c-d; par 16-19 75b-76b /
mind. 7d(4) The being of relations.) Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 38 654b-c
S3 JAMES: Psychology, 157b-161a csp 158b-159b; 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 18,
458a-459b; 865b; 873a-b; 879b-886a csp A 2, ANS 105c-106b
884b-885a; 889a-890a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 291b-294b
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 238a-b;
7</(5) The being of fictions and negations 257d
7 PLATO: Sophist, 561d-564b; 571d-574c esp 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, APPENDIX, 372a-c
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: 'Being* as a transcendental term or concept, see IDEA 4b(4); METAPHYSICS 2b; OPPOSITION
2c; for the analysis of the meaning of words like "being," and for the theory of 'being' as an
analogical term or concept, see RELATION id; SAME AND OTHER 4c; SIGN AND SYMBOL 3d.
The discussion of unity, goodness, and truth as properties of being, or as convertible with
being, see GOOD AND EVIL ib; ONE AND MANY i; SAME AND OTHER la, 2e; TRUTH ib.
Other treatments of the between being and becoming, and of the problem of the
distinction
reality of mutable as compared with immutable being, see CHANGE i, IDC; ETERNITY 43-
4b; MATTER i; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 2c.
Considerations relevant to the distinction between essence and existence, see FORM 2a; GOD
23-20, 43; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 2a-2b; SOUL 4b; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR
2a; for considerations relevant to the distinction between substance and accident, or
between the essential and the accidental, see FORM 20(2); MATTER ib; NATURE ia(i);
NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 2d; QUALITY i; QUANTITY i; SAME AND OTHER 33;
SOUL 2a; and for the problem of the being of qualities, quantities, and relations, see
QUALITY i; QUANTITY i; RELATION la.
Considerations relevant to the distinction between potentiality and actuality, or matter and
form, see CHANGE 2a; DESIRE 23; FORM 2c(i); HABIT la; INFINITY ib, 40; MATTER i-ia,
3b; MIND 2b, 40; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY i; for considerations relevant to the dis-
tinction between the real and the ideal, see IDEA 30, 6a-6b; KNOWLEDGE 63(3); and for the
controversy over the real existence of ideas, forms, mathematical objects, umversals, see
FORMla, 2a; MATHEMATICS 2b; SPACE 5; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 2a-2c.
Considerations relevant to the distinction between sensible and supra-sensible being, see
KNOWLEDGE 6a(i), 63(4); MIND ia(i).
Elaborations of the theory of substance and treatments of the distinction between material and
immaterial, corruptible and incorruptible substances, see ANGEL 2; CHANGE ice; ELEMENT
53; FORM 2d; MAN 33-33(1), 3b; MATTER 2, 2d, 33; MIND
loc-iod; SOUL 33-30, 4b.
ib, 2a,
The relation of being and becoming as objects of knowledge to the faculties of sense and
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booty ofthe Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works ace divided into two groups:
For the date, place, concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
and other facts
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
-
HEGEL. The Phenomenology of Mind, vni
CH
. Science
I
(c),
of Logic, VOL i, BK i, SECT i; SECT in,
3; BK II, SECT I, CH I SECT II, CH I SECT \
BRADLEY The Principles of Logic, Terminal
VII,
.
XI
Appearance and Reality, BK i, CH 2,
Essays,
7-8; BK n,
-
J
-
BOETHIUS. In Isagogem Porphyri Commenta
ERIGENA.
. De Trimtate
De
Dwisione Naturae
(On the Trinity)
ture, PART II, APPENDIX 2
BERGSON. Creative Evolution
The Creative Mind, CH 3, 6
.
BON A VENTURA. Itineranum Mentis in Deum (The MCTAGGART. The Nature of'Existence BK i ',
-
.
INTRODUCTION
is an inveterate human give the genesis of our opinion ..Things as differ-
EXPLANATION
tendency. Even philosophers who think ent as a logical demonstration and a piece of
that we cannot attain to knowledge of causes autobiography seem to be relevant in account-
get involved in explaining why that is so. Nor ing for our convictions; as, in accounting for
will their disputes about the theory of causes our behavior, we may refer to our purposes and
ever remove the word "because*' from the vo- to our past.
able as the word "is." "The impulse to seek THE GREEK WORD for cause, from which our
causes," says Tolstoy, "is innate in the soul of English word "aetiology" is derived, came into
man." the vocabulary of science and philosophy from
The question "Why ?" remains after all other the language of the law courts. In its legal sense
questions are answered. It is sometimes the only itwas used to point out where the responsibility
unanswerable question unanswerable either in lay. A suit at law is based upon a cause of action;
the very nature of the case or because there are he who demands redress for an injury suffered
secrets men cannot fathom. Sometimes, as Dan- is
expected to place the blame. The charge of
te says, man must be "content with the quta" responsibility for wrongdoing the blame or
the knowledge that something is without know- fault which is the cause for legal redress or pun-
ing why. "Why?" is the one question which it ishment naturally calls for excuses, which may
has been deemed the better part of wisdom not include a man's motives.
to ask; yet it has also been thought the one In the context of these legal considerations,
question which holds the key to wisdom. As two different meanings of cause begin to ap-
Virgil writes, in one of his most famous lines, pear. One man's act is the cause of injury to
Fehx, quipotuttrerum cognoscere causas (Happy another, in the sense of being responsible for
the man who has been able to know the causes its occurrence. If the act was intentional, it
can be answered in many ways. Other knowl- These two types of cause appear in the ex-
edge may prove useful in providing the answers. planations of the historians as well as in trials at
A definition, for example, which tells us what a law.Herodotus and Thucydides, trying to ac-
thing is, may explain why it behaves as it does count for the Persian or the Peloponnesian war,
or why it has certain properties. A narrative, enumerate the incidents which led up to the
which tells us how some thing happened by de- outbreak of hostilities. They cite certain past
scribing a succession of events, may also be part events as the causes of war the factors which
of the total explanation of some event in ques- predisposed the parties toward conflict, and
tion. even precipitated it. The historians do not
In other circumstances, a demonstration or a think they can fully explain why the particular
statement of grounds or reasons may be ex- events become the occasions for war except by
planatory. "How do you know?" is often a con- considering the hopes and ambitions, or, as
cealed form of the "Why" question. To answer Thucydides suggests, the fears of the contest*
itwe may have to give our reasons for thinking ants. For the ancient historians at least, finding
that something or other is the case; or perhaps the causes includes a. search. for the motives
155
156 THE GREA'T IDEAS
which underlie other causes and help to explain hausts the number of ways in which the term
how other factors get their causal efficacy. 'cause' is used."
Thucydides explicitly distinguishes these two The production of works of art, to which
kinds of causes in the chapter of his history.
first Aristotle hinieeff frequently turns for examples,
After noting that the "immediate cause" of the most readily illustrates these four different
war was the breaking of a treaty, he adds that kinds of causes. In making a shoe, the material
the "real- cause" was one "which was formally cause is that out of which the shoe is made the
most kept out of sight," namely, the "growth leather or hide. The efficient cause is the shoe-
of the power of Athens, and the alarm which maker, or more precisely the shoemaker's acts
this inspired in Lacedaemon." which transform the raw material into the
It is sometimes supposed that Thucydides finished product. The formal cause is the pat-
owes his conception of causes to the early medi- tern which directs the work; it is, in a sense,
That might very well be the case,
cal tradition. the definition or type of the thing to be
Hippocrates constantly seeks the "natural
for^ made, which, beginning as a plan in the artist's
caused of disease; and in his analysis of the mind, appears at the end of the work in the
various factors involved in any particular dis- transformed material as its own intrinsic form.
ease, he tries to distinguishbetween the pre- Theprotection of the foot is the final cause or
disposing and the exciting causes. end that for the sake of which the shoe was
But the classification of causes was not com- made.
pleted in the Athenian law courts, in the Greek Two of the four causes seem to be less dis-
interpretation of history, or in the early prac- cernible in nature than in art. The material and
tice of medicine. Causes were also the pre- efficient causes remain evident enough. The
occupation of the pre-Socratic physicists. Their material cause can usually be identified as that
study of nature was largely devoted to an anal- which undergoes the change the thing which
ysis of the principles, elements, and causes grows, alters in color, or moves from place to
of
change. Concerned with the problem of change place. The efficient cause is
always that by
in general, not merely with human action, or which the change is
produced. It is the
particular phenomena such as crime, war, or moving cause working on that which is sus-
disease, Greek scientists or philosophers, from ceptible to change, e.g., the fire heating the
Thales and Anaxagoras to Empedocles, De^moc- water, the rolling stone setting another stone
ritus, Plato, and Aristotle, tried to discover the in motion.
causes involved in any change. Aristotle carried But the formal cause is not as apparent in
the analysis furthest and set a pattern for all nature as in art. Whereas in art it can be iden-
later discussions of cause. tifiedby reference to the plan in the maker's
mind, it must be discovered in nature in the
THE EXPLANATION OF a thing, according to change itself, as that which completes the pro-
must answer all of the queries "com-
Aristotle, cess. For example, the redness which the apple
"
prehended under the question 'why.' This takes on in ripening is the formal c^use of its
question can be answered^ he thinks, in at least alteration in color. The trouble with the final
four different ways, and these four ways of say- cause is that it so often tends to be inseparable
ing why something is the case constitute his fa- from the formal cause; for unless some extrinsic
mous theory of the four causes. purpose can be found for a natural change*
u
ln one sense," he writes, "that out of which some end beyond itself which the change serves
a thing comes to be and which persists, is called the final cause, or that for the sake of which
" 1
'cause the material cause. "In anothersense, the change took place, is no other than the
thd form or the archetype" is a causethe for- quality or form which the matter assumes as a
"
mal cause. Again the primary sourc^dd? the result of its transformation.
The attack on final causes does not, at the whole of nature exhibits the working out of a
beginning at least, reject them completely. divine plan or design.
Bacon, for example, divides natural philosophy Spinoza answers such questions negatively.
into two parts, of which one part, "physics, "Nature has set no end before herself," he de-
inquireth and handleth the material and effi- clares, and "all final causes are nothing but
cient causes;and the other, which is meta- human fictions." Furthermore, he insists, "this
physics, handleth the formal and final causes." doctrine concerning an end altogether over-
The error of his predecessors, of which he com- turns nature. For that which is in truth the
plains, is their failure to separate these two cause it considers as the effect, and vice versa''
types of inquiry. The study of final causes is He deplores those who "will not cease from
inappropriate in physics, he thinks. asking the causes of causes, until at last you fly
u
"This misplacing," Bacon comments, hath to the will of God, the refuge of ignorance."
caused a deficiency, or at least a great impro- Spinoza denies that God acts for an end and
ficiency in the sciences themselves. For the that the universe expresses a divine purpose.
handling of final causes, mixed with the rest in He alsothinks that final causes are illusory even
causes,and given men the occasion to stay upon cause of this or that house," we do no more than
these satisfactoryand specious causes, to the indicate a "particular desire, which is
really an
great arrest and prejudice of further discov- efficient cause, and is considered primary, be-
as
ery." On this score, he charges Plato, Aristotle, cause men are usually ignorant of the causes of
and Galen with impeding the development of their desires."
science, not because "final causes are not true, Though Descartes replies to Pierre Gassen-
and worthy to be inquired, being kept within di'sarguments "on behalf of final causality," by
their own province; but because their excur- saying that they should "be referred to the
sions into the limits of physical causes hath bred efficient cause," his position more closely re-
a vastness and solitude in that tract." sembles that of Bacon than of Spinoza. When
Such statements as "the hairs of the eyelids we behold "the uses of the various parts in
are for a quickset and fence about the sight," plants and animals," we may be led to admire
or that "the leaves of trees are for protecting of "the God who brings these into existence," but
the fruit, "or that "the clouds are for watering "that does not imply," he adds, "that we can
of the earth," are, in Bacon's opinion, "imper- divine the purpose for which He made each
tinent" in physics. He therefore praises the thing. And although in Ethics, where it is often
mechanical philosophy of Democntus. It seems allowable to employ conjecture, it is at times
to himto inquire into the "particularities of pious to consider the end which we may con-
physical causes" better "than that of Aristotle jecture God set before Himself in ruling the
and Plato, whereof both intermingled final universe, certainly in Physics, where every-
causes, the one as a part of theology, the other thing should rest upon the securest arguments,
as a part of logic." it is futile to do so."
As Bacon's criticisms indicate, the attack on The elimination of final causes from natural
final causes in nature raises a whole series of science leads Descartes to formulate Harvey's
questions. Does every natural change serve discoveries concerning the motion of the heart
some purpose, either for the good of the chang- and blood in purely mechanical terms. But
ing thing or for the order of nature itself? Is Harvey himself, as Boyle points out in his Dis-
there a plan, analogous to that of an artist, quisition About the Final Causes of Natural
which orders the parts of nature, and their ac- Things, interprets organic structures in terms of
tivities, to one another as means to ends? A their functional utility; and Boyle defends the
natural teleology, which attributes final causes soundness of Harvey's method employing fi-
to everything, seems to imply that every nat- nal causes against Descartes.
ural thing is governed by an indwelling form Guided as it is by the principle of utility or
working toward a definite end, and that the function, Harvey's reasoning about the circula-
158 THE GREAT IDEAS
tion of the blood especially its venal and ar- explanation. Spinoza, in fact, claims that the
terial flow in relation to the action of the lungs reliance upon final causes "would have been
appeals to final causes. He remarks upon the sufficient to keep the human race in darkness
need of arguing from the final cause in his work to all eternity, if mathematics, which does not
on animal generation. "It appears advisable to deal with ends, but with the essences and prop-
me," he writes, "to look back from the perfect erties of forms, had not placed before us another
the principle that when judging certain things concerning our ability to know causes presup-
in nature, namely organisms and their possi- poses this conception of cause and effect, which
bility, we must look to the conception of final asserts that "there is some connection between
causes.Such a principle is admittedly necessary them, some power in the one by which it in-
even where we require no more than a guiding- falliblyproduces the other." The identification
thread for the purpose of becoming acquainted of cause with the efficient type of cause becomes
with the character of these things by means of acommonly accepted notion, even among those
observation." Kant criticizes a mechanism who do not agree with Hume that "we are ig-
which totally excludes the principle of finality norant ... of the manner in which bodies oper-
whether it is based on the doctrine of "blind ate on each other"; and that "their force and
chance" of Democritus and Epicurus, or the energy is entirely incomprehensible" to us.
"system of fatality" he attributes to Spinoza. The narrowing of causality to efficiency also
Physical science, he thinks, can be extended by appears in the doctrine, more prevalent today
the principle of final causes "without interfer- than ever before, that natural science describes,
ing with the principle of the mechanism of but does not explain that it tells us how things
physical causality." happen, but not why. If it does not require the
scientist to avoid all reference to causes, it
THE TENDENCY TO dispense with final causes does limit him to the one type of causality
seems to prevail, however, in the science of me- which can be expressed in terms of sequences
chanics and especially in the domain of inani- and correlations. The exclusion of all causes ex-
mate nature. Huygens, for example, defines cept the efficient tends furthermore to reduce
motion of some sort of matter."
light as "the the causal order to nothing but the relation of
He explicitly insists that conceiving natural cause and effect.
what he calls the "true Philosophy, in which cient reason for things or events do not as such
one conceives the causes of all natural effects in stand in relation to an effect, in the sense in
terms of mechanical motions." which an effect is
something separable from and
Mechanical explanation is distinguished by externally related to its cause. That way of con-
the fact thatit
appeals to no principles except ceiving causation as a relation of cause to
matter and motion. The material and the mov- effect is appropriate to the efficient cause
ing (or efficient) causes suffice. The philosoph- alone. When the efficient cause is regarded as
ical thought of the i7th century, influenced by the only cause, having a power proportionate to
that century's brilliant accomplishments in me- the reality of its effect, the very meaning of
chanics, tends to be mechanistic in its theory came involves relation to an effect,
of causation. Yet, being also influenced by the In the other conception of causation, the
model and method of mathematics, thinkers causal order relates the four causes to one an^
like Descartes and Spinoza retain the formal other. Of the four causes of any change or act,
cause as a principle of demonstration, if not of the first, says Aquinas, "is the final cause; the
CHAPTER 8: CAUSE 159
reason of which is that matter does not receive and instrumental causes become of great sig-
form, save in so far as it is moved by an
agent, nificance in arguments, metaphysical or theo-
for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to logical, concerning the cause of causes a first
act. But an agent does not move except from or ultimate cause. Aristotle's proof of a prime
the intention of an end." Hence in operation mover, for example, depends upon the proposi-
the order of the four causes is final, efficient, tion that there cannot be an infinite number of
material, and formal; or, as Aquinas states it, causes for a given effect. But since Anstotle
"first comes goodness and the end, moving the also holds that the world is without beginning
agent to act; secondly the action of the agent or end and that time is infinite, it may be won-
1
moving to the form; thirdly, comes the form.' dered why the chain of causes cannot stretch
back to infinity.
THE THEORY OF developed by Aris-
causes, as If time is infinite, a temporal sequence of
totle and Aquinas, proposes other distinctions causes reaching back to infinity would seem to
beyond that of the four causes, such as the dif- present no difficulty. As Descartes points out,
ference between the essential cause or the cause you cannot "prove that that regress to infinity
per se and the accidental or coincidental cause. is absurd, unless you at the same time show that
As indicated in the chapter on CHANCE, it is in the world has a definite beginning in time.'*
terms of coincidental causes that Aristotle Though it is a matter of their Jewish and Chris-
speaks of chance as a cause. tian faith that the world had a beginning in
A given effect may be the result of a number time, theologians like Maimonides and Aquinas
of efficient causes. Sometimes these form a se- do not think the world's beginning can be
ries, as when one body in motion sets another in proved by reason. They do, however, think that
motion, and that moves a third, or, to take an- the necessity of a first cause can be demon-
other example, a man is the cause of his grand- and both adopt or perhaps adapt the
strated,
son only through having begotten a son who argument of Aristotle which relies on the im-
later begets a son. In such a succession of causes, possibility of an infinite regression in causes.
the first cause may be indispensable, but it is The argument is valid, Aquinas makes clear,
not by itself sufficient to produce the effect. only if we distinguish between essential and
With respect to the effect which it fails to pro- accidental causes. "It is not impossible," he
duce unless other causes intervene, it is an ac- says,"to proceed to infinity accidentally as re-
cidental cause. In contrast, an essential cause is
gards efficient causes. ... It is not impossible
one which, by its
operation, immediately brings for man to be generated by man to infinity."
the effect into existence. But, he holds, "there cannot be an infinite num-
Sometimes, however, a number of efficient ber of causes that are per se required for a cer-
causesmay be involved simultaneously rather tain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved
than successively in the production of a single by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to
effect. They may be related to one another as infinity," In the latter case, it should be ob-
cause and effect rather than by mere coinci- served, the cooperating causes are simultaneous
dence. One cause may be the essential cause of and so if there were an infinity of them, that
another which in turn is the essential cause of would not require an infinite time. The crux of
the effect. When two causes arc thus simulta- the argument, therefore, lies either in the im-
neously related to the same eifect, Aquinas calls possibility of an infinite number of simulta-
one the principal, the other the instrumental neous causes, or in the impossibility of an infinite
cause; and he gives as an example the action of number of causes related to one another as in-
a workman sawing wood. The action of the saw strumental to principal cause.
causes a shaping of the wood, but it is instru- Among causes so related, Descartes, like
mental to the operation of the principal cause, Aquinas, argues that there must be one first or
which is the action of the workman using the principal cause. "In the case of causes which are
saw. so connected and subordinated to one another,
These two distinctions between essential that no action on the part of the lower is possi-
and accidental causes and between principal ble without the activity of the higher; e.g., in
160 THE GREAT IDEAS
the case where something is moved by a stone, On the assumption that God created the
God as the first cause of all observable effects tion which cause motions or changes, or even
has elegance than the so-called "ontological
less the generation of things, rather than their very
argument" in which the conception of God as existence." It may, however, be more difficult
a necessary being, incapable of not existing, to understand the creative action of God in re-
cording to Aristotle and Aquinas, the latter doctrine which Berkeley later reports by saying
mode of reasoning can only demonstrate the that this makes "the divine conservation ... to
nature of a thing, not its existence. Aquinas, be a continual creation." Aquinas agrees that
furthermore, does not regard the ontological "the conservation of things by God is not by a
argument as a form of reasoning at all, but new action, but by the continuation of that
rather as the assertion that God's existence is action whereby He gives being." But in the
self-evident to us, which he denies. conservation of things Aquinas thinks that God
The
various forms which these arguments acts through natural or created causes, whereas
take and the issue concerning their validity are in their initiation, being is the proper effect of
more fully discussed in the chapters on BEING, God alone.
GOD, and NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY. But The dogma of divine providence also requires
here it is worth noting that Kant questions a theory of the cooperation of the first cause
whether the a posteriori method of proving with natural or secondary causes. Dante, de- m
God's existence really differs from the ontologi- scribing the direction which providence gives
cal argument. It is, according to him, not only to the course of nature, uses the image of a bow.
"illusory and inadequate," but also "possesses "Whatsoever this bow shoots falls disposed to
the additional blemish of an ignoratio elenchi itsforeseen end, even as a thing directed to its
professing to conduct us by a new road to the aim." That God governs and cares for all things
desired goal, but bringing us back, after a short may be supposed to reduce nature to a puppet
circuit, to the old path which we had deserted show in which every action takes place in obe-
Hence the causal proof does not, in
at its call." dience to the divine will alone. Natural causes
Kant's opinion, succeed in avoiding the fallacies would thus cease to be causes or to have any
which he, along with Maimomdes and Aquinas, genuine efficacy in the production of their own
finds in the ontological argument. effects.
which, as we have seen, is contrary to Jewish and, in another place, he says, "whatsoever
and Christian faith but not to reason the re- causes He assigns to certain effects, He gives
ligious belief in a Creatorwould remain a belief them the power to produce those effects ... so
in that unique cause without whose action to that the dignity of causality is
imparted even to
preserve being at every
its moment the world creatures."
would cease to be. In addition to the role of divine causality in
CHAPTER 8: CAUSE
the regular processes of nature, still another and until the separation widens between thei
kind of divine causation is presupposed by the perimental and the philosophical sciences* M
religious belief in supernatural events, such as possibility of knowing causes is not genera
the elevation of nature by grace and the devia- doubted,
tions from the course of nature which are called Galileo's exposition of the new mccbar
"miracles." All these considerations, and espe- explicitly announces a departure from the t
cially the matter of God's miraculous interven- ditional interest of the natural philosopher
tion in the regular course of nature, have been the discovery of causes. The aim, he says in
subjects of dispute among theologians and phi- Two New Sciences, is not "to investigate
losophers (and sometime physicists and histo- cause of the acceleration of natural mott
rians). Some of those who do not deny the ex- concerning which various opinions have b<
istence of a Creator, or the divine government expressed by various philosophers"; but rat
of the universe through natural law, neverthe- "to investigate and to demonstrate some of
less question the need for divine cooperation properties of accelerated motion." The "v
with the action of every natural cause, or God's lous opinions" about causes are referred tc
intervention in the order of nature. "fantasies" which it is "not really worth whi
Throughout these controversies, the theory for the scientist to examine.
of causes defines the issues and determines the This attitude toward causes, especially c
lines of opposing argument. But since other cient causes, characterizes theaim of mat
basic notions are also involved in the debate of matical physics, both in astronomy and r
these issues, the further consideration of them chanics. For Newton it is enough in fact,
is reserved for other chapters, especially GOD, says, it "would be a very great step in phii
NATURE, and WORLD. ophy" "to derive two or three general pi
ciples of motion from phenomena . thoi . .
THE DISCUSSION OF CAUSE takes a new turn in the causes of those principles were not yet <
modern times. The new issues arise, not from covered. And, therefore, I scruple not to p
different interpretations of the principle of pose the principles of motion and lei. . .
causality, but from the skeptic's doubts con- their causes to be found out." In other passaj
cerning our ability to know the causes of things, Newton disparages the search for "hidden
and from the tendency of the physical sciences occult causes" as no part of the business
to limit or even to abandon the investigation of science,
causes. Hume goes further. He insists that all cat
According to the ancient conception of sci- are hidden. By the very nature of what cai
ence, knowledge, to be scientific, must state the are supposed to be and because of the man
causes of things. The essence of scientific meth- in which the human mind knows, man i
od, according to the Posterior Analytics of Aris- have no knowledge of how causes really j:
totle, consists in using causes both to define and duce their effects. "We never can, by our
to demonstrate. Sometimes genus and differ- most scrutiny," he says, "discover anyth
entia are translated into material and formal but one event following another, with
cause; sometimes a thing is defined genetically being able to comprehend any force or po*
by reference to its efficient cause, and sometimes by which the cause operates, or any connex
teleologically by reference to its final cause. between it and supposed effect."
its
The degree to which this conception of sci- All that men can be referring to when tj
example, do not seem to exemplify it as much ject followed by another, and where all obj<
as do Aristotle's own physical treatises or Har- similar to the first are followed by objects $i
vey's work on the circulation of the blood. Yet lar to the second." So far as any knowlei
until modern developments in mathematical based upon reason or experience can go,
physics, the ascertainment of causes seems to be relation of cause and effect is simply one
the dominant conception of the scientific task; succession, impressed upon the mind "far
162 THE GREAT IDEAS
customary That one event leads to
transition." contingency in the happenings of nature.
another becomes more and more probable but Against Hume's reduction of statements about
never more than probable as the sequence causes to probable opinion, Kant insists that,
recurs more and more frequently in experience. in the metaphysics of nature, such judgments
Hume's skepticism about causes, and his re- can be made with absolute certainty. These
interpretation of the meaning of cause, gains related issues are discussed in the chapters on
wide acceptance in subsequent thought, es- CHANCE, FATE, and NECESSITY AND CONTIN-
pecially among natural scientists. William GENCY.
James, for example, considering "the principle In the development of the natural sciences
"
that 'nothing can happen without a cause,' since Hume's day, his translation of cause and
declares that "we have no definite idea of what effect into observed sequences or correlations
we mean by what causality consists
cause, or of reinforces thetendency, which first appears
in. But the principle expresses a demand for with Galileo and Newton, to describe rather
some deeper sort of inward connection between than to explain natural phenomena. Yet to the
extent that the findings of science bear fruit
phenomena than their merely habitual time-
sequence seems to be. The word 'cause' is, in in technology, man's control over nature seems
short, an altar to an unknown god; an empty to confirm Bacon's view of science rather than
pedestal still marking the place for a hoped-for Hume's at least to the extent that the appli-
statue. Any really inward belonging- together cation of scientific knowledge to the production
of the sequent terms," he continues, "if dis- of effects implies a knowledge of their causes.
covered, would be accepted as what the word
cause was meant to stand for." THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY that nothing
Though Hume holds that we cannot pene- happens without a cause or sufficient reason,
trate beyond experience to the operation of or, as Spinoza puts it, "nothing exists from
real causes imbedded in the nature of things, whose nature an effect does not follow" has
he does not deny the reality of causation as a been made the basis for denials of human free-
principle of nature, On the contrary, he denies dom as well as of chance or contingency in the
that anything happens by chance or that any order of nature. The problem of man's free will
versally allowed," Hume says with approval, and WILL, but we can here observe how the
"that nothing exists without a cause of its exist- problem is stated in terms of cause, with re-
chance in the world, our ignorance of the real will or escape the foresight of His providence,
cause of any event has the same influence on then how is man free from God's foreordmation
the understanding, and begets a like species of when he chooses between good and evil ? If, as
belief or opinion." the theologians say, "the very act of free choice
In other words, Hume's position seems to be istraced to God as to a cause," in what sense
that man's ignorance of real causes, and the can the act be called "free"? Is it not neces-
mere probability of his opinions about custom- sarily determined to conform to God's will and
ary sequences of "cause" and "effect," indicate to His plan ? But, on the other hand,
"every- if
human limitations, not limits to causal deter- thing happening from the exercise of free
mination in the order of nature itself. Adversar- choice must be subject to divine providence,"
ies of Hume, coming before as well as after must not the evil that men do be attributed to
him in the tradition of the great books, take God as cause ?
issue with him on both points. The problem takes another form for the scien-
Against Hume's determinism, which is no tist who thinks only in terms of natural causes,
for the theologian, nothing is exempt from God's give to these questions have profound conse*
will. Since the realm of nature includes human quences for man's view of himself, the universe,
nature, must not human acts be caused as are ancl his place init. As the issue of
necessity and
all other natural events ? Are some human acts chance central in physics or the philosophy of
is
free in the sense of being totally uncaused, or nature, so the issue of determinism and freedom
only in the sense of being caused differently is central in psychology and ethics, in political
from the motions of matter ? Are causality and theory and the philosophy of history, and above
freedom opposed principles within the order of all in theology. It makes opponents of James
nature, appropriate to physical and psychologi- and Freud, of Hegel and Marx, of Hume and
cal action; or do they constitute distinct realms Kant, of Spinoza and Descartes, of Lucretius
as for Kant, the realms of phenomena and and Marcus Aurelius. It raises one of the most
noumena, the sensible and the supra-sensible; perplexing of all theological questions for Au-
or as for Hegel, the realms of nature and gustine, Aquinas, Pascal, and for the two great
history ? poets of God's will and man's freedom Dante
The different answers which the great books and Milton.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The general theory of causation 164
i a. The kinds of causes: their distinction and enumeration 165
ib. The order of causes: the relation of cause and effect
4.
The analysis of means and ends in the practical order
5^. Cause in philosophical and scientific method: the role of causes in definition,
5^.
The nature and sources of our knowledge of causes
170
5</.
The limits of our knowledge of causes
7.
The causality of God or the gods 172
70. Divine causality in the origin and existence of the world: creation and conserva-
tion
7& Divine causality in the order of nature or change: the first cause in relation to all
other causes
7?. Divine causality in the government of the universe: providence and free will 173
7</.
Divine causality in the supernatural order: grace, miracles 175
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which arc the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page
12.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the mam divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
a
/ Metaphysics, BK in, CH 2 J996 i
8-997*1 4] AA 2-3 13c-15a; Q 75, A i 137d-138c; A 4
514d-515d; BK v, CH 1-2 533a-534c; BK vi, CH 140a-d; Q 76, A i 141a-c; PART in SUPPL, Q 76,
2 [1026^4-1027*15] 549a-b; BK vii, CH 17 A i 939d-941a
565a-S66a,c; BK vm, CH 3 1104^5-14] 567d- 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 80b-c
568a; CH 4 568d-569b; CH 6 569d-570d; BK x, 30 BACON: Advancement
of Learning,
42a-46a
CH i (i052 b 8-i4] 579a; BK xn, CH 4-5 599d- 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, in, 84b-86b /
601a; BK xiv, CH 6 625d-626d Objections and Replies, llld-112a; 121b-c;
9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK i, CH 5 [136^39- AXIOM i-iv 131d; 212a; 212c
1360111] 602c-d; CH 10 [1369*5-^7] 612b-613a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, DBF i 355a; DBF
7
12 LUCRETIUS* Nature of Things, BK vi [703-711] 355b; AXIOM 3-5 355d; PROP 3 356a; PROP 8,
89c-d SCHOL 2, 357b-d; PROP 36 369b; APPENDIX
12 AUREUUS: Meditations, BK v, SECT 8 269d- 369b-372d; PART n, PROP 7, COROL and SCHOL
270b 375a-c
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR i, CH i 78a-c; 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK in, RULE i-n 270a
CH 4 79d-80a; CH 10 82b / Fourth Ennead, TR 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xxi,
iv, CH y 174d-175c / Sixth Ennead, TR vu, SECT 1-5 178b-179d; SECT 19 182 b-c; CH xxn,
CH 2 322b-323a SECT ii 203c-d; CH xxvi, SECT 1-2 217a-d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q 2, 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 25-33
A 3 12c-14a; Q 3, A 4, ANS 16d-17c; o 33, A i, 417d-419a pa&im; SECT 6o-6 424b-426a
REP i 180d-181c; Q 49 264d-268a,c passim; 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT HI, DIV
Q 52, A 3, ANS 280a-d; Q 65, A i 339b-340b; i8-SECT viii, DIV 75 457c-485a passim
la to \b CHAPTER 8: CAUSE 165
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15a-b; 17c-d; 46d-47c; A i 858c-859d; A 4 861a-862a; PART in SUPPL,
57c-d; 58d-59b; 63b; 67d-68b [fn i]; 76c~83b; Q 76, A i, ANS 939d-941a
95a-d; 133a; 140b,d-143a; 152a-153a; 164a- 22 CHAUCER: Tale ofMelibeus, par 37 417b
171a; 187c-189a; 214b,d [fn i); 225c-226b / 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 78c-d
Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 279b,d- 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK n, 36d
287d esp 285c-286a / Practical Reason, 291a- 28 HARVEY. On Antmal Generation, 335d; 407c;
292a; 294c-295d; 311d-314d; 339a / Judge- 408b; 415b-417a; 42Sa-429b
ment, 550a-578a esp 550a-551a,c, 555a-558b, 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 43a-d; 45a-
564a-c, 566a-b, 568c-570a, 577c-578a, 587a< 46a
591b; 592a-d; 597a-599d; 611d-613a,c 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, HI, 87c-88c; iv,
53 JAMES: Psychology, 885b-886a 90a-b / Objections and Replies, llOc-llld;
AXIOM vni 132b; 158b-161d passim, esp 158c-
la. The kinds of causes: their distinction and 161b; 212a; 213b-c; 214c; 229c-d
enumeration 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, DEF i 355a; PROP n
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 240c-245c / Timaeus, 447b-c; 358b-359b; PROP SCHOL-PROP 18 362c-
17,
455a-458a; 465d-466a / Sophist, 577d-578b / 363c; PROP 28, SCHOL 366a; APPENDIX 369b-
Statesman, 592d-593a; 596a-b / Philebus, 615c- 372d; PART n, PROP 45, SCHOL 390b; PART in,
619d; 637c-d / Laws, BK x, 760a-765c esp DEF 1-3 395d-396a; PROP 1-3 396a-398c; PART
762b-763b iv, PREF 422b,d-424a; DEF 7 424b
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 2 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xxvi,
b a
[7i 33~72 6] 98b-c;
BK n, CH n 128d-129d / SECT 2 217b-d
Physics, BK n, CH 3-7 271a-275d esp CH 3 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 51-53
b &
271a-272c; BK in, CH 7 [207 35-2o8 4] 286c; 422d-423a
BK iv, CH i [209*18-23] 288a / Generation and 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 229b-230a
Corruption, BK n, CH 9-10 436d-439c / Meta- 42 KANT- Pure Reason, 133a; 164a-171a / Judge-
physics, BK CH 3-10 501c-511d; BK n, CH 2
i, ment, 550a-551a,c; 553c-555a; 556b-558b;
b a b
[994 28-3i] 513b; BK in, CH 2 [996 i8- 26] 577c-578a; 584c-d; 594b-c
514d-515b, BK v, CH 2 533b~534c; CH 18 543c- 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 165a-
d; CH 30 547a-d; BK vi, CH 2-3 548c-549d; 166b
BK vn, CH 17 565a-566a,c; BK vin, CH 2 566d-
\b. The order of causes: the relation of cause
567d; CH 3 [104^5-24] 567d-568b; en 4
R b and effect
568d-569b; BK xi, CH 8 [io65 26- 4] 593d;
BK xii, CH 4--') 599d-601a 7 PLATO: Lysis, 24b / Phaedrus, 124b-c /
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i Euthyphro, 195c-d / Gorgias, 267c-268a /
b b
[639 8-642 4] 161d-165d / Generation of Ani- Timaeus, 455a-b; 460c; 465d-466a / Theaete-
mals, BK i, CH i [715*1-18] 255a-b; CH 20 tus, 521b-522b / Philebus, 617b-c / Laws, BK
a b
(729 io]-CH 22 [7}o 33] 269b-271a passim; x, 760a-765c esp 762b-763b
b
BK v, CH i [778 a i6- b i9J 320a-321a / Ethics, 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 12 [i4 io-22] 20b /
BK in, CH 3 [iii2 H 3o-33]358b/ Rhetoric, BK i, Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 2 [7i b ^~72 a 6]
CH 10 [i369a 3i- b 5] 612c-d 98b-c; BK n, CH 12 129d-131b; CH 16-18 134b-
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 2, A 3 136a / Physics, BK n, CH 6 [198*5-13] 275a;
12c-14a, Q 3, A 8, REP i 19d-20c; Q 4, A 3, CH 8-9 275d-278a,c; BK in, CH 2 [202 a 2J-cH 3
b
ANS 22b-23b; Q 5, A 2, REP 1-2 24b-25a; A 4 [202 22J 279c-280c; BK vn, CH 1-2 326a-329a;
25d-26c; Q u, A 3, ANS 49a-c; Q 13, A 5, ANS BK vni 334a-355d / Heavens, BK i, CH 7
b
and REP i 66b-67d; Q 14, A 8, ANS and REP i [275*i- 29] 366a-367a / Generation and Cor-
82c-83b; A n, ANS 84c-85c; A 16, REP i 90b- ruption, BK i, CH 7 421d-423b / Metaphysics,
91b; Q 19, A 6, ANS 113c-114d, Q 25, A 2, REP BK n, CH r (993 b 23J-cH 2 [994^0] 512a-513b;
2-3 144c-145b; Q 36, A 3, ANS 194c-195d, Q 39, BK v, CH 2 [1013^3-16] 533c-d; [1014*20-25]
b
A 2, REP 5 203b-204c; Q 44 238a-241d; Q 46, 534b-c; BK xi, CH 8 [io65 2~4] 593d; BK xn,
A 2, REP 7 253a-255a; Q 48, A i, REP 4 259b- CH 3 [1070*20-24] 599c; CH 4 [io7o b22~35]
260c; Q 49, A i, ANS 264d-265d; Q 51, A i, 600b; CH 6-8 601b-605a / Soul, BK i, CH 3
a b
REP 3 275b-276b; Q 52, A 3, ANS 280a-d; Q 65 [4o6 2-i2] 635b-c; [4o6 5~9] 635d-636a; CH 4
339a-343c; Q 75, A 5, REP 3 382a-383b; Q 82, [408*29-33] 638a
A 4, ANS 434c-435c; Q 87, A 2, REP 3 466c- 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i
b b
467b; Q 104 534c-538c; Q 105, A 5, ANS 542a- [639 i3-642*24] 161d-165b esp [639 i3~32]
b
543b; PART i-n, Q 2, A 5, REP 3 618d-619c; 161d-162a; BK n, CH i [646*25- io] 170b-c /
Q 7, A 3, ANS 653c-654b Motion of Animals, CH 5 235c-d / Generation
b
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica JPWT i-n, Q 60, of Animals, BK n, CH 6 [742*i6~ i7] 283b-d /
A i, ANS 49d-50c; Q 72, A 3 113b-114a; Q 75, Rhetoric, BK i, CH 7 [1364*33-36] 606a; BK n,
A i, ANS and REP 2 137d-138c; Q 76, A i, ANS CH 23 [1400*28-35] 649a-b
and REP i 141a-c; Q 85, A i, REP 4 178b-179b; 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 2, 168b-c;
A 5, ANS and REP i 181d-182d; PART in, Q 62, CH 4 169a
166 THE GREAT IDEAS \btol
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 43a-d
(1. The general theory of cautation. lb. The order 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART v, 55d-56a /
qf causes: the relation of cause and effect.) Meditations, in, 84b-86b; 87c-88c/ Objections
16 KEPLJBR: Epitome, BK iv, 854b; 940b-941a and Replies, 110a-112a csp llld-112a; 120b-
17 PLOTINUS: Fifth. Ennead, TR H, CH i 214c-215a 121c; AXIOM i-v 131d-132a; AXIOM vin 132b;
/ Sixth Ennead, TR VH, CH 2 322b-323a PROP n 132c; 158b-161d passim; 212a; 213b-d;
18 AUGUSTINE: City of'God\ BK xn, CH 24-25 229c-d
358a-359a; BK xxn, CH 2 587b-588a; CH 24 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, DBF i 355a; AXIOM
609a-612a 3-5 355d; PROP 3 356a; PROP 8, SCHOL 2,
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q a, A 3 357b-d; PROP 11 358b-359b; PROP 21-29 364a '
12c-14a; Q 3, A i, ANS 14b-15b; A 2, ANS 15c- 366c esp PROP 28 365c-366a; PROP 33 367 b-
16a; A 4, ANS 16d-17c; A 6, ANS 18c-19a; A 7, 369a; PROP 36 369b; APPENDIX 369b-372d;
ANS and REP i 19a-c; A 8, ANS and REP 1-2 PART n, DEF 5 373b-c? DEF 7 373c; PROP 7,
19d-20c; Q 4, A 2, ANS 21b-22b; A 3, ANS and COROL and SCHOL 375a-cJ LEMMA 3 378d-379a;
REP 4 22b-23b; Q 5, A 2, REP i 24b-25a; A 4, PROP 48, DEMONST 391a; PART III, DEF 2-3
ANS 25d-26c, Q 8, A i 34d-35c; Q 13, A 5, ANS 395d-396a; PROP 1-3 396a-398c; PART v,
and REP i 66b-67d; A n, REP 2 73c-74b; Q 18, AXIOM 2 452c
A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 19, AA 4-5 lllc-113c; 32 MILTON. Paradise Lost, BK v [469-490] 185b-
A 6, ANS and REP 3 113c-114d; A 7, REP 2 186a
U4d'115d; A 8 116a-d; Q 22, AA 2-3 128d-131c; 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 505 261a-b / Vacuum,
Q 23, A 5, ANS 135d-137d; Q 36, A 3, ANS and 369a
REP 4 194c-195d; Q 39, A 2, REP 5 203b-204c; 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK in, RULE i-n 270a
Q4i, A i, REP2217d-218c; A2, ANs218c-219d; 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK 11, CH xxi,
Q 42, A 2, ANS 225d-227a; A 3, ANS and REP 2 SECT 1-5 178b-179d; SECT 19 182b-c; CH xxn,
227a-d; Q 44, A i, REP i 238b-239a; A 2 239b- SECT ii 203c-d; CH xxvi, SECT 1-2 217a-d
240a; Q 45, A 2, REP 2 242d-244a; A 3 244a-d; 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 25-33
A 5, ANS 245c-247a; Q 46, A i, REP 6 250a- 417d-419a passim; SECT 65-66 425d-426a
252d; A 2, HEP i 253a-255a; Q 48, A i, REP 4 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT in, DIV
259b-260c; Q 50, A i, ANS 269b-270a; Q 52, A i8-SECT vni, DIV 75 457c-485a passim, esp
3, ANS 280a-d; Q 63, A 8, REP i 332c-333b; SECT vn, DIV 60 477a-c; SECT xi 497b-503c
Q 65, A 3 341c-342b; Q 75, A i, REP i 378b- passim, esp DIV 105 498d-499a
379c; Q 82, A 3, REP i 433c-434c; A 4 434c- 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15a-b; 17c-d; 47b-c;
435c; Q 87, A 2, REP 3 466c-467b; Q 88, A 3, 57c-d; 58d-59b; 63b; 67d-68b [fn i], 76c-
REP 2 472c-473a; Q 90, A 3 482c-483a; Q 103, 83b esp 81c-d; 95a-d; 140b,d-145c; 152a-
AA 6-8 532b-534b; Q 104, A i, ANS 534c-536c; 153a; 187c-189c; 214b,d [fn i] / Practical
A 2 536c-537b, Q 105 538d-545b; Q 112, A i, Reason, 311d-314d; 339a / Judgement, 550a-
ANS 571d-573a; Q 114, A 3, ANS 583b-d; QQ 551a,c; 553c-555a; 561c-562a,c; 577c-578a;
115-116 !>85c-595c; Q 118, A 2, REP 3 601c- 582c-583b
603b; PART i-ir, Q i, A 2 610b-611b; Q 46, A i, 45 FARADAY- Researches in Electricity, 582b-584a
ANs813b-814a passim
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 66, 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 9b-c; lOd; 65a-66a
A 6, REP 3 80c-81b; Q 75, A 4 140a-d; Q 112, / Descent of Man, 285b-c
AA 1-3 356c-358d; Q 113, A 8 367d-368c; PART 51 TOLSTOY. War and Peace, BK x, 447c-448d;
II-H, Q i, A 7, REP 3 385c-387a; Q 9, A 2, ANS BK xi, 470a-c; EPILOGUE i, 650b-c; EPILOGUE
424b-425a; PART in, Q 6, A i, ANS 740b-741b; n 675a-696d
A 5, ANS 744a-d; Q 18, A i, RBP 2 810a-811c; 53 JAMES: Psychology, 772b; 884b-885a
QI9, A i, ANS and REP2816a-818b, g62858b-
864c passim; Q 64, A i, ANS 870c-871b; A 8, 2. Comparison of causes in animate and in-
REP i 876c-877c; PART in SUPPL, Q 70, A 3, animate nature
ANS 897d-900d; Q 74, A 3, REP 2 927c-928d; 7 PLATO: Phaedo, 241d-242b / Laws, BK x, 763a-
Q 76, A i, REP i 939d-941a; A 2 941b-942b; 765d
Q 80, A i, REP i 956c-957c; Q 86, A 3, REP 2 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BKII, CH8-9275d-278a,c;
994d-996a,c BK viii, CH 2 [252 b i6-28] 336c-d; [253*6-21]
21 DANTE' Dwine Comedy, PARADISE, n b
[112-148] 337a-b; CH 4 [254 i2-33J 339a-b / Heavens,
109a-b BK ii, CH 12 383b-384c / Meteorology, BK iv,
22 CHAUCER: Tale ofMelibcus, par 37 417b CH 12 493d-494d / Metaphysics, BK v, CH 4
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 78c-79a; 79d- b
[ioi4 2o-26] 535a; BK vn, CH 9 [1034*32-
80a b
8] 55Tc-d; CH 10 [1035^4-28] 559a-b; CH 16
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 135c- b
[i040 5-i6] 564c; BK ix, CH 2 571c-572a; CH 5
136b 573a-c;CH 7 [1049*12-19] 574d / Soul, BK n,
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 390c; 415b- CH 4 b
(4i5 8-28] 645d-646a; BK HI, CH 9-13
416c; 426a-429b; 442c-443c; 445c; 447a-b 664d-668d / Sleep r CH 2 [455 b i3~28] 698b-c
3 to 4 CHAPTER 8: CAUSE 167
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK v, SECT 8 269d- 90b; 291a-295b; 388a; 820b-826a csp 825b-
270b 826b [fn 2}
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK in, 49c; BK iv, 69a; BK 54 FREUD- Origin and Development of Psycho-
91b-d
vi, Analysis, 13c / General Introduction, 454b-c;
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR i 78a-82b csp 486c-487a
CH 4 79d-80a, CH 9-10 82a-b
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK v, CH 9-10 213b- 4. The analysis of means and ends fn the
216c practical order
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 19, 7 PLATO: Lysis, 23a-b / Laches, 29b-c / Gorgtas,
AA 3-10 110b-118b passim; Q 41, A 2 218c-219d; 262a-264b; 280b-d / Republic, BK n, 3lOc-d
Q46, A i, REP 9-10 250a-252d; Q 47, A i, REP i 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK in, CH i [n6b22~36]
256a-257b; Q 59, A 3 308b-309a; Q 62, A 8, 163b-c / Heavens, BK n, CH 12 [292*14^26]
REP 2 323c-324a; Q 83, A i 436d-438a; Q 103, 383d-384b / Metaphysics, BK n, CH 2 [994b8-
A ii REP 1,3 528b-529a; Q 115, A 6, ANS 591d- 16] 512d-513a; BK v, CH 2 [ioi3 m 32-b 3l 533c;
b
592d; PART i-n, Q 10 662d-666a,c; Q 13, A 6 [ioi3 25-28] 533d-534a; BK ix, CH 8 {1050*4-
b 575d-576b BK CH
676c-677b i] / Soul, in, 10 665d-666d
168 THE GREAT IDEAS 4 to 5a
^
,i2 LUCRETIUS Nattitv of Things* BX v {5^6-533]
:
(5. Qruie fa relation to knowledge. 5b. Cause in Id. The limits of our knowledge of causes
philosophical and scientific method: the role OLD TESTAMENT: Job, 38-39 (D) Job, 38:1-
of causes m definition, demonstration, ex- 39:30
periment, hypothesis) 7 PLATO: Republic, BK vi, 383d-388a / Ttmaeus,
49 DARWIN- Ortgtn of Species, 217d-218a; 239c- 447b-d
240d 8 ARISTOTLE: BK n, CH 4 [19^5-7) 273a
Physics,
50 MARX: Capital, lOb-llb BK i, CH 2 [982 b 28-983 s n]
/ Metaphysics,
b
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 470a-c; BK 501a-b; BK in, CH 2 [ 99 6*i8- 26] 514d-515b
xni, 563b; EPILOGUE 11 675a-696d passim, esp 9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Animals, BK 11, CH 6
b
677b~680b, 687b-688a, 694d-695c (742 i7-743*iJ 283d-284a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 89b 90a; 324b; 668a-671a 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [526-533]
esp 670a-b; 745b; 824b-825a; 884b-886a 67d-68a; BK vi [703-711] 89c-d
54 FREUD: General Introduction, 454 b-c; 483d- 16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly
484a Spheres, 505a-506a
17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR vin, CH n 348b-c
3c. The nature and sources of our knowledge 19 AQUINAS: Summa PART i, Q 12,
Theologica,
of causes A ANS 57b-58b; Q 19, A 5,
8, REP 2 112d-113c;
7 PLATO- Meno, 188b 189a / Phaedo, 240c-245c Q ANS 297b-298a
57, A 3,
/ Republic, BK Vi, 383d-388a / Timaeus, 455a- 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, in [24-
c; 465d-466a 45] 56a-b; xvin [49-60] 80b-c
8ARISTOTLF* Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 2 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 54a; 78a-80c
b CH 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 80b-82b; 271b-273b;
[7i 33~72*6] 98b-c; BK n, 19 136a-137a,c /
Metaphysics, BK i, CH 1-2 499a-501c, BK n, en 497b-502c passim
b
i
[99^19-31] 512a-b; BK in, CH 2 [996*i8- 26] 30 BACON' Advancement of Learning, 45a-46a /
S14d-515b Novum Organum, BK n, APH 2 137b-c
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 4 169a 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, iv, 90a-b / Objec-
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xi, CH 7 326a-c; tions and Replies, llOa-b; 215a-b
c 29 339a-b 31 SPINOZA Ethics, PARTI, APPENDIX 369b-372d;
:
passim, esp DIV 105 498d-499a, DIV 115 503b-c 550a-551a,c; 557c-558b; 564a-c; 584c-d;611d-
3 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 335b-337a 613a,c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15a-b; 17c-d; 46d-47c; 45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169a
57c-58b; 58d-59b; 66d-67b; 76c-83b; 85a-b; 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 65a; 92d-94c pas-
86c-d; 95a-d; HOb; 164a-l7la; 194d-195a; sim
214b,d 225c-226b / Fund. Prin. Meta-
[fn i]; 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK ix, 342a-344b;
physic of Morals, 285c 286a / Practical Reason, BK x, 405a-b; BK xi, 469a-470c; BK xin,
294c-295d; 311d-314d / Intro. Metaphystc of 563a-b; EPILOGUE i, 646c-647b; 650b-c;
Morals, 387a-b / Judgement, 562d-563b EPILOGUE n 675a<696d esp 687d-688a, 693c
53 JAMBS: Psychology, 88a-90b passim 53 JAMES: Psychology, 90a; 822b; 885b-886a
CHAPTBR 8: CAUSE 171
3 [767^-15] 309a; BK v, CH i [778*1 5^19] Meditations, iv, 90a-b / Objections and Re-
b b
320a-321a; CH 8 [788 22~789 i5] 330c-331a,c plies, 215a-b
/ Politics, BK i, CH 2 [1252^0-1253*1] 446a-b; 31 SPINOZA \Ethics, PART i, APPENDIX 369b-372d;
b PART iv, PREF 422b,d-424a; DBF 7 424b
CH8[i256 8-26]450b-c
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 6, 170b-c; 33 PASCAL: PensSes, 72, 184b; 75 185b-186a
CH 10 171b-172b; CH 12 172d-173c; CH 13, 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK in, GENERAL SCHOL,
174d-175c; BK n, CH 3 185a-186d; CH 4, 187c; 371a / Optics, BK in, 528b-529a
BK in, CH i 199a-c; CH 3 200a-201a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH i,
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [1022-1037] SECT 15, 125b
13c-d; BK ii [1052-1063] 28b-c; BK iv [823- 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 60-66
857] 55a-b; BK v [76-90] 62a-b; [156-234] 424b-426a passim; SECT 107 433d-434a
63a-64a 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT v, DIV 44,
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK v, SECT 8 269d- 469b-c; SECT xi, DIV in 501b-c
270b; BK vi, SECT 40 277d 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 229b-230a
16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 187a-190a; 205a-209b;
Spheres, BK i, 51 Ib 239a-240b / Judgement, 467d-470b; 473a-
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 846b-847a; 857b- 474b; 523c-d; 550a-613a,c esp 550a-562a,c,
860b; 863b-887a passim; 913a-b; 915b-916a; 568c-570b, 575b-578a, 587a-588a
925b-928a; 932a-933a / Harmonies of the 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 157b-c;
World, 1023b-1080b esp 1049b-1050a 161d-162a
17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR n, CH i 40a- 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 40c-d; 41c-42a;
41a / Fifth Ennead, TR vm, CH 7 242d-243c 60b-61d passim; 95d-97a esp 96b; 217d-218a
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xi, CH 22 333d- / Descent of Man, 593d
334c; BK xn, CH 4-5 344b-345b; BK xix, 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE i, 646c-
CH 12-14, 518c-520c; BK xxn, CH 24, 610c- 647b; 650b-c; EPILOGUE n, 687d-688a
611c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 4a-6b; 671b [fn i]
19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 2, A 3,
: 54 FREUD: Narcissism, 401 b / Instincts, 415b /
ANS and REP 2 12c-14a; Q 5, A 2, REP 1-2 Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 651d-654c pas-
24b-25a; A 4 25d-26c; Q 6, A i, REP 2 28b-d; sim, esp 654a-c
172 THE GREAT IDEAS 7 to n
7. The causality of God or the gods x 120b; xni [52-84] 126*-b; xix [40-51]
[1-6]
135c; xxix
[13-45] 150b-c
la, Divine causality in the origin and existence 22 CHAUCER: Knight's Tale [2987-3010] 209te-b
of the world; creation and conservation 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART 111, 173d; PART iv,
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1-2; 7:4 / Nehemiah, 251a<b
9:6-(>) // Esdras, 9:6 / Job, 26:7; 37:18; 28 GALILEO Two New Sciences, FOURTH DAY,
:
113:3; 118:73; 1202; 135:5-9; 145:5-6; 148:1- 137d-138a; 214c; 215a-b; 228a-c; 229c-d
6 / Proverbs, 3:19-20; 8:23-29 / Isaiah, 40:26- 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 16-18 362a-
28; 42:5; 44:24; 45:7-12,18; 48:13; 65:17- 363c; PROP 25 365b; PROP 33, SCHOL2, 368c-
(D) Isaias, 40:26-28; 42:5; 44:24; 45:7-12,18; 369a
48:13; 65:17 / Jeremiah, 10:12; 27:5; 31:35; 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK i [650-659] 107b;
51:15-16 (D) Jeremias, 10:12; 27:5; 31:35; BK ii [345-353] 118b-119a; BK in [708-735]
51:15-16 / Amos, 5:8 / Zechanah, i2'i (D) 150b-151b; BK iv [720-735] 168a-b, BK v
Zacharias, 12:1 [468-505] 185b-186a; [577-594] 187b-188a;
APOCRYPHA: Judith, 16:14 (Z)) OT, Judith, [800-868] 192b-194a; BK vn [59-640] 218b-
16:17 / Rest of Esther, 13:10 (D) OT, Esther, 231a esp [139-161] 220a-b, [216-550] 221b-
13:107 Wisdom of Solomon, 1:14; 11:17 (D) 229a
OT, Boo^ of Wisdom, 1:14; 11:18 / Ecclesias- 33 PASCAL: PensSes, 482 258a
ticus, 24:8-9; 33:10-13; 39:16-35; 43 (D) 34 NEWTON- Optics, BK in, 542a-543a
OT, Ecclesiasticus, 24:12-14; 33:10-14; 39*21- 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xv,
41 43 / Bel and Dragon, 5~(D) OT, Daniel,
;
SECT 12, 165c; BK iv, CH x, SECT 15 352d-
14:4 / // Maccabees, y.2^-(D) OT, II 353a; SECT 18-19 353c-354c
Machabees, 7:23,28 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 25-33
NEW TESTAMENT: Acts, 7:40^50; 14:15; 17:22-28 417d-419a esp SECT 29-33 418c-419a; SECT
(D) Acts, 7:49-50; 14:14; 17:22-28 / Colos- 45-46 421b-c; SECT 48 422a passim; SECT 57
sians, 1:16-17 / Hebrews, i.io; 3:4; 11:3 / 423d-424a; SECT 146-150 442a-443b
// Peter, 3:5 / Revelation, 4:11; 14:7 (D) 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xn, DIV
Apocalypse, 4 : 1 1 ; 1
4 7 132, 509d[fn i]
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 447a-452d; 465d-466a / 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 81d-82a; 143a-145c /
Sophist, 577d-578b Judgement, 597a-599d
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [146-158] 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 245d-
2d-3a; BK v [146-234] 63a-64a 246c; PART iv, 361a-b
17PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR ix, CH 1-12 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 239c-d; 243d
65d-73d / Fifth Ennead, TR n, CH i 214c-215a;
TR vni, CH 7 242d-243c lb. Divine causality in the order of nature or
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 10 3b-c; change: the first cause in relation to all
BK vii, par 16-23 48c-50c; BK xi, par 4-11 other causes
90a-92b; BK xn, par 2-9 99c-101c; par 14-40 7 PLATO: Timaeus, 455a-b; 465d-466a / States-
102b-110a; BK xni, par 6-48 112a-124a / City man, 587a-589c
of God, BK vn, CH 29-31 261a-262a; BK xi, 8 ARISTOILE: Physics, BK vn, CH 1-2 326a-329a;
CH 4-24 324a-336a; BK xn, CH 10-27 348b- BK vin 334a-355d / Heavens, BK n, CH 12
360a,c; BK xxn, CH i 586b,d-587b / Christian 383b-384c / Generation and Corruption, BK n,
Doctrine, BK i, CH 32 633c-d CH 10 [336^5-34] 438d; [337*15-23] 439a*b /
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 8, A i Metaphysics, BK i, CH 2 [983*7-9] 501 b; BK
b
34d-35c; A 2, ANS 35c-36b; A 3, ANS and REP i xn, CH 4 [io7o 22~35] 600b; CH 5 [1071*30-36]
36b-37c; Q 9, A 2, ANS 39c-40d; Q 21, A 4, 601a; CH 6-10 601b-606d
REP 4 126c-127c; QQ 44-46 238a-255d; Q 50, 10 HIPPOCRATES: Sacred Disease, 154a 156a;
A i, ANS 269b-270a; A 3, ANS 272a>273b; Q 56, 160b-d
A 2, ANS and REP 4 292d-294a; Q 57, A 2, ANS 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [146-158]
and REP 2 295d-297a; Q 61 314d-317c; Q 65 2d-3a; BK n [167-183] 17a-b; [1090-1104] 29a;
339a-343c; Q 75, A 6, REP 2 383c-384c; Q 84, BK vi [43-95] 80d-81c; [379-422] 85b-d
A 3, REP 2 443d-444d; QQ 90-93 480c-501c; 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 6 110c-112b;
Q 94, A 3, ANS 504a-505a; Q 104, A i csp REP 4 CH 14 120d-121c
534c-536c; Q 118, AA 2-3 601c-604b; PART 1-11, 16 KEPLER: Harmonies ofthe World, 1049b-1050a
Q 17, A 8, REP 2 692a-c 17 PLOTINUS: Sec&nd Ennead, TR n, CH 2 4la-c /
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xxv [37- Third Enntad, TR II-IH 82c-97b passim; TR vni
78] 91d-92a; PARADISE, vn [121-148] 116b-c; 129-136a / Fifth Ennead, TR i, CH 2 208c-209b
Ib to 7c CHAPTER 8: CAUSE 173
Daniel, 13:1-64 / Bel and Dragon (D) OT, ANS 12c-14a; Q 3, A i, REP i 14b-15b; Q 8, A 3,
Daniel, 13:65-14:42 / I Maccabees, 3:13-26 ANS and REP 2-3 36b-37c; Q 13, A 8, ANS and
(D) OT, / Machabees, 3 13-26 / II Maccabees, REP i 70d-71b; Q 15, A 3, REP 4 93b-94a; Q 19,
6:i-i6-(Z)) OT, // Machabees, 6:1-16 A 3 HOb-lllc; QQ 22-24 127c-143c; Q 63, A 7,
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 6.25-34; 10:29-33; ANS 331c-332b; Q 96, A r, ANS and REP 2 510b-
23.37 / Lu^e, 12:4-7,22-34; 21 112-19 esp 21 :i8 511b; QQ 103-119 528a-608d esp QQ 103-105
/John, 6:22-71 csp 6:40, 6:44-45, 6:64-65 528a-545b; PART i-n, Q 9, A 6 662a-d; Q 10,
(D) John, 6:22-72 esp 6:40, 6:44-45, 6:65-66 A 4 665d-666a,c; Q 19, A 4 705b-c; Q 21, A 4,
/ Acts, 6:8-7.60 csp 7:51; 13:48 (D) Acts, REP 2 719d-720a,c
6:8-7.59 csp 7:51; 13:48 / Romans, 8:28-11:36 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 91,
/ Ephesians, 1:4-2:10; 4:1-7 / Philippians, AA 1-2 208b-209d; Q 93 215b,d-220d passim;
2:12-13 / // Timothy, 1:9 / Hebrews, 13-5-6 PART ii-n, Q i, A 7, ANS 385c-387a; Q 25, A 11,
/ / Peter, 1:1-5 / Revelation, 1 1-15-1 8 (D) REP 3 508d-509c; PART in, Q 61, A i, ANS
Apocalypse, 11:15-18 855a-d
4 HOMER: Iliad, BK VIH [130-144] 52c; BK xxiv 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, vii [61-96]
[522-551] 176d-177a lOb-c; PURGATORY, xvi [52-114] 77b-78a; xxi
5 EURIPIDES- Helen [703-733] 304d-305a [40-72] 85b-d; PARADISE, i
[94-142] 107b-d;
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK in, 112d-113b n [112-148] 109a-b; vm [85-148] 117c-118c;
7 PLATO: Republic, BK n, 321d-322d; BK x,439b xi [28-39] 122b; xn [37-45] 124a; xx [118-138]
/ Critias, 479c 138a
8 ARISTOTLE: Generation and Corruption, BK n, 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK iv, STANZA
CH 10 [336 b 25~34] 438d / Metaphysics, BK xn, 137-154 106b-108b / Knight's Tale [1251-1267]
CH 10 605d-606d 180b; [1303-1333] 181b-182a; [1663-1672]
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK x, CH 8 [1179*23-32] 187b; [2987-3046] 209a-210a / Friar's Tale
434a / Politics, BK vn, CH 4 [1326*29-32] [7064-7085] 281a-b / Franklin's Tale [11,177-
530b-c 206] 353b-354a / Monk's Tale 434a-448b /
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [167-183] Nun's Priest's Tale [15,236-256] 456b-457a
17a-b; [1090-1104] 29a; BK v [146-234] 63a- 23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH xxv, 35a~b
64a; [1161-1240] 76b-77b; BK vi [43-95] 80d- 23 HOB BBS- Leviathan, PART i, 53d; 96b; PART 11,
94 431b-c; SECT 105-109 433b-434b passim; 13:24-26 / Lu%e, 1:5-66; 4:31-5:26; 7:1-16;
SECT 146-155 442a-444c passim 8:22-56; 9:12-17,28-42; 11:14-26; 13:11-17;
35 HUME: Human Understanding* SECT VH, DIV 14:1-6; 17:11-19; 18:35-43 (D) Lu^e, 1:5-66;
54-57 474b-475d; SECT vm, DIV 78-81 485c- 4:31-5:26; 7:1-16; 8:22-56; 9:12-17,28-43;
487a; SECT xi 497b-503c passim, csp DIV 108- 11:14-26; 13:11-17; 14:1-6; 17:11-19; 18:35-43
109 500b-501a / John, 1:14-17; 2:1-11; 4:46-54; 11:1-45 /
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 75c-d Acts, 2:1-22; 3:1-16; 4:33; 5:12-16; 9:36-43;
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, la-2b 14:8-10; 19:11-12; 20:7-12; 28:1-10 (D)Acts,
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK in, 414d; BK 2:1-22; 3:1-16; 4:33; 5:12-16; 936-43; 14:7-
iv, 437d-438b 9; 19:11-12; 20 7-12; 28:1-10 / Romans, 1:3-5;
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 292d-293b 3:19-7.25; ii // Cormthians, 3:1-15; 15:9-10 /
42 KANT: Practical Reason, 334a-335c / Judge- // Corinthians, 4:15; 8-9 passim; 12:1-10 /
ment, 594 d [fn i] Galatians, 5 14 / Ephesians, i :i-i i / Philippians,
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d- 2:12-13; 4-13 / // Thessalomans, 2:16-17 (D)
160b; 161d-168b; 168d-170b; 182d-184d; II Thessalonians, 2:15-16 / II Timothy, 2:1 /
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 19:24-26; 21:1-8 / 37c; Q 12, A 2 51c-52c; AA 4-5 53b-55b; A 13
Exodus, 3-12 passim, esp 3-2, 3:20; 14; 16-17 / 61c-62b; Q 62 317c-325b; Q 89, A i, REP 3
Numbers, 9:15-23; 11-12; 16-17; 20:1-13; 473b-475a; A 2, REP 3 475a-d; A 8, REP 2
21:5-9; 22.21-34 / Joshua, 3:13-4.24; 6'i- 479c-480c; Q 92, A 4, ANS 491b-d; o 95 506b-
20; 10:12-14; 24.6-7 (D) Josue, 3:13-4 25; 510a; Q 104, A 4, ANS 538a-c; Q 105, AA 6-8
6-1-20; 10:12-14; 24:6-7 / Judges, 6:36-40 / 543b-545b; Q 106, A 3, ANS 547c-548b; Q 108,
/ Samuel, 12:17-19 (D) / Kings, 12-17-19 / A 8, ANS and REP 1-2 561a-562a; Q no, A 4
/ Kings, 17; 18:30-39 (D) HI Kings, 17; 567c-568b; Q 113, A i, REP 2 576a-d; Q 114,
18:30-397 II Kings, 1-6; 13:20-21; 20:1-11 A 4 584a-585a; Q 119, A i, ANS 604c-607b;
(D) IV Kings, 1-6; 13.20-21; 20:1-11 / Nehe- PART i-n, Q 5, A 6, REP 2 641a-642a; Q 10, A 4,
miah, 9 (Z>) II Esdras, 9 / Psalms, 78; 84 n; REP 2 665d-666a,c
85:1-3; 86:5; 103:1-5; 105; 1067-11; 130 (D) 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 51,
Psalms, 77; 83:12; 84:2-4; 85:5; 102:1-5; 104; A 4 15a-d; Q 55, A 4, ANS and REP 6 28c-29d;
105:7-11; 129 / Proverbs, 3-1-4,21-26 / Isaiah, Q 58, A 3, REP 3 43b-44a; Q 62, A i 60a-d;
38; 44:22; 557-(Z>) Isaias, 38; 44:22; 55.7 Q 63, A 2, ANS and REP 1-2 64b-65a; Q 65, A 3,
/Jeremiah, 33:1-14 (D) Jeremias, 33:1-14 / ANS 72d-73d; Q 66, A 2, REP i 76c-77c; Q 76,
Daniel, 3:1-4:3; 5-6; 9:9 (Z)) Daniel, 3:1- A 2, REP 2 141d-142c; Q 79, A 3, ANS 158a-d;
23,91-100; 5-6; 9:9 / Joel, 2:30-31 / Jonah Q 81, A 3, REP 3 165d-166b; A 4 166b-167a;
(D) Jonas / Micah, 7:18-20 (D) Micheas, Q 85, A 6, ANS 182d-184a; Q 98, A i, ANS 239b-
7:18-20 / Zechariah, 12:10 (D) Zachanas, 240c; Q 106, A i, ANS and REP 1,3 321a-322a;
12-10 QQ 109-114 338a-378a,c esp Q 113, A 10 369c-
APOCRYPHA: Song of Three Children (D) OT, 370b; PART n-ii, Q 24, A 3, REP i 491a-d; PART
Daniel, 3:24-90 / Bel and Dragon, 28-42 (D) in, QQ 7-8 745c-763b; Q 61, A r, REP 2 855a-d;
OT, Daniel, 14:27-42 / II Maccabees, i -18-22; Q 62 858b-864c; PART in SUPPL, Q 75, A 3 938a-
2:10 (D) OT, UMachabees, 1:18-22; 2:10 939d; Q 83, A 3 978c-980d; Q 92, A i 1025c-
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 8-9; 12:22-29; 1032b
14:13-36; 15:22-39; 17:1-8; 20:29-34 / Marl^ 21 DANTB: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, vn [16-
1:20-34,40-44; 2:3-12; 4:34-41; 5; 6:34-56; 120] 115b-116b; xni [52-87] 126a-b; xx
7:24-8:26; 9:2-10,17-30; 10:46-52; 13:24-26 [79-138] 137c-138a; xxix [58-66] 150d-151a;
^(D) Mar)(, 1:29-34,40-44; 2:3-12; 4:34-40; XXXH [40-87] 155a-c; XXXH [i39]-xxxiii [145]
51 6:34-56"! 7:24-8:26; 9:1-9,16-29; 10:46-52; 156a-157d
176 THE GREAT IDEAS 8
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART in, 307a- 262c-263d; 274a-275a; 281d-282d; 283c-
b; PARI iv, 338b-c; 348d-349a 284a,c; PART in, 300a-301c; PART iv, 337d-
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 219b-220a 342a
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK i, lla- 49 DARWIN- Descent of Man, 323a-b; 327a-328d
b; BK v, 127b-137c passim; BK vii, 171a-177b; 50 MARX- Capital, 7b; 8a-lld passim; 377c-378d
189d-190a 50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 416c-
417a,c; 419b,d-425b passim; 428b-d
}. The operation of causes in the process of
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK ix, 342a-344b;
history BK x, 389a-391c; 430b-432c; 447c-448c; BK
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 21d-22a; BK ix, xi, 469a-472b; BK xin, 563a-575a; BK xiv,
291b-c 588a-590c; 609a-613d; BK xv, 618b-621b;
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK i, 354d- EPILOGUE i, 645a-650c; EPILOGUE n 675a-
355a; BK iv, 462a-b 696d
7 PLATO: Statesman, 587a-589c / Laws, BK in, 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v,
663d-666d; BK iv, 679a-c 127b-137c
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK v 502a-519d passim 54 FREUD: War and Death, 761a-c / Civilization
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [449-482] and Its Discontents, 781a-782d; 787a-788d;
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The consideration of cause in relation to principle and clement, sec ELEMENT a; PRINCIPLE la.
The distinction between necessary and contingent and for the conception of chance
causes,
in relation to cause, see CHANCE xa-ib; NATURE 3c~3c(i); NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY
3a-3c.
The issue concerning determinism in nature or history, see FATE 5-6; HISTORY 43(1);
MECHANICS 4c(i); NATURE 2f, 3c(2).
Other discussions of the controversy concerning causality and free will, and of the problem
of man's freedom in relation to God's will, see FATE 2, 4; HISTORY 43(1); LIBERTY 4a~4b,
53, 5d; WILL 5a(3)~5 a (4)> 5^), 5 C > ?c-
The theory of divine causality in creation, providence, and the performance of miracles, see
ASTRONOMY 8d; GOD 53, 73-76; MATTER 3d; NATURE 3c(4); WORLD 40, 4d^e.
The role of ends or final causes in the order of nature and the structure of the universe, sec
DESIRE i ;GOD 5b; NATURE 3c(3); WORLD ic, 6c; and for the general theory of means and
ends, see GOOD AND EVIL 40, 5c; JUDGMENT 3; PRUDENCE 33, 4b; WILL ac(2)-2c(3).
The discussion of cause as an object of knowledge and
methods and aims of
in relation to the
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Gieat Booty of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups;
For the date,place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas,
I. II.
AQUINAS. Summa Contra Gentiles, BK in, CH 1-16, SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. Outlines of Pyrrhonism, BK HI,
64-83, 88-98 CH 1-20
DESCARTES. The Principles of Philosophy, PART i, 28 Against the Physicists, BK i (Concerning Cause
.
.
ofthe Human Mind,
Lectures on the Philosophy EDDINGTON. The Nature of the Physical World,
VOL i, pp 189-220, VOL ii, pp 128-134 CH 14
COMTE. The Positive Philosophy, INTRO, CH i BK HI, ; McTAGGART. The Nature of Existence, CH 24-26
CH i SANTAYANA. The Realm of Matter, CH 7
W. HAMILTON, lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, M. R. COHEN. Reason and Nature, BK i, CH 4(2) ;
WUNDT. Die Prmzipien der mechanischen Naturlehre PLANCK Where Is Science Going?, CH 4-5
JEVONS. The Principles of Science, CH 1 1 The Philosophy of Physics, CH 2
.
DOMET DE VORGES. Cause cfficiente et cause finale The Analysis of Matter, CH 30-31, 35
.
WATTS. The Reign of Causality Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits,
.
VENN. Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic, CH 2 PART IV, CH 9~IO; PART VI, CH 5~6
Chapter 9: CHANCE
INTRODUCTION
sense in which we use the word The swerve of the atoms, according to Lu-
ONE "chance" does not exclude the operation cretius, accounts for the origin of the world,
of causes. The chance event, in this sense, is the motions of nature, and the free will of man.
not uncaused. But within this meaning of But nothing accounts for the swerve of the
chance, there isthe question oihow the chance atoms. It is uncaused, spontaneous, fortuitous.
event is caused. "When the atoms are being carried downwards
On one view, what happens by chance is dis- straight through the void by their own weight,
tinguished from what happens by nature in they push a little from their path at times quite
terms of a difference in manner of causation undetermined and at undetermined places,
the difference between the contingent and the yet only just so much as you would call a
necessary. On another view, the chance event change of trend. If they did not swerve, all
does not differ causally from that which hap- things would fall downward through the deep
pens regularly or uniformly. The difference lies void like drops of rain, nor could collision come
not in the pattern of causes, but in our knowl- to be, nor blows be brought to pass among the
edge of them. The chance event is unpredict- atoms; thus nature would never have brought
able or less predictable because of our ignorance anything to being."
of its causes, not because of any real contingency Since the atoms differ in shape, size, and
There is still a third sense of "chance" in atoms, falling straight yet more rapidly, would
which it means that which happens totally overtake and hit the lighter atoms, thus bring-
without cause the absolutely spontaneous or ing about their grouping or interlocking. But
this supposition, says Lucretius, is
fortuitous. contrary to
These three meanings of chance at once in- reason. It may hold for things falling through
dicate the basic issues in which the concept is water or thin air, but through the empty void
involved. The third meaning is the most radi- "all things, even of unequal weight, move with
cal. It stands in opposition to the other two. an equal velocity through the unresisting void."
Their opposition to one another can be con- Therefore heavier things will never be able to
sidered after we examine the sense in which fall on the lighter from above nor of themselves
chance excludes every type of cause. bring about the blows sufficient to produce the
varied motions by which nature carries things
THE DOCTRINE OF absolute fortuitousness is on. Wherefore, Lucretius concludes, the atoms
indetermmism in its most extreme form. The "must swerve a little."
familiar phrase, "a fortuitous concourse of Once the atoms have collided, the way in
atoms,'* indicates the classical statement of which they are locked together in the patterns
this doctrine, and identifies it in the great books of composite things, and all the subsequent mo-
with the theory of atomism. It would be more tions of these things, can be accounted for by
precise to say "with Lucretius' version of that reference to the natural properties of the atoms.
theory," because it is with regard to chance The atomic sizes, shapes, and weights determine
that he departs from the teachings of Democ- how they behave singly or in combination. But
ritus and Epicurus, and adds an hypothesis of the swerve of the atoms is not so determined.
his own. It is completely spontaneous.
179
180 THE GREAT IDEAS
"If each motion is
always due to another, and accidents happen. The chance meeting of old
the new always springs from the old in a deter- friends who run across each other in a railroad
mined order, and if the atoms do not by swerv- station after a separation of many years is a
ing break through the decree* of fate, so that coincidence a coinciding of the two quite
cause does not follow cause through infinite separate and independent lines of action which
time"; whence, asks Lucretius, "is it wrested brought each of them to the same station at
from fate, this will whereby we move forward the same time, coming from different places,
where pleasure leads each one of us, and swerve going to different places, and proceeding un-
likewise in our motions, neither at a fixed time der the influence of different causes or pur-
nor at a fixed place, but only when and where poses. That each is there can be explained by
the mind itself has prompted us?" The answer the operation of causes. That both are there
he gives is that there must be "in the atoms . . .
together cannot be explained by the causes
another cause of motion besides blows and determining their independent paths.
weights, whence comes this power born in us, So understood, the chance event exemplifies
since we see that nothing can come to be from what Aquinas calls a "clashing of two causes."
nothing." And what makes it a matter of chance is the
fact that "the clashing of these two causes, in-
BEING ABSOLUTELY fortuitous, the swerve of asmuch as it is accidental, has no cause." Pre-
the atoms is absolutely unintelligible. There is cisely because it is accidental, "this clashing of
no answer to the question why they chance to causes not to be reduced to a further pre-ex-
is
swerve at undetermined times and places. This isting cause from which it follows of necessity."
unintelhgibility may not, however, make the The illustration is not affected by considera-
fortuitous either unreal or impossible. It can tions of free will. Whether men have free will
be argued that chance may exist even though, or not, whether free acts are caused or are, as
for our limited understanding, it remains mys- Kant suggests, uncaused and spontaneous, the
terious. event we call a "chance meeting" remains acci-
The same problem of intelligibility arises dental or, more precisely, a coincidence. What-
with respect to that meaning of chance wherein ever the factors are which control the motions
it is identified with coincidence or contingency. of each man, they operate entirely within that
Here, as in the case of the absolutely fortuitous, single man's line of action. Prior to the meeting,
chance belongs to reality or nature. "Some they do not influence the other man's conduct.
things always come to pass in the same way, and Ifwe could state the cause for the coincidence
others for the most part," writes Aristotle as an of the two lines of motion, it would have to be
observer of nature, but there is also "a third some factor which influenced both lines. Were
class of events besides these two events which there such a cause and were it known to us, we
"
all say are 'by chance.' Things of this last could not say that the meeting happened by
kind, he goes on to say, are those which "come chance. It would still be a coincidence in the
to pass incidentally" or accidentally. merely physical sense of coming together, but
According to this theory, a real or objective itwould not be a coincidence causally.
indeterminism exists. Chance or contingency is That free will is irrelevant to this meaning of
not just an expression of human uncertainty chance can be seen from the fact that the col-
born of insufficient knowledge. Contingency, lision of particles which produces atomic fission
a product of causes, not their total absence. dental meeting of friends. Causes control the
Of the contingent event, "there is no definite speeds and directions of the colliding particles,
cause," in Aristotle's opinion, but there is "a but no cause determines their collision > or, in
chance cause, />., an indefinite one." other words, there is no cause for the coinci-
In the chance happening, two lines of action dence of two separate lines of causation. Con-
coincide and thereby produce a single result. temporary physics affirms a real or objective
This is our ordinary understanding of the way indeterminism insofar as it does not merely say
CHAPTER 9: CHANCE 181
that the cause of the coincidence is unknown A world in which chance really exists is re-
to us, but rather holds that no such cause exists markably different from a world in which neces-
to be known. sity prevails, in which everything is determined
by causes and there are no uncaused coinci-
THE CONCEPTION OF THE chance event as an dences. William James vividly epitomizes their
uncaused coincidence of causes is an ancient as difference by calling the world of absolute ne-
well as a modern doctrine. In his Physics^ Aris- cessity or determinism the world of Spinoza
between what happens by
totle distinguishes or Hegel a "block universe" in contrast to
nature and what happens by chance in terms of what he describes as a "concatenated universe.**
different types of causality. "Chance," he Voltaire before him, in his Philosophical Dic-
writes, is "reckoned among causes; many things tionary, had used the phrase "the concatenation
are said both to be and to come to be as a result of events" to express the meaning of chance.
of chance." But the fact that its effects cannot The phrase evokes the right image, the pic-
be "identified with any of the things that come ture of a world in which many concurrent lines
to pass by necessity and always, or for the most of causality, exercising no influence upon one
long to the class of the indefinite, and to be in- only "with reference to a deficiency in our
scrutable toman." Though he distinguishes be- knowledge. For if we do not know that the es-
tween spontaneity and chance, he says that both sence of a thing involves a contradiction, or if
"are causes of effects which, though they might we actually know that it involves no contra-
result from intelligence or nature, have in fact diction,and nevertheless we can affirm nothing
been caused by something incidentally." with certainty about its existence because the
What happens by nature happens regularly, order of causes is concealed from us, that thing
or for the most part, through causal necessity. can never appear to us either as necessary or
This necessity results from the operation of es- impossible, and therefore we call it either con-
sential causes, causes in the very nature of the tingent or possible." Hence, for Spinoza, con-
moving When
the regularity fails, it is
things. tingency or chance is illusory rather than real
due to the intervention of some accidental a projection of the mind's ignorance or of its
chapter on CAUSE, an accidental as opposed to chapters onFATE and NECESSITY AND CON-
an essential cause is, in Aristotle's theory, one TINGENCY inevitably raises theological ques-
which does not by itself'produce the given effect. tions. Just as the theologian must reconcile
It does so only through the conjunction of other man's free will with God's predestination, so
causes. But since it does not determine these must he, if he accepts its reality, also reconcile
other causes to operate, the effect contingent chance with divine providence, apart from
on their combined activity is
produced by which nothing can happen either necessarily
chance, that by the contingency of several
is, or contingently.
incidental causes working coincidentally. For Augustine it would seem that divine
182 THE GREAT IDEAS
providence leaves no room for chance among nature where no natural causes determine the
natural things. After noting that causes are coincidence, while not real at least not in the
sometimes divided into a "fortuitous cause, a same sensefor God ? Or does the statement
natural cause, and a voluntary cause/' he dis- that what "divine providence plans to happen
misses "those causes which are called fortui- contingently, happens contingently" mean that
tous" by saying that they "are not a mere name chance remains a real feature of the universe
for the absence of causes, but are only latent, even for God ?
and we attribute them either to the will of the One
thing is clear. In one sense of the word,
true God, or to that of spirits of some kind or the Christian theologians completely deny
other/' chance. If "chance" means something which
In certain places Aquinas seems to talk in God does not foresee, something unplanned
much the same fashion though chance
as by His providence, then according to their
existed only for our limited intellects and not faith nothing happens by chance. It is in this
for God. "Nothing," he declares, "hinders sense also that what happens by chance is
certain things from happening by luck or opposed to what happens on purpose, or has a
chance, if compared to their proximate causes; final as well as an efficient cause. As the chapter
but not compared to divine providence, ac-
if on CAUSE indicates, those who deny final causes
cording to which 'nothing happens at random in nature sometimes use the word "chance" to
in the world/ as Augustine says." The example signify not lack of cause, nor even contingency,
he uses to illustrate his point is that of two serv- but only the blindness of causality working
ants who have been sent by their master to the to no end.
same place: "the meeting of the two servants, The controversy discussed in the chapter on
although to them it appears a chance circum- WORLD between those who see in the struc-
stance, has been fully foreseen by their master, ture of the universe the grand design of a di-
who has purposely sent them to meet at one vine plan and those who attribute whatever
place, in such a way that one has no knowledge order there is in nature to blind chance further
of the other." In such a way also "all things indicates the sense in which theologians like Au-
must of necessity come under God's ordering," gustine Aquinas deny chance. But if
and
from which it follows that God directly causes "chance" means no more than contingency, then
the action of even accidental causes, and their to affirm chance excludes, not providence, but
coincidence* The chance event would then be of "fate" according to
fate, at least that sense
contingently .... To some effects He has at- nas that "the mode both of necessity and con-
tached unfailing necessary causes, from which tingency falls under the foresight of God."
the effects follow necessarily; but to other
defectiblc and contingent causes, from which THE THEORY OF chance has obvious bearings on
effects arise contingently." For some minds the theory of knowledge, especially with regard
this may only deepen the mystery rather than to the distinction between knowledge and opin-
solve it. At least it leaves many questions un- ion and between certainty and probability.
answered. On any view of chance whether it is real or
Docs Aquinas mean that a coincidence of illusory 'iyhen men call a future event con-
causes is not itself uncaused ? Does he mean that tingent they mean that they cannot predict it
God causes the concatenation of events, and with certitude. So far as human prediction goes,
that a sufficient reason for every contingency it makes no difference whether the future event
exists in God's will? If so, is chance an illusion, is necessarily determined and we lack adequate
a function of our ignorance of divine provi- knowledge of its causes, or the event has a gen-
dence? May chance be quite real on the level of uine indeterminacy in the way it is caused or
CHAPTER 9: CHANCE 183
uncaused. Regardless of what the objective comparison. To the question "whether our
situation is, the assurance with which we pre- intellect can know contingent things," he re-
dict anything reflects the state of our knowl- plies that "the contingent, considered as such>
probability which men attach to their state- sider knowable things in their universal prin-
ments measure the inadequacy of their knowl- ciples, then all science is of necessary things.
edge and the consequent uncertainty of their But if we consider the things themselves, thus
opinions about matters which cannot be known some sciences are of necessary things, some of
but only guessed. Holding different theories contingent things."
of the distinction between knowledge and Among the sciences of contingent things,
opinion, both Plato and Aristotle exclude the Aquinas includes not only "the sciences of na-
accidental and the contingent, along with the ture" but also "the moral sciences," because the
particular, from the objects of science. Since in latter, dealing with human action, must reach
their view certitude belongs to the essence of down to contingent particulars. In the sphere
science or of knowledge as contrasted with of morals as of nature, certainty can be achieved
opinion science for them deals not only with only on the level of universal principles. De-
the universal but with the necessary. liberation about particular acts to be done
In the Republic Socrates assigns opinion to moves on the level of probable opinion. In con-
the realm of becoming the realm of changing trast to the moral scientist, the man of action
and contingent particulars. Unlike Plato, Aris- must weigh chances and make decisions with
totle does not restrict knowledge to the realm of regard to future contingencies. It would be as
eternal and immutable being, but he does in- foolish, Aristotle says, to expect the certitude
sist that physics, as a science of changing things, of scientific demonstration from an orator or a
preserve the certitude of science by concerning judge, as "to accept probable reasoning from a
itself only with the essential and the necessary. mathematician."
"That a science of the accidental is not even
possible," he writes, "will be evident if we try IT is NOT SURPRISING that the modern theory of
to see what the accidental really is." It is a mat- probability or, as it was later called
by Boole,
ter of chance that cold weather occurs during the Venn, and others, the "logic of chance"
dog-days, for "this occurs neither always and should have its
origin in the sphere of practical
of necessity, nor for the most part, though it problems. Pascal's correspondence with Fermat
might happen sometimes. The accidental, then, illustrates the early mathematical speculations
is what occurs, but not always nor of necessity, concerning formulae for predicting the out-
nor for the most part. Now ... it is obvious come in games of pure chance. For Pascal the
why there is no science of such a thing." logic of chance also has moral implications. If
disagrees with Aristotle and
Though he we are willing to risk money at the gaming
Aquinas about the reality of chance or con- table on the basis of calculated probabilities,
tingency, Spinoza agrees with them that knowl- how much more willing should we be to act
edgeat least adequate knowledge has the decisively in the face of life's uncertainties,
necessary for its object. Of individual things, even to risking life itself on the chance of eternal
he says,"we can have no adequate knowledge salvation.
. . . and this is what is to be understood by us as When we act "on an uncertainty, we act
their contingency." To be true to itself and to reasonably," Pascal writes, "for we ought to
the nature of things, reason must "perceive work for an uncertainty according to the doc-
things truly, that is to say, as they are in them- trine of chance." If the chance of there being
selves, that is to say, not as contingent but as an after-life is
equal to the chance of there
necessary." being none if the equiprobability reflects our
The position of Aquinas is worth stating for equal ignorance of either alternative then,
184 THE GREAT IDEAS
Pascal argues, we ought to wager in favor of Hume asserts, "is the same with the probability
immortality and act accordingly. "There is of causes, as with that of chance."
here the infinity of an infinitely happy life to Since Hume's day, the theory of probability
gain, a chance to gam against a finite number of has become an essential ingredient of empirical
chances of loss, and what you stake is finite." science. The development of thermodynamics
Like Pascal, Hume thinks that we must be in the I9th century would have been impossible
content with probability as a basis for action. without it. This is also true of the quantum
"The great subverter of Pyrrhonism or the ex- mechanics and atomic physics of our own time.
cessive principles of skepticism," he writes, "is But of chance, the theory of
like the doctrine
action, and employment, and the occupations probability tends in one of two directions:
of common life." But unlike the ancients, either toward the subjective view that proba-
Hume also thinks we should be content with bility is only a quality of our judgments, meas-
probabilities in the sphere of the natural sci- uring the degree of our ignorance of the real
ences. Certitude is attainable only by the causes which leave nothing in nature unde-
mathematician who deals with the relations be- termined; or toward the objective view that
tween ideas. Since the natural sciences deal there is genuine indetermmism in nature and
with matters of fact or real existence, and since that mathematical calculations of probability
to things we must rely entirely upon
know such estimate the real chance of an event's occurring.
our experience of cause and effect, we cannot
reach better than probable conclusions. THE ELEMENT OF chance also has a bearing on
The scientist, according to Hume, "weighs the general theory of art. The hypothesis of the
opposite experiments. He considers which side melody which a kitten might compose by walk-
is
supported by the greater number of experi- ing on the keyboard, is obviously intended to
ments; to that side he inclines, with doubt and contrast a product of chance with a work of
hesitation; and when at last he fixes his judg- art. The competent musician knows with
ment, the evidence exceeds not what we prop- certainty that he can do what the meandering
erly call probability. All probability, then, sup- kitten has only one chance in many millions
denies the existence of chance or contingency cerning the sick would have been directed
in the order of nature. Chance is entirely sub- by chance." On the same principle, Galen dis-
jective. It is identical with the probability of tinguishes the physician from the empiric, who,
our opinions. In the throw of dice, the mind, he "without knowing the cause," pretends that he
says, "considers the turning up of each particu- is "able to rectify the failures of function."
sonably, that it was due to the force of chance, goods with goods of fortune the goods which,
which always to be allowed for in the order of
is unlike knowledge and virtue, we cannot ob-
things." Thus, Augustine says later, "I saw it tain merely by the exercise of our will and
as obvious that such things as happened to be faculties. Considering the elements of happi-
said truly from the casting of horoscopes were ness,Aquinas groups together wealth, honor,
true not by skill but by chance; and such things fame, and power as goods of the same sort be-
as were false were not due to want of skill m the cause they are "due to external causes and in
art but merely that luck had fallen the other most cases to fortune."
way." The goods of fortune, as well as its ills, con-
Neither art itself, nor skill in its practice, sist in things beyond man's power to command
can ever be perfect enough to remove chance and, in consequence, to deserve. Recognizing
entirely, for the artist deals with particulars. the unpredictable operation of fortune, Epicte-
Yet the measure of an art is the certainty which tus, the Stoic, argues that "we must make the
have as directions for achieving the de-
its rules best of those things that are in our power, and
sired result; and the skill of the artist is meas- take the rest as nature gives it." have "the We
ured by the extent to which he succeeds by power to deal rightly with our own impres-
rule and judgment rather than by chance. sions." Hence the Stoics advise us to control our
When Aristotle quotes Agathon's remark that reactions to things even though we cannot con-
"art loves chance and chance loves art," he ex- trol the things themselves. Yet men will always
plains its sense to be that "chance and art are ask, as Hamlet does, "Whether 'tis nobler in
concerned with the same objects" that which the mind to suffer the slings and arrows of out-
docs not come to be by nature nor from neces- rageous fortune, or to take arms against a sea of
sity. Hence art sometimes fails, either from un- troubles, and by opposing end them?"
controllable contingencies or from insufficient The fact that the goods and ills of fortune arc
knowledge of causes. "All causes," says Hume, beyond our power to control raises the fur-
"are not conjoined to their usual effects with ther question of man's responsibility regarding
like uniformity. An artificer, who handles only them. We can hardly be held responsible for
dead matter, may be disappointed of his aim, as everything that happens to us, but only for
well as the politician, who directs the conduct those things which are subject to our will.
of sensible and intelligent agents." This traditional moral distinction between the
good or evil which befalls us by fortune and
IN THE REALM OF human affairs in morals, that which we willfully obtain or accomplish,
it.Such advice can be followed because, in his foran explanation of those small events which
opinion, "Fortune is the arbiter of one half of made these people what they were, but it will
our actions, but still leaves us to direct the be clear that all those small events were inevi-
other or perhaps a little less."
half, table."
succeed in calculating the composition of forces tune, now courting fortune in his struggle
involved in the mass movements of men, "we against fate. t
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1 . The conception of chance 1
87
la. Chance as the coincidence of causes
3. Chance, necessity, and design or purpose in the origin and structure of the world 189
4.
Cause and chance in relation to knowledge and opinion: the theory of probability
5.
The control of chance or contingency by art
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which arc the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER- Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES -Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and Tower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the mam divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES- The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS. The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style, for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
396d-398b; PART iv, PREF 422b,d-424a; DEP 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR n, CH 1-2 82c-
3-4 424*; APPENDIX, vi 447c-d; PART v, PROP 83d; TR HI, CH 2 93d / Fourth Ennead, TR in,
6, DBMONST 454a CH 6 i50c-d
1
3/o 5 CHAPTER 9: CHANCE 189
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other discussions of the issue of determinism and chance, see FATE 3, 5-6; HISTORY 43(1);
NATURE 30-30(1); NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 33-30; and for the relation of chance to
free will, sec LIBERTY 43; WILL 53(3), 50.
The general theory of cause and its bearing on the concept of chance, see CAUSE i-ib, ^d~6;
NATURE 30(3).
The theological problems of chance in relation to fate, providence, and predestination, see
CAUSE 70-70; FATE 4; GOD 70.
Other discussions of the theory of probability, see JUDGMENT 6c; KNOWLEDGE 4b, 6d(i)-
6d(3); NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 43; OPINION i, 3b; SCIENCE 46; TRUTH 4d.
Discussions bearing on the rektion of art to chance, see ART i, 2a; and for the role of chance
in the sphere of prudence, see PRUDENCE 43-4^ 53.
The theory of the goods of fortune, see GOOD AND EVIL 4d; HAPPINESS 2b(i); VIRTUE AND
VICE 6~c; WEALTH loa.
192 THE GREAT IDEAS
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booths ofthe Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
the pre-Socratic physicists and the natura from which "nature" comes. In, their
FROM
ancient philosophers Darwin, Marx, and
to original significance, both words had reference
James and, in our own day, Dewey and White- to the sensible world of changing things, or to
head the fact of change has been a major focus its underlying principle- to the ultimate source
of speculative and scientific inquiry. of change. The physics of the philosopher and
Except by Parmenides and his school, the the physics of the empirical scientist are alike
existence of change has never been denied. Nor inquiries concerning the nature of things, not in
can it be without rejecting all sense-perception every respect but in regard to their change and
as illusory, which is precisely what Zeno's para- motion. The conclusions of both inqumes have
doxes seem to do, according to one interpreta- metaphysical implications for the nature of the
tion of them. But if argument cannot refute physical world and for the character of physi-
the testimony of the senses, neither can reason- cal existence.
ing support it. The fact of change, because it The philosopher draws these implications for
is evident to the senses, does not need proof. being from the study of becoming. The scien-
That change is, is evident, but what change is, tist,in turn, draws upon philosophical dis-
isneither evident nor easy to define. What prin- tinctions in order to define the objects of his
ciples or factors are common to every sort of study. Galileo, for example, in separating the
change, how change or becoming is related to problem of freely falling bodies from the
permanence or being, what sort of existence be- motion of projectiles, employs the traditional
longs to mutable things and to change itself philosophical distinction between natural and
these are questions to which answers are not violent motion. The
analysis of time and space
obtainable merely by observation. Nor will (basic variables inNewtonian mechanics), the
simple observation, without the aid of experi- distinction between discontinuous and contin-
ment, measurement, and mathematical calcu- uous change, and the problem of the divisibility
lation, discover the laws and properties of mo- of a continuous motion these are philosoph-
tion. ical considerations pre-supposed by the scien-
The
analysis of change or motion has been a tific measurement of motion.
problem for the philosophers of nature. They
have been concerned with the definition of WE HAVE so FAR used the words "change" and
change, its relation to being, the classification "motion," as well as "becoming," as if all three
of the kinds of change. The measurement of were interchangeable in meaning. That is
motion, on the other hand, and the mathemat- somewhat inaccurate, even for the ancients
ical formulation of its laws have occupied the who regarded all kinds of change except one
experimental natural scientists. Both natural as motions; it is much less accurate for the
philosophy and natural science share a common moderns who have tended to restrict the mean-
subject matter, though they approach it by dif- ing of "motion" to local motion or change of
ferent methods and with different interests. place. It is necessary, therefore, to examine
Both are entitled to use the name "physics" briefly the kinds of change and to indicate the
for their subject matter. problems which arise with these distinctions.
The Greek word phiisis from which "phys- In his physical treatises, Aristotle distin-
ics" comes has, as its Latin equivalent, the word guishes four kinds of change. "When the change
193
194 THE GREAT IDEAS
from contrary to contrary is in quantity" he which transformation and the
undergoes
writes, "it is
'growth and diminution'; when starting-point and goal of motion. "Every mo-
it is in
place, it is 'motion'; when it is ... #i tion," he says, "proceeds from something and
"generation" and "corruption," "becom- is in motion, the second is that which to which
ing" and "perishing" to name the last kind of the motion proceeds, and the third is that from
change. which it
proceeds."
Of the four kinds of change, only the last is In the alteration which occurs when the
not called "motion." But in the context of wood changes quality, just as in the increase
saying that "becoming cannot be a motion," or decrease which occurs with a body's change
Aristotle also remarks that "every motion is a in quantity and in the local motion which
kind of change." He does not restrict the mean- occurs with a body's change of place, that which
ing of motion to change in place, which is usu- changes persists throughout the change as the
'allycalled "local motion" or "locomotion." same kind of substance. The wood does not
There according to Aristotle's vocab-
are, then, cease to be wood when it becomes hot or cold;
ulary, three kinds of motion: (i) local motion, the stone does not cease to be a stone when it
in which bodies change from place to place; rolls from here to there, or the organism an
(2) alteration or qualitative motion, in which animal of a certain kind when it grows in size.
bodies change with respect to such attributes In all these cases, "the substratum" that
as color, texture, or temperature; (3) increase which is the subject of change "persists and
and decrease, or quantitative motion, in which changes in its own
properties. The body, . . .
bodies change in size. And, in addition, there although persisting as the same body, is now
is the one kind of change which is not motion healthy and now ill; and the bronze is now
generation and corruption. This consists in the spherical and at another time angular, and yet
coming to be or passing away of a body which, remains the same bronze."
while it has being, exists as an individual sub- Because the substance of the changing thing
stance of a certain sort. remains the same while changing in its proper-
Becoming and perishing are most readily ex- ties i.e., in such attributes or accidents as
emplified by the birth and death of living quality, quantity, and placeAristotle groups
things, but Aristotle also includes the transfor- the three kinds of motion together as accidental
mation of water into ice or vapor as examples of change. The changing thing does not come to be
generation and corruption. One distinctive or pass away absolutely, but only in a certain
characteristic of generation and corruption, respect. In contrast, generation and corruption
in Aristotle's conception of this type of change, involve a change in the very substance of a
is their instantaneity. He thinks that the other thing. "When nothing perceptible persists in
three kinds of change are continuous processes, its identity as a substratum,and the thing
taking time, whereas things come into being changes as a whole," then, according to Aris-
or pass away instantaneously. Aristotle thus totle, "it is a coming-to-be of one substance,
applies the word "motion" only to the con- and the passing-away of another."
tinuous changes which time can measure. He In such becoming or perishing, it is matter
never says that time is the measure of change, itself rather than a body or a substance which
but only of motion. is transformed. Matter takes on or loses the
But the contrast between the one mode of form of a certain kind of substance. For exam-
change which is not motion and the three kinds ple, when the nutriment
is assimilated to the
of motion involves more than this difference form of a living body, the bread or corn be-
with regard to time and continuity. Aristotle's comes the flesh and blood of a man. When an
analysis considers the subject of change that animal dies, its body decomposes into the ele*
CHAPTER 10: CHANGE 195
mcnts of inorganic matter. Because it is a mode of change which is local motion? Even
change of substance itself, Aristotle calls the supposing that the kinds of change* are not re-
one kind of change which is not motion sub- ducible to one another, is local motion pri-
and speaks of it as "a coming* to-
stantial change, mary in the sense that it is involved in all the
be or passing-away simply"~-that is, not in a others ?
certain respect, but absolutely or "without When mechanics dominates the physical
qualification."
sciences (as has been so largely the case in
These distinctions are involved in a long modern times), there is a tendency to reduce all
and controversy. They
tradition of discussion the observable diversity of change to various
cannot be affirmed or denied without opposite appearances of local motion. Newton, for ex-
sides being taken on the fundamental issues ample, explicitly expresses this desire to formu-
concerning substance and accident, matter and late all naturalphenomena in terms of the
form, and the causes of change or motion. The mechanics of moving particles. In the Preface
adoption or rejection of these distinctions af- to the first edition of his Mathematical Princi-
fects one's view of the difference between inor- ples, afterrecounting his success in dealing with
celestial phenomena, he says, "I wish we could
ganic and organic change, and the difference
between the motions of matter and the changes derive the rest of the phenomena of Nature by
which take place in mind. The statement of the same kind of reasoning from mechanical
certain problems is determined accordingly; principles, for I am induced by many reasons
as, for example, the problem of the transmu- to suspect that they may all depend upon cer-
tation of the elements, which persists in various tain forces by which the particles of bodies, by
forms from the physics of the ancients through some causes hitherto unknown, are either mu-
mediaeval alchemy and the beginnings of tually impelled towards one another, and co-
modern chemistry to present considerations here in regular figures, or are repelled and re-
of radioactivity and atomic fission. cede from one another."
The notion that all change can be reduced to
SINCE THE lyTH CENTURY, motion has been the results of local motion is not, however, of
identified with local motion. "1 can conceive modern origin. Lucretius expounds the theory
no other kind" of motion, Descartes writes, of the Greek atomists that all the phenomena
"and do not consider that we ought to conceive of change can be explained by reference to the
any other in nature." As it is expressed "in com- local motion of indivisible particles coming to-
mon parlance," motion, he says, "is nothing gether and separating. Change of place is the
more than the action by which any body passes only change which occurs on the level of the
from one place to another" ultimate physical reality. The atoms neither
This can hardly be taken to mean that come to be nor pass away, nor change in quality
change of place is the only observable type of or size.
change. That other kinds of change are ob- But though we find the notion in ancient
servable cannot be denied. The science of atomism, only in modern physics that the
it is
mechanics or dynamics may be primarily or ex- emphasis upon local motion tends to exclude all
clusively concerned with local motions, but other kinds of change. It is characteristic of
other branches of natural science, certainly what James calls "the modern mechanico-
chemistry, deal with qualitative transforma- physical philosophy" to begin "by saying that
tions; and the biological sciences study growth the only facts are collocations and morions of
and decay, birth and death. primordial solids, and the only laws the changes
1
The emphasis on local motion as the only of motion which changes in collocation bring/
kind of motion, while it does not exclude ap- James quotes Helmholtz to the effect that "the
parent changes of other sorts, does raise a ques- ultimate goal of theoretic physics is to find the
tion about their reality. The question can be last unchanging causes of the processes of Na-
put in several ways. Are the various apparently ture." If, to this end, "we imagine the world
different kinds ofchange really distinct, or can composed of elements with unalterable quali-
they all be reduced to aspects of one underlying ties," then, Helmholtz continues, "the only
196 THE GREAT IDEAS
changes that can remain in such a world are is it an unconnected fact that the analytical
spatial changes, />., movements, and the only geometry prepares the way for the differential
outer relations which can modify the action of calculus that is, needed to measure variable mo-
the forces arc spatial too, or, in other words, the tions, their velocities, and their accelerations.
In the history of physics, Aristotle represents fundamental issues in the philosophy of nature.
the opposite view. No one of the four kinds of Does motion involve a transition from poten-
change which he distinguishes has for him actual existence, or only the substitution
tial to
greater physical reality than the others. Just as of one actual state for another only a "trans-
quality cannot be reduced to quantity, or cither portation," as Descartes says, from one place to
of these to place, so in his judgment the mo- another?
tions associated with these terms arc irreducible While motion is going on, the moving thing,
to one another. Yet Aristotle does assign to lo- according to Aristotle's definition, must be
cal motion a certain primacy. "Motion in its partly potential and partly actual in the same
most general and primary sense," he writes, "is respect. The leaf turning red, while it is altering^
change of place, which we call locomotion." He has not yet fully reddened. When it becomes
does not mean merely that this is the primary as red as it can get, it can no longer change in
sense of the word, but rather that no other that respect. Before it
began to change, it was
kind of motion can occur without local motion actually green; and^since it could become red,
being somehow involved in the process. Show- it was potentially red. But while the change is
becoming of any sort had both less reality and The Aristotelian definition of motion is the
less intelligibility than being. object of much ridicule in the iyth century.
Aristotle had defined motion as the actuality Repeating the phrasing which had become tra-
to what Descartes calls its strict as opposed to potential" Descartes asks: "Now who under-
its
popular meaning, motion is "the transfer- stands these words ? And who at the same time
ence of one part of matter or one body from does not know what motion is? Will not every-
1
the vicinity of those bodies that are in immedi- one admit that those philosophers have been
ate contact with it, and which we regard as in trying to find a knot in a bulrush?" Locke also
repose, into the vicinity of others." This defi- finds it
meaningless. "What more exquisite
nitioncontrasted with the Aristotelian con- jargon could the wit of man invent than this
ception which it generally supersedes in the definition . . . which would puzzle any rational
subsequent tradition of natural science is as man to whom U was not already known by its
revolutionary as the Cartesian analytical geom- famous absurdity, to guess what word it could
etry is
by comparison with the Euclidean. Nor ever be supposed to be the explication of. If
CHAPTER 10: CHANGE 197
Tully, asking a Dutchman what beweegmgc stated by Newton as the first of his "axioms or
was," Locke continues, "should have received laws of motion." "Every body," he writes,
this explication in his own language, that it "continues in its state of rest, or of uniform
was actus quatcnus in potential
entts in potcntia motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to
I ask whether any one can imagine he could change that state by forces impressed upon it."
thereby have guessed what the word beweeginge As applied to the motion of projectiles, the
signified?" law declares that they "continue in their mo-
Locke does not seem to be satisfied with any tions, so far as they are not retarded by the re-
definition of motion. "The atomists, who define sistance of air, or impelled downwards by the
motion to be 'a passage from one place to an- force of gravity."
other/ what do they more than put one synon- In his experimental reasoning concerning the
ymous word for another? For what is passage acceleration of bodies moving down inclined
other than motion ? . . . Nor will 'the successive planes, Galileo argues that a body which has
application of the superficies of one body to achieved a certain velocity on the descent
those of another,' which the Cartesians give us, would, if it then proceeded along a horizontal
prove a much better definition of motion, when plane, continue infinitely at the same velocity
well examined." But though Locke rejects the except for the retardation of air resistance
definition of the atomists and the Cartesians and friction. "Any velocity once imparted to a
on formal grounds, he accepts their idea of moving body," he maintains, "will be rigidly
motion as simply change of place; whereas he maintained as long as the external causes of ac-
dismisses the Aristotelian definition as sheer celeration or retardation are removed." So in
absurdity and rejects the idea that motion or the case of projectiles, they would retain the
change necessarily involves a potentiality capa- velocity and direction imparted to them by the
ble of progressive fulfillment. cannon, were it not for the factors of gravity
As we have already remarked, the omission and air resistance. Bodies actually in motion
of potentiality from the conception of motion possess their motionin themselves as a complete
is a theoretical shift of the deepest significance. actuality. They need no causes acting on them
It occurs not only in Descartes' Principles of to keep them in motion, but only to change
Philosophy and in the atomism of Hobbes and their direction or bring them to rest.
Gassendi, but also in the mechanics of Galileo The motion of projectiles presents a difficulty
and Newton. According to these modern philos- for the theory which describes all motion as a
ophers and scientists, a moving body is always reduction of potency to act. "If everything that
actually somewhere. It occupies a different isin motion, with the exception of things that
place at every moment in a continuous motion. move themselves, is moved by something else,
The motion can be described as the successive how is it," Aristotle asks, "that some things,
occupation by the body of different places at e.g., things thrown, continue to be in motion
different times. Though all the parts of the mo- when their movent is no longer in contact with
tion do not coexist, the moving particle is com- them ?" This is a problem for Aristotle precisely
pletely actual throughout. It loses no reality because he supposes that the moving cause
and gains none in the course of the motion, must act on the thing being moved throughout
since the various positions the body occupies the period of the motion. For the potentiality
lie totally outside its material nature. It would, to be progressively reduced to actuality, it
quires a mover; or even that a body cannot sus- changing. Change takes place through, not j,
tain itself in motion beyond a point propor- them. As constituents of the changing thing,
tionate to the quantity of the impressed force they are the principles of its mutable being,
which originally set it in motion. principles of its being as well as of its
being
mutable.
FOR THE ANCIENTS, the basic contrast between The explanation of change by reference to
being and becoming (or between the permanent what does not change seems to be common to
and the changing) is a contrast between the in- all theories of becoming. Lucretius, as we have
telligible and the sensible. This is most sharply already seen, explains the coming to be and
expressed in Plato's distinction between the passing away of all other things by the motions
sensible realm of material things and the intel- of atoms which neither come to be nor pass
ligible realm of ideas. "What is that which al- away. The eternity of the atoms underlies the
ways is and has no becoming," Timaeus asks; mutability of everything else.
"and what is that which is always becoming Yet the atoms are not completely immutable.
and never is?" He answers his own question by They move forever through the void which,
saying that "that which is apprehended by in- according to Lucretius, is required for their
telligence and reason is always in the same state; motion. Their local motion is, moreover, an
but that which is conceived by opinion with actual property of the atoms. For them, to be
the help of sensations and without reason, is al- is to be tn motion. Here then, as in the Cartesian
ways in a process of becoming and perishing, theory, no potentiality is involved, and motion
and never really is." is
completely real and completely intelligible.
Even though Aristotle differs from Plato in
thinking that change and the changing can be THE NOTIONS OF time and eternity are insep-
objects of scientific knowledge, he, too, holds arable from the theory of change or motion. As
becoming to be less intelligible than being, pre- the chapters on TIME and SPACE indicate, local
cisely because change necessarily involves po- motion involves the dimensions of space as well
tentiality. Yet becoming can be understood to as time, but change requires time, and time
all
the extent that we can discover the principles itself is inconceivable apart from change or mo-
of being the unchanging principles of
its tion. Furthermore, as appears in the chapters
change. "In pursuing the truth," Aristotle re- on TIME and ETERNITY, the two fundamentally
marksand this applies to the truth about opposed meanings of eternity differ according to
change as well as everything else "one must whether they imply endless change or absolute
start from the things that are always in the changelessness.
same state and suffer no change." Eternity is sometimes identified with infinite
place. The same principles arc sometimes stated ance. The other sense of the eternal is also im-
to be (i) matter, (2) form, and (3) privation; pliedthe sense in which eternity belongs to
the matter or substratum being that which the realm of immutable being. The eternal in
both lacks a certain form and has a definite po- this sense, as Montaigne points out, is not mere-
tentiality for possessing it. Change occurs when ly that "which never had beginning nor never
CHAPTER 10: CHANGE 199
11
shall have ending, but rather that "to which who affirm, as an article of their religious faith,
1
time can bring no mutation.* that "in the beginning God created heaven and
There are two great problems which use the earth." The world's motions, like its existence,
word "eternity" in these opposite senses. One have a beginning in the act of creation. Crea-
isthe problem of the eternity of motion: the tion itself, Aquinas insists, is not change or mo-
question whether motion has or can have either tion of any sort, "except according to our way
a beginning or an end. The other is the prob- of understanding. For change means that the
lem of the existence of eternal objects im- same thing should be different now from what
mutable things which have their being apart itwas previously. . But in creation, by which
. .
from time and change. the whole substance of a thing is produced, the
The two problems are connected in ancient same thing can be taken as different now and
thought. Aristotle, for example, argues that "it before, only according to our way of under-
is impossible that movement should either have standing, so that a thing is understood as first
come into being or cease to be, for it must al- not existing at all, and afterwards as existing."
ways have existed." Since "nothing is moved Since creation is an absolute coming to be from
atrandom, but there must always be something non-being, no pre-existent matter is acted upon
present to move it," a cause is required to sus- as in generation, in artistic production, or in
tain the endless motions of nature. This cause, any of the forms of motion.
which Aristotle "the prime mover," must
calls
be "something which moves without being THE PHILOSOPHICAL and theological issues con-
moved, being eternal, substance, and actual- cerning creation and change, eternity and time,
ity." are further discussed in the chapters on CAUSE,
Aristotle's theory of a prime mover sets up a ETERNITY, and WORLD. Other problems aris-
hierarchy of causes to account for the different ing from the analysis of change must at least
perfect circular motion of the heavens serves to Though less radical than the difference be-
mediate between the prime mover which is tween creation and change, the difference be-
totally unmoved and the less regular cycles of tween the motions of inert or non-living things
terrestrial change. The "constant cycle" of and the vital activities of plants and animals
movement in the stars differs from the irregular raises for any theory of change the queslf&i
cycle of "generation and destruction" on whether the same principles apply to both. The
earth. For the first, Aristotle asserts the neces- rolling stone and the running animal both move
sity of "something which is always moved with locally, but are both motions locomotion in the
an unceasing motion, which is motion in a cir- same sense ? Augmentation occurs both in the
cle." He calls this motion of the first heavenly growth of a crystal and the growth of a plant,
sphere "the simple spatial movement of the but are both of them growing in the same sense ?
universe" as a whole. Besides this "there are In addition, there seems to be one kind of
other spatial movements those of the planets change in living things which has no parallel in
which are eternal" but are "always acting in the movements of inert bodies. Animals and
different ways" and so are able to account for men learn. They acquire knowledge, form hab-
the other cycle in nature the irregular cycle its and change them. Can change of mind be
of generation and corruption. explained in the same terms as change in mat-
In addition, a kind of changelessness is attrib- ter?
uted to all the celestial bodies which Aristotle The by questions of this sort are
issues raised
challenged by Jewish and Christian theologians motion, and the uniform or variable accelera-
200 THE GREAT IDEAS
tion of the latter are problems which belong sions, without business, without diversion,
to the chapters on ASTRONOMY and ME- without study. He then feels his nothingness,
CHANICS. Change, furthermore, is a basic fact his forlornness, his dependence, his weakness,
not only for the natural scientist, but for the his emptiness." Darwin does not think that the
historian the natural historian or the histori- desire for change is peculiar to man. "The lower
an of man and society. The considerations animals," he writes, "are . likewise
. .
capricious
relevant to this aspect of change receive treat- in their affections, aversions, and sense of beau-
ment in the chapters on EVOLUTION, HISTORY, ty. There is also reason to suspect that they love
and PROGRESS. novelty for its own sake."
Even these ramifications of discussion do not But men also wish to avoid change. The old
exhaust the significance of change. The cyclical Prince Bolkonski, in War and Peace, "could not
course of the emotions and the alternation of comprehend how anyone could wish to alter his
pleasure and pain have been thought inexpli- lifeor introduce anything new into it." This is
cable without reference to change of state in re- not merely an old man's view. For the most
gard to desire and aversion the motion from part, it is permanence rather than transiency,
want to satisfaction, or from possession to dep- the enduring rather than the novel, which the
rivation. Change is not only a factor in the poets celebrate when they express man's dis-
analysis of emotion, but it is also itself an object content with his own mutability. The with-
of man's emotional attitudes. It is both loved ering and perishing of all mortal things, the
and hated, sought and avoided. assault of time and change upon all things fa-
According to Pascal, man tries desperately to miliar and loved, have moved them to
elegy
avoid a state of rest. He does everything he can over the evanescent and the ephemeral. From
to keep things in flux. "Our nature consists in Virgil's Sunt lacnmae rerum et mentem mortaha
motion," he writes; "complete rest is death. . . .
tangunt to Shakespeare's "Love is not love
Nothing is so insufferable to man," he contin- which when it alteration finds," the poets
alters
ues, "as to be completely at rest, without pas- have mourned the inevitability of change.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The nature and reality of change or motion 202
3. Cause and effect in motion: the relation of mover and moved, or action and passion
6a. The reducibility of all modes of motion to one kind of change 206
6. The primacy of local motion
6V. Comparison of change in living and non-living things
6V. Comparison of the motions of matter with changes in the Older of mind
CHAPTER 10: CHANGE 201
PAOB
9. Change of quality
100. Substantial change in the realm of bodies: the transmutation of the elements 211
loc. The incorruptibility of atoms, the heavenly bodies, and spiritual substances
14. The theory of the prime mover: the order and hierarchy of movers and moved 214
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume m the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 1 16a-119b,the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
printed in two columns,
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in ti tie of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7-45 (D) // Esdras, 7 46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference, "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
b
1071*4] 600b-c / Soul, BK i, CH 3 [4o6 n-i4] 106b-107c; Q 23, A i, REP 3 132c-133b; Q 53,
636a; BK HI, CH 7 [431*1-8] 663c A i, REP 2-3 280d-282a; A 3, ANS 283 b- 2 84 d;
2 tola CHAPTER 10: CHANGE 203
Q 65, A 4 342b-343c; Q 67, A 3, REP r 351b- 93c; 120c-129c esp 121a-124<J, 126a-128b;
352a; A 4, ANS 352a-354a; Q 73, A i, REP 2 141b,d-145c; 200c-204c
370a-371a; A 2, ANS 371b-d; Q 79, A 9, ANS
2a. The constituents of the changing thing
422b-423d; Q 103, A 5, REP 2 531b-532b;
PART I-H, Q 10, A i, REP 2 662d-663d; Q 23, 7 PLATO: Ttmaeus, 458a-460d / Philebus, 610d-
AA 3-4 725c-727a; Q 25, A i, ANS and REP 2 619d
730b-731b; Q 31, A 3, REP 2 754a-d; A 8 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK i, CH i 259a-b; CH 6-9
758b-759a 264c-268d; BK HI, CH 1-3 278a-280c; BK iv,
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 15, CH 9 [2i7 a20-b 27] 297a-c; BK v, CH i [225*12-
b
A 10, REP i 795b-796a; Q 62, A 4 861a-862a; 29] 305b-c; BK vi, CH 10 [240 8-24i*26] 324c-
PART III SUPPL, Q 91, A 3, REP 2 1020d-1022c 325b / Heat/ens, BK r, CH 3 [270*12-17] 361b;
22 CHAUCER: Knight's Tale [2987-3040] 209a- BK iv, CH 4 [312*3-22] 403c-d / Generation and
210a Corruption, BK i, CH i [31 4^6-3 15*3] 410a-b;
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 292d-294b CH 3 413c-416c esp [3i8*i-3i9b 4] 414b-416c;
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY- CH 4 [320*2-6] 417a; BK n, CH i [}29 B24-b 2]
FOURTH DAY 197a-260a,c esp THIRD DAY, 224d 429a-b / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 6 [987^0-
b b
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK i, APH 66 114d- 988*8] 506a; CH 8 [988 22~989 24] 506d-508a;
115c; BK ii, APH 48 179d-188b BK in, CH 4 [999*24^24] 518a-c; BK iv, CH 5
31 DESCARTES: Rules, xn, 24a [1009*22-38] 528d; BK v, CH i [1013*3-7] 533a;
31 SPINOZ\: Ethics, PART n, LEMMA 3 378d-379a CH 2 [1013*24-27] S33b; CH 4 534d-535c; BK
b
33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 433b- vn, CH 8-10 556b-559d; CH 15 [io39 2o-
434a 1040*8] 563c-564a; BK vin-ix 566a-578a,c;
34 NEWTON- Principles, DEFINITIONS-BK n 5a- BK xi, CH 9 [1065^5-31] 594b; CH 12 [io68 b io-
267a esp DEFINIIIONS, SCHOL 8b-13a, LAW i 14] 597c; BK xn, CH 1-5 598a-601a; CH 10
14a [1075*25-34] 606a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK in, CH iv, 9 ARIS TOTLE: Generation ofAnimals, BK i, CH 18
SFCT 8-9 260d-261b [724*20^13] 264b-d; CH 20 [729*6]-^ 22
b
35 BERKELEY Human Knowledge, SECT 102 [73o 33] 269b-271a
432d-433a, SECT 110-115 434b 435c 10 GALEN* Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 2-3 167b-
42 KANT. Pure Reason, 27a; 28b-c; 29c-d; 31d- 169a
32a; 55c-56a; 72c-85d esp 74b-76c, 82a-83b; 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [146-634]
91d-93c; 95a-d 2d-8d; BK n [62-1022] 15d-28a
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 178a- 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK xn, SECT 30
179d; 186d-190b 310a-b
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xiv, 608a-b 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR vm, CH 8 30d-31c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 882a-884b / Second Ennead, TR i, CH 1-4 35a-37b; TR iv,
CH 6-8 51d-53a; TR v, CH I-TR vi, CH 2 57d-
2. The unchanging principles of change 62b / Third Ennead, TR vi, CH 8-19 lllc-119a
7 PLATO Phaedrus, 124b-c/ Ttmaeus, 455c-458a / Sixth Ennead, TR in, CH 22 293d-294c; TR v,
564d-574c / Philebus, 610d-619d /
/ Sophist, CH 8 307d-308c
Laws, BK x, 760a-765d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK xn, par 3-16 99d-
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK i 259a-268d / Heavens, 103a
BK i, CH 3
a
[270 i2-i7) 361b / Metaphysics, 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 9,
a b ANS 38c-39c; Q 19, A i, ANS 108d-109c;
BK in, CH 4 [99Q 24- 24] 518a-c, BK xn, CH 10 A i,
399a; PART iv, PROP 29-35 431d-434a; PART 31 SPINOZA. Ethics, PART n, AXIOM 1-5 373c-d;
v,AXIOM i 452c LEMMA 3 378d-379a; PART in, DEF 1-3 395d-
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 27a; 76c-83b csp 76c-d; 396a; PROP 1-4 396a-398d; PART iv, AXIOM-
91d-93c PROP 7 424c-426b; PART v, AXIOM 2 452c;
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 160c-d; PROP 3-4 453a-d
165a-b; 178a-d; 179b-d 34 NEWTON: Principles, DBF in-iv 5b-6a; LAW
i-ni 14a-b
3. Cause and effect in motion: the relation of 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK 11, CH xxi,
mover and moved, or action and passion SECT 1-5 178b-l79d; SECT 74, 199d-20Qb; CH
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 124b-c / Gorgias, 267c-268a xxn, SECT ii 203c-d; CH xxin, SECT 28-29
/ Timaeus, 460c-d / Laws, BK x, 760a-7<?5d 211b-212a
csp 761b-765d 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT in, DIV
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 9 [n b i-7] 16c-d / i8-SECT vin, DIV 74 457c-484c passim, csp
b
Physics, BK HI, CH i [2oo 29~32] 278b; CH 2 SECT VH, piv 60 477a-c
CHAPTER 10: CHANG 205
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15a-b; 43a-b; 76c-83b; A 6, REP 4 330c-331c; Q 66, A 4, REP 4 348d-
91d-93c 349d; PART i-n, Q 31, A 2, ANS and REP i
753c-754a
4. Motion and rest: contrary motions 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 113,
7 PLATO. Cratylus, 112b / Republic, BK iv, 350d- A 7, REP 5 366a-367c; PART in SUPPL, Q 84,
351b / Timaeus, 453b-c; 460c-d / Sophist, A 3 985d-989b
567a-574c Statesman, 587a-589c esp 587a-b
, 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, xxvn
b
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 14 [i5 i-i6] 21b-c [106-120] 148b-c
/ Physics, BK v, CH 5-6 310a-3I2d / Heavens, 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY,
BK i, CH
4 3fc2a-c / Metaphysics, BK iv, CH 2 201a-202a
b
[ioo4 27-29J 523d; BK xi, CH 12 [1068^0-25] 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 46 177c-
597c-d / Soul, BK i, CH 3 [406*22-27] 635c 179a
10 GALEN Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 2, 167b-d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, DEF 5 373b-c
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK n, 832c 32 MILTON Paradise Lost, BK v [580-582] 188a
:
8. Change of size
Animal Generation, 353b-354a; 388c-d; 408c
409b, 412b-415b csp 415a; 441a-443b; 494a-c
8a. The increase and decrease of inanimate 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 71a-c
bodies
7 PLATO* Timaeus, 460c-d / Laws, BK x, 762b-c 9. Change of quality
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK iv, CH i [209*27-29] 7 PLATO- Parmenides, 509a-510a / Theaetetus
b
288a; CH 6 [2i3 i9~22] 293b; CH 9 296b-297c; 533a-534a
BK vii, CH 2 [245 i2-i8] 328d-329a; BK vin,
ft
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 5 [4*io-b i9] 8b-9a
b
CH 3 [253 i2-23J / Heavens, BK i, CH 3
337d CH 14 [15*14-32] 20d-21a / Topics, BK vi, CH (
[270*23-36] 361c / Generation and Corruption, [145*2-13] 198c-d / Physics, BK i, CH 7 [190^-
B b
BK ii, CH 6 [333 35- 3] 434b / Soul, BK n, CH 4 9] 266b; BK v, CH 2 [226*26-29] 306d; [226V
b ft
b *
AA 1-2 15d-19a; PART ii-n, Q 24, A 5 492b- 27-44 7 9 685b-c
[4 4 6 ]
493d; A 6, ANS 493d-494b; PART in, Q 7, A 12, 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 2, 167b
REP i 754c-755c 168b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART iv, 271d-272a 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR vi, CH 8-10 lllc
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 113a
139b-141d; 151c-154b 19 AQUINAS Summa :
Theologica, PART i, Q 48
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 412b A 4, ANS and REP 3 262a-263a
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 40, 171a- 20 AQUINAS Summa
Theologica, PART i-n, Q 5C
:
172d; APH 48, 180a-181a; 184a-c A i, REP 3 6a-7b; Q 52, A i, ANS and RE
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK in, PROP 6, COROL iv 3 15d-18a; PART in SUPPL, Q 82, A 3, ANS an<
m\>/ Optics, BKin,539b REP 2 971a-972d; Q 91, A i, REP 2,4 1016t
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i, 9a- 1017c
15c csp 9a-10b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART in, 172b
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 184a-185b; 192a-b 34 NEWTON: Optics, BK in, 541b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xxv;
8. Growth in living organisms
SECT 1-2 217a-d
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 471d-472a 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 25
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK n, CH b
i
[i93 i3-i9] 33 417d-419a passim, esp SECT 25-26 41 7d
269d-270a; BK vi, CH 10 [24 1*32^2] 325c; BK 418a
210 THE GREAT IDEAS 9a to 10
* CH b CH 5 [74^5-15]
(9. Change of quality.) i
t733 i-i7] 273d-274a;
282c; CH 6 [742*8-16] 283a; BK v, CH i [778*
9a, Physical and chemical change: compounds 15-20] 320a-b; CH 3 [782*1-20] 324a-b
and mixtures 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 5, 169b;
7 PLATO: Ttmaeus, 448b-d; 459d-462b CH 8 171a; BK HI, CH 7, 203c-204c
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK vi, CH 14 [151*20-32] 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK iv [1030-
206a / Heavens, BK i, CH 3 [270*26-36] 361c, 1057] 57c-d
CH 5 [27i b i8-23J 362d-363a; BK in, CH 3 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 292d-293d
b 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 412a-415b;
393c-d; CH 8 [3o6 22-29] 398a / Generation
and Corruption, BK i, en 2 [315*28-33] 410d; 450b-d
CH 10 426c-428d; BK 11, CH 6-8 433d-436d / 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 38-39 436b-
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, vn [61-96] 302 b; BK vin, CH 1-4 334a-340d; CH 8 348b-
lOb-c; xiv [94-120] 20c-d; xxvi [90-142] 39a- 352a / Heavens, BK i, CH 2 [269b2-io] 360c-d;
c; PURGATORY, xi ['j^-n'j} 69c-70a; xiv [91- CH 3 [27ob i-24] 361c-362a; BK i, CH 9 [279*12]-
126] 74c-75a; xxvm
[76-148] 96d-97c; PARA-
BK ii, CH i [284^] 370b-376a; BK n, CH 6
DISE, xv-xvi 128b-132a 379c-380c / Generation and Corruption, BK n,
22 CHAUCER: Wife of Bath's Prologue [5583-6410] CH 10-11 437d-441a,c / Meteorology, BK i, CH
256a-269b 14 [352*16-353*27] 458b-459a,c passim; BK n,
23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH vi, 9b-c CH 3 [356^-357*4] 462b-c / Metaphysics, BK
23HoBBEs- PART i, 79c-d; PART
Leviathan, 11, ix, CH 8 [1050^0-28] 576c-d; BK xn, CH 6
b
150c; 154b-c; PART iv, 271d [io7i 3]-CH 7 [1072*22] 601b-602b; CH 7
25 MONTAIGNE- Essays, 33b-36a; 47a-51a; 131b- [1073*2-34] 603a c
132a; 28Ia-282a; 292d-294b; 318c-319b; 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i
[951-1051]
458b-c, 462c-465c; 478c-479c; 540d-541c 12d-14a csp [988-1007] 13b; BK [80-141] n
26 SHAKESPEARE. 2nd Henry IV, ACT in, sc I 16a-d; [294-302] 18d; [569-580] 22b
[45-56] 483b 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK v, SECT 13 271b;
27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT i, sc n [68-73] SECT 23 272b; BK vi, SECT 15 275a-b; BK ix,
32b; ACT v, sc i [202-240] 66c-d / Troilus and SECT 28 293d-294a; BK xi, SECT 27 306b
Cressida, ACT in, sc in [145-189] 124a-c; ACT 16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK xin, 429a-b
iv, sc iv [26-50] 128c / King Lear, ACT iv, sc i 16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 888b 891a
[10-12] 269c / Sonnets, xv 588b-c, xxv 590a; 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR vn, CH 7-8 122d-
XLIX 593d; LX 595b-c, LXIV-LXV 596a-b; 124c; CH 11-13 126a-129a / Fourth Ennead,
cxvi 604a, cxxin 605a TR iv, CH 7-8 161d-162d
28 GILBERI: Loadstone, PREF, 2a 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK xi, par 10-17
28 HARVEY. Motion of the Heart, 274a; 285b-c 91d-93c; BK xn, par 8-9 lOla-c; par 12-16
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 14c-15c csp 101d-103a; par 29 105d-106a; par 33 107b-c;
15a-b; 16c-d; 61b; 65b-c; 90b-d / Novum par 39-40 109a-110a / City of God, BK xi,
Organum, BK i, APH 90 124d-125a CH 4-6 324a-325d; BK xn, CH 10-20 348b-
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART n, 45d 357a
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART in, PROP 4-11 398d- 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 10,
400b; PART v, PROP 6, SCHOL 454a A 2, REP 2 41d-42c; A 4, ANS 43b-44b; Q 14,
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 129-131 195b; 135 196a; A 12, ANS 85d-86d; Q 46, AA 1-2 250a-255a;
139-143 196b-200a; 164-172 202b-203b; 181 Q 75, A i, REP i 378b-379c
204b / Vacuum, 355a-358b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL,
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH xix, SECT 223 Q 77, A 2, ANS 945a-946b; Q 91, A 2 101 7c-
76c-d / Human Understanding, 85a-c 1020c
36 SWIFT. Gulliver, PART
105a-106b
in, 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK n, 56b-c
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 335c 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY,
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. [15-20] Ib 224d
43 FEDERALIST. NUMBER 14, 62a-d 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 35,
43 MILL: Liberty, 293b-302c passim / Repre- 163a; APH 48, 186b-c
sentative Government, 336b-c; 350c; 377d- 31 DESCARTES: Rules, xin, 27b-c
378a 34 NEWTON: Prmciples, LAW 1 14a; BK HI, PROP xo
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 178a-c; 284a-285a / Optics, BK in, 540a-541b
PART i, 209b; 258b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK 11, CH xiv,
47 GOETHE: Faust, DEDICATION la-b; PART n SECT 26 160c-d
[n.573-586] 281b-282a; [11,612-622] 282b- 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 135a-137a,c; 152a-d;
283a 160b-161d
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 302b; 577c-d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 882a
214 THE GREAT IDEAS 14*? 15*
568a-b / Philebus, 634b-635b / Seventh Letter,
14. The theory of the prime mover: the order 809c-810d
and hierarchy of movers and moved 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 5 [4 a io-b i2] 8b-9a
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 124b-c / Statesman, 587a- / Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 8 104a-b / Meta-
589c / Laws, BK x, 758d-765c physics, BK i, CH 6 505b<506b; CH 9 508c-511c;
b b
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vn, CH i-2326a-329a; BK in, CH i
[995 i3-i8] S14a; [995 3 1-996*1]
BK vui 334a-355d / Heavens, BK HI, CH 2 514b; [996V91
l
144-145 esp 144:13, 145:10 / Ecclesiastes, 3:14- 355a, DEF 3,6-7 355b, PROP 3 356a, PROP 5-8
15 / Isaiah, 40:8,28; 43:10-13; 57:15 (D) 356b-357d, PROP 11-15 358b-361d, PROP 17
Isaias, 40:8,28; 43:10-13; 57:15 / Jeremiah, 362b-363c, PROP 19-20 363c-364a, PROP 33,
10:10 (D) Jeremias, 10:10 / Lamentations, SCHOL i 367c-d, PROP 34 369a; PART v, PROP
5:19 / Daniel, 6:25-27 / Malachi, 3:6 (D) 17 456c-d
Malachias, 3*6 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK HI [372-389] 143b-
APOCRYPHA: Eccksiasticus, 36:17; 39:20; 42:21 144a
(D) OT, Eccksiasticus, 36:18-19; 39:25542:21- 33 PASCAL: Penstes, 469 256a
22 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK in, GENERAL SCHOL,
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 24:35 /John, 1:1-5 / 370a-371a
Romans, 1:21-25; 6.23 / Colossians, 1:16-17 / 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xvn,
/ Timothy, 1:17 / Hebrews, 1:10-12; 7:23-28; SECT 20 172d-173c; CH xxm, SECT 21 209c
13:7-8 /James, 1:17 / I John, 5:11-12 / Revela- 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 117 436a
tion, 1:17-18; 10 :6; 11:15-18 (D) Apocalypse, 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 175d-176c; 177b-179b;
1:17-18; 10:6; 11:15-18 190c; 192d; 201b-c / Practical Reason, 352a-b
5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus at Colonus [607-615] 120a 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 270,
7 PLATO: Republic, BK n, 322d-323c; 324a-b 85c / Philosophy of History, PART in, 306a
216 THE GREAT IDEAS
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The broad philosophical context of the theory of change, see BEING 5; DESIRE i FORM i-ib; ;
'
A discussion relevant to the theory of the prime mover, see ANGEL 2a.
The mathematical and experimental approach to the study of local motion and the formula-
tion of its laws, see ASTRONOMY 8c-8c(3); MFCHANICS 5-5^2), 6c-6e; ONE AND MANY
The consideration of economic, political, and cultural change, see CONSTITUTION 7-73,
8-8b; PROGRESS 3-4^ 6-6b; REVOLUTION 2-2C, 4-4^ WEALTH 12.
The discussion of change or becoming as an object of knowledge, see BEING 8a-8b; KNOWL-
EDGE 6a(i); OPINION i.
Other considerations of man's attitude toward change and mutability, see CUSTOM AND
CONVENTION 8; PROGRESS 5; TIME 7.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boofe of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works aie divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
I. II.
HOBBES. Concerning Body, PART in, CH 15-16, 21-22 CRESCAS. Or Adonai, PROPOSITIONS 4-9, 13-14,
BERKELEY. Siris 17, 25
KANT. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural SUAREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae, xvm (n),
Science xxx (8-9), LX (8), XLVI (3), XLVIII-L
HEGEL. The Phenomenology of Mind, in JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS. Cursus Philosophicus Tho-
Science of Logic, VOL i, BK i, SECT
.
i, CH i(c) misttcus, Philosophia Naturalis, PART i, QQ 14, 19,
CH PART ni ~
I 2 10-12
.
Logic, 7 22-24, QQ
W. IAMBS. Some Problems of Philosophy\ CH 9-10, LEIBNITZ. Discourse on Metaphysics, xv-xxn
12 .
Monadology, par 10-18
CHAPTER 10: CHANGE 217
VOLTAIRE. "Motion," in A Philosophical Dictionary G. N. LEWIS. The Anatomy of Science, ESSAY m-iv
SCHOPENHAUER. The World as Will and Idea HEIDEGGER. Sftn und Zcit
WHEWELL. The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, B. RUSSELL. Principles of Mathematics, CH
54,
VOL i, BK ii, CH 13 56-59
HELMHOLTZ. Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects, .The Analysis of Matter, CH 27, 33-34
VII EDDINGTON. The Nature of the Physical World,
MAXWELL. Matter and Motion CH 5
Common Sense of the Exact Sciences,
CLIFFORD. The DEWEV. Experience and Nature, CH 2
CH 5 . The Quest for Certainty, CH 2
LOTZE. Metaphysics, BK i, CH 4-5 BK n, CH 4
; WHITEHEAD. The Concept of Nature, CH 5
BRADLEY. Appearance and Reality, BK i, CH 5 .Process and Reality, PART n, CH 10
CROCE. History, Its Theory and Practice SANTA Y AN \. Scepticism and Animal Faith, CH 5
BERGSON. Creative Evolution .The Realm of Matter, CH 5-6
.The Creative Mind, CH 5 RIEZLER. Physics and Reality
Chapters: CITIZEN
INTRODUCTION
," like "comrade," has been and CONSTITUTION. It is sufficient here to note that
/ still is a revolutionary word. Both words the difference in the authority and power pos-
have been titles proudly adopted by men to sessed by rulers according as it is absolute or
mark their liberation from the yoke of despo- limited corresponds with a difference in the
tism or tyranny. Both titles are still sought by status, the degree of freedom, and the rights
those who have not yet gained admission to the and privileges of the people ruled.
fraternity of the free and equal.
The rank and status of citizenship first ap- IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND citizenship it is neces-
peared in the ancient world with the begin- sary to understand the several ways in which
ning of constitutional government in the city- men can belong to or be parts of a political
states of Greece. The Greeks were conscious community. There are two divisions among
of this fact, and proud of it. In terms of it, men within a community which help us to
they themselves apart from the barbarians
set define citizenship.
who were subjects of the Great King of Persia According to one of these divisions, the
or the Egyptian Pharaoh. The Spartan heralds, native-born are separated from aliens or foreign-
according to Herodotus, thus address the ers.In the Greek city-states it was almost im-
Persian commander: "Thou hast experience possible for aliens to become citizens. Plutarch
of hall the matter; but the other half is beyond notes that Solon's law of naturalization, which
thy knowledge. A slave's life thou under- he qualifies as "of doubtful character," would
standest; never having tasted liberty,
but, not allow strangers to become citizens unless
thou canst not tell whether it is sweet or no. "they were in perpetual exile from their
Ahl hadst thou known what freedom is, thou own country, or came with their whole family
wouldst have bidden us fight for it, not with to trade there." The metics, or aliens, who
the spear only, but with the battle-axe." were allowed in the city were usually a class
218
CHAPTER 11: CITIZEN 219
his article on Geneva, has clearly distinguished THE DISTINCTION OF citizen from slave, infant,
the four orders of men (or even five, counting or alien does not complete the picture. The
mere foreigners) who dwell in our town, of subjects of a king are not slaves, nor are they
which two only compose the Republic." citizens of a republic. Yet like citizens, subjects
According to a second way in which men have membership in the political community.
are divided within the political community, They constitute the people the king serves as
free men are separated from slaves. The latter, well as rules, unless he is a tyrant, for only if he
though they may be native-born, are not is a tyrant does he treat them as if they were
members of the political community, but his property, to be used for his own pleasure or
its property. A slave, accord- Sometimes a distinction made
merely part of interest. is be-
ing to Aristotle, is one "who, being a human tween first- and second-class citizens, and then
being, is also a possession." But, he says in the latter, who occupy an intermediate position
another place, "property, even though living between citizenship and slavery, are regarded
beings are included in it, is no part of a state; as subjects. "Since there are many forms of
for a state is not a community of living beings government," Aristotle writes, "there must be
only, but a community of equals." many varieties of citizens, and especially of cit-
On this principle, Aristotle excludes more izens who are subjects; so that under some gov-
than the chattel slave from the status and priv- ernments the mechanic and the laborer will be
ilege of citizenship. "We cannot consider all citizens, but not in others." The whole meaning
those to be citizens," he writes, "who are neces- of citizenship changes for Aristotle when the
sary to the existence of the state; for example, working classes are admitted to it.
children are not citizens equally with grown-up From a somewhat different point of view,
men. ... In ancient times, and among some Aquinas holds that a man can be "said to be a
nations," he continues, "the artisan class were citizen in two ways: first,absolutely; secondly,
slaves or foreigners, and therefore the majority in a restricted sense. A man is a citizen abso-
of them are so now. The best form of state will lutely if he has all the rights of citizenship; for
not admit them to citizenship." instance, the right of debating or voting in the
The "slaves who minister to the wants of popular assembly. On the other hand, any man
individuals," and the "mechanics or laborers may be called citizen only in a restricted sense
who are the servants of the community" are if he dwells within the state, even lowly people,
to be counted as "necessary people" but not
its or children, or old men, who are not fit to enjoy
as members of the state. When he discusses the power in matters pertaining to the common
size and character of the population for an ideal welfare." Those who are thus disfranchised, but
state, Aristotle says, "we ought not to include are not slaves, are subjects rather than citizens
multitude of slaves and sojourners and foreign- It is possible, of course, for men to have the
but we should include only those who are
ers; dual status of subject and citizen, as is the case
members of the state, and who form an essential now in England and the self-governing domin-
part of it." commonwealth. This double
ions of the British
The exclusion of slaves and resident aliens status does not blur the distinctionbetween cit-
from membership in the political community izen and subject; rather it signifies the mixed
has a profound bearing on the meaning of the nature of a form of government which is both
cially of one claiming absolute power, have no "exercised primarily with a view to the in-
is
voice in their own government, and no legal terest of the master." Yet it "accidentally con-
means for protecting their natural rights as siders the slave, since, if the slave perish, the
men. So long as the absolute ruler does not rule of the master perishes with him."
tyrannize, he governs for the welfare of his Thus conceived, the slave lacks every vestige
people; and so, though a despot in the sense of of political liberty. He is treated as radically
wielding absolute power over political inferiors, inferior to his master almost as if he were
he is benevolent in the sense of serving rather something less than a man. He has no voice in
than using them. But if he ceases to be benevo- hisown government, nor is his welfare the para-
lent and turns tyrannical, his subjects have no mount consideration of his ruler. In short, we
recourse except rebellion. They must resort to have slavery when one man governs another in
violence in order to emancipate themselves the way ina man manages his property,
which
from a condition which amounts to slavery. using it own good.
for his
A citizen, on the other hand, is
safeguarded When one man governs another in the way
in his legal as well as in his natural rights and, in which good parents administer the affairs of
in some modern republics at least, he is pro- children as members of the household, we have
vided with juridical means for rectifying sup- the type of rule which also appears in the rela-
posed injustices, For citizens, the right of re- tion between absolute kings or benevolent des-
bellion is the last, not the only, resort. pots and their subjects. "The rule of a father
over his children is royal," Aristotle writes, "for
THE DISTINCT CONDITIONS of slavery, subjec- he rules by virtue of both love and of the re-
tion, and citizenship can be summarized by de- spect due to age, exercising a kind of royal
fining three ways in which rulers are related to power. ... A king," Aristotle adds, "is the nat-
the persons they rule. These three relations ural superior of his subjects, but he should be
seem to have been first clearly differentiated by of the same kin or kind with them, and such is
antiquity. Of household management, he writes, ily, we see two differences between the condi-
"there are three parts one is the rule of a tion of a slave and that of a subject under abso-
master over slaves . another of a father, and
. . lute or despotic rule in the state. The inferiority
a third of a husband." In each case, "the kind of of children, unlike that of slaves, is not their
rule differs: the freeman rules over the slave permanent condition. It is an aspect of their
after another manner from that in which the immaturity. They are temporarily incapable
male rules over the female, or the man over the of judging what is for their good, and so need
child." the direction of their superiors in age, ex-
As we have already seen, Aristotle conceives perience, and prudence. But children have
the slave as a piece of property. When he says some equality with their parents, to the ex-
that the slave "wholly belongs to his master" tent that their humanity is recognized as the
or that "he is a
part of his master, a living but reasonwhy they should not be ruled as slaves,
separated part of his bodily frame," he is ob- but governed for their own welfare.
viously considering only the chattel slave. The government of children, Aristotle de-
There are, as the chapter on SLAVERY indicates, clares, "is exercised in the first instance for the
other kinds or degrees of slavery less extreme good of the governed, or for the common good
than this. of both parties, but essentially for the good of
But chattel slavery, more clearly than the the governed." In the same way, the subjects of
attenuated forms of servitude, defines the na- a benevolent despot, or of any absolute mon-
ture of mastery. The master maxiages or uses arch who rules paternaUsticaliy, are said to be
CHAPTER 11: CITIZEN 221
governed for their own good. They are served, FOR THE SAME REASON that the revolutionists
not used, by their rulers; and to this extent against absolutism or despotism in the i8th cen-
they have a degree of political liberty. But they tury use the phrase "free government" for re-
do not have the complete liberty which exists publican institutions, they also use "citizen** to
only with self-government. designate a free man, a man who possesses the
That occurs only under constitutional rule, political liberty and equality which they re-
which for Aristotle has an imperfect analogue gard as the natural right of men because they
in the family in the relation of husband and are men. In this respect they do not differ
wife. In the state, however, it is perfectly repre- substantially from their Greek or Roman an-
sented by the relation between the holders of cestors who prize constitutional government
public office and other citizens. "In the consti- and citizenship as conditions of freedom and
tutional state," Aristotle says, "the citizens rule equality.
and are ruled by turns; for the idea of a consti- Furthermore, like the constitutionalists of
tutional state implies that the natures of the antiquity, the republicans of the i8th century
citizens are equal, and do not differ at all." The arc, with few if any exceptions, not democrats
citizen, in other words, is one "who has the in the senseof extending the rights and privi-
power to take part in the deliberative or judi- legesof citizenship to all adults. In the i8th
cial administration of the state." Rousseau century slavery still exists; and a large part even
seems to have a similar conception of the citi- of those who are not in economic bondage re-
zen as both ruling and ruled, though he uses mains outside the pale of citizenship, disqual-
the word "subject" to designate the citizen as ified by accidents of birth such as race or sex,
ruled. "The people," he writes, "are called and by the lack of sufficient wealth or property
citizens, as sharing in the sovereign power, and which makes it necessary for them to labor in
subjects, as being
under the laws of the State." order to live. It is not only an ancient oligarch
Because the man who holds office in a con- like Aristotle who thinks that "the ruling class
stitutional government is first of all a citizen should be the owners of property, for they are
himself, and only secondly an official vested citizens, and the citizens of a state should be in
with the authority of a political office, the citi- good circumstances; whereas mechanics" should
zen is a man ruled by his equals and ruled as an have "no share in the state." In the i8th cen-
equal. Observing these facts, Aristotle describes tury, as well as in ancient Greece, extending the
citizenship as the one "indefinite office" set up privileges of citizenship to indentured appren-
by a constitution. It is indefinite both in tenure tices, day laborers, orjourneymen, is a form of
and by comparison with the various magistra- radicalism known "extreme democracy."
as
cies or other offices which have more definitely Kant may be taken as representative of an
assigned functions. Since a citizen is ruled only enlightened point of view in the i8th century.
by other citizens, and since he has the oppor- He finds that there are "three juridical attri-
tunity of ruling others in turn, citizenship in- butes" that belong by right to the citizens:
volves political liberty in the fullest sense. This "i. constitutional freedom, as the right of
does notmean freedom fiom government, but every citizen to have to obey no other law than
freedom through self-government d\ the free- that to which he has given his consent or ap-
dom a man can have m society, liberty under proval; 2. civil equality, as the right of the
law and proportioned to justice. citizen to recognize no one as a superior among
Two of these three political conditions- the people in relation to himself and 3. . . .
slavery and subjection naturally receive fuller political independence, as the right to owe his
treatment in the chapter on SLAVERY. The existence and continuance in society not to the
discussion of the third, citizenship, belongs not arbitrary will of another, but to his own rights
only to this chapter, but also to the chapter and powers as a member of the commonwealth."
on CONSTITUTION, and to other chapters which The last attribute leads Kant to distinguish
deal with forms of constitutional government, between "active and passive citizenship." Al-
such as ARISTOCRACY, DEMOCRACY, and OLI- though he admits that this "appears to stand in
GARCHY. contradiction to the definition of a citizen as
222 THE GREAT IDEAS
such," he concludes that there are some in the the fight against franchise restrictions and for
community not entitled to the full privileges universal suffrage, which would admit every
of citizenship.It is his contention, widely shared normal, adult human being to the freedom and
in the 8th century, that suffrage, which "prop-
1
equality of citizenship.
erly constitutes the political qualification of a The first revolution has a long history. It be-
citizen/' presupposes the "independence or gins with the Greek city-states which, having
self-sufficiency of the individual citizen among won this victory against the Persians, lost it to
Consequently he denies suffrage to "every- with the establishment of the Roman republic
one who is compelled to maintain himself not and again it
after the expulsion of the Tarquins,
according to his own industry, but as it is ar- is undone when the Caesars assume absolute
ranged by others." Such a restriction, he says, power. This part of the story is told with vary-
includes "the apprentice of a merchant or ing emotions by Plutarch and Polybius, Tacitus
tradesman, a servant who is not in the employ and Gibbon. During the Middle Ages the same
of the state, a minor" and "all women." They struggle appears in the various efforts to estab-
are "passive parts" of the state and do not have lish the supremacy of law, particularly through
"the right to deal with the state as active mem- the development of customary and canon law.
bers of it, or to take action by
to reorganize it, The revolution still continues in the i7th and
1 8th centuries and the new
way of introducing certain laws." Kant insists, heights it reaches
however, that "it must be made possible for are reflected in the writings of a constitution-
them to raise themselves from this passive con- alist likeLocke and republicans like Rousseau,
dition in the State, to the condition of active Kant, and the American Federalists. The Dec-
citizenship." laration of Independence and the Constitution
of the United States are perhaps the classic
THE FOREGOING DISCUSSION shows the connec- documents of this historical phase.
tion between the idea of citizenship and the two The second revolution, particularly as iden-
revolutionary movements which John Stuart tifiedwith the fight for universal suffrage, is a
Mill notes in the history of political thought relatively recent event. Its roots may go back
and action. The first is the movement to obtain as far as Cromwell's time to the activity of the
"recognition of certain immunities, called po- Levellers, and in the i8th century to the writ-
litical liberties or rights, which it was to be re- ings of John Cartwnght. But whatis, perhaps,
garded as a breach of duty in the ruler to in- its first fullexpression does not appear until
fringe, and which if he did infringe, specific Mill's Representative Government. In that book,
resistance, or general rebellion, was held to be Mill lays down the principles of the franchise
filling the magistracies, for they selected offi- give the citizen additional protection against
cials from the whole citizenry by lot. interference in the performance of his civic
The parallelism goes no further than that. duties, such as independent political thought
Greek democracy, even when it denied special and action, or in the exercise of his human
privileges to the propertied classes, never con- privileges, such as freedom of religious worship.
templated the abolition of slavery or the polit- The invention of these constitutional devices
ical emancipation of women. sprang from the bitter experience of coercion
and intimidation under Star Chamber proceed-
THERE ARE OTHER differences between ancient ings, royal censorship, and unlimited police
and modern institutions which affect the char- power. A citizen who can be coerced or intim-
acter of citizenship. The problem of who shall idated by his government differs only in name
be admitted to citizenship is fundamental in from the subject of an absolute despot.
both epochs. Insofar as it connotes the condi- In addition to having these legal
safeguards,
tion of political liberty and equality, the status modern differs from ancient
citizenship in the
of citizenship remains essentially the same. But way in which its
rights and privileges are exer-
the rights and duties, the privileges and im- cised. The machinery of suffrage is not the same
munities, which belong to citizenship vary with when citizens act through elected
representa-
the difference between ancient and modern tives and when they participate directly in the
constitutionalism. deliberations and decisions of government,
by
Even if they had been written, the consti- voting in the public forum.
tutions of the ancient world would not have
declared the rights of man and the citizen, THE PROBLEM OF EDUCATION for citizenship is
nor would they have had bills of rights ap- insome respects stated in almost identical terms
pended to them. The significance of these by such different political philosophers as Plato
modern innovations (which begin, perhaps, with and John Stuart Mill.
Magna Carta) lies, new conception
not in a In both the Republic and the Laws, Plato
of citizenship, but in the invention of juridical emphasizes that "education is the constraining
means to endow the primary office of citizen- and directing of youth towards that right reason
ship with sufficient legal power to protect it which the law affirms." By this he means not
from invasion by government. only that education will affect the laws, but
In The Federalist, Hamilton maintains that also that the laws themselves have an educa-
"bills of rights are, in their origin, stipulations tional task to perform. The educational pro-
between kings and their subjects, abridgments gram thus planned and conducted by the
is
of prerogative in favour of privilege, reserva- state. The guardians the only citizens in the
tions of rights not surrendered to the prince." Republic in the full sense of the term are
Defending the absence of a special bill of rights trained for public life, first by the
discipline of
in the original Constitution, he insists that "the their passions, and second by the cultivation of
Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, their minds. Their passions are disciplined
by
and to every useful purpose, a bill of rights." music and gymnastics, their minds cultivated
It declares and specifies "the political privileges by the liberal arts and dialectic.
of the citizens in the structure and adminis- In the democracy which Mill contemplates as
tration of the government," and "defines cer- an ideal, "the most important point of excel-
tain immunities and modes of proceeding, lence ... is to promote the virtue and intelli-
which arc relative to personal and private gence of the people themselves." He does not
concerns." outline a specific curriculum for the
training of
Nevertheless, the right of free speech and citizens, but it is clear that he thinks their edu-
free assembly and the right to trial by a jury cation cannot be accomplished in the schools
of peers, along with the immunity from un A alone. The superiority of democracy, according
warranted searches and seizures or from ex post to Mill, lies in the fact that it calls
upon the
facto laws and bills of attainder, provided by citizen "to weigh interests not his own; to be
the early amendments to the Constitution, do
guided, in case of conflicting claims, by another
224 THE GREAT IDEAS
rule than his private partialities; to apply at of the good man who is free and also a subject,
every turn, principles and maxims which have e.g. his justice, will not be one but will comprise
for their reason of existence the common good; distinct kinds, theone qualifying him to rule,
and he usually finds associated with him in the the other to obey."
same work minds more familiarized than his The virtues of the citizen direct him pri-
own with these ideas and operations, whose marily in the performance of his obligations to
study it will be to supply reasons to his under- the state. But if the welfare of the state is not
standing, and stimulation to his feeling for the the ultimate end of man, if there are higher
general interest," In this "school of public goods which command human loyalty, if man's
sponsibility for making liberal education avail- as the classic example of one who would rather
able to every future citizen. To say that all die than disobey his inner voice the command
normal children have enough intelligence to of his conscience. A Stoic like Marcus Aurelius
become citizens, but to regard the native en- is
willing to give unqualified allegiance to the
dowment of a large number of them as in- political community only when it is the ideal
capable of liberal education, makes a travesty embracing the whole human broth-
city of man,
of citizenship. Will the child who cannot profit erhood. "My city and my country, so far as I
by liberal education be able to discharge the am Antoninus," he says, "is Rome, but so far as
duties of the office to which he will be ad- I am a man" whose "nature is rational and
mitted upon coming of age? social" "it is the world."
For Christian theologians, membership in the
THE TRAINING OF CHARACTER is always more dif- city of God is a higher vocation than citizen-
ficult than the training of mind. In education ship in any earthly community even when
for citizenship, the problem of moral training that is the city of man at its best. The city of
involves the question discussed in the chapter God demands a higher order of virtue than the
on VIRTUE whether the good man and the city ofman. Referring to the earthly city, Au-
good citizen are identical in virtue. gustine says that "the things which this city de-
For Aristotle, and seemingly also for Mill, sires cannot justly be said to be evil, for it is it-
the virtue of the good man under an ideal con- self, own kind, better than all other human
in its
stitution would be identical with that of the goods. For it desires earthly peace for the sake
good citizen. As both ruling and being ruled, of enjoying earthly goods." It is all right for
"the good citizen ought to be capable of both," men to seek "these things" for they "are good
Aristotle writes. "He should know how to gov- things, and without doubt the gifts of God,"
ern like a freeman, and how to obey like a free- But, Augustine goes on to say, "if they neglect
manthese are the virtues of a citizen. And al- the better things of the heavenly city, which
though the temperance and justice of a ruler are securedby eternal victory and peace never-
are distinct from those of a subject, the virtue ending, and so inordinately covet these present
of a good man will include both; for the virtue good things that they believe them to be the
: CITIZEN 225
only desirable things," then, in Augustine's sire and political obligation. Whatever form
opinion, they are misdirected in their love. this takes, the conflict confronts the political
In giving precedence to the commandments philosopher with all the questions that consti-
of God, the theologians do not deprecate the tute the problem of the individual and society,
commands of the state or the obligations of or man and the state.
citizenship. But those who belong to both cities To what extent and in what respects is the
may find themselves faced with a conflict be- individual's personality sacred and inviolable
tween the law of the state and the divine law. by the state ? How
much freedom from govern-
In such circumstances, the faithful have no ment has the individual a right to demand?
choice. They must obey- God before man. How much individual sacrifice has the state a
"Laws that are contrary to the commandments right to expect ? Is the state merely a means in
of God," Aquinas holds, do not "bind a man the individual's pursuit of happiness, or the end
in conscience" and "should not be obeyed." to which all other goods must be ordered ? Is
statutes of heaven. For their life is not of asCONSTITUTION, GOOD AND EVIL, LAW, LIB-
to-day or yesterday, but from all time, and ERTY, and STATE but we have placed its prin-
no man knows when they were first put forth." cipal formulation in this chapter because the
The problem which Antigone faces can occur concept of citizenship signifies the ideal con-
in as manyother ways as there are possibilities dition of the human individual as a member
of tension between individual conscience or de- of the political community.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The individual in relation to the state 226
government
2b. The distinction between citizen and subject: the distinction between the sub-
jects of a constitutional monarchy and of a despotism 228
2c. The character and extent of citizenship under different types of constitutions
5. The virtues of the citizen and the virtues of the good man 229
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and
page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER* Iliad, BK n {265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS* When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 ]AMkS' Psychology, 116a-ll9b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in .he lower half of page 119 When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For in 7 PLATO Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
example,
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS. One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK 11
[265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES- The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions diffei in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follo\vs, eg, OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7 45 (D) II Esdras, 7 46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or moie especially
relevant parts of a whole reference, "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously m
the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the icferences, see the Explanation of
Reference Style, for general guidance m the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
b
30] 455d-456a; CH 5 [i264 i6~25] 459d-460a;
1. The individual in relation to the state BK in, CH 6 [i278 b i5-29] 475d-476a; BK vn,
5 AESCHYLUS: Suppliant Maidens [366-401] CH 1-3 527a-530a; CH 9 [1329*22-24] 533c;
5c-6a / Seven Against Thebes [1005-1078] 38b- CH 13 [13 32*28-38] 537a, BK vm, CH i [1337*
39a,c 27-32] 542b
5 SOPHOCLES- Antigone 131a-142d / Ajax [1071- 12 LUCRETIUS. Nature of Things, BK n [1-61]
1090] 152b; [1226-1263] 153c-154a / Philoctetes 15a-d, BK in [59-93] 30d-31b; [978-1002]
182a-195a,c 42d-43a; BK v [1105-1135] 75c-d
5 EuRiPiDbs: lleracleidae [500-534] 252c-d / 12 EPICTETVS- Discourses, BK i, CH 19 125b-126c;
Suppliants [338-364] 261 b-c / Phoenician BK n, CH 10 148c-150a; BK CH 22 195a-
in,
Maidens 387a-b;
[991-1020] [1625-1682] 201a
392b-d / Iphigema at Auhs 42Sa-439d esp 12 AURELIUS* Meditations, BK v, SECT 22 272b;
[1255-1275] 436c, [1368-1401] 437c-d BK vii, SECT 5 280a-b; BK xi, SECT 21 305d-
5 ARISTOPHANES: Achamians 455a-469a,c 306a
6 HLRODOFUS: History, BK i, 6c-7a 13 VIRGIL- Aeneid, BK i [418-465] 114b-115b
6 THUCYDIDES. Peloponnesian War, BK n, 395d- 14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 44d-45c / Numa Pom-
399a; 402b-404a; BK vi, 511c-d pilius,51c-S2b / Solon, 71 b; 71d / Marcus
7 PLATO: Apology 200a-212a,c / Crtto 213a- Cato, 284b
/ Lysander, 361a-d / Cato the
219a,c esp 216d-219a,c / Republic, BK iv, Younger, 626d-627b; 632b-c / Demosthenes,
342a-d; 350a-d; BK v, 365c-d; BK vi, 379d- 699c-700a
380c; BK vii, 390b-391b; 401a-b; BK vm 18 AUGUSTINE- City of God, BK xix, CH 5 513d-
401d-416a esp 402b-c / Laws, BK HI, 672d- 514b; CH 17 522b-523a
676b; BK v, 692c-693c; BK vi, 707b-708a, BK 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 21,
vn, 721d; BK ix, 754a-b; BK xi, 775d-778a; A 3 718d-719c; A 4, REP 3 719d-720a,c
BK XII, 791C 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 90,
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 2 [io94 b 5~io] AA 2-3 206b-207c; Q 92, A i, REP 3 213c-214c;
339c-d; BK v, CH n [1138*4-13] 386b-c / Q 94, A 2, ANS 221d-223a
Politics, BK i, CH 2 [1253*19-39] 446c-d; BK n, 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvi [52-
CH i [i26ob37-i26i a7J 455b,d; CH 2 [1261*15- 114] 77b-78a; PARADISE, via [115-148] 118b-c
1 tola CHAPTER 11: CITIZEN 227
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART 73b-c; PART n,
i, 116-118 135c-136b; 158 142d / Philosophy of
99a-b; 104a-d; 105c-d; 112b-117b; 153a-157c; History, INTRO, 164b; I70c-172b; 186b-c;
CONCLUSION, 279a-c PART i, 211a-c; 222a-c; 251a*b; PART n, 271c-
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 7a-d; 46d; 48a-51a pas- d; PART HI, 289 b-d; 302d-303c; PART iv, 320c-
sim; 381a-388c; 480b-482b; 486b-489b; 490c- 321a, 328b-330a; 365 b-c; 366c-367a
491d 50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto^ 419a-
26 SHAKESPEARE: 2nd Henry VI, ACT i, sc i [180- 434d
206] 35c-d / Henry V, ACT i, sc n [174-220] 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 206d-207b;
535d536b 216a; 233b 234a; BK
260a-262a; BK ix,
vi,
27 SHAKESPEARE: Troilus and Cressida, ACT i, sc 343c-d; BK xi, 475b-476c; 505a-511b esp
HI [78-134] 109a-c / Conolanus, ACT i, sc i 509d-510a; BK xn, 537b-538a; BK xm, 577b-
[67-167] 352a-353a, ACT in, sc i 369a-373b / c; BK xv, 634a-635a; EPILOGUE i, 668a-669c;
*
Henry VIII, ACT i, sc n [68-102] 553c-d 670d-671c
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART i, 68b-73a; 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK xn,
177a-b 369a-370d
30 BACON* Advancement of Learning, 71a-72c 54FRFUD. War and Death, 757b-c; 761a-c /
31 DCSCARTES* Discourse, PART HI, 48b-49a Civilization and Its Discontents, 780b-781a
31 SPINOZA Ethics, PART iv, PROP 37, SCHOL 2
2. The conception of citizenship
435b-436a; PROP 73 446c-447a
32 MILTON Samson Agonistes [843-902] 358a- 7 PLATO Protagoras, 45d-46a
:
Ephesians, 2:19-22 / Titus, 3:17 Hebrews, 13:17 43 MILL: Representative Government, 424c-428a
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 30 138a,c; passim, csp 426a-b
BK 11, CH 5, 143d-144a; BK iv, CH 3 224b-d 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 317c-d
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK in, SECT n 262a- 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vi, 244d-245d;
b; SECT 13 262c; BK iv, SECT 23 265c BK x, 466b-c
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK in, par 15 17a-b/ 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK vi,
City of God, BK i, PREF 129a-d; BK v, CH 15-16 166c-167b
220d-221b; BK xi, CH i 322b,d-323a; BK xiv, 54 FREUD: War and Death, 755a-761c csp 755b-
CH 28-BK xv, CH 4 397a-400a; BK xvin, CH 75 7c / Civilization and Its Discontents, 785d-
1-2 472b-473d; CH 47 500d-501b; BK xix, CH 788d
ii 516d-517b; CH 14 520a-d; CH 17 S22b-523a;
CH 21 524a-525a; CH 24-26 528b-529a 9. Historical episodes and stages in the struggle
for citizenship
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 21,
A 4, ANS and REP 3 719d-720a,c 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK in, 104b-108d csp
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xni 107c-108c; BK iv, 152d-153b; BK v, 171c-175b;
[79-96] 72d; xvi [85-114] 77d-78a; xix [127- BK vi, 193b-c; BK VH, 245b
141] 82d 83a 6 THUG YDI DBS Pcl&ponnesian War, BK iv, 468a-
:
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 151a-c; PART in, 469a; BK vi, 520a-d; 534b-c
198d-199a; 240a-246a,c; PART iv, 275a-277d 7 PLATO: Laws, BK in, 672d-676b
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK xii [485-551] 329b- 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK n, CH 12 470b-471d;
b
331a BK in, CH 15 [i286 8-2i] 484d-485a; BK iv,
CH b
35 LOCKE: Toleration, 15d; 16c-17b 13 [i297 i6-28] 498a; BK v, CH 4 [1304*18-
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xxiv-xxvi, 38] 505d-506a / Athenian Constitution, CH 1-41
200a-215a; BK xxvi, 218a-219d 553a-572a passim, csp CH 41 571c-572a
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 327a-c; 358d-359a / 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK vi [756-853] 231a-234a;
Social Contract, BK n, 401c-402a; BK iv, 435a- BK vin [626-731] 275b-278b
439c esp 437d-438c 14 PLUTARCH: Theseus, 9c-d / Romulus, 21a-27c
40 GIBBON- Decline and Fall, 193c-194a; 226a-b; csp 22c / Poplicola, 79d-80a / Coriolanus
291d-292d; 299b-300d passim 174b,d-193a,c esp 176b-184c / Tiberius
42 KANT: Science of Right, 444a-c Gracchus 671b,d-681a,c / Caius Gracchus
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ARTICLE vi [591- 681b,d-689a,c
599] 16d; AMENDMENTS, i
[615-617] 17a 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK in, 51b-52a; BK xi,
43 MILL: Liberty, 279a-d 106a-d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 270 26 SHAKESPEARE: Julius Caesar 568a-596a,c
84d-89c; ADDITIONS, 162 143b-144c / Philos- 27 SHAKESPEARE: Coriolanus 351a-392a,c
ophy of History, INTRO, 205d-206a,c; PART i, 32 MILTON: New Forcers of Conscience 68a-b /
216b-217c; 245d-247b; PART HI, 308b-c; Lord Gen. Cromwell 69a-b
309d-310a; 310d-311a; PART iv, 316a-d; 321b- 35 LOCKE: Cwil Government, CH vi, SECT 74-76
322a; 325d-326b; 331b-d; 333b-c; 336c-337d; 41b-42a; CH vn, SECT 94 46a-c, CH vm, SECT
345c-346c; 350b-c; 351b-354a; 365b-c 100-1 1 1 47c-51a; CH xiv, SECT 162-166 63a-64a
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK n, 28d- 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK in, 413b [fn i]
32a; BK v, 127b-137c passim 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 58d-61b esp
61b; BK in, 170c-173b; 176a-179a; BK iv,
8. The idea of world citizenship: the political 269d-271d
brotherhood of man 40 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 14a-d; 15c; 29c-d;
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 9 114c-116b; 90d-92a; 521a-523a,c
CH 13 120b-c; BK 11, CH 10 148c-150a; CH 20, 41 GIBBON. Decline and Fall, 202a-d; 215c-219a;
164d-165c; BK in, CH n 187a-b; CH 22, 199c- 403b-404d esp 404c; 452d-453a,c; 562b-564b;
d;cH24203c-210a 574b-582b; 586c-589a
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK in, SECT 4 260b- 42 KANT: Science of Right, 451d-452a
261a; SECT n
262a-b; BK iv, SECT 3-4 263b- 43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: la-3b
264a; BK vi, SECT 44 278b-c 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: lla-20a,c
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK i [254-296] llOa-llla; BK 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 14, 62b-d
vi [845-853] 233b-234a 43 MILL: Liberty, 267b,d-268c
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xix, CH 7 515a-c; 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART n, 263a-d;
CH 17, 522d 275b-276a; PART in, 288c; 295d-296c; 299c-
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 471a-c 300a
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 31d-32a 50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 415b-
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 355b-c / Political 416c; 423d-425b; 431c-433d
Economy, 369a-b; 373c / Social Contract, BK 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, lOa-b; BK vi,
iv, 437c 238c-243d
232 THE GREAT IDEAS
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other considerations of the issues involved in the relation between the individual and the
GOOD AND EVIL 5d; HAPPINESS 50; JUSTICE icb; STATE 2f, 30, 3e, 8e.
state, see
The context of the concept of citizenship in the theory of constitutional government or
government by law rather than by men, see CONSTITUTION; LAW ya-yb; LIBERTY id, if-ig;
MONARCHY ia(i); TYRANNY 5~5d.
Other comparisons of with subjects or slaves, see JUSTICE pd; SLAVERY 6a-6c.
citizens
The bearing of different types of constitution on the character of citizenship and especially
on the extent of the franchise, sec CONSTITUTION 5-5 b; DEMOCRACY 4-43(2), 5b(2);
OLIGARCHY 5-53.
The political machinery, such as elections and representation, by which the citizen exercises
his suffrage, see CONSTITUTION DEMOCRACY 50-5^4); GOVERNMENT ih.
9~o.b;
The consideration of civic virtue in relation to virtue generally, see VIRTUE AND VICE yb; and
for the problem of education for citizenship, see ARISTOCRACY 5; DEMOCRACY 6; EDUCA-
TION 8d; STATE yd; VIRTUE AND VICE 73.
Another discussion of the distinction between the city of man and the city of God, see
STATE 2g; and for matters relevant to the ideal of world citizenship, see LOVE 4c; STATE lof;
WAR AND PEACE i id.
Descriptions of the historical struggle for citizenship, and for the extension of the franchise,
see LABOR yd; LIBERTY 6b; SLAVERY 6c; TYRANNY 8.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booty of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date,place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
idea of a constitution as establishing inally formed or at least differentiated from
THE
and organizing a political community; the the tribe and family.
varieties; and the nature of constitutional with the formation of states. "The act by which
government these three problems are so inti- a People is represented as constituting itself in-
mately connected that they must be treated to a State," he writes, "is termed the Original
together. We
have used the word "constitu- Contract" and this in turn signifies "the right-
tion" to express the root notion from which all fulness of the process of organizing the Consti-
other matters considered in this chapter are tution."
derived. In this sense, the constitution appears to be
It impossible to say precisely what a con-
is identical with the organization of a state. It
stitution is in a way that will fit the political would then seem to follow that every state, no
reality of the Greek city-states, the Roman re- matter what its form of government, is consti-
public and its transformation into the empire, tutional in character. But this would leave no
mediaeval kingdoms and communes and their basis for the fundamental distinction between
gradual metamorphosis into the limited mon- constitutional and non-constitutional or what
archies and republics of modern times. No defi- is
usually called "absolute," "royal," or "des-
nition can adequately comprehend all the vari- potic" governmen t.
ations of meaning to be found in the great That basic distinction among forms of gov-
works of political theory and history. But there ernment is as old as Plato and Aristotle. It is
are a number of related points in the various first made by Plato in the Statesman in terms
principle of its being in the form which the denying that the latter can constitute the form
artist imposes upon matter. In the context of of a truly cwil society, as opposed to a domestic
his general theory of political association, Aris- society or the primitive patriarchate of a tribe.
totle'sremark that "the man who first founded Yet Locke obviously docs not deny the his-
the state was the greatest of benefactors," may toric fact that there have been communities,
imply that the idea of a constitution is the which otherwise appear to be states, that have
creative principle by which the state was orig- their character or form determined by absolute
233
234 THE GREAT IDEAS
government. His point, therefore, seems to be ten or unwritten, whether a product of custom
that among types of government, absolute or explicit enactment, a constitution, Aristotle
monarchy does not fit the nature of civil writes, "is the organization of offices in a state,
Hegel, for instance, points out that "it would the duties are assigned of deliberating about
be contrary even to commonplace ideas to call certain measures and of judging and command-
patriarchal conditions a 'constitution' or a ing, especially the last; for to command is the
objectivity of possessing in its own eyes and in of sovereignty. That would not seem to be true,
the eyes of others, a universal and universally however, for those who, like Rousseau, mam-
valid embodiment m laws." Without such an tain "sovereignty is indivisible." Yet
that
"objective law and an explicitly established ra- Rousseau also admits that "each magistrate is
tional constitution, its autonomy is ... not almost always charged with some governmental
early Roman constitution, or its modern con- "Every act of a delegated authority," Hamil-
emergency grants of
stitutional equivalent in ton writes in The Federalist^ "contrary to the
government always represent limited amounts exercised, is void. No legislative act, therefore,
of power and authority limited in that each contrary to the Constitution can be valid. To
is
always only a part of the whole. deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is
shaped by custom and those enacted by con- inevitably raises the question of how or by
stituent assemblies. whom constitutions are made. If the provisions
Unlike all other man-made laws, a constitu- of a constitution were precepts of natural law,
tion the law which creates and regulates
is they would, according to the theory of natural
government itself, rather than the law which a law, be discovered by reason, not positively in-
government creates and by which it regulates stituted. But though constitutions have the
the conduct of men, their relation to one an- character of positive law, they cannot be made
other and to the state. This is
perhaps the basic as other positive laws are made by legislators,
distinction with regard to the laws of the state. i.e., men holding that office under the consti-
"The fundamental law in every common- tution.
wealth," says Hobbes, "is that which being The generally accepted answer is that a con-
taken away the commonwealth faileth and is stitution is made
by the people who form the
utterly dissolved." Montesquieu distinguishes political community. But, as Madison observes,
what he calls "the law politic," which consti- some evidence exists to the contrary. "It is not
tutes the state, from ordinary legislation; and a little remarkable," he writes, "that in every
Rousseau likewise divides the laws into the case reported by ancient history, in which
"political" or "fundamental" laws and the government has been established with delibera-
"civil laws" those "which determine the tion and consent, the task of framing it has not
form of the government" and those which the been committed to an assembly of men, but has
government, once it is constituted, enacts been performed by some individual citizen of
and enforces. pre-eminent wisdom and approved integrity."
In addition to being the source of all other He cites many examples from Plutarch to sup-
positive laws of the state for it sets up the port this observation, but he adds the comment
very machinery of lawmakmg a constitution that it cannot be ascertained to what extent
is fundamental law in that it establishes the these lawgivers were "clothed with the legiti-
standard of legality by which all subsequent mate authority of the people." In some cases,
laws are measured. Aristotle observes that "the however, he claims that "the proceeding was
justice or injustice of laws varies of necessity strictly regular."
with constitutions." What may be a just enact- The writers of The Federalist are, of course,
ment in one state may be unjust in another primarily concerned with a constitution that is
according to the difference of their consti- not the work of one man but the enactment of
tutions. a constituent assembly or constitutional con-
In American practice and that modeled upon vention. From their knowledge of British law,
it, a law which violates the letter or spirit of the they arc also well aware that a constitution may
236 THE GREAT IDEAS
sometimes be the product of custom, growing The reality and significance of the difference
and altering with change of custom. But how- between these three political philosophers
ever it is exercised, the constitutive power is would seem to depend on the precise historical
held by them to reside in the constituents of meaning each gives to the hypothesis of men
the state, the sovereign people. This power may living in a state of nature prior to political
be exercised through force of custom to pro- association. If, prior to the state, men live in
duce an unwritten constitution, or through non-political societies, and if the state, as op-
deliberative processes to draft a written one; posed to the family or the despotically ruled
but it can never be exercised by a government community, begins to exist only when it is
except with popular consent^ since all the powers constituted, then the formation of the state
of a duly constituted government derive from and the formation of its government would
its constitution. In the American if not the seem to be the product of a single convention.
British practice, the amendment of the con-
stitution also involves, at least indirectly, an THE PRINCIPLE OF constitutionality is also
appeal to the people. necessary in order to understand the familiar
Rousseau assigns the constitutive power to a distinction between government by laws and
constitution (the political or fundamental law government by laws without men to make and
made by the legislator) from the formation of administer them, or government by men who
the state by the social contract entered into by do not issue general directives which have the
the people in their original act of association. character of law. Government always involves
But is not the constitution also a formative con- both laws and men. But not all government
tract or convention? If it is popular in origin, rests upon the supremacy of law, a supremacy
either through custom or enactment, is there which consists in the equality of all before the
more than a verbal difference between these law and the predominance of regular law as
two contracts the one which establishes a opposed to arbitrary decision. Nor is all govern-
political society and the one which establishes ment based upon a law that regulates the offi-
its government ? cialsof government as well as the citizens, and
For Hobbes, and seemingly also for Locke, determines the legality of official acts, legisla-
the compact by which men abandon the state tive, judicial, or executive. That law is, of
of nature and establish a civil society results at course, the constitution.
the same time in the establishment of a govern- Locke makes a distinction between govern-
ment. It is, Hobbes writes, "as if every man ing by "absolute arbitrary power" and govern-
should say to every man, I authorize and give
ing by "settled standing laws." It is his con-
my right of governing my self, to this Man or tention that "whatever form the common-
to this Assembly of men, on this condition, wealth under, the ruling power ought to
is
tion." For him, "the institution of government All the power the government has, being only
is not a contract." for the good of the society, as it ought not to
CHAPTER 12: CONSTITUTION 237
government by laws and government by men, supremacy of law, it is doubtful that a truly
it seems to be identical with the distinction be- mixed regime is intended a government which
tween constitutional and non-constitutional is
partly absolute and partly constitutional.
government. In the latter, an individual man Aristotle, furthermore, gives us reason to
invests himself with sovereignty and, as sover- think that such a mixture would be unthink-
eign, puts himself above all human law, being able to a Greek. At least in his own vocabulary,
both its source and the arbiter of its legality. the terms roy0/and/>0////Vtf/are as contradictory
Such government is absolute, for nothing limits as round and square. Royal, or kingly, govern-
the power the sovereign man exercises as a ment for Aristotle is "absolute monarchy, or
prerogative vested in his person. In constitu- the arbitrary rule of a sovereign over all." In
tional government, men are not sovereigns but royal government, there are no political offices,
having only a share of the sov-
office-holders, and no citizens. The ruler is sovereign in his
ereignty. They rule not through de facto pow- own person and the ruled are subject to his
er, but through the juridical power which is will, which is both the source of law and
vested in the office they hold. That power is exempt from all legal limitations.
both created and limited by the law of the con- To Aristotle, political government means
stitution which defines the various offices of pure constitutionalism. It exists only where
government. "the citizens rule and are ruled in turn," for
"when the state is framed upon the principle of
ALTHOUGH ABSTRACTLY or in theory absolute equality and likeness, the citizens think they
and constitutional government are clearly dis- ought to hold office by turns." To the generic
tinctmore than opposed political his-
that, form of constitutional government, Aristotle
tory contains the record of intermediate types. sometimes gives the name of "polity," though
These can be regarded as imperfect embodi- he also uses this name for the mixed constitu-
ments of the principle of constitutionality, or tion which combines democratic with oligar-
as attenuations of absolute rule by constitu- chical criteria for citizenship and public office.
tional encroachments. Despite their incompati- The mixed constitution is not to be confused
bility in principle, historic circumstances have with the mixed regime, for it is a mixture of
cum, "royal and political government.* which the Romans express by the word "re-
It may be thought that a foreshadowing of public" and which the constitutionalists of the
the mediaeval mixed regime can be found in 1 8th century call "free government."
Plato's Laws, in the passage in which the The distinctive characteristics of such gov-
Athenian Stranger says that monarchy and ernment whether it is called political, repub-
democracy are the "two mother forms of states lican, constitutional, or free he in the fact
from which the rest may be truly derived." He that the citizens are both rulers and ruled; that
then asserts that, to combine liberty with wis- no man, not even the chief magistrate, is above
dom, "you must have both these forms of gov- the law; that all political power or authority is
ernment in a measure." Since the Persian des- derived from and limited by the constitution
culiarly mediaeval political formation which but it does not entirely divest the king of per-
resulted from the adaptation of Roman law (it- sonal sovereignty. Locke quotes with approval
self partly republicanand partly imperial) to the speech from the throne in 1609, in which
feudal conditions under the influence of local James I said that "the king binds himself by a
customs and the Christian religion. double oath, to the observation of the funda-
Thrmediaeval mixed regime is not to be con- mental laws of his kingdom. Tacitly, as by
fused with modern forms of constitutional being a king, and so bound to protect as well
monarchy any more than with the mixed con- the people, as the laws of his kingdom, and ex-
stitution or polity of the Greeks. "The so- pressly by his oath at his coronation." To this
called limited monarchy, or kingship according extent the British kingdom is, as Fortescue had
to law," Aristotle remarks, "is not a distinct said, "political." But the king also retains the
form of government." The chapter on MON- prerogative to dispense with law and to govern
ARCHY deals with the nature of constitutional in particular matters by decree apart from law,
monarchy and its difference from the mixed and to this extent the government still remains
regime as well as its relation to purely republi- royal.
can government. The mediaeval king was not a Locke recognizes the difficulty of combining
constitutional monarch, but a sovereign person, the absolute power of the king in administra-
in one sense above the law and in another tion with the limitations on that power repre-
limited by it. sented by Parliament's jurisdiction over the
To
the extent that he had powers and pre- laws which bind the king. To the question,
rogatives unlimited by law, the mediaeval king Who shall be judge of the right use of the royal
was an absolute ruler. He was, as Aquinas says, prerogative ? he
replies that "between an execu-
quoting the phrase of the Roman jurists, legibus tive power in being, with such prerogative, and
solutus exempt from the force of all man- a legislative that depends upon his will for their
made law. Aquinas also describes him as "above convening, there can be no judge on earth . . .
ganizcd into an objective constitution, but only IN THE HISTORY of political change, it is neces-
feudal monarchy." sary to distinguish change from or to constitu-
It not until the i8th century that the
is tional government and, within the sphere of
legitimate government is republican" ; for Kant, Republics are set up and constitutions estab-
"the only rightful Constitution ... is that of a lishedby the overthrow of despots or with their
Pure Republic," which, in his view, "can only abdication. Republics are destroyed and consti-
be constituted by a representative system of the tutions overthrown by dictators who usurp the
people." The writers of The Federalist take the powers of government. Violence, or the threat
same stand. They interpret the "aversion of the of violence, usually attends these changes.
people to monarchy" as signifying their espousal The other sort of change may take place in
of purely constitutional or republican govern- two ways: either when one constitution re-
ment. In the tradition of the great books, only places another, as frequently occurs in the revo-
Hegel speaks thereafter in a contrary vein. lutions of the Greek city-states; or when an
Constitutional monarchy represents for him enduring constitution is modified by amend-
the essence of constitutionalism and the only ment, as is customary in modern republics.
perfect expression of the idea of the state. Every constitutional change is in a sense revo-
Because modern republics, and even modern lutionary, but can be accomplished by due
if it
constitutional or limited monarchies, have de- process of law, violence can be avoided.
veloped gradually or by revolution out of nixed All the changes in which constitutional gov-
regimes; and because this development came ernment or constitutions arc involved raise
as a reaction against the increasing absolutism fundamental questions of justice. Is republican
or despotism of kings, the principle of constitu- government always better than absolute mon-
tionality has been made more effective in mod- archy and the mixed regime better in the
ern practice than it was m
the ancient world. sense of being more just, better because it gives
In addition to asserting limitations upon gov- men the liberty and equality they justly de-
ernments, constitutions have also provided serve? Is it better relative to the nature and
means of controlling them. They have been condition of certain peoples but not all, or of a
given the force, as well as the authority, of people at a certain stage of their development,
positive law. They have made office-holders ac- but not always? In what respects does one con-
countable for their acts; and through such ju- stitutionembody more justice than another?
ridical processes as impeachment and such po- What sorts of amendment or reform can rectify
devices as frequent elections and short
litical the injustice of a constitution? Without an-
terms of office, they have brought the adminis- swering such questions, we cannot discriminate
tration of government within the purview of between progress and decline in the history of
the law. constitutionalism.
Following Montesquieu, the Federalists rec- Divergent answers will, of course, be found in
ommend the separation of powers, with checks the great books. Among the political philoso-
and balances, as the essential means of enforc- phers, there are the defenders of absolutism
ing constitutional limitations of office and of pre- and those who think that royal government is
venting one department of government from most like the divine; the exponents of the su-
usurping the power of another. The citizens are premacy of the mixed regime; the republicans
further protected from the misuse of power by who insist that nothing less than constitutional
constitutional declarations of their rights and government is fit for free men and equals. And
immunities; and constitutional government is there are those who
argue that the justice of
itself safeguarded from revolutionary violence any form of government must be considered
by such institutions as judicial review and by relative to the condition of the people, so that
the availability of the amending power as a republican government may be better only in
means of changing the constitution through some circumstances, not in all.
due process of law. The issue arising fi">m these conflicting views
240 THE GREAT IDEAS
concerning constitutional and absolute govern- ditions.The territorial extent and populousness
ment is treated in the chapters on CITIZEN, of the nation-state as compared with the an-
MONARCHY, and TYRANNY. But one other cient city-state makes impossible direct partici-
issue remains to be discussed here. It concerns pation by the whole body of citizens in the
the comparative justice of diverse constitutions. major functions of government.
Constitutions can differ from one another in the Considering the ancient republics of Sparta,
way in which they plan the operations of gov- Rome, and Carthage, the writers of The Fed-
ernment, or in the qualifications they set for eralist try to explain the sense in which the
citizenship and public office. Usually only the principle of representation differentiates the
second mode of difference seriously affects American republic from these ancient consti-
their justice. tutional governments. "The principle of repre-
In Greek political life, the issue of justice as sentation," they say, "was neither unknown to
between the democratic and the oligarchical the ancients nor wholly overlooked in their
constitution is a conflict between those who political constitutions. The true distinction be
think that all free men
deserve the equality of tween these and the American government lies
citizenship and the opportunity to hold office, in the total exclusion of the people, in their collec-
and those who think it is unjust to treat the tive capacity, from any share in the latter, and
rich and the poor as equals. The latter insist not in the total exclusion of the representatives of
that citizenship should be restricted to the the people from the administration of the
the justice of discriminating between rich and not to separate it from the other advantage of
poor with respect to public office. Such a mix- an extensive territory. For it cannot be be-
ture, he writes, "may be described generally as any form of representative govern-
lieved that
a fusion of oligarchy and democracy," since it ment could have succeeded within the narrow
attempts "to unite the freedom of the poor and limits occupied by the democracies of Greece."
the wealth of the rich." The mixed constitution, In their opinion, representative government
the theory of representation. That begins in representative assemblies that the idea of rep-
mediaeval treatises which recognize the consult- resentation and the theory of its practice as-
ative or advisory function of those who repre- sume a place of such importance that a political
sent the nobles and the commons at the king's philosopher like Mill does not hesitate to iden-
court. But it is only in recent centuries when tify representative with constitutional govern-
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The between government by law and government by men: the nature of
difference
constitutional government 242
30. The combination of constitutional with absolute government: the mixed regime;
constitutional or limited monarchy
3& The merits of constitutional government compared with royal government and
the mixed regime 244
5a. The justice of different constitutions: the extent and character of citizenship
under each
6. The origin of constitutions: the lawgiver, the social contract, the constituent assembly 246
90. The functions and duties of representatives: their relation to their constituent!
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER. Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGF SECTIONS' When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 1 16a-l 19b, the passage
.
begins in the upper half of page 1 16 and ends in the lower half of page 1 19 When the text is
the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
printed in two columns,
nancl side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS* One or more of the mam divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cei-
tain cases; eg., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT. Nehemtah, 7.45 (D) II Esdras, 7.46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference, "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
57c-58d; BK xi, 69a-c; BK xix, 137c-d; BK 43 MILL: Liberty, 321b-c / Representative Govern-
xxv, 211c-d; BK xxvi, 223c-d ment, 327b,d-332d passim; 355b-356a; 40 Id-
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 323d-324a; 357b-c; 402a
358b-d; 361c-362a / Political Economy, 370b- 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PARTin, par 267
371a / Social Contract, BK i, 387b,d-391b; 84b; par 269 84d; par 271-273 89c-92a; par
BK n, 400a; 406a-b; BK in, 408c; 419a-c; BK 290 97d; ADDITIONS, 161 143a-b; 164 144c-
iv, 433a-434b 14Sa / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 173a-
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 24b,d-28b passim; 175c
51b-d; 154a-c; 342a-c; 592a
41 GIBBON- Decline and Fall, 73d-75a; 96d; 2b. The constitution as the fundamental law:
125a; 161c-162a its relation to other laws, as a source or
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 113b-115a / Science of measure of legality or justice
Right, 435c-437c; 450d-452a / Judgement, 7 PLATO: Republic, BK vi, 380b-c / Laws, BK iv,
586a-587a 681b-682c
43 DECLARATION OP INDEPENDENCE: la-3b 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK in, CH 3 [i276b i-i5]
473b-c; CH n [i282 i-i3] 480b-c; BK iv, CH i
b
passim
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 16, 68b-c; NUMBER 33 CH n
[1289*13-25] 488a-b; [1295*40^1] 495c;
107b-109b passim; NUMBER 44, 146d-147a; BK CH 9 BK vm, CH
v, [1310*12-35] 512b-c; i
in, CH 15
b
[u86 8-22] 484d-485a; BK iv, CH 13 466d-467a; CH 10 [i272 a35-b n] 468d-469a;
b
[i297 i6-28] 498a / Athenian Constitution BK iv, CH n-i2 495b~497b; BK v 502a-519d
553a-584a,c csp CH 5-12 554d-558a, CH 29-31 passim, esp CH 7-9 508c-512d,CH ii515d-518c;
566b-567d, CH 41 571c-572a BK vi, CH 5 [i3i9b 33-i32o*4] 523b-c; BK VH,
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [1011- CH 9 [1329*3-12] 533b-c / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 4
1027] 74b-c [1360*2 0-2 9] 600c
14 PLUTARCH: Theseus, 9a-d / Romulus, 20c-28a 14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 35c-d; 47a-48a / Cori-
/ Lycurgus 32a-48d csp 33c-35d, 47a-c / olanus, 180b-d / Lysander, 361a-d / Agesilaus,
Solon, 68a-74b / Poplicola- Solon, 86a-87b 482a-c; 495c-d / Agis, 649b-c
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK HI, 51b-c 15 TACITUS. Histories, BK i, 210d-212d
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 84c-90d; 97c-d; 20 AQUINAS' Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 97,
PART n, 99a-104d; 109b-c; 133b; PART in, AA 2-3 236d-238b
200a-b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 148c-153a;
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 462d-463b 154b-c
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 37, SCHOL 2 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 47a-51a; 318c-319b;
435b-436a 462c-465c; 504c-506a
35 LOCKE: Toleration, 16a-c / Civil Government, 26 SHAKESPEARE- Julius Caesar 568a-596a,c
CH vt, SECT 76 42a; CH vii, SECT 87 44a-b; 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK i, APH 90, 125a /
CH vin 46c-53c esp SECT 96-97 47a-b; CH x, New Atlantis, 205d-207b
SECT 132 55a-b; CH xi, SECT 141 58a-b; 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH vin, SECT 97-
CH xv, SECT 171 65a-b; CH xvi, SECT 98 47a-c; CH xni, SECT 155 60d-61a; CH
175 65d; CH xix, SECT 220 75c-d; SECT 243 xiv, SECT 162-168 63a-64c; CH xvin, SECT
81d 203-210 72a-73c; CH xix, SECT 223-225 76c-
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 216b; 262a 77a
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK ix, 58b,d- 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK HI, 9b-10c;
60a BK iv, 15d-16a; BK v, 21d-22b; BK vii, 44d-
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 353c-355b; 358b-d / 45b; BK vin, 51a-57a; BK x, 63b-c; BK xi,
Political Economy, 370b-d / Social Contract, 74c-d
BK i, 391a-393c; BK n, 400a-402a; BK m,423a- 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 361a-362a / Social
424d Contract, BK n, 403a-404a; 405d-406a; BK in,
41 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 71d-72d; 403b-c; 408b-c;418a-421c; BK iv, 432b-435a
562b-c 40 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 622d-623a
42 KANT: Science of Right, 434b-c; 435a-436c; 42 KANT: Science of Right, 441b-c; 450d-452a esp
437c-d; 439a-441d; 450d-452a csp 450d- 450d-451a
45lc 43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: la-3b
43 DECLARATION OP INDEPENDENCE: [7-28] la-b 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 8, 45a-47a; NUMBER 10
43 CONSTITUTION OP THE U.S.: PREAMBLE lla,c; 49c-53a; NUMBER 15-16, 64b-68d; NUMBER
ARTICLE vii [604-610] 17a,c 18-22 71a-85a esp NUMBER 20, 77c; NUMBER
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER i, 29a-b; NUMBER 2, 25, 91b-d; NUMBER 27-28 94d-98b passim;
32a-33b; NUMBER 22, 84d-85a; NUMBER 37- NUMBER 41, 133a-134c; NUMBER 43, 141a-
38, 117d-124a; NUMBER 40 128b-132a; NUM- 142d; NUMBER 44, 147a-b; NUMBER 71, 2l5b-
BER 49, 159b-c; NUMBER 53, 167d-168b; c; NUMBER 78 229d-233c
NUMBER 78, 232a-c 43 MILL: Liberty, 320a-c / Representative Govern-
43 MILL: Liberty, 302d-303a / Representative ment, 327b,d-332d; 350b-356b; 401d-402b;
Government, 327b,d-332d passim 413c-414d;425b-d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 258, 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 120a-c
80d-81b; par 273, 91d-92a; ADDITIONS, 116 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 273,
135c-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 173a- 91d-92a / Philosophy of History, PART n, 272c-
175c; PART iv, 365c-366b 273a; PART iv, 365c-d; 367c-d
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 680b- 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE i, 668a-
684a 669c
CHAPTER 12: CONSTITUTION 247
43 DECLARATION OP INDEPENDENCE: [7-28] la-
la. The relative stability of different types of b; [52-55] 2a; [66-67] [70-71] 2b; [95-105}
constitutions 3a
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK in 107c-108c 43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: v [74j~vi [93]
6THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK vm, 6a-b
587a-b 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: PREAMBLE lla,c;
7 PLATO: Republic, BK vm-ix, 401d-421a esp BK ARTICLE I, SECT 2 [45-47] lid? SECT 3 [81-95]
vm, 403a-404a, 405c-406a, 408b-409b, 411d- 12a-b; SECT 6 [i43)-sECT 7 [169] 12c-d; SECT 9
414b / Laws, BK in, 667c-676b / Seventh [267-275] 13d; [283-295] 13d-14a; SECT 10
Letter, 801 b-c [300-303] 14a; ARTICLE ii, SECT i [331-334]
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK xi, CH o-n 465b-470b 14b; SECT 4 15c; ARTICLE HI, SECT 2 [493]-
passim; BK in, CH 13 [1284*3-^34] 482a-483a; SBCT 3 [511] 15d-16a; ARTICLE iv, SECT 4
BK iv, CH ii [i295 b 35-i296b 2] 496a-c; CH 12 16b-c; ARTICLE vi [583-599] 16d; AMEND-
b
496d-497b; BK v 502a-519d csp CH i [i30i 5- MENTS, i-x 17a-18a; xin, SECT i-xiv, SECT i
b b
1302*16] 502d-503b, CH 3 [i3<>2 34-i303 i8] 18c-d;xvl9b;xixl9d
a b
504b-505a, CH 4 [i304 i8~ i8] 505d-506b, CH 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 8, 46c-d; NUMBER 9-10
b
7 [ I 37 5-2 7l 509a-b, CH 12 [i3i5 n~39] 518c-
ft
47a-53a; NUMBER 21, 78d-79b; NUMBER 25,
b
d; BK vi, CH 5 [I3i9 33-i32o*3] 523b-c 90a-b; NUMBER 26-28 92a-98b passim; NUM-
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK iv, 72a-b / Histories, BK BER 41, 133a-134c; NUMBER 43, 140c-142d;
n, 224d-225a NUMBER 44, 144d-145a; 146c-d; NUMBER 46-
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H,Q 105, 51, 151a-165a; NUMBER 53, 167b-168b; NUM-
A i, ANS 307d-309d BER 55, 173b-174c; NUMBER 57, 176d-178b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 105c-106d passim; NUMBER 58, 180d; NUMBER 62, 189d-
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK in, lOc-d; 191c; NUMBER 63, 192c-193c; NUMBER 65-^6
BK vm, 51a-54b; 57b-c; BK xv, 112c-114a; BK 198a-203a; NUMBER 68, 205d-206a; NUMBER
xix, 142a-143c; 145d 69, 207b-d; NUMBER 7^ 218d-221c; NUMBER
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK in, 411b-c; 76, 226a-227b; NUMBER 78 229d-233c; NUM-
413d-414c BER 80, 236a-b; NUMBER 81, 237d-239c;
40 GIBBON: Decltne and Fall, 48d-49a; 522d- NUMBER 83-84 244b-256a
523a,c 43 MILL: Liberty, 267d-268b; 269a-c / Repre-
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 10, 51c-53a; NUMBER sentative Government, 355b-356b; 361b; 365b-
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other considerations of the distinction between government by law and government by men,
and for the comparison of constitutional government with other forms of government, see
ARISTOCRACY 4; LAW 6b, ya^b; LIBERTY id, if; MONARCHY ia-ia(2), 4^46(4);
TYRANNY 5-^.
The exposition of different types of constitutions and different forms of constitutional govern-
ment in themselves and in relation to one another, see ARISTOCRACY i-2e; CITIZEN 2c~3;
DEMOCRACY 3~3c, 4a(i)~4a(2), 4d; OLIGARCHY 1-2, 4, 5a.
Other discussions of the mixed regime and the mixed constitution, see ARISTOCRACY 2b;
DEMOCRACY 3a~3b; GOVERNMENT 2b; MONARCHY ib(i) ib(2).
The idea of citizenship in relation to constitutional government, see CITIZEN 2a-2b; and for
the conception of the statesman as a constitutional office-holder, see STATE 8.
The conception of constitutional law and its relation to other bodies of law and legal justice,
see JUSTICE pc, loa; LAW 73.
Matters relevant to the conventional character of constitutions and the relation of the idea of
a constitution to the theory of the social contract, see CUSTOM AND CONVENTION 6a; LAW
yc; NATURE 2b; STATE 3d.
Constitutional government in relation to the theory of sovereignty, see DEMOCRACY 4b;
GOVLRNMENT IgO)" ^)* ^AW 1 6bj MONARCHY ^($)\ STATE 2CJ TYRANNY $.
Other discussions of the safeguards of constitutional government and of the theory and
machinery of representation, see ARISTOCRACY 6; DEMOCRACY 40, 5-^c; GOVERNMENT ih;
LIBERTY ig.
The problem of constitutional change and the stability of different types of constitution, see
ARISTOCRACY 3; DEMOCRACY 7-73; REVOLUTION 2a, 30(2); STATS ^g.
The issues involved in the development of constitutional government and the establishment
of liberty under law, see GOVERNMENT 6; LIBERTY 6b; MONARCHY 4e(2); PROGRESS 43;
REVOLUTION 33; TYRANNY 4b, 8.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booty of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date,place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
Democracy, CH 3
. MclLWAiN. The Fundamental Law Behind the
WHEWELL. The Elements of Morality, BK v, en 4-5 Constitution
CALHOUN. A Disquisition on Government . Constitutionalism and World
the Changing
A Discourse on the Constitution and Govern-
. . and Modern
Constitutionalism, Ancient
ment of the United States KELSEN. General Theory of Law and State
TOCQUEVILLF. Democracy in America ROSSITER. Constitutional Dictatorship
Vancien rtgime {Ancient Regime)
. BORGESE et al Preliminary Draft of a World
BAGEHOT. The English Constitution Constitution
Chapter 13: COURAGE
INTRODUCTION
'"TT'HE heroes of history and poetry may be it is not because nothing affrights them or turns
JL cruel, violent, self-seeking, ruthless, intem- their blood cold. Fear seizes them, as does anger,
perate, and unjust, but they are never cowards. with all its bodily force. They are fearless only
They do not falter or give way. They do not in the sense that they do not act afraid or fail
despair in the face of almost hopeless odds. They to act. Their courage always equal to the
is
have the strength and stamina to achieve what- peril sensed or felt, so that they can perform
ever they set their minds and wills to do. They what must be done as if they had no fear of pain
would not be heroes if they were not men of or death.
gives the legendary heroes almost the stature who is undone by fear. An ambush, Indomen-
of gods. In the Homeric age they do in fact con- eus says in the Iliad* will show "who is coward-
tend with gods as well as men. The two Homeric ly and who is brave; the coward will change
peopled with men
epics, especially the Iliad, are color at every touch and turn; he is full of fears,
who cannot be dared or daunted. In Tenny- and keeps shifting his weight first on one knee
son'spoem, Ulysses, now restive in Ithaca, and then on the other; his heart beats fast as he
remembering the years at Troy and the long thinks of death, and one can hear the chatter-
voyage home, says to his companions, ing of his teeth." The brave man, mastering
fear, will appear to be fearless.
Some work of noble note may yet be done
This is the courage of men of action, men in
Not unbecoming men that strove with Gods
and though war, found not only in the heroes of Troy's
We are not now that strength which in old days siege, but in the stalwarts of all other battles
Moved earth and heaven; that which we are, we are: Leomdas at Thermopylae, Aeneas and Turnus
One equal temper of heroic hearts,
Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will engaged in single combat, the conquerors in
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield. Plutarch, the warrior-nobility in Shakespeare,
the civilized Prince Andrew and young Rostov
In the Iliad, courage is the quality above all in War and Peace. It is the sort of courage which
others which characterizes the great figures of goes with physical strength, with feats of en-
Achilles and Hector, Ajax, Patroclus, and Dio- durance; and, as signified by the root-meaning
medcs, Agamemnon and Menelaus. The only of "fortitude," which is a synonym for courage,
other quality which seems to be equally prized, it is a reservoir of moral or
spiritual strength to
and made the subject of rivalry and boast, is sustain action even when flesh and blood can
cunning the craft of Odysseus, that man of carry on no further. Such courage is a virtue in
many devices, and the cleverness in speech of the primary sense of the Latin word virtus
Nestor. Yet the best speech is only the prelude manliness, the spirit, or strength of spirit, re-
to action, and except for the night expedition quired to be a man.
of Odysseus and Diomcdes into the Trojan
camp, the great actions of the Iliad are un- THERE ARE OTHER sorts of courage. The courage
planned deeds of prowess stark, not stealthy. of the tragic hero, of Oedipus and Antigone,
The heroes have boundless passions, and fear goes with strength of mind, not body. This,
is among them. When they are called fearless, perhaps even more than being lion-hearted, is
252
CHAPTER 13: COURAGE 253
a specifically human strength. Courage does not and indolence cowardice is engendered, and
consist only in conquering fear and in with- from laborious exertions and pains, courage."
holding the body from flight no matter what This, according to Hippocrates, partly explains
the risk of pain. It consists at least as much in why the Asiatics readily submit to despotism and
steeling the will, reinforcing its resolutions, and why the Europeans fight for political liberty.
turning the mind relentlessly to seek or face But the character of the Europeans, he adds, is
of a living being, manly and of ripe age, and en- consists in undertaking dangers, even to the
gaged in matter political, and a Roman, and a point of sacrifice, for the state. Moreover, for
ruler, who has taken his post like a man waiting him true courage is
entirely a civic virtue. "The
for the signal which summons him from life, intrinsic worth of courage as a disposition of the
and ready to go, having need neither of oath mind," he writes, "is to be found in the gen-
nor of any man's testimony." The burdens are uine, absolute, final end, the sovereignty of the
heavy, the task difficult but not impossible, for stale. The work of courage is to actualize this
a man "can live well even in a palace." final end, and the means to this end is the sacri-
Civil courage is as necessary for the citizen as fice of personal actuality," Though he admits
for the ruler. This virtue, in Mill's opinion, is that courage "is multiform," he insists that
especially necessary for citizens of a free gov- "the mettle of an animal or a brigand, courage
ernment. "A people may prefer a free govern- for the sake of honor, the courage of a knight,
sary for preserving it; if they will not fight for individual counts as only one amongst many."
it when it is directly attacked; if they can be
deluded by the artifices used to cheat them out THE WORK OF MAN is learning as well as ac-
of it; if by momentary discouragement, or tem- tion. Man has a duty to the truth as well as to
porary panic, or a fit of enthusiasm for an in- the state. The ability to face without flinching
dividual, they can be induced to lay their liber- the hard questions reality can put constitutes
ties at the feet even of a great man, or trust him the temper of a courageous mind. "Tht huge
with powers which enable him to subvert their world that girdles us about," William James
institutions; in all these cases they are more or writes, "puts all sorts of questions to us, and
and though it may be for
less unfit for liberty: tests us in all sorts of ways. Some of the tests we
their .good to have had it even for a short time, meet by actions that are easy, and some of the
they are unlikely long to enjoy it." questions we answer in articulately formulated
The courage or pusillanimity of a people is words. But the deepest question that is ever
sometimes regarded as the cause, and sometimes asked admits of no reply but the dumb turning
as the effect, of their political institutions. "The of the will and tightening of our heart-strings
inhabitants of Europe," Hippocrates writes, are as we say, Tes, I will even have it sol' When a
"more courageous than those of Asia; for a dreadful object is presented, or when life as a
climate which is always the same induces indo- whole turns up its dark abysses to our view,
lence, but a changeable climate, laborious exer- then the worthless ones among us lose their hold
tions, both of body and mind; and from rest on the situation altogether . . . But the heroic
254 THE GREAT IDEAS
mind docs differently ... It can fact them if which exist in the State exist also in the individ-
necessary, without for that losing its hold upon ual," Socrates says, and "they are three in num-
the rest of life. The world thus finds in the ber." There is one "with which a man reasons
heroic man its worthy match and mate ... He ... the rational part of the soul, another with
can stand this Universe." which he loves and hungers and thirsts and feels
Not only in answering questions, but in ask- the flutterings of any other desirethe irra-
Learning is never an easy enterprise, nor the husbandmen and artisans, or the workers,
truth an easy master. The great scientists and and the auxiliaries or the soldiers.
philosophers have shown the patience and per- The virtues which belong to the several parts
severance of courage in surmounting the social of the soul also belong to the
corresponding
hardships of opposition and distrust, as well as parts of the state. Wise is the man, Socrates de-
the intellectual difficulties which might discour- clares,"who has in him that little part which
agemen less resolved to seek and find the truth. rules, and which proclaims commands, that
The great religious martyrs, as indomitable in part too being supposed to have a knowledge of
their humility as soldiers are in daring, have what is for the interest of each of the three
been as resolutenever yielding to a despair parts and of the whole." Courageous is he
which would have dishonored their faith. "whose spirit retains in pleasure and in pain the
In these types of fortitude, different mo-
all commands of reason about what he ought or
tivations are apparent, as diverse as the forms ought not to fear."
which courage takes under the various demands Temperance, however, instead of being ex-
of life. Not all the forms of courage may be clusively the perfection of one part, pervades
equally admirable, partly because they are un- the whole, and is found, according to Socrates,
equal in degree, but also partly because the in the man "who has these same elements in
courageous acts themselves, or the purposes for friendly harmony, in which the one ruling prin-
which fortitude is needed, are not of equal ciple of reason, and the two subject ones of
moral worth. Yet the essence of courage seems spirit and desire are equally agreed that reason
to be the same throughout. It sustains the honor ought to rule." Justice "the only virtue which
of Don Quixote and in some sense even of Sir remains . . when
the other virtues of temper-
.
John Falstaff; it burnishes the fame of Alexan- ance and courage and wisdom are abstracted"
der and Caesar; it fortifies Socrates and Galileo "is the ultimate cause and condition of the ex-
to withstand their trials. Whether in the dis- istence of all of them, and while remaining in
charge of duty or in the pursuit of happiness, them is also their preservative." It is the virtue
courage confirms a man in the hard choices he which "does not permit the several elements
has been forced to make. within a man to interfere with one another, or
courage or fortitude among the four principal fends the laws and peace, and temperance bal-
virtues. The other three are temperance, jus- ances the economy. Wisdom would belong most
tice, and either wisdom or prudence, according properly to the guardians, courage to the aux-
to the enumeration of different writers. iliaries, while all three classes would need tem-
4
Plato names these virtues when, in the Re- perance. Hegel also associates courage with 1the
M
public, he compares the parts of the state with military class" that universal class which is
the parts of the soul. "The same principles charged with the defence of the state" and
CHAFFER 13: COURAGE 255
whose duty it is "to make real the ideality im- nor to gratify one's lust." Not only may the
plicit within itself, i.e., to sacrifice itself." But law-abiding man be called upon to be coura-
whereas for Hegel courage seems to be the fore- geous in the respects which Aristotle indicates,
most political virtue, Plato puts it last in the but it may sometimes take great courage to up*
order of goods, "Wisdom is chief," the Athe- hold the law itself against many temptations to
nian Stranger says in the Laws; "next follows the contrary. "After the death of Moses ... the
temperance; and from the union of these two Lord spake unto Joshua," and said unto him:
with courage springs justice, and fourth in the "Be thou strong and very courageous, that
scale of virtue is courage." thou nwyest observe to do according to all the
In the context of a different psychological law which Moses my servant commanded thee:
analysis, and a theory of the virtues which con- turn not from it to the right hand or to the
siders them primarily as habits, Aristotle's con- left."
ception of courage differs from Plato's in a The fourth virtue with which courage, tem-
number of respects. It is most closely allied perance, and justice are associated in the con-
with temperance. These two virtues together duct of private or public life is prudence, or
belong to the irrational part of the soul the "practical wisdom." Though Aristotle classifies
passions or appetites and are concerned with prudence as an intellectual virtue, consisting in
our attitude toward pleasure and pain. They the capacity for making a right judgment about
both in feeling and action, with
discipline us, things to be done, he also regards prudence as
regard to the pleasurable objects of desire and inseparable in origin and exercise from these
the painful objects of fear or aversion. Aris- other three virtues which he calls "moral"
totle seems to think courage more praiseworthy rather than "intellectual." Later writers call
than temperance, "for it is harder to face what the four virtues taken together courage, tem-
is painful than to abstain from what is pleasant." perance, justice, and prudence the "cardinal"
Just as the temperate man is one who habit- virtues in order to signify, as Aquinas explains,
ually forgoes certain pleasures and seeks other that the whole of moral life "hinges" upon them.
pleasures moderately for the sake of achieving The theory of the cardinal virtues, and of
some greater good, so the courageous man is one their connection with one another in such wise
who can at any time endure pain and hardship, that none can be perfect in the absence of the
or overcome fear of danger and death, in order others, is treated in the chapter on VIRTUE.
to achieve a paramount end. Since death is "the The chapters on JUSTICE, TEMPERANCE, and
most terrible of all things," Aristotle declares PRUDENCE discuss the doctrine that each of
that "properly, he will be called brave who is these virtues is only a part of virtue, which
fearless in faceof a noble death, and of all must be integrated with the other parts. The
emergencies that involve death." But it must special role which prudence plays in relation to
be "for a noble end that the brave man endures virtues like courage and temperance at least
and acts as courage directs." according to Aristotle's view that "it is not pos-
The paramount end,
the greatest good, which sible to be good in the strict sense without prac-
the moderation of temperance and the endur- tical wisdom, nor practically wise without moral
ance of courage serve, is for Aristotle happi- virtue" must be reserved for the chapter deal-
ness.Yet through their relation to justice, ing with that virtue. Nevertheless, it is neces-
which concerns the good of others and the wel- sary to consider here how its dependence on
fare of the state, temperance and courage help prudence may qualify the meaning or nature of
a man to perform his social duties, whether courage.
as ruler or citizen, in peace or war. The man
who acts lawfully will not only be just, but also THE CONNECTION which some writers see be-
courageous and temperate, for, in Aristotle's tween courage and prudence affects the defini-
view, "the law bids us do both the acts of a tion of courage in two ways. The first involves
brave man, e.g., not to desert our post nor take the doctrine of the mean which enters into the
to flight nor throw away our arms, and those of consideration of all the moral virtues, but espe-
a temperate man, e.g., not to commit adultery cially courage and temperance.
256 THE GREAT IDEAS
Aristotle originates the analysi; of virtue as By uniting caution and confidence, we avoid
"a mean between two vices . . : because the the extremes of foolhardiness and cowardice
vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is and achieve the mean in which Aristotle says
right in both passionsand actions." It requires courage consists. Both are necessary. Coward-
prudence to decide what things should be feared, ice is not the only vice
opposed to courage. The
when they should be feared, and how much; man who acts without caution in the face of
and so a prudent judgment is involved in fear- danger, recklessly disregarding what might be
ing the right things at the right time and in the reasonably feared, is foolhardy rather than cou-
right manner neither too much nor too little. rageous; even as the coward is held back by fears
"The coward, the rash man, and th brave which his reason tells him should be overcome.
man," Aristotle writes, "are concerned wath the Because he agrees that courage consists in
same objects but are differently disposed to avoiding both extremes, Spinoza writes that
them; for the first two exceed and fall short, "flight at the proper time, just as well as fight-
while the third holds the middle, which is the ing, is to be reckoned as showing strength of
right, position; and rash men are precipitate mind." These two acts are allied, since it is
by
and wish for dangers beforehand but draw back "the same virtue of the mind" that a man
when they are in them, while brave men are "avoids danger . . . and seeks to overcome it."
keen in the moment of action, but quiet before- To determine at a given moment whether to
hand." fleeor to fight, so as to avoid either foolhardi-
Aristotle is not the only one to define cour- ness or cowardice, obviously involves a decision
age as a midd leg round between contrary ex- of reason. Such a decision, according to Spinoza,
tremes. Most writers who devote any attention demands "strength of mind," by which he
to the nature of courage come to somewhat the means "the desire by which each person en-
same conclusion. Epictetus, for example, in de- deavours from the dictates of reason alone to
claring that we should "combine confidence preserve his own being." Without rational di-
with caution in everything we do," seems also rection or, as Aristotle would say, without
to make courage a mean. He points out that prudence, one may be fearless but not cou-
such a combination at first "may appear a
para- rageous.
dox" since "caution seems to be contrary to Those who, like Hobbes, do not include rea-
confidence, and contraries are by no means son or prudence as an essential element in their
compatible." But this, he says, is only due to conception of courage, treat courage as an emo-
"confusion." There would be a paradox "if we tion rather than a virtue, and tend to identify
really called upon a man to use caution and con- it with fearlessness, its opposite the
making
fidence in regard to the same things ... as unit- condition of being over-fearful. "Amongst the
ing qualities which cannot be united." But, as passions," writes Hobbes, "courage (by which I
Epictetus explains, caution and confidence can mean the contempt of wounds and violent
be united because they concern different ob- death) inclines men to private revenges, and
jects. sometimes to endeavor the unsettling of the
The difference in objects which he has in public peace; and timorousness many times dis-
mind becomes clear in the light of the Stoic poses to the desertion of the public defense."
maxim, "Be confident in all that lies beyond As Hobbes describes courage, it
may be of
the will's control, be cautious in all that is de- doubtful value to the individual or to the state.
pendent on the will." Sharply distinguishing Melville seems to have this meaning of courage
between what does and does not lie within our in mind when he says that "the most reliable
control, Epicfetus tells us to look with care and and useful courage is that which arises from the
caution only to those things in which we can do fair estimation of the encountered peril" the
evil by making an evil choice. "In such matters lack of which makes "an utterly fearless man
of will it is
right to use caution." But in other ... a far more dangerous companion than a
matters, "in things outside the will's control, coward."
which do not depend on us ... we should use If apparent fearlessness were courage, then
confidence." certain animals might be called "courageous,"
CHAPTER 13: COURAGE 257
and men of sanguine temperament, extremely ism which knows no such motivation and flouts
self-confident or at least free from fear, would danger in the spirit of Anzengruber's Hans the
"
be as courageous as those who succeed in mas- Road-Mender: 'Nothing can happen to me?
tering their fears in order to do what is expected But Aquinas, who emphasizes rational motiva-
of them. But, as Aristotle observes, drunken tion as much as Freud discounts it, insists that
men often behave fearlessly and we do not courageous men "face the danger on account of
praise them
for their courage. Plato likewise the good of virtue, which is the abiding object
presents a view of courage which requires fore- of their will, however great the danger be."
thought and a genuine concern for danger. Courage as Aquinas conceives it, though only
"I do not call animals which have no fear
. . . a part of virtue in the sense of being one virtue
of dangers, because they are ignorant of them, among many, nevertheless represents the whole
courageous," says Nicias in the Laches. They moral life from one point of view. The quality
are "only fearless and senseless . . There is a . of courage, he points out, "overflows into the
difference to way of thinking," he goes on,
my rest" of the virtues, as these in turn enter into
opinion that thoughtful courage is a quality pleasures of touch," Aquinas writes, "so that
tion of courage would involve a reasonable, a gers of death, which is a matter of very great
wise or prudent, discrimination between what difficulty, is more able to remain firm against
should be feared and what should be under- the onslaught of pleasures; for, as Cicero says,
taken in spite of peril or pain. As the Parson //would be inconsistent for a man to be unbroken
declares, in his discourse on the Seven Deadly byfear, and yet vanquished by cupidity, or that he
Sins in the Canterbury Tales, "this virtue is so should be conquered by lust, after showing himself
suffering, the toils that are fitting." prudent, since both his temperance and his
To be able to make decisions of this sort in courage result from a prudent or rational choice
particular cases, a man must have some view of of means to the end he pursues.
the order of goods and the end of life. For a Writing as a theologian, Aquinas distinguishes
man to act habitually in a courageous manner, what he calls "the perfecting virtues" of the
he must be generally disposed to value certain religious life from "the social virtues" of the
things as more important than others, so that political life the virtues with which the moral
and endure hardships is concerned. He holds
he is
willing to take risks philosopher courage to
for their sake. be inseparable from the other virtues on either
Freud seems to be skeptical of what he calls plane whether directed to a natural or super-
"the rational explanation for heroism," accord- natural end because it is the sameness of the
ing to which "it consists in the decision that the end in each case which binds the virtues to-
personal life cannot be so precious as certain gether. "Thus prudence by contemplating the
abstract general ideals." More frequent, in his things of God," he explains, "counts as nothing
opinion, "is that instinctive and impulsive hero- all the thingsof this world" and "temperance, so
258 THE GREAT IDEAS
far as nature allows, neglects the needs of the "It is the positive aspect, the end and con-
body; fortitude prevents the soul from being tent," Hegel writes, which "gives significance
afraid of neglecting the body and rising to to thespiritedness"of courageous actions. "Rob-
heavenly things; and justice consists in the bers and murderers bent on crime as their end,
whole-hearted consent to follow
soul's giving a adventurers pursuing ends planned to suit their
the way thus proposed." own whims, etc., these too have spirit enough
to risk their lives." Because their ends are
WE ARE THUS brought to the second qualifica- either malicious or unworthy, the mettle of
tion upon courage which arises from its connec- a brigand and even the courage of a knight
tion with prudence, and through prudence with do not seem to Hegel to be true forms of
the other virtues. Does it make any difference courage.
whether the end for which a man strives val- According to Kant, "intelligence, wit, judge-
iantly is itself something commendable rather ment, and other talents of the mind, however
than despicable ? If not, then the thief can have they be named, or courage, resolution, perse-
courage just as truly as the man who fears dis- verance, as qualities of temperament, are un-
honor more than death; the tyrant can be cou- doubtedly good and desirable in many respects;
rageous no less and no differently than the law-
but these gifts of nature may also become ex-
to consider only the utility of courage. Refer- constitutes what is called character , is not good."
ring to the end which he says "every man has necessary to make courage vir-
If a good will is
before him, namely glory and riches," he points tuous, then the behavior of a scoundrel may
out that men proceed in various ways: "one look courageous, but it can only be a counter-
with caution, another with haste; one by force, feit."Without the principles of a good will,"
another by skill; one by patience, another by such things as the ability to face dangers or to
itsopposite; and each one succeeds in reaching bear hardships, Kant thinks, "may become ex-
the goal by a different method." Fortune, he tremely bad . . . The coolness of a villain," he
thinks, plays a large part in their success, and adds, "not only makes him far more dangerous,
for that reason he holds no method certain. but also makes him more abominable in our
Any method requires us to use fortune to the eyes than he would have been without it."
best advantage. This demands courage and even It may still remain true that courage can
courage may improve the chances of success, of antiquity, the place of courage in the state
and it is success that counts. According to their and in the training of citizens receives particular
notions of courage as a virtue, Plato, Aristotle, attention. The constitutions of Crete and Sparta
and Aquinas sharply disagree with this, as we seem to make courage the only essential virtue
have already seen. So do Kant and Hegel. for the citizen.
CHAPTER 13: COURAGE 259
Plutarch, in his life of Lycurgus, shows how trained to be good citizens, not merely good
"the city was a sort of camp.'* The training and Arguing that no sound legislator would
soldiers.
education of all was directed to military valor. order "peace for the sake of war, and not war
1 '
"Their very songs had a life and spirit in them for the sake of peace, the Athenian Stranger
that inflamed and possessed men's minds with suggests that a broader conception of courage
an enthusiasm and ardour for action The . . . than the Cretans and Spartans seem to have
subject always serious and moral; most usually, would recognize its use, not only in external
it was in praise of such men as had died in de- warfare, but in the tasks of peace in the strug-
fence of their country, or in derision of those gle to lead a good life and build a good society.
that had been cowards; the former they de- "What is there," he asks Megillus the Spartan
clared happy and glorified; the life of the latter and Cleinias the Cretan, "which makes your
they described as most miserable and abject." citizens equally brave against pleasure and pain,
The result was, according to Plutarch, that conquering what they ought to conquer, and
"they were the only people in the world to superior to the enemies who are most dangerous
whom war gave repose." and nearest home ?"
Both Plato and Aristotle criticize the con- Nevertheless, through the centuries the type
stitutions of Crete and Sparta for making war of courage which the poets and historians cele-
the end of the state and exalting courage, which brate has been the bravery of men who put
isonly a part, above "the whole of virtue." their very lives in jeopardy for their fellow
Courage must be joined with the other virtues to men the courage of the citizen doing his duty,
make a man good, not only as a citizen but as a or, whatis still more
spectacular, of the soldier
man. "Justice, temperance, and wisdom," says confronting the enemy. This fact among others
the Athenian Stranger in the Latvs "when y
is one reason
why many writers, from the Greeks
united with courage are better than courage to Hegel, have found a moral stimulus in war;
Furthermore, military courage is not even equivalent. On this point they are answered
the whole of courage. While recognizing the not merely by those who see only degradation
need for it, Plato thinks that a wise statesman in war, but also by the many expressions of the
would put it in its proper place, if men are to be insight that peace can have its heroes too.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The nature of courage 260
3. The passions in the sphere of courage: fear, daring, anger, hope, despair
5. The motivations of courage: fame or honor, happiness, love, duty, religious faith 263
ja. The courage required of citizens and statesmen: the political recognition of
courage
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 1 16a-l 19b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of pace 119. When the text is
in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and Tower halves of the left-
printed
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halvesof the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the mam divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference, line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehcmiah, 7.45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, sec the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 327- 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 44,
328 108a-c; ADDITIONS, 189 149d / Philosophy A 4, ANS 809c-810a; Q 45, A 4, ANS 812b-813a
of History, INTRO, 195c-d; PART i, 243d-244c; 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 105,
PART iv, 343d-344a A 3, REP 5-6 316a-318b
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic^ 83a-86b 21 DANTE Divine Comedy, HELL, I-H Ja-4a; in
:^
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK H, 77d-78a; BK [22-69] 4b-d; vin [67]-ix [105] llc-13b
ix, 369c-d; BK xi, 480a-482b csp 481d-482a; 23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH xii-xm 17d-21a
BK xm, 577a-578b; BK xiv, 589c-590c esp 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 115d
590a; 605b-d 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK iv,
53 JAMES: Psychology, 826a-827a 264c-265a
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 22d-24a; 25c-26d; 115b-
2. The vices opposed to courage: cowardice, 119d; 167a-170a; 334b-335a; 337b-c
foolhardioess 26 SHAKESPEARE: 1st Henry VI, ACT iv, sc i [9-
OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 14:9-14 / Leviticust 47] 20a-b / 1st Henry IV, ACT n, sc iv [126-
26:32-40 / Deuteronomy, 20:8 / 7 Samuel, 17 312] 445c-447b; ACT iv, sc in [1-29] 459b-c /
esp 17*11, 17:24 (D) / Kings, 17 csp 17-11, Julius Caesar, ACT n, sc n [32-37] 578c
17.24 / Proverbs, 28.1 / Isaiah, 30:15-18 (D) 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT n, sc n [575-633]
Isaias, 30-15-18 46b-d; ACT iv, sc iv [31-66] 59a-c / Macbeth,
APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 3:26 (D) OT, Eccle- ACT i, sc vn [29-82] 289c-290b
siasticus, 3:27 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART n, 256c-d;
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 26.56,69-75 / MarJ(, 291c-d
14:50,66-72 / Luty, 22:55-61 / John, 7:13; 32 MILTON Paradise Lost, BK n [204-208] 115b
18:15-18,25-27 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 272b
4 HOMER: BK in 19a-23d; BK xm [266-
Iliad, 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK XXVIH,
294] BK xxn [1-366] 155a-159a /
91a-b; 239d-240a
Odyssey, BK ix [461-542] 234a-d; BK xn [m- 43 MILL: Representative Government, 392b-c
i26]251b 47 GOFTHE: Faust, PART n [97 11-9904] 235b-240b
5 AESCHYLUS: Seven Against Thebes [631-723] 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dicl(, 305a-307a
34a-35a 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 16a-18b; BK n,
5 SOPHOCLES: Ajax [733-783] 149b-d / Electra 80d-81b; 102a-c; BK v, 203c-d; BK vin, 330d-
[947-1057] 163d-164d 332a; BK ix, 344b-346a; 366d-367b; BK x,
5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [473-510] 262c-d 419b-420d; 426b; BK xi, 475b-476c; 480a-
5 ARISTOPHANES. Frogs [277-311] 567c-d; [460- 482b; BK xm, 569d-570a; BK xiv, 596c-d;
674] 569c-571d 603a-604b; 610c-611c; BK xv, 618d-619d;
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK in, 120d-121b; BK EPILOGUE I, 648b-C
vn, 216b-218b; 225c-d; BK 303c-304a ix, 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK x,
6 THUCYDIDES- Peloponnesian War, BK i, 370a- 273a-d
c; BK n, 389d-390b; BK iv, 462d-463a, BK v,
484a-c 3. The passions in the sphere of courage: fear,
[123-158] 282a-283a; BK xii [593-611] 370a; 135c; 150a-164a,c; BK iv, 173d-177a; 188a-
[650-696] 371b-372b 190c; BK v, 203c-d; BK ix, 369a-372a; BK x,
14 PLUTARCH: Aemihus Paulus, 224d-229c / 419b420c; 451c-456a; 457a-c; 461d-463c;
232a-233a; 244c-245d / Caesar,
Pelopidas, 467a-468a,c; BK xi 480a-482b; 513d-515a esp
f
539a-c; BK vin, CH 4 [^S^S] 544a-b / 51:7-13 (D) Isaias, 12:2; 35:4; 41:10-16;
Rhetoric,BK i, CH 9 [i366*33~b i4] 608d-609a; 43:1-7; 51 7-13 f Daniel, r, 3:1-4:3; 6:1-22
BK n, CH 14 637d-638a (D) Daniel, i; 3:1-23,91-100; 6:1-22
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK n, CH i 138b,d- APOCRYPHA: Judith, 8-13 (D) OT, Judith, 8:1-
140c 13:26 / Song of Three Children (D) OT,
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK xi, SECT 18 304b- Daniel, 3:24-90 / Susanna-* (D) OT, Daniel,
305b 13:1-64 / I Maccabees, 2:49-64; 6:43-46; 9:7-
14 PLUTARCH: Coriolanus, 175b / Cato the 10; 13:1-6 (D) OT, 7 Machabees, 2:49-64;
Younger, 637b-c 6:43-46; 9:7-10; 13:1-6 / 77 Maccabees, 6:18-
15 TACITUS: Histories, BK i, 211c-212b 7:42; 8:12-22; 11:7-11; 13:10-15; 14:37-46;
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR n, CH 8, 86d-87b 15:7-27 (7)) OT, 77 Machabees, 6:18-7:42;
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xix, CH 4, Slld- 8:12-22; 11:7-11; 13:10-15; 14:37-46; 15:7-27
513c; CH 20 523d-524a NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 5:10-12; 10:26-31 /
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 35, Lu^e, 1:70-75; 12:32 / John, 15:13 / Acts csp
A 6, REP 3 777b-778c 4:1-30, 6:8-7:60, 16:1-40, 19:1-41,
5:40-41,
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 60, 20,22-24 Acts csp 4:1-30, 5:40-41,
(D)
A 4-cj 61, A 5 52b-59d; Q 65, AA 1-3 70b-73d; 6:8-7:59, 16:1-40, 19:1-40, 20:22 -24 /Romans,
Q 66, AA 1-4 75b-79b; PART in SUPPL, Q 96, 8:31-39 / 77 Corinthians, 1:1-12; 6:4-10; n '23-
A 6, ANS and REP 3-4,8-9 1058a-1061b; A 12 30 / Philippians, 1:27-28; 2:29-30 / 77 Thes-
1064d-1065b salonians, 1:4-5 / Hebrews, n; 13:6 / 7 Peter,
22 CHAUCER: Parson's Tale, par 60-6 1 529b-530a 3:8-22
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 62c-63a; CONCLU- 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK v [520-532] 35c; BK vi
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK vm
[494-520] 272a-273a; 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK i, 16d-17a; BK xii, 117a
BK ix [590-620] 295a-b; BK xn [425-440] 365b 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR n, CH 8, 86d-87b
14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 39a-45c / Coriolanus, 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 105,
17Sb / Pelopidas, 238b-239c / Cleomenes, 661a- A 3, ANS and REP 5-6 316a-318b
663c 23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH m, 5c; CH vi, 9b-c;
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i, CH vm, 14b-c; CH ix, 15a-b; CH x, 16b-c;
28a-29b CH xvn 23d-24d; CH xix 26a-30a; CH xxi,
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 331a-332a; 336c-337b 32a-d; CH xxiv-xxvi, 34d-37d
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 23a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART 11, U5d; CONCLU-
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 303b-305c; SION, 279b-c
337d-338a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 53c-55d; 181d-183c;
40 GIBBON: Decline and Rail, 93d-94b; 644b- 327d-329d; 331a-332a
645d csp 645a 26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard III, ACT v, sc m
[237-
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 223a; 224a 341] 146b-147c / Henry V, ACT in, sc i 543d-
42 KANT- Practical Reason, 325d-327d / Judge- 544b; ACT iv, sc m
[1-78] 555c-556c; sc v
ment, 504a-b 558a-b / Julius Caesar 568a-596a,c csp ACT i,
43 MILL- Liberty, 282b-283a sc ii [84-96] 570b, ACT v, sc v [68-8 1] 596a,c
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK iv, 175a-b; BK 27 SHAKESPEARE- Trotlus and Cressida, ACT i,
ix, 369c-d; BK xi, 481a-482a; BK xiv, 605b-d sc in [33-54] 108c / Coriolanus, ACT n, sc 11
53 JAMES: Psychology, 82b-83a [86-138] 365a-c; ACT iv, sc i [i-n] 377a /
Timon of Athens, ACT in, sc v 406d-408a /
7. The political or civic significance of courage
Cymbehne, ACT v, sc in 479d-480d / Henry
ACT i, sc ii [68-88] 553c-d
Vlll,
la. The courage required of citizens and states- 29 CERVANTES- Don Quixote, PART i, 40d
men: the political recognition of courage 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 23a
4 HOMER: Iliad, BK xn [310-328] 85b-c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 72-73 446b-
5 SOPHOCLES: Ajax [1264-1363] 154a-d / Phil- 447a
195a
octetes [1418-1433] 32 MILTON: Lord Gen, Cromwell 69a-b / Sr Henry
5 EURIPIDES: Rhesus [150-202] 204c-205a / Vane 69b / Paradise Lost, BK ii [430-456] 120b-
Heradeidae [489-573] 252c-253a / Suppliants 121a
[297-356] 261a-c / Hecuba [300-330] 355b-c / 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spint of Laws, BK in, 12b-c;
Phoenician Maidens [991-1018] 387a-b / Ipht- BK iv, 15a-c; BK xiv, 107b-d, BK xxx, 281a
Auhs [1368-1562] 437c-439b
genia at 38 ROUSSEAU. Political Economy, 375a / Social
5 ARISIOPHANES: Knights [565-580] 477a-b / Contract, BK in, 411b-c; BK iv, 437d-438c
Wasps [1060-1121] 520c-521b 40 GIBBON. Decline and Fall, 23c, 369d-370c;
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK vn, 225c-d; 226b-c; 427a-c; 630b,d-631a; 644d-645c
233a-234b; 239a-c; 256d-257c; BK vm, 282c- 43 MILL Representative Government, 329b-c;
283a; BK ix, 291c-292a; 293c-294d 334b-c; 392b-c
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK n, 396b- 46 HEGEL- Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 325
399a, 402c-404a; BK vn, 555b-557b; 559d- 107d; par 328 108b-c; ADDIIIONS, 189 149d /
560b Philosophy of History, PART i, 213d-214a
7 PLATO- Apology, 207b-d / Cnto, 217b-c / 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 315b-c; 321b-c
Republic, BK ii, 319c-320c; BK iv, 347a-d; BK 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 9c-10d; BK in,
v, 366c-367b / Statesman, 605d-608d / Laws, 149d-150a; BK x, 445c; BK xi, 475b-476c;
BK i, 644a-645c; BK xn, 784d-786b 513d-515a; BK xn, 537b-538a; BK xiv, 610c-
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK in, CH 8 [in6 i5-b 3] ft
611c; EPILOGUE i, 648b-c; 668a-669c
b
362b-d; BKV, CHI [ii29 i9-24]377a/ Politics,
BK in, CH 4 [i277 a 8-25] 474a-b; CH 12 [1283* ib. Courage in relation to law and liberty
18-20] 481b; BKVII, CH2 [1324^-23] 528c-d; 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK v, 175b; BK vn,
CH 7 531d-532c; CH 15 [i3 3 4 a n-b 6] 539a-b; 232c-233d; 238a-c; 239a-c
BK vm, CH 4 [i338 b 8-38] 544a-b 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK n, 396b-
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK H, CH 10 148c- 399a; 402c-404a; BK iv, 469d-470b; 478d-
150a; BK in, CH 24 203c-210a 479b; BK v, 484a-c; BK vn, 555b-557b
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK in, SECT 5 261a; 7 PLATO: Apology 200a-212a,c / Crito 213a-
BK v, SECT i 268b,d 219a,c / Laws, BK i, 644a-645c; BK in, 675a-c;
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK vi [781-807] 232a-b; BK BK xn, 784d-786b
xi [225-444] 334a-340a 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK in, CH 8 [m6*i5-b 24]
14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 40c-45c /
Poplicola, 362b-363a / Politics, BK v, CH 10 [1312*18-39]
514d; CH n [i3i3*34- io] 516a-b; BK vn, CH 7
b
83b-84a / Coriolanus, 177b-179a; 180d-181b
/ Aemilius Paulus, 226c-229c / Pyrrhus, 328c- 531d-532c; CH 15 [1334*19-22] 539a / Rhetoric,
330a / Nicias, 423a-430d / Cato the Younger BK i, CH 9 [1366*1-14] 608d-609a
620a-648a,c / Clcomenes, 659d-660a / Demos- 10 HIPPOCRATES Atrs, Waters^ Placet^ par 16 15d-
:
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The general theory of virtue and the virtues, see VIRTUE AND VICE.
The virtues most closely related to courage, see JUSTICE; PRUDENCF; TEMPERANCE.
The relation of these other virtues to courage, see PRUDENCE 33-3)3, $e; TEMPERANCE ra;
VIRTUE AND VICE 2-30.
Courage and oilier virtues in relation to happiness and duty, see HAPPINESS 20(3); VIRTUE
AND VICE id, 6a.
Matters relevant to the emotional aspects of courage, see EMOTION 40(1); PLEASURE AND
PAIN 8a; VIRTUE AND VICE 53.
The general consideration of moral training, see EDUCATION 4~4d; VIRTUE AND VICE 4-40(3).
The general consideration of civic virtue, see CITIZEN5; STATE 8b-8c; VIRTUE AND VICE
7~7d; and for courage as a military virtue, sec WAR AND PEACE ice.
The analysis of the heroic and the conception of the hero, see HONOR 5-53, 5c.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boofy of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
'HE contrast between the artificial and the and "convention" cannot be treated simply
JL natural generally understood in terms of
is as synonyms.
the contribution which man does or does not In the tradition of the great books, the word
make to the origin or character of a thing. Works "convention" has at least two meanings, in
of art are man-made. The artificial is somehow only one of which is it synonymous with "cus-
humanly caused or contrived. The contrast be- tom." When "convention" is used to signify
tween the natural and the conventional or cus- habitual social practices it is, for the most part,
tomary invplves the same point of difference. interchangeable with "custom." In this signif-
Though customs are not, in the strict sense, icance, the notion of convention, like that of
made by man, as are works of art, they do grow custom, is an extension of the idea of habit.
only as the result of the kind of acts which men What habit is in the behavior of the individual,
perform voluntarily rather than instinctively. customary or conventional conduct is in the be-
Similarly, conventions, like contracts, are so- havior of the social group.
cial arrangements or agreements into which The other meaning of "convention" does not
men enter voluntarily. connote the habitual in social behavior, but
The fundamental notions with which this stresses rather the voluntary as opposed to the
chapter deals are thus seen to be closely related instinctive origin of social institutions, arrange-
to ideas and distinctions treated in the chapters ments, or practices. For example, different sorts
on ART and NATURE. For example, the distinc- of family organization are conventional in the
tion between human action and production, or sense that at different times or in different com-
doing and making, helps us to understand how munities men have set up their domestic ar-
the conventional and the artificial differ from rangements in different ways. In each case they
one another as opposites of the natural. Art in- tend to perpetuate the particular institutions
volves voluntary making. Customs result from which they or their ancestors originated. What-
voluntary doing. In both cases, the distinction ever is conventional about social institutions
between the voluntary and the instinctive might have been otherwise, if men had seen fit
the latter representing the natural seems to to invent and adopt different schemes for the
be presupposed. organization of their social life. This indicates
A third term habit is traditionally associ- the connection between the two senses of the
ated with the consideration of the voluntary word "convention," for all customs are con-
and the instinctive. Like these others, it seems ventional in origin, and all conventions become
to have a critical bearing on the discussion of customary when perpetuated.
custom and art. Aristotle, for example, con-
ceives art as an intellectual virtue, that is, a THE FACT THAT men can depart from, as well as
habit of mind, an acquired skill. For Hume abide by, their conventions that they can
the customary and the habitual are almost transgress as well as conform to custom seems
the same. Whether they are to be identified to indicate that custom and convention belong
or are only connected causally, the relation of to the sphere of human freedom. Yet there is
habit to custom not only throws some light also a sense in which custom is a constraining
on the nature of custom, but also calls our at- force, which reduces the tendency of individ-
tention to the fact that the words "custom" uals to differ from one another, and which has
268
CHAPTER 14: CUSTOM AND CONVENTION 269
according to Freud, in the neurotic disorders "to collect any general observations concerning
from which men surfer when their instinctive mankind." At least enough uniformity is found,
impulses come into conflict with "accepted cus- in his opinion, for it to be "universally acknowl-
tom." Discussing the influence of custom upon edged that human nature remains still the
the developing individual, he says that "its or- same." To whatever extent human behavior is
dinances, frequently too stringent, exact a great purely natural or instinctive, it is common to
deal from him, much self-restraint, much re- allmembers of the species, and does not, like
nunciation of instinctual gratification." It be- customary conduct, vary remarkably from one
comes, therefore, one of the aims of psychoan- part of the human race to another, or from
alytic therapy to release
the individual from generation to generation.
his bondage to custom, or at least to make him The diversity and vanation of customs seems
conscious of theway which certain desires
in therefore to be of their essence and to show that
have been submerged or distorted, and his they are both man-made and voluntary in or-
whole personality shaped, by the constraints they were not devices of men," Augus-
igin. "If
which the mores and taboos of the tribe have tine writes,"they would not be different in dif-
imposed upon him. ferent nations,and could not be changed among
Considered m relation to society, custom also particular nations." The distinction between
seems to exercise a conservative, if not repres- nature and convention can be formulated,
sive effect. Established customs tend to resist therefore, partly in terms of the contrast be-
change. They are sometimes thought to impede tween the constant and the variable, and partly
progress. But to the extent that they conserve in terms of the differencebetween the instinc-
the achievements of the past, they may be in- tive and the voluntary.
dispensable to progress because they provide The
early Greeks had an apt way of express-
the substance of what we call "tradition." A ing this. As Aristotle phrases their insight, they
passage in Bacon's Advancement of Learning il- referred to the natural as "that which every-
lustrates these apparently contrary effects of where has the same force and does not exist by
custom. people's thinking this or that," as, for example,
Over-emphasis upon either antiquity or nov- "fire burns both here and in Persia." The con-
elty seems to Bacon a disease of learning, or an ventional and those things which are "not by
obstacle to advancement. "Antiquity en-
its nature but by human enactment are not every-
vieth there should be new additions," he writes, where the same." The laws of Persia differ from
"and novelty cannot be content to add but it the laws of Greece, and in Greece or in Persia,
must deface." If custom tends to support an- they change from time to time.
tiquity against novelty, it may also encourage
inventions or discoveries which genuinely en- THE VARIABILITY of custom in contrast to the
hance the tradition without defacing it. "An- constancy or uniformity of nature puts the dis-
tiquity deserveth that reverence," Bacon says, tinction between nature and convention at the
"that men should make a stand thereupon and service of the skeptic. One form of the skeptical
discover what is the best way; but when the attack upon natural law, universal moral stand-
discovery is well taken, then to make progres- ards, and the objectivity of truth or beauty
sion." As the preserver of antiquity, custom making custom the only measure of
consists in
thus appears to afford a basis for progress. the acceptability of human actions or judg-
One other fact about customs which most ments. To say, for example, as Hume does, that
commentators from Herodotus to Montaigne the connection which the mind seems to make
and Freud have observed is their variety and between cause and effect is based on custom
variability. Customs differ from time to time, rather than reason, has the skeptical effect which
and from place to place. But this diversity and Hume intends. It substitutes the arbitrary for
variation in custom does not necessarily mean the rational. It dispossesses reason as a source of
270 THE GREAT IDEAS
either the validity or the intelligibility of our In the Gorgtas, which is named after another
conclusions concerning cause and effect. of the leading sophists of the day, Plato puts
As the chapters on KNOWLEDGE and OPINION into the mouth of Calhcles the sophistic posi-
indicate, the skeptical argument takes other tion that there is no law or standard of justice
forms. The reduction of all human judgments except the rule of the stronger. Insisting that
to opinion makes the differences between men, "convention and nature are generally at vari-
in either action or thought, unresolvablc by ar- ance with one another," Calhcles attempts to
gument or debate. One opinion can predomi- show that all of Socrates' efforts to discover an
nate over another only by force or by the weight absolute standard of justice come to naught, be-
of numbers. When it predominates by weight cause he cannot help but resort "to the popular
of numbers, it
prevails by custom or conven- and vulgar notions of right, which are not natu-
tion. It the opinion which the majority have
is ral, but conventional."
agreed upon at a given time or place. To settle As they appear in Plato's dialogues, the soph-
every controversy about what men should think ists arc
obviously impressed by the kind of in-
or do by counting heads is to hold that every- formation which fills the History of Herodotus
thing is a matter of opinion and purely conven- information about the great diversity of hu-
tional. man beliefs and practices which anyone could
Whether theskeptic reduces everything to discover for himself if he traveled, as Herodotus
opinion or to convention, he achieves the same did, from people to people, obsetvmg their in-
effect. What he means by calling everything an stitutions and collecting their legends. Herodo-
"opinion'* or a "convention" is equally inimical tus himself does not explicitly draw the skep-
to reason. In either case, the willful or arbitrary tical conclusion, yet his own suspended judg-
is enthroned in reason's place and only force can ment on many matters betokens a turn of mind
be finally decisive. The two ideasopinion and made cautious by the impact of contrary opin-
convention seem to be corollaries of one ions and conflicting customs.
another. Both imply a kind of relativity. Opin- In the Hellenistic period when the main stream
ion normally suggests relativity to the individ- of Greek philosophy divides into a number of
ual, custom or convention relativity to the so- Roman schools of thought, the skeptical posi-
cial group. Either may be involved in the or- tion receives what is
perhaps its fullest and most
igin of the other. The individual may form his explicit statement. But of Lu-
in the writings
opinions under the pressure of prevailing cus- cianand Pyrrho, to take two examples, it is not
toms of thought or action; the customary be- so much the conflict of customs as it is what
liefs or practices of a society or culture may, and Lucian calls "the warfare of creeds," which oc-
usually do, result from opinions which have casions universal doubt. Yet whatever the
come to prevail. source of doubt, Pyrrhonism states the tradi-
The Greek sophists, we learn from the dia- tional denials of the skeptic in their most ex-
logues of Plato, appealed to the distinction be- treme form. The senses are entirely untrust-
tween nature and convention and to the distinc- worthy. Reason is both impotent and self-de-
tion between knowledge and opinion in exactly ceiving. Men possess no knowledge or science.
the same way. They used the notions of opinion No truth is self-evident; none can be demon-
and convention with equal force in their efforts strated.
to question absolute standards of conduct and
the objectivity or universality of truth. The THB CRITICAL TEMPER of the Greek sophists,
most familiar of ail the sophistical sayingsthe and of an observer of men and manners like
remark attributed to Protagoras that "man is Herodotus, reappears later in the questionings
the measure of all things" is interpreted by of Montaigne sharpened somewhat, perhaps,
both Plato and Aristotle to mean that what men by his acquaintance with the Roman skeptics.
wish to think or do determines for than what is In his case, perhaps more than any other, it is
true or right. Man's will governs his reason, and the implication! pf custom which, everywhere
.convention, or the agreement of individual expatiated on in his Essays, give them their
wills, decides what is acceptable to the group. Not himself a traveler in distant
skeptical tone*
CHAPTER 14: CUSTOM AND CONVENTION
parts,Montaigne traverses the world of time we reduce truth and falsity "to the measure of
and space by reading. He becomes conversant our capacity and the bounds of our sufficiency."
with the strange customs of the aborigines and When new ideas or the strange beliefs of others
of the Orient through the reports of returned at seem incredible simply because they arc
first
explorers. He culls from the historians and ge- not our own, "we shall find that it is rather cus-
ographers of antiquity every difference in cus- tom than knowledge that takes away their
tom which their books set forth as fact or fable. strangeness."For his own part, Montaigne
Montaigne's insatiable appetite for collecting makes his "emblem" the question, "What do I
and comparing customs is not an aimless fascina- know?" This, he says, sums up his Pyrrhonian
tion on his part with the spectacle of human va- philosophy.
riety. It steadfastly
leads him to the conclusion
which is for htm the only one possible. Since ACCORDING TO the modern social scientist who
every belief or practice can be paired with its claims that custom is the ultimate standard of
opposite in the customs of some other time or conduct and that it provides the only criterion
place, no can demand unquali-
belief or practice of moral judgment, no questions can be raised
fied or universal assent. "There is nothing," he about the goodness or evil of particular cus-
writes, "which custom does not, or may not do; toms. The customs of one people cannot be
and therefore, with every good reason it is that judged by another, at least not objectively or
Pindar calls her the ruler of the world." impartially, for those who judge must do so on
To say, as Montaigne does, that "the taste for the basis of their own customs. Since there is no
good and evil depends in good part upon the arbiter above conflicting customs to say which
of taste. "We fancy its forms," Montaigne The descriptive science of sociology or com-
thinks, "according to our own appetite and lik- parative ethnology thus tends to replace the
ing/' As may be seen in the chapter on BEAUTY, normative science of ethics or moral philoso-
Montaigne assembles an abundance of evidence phy. The only scientifically answerable questions
to show that standards of beauty vary with dif- about human conduct take the form of "How do
ferent peoples. The tastes or preferences of one men behave ?" 6r "How have they acted individ-
group are as unaccountable as they are frequent- ually or in groups ?" but not "How should they ?"
ly revolting to another.
The study of morality, as in Sumner's Folkways^
Even in the field of speculative thought about becomes a study of the mores how the customs
the nature of things, Montaigne regards the which measure conduct develop and dominate;
things men hold to be true as nothing more than or, as in the writings of Freud, it becomes a
But Locke does not leave this observation of are "positive institutions" and those which "rea-
the diversity of customs unqualified. He goes on son prescribes, the laws of nature and nations."
to assert that "though perhaps, by the different The former are man-made the "result of cus-
temper, education, fashion, maxims, or interest tom and prejudice." This holds true of both
of different sorts of men, it fell out, that what written and unwritten laws, although only the
was thought praiseworthy in one place, escaped unwritten precepts are now usually called "cus-
not censure in another; and so in different soci- tomary laws." These customary laws are positive
eties, virtues and vices were changed: yet, as to in the sense that they are humanly instituted or
the main, they for the most part kept the same enacted posited by the will of the legislator
everywhere. For, since nothing can be more nat- rather than merely discovered by the reason of
ural than to encourage with esteem and reputa- the philosopher. They are conventional in the
tion that wherein every one finds his advantage, sense that they representsome voluntary agree-
and to blame and discountenance the contrary; ment on the part of the members of the com-
it is no wonder that esteem and discredit, vir- munity they govern, whether that consist in
tue and vice, should, in a great measure, every- obeying the edicts of the emperor or in giving
where correspond with the unchangeable rule of consent to the enactments of the senate.
resents a constant and common factor through- ies of positive law seem to contain.
out the diversity of cultures. Accordingly, it The principles underlying all codes of civil
would seem to follow that just as habits are law, whether discovered directly by reason or
modifications of instinct or developments of the drawn inductively, as Grotius later suggests,
individual's native capacities for action, so cus- from the comparative study of diverse legal sys-
toms are conventional elaborations of what is tems, comprise the precepts of what the Ro-
natural to man as a social animal. On this mans, and later Aquinas, call "natural law."
theory, the conventional cannot be understood Thus these writers seem to re-affirm, though in
except by reference to the natural, />., the somewhat different language, Aristotle's point
nature of man or society. that what is naturally just is the same for all
men everywhere and always, while the laws of
THE VIEW THAT conventions have a natural Greece and Persia represent diverse convention-
basis is most
readily exemplified by Aristotle's al determinations of the universal principles of
justice, and by the teaching of Aquinas concern- The theory of natural and natural law,
right
ing natural and positive law. For the Greeks the as expressed in the writings of Hobbes, Locke,
legal and the conventional are almost identical, and Kant, as well as in the ancient and mediae-
so that a kind of justice rather than a kind
it is val tradition, is, of course, more fully treated in
of law which Aristotle calls "natural." Roman the chapters on JUSTICE and LAW. But one ex-
philosophers like Cicero, and Roman jurists like ample of the distinction between natural and
Gaius and Ulpian, make what seems to be an conventional justice may be instructive here.
CHAFFER 14: CUSTOM AND CONVENTION 273
Aquinas conceives positive rules as "deter- The deepest of all moral issues therefore ex-
minations" of, rather than "deductions" from, ists between those who think that morality some-
natural law. He treats such precepts as "Thou how derives from nature or reason and those
shah not kill" and "Thou shalt not steal" as who, like the ancient sophists or Montaigne or
conclusions that reason can draw deductively Freud, find its source in custom and convention.
from the first principle of natural law, which is According to the side a man takes on this issue,
sometimes stated in the form of the command: he does or does not believe it possible to discover
Do good, harm no one, and render to each his oum. standards independent of custom, thereby to
Because these precepts are the prescriptions of judge whether customs are good, bad, or indif-
reason rather than enactments of the state, they ferent. On one belief, public manners are con-
larceny are always and everywhere unjust. But they are sometimes violations of them, just as
what sort of killing and taking of what is not positive laws are either determinations or vio-
one's own shall be defined as murder and theft; lations of natural law. On the other belief, the
and how offenders shall be tried, judged, and individual may be approved or condemned for
punished these are matters which natural jus- conforming to or transgressing the manners or
tice or the precepts of natural law leave open for mores of his group; but those manners or mores,
determination by the positive laws of each com- whether they are liked or disliked by the in-
munity, according to its own constitution and dividual, are above any tenable, objective criti-
its local customs. cism.
The theory thus exemplified, of the relation The controversy in jurisprudence and moral-
between conventional and natural justice, or be- ity between the naturalists or rationalists who
tween positive and natural law, applies to moral appeal to man's nature or reason, and the posi-
rules and ethical standards generally. For the tivists who hold that human customs cannot be
same reason that a positive law which violates appealed from, parallels a controversy in the
natural justice cannot be called "just" even theory of knowledge or science. The parallel is-
though it is harmonious with the customs of the sue, considered at greater length in the chapters
approved as morally right if it violates the right even of such sciences as logic and mathemat-
as reason sees it. The defenders of natural law, ics consists of postulates or axioms.
which is also sometimes called "the law of rea- Axioms, like the precepts of natural law, are
son," proclaim the existence of an absolute supposed to have a universality derived from
standard, above the diversity and conflict of the nature of human reason. They are self-evi-
customs, by which their soundness is measured. dent truths, compelling assent. Postulates, on
Conflicting ethical doctrines raise many is- the contrary, are like rules of positive law vol-
sues concerning what it is right for men to do or untarily accepted assumptions which, when
good for them to seek; but the moralists at agreed upon by the experts in a certain science,
least agree that morality is based on reason or become its conventional basis. In science as in
nature. For them the facts of human nature or law, the positivists recognize nothing beyond
the intuitions of reason will ultimately decide the agreement of men to determine what shall
the points in issue. However for apart Plato be ta^en for granted as true or just.
and Aristotle, Aquinas and Hegel, Kant and
Mill may be in their conceptions or analyses THE DIFFERENCE between nature and conven-
of the right and the good, they stand together, tion also enters into the traditional discussion of
at least negatively, on the question of how their two of the most characteristic activities of man:
disputes can be resolved: not by appealing to speech and political association.
the mores of the tribe, not by looking to the No one disputes whether the faculty of speech
conventions of the community as a measure, is natural to man. It is as natural for man to
not by letting the customs of the majority speak as for dogs to bark or birds to sing. But
decide. the question is whether any human language,
274 THE GREAT IDEAS
having a certain vocabulary and syntax, is nat- ciety, the question is whether the family and
ural or conventional. The answer seems to be the state are wholly natural, wholly convention-
dictated at once by the facts of the matter. al, or partly one and partly the other- their in-
Human languages exist or have existed in stitutions being erected by choice and custom
great number and and those which
diversity, upon a natural basis. And as in the case of lan-
still endure have gradually developed and are guage, here too the great books do not, for the
undoubtedly subject to further change. Hence, most part, give either of the extreme answers.
according to the traditional understanding of They do not say that the state is entirely natu-
the natural and the conventional, these various ral, that it is the expression of human instinct
tongues must represent conventional languages as the bee-hive and the ant-mound are instinc-
originally invented by this human group or tive formations. Nor do they say that the state
that, perpetuated by custom, altered by the is
completely conventional, that it comes into
conventions of usage. In contrast, the expres- existence only as the result of voluntary associa-
sive sounds instinctively made by other ani- tion on the part of men contracting to live to-
Nevertheless, as the chapter on LANGUAGE in- between the ways in which men and other ani-
dicates, the writers of rhc great hooks consider mals are gregarious. Unlike the association of
the hypothesis of a natural human language. animals, which he attributes to instinct, the so-
The Old Testament story of the Tower of Ba- ciety of men rests on reason and speech. "Man
bel sometimes interpreted as implying the ex-
is is the
only animal," he writes, "endowed with
istence of one language for all men before God the gift of speech intended to set forth the
. . .
confounded their speech and diversified their expedient and the inexpedient, and therefore
tongues. The story of Adam's giving names to likewise the just and the unjust." Because of
the various species of plants and animals in the these things, cities differ from one another, as
Garden of Eden is also cited by those who think bee-hives or ant-mounds do not.
there can be natural as well as conventional The diveisity of states rep resents for Aristotle
signs. In Plato's Cratylus the attempt is made to a deliberate inventiveness on the part of reason
discover the natural names for things, or at least and an exercise of free choice certainly inso-
to discern some natural basis for the words of a far as states are politically constituted, each with
conventional language like Greek. its own constitution. Aristotle's remark that
These who reject the hypothesis of a single while "a social impulse is implanted in all men
human language from which all others have de- by nature," yet "he who founded the state
first
natural language as impossible in the very na- contradictory; but its two parts can be read as
ture of the case, sometimes acknowledge the quite consistent with one another, if the first is
possibility of certain common elements prin- taken as signifying the natural basis of the state
ciples of syntax, if not words present in all hu- (in a social impulse), and the second as saying
man languages. The discovery of the common that a certain convention (a constitution) is re-
al as written or spoken, may have the same nat- read as maintaining the opposite extreme that
ural basis in the fact that they are all used to it isentirely conventional. The extreme inter-
express what men can naturally perceive or pretation is based on the sharpness with which
think* each of them distinguishes between men living
As in the case of language, so in the case of so- in a state of nature and in a state of civil society.
CHAPTER 14: CUSTOM AND CONVENTION 275
Though they differ among themselves in their longer spoken or a law no longer observed. This
exposition of these two conditions of man, they general compliance consists in nothing more
seem to agree that for men to pass from a state than a certain conformity among the habits of
of nature, whether hypothetical or historical, in individuals.
which men live in anarchy or at least in isola- The continuity between custom and statute
tion, it is necessary for them to enter into a as parts or phases of the positive law rests upon
contract or compact with one another. Since the relation of both to habit. "Custom," accord-
this social contract is the original, or origi- ing to Aquinas, "has the force of a law, abolishes
nating, convention by which the common- law, and is the interpreter of law" precisely be-
wealth or civil society is established, it would cause it
operates through the habits of the peo-
seem to follow on their view, the state is
that, ple. "By repeated external actions," such as
entirely a product of convention, and in no produce a custom, "the inward movement of
way natural. the will and the conceptions of the reason are
Yet Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, each in most reveahngly declared," and, according to
hisown way, add a qualification in favor of the Aquinas, "all law proceeds from the reason and
naturalness of the state, just as Aristotle qualifies will of the lawgiver." The law which a prince or
his remark that "the state is a creation of na- a people enacts, to become effective as social
ture" by piaismg the man "who first founded regulation, must develop a particular habit of
the state." The exponents of the social contract conduct in many individuals. Then and only
theory of the state's origin find the nature ofm then does a new enactment obtain the full force
man or in his reason an instinct, a need, or a law of law. To remain effective it must continue to
which impels or bids him to seek association have the support of "the customs of the coun-
with others for the sake of advantages which he try."
cannot enjoy apart from civil society. This suf- Without that support it
may be a law on the
fices to affirm the existence of a natural basis books but not m practice, for the authority of a
for the convention or contract which establishes law cannot long prevail against a contrary cus-
the state. tom, except through a degree of coercion so op-
These appaiently opposed theories of what is pressive as to produce rebellion. That is also
natural andwhat conventional about the state why the customary or unwritten rule usually
thus appear to approach each other, though one the primitive form of positive law is less flex-
ness, the other from its conventional origin. The Custom is a conservative factor. "There is
whole problem is, of course, further treated in nothing more difficult to take in
hand," writes
the chapters on FAMILY and STATE; but one Machiavelli, nothing "more perilous to con-
receives special consideration in still another take the lead in the introduction of a new order
chapter. The point concerns the relation be- of things. The innovator has for enemies all
tween the idea of a constitution and the idea of those who have done well under the old con-
a social contract. Both are conceived as the ditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who
basic or primary convention which establishes may do well under the new."
the state. The question whether the two ideas Just as custom may either support the written
are interchangeable or only analogous is exam- law or render it ineffective, so custom works in
ined in the chapter on CONSTITUTION. opposite directions as a social force. It is both a
factor of cohesion and of division among men
CUSTOM is BOTH a cause and an effect of habit. a cause of whatis called "social
solidarity" and a
The habits of the individual certainly reflect the barrier separating peoples from one another.
customs of the community in which he lives; When the Athenians refuse to ally themselves
and in turn, the living customs of any social with the Persians, they chide the Spartans, ac-
group get their vitality from the habits of its cording to Herodotus, for fearing that they
members. A custom which does not command "might make terms with the barbarian." For
general compliance is as dead as a language no all the gold on earth, they tell the Spartan
276 THE GREAT IDEAS
envoys, they could not "take part with the The Federalists, advocating the political union
Medes." To do so would betray "our common of the thirteen American states, could urge its
brotherhood with the Greeks, our common feasibility on the ground that a social union al-
language, the altars and sacrifices of which we ready existed. "Providence has been pleased to
all partake, and the common character which give this one connected country," Jay writes,
we bear.'* "toone united people a people descended from
The barbarians or the gentiles to use the the same ancestors, speaking the same language,
traditional names for aliens or foreigners are professing the same religion, attached to the
excluded by a social, not a geographic, bound- same principles of government, very similar in
ary line, the line drawn between those who their manners and customs.'*
share a set of customs and all outsiders. When the Those who today advocate world federal
stranger is
group does not adopt
assimilated, the union cannot similarly point to a world society
him; he adopts the customs of the community, already in existence. They can only hope that
The very word "community" implies a multi- if the separate states were to unite
politically,
tudc having much in common. More important the social cohesion of the world's people might
than the land they occupy are the customs they subsequently develop as a result of the fostering
share. of universal customs by universal law.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGB
1. The distinction between nature and convention: its application to the origin of the
state and of language 277
5#. The effect of custom on the training and character of men 280
8. Custom in relation to order and progress: the factors of tradition and invention 283
90. Custom as a source of opinion and belief: its influence on judgments of beauty
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK u [265-283] 12d the
number 4 is the number of the volume m the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES '.Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and Tower halves of the left-
printed
hand side of the page, theletters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the mam divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES. The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King fames
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT. Nehemiah, 7.45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
358a / Laws, BK iv, 678c-679a; BK vn, 717d- CH 7 [ii34b i8~ii35*4] 382c-d / Poetics, BK i,
718c CH 6 448c-449b
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK n, CH 8 [i268 b 23~ 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [1412-
1269*28] 464d-465b 1435] 79b-d
10 HIPPOCRATES Airs, Waters, Places, par 14, 15b
: 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses,BK i, CH 2, 107a-b; CH
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [925-1027] ii, 117b-c; CH n, 150a-151a
BK n,
73b-74c 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK iv, SECT 18 264d
13 VIRGIL: Aenetd, BK xn [791-842] 375a-376b 14 PLUTARCH: Themistocles 99b-c / Marcus Cato,
t
18 AUGUSTINE* Confessions, BK HI, par 13 16c-d/ 5b; par 19-30 5d-8d csp par 25-27 7a-d; BK
City of God, BK xv, CH 16 410b-411d / Chris- in, par 13 16c-d; par 15 17a-b; BK vi, par 2
tian Doctrine, BK n, CH 25 649b-d csp 649d; 35a-c; par 11-13 38b-39c / City of God, BK xv,
BK HI, CH 12 662c-663c; CH 18-22 664d-666c CH 16 410b-411d / Christian Doctrine, BK n,
20 AQUINAS* Summa Theologtca, PART i-n, Q 97, CH 19-26 646b-650a; CH 39-40 654c-656a;
A 2 236d-237b; A 3, REP 1-2 237b-238b BK in, CH 10, 661d-662a; CH 12-14 662c-663d;
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, xvi [64-78] CH 18-22 664d-666c
23a-b; PURGATORY, vi [58-151] 61b-62c; xi 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 61d-62a; 75a-b;
[73-117] 69c-70a; PARADISE, xv [97]-xvi [154] 78b-c; 96a; PART n, 140b
129b-132a; xxvi [124-138] 147a-b 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK in,
22 CHAUCER: Trotlus and Cressida, BKII, STANZA 4 141d-142b
22a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 46b-47c; 93b-c; 102a-
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 131b-132a; 143c-145c 103a; 143c-144a; 281a-284c; 307b; 424d-
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 294 225b-226b 426b
35 LOCKE. Cwil Government, CH xin, SECT 157 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT n, sc n [249-259]
61c-d 43b / Troilus and Cressida, ACT n, sc n [1-206]
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vm, DIV 113c-115c / King Lear, ACT i, sc n [1-22] 247d-
66, 480b 248a / Henry VIII, ACT i, sc in [3-5] 555b
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 105a-106b; 128a 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART i, 32c-33a
38 MONTESQUIEU: Sptrtf of Laws, BK xiv, 104c; 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART n, 46b-c; PART
BK xix 135a-146a,c esp 136c; BK xx, 146a-b in, 48b-49d
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK n, 402b-c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART m, THE AFFECTS, DBF
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 545c-d; 638c- 27 419a-b
639a 33 PASCAL: Penstes, 309 228b; 312 229a; 325
41 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 6b; 107b; 485b- 230b-231a; 381-385 238b-239a
486b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, 90a-d; BK i,
43 MILL: Liberty, 269c-d; 300d-302c/ Representa- CH n, s ECT 8-1 2 105d-107d passim 3 ECT 2 1-26 ;
7b. Custom as a barrier between communities Id. The influence of custom on the liberty of
vn the individual
4 HOMER: Odyssey, BK [27-36] 218b
5 AESCHYLUS: Suppliant Maidens [825-965] lld- 6 THUCYDIDES; Peloponnesian War, BK n,396c-d
13b 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 22a-c; 42b-c; 46b-47c;
6 HERODOTUS' History, BK i, 2a;31d-32a; BK iv, 143c-144a; 307b; 424d-426b esp 426a-b
137a-138c; 143b-144b; BK vin, 287c-d 27 SHAKESPEARE: Coriolanus, ACT n, sc n [136-
7 PLATO: Laws, BK iv, 678c-679a 164] 365c-366a; sc in [119-131] 367b
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK i [520-543] 117b-118a; 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xn, 84b,d;
BK ix [590-620] ?95a-b BK xix, 138a-c; 142a, 145b-c
14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 46b-c / Themistocles, 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 324a-b
99b-c / Marcus Cato, 287d-288c / Alexander, 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 41a
562b-563c 43 MILL: Liberty, 269b-271d; 293b-302c; 307b-
15 TACITUS: Histories, BK v, 295b-296a 312a passim
18 AUGUSTINE. City of God, BK xix, CH 7 515a-c 46 HEGEL. Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 355
/ Christian Doctrine, BK in, CH 14 663c-d 112d-113a; ADDITIONS, 123 136d-137a / Phi-
22 CHAUCER: Tale of Man of Law [4638-4644] losophy of History, PART n, 279c-281b; PART
238a HI, 310d-311b; PART iv, 333b-c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 96a 51 TOLSTQY: War and BK vin, 303a-305b
Peace,
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 44b-c; 46b-47a; 91d-98b 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-
csp 93b-94a; 477d-478a; 524b-d Analysts, 20c-d / General Introduction, 452c-d;
26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard II, ACT i, sc HI [154- 573c / War and Death, 755d; 757c-759d /
173] 325b / Merchant of Venice, ACT i, sc in Civilization and Its Discontents, 776b-802a,c
8/09* CHAPTER 14: CUSTOM AND CONVENTION 283
b
PART ii, 76b-77a; PART in, 95a-b [72 5-i4] 99b / Metaphysics, BK iv, CH 5-6
36 STERNE, Tristram Shandy, 309b-310a 528c-531c
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 223a-225a 16 COPERNICUS Revolutions of the Heavenly
:
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 95a-d / Descent of 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 2b-c
Man, 302a-b; 462d-463a; 569c; 571b-577d esp 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE i, 645a-
577b-d 646c
50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 427a- 53 JAMES: Psychology, 884b-886a
b; 428b-d 54 FREUD: Instincts, 412a-b
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other discussions of the distinction between nature and convention, and for the examination
of related distinctions, see ART 2c; HABIT i, 7; NATURE 2a-2c.
The consideration of the natural and the conventional in language and society, see FAMILY i ;
LANGUAGE 2-2b; NATURE 2b, 50; SIGN AND SYMBOL la-if; STATE jb-jd.
Applications of the distinction between nature and convention in law and jurisprudence, see
JUSTICE 6a-6b, 93, loa; LAW 4-4!!, 5c, yc; and for the relation of law to custom and habit,
see HABIT 7; LAW 5f.
The custom as a conservative force in relation to progress, see CHANGE i2b;
discussion of
HISTORY 4b; PROGRESS 43, 5,
The bearing of custom and convention on the issues of morality, see GOOD AND EVIL 33, 6d;
NATURE 53; OPINION 6a; RELATION 6c; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 70.
The relativity of truth to the customs of the time and place, and for the theory that the
foundations of science are conventional, see HYPOTHESIS 3; KNOWLEDGE 40, 5c; OPINION
3c; PRINCIPLE 3c(2), 5; RELATION 6b; TRUTH 7-7^ UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 73.
Matters relevant to the influence of custom on taste or judgments of beauty, see BEAUTY 5;
NATURE 5d; RELATION 6c; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 70.
The significance of nature and custom in the sphere of economic activity, see NATURE 5b;
WEALTH i, lob.
CHAPTER 14: CUSTOM AND CONVENTION 285
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booths ofthe Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings, which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
T~NEFINITION has been variously defined Aristotle and Spinoza, Hobbes and Locke, Aqui-
JLx in the tradition of the great books. These nas and William fames. Their views of the way
diverse conceptions of what a definition is raise in which definitions should be constructed or
cause, and characterizes the thing by the end it the mind, reality, and knowledge, we can nev-
naturally serves. And sometimes, as with Wil- ertheless formulate these issues in isolation.
But
liam James, definitions simply express the pur- we ought to bear in mind that t$ey
in doing so
poses or interests which we have in mind when can be more readily understood in proportion
we classify things to suit ourselves. as they are seen in the light of other relevant
In the tradition of the liberal arts of gram- considerations.
mar, rhetoric, and logic, these various concep- There is, first of all, the question about the
tions of definition are connected with contro- object of definition. What is being defined
versies concerning the power and activity of when men make or defend definitions? This
the human mind, the relation of language to question broadens into the problem of nominal
thought, the structure of science or, more gen- as opposed to real definitions. That is a complex
erally, the nature of knowledge, and the con- problem which raises a number of further ques-
stitution of reality, with particular reference to tions. Are all definitions arbitrary, expressing
the existence of universals and individuals and the conventions of our speech or the particular
their relation to one another, purpose we have in mind when we classify
x These connections appear in the thought of things? Or do some, if not all, definitions ex-
286
^'DEFINITION 287
press the real natures of the things (defined P Do that definitions are 6rst principles or foundations
they classify things according to natural kinds of science. "In Geometry (which is the only sciv
which have reality apart from our ifiind and its ence that it hath pleased God hitherto to be-
interests ? stow on mankind), men begin," he writes, "at
These issues are in turn related to the issue settling the signification of their words; which
concerning the limits of definition and its ulti- settling of significations, they call Definitions;
mate principles whether all things, or only '
and place them in the beginning of their reckon*
some, are definable, and whether the 'indefin- ing." This sh6ws, Hobbes thinks, "how neces-
able terms, without which definition is itself sary it is for any man that aspires to true knowl-
impossible, can be arbitrarily chosen or must edge to examine the definitions of former au-
always be terms of a certain sort.The sense in thors; and either to correct them, where they
which definitions may be true or false and the are negligently set down; or to make them him*
sense in which they cannot be either, have a self. For the errors of definitions multiply them*
bearing on all these issues; and through them selves, according as the reckoning proceeds."
allrun the divergent conceptions of how defini- For Hobbes, then, definition is verbal; yet
tions can or should be constructed. definitions can also be true or false, and on the
truth of definitions depends the distinction be-
WHEN IN THE course of argument one man dis- tween knowledge and opinion. "In the right
misses the opinion of another by saying, "That definition of names," he says, "lies the first use
is
just a matter of definition," the usual im- of speech; which is the acquisition of science."
plication is that the rejected opinion has no Only when discourse "begins with the defini-
truth apart from the way in which the man tions of words" can it reach conclusions that
who proposed it uses words. He may even be have the character of knowledge. "If the first
accused of begging the question, of framing ground of such discourse be not definitions . . ;
definitions which implicitly contain the con- then the end or conclusion is opinion."
clusion he subsequently draws from them. Hobbes accurately reports the nature of ge-
The underlyingsupposition here seems to be ometry when he says that in that science defini-
expressed by Pascal when, in his essay On Geo- tions serve as principles in reasoning or proof.
metrical Demonstration, he asserts that "there is The words "by definition" mark one of the
great freedom of definition and definitions are steps in many Euclidean proofs. Descartes and
never subject to contradiction, for nothing is
Spinoza, proceeding in the geometrical man-
more permissible than to give whatever name head of their works
ner, place definitions at the
we please to a thing we have clearly pointed as ultimate principles to be used in validating
out." He calls "true definitions" those which their conclusions. But, unlike Hobbes, these
are "arbitrary, permissible, and geometrical," writers do not seem to regard their definitions
The only restriction he would place upon our as merely verbal. Euclid goes further, as we
freedom to make definitions is that "we must shall presently see, and offers what amounts
be careful not to take advantage of our freedom to proofs of his definitions, or at least of their
toimpose names by giving the same name to geometrical reality. Aristotle and Aquinas cer-
two different things." And even this case, '-he tainly take the position not only that definition^
claims, is
permissible "if we avoid confusion by are principles, but also that definitions them-
not extending the consequences of one to the selves are capable of being demonstrated. But
other." they complicate the matter by insisting that
If we are free to make whatever definitions definitions are neither true nor false, since, as
we please, it would seem to follow that defini- Aristotle says, they do not involve "the asser-
tions cannot be matters of argument; and dif- tion of something concerning something."
ferences of opinion which result from differ- At least two questions seem to be involved in
ences in definition would seem to be irrecon- this familiar dispute about the arguability of
cilableby any appeal to reason or to fact. definitionsand their role in argumentation. To
Such a conception of definition as verbal avoid confusion, they should be kept distinct.
does not seem to prevent Hobbes from holding One is the question of the truth and falsity of
288 THE GREAT IDEAS
definition*. It should be separated from, even But are they merely nominal? Are they en-
though it is related to, the other question about That this word should be used
tirely arbitrary ?
whether all definitions are nominal, />., con- to name this thing is arbitrary, but that when
cerned only with assigning meanings to the it is so used a certain definition also applies
words by which we .name things. To under- may not be arbitrary. Among the several verbal
stand what is involved in this second question, definitions of a word, the one which applies in
it be helpful to consider the relation of
may any particular case depend upon the char-
will
words, thoughts, and things the process of m acter of the thing which the word is used
definition. to name.
For example, if John and fames are sons of
A DICTIONARY is supposed to contain defini- the same parents, the name "brother" applies,
tions. It does in part insofar as the meaning of but not with the same definition which is re-
any word is expressed m a phrase containing quired for the application of the name to Mark
other words which arc not synonyms for the and Matthew who, unrelated by blood, are
word in question. The combined meanings of members of the same monastic order. What the
these other words determine the meaning of word "brother" is used to mean may be arbi-
the word being defined. trary, but when it is used now of John and
For example, one definition of the word James, and now of Mark and Matthew, it
"brother" is "a male relative, the son of the would be misapplied if it did not carry the ap-
same parents or parent." Another is "a male propriate definition. Which definition is
appro-
member of a religious order." These two defini- priate in each case does not seem to be arbi-
tions give different meanings for the same word. trary, since that appropriateness depends not
The dictionary here recording two ways in
is on our will but on the objective facts of the
which, as a matter of historical fact, the word case the actual relation of the persons called
has been used. It has been and can be used in "brothers."
other ways. No one of these definitions can
still Precisely because the word is used to name a
be called "right" and the others "wrong." thing, the definition of the word as so used docs
Dictionary definitions seem to be verbal and more than state the meaning of the word. It
arbitrary in a number of ways. That the word states something about the character of the
"brother" should carry any of the meanings thing named. Definitions remain merely verbal
which the dictionary records is an accident of only so long as the words they define are not
English usage. It is arbitrary that that partic- actually used to name or to signify things in
ular sound or mark should be the name for a some way. Whenever a thing is named or sig-
male relative who is the son of the same par- nified, the definition which gives the meaning
ents. Itwould be equally arbitrary to restrict of the word must also signify something about
the meaning of the word "brother" to any one the nature of the thing.
of its definitions. "In the natural order of ideas," writes Lavoi-
Nothing about a word limits the number of sier, "the name of the class or genus is that
distinct meanings with which it can be used. As which expresses a quality common to a great
Locke says, "every man has so inviolable a lib- number of individuals; the name of the species,
erty to make words stand for what ideas he on the contrary, expresses a quality peculiar to
pleases, thatno one hath the power to make certain individuals only. These distinctions are
others have the same ideas k
their minds that not, as some may imagine, merely metaphysical,
he has, when they use the same words that he but arc established by Nature."
does." A word is thus a conventional sound or
mark, which can be given any meaning con- YET IT MAY BE said that the definition is still
vention assigns to it. When that meaning is ex- nominal, for depends entirely on the mean-
it
pressed in other words* we have a verbal defini- ings of the words which express it. For example,
tion, and such definitions arc certainly nominal one definition of "brother" involves the mean-
in this sensethat they state the meaning of ings of such words as "male" and "relative,"
a name. "son," "parent," dnd "same." If we were to
CHAPTER 15: DEFINITION <!89
look these words up in a dictionary, the def- tion, impose themselves upon our minds as prin-
initions we found would involve the meanings ciples, leaving us no choice, parallels the issue
of still other words, and so on in an endlessly between the view that the principles of a sci-
circular fashion. Furthermore, we would find ence consist of postulates voluntarily assumed
1*
the account of certain words, such as "relative and the view that they are axiomatic or un-
and "same," somewhat unsatisfactory as defini- avoidable.
tions because the meaning of the defining words Far from regarding such basic indefinable
would immediately involve the meaning of the terms as clearest and most indisputable in mean-
word to be defined. To say that "same" means ing, Spinoza thinks that "these terms signify
"not other" or "not different" seems the same ideas in the highest degree confused." For him
as saying "same" means "same." Yet we must "the true definition of any one thing ... ex-
know the meaning of "same," for otherwise we presses nothing but the nature of the thing de-
could not understand the meaning of "brother," fined." But to arrive at the true definition, it is
in the definition of which the word "same" necessary to discover the cause of the thing.
appears.
For "every existing thing," he writes, "there is
That some words seem to have indefinable some certain cause by reason of which it exists."
meanings suggests that not all meanings are This cause "must either be contained in the
merely verbal or nominal, and that the mean- nature itself and definition of the existing thing
ing of every word cannot be found in the mean- ... or it must exist outside the thing." In the
ings of other words. In the Preface to his dic- latter case, the definitionof the thing always
tionary, Dr. Johnson observes that "as nothing involves a statement of the external cause of its
can be proved but by supposing something in- existence.
tuitively known, and evident without proof, so Accordingly, Spinoza rejects the traditional
nothing can be defined but by the use of words type of Aristotelian definition as purely sub-
too plain to admit of definition." The circular- jective a matter of individual memory and
ity of the dictionary is thus avoided. When we imagination. "Those who have more frequently
trace meanings from one word to another, we looked with admiration upon the stature of
finally come to words whose meanings we seem men," he writes, "by the name man will under-
to understand immediately, or at least without stand an animal of erect stature, while those
reference to the meanings of other words. who have been in the habit of fixing their
Just as the arbitrary character of verbal def- thoughts on something else will form another
initions seems to be removed by the considera- common image of men, describing man, for in-
tion of the things which words name or signify, stance, as an animal capable of laughter, a biped
so the purely nominal character of definitions without feathers, a rational animal, and so
seem to be removed by recourse to meanings on; each person forming universal images of
which are understood without further verbal things according to the temperament of his own
explanation meanings which may in fact be body."
incapable of such explanation. However the issue between Spinoza and Aris-
totle is resolved, both seem to agree that more
NOT ALL WRITERS agree with Dr. Johnson. All is involved in the process of definition than the
of them would admit that some words must be statement of verbal equivalences. "We have a
left undefined in order to define others, but definition," Aristotle says, "not where we have
which shall be used as indefinable and which a word and formula identical in meaning (for in
shall be defined is, in the opinion of some, a that case all formulae or sets of words would be
matter of choice. It is not something which can definitions)." The formula which is
expressed
be determined by the order intrinsic to our in a phrase or combination of words must state
ideas or meanings. The issue between the math- the nature or essence of a thing, not just the
ematical logicians who think that we are free meaning of a word. "The formula ... in which
to choose our primitive or indefinable terms, the term itself is not present but its meaning is
and those who, like Aquinas, think that cer- expressed, this," according to Aristotle, "is the
tain terms, such as being, same, one, and rela- formula of the essence of each thing" and. he
290 THE GREAT IDEAS
adds, "there is an essence only of those things the beings to which we also arbitrarily assign
purely nominal only stating the meaning of example, it is not the definition "rational ani-
the word "man" until that word is used to mal" which proved, but the proposition
is
name some kind of thing. If, however, we apply "there exists an animal which differs from other
the word "man" to existing entities which animals in being rational," or the proposition
combine the characteristics of having two legs "the real being which we call 'man' is both an
and lacking feathers, then "featherless biped" animal and rational, and he alone is rational."
defines, not the word "man," but a class of real, If these propositions cannot be proved, "ration-
that is, existing things. In addition to being al animal" remains a purely nominal definition.
nominal, the definition is now also real the m That definitions are not as such either true or
sense that the class or kind which it determines false is unaffected by the distinction between
has existing members. real and nominal definitions. The point is sim-
That animals exist may similarly be a fact of ply that a definition, which is always linguisti-
observation. But "animal" is only one of the cally expressed by a phrase, never a sentence,
two terms in the other nominal definition of neither affirms nor denies anything, and so can-
"man." In order to make "rational animal" not be either true or false. "Featherless biped"
more than a nominal definition, it is necessary or "son of the same parents" makes no assertion
to verify the existence of animals which possess about reality or existence.
a certain characteristic, rationality, not pos- Yet there is which defini-
a special sense in
sessed by all animals. If rationality in some de- tions can be true or false, which does have a
gree belonged to all animals, then the word bearing on the distinction between real and
"man" (nominally defined by "rational ani- nominal definitions. Pascal suggests three alter-
mal") would be synonymous with "animal." natives with regard to the truth or falsity of
But, unlike feathers, the presence or absence of definitions. "If we find it impossible," he
which seems readily observable, the possession writes, "it passes for false; if we demonstrate
or lack of rationality is difficult to ascertain. that true, it passes for a truth; and as long
it is
Here we face two possibilities. One is that we as it cannot be proved to be either possible or
can never be sure that some existing animals impossible, it is. considered a fancy."
are andsome are not rational. Then the defini- According to Aquinas, there are two ways in
tion "rational animal" will never become real. which a definition can be false. In one way,
always remain merely nominal, the state-
It will when the intellect applies "to one thing the
ment of a possible meaning for "man," but one definition proper to another; as that of a circle
which we cannot employ when we apply the to a man. In another way, by composing a def-
word to name any existing thing. The other inition of parts which are mutually repugnant.
possibility is that we can infer the existence of a A definition such as 'a four-footed rational ani-
special class of animals (distinguished by the mal' would be of this kind ... for such a state-
possession of reason) from such evident facts as ment as 'some rational animals are four-footed*
the activities of reading and writing, activities is false in itself."
not performed by all animals. Then, members But the truth or falsity of that statement can
the class defined having been found to exist, conceivably be argued, and therefore it is not
,c$
animal" becomes a real definition of so clear an example of a false definition as one
CHAPTER 15: DEFINITION 291
which, in Pascal's terms, plainly represents an all sciences. Until a definition ceases to be nom-
impossibility. Suppose someone offered "round inal and becomes real, it cannot be used scien-
square" as the nominal definition of "rectacy- tifically in the demonstration of other conclu-
cle." The phrase "round square" expresses a sions; to use amerely nominal definition in the
self-contradiction, and in consequence the defi- proof begs the question.
nition is false. Its falsity is tantamount to the If the existence of the thing defined is either
impossibility of there being any such figure as a directly observable or self-evident, no proof or
which has the definition proposed.
rcctacycle postulation of existence is required. In theol-
The truth of a definition which is nothing ogy, for example, there are those who think
more than its freedom from self-contradiction that the existence of God is immediately seen
is
equivalent to the possibility, as opposed to in the definition of God. Descartes and Spinoza
the impossibility, of the thing defined. To call seem to be of this opinion.
the definition "son of the same parents" or Descartes argues that "eternal existence** is
"featherless biped" true is to say that the words necessarily included in the idea of God as "a
defined "brother" or "man" signify possible supremely perfect Being." This is so evident,
existences. In short, only those nominal defini- he declares, that "existence can no more be
tions which are true can ever become real, and separated from the essence of God than can its
they become real only when the possibility having its three angles equal to two right angles
they signify is
actually known to be realized in be separated from the essence of a triangle, or
existence. the idea of a mountain from the idea of a val-
edge and a compass for purposes of construc- essary to prove the existence ofGod, "accept-
tion. When in Proposition i Euclid proves that ing as a middle term the meaning of the name,"
he can construct an equilateral triangle, he es- but using an effect in "place of the definition of
tablishes the geometrical reality of the figure the cause in proving the cause's existence."
defined in Definition 20. A geometrical con- The difference between these two positions
struction is thus seen to be what is called an might be summed up by saying that Descartes
"existence proof." It converts a nominal into a and Spinoza, like Anselm before them, think
real definition. Figures which cannot be con- the definition of God is
intrinsically real, where-
structed must be postulated; as, for example, as Aquinas thinks we must begin with a nom-
the straight line and the circle. Postulates i and inal definition of God, which becomes real only
3 ask us to assume that a straight line can be with proof of God's existence. For some con-
drawn between any two points and that a circle firmed atheists, any definition of God is not
can be described with any center and radius. only nominal, but false the definition of an
These postulates give Definitions 4 and 15 their impossible being, incapable of existing.
geometrical reality.
Though the method of construction is pecu- THERE is STILL another issue about nominal and
liar togeometry, the relation of definitions to real definitions. The point involved is the one
proofs or postulates of existence is the same for raised by Locke's discussion of nominal and real
292 THE GREAT IDEAS
essences. It is also raised by Aristotle's discrim- in the mind of the speaker, stand for we know
ination between essential and accidental uni- not what; and the extent of these species, with
the difference between the unity sig-
ties, i.e., such boundaries, are so unknown and undeter-
nified by the phrase "featherless biped" and by mined, that it is impossible with any certainty
the phrase "black man." Both phrases look like to affirm, that all men are rational, or that all
definitions. Each designates a possible class of gold is yellow,"
individuals and sets up the conditions for mem-
bership in that class or exclusion from it. THIS ISSUE HAS MANY ramifications. In one
The distinction between them does not rest, direction it leads into Aristotle's quarrel with
according to Aristotle, on the criterion of exist- Plato over the method of definition by division
ence. Both of the objects defined may exist, but or dichotomy. In the Sophist and the Statesman,
whereas the first is truly a species, the second is the search for definitions proceeds by the divi-
only, in Aristotle's opinion, an accidental vari- sion of a class of things into two sub-classes, one
ety within the species man. Man, being a spe- of which then further subdivided, and so on
is
cies, can have a real essence, and so any defini- until a class is reached which has the character-
tion of man whether "featherless biped" or istics of the object to be defined. The attempt
"rational animal" can be a real definition, con- to define a sophist, for example, starts with the
stituted by genus and differentia. But negro or notion that he is a man of art, and proceeds by
aryan, not being a species, but only a race or dividing and subdividing the various kinds of
variety, has no essence as such. The definitions art.At one point in the course of doing this, the
"black man" and "white man" indicate Athenian Stranger summarizes the process to
this in thatthey are constituted by two terms that point.
which are related as substance and accident, not "You and I," he says to Theaetetus, "have
as genus and differentia. come to an understanding not only about the
Though Aristotle distinguishes these two name of the angler's art, but about the defini-
types of formulae as essential and accidental tion of the thing itself. One half of all art was
definitions rather than as real and nominal defi- acquisitive half of the acquisitive art was con-
nitions, the one principle of distinction is close- quest or taking by force, half of this was hunt-
ly related to the other, for only essential defini- ing, and half of hunting was hunting animals,
tions can have real essences for their objects. half of this was hunting water animals of this
Accidental definitions do more than state
little again, the under half was fishing, half of fishing
the meanings of words, or express what Locke was striking; a part of striking was fishing with
calls the "nominal essences" of things. He a barb, and one half of being the
this again,
doubts that the definition of anything except a kind which strikes with a hook and draws the
mathematical object can ever grasp the real es- fish from below upwards, is the art which we
sence of a thing. For him all definitions are have been seeking, and which from the nature
nominal, which is
equivalent to saying that we of the operation is denoted angling or drawing
never define by means of the true genus and up ... And now, following this pattern," he
differentia, but always by accidental and exter- continues, "let us endeavor to find out what a
nal signs, or by stating the component parts of Sophist is."
"Speaking of a man, or gold," Locke ex- the course of division, one of the two classes is
plains, "or any other species of natural sub- discarded while the other is subject to further
stance, as supposed constituted by a precise and subdivision. Aristotle's criticism of this pro-
real essence which nature regularly imparts to cedure turns partly on the fact that the divi-
every individual of that kind, whereby it is sion is
always dichotomous, or into two sub-
made to be of that species, we cannot be certain classes, and partly on the fact that the terms
of the truth of any affirmation or negation which Plato uses in a succession of subdivisions
made of it. For man or gold, taken in this sense, do not seem to have any systematic relation to
and used for species of things constituted by one another. If the class of animals, for exam-
real essences, different from the complex idea ple, is divided into those with and those with-
CHAPTER 15: DEFINITION 293
out feet, it makes a difference, according to vary from man to man and from hour to horfr."
Aristotle, what terms are then used to differ- In a footnote lames adds: "A substance like
entiate footed animals into their proper sub- oil has as many different essences as it has uses
classes. to different individuals." The classification of
"It necessary," he insists, "that the divi-
is natural as well as artificial objects should there-
sion be by the differentia of the differentia; e.g., fore proceed according to the advice' Mephis^
'endowed with feet' is a differentia of 'animal'; topheles gives to the student in Goethe's Faust.
again the differentia of 'animal endowed with "You will have more success," he says, "if you
feet' must be of it qua endowed with feet. will learn to reduce all, and to classify each ac-
Therefore we must not say, if we are to speak cording to its use." But if this is so, then no one
cloven; for these are differentiae in the foot; things. Some classifications may be more sig-
cloven-footcdness is a form of footedness. And nificant than others, but only by reference to
the process wants always to go on so till it our interests, not because they represent reality
reaches the species that contains no difference. more accurately or adequately, It does not mat-
And then there will be as many kinds of foot as ter, therefore, whether we define by genus and
there are differentiae, and the kinds of animals differentia, by other characteristics in combina-
endowed with feet will be equal in number to tion, or by reference to origins or functions.
the differentiae. If then this is so, clearly the Darwin's scheme of classification provides
last differentia will be the essence of the thing evidence relevant to this whole issue. As indi-
and its definition." cated in the chapters on ANIMAL and EVOLU-
As Aristotle quarrels with Plato's method of TION, Darwin thinks that his genealogical clas-
division, so William James takes issue with Aris- sificationof plants and animals conies nearer to
totle's theory that a real essence is defined when the natural system of living organisms than the
the right differentia is properly chosen within a classifications proposed by his predecessors.
certain genus of things. He tends to follow "The Natural System," he writes, "is a genea-
Locke's notion that definitions indicate no logical arrangement, with the acquired grades
more than the nominal essences of things, but of difference, marked by the terms, varieties,
he gives this theory a special twist by adding species, genera, families, etc.; and we have to
the notion that all our definitions merely group discover the lines of descent by the most per-
things according to the interest or purpose, manent characters whatever they may be and
whether theoretical or practical, which moti- of however slight vital importance." Hence-
vates our classification of them. This has come forth, following his method, "systematists will
to be known as the pragmatic theory of have only to decide whether any form be
. . .
"My thinking," writes James, "is first and forms, to be capable of definition; and if de-
lastand always for the sake of my doing." After finable, whether the differences be sufficiently
pointing out that Locke "undermined the fal- important to deserve a specific name."
lacy" of supposing that we can define the real But Darwin's statement re-opens rather than
essences of things, he goes on to say that "none resolves the great traditional questions. Are the
of his successors, as far as I know, have radically various groupings made in classification divi-
escaped it, or seen that the only meaning of es- sions which the classifier finds useful to impose
sence is ideological^ and that classification and on nature, or do they represent lines of real
conception are purely ideological weapons of the distinction in the very nature of things? If the
mind. The essence of a thing is that one of its latter is the case, either wholly or in part, are
properties which is so important for my interests we able to do more than approximate real dis-
that in comparison with it I may neglect the tinction by whatever method of definition we
rest. . . . The properties which are important employ? Can we discover real species, cssen-
294 THE GREAT JDEAS
tially distinct from one another, and can our mind to submit itself to the test of agreement
definitions formulate the essence of each ? with reality. Definition helps man to ask nature
or experience the only sort of question to which
THE SEARCH FOR definitions basically belongs to answers can be found,
the activity of the human mind in all its scien- The search for definitions has, perhaps, its
tific or dialectical efforts to clarify discourse, to most dramatic exemplification in the dialogues
achieve precision of thought, to focus issues and of Plato. Socrates usually leads the conversation
to resolve them. in quest of them; though it is
only in certain
Men have no other way of coming to terms dialogues, such as the Sophist and the States-
with one another than by defining the words man, that the making of definitions is
practiced
they use to express their concepts or meanings, in detail. Two other books in this set are largely
They make terms out of words by endowing concerned with ways of reaching and defending
words with exactness or precision of meaning, definitions Aristotle's Topics (which should be
Definition does this and makes possible the considered together with the opening chapters
meeting of minds either m agreement or in dis- of his Parts of Animals) and Bacon's Novum
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
'
PAGB
1. The theory of definition 295
la. The object of definition: definitions as arbitrary and nominal or real and con-
cerned with essence
id. The unity of a definition in relation to the unity of the thing defined 297
ic. The truth and falsity of definitions
3.
The grammatical or verbal aspects of definition 299
6V. The role of definitions in practical or moral philosophy and the social sciences 301
CHAPTER 15: DEFINITION 295
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, whicn arc me voiurac and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set, the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS- When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 J AM ES Psychology, 116a-l 19b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower haft of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the mam divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in ecu*
tain cases; c,g. y Iliad, BK u [265-283] 12d. :
BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
:
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the fCing
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference, "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
(1. The theory of definition. la. The object of \b. The purpose of definition: the clarification
definition; definitions as arbitrary and nom- of ideas
inal or real and concerned ivitk essence.) 7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 120a-b / Meno, 174a-179b /
b
CH i [io25 28-io26*6]547d-548a; BK vn, Euthyphro, 193c / Seventh Letter, 809c-810b
CH i
[1028*31-37] 550d; CH 4-6 552b-555a; 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK 11, CH 14
a
CH 10-17 558a-566a,c; BK vin, CH 2-3 566d- [98*1-2] 133c-d / Topics, BK i, CH 18 [io8
b b
568d; CH 6 569d-570d; BK x, CH i [i052 i- 17-37] 152b-d; BK vi, CH i [i39 n-i5]
15] 578d-579a; BK xr, CH 5 590a-d; BK 192b-c; CH 4 [141*26-32] 194c; BK vin, CH 3
b
xin, CH 4 [io78 i8-32] 610b-c / Soul, BK i, [158*31-159*2] 214d-215c / Metaphysics, BK
CH i 631a-632d; BK in, CH 6 [43o b 26~3i] iv, CH 4 525a-528b; BK xi, CH 5 590a-d / Soul,
663b-c BK i, CH i [402 b 1 5-403*2] 631d-632a
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK n, CH 2
b
[641*14-31] 163d-164a; CH 2-4 165d-168c [648 i~5] 172d / Rhetoric, BK n, CH 23 [1398*
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i, A 15-27] 646c
7, REP i 7a-c; Q 2, A i, REP 2 10d-lld; A 2, 12 AURELIUS. Meditations, BK HI, SECT n 262a-b
REP 2 lld-12c; Q 3, A 3, ANS 16a-d; A 5, ANS 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologtca, PART i, Q 85,
17c-18b; Q 17, A 3 102d-103c; Q 29, A i, A 3, REP 3 455b-457a
REP 1,3-4 162a-163b; A 2, REP 3 163b-164b; 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 56b; 58d-59a;
Q 44, A i, REP i 238b-239a; A 3, REP 3 240b- PART iv, 269b-c
241a; Q 58, A 5 303c-304c; Q 75, A 4, ANS 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY,
381b-382a; Q 85, A 6 458d-459c; Q n6, A i, 142d-143a
CONTRARY 592d-593d 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 60b-c;
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-H, Q 4, 61b-c / Novum Organum, BK i, APH 59
A i, ANS 402a-403d; PART in, Q 2, A 2, ANS 112b-c
711d-712d; Q 60, A 4, REP i 849c-850b 31 DESCARTES. Rules, xn, 23c-24a; xin, 26b-c
23 HOBBRS: Leviathan, PART i, 55b-c; 56b; 59c-d; 33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 430b-
PART iv, 270a-c 434 b passim
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 518d-519a 34 NEWTON* Principles, DEFINITIONS, SCHOL, 8b
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 142d- 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK HI, CH iv,
143a SECT 6-14 260d-263a
30 BACON: Novum Qrganum, BK 11, APH 4 137d- 35 HUME- Human Understanding, SECT vin,
138b Div62478b-c; Div74484a-c
31 DESCARTES: Rules, xin, 26b-c / Objections 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 113b-c / Practical Reason,
and Replies, POSTULATE iv 131a-b 293c-294b
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 8, SCHOL 2 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 377d
356d-357d; PART n, PROP 40, SCHOL i 387b- 45 LAVOISILR: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 4a-
388a; PART HI, PROP 4 398d SC;PARTI, lOa-b; 21a-22c
33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 372b-373b; 376b-377a / 45 FARADAY. Researches in Electricity, 361a-b
Geometrical Demonstration, 430b-431b 46 HEGEL. Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 2
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH 9b-10a
xxxi, SECT 6-13 240d-243b, CH xxxn, 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 207d-208a
SECT 18 246c-247a; SECT 24 247c-d; BK in, 51 TOLSTOY. War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 694b-d
CH in, SECT 11-20 257a-260a esp SECT 18-20 53 JAMES: Psychology, 314a-b; 669a-671a; 871a-b
259b-260a; CH v, SECT 14 267b-c; CH vi
268b-283a; CH x, SECT 17-21 295d-297b; CH
Ic. The limits of definition: the definable and
the indefinable
xi, SECT 15-24 303b-305d; BK iv, CH iv,
SECT 11-17 326b-328d passim; c*f vi, SECT 7 PLATO: Republic, BK vi, 384a-388a / Theaete-
4-16 331d-336d passim; CH xn, SECT 9 360d- tus, 544c-547c /
Seventh^
809c-810b
Letter,
SARisTOTiE- Metaphysics, BK i, CH 9
Human b
35 BERKELEY: Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 24-993*1] 511a-b; BK 11, CH 2
b
18 410a-c 513a-b; BK v, CH 3 [ioi4 3-i3) 534d; BK vn,
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 179d-182b; 215d-216c / CH 4-5 552b-554a; CH 10-11 558a-561a; CH
Science of Right, 404d; 423d-424b 13 [1039*15-23] 563a; CH 15 563c-564c; BK
,
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i, vm, CH 3 [io43 b 23~33] 568b; BK x, CH 8-9
lOa-b 585b-586c
46 HEGBL: Philosophy of History\ INTRO, 176c; 17 PLOTINUS: Fifth Ennead, TR v, CH 6 231b d
184d-185a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i, A
49,DARwm: Origin of Species, 27b-29a csp 29a 7, REP i 7a-c; Q 2, A i, REP 2 10d-lld; A 2,
51 TOL$TOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, REP 2 lld-12c; Q 3, A 3, ANS 16a-d; A 5, ANS
17c-18b; Q 29, A i, REP i 162a-163b; A 2,
53 JAMES: Psychology, 106a; 185a-b; 668a-671a; REP 3 163b-164b; Q 44, A 3, REP 3 240b-
241a; Q 85, A i, REP 2 451c-453c
\dtolb CHAPTER 15: DEFINITION 2*7
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK i, APH 59 112b*c 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY,
31 DESCARTES: Rules, xn, 23c-24a 200a-b
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, AXIOM 2 355d 30 BACON* Novum Organum, BK i, APH 59 112b-
33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 431b- c; BK n, APH 35 162a-164a
434b; 442a-443b 31 DESCARTES: Rules, xm, 26bc
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH 11, 31 SPINOZA* Ethics, PART i, PROP 8, SCHOL 2,
SECT i 127d-128a; CH iv, SECT 6 131a; CH 357b-d; PART n, PROP 40, SCHOL 1-2 387b-
xx, SECT i 176b-c; BK in, CH iv, SECT 4-17 388b
260b-263c; CH vi 268b-283a passim, csp 33 PASCAL Geometrical Demonstration, 430b-
SECT 7-10 270b-271b; CH xi, SECT 13-25 431b
302d-306c 35 LOCKE* Human Understanding, BK n, CH
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vn, DIV xxxn 243c-248b passim
49 471c-d 42 KANT* Pure Reason, 179d-182b
42 KANT- Pure Reason, 29d-33d; 53b-54b; 43 MILL Utilitarianism, 469a-b
179d-182b; 215d-216c /Judgement, 603a-604b 44 BOSWFLL: Johnson, 82a-c
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 37, 119b-120b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, IN IRQ, par 2 9b-
44 Bosw ELL: Johnson, 82b lOa
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 242a/ Descent of 53 JAMES: Psychology, 669a-671a
Man, 346d-347b
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 694b-d
2. The various methods of definition or classi-
fication
53 JAMES: Psychology, 314a
Id. The unity of a definition in relation to the 2a. The use of division or dichotomy in defi-
TIONS 301a-302b esp 14 301b, 18,21 302a 209a; SECT 37 213d-214b; BK in, CH ix, SECT
11 ARCHIMEDES: Sphere and Cylinder, BK r, DEF- 15-17 288d-290a; CH xi, SECT 10 302b; SECT
INITIONS 404a / Conoids and Spheroids, 452a- 19-25 304b-306c
454a passim; DEFINITIONS 455a-b / Spirals, 35 HUME* Human Understanding, SECT 11, DIV
DEFINITIONS 490a / Equilibrium of Planes, BK 17, 457b,d [fn i]; SECT vn, DIV 48-49 470d-
n, 51 la / Sand-Reckoner, 524a-b / Quadrature 471d; SECT vin, DIV 74 484a-c
ofthe Parabola, DEF 534b-535a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, I5c-16c; 215d-216d;
11 APOLLONIUS: Conies, BK i, FIRST DEFINI- 243c-244c / Practical Reason, 293c-294b / In-
TIONS 604a-b esp i 604a; SECOND DEFINITIONS Metaphysic of Morals, 388a-c /Judgement,
tro.
626a 603b-d
11 NICOMACHUS* Arithmetic, BK i, 814b-c 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 37, 119b-120b
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK v, 986b*1004a passim 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART I, lOa-
17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR in, CH i, 281 a- b b; 21a-22c;
6c CHAPTER 15: DEFINITION 301
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 184a-187b lllb; Q 90 205a-208b; PART n-ii, Q 4, A i
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 361a-d 402a-403d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 2 23 HOBBBS: Leviathan, PART i, 57d-58a
9b-10a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK in, CH xi,
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE u, 690b; SECT 17 303d-304a; BK iv, CH HI, SECT 20,
694bd 319b
53 JAMES Psychology, 3b-4a, 869a-871a csp 870a-
: 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT VH, DIV
871a 48-49 470d-471d
54 FREUD: Narcissism, 400d-401a / Instincts, 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK n, 4a
412a-413b 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 330a-d
42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 271a-
6c. The role of definitions in practical or moral c, 280d-281a / Practical Reason, 297a-314d;
philosophy and the social sciences 330d-331a / Intro. Metaphysic ofMorals, 386b-
7 PLATO- Phacdrus, 120a-c / Seventh Letter, d; 390b,d-391a / Science of Right, 398c-399c
809c-810b 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 37, 119b-120b; NUMBER
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH I-BK n, CH 6 39 125a-128b passim, esp 125b*c; NUMBER 42,
339a-352d passim; BK x, CH 1-8 426a-434a / 137a-b
Politics, BK i, CH 1-2 445a-446d; BK in, CH 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 469a-b
1-6 471b,d-476c; CH 9 [1280*25-1281*2] 477d- 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 2 9b-
478c lOa / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 158a-162a
12 AVRELIUS: Meditations, BK in, SECT n 262a-b 50 MARX: Capital, 6c-lld passim; 178d-179c
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xix, CH 21-24 passim; 265a-266a; 267c-d
524b-528c esp CH 21 524b-525a, CH 24 528b-c 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK ix, 365a-b;
20 AQUINAS Swnma Theologica, PART i-n, Q 49 EPILOGUE n, 683d-684a, 690b
la-6a; Q 55, A 4 28c-29d; Q 71, A 6 llOb- 53 JAMES: Psychology, 887a-888a
CROSS-REFERENCES
For The linguistic aspects of definition and the general theory of the meaning of words, see
LANGUAGE la; SIGN AND SYMBOL 43.
The logical aspects of definition, see IDEA 43.
Other discussions of the object of definition and the problem of essences or universal, see
BEING 8c; NATURE 4a; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 2a-2c.
The notions of genus and differentia, species and property, see BEING 8d; IDEA 4^3);
NATURE ia(i); RELATION 53(4); UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 5b.
Other considerations of indefinable terms, see INFINITY 2c; PRINCIPLE 23(3); and for the
mdefinability of individuals, see UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 4e.
The use of definitions as principles in reasoning or proof, and for the problem of demonstrat-
ing definitions, see PRINCIPLE 23(2); REASONING 5^2).
The discussion of matters related to the truth or falsity of definitions, see IDEA 6f; TRUTH
3 bd).
The role of definitions in dialectic and science, and in the various sciences, see DIALECTIC
23(2), 2b(i); MATHEMATICS 33; MATTER 4b; METAPHYSICS 2b; PHILOSOPHY
PHYSICS 23; SCIENCE 43.
302 THE GREAT IDEAS
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below arc works not included in Great Boo{s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals, These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
J.MILL. Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human DEWEY. Logic, the Theory of Inquiry, CH 13-14,
Mind, CH 8 16-18, 20.
W. HAMILTON. Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, DEWEY and BENTLEY. Knowing and the Known,
VOL n (24) CH 7
Chapter 16: DEMOCRACY
INTRODUCTION
all the traditional names for forms of panied by the elaboration of safeguards for the
OF government, "democracy" has the liveli- rights of man to assure that government actu-
est currency today. Yet like all the others, it ally functions for the people, and not merely for
has a long history in the literature of political one group of them.
thought and a career of shifting meanings. How Although they are essential parts of democ-
radically the various conceptions of democracy racy, neither popular sovereignty nor the safe-
differ may be judged from the fact that, in one guarding of natural rights provides the specific
of its meanings, democracy flourished in the characteristic of democracy, since both are com-
Greek city-states as early as the fifth century patible with any other just form of government.
B.C.; while in another, democracy only began The specifically democratic element is
apparent
to exist in recent times or perhaps does not yet from the fact that throughout the many shifts
jor political issue of our day is understood. But Athens a democracy because "its administration
as recently as the i8th century, some of the favours the many instead of the few." Close to
American constitutionalists prefer a republican our own day, Mill likewise holds that democ-
form of government to democracy and at other
;
racy is "the government of the whole people by
times, both ancient and modern, oligarchy or the whole people" in which "the majority . . .
may be, and in fact often has been, a difference of casions the i8th century distinction between a
opinion with respect to the meaning of "the democracy and a republic, though this verbal
people," this notion has been traditionally asso- ambiguity can be easily avoided by using the
ciated with the doctrine of popular sovereignty, phrases "direct democracy" and "representa-
which makes the political community as such tive democracy," as was sometimes done by the
the origin and basis of political authority. In the writers of The Federalist and their American
development of the democratic tradition, par- contemporaries.
ticularly in modern tijnes, this has been accom- These last two points the extension of the
303
304 THE GREAT IDEAS
franchise and a system of representation mark said to "arise naturally out of democracy, and
the chief differences between ancient and con- the most aggravated form of tyranny and slav-
temporary institutions of democracy. Today ery out of the most extreme form of liberty."
constitutional democracy tends to be represent- Similarly, Aristotle, in the Politics, calls de-
ative,and the grant of citizenship under a dem- mocracy "the most tolerable" of the three per-
ocratic constitution tends toward universal suf- verted forms of government, in contrast to oli-
ment, it has elements in common with other treatment conforms with this observation. He
forms of lawful government which, for one rea- devotes the central portion of his Politics to the
son or another, may not be democratic. The sig- analysis of oligarchy and democracy. In his view
nificance of these common elements the prin- they are equal and opposite in their injustice,
and the status of citi-
ciple of constitutionality
and to him both seem capable of degenerating
zenshipwill be assumed here. They are dis- into despotism and tyranny.
cussed in the chapters on CONSTITUTION and Among the political philosophers of modern
CITIZEN. The
general theory of the forms of times a certain uniformity of treatment seems
government is treated in the chapter on GOV- to prevail in the context of otherwise divergent
ERNMENT, and the two forms most closely re- theories. Writers like Hobbes, Locke, and
praise of being called either the most tolerable of a part only, then it is called an aristocracy."
of bad governments or the least efficient among Though Hobbes favors monarchy and Montes-
acceptable forms. It has been held up as the po- quieu either aristocracy or democracy, these
litical ideal, the only perfectly just state that writers do not make the choice among the three
paragon of justice which has always been, traditional forms a significant expression of
whether recognized or not, the goal of political their own political theories. For them the more
progress. important choice presented by other alterna-
is
Sometimes the same writer will express di- tives: for Hobbes between absolute and limited
vergent views. Plato, for example, in the States- government; for Montesquieu and Locke, be-
man, claims that democracy has "a twofold tween government by law and despotism; for
meaning'* according as it involves "ruling with Rousseau and Kant, between a republic and a
law or without law." Finding it "in every re- monarchy.
spect weak and unable to do either any great The authors of The Federalist definitely
1
good or any great evil/ he concludes that it is show their preference for "popular govern-
"the worst of all lawful governments, and the ment" as opposed to monarchy, aristocracy, or
best of all lawless ones." The rule of the many is oligarchy. They usually refer to it as a "repub-
least efficient for either good or evil. But in the lic,"by which they mean "a government which
Republic, he places democracy at only one re- derives all its powers directly or indirectly from
move from tyranny. On the ground that "the the great body of the people, and is administered
excessive increase of anything often causes a re- by persons holding their offices during pleasure,
action in the opposite direction," tyranny is for a limited period, or during good behavior."
CHAPTER 16: DEMOCRACY 305
Alexander Hamilton and others involved in the stitutional discriminations based on wealth, race,
American constitutional debates, as for example or previous condition of servitude.
James Wilson, occasionally call this system a With Mill, all means every human person
"representative democracy," but in The Federal- without regard to the accidents of birth or for-
ist a republic is sharply differentiated from a tune. "There ought to be no pariahs in a full-
democracy. The "great points of difference," grown and civilized nation," he writes, "no per-
however, turn out to be only "the delegation sons disqualified, except through their own de-
of the government (in a republic) to a small fault." Under the latter condition, he would
number of citizens elected by the rest," and the withhold the franchise from infants, idiots, or
"greater number of citizens, and greater sphere criminals (including the criminally indigent),
of country" to which a republic may extend. but with these exceptions he would make suf-
The difference, as already noted, is best ex- frage universal. He sums up his argument by
pressed in the words "representative" and "di- claiming that "it is a personal injustice to with-
rect" democracy. hold from any one, unless for the prevention of
In Mill's Representative Government we find greater evils, the ordinary privilege of having
democracy identified with the ideal state. "The his voice reckoned in the disposal of affairs in
ideally best form of government," he writes, "is which he has the same interest as other people/*
that in which the sovereignty, or supreme con- and whoever "has no vote, and no prospect of
trolling power in the last resort, is vested in the obtaining it, will either be a permanent malcon-
entire aggregate of the community, every citi- tent, or will feel as one whom the general affairs
zen not only having a voice in the exercise of of society do not concern." But it should be
that ultimate sovereignty, but being, at least oc- added that for Mill the franchise is not merely a
casionally, calledon to take an actual part in the privilege or even a right; "it is," he says,
government, by the personal discharge of some "strictly a matter of duty." How the voter uses
public function, local or general." Though Mill the ballot "has no more to do with his personal
recognizes the infirmities of democracy and wishes than the verdict of a juryman. ... He is
though he readily concedes that it may not be bound to give it according to his best and most
the best government for all peoples under all conscientious opinion of the public good. Who-
circumstances, his argument for its superiority ever has any other idea of it is unfit to have the
to all other forms of government remains sub- suffrage."
stantially unqualified. The notion of universal suffrage raises at once
the question of the economic conditions pre-
IN MILL'S CONSTRUCTION of the democratic ideal requisite to the perfection of political democra-
as providing liberty and equality for all, the es- cy. Can men exercise the political freedom of
sential distinction from previous conceptions lies citizenship without freedom from economic de-
in the meaning of the word all. The republicans pendence on the will of other men? It was com-
of the 8th century, in their doctrines of popu-
1
monly thought by i8th century republicans
lar sovereignty and natural rights, understood that they could not. "A power over a man's sub-
of poll taxes and other discriminations based on by participating in the functions of govern-
wealth. In the opinion of Karl Marx, the "bat- ment that men can become competent as citi-
tle for democracy" will not be won, nor even zens. By engaging in civic activities, a man "is
working class raises the proletariat to the posi- whatever is for their benefit to be for his bene-
tion of ruling class." Quite apart from the mer- fit." The "moral part of the instruction afforded
itsof the revolutionary political philosophy by the participation of the private citizen, if
which Marx erects, his views, and those of other even rarely, in public functions," results, ac-
social reformers of the i9th century, have made cording to Mill, in a man's being able "to
it a central issue that democracy be conceived in weigh interests not his own; to be guided, in
social and economic terms as well as political. case of conflicting claims, by another rule than
Otherwise, they insist, what is called "democ- his private partialities; to apply, at every turn,
racy" will permit, and may even try to con- principles and maxims which have for their
done, social inequalities and economic injustices reason of existence the common good." If
which vitiate political liberty. national affairs cannot afford an opportunity
for every citizen to take an active part in govern-
THERE is ONE other condition of equality which ment, then that must be achieved through local
the status of citizenship demands. This equal- is
government, and it is for this reason that Mill
ity of educational opportunity. According to advocates the revitalization of the latter.
Mill, it is "almost a self-evident axiom that the
State should require and compel the education, THERE ARE OTHER problems peculiar to modern
up to a certain standard, of every human being democracy. Because of the size of the territory
who is born its citizen." All men may not be and population of the national state, democratic
endowed with the same native abilities or tal- government has necessarily become representa-
born with enough intelligence to
ents, but all tive. Representation, according to The Federal-
become citizens deserve the sort of education ist, becomes almost indispensable when the
which fits them for the life of political freedom. people is too large and too dispersed for assem-
Quantitatively, this means a system of educa- bly or for continuous, as well as direct, partici-
tion as universal as the franchise; and as much pation in national affairs. The pure democracy
for every individual as he can take, both in which the Federalists attribute to the Greek
youth and adult life.
Qualitatively, this means city-states may still be appropriate for local
liberal education rather than vocational train- government of the town-meeting variety, but
ing, though in contemporary controversy this for the operations of federal or national govern-
point is still
disputed. ment, the Federalists think the republican in-
The way in which
recognizes and discharges
it stitutions of Rome a better model to follow.
its educational responsibility tests the sincerity The Federalists have another reason for es-
of modern democracy. No other form ofgovern- pousing representative government. The "mor-
ment has a comparable burden, for no other tal disease" of popular government, in their
calls all men to citizenship. In such a govern- view, is the "violence of faction" which decides
ment, Montesquieu declares, "the whole power measures "not according to the rules of justice
of education is required." Whereas despotism and the rights of the minor party, but by the
may be preserved by fear and a monarchy by a superior force of an interested and overbearing
system of honor, a democracy depends on civic majority." Believing the spirit of faction to be
virtue. For where "government is intrusted to rooted in the nature of man in society, the
private citizens," it
requires "love of the laws American statesmen seek to cure its evil not by
CHAPTER 16: DEMOCRACY 307
"removing its causes," but by "controlling its of time and space. Far from being a leader, or
effects." The principle of representation, Madi- one of the best men, he need not even be a
'
son claims, 'promises the cure." better man than his constituents. At the other
Representation, by delegating government extreme, not clear why the completely in-
it is
to a small number of citizens elected by the dependent representative need even be popu-
rest, is said "to refine and enlarge the public larly elected. In Edmund Burke's theory of
views by passing them through the medium of virtual representation, occasioned by his argu-
a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may ment against the extension of the franchise, even
best discern the true interest of their country." those who do not vote are adequately repre-
From this it appears that representation pro- sented by men who have the welfare of the
vides a way of combining popular government state at heart. They, no less than voting constit-
with the aristocratic principle of government uents, can expect the representative to consider
the best men. what is for their interest, and to
by oppose their
The assumption that representation would wishes if he thinks their local or special interest
government is not unmixed with oligarchical Between these two extremes, Mill tries to
prejudices. If, as the Federalists frankly sup- find a middle course, in order to achieve the
what extent does representation merely pro- Mill's discussion of representation leaves few
vide an instrument which the people employs to crucial questions unasked, though it
may not
express its will m
the process of self-govern- provide clearly satisfactory answers to all of
ment? To what extent is it a device whereby them. It goes beyond the nature and function
the great mass of the people select their betters of the representative to the problem of securing
to decide for them what is
beyond their com- representation for minorities by the now famil-
petence to decide for themselves? iarmethod of proportional voting. It is con-
According to the way these questions are cerned with the details of electoral procedure
answered, the conception of the representative's the nomination of candidates, public and secret
function especially in legislative matters will balloting, plural voting as well as the more
vary from that of serving as the mere messenger general question of the differences among the
of his constituents to that of acting indepen- executive, judicial, and legislative departments
dently, exercising his own judgment, and rep- of government with respect to representation,
resenting his constituents not in the sense of do- especially the difference of representatives in
ing their bidding, but only in the sense that he the upper and lower houses of a bicameral
has been chosen by them to decide what is to Like the writers of The Federalist,
legislature.
be done for the common good. Mill seeks a leaven for the democratic mass in
At one extreme, the representative seems to the leadership of men of talent or training. He
be reduced to the ignominious role of a mouth- would qualify the common sense of the many
piece, a convenience required by the exigencies by the expertness or wisdom of the few.
308 THE GREAT IDEAS
THE ANCIENT ISSUE between the democratic equals. "Tried by an absolute standard," Aris-
and the oligarchical constitution turns primari- totle goes on to say, "they are faulty, and,
ly on a question of justice, not on the relative therefore, both parties, whenever their share
competence of the many and the few to rule. in the government does not accord with their
Either form of government may take on a preconceived ideas, stir up a revolution."
more or less aristocratic cast according as men Plato, Thucydides, and Plutarch, as well as
of eminent virtue or ability assume public Aristotle, observe that this unstable situation
office, but in neither case does the constitution permits demagogue or dynast to encourage
itself guarantee their choice, except possibly on lawless rule by the mob or by a coterie of the
the oligarchical assumption that the possession of rich. Either paves the way to tyranny.
wealth signifies superior intelligence and virtue. To stabilize the state and to remove injus-
The justice peculiar to the democratic con- tice, Aristotle proposes a mixed constitution
stitution, Aristotle thinks, "arises out of the which, by a number of different methods, "at-
notion that those who are equal in any respect tempts to unite the freedom of the poor and
arc equal in all respects; because men are equally the wealth of the rich." In this way he hopes to
free,they claim to be absolutely equal." It does satisfy the two requirements of good govern-
not seem to him inconsistent with democratic ment. "One is the actual obedience of citizens
justice that slaves, women, and resident aliens to the laws, the other is the goodness of the
should be excluded from citizenship and public laws which they obey." By participating in the
office. making of laws, all free men, the poor included,
In the extreme form of Greek democracy, the would be more inclined to obey them. But
qualifications for public office are no different since the rich are also given a special function,
from the qualifications for citizenship. Since there is, according to Aristotle, the possibility
they are equally eligible for almost every gov- of also getting good laws passed, since "birth
ernmental post, the citizens can be chosen by and education are commonly the accompani-
lot rather than elected by vote. Rousseau agrees ments of wealth."
with Montesquieu's opinion of the Greek prac- To Aristotle the mixed constitution is
per-
tice, that "election by lot is democratic in na- fectly just, and with an aristocratic aspect added
ture." He thinks it "would have few disad- to the blend, it
approaches the ideal polity.
vantages in a real democracy, but," he adds, Relative to certain circumstances it has "a
"I have already said that a real democracy is
greater right than any other form of govern-
only an ideal." ment, except the true and ideal, to the name of
The justice peculiar to the oligarchical con- the government of the best."
stitution is, according to Aristotle, "based on Yet the true and the ideal, or what he some-
the notion that those who arc unequal in one times calls the "divine form of government,"
respect are in all respects unequal; being un- seems to be monarchy for Aristotle, or rule by
equal, that is, in property, they suppose them- the one superior man; and in his own sketch of
selves to be unequal absolutely." The oligarchi- the best constitution at the end of the Politics
cal constitution consequently does not grant the best practicable, if not the ideal Aristotle
citizenship or open public office to all the fret- clearly opposes admitting all the laboring classes
born, but in varying degrees sets a substantial to citizenship.
reconcile conflicting principles of justice, but to the nature of man. Peoples whose accidental
as the inevitable product of a decaying feudal- circumstances temporarily justify less just or
ism and a rising nationalism. Yet Aquinas even unjust forms of government, such as oli-
claims that a mixed regime was established by garchy or despotism, must not be forever con-
divine law for the people of Israel; for it was demned to subjection or disfranchiscment, but
"partly kingdom, since there is one at the head should rather be raised by education, experi-
of all; partly aristocracy, in so far as a number ence, and economic reforms to a condition in
of persons arc set in authority; partly democra- which the ideal polity becomes appropriate for
however, be carried over from ancient to the political prerogatives of all men. The differ-
modern tunes. Modern democracy answers it ence between the many and the few, between
differently, granting equality to all men on the the equality of men as free or human and their
basis of their being born human. It recognizes individual inequality in virtue or talent, must
in wealth or breeding no basis for special politi- always be given political recognition, if not by
cal preferment or privilege. By these standards, superiority in status, then by allocation of the
the mixed constitution and even the most ex- technically difficult problems of statecraft to
treme form of Greek democracy must be re- the expert or specially competent, with only
garded as oligarchical in character by a writer certain broad general policies left to the deter-
like Mill. mination of a majority vote. Jefferson and Mill
Yet Mill, no less than Aristotle, would agree alike hope that popular government may abol-
with Montesquieu's theory that the Tightness ish privileged classes without losing the bene-
of any form of government must be considered fits of leadership by peculiarly gifted individ-
with reference to the "humor and disposition of uals. The realization of that hope, Jefferson
the people in whose favor it is established." The writes Adams, depends on leaving "to the citi-
constitution and laws, Montesquieu writes, zens the free election and separation of the
"should be adapted in such a manner to the anstoi from the pseudo-aristoi, of the wheat
people for whom they are framed that it would from the chaff."
be a great chance if those of one nation suit At all times there is the danger of tyranny
another." by the majority and, under the threat of rev-
Mill makes the same point somewhat differ- olution, the rise of a demagogue who uses mob
ently when he says, "the ideally best form of rule to establish a dictatorship. Hobbes phrases
government . . , does not mean one which is this peculiar susceptibility of democracy to the
democracy of Athens and at the same time cele- cape "disgraceful submission to an Athenian
brates the might of her empire. "It is
only the master." The Athenian ambassador, Euphemus,
Athenians," he says, "who, fearless of conse- finds himself compelled to speak at first of "our
quences, confer their benefits not from calcu- empire and of the good right we have to it";
lations of expediency, but in the confidence of but he soon finds himself frankly confessing
liberality." But four years later, after the re- that "for tyrants and imperial cities nothing is
fidence of liberality" which Pericles had said state in external affairs. The other side is the
was the attitude of a democratic state toward tension between democratic institutions and
its dependencies. "The question is not of jus- military power or policy in the form of stand-
tice," Diodotus declares, "but how to make ing armies and warlike maneuvers. The in-
the Mitylenians useful to Athens. . . . We must efficiency traditionally attributed to democ*
not," he continues, "sit as strict judges of the racy under peaceful conditions does not, from
offenders to our own prejudice, but rather see all the evidences of history, seem to render de-
how by moderate chastisements we may be en- mocracy weak or pusillanimous in the face of
abled to benefit in the future by the revenue- aggression.
producing powers of our dependencies. ... It is The deeper democracy seems to lie
peril for
far more useful for the preservation of our war upon its institutions and on
in the effect of
empire," he concludes, "voluntarily to put up the morality of its people As Hamilton writes
with injustice, than to put to death, however in The Federalist: "The violent destruction of
justly, those whom it is our interest to keep life and property incident to war, the continual
alive." effort and alarm attendant on a state of cori*
Twelve years later, Alcibiades, no democrat tinual danger, will compel nations the most atr
himself, urges the Athenians to undertake the tached to liberty to resort for repose and se*
Sicilian expedition by saying, "we cannot fix curity to institutions which have a tendency to
the exact point at which our empire shall stop; destroy their civil and political rights. To be
we have reached a position in which we must more they at length become willing to
safe,
not be content with retaining but must scheme run the risk of being less free."
CHAPTER 16: DEMOCRACY 311
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PACB
1. Conceptions of democracy: the comparison of democracy with other forms of govern-
ment 312
2. The derogation of democracy: the anarchic tendency of freedom and equality 313
2a. ^awless mob-rule: the tyranny of the majority
2& The incompetence of the people and the need for leadership: the superiority of
monarchy and aristocracy
3^. Comparison of the political wisdom of the many and the few: the mixed regime
as including both
4^. The infirmities of democracy in practice and the reforms or remedies for these
defects
4<f.
The suitability of democratic constitutions to all men under all circumstances:
conditions favorable to democracy; progress toward democracy 317
5^. The distribution of functions and powers: checks and balances in representative
democracy 319
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER. Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is m section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
printed in two columns,
hand sideof the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
thepage. Foi c'xample,in 7 PLVTO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 ana ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS- One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) arc sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; eg., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE RLFERFVCES* The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows, eg., OLD TESTA-
MEN i Nehemiah, 7 45 (D) II Esdras, 7 46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
(4a. Liberty and equality far all under law. 4b. The democratic realization of popular sov-
4a(l) Universal suffrage: the abolition of ereignty: the safeguarding of natural
privileged classes.) rights
43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: vi [87-93] 5 EURIPIDES* Suppliants [334-358] 261 b-c;
6b [399-462] 261d-262b
43 CONSTITUTION OP THE U.S.: ARTICLE i, SECT 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK HI, 107c-d; BK vn,
9 [289-295) 14a; ARTICLE vi [597-599] 16d; 245b
AMENDMENTS, XIV, SECT 1-3 18d-19a; XV 6THUCVDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK n,
19b; xvn 19b-c; xix 19d 396b-397c
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 39, 125c-126b; NUM- 7 PLATO Laws, BK iv, 681d-682c
:
BER 57, 177a-b; NUMBER 84, 252a 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK HI, CH i 471b,d-472c;
43 MILL: Representative Government, 344d-346c; CH 6 [i278 b 7-i4] 475d / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 8
350a; 369b-370a; 380c-389b; 394a-396d; [1365^2-31] 608a
403d 14 PLUTARCH- Tiberius Gracchus, 678b-d
50 MARX-ENCELS: Communist Manifesto, 416c- 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 101a~104d;
d; 425b-c; 428d-429c PART HI, 228b-c; PART iv, 273a-c
31 SPINOZA Ethics, PART iv, PROP 37, SCHOL 2
4a(2) The problem of economic justice: the 435b-436a
choice between capitalism and social- 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH iv, SECT 21 29d;
ism CH vn, SECT 87~CH VIH, SECT 99 44a-47c;
5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [399-462] 261d-262b CH ix, SECT I27-CH x, SECT 132 54a-55b;
5 ARISTOPHANES: Ecdesiazusae 615a-628d CH xi 55b-58b; CH xni, SECT 149 59b-d; CH
7 PLATO: Republic, BK in, 341c-d; BK v, 363b- xix 73d-81d passim, esp SECT 212 74a-b,
365d/ Laws, BK v, 691b-697a SECT 243 81d
QARisroiLF- Ethics, BK v, en 2 [ii3o b 3o]-cii 38 MONTESQUIEU- Spirit ofLaws, BK n, 4a-6b
b
4 [ri32 2o] 378b-380b / Politics, BK n, CH 5 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 323d; 356b-359a /
458a-460a; CH 6 [1265*27-37] 460c-d; CH 7 Economy, 369b-c / Social Contract,
Political
461d-463c; BK v, CH i 502a-503b; BK vi, CH BK387b,d-392a; BK n, 395a-396a; BK HI,
i,
a b
3 521c-522a; CH 5 [i32o i7- u] 523d-524b 420a-424d
14 PLUTARCH- Lycurgus, 36a 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 14b; 91a-d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 94d
105, A 2, ANS and REP 1-6 309d-316a 42 KANT Science of Right, 429a-c, 434a; 435a-
23 HOBBES: leviathan, PART n, 156b-157a 458a,c esp 436c, 437c-d, 450a-b, 451c-d
27 SHAKLSI>E\UE Conolanns, ACT i, sc i [1-226] 43 DECLARATION OF INDFPENDENCE [1-28] la-
351a-353d b; [41-47] 2a; [109-12 i]3a-b
35 LOCKE- Civil Government, CH v 30b-36a 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: PREAMBLE lla,c;
38 MONTESQUIEU Spirit of Laws, BK iv, 16a-17b; AMENDMENTS, i-x 17a-18a; XHI-XV 18c-19b;
BK v, 19d*21d; BK vn, 44d-45b, BK xm, xix 19d
96a-102a,c 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 10 49c-53a, NUMBER
38 ROUSSEAU- Economy, 375b-d; 377b-
Political 14, NUMBER 22, 84d-85a; NUMBER 39
60c-d;
d / Social Contract, BK i, 393d-394d; BK u, 125a-128b; NUMBER 40, 131b; NUMBER 44,
405a-d 144d-145a; 146c-d; NUMBER 46, 150b-c; NUM-
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 28a-d; BER 51, 164a-16Sa; NUMBER 78, 231a-232c;
61c-d; 109d-UOd; BK iv, 201b-d; 239c-240a; NUMBER 83, 246a-b; NUMBER 84, 251b-254b
287c-d 43 MILL- Liberty, 267a-274a / Representative
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: AMENDMENTS, Government, 344d; 3SOa; 382b-c
v [645-648] 17c; xm 18c, xvi 19b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 10, 50b-53a; NUMBER 279, 93d-94d; par 308 102c-103a / Philosophy
35, 113a-114b; NUMBER 60, 184d-186b; NUM- of History, INTRO, 175b-c; PART n, 272a-d
BER 79, 233c
43 MILL: Liberty, 309a-c / Representative Govern- 4c. The infirmities of democracy in practice
150c-d
and representative, or republican, gov-
ernment: the territorial limits of democ-
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH xm, SECT 157-
racy
i5861c-62b
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK n, 5a; BK 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK vi, CH 4 [i3i8b2i-27]
in, lOa-c; BK vi, 35c-36a; BK vm, 51a-52c; 522b
BK ix, 58b,d-59b; BK xi, 69a-c; BK xix, 142c- 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH x, SECT 132
143a 55a-b
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK in, 418a-420a; 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK VIH, 56c-d;
BK iv, 433a-434b BK ix, 58b,d-60a; BK xi, 71a-c; BK xix, 142c-
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 14b 143a
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 94d-95c; 562c- 38 ROUSSEAU Social Contract, BK in, 410c; 420a-
565a esp 563d-564a 423a
43 FEDERALIST- NUMBER 10 49c-53a passim; 42 KANT: Science of Right, 451c-452a
NUMBER 22, 83b-d; NUMBER 44, 146c-d; 43 FEDERALIST. NUMBER io, 51c-53a; NUMBER
NUMBER 48, 157c; NUMBER 49-50 159b-162c; 14, 60a-61b; NUMBER 48, 157c; NUMBER 63,
NUMBER 55, 172b-173b; NUMBER 58, 181b-c; 192c-194a
NUMBER 62, 189d-191c; NUMBER 63, 192b- 43 MILL: Representative Government, 330a-b;
195b, NUMBER 75, 223c-d 350a
43 MILL: 298b-299b; 309a-b
Liberty, 268d-271a;
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 175b-c;
354b-355b; 362c-
/ Representative Government, PART n, 273d-274a
389b passim, csp 380c-381a, 387b-d; 392b-
5b. The theory of representation
399d; 403b-d; 406a-409c passim
44 BOSWELL. Johnson, 178a-c, 374b-c 7 PLATO- Laws, BK vi, 697a-705c
46 HEGEL* Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 30 } 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK iv, CH 14 498b-499c
101c-102a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, passim; CH 15 499c-501c; BK vi, CH 3-4
172d-173a 521c-523b
14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 34d-3Sd / Solon, 70d-
d. The suitability of democratic constitutions 71c
to all men under all circumstances: con- 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 90,
ditions favorable to democracy; progress A 3, ANS and REP 2 207a-c; Q 97, A 3, REP 3
toward democracy 237b-238b
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK vi, 193b-c; BK i\, 23 HOBBES- Leviathan, PART i, 96c-98a,c; PART
314a,c n, lOla-b; 104d-105c; 117b-121a; 153a-159c
7 PLATO: Republic, BK ix, 425c-427b 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH vn, SECT
87-89
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK in, CH 15 [i286b 8-22J 44a-d; CH xi, SECT 140 58a; CH xn, SECT
484d-485a; BK iv, CH 2 [1289^3-20] 488c-d; 143 58c-d; CH xin, SECT 154-158 60c-62b;
CH n-12 495b-497b; BK vi, CH 4 522a-523b CH xix, SECT 240 81b
38 MONTESQUIEU: of Laws, BK i, 3b-d;
Spirit 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xi, 71a-d
BK vm, 56b-c; 57b-c; BK xiv, 107b-d; BK 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK HI, 421c-423a
xvi, 118b-c; BK xvii-xvm, 122a-126c; BK 39 SMITH: Wealth ofNations, BK iv, 269d-271d
xix, 139c-140a 40 GIBBON- Decline and Fall, 522c-523a
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 324a-b / Social Con- 42 KANT: Science of Right, 436c; 450a-b; 451c-
tract, BK n, 402b-405a; 405c-406a; BK in, 452a
410c; 411a-c; 415d; 421c-423a 43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: [35-47]
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 562c-565a csp lb-2a; [109-121] 3a-b passim
562c-d, 563d-564a 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ARTICLE i lla-
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 114b-115a / Science of 14b passim
%A/,436d-437c;451a-b 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER io 49c-53a; NUMBER
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 14, 60a-61b; NUMBER 14, 60a-61b; NUMBER 22, 82a-83a; NUM-
39, 125b; NUMBER 55, 174c-d BER 28, 97b-d; NUMBER 35, 113a-114b;
318 THE GREAT IDEAS to
(7. The growth and vici&itudet of democracy) 14 PLUTARCH: Romulus, 21a-27c csp 22c / Peri-
cles, 129a-141a,c passim
la. Demagoguery and the danger of revolution 15 TACITUS' Histories, BK n, 224d-225a
5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [399-462] 261d-262b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART 11, 107a; 107c
5 ARISTOPHANES: Knights 470a-487a,c esp 35 LOCKE: CH xvi 654-70c
Civil Government,
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The general theory of government and the forms of government, see GOVERNMENT; and
for the forms of government most closely related to democracy, see ARISTOCRACY;
OLIGARCHY.
The theory of constitutional or representative government, in itself and in contrast to
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booty of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
H, ADAMS. The Degradation of the Democratic FRIEDRICH Constitutional Government and Democ-
Dogma racy
OSFROGORSKI. Democracy and the Organization of BENES. Democracy Today and Tomorrow
Political Parties DEWEY. Characters and Events, VOL n, BK v (17)
DICEY. The Relation Between Law and Public Opin- .The Public and Its Problems, CH 3
ion in England During the Nineteenth Century .Freedom and Culture, CH 4-7
SANTAYANA. Reason in Society, CH 5 MAC!VER. Leviathan and the People
SORBL. Reflexions on Violence HOOK. Reason, Social Myths and Democracy
MICHELS. Political Parties BECKER Modern Democracy
MORLRY. Notes on Politics and History MERRIAM. The New Democracy and the New Despot-
BEARD. Economic Origins ofjeffersoman Democracy ism
CROLY. Progressive Democracy . What Is Democracy?
PARLIO. The Mind and Society, VOL iv AGARD. What Democracy Meant to the Greeks
T. VFBLEN. The Vested Interests and the State of B \RKER Reflections on Government
the Industrial Arts LINDSAY. The Modern Democratic State
LENIN. The State and Revolution, CH 5 MARITAIN. Scholasticism and Politics, CH in-iv
"Left-Wing" Communism, an
.
Infantile Dis- .
Ransoming the Time, CH 2
order .
Christianity and Democracy
TROISKY. The Defense of Terrorism .
Pnncipes a*une pohttque humaniste
BRYCF. The American Commonwealth PERRY Puritanism and Democracy
Modern Democracies
. SIMON. Community of the Free, CH 4
Chapter 17: DESIRE
INTRODUCTION
TN Darwin, Mill, James, and Freud, at the be defined as appetite of which we are con-
JL modern end of the great word
tradition, the scious."
"desire" primarily signifies a cause of animal and Spinoza here seems to be reflecting the dis-
human behavior. It is one of the basic terms in tinction made by earlier writers between
psychological analysis, covering that whole natural appetite and conscious desire, which we
range of phenomena which are also referred to today would, perhaps, express in terms of
by such terms as wanting, needing, craving, wish- "need" and "wish." The ancient conception
ing, willing, all of which are discussed in con- of tendencies inherent in all things inanimate
nection with theories of instinct and emotion, as well as living which seek a natural fulfill-
libido and love, motivation and purpose. ment broadens the meaning of appetite or de-
If we turn to traditional beginnings, to the sire. When Aristotle says that "each thing seeks
writings of Plato, Aristotle, Galen, and Ploti- its own perfection" and that "nature does
nus, we find that the psychological considera- nothing in vain," he is
thinking of non-living
tion of desire is part of a much larger context. as well as living bodies. Wherever in the phys-
The ancients are, of course, concerned with the world things seem to have a natural tend-
ical
role of desire in causing animal or human be- ency to move in a certain direction or to change
havior, and with the causes of such desire, but in a certain way, there appetite, belonging to
they are also interested in cravings which seem the very nature of the moving thing, operates
to be present in plants as well as animals. Plato, as a cause. Adopting this view, Dante declares
for example, attributes to plants "feelings of that "neither Creator nor creature was ever
pleasure and pain and the desires which accom- without love, either natural or of the mind";
pany them." The vegetative activities of nu- and in his Convwio he shows how each thing
trition, growth, and reproduction seem to has its "specific love." The love, or desire, of
spring from basic appetites or, in modern the elements their "innate affinity to their
is
phraseology, "biological needs" inherent in proper place"; minerals desire "the place where
allliving matter. their generation is ordained" with the result
Because hunger and thirst so readily sym- that "the magnet ever receives power from the
bolize the essence of desire (or certainly repre- direction of its generation."
sent its most general manifestation in living According to this view it is possible to speak
1
things), the words "appetite* and "desire" are of the natural desire of raindrops to fall or of
frequently used as synonyms in the earlier smoke rise. Such a manner of speaking
to may
phase of the tradition. As Hobbcs observes, at seem metaphorical an expression of
first
when he proposes to use "appetite" and "de- primitive animism or anthropomorphism but
sire" as synonyms, desire is "the general name," the ancients, observing different natural tend-
and appetite is "oftentimes restrained to signify encies in heavy and light bodies, mean this
ally related to men in so for as they are con- to turn toward the sun, or that all men by
scious of their appetites, and it
may therefore nature desire to know.
323
324 THE GREAT IDEAS
FROM ITS NARROWEST meaning with reference fies the tendency of its nature. That nature
to the behavior of animals and men, desire does nothing in vain means simply that no
gains a wider connotation when it is conceived natural desire need or appetite exists with-
as covering the appetites found in living organ- out the possibility of fulfillment.
isms. But broadest significance, it refers
in its
to the innate tendency inherent in matter it- CONSIDERING THE DESIGN of the universe and
self. As we shall presently see, appetite, desire, the relation of creatures to God, theologians like
or tendency is seated in matter according to Augustine and Aquinas use the concept of de-
that conception of matter which identifies it sire in both its psychological and its meta-
describes matter as "in beggardom, striving as Aquinas points out, "a certain imperfection is
it were by violence to acquire, and always dis- implied," namely, the lack "of the good which
appointed/' Matter is that in natural
things we have not." Since God is perfect, desire can-
which the reason for their motion and change.
is not be attributed to Him, "except metaphor-
Considering natural change, Aristotle names ically." Love, however, implies perfection
what he thinks are its three principles. In addi- rather than imperfection, since it flows from
tion to "some thing divine, good, and desirable,'* the act of the will "to diffuse its own goodness
he writes, "we hold that there are two other among others." For that reason, although the
as of its own nature to desire and yearn for it." does not preclude love.
These are respectively form, privation, and The theologian goes beyond the metaphysi-
matter. The relation between matter and form cian or physicist when he carries the analysis of
is expressed by Aristotle in terms of desire. desire to the supernatural plane. As God is the
"The form cannot desire itself," he says, "for supernatural efficient cause of all created things,
it is not defective; nor can the contrary desire so God is also the supernatural final cause the
it, for contraries are mutually destructive. The end or ultimate good toward which all creatures
truth is that what desires the form is matter, tend. The metaphysical maxim that each thing
as the female desires the male." seeks its own perfection is then transformed.
Conceived most generally as natural appe- "All things," Aquinas writes, "by desiring
tite or tendency, desire becomes a physical or own perfection, desire God
their Himself, inas-
metaphysical term. "Natural appetite" says much as the perfections of all things are so
Aquinas, "is that inclination which each thing many similitudes of the divme being. ... Of
has of its own nature." The significance of de- those things which desire God, some know Him
sire in this sense extends, far beyond psycho- as He is Himself, and this is
proper to the ra-
logical phenomena, to
all things m
motion tional creature; others know some participation
under the impetus or inclination of their own of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible
natures, rather than moved violently by forces knowledge; others have a natural desire with-
impressed on them from without. out knowledge, as being directed to their ends
In ancient physics every natural tendency by a higher intelligence."
has an end or fulfillment in which the motion The existence in the creature of a desire for
governed by that tendency comes to rest. Eros God raises difficult questions concerning the
and telos desire and end are complementary manner in which this desire is fulfilled. A super-
concepts, each implying the other as principles natural end cannot be attained by purely nat-
of physics, i.e., as factors operating together ural means, i.e., without God '5 help. The vision
throughout nature in the order of change. The of God in which the souls of the blessed come
telos of each thing is the perfection which satis- to rest is, according to the theologian, the ulti-
CHAFFER 17: DESIRE 325
mate gift of grace. Hence, in man's case at least, With regard to the frantic pursuit of diversions,
it becomes necessary to ask whether he can have he claims that "both the censure rs and the cen-
11
a purely natural desire to see God if the goal sured do not understand man's true nature
of such desire cannot be achieved by purely and the "misery of man without God." In such
natural means. restlessness and vain seeking, the theologian sees
The question is not whether men to whom evidence of man's natural desire tobew/M God,
God has revealed the promise of ultimate glory Admitting the same facts, the skeptics inter-
can consciously desire the beatific vision. Clear- pret the infinity of man's desire as a craving tc
ly that is
though to sustain such desire
possible, be God. If this is not every man's desire, it i;
the theological virtue of hope, inseparable from certainly Satan's in Paradise Lost. Skeptic 01
faith and charity, may be required. Rather the believer, every man understands the questior
question is whether the beatific vision which is which Goethe and Dante among the great
man's supernatural end can be the object of poets make their central theme. At what mo
natural desire. On this the theologians appear ment, amid man's striving and restlessness, wil
to be less clearly decided. the soul gladly cry, "Ah, linger on, thou art sc
Aquinas holds that "neither man, nor any fair?" Confident that there can be no such
creature, can attain final happiness by his nat- moment, Faust makes that the basis of hu
ural powers." Yet he also seems to maintain wager with Mephistopheles.
that man has a natural desire for the perfect The two poets appear to give opposite an
happiness of eternal life. "The object of the swers to the question. Faust finds surcease in ar
will, /.<?., of man's appetite," he writes, "is the earthly vision of progressive endeavor. Heaven
universal good, just as the object of the intel- ly rest comes to the soul of Dante at the ver)
lect is the universal truth/' Man's natural de- moment it
relinquishes its quest, winning peace
sire to know the truth not just some truths through surrender.
but the whole truth, the infinite truthwould
seem to require the vision of God for its fulfill- IN THE BROADEST OR theological sense of the
ment. Aquinas argues similarly from the will's word, God alone does not desire. In the nar
natural desire for the infinite good. "Naught rowest or psychological sense, only animals anc
can man's will," he writes, "save the uni-
lull men do. The contrast of meanings is useful
versal good ... to be found not in any creature, Natural appetite or tendency throws light 01
but m God alone." Some writers find this con- the nature of conscious desire.
firmed m the fact that whatever good a man In order to "determine the nature and seat o
sets his heart upon he pursues to infinity. No desire," Socrates in the Philebus considers sue!
finite amount of pleasure or power or wealth things as "hunger, thirst, and the like" as "11
seems to satisfy him. Healways wants more. the class of desires." He points out that "whei
But there is no end to wanting more of such we say 'a man thirsts,' we mean to say that hi
"
things. The infinity of such desires must result 'is
empty.' It is not drink he desires, but re
in frustration. Only God, says the theologian, plenishment by drink, which is a change o
only an infinite being, can satisfy man's infinite This insight Socrates generalizes by say
state.
they seek it as if the possession of the objects of word is frequently substituted for the othet
their quest would make them really happy." Here the fact already noted, that God loves bu
326 THE GREAT IDEAS
does not desire, suggests the root of the distinc- which we seek to avoid as somehow injurious
tion between desire and love. Desire always in- rather than beneficial to us.
volves some lack or privation to be remedied by There is no question that desire and aversion
a change; whereas love, certainly requited arc psychologically connected with estimations
love, implies the kind of satisfaction which ab- of good and evil or pleasure and pain. This is
hors change. Love and desire are, of course, the case no matter how we answer the moral-
frequently mixed, but this does not affect their ist's question, Do we desire something because
essential difference as tendencies. They are as it is
good, or do we call it "good" simply be-
different as giving and getting. Love aims at cause we desire it? The ethical significance of
the well-being of the beloved, while desire seeks the question, and of the opposite answers to it,
to enjoy a pleasure or possess a good. isdiscussed in the chapter on GOOD AND EVIL.
Not all writers, however, contrast the gener-
osity of love with the acquisitiveness of desire. THE METAPHYSICAL conception of natural de-
Locke, for example, finds self-interest and self- sire provides terms for the psychological anal-
seeking in both. The meaning of love, he ob- ysis of conscious desire and its object. Viewed
serves, is known to anyone who reflects "upon as belonging to the very nature of a thing,
the thought he has of the delight which any appetite, according to Aristotle, consists in the
present or absent thing is apt to produce in him. tendency toward "something we do not have"
. . For when a man declares in autumn when
. and "which we need." Both factors are essen-
he is eating them, or in spring when there are tialthe privation and the capacity, or poten-
none, that he loves grapes, it is no more but tiality, for having what is lacked. Privation m
that the taste of grapes delights him." The the strict sense is always correlative to poten-
meaning of desire is, in Locke's opinion, closely tiality.
related. It consists in "the uneasiness a man The writers who use these terms would not
question whether they arc distinct m animals know, or that certain animals, instinctively
as well as m men, and their relation to one gregarious, naturally tend to associate with one
another when they are distinct, arc matters another in herds or societies, the potentiality of
more fully discussed in the chapter on LOVE. knowledge or social life is indicated; and pre-
have," Socrates thinks we should reply: "You, that many men also consciously seek knowl-
ray friend, having wealth and health and edge, knowing what knowledge is and considei-
strength, want to have the continuance of ing it something worth having.
them. . . . When you say, 'I desire that which I The instinctive desires of animals are not
have and nothing else,* is not your meaning generally thought to operate apart from the
that you want to have in the future what you perception of the object toward which the an-
now have ?" This "is equivalent to saying that a imal is emotionally impelled. The instinctive
man desires something which is for him non- desireworks consciously, both on the side of
existent,and which he has not got"; from which perception and on the side of the emotionally
Socrates draws the conclusion that everyone felt impulse. If, because it is innate rather than
which he has not already, which
"desires that is learned, or acquired through experience, we
future and not present and of which he
. . . is call the instinctive desire "natural," it is well
tween conscious and unconscious desire; Dar- consciously by being repressed, which does not
win separates instinctive from learned desires; prevent it from influencing our conduct or
and James observes how a conscious desire may thought, but only from intruding its driving
become habitual and operate almost automat- force and its goal upon our attention. In con-
human tendency is not excluded by the fact namely, animal as opposed to rational desire*
328 THE GREAT IDEAS
The appetitive or driving aspect of emotions Those psychologists who find in man two
is indicated by William James in his analysis of distinct faculties of knowledge the senses and
instinctive behavior. The functioning of an the reason or intellect also find in him two dis-
instinct maybe viewed, according to James, as tinct faculties of appetite or desire. The dis-
a train of psychological events of "general re- tinction is perhaps most sharply made by Aris-
flex type . . . called forth by determinate sen- totleand Aquinas, who claim that "there must
sory stimuli in contact with the animal's body, be one appetite tending towards the universal
or at a distance in his environment," arousing good, which belongs to reason, and another
"emotional excitements which go with them." with a tendency towards the particular good,
The emotional part of the instinctive behavior which appetite belongs to sense." The tradi-
emotions, James goes so far as to say that the Psychologists who attribute these diverse
feeling of fear results from running away, he modes of desire, they attribute sensation and
as
does not mean to deny that the emotion of fear thought, to a single faculty called "mind" or
involves the impulse to flee. "understanding," nevertheless deal with the
In its aspect as impulse or tendency to act whole range of appetitive phenomena, includ-
an emotion is a desire, consciously aroused by ing both the animal passions and acts of will.
sense-perceptions and accompanied by conscious James, for example, treats the instinctive acts
feelings. This conception of emotion has been associated with the emotions as "automatic and
variously expressed in the tradition of the great reflex" movements, and separates them from
books. Aquinas, for example, calls all the emo- "voluntary movements which, being desired
tions or passions "movements of the sensitive and intended beforehand, are done with full
appetite." But he also uses the words "desire" prevision of what they are to be." In so doing,
and "aversion" along with "love" and "hate," he draws a line between emotional impulses and
"anger" and "fear" to name specific emotions. acts of will, even though he does not distin-
writes, "is the essence itself or nature of a per- THE ROLE OF DESIRE in human life especially
son in so far as this nature is conceived from its emotional desire is so intimately connected
given constitution as determined towards any with problems of good and evil, virtue, duty,
action. ... As his nature is constituted in this and happiness, that until quite recently the
or that way, so must his desire vary and the subject was discussed mainly in books on ethics,
nature of one desire differ from another, just politics, or rhetoric rather than psychology.
as the affects from which each desire arises dif- Even Freud, who tries to separate psychological
fer. There are as many kinds of desire, there- description and explanation from moral princi-
fore, as there are kinds of joy, sorrow, love, etc,, ples or conclusions, cannot avoid treating the
and in consequence ... as there arc kinds of effects of morality upon the dynamics of desire
objects by which we are affected." and the life of the passions.
Many of the funda-
CHAPTER 17; DESIRE
mental terms of psychoanalysis conflict, re- mesticating" them, as one would train a beast
pression, rationalization, sublimation, to name to serve the ends of human life.
only some carry the connotation of moral The implication, in Aristotle and Spinoza as
issues, even though they imply a purely psy- well as in Freud, does not seem to be that man's
sembles to some degree what a moralist like satiated and so are we desperate with ennui.
Aristotle calls self-indulgence or incontinence. Hence, freedom from all desires, not just their
To give vent to all the promptings of desire, moderation, seems to be recommended for
without regard to the demands of society or peace of mind; as centuries later Schopenhauer
reality is to revert to infancy a state charac- recommended the negation of the will to live in
terized, according to Freud, by "the irrecon- order to avoid frustration or boredom.
cilability of its wishes with reality." Because Marcus Aurehus and the Stoics, and later
children "live at the beck and call of appetite, Kant, similarly urge us "not to yield to the
and it is in them that the desire for what is persuasions of the body and never to be
. , .
pleasant is strongest," Aristotle thinks it fitting over-powered either by the motion of the senses
that we should speak of self-indulgence when or of the appetites." But whereas the Stoics
it occurs in an adult as a "childish fault." would restrain desire "because it is animal" and
Aristotle and Freud seem to be looking at in order to avoid pain, Kant argues that the re-
the same facts of human nature and seeing them nunciation of desire should be undertaken "not
in the same light. What Freud describes as the merely in accordance with duty but from . . .
conflictbetween the "pleasure-principle" and duty, which must be the true end of all moral
the "reality-principle," Aristotle and with cultivation."
him Spinoza treats as a conflict between the The opposition between these two views of
passions and the and Kant conceives in
reason, desire in the moral life represents one of the
terms of the opposition between desire and major issues in ethical theory, further discussed
duty. What Freud says of the reality-principle in the chapters on DUTY and VIRTUE. The doc-
that it "demands and enforces the postpone- trine of natural appetite is crucially relevant to
ment of satisfaction, the renunciation of mani- the issue. If the naturalist in ethics is
right, he
fold possibilities, and the temporary endurance is so by virtue of the truth that natural tend-
of pain" parallels traditional statements con- encies are everywhere the measure of good and
cerning the role of reason or of duty in the evil. If, however, there is no truth in the doc-
moral life. Where the moralists speak of the trine of natural desire, then the impulses which
necessity for regulating or moderating emo- spring from man's animal passions can claim no
tional desires, Freud refers to the need of "do- authority in the court of reason.
330 THE GREAT IDEAS
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PACE
1. Desire and the order of change: cros and tclos 331
3</.
Desire and aversion as emotional opposites 337
5. Desire as ruler
7$. The restless search for the infinite: the desire for the vision of God 343
CHAPTER 17: DESIRE
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: lhad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower hah es of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a-119b,the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in tv\o columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO* Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECI) are sometimes included in the reference, line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., lhad, BK n [265-283] 12d,
BIBLE REFERENCES- The refeiences are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT Nehemiah, 7.45 (D) II Esdras, 7 46
SYMBOLS' The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style, for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
BK in, par i 13b-c; par 10 15b-d; BK iv, par CH 6 [700^3-30] 236a / Ethics, BK i, CH i
15-19 23a-24b; BK v, par 1-2 27a-c; BK vu, [1094*1-3] 339a, CH 2 [1094*17-22] 339b; BK
vi, CH 2 387d-388b; BK vu, CH 11-14 403c
'
par 16-23 48c-50c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 5, 406a,c; BK x, CH 2 426c-427b; CH 3 [1174*
A REP 3 25a-d; Q 19, A i, REP 2 108d-109c;
3, 4-11] 428b; CH 4 [1175*10-22] 429c, CH 5
b430b / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 6-7
Q 59, A 2, ANS 307c-308b; Q 81, A 2 429c- [ii75 24~33]
430c; PART I-H, Q 27, A 3, ANS and REP 3-4 602d-607d; CH 10 [1369*1-4] 612b; en 11
738c-739c [1370*17-28] 613c
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvn 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK u [1-61]
[9i]-xvm [75] 79b-80c; xx [i24]-xxi [75] 15a-d
84c-85d passim; PARADISE, i [103-120] 107b-c 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 4 108d-
23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, PART i, 61a d HOa
27 SHAKESPEARE: King Lear, ACT n, sc iv 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead^ IR vi 21a-26a pas-
[263-274] 261c sim / Third Ennead, TR v I00c-106b / Fourth
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 347c; 349a- Ennead, TR iv, CH 35, 177d-178a / Fifth En-
350a; 402a-d nead, IR v, CH 12 234a-d / Sixth Ennead, TR
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, vi, 97d-98a; 99d- vii, CH 30 336b-d
102d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK n, par 9-18 lOd-
31 SPINOZA- Ethics, PART iv, PROP 2-7 425a-426b 13a; BK x, par 29-33 78d-80b / Ctty of God,
33 PASCAL: Penstes, 100 191a-192b BK xii, CH 6 345b-346c; BK xix, CH i 507a-
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xx, 509a / Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 3-4 625 b-c;
SECT 6 177a-b; CH xxi, SECT 30-35 185a-186d CH 22-30 629b-633b
csp SECT 31 185c-d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, QQ 5-6
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 346b 23b-30d passim; Q 16, A i, ANS 94b-95c; A 4
43 MILL: Liberty, 295b-d 97a-c; QQ 19-20 108d-124a passim; Q 26, A 2,
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par ANS 150c-151a; Q 48, A i, ANS and REP 4
190-195 66a-67a 259b-260c; QQ 59-60 306b-314c passim, esp
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XHI, 577a-578b Q 60, AA 3-5 311d-314c; Q 62, A i, ANS 317d-
esp 577d-578a; BK xw, 605b-d; BK xv, 630c- 3l8c; Q 63, A 4 328b-329a; QQ 80-83 Wa-
63 Ic; EPILOGUE i, 665a-d 440b passim; Q 104, A 3, REP i 537b-d; Q 105,
;
414a-d; THE AFFECTS, DBF 1-3 416b-417a; 107c; Q 19, A 4 lllc-112c; Q 41, A 2 218c-219d;
PART iv, DBF 1-2 424a; PROP 9-13 426d-428a; Q 57, A 4, REP 3 298a-299a; Q 59, A i, REP 3
PROP 19-28 429d-431c; PROP 63 443d-444a; 306c-307b; Q 75, A 3, REP 3 380c-381b; Q 78,
PROP 65-66 444b-d A i, ANS and REP 4 407b-409a; Q 80, A 2,
33 PASCAL: Pensees, Si 186b REP 3 428a-d; Q 81, A 3, ANS and REP 2
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH n, 430c-431d; PART i-n, Q i, AA 1-6 609b-614c;
SECT 3 104b-d; BK n, CH VH, SECT 3 131d- Q 6 644a-651c; QQ 16-17 684a-693d; Q 22, A 2,
132a; CH xx, SECT 6 177a-b; CH xxi, SECT REP 2 721c-722c; Q 28, A 6 744b-d
29-48 184d-190d passim, esp SECT 31 185c-d, 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvni
SECT 42 188c; SECT 55-56 192c-193b; SECT [19-75] 80a-c
61-62 194b-d; SECT 70 197a-b; SECT 73 198c- 23 HOBBES Leviathan, PART i, 53a; 61a-c; 64a-c;
199c 76c; PART n, 112d-113c
42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 31 DLSCARIES: Discourse, PART v, 60b
264d-265b / Practical Reason, 298a-300d; 31 SPINOZA. Ethics, PART in, THE AFFECTS, DBF i
315c-317b; 330c-331a; 341c-342a / Judge- 416b-d; PART iv, DEF 7 424b; PROP 19 429d;
ment, 605d-606b [fn 2] PROP 59 442b-d
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 448a-450b; 461c-464d 33 PASCAL Provincial Letters, 24b-26b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART n, par 123- 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH 11,
124 44a-d / Philosophy of History, PART iv,
SEC 3 104b-d; SECT 13 107d-108c; BK n, CH
i
28-29 527b-533a; PART in SUPPL, Q 69, A 4, 474b-d / Philebus, 621c-622b / Laws, BK vi,
ANS 889c-890c 712b
21 DANTE. Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvin 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK i, CH o [i92 a i6-24]
[19-39] 80a-b; PARADISE, in [34-90] 109d- 268b-c; BK vni, CH 4 [255*30-^31] 340a-c /
llOb; xxxn [52-72] 155b-c; xxxni [46-48] Metaphysics, BK i, CH i [980*22-28] 499a
156c 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK v, CH 8
b
[542 i7- 4] 68d-69a; BK vi, CH i8-BK vn,
ft
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 76c-d
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART in, PROP 32 406b-c; CH 2 97b-108c passim, esp BK vi, CH 18 97b-
PROP 35-36 406d-407c; PROP 39, scHOL408b-d 99c, BK vn, CH i 106b,d*108a; BK vin, en
b
33 PASCAL: Pensc'cs, 109 193b-194a i
[589*4-9] 115b / Ethics, BK in, CH n [in8
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 346b 8-18] 365a-b / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 11 [1370"*
42 KANT: Practical Reason, 298a-300a; 341c- 18-25] 613c; BK n, CH 7 [1385*21-25] 631d
342a / Judgement, 470a-471b 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK in, CH 6 202d-
43 MILL: Representative Government, 347b-348b / 203a; CH 8 205a-207b, CH 13, 211d-212d
Utilitarianism, 448d-449c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [1-61]
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 45 15a-d; BK iv [858-876] 55b-c; [1037-1057]
23c-d; par 59 27a-b; PART n, par 124 44b-d, 57d
PART in, par 154 57c; par 182 64a / Philosophy 15 TACITUS: Histories, BK n, 224d-225a
of History, INTRO, 165b-166a 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR v 100c-106b /
47 GOETHE: Faust esp PART i [2605-3216] 63 b- Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 28, 157a-b
79a, PART n [9192-9573] 223b-232a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 6, A
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 308a-309d passim; i, REP 2 28b-d; Q 12, A i, ANS 50c-51c; A 8, REP
Interpretation of Dreams, 189b-193b; 356d- 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 74,
373a esp 363c-d, 364d-365c, 369a-370a / Nar- AA 5-10 131d-137c, Q 77, A i, ANS 145a-d
cissism* 407c-4Q8a / General Introduction, 452c- 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 52d-53a
d; 495a-499b esp 496a-497b; 527c-539c esp 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK in,
532d-535d; 587d-588b; 592c-593a / Beyond 148d-150d; 154a-156c, 159d-163c; 166a468a
the Pleasure Principle, 641d-643c / Group Psy- 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 210b-212a; 273b-276a;
chology, 693b-694b / Ego and Id, 704b-c; 710c- 490d-491d
712a / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and \Anxiety, 26 SHAKESPEARE: 3rd Henry VI, ACT in, sc n
739a-c; 745a; 751 b-d/ Civilization and Its Dis- [123-195] 87c-88a
contents, 773d-774c; 781 a-c / New Introductory 27 SHAKESPEARE: Troilus and Cressida, ACT v,
Lectures, 847a-b sc n [106-114] 136a
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK HI, 60d-61a
5. Desire as ruler 28 HARVEY: Circulation of the Blood, 306a-c;
309d
5*i. Desire ruling imagination: daydreaming 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK i, APH 49 Ilia
and fantasy 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, iv 89a-93a / Objec-
7 PLATO: Republic, BK v, 361a tions and Replies^ 215d-216a
8 ARISTOTLE: Dreams, CH 2 [46o*33-b 27] 704b-d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART in, PROP 39, SCHOL
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 42 82a 408b-d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART I-H, Q 77, 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 82-87 186b<189a; 99-100
A i, ANS 145a-d 191a-192b / Geometrical Demonstration, 439b-
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PARTI, 52d-53a; PART n, 442a
138d-139a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 37a-b; 405d-406a xxi, SECT 12 180d-181a; SECT 65-67 195b-
26 SHAKESPEARE: 3rd Henry VI, ACT m, sc n 196c; BK iv, CH xx, SECT 12 392c
[123-195) 87c-88a / Richard //, ACT v, sc v 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER i, 29b-30a; NUMBER
[1-41] 349d-350a 31, 103c-104a; NUMBER 50, 162a-b
CHAPTER 17: DESIRE 339
43 MILL: Liberty, 269d-270a 15 TACITUS : Annals, BK
57b-58d in,
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 103b-c; 106d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK iv, par 25 25c;
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 15b-16a; BK BK vi, par 11-13 38b-39c; BK vm, par 25-27
ii, 82d-83a; BK in, 134a-c; BK iv, 170d-171c; 60a-c; BK x, par 40-70 81c-89a / Christian
BK vi, 238a-c; BK ix, 366d-367b; BK x, 426b; Doctrine, BK HI, CH 18-21 664d-666b
BK xi, 505a-511b esp 509d-510a; BK xm, 19 AQUINAS- Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 81,
585b A 3, REP 1-2 430c-431d; Q 83, A i, REP i 436d-
53 JAMES: Psychology, 314b; 381b-385b; 643a- 438a; PART i-n, Q 6, A 7 650a-d; Q 9, A 2
646a; 652a-657b; 668a-671a 658d-659c; Q 10, A 3 664d-665c
54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 363d-364b; 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 75,
379a-380d / Narcissism, 400a / Group Psy- AA 2-3 138c-139d, Q 77 144d-152a
chology, 682b-d / Ego and Id, 716a / War and DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, v [I]-VHI [64]
21
1
/ Samuel, 18-5-12; 19:8-10 (D) 7 Kings, 104a / Richard III 105a-148a,c / Romeo and
18:5-12; 19:8-10 / // Samuel, n; 13 (D) Juliet, ACT n, sc vi [1-15] 300c
// Kings, ii ; 13
27 SHAKESPEARE' Hamlet, ACT in, sc n [61-79]
APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 2:6-9 (D) 49c-d; sc iv [65-81] 55b-c / Troilus and Cres-
OT, Boo^ of Wisdom, 2:6-9 sida, ACT i, sc in [101-124] 109b; ACT n, sc
NEW TESTAMENT' Romans, i '18-32 / Philippians, n 113c-115d / Othello 205a-243a,c esp ACT
5 AESCHYLUS: Eumemdes [490-565] 86b 87a 31 DESCARTES. Discourse, PART in, 49b-d
Auhs [543-589] 429d-
5 EURIPIDES: Iphigenia at 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART in, PROP i 396a-c;
430a PROP 9, SCHOL 399c; PART iv, PREP 422b,d-
5 ARISTOPHANES: Clouds [882-1104] 499b-502a 424a; PROP 14-18 428a-429d; PROP 44-73
/ Lysistrata 583a-599a,c 437c-447a, APPENDIX, i-in 447a-b; xxxn
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 128a-d / Phaedo, 225d- 450c-d, PART v, PREF 451a-452c; PROP i- 16
226c / Gorgia$, 275b-280d / Republic, BK in, 452d-456c; PROP 42 463b-d
326c-327b; BK iv, 346a-356a; BK ix, 416a-c; 32 MILTON: Areopagitica, 390b-391a
435c-427b / Laws, BK vi, 7l2b; BK vm, 33 PASCAL- Pensees, 104 193a; 502 260b-261a
735c~738c 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH n,
8 ARISTOTLE* Topics, BK v, CH i [129*10-16] SECT 13 107d-108c; BK n, CH xxi, SECT 46-54
179a / Soul, BK HI* CH 9 [433*5-8] 665c; CH n 189d-192c; SECT 71 197b-198a, SECT 73 198c-
[434*10^15] 666d-667a 199c
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 13 [iio2 b i3-no3* 42 KANT. Fund. Pnn. Metaphy sic of Morals, 256b;
3] 348a-c; BK in, CH 10-12 364b-366a,c; BK 258b-c; 259a-c; 264d^265b / Pref. Metaphysi-
vi, CH 2 387d-388b; BK vn, CH i-io 395a- cal Elements of Ethics, 378b-c / Judgement,
403c passim / Politics, BK n, CH 7 [i266 b 26- 586a-587a
1267*17] 462b-d 43 MILL- Liberty, 295a-d / Representative Govern-
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 826d-827a ment, 348a-b / Utilitarianism, 463d-464d
12 AURELIUS: Meditations 253a-310d esp BK n, 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 135c-136a; 176d
SECT 16 259a, BK iv, SECT 24 265c-d, BK vn, 46 HEGEL- Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 19
SECT 55 283b-c 16d-17a; PART in, par 149 56b; par 187 65a-
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK iv 167a-186b ADDITIONS, 13-14 118c-d / Philosophy of
c;
14 PLUTARCH: Corwlanus, 174b,d-175a / Caius INTRO, 162a-172b; PART in, 312d-
History,
Manus, 353d-354a,c 313a
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK in, 57b-58d 49 DARWIN- Descent of Man, 304a-305a; 310c-
17 PLOIINUS: Fifth Ennead, TR ix, CH 1-2 246c- 319a esp 310c-312c, 313d-314b, 318d-319a;
247b 592b-593b
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK n, par 2-4 9b-d; 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vi, 245b-c;
BK in, par i 13b-c; BK vi, par 18-26 40d-43a; 248b-250a; EPILOGUE 655c-656b
i,
BK vin, par 1-2 52c-53b; par 10-11 55c-56b; 53 JAMES: Psychology, 80a-83b passim; 202a-
par 25-27 60a-c; BK x, par 40-70 81c-89a / 204b, 797b-798a; 807a-808a, 816a~819a
of God, BK ix, CH 4-5 287a-289a;
City 54 FREUD. Origin and Development of Psycho-
BK xiv, CH 8-9 381c-385b; BK xix, CH 4, Analysis, 9a; 16c / Hysteria, HOb-c / Inter-
511d-512a / Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 24 pretation of Dreams, 386d-387a / Narcissism,
630c-631a; CH 27 631d; BK in, CH 18-21 664d- 407 b-c / General Introduction, 452c-d; 501 d-
666b 504b esp 504b; 590a-593b; 624a-625b esp
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologtca, PART i, Q 81, 625a-b / Ego and Id, 701d-702d; 704a-707d
A 3 430c-431d; Q 95, A 2 507c-508a; Q 98, A 2 esp 706d-707c; 715a-716c csp 715c-d / In-
517d-519a; PART i-n, Q 10, A 3 664d-665c; Q hibitions,Symptoms, and Anxiety, 721d-722c;
17, A 7 690d-692a; Q 24 727a-730a; Q 45, A 744a / War and
Death, 757c-759d / Civiliza-
4, ANS 812b-813a tion and Its Discontents, 773b-774a csp 773c;
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 50, 780b-781d; 783c-785a; 785d-789a esp 787b-c;
A 3 8b*9a; Q 56, A 4 32b-33c; A 5, RKP i 792a-796c esp 792a-b, 793a-b, 793d-794b;
33c~34b; QQ 59-60 45d-54d; PART w, Q 15, 800c-801b / New Introductory Lectures, 837d-
A 4 790d-791c 840a
6bto1a CHAPTER 17: DESIRE 341
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Matters relevant to the metaphysical conception of desire, sec BEING 70-7^3); CHANGE i;
MATTER la, 3)3.
Discussions bearing on the theory of natural appetite or desire, see HABIT 33; HAPPINESS i;
NATURE la, 2d, 30(3).
Other discussions of the distinction between conscious and natural desire, and of animal
appetite in contrast to the human will, see ANIMAL 13(3); MAN 4b; SENSE 3e; WILL i,
2b(2).
The consideration of voluntary acts or movements, see ANIMAL 4b; NATURE 30(2); WILL
3a(i)-3 a(2).
Other treatments of the objects of desire in general, see BFING 3b; Goon AND EVIL 1,1, 3c;
HAPPINESS 4~4b; PLEASURE AND PAIN 6a-6b; and for particular objects of desire, see
i,
EMOTION 3b; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 8c, 8e; OPINION 2a; WILL 3b(i).
The psychological or ethical consideration of problems arising from the conflict between de-
sire and reason or duty, see DUTY 8; EMOTION 4-4^2); LIBERTY 33-3^ MIND ie(3), pb;
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booty of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
MARLOWE. Tamburlaine the Great BMN. The Emotions and the Will
SUAREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae, x (i), xxin- E. HARTMANN.Philosophy of the Unconscious
xxiv, xxx (16), XLVH (14) H SIDGWICK. The Methods of Ethics, BK i, CH 4
JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS. Cursus Phihsophicus Tho- ZOL\. Nana
misticus, Philosophia Naturalis, PART iv, Q 12 FRANCE. The Crime ofSylvestre Bonnard
MOLIERE. Lavare (The Miser) T. H. GREEN. Prolegomena to Ethics, BK u, CH 2
MALEBRANCHE. De la recherche de la vente, BK L. STEPHEN. The Science of Ethics, CH 2
IV IBSEN. The Master Builder
ACINE. Phedre CHLKHOV. The Sea-Gull
. Athahe RIBOT. The Psychology of the Emotions
OSSURT. Traitf de la concupiscence BRADLEY. Collected Essays, VOL i
(14)
EIBNITZ New Essays Concerning Human Under- MOORE. Prmcipia Ethica, CH 2 (39-47)
standing, BK II, CH 21 SCHELER. Der Formahsmus in der Ethif^ und die ma-
J. BUTLER. Fifteen Sermons upon Human Nature, teriale Wertethi^
i-n B RUSSELL. The Analysis of Mind, LECI 3
HUTCHESON. A System of Moral Philosophy, BK i, DEWEY. Human Nature and Conduct, PART in (8)
CH 2-3; BK II, CH 2 FITZGERALD. The Great Gatsby
An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the
. O'NEILL. Desire Under the Elms
Passions and Affections F. ALEXANDER. Psychoanalysis of the Total Person-
HfiLvimus, Traitt de r esprit, HI, CH 9-11 ality
T. REID. Essays on the Active Powers of the Human BEEBE-CENTER. The Psychology of Pleasantness and
Mind, in, PART ii, CH 1-2 Unpleasantness
J. G. FICHTE. The Vocation of Man NYGREN. Agape and Eros
SCHOPENHAUER. The World as Will and Idea ROUGEMONT. Love in the Western World
BROWN. Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human MARITAIN. Scholasticism and Politics, CH vi
Mind, VOL u, pp 153-179 D'ARCY. The Mind and Heart of Love
Chapter 18: DIALECTIC
INTRODUCTION
words "dialectical" and "dialectician" the only avenue to God condemned the dia-
THE are currently used more often in a deroga- lecticiansthe philosophers or theologians who
tory than in a descriptive sense. The person tried to use reason discursively rather than pro-
who criticizes an argument by saying, "It's just ceed by intuition and vision. With the Refor-
a matter of definition" is also apt to say, "That mation and with the Renaissance, men like Mar-
may be true dialectically, but . ." or "You're . tin Luther and Francis Bacon regarded dialec-
just being dialectical." Implied in such remarks tic as the bane of mediaeval learning. Because
is
dispraise of reasoning which, however excel- of its dialectical character, Luther dismissed all
alpine mule had wings, my Transalpine mule implications from whatever is said or can be
would fly. If it please God, I shall not be a said, pushing a premise to its logical conclusion
cuckold, but I shall be a cuckold if it please or reducing it to absurdity. This aspect of dia-
him." lectic appears to be the object of Rabelais' satire
As a term of disapproval, "dialectical" has in the famous dispute between Panurge and
been used by scientists against philosophers, Thaumast, which is carried on "by signs only,
by philosophers against theologians and, with without speaking, for the matters are so ab-
equal invective, by religious men against those struse, hard, and arduous, that words proceed-
who resort to argument concerning matters ing from the mouth of man will never be suffi-
of faith. cient for the unfolding of them."
The
early Middle Ages witnessed a conflict In view of those who think that truth can be
between the mystical and the rational ap- learned onlyby observation, by induction from
proaches to the truths of religion. Those for particulars, or generalization
from experience,
whom religious experience and revelation were the technique of dialectic, far from being a
345
346 THE GREAT IDEAS
method of inquiry, seems to have virtue only THE CONNECTION of dialectic with disputation
for the purpose of disputation or criticism. and rhetoric has some foundation in the his-
"The human Gibbon, "are
faculties," writes torical fact that many of the techniques of
fortified and practice of dialectics."
by the art dialectic originated with the Greek sophists who
It is "the keenest weapon of dispute," he adds, had primarily a rhetorical or forensic aim.
but "more effectual for the detection of error Comparable to the Roman rhetoricians and to
than for the investigation of truth." the law teachers of a later age, the sophists
Mill describes "the Socratic dialectics, so taught young men how to plead a case, how to
magnificently exemplified in the dialogues of defend themselves against attack, how to per-
Plato," as a "contrivance for making the diffi- suade an audience. Skill in argument had for
culties of the question . . .
present to the learn- them a practical, not a theoretical, purpose;
er's consciousness . . .
They were essentially a not truth or knowledge, but success in litiga-
negative discussion of the great questions of tion or in political controversy. The familiar
philosophy and life," he continues, "directed charge that the method they taught enabled
with consummate skill to the purpose of con- men "to make the worse appear the better rea-
vincing anyone who has merely adopted the son," probably exaggerates, but none the less
commonplaces of received opinion that he did reflects, the difference between the standards
not understand the subject . The school dis- . . of probability in disputation and the standards
inferior to the powerful dialectics which formed is identified with the sophistical.
the intellects of the 'Socratic viri'; but the But there is another historical fact which
modern mind," he says, "owes far more to both places dialectic in a different light. In the tra-
than it is
generally willing to admit, and the dition of the liberal arts, especially in their
present modes of education contain nothing Roman and mediaeval development, "dialec-
which degree supplies the place
in the smallest tic"and "logic" are interchangeable names for
either of the one or of the other." the discipline which, together with grammar
Disparaging comment on dialectic comes not and rhetoric, comprises the three liberal arts
only from those who contrast it unfavorably known as the "tnvium." In his treatise On
with the methods of experiment or empirical Christian Doctrine Augustine uses the word
research. It is made also by writers who trust "dialectic" in this way. Whatever else it means,
reason's power to grasp truths intuitively and the identification of dialectic with logic implies
to develop their consequences deductively. its distinction from rhetoric, and certainly
Sensitive to what may seem to be a paradox from sophistry.
here, Descartes writes in his Rules for the Di- Yet Augustine does not fail to observe the
rectionof the Mind: "It may perhaps strike misuse of dialectic which debases it to the level
some with surprise that here, where we are dis- of sophistry. "In the use of it," he declares, "we
cussing how to improve our power of deducing must guard against the love of wrangling, and
one truth from another, we have omitted all the childish vanity of entrapping an adversary.
the precepts of the dialecticians." The dialec- For there are many of what are called sophisms"
tician can proceed only after he has been given he continues, "inferences in reasoning that are
premises to work from. Since, in Descartes' false, and yet so close an imitation of the true,
view, dialectic provides no method for estab- as to deceive not only dull people, but clever
lishing premises or for discovering first princi- men too, when they are not on their guard."
ples, it can "contribute nothing at all to the He gives as an example the case of one man say-
discovery of the truth ... Its only possible use ing to another, "What I am, you are not." The
is to serve to explain at times more easily to other man may assent to this, thinking, as
Others the truths we have already ascertained; Augustine points out, that "the proposition is
hence should be transferred from Philosophy
it in part true, the one man being cunning, the
1*
to Rhetoric. other simple.'* But when "the first speaker
CHAPTER 18: DIALECTIC 347
"
adds: 'I am a man* and "the other has given to apt to have a bad name with the rest of
it is
his assent to this also, the first draws his con- the world ... But when a man begins to get
1 "
clusion: 'Then you are not a man, older, he will no longer be guilty of such in-
According to Augustine, "this sort of en- sanity; he will imitate the dialectician who is
snaring argument" should not be called dia- seeking for truth, and not the sophist, who is
lectical, but sophistical. He makes the same contradicting for the sake of amusement."
sort of observation about the abuse of rhetoric In the hands of the philosopher dialectic is an
in speech which "only aims at verbal ornamen- instrument of science. "There is," according to
tation more than is consistent with seriousness Socrates, "no other method of comprehending
of purpose." That, too, he thinks, should be by any regular process all true existence or of
"called sophistical" m
order to avoid attaching ascertaining what each thing is in its own na-
the name of rhetoric to misapplications of the ture." It passes beyond the arts at the lowest
art. level,"which are concerned with the desires or
Dialectic for Augustine is the art which opinions of men, or are cultivated with a view
"deals with inferences, and definitions, and to production and constructions." It likewise
divisions" and "is of thegreatestassistanceinthe transcends the mathematical sciences, which,
discovery of meaning." Rhetoric, on the other while they "have some apprehension of true
hand, "is not to be used so much for ascertain- being .leave the hypotheses which they use
. .
ing the meaning as for setting forth the mean- unexamined, and are unable to give an account
ing when it is ascertained." Dialectic, in other of them." Using these as "handmaids and
words, is divorced from the practical purpose of helpers," dialectic "goes directly to the first
stating and winning an argument, and given principle and is the only science which does
theoretical status as a method of inquiry. away with hypotheses in order to make her
ground secure."
THIS CONCEPTION of dialectic originates in the The dialectic of Plato has an upward and a
dialogues of Plato. Not
himself a sophist, either downward path which somewhat resemble the
by profession or in aim, Socrates found other inductive process of the mind from facts to
uses for the analytical and argumentative devices principles, and the deductive process from
invented by the sophists. The same skills of mind principles to the conclusions they validate.
which were practically useful in the public as- Dialectic, says Socrates, ascends by using hy-
sembly and in the law courts could be used or potheses "as steps and points of departure into
adapted for clarification and precision in specu- a world which is above hypotheses, in order
lative discussions. They could also be used to that she may soar beyond them to the first
find the truth implicit in the commonly ex- principle of the whole ... By successive steps
pressed convictions of men and to lay bare she descends again without the aid of any sensi-
errors causedby lack of definition in discourse ble object, from ideas, through ideas, and in
Republic, one of the reasons Socrates gives for the light of their presuppositions or conse-
postponing the study of dialectic until the age quences; the formulation of inferences and
of thirty is that youngsters, "when they first proofs; the resolution of dilemmas arising from
get the taste in their mouths, argue for amuse- opposition in thought.
ment" and "like puppy-dogs, they rejoice in
pulling and tearing at all who come near them." WHEREAS FOR PLATO dialectic is more than the
As a result of being vainly disputatious, they whole of logic, for Aristotle it is less. Dialectic
"get into the way of not believing anything is more than the process by which the mind
which they believed before, and hence, not goes from myth and fantasy, perception and
only they, but philosophy and all that relates opinion, to the highest truth. For Plato it is the
348 THE GREAT IDEAS
ultimate fruit of intellectual labor
knowledge more easily the truth and error about the sever-
itself, and supreme form as a vision of be-
in its al points that arise."
ing and unity. That is why Socrates makes it Though it is
primarily a method of arguing
the .ultimate study in the curriculum proposed from assumptions and of dealing with disputes
for training the guardians to become philoso- arising from contrary assumptions, dialectic is
pher kings. "Dialectic," he says, "is the coping- also concerned with the starting points of argu-
stone of the sciences, and over them; no is set ment. The Topics considers how assumptions
other science can be placed higher the nature are chosen, what makes them acceptable, what
of knowledge can go no further." determines their probability. Here again Aris-
For Aristotle, dialectic, far from being at the totle shows how the philosopher can make use
summit of science and philosophy, lies at their of dialectic as that "process of criticism where-
base, and must be carefully distinguished from in lies the path to the principles of all inquiries."
sophistry, which it resembles in method. "Dia-
lecticians and sophists assume the same guise as THERE ARE FOUR major expositions of dialectic
the/philosopher," Aristotle writes, "for sophis- in the tradition of the great books. It is as pivot-
tic is wisdom which exists only in semblance, al aconception in the thought of Kant and
and dialecticians embrace all things in their Hegel as it is in the philosophies of Plato and
dialectic, and being is common to all things; but Aristotle. With differences which may be more
evidently their dialectic embraces these sub- important than the similarities, the Kantian
jects because these arc proper to philosophy. treatment resembles the Aristotelian, the
Sophistic and dialectic," he continues, "turn on Hegelian the Platonic.
the same class of things as philosophy, but Like the division between the Posterior
philosophy differs from dialectic in the nature Analytics and the Topics in Aristotle's Organon,
of the faculty required and from sophistic in the transcendental logic of Kant's Critique of
respect of the purpose of the philosophic life. Pure Reason falls into two parts the analytic
Dialectic is
merely critical where philosophy and the dialectic. The distinction between his
claims to know, and sophistic is what
appears to transcendental logic and what Kant calls "gen-
be philosophy but is not." eral logic" is discussed in the chapter on LOGIC,
Intermediate between science and rhetoric, cognition of the understanding, and the princi-
dialectic can serve both. In addition to its prac- ples without which no object at all can be
tical employment in forensics, it is useful in the thought." This is the "Transcendental Analyt-
philosophical sciences because it
develops skill ic, and at the same time a logic of truth"-
in making and criticizing definitions, and in a logic of science. Since in his (view "it ought
asking or answering questions. "The ability to properly to be oaly a canon for judging of the
raise searching difficulties on botfi sides of a empirical use of the understanding, this kind of
c
abject," Aristotle says, "will make us detect logic is misused when we seek to employ it as
18: DIALECTIC 349
an organon bf thte universal and unlimited exer- But "transcendental illusion, on the contrary,"
cise of the understanding." he writes, "does not cease to exist even after it
When it is thus misused, "the exercise of the has been exposed and its nothingness has been
writes, "must therefore be a critique of dia- The reason for this, Kant explains, is that
lectical illusion, and this critique we shall term "here we have to do with a natural and unavoid-
Transcendental Dialectic not meaning it as v
able illusion, which rests upon subjective prin-
an art of producing dogmatically such illusion ciples, and imposes these upon us as objective.
(an art which is unfortunately too current . . . There is, therefore," he continues, "a
among the practitioners of metaphysical jug- natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure rea-
gling),but as a critique of understanding and son" which arises because the mind seeks to
reason in regard to their hyperphysical use." answer questions "well nigh impossible to
Kant goes further than Aristotle in separat- answer," such as "how objects exist as things in
ing dialectic from science. With regard to the themselves" or "how the nature of things is to
sensible or phenomenal world of experience, be subordinated to principles." In its effort to
science is
possible; with regard to the mind's transcend experience "in disregard of all the
own structure, the supreme sort of science is warnings of criticism" the mind cannot escape
possible. But when reason tries to use its ideas the frustration, the dialectical illusion, "which
for other objects, and then regards them "as is an inseparable adjunct of human reason."
conceptions of actual things, their mode of It is not, Kant
repeatedly insists, that "the
application is transcendent and delusive." Kant ideas of pure reason" are "in their own nature
explains that "an idea is employed transcen- dialectical ;
it is from thei r misemployment alone
dentally, when it is applied to an object falsely that fallacies and illusions arise."
clusion equally acceptable to reason "a per- very process of transcending its earlier stages,
fectly natural antithetic" as in the antinomies gains an affirmative, and, in fact, a richer and
of pure reason; or, as in the paralogisms, the more concrete shape."
reasoning has specious cogency which can be The dialectical process is a motion in which
shown to "conclude falsely, while the form is
contrary and defective truths are harmonized.
correct and unexceptionable." In this balance The synthesis of thesis and antithesis results in
of reason against itself lies the illusory character a more complete truth. To illustrate his mean-
of the transcendental dialectic. ing,Hegel uses the example of building a house.
Where Aristotle recognizes that reason can For such a purpose, we must have "in the first
be employed on both sides of a question be- aim and design" and as
instance, a subjective
cause involves competing probabilities, Kant
it means, "the several substances required for
in calling dialectic "a logic of appearance" ex- the work iron, wood, stones." In rendering
plicitly remarks that "this does not signify a these materials suitable for our purpose, we
doctrine of probability." He further distin- make use of the elements: "fire to melt the
guishes what he calls "transcendental illusory iron, wind to blow the fire, water to set the
appearance" from "empirical illusory appear- wheels in motion, in order to cut the wood,
ance" and ordinary "logical illusion." The etc."
latter two can be corrected and totally removed. Yet the house that we build is, according to
350 THE GREAT IDEAS
Hegel, an opposite or antithesis of these ele- For Hegel the opposition takes the mijdcr
ments. "The wind, which lias helped to build form of contrary theses and antitheses. They
the house, is shut out by the house; so also arc can be dialectically overcome by a synthesis
the violence of rains and floods, and the de- which remedies the incompleteness of each
structive powers of fire, so far as the house is half truth. "It is one of the most important
made fire-proof. The stones and beams obey discoveries of logic," Hegel says, "that a
the law of gravity press downward and so specific moment by standing in an
which,
high walls are carped up." The result is that opposition, has the position of an extreme,
"the elements are made use of in accordance ceases to be such and is a moment in an organic
with their nature, and yet to cooperate for a whole by being at the same time a mean."
product, by which their operation is limited." The Hegelianopposition is thus also "media-
The initial opposition between the idea of a tion."
house and the elements is reconciled in the Dialectical opposition for Aristotle originates
higher synthesis, which is the house itself. in the disagreements which occur in ordinary
While it shows the opposing theses and the human discourse. But just as disagreement is
resulting synthesis, this example does not fully reasonable only if there are two sides to the
exhibit the dynamic character of the Hegelian question in dispute, so reason can operate dia-
dialectic. If the resulting synthesis is not the lectically only with regard to genuinely argu-
whole truth, it too must be defective and re- able matters. The familiar topics concerning
quire supplementation by a contrary which is which men disagree represent the commonplace
defective in an opposite way. These two to- issuesof dialectic, since for the most part they
gether then become the material for a higher are formed from debatable propositions or ques-
synthesis, another step in that continuing dia- tions."Nobody in his senses," Aristotle be-
lectical process which is the life of mind both lieves,"would make a proposition of what no
the subjective dialectic of the human mind and one holds; nor would he make a problem of
the objective dialectic of the Absolute Mind or what obvious to everybody or to most peo-
is
through these four conceptions of dialectic is sisof incomplete opposites nor in a rejection of
to be found in the principle of opposition. In both as illusory; but, having "an eye to general
each of them dialectic either begins or ends opinion," it seeks to ascertain the more reason-
with some sort of intellectual conflict, or de- able view the more tenable or probable of the
velops and then resolves such oppositions. two.
For Kant dialectical opposition takes the ex- In the Platonic theory of dialectic, the ele-
treme form of irreducible contradictions from ment of opposition appears in the tension be-
which the mind cannot escape. "It is a melan- tween being and becoming, the one and many,
choly reflection," he declares, "that reason in or the intelligible and the sensible, which is
its highest exercise, falls into an antithetic." found present in every stage of the mind's dia-
This comes about because "all statements enun- lectical ascent to the contemplation of ideas.
ciated by pure reason transcend the conditions So fundamental is this tension thatSpc rates uses
of possible experience, beyond the sphere of it to define the dialectician as one who is "able
which we can discover no criterion of truth, to see 'a One and Many' in Nature" by com-
while they are at the same time framed in ac- prehending "scattered particulars in one idea"
cordance with the laws of the understanding, and dividing it "into species according to their
which are applicable only to experience; and natural formation." Here as in the Hegelian
thus it is the fate of all such speculative dis- theory the oppositions apparent contradic-
cussions, that while the one party attacks the tions in discourse can be resolved by dialectic,
weaker side of his opponent, he infallibly lays and through their resolutiqn the mind then
open his own weaknesses." rises to a higher level.
CHAPTER 18: DIALECTIC 151
1
IT is ONLY IN the writings of Hegel or his fol- ment/ yet it is also conceived as working
lowers that the meaning of dialectic is not 'towards a definite crtd~~thc revolution which
limited to the activity of human thought. has asits result the peace of the classless
society.
Hegel expressly warns that "the loftier dia- Bourgeois industry, by bringing about the con-
lectic ... is not an activity of subjective think- centration and association of the proletariat,
ing applied to some matter externally, but is produces "its own grave diggers; its fall and the
rather the matter's very soul putting forth its victory of the proletariat" are "equally inevi-
branches and fruit organically." It is the "de- table."
velopment of the Idea," which is "the proper In Marx's vocabulary the phrases "historical
activity of its rationality." If the whole world materialism" and "dialectical materialism" arc
in its existence and development is the thought strictly synonymous. But Marx's protest to
and thinking of an Absolute Mind, or the Idea, the contrary notwithstanding, a comparison of
then the events of nature and of history are Marx and Hegel seems to show that a dialectic
moments in a dialectical process of cosmic pro- of history is
equally capable of being conceived
portions. The
principles of dialectic become in terms of spirit or of matter.
the principles of change, and change itself is The question whether there is a dialectic of
conceived as a progress or evolution from lower nature as well as a dialectic of history remains a
to higher, from part to whole, from the inde- point of controversy in Marxist thought, de-
terminate to the determinate. spite the bearing which Hegel's Science of Logic
The dialectical pattern of history, conceived and Phenomenology of Mind might have upon
as the progressive objectifkation of the question. Engels tries in his Dialectics of
by Hegel
spirit,
reconstructed by Karl Marx in terms
is Nature to give a fuller rendering of the Hege-
of the conflict of material forces. Marx himself lian dialectic in
strictly
materialistic terms. Its
Hegel. "My dialectic method," he writes, "is as all of history, is also reflected in certain post-
not only different from the Hegelian, but is Darwinian doctrines of cosmic evolution.
its direct opposite." Hegel, he claims, thinks
that "the real world is
only the external, CONSIDERATIONS RELEVANT to the Hegelian or
"
phenomenal form of 'the Idea,' whereas Marxist dialectic will be found in the chapters
Nevertheless, with respect to dialectic, Marx aversion they have produced in certain quarters.
praises Hegel for being "the first to present its Freud, for example, is as unsympathetic in his
and conscious manner." 'The only trouble is rejection of dialectical materialism, as James be-
that with Hegel, dialectic "is standing on its fore him is extreme in the expression of his dis-
accomplishes in his dialectical materialism. life is that in it all contradictions find, their re-
Having put dialectic on its proper basis, conciliation," James declares: "With this intel-
of a conflict of material forces, or of social The Hegelian dialectic and what James calls
classes in economic strife, according to a dialec- "the pantomime-state of mind" are, in his opin-
ticalpattern which provides "recognition of ion, "emotionally considered, one and the same
the existing state of things, at the same time thing. In thepantomime all common things are
also the recognition of the negation of that represented to happen in impossible ways, peo-
of its inevitable breaking up." History is
state, ple jump down each other's throats, houses turn
thus viewed dialcctically "as in fluid move- inside out, old women become young men,
352 THE GREAT IDEAS
everything 'passes into its opposite* with incon- object, many and one) must first be translated
ceivable celerity and skill. . . . And so in the into impossibilities and contradictions, then
Hegelian logic," James continues, "relations 'transcended' and identified by miracle, ere the
elsewhere recognized under the insipid name of proper temper is induced for thoroughly enjoy-
distmctions (such as that between knower and ing the spectacle they show.'*
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGB
1 . Defini tions of dialectic 353
(1) The ascent from appearance to reality, or from opinion to knowledge: the
upward and downward paths of dialectic
(2) Definition, division, hypothesis, and myth in the service of dialectic 354
2b. Dialectic as the method of inquiry, argument, and criticism in the sphere of
opinion
(1) Divisions of dialectic: the theory of the predicables
(1) The division of logic into analytic and dialectic: the distinction between
(1) The distinction between subjective and objective dialectic: the realization
of the moral will 355
(2) The dialectic of nature and of history: the actualization of freedom
3^. The opposed premises of dialectical argument: dialectical problems and theses;
the conflict of probabilities
$d. Thesis and antithesis as moments in the advance toward a dialectical synthesis
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which arc the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
upperandlower halves of the page. Forexample, m53 JAMES: Psychology, 116a-119b, thepassagc
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. Forexample, in 7 PLATO Symposium, 163b-164c, the
passage begins
the lower half m
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the mam divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, brackets, are given in cer- m
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES- The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehermah, 7*45 (D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS' The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style, for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
(2a. Dialectic as the pursuit of truth and the con- 26(1) Divisions of dialectic: the theory of the
templation of being. 2a(\) The ascent predicables
from appearance to reality, or from opinion 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK i-vn 143a-211a,c esp
knowledge: the upward and downward
to BK i, CH 2 143d-144a, CH 4-6 144b-146a, CH
paths of dialectic."} 12 148d
/ Sophistical Refutations, CH 11 [i7i b
a b
17 PLOTINUS First Ennead, TR nr, CH 4-6 lla 12b 3-8] 236a-b; [i72 22- 4] 237b-c
42 KANT- Pure Reason, 113b-115c; 173b-174a / 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK i, CH 2 [1356*36-
Judgement, 551a-552c
43 MILL: Liberty, 288a 20 AQUINAS- Summa Theologica, PARTI-II, Q 57,
A 6, REP 3 40a-41a
2a(2) Definition, division, hypothesis, and
myth in the service of dialectic 2^(2) The technique of question and answer
7 PLATO: Charmtdes, 4a-13d esp 4b, 5a-b, 6d, 7 PLATO: Protagoras, 50d-51b / Euthydemus,
7c, lOa / Laches, 31c-37d / Protagoras, 43d- 78a-d / Cratylus, 88d-89a / Republic, BK vi,
45a; 49a / Phaedrus, 124b-129d; 134a-c, 139d- 375b-c / Sophist, 551d
140b / Meno 174a-190a,c esp 175d, 179d-180b, 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK i, CH i
[24*
183b-c / Euthyphro, 192c-199a,c esp 193a, 2i-b i5) 39a-c / Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH
b
193d, 195b / Phaedo, 242b-243c / Republic, n [77*25-35] 106b; BK n, CH 5 [9i u-i7]
BK i~n, 297b 316b; BK iv, 346a-356a, BK 125b / Topics, BK vin 211a-223a,c / Sophis-
b
vi-vn,386d-398c/ Timaeus, 462b-c/ Parmem- tical Refutations, CH a
10 [i7i 27)-cn n [i7i 6]
des 486a-511d esp 491a-d / Sophist 551a-579d 235d-236a, CH n [172*15-21] 237a
esp 552b-c, 553d-554a, 561b, 570c-571d /
12 EPICTETUS Discourses, BK in, CH 2, 178a-d
Statesman 580a-608d esp 580d, 582d-583c, 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 65a
586c~589c, 591a-d, 594d-596a / Phdcbus 42 KANT Pure Reason, 36a-b
.
609a-639a,c esp 610d 613a, 615c 617d / 46 HECJFL* Philosophy of Right, PART n, par 140,
Seventh tetter, 809c-810d 53a-b
8 ARISTOTLE: Generation and Corruption, BK i,
2c. Dialectic as the logic of semblance and as
CH 2 [316*5 -14] 411c-d / Metaphysics, BK i, CH
b the critique of the illusory employment
6 [987*29- 7] 505bc; [987^0-33! 506a, BK
h of reason beyond experience
xin, CH 4 [io78 i8 32] 610b-c / Soul, BK i,
CH i [403*29 b 8] 632c-d 42 KANT Pure Reason, la-4a,c esp la-b; 7a-8b,
QARisroTLi' Parts of Animals, BK i, CH 23
1
167a-d / Republic, BK in, 333b-d; BK v, 370d- par 104 39b-d; PART n, par 105-114 40a-42b
373c; BK vi-vu, 383d-398c / Parmemdes esp par 109 41a-b; PART in, par 256 79d-80a;
486a-511d / Sophist, 564d-574c / Statesman, par 302 lOla-c; par 353-360 112b-114a,c /
594d-595a / Plnlebus, 610d-613a; 615c-617d; Philosophy of History 153a 369a,c esp INTRO,
633a-635a esp 634b-635a / Seventh Letter, 153a-190b, 203a-206a,c, PART i, 208b-d,
809c-810d 235d-236c, 238b, 245b-d, 257a-c, PART n,
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK i, CH 6 505b- 279c-d, PART in, 286c-287a, 303c-311d, PART
b
506b, BK HI, CH
i
[995 2o~25] 514a-b; BK iv, iv, 316a-b, 321d-322c, 326d-327a, 333d-334d
CH 2 522b-524b esp [ioo"4 b 15-26] 523d 53 JAMES Psychology, 117b, 238b [fn 2]
11 NICOMACHUS- Arithmetic, BK n, 839d-840b
17 PLOTINUS' First Ennead, TR in, CH 4 lla-c /
4. Dialectic in relation to philosophy and sci-
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The comide ration of dialectic as logic or a part of logic, and of its relation to the other liberal
Other discussions of the conception of dialectic as the highest science, the supreme form of
knowledge or wisdom, see METAPHYSICS i; PHILOSOPHY 20; SCIENCE 13(2); WISDOM la.
Other discussions of dialectic as a method of argument in the sphere of opinion, sec OPINION
20; REASONING 5c; RHETORIC 4c 4c(3); and for matters relevant to the use of dialectic as
a method of inquiry, see DEFINITION 4; HYPOTHESIS i; PRINCIPLE 30(2).
The philosophy of history, see HISTORY 4a(2)~4a(3); PROGRESS xa.
role of dialectic in the
The discussion of the types of opposition which have significance for dialectic, see OPPOSI-
TION le, 20, 2e; REASONING 5c.
Dialectic in relation to philosophy and theology, see METAPHYSICS 30; PHILOSOPHY 30;
THEOLOGY 5.
Discussions of sophistry, and for the condemnation of dialectic as sophistry, see LOGIC 5;
METAPHYSICS 43; PHILOSOPHY 6b; THEOLOGY 5; TRUTH 8c; WISDOM 3.
CHAPTER 18: DIALECTIC 357
ADDITIONAL READINGS v
Listed below are works not included in Great Booty of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works arc divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great lotas.
INTRODUCTION
discussing in the bourse of his essay power. Those whom the law binds in conscience
ECKE,
on Human Understanding "why a man rather than by its coercive force obey the law
must keep his word," notes that we meet with because it is morally right to do so. The sense
three different answers to this question. "If a of the law's moral authority is for them the
Christian be asked, he will give as reason: Be- sense of duty from which the dictates of con-
cause God, who has the power of eternal life science flow.
and death, requires it of us. But if a Hobbist be Locke's third answer that of the ancient
asked why ? he will answer: Because the public philosophers shows that duty is sometimes
requires it, and the Leviathan will punish you understood without reference to law, divine or
if you do not, And if one of the old philoso- human. We share this understanding whenever,
phers had been asked, he would have answered: having made a promise or contracted a debt,
Because it; was dishonest, below the dignity of we feel an obligation to discharge it even if
a man, and opposite to virtue, the highest per- no superior commands the act. Here, further-
perhaps the central problem concerning duty. As indicated by Locke's statement of this
All three acknowledge the existence of duty ancient view, it is the honest or just man who
and the force of obligation. By accepting the acknowledges such obligations apart from the
question they affirm the proposition that a man law or his relation to any superior. Virtue may,
must or ought to keep his word. But why ? What of course, also direct a man to act for the com-
creates the ought or obligation? mon welfare and to obey the laws of the state
Two of the answers Locke cites that of the or the commandments of God. But the imme-
Christian and that of the Hobbist seem to diate source of the obligation to act in a certain
derive duty from the commands of law, the law way toward one's fellow men is placed by the
of God or of the state, in either case a law to be ancients, according to Locke, in "virtue, the
enforced by the sanctions of a superior power. highest perfection of human nature." On this
Accordingly, the citizen has duties to the state, view, virtue alone provides the motivation.
the religious man to God. Yet it does not seem Without it men would act lawfully only be-
to be entirely the case that such duties rest ex- cause of the law's coercive force. Without it
clusively on the superior power of God or the men would recognize no obligations to their
state. Men who obey either divine or civil law men or to the state.
fellow
from fear of punishment alone, are said to act
not from duty but from expediency in terms THESE TWO conceptions of duty for the mo-
of a calculation of risks and consequences. ment grouping the Christian and Hobbist an-
Obedience to law would appear to be ac- swers together against the ancient view may
knowledged as a duty only by those who recog- seem at first to be only verbally different. It
nize the authority of the law or the right of the seems certain that dutiful conduct would fre-
lawmaker to command. They would be willing quently be the same on either view. Yet they
to obey the law even if no external sanction do conflict with one another, and each, if
could be enforced against them by a superior examined further, presents difficulties.
358
CHAFTBR 19; DUTY
The theory that duty arises from a man's and courage, do not give rise to obligation^
own virtue receives its classic expression, as unless they arc somehow annexed to or united
Locke intimates, in the ancient philosophers, with justice. Whenever Aristotle speaks of
duties he does so with reference to the obliga-
particularly Plato and Aristotle.
It appears in
the Republic, for example, when Socrates has to tions that follow from justice "the duties of
meet Glaucon's argument that men abide by parents to children and those of brothers to
moral rules, not simply because they ought to, each other those of comrades and those of
. . .
punishment. Glaucon claims that, given the Whereas for Aristotle justice always refers to
which can render a the good of another, or to the common good of
possession of Gyges' ring
man invisible to others, "no man would keep all, such virtues as temperance and courage,
his hands off what was not his own when he when they are isolated from justice, concern
could safely take what he liked." He could "in the well-being of the individual himself. That
all respects be like a God among men." is
why only justice entails duties, which are ob-
Against this Socrates sets his conception of ligations to act in a certain way for the welfare
the "just man" who does what he ought to do of others, if the good of no other individual is
because it is just, and because justice is essential involved, it seems that a man has no duty to be
to the very life and health of the soul. Accord- temperate or courageous, even when he possesses
ing to Socrates' way of thinking, it
is ridiculous these virtues.
to ask "which is the more profitable, to be just Precisely because of the essentially social
and act justly and practise virtue, whether seen character of justice, Aristotle raises the ques*
or unseen of gods and men, or to be unjust. . . . tion "whether a man can treat himself unjustly
We know that, when the bodily constitution is or not." He is
willing to admit that a man can
pered with all kinds of meat and drinks, and phorical sense. What he calls "metaphorical jus-
having all wealth and all power; and shall we be tice" is not a relation between a man and him-
told that when the very essence of the vital self, but a relation between one part of himself
temperance, courage, and wisdom. It is al- tally Aristotelian. Referring to that "kind of
most indifferent therefore whether one attrib- metaphorical justice" to which Aristotle ap-
utes moral obligation to the particular virtue peals in stating the sense in which a man can
of justice or to virtue in general. As the chap- treat himself unjustly, Aquinas explains how
ters on JUSTICE and VIRTUE indicate, Aristotle "all the other virtues" can be said to "involve
differs from Plato, both with respect to the the duty of the lower powers to reason." Apart
virtues in general and to justice in particular. from this metaphorical duty of the passions to
For Aristotle it is justice alone, not virtue in obey reason, duty in the strict sense comes, in
general or any other particular virtue, which the opinion of Aquinas, only from the precepts
gives rise to duty or obligation. of justice, which concern the relation of one
Justice differs from the other virtues, accord- person to another.
ing to Aristotle, in that it "alone of the virtues
is
thought to consider 'another's good' because ON THIS THEORY, duty is not coextensive with
it concerns the Delation of a man to his neigh- morality, the sense of duty is not identical with
1
bor.' The other virtues, such as temperance the moral sense, knd sjbeci&c duties obligate a
360 THE GREAT IDEAS
man to other men even when no general law state? Can duty be co-extensive with morality
exists to be obeyed. Difficulty is found with if the only rules of conduct to be obeyed are
this theory by those critics who think that the laws imposed from without regulations which
whole of morality, not simply one part of it, have authority simply because they come from
involves duties. Does not the sense of duty one who has the right to command? Again, as
operate, they ask, in matters which do not affect we shall see, Kant would say No,
any other individual or even the common good ?
Does a man, for example, have a duty to tell the WE HAVE now stated the questions about duty
truth only to others, but not to seek it for him- which raise difficulties for Aristotle and Hobbes.
self? Kant, as we shall see, holds that there are Though they differ in their theories of law and
private as well as public duties, or, in his lan- justice, as well as in their conceptions of duty,
guage, internal duties in the realm of ethics as they seem to concur in thinking that doing
well as external duties in the realm of juris- one'sduty does not exhaustively solve all moral
prudence. problems.
The Hobbist theory of duty seems to face The same questions do not, however, seem to
similar difficulties. The specific duties which are present difficulties to other moralists to Kant
determined by the precepts of justice may, as and to the Stoics of antiquity, such as Marcus
we have seen, not always be the same as the Aurehus and Epictetus. On the contrary, their
specific duties imposed by civil law,
though moral philosophy, by making the sphere of duty
they will be identical whenever the law of the co-extensive with the whole of the moral life,
state is itselfan expression or determination of seems to prevent such questions from being
secondarily, or in consequence, does it involve to the question, Why must a man keep his
obligations to other men who are one's equals. word ? In the first place, Locke's statement of
With Hobbes, for example, justice, and ob- the answer given by "the ancient philosophers"
So that the nature of justice consisteth in keep- against that of Plato and Aristotle. That
ing of valid covenants; but the validity of cove- association may be justified on the ground that
nants begins not but with the constitution of a duty to God, like duty to the state, involves
men to peace, and to obedience," until "a Com- about the pervasiveness of duty in the realm of
monwealth is once settled," and then they be- morals. Locke's statement of the Christian posi-
come "the commands of the Commonwealth." tion*which selects one aspect of it only, may
In other words, "it is the Sovereign power that therefore be inadequate.
obliges men to obey them," and obedience, The point which unites Kant, the Stoics, and
which is said to be "part also of the law of Aquinas is their agreement concerning the ex-
nature," is its
proper expression. istence of a law which is neither enacted by the
So far the two conceptions conflict or at least statenor proclaimed by God m his revealed
diverge. But if the legal theory of duty goes no commandments. This law the Stoics speak of as
further than the enactments of the state, the "the law of reason," Aquinas calls "the natural
same question arises here as before. Does a man law," and Kant conceives to be "the moral law
have no duties apart from his relation to the within." The common conception thus vari-
19: DUTY 361
ously expressed is more fully treated in the every case to obey the law. It is not a duty to
chapter on LAW; but that ampler discussion is persons, except as the moral law commands us
not needed to perceive that the law of reason to respect the dignity of the human person,
or of nature is a moral law, in that its general ourselves and others alike.
principles and detailed precepts govern the en- The element of a superior commanding an
tire range of moral acts. inferior seems to be present in this conception
"Morality," according to Kant, "consists in of duty through the relation of reason to the
the reference of action to the legislation
all will and appetites of man. Acting dutifully con-
which alone can render a kingdom of ends pos- sists in the submission of the will to reason,
sible." By this he means that "the will is never and in overcoming all contrary inclinations or
to act on any maxim which could not without desires. But though Kant sometimes speaks in
contradiction be also a universal law." This law these terms, he also conceives duty as carrying
is also moral in the sense that it exercises only with an obligation to God. "The subjective
it
moral authority and should prevail even with- principle of a responsibility for one's deeds be-
out the support of the external sanctions which fore God," he says, is "contained, though it be
accompany the positive commands of a supe- only obscurely, in every moral self-conscious-
rior. 'The idea of duty," Kant declares, "would ness."
alone be sufficient as a spring [of action] even if Nevertheless, Kant insists that "the Christian
the spring were absent which is connected by principle of morality itself is not theological."
forensic legislation . . .
namely external com- It rests, in his opinion, on the "autonomy of
pulsion." pure practical reason, since it does not make
Making the natural or moral law the princi- the knowledge of God and his will the founda-
of duty introduces the element of obligation tion of these laws, but only of the attainment of
ple
into every moral act. Whatever is right to do the summum bonum, on the condition of follow-
we are obliged to do in conformity to the law ing these laws, and it does not even place the
of nature or in obedience to the commands of proper spring of this obedience in the desired
the moral law. We need no external promulga- results, but solely in the conception of duty, as
tion of this law i.e., no express formulation in that of which the faithful observance alone con-
words by a lawgiver for this law is inherent in stitutes the worthiness to obtain those happy
reason itself. Its various maxims or precepts can consequences."
be deduced from what Aquinas calls the "first It is "through the summum bonum as the
principle ... of the practical reason" and Kant object and final end of pure practical reason"
"the categorical imperative." Or, as the Stoics that, in Kant's view of Christian morality, we
say, since reason is the "ruling principle" in pass from moral philosophy to ''religion, that is,
man, man's duty consists in "holding fast" to it to the recognition of all duties as divine com-
and "going straight on" so that it has "what is mands" A Christian theologian like Aquinas,
its own." however, seems to go further than Kant in
On this theory, we are obliged in conscience equating conformity to the moral law or the
to do whatever reason declares right, whether natural law of reason with religious obedience
or not others are directly involved. The dis- to God. Nor does he explain this equivalence
between the spheres of justice and the other man's attainment of the summum bonum or
virtues is irrelevant to conscience. Conscience, eternal happiness depend on his free compli-
according to Kant, functions equally in the ance with the moral law. Rather, for Aquinas,
the realm of ethics and the realm of jurispru- tional creature's participation in the eternal
dence, conscience, applying the moral law, dic- law" of God the "imprint on us of the divine
tates our duty in the particular case. We stand light." As God is the author of man's nature
in no different relation to ourselves and others, and reason, so is He the ultimate authority be-
since the moral law is universally and equally hind the commands of the natural law which
poses upon us what Socrates in the Apology The happy man, according to Aristotle, is
calls man's "duty to inquire." If we fail to seek one who somehow succeeds in satisfying all his
the truth, we sin against God by sinning against desires by seeking the various kinds of goods in
our nature, even though "Thou shalt seek the some order and relation to one another. Happi-
truth" is nowhere explicitly prescribed in Holy ness itself is something that "we choose always
chapters on HAPPINESS and PLEASURE as well entirely excluded, but neither is it given any
as the present one. All three must be read to- independent significance. As we have seen, it is
getherand perhaps also the chapters on DE- merely an aspect of the virtue of justice, and
SIRE, LAW, and VIRTUE to complete the pic- amounts to no more than the just man's ac-
happiness are central, the basic distinction is which of duty with the
identifies the sense
between good and evil, and desire rather than moral sense. In the Stoicism of Marcus Aurehus
law sets the standard of appraisal. An analysis and Epictetus, to live well is to do one's duty,
of means and ends and a theory of the virtues and to set aside all contrary desires. "It is thy
are usually found in the ethics of happiness, as duty," the Emperor writes, "to order thy life
a theory of conscience and sanctions is usually well in every single act; and if every act does its
prominent in the ethics of duty. duty, as far as is possible, be content; and no one
At one extreme, there is the position which is able to hinder thee so that each act shall not
totally excludes the concept of duty. This fact do its duty." Man is not destined to be happy;
more than any other characterizes the Epicure- his happiness consists rather in doing what is
anism of Lucretius. The good life for him is one required of him at his post of duty in the order
where "nature craves for herself no more than of the universe. The only good is a good will,
CHAPTER 19: DUTY 363
a dutiful will, a will which conforms itself to the moral can therefore consist in nothing else than
law of nature. the conception of law in itself, which certainly
Kant's much more elaborate moral philos- is only possible in a rational being in so far as
ophy presents the same fundamental teachings. this conception, and not the expected effect,
This is indicated by the fact that he associates determines the will."
what he calls eudaemonism (i.e., the ethics of This law, which is the source of duty and of
happiness) with hedonism (i.e., the ethics of all moral action, is Kant's famous "categorical
pleasure). Happiness, he writes, is "a rational imperative" or, in other words, reason's un-
being's consciousness of the pleasantness of life conditional command. According to its decree,
uninterruptedly accompanying his whole ex- Kant declares, "I am never to act otherwise
istence," and its basis is "the principle of self- than so that I could also will that my maxim
love." Therefore, according to Kant, both eu- should become a universal law." By obeying
daemonism and hedonism commit the same the categorical imperative, we can know and do
error. Both ''undermine morality and destroy our duty and rest assured that our will is mor-
its sublimity, since they put the motives to ally good. "I do not, therefore, need any far-
virtue and to vice in the same class, and only reaching penetration to discern what I have to
teach us to make a better calculation." Both do," Kant writes, "in order that my will may
admit desire as a moral criterion of good and be morally good. Inexperienced in the course
evil. Both
are utilitarian in that they are con- of the world, incapable of being prepared for
cerned with consequences, with means and ends. all its contingencies, I
only ask myself: Canst
Both measure the moral act by reference to the thou also will that thy maxim should be a uni-
end it serves. versal law? If not, then must be
rejected, and
it
For Kant, "an action done from duty de- that not because of a disadvantage
accruing
rives its moral worth, not from the purpose from it to myself, or even to others, but because
which is to be attained by it, but from the it cannot enter as a principle into a possible
maxim by which determined, and there-
it is universal legislation."
fore does not depend on the realization of the To say that a man ought to do this or refrain
object of the action, but merely on the principle from doing that in order to achieve happiness is,
oi volition by which the action has taken place, for Kant, at best a conditional obligation, ulti-
without any regard to any object of desire. . . .
mately a specious one since he is not uncon-
Duty," he goes on to say, "is the necessity of ditionally obliged to be happy. Kant does not
acting from respect for the law." From this he totally exclude happiness or the summum bo-
argues that duty, and consequently all moral num. In fact he says that there
no need to is
action, must be done because it is right, because maintain "an opposition" between them and
the law commands
and for no other reason.
it, morality. But he claims that "the moment duty
The recommendation of any action solely on is in question we should take no account of
the ground that it will contribute to happiness happiness." Just as Aristotle treats duty only in
as satisfying the inclination of the person and terms of justice, so Kant considers happiness to
achieving the object of the will, is completely have a moral quality only insofar as to be
ruled out. That would be a judgment of pure worthy of it is an end set by the moral law.
expediency. Worse than not moral, it is, in the
opinion of Kant, immoral. Two OTHER voices join in this great argument
"An action done from duty," Kant writes, concerning duty and happiness. One is that of
"must wholly exclude the influence of inclina- John Stuart Mill, whose Utilitarianism recog-
tion, and with it every object of the will, so that nizes Kant as the chief opponent of an ethics of
nothing remains which can determine the will happiness. Though Mill differs from Aristotle
except objectively the law, and subjectively on many points, particularly in regard to the
pure respect for this practical law, and conse- virtues as means to happiness, Mill's answer to
quently the maxim that I should follow this Kant can be read as a defense of Aristotle as
law even to the thwarting of all my inclina- well as of his own theory.
tions. . . . The pre-eminent good which we call From Kant's point of view, they are both
364 THE GREAT IDEAS
utilitarians. They both argue in terms of means isa constant theme in the great poems. It is
and ends. They both make purely pragmatic, pivotal to the plot of most of the great love
not moral, judgments judgments of expedi- stories. It is a theme of tragedy, for in which-
ency instead of judgments of right and wrong. ever direction the tensionis resolved whether
From Mill's point of view, Aristotle like him- in the line of by Aeneas forsaking
duty (as
selfneeds no other principle of morality than Dido) or in disobedience to law (as by Adam
happiness, an ultimate end which justifies every yielding to Eve in Paradise Lost) ruin results.
means that tends towards its realization. "The The tragedy of being both rational and ani-
ultimate sanction of morality, external mo-
all mal seems to consist in having to choose between
tives apart," Mill writes, "is a subjective feeling duty and desire rather than m making any par-
in our own minds." He asserts that "when once ticular choice. It may be significant, however,
the general happiness recognized as the ethical
is that the tragic heroes of poetry more frequently
standard," it will appeal to "a powerful natural abandon duty than desire or love, though sel-
sentiment." Man's nature as a social being, he dom without mortal punishment, preceded by
holds, "tends to make him feel it one of his a deep sense of their transgression. Sometimes,
natural wants that there should be harmony however, they are self-deceived, and cloak de-
between his feelings and aims and those of his sire inthe guise of duty.
fellow-creatures." There
is another source of
tragic conflict in
This conviction, in persons who have it, the spheie of duty. Men are torn by competing
"docs not present itself to their minds as a loyalties, obligations which pull them in oppo-
superstition of education, or a law despotically In the basic relationships of the
site directions.
imposed by the power of society, but as an family, the duty a man owes to his parents often
attribute which it would not be well for them cannot be discharged without violating or ne-
to be without." This conviction, rather than glecting obligations to his wife. When the moral
an internal sense of obligation or fear of external law and the law of the state command contrary
sanctions imposed by a superior power, is for actions, duty is weighed against duty in an
Mill "the ultimate sanction of the greatest hap- ordeal of conscience. Sometimes, however, one
piness morality" which aims at the greatest obligation seems to take clear precedence over
happiness for the greatest number. another, as in the mind of Sophocles' Antigone,
Where Mill answers Kant by excluding duty for whom the king's edict loses its authority
even from considerations of justice Aquinas when it runs counter to the law of God. Creon
seems to develop an analysis in which every the king, not Antigone his subject, may be the
moral act can be regarded as obeying or dis- play's more tragic personage. He sacrifices a
obeying the natural law and yet, at the same dearly beloved son to uphold the authority he
time, be judged as a means which serves or fails considers it his duty as a ruler to maintain.
to serve the ultimate end of man's natural de- If man is not a rational animal or if, whatever
sire. "The order ofthe precepts of the natural his nature, reason is not its
ruling principle,
law is," in the words of Aquinas, "according to then the sense of duty would appear to be an
the order of natural inclinations." The dilemma imposture that draws its driving force from
set up by the opposition between duty and the emotional energies with which certain man-
happiness seems to be denied, or at least avoided, made rules of conduct are invested. Rather than
by a theory which finds a perfect parallelism acting as a counterweight to desire, duty is
between the precepts of natural law and the itself the shape which certain desires take to
economy can grow to play too dominant a part. office as well as vested with its
authority and
For the psychoanalyst, not tragedy but neurosis power. The office-holder, duty-bound by the
resultsfrom an overdeveloped sense of duty. constitution, is not an absolute ruler. He is, in
When "the ego [is] forced to acknowledge its fact,a servant of the state, not its master. The
weakness," Freud explains, it "breaks out into mediaeval king who pledged himself in his coro-
anxiety: reality anxiety in face of the external nation oath to discharge the duties of his office
world, normal anxiety in face of the super-ego, may not have been bound by human law, but
and neurotic anxiety in face of the strength of so long as his conscience kept him loyal to his
the passions in the id." pledge, he recognized the supremacy of the
natural law or of the law of God. The self-
THE RELATION of ruler and ruled in the domes- governing citizen of a republic is similarly duty-
ticor the political community may seem at first bound only when he recognizes the supremacy
to impose duties or obligations only on the of the common good.
ruled. The commands. His subjects are
ruler According to the theory of constitutional
obliged to obey. Does the ruler in turn have no government, rights and duties are correlative.
duties, no obligations to those whom he governs ? The acknowledgment of duties signifies that the
If he has none, then neither have the persons he holder of rights recognizes their limited or con-
rules rights which he must respect. Such abso- ditional character. To consider oneself
entirely
lute rule defined by a correlative absence of exempt from duties or obligations is to regard
duties in the ruler and rights in the ruled has one's rights as absolute. Can anyone have abso-
been one conception of the relation between lute rights except on condition of being with-
master and slave. out a superior of any sort? One implied answer
In the state rulers who are merely office- to this question is that neither despot nor state,
holders are obligated by the duties of their but only God, is autonomous or without duty.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The concept of duty or obligation: its moral significance 366
3. The divisions of duty : internal and external duty the realms of ethics and unsprudence
;
j 367
5.
tTie derivation of duty from divine, natural, and civil law, and from the
categorical
imperative of reason
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS. When the text is printed m one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, \ 16a-l 19b,the passage
.
begins in the upper half of page 1 16 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and Tower halves of the left-
printed
hand sideof the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand sideof
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO, Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand siac of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS' One or more of the mam divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) arc sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES. The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7.45 (D) 11 Esdras, 7.46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
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389a-390a,c; 391a-394a,c / Science of Right, thians, 8/7 Timothy, 411-2 / Titus, 1
115
398a-399c; 400b,d-401b 5 AESCHYLUS: Choephoroe 70a-80d esp [1010-
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46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 79 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK n, SECT 5 257b-c;
33a-c; PART u, par BK SECT 4 260b-261a; BK iv, SECT 18
137-141 4&a-54d /
Philoso- in,
phy of History, INTRO, 170d-171c; 186b-c; 264d; BK vin, SECT 32 287d-288a
PART i, 207b-c; 211a-c; 214d-2l6b; PART HI, 18 AUGUSTLNE: Confessions, BK n par 9, lOd;
290a-b BK iv, par 14 22d-23a
$1 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 79,
:
27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet 29a-72a,c esp ACT n, 20 AQUINAS: Summa TJieologicd, PART I-H, Q 96,
sc n [617-633] 46c-d, ACT in, sc i [56-90] A 4 233a-d; Q 99, A 5 249a-250a; PART n-ii,
47c-d, sc in [36-72] 53d-54a, sc iv 54b-56d, Q 4, A 7, REP 3 407d-409a {
ACT iv, sc iv [32-66] 59a-c / King Lear, ACT 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 86c-87c; 95d-
Hi, sc iv [23-36] 264c / Macbeth, ACT in, sc 96a; PART n, llOa; 113c; 131a-c; 137b-138b;
iv 297c-299b; ACT v, sc i 306b-307a; sc in 159d-160d; 164a,c; PART m, 165a; CONCLU-
307c-308b SION, 282a; 283c
6/o 7 CHAPTER l?r DUTY 369
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 46b-d; 233ab 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 89b-c
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 37, SCHOL 2 42 KANT: Ititro. Metaphysic of Morals, 392a
435b-436a 43 MILL: Liberty, 304c-d / Utilitarianism, 456d-
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK ix [647-654] 261 b 457b
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH u, SECT 4-6 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 145b; 221d-224a; 542a-c
25d-26c; CH xvi, SECT 186 68d-69a; SECT 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART m, par 150
195 70a-b / Human Understanding, BK i, CH 56c-57a
n, SECT 5-6 105a-c; SECT 12-13 107b-108c 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vn, 275a-276b;
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spmt of Laws, BK i, 2a-b; EPILOGUE i, 668a-669c; 670d-671a
BK xxm, 187d-188a
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 330a-331c; 356b-359a 7. The relation of duty to justice and to rights:
BK oaths and promises
/ Social Contract, 388d-389a, 392b-393c;
i,
Pref. Metaphysical
Elements of Ethics, 366a-d; (D) Psalms, 49:14; 65:13-14 / Ecclesiastes, 5:4
369a-c; 373d / Intro.
Metaphysic of Morals, -(D) Ecclesiastes, 5:3 / Zechanah, 8:17 (D)
386b-d; 388b-c; 390b,d-391c; 392b-393a / Zachanas, 8:17
Judgement, 571c-572a, 605d-606b [fn 2} APOCRYPHA Ecclesiasticus, 29:3 (D) OT, EC-
43 MILL- Utilitarianism, 445d-446d; 470a-b desiasttcus, 29:3
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART n, par 135 NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 5:33-37 / James,
47b-d; ADDITIONS, 86 129c / Philosophy of 5:12
History, INTRO, 170d-171c; 186b-c; PART iv, 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK iv [153-239] 25c-26b
362b-d 5 ALSCHYLUS: Choephoroe 70a-80d
5 SOPHOCLES. Philoctetes 182a-195a,c csp [895-
between duties of diverse origins
6. Conflicts
1292] 190a-193c
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 2:18-25 esp 2-24 / 5 EURIPIDES: Hecuba [218-331] 354d-355c /
7a / Seven Against Thebes 27a-39a,c / Aga- 6 THUCYDIDES. Peloponnesian War, BK 11, 406a-
memnon [184-247] 54a-c / Choephoroe [885- 407b; BK in, 429c-434c; BK v, 490a-b
930] 78d-79b / Eumemdes 81a-91d 7 PLATO Apology, 209a-b / Crito, 216d-219a,c /
5 SOPHOCLES: Antigone 131a-142d esp [1-99] BK i, 297a-300b
Gorgias, 284a-285a / Republic,
131a-132a / Philoctetes 182a-195a,c esp [50- Law*, BK xii, 787d-788c
/
122] 182d~183b 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vm, CH 9 [ii59b 25~
5 EURIPIDES Electra 327a-339a,c esp [962-987] ii6o a 9] 411d-412b / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 14
a
335d-336a / Phoenician Maidens 378a-393d / [i375 8-n]619c
Auhs 425a-439d
Iphtgenia at 12 AURELIUS Meditations, BK m, SECT 7 261c
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK n, 71d-72a; BK v, 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK xii [175-215] 358b-360a
171d-172a 14 PLUTARCH: Lysander, 357a-b / Agesilaus,
7 PLATO: Crtto, 213d-219a,c 484a-b
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK iv [331-361] 176a-177a 19 AQUINAS. Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 16,
14 PLUTARCH: Fabius, 152b-d/ Conolanus, 189d- A REP 3 97a-c; Q 21, A i, REP 3 124b-125b
4,
191c / Timoleon, 196b-198b / Agis, 654c-655a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 60,
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xix, CH 19 523b-d A 3 51c-52b; Q 99, A 5 249a-250a; Q 100,
23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, PART n, lOlc, 151a-c; A 2, REP 2 252b-253a; A 3, REP 3 253a-d;
PART in, 198d-199a; 240a-246a,c PART H-II, Q 4, A 7, REP 3 407d-409a; Q 23,
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 381a-388c esp 386a-d; A 3, REP i 485a-d
467b-470a; 486b-488b 22 CHAUCER: Knight's Tale [1128-1176] 178b-
26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard II, ACT i, sc n [1-43] 179a / Franklin's Tale [11,770-844] 363b-364b
322d-323a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 77b-c; 86c-92b;
32 MILTON: Samson Agonistcs [843-902] 358a- PART n, 115a-116a; 127b; 138c; 142a-d; 145a-b
359a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 13d-14c; 381a-388c esp
35 LOCKE: Toleration, 16c-17b; 18a-b 383c-d, 387b-c; 467b-470a
38 ROUSSEAU: Political Economy, 369c / Social 26 SHAKESPEARE: 2nd Henry VI, ACT v, s.c i
Contract, BK iv, 435a-439c passim [175-190] 66d-67a / 3rd Henry VI, ACT i, sc
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 193c-194a; 226a-b II [ I-
34] 72d-73b / Titus Androntcus, ACT v,
370 THE GREAT IDEAS 8
759c-d; 764c-765a / Civilization and Its Dis- ACT i, sc n 408b-409c / 1st Henry IV, ACT n,
contents, 780b-802a,c esp 781a-d, 783c-789b, sc in 443b-444b
791b d, 793d 794a, 800c-801b / New Intro- 27 SHAKESPEARE: Othello, ACT i, sc HI [175-189]
ductory Lectures, 853a-b 210d-211a / King Lear 244a-283a,c
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 75c / New
9. The duties of command and obedience in
Atlantis, 207b-209d
family life
32 MILTON- Paradise Lost, BK iv [288-301] 158b-
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 2:18-25; 9:18-29 / 159a; [440-502] 162a-163a; [634-638] 166a;
Exodus, 20:12; 21:1-21,26-27 / Leviticus, 19:3 BK vin [452-594] 242a-245a; BK x [144-156]
/ Deuteronomy, 5:16; 15:12-18; 21*15-23; 277b; [867-936] 293b-294b / Samson Agonis-
22-13-30; 24. 1-4,14-15; 25-5-10; 27:16,20,22- /w[87i-902]358b-359a;(997-io6o]361b-362b
23 / Ruth I Proverbs, 20.20; 30:17 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH vi, SECT 52-cn
APOCRYPHA. Ecclcuasticus, 3 i-i8;4 30; 7-19-28; vn, SECT 86 36a-44a; CH xv, SECT 169-170
30:1-13; 33.24-31 (D) OT, Ecclesiasttcus, 64c-65a; SECT 173-174 65c-d
3:1-20; 4:35; 7-21-30; 30.1-13; 33.25-33 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART i, 29b
NEW TESTAMENT. Matthew, 15 3-6 / // Corin- 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 6b-c; 21a-22d; lOOb-
thians, 12*14 / Ephesians, 5 22-25; 6-1-9 / 102a; 105a-107b; 108c-110c; 120c-121a,c;
Colossians, 3.18-4:1 / / Timothy, 5:8 / Titus, 124a-125c; 126d-127b; 136b-c; 283c-d; 312c-
2-9-11 / Philemon / I Peter, 3:1-7 313a; 321b-324b; 340c-341d; 359b-362c
4 HOMER: Odyssey, BK i-n 183a-192d 38 MONTESQUIFU: Spirit of Laws, BK v, 22d-23a;
5 SOPHOCLFS Oedipus at Colonus [421-460] BK xxiu, 187b,d-189d; BK xxvi, 216a-b
118a-b / Antigone 131a-142d esp [631-680] 38 ROUSSEAU- Inequality, 357a-b, 364d-365b /
136c-137a / Trachimae 170a-181a,c esp [1157- Political Economy, 367a-368c / Social Con-
(D) Josue, 22:1-6; 24:14-28 / Judges, 11:28- 256d; BK n, SECT 13 258c; BK v, SECT 7 269d;
40/7 Samuel, 15.10-35 (D) I Kings, 15:10- BK ix, SECT i 291a-c; SECT 40 295b
35 / II Kings, 12:1-16 (D) IV Kings, 12:1-16 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK v [42-103] 188a-190a
/ / Chronicles, 16:29 (D) / Paralipomc- 14 PLUTARCH: Aemihus Paulus, 214b-d
non, 16-29 / // Chronicles, 1-7; 29-31 (D) 15 TACITUS: Histories, BK iv, 282d-283b
II Parahpomenon, 1-7; 29-31 / Ezra(D) 16 KEPLER Harmonies of'the World, lOlla
I Esdras / Nehemiah(D) I! Esdras / Psalms 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 4 2a; BK
passim / Ecclesiastes, 5:2-7; 12:13 (D) EC- in, par 15 17a-b / City of God, BK vn, CH
clesiastes, 5*1-6; 12.13 / Isata h* i 11-20 (D) 27-31 259c-262a; BK x, CH 1-7 298b,d-303a;
Isaias, 1:11-20 / Daniel, 9 / Micah, 6:8 (D) CH 16 308b-309c; CH 19 310d-311b; BK xix,
Micheas, 6 -8 CH 14-16, 520c-522a; CH 19 523b-d / Christian
APOCRYPHA: Tobit, 4 5-11,19; 12 8-10 (D) OT, Doctrine, BK i, CH 10 627b; CH 22-30 629b-
Tobias, 4:6-12,20, 12:8-10 / Judith, 4; 8-9 633b
(D) OT, Judith, 4; 8-9 / Ecclesiasticus, 18:22- 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 63,
24; 35*4-12 (D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 18:22- A i, ANS 325c-326c; PART i-n, Q 19, A 5, REP
24; 35:6-15 / Baruch, i; 4:1-3 (D) OT, 1-2 705d-707a; A 6, ANS and REP 2 707a-708a;
Baruch, i; 4:1-3 / Bel and Dragon, 2-28 (D) Q 21, A 4 719d-720a,c
OT, Daniel, 14.1-27 / I Maccabees, 4:38-61 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 91,
(D) OT, / Machabees, 438-61 AA 4-5 210c-212c; Q 96, A 4 233a-d; QQ 98-
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 4:1-11; 5:33-36; 108 239b-337d; PART n-n, Q 4, A 7, REP 3
6*1-8,16-18; 7:21; 18:23-35; 22:21,34-40 / 407d-409a; Q 16 454c-456d; Q 22 480d-482c;
~ Q 44 592d-598c, QQ 183-189 625a-700d; PART
Mar^, 12*28-34 / Luke, 2 21-24; 4* I I 3' 9' 2 3~
26,57-62; 10:25-42; 177-10; 18:1-14; 20:25 in, Q 25 839c-845a
/ Acts, 5:17-32; 20:22-24 / Romans, 12-13 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xin
/ Ephesians, 4 esp 4*17-32 / Colossians, 3 / [103-129] 73a-b; xvn [82]-xvm [75] 79b-80c;
/ Timothy, 2.1-8 / // Timothy / James, 5:13- xxx-xxxi 99b-102b; PARADISE, in [i]-v [87]
18 / I John esp 2:3-11, 2:15, 3:23, 47-5:57 109b-113a passim; vn [25-33] 115c; [64-102]
II John 115d-116a; xxvi [115-117] 147a
4 HOMER: Iliad, BK i [206-222] 5b; BK ix [485- 22 CHAUCER. Second Nun's Tale [15,829-16,021]
514] 62a-b; BK xxiv [424-431] 175d / Odyssey, 468a-471b
BK xin [125-184] 256b-257a 23HoBBFs: Leviathan, PART i, 80c; PART n,
5 AESCHYLUS: Suppliant Maidens la-14a,c esp 137b-138b; PART ii-in, 159d-167b; PART in,
[600-709] 8d-10b / Agamemnon [369-398] 177c-180d; 198a-207b; 240a-246a,c; PART iv,
56a-b / Eumemdes
[490-565] 86b-87a 261d262a
5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [863-910] 25 MONTAIGNE- Essays, 152b-156d; 233a-b
107b-c / Oedipus at Colonus [461-509] 118b-d 26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard U, ACT i, sc n [1-41]
/ Antigone 131a-142d esp [441-470] 134d- 322d-323a
135a, [i347~ I 353l 142d / AJ ax l74 8 -779l 27 SHAKESPEARE: Henry VIII, ACT in, sc n
149c-d; [1316-1421] 154b-155a,c / Electra [435-457] 573c-d
[1058-1097] 164d-165a / Philoctetes [1440- 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 80b-81a;
1444] 195a,c lOOd-lOla
5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants 258a-269a,c esp [1-41] 31 DESCARTES. Meditations, 69b
258a-b, [513-563] 262d-263b / Electra [167- 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART v, PROP 41 462d-463b
212] 328c-d / Bacchantes 340a-352a,c / Hecuba 32 MILTON: Sonnets, xvi 66b-67a / Paradise Lost
[799-805] 359d 93a-333a esp BK i [242-283] 98b-99b, BK iv
5 ARISTOPHANES: Birds 542a-563d esp [1170- [411-439] 161b-162a, [720-739] 168a-b, BK v
1266] 557b-558b [136-210] 178a-179b, [506-543] 186a-187a, BK
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK v, 171d-172a; BK vi, vii [449-518] 227a-228b, BK vnr [311-333]
201d-202c; BK vin, 282b c; BK ix, 308a-c 239a-b, [630-643] 246a, BK ix [647-654] 261b,
7 PLATO: Euthyphro 191a-199a,c / Apology, BK xi [133-161] 302a-b, BK xn [386-410]
206b-d / Timaeus, 447a / Laws, BK iv, 682d- 327b-328a / Samson Agonistes [1334-1409]
683b; BK x, 769c-771b 368b-370a / Areopagitica, 402a-b
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK i, CH n [105*2-6] 148c 33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 78b-80b / Pensfcs,
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK vn, CH 9 [1329*26-34] 476 256b-257a; 482 258a; 489,491 259a; 539
533d 265b
374 THE GREAT IDEAS 11
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other discussions of the issue between the ethics of duty and the ethics of happiness or pleas-
ure, see HAPPINESSPLEASURE AND PAIN 6-6a, 8b.
3;
Matters relevant to DESIRE 20, 33; GOOD AND EVIL 33-3^2); JUSTICE ic-if,
this issue, see
4; LAW 33(1), 4-43, 4C~4d; TEMPERANCE 3; VIRTUE AND VICE id, 6a; WILL 8b(i), 8c-8d.
Other treatments of conscience, both psychological and ethical, see HONOR 2a; PUNISHMENT
5c; SIN 5; TEMPERANCE 3.
The consideration of duty in relation to law, justice, and rights, see GOD 3d; JUSTICE ic, 3,
rib; LAW 2, 43, 4c~4d, 6a; RELIGION 2; WILL 8d.
The conflict between duty and desire or love, see DESIRE 6a~6b; LOVE 3c.
The treatment of specific duties, domestic, political, and religious, see CITIZEN 4; FAMILY 6d;
GOD 3d; JUSTICE nb; RELIGION 2; STATE 8a; TRUTH 8e.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booths of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works arc divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
-
KANT. Lectures on Ethics, pp '11-47, 116-253
.
Religion Within the Limits
DOSTOEVSK.Y. Crime and Punishment
of Reason Alone
J. TAYLOR.
Of Holy Living
Ductor Dubitantium
.
RACINE. Andromaque
BAXTER. Chapters from A Christian Directory
PUFENDORF. De Qffkw Hominis et Civis Juxta L>-
-
CICERO.
.
De Minibus (On the Supreme Good)
De Officiis (On Duties)
gem Naturalem (&/" the Duties of Man and of the
Citizen According to Natural Law)
CHAPTER 19: DUTY 375
J. BUTLER. Fifteen Sermons upon Human Nature, m, NIETZSCHE. The Genealogy of Morals, n
X, XIII BRENTANO. The Origin ofthe Knowledge of Right and
T. REID. Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Wrong, par 1-13
Mind, in, PART in, CH 5-8 SPENCER. The Principles of Ethics, VOL n, PART iv,
D. STEWART. Outlines of Moral Philosophy PART n, t CH 9-29; PART v-vr
CH 2 DEWEY. 'The Idea of Obligation," in Outlines of a
J. G. FICHTE. The Vocation of Man, PART
in Theory of Ethics
Critical
WORDSWORTH. Ode to Duty The Study of Ethics, CH 7-8
.
INTRODUCTION
books assembled in this set are Plato's Republic, Aristotle's Politics, Augustine's
'""p'HE great
JL offered as means to a liberal or general Christian Doctrine, Bacon's Advancement of
education. The authors of these books were Learning, Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations,
educated men; more than that, they typified Hegel's Philosophy of Right, and the psychologi-
the ideal of education in their various epochs. cal writings of James and Freud. But in no case
As their writings reveal, their minds were large- is education the principal theme of these books,
it is for most of the works cited in the list of
ly formed, or at least deeply impressed, by as
reading the works of their predecessors. Many Additional Readings, among which will be
of them were related as teacher and student, found treatises on education by authors in this
sometimes through personal contact, sometimes set.
specifically a treatise on education, except Mon- the liberal arts of grammar, rhetoric, and logic;
taigne's essay Of the Education of Children. psychology, medicine, metaphysics, and theol-
Some of these authors speak more or less fully ogy; ethics, politics, and economics. It is a
of their own education, as does Marcus Aurehus problem which draws into focus many of the
in the opening book of his Meditations, Augus- great ideas virtue and truth, knowledge and
tine in his Confessions, Descartes in his Dis- opinion, art and science; desire, will, sense,
course, and Boswell. Others refer to their edu- memory, mind, habit; change and progress;
cational experience in fictional guise, as does family and state; man, nature, and God.
Aristophanes in the argument in the Clouds This can be verified by noting the diverse
between the Just and Unjust Discourses; or contexts in which education is discussed in the
Rabelais when he tells of Gargantua's school- great books. In each connection we shall find
ing in Gargantua's letter to Pantagruel. Some- some of the special questions which together
times they report the way in which other men make up the complex problem of education.
were trained to greatness, as does Plutarch; For example, the nature of teaching and learn-
or, like Gibbon, Hegel, and Mill, they de- ing is examined in the wider context of psy-
scribe and comment on the historic systems of chological considerations concerning man's
education. abilities,the way in which knowledge is ac-
In still other instances the great books con- quired, and how it is communicated by means
tain sections or chapters devoted to the ends of language or other symbols. Different con-
and means of education, the order of studies, ceptions of the nature of man and of the rela-
the nature of learning and teaching, the train- tion of his several capacities surround the ques-
ing of statesmen and citizens; as for example, tion of the ends of education. In this context
376
CHAPTER 20: EDUCATION 377
questions also arise concerning the parts of takes precedence over individual happiness,
education the training of man's body, the then education must be directed to training
formation of his character, the cultivation of men for the role they play as parts of a larger
his mindand how these are related to one organism. Education then serves the purpose of
another. preserving the state. Of all things, Aristotle
The whole theory of the virtues and of habit says, "that which contributes most to the per-
formation involved in the question whether
is manence of constitutions is the adaptation of
virtue can be taught or must be acquired in education to the form of government. The . . .
some other way, and in related questions about best laws," he continues, "though sanctioned
the influence of the family and the state on by every citizen of the state, will be of no avail
the growth of character. These questions are unless the young by habit and edu-
are trained
also asked in terms of general political theory. cation in the spirit of the constitution."
Different views of the state are involved in Rousseau seems to take a similar view when
questions about the division of responsibility he calls for a system of public education run
for education among various agencies. Ques- by the state. Its object is to assure that the
tions about the purpose of education, and what citizens are "early accustomed to regard their
sort of education shall be given to the diverse individuality only in its relation to the body
classes in the state, are differently raised and of the state, and to be aware, so to speak, of
differently answered in the context of discus- their own existence merely as a part of that
sions of different forms of government. of the state." Taught in this way, the citizens,
Though they are far from exhaustive, these Rousseau claims, "might at length come to
examples should nevertheless suffice to make identify themselves in some degree with this
the point that there can be no philosophy of greater whole, to feel themselves members of
education apart from philosophy as a whole. their country, and to love it with that ex-
It may therefore not be a disadvantage to find quisite feeling which no isolated person has
the discussion of education in the great books save for himself."
almost always imbedded in the context of some If happiness cannot be fully achieved on
more general theory or problem. earth, then whatever temporal ends education
serves must themselves be ordered to eternal
ONE OPINION FROM which there is
hardly a salvation, and the whole process of human
dissenting voice in the great books is that edu- development must be a direction of the soul
cation should aim to make men good as men to God. "What did it profit me," Augustine
and as citizens. "If you ask what is the good of asks in his Confessions, "that all the books I
battle, because they are good." Men should light, and my face to the things enlightened;
enter upon learning, Bacon declares, in order whence my face, with which I discerned the
"to give a true account of their gift of reason, things enlightened, was not itself enlightened.
to the benefit and use of men"; while William Whatever was written, either on rhetoric, or
James need for "a perfectly-rounded
stresses the logic, geometry, music and arithmetic, by my-
development." Thus it would seem to be a self without much difficulty or any instructor,
common opinion in all ages that education I understood, Thou knowest, O Lord my God;
should seek to develop the characteristic ex- because both quickness of understanding and
cellences of which men are capable and that its acuteness in discerning, is Thy gift; yet did I
ultimate ends are human happiness and the not thence sacrifice to Thee." Wherefore, Au*
welfare of society. gustine concludes concerning this stage of his
Within this area of general agreement there learning, "it served not to my use but to my
are, of course, differences which result from the perdition."But Augustine does not therefore
different views that are taken of man's relation conclude that, under no circumstances, can
to the state or to God. If the good of the state liberal education be put to good use. In his
378 THE GREAT IDEAS
treatise On Christian Doctrine, he considers in industry the training they may need to per-
detail how the liberal arts, which serve so well form these functions does not fully develop
in the study of Sacred Scripture, may also serve their common humanity. It is not adequate to
to bring the soul to God. make them good as men, as citizens, or as
children of God.
SUCH DIFFERENCES DO NOT, however, annul The traditional meaning of the word "lib-
one consequence of the general agreement, eral" as applied to education entails a distinc-
namely, the conception that education is con- tion between free men and slaves, Slaves, like
cerned with the vocation of man, and pre- domesticated animals, are trained to perform
pares him in thought and action for his purpose special functions. They are not treated as ends,
and station in life. In these terms Adam Smith but as means, and so they are not educated for
argues for a minimum general education. He their own good, but for the use to which they
claims that "a man without the proper use of are put. This is true not only of slaves in the
the intellectual faculties of a man, is, if pos- strict sense of household chattel; it is also true
sible, more contemptible than even a coward, of all the servile classes in any society which
and seems to be mutilated and deformed in a divides its human beings into those who work
still more essential part of the character of in order to live and those who live off the work
human nature." He explicitly points out that of others and who therefore have the leisure in
this is the condition of "the great body of the which to strive to live well.
people,'* who, by the division of labor, are con- In accordance with these distinctions, Aris-
fined in their employment "to a few very sim- totle divides education into "liberal" and "il-
ple operations," in which the worker "has no liberal." Certain subjects are illiberal by na-
occasion to exert his understanding, or to exer- ture,namely, "any occupation, art, or science,
invention in finding out expedients for
cise his which makes the body or soul of the freeman
removing difficulties which never occur." The less fit for the practice or exercise of virtue."
result,according to Smith, is that "the torpor In this category Aristotle includes "those arts
of his mind renders him, not only incapable which tend to deform the body, and likewise
of relishing or bearing a part in any rational all paid employments, for they absorb and
conversation, but of conceiving any generous, degrade the mind."
noble, or tender sentiment, and consequently It is not only the nature of the subject, but
of forming any just judgment concerning also the end which education serves, that de-
many even of the ordinary duties of private termines whether its character is liberal or
plication at least seems to be the object of lence." In other words, to be liberal, education
Smith's criticism, is not vocational. It fits a must serve the use of leisure in the pursuit of
man some specialized function, ac-
only for must treat man as an end, not as
excellence. It
cording to which he or his social class is differ- a means to be used by other men or by the
entiated from some other man or class. state.
In our day, the word "vocational" is used It follows that any society which abolishes
ing, whether it is
preparation for the least all men to freedom, should conceive education
skilled of trades or for the most learned of as essentially liberal and for all men. It should,
professions. Since all men are not called to the furthermore, direct education, in all its parts
practice of law or medicine any more than all and phases, to the end of each man's living well
arc called to productive work in the various rather than to the end of his earning a living
arts and crafts, or the tasks of commerce and for himself or others.
CHAPTER 20: EDUCATION 379
IN THE CLASSIFICATION of the kinds of educa- ing of the soul." Gymnastic as well as music, he
tion, the word "liberal" is frequently used in a claims, has "in view chiefly the improvement
more restricted sense to signify not all education of the soul," and he considers the two as bal-
designed for free men, but only the improve- ancing and tempering one another.
ment of the mind through the acquisition of Whether they produce competence in gym-
knowledge and skill. In this sense liberal educa- manual arts,
nastic or athletic feats, or, like the
tion is set apart from physical education which proficiency in productive work, all bodily skills,
concerns bodily health and proficiency, and even the simplest, involve the senses and the
moral education which concerns excellence in mind as well as bones and muscles. They are
action rather than in thought. arts no less than music or logic. Apart from their
These divisions are clearly made, perhaps for utility,they represent a certain type of human
the first time, in Plato's Republic. The educa- excellence, which will be denied only by those
tion described there begins in the early years who can see no difference between the quality
with music and gymnastic. Gymnastic "pre- of a racehorse and the skill of his rider. Whether
sides over the growth and decay of the body." these skills as well as other useful arts are part of
Music, which includes literature as well as the liberal education in the broader sense depends,
arts of harmony and rhythm, is said to educate as we have seen, on the end for which they are
its students "by the influence of habit, by taught or learned. Even the arts which arc
harmony making them harmonious, by rhythm traditionally called liberal, such as rhetoric or
rhythmical," and its function is to develop logic,can be degraded to servility if the sole
moral as well as aesthetic sensibilities. motive for becoming skilled in them is wealth
The second part of Plato's curriculum, won by success in the law courts.
"which leads naturally to reflection" and draws
"the soul towards being," consists in the mathe- IN THE TWO traditional distinctions so far dis-
matical arts and sciences of arithmetic, geome- cussed, "liberal education" seems to have a
try, music, and astronomy. The program is somewhat different meaning when it
signifies
capped by the study of dialectic, to which all the opposite of servile training and when it
the rest is but "a prelude"; for "when a person signifies the opposite of moral cultivation. In
starts on the discovery of the absolute by the the first case, the distinction is based upon the
light of reason only, and without any assistance purpose of the education; in the second, it
of sense, and perseveres until by pure intelli- refers to the faculties or functions
being cul-
gence he arrives at the perception of the ab- tivated. When the second is stated in terms of
solute good, he at last finds himself at the end the distinction between the intellectual and
of the intellectual world." the moral virtues, liberal (i.e., intellectual)
Up to this point, the program can be taken education is conceived as
aiming at good habits
as liberal education in the narrow sense of learn- of thinking and knowing, and moral education
ing how and what to think. The fifteen years of is
thought of as aiming at good habits of will,
experience in civic affairs and the tasks of gov- desire,or emotion, along with their conse-
ernment, which Plato interposes at the age of quences in action.
thirty-five, seem to function as another phase Although he does not use these terms, Mon-
of moral training. This period provides "an taigne seems to have the contrast between
opportunity of trying whether, when they are moral and intellectual training in mind when
drawn all manner of ways by temptation, they he criticizes the education of his day for
aiming
will stand firm or flinch." "at nothing but to furnish our heads with
To the extent that physical training aims, knowledge, but not a word of judgment and
beyond health, at the acquirement of skill in virtue." It is, to him, a "pedantic education,"
a coordinated use of one's body, it can be an- which not only fails to achieve the highest edu-
nexed to liberal rather than moral education. cational purpose, but also results in a great
Plato notes, for example, that gymnastic should knowledge is hurtful to him
evil, in that "all
not be too sharply distinguished from music who has not the science of goodness."
as "the training of the body" from the "train- A too sharp separation of the intellectual
380 THE GREAT IDEAS
and the moral may be questioned, or at least cal theories of the good man and the good life,
qualified,by those who, like Socrates, tend to and according to differing enumerations and
identify knowledge and virtue. Yet they sel- definitions of the virtues. It will differ even
dom go to the opposite extreme of supposing more fundamentally according to whether the
that no distinction can be made between the primary emphasis is
placed on pleasure and
task of imparting knowledge to the mind and happiness or duty. The parties to this basic
that of forming character. Socrates, for exam- issue in moral philosophy, which is discussed
ple, in the Meno, recognizes that a man cannot in the chapters on DUTY and HAPPINESS, in-
bemade temperate, courageous, or just in the evitably propose different ways of forming
same way that he can be taught geometry. good character by strengthening the will in
From another point of view, the notion of obedience to law, or by habituating the ap-
moral training is questioned by those who, like petites to be moderate or reasonable in their
Freud, think that the patterns of human desire inclinations.
or emotion can be beneficially changed apart On either theory,
the basic problem of moral
from moral the object of psy-
discipline. It is education whether morality can be taught
is
choanalysis, he writes, "to strengthen the ego, and how. The Greeks formulated this question
to make it more independent of the super-ego, in terms of virtue, by asking whether such
to widen its field of vision, and so to extend its
things as courage and temperance are at all
organization that it can take over new portions teachable, as geometry and horsemanship
of the id." To do this is radically to alter the plainly are. The problem remains essentially
individual's behavior-pattern. "It is reclama- the same if the question is how the will can be
tionwork," Freud says, "like the draining of trained. Can it be trained by the same methods
the Zuyder Zee." Emotional education, so as those which work in the improvement of the
conceived, therapeutic more like preven-
is
understanding ?
tive and remedial medicine than moral training. The answer to the question, whichever way
Religious education is usually regarded as it is formulated,
depends on the view that is
both intellectual and moral, even as the science taken of the relation between moral knowl-
of theology is said to be both speculative and edge and moral conduct. Do those who under-
practical. Citing the admonition of St. James, stand the principles of ethics"or who know the
"Be ye doers of the word, and not hearers moral law necessarily act in accordance with
only," Aquinas holds that religious education their knowledge ? Can a man know what is good
is concerned with the
knowledge not only of or right to do in a particular case, and yet do
"divine things" but also of the "human acts" the opposite? St. Paul seems to suggest this
by which man comes to God, Since man is when he "For the good that I would I do
says,
infinitely removed from God, he needs for this not: but the evil which I would not, that I do."
purpose the grace of God, which, according to If something more than knowledge or straight
Aquinas, "is nothing short of a partaking of the thinking is needed for good conduct, how is it
divine nature." acquired and how can one man help another to
Both on the side of man's knowledge of God acquire it ? Certainly not by learning and teach-
and on the side of his love and worship of God, ing in the ordinary sense which applies to the
religious education involves the operation of arts and sciences. Then how by practice, by
supernatural factors revelation, grace, sacra- guidance or advice, by example, by rewards and
ments. Hence God is Himself the primary punishments; or if by none of these, then by a
source of religious education. But as the dis-
gift of nature or by the grace of God ?
penser of the sacraments whereby "grace is m- These questions are necessarily prior to any
strumen tally caused," the church, according to discussion of the role of the family, the state,
Aquinas, functions inst rumen tally in the serv- and the church in the process of moral training.
ice of the divine teacher.
They also provide the general background for
the consideration of particular influences on
THE CONCEPTION OF THE means and ends of character formation in men and children, such
moral education will differ with different ethi- things as poetry and music, or laws and cus-
CHAPTER 20: EDUCATION 381
toms. Ail of these related 'problems of moral tract Concerning the Teacher^ between the art
education have a political aspect, which ap- of teaching and the art of healing. Both are co-
pears in the issue concerning the state's right operative arts, arts which succeed only as "min-
to censor or regulate the arts for morality's isters of nature which is the principal actor,"
sake; in the question of the primacy of the and not by acting, like the art of the cobbler or
family or the state in the moral guidance of the sculptor, to produce a result by shaping plastic
but dead materials.
young; in the distinction between the good
man and the good citizen or ruler, and the The comparison which Hippocrates makes of
instruction in medicine with "the culture of
possible difference between the training appro-
and for the other. the productions of the earth" exhibits the same
priate for the one
conception of teaching. "Our natural disposi-
THE MAIN PROBLEM of intellectual education tion," he writes, "is, as it were, the soil; the
seems to be the curriculum or course of study. tenets of our teacher are, as it were, the seed;
The traditional attempts to construct an ideal instruction in youth is like the planting of the
curriculum turn on such questions as what seed in the ground at the proper season; the
what shall be their
studies shall be included, place where the instruction is communicated
order, and how shall they be taught or learned. is like the food
imparted to vegetables by the
A variety of answers results from a variety of atmosphere; diligent study is like the cultiva-
views of man's faculties or capacities, the nature tion of the fields; and it is time which imparts
of knowledge itself, the classification and order strength to all things and brings them to ma-
of the arts and sciences. Especially important turity."
are the various conceptions of the nature and This conception of teaching as a cooperative
function of the liberal arts. Subordinate ques- art,analogous to medicine or to agriculture,
tions concern the place of the fine and useful underlies the principles of pedagogy in the
arts in liberal education, and the role of ex- Great Didactic of Comcnius. It gives signifi-
perience and experiment both in contrast to cance to the distinction that Aquinas makes be-
and in cooperation with the role of books and tween learning by discovery, or from experi-
teachers. ence, and learning by instruction, or from a
In addition to the problem of the curriculum teacher even as a person is healed "in one way
and its materials the theory of intellectual edu- by the operation of nature alone, and in
cation necessarily considers methods of teach- another by nature with the administration of
process of the causes or factors at work in raised by the nature of the learning process,
any acquisition of skill or knowledge. the discussion of teaching deals with the moral
The contribution of the teacher cannot be or emotional aspect of the relation between
understood apart from a psychological analysis teacher and student. Without interest, learn-
of learning, for the teacher is obviously only ing seldom takes place, or if it does, it cannot
one among its many causes. It makes the great- rise above the level of rote memory. It is one
est difference to the whole enterprise of learn- thing to lay down a course of study; another to
ing whether the teacher is regarded as the motivate the student. Though he does not
noble and true birth." between Dante and Virgil in the Divine
tesies
This Socratic insight is later reformulated in Comedy present an eloquent picture of love
the comparison which Aquinas makes, in his between student and teacher, master and dis-
382 THE GREAT IDEAS
ciple. Not only love, but docility, is
required itscitizen." Yet he deprecates the idea of a
on the part of the student; and respect for the "general state education" as a "mere contriv-
student's mind on the part of the teacher. In- ance for moulding people to be exactly like
tellectual education may not be directly con- one another."
cerned with the formation of character, yet the Discussing the pro's and con's of this issue,
moral virtues seem to be factors in the pursuit Mill touches upon most, if not all, of the ques-
of truth and in the discipline of the learning tions just raised. He believes that the difficul-
WE HAVE ALREADY noted some of the political where and how they pleased, and content itself
problems of education. Of these probably the with helping to pay the school fees of the
chief question is whether the organization and poorer classes of children, and defraying the
institution of education shall be private or pub- entire school expenses of those who have no
lic.
Any answer which assigns the control of one pay for them." Schools completely
else to
education largely or wholly to the state must established and controlled by the state, he
lead to a number of other determinations. maintains, "should only exist, if they exist at
Who be educated, all or only some?
shall all, as one among many competing experiments,
Should the education of leaders be different earned on for the purpose of example and
from the education of others? If educational stimulus, to keep the others up to a certain
ment; or can and should it aim at a better so- concerns the continued growth of the mind
ciety and a higher culture? throughout the life of mature men and women,
These are some of the questions with which the answer is not to be found in the
great books
statesmen and political philosophers have dealt, in the words of their authors. Yet the great
answering them differently according to the books as a whole may constitute a solution to
institutions of their time and in accordance that problem.
with one or another theory of the state and its The authors of these books, from Homer to
government. There are still other questions. Freud, are the great original teachers in the
Is freedom of expression, in teaching and dis- tradition of our culture. They taught one
cussion, indispensable to the pursuit of truth another. They wrote for adults, not children,
and the dissemination of knowledge ? To what and in the main they wrote for the mass of men,
extent shall the state control the content and not for scholars in this or that specialized field
methods of education or leave such determina- of learning.
tion to the teaching profession ? How shall pub- The books exhibit these teachers at work in
lic education be supported ? Should it be car- the process of teaching. They contain, more-
ried beyond childhood and youth to all the over, expositions or exemplifications of the lib-
ages of adult life; and if so, how should such eral arts as the arts of teaching and learning in
education be organized outside of schools ? every field of subject matter. To make these
Mill, for example, holds it to be "almost a books and their authors work for us by working
self-evident axiom that the State should re- with them is, it seems to the editors and pub-
quire and compel the education, up to a certain lishers of this set of books, a feasible and de-
standard, of every human being who is born sirable program of adult education.
CHAWB* 20: EDUCATION 3*3
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The ends of education 384
i a. The ideal of the educated man 385
ib. The disadvantages of being educated
3. The training of the body and the cultivation of bodily skills: gymnastics, manual work
40. The possibility and limits of moral education: knowledge and virtue 387
4<r.
The role of the state in moral education law, custom, public opinion
:
4^. The effect upon character of poetry, music, and other arts: the role of history and
examples 389
5<?.
The emotional aspect of learning: pleasure, desire, interest
5/i Learning apart from teachers and books: the role of experience 393
6. The acquisition of techniques: preparation for the vocations, arts, and professions 394
7. Religious education
jb. The teaching function of the church, of priests and prophets 395
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS. When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 1 16a-l 19b, the passage
.
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
printed
hand sideof the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
page.
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference, line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e g., Iliad, BK u [265-283) 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MEN i :
Nehemtah, 7 45 (D) // Esdras, 7-46.
SYMBOLS- The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style, for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
b
50 MARX: Capital, 237d-238c 1103*3] 348c; BK n, CH 3 [no4 4-i4]350a, BK
a b
51 TOLSTOY. War and Peace, BK i, 47b-c; BK vr, in, en 12 [ni9 35- i9] 366a,c / Politics, BK n,
244d-245d CH 7 461d-463c; BK vn, en 13 -BK vin, CH 7
536b-548a,c
3. The training of the body and the cultivation 12 LUCRLTIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [1-30]
of bodily skills: gymnastics, manual 30a-b; BK v [1-54] 61a~d; BK vi [1-42] 80a-d
work 12 EPIC FETUS. Discourses 105a 245a,c esp BK i,
5 ARIMOPHANLS: Clouds [866-1114] 499a-502b CH 1-5 105a-110c, CH 18 124a-125a, BK i, CH
csp [1002 1024] 500d-501a 24-BK n, CH 2 129a-141c, BK n, CH 21- 24
7 PLAIO: Protagoras, 46c / Gorgias, 261a-262a; 166c-174b, BK HI, CH 3 178d-180a, CH 8 11
289d-290a / Republic, BK n, 310c-d; 320c- 184b-187b, CH 13 188b-189c, CH 23-26 201a
321a; BK in, 334b-335b; BK vi, 380d-381a, 213a,c, BK iv, CH 3-7 224b-235a,cn 9-13 237d-
BK VH, 391c-d; 398c-399d / Timaeus, 475b-d / 245a,c
Statesman, 599d-600a / Laws, BK i, 644b-646a; 12 AURELIUS: Meditations 253a-310d esp BK i,
BK n, 653b-654a; 663a-b; BK VH, 717b-d; SECT 7-9 253b-254a, SECT 1 1 254b, SKCT 14- 16
721d-722c; 726a-727c; BK vin, 734a-735a 254b-255d, BK 11, SECT 17 259b-d, BK iv,
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK VH, CH 3 [246*io-b i9J SECT 18 264d, BK v, SECT 14 271b, SECT 16
329c-330a / Heavens, BK n, en 12 [292*i4-b i8] 271c-d, BK vi, SECT 12 274c, BK vn, SECT 69
383d-384b 284d, BK vin, SECT i 285a-b, SECT 13 286c,
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK n, CH 6 [no6 a35-b 8] BK ix, SECT 41 295c
b
352a/Po////a,BKiv, CH i [i288 io-2o]487a-b; 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK ix [590-620] 295a-b
BK vn, CH 15 [i334b 7~28] 539b-d; CH 17 14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus-Numa, 63d-64a / Peri-
1*336*4- 39] 541a-c; BK vin, CH 3-4 542d-S44c cles, 121a-122b / Conolanus, 174b,d-175a
10 HIPPOCRATES: Articulations, par 52 109b-110a, 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK xin, 125d-126a
par 55, lllc; par 58 112b-113a / Aphorisms, 17 PLOTINUS: first Ennead, TR in, CH 2 lOd, CH
SECT i, par 3 131a-b; SECT n, par 49-50 133d 6 lld-12b
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK in, CH 15, 190a-c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 13-31 4b-9a
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK ix [590-620] 295a-b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 96,
14 PLUTARCH- Lycurgu*, 40c-42a / Conolanus, A 2, ANS 231c-232b, Q 99, A 6, ANS 250a-251a;
175b / Phikpocmen, 293d-294a Q 100, A 9 261 b- 262 b; Q 105, A 4, ANS 318b-
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR n, CH 8, 86d-87b 321a; Q 108, A 3 334a 336b
CHAPTER 20: EDUCATION 387
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy BK i, 649b-d / Seventh Letter, 801b-802d;
22 CHAUCER: Tale of Wife of Bath [6691-6788] 806b-c; 809c-810d esp 810c-d
274b-276a / Clerks Tale [8031-8037] 298a; 8 ARISTOTLE: CH 10 [13*16-31] 18d /
Categories,
[8269-8317] 302b-303a BK n, CH 25 [69*20-28] 91a
Prior Analytics,
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK n, 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 3 [1094^7-1095*
81a-83b n] 340a; CH 9 345a-c; BK n, CH 1-4 348b,d-
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 16c; 43a-c; 55d-62a esp 351b; BK vi, CH 1-2 387a-388b; CH 12-13
60c-61c; 63d-75a 393b-394d; BK vn, CH 2-3 395c-398a; BK x,
30 BACON Advancement of Learning, 76a-81c esp
: CH 9 [ii79 33~b 3o] 434a-c / Politics, BK v,
ft
177d-178b, 183b-190a,c / Apology, 203c-204b Elements of Ethics, 365 b-d; 368d / Judgement,
/ Gorgias, 258d-259b, 262d-263c; 277d; 287c- 513d-514b
291b / Republic, BK n, 319d<320c; BK VH 43 MILL: Liberty, 303b-d; 306c-307a / Utilitar-
388a-401d esp 389d-391b, 397a-401d; BK x, ianism, 464b-c
439b-441a,c / Timaeus, 474c-475c / Sophist, 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART n, par 132
556c-558d / Statesman, 607b 608d / Laws, 46b-47a; ADDITIONS, in 134d-135a; 119 136b
388 THE GREAT IDEAS
42 KANT: Science of Right, 420b-421c
(4. The formation of a good character, virtue, a 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 372c
The possibility and limits of
right will. 4a. 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART HI, par 173-
moral education: knowledge and virtue.)
175 61a-d; par 239 76d; ADDITIONS, in 134d-
49 DARWIN; Descent of Man, 313d-314b; 317c- 135a; 147 140c
319a 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK XH,
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vi, 244d-245d 395b-d
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov EPILOGUE, , 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-
411b-412d Analysis, 17d-18a / Sexual Enlightenment of
53 JAMES: Psychology, 806a-808a Children 119a-122a,c passim / Narcissism, 408b
54 FREUD. General Introduction, 573c-d; 592b-c; / Ego and Id, 704d-707d / Civilization and Its
596b-c; 624d-625b / Civilization and Its Discontents, 794c-795a esp 795 b [fn 2] / New
Discontents, 781a-d; 784a-789b; 796d [112]; Introductory Lectures, 834b-c; 844b-c; 876b-c
800c-801a / New Introductory Lectures, 870a-c
4c. The role of the state in moral education:
4b.The influence of the family in moral training law, custom, public opinion
OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus*, 20:12 / Deuteronomy, 5 ARISTOPHANES: Clouds 488a-506d
5 16, 6:6-7; 11:18-19; 27:16 / Proverbs, 1:8-9; 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 35c-d
3:12; 6:20-24; 13:1,24; 15:5; 19:18; 22:6,15; 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK i,370a-c;
23:13-26; 29:15, 17 BK n, 396d-397a
APOCRYPHA: Tobit, 4 (D) OT, Tobias, 4 / 7 PLATO. Protagoras, 45b-47c / Apology, 203c-
Ecclcsiasticus, 7-23-24; 30:1-13 (D) OT, 204b / Gorgtas, 287c-291b / Republic, BK n-
Ecclesiasticus, 7:25-26; 30:1-13 iii, 320c-339a; BK vi, 377a-379c / Timaeus,
NEW TESTAMENT: Ephesians, 6:1-4 / Colossians, 474c-d / Statesman, 607a-608a / Laws 640a-
3 .20-2 1 799a,c esp BK i, 643a-644a, 645c-646d, BK in,
7 PLATO: Protagoras, 45d-47a / Meno, 186a- 676b-c, BK iv, 683d-685a, BK v-vi, 696c-697d,
187b / Republic, BK v, 366a-c / LtfAJ, BK v, BK vi, 704a-c, 710d-711c, BK vn 713c-731d,
687d-688*; BK vn, 713c-716d BK vin, 735c-738c, BK ix, 757a, BK xii, 792c-d
a b
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK x, CH 9 [n8o 25- i4J / Seventh Letter, 800b-c
435a-c / Politics, BK iv, CH 11 [i295 b i4-i8] 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 9 [io99 b 29~32]
a b
495d; BK vn, CH 17 [i336 23- 3J 541b-c 345b; CH 13 [1102*8-25] 347c; BK n, CH i
b b
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK i 253a-256d esp [iio3 3-7]349a, BK v, CH i [ii29 i2-24]377a;
SECT 1-4 253a, SECT 14 254b-c, SECT 16 254d- CH 2 [ri3o b 2o-3o] 378b; BK x, CH 9 [ii79 b 3i-
255d n8ob 28] 434c-435c / Politics, BK n, CH 5
b a
14 PLUTARCH: Marcus Cato, 286c-287b [i263 36-i264 459a; CH 7 461d-463c; BK
i]
passim, esp 337a-b; 342b-344d passim, 346c- [4465-4510] 234b-235b / Nun's Priest's Tale
350a, 381b-382b / Utilitarianism, 456a-d, [15,444-452] 460a-b / LEnvoi 550a-b
457c-458b 25 MONTAIGNE- Essays, 68b-69a; 197a-199c
46 HEGEL Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 150- 26 SHAKESPEARE: Merchant of Venice, ACT v, sc
153 56c-57c; par 239 76d; par 270, 84d-85a; i
[66-88] 431b-c
89a-b; par 315 104c; ADDITIONS, 96-98 132c- 29 CERVANTES- Don Quixote, PART i, 12b-16c;
133a; 131 137d; 162, 143b-144a; 183 148d- 186d-187c; PART n, 427c-429a
149a / Philosophy of History, PART iv, 365c 30 BACON: Advancement of learning, 4c-6c; 38c-
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 310c-317d esp 39d esp 38d-39a; 78a-d; 79c-80a; 85a-c
317a-c 31 DESCARTES. Discourse, PART i, 43a-b
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vi, 244d-245d; 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART in, PROP 55 413b-
BK viu, 303a-305b esp 303d-304b 414a
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK xn, 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK ix [1-47] 247a-248a
398a-d / Areopagitica, 385a-386b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 190a-191a 33 PASCAL: Pensees, n 173b-174a
54 FREUD: Sexual Enlightenment of Children, 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV i
122a,c / Narcissism, 408b / War and Death, 451a-b
757b-759d passim, esp 75 7c / Civilization and 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 250b-251a
Its Discontents, 781a-c; 784a-d; 800 b-d / New 37 FIELDING, Tom Jones, 254a-d
Introductory Lectures, 834c 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK iv, 17b-
18d
4</. The upon character of poetry, music,
eflfect
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 365b-366b / Political
and other arts: the role of history and
Economy, 376c-377a
examples 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 337d-338c;
4 HOMER: BK ix [430-605] 61c-63b
Iliad, 347d
5 ARISTOPHANES* Acharnians [626-658] 462b-d 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 94a-b; 284a>c;
/ Wasps [1009-1070] 519d-520c / Frogs [1008- 338d-339a; 449a-b
1098] 576b-577c; [1482-1533] 581d-582a,c 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 40d-41a; 225a-c;
6 HB^ODOTUS: //w/pfy, BK i, 35c-d , 311a-312a
390 THE GREAT IDEAS
682c; PART in SUPPL, o 96,A 7 1061b-l062a;
(4. The formation of a good character, virtue, a A ii, ANS and REP 1,5 1063d-1064d; A 12
right will. 44. The effect upon character I064d-1065b
of poetry, music, and other arts: the role of DANTE: Dmne
21 Comedy, HELL la-52d passim,
history and example*!) vn xv
esp i-n la-4a, [64]-ix [105] 10b-13b,
42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 21a~22c, xxiv [1-78] 34d-35b; PURGATORY
263a-b; 264b [fn i); 266d [fn 2] / Practical 53a-105d passim, esp v [1-21] 59a, xvm [1-96]
Reason, 325d-327d esp 327b-d; 356a-360d / 79d-80d, xxvii 94c-96a, xxx [22-81] 99c-
Judgement, 504a-b; 513d-514b; 521b-523c; lOOb; PARADISE, iv [115-142] llld-112a
586d-587a 22 CHAUCER- Prologue [285-308] 164a-b
44 Bosw ELL: Johnson, 308b-d; 347c-d 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i,
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART n, 267a- lb,d; 18b-25a passim; BK n, 101b-106a
268b; 276a-b; PART iv, 347b-d 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 57b-60c; 64c-79c passim,
53 JAMES: Psychology, 826b-827a esp 70c-72a
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 7d-lla;
5. The improvement of the mind by teaching
14c-15a, 16c; 29c-32c; 68b-69b
and learning 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART i, 42b
31 SPINOZA- Ethics, PART APPENDIX, ix 448a
iv,
5a. The profession of teaching: the relation of 32 MILTON: Areopagitica, 398a-b
teacher and student
36 STERNE Tristram Shandy, 423b-424b
:
4 HOMER: Iliad, BK ix [430-605] 61c-63b 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 41a-43b; 45d-46a; 94d-
5 ARISTOPHANFS: Clouds 488a-506d 95a
7 PLATO: Laches, 29d-31b / Protagoras, 38a-47c 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 326c-d / Political Econ-
esp 39d-41a, 42a-c / Euthydemus 65a-84a,c / omy, 376d-377a
Symposium, 169c-170a / Meno 174a-190a,c esp 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 57b-58b; BK
179b-183a / Apology, 203a-204c; 206b-208c / v, 331b,d-334c; 338c-340b; 354d-355d esp
Cnto, 215a-c / Gorgias, 252a-259c; 290b-291b 355c-d
/ Theaetetus, 515d-517b; 544a-c / Sophist, 40 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 669a-671b
556b-559a / Laws, BK vn, 723c-d / Seventh 43 MILL: Representative Government, 420b-d;
Letter, 801c-802d; 808b-c 424b-c
8 ARISTOTLE: Sophistical Refutations, CH i [165* 44 BOSWELL:/O^O, 23b-c; 191b-c; 199d-200b;
19-24] 227c; CH 2 [i65*}8-b 3] 227d-228a, CH 300a-c
b
ii [i7i 236b-d / Metaphysics, BK i, CH i
i8-35J 47 GOETHE Faust, PART n [6689-6818] 164a-166b
:
[9817-9! 499d CH 2 [9 82a i3-MJ 500b; [982" 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 47b-48d; BK
'
b
28-30] 500c; BK iv, CH 2 [ioo4 i8~27] 523d vni, 306b
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK rx, CH i [ii64 a 22-b 6] 54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 870b-c
b b
417a-b; BK x, CH 9 [ii8o 28-n8i i9) 435d-
436a,c . The means and methods of teaching
10 HIPPOCRATES: The Oath, xiiia 5 ARISTOPHANES: Clouds 488a-506d
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [1-30] 7 PLATO: Protagoras, S0c-52d / Cratylus, 85d-
30a-b; BK v [1-54] 61a-d; BK vi [1-42] 80a-d 88a esp 87c-d; 112d-113d / Phaedrus, 131b-
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK n, CH 17 158d-161a 141a,c esp 139b-140b / Meno, 179b-183a /
csp 160b-161a; CH 24 172d-174b; BK in, CH 2 Apology, 206b-d / Republic, BK vu, 388a-398c
177c-178d; CH 9, 185b-d; CH 21-23 193d ' esp 389d-390b; 399c / Theaetetus, 515d-517b,
203b; BK iv, CH 8 235b-237d 549c-550a,c / Sophist, 551d; 556b-559a /
14 PLUTARCH: 122d-123d / Alcibiades,
Pericles, Statesman, 590d-591c / Philebus, 610d-613a /
155b,d-158b / Alexander, 542d-544a / Cato Laws, BK n, 656b-c; BK iv, 684c-685a /
the Younger, 623a-b / Dion, 782c-788b Seventh Letter, 809a-811a esp 809a-c
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK xni, 125d-126a; BK xiv, 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH i
153d-155a [71*1-10] 97a / Sophistical Refutations, CH 2
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 22 6b-c; b b
[i65*38- 3] 227d-228a; CH 10 [i7i27- 2]
BK iv, par 2 19d; BK v, par 22 33b-c; BK vi, 235d-236a; CH ii [172*15-21] 237a / Heavens,
par 1 1 38b-c / Christian Doctrine, BK iv, CH 4 BK i, CH 10 [279b32-28on] 371b-c / Meta-
676d-677a; CH 27 696a-c physics, BK n, CH 3 513c-d / Sense and the
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PROLOGUE la-b; b
Sensibk, CH i [436 i8-437i7] 673d-674a
PART i, Q 76, A 2, REP 5 388c-391a; Q 1 06 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i
b b
545c-549a; Q 107, A 3, ANS and REP i 551a-c; [639*i- i2] 161a-d / Ethics, BK vi, CH 3 [ii39
Q in, A j 568c-569b; Q 117, AA 1-2 595d- 18-34] 388b-c
598c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [921-950]
20 AQUINAS: Summa Thfologica, PART n-ii, Q i, 12b-c; BK iv (1-25) 44a-b
A 7, REP 2 385c-387a; Q 2, A 3, ANS 392d-393c; 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK n, CH 24, 172d-
Q 181, A 3 618c-619b; Q 188, A 6, ANS 681b- 173c; BK in, CH 9, 185b; CH 23, 203a-b
CHAPTER 20: EDUCATION 391
passim, csp 73b-74a; 446d-450a; 453c-454d par 23 6d-7a; BK iv, par 28-31 26a-27a /
28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 268c / On Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 2 624d-625a; BK
Animal Generation, 336d-337a,c n, CH 36-37 653d-654b
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 16c; 31a-d; 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 76, A
39b-d; 61d-62c; 64b-c; 65a-c; 68b-69c 2, REP 5 388c-391a; Q 84, A 3,REP 3 443d-
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART i, 42b; 42d-43a 444d, Q 117, A i, ANS and REP
4 595d-597c
32 MILTON: Areopagitica, 384a 20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART n-n, Q i,
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 9-10 173b; 40 177b-178a A 7, REP 2 385c-387a; Q 2, A 3, ANS 392d-393c;
35 LOCKE: Toleration, 3c-4a; 7a-b; 15c / Human PART HI, Q 9, A 4, REP i 766b-767b; Q 12
Understanding, BK in, CH x, SECT 34 299d- 776c-779d
300a; BK iv, CH vn, SECT n, 340d-341a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 55d-56a; 66c-d;
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART HI, 109b-110b 68b
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 417b-418a; 421b- 24 RABELAIS- Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i,
422b 18b-19a; 26d-30c
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 42a-c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 55d-62a passim; 63d-
38 ROUSSEAU: 339d-340a
Inequality, 75a csp 64c-66b; 446a-450a; 453c-454d
39 SMITH- Wealth of Nations, BK v, 337c-d 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 268c / On
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 2d-4a,c / Practical Reason, Animal Generation, 332a-335c esp 334d-33Sc
335bc 30 BACON: Advancement of learning, 16a; 57d-
43 MILL: Liberty, 283c-288c esp 284b-d / Repre- 58b; 64b-c / Novum Organum, PREF 105a-
sentative Government, 331a; 424b-c 106d
44 BOSWELL- Johnson, 7d-8a; 144c; 191b-c; 199d- 31 DESCARTES: Rules, m-iv 3b-7d; xii-xm
200b; 448a-b; 471d 18b-27d esp xn, 23c, 24d-25a / Discourse,
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 175, PART vi, 61d-62c; 63a-b / Meditations, i 7Sa-
61c-d 77c / Geometry, BK i, 297a-b; BK in, 341b
47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [522-601] 15a-16b 33 PASCAL: Penstes, 6 173a
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 48b-d 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH i,
53 JAMES: Psychology, 290a-291a; 692a-b; 711b- SECT 15 98d-99a; SECT 23 101b-102a, CH in,
712b SECT 25 120c-d
54 FREUD. General Introduction, 449a-451b passim 36 STERNE Tristram Shandy, 221a-222a
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 99d-100a
5c. The nature of learning: its several modes 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 528c
7 PLATO: Laches, 29d-30b / Euthydemus, 67b- 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 14a-15c; 113b414a; 244c-
68d / Cratylus, llld-112d / Phaedrus, 124a- 245c / Judgement, 526a-527b
126c esp 126a-c; 139b-140b/ Meno, 179b-183a; 43 MILL: Liberty, 283c-288c
188d-189a / Phaedo, 228a-230c / Republic, BK 44 BOSWELLI/O^WOH, 121d; 126d; 257c
vi-vn, 383d-401d / Theaetetus, 541d-543a / 45 LAVOISIER '.Elements of Chemistry, PREF, lc-2b
Philebus, lOd-613a 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 69,
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK n, CH 21 [67* 30b-c
21-25] 88c / Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH i 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 245b
97a-d; BK n, CH 19 136a-137a,c / Sophistical 53 JAMES: Psychology, 15b-17a; 49b-52b csp 52a;
Refutations, CH 2 [i6538-b 3] 227d-328a / 71a-73b; 83a-b; HOb; 331b-336a passim;
b
Physics, BK vn, CH 3 [247 i-248*6] 330b-d; 362b-364a; 433a-438a; 443a-444a; 448b-
BK vi n, CH 4 [255*3<>~b23] 340a-c / Meta- 450a; 664b-665a; 691a-b; 827a-835a
392 THE GREAT IDEAS
(5. The improvement of the mind by teaching and 44a; PART n, 47a-b; PART vi, 61d-62c /
learning) Geometry, BK i, 297a-b; 298b; BK HI, 341 b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH i,
5</. The order of learning: the organization of SECT 15 98d-99a; SECT 20 lOOc-d; SECT 23
the curriculum 101b-102a; CH HI, SECT 13 116a-b; BK n, CH i,
7 PLATO: Protagoras, 46b-c / Memo, 179b-183a / SECT 6-8 122b-123a; SECT 22 127a; CH xi,
Gorgias, 272b-273b / Republic, BK n, 320c- SECT 8-9 145b-c; BK in, CH n, SECT 7 254a-b;
321a; BK in, 333b-334b; BK vi, 380d-381a; CH in, SECT 7-9 255d-256c; CH v, SECT 15
BK VI-VH, 383d-401d / Timaeus, 465d-466a / 267c-d; CH ix, SECT 9 286d-287b; BK iv, CH
Sophist, 552b-c / Philebus, 610d-613a / Laws, vii, SECT 9 338d-339b; SECT n 340a-342d
BK n, 653a-654a; BK v, 696b-d; BK VH, 728b- passim, esp 340d-341a; CH xn, SECT 3 358d-
730c; BK xn, 798a-799a,c / Seventh Letter, 359c
809c-810d 36 SWIFT Gulliver, PART n, 78b
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK i, CH i 259a-b; CH 7 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 421b-422b
b 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 334c-337b;
[i89 3O~33] 265 b-c / Metaphysics, BK n, CH 3
b
[995*12-14] 513c; BK iv, CH 3 [ioo5 2~5] 524c; 338c-d;342b
CH 4 [1006*5-12] 525a-b; BK v, CH i [1013*1-3] 42 KANT: Practical Reason, 294a-b / Judgement,
b
533a; BK vn, CH 3 [io29*35- i2] 552a; BK ix, 551a-552c, 572a-b
CH 8 [i049b 29-io50 a 3J 575c-d / Soul, BK i, 44 BOSWELL- Johnson, llb-d; 15a-c; 23d-24b;
CH i (402 b i 5-403*2] 631d-632a; BK n, CH 2 121d; 128c; 135b-c; 273a-b; 309c-d; 448a-b
[413*11-13] 643a 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 213c
9 ARISTOTLE- Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [1868-2045] 44b-48a
b
[639*i2- i2] 161b-d / Ethics, BK i, CH 3 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK x,
b b
[i094 28-io95*3] 340a; BK vi, CH 3 [ii39 25- 291d-292b
b
29] 388c / Politics, BK vn, CH 15 [i334 2o-28] 53 JAMES- Psychology, 317b-319a; 323a-b; 360a;
539c-d; BK vm, CH 3 542d-543d 406a-b;453a-457aesp453b 456b-457a;503b; f
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 56b; 59b-c; 71c-d; 10 GALFN. Natural Faculties, CH 10, 207d
BK in,
72a<d; PART iv, 268c-269b 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of BK i [41-53]
Things,
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i, Ic-d; BK ii
[1023-1047] 28a-b; BK in [1-30]
18b-19d; 25a-30c; BK n, 75c-77a; 78b-80d; 30a-b; BK iv [1-25] 44a-b
, 82c-83b 12 EPICTETUS Discourses, BK iv, CH 4 225a-228a
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 63d-80b passim, esp 69d- 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR in, CH 1-3 lOa-lla
70c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 14-16 4c-
28 HARVEY; On Animal Generation, 332a-336a 5b; par 19-27 5d-7d
esp 334c-d, 335c-336a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 12,
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 4c-5b; 14c- A ANS 50c-51c; A 8, REP 4 57b-58b; PART
i,
253a / Republic, BK in, 333b-d; 337b-d; BK v, 204c-d; BK in, CH HI, SECT 7-8 255d-256a;
366a-c; BK vi, 377a-379c; BK vn, 401a / BK iv CH xn, SECT 9-13 360d-362d
f
b
9 ARISTOTLE Ethics, BK i, CH 3 [i094 28-io95*3]
:
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 14a-15c; 146a449d esp
340a; CH 4 [1095*30-^3] 340c-d; BK n, CH i 148b-c
43 MILL: Liberty, 287b-c; 288a-b; 294c-295a /
[1103*14-17] 348b; BK vi, CH 8 [1142*12-19]
b
391b; CH ii [ii43*25- i3] 392d-393a; BK x, Representative Government, 341d-343a passim;
CH 9 [n8o b i3-23] 435b-c; [n8i*i8-b 6] 436a / 418b-d / Utilitarianism, 456a-d
Politics, BK in, CH 16 [1287*32-33] 485d; BK
44 Bosw ELL: Johnson, 257c; 378b-c
vni, CH 6 546b-547b 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREP, Id-
10 HIPPOCRATES: Articulations, par 10 94d-95a / 2b; PART HI, 87b-c
The Law, par 3-4 144c-d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART HI, par 197
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [925-1457] 67a-b / Philosophy of History, PART i, 230c-
73b-80a,c passim, esp [1448-1457] 79d-80a,c 231b
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK vm
[508-519] 272b-273a
47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [522-^01] 15a-16b
394 THE GREAT IDEAS 6 to 7a
49 DARWIN- Descent of Man, 278c d
(5. The improvement of the mind by teaching and 50 MARX. Capital, 81d; 165c-166a; 170c-171c;
learning. 5/ Learning apartfrom teachers 237d-241a esp 240c-d
and books: the role of experience.) 53 JAMES: Psychology, 774a
48 MELVILLE: Moby DicJ{, 82a; 243a 54 FREUD: "Wild" Psycho* Analysis, 130b-c /
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK x, 424a-b; BK General Introduction, 449a-452a passim
xin, 584c-585b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 362b-364a passim; 453b- 7. Religious education
454a; 767b-768a; 852b-862a esp 852b-853a, OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 12-24-27; 18:19-20;
856b 857a, 859b 860a 24.12 / Deuteronomy, 4*9-10,14; 5:31; 6:1,6-
9, u 18-21; 31*9-13 / Joshua, 8-30-35 (D)
6. The acquisition of techniques: preparation ]osue, 8:30-35 / // Kings, 23.1-2 (D) IV
for the vocations, arts, and professions
Kings, 23.1-2 / // Chronicles, 34-29-30 (D)
5 ARISTOPHANES* Clouds 488a-506d esp [461- II Parahpomenon, 3 1 '29-30 / Nehemiah, 8
509] 494b-d, [723-812] 497b-498c (D) 77 Esdras, 8 / Psalms, 78:1-4 (D) Psalms,
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 136a-b / Gorgias, 258d-262a 77 -i-4
esp 260a-d / Republic, BK 11, 319a-c; BK in, Ntw TLSTAMENT: Ephesians, 6 '4
337b-338a; BK v, 366a-c; BK vi, 377d-378c / 7 PLATO: Laws, BK x 757d-771b; BK xn, 797b-
Philebus, 633a-d / Laws, BK i, 649b-c; BK iv, 798b
684d-685a 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK in, CH 22 195a-
8 ARISTOTLE* Topics, BK i, CH 3 144a-b 201a
9AnisrOlLt, EthlCS, BK I, CH 13 fllO2 a I7~22] 18 Auc.usTiNh. Christian Doctrine 621a-698a,c
347c; BK u, en i 348b,d-349b; en 4 3SOd- 19 AQUINAS* Summa Theologica, PROLOGUE la-b
b b
351b; BK x, en 9 [u8o i3-n8i i3] 435b- 20 AQUINAS* Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q
b
436a,c passim / Politics, BK iv, CH i [i288 io- 105, A 4, ANS 318b-321a; Q in, A i, ANS 351d-
20] 487a-b; BK vin, CH 6 546b-547b / Atheni- 352d; A 4 354c-355d; PART n-ii, Q 2, A 6,
an Constitution, CH 42, par 3 572c ANS 395b-396a; Q 16, A 2, ANS and REP 2
10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 1-4 455c-456d; Q 188, A 5 679d-681a; A 6, ANS
la-2c; par 9 3b-d / Epidemics, BK in, SECT 681b-682c; PART in SUPPL, Q 96, A 7 1061b-
94d /
in, par 1 6 S9b-c / Articulations, par 10, 1062a
The Law, par 2-5 144b-d 23HoBBrs- leviathan, PART u, 123a-b; 153a-
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [1091- 156b passim, esp 154d-155a; PART HI, 208d-
1104] 75b-c; (1241-1408] 77b-79b 209a, 211b-c; 241c-242a; PART iv, 269a
13 VIRGIL. Aeneid, BK vin [512-517] 272b 24 RABELAIS Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i,
14 PLUTARCH' Demosthenes, 692c-695d 24c-d;27a;BKii,82c-83b
18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK iv, CH 3 33 PASCAL. Pensees, 185-194 205a-209b, 285
676a-d 224a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART n-ii, Q i, 35 LOCKE: Toleration, 3c-4a; 7a-b
A 7, REP 2 385c-387a 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xxiv,
24 RABELAIS' Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i, 202b-c
27d-30c; BK n, 76b-77a; 85c-87c esp 87a; 39 SMITH- Wealth of Nations, BK v, 343b,d-356d
BK iv, 232a-233b passim; 357c
29 GhRVANii-s Don Quixote, PART i, 82b 83c 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 82d; 601 b-c
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 30b-c; 42 KANT: Practical Reason, 325a-327d esp 326b-
53d-54b; 82c-d 327a
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART vi, 66c 43 MILL. Liberty, 285b; 290a-292a passim / Rep-
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART i, 29b-31a resentative Government, 437d-438b
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 42d-43c; 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 151b-d
51c-58b esp 51c-53b, 54c-55a; BK v, 301a- 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK vi,
305c; 339b-c; 342d-343c 150d-153d
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 5a-c; 245b-d;
411d-412c la. God as teacher: divine revelation and in-
17
[1337*10-19] 542a
Sa. The educational responsibility of the fam- 14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus-Numa 61b,d-64a,c pas-
ily and the state sim / Solon, 76a
7 PLATO: Cnto, 217a-b / Laws, BK VH, 721d- 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK HI, 56d-57b; BK iv, 67c;
722c; BK vin, 723c-d, BK xi, 778d 72b-73a; BK xiv, 152d-153c
b
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK x, CH 9 [ii79 3i-n8o b 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK 11, CH 9 154a-c;
b CH 12-14 155c-157c; BK vin, CH 13 273b-d
13] 434c-435b / Politics, BK i, CH 13 [i26o
9-19] 455c; BK vin, CH i 542a-b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 102d-103a; 114d-
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK i, SECT 4 253a 115a; 123a-b; 150c-151a; PART in, 224d-225d,
14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 39a-45b esp 40c-41a / CONCLUSION, 282d'283a
Lycurgus-Numa, 63d-64a,c 29 CERVANTES. Don Quixote, PART i, 117d-119d;
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 95, 184a-187c
A i, ANS 226c-227c; Q 105, A 4, ANJ and REP 5 30 BACON Advancement of Learning, 7a / New
:
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Matters relevant to physical education or the training of bodily skills, see ART 90; HABIT 53;
LABOR 2b.
Matters relevant to moral education, see ART ica; CUSTOM AND CONVENTION 5b; GOOD AND
EVIL 6a; HABIT 5b; HISTORY 2; KNOWLEDGE 8b(i); PLEASURE AND PAIN loa; POETRY 93;
PUNISHMENT 33; VIRTUE AND VICE la, 4-4^ 4d(2), 4d(4), 8b; and for the training of
specific virtues, see COURAGE 6; TEMPERANCE 4.
Matters relevant to liberal education or intellectual training, see ART 6b; HABIT 43-4^ 5d;
HISTORY 2; KNOWLEDGE 93; MAN 6a; MIND 4a~4c; PLEASURE AND PAIN loa; POETRY 5a,
93; TRUTH 3d(3); VIRTUE AND VICE 40-4^, and for discussions of the liberal arts, see
LANGUAGE la, 7-8; LOGIC 3-3^ MATHEMATICS ib; RHETORIC ib, 2c-2d, 6.
Matters relevant to professional education or training in the useful arts and crafts, see
LAW 9; MEDICINE i, 2c; PHILOSOPHY 5; RHETORIC 6; STATE 8c.
Matters relevant to religious education, see GOD 6c(i)-6c(3); KNOWLEDGE 6c(^); PROPH-
ECY ic-id; RELIGION ia-ib(3), 5c; THEOLOGY 2, 4a~4c; VIRTUE AND Viet 8b, 8e;
WISDOM ic.
The consideration of factors involved in learning and teaching, see EMOTION 5d; EXPERIENCE
2~3b; HABIT 43-4^, KNOWLEDGE 43-40, 93; LANGUAGE 8; LOGIC 4; MIND 4c; PLEASURE
AND PAIN 4c(2); TRUTH 3d(3), 8c; VIRTUE AND VICE 40-4^
The role of the family in education, see FAMILY 2c, 6d; VIRTUE AND VICE 4d(i).
The role of the state in education, see LAW 6d; VIRTUE AND VICE 4d(3), 73; and for the
problem of education in relation to different forms of government, see ARISTOCRACY 5;
CrnztN 6; DEMOCRACY 6; MONARCHY 33; STATE 8c.
The discussion of freedom in the communication of knowledge and art, see ART lob; KNOWL-
EDGE 9b; LIBERTY 23; OPINION 5b; POETRY 9b; TRUTH 8d.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booty of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date,place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
tory), BK 1-3; BK X, CH I
i; BK II, CH tutions
SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. Outlines of Pyrrhonism, BK in, S.BUTLER. The Way of All Flesh
CH 27-32 BAIN. Education as a Science
MARTIANUS CAPELLA. De Nuptiis Philologiae et CLIFFORD. "Virchow on the Teaching of Science,"
Mercurtt m VOL n, Lectures and Essays
CASSIODORUS. Institutiones (An Introduction to Dt- T. H. GREEN. The Principles of Political Obliga-
vine and Human Readings) tion, (L)
HUGH OF SAINT VICTOR. Dtdascaltcon: De Studio H ADAMS. The Education of Henry Adams
Legendt MONTESSORI. Method of Scientific Pedagogy
JOHN OF SALISBURY. Metalogicon BRYCE. The Functions of a University
T. MORE. Utopia, BK i SHAW. Pygmalion
LUTHER. To the Councilmen of All Cities m Germany T. VEBLEN. The Higher Learning m America
That They Establish and Maintain Christian Schools WHITEHEAD. The Organization of Thought, CH 1-5
CASTIGLIONE. The Boof( of the Courtier The Aims of Education
.
ERASMUS. The Education of a Christian Punce KELSO. The Doctrine of the English Gentleman in the
De Puerts Statim ac Liberahter Instttuendts (On
. Sixteenth Century
Liberal Education) GORKY. Forty Years theLifeofClimSamghin> VOLI,
ELYOT. The Governour Bystander
VIVES. On Education B. RUSSELL. Education and the Good Life
IGNATIUS OF LOYOLA. Constitutions .
Sceptical Essays, xiv
LYLY. Euphues Pius XL
Dwini lllius Magistri (Encyclical on
COMENIUS. The Great Didactic Christian Education of Youth)
. School of Infancy ORTEGA Y GASSET. Mission of the University
FENELON. A
on the Education of Daughters
Treatise RANK. Modern Education
Adventures of Telemachus
.
JAEGER. Paideia
CHESTERFIELD. Letters to His Son T. S. ELIOT. "Modern Education and the Classics,"
VOLTAIRE. "University," in A Philosophical Dic- in Essays, Ancient and Modern
INTRODUCTION
words "atom" and "element" express composition and into them it is resolved. The
THE basic notions in the analysis of matter. To so-called four elements of the universe in gen-
some extent their meaning seems to be the eral are simple bodies, fire, water, air, and earth;
same. Atoms or elements are usually under- for out of them in the first instance we account
stood to be ultimate units, the parts out of for the constitution of the universe, and into
which other things are formed by combination. them finally we conceive of it as being re-
usually designates a small particle of matter, Thus the factors of price may be said to func-
whereas "element" signifies the least part into tion in economic analysis as do the parts of
which anything at all can be divided. It is this speech in grammatical analysis.
broader meaning of "clement" which permits Another illustration comes from the theory
Euclid tocall his collection of the theorems in of the four bodily humors in ancient physiol-
terms of which all geometric problems can be ogy. In the traditional enumeration, which
solved, the "elements" of geometry. According goes back to Hippocrates, they are blood,
to Aristotle, this is true, not only of geometrical phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile, and they
proofs, but also "in general of the elements of function analytically as do fire, water, air, and
demonstration; for the primary demonstra- earth in ancient physics. They "make up the
tions, each of which is implied in many demon- nature of the body of man," according to a
strations," he says, "are called elements of Hippocratic treatise on the nature of man,
demonstration." From this it follows that ele- "and through them he feels pain or enjoys
ments will be found in any subject matter or health." Perfect health is
enjoyed by a man
science in which analysis occurs, and not only "when these elements are duly proportioned
in physics. to one another in respect of compounding,
"An element," writes Nicomachus in his In- power, and bulk, and when they are perfectly
troduction to Arithmetic, "is the smallest thing mingled." Galen, in an analysis of tempera-
which enters into the composition of an object, ments, explains all varieties of temperament and
and the least thing into which it can be ana- allcomplexions of physique in terms of these
lyzed. Letters, for example, are called the ele- humors, either by their mixture or by the pre-
ments of literate speech, for out of them all dominance of one or another. Thus the san-
articulate speech is composed and into them guine, phlegmatic, choleric, or melancholic
finally it is resolved. Sounds are the elements of temperament accounted for by the excess of
is
all melody; for they are the beginning of its one and a deficiency of the other humors.
400
CHAPTER 21: ELEMENT 401
Still another physiological application of the The two words are often used as synonyms.
notion of element is to be found in the ancient Lavoisier, for example, says that we can use
and bone, or in the
division of tissue into flesh "the term dements ',
or principles of bodies, to
more elaborate modern analysis of the types of express our idea of the last point which analysis
cells which comprise all living matter. is
capable of reaching."
To discover any difference in the meaning of
THESE ILLUSTRATIONS indicate that the irre- "element" and "principle," it is
necessary to
ducibihty of elements to anything simpler than specify their correlatives precisely. Out of ele-
themselves does not necessarily mean that they ments, compounds or mixtures are formed.
are absolutely indivisible. Cells can be further From principles, consequences are derived. In
divided into nucleus, protoplasm, and mem- logic, for example, we say that terms are the
brane without ceasing to be the elements of elements of propositions (the proposition 'Soc-
tissue. The parts of speech nouns, verbs, ad- rates is a man' comprising the terms 'Socrates'
jectives can be further divided into syllables and 'man'), but we say that axioms arc the
and letters without ceasing to be the elements principles from which conclusions are derived.
of significant utterance. Letters, treated as the This docs not prevent the same thing from be-
elements of language, can be physically divided. ing viewed in different connections as both ele-
The fact that terms are sometimes regarded as ment and principle as an element because it
the logical elements out of which propositions isthe simple part out of which a more complex
and syllogisms are formed does not prevent a whole is composed, and as a principle because it
distinction from being made between simple is the source from which something else is de-
and complex terms. Nicomachus calls the tri- rived. The parts of speech in grammar are the
among all plane figures, "for elementary components of phrases and sen-
angle elementary
everything else is resolved into it, but it into tences; they are also the principles from which
nothing else"; yet the triangle is divisible into the rules of syntax arc derived.
the lines which compose it and these lines in The third notion which belongs with ele-
turn are divisible into points. ment and principle is cause. Its correlative is
the element of all other figures "and has itself element in one connection and a principle in
no element," he does not mean that the tri- another can be regarded as a cause from still a
tively so. Relative to the analysis of plane fig- tises, for example, matter is regarded in all three
ures, there is no simpler figure out of which the ways: it isan element of all bodies, for they are
triangle can be formed. Similarly, relative to substances composed of matter and form; it is a
the analysis of significant speech, there is no principle of change, since from matter, form,
simpler part than the word. Relative to the and privation change is derived; it is a cause
brought together by Aristotle in the beginning Thus the action of one body upon another is a
of his Physics, when he declares that we attain cause and a principle, but not an element, Re-
"scientific knowledge" through acquaintance ferring to these distinctions, Aquinas declares
with the "principles, causes, and elements" of that "principle is a wider term than cause, just
The word "principle" occurs almost as fre- chapters on CAUSE and PRINCIPLE tend to sub-
quently as "element" in the titles of books stantiate this observation about the scope of
which claim to be basic expositions or analyses. these ideas in the tradition of western thought.
402 THE GREAT IDEAS
THE BASIC ISSUES concerning elements occur In terms of these simple bodies and the ele-
in the analysis of matter. Before Plato and mentary qualities all other material things can
Aristotle, the early Greek physicists had asked be explained.
such questions as, From what do all things In contrast to the elements stand the mixed,
come ? Of what are all
things made ? A number or compound, bodies, in the constitution of
of answers were given, ranging from one kind of which two or more elements combine. There
ultimate, such as earth or fire, through a small may be many kinds of mixed bodies, but none
set of ultimate kinds, to an infinite variety. is irreducible in kind, as are the four elements;
The classical theory of the four elements is the any mixed body can be divided into the differ-
middle answer, avoiding the extremes of unity ent kinds of elementary bodies which compose
and infinity. it, whereas the elementary bodies cannot be
According to Galen, it was Hippocrates who divided into parts which are different in kind
"first took in hand to demonstrate that there from themselves, A living body, for example,
are, in all, four
mutually interacting qualities" may contain parts of earth and water, but the
and who provided "at least the beginnings of parts of earth are earth, the parts of water,
the proofs to which Aristotle later set his hand" water.
in developing the theory of the four elements. It is precisely the mode of divisibility that
Galen was a subject of
also indicates that it Aristotle declares is "the fundamental ques-
controversy among the ancients whether the tion." In answering this question he opposes the
"substances as well as the qualities" of the theory of the four elements to another Greek
four elements "undergo this intimate mingling" account of the constitution of matter the
from which results "the genesis and destruc- atomic theory, developed by Leucippus and
tion of all
things that come into and pass out Democritus, and expounded for us Lucretius' m
of being." poem On the Nature of Things.
Aristotle, in his treatise On Generation and
Corruption, enumerates the various senses in ACCORDING TO the Greek atomists, matter is
which the physicist considers elements. "We not infinitely divisible. "If nature had set no
have to recognize three 'originative sources* limit to the breaking of things," Lucretius
(or elements)," he writes: "firstly, that which writes, "by this time the bodies of matter could
is potentially perceptible body; secondly, the have been so far reduced ... that nothing
contrarieties (e.g., heat and cold); and thirdly, could within a fixed time be conceived out of
Fire, Water, and the like." The "potentially them and reach its utmost growth of being."
perceptible body" is identified with prime mat- There must then be "a fixed limit to their
ter, and, since this "has no separate existence, breaking" a limit in physical division which
but isalways bound up with a contrariety," ultimately reaches units of matter that are ab-
it can be ruled out from the usual notion solutely indivisible. Lucretius calls them "first
of element. The elementary qualities, the beginnings ... of solid singleness, . . . not com-
"contrarieties" named secondly, arc the hot pounded out of a union of parts, but, rather,
and cold and dry and moist. The so-called strong in everlasting singleness" the "seeds of
elements, Fire, Air, Water, and Earth, are left things," or atoms. The Greek word from which
to the last, and are mentioned "only thirdly," "atom" comes literally means uncuttable.
Aristotle says, because they "change into one From this it is evident that Aristotle can
another . . . whereas the contrarieties do not deny the existence of atoms while at the same
change." time he affirms the existence of elementary
The elementary qualities "attach them- bodies. The elements, unlike the atoms, are not
selves" by couples to the "apparently 'simple* conceived as indivisible in quantity, but only
bodies." In consequence, Aristotle writes, "Fire as incapable of division into diverse kinds of
is hot and dry, whereas Air is hot and moist . . . matter.
and Water is cold and moist, while Earth is In the Greek conception of atom and ele-
cold and dry." Each of them, however, "is ment, the difference between them lies in this
characterized par excellence by a single quality." distinction between quantitative and
qualita-
CHAPTER 21 .-ELEMENT 403
tity of matter. Itcannot be broken into quan- against or battling with "the elements."
titative parts. The elementary body is not
atomic. It is always capable of division into "It WILL NO DOUBT be a matter of surprise,"
smaller units, but all of these units must be of Lavoisier writes in the Preface to his Elements
the same kind as the elementary body under- of Chemistry, "that in a treatise upon the ele-
going division. ments of chemistry, there should be no chapter
The element is indivisible
only in the sense on the constituent and elementary parts of
that cannot be decomposed into other fy.nds
it matter; but I shall take occasion, in this place,
of matter, as a mixed body can be decom- to remark that the fondness for reducing all the
posed into its diverse elements. The atom can- bodies in nature to three or four elements,
not be divided in any way. Only compound proceeds from a prejudice which has descend-
bodies can be divided into their constituent ed to us from the Greek philosophers. The
atoms, all of which are alike in kind, differing notion of four elements, which, by the variety
only quantitatively in size, shape, or weight. of their proportions, compose all the known
Different kinds of matter occur only on the substances in nature, is a mere hypothesis,
level of compounds and as the result of diverse assumed long before the principles of ex-
first
another; or, more strictly, according to combi- admit, as elements, all the substances into which
nations of elementary sensible qualities hot we are capable, by any means, to reduce bodies
and cold, moist and dry. By virtue of the quali- by decomposition." His quarrel with the an-
tiespeculiar to them, the four elements stand two points. The first is
cients chiefly concerns
in a certain order to one another. Water and on the number of the elements, which he thinks
air,according to Plato, are "in the mean be- experiment has shown to be much greater than
tween fire and earth" and have "the same pro- the four of classical theory. The second is on
portion so far as possible; as fire is to air so is the simplicity of the experimentally discovered
air to water, and as air is to water so is water to elements. They can be called atoms or simple
earth." The quality which two of the elements bodies only if we do not thereby imply that we
have in common
provides the mean. Thus fire know them to be absolutely indivisible either
and air are joined by the common quality of qualitatively or quantitatively. are not en- We
hot; air and water by moist; and water and titled "to affirm that these substances we con-
sponding to fire is 'such-as-fire,' not fire; that The classification of atoms is both quantitative
which corresponds to air is 'such-as-air,' and so and qualitative qualitative in the sense that
on with the rest of them." Thus the four ele- the atoms of different elementary kinds of mat-
ments are only analogous to, for they are purer ter differ in their active properties.
than, ordinary earth, air, fire, and water; yet According to the ancient meaning of the
their names continued to be used as symbols terms, the molecule would seem to be both a
for the true elements, a connotation which is mixture and a compound mixed, in that it can
404 THE GREAT IDEAS
be broken up into other fynds of matter; corn- atomic change; the meaning of "element" has
found, in that it can be divided into smaller moved equally far from its original sense.
units of matter. But in modern theory the
meanings of "compound" and "mixture" have Do THESE ALTERED meanings change the basic
molecule being classified as a
also changed, the issues m the philosophy of nature? Are these
compound rather than a mixture. The combi- issues resolved or rendered meaningless by ex-
nation of the elements to form molecular com- perimental science?
pounds is determined by the proportion of The central point in the theory of elements
their weights or valences rather than by a fu- is an irreducible qualitative diversity in kinds
sion of their qualities. of matter. The elements of modern chemistry
The most radical change in theory is not may no longer be elementary types of matter in
this, however; nor is it the increase in the num- the strict sense of the word; but the kind of dif-
ber of the elements from four to more than ference which would be strictly elemental may
ninety-four; nor the ordering of the elements be found in the distinction of the positive, the
by reference to their atomic weights rather negative, and the neutral with respect to the
than ,by the contrariety of their qualities. It electrical charge of sub-atomic particles.
results from the discovery that an atom is not Similarly, the central point in atomism as a
ttncuttable and that new elements can be pro- philosophy of nature is the existence of ab-
duced by atomic fission. Faraday's experimen- solutely indivisible units or quanta of matter;
tal work in iom^ation and in electro-chemical in other words, the denial that matter is in-
decomposition lies at the beginning of the finitely divisible, that any particle, no matter
physical researches winch have penetrated the how small, capable of being broken into
is
interior structure of the atom and isolated smaller parts. The strict conception of the
smaller units of matter. Even before atoms atom is, therefore, not invalidated by the ex-
were experimentally exploded, analysis had pic- perimental discovery that the particles called
tured them as constituted by positive and neg- "atoms" are not atomic, that they are them-
ative charges. selves complex structures of moving
particles,
As the result of his researches, Faraday, for and that they can be physically divided.
example, conceives of atoms as "mere centres It makes no difference to the
philosophical
of forces or powers, not particles of matter, in atomist whether the particles which constitute
which the powers themselves reside." The atom molecules or the particles the electrons and
thus ceases to be "a little unchangeable, im- protons, the neutrons and mesons which con-
penetrable piece of matter," and "consists of stitute"atoms," are atomic. Even if further ex-
the powers" it exercises. What was ordinarily perimental work should succeed in dividing
referred to "under the term shape' becomes these "sub-atomic" particles, the
question
the "disposition and relative intensity of the could still be asked: Is matter infinitely divisi-
forces" that are observed. ble, regardless of our actual power to continue
With Faraday it is evident that the meaning making ad infimtuml Since the ques-
divisions
of "atom" has departed far from the sense in tion, when
thus formulated, cannot be put to
which Lucretius speaks of "units of solid single- experimental test, the issue concerning atoms
ness" or Newton of "solid, massy, hard, im- would remain.
penetrable, movable particles . . .
incompara- That issue would not refer to any particle of
bly harder than any porous bodies compounded matter defined at a certain stage of physical
of them; even so very hard as never to wear or
analysis or experimental discovery. It would
break in pieces; no ordinary power being able consist in the opposition of two views of the
to divide what God himself made one in the nature of matter and the constitution of the ma-
first creation." With
the conception of the ele- terial universe: the affirmation, on the one
ments as different kinds of atoms; then, with hand, that truly atomic particles must exist;
the discovery of radio-active elements under- and the denial, on the other, that no particle
going slow disintegration; finally, with the pro- of matter can be atomic.The affirmative argu-
duction of isotopes and new element through ments of Lucretius and Newton make the con-
CHAPTER 21: ELEMENT 405
negative arguments of Aristotle and Descartes velocities into one, their perfect union for a
proceed from the divisibility of whatever is time, and final separation into the constituent
continuous to the conclusion that any unit of waves." Such a view of the constitution of mat-
matter must have parts. ter, Faraday writes, leads to "the conclusion
The philosophical doctrine of atomism, in the that matter fills all
space, or at least all space to
form in which Lucretius adopts it from Epicu- which gravitation extends."
rus, insists upon void as the other basic princi- The very continuity the voidlessness or
ple of the universe. "Nature," he writes, "is lack of pores which the opponents of atom-
founded on two things: there are bodies and ism insist is the source of matter's infinite divis-
there is void in which these bodies are placed ibility, the atomists seem to give as the reason
and through which they move about." Com- why the ultimate particles are without parts,
pound bodies are divisible because the atoms of hence simple, solid, and indivisible.
particles which arc composed of matter en- anything immaterial; nor do all insist
reality to
tirely without void. In Newton's language that whatever exists is either an atom or made
hardness must be "reckoned the property of all up of atoms and void. In the tradition of the
uncompounded for
"compound
matter," if great books, the extreme doctrine is found in
bodies are so very hard as we find some of them Lucretius alone. Though it is shared by Hobbes,
to be, and yet are very porous," how much and is reflected in the Leviathan, it is not ex-
harder must be "simple particles which are pounded there. It is
developed in his treatise
void of pores." Concei nmg Body.
The opponents of atomism tend to deny the For Lucretius, the atoms are eternal as well
well. Descartes, for example, denies that there all other things are themselves without be-
can be "any atoms or parts of matter which are ginning. "In time gone by," Lucretius writes,
indivisible of their own nature. For how- . . .
"they moved in the same way in which now
ever small the parts are supposed to be, yet they move, and will ever hereafter be borne
because they are necessarily extended we are along in like manner" through an endless suc-
always able in thought to divide any one of cession of worlds, each of which comes to be
them into two or more parts." For the same thiough a concourse of atoms, each in turn
reason, he maintains, there cannot be "a space perishing as with decay that concourse is dis-
in which there is no substance . . . because the solved. Newton writes in what seems to be a
extension of space or internal place is not dif- contrary vein. "It seems probable to me," he
ferent from that of body." The physical world, says, "that God in the beginning formed mat-
on this view, is conceived as what the ancients ter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, mova-
called a plenum, continuously filled with mat- ble particles." "All material things," he contin-
ter. This controversy over void and plenum is ues, "seem to have been composed of the hard
elaborated in the chapter on SPACE. and above mentioned, variously
solid particles
solutely hard, are "highly elastic," and they are does not and there seems to be some evidence
406 THE GREAT IDEAS
in the Optics that he would notreduce the smells of bodies." Furthermore, the distinction
soul of man to a flow of extremely mobile which is here implicit between primary and
atoms, or attempt to account for all psycho- secondary sense qualities is not peculiar to
logical phenomena (thought as well as sen- atomism. It can also be found in a critic of
tides," he writes, "affecting the several organs atomist himself relies for his knowledge of na-
of our senses, produce in us those different sen- ture in terms of the properties and motions of
sations which we have from the colours and particles themselves imperceptible.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The concept of element 407
3. The theory of the elements in natural philosophy, physics, and chemistry 408
5^. Arguments for and against the existence of atoms: the issue concerning the
infinite divisibility of matter
5</.
The number, variety, and properties of atoms: the production of sensible things
by their collocation 411
5/".
The atomic constitution of mind and soul: its bearing on immortality
5^. The atomistic account of the origin and decay of the world, its evolution and
order 412
CHAPTER 21 : ELEMENT 407
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS. When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in53 JAMES Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
.
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends m the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and Tower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halvesof thenght-handsidcof
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in thekwerhalf
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES- The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
345d-347b; Q 91, A i, ANS and REP 3 484a-485b 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREP, 3d-4a
408 THE GREAT IDEAS 3to3c
b
634a; CH 5 [409 18-4 11*7] 639c-641a; BK in,
3. The theory of the elements in natural phi- CH i [424 b 2o~425 a i3] 656b,d-657a / Sense and
losophy, physics, and chemistry the Sensible, CH 2-5 674a-683b passim
7 PLATO: PW0,240d-242b/ Timaeus, ^Sb-d; 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK n, CH i
a b a
455c-462b / Philebus, 618c-619a / Laws, BK x, [646 i2- 2o] 170a-d; CH 2 [648 2o]-cH 3
b
760a-761d [649 22] 172c-174b / Generation of Animals,
a
8 ARISTOTLE. Physics, BK i, CH r [i84 io]-cH 2 BK CH ii [76^7-24] 302c-d
in,
b GALEN- Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 2-3, 167d-
[i84 2|] 259a-c; CH 4-9 262a-268d / Heavens, 10
BK in -iv 389b,d-405a,c / Generation and Cor- 169a, CH 6 169c-170c; BK n, CH 4, 186d-187a;
ruption 409a-441a,c csp BK 11, CH 1-3 428b,d- CH 8, 193b-d
431a / Meteorology 445a-494d 11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK n, 829a
10 GALPN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 2-3 167 b- 12 LUCRETIUS' Nature of Things, BK i [705-715]
169a; CH 6 169c-170c; BK n, CH 4, 186d-187b 9d; [763-788] lOb-c
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i
[635-920] 12 EPICIETUS. Discourses, BK in, CH 13, 188d-
8d-12b 189a
17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR i, CH i, 35a 13 VIRGIL. Aeneid, BK vi [724-731] 230b
20 AQUINAS. Summa Theohgica, PART i-n, Q 49, 17 PLOTINUS Second Ennead, TR i, CH 3 36b-d;
A 4, ANS 5a-6a; PART in SUPPL, Q 74 925b- CH 6 7 37d-39c / Fourth Ennead, TR vn, CH 2
935a,c passim; Q 91, A 4 1022d-1023d; A 5, 192a-b / Sixth Ennead, TR in, CH 9, 285d-
ANS and REP 4 1024a-1025b 286a, TR VH, CH ii 326d-327d
28 GILBERT* Loadstone, BK HI, 60c-d 18 AUGUSIINE: City of God, BK VIH, CH 2 265b-
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry la-159d 266a
passim 19 AQUINAS: Summa Thcologica, PART i, Q 66,
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 383b-386c A I, CONTRARY and REP tO CONTRARY 343d-
53 JAMES. Psychology, 876a 345c; A 2 345d 347b; Q 71, A i, REP 2 367a-
368b, Q 91, A i, ANS and REP 3 484a-485b;
3*. Element and atom: qualitative and quanti- Q 115, A 3, REP 2 588c-589c
tative indivisibility 20 AQUINAS' Summa Thcologica, P\RT in SUPPL,
8 ARISTOTLE: BK i, CH 2 [i84 b i5~22]
Physics, Q 74 925b-935a,c passim, csp A 5 929d-931b;
259b c / Heavens, BK HI, en 4 [303*3]-^ 5 Q 79, A i, REP 4 951b-953b, Q 91, A 4 1022d-
b b
(304 23J 394b-396a; CH 7 [305^7 3o6 2] 1023d
H
397a-d; BK iv, en 2 [308^29-$ IO I 3] 400b- 28 Gn BERT: Loadstone, BK i, 13b-d; BK in,
401c / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 4 [9^5^-191 60c-d
b
503c-d, BK v, CH 3 [ioi4 }-6] 534d, CH 25 28HARVLY: On Animal Generation, 491a-b;
b
545b-c/So/, BKI, CH2 [4o$ 28-404 5]633a-b
ll
496a-c
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK [599-920] i 30 BACON. Novum Organum, BK i, APH 45 llOb;
8b 12b esp [705-920] 9c-12b APH 66, 114d-115a; BK ii, APH 40, 171a-173a
17 PLOTINUS. Third Ennead, TR i, CH 3 79b-c 32 MILTON- Paradise Lost, BK in [708-721] 150b-
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK i, APH 45 HOb; 151a
APH 66, 114d-115a 45 LAVOISIER. Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 3b-4a;
42 KANT. Pure Reason, 161d-163a PARI i, 29d-33b; PART ii, 53a-55a, 57c-65a,c
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREP, 3b- 45 FARADAY Researches in Electricity, 383b-386c
4a; PART in, 87c-d; 103b-c; 105d 51 TOLSTOY* War and Peace, BK vi, 248d-249a
3^. The enumeration of the elements: their 3c. The mutability of the elements: their trans-
properties and order mutation
7 PLATO: Cratylus, 98d / Phaedo, 247b-248c / 7 PLATO: Timaeus, 456b-c; 458d-460b
Timaeus, 448b-d; 458b-460b / Philebus, 618c- 8 ARISTOTLE. Heavens, BK i, CH 3 360d-362a;
619a / Laws, BK x, 760a-761d BK in, CH i [298*24-299*1] 389b,d-390b, CH
b
8 ARISTOTLE. Physics, BK in, CH 5 [204 io-205
a
2 [3oi b 33~302 a 9] 393b; CH 6 [304 b 23)-cH 8
b b
6] 282c-283a; BK iv, CH i [2o8 8-22] 287b / [3o6 29] 396a-398a / Generation and Corrup-
b b
Heavens, BK i, CH 1-8 359a-369a; CH 9 [278 tion, BK i, CH i 409a-410c; CH 6 [322 i-2i]
A 367a-368b; Q 76, A
i 4, REP 4 393a-394c; lla; BK n [688-699] 23d
Q 91, A i 484a-485b 16 KEPLER: Harmonies ofthe World, 1016b-1017a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 2, 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xix, CH 16, 522a
A i, ANS 710a-711c; PART in SUPPL, Q 74, A i, 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 119,
REP 3 925c-926c; A 4, ANS 928d-929d; A 5 A i, REP 3 604c-607b
929d-931b; Q 79, A i, REP 4 95lb-953b; Q 80, 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART ii-n, Q
A 3, REP 3 958b-959c; Q 82, A i, ANS 968a- 179, A 2, REP 2 607a-c; PART in SUPPL, Q 80,
970c; Q 91, A 5 1024a-1025b A 3 958b-959c
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, vii [121- 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK in,
148] 116b-c 138a-d
410 THE GREAT IDEAS 5/05*
(4. The discovery of elements in other arts and 5a. The conception of atomic bodies: imper-
sciences.) ceptible, indestructible, and indivisible
28 HARVEY: Circulation of the Blood, 316d / On 8 ARISTOTLE: Generation and Corruption, BK i,
Animal Generation, 429c-438c csp 432d-433b; CH i [314*22-24] 409b-c / Metaphysics, BK vn,
488d-496d esp 490d-491c, 494a-b CH 13 [1039*2-11] 562d
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 52b d; 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 12 172d-
76d-77c cn6l88c-191a
173c, BKII,
31 DESCARTES: Rules, vi, 8b-9a; vin, 14b-c; 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i
(146-328)
xn, 21b-24c / Discourse, PART vi, 62a / Ob- 2d-5a; [483-634] 7a-8d
jections and Replies, 128a-129a 17 PLOTINUS. Second Ennead, TR iv, CH 7, 52c
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH 11, 34 NEWTON: BK i, PROP 73, SCHOL
Principles,
SECT 1-2 127d-128b; CH vn, SECT 10 133a-b; 133b-134a; BK HI, RULE in 270b-271a / Op-
CH xn, SECT 1-2 147b-d; SECT 8 148c-d; CH tics, BK in, 537a-b; 541b; 543a
xv, SECT 9 164b-d; CH xvi, SECT i 165c-d; 35 LOCKE. Human Understanding, BK iv, CH HI,
CH xxi, SECT 75 200b-d; BK HI, CH iv, SECT SECT 25 321a-b
15-16 263a-c 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 386c-d;
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 20b-23b esp 850b,d-855a,c
20b-21c, 22b-c 53 JAMES. Psychology, 68a
46 HKGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART HI, par 341
HOc 56. Arguments for and against the existence of
atoms: the issue concerning the infinite
50 MARX: Capital, 6b-c; 19c-26d passim,esp
25d-26d; 62a; 85d-88d divisibility of matter
20b-22a, esp 85d,
88c 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BKHI, CH 6-7 284b-286c
51 TOLSTOY: War and BK xi, 469a-470c;
Peace, / Heavens, BK in, CH 6 [3Q4 b 23-305 a io]
b
BK xiv, 589c-590c; EPILOGUE n, 694d-695c 396a-b; BK iv, CH 4 [3ii*3o- i] 402d-403a /
53 JAMES: Psychology, xiiib; 18b-19b; 116b-117a; Generation and Corruption, BK i, CH 2 [3i5b25~
a
126a; 150a 3i7 i7J 411b-413a; cn8 423b-425d / Sense and
54 FREUD- War and Death, 758a the Sensible, CH 6 [445 b 4~4 46*20] 683b-684c
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [146-328]
5. The theory of atomism: critiques of atom- 2d-5a; [483-920] 7a-12b, BK n [62-141] 15d-
ism 16d
7 PLAIO. Sophist, 567a-568a 12 AURELIUS- Meditations, BK x, SECT 6 297a-b
8 ARISTOTLE- Physics, BK i, CH 2 [i84b i5~22] 17 PLOTINUS- Second Ennead, TR iv, CH 7
b
259b-c / Heavens, BK i, CH 7 [275 3o~276*i8] 52a-c / Third Ennead, IR i, CH 3 79b-c /
b Fourth Ennead, TR n, CH i, 139d
367a-b; BK in, CH 4 [303*3- 8] 394b-d; BK
iv, CH 2 [3o8 b 29~3io*i4] 400b-401c / Genera- 19 AQUINAS- Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 7,
tion and Corruption, BK i, CH 2 410d-413c; A 3, REP 3 32c-33c, A 4, ANS 33d-34c
CH 8 [325 a23-b ii] 423d-424b / Metaphysics, 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 139c-
BK i, CH 4 [985^-19] 503c-d 141d, 147d-148b; 151d-153a
10 GALEN: Natural Vacuities, BK i, CH 12-14 30 BACON. Novum Organum, BK i, APH 66, 115c
172d-179d; BK n, CH 6 188c-191a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 15, SCHOL
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things la-97a,c 360b-361d
12 AURELIUS. Meditations, BK iv, SECT 3, 263b-c; 34 NEWTON. Principles, BK HI, RULE in 270b-
BK ix, SECT 39 295a; BK x, SECT 6 297a-b 271a / Optics, BK ii, 478b-485b; BK in, 537a-
17 PLOIINUS: Second Ennead, TR iv, CH 7, 52c / 541 b esp 541 b
Third Ennead, TR i, CH 2, 78d; CH 3 79b-c / 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK 11, CH
Fourth Ennead, TR vn, CH 2-4 192a-193c xvn, SECT 12 170d; CH xxix, SECT 16 237b-
19 AQUINAS- Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 115, 238a; BK iv, CH x, SECT 10, 351c~352a
A i, ANS and REP 3,5 585d-587c 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 47
25 MONTAIGNE Essays, 263a 421c-422a
28 HARVLY: On Animal Generation, 355b-d; 42 KANT. Pure Reason, 131c; 137a-140c; 152d;
495c-496d 161d-163a
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 8 140b 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 103d
34 NEWT ON: Principles, BK in, RULE in 270b- 45 LAVOISIER. Elements of Chemistry, PART i,
27la / Optics, BK in, 531b-542a 9a-d
35 LOCKE* Human Understanding, BK iv, CH HI, 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 386c-d;
SECT 25-26 321a-c 850b,d-855a,c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 161d-163a
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 850b,d- 5c. Atoms and the void as the ultimate con*
stituents of reality
85Sa,c
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK xi, 7 PLATO: Sophist, 567a-b
34 Id 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK i, CH 5 [188*18-23]
53 JAMES: Psychology, 876a; 882a-884b 263c; BK iv, CH 6-9 292c-297c / Heavens, BK
5d to 5g CHAPTER 21: ELEMENT 411
b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART
i, CH 7 [275 3o-276*i8] 367a-b; CH 9 [279*12- i, Q 84, A
18] 370b-c; BK in, CH 6 [305*14-22] 396b-c; 6, ANS 447c-449a
BK iv, CH 2 [3o8 b 29~3 10*14] 400b-401c; CH 5 34 NEWTON: Optics, BK in, 518b-519b; 522a
b 404b-d / Generation and Cor- 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK HI, CH
[3i2 2o-3i3*i4]
ruption,BK i, CH 8 423b-425d / Metaphysics, iv, SECT 10 261b-d; BK iv, CH x, SECT 5
BK CH 4 [985 b3~i9] 503c-d; BK iv, CH 5
i, 350a-b
[1009*22-37] 528d; BK vu, CH 13 [1039*2-11] 53 JAMES: Psychology, 98a-117b esp 98b-103b,
562d 115a
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 12, 173a;
BK n, CH 6 188c-191a esp 189a-b 5/. The atomic constitution of mind and soul:
(5. The theory o/ atomism: critiques of atomism.) 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK vi, SECT 10
274b-c
5 A. Th
atomistic account of the origin and de- 17 P LO TINUS Third Ennead, TR i, CH 3 79b-c
.
cay of the world, its evolution and order 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologies PART i, Q 47, A
12 LUCRFHUS: Nature of Things, BK i [1008- i, ANS 256a-257b; A 3, ANS 258c-259a
1037] 13c-d; BK ii
[1023-1174! 28a~30a,c; BK 34 NEWTON: Optics, BK in, 541b
v [55-508] 61d-67c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 95b
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The discussion of the ideas most closely associated with element, see CAUSE; PRINCIPLE.
Matters relevant to the conception of elements or atoms as simple parts of a whole, see
,
ONE AND MANY ab-2c; and for another discussion of the distinction between elements
or atoms and compounds or mixtures, see CHANGE 93; MATTER 2.
The problem of the transmutation of the elements, see CHANGE loa.
The issue concerning the divisibility of matter and the existence of a void, see INFINITY
4b; ONE AND MANY 33(3); SPACE 2b(i)-2b(3); and for the question of the number of
the elements or of the atoms, see INFINITY 5-5 b; QUANTITY 7.
. Other considerations of atomistic materialism, see MATTFR 33, 6; MECHANICS 4c; MIND 2e;
SOUL 3d; WORLD ib, 4c.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
r
,\ Listed below are works not included in Great Books ofthe Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date,place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
JOHN OF SMNT THOMAS. Cursus Philosophicus Tho- JEANS. The Universe Around Us, CH 2
misticus, Philosophia Naturaks, PART in, Q 10 C. G. DARWIN. The New Conceptions of Matter
BOYLE. The Sceptical Chymtst SODDY. The Interpretation of the Atom
LEIBNITZ. New Essays Concerning Human Under- STRANATHAN. The "Particles" of Modern Physics
standing, APPENDIX, CH 3 SMYTH. Atomic Energyfor Military Purposes
T*-i Monadology, par 1-9 GAMOW. Atomic Energy in Cosmic and Human
VOLTAIRE. "Atoms," m A Philosophical Dictionary Life
DALTON", A New System of Chemical Philosophy ANDRADB. The Atom and Its
Energy
WHEWBLL. The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Atom
HfecHT, Explaining the
VOL i, BK vi G. THOMSON. The Atom
Chapter 11: EMOTION
INTRODUCTION
emotions claim our attention in two psychoanalyst to the extent that it is medical
THE ways. We experience them, sometimes in or therapeutic has a strong practical bent.
amanner which overwhelms us; and we analyze In the great works of poetry and history no
them by defining and classifying the several similar shift takes place as one goes from Homer
passions, and by studying their role in human and Virgil to Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, from
life and society. We seldom do both at once, Greek to Shakespearean tragedy, from Plu-
for analysis requires emotional detachment, and tarch and Tacitus to Gibbon. What Words-
moments of passion do not permit study or worth said of the lyric poem that it is "emo-
reflection. tion recollected in tranquillity" may not ap-
With regard to the emotions the great books ply to the narratives in an identical sense. Yet
are similarly divided into two sorts those they too re-enact the passions in all their vi-
which are theoretical discussions and those tality. Their pages are filled with the emotions
which concretely describe the passions of par- of men in conflict with one another or suffering
ticular men, exhibit their vigor, and induce conflict within themselves.
in us a vicarious experience. Books of the This is no less true of historical narrative than
first sort are scientific, philosophical, or theo- of fiction. The memorable actions of men on
logical treatises. Books of the second sort are the stage of history did not occur in calm and
the great epic and dramatic poems, the novels quiet. We would certainly not remember them
and plays, the literature of biography and as well if the historian failed to re-create for us
they do fight and encounter one with an- which pervade a life even during moments of
other; and other like particularities." emotional detachment and calm and pleasure
and pain may color all the emotions. "Pleasure
FOUR WORDS "passion," "affection" or "af- and pain," Locke suggests, are "the hinges on
fect," and "emotion"have been traditionally which our passions turn." Even though they
used to designate the same psychological fact. may not be passions in the strict sense, they
Of these, "affection" and "affect" have ceased are obviously closely connected with them.
to be generally current, although we do find
restricted to mean one of the emotions, or the upsetting the normal course of the body's func-
more violent aspect of any emotional experi- tioning, is sometimes thought to be a modern
ence. But if we are to connect discussions col- discovery, connected with the James-Lange
lected from widely separated centuries, we theory that the emotional experience is nothing
must be able to use all these words inter- but the "feeling of ... the bodily changes"
fieryand the pupils contracted; in modesty the This fact about the emotions was known to
cheeks are suffused with blushes; in fear, and antiquity and the Middle Ages. Aristotle, for
under a sense of infamy and of shame, -the face example, holds that mere awareness of an ob-
is
pale" and "in lust how quickly is the member ject does not induce flight unless "the heart is
distended with blood and erected!" moved," and Aquinas declares that "passion is
beat and breathing, changes in the condition apparatus and techniques been devised for re-
of the skin and other Though some de-
tissues. cording and, in some cases, measuring the phys-
gree of bodily disturbance would seem taJbe an accompanying experimentally
iological changes
emotional experience,
essential ingredient in all produced emotionsin both animals and men.
the intensity and extent of the physiological Modern theory also tries to throw some light
reverberation, or bodily commotion, is riot the on these organic changes by pointing out their
same or equal in all the emotions. Some emo- adaptive utility in the struggle for existence.
tions are much more violent than others. This This type of explanation is advanced by Dar-
leads William James to distinguish what he calls win in The Expression of Emotions in Man
the "coarser emotions ... in which every one and Animals, and is adopted by other evolu-
recognizes a strong organic reverberation" from tionists. "The snarl or sneer, the one-sided un-
the "subtler emotions" in which the "organic covering of the upper teeth," James writes, "is
*
reverberation is less obvious and strong.*' accounted for by Darwin as a survival from the
This fact is sometimes used to draw the line time when our ancestors had large canines, and
between what are truly emotions and what are unfleshed them (as dogs now do) for at tack. . . .
22: EMOTION 415
The distention of the nostrils in anger is inter- disagreeable things only as affecting the sense"
preted by Spencer as an echo of the way in that is, the exterior senses "there would be
which our ancestors had to breathe when, dur- no need to suppose," Aquinas writes, "that an
ing combat, their 'mouth was filled up by a part animal has a power besides' the apprehension of
of the antagonist's body that had been seized* those forms which the senses perceive, and in
. . . The which the animal takes pleasure, or from which
redding of the face and neck is called
by Wundt a compensatory arrangement for it shrinks with horror." But animals need to
relieving the brain 'of the blood-pressure which seek or avoid certain things on account of their
the simultaneous excitement of the heart advantages or disadvantages, and such emo-
brings with it. The effusion of tears
explained is tional reactions of approach or avoidance re-
both by this author and by Darwin to be a quire, in his opinion, a sense of the useful and
blood-withdrawing agency of a similar sort." the dangerous, which is innate rather than
Reviewing statements of this sort, fames is learned. The estimative power thus seems to
willing to concede that "some movements of play a role which later writers assign to instinct.
expression can be accounted for as weakened The relation of instinct to the emotions and to
repetitions of movements which formerly (when fundamental biological needs is further con-
they were stronger) were of utility to the sub- from other points of view, in the chap-
sidered,
ject" \ but though we may thus "see the reason ters on DESIRE and HABIT.
for afew emotional reactions," he thinks
"others remain for which no plausible reason LIKE DESIRE, emotion is neither knowledge
can even be conceived." The latter, James sug- nor action, but something intermediate be-
gests, "may be reactions which are purely me- tween the one and the other. The various pas-
chanical results of the way in which our nervous sions are usually aroused by objects perceived,
centres are framed, reactions which, although imagined, or remembered, and once aroused
permanent in us now, may be called accidental they in turn originate impulses to act in certain
as far as their origin goes." ways. For example, fear arises with the percep-
Whether or not changes which
all the bodily tion of a threatening danger or with the imagi-
occur in such emotions as anger or fear serve nation of some fancied peril. The thing feared
the purpose of increasing the animal's efficiency is somehow recognized as capable of inflicting
in combat or flight as, for example, the in- injury with consequent pain. The thing feared
crease of sugar in the bloodand the greater sup- is
something from which one naturally
also
ply of blood to arms and legs seem to do the tends to flee in order to avoid harm. Once the
basic emotions are generally thought to be con- danger is known and until it is avoided by
nected with the instinctively determined pat- flight or in some other way, the characteristic
terns of behavior by which animals struggle to feeling of fear pervades the whole experience.
survive. "The actions we call instinctive," It is partly a result of what is known and what
fames writes, "are expressions or manifestations isdone, and partly the cause of how things
of the emotions'^ or, as other writers suggest, seem and how one behaves.
an emotion, whether in outward expression or Analytically isolated from its causes and ef-
in inner experience, is the central phase of an fects, the emotion itself seems to be the feeling
instinct in operation. rather than the knowing or the doing. But it
The observation of the close relation between is not simply an awareness of a certain bodily
instinct and emotion does not belong exclu- condition. It also involves the felt impulse to
sively to modern, or post-Darwinian, thought. do something about the object of the passion.
The ancients also recognize it, though in differ- Those writers who, like Aquinas, identify
ent terms. Following Aristotle's analysis of the emotion with the impulse by which "the soul
various "interior senses,'/ Aquinas, for example, is drawn to a thing," define the several passions
speaks of the ''estimative power" by which ani- as specifically different acts of appetite or de-
mals seem to be innately prepared to react to <sire^$pecific tendencies to action. Aquinas, for
things useful or harmful. instance, adopts the definition given by Dam-
:
"If an animal were moved by pleasing and ascene: "Passion is a movement of the sensi-
416 THE GREAT IDEAS
live appetite when we imagine good or evil." are common to men and animals and that they
Other writers who, like Spinoza, find that arc more closely related to instinct than to
"the order of the actions and passions of our reason or intelligence. Darwin presents many
body is coincident in nature with the order of instances which, he claims, prove that "the
the actions and passions of the mind," stress the senses and intuitions, the various emotions and
cognitive rather than the impulsive aspect of faculties, such as love, memory, attention, cu-
emotion. They accordingly define the passions riosity, imitation, reason, etc., of which man
in terms of the characteristic feelings, pleasant boasts, may be found in an incipient, or even
and unpleasant, which flow from the estima- sometimes in a well-developed, condition in
tion of certain objects as beneficial or harmful. the lower animals." Where Darwin remarks
Spinoza goes furthest in this direction when he upon "the fewness and the comparative sim-
says that "an affect or passion of the mind plicity of the instincts in the higher animals
is a . . .
confused idea . . .
by which the mind affirms of in contrast with those of the lower animals,"
its
body, or any part of it, a greater or less power James takes the position that man "is the ani-
of existence than before."
mal richest in instinctive impulses." However
There seems to be no serious issue here, for that issue is decided, the emotions seem to be
writers of both sorts acknowledge, though with more elaborately developed in the higher ani-
different emphasis, the two sides of an emotion mals, and man's emotional life would seem to
the cognitive and the impulsive, that which be the most complex and varied of all.
faces toward the object and that which leads The question then arises whether particular
into action. On either view, the human pas- passions are identical or are only analogous
sions are regarded as part of man's animal na- when they occur in men and animals. For ex-
is human
ture. It is generally admitted that disembodied ample, anger, no matter how closely
spirits, if such exist, cannot have emotions. The it resembles brute rage in its physiology and
angels, Augustine writes, "feel no anger while impulses, nevertheless peculiarly human? Do
they punish those whom the eternal law of God men alone experience righteous indignation be-
cause of some admixture in them of reason and
consigns to punishment, no fellow-feeling with
misery while they relieve the miserable, no fear passion? When similar questions are asked
while they aid those who are in danger." When about the sexual passions of men and animals,
we do ascribe emotions to spirits, it is,
Augus- the answers will determine the view one takes
tine claims, because, "though they have none of of the characteristically human aspects of love
our weakness, their acts resemble the actions to and hate. It may even be asked whether hate,
which these emotions move us." as men suffer it, is ever experienced by brutes,
In connection with the objects which arouse or whether certain passions, such as hope and
them, the emotions necessarily depend upon despair, are known to brutes at all?
the senses and the imagination; and their per-
turbations and impulses require bodily organs IN THE TRADITIONAL theory of the emotions,
That is why, as indicated in the
for expression. the chief problem, after the definition of emo-
chapter on DESIRE, some writers separate the tion, the classification or grouping of the pas-
is
passions from acts of the will, as belonging to and the ordering of particular passions.
sions,
the sensitive or animal appetite rather than to The vocabulary of common speech in all ages
the rational or specifically human appetite. and cultures includes a large number of words
Even those writers who do not place so high an for naming emotions, and it has been the task of
estimate on the role of reason, refer the emo- analysts to decide which of these words desig-
tions to the animal aspect of human behavior, nate distinct affects or affections. The precise
or to what is sometimes called "man's lower character of the object and the direction of the
nature." When this phrase is used, it usually impulse have been, for the most part, the cri-
signifies the passions as
opposed to the reason, teria of definition. As previously noted, it is
not the purely vegetative functions which man but recently that the experimental observation
shares with plants as well as animals. of bodily changes has contributed to the differ-
There seems to be no doubt that emotions entiation of emotions from one another.
CHAPTER 22: EMOTION 417
Spinoza offers the longest listing of the pas- simply" (i.e., love, hate, desire, aversion, joy,
sions. For him, the emotions, which are all sorrow), and the "irascible," which "regard good
"compounded of the three primary affects, de- or evil as arduous through being difficult to
sire, joy, and sorrow," develop into the follow- obtain or avoid" (i.e., fear, daring, hope, de-
humility, repentance, pride, despondency, self- evil ... or according to approach and with-
exaltation, shame, regret, emulation, gratitude, drawal." Anger seems to be the only passion
benevolence, anger, vengeance, ferocity, au- for which no opposite can be given, other than
dacity, consternation, courtesy, ambition, lux- that "cessation from its movement" which
uriousness, drunkenness, avarice, lust. Aristotle calls "calmness" and which Aquinas
Many of the foregoing are, for Hobbes, de- says is an opposite not by way of "contrariety
rived from what he calls "the simple passions/* but of negation or privation."
which include "appetite, desire, love, aversion, Using these distinctions, Aquinas also de-
hate, joy, and grief." There are more emotions scribes the order in which
one passion leads to or
in Spinoza's list than either Aristotle or Locke generates another, beginning with love and
or James mentions, but none which they in- hate, passing through hope, desire, and fear,
clude is omitted. Some of the items m
Spino- with their opposites, and, after anger, ending
za's enumeration are treated by other writers in joy or despair. On one point, all observers
as virtues and vices rather than as passions. and theorists from Plato to Freud seem to
The
passions have been classified by reference agree, namely, that love and hate lie at the root
to various criteria. As we have seen, James dis- of all the other passions and generate hope or
terms of the violence or mildness of the accom- tions of love prosper or fail. Nor is the insight
panying physiological changes; and Spinoza that even hate derives from love peculiarly
distinguishes them according as "the mind pass- modern, though Freud's theory of what he
es to a greater perfection" or "to a less perfec- calls the "ambivalence" of love and hate to-
tion." Spinoza's division would also seem to ward the same object, seems to be part of his
imply a distinction between the beneficial and own special contribution to our understanding
the harmful in the objects causing these two of the passions,
object moving." Aquinas adds still another cri- man's emotional responses seem to be subject
terion "the difficulty or struggle ... in ac- to voluntary control, so that men are able to
quiring certain goods or in avoiding certain form or change their emotional habits. If this
evils" which, in contrast to those we "can were not so, there could be no moral problem
easily acquire or avoid," makes them, there- of the regulation of the passions; nor, for that
fore, "of an arduous or difficult nature." In matter, could there be a medical problem of
these terms, he divides ail the passions into the therapy for emotional disorders. The psycho-
"concupiscible," which regard "good or evil analytic treatment of neuroses seems, more*
418 THE GREAT IDEAS
over, to assume the possibility of a voluntary, These matters are further discussed in the
or even a rational, resolution of emotional con- chapter on TEMPERANCE. But it should be
flictsnot perhaps without the aid of thera- noted here that the passions and the reason, or
peutic efforts to uncover the sources of con- the "lower" and the "higher" natures of man,
flictand to remove the barriers between re- are not always in conflict. Sometimes emotions
pressed emotion and rational decision. or emotional attitudes serve reason by support-
The
relation of the passions to the will, es- ing voluntary decisions. They reinforce and
pecially their antagonism, is relevant to the
make effective moral resolutions which might
question whether the actions of men always otherwise be too difficult to execute.
conform to their judgments of good and evil,
or right and wrong. As Socrates discusses the THE ANCIENTS DID not underestimate the force
problem of knowledge and virtue, it would of the passions, nor were they too confident of
seem to be his view that a man who knows the strength of reason in its struggle to control
what is good for him will act accordingly. Men them, or to be free of them. They were ac-
may "desire things which they imagine to be quainted with the violence of emotional excess
good/* he says, "but which in reality are
evil." which they called "madness" or "frenzy." So,
Hence their misconduct will be due to a mis- too, were the theologians of the Middle Ages
taken judgment, not to a discrepancy between and modern philosophers like Spinoza and
action and thought. Eliminating the case of Hobbes. But not until Freud and perhaps
erroneous judgment, Socrates gets Meno to also William James, though to a lesser extent-
admit that "no man wills or chooses anything do we find in the tradition of the great books
ly contradicts the observed facts." Yet he ad- language, between the ego and the id. It is
mits that whatever a man does must at least rather the repression which results from such
seem good to him at the moment', and to that conflict. On the one side is the ego, which
extent the judgment that something is good or "stands for reason and circumspection" and has
bad would seem to determine action accord- "the task of representing the external world,"
ingly. In his analysis of incontinence, Aristotle or expressing what Freud calls "the reality-
tries to explain how a man may act against what principle." Associated with the ego is the super-
is his better judgment and yet, at the moment ego "the vehicle of the ego-ideal, by which
of action, seek what he holds to be good. the ego measures itself, towards which it
Action may be caused either by a rational strives, and whose demands for ever-increasing
directions then a man may act under emo- The ego, according to Freud, is constantly
tional persuasion at one moment in a manner attempting "to mediate between the id and
contrary to his rational predilection at another. reality" and to measure up to the ideal set by
That a man may act either emotionally or the super-ego, so as to dethrone "the pleasure-
rationally, Aristotle thinks, explains how, un- principle, which exerts undisputed sway over
der strong emotional influences, a man can do the processes in the id, and substitute for it the
the very opposite of what his reason would tell reality-principle, which promises greater se-
him is
right or good. The point is that, while curity and greater success." But sometimes it
the emotions dominate his mind and action, he fails in this task. Sometimes, when no socially
does not listen to reason. acceptable channels of behavior are available
CHAPTER 22: EMOTION 419
for expressing emotional drives in action, the there a fundamental opposition between the
is
ego, supported by the super-ego, represses the medical and the moral approaches to the prob-
emotional or instinctual impulses, that is, pre- lem, whether psychotherapy is needed only
vents them from expressing themselves overtly. when morality has failed, whether morality is
Freud's great insight is that emotions re- itself partly responsible for the disorders which
pressed do not atrophy and disappear. On the psychotherapy must cure, the difference be-
contrary, their dammed-up energies accumu- tween the medical and the moral approaches is
late and, like a sore, they fester inwardly. To- clear. Medically, emotional disorders call for
gether with related ideas, memories, and wishes, diagnosis and therapy. Morally, they call for
the repressed emotions form what Freud calls criticism and correction.
a "complex," which is not only the active nu- Human bondage, according to Spinoza, con*
cleus of emotional disorder, but also the cause sists in "the impotence of man to govern or
of neurotic symptoms and behavior phobias restrain the affects ... for a man who is under
and anxieties, obsessions or compulsions, and their control is not his own master." A free man
the various physical manifestations of hysteria, he describes as one "who lives according to the
such as a blindness or a paralysis that has no dictates of reason alone," and he tries to show
organic basis. "how much reason itself can control the af-
The line between the neurotic and the nor- fects" to achieve what he calls "freedom of
mal shadowy, for repressed emotional com-
is mind or blessedness." While moralists tend to
plexes are, according to Freud, also responsible agree on this point, they do not all offer the
for the hidden or latent psychological signifi- same prescription for establishing the right re-
cance of slips of speech, forgetting, the content lation between man's higher and lower natures.
of dreams, occupational or marital choices, and The issue which arises here is also discussed
a wide variety of other phenomena usually re- in the chapters on DESIRE and DUTY. It exists
garded as accidental or as rationally deter- between those who think that the passions are
mined. In fact, Freud sometimes goes to the intrinsically evil, the natural enemies of a good
extreme of insisting that all apparently rational elements always in rebellion against
will, lawless
processes both of thought and decision are duty; and those who think that the passions
themselves emotionally determined; and that represent a natural desire for certain goods
most, or all, reasoning is nothing but the ration- which belong to the happy life, or a natural
nies that all thinking is necessarily dominated die. But if, according to the opposite doctrine,
by the passions. The sort of thinking which is the passions have a natural place in the moral
free from emotional bias or domination may life, then the aim should be, not to dispossess
result in knowledge, if reason itself is not de- them entirely, but to keep them in their place.
fective in its processes. But the sort of thinking Aristotle therefore recommends a policy of
which is directed and determined by the pas- moderation. The passions can be made to serve
sions must result in opinion. The former is reason's purposes by restraining them from ex-
reasoning; the latter what Freud calls "ration- cesses and by directing their energies to ends
alization" or sometimes "wishful thinking." which reason approves.
As Aristotle conceives them, certain of the
BECAUSE THEY CAN be ordered when they get virtues especially temperance and courage-
out of order, the emotions
raise problems for are stable emotional attitudes, or habits of emo-
both medicine and morals. Whether or not tional response, which conform to reason and
420 THE GREAT IDEAS
carry out its rule. The moral virtues require commonwealth so that they can live peacefully
more than a momentary control or moderation with one another, they are moved partly by
of the passions; they require a discipline of them reason and partly by their passions. 'The pas-
which has become habitual. What Aristotle sions that incline men to peace,*' he writes,
calls continence, as opposed to virtue, consists "are fear of death; desire of such things as are
in reason's effort to check emotions which are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by
still unruly because they have not yet become their industry to obtain them." But once a
habituated to reason's rule. commonwealth is formed, the one passion which
The fact of individual differences in tempera- seems to be the mainspring of all political ac-
ment is of the utmost importance to the moral- tivity is "a perpetual and restless desire of
ist who is
willing to recognize that universal power after power, that ceaseth only in death";
moral rules apply to individuals differently ac- for a man "cannot assure the power and means
cording to their temperaments. Both psychol- to live well, which he has present, without the
dispositions in their inherited makeup. These such matters; nor do all make such questions
temperamental differences also have a medical the pivots of their political theory. But there is
or physiological aspect insofar as certain ele- general agreement that the passions are a force
ments in human physique the four bodily to be reckoned with in the government of men;
humors of the ancients or the hormones of that the ruler, whether he is despotic prince or
modern endocrinology seem to be correlated constitutional officeholder, must move men
with types of personality. through their emotions as well as by appeals to
reason.
ONE OF THE GREAT issues in political theory The two political instruments through which
concerns the role of the passions in human asso- an influence over the emotions is exercised are
ciation. Have men banded together to form oratory (now sometimes called "propaganda")
states because they feared the insecurity and and law. Both may work persuasively. Laws,
the hazards of natural anarchy and universal like other discourses, according to Plato, may
war, or because they sought the benefits which have preludes or preambles, intended by the
only political life could provide ? In the polit- legislator "to create good-will in the persons
ical community, once formed, do love and
it is whom he addresses, in order that, by reason of
friendship or distrust and fear determine the this good- will, they will more intelligently re-
relation of fellow citizens, or of rulers and ruled ? ceive his command." But the law also carries
Should the prince, or any other man who with it the threat of coercive force. The threat
wishes to get and hold political power, try to of punishment for disobedience addresses itself
inspire love or to instill fear in those whom he entirely to fear, whereas the devices of the ora-
seeks to dominate? Or are each of these emo- tor or even of the legislator in his preamble
tions useful for different political purposes and are not so restricted. The orator can play upon
in the handling of different kinds of men? the whole scale of the emotions to obtain the
Considering whether for the success of the actions or decisions at which he aims.
prince it is "better to be loved than feared or Finally, there the problem of whether the
is
feared than loved," Machiavelh says that "one statesman should exercise political control over
should wish to be both, but, because it is diffi- other influences which affect the emotional life
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The nature and causes of the emotions or passions 422
i a. Emotion in relation to feelings of pleasure and pain 423
ib. Bodily changes during emotional excitement
3^. Rationalization
or the emotional determination of thought 426
3^.
The alleviation and cure of emotional disorders
4.
The moral consideration of the passions
428
(2) Attenuation and atrophy of the passions: the liberation of reason 431
5</.
The devices of oratory: emotional persuasion
5<?.
The regulation of art for the sake of training the passions
422 THE GREAT IDEAS
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, tne
to.
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b reicr to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, m$3] AMES- Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
printed
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
thepage For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) arc sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7 45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS- The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
b b
3 [427 2i-24] 660a; CH 9 [432 26-433*2] 665c 395d-396a, PROP i 396a-c, PROP 3 398b-c,
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK iv, CH n PROP 56 414a-d, THE AFFECTS 416b-422a,c;
[692*22-27] 224b-c / Ethics, BK n, CH 5 PART iv, DBF 7 424b; PROP 1-4 424c-425d;
b
[iio5 i9-no6*6] 351b-c / Politics, BK vn, CH PROP 9-13 426d-428a; APPENDIX, i-n 447a-b;
b
7 [i327 40-i328 i8] 532a-c / Rhetoric, BK n, PART v, AXIOM 2 452c; PROP 34 460c-d
ft
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [136-160] 176b-178a esp SECT 3 176d; CH xxxni, SECT
31d-32a; [231-322] 33a-34b 5-15 248d-2SOc
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK vi [724-734] 230b 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality* 338c-d
17 PLOTINUS. First Ennead, TR i, CH i la-b; CH 5 42 KANT: Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics,
2d-3c, CH 9-11 4c-5c/ Third Ennead, TR vi, CH 378b-c / Intro. Metaphysic of'Morals, 385a-d;
3-4 108a-109b / Fourth Ennead, TR iv, CH 18 386b-d / Judgement, 483d-484b; 508d [fn i]
166d-167b; CH 20-21 167d-168c; CH 28 172a- 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 17, 69c
173b/ Sixth Ennead, TR i, CH 19-22 262a-264c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 49b-50a; 87b; 209a-b;
18 AUGUSTINE- City of God, BK ix, CH 4-5 287a- 327b-328a, 738a-766a esp 738a-b, 742a-746a,
289a 758a-759a, 761a-765b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 81, 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-
AA 2-3 429c-431d; PART i-n, QQ 22-48 720b,d~ Analysis, 4d-5a / Interpretation of Dreams,
826a,c 363c-d / Repression, 424d-425b / Uncon-
la to \b 22: EMOTION 423
b BK HI, CH 9 [432 b26-
Xious, 432c-433d esp 433b / General Introduc- [4<j8*34- 3i] 638b-d;
608d; 623 b-c / Inhibitions, Symptoms,
tioii, 433*1] 665c / Memory and Reminiscence, CH 2
and Anxiety, 720c-72lb; 736d-741c / New [453*15-31] 695b-d / Dreams, CH 2 [460*32-
b
Introductory Lectures, 837 b-d i8]704b-c
9 ARISTOTLE History of Animals, BK
:
iv, CH i
(1. The nature and causes of the emotions or 721a-b; 737c-739c; 752a-c / Civilization and
passions.) Us Discontents, 782a-b,d [fn ij; 787a-b; 789b-
791 d csp 789c-790b / New Introductory Lec-
If. Instinctive emotional reactions in animals tures, 840a-853b csp 840b-c, 846b-849b,
and men 851a-c
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK in, llld-112c csp
112c; BK vn, 236c
2. The classification and enumeration of the
7 PLATO: Symposium, 157b-159b csp 158a-159a;
emotions
165b-166b / Republic, BK 11, 320b-c / Laws, 7 PLATO: Phikbus, 628d-630c
BK vi, 712b 9 ARISTOTLE- Ethics, BK n, CH 5 351b-c/ Rhet-
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK n, CH 27 oric,BK i, CH ii, [1378*20-30] 623b
b 19 AQUINAS. Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 81,
(70 6-39) 92c-93a,c
9 ARISTOTLE. History of Animals, BK iv, CH i A 2 429c-430c; PART i-n, Q 23 723c-727a, Q
b b
[524 i7-i9] 50c; BK v, CH 8 [542*i7~ 4] 68d- 24, A 4 729c-730a; Q 30, A 2, ANS and REP i
a
69a; CH 18 (55o 29-3i] 77b; BK vi, CH i8-BK 749d-750d
VH, CH 2 97b-108c passim, esp BK vi, CH 18 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 62c-64a
97b-99c, BK vn, CH i 106b,d-108a; BK ix, 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART in, THE AFFECTS 416b-
CH i [6o8*2i- b 2o] 133b,d-134a; CH 37 [62i b 28- 422a,c
622*10] 147c / Parts of Animals, BK iv, CH 5 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xx,
[679*5-32] 209a-c; CH n [692*22-27] 224b-c / SECT 1-3 176b-d; SECT 18 178a
CH 2 [753*6-17]
Generation of Animals, BK HI, 53 JAMES: Psychology, 127b; 656a; 742a-743a;
294a-b BK HI, CH 8 [ui6 b 24-i 117*3]
/ Ethics, 745b-746a;766a
b
363a-b; BK vn, CH 6 [ii49 24~i 150*8] 400b-c
2a. Definitions of particular passions
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 12,
173a-c 7 PLATO: Cratylus, 103b-d / Phaedrus, 120a-c /
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 23 128c-d; Symposium 149a-173a,c esp 161d-168a / Eu-
BK in, CH 7, 183c-d thyphro, 193d-194b / Apology, 202a / Philebus,
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK ix, SECT 9 292b-d 628d-630c / Laws, BK i, 650a; 651a-c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 78, 8 ARISTOTLE- Topics, BK n, CH 7 [ii3*33- b 3]
b
A ANS 411d-413d; Q 82, AA 2-3 429c-431c;
4, 158d-159a; BK iv, CH 5 [i25 28~34] 175a; CH
Q 96, A i, REP 2 510b-511b; PART i-n, Q 17, A 6 [127^6-32] 177b; CH 13 [151*14-19] 205d-
a b
2, REP 3 687d-688b; Q 40, AA 2-3 793d-795a; 206a; BK vin, CH i [i56 26- 3J 212b-c / Soul,
Q 41, A i, REP 3 798b-d; Q 46, A 4, REP 2 BK i, CH i [403*25-33] 632b-c
815b-d; A 5, REP i 815d-816d 9 ARISTOTLE. Parts of Animals, BK iv, CH n
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvin [692*22-27] 224b-c / Ethics, BK in, CH 6
b
[10-75] 80a-c [1115*7-14] 361a-b; CH 8 [m6 24-i 117*3]
22 CHAUCER: Nun's Priest's Tale [15,282-287] 363a-b; BK iv, CH 9 [1128^0-14] 375d-376a;
457b / Manciple's Tale [17,104-144] 490a-b BK vin, CH 6 [1158*10-14] 409d-410a; BK ix,
25 MONTAIGNE. Essays, 184a-b CH 10 [1171*11-13] 424d, CH 12 [117^29-33]
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 346a-347d; 425d / Politics, BK v, CH 10 [i3i2b 24~33]
349a-350a; 361b-362a; 381b-c; 402a-d; 405c- 515b / Rhetoric, BK n, CH i [i378*2o]-cH n
406a; 476c-477a [1388^0] 623b-636a
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, vi, 99d-100a; 102b- 17 PLOIINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR iv, CH 28 172a-
103a/ Objections and Replies, 156a-d 173b
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART in, PROP 57, SCHOL 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK n, par 13 lld-
415b 12a; BK in, par 2 13c-d; BK iv, par 7-14 20d-
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vin, DIV 23a csp par n 21d-22a
80 486c-d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, QQ
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 343d-346d 26-48 733d-826a,c
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 469c-d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 61a-65b esp
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 124b; 174b; 347a-c; 386a 61a-62c
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 144a-b 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 5a-6c; 25c-26d; 344a-
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 287d-291a csp 347c; 409d-434d passim, csp 424d-425a
289a-291a; 304b-313a csp 305c-309a, 312b,d 27 SHAKESPEARE: Othello, ACT HI, sc in [165-
[fni7];371c-372c 192] 223d-224a; [322-357] 225c-226a; sc iv
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 499c-500c [155-162] 229a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 49b-51a; 198a-199a; 204b- 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART in, PROP 11-59 399d-
211a passim, csp 206a, 208a-209b; 700a-738b 416b; THE AFFECTS 416b-422a,c; PART iv,
csp 717a-731b, 734b-735a, 738a-b APPENDIX, xxi-xxv 449a-c
54 FREUD: General Introduction, 591d-592c; 33 PASCAL: Pcnstes, 262 221a
607d-609b csp 608d-609b; 613a; 615b-616c; 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xx,
623 b-c / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, SECT 3-18 176d-178a
2b to CHAP?** DEMOTION 425
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 453a-456a; 502a-b 19 AQUINAS: $umma Theohgica, PART i-n, Q 23,
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 198d-199a; 237b-c AA 2-4 724c-727a; Q 25, A 4 733a-d; Q 29,
38 ROUSSEAU- Inequality, 345c-346d AA 2-3 745c-747a; Q 32, A 4 761c-762a; Q 35,
42 KANT: Fund. Prtn. Metaphystc of Morals, 259a; A 6 777b-778c; Q 46, A i, REP 2 813b-814a
259d-260b [fn 2] /Judgement, 502d-503d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART r, 61b-d; 62b-c;
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 308d-309a; 312b,d 63b-d; CONCLUSION, 279a-c passim
[fn27];313a-b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART in, PROP 17 401d-402a;
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BKXII, 561 b PROP 51 411c-412a; PART iv, DEP 5 424b;
53 JAMES: Psychology,717a-736b passim, esp AXIOM 424c; PROP i, SCHOL-PROP 7 424d-
717a-721a, 733b-73Sa; 738b-741b 426b; PROP 9-18 426d-429d esp PROP 15-18
54 FREUD: Instincts, 418c-421a,c / General Intro- 428a-429d; PROP 60 442d-443a; APPENDIX,
duction, 558d; 607d-609c; 612c-614b; 623b-c / xxi-xxv 449a-c
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 641 b-c / Group 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK 11, CH xx,
Psychology, 673b-674a; 681c-683a; 693a- SECT 3-18 176d-178a passim
694d passim / Symptoms, and
Inhibitions, 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 127b-c
Anxiety, 736d-739c; 751a-754a,c esp 753d- 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK v, 19a
754a,c / Civilization and Its Discontents, 783c; 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 312b,d [fn 27]
795d-796b; 798a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 197b-198a; 708a-709a;
720b; 729a-b; 734b-735a
2b. The order and connection of the passions 54 FREUD: Instincts, 415d-421a,c passim, esp
7 PLATO: Philebus, 628d-630c 419d-421a,c / Beyond the Pleasure Princi-
a b
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK n, CH 7 [ii3 33- 3] ple, 659b-c / Group Psychology, 677c-678c /
158d-159a Ego and Id, 709c-710c / War and Death,
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK in, par 2-4 13c- 758a-b
14b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q 81, A 3. The disorder or pathology of the passions
2 429c-430c; PART i-n, Q 25 730b-733d, Q 27,
A 4 739c-740a; Q 29, A 2 745c-746b, Q 30, A da. Madness or frenzy due to emotional excess:
2 749d-750c; Q 32, AA 3-4 760d-762a; Q 33, A excessively emotional or emotionally
2 766a-767a; Q 36, A 2 781c-782b; Q 40, A 7 over-determined behavior
797a-c; Q 43, A i 805d-806b; Q 45, A 2 810d- 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK i
[1-445] 3a-7c; BK ix [189-
811b; Q 46, AA 1-2 813b-814d; Q 48, A i 822d-
429] 59a-61c
823b 5 AESCHYLUS: Choephoroe [1010-1063] 80a-c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 61a-65b esp 61a- 5 SOPHOCLES: Ajax 143a-155a,c esp [282-332]
62c 145c-146a / Electra 156a-169a,c
25 MONTAIGNE' Essays, 105c-107a 5 EURIPIDES: Medea 212a-224a,c / Electra 327a-
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART in, 395a-422a,c esp 339a,c / Bacchantes [1024-1297] 348c-351a /
PROP 11-59 399d-416b, THE AFPECIS 416b- Heracles Mad [815-1015] 371d-373d / Orestes
422a,c; PART iv, DEF 5 424b; PROP 7 426a-b 394a-410d esp [1-424] 394a-398b
33 PASCAL. Pensees, 262 221a 6 HERODOTUS History, BK in, 95d-98a; 103b-d;
:
Hysteria 25a-118a,c csp 35b-c, 37d-38d, 52c- 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 68d
53c, 65a-72b, 81c-87a, lllb-115a / Interpreta- 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH
tion of Dreams, 320b-c; 328c; 380d-382a / xxxni, SECT 10 249d
Narcissism, 402c-404d / Repression 422a- 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 210b-211a;
427a,c / Unconscious, 432d-436b / General BK xv, 618a
Introduction, 545a-638a,c esp 557b-569c, 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK ix,
585b-600d, 604c-606a, 611a-615a, 632b- 260d-262a; BK xi, 318a-348d; BK xii, 376b-d
635d / Group Psychology, 690a-691c esp 53 JAMES- Psychology, 722a-725a passim, esp
690c-d; 695b-696a,c / Ego and Id, 712c- 723a, 724b; 733b [fn i]
71 5c / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety 54 FREUD: Hysteria, 83d-86a passim, csp 84d-
718a-754a,c esp 720a-723d, 728b-731d, 741d 85a; 87a-97b / Interpretation of Dreams,
[fn i], 745d-747b, 750a-d / Civilization and 205a-c; 235b-d; 276c; 370b-373a / Repression,
Its Discontents, 792b-799a esp 797a-b, 798d- 425d-426b / Unconscious, 434c-435d / General
799a / New Introductory Lectures, 840a-846a; Introduction, 607b-615b esp 610d-612d; 623b-c
851d-852d;859c-860c / Ego and Id, 715d-717a,c / Inhibitions, Symp-
toms, and Anxiety, 720a-754a esp 724a-728b,
Hysterias 733c-742a, 744b-748b / New Introductory
10 HIPPOCRATES: Regimen in Acute Diseases, AP- Lectures, 840a-846a
PENDIX, par 35 43d
53 JAMES Psychology, 131b-137b esp 135a, 137a; 3c(4) Traumas and traumatic neuroses
248a-252a; 747b [113]; 768b-770a esp 770b 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-
[fn 3]; 789b-790b [fn 2]; 802b-803a Analysis, 3a-5a esp 4b-c; 14d-15a / Hysteria,
54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 25a-30a esp 26a-c, 27c-d / General Introduc-
Analysis, la-5d esp 4c-5d / Hysteria, 25a-62b tion, 558a-d; 603a-b / Beyond the Pleasure
esp 35b-c, 37d-38d, 53b-c; 72d-73b; 76c-d, Principle, 641a-d; 648d-650c / Inhibitions,
81d-83c; 97b-99c; lllb-118a,c / Interpretation Symptoms, and Anxiety, 735d-736c; 741a-b;
of Dreams, 200a-d 426b-c / Un-
/ Repression, 744b-745d; 749b-c; 751b-752b / New Intro-
conscious, 434c-436a esp 435d-436a / General ductory lectures, 817c-818b; 845b-846a
Introduction, 572a-b; 586d-587b; 610d-612b
3</. The alleviation and cure of emotional dis-
passim / Ego and Id, 713d-714a / Inhibitions,
orders
Symptoms, and Anxiety, 718c-719c; 728b-729a;
741c-742a; 747c-748a; 750b 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [31-93]
30b-31b esp [87-93] 31b; BK vi '[1-42]
3c(2) Obsessions and compulsions 80a-c
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [59-93] 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 38
30d-31b; [1053-1075] 43c-d 786d-789d
27 SHAKESPEARE: Macbeth, ACT v, sc i 306b- 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 37c-39a; 401b-406a
307a, sc in [37-46] 308a 27 SHAKESPEARE: Macbeth, ACT v, sc i 306b-
29 CERVANTES' Don Quixote, PART i, 2b 307a; sc in [37-46] 308a
31 SPINOZA. Ethics, PART iv, PROP 44, SCHOL 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH
437d-438a xxxni, SECT 13 250a-b
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 139 196b-199a; 142-143 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 13b-c; 127a-b; 284c-d;
199b-200a 297d-298a
44 Bosw ELL: Johnson, 138c-139a 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic^, 357b-358b
48 MELVILLE Moby Dic\ esp 135a-136b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vi, 271b c;
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 513d-515a BK xii, 551c-554a; BK xv, 614a-d; 616a-618b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 733b [fn i); 801a-805b esp 617a-b
54 FREUD: Hysteria, 83d-86a; 90a-b; 99c-102a / 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK n, 21 d-
Repression, 426d-427a,c / Unconscious, 436b / 23c
General Introduction, 550d-557b esp 551b- 53 JAMES: Psychology, 132b; 135a-b
552c; 561c-562c; 568a-569a; 572b-c; 587b-c; 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-
600d; 612a-b / Ego and Id, 713c-715c pas- Analysis, la-4d; 6c-7a; 10c-13d; I4d-l$a; 18a-
sim / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 718b- 20d / Hysteria, 25a-81c passim, esp 30d-31a,
719b passim; 721c; 723c-d; 729a-733c; 59d-60a, 62c-72d, 75d-81c; 106c-lllb / Psycho-
735c-d; 747c-d; 750b-d / New Introductory Analytic Therapy 123a-127a,c/ "Wild" Psycho-
Lectures, 841 b-c Analysis 128a-130d / General Introduction,
546b-c; 550a-c; 560b-561b; 603b-604c; 623c-
3c(3) Phobias and anxieties 638a,c / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 643d-
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i
[102-158] 644d; 651c-d / Ego and Id, 712c-713a / In-
2b-3a; BK in [59-93] 30d-31b hibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 748b-d /
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART i-n, Q 35, New Introductory Lectures, 840a; 851d-852d;
A 8, ANS 779c-780c 864a-873d csp 871a-873d
428 THE GREAT IDEAS 4/0
4. The moral consideration of the passions 4a. The conflict between reason and emotion
7 PLATO: Gorgias, 275d-277c / Republic, BK iv, 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus at Colonus [655-663]
350c-353d; BK x, 433d 120b-c
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK n, CH I-BK in, CH i 7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 120b-c; 128a-129c / Repub-
348b,d-357b passim; BK in, CH 6-BK iv, CH lic, BK iv, 350c-355a; BK ix, 416a-c
9'
BK v, CH 8 [1135^7-1136*9]
361a-376a,c; 9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH n 239a-d /
b
383c~384a; BK vn 395a-406a,c; BK x, CH Ethics, BK i, CH 13 [i 1 02 i 3-1103*10] 348a-d;
8 [ii78 8-2i] 432d / Politics, BK vn, CH 15
ft
BK in, CH i [mi*35-b 4] 357b; BK vn 395a-
[1334^8-28] 539b-d / Rhetoric, BK n, CH 12-14 406a,c / Politics, BK in, CH 15 [1286*17-20]
636a-638a 484b-c; [1286*33-37] 484d
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [288-322] 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [307-322]
33d-34b 34a-b
12EpicTETUs: Discourses 10Sa-245a,c passim, 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK 11, SECT 5 257b-c;
17 PLOTINUS: First Enncad, TR in, CH 1-3 lOa- 502a-519d passim, esp CH 2-3 503b-505b, CH
lla / Fifth Ennead, TR ix, CH 1-2 246c- lo-n 512d-518c, BK vn, CH 7 [i327 b 40-i328 8
247b 18] 532a-c
19 AQUINAS* Summa Theologtca, PART I-H, Q 46, 14 PLUTARCH:
Cleomenes, 659d-660a / Dion,
A 5, ANS and REP i 815d-816d 784d-785a
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 51, 15 TACITUS. Histories, BK in, 257c-d
A i, ANS 12b-13c; Q 63, A i 63a-64a; Q 65, A i, 23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, 3a-37d passim
ANS 70b-72a 23 HOBBES Leviathan, INTRO, 47b-d, PART i,
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xxx 85c-d; 90b-d; 93d-94a; 95d-96b; PART n,
[100-145] lOOb-d 104b-d, 105c-106b; 113b; 140c-142a, 151b-c,
22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BKIII, ST\NZA PART iv, 272c; CONCLUSION, 279a-c
129 71a-b / Wife of Bath's Prologue [6191- 27 SHAKESPEARE: Timon of Athens, ACT in, sc v
6208] 266a 406d-408a
23 HOBBES: leviathan, PART i, 68b-c; 77c-78a 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 20c-d;
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 200d-205b esp 203a- 78a-d
204a; 434d-435d; 491d-495a csp 494d-495a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART in, PROP 46 410c; PART
26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard II, ACT HI, sc n iv, PROP 35, SCHOL 433d-434a; APPENDIX,
335b-337d / 1st Henry IV, ACT in, sc i [146- vin-xvii 447d-448d
189] 451c-452a / 2nd Henry IV, ACT iv, sc v 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 291-338 225a-233a
494b-496d 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH xi, SECT 136-137
27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT iv, sc iv [32-66] 56c-57b
59a-c 36 SWIFT. Gulliver, PART i, 28b-29a; 37a-b;
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 49b-50b; PART in, 112a-114b; 119b-121a
76d-77c 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK n, 6a-b;
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xiv BK in, 9a; lOa; lOc-lla; 12b-d; BK v, 18d-
102b,d-108d 19d; BK vn, 47c-48a; BK xm, 96a; BK xix,
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 435b-d 135d-139c passim; BK xxvni, 259b; BK xxix,
42 KANT: Fund, Prin. Metaphysic of'Morals, 256a; 269a,c
258b-c / Practical Reason, 356a-360d 38 ROUSSEAU: Political Economy, 368a-b; 375d-
43 MILL: Liberty, 303d-304d / Representative 376b
Government, 346c-348c 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 4d-5a
CHAFER 22: EMOTION 433
43 FEDERALIST: NU\UR i 20a-31 passim; NUM- 54 FREUD: Croup Psychology 664a-696a,c csp
BER 5-6 37a-41c passim, esp NUMBER 6, 40a-b; 665c, 672a-676b, 687b-c / Civilization and Us
NUMBER 10 49c-53a csp 50a-d; NUMBER 15, Discontents, 781d-782d; 783b-c; 785c-788d;
65b NUMBER 17 69a-70d; NUMBER
d; 27, 796a-b / New Introductory Lectures, 884a
95c-d; NUMBER 31, 103d-104a; NUMBER 34,
\b. The acquisition and retention of power.
HOc-d; NUMBER 46, 150b-152a; NUMBER 49,
love or fear
160b-161a; NUMBER 50, 162a-b; NUMBER 55,
173a-b; NUMBER 63, 192c-193a; NUMBER 70, 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK in, 95d-96b; 103d-
211d-212a; NUMBER 76, 225d-226a 104a; 107c-d
43 MILL: Government, 329b-c; 6 THUCYDIDES Pcloponnesian War, BK i,368b-d;
:
Representative
336c-337a; 346c-348c BK n, 402a-404a; BK in, 425d-426d; BK vi,
tract, BK n, 406c
5e. The regulation of art for the sake of train-
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 309a-c ing the passions
41 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 92a-b 7 PLATO- Republic, BK n-in, 320c-339a; BK iv,
42 KANT: Fund. Prm. Metaphysic of Morals, 253d- 344b-d; BK x, 431b-434a / Laws, BK vn,
254b / Practical Reason, 321b-329a esp 325d- 717b-721a; 726d-728b
326b / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 383a-b 9 ARISTOTLE Politics, BK vn, CH 17 [i336b i2-
b b
43 FEDERALIST. NUMBER 15, 65a-d; NUMBER 16 BK vin, CH 5 [i339 ii-i^4o i9]
23] 541c-d;
66c-68d passim, esp 67d-68a; NUMBER 17, 545a-546a; CH 7 547b-548a,c
69d-70a; NUMBER 27, 95b-96a 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR in, CH 1-2
43 MILL Liberty, 295d-296a / Representative lOa-d
Government, 329c-330a 29 CERVANTES Don Quixote, PART
:
i, 184a-187c
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART iv, 328b- passim
329c 32 MILTON: Areopagitica, 384b-386b; 387b-
49 DARWIN: Descent ofMan, 314a-b 394b
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK n, 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK iv, 17b-
30d-31a 18d
54 FREUD: War and Death, 757c 44 Eosw ELL: Johnson, 308b-c
CHAPTER 22: EMOTION 435
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The general theory of instinct, sec HABIT 3-36; and for the consideration of instinctual drives,
see DESIRE 2a, 33.
The relation of pleasure and pain to the emotions, see PLEASURE AND PAIN 43.
The conception of the emotions as forms of animal appetite or sensitive desire, see DESIRE
3b(i);WiLL2b(2).
The analysis of the one emotion which is held to be the root of all the others, see LOVE
2a-2a(3).
Other discussions of the conflict between the passions and reason, or between one emotion
and another, see DESIRE 3d, 43, 6c; DUTY 8; MIND pb-pc; OPPOSITION 43-40, 4d.
Other discussions of emotional disorder from a psychological or medical point of view, see
DESIRE 4a~4d; MEDICINE 6c(2); MIND 8b; ONE AND MANY 3^5); OPPOSITION 4c.
The influence of the emotions upon imagination or thought, see DESIRE 53-5 b, 6c; MEMORY
AND IMAGINATION 8c, 8d(i); OPINION 2a; TRUTH 3d(2).
The moral problems raised by the conflict between reason and emotion, see DESIRE 6a-6b;
DUTY 4~4b; LIBERTY 33-3^ MIND 9C-pd; SIN 5; SLAVERY 7; TYRANNY 5d; VIRTUE AND
VICE 53.
The significance of the passions in relation to law, government, and the state, see LAW 5, 6a;
PUNISHMENT ic-id; STATE 3e~3f; and for the problem of political censorship or regulation
of the arts because of their emotional influence, see ART lob; LIBERTY 2a; POETRY yb.
The consideration of emotion by the orator, see RHETORIC 40.
Emotion in relation to artistic inspiration or expression, see ART 8; POETRY 3.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boo^s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
T, REID, Essays on the Active Powers of the Human BRADLEY. Collected Essays, VOL u (23)
Mind, in, PART n, CH 3-7 STRINDBERG. The Dance of Death
BROWN. Lectures on the
Philosophy of the
Human TITCHENER. Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of
Mind, VOL in, pp 26-473 Peeling
and Attention
D. STEWART. Philosophy of the Active and Moral CANNON, Bodily Changes in Pain,
Hunger, Fear and
Powers of Man Rage
W. HAMILTON. Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, CRILE. The Origin and Nature of the Emotions
VOL i
(41-46) CARLSON. The Control of Hunger in Health and
COMTE, System of Positive Polity, VOL w, Theory of Disease
the Future of Man, en 2 PARETO, The Mind and Society, VOL HI, CH 9
LorzE. Microcosmos, BK n, CH 5 PROUST, Remembrance of Things Past
BAIN, The Emotions and the Will JUNG. Psychological Types
E. HARTMANN. Philosophy of the Unconscious, (B) McTAGGART. The Nature of Existence, CH 41, 57
ii-m B, RUSSELL. The Analysis
of Mind, LECT 3, 14
FRAZER, The Golden Bough, PART vi, CH 8 .
Sceptical Essays,
vi
Chapter 'Ly. ETERNITY
INTRODUCTION
notion of eternity, like that of infinity* that go beyond experience, and have some
THE two
has meanings. One meaning may refer meaning even if they lack imaginative content.
to something positive, yet both seem to be for- Locke indicates this other aspect of the matter
mulated by the human mind in a negative way. when he criticizes thosewho assert dogmatically
We grasp one meaning of eternity by saying that "the world is neither eternal nor infinite."
that there is no beginning or end to time's It seems to him that the world's eternity or the
process. The other sense of eternity we con- world's infinity is "at least as conceivable as
ceive by denying time itself and, with it, change the contrary."
or mutability. It may not be inconsistent, therefore, to say
Considering eternity as infinite duration, that infinite time, while unimaginable, remains
Locke says that we form this notion "by the quite conceivable; for to say that eternity is
same means and from the same original that we conceivable is
simply to say that endless time
come to have the idea of time viz., having . . . is neither more nor less possible than time with
got the idea of succession and duration ... we a beginning and an end. The first conception
can in our thoughts add such lengths of dura- is
meaningful as the second. It is in fact
as
tion to one another, as often as we please, and formed from the second by negation by sub-
apply them, so added, to durations past or to stituting the word "without" for "with" with
come. And this we can continue to do, with- respect to "a beginning and an end." But un-
out bounds or infimtum"
limits, and proceed in likeour conceptions, our images cannot be
The unimaginabihty of the infinite is no formed by negation. When we imagine, as when
different in the sphere of time than in that of we perceive, the object before us is
positive
space or number. The difficulty, Locke points and We
cannot imagine, as we cannot
definite.
out, is the same in all three cases. "The idea experience, a duration, or a span of time, with-
of so much is
positive and clear. The idea of out a beginning and an end.
greater is also clear." But do not yet give
these
us the idea of the infinite. That only comes with WITH REGARD TO the other traditional mean-
"the idea of so much greater as cannot be com- ing of "eternity," Locke takes a different posi-
prehended, and this is
plainly negative, not tion. It too might be defended as a negative
positive . . . What lies beyond our positive idea conception, so far as human comprehension is
towards infinity,'* Locke continues, "lies in ob- concerned, since it involves the denial of time
scurity, and has the indeterminate confusion itself, i.e., of a duration comprising a succession
of a negative idea, wherein I know I neither of moments. But here Locke says that there is
do nor can comprehend all I would, it being "nothing more inconceivable to me than dura-
too large for a finite and narrow capacity." tion without succession. ... If our weak appre-
In insisting that we can have no positive idea hensions," he continues, "cannot separate suc-
of infinity whether of space, time, or number cession from any duration whatsoever, our idea
Locke's point seems to be that it is beyond of eternity can be nothing but of an infinite
our finite capacity to form an image of an in- succession of moments of duration, wherein
finite object. But though our imaginations may anything does exist."
be limited in this way, we do seem able to con- Nevertheless, Locke affirms that "we can
structin a negative mannerconceptions easily conceive in God infinite duration, and
437
438 THE GREAT IDEAS
we cannot avoid doing so." Whether he means Eternity so conceived is perhaps even more
by God's eternity involves temporal
this that unimaginable than the eternity which is in-
succession, must be determined by an inter- finite time. We may feel that we have some
pretation of the passage in which he maintains sense of an infinite duration when we talk, as
that "God's infinite duration being accompa- Ivan does m the Brothers Karamazov, about a
nied with infinite knowledge and infinite pow- billion years or "a quadrillion of a quadrillion
are no more distant from his knowledge, no time is like that, only longer. But because all
farther removed from his sight, than the pres- our experience is temporal through and
ent; they all lie under the same view." through, it is more difficult to get any sense of
If this passage means that time stands still that which is both absolutely timeless and
for God in a single moment in which all things endlessly enduring.
arc co-present, then Locke may not be as reso- Poets, and sometimes philosophers turned
lute as Hobbcs in rejecting the theologian's poets, have struggled to give this concept imag-
conception of God's eternity. Criticizing the inative content by contrasting "the white radi-
Scholastics, Hobbes says that "for the meaning ance of eternity" with a "many-colored glass,"
of Eternity, they will not have it be an endless or by speaking of time itself as "the moving
succession of time." Instead, "they will teach image of eternity." When Dimmler in War and
us that eternity is the standing still of the pres- Peace tells Natasha that "it is hard for us to
ent time, a Nunc-stans (as the Schools call it)." imagine eternity," she replies that it does not
This, Hobbes thinks, "neither they nor
anyone seem hard to her that eternity "is today, now
else understands, no more than they would a and it be tomorrow, and always, and was
will
Hic-stans for an infinite greatness of place." there yesterday and the day before. ." . .
A theologian like Aquinas tries to avoid the These and similar attempts may not succeed
difficulty which Hobbes finds mthis conception as much as the insight that if we could hold the
by distinguishing between the now of eternity present moment still, or fix the fleeting instant,
and the now of time. "The now of time is the we could draw an experience of the eternal from
same," he writes, "as regards its subject in the the heart of time. "The now that stands still,"
whole course of time, but it differs in aspect." Aquinas writes, "is said to make eternity ac-
Furthermore, "the flow of the now, as altering cording to our apprehension. For just as the
in aspect, is time. But eternity remains the apprehension of time is caused in us by the
same according to both subject and aspect; and fact that we apprehend the flow of the now,
hence eternity is not the same as the now of so the apprehension of eternity is caused in us
time." by our apprehending the now standing still."
The notion of the eternal as the timeless and
the immutable docs not belong exclusively to To UNDERSTAND the opposed views that con-
Christian theology. In the tradition of the stitute the major issues with regard to eternity,
great books it is found, for example, in Plato necessary to hold quite separate the two
it is
and Plotinus. Eternity, according to Plotinus, meanings of the word which have run side by
is "a Life changelcssly motionless and ever side in the tradition of western thought. The
holding the Universal content in actual pres- of these two senses, signifying interminable
first
ence; not this now and now that other, but time, is the meaning of "eternity" which has
always all; not existing now in one mode and greatest currency in popular speech. This is the
now in another, but a consummation without meaning which appears in the chapters on
part or interval. All its content is in immediate INFINITY and TIME. It is also the sense in which
concentration as at one point; nothing in it philosophers and theologians debate the prob-
ever knows development: all remains identical lem of the eternity of the world whether the
within itself, knowing nothing of change, for world ever began or will ever end.
ever in a Now since nothing of it has passed Since that which exists interminably is im-
away or will come into being; but what it is
perishable, the word "eternal" is also applied
now, that it is ever." to substances which are thought to be ever
CHAPTER 23: ETERNITY 439
erally, think of the heavenly bodies as "beings nity" the notion of intcrrninability; for, he
which are sensible and both moving and moved, writes, "aswhatever is wholly immutable can
but eternal and impassible." Aristotle calls the have no succession, so it has no beginning, and
heavenly bodies "eternal and incorruptible." no end." Yet Aquinas preserves the sharp dis-
For Lucretius and the atomists, the atoms and tinction between the two meanings when he
the atoms alone are eternal. They are, he says, differentiates the sense in which the world
"everlasting, though all things else are dis- might be called eternal and the sense in which
solved." Unless they were eternal, "all things he would attribute eternity to God alone.
before this would have utterly returned to "Even supposing that the world always was,
it would not be equal to God in eternity," he
nothing," If the atomic particles "were to wear
away, or break in pieces," Newton argues, "the writes; for "the divine being is all
being simul-
nature of things depending on them, would be taneously without succession, but with the
changed. . And therefore, that nature may
. . world it is otherwise."
be lasting, the changes of corporeal things are The conception of eternity as absolutely im-
to be placed only in the various separations and mutable existence is found in the ancient pagan
new associations and motions of these perma- writers. Plotinus, as we have already seen, makes
nent particles." immutability the mark of eternity. The un-
The heavenly bodies and the atoms may be moved prime mover of Aristotle and the Pla-
thought everlasting, but they are not immu- tonic Ideas or Forms also possess this charac-
table m
ail respects, for local motion is of their teristic. But it is the Jewish and Christian
very essence. Imperishable in existence, they theologians who make eternity in this sense one
are also endlessly in motion. In Aristotle's view, of the prime attributes of God.
localmotion can be perpetual or eternal only Augustine, for example, invokes God as
if is circular. Circular motion alone has
it "that everfixed Eternity" in whom "nothing
neither beginning nor end. passeth, but the whole is present." Since time
The eternal circular motion of the heavens, isfor him inconceivable apart from change or
according to Aristotle, in turn communicates motion, that which exists immutably does not
an eternal cyclical movement to the rest of exist in time. Referring to God's eternity, he
reality. "Since the sun revolves thus, the sea- says, "Compare it with the times which are
sons in consequence come-to-be in a cycle .... never fixed, and see that it cannot be com-
and since they come-to-be cyclically, so in their pared. . . .
Thy years neither come nor go;
turn do the things whose coming-to-be the whereas ours both come and go, that they all
seasons initiate." Such an eternal return, it
may come. .Thy years are one day; and Thy
. .
would seem, is also applied by Aristotle to hu- day is not daily, but To-day. . . .
Thy To-day
man he writes that "probably each
things, for is
Eternity."
art and each science has often been developed Time and eternity are here conceived as two
as far as possible and has again perished." distinct orders of reality. The temporal order
is the order of things in
change or motion, the
SINCE THE HEAVENS and the atoms are in mo- eternal the realm of the fixed or permanent,
tion, even though their motion is everlasting the immobile and immutable. "As eternity is
or eternal, they cannot be eternal the second m the proper measure of being," Aquinas writes,
ways of viewing the order of nature. "Things green are, since they are incapable of change.
are conceived by us as actual in two ways," he This is the sense of eternity in which the un-
writes; "either in so far as we conceive them to changing instant is eternal, or the past is eter-
exist with relation to a fixed time and place, nal, even though both are somehow elements
or in so far as we conceive them to be contained or aspects of time and the process of change.
in God, and to follow from the necessity of the The past may be eternal but it no longer
divine nature." second way do "we
Only in the exists. The passing moment may be eternal,
conceive things under the form of eternity." but it has no duration. Lack of existence and
We can view things under the aspect of eter- lack of duration together distinguish that
nity only insofar as we know God and, through meaning of "eternal" in which it
merely sig-
knowing God, are able to know all things ac- nifiesthe unchanging, from the meaning in
cording as "their ideas involve the eternal and which it signifies that which exists or endures
infinite essence of God." forever without changing. It is only in the
The
separation of time and eternity into dis- second of these two meanings that the eternal
tinct spheres of reality, or even into distinct can be conceived as that which exists entirely
ways of conceiving the whole of being, is chal- outside the realm of time.
being within the sphere of change. Aristotle appears to answer these questions
A similar point seems to be made in Aris- affirmatively, especially in the last book of his
totle'stheory of change. When change is con- Physics where he claims to demonstrate the im-
ceived as consisting in a transformation of mat- having been a beginning to
possibility of there
ter, it is composed of matter and form
the thing motion. Aquinas, on the other hand, doe/not
which changes, and neither the matter nor the think that the eternity of the world can be
form. Matter as matter, Aristotle writes, "does demonstrated; and of Aristotle's arguments he
not cease to be in its own nature, but is nec- says that they are not "absolutely demonstra-
essarily outside the sphere of becoming and tive, but only relatively so viz^ as against the
ceasing to be." The remark would seem to hold arguments of some of the ancients who asserted
true as well of the form as form. that the world began to be in some actually
CHAPTER 23: ETERNITY 441
mpossible ways." In support of this conten- endless motion "cannot be decided by proof,
lon, he cites a remark made by Aristotle in neither in the affirmative nor in the negative.*'
he Topics, that among "dialectical problems Just as for Augustine and Aquinas, so for him
vhichwe cannot solve demonstratively," one it is indifferent from a philosophical point of
s "whether the world is eternal." view whether the created world and its Crea-
For Kant the problem typically dialectical,
is tor are co-eternal or whether, as Genesis says,
t occurs as part of the first antinomy in the "in the beginning God created heaven and
Transcendental Dialectic, the thesis of which earth."
sserts that "the world has a beginning in time" But both alternatives are not equally ac-
ind the antithesis that "the world has no be- ceptable to the theologian. Since there is no
;inning, but is infinite in respect both to time proof on either side "sufficient to convince us,"
,nd space." The fact that apparently cogent ar- Maimomdes writes, "we take the text of the
guments can be marshalled for both of these Bible literally, and say that it teaches us a
ontradictory propositions shows, in Kant's truth which we cannot prove" namely, that
>pmion, that the reasoning on either side is the world had a beginning in time. Aquinas
lot demonstrative, but only dialectical and, comes to the same conclusion. "That the
& he says, "illusory." world did not always exist," he writes, "we hold
The Jewish and Christian doctrine of the by faith alone." It is not "an object of dem- . . .
vorld's creationby God might seem to require onstration or science." For Christian and Jew
he denial of the world's eternity. But in fact alike, the religious dogma that the world is not
he theologians find either alternative com- only created by God, in the sense of depending
>atible with divine creation, which they con- for its existence upon God as cause, but was
eive as the cause of the world's being, not also initiated by God, or caused to begin to
of its beginning. Augustine, for ex-
iccessarily exist and move, is based on the revealed word
mple, examines the sense in which the world of God in Holy Writ.
5held by some to be co-eternal wiiji God, even Those who, on philosophical grounds, deny
hough made or created by God. 4*1 1 is as if a creation ex nihilo also deny the world's begin-
oot," he interprets them to say,T*had been ning. Pursuant to his theory of the world as a
Iways from eternity in the dust; there would necessary and perpetual emanation from the
Iways have been a print underneath it; and One, Plotmus, for example, declares that "the
'et no one would doubt that thisllrint was Kosmos has had no beginning . . and this is
.
nade by the pressure of the focfe, nbr that, warrant for its continued existence. Why
hough the one was made by the other, neither should there be in the future a change that has
vas prior to the other." So, he goes on, it
might not yet occurred?" For Spinoza likewise, "all
Iso be said that the world has always existed things which follow from the absolute nature
nd yet is
always, throughout eternity, created, of any attribute of God must for ever exist";
.., caused to exist, by God. and to this extent at least, the world is eternal
Commenting on this passage, Aquinas adds and uncreated.
he observation that if an "action is mstanta- The man of faith, however, believes in a God
icousand not successive, it is not necessary for who is free to create or not to create, not one
he maker to be prior m duration to the thing from whom the world emanates as a necessary
nade." Hence does not follow necessarily,
it effect from its source. When, therefore, he af-
ie writes, "that if God is the active cause of firms that God freely chose to produce the world
he world, He must be prior to the world in out of nothing, he seems to meet the question,
luration; because creation, by which He pro- "What was God doing before He made heaven
luced the world, is not a successive change" and earth?" To the questioner Augustine does
but an instantaneous act. not wish to give "the jesting answer said to
Writing both as a philosopher and as a theo- have been given by one who sought to evade
ogian, Maimomdes many centuries before the force of the question 'He was getting
"
Cant stated his antinomy thinks he is able to Hell ready for people who pry too deep/
how that the question of infinite time and Instead he points out that the question itself
442 THE GREAT IDEAS
is illicit for it assumes a time before time be- To the first
question, it does not suffice to
gan. "If before heaven and earth were made," replyby affirming the existence of God. Some
he writes, "there was no time, then what is modern theologians deny God's absolute im-
meant by the question 'What were You doing mutability, and so deny the eternahty of His
then? If there was not any time, there was not being in the precise sense under consideration.
"
any 'then.'In the phrase "before creation" With regard to the second question, we must
the word "before" has no temporal significance. observe that, in the tradition of the great books,
It signifies a different kind of priority the cternality has been claimed for two things other
sense in which eternity precedes time, the sense than God, namely, for truth and ideas. What-
in which Augustine says of God that "it is not ever "is produced by reasoning aright," Hobbes
in time that You are before all time You says, is eternal, and immutable
"general,
are before all the past by the eminence of Your truth." On
somewhat different grounds James
ever-present eternity." declares, "there is no denying the fact that
the mind is filled with necessary and eternal
TURNING FROM eternity in the sense of infinite relations which it finds between certain of
anything eternal exists. The atoms of Lucretius frequency in which experience may have as-
are not eternal in this sense, nor are the sup- sociated the conception's originals in time and
posedly imperishable heavenly bodies. Nor is space." He quotes Locke to the effect that
itsufficient to point out that change itself in- "truths belonging to the essences of things . . .
volves aspects or elements of permanence; for are eternal, and are to J9e"fbund out only by the
the question, strictly interpreted, asks whether contemplation of those essences."
anything and of itself which, having no
exists in The common phrase "the eternal verities"
beginning or end, also has no past, present, or which James uses testifies to the prevalence
future no temporal phases in its continued of the notion that truth itself cannot change,
endurance. Only such a thing would be utterly and that en men speak of a new truth or
non- temporal or changeless. the growtlf of truth, the change they refer to
Since nothing made of matter exempt from
is is
only a*change of mind with respect to what
motion, it is generally supposed that no ma- men thiluc is true or false, not a change in the
terial thing is eternal in this sense. Not even truth itJlf. Whatever is true now,
always was
God is eternal unless God is
absolutely immu- true ano^lvfcys will be. Time and change make
table as well as spiritual. The angels are spiritual no differenceto the truth of two plus two equals
to Christian theology,
beings, yet, according four.
they cannot be called "eternal" because, in But even so it can still be asked how the
the first place, they are creatures and had an truth exists, for the attribution of eternity to
origin; and, in
the second place, they are sub- anything also requires us to consider its mode
ject to spiritual change even if they are not of being.If, for example, the truth exists only
involved in the sorts of motion to which bodies in the mind, then it exists unchangingly only
are susceptible. The theologians, therefore, use in the mind of an absolutely infallible knower,
the word "aeviternal" to signify the mode of a mind which neither learns nor forgets, nor
angelic existence in that it is "a mean between changes in any respect with regard to what it
eternity and time." Aeviternity, Aquinas ex- knows. If God is such a knower, eternal truth
plains,
has "a beginning but no end," while can have existence in God's mind.
"eternity has neither beginning nor end . . . The theologians sometimes go further and
and time both beginning and end." identify absolute truth, as they identify ab-
solute goodness, with God. Aquinas writes, for
THE QUESTION ABOUT the eternal as timeless example, that "if we speak of truth as it is in
and immutable existence has two parts: Does things, then all things are true by one primary
an immutable God exist? Does anything else truth; to which each one is assimilated accord-
exist which is immutable? ing to its entity, and thus, although the es-
CHAPTER 23: ETERNITY 443
nces or forms of things are many, yet the theologians give it a positive rather than a
uth of the divine intellect is one, in con- negative significance. They mean by it the ac-
rmity to which all things are said to be true." tual infinity of perfect being and absolute pow-
n this view, it would appear that there are er, in sharp distinction from the potential in-
>t two eternal beings, but only one. finity by which the mathematicians signify the
William James finds immutability not only lacf^ of a limit in addition or division.
the truth, but also in the concepts of the These two meanings of "infinity" seem to par-
iman mind. "Each conception," he writes, allel the two meanings of "eternity" which we
op one conception and take up another, but positive sense in which God's eternity consists
e dropped conception can in no intelligible in that fullness of being which can exist apart
ase be said to change into its successor. . . . from time and change. Because our intellects
bus, amid the flux of opinions and of physical we may apprehend eternal being in a
are finite,
ings, the world of conceptions, or things in- negative manner by calling it "timeless" or by
nded to be thought about, stands stiff and conceiving it as infinite duration, but Spinoza
imutable, like Plato's Realm of Ideas." cautions us against supposing that it can be
In the case of ideas, however, the problem "explained by duration or time, even if the
complicated by the question whether ideas duration be conceived without beginning or
ist in and by themselves, outside the mind end."
God or man.
according to a doctrine at-
If, One other theological discussion raises issues
ibuted to Plato and the Platonists, the Ideas which involve in a unique way the two mean-
Forms exist separately, then they constitute ings of eternity. It deals with the revealed doc-
calm of eternal beings, for their immutability trine of perdition and salvation as eternal death
unquestionable. If, from an opposite point of and eternal life. Is the eternality of Hell and
ew, the realm of unchanging ideas is identical Heaven equivalent to a period of endless dura-
th the divine intellect, then no eternal being tion or does it mean more fundamentally
beings exist apart from God. the unchanging state of souls after the Last Judg-
ment ?
HE PROPOSITION that God is the only eternal According to Augustine and Aquinas, the
ing, the only uncreated and immutable exist- eternity of Heaven and Hell means the moral
ice, is inextncably connected with the propo- immutability of the immortal soul as well as the
ion that God the only actually infinite
is intcrminability of the beatitude
it enjoys or the
mg, the ens realissimum having all perfec- punishment it suffers. Only in Purgatory does a
)ns. "Eternity is the very essence of God," change of moral state occur, but the process of
)inoza writes, "in so far as that essence in- purification which takes place there is always
dves necessary existence." In saying this he limited in period. Purgatory is, therefore, not
>peals to his definition of eternity, by which eternal in either sense.
: are to understand "existence itself, so far As Kant sees it, however, the after-life must
it isconceived necessarily to follow from the not only be interminable, or of infinite duration,
finition alone of the eternal thing." For but it must also permit a progressive moral de-
>inoza, as well as for Aquinas, the same fact velopment without end. Man is justified, ac-
nch makes God eternal namely, the iden- cording to Kant, "in hoping for an endless du-
y of his essence and existence also consti- ration of his existence" only on the ground that
tes his infinity and uniqueness. It is impossi- "the holiness which the Christian law requires
s, Spinoza argues, for there to be two infinite . leaves the creature nothing but a progress
. .
bstances. For the same reason, there cannot ininfimtum" From still another point of view,
two eternal beings. Dr. Johnson questions the traditional Christian
As indicated in the chapter on INFINITY, dogma that the souls of the blessed are secure in
icn the word "infinite" is applied to God, the a perpetual state of rectitude in this respect
444 THE GREAT IDEAS
like the good angels who are confirmed in their On Dr. Johnson's theory, the moral condi-
goodness from the first instant of creation. tion of the damned seems to be immutable. It
Boswcll had "ventured to ask him whether, is irremediable even by the punishments which,
although the words of some texts of Scripture according to him, may exercise some deterrent
seemed strong in support of the dreadful doc- effect upon the blessed who, he seems to think,
trine ofan eternity of punishment, we might are not as unalterably set in the path of right-
not hope that the denunciation was figurative, eousness as the wicked are in their iniquity.
and would not be literally executed." To this, On any of these conceptions of Heaven and
Dr. Johnson replied: "Sir, you are to consider Hell, and of the state of the soul in the after-
the intention of punishment in a future state. life, the meaning of "eternity" is somewhat
We have no reason to be sure that we shall then altered; for eternal life or eternal death is con-
be no longer able to offend against God. We do ceived as having a beginning, if not an end, for
not know that even the angels are quite a m the individual soul. As in the case of all funda-
state of security. ... It may, therefore, perhaps mental religious dogmas, the truth asserted re-
be necessary, in order to preserve both men and mains obscure and mysterious. It is not only
angels in a state of rectitude, that they should beyond imagination, but also beyond any ade-
have continually before them the punishment quate rational conception, analysis, or demon-
of thosewho have deviated from it." stration.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. Eternity as timelessness and immutability or as endless and infinite time: the distinc-
tion between eternity and time 445
la. The priority of eternity to time 446
\b. Aevitcrnity as intermediate between eternity and time
2. The issue concerning the infinity of time and the eternity of the world or of motion
3.
The eternity of God 447
4^. The imperishable in the physical order: matter, atoms, celestial bodies 448
qd. The eternity of Heaven and Hell: everlasting life and death 449
5.
The knowledge and imagery of eternity
CHAPTER 23: ETERNITY 445
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which arc the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER Iliad, BK 11 [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGL SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, m53 JAMES '.Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the mam divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; eg., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES- The references are to book, chapter, and verse When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT Nehemiah, 7-45 (D) II Esdras, 7-46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
47-15, 89 esp 89:1-6; 92; 101*13-29; 102:14-18; 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 81b-c
135; 144:10-13; 145:5-10 / Isaiah, 40:28-29; 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 175d-176c; 190c; 201b-c /
43:10-13; 57:15 (D) Isaias, 40.28-29; 43 10- Practical Reason, 334b-335c; 344b-c / Judge-
13; 57.15 / Jeremiah, 10 10 ()) Jeremtas, ment, 592a-c
10 10 / Lamentations, 5:19 / Daniel, 6:25-27 / 46 HEGEL. Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d-
Malachi, 3-6 (D) Malachias, 3.6 157b, 206c
APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 3920; 42 21 (D) 51 TOLSTOY War and Peace, BK xv, 631a-c
OT, Ecclesiasttcus, 39*25;
42:21-22
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 24:35 / Colos^ans, 4. The things which partake of eternity
1:16-17 / I Timothy, 1.17 / Hebrews, i 10-12;
4^. The imperishability of angels, spiritual
13 7-8 / Revelation, 1.17-18; 10 6 (D) Apoc-
substances, souls
alypse, 1:17-18; 10 6 :
A i, REP 2 325c-326c; Q 65, A i, REP i 339b- 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART iv, 267b
340b; Q 66, A 2 345d-347b; Q 75, A 6, ANS 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 276b~285c passim, esp
383c-384c; Q 84, A i, REP 3 440d-442a; Q 104, 279b-282a
A i, REP 1,3 534c-536c; Q 113, A i, ANS 576a-d; 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK i, APH 56 112a
Q 115, A3, ANs588c-589c 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 216d-
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, 217c; 228a-b; 229c-d
Q 77, A 2, ANS and REP i 945a-946b; Q 91 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, DBF 8 355c; PROP 8,
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other discussions of the distinction between eternity as infinite time and eternity as time-
lessness, seeTiME 2; and for the relation of eternity to time, seeTmE 2C.
Another consideration of infinite time, see INFINITY 3e.
The controversy concerning the infinity of time and the eternity of the world or motion,
see ASTRONOMY 8c(i), 8d; CHANGE 13; TIME 2b; WORLD 43; and for the relation of creation
to eternity and time, see GOD 73; TIME 2c; WORLD 46(2).
The notion of permanent elements or principles of change, see CHANGE 2.
Other discussions of the eternity of God, see CHANGE i5c; GOD 4d.
The conception of the angels as aeviternal, see ANGEL 3c; TIME 2a.
The discussion of imperishable or incorruptible bodies, see ASTRONOMY 8a; BEING 7b(3);
CHANGE ice; ELEMENT 53.
The consideration of the eternality of truth and of ideas, see CHANGE 153; FORM 2b; IDEA ic;
IMMORTALITY 6c; TRUTH 5.
The conception of the eternity of Heaven and Hell or of eternal salvation and damnation, see
HAPPINESS 7c; IMMORTALITY 5e~5f; PUNISHMENT 50(1); SIN 6d.
The problem of the knowabihty of the infinite, see INFINITY 6b; KNOWLEDGE 53(4).
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below arc works not included in Great Boo^s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
'TT'HIS chapter belongs to Darwin. Not that only on philosophical thought, but also on the
JL his writings, which are cited under almost direction of research mall the biological sciences.
all headings, stand alone in the various places
they appear. The point is rather that many of WITH REGARD TO Darwin's predecessors the
the topics are dictated by and draw their mean- question is not so much one of their influence
ing from his thought, and that he figures in all upon him as of their anticipation, in one way or
the major issues connected with the origin of another, of his discoveries, his conceptions, and
species, the theory of evolution, and the place his theory.
of man in the order of nature. With respect to The observation made in antiquity concern-
the matters under consideration in this chapter, ing a hillside deposit of marine fossils is some-
the other writers in the tradition of the great times taken as implying an early recognition of
books cannot escape from being classified as the evolution of terrestrial life. More apposite
coming before or after Darwin, or as being with perhaps is the statement by Lucretius that "the
or against him. new earth first put forth grass and bushes, and
Darwin's influence on later writers may be next gave birth to the races of mortal creatures
variously estimated, but it is plainly marked by springing up many in number in many ways
their use of his language and their reference to after divers fashions." Lucretius also speaks of
his fundamental notions. James* Principles of strange monsters which nature did not permit
Psychology, especially in its chapters on instinct to survive. "Nature set a ban on their increase
and emotion, views the behavior of men and and they could not reach the coveted flower of
animals and the phenomena of intelligence or age nor find food nor be united in marriage . . .
mind in evolutionary terms. The writings of And many races of living things must then have
Freud are similarly dominated by the genetic died out and been unable to beget and continue
approach and by an appeal to man's animal their breed." Those which survived, he adds,
ancestry in order to explain the inherited con- had qualities which "protected and preserved
stitution of his psyche in conformity with the each particular race."
doctrine of evolution. Apparently susceptible to similar interpreta-
Outside psychology the concept of evolution tion are Aristotle's statements that "nature
is reflected in theories of progress or of a dia- proceeds little by little from things lifeless to
lectical development in history; as, for example, animal life"; that "there is observed in plants
in the dialectical or historical materialism of a continuous scale of ascent toward the animal";
Marx and Engels, which is set forth in the and that "throughout the entire animal scale
latter's Dialectics of Nature. An even more there a graduated differentiation in amount
is
general re-orientation of philosophy, which of vitality and in capacity for motion." Augus-
stems from an evolutionary way of thinking, is tine's commentary on the first chapter of
to be found in the writings of Bergson and Genesis seems even more explicitly to contem-
Dewey, such as Creative Evolution and The In- plate the successive appearance of the various
Darwin on Philosophy. These, along
fluence of forms of life. Plants and animals did not actually
with many of the specifically biological works exist when the world began. Though their
cited in the list of Additional Readings, give causes were created by God and existed from
some measure of the influence of Darwin not the beginning, the actual production of plants
451
452 THE GREAT IDEAS
and animals in their various kinds is, as Aquinas but also the disposition of their remaining parts,
tellsus while summarizing Augustine's view, and when we find here the wonderful simplicity
"the work of propagation*' not of creation. of the original plan, which has been able to
Like Aristotle, both Aquinas and Locke repre- produce such an immense variety of species by
sent the world of living organisms as a graduated the shortening of one member and the length-
scale ascending from less to more
perfect forms ening of another, by the involution of this part
of life. But where Aquinas tends to conceive and the evolution of that, there gleams upon
that graduated scale as a hierarchy involving the mind a ray of hope, however faint, that the
essential differences, Locke sees an almost per- principle of the mechanism of nature, apart
fect continuity involving only differences in from which there can be no natural science at
degree. "In all the visible world," he writes, all, may yet enable us to arrive at some explana-
"we see no chasms or gaps." To illustrate this, tion in the case of organic life. This analogy of
he points out that "there are fishes that have forms, which in all their differences seem to be
wings, and are not strangers to the airy region; produced in accordance with a common type,
and there are some birds that are inhabitants strengthens the suspicion that they have an
of the water, whose blood is cold as fishes . . . actual kinship due to descent from a common
There are animals so near of km to both birds parent. This we might trace in the gradual
and beasts that they are in the middle between approximation of one animal species to another,
both: amphibious animals link the terrestrial from that in which the principle of ends seems
and aquatic together and the animal and
. . . best authenticated, namely from man, back to
vegetable kingdoms are so nearly joined, that, the polyp, and from this back even to mosses
if you will take the lowest of one and the highest and lichens, and finally to the lowest perceiv-
of the other, there will scarce be perceived any able stage of nature."
tion of a hierarchy in nature, or even of a con- ficial resemblance to Darwin's thought. The
tinuity in which the species differ by "almost matter is further complicated by Darwin's own
insensible degrees," constitutes only back- sense of his divergence from and disagreement
ground. What the theory of evolution brings with his predecessors both immediate precur-
to the fore is the notion of a developmental or sors like Buffon and Linnaeus and earlier phi-
ccrned. He is concerned with establishing the phyla, families, and orders. But there are also
fact that new do
originate in the course
species smaller groupings within a species. There arc
of time, against those who suppose the species races or varieties and sub-varieties, the mem-
of living things to be fixed in number and im- bers of which share the characteristics of the
mutable in type throughout the ages. He is species but differ from one another in other
concerned with describing the circumstances respects. Ultimately, of course, within the
under which new species arise and other forms smallest class the systematist bothers to define,
cease to have the status of species or become each individual differs from every other in the
extinct. He is concerned with formulating the same group with whom, at the same time, it
various factors in the differentiation of species, shares certain characteristics of the race, the
and with showing, against those who think a species, the genus, and all the larger classes to
new species requires a special act of creation, which they belong.
that the origin of species, like their extinction, This general plan of botanical or zoological
isentirely a natural process which requires no does not seem to give species pe-
classification
factors other than those at work every day in culiar status in the hierarchy of classes or group-
animals. Only as a consequence of these pri- except as these are more or less inclusive than
considerations does he engage in specula- itself. Why then should attention be focused
mary
tions about the moving panorama of life on on the origin of species, rather than of varieties
earth from its beginnings to its present and its or of genera ?
future. One part of the answer comes from the
Darwin looks upon the term "species" as facts of generation or reproduction. Offspring
"arbitrarily given," and for that reason does tend to differ from their parents, as well as
not attempt any strict definition of it. He uses from each other, but they also tend to re-
it, moreover, like his predecessors in systematic semble one another. "A given germ," Aristotle
biological classification, to signify "a set of in- writes, "does not give rise to
any chance living
dividuals closely resembling each other" a being, nor spring from any chance one; but
class of plants or animals having certain com- each germ springs from a definite parent and
mon Darwin would probably
characteristics. gives rise to a definite progeny." This is an
agree with Locke's criticism of those who sup- early formulation of the insight that in the
pose that our definitions of species grasp the process of reproduction, the law of like generat-
real essences or relate to the substantial forms ing like always holds for those characteristics
inherent in things. As indicated in the chapter which identify the species of ancestors and
on DEFINITION, Locke insists that our notion progeny.
of a species expresses only what he calls the In other words, a species always breeds true;
"nominal essence" a set of characteristics we its members always generate organisms which
attach to the name we give things of a sort can be classified as belonging to the same
when we group them and separate them in our species, however much they vary among them-
classifications. "The boundaries of species, selves as individuals within the group. Further-
whereby man sorts [things], are made by men," more, the sub-groups the races or varieties
he writes; "the essences of the species, dis- of a species arc able to breed with one another,
tinguished by different names, are ... of man's but diverse species cannot interbreed. Organ-
making." isms different in species either cannot mate
Species is not the only term of classification. productively at all, or if crossbred, like the
A genus, for example, is a more inclusive group horse and the ass, they produce a sterile hy-
than a species. Groups which differ specifically brid like the mule.
belong to the same genus if their difference is In the hierarchy of classes, then, species
accompanied by the possession of common would seem to be distinguished from all smaller
traits. As species differ from one another within groupings by their stability from generation to
a generic group, so genera are in turn sub- generation. If species arc thus self-perpetuating,
classes of more inclusive groupings, such as they in turn give stability to all the larger
454 THE GREAT IDEAS
groupings~-the getoera, phyla, families which varieties to breed true; his own observations
remain as fixed from generation to generation of the geographical distribution of species of
as the species which constitute them. Hence flora and fauna, especially those separated from
the question of origin applies peculiarly to one another by impassable barriers; the facts of
species rather than to varieties or to genera, comparative anatomy and embryology which
On the supposition stated, no origin of reveal affinities in organic structure and de-
species of organisms have always existed from dicates the great antiquity of life upon the
the beginning of life on earth; or, if in the earth, which gives evidence of the cataclysmic
course of ages new species have arisen, their changes in the earth's surface (with conse-
appearance cannot be accounted for by natural quences for the survival of life), and which
generation. By the law of natural generation, above all contains the fossil remains of forms of
Spontaneous generation, of course, remains a Briefly stated, Darwin's insight is that new
A new species of organism might
possibility. species arise when, among the varieties of an ex-
come to be without being generated by other isting species, certain intermediate forms be-
living organisms. But apart from the question come extinct, and the other circumstances are
of fact (/'.<?., whether spontaneous generation now become
such that the surviving varieties,
ever does occur), such origin of a form of life more sharply separated from one another in
seems to he outside the operation of natural type, are able to reproduce their kind, and, in
causes and to imply the intervention of super- the course of many generations of inbreeding,
natural power. also tend to breed true. They thus perpetuate
The possibility of spontaneous generation their type until each in turn ceases to be a spe-
was entertained in antiquity and the Middle cies and becomes a genus when its own extreme
Ages, and was even thought to be supported by varieties, separated by the extinction of inter-
observation, such as that of maggots emerging mediates, become new species, as they them-
from putrefying matter. But modern science selves did at an earlier stage of history. For the
tends to affirm the biogenetic law that living or- very same reason that Darwin says "a well-
ganisms are generated only by living organisms. marked variety may be called an incipient
To Kant, the notion that "life could have species," a species may be called an incipient
upon "the generation of something organic species. On the contrary, when in the course
from something else that is also organic," of thousands of generations some of the varie-
Kant docs not carry that principle to the point ties of a species achieve the status of species,
where it would make the generation of a new the species from which they originated by
species impossible. "Within the class of organic variation ceases to be a species and becomes
beings," he writes, it is possible for one organ- a genus.
ism to generate another "differing specifically "The only distinction between species and
from it." well-marked varieties," Darwin writes, "is that
the latter are known, or believed, to be con-
AGAINST THE BACKGROUND of these various nected at the present day with intermediate
suppositions, Darwin is moved to a new in- gradations, whereas species were formerly thus
sight by the conjunction of certain types of connected ... It is quite possible that forms
fact: the results of breeding under domestica- now generally acknowledged to be merely
tion which exhibit the great range of variation Varieties may hereafter be thought worthy of
within a species and the tendency of inbred specific names; and in this case scientific and
CHAPTER 24: EVOLUTION 455
common language will come into accordance. tween two given species must be infinite in
In short, we shall have to treat species in the number, which is impossible."
same manner as those naturalists treat genera The Russian geneticist, Theodore Dobzhan-
who admit that genera are merely artificial sky, gives an interpretation of continuity in
combinations made for convenience . . . Our nature which differs from Kant's in that it
classifications will come to be, as far as they follows and applies Darwin's conception of
can be so made, genealogies." species and their origin. According to him, if
The origin ofspecies thus seems to be identical we suppose the extreme case of all possible
with the extinction of intermediate varieties, com- genetic variations being alive on earth to-
bined with the survival of one or more of the gether, the result would be not an infinite
extreme varieties. These seem to be simply two number of species, but no species and genera at
ways of looking at the same thing. Still another The array of plants and animals would
all.
way of seeing the point may be achieved by approach a perfectly continuous series in which
supposing, contrary to fact, the survival of all there would only be individual differences.
the varieties ever produced through the breed- There would be no specific or generic group-
ing of organisms. ings of the sort now made in our classification
very process of natural selection constantly first, those which determine the extinction or
tends, as has been so often remarked, to ex- survival of organisms and, with their survival,
terminate the parent-forms and the inter- their opportunities for mating and reproduc-
mediate links." If one were to suppose the tion; second, those which determine the trans-
degrees of the difference between the one through geological catastrophes which make
species and the other. In one word, there are certain areas of the earth's surface uninhabit-
no species or sub-species which ... are the able for all organisms, or for those types which
nearest possible to each other; intermediate cannot adapt themselves to the radically
species or sub-species being always possible, the changed environment; through the competi-
difference of which from each of the former is tion among organisms for the limited food
always smaller than the difference existing supply available in their habitat; through the
between these." But, Kant adds, "it is plain struggle for existence in which organisms not
that this continuity of forms is a mere idea, to only compete for food but also prey upon one
which no adequate object can be discovered in another; through the sexual selection which
experience," partly because "the species in operates within a group when some organisms
nature are really divided and if the gradual
. . . are prevented 'by others from mating and
progression through their affinity were con- reproducing; and through all the obstacles
tinuous, the intermediate members lying be- which isolate groups from interbreeding, in-
456 THE GREAT IDEAS
eluding geographical and physiological in- separate identities. They can therefore be re-
accessibility. assorted and enter into new genetic combina-
The struggle for existence is not only a tions in the next generation. Most important of
struggle to survive, but also a struggle to re- all,Darwin thinks that new forms of life arise
produce. Natural selection operates with re- gradually as the result of a continuous accumu-
spect to reproduction as well as survival. lation of slight and imperceptible variations.
Whether the survivalis of the fittest alone, or The opposite view is now taken. The discovery
whether the multiplication of inferior organ- of abrupt mutations in a single generation dis-
isms also gives evolution another direction, has countenances Darwin's maxim natura nonfactt
been disputed since Darwin's day; but ac- saltum "nature does nothing by jumps."
cording to his theory, "natural selection works These advances in genetics since Darwin's
solely by and for the good of each being; all day do not alter the main outlines of his theory.
corporeal and mental endowments will tend to The mechanisms of heredity may be much
progress toward perfection . . . Thus, from the more complicated than Darwin knew, and
war of nature, from famine and death . . . the involve much of which he was ignorant, such
production of the higher animals directly fol- as mutation-rates, or the various types, causes,
variation, tremendous advances since Darwin tion of genetic variation in offspring and the
in the experimental science of genetics require transmission of ancestral traits. No matter how
revisions in this part of his theory of evolution. these are explained, their occurrence is all that
This is
particularly true of the researches of is needed to permit new species to originate
Mendel, Bateson, and Morgan concerning the through natural processes of heredity and
ways in which genetic factors operate. But on Darwin were alive today," Julian
selection. "If
one major point in the theory of heredity Huxley writes, "the title of his book would
Darwin holds a view which later investigations have to be not the 'origin' but the 'Origins of
have tended to confirm. Antedating Weismann, Species.' For perhaps the most salient single
he nevertheless opposes Lamarck's theory of fact that has emerged from recent studies is
the inheritance of acquired characteristics. As that species may arise in a number of quite
William James expresses it, where Lamarck sup- distinct ways."
entirely by causes operating in the breeding various stages in its history, or even by a writer
process. James thinks "the evidence for Mr. like Kant, who seems to possess thegerm of its
Darwin's view [was] quite convincing,"
. . . . . .
insight.
even before received the support of Weis-
it The critical test in every case is whether
mann's theory, according to which it is "a those who affirm the occurrence of new species
priori impossible that
any peculiarity acquired by natural processes rather than by special
during the lifetime by the parent should be them as simply added to the
creation, think of
transmitted to the germ." organic forms already in existence without any
The not the same with regard to
situation is
change in the status as species of the pre-exist-
Darwin's views on the mechanism of heredity. ing forms. Those who think in this way do not
Writing before Mendel's classic experiments in have Darwin's idea of the origin of species; for
hybridization,Darwin seems to suppose a in conceiving an increase in the number of
blending of hereditary factors; whereas, ac- species as merely a matter of addition, they
cording to Mendel, inheritance is
particulate. necessarily attribute stability to each species,
Distinct genetic factors combine to produce a new as well as old. By this test, not even Kant
certain somatic result without losing their seems to be near the center of Darwin's hy-
CHAPTER 24: EVOLUTION 457
pothcsis of the origin of species by the extinc- number. Analogy would lead me one step
tion of intermediate varieties. farther, namely, to the belief that all animals
In comparing Darwin with certain of his and plants are descended from some one proto-
predecessors, notably Aristotle and Aquinas, it type. But analogy may be a deceitful guide."
seems necessary to apply another kind of test. It is immaterial to the theory of evolution, he
Here the problem is not so much one of dis- adds, whether this inference, "chiefly grounded
pear to disagree, whether the issue between to the interpretation of this passage, and ac-
them is genuine. They do not seem to conceive cording to the possibility of a double use of the
a species in the same way. Certainly they use word "species" for both the small number of
the word differently. This affects the way in progenitors from which all the extant types of
which the whole problem of origins is under- plants and animals have evolved, and for a very
stood. The controversies concerning the fixity large number of those extant types. If the
or mutability of species, concerning evolution theologians use the word "species" in the first
and creation, and concerning the origin of man sense, and Darwin in the second, they need not
involve genuine issues only if those who seem be in disagreement. The "view of life" which
to disagree do not use the word "species" in Darwin attributes to certain eminent authori-
widely different senses. ties, he himself does not flatly reject, namely,
It is
possible that certain forms of life do not that life, "with its several powers [has] been
originate by descent from a common ancestor originally breathed by the Creator into a few
and do not derive their status as quite distinct forms or into one."
types from the mere absence of intermediate Is there common ground here in the ad-
varieties varieties which once must have ex- mitted possibility that life may have been
isted but are now extinct. If such forms were originally created in a small number of distinct
to be called "species," the word would have a forms and that these are to be regarded as
different meaning from the meaning it has species in one conception, though not in
when applied to types of pigeons, beetles, or another? If so, the affirmation of a certain
rats. would apply only to a few
fixity to species
The of these two meanings may express
first primordial Concerning forms which
forms.
the philosophical conception of a living species have appeared with the passage of time, two
as a class of organisms having the same essential questions would have to be answered. First,
nature, according to which conception there are they species in the philosopher's sense of
never could have been intermediate varieties. distinctand immutable essences, or species in
The second meaning may be that of the scien- the scheme of systematic biological classifica-
tific taxonomist in botany or zoology who con- tion? Second, is their first appearance at an
structs a system of classification, genealogical historical moment due to a special act of
or otherwise. On meaning, one million
this creation, to spontaneous generation, or to
and a half would be a conservative estimate of evolution from already existing organic forms
the number of plant and animal types classi- by "descent with modification"?
fied by the systematist as "species." In contrast, To join issue with Darwin, it would seem to
the number of species, in the philosophical be necessary for the person answering these
sense of distinct essences, would be extremely questions to use the word "species" in the
small. biologist's sense and at the same time to ac-
Darwin, for example, says, "I cannot doubt count for the historical ongm of the new species
that the theory of descent with modification by special creation or spontaneous generation.
embraces all the members of the same great But in the tradition of the great books, theo-
class or kingdom. I believe that animals are logians like Augustine and Aquinas do not
descended from at most only four or five pro- attribute to God any special acts of creation
genitors, and plants from an equal or lesser after the original production of the world,
458 THE GREAT IDEAS
except to explain the origin of individual mediately from God," He does not reject the
human souls. suggestion of Augustine that the human body
"Nothing entirely new was afterwards made may have preexisted in other creatures as an
by God," Aquinas writes, "but all things effect preexists in its causes. But he adds the
subsequently made had in a sense been made qualification that preexists in its causes only
it
before in the work of the six days Some ex- . . . in the manner of a "passive potentiality," so
isted not only in matter, but also in their that "it can be produced out of pre-existing
causes, as those individual creatures that are matter only by God." A
Christian theologian
now generated existed in the first of their kind. like Aquinas might entertain the hypothesis of
Species also that are new, if any such appear, emergent evolution as applied to the human
existed beforehand in various active powers; so organism, but only with the qualification that
that animals, and perhaps even new species of natural causes by themselves do not suffice for
animals, are produced by putrefaction by the the production of man.
power which the stars and elements received at On the second view, which is Darwin's, man
the beginning. Again, animals of new kinds and the anthropoid apes have descended from a
arise occasionally from the connection of in- common ancestral form which is now extinct,
dividuals belonging to different species, as the as are also many of the intermediate varieties
mule is the offspring of an ass and a mare, but in the chain of development unless, as it is
even these existed previously m their causes, in sometimes thought, certain fossil remains sup-
the work of the six days." ply some of the missing Jinks. "The great break
in the organic chain between man and his near-
WHETHER OR NOT the theologian's conception which cannot be bridged over by any
est allies,
of an historical development of the forms of life extinct or living species, has often been ad-
conforms to the evolutionist's hypothesis, even vanced," Darwin admits, "as a grave objection
though it does not offer the same type of ex- to the belief that man is descended from some
is a matter which the reader of the lower form; but this objection," he continues,
planation,
textsmust decide. But one issue, which still "will not appear of much weight to those who,
remains to be discussed, can leave little doubt from general reasons, believe in the general
of a basic controversy between Darwin and principle of evolution. Breaks often occur in all
some of his predecessors, especially the theo- parts of the series, some being wide, sharp and
logians. defined, others less so m various degrees, as
Itconcerns the origin and nature of man. It between the orang and its nearest allies be-
can be stated m
terms of two views of human tween the Tarsius and the other Lemundae
nature. One is that man is a species in the between the elephant, and in a more striking
philosophical sense, essentially and abruptly manner between the Ornithorhynchus or
distinct from brute animals; the other, that Echidna, and all other mammals." Further-
man is and
a species in the biologist's sense, more, Darwin insists, no one who has read
differs from other animals only by continuous Lyell's Antiquity of Man "will lay much stress
mentality of any created power, but was im- interpreted by Aquinas and Darwin. But ac-
CHAPTER 24: EVOLUTION 459
cording to the doctrine of man's creation by potentiality for a varietyof forms, Darwin's
God, or even on the hypothesis of emergent theory of descent with modification seems to
evolution, there need not be strictly speak- be definitely opposed to the hypothesis of
ing, there cannot be a missing link between emergent evolution. Speaking as a Darwinian,
ape and man, for the emergent species is a James says that "the point which as evolution-
whole step upward in the scale of life. Man is we are bound to hold fast
ists to is that all the
thus not one of several organic types which new forms of being that make their appearance
have become species through the extinction of are really nothing more than results of the
intermediate varieties, and hence he differs redistribution of the original and unchanging
from other animals not in an accidental, but materials ... No new natures, no factors not
rather in an essential manner that is, he dif- present at the beginning, arc introduced at
fers in kind rather than degree. any later stage."
This issue concerning human nature is dis- In this dispute between two theories of evo-
cussed from other points of view in the chap- lution, does not the solution depend in every
ters on ANIMAL and MAN. Here the issue, case upon a prior question concerning the rela-
stated in terms of man's origin, seems to in- tion of the species under consideration
volve three possibilities: special creation, evo- whether or not it is possible for them to be or to
lution by descent from a common ancestor, have been developmen tally connected by in-
and emergent evolution. But these three termediate varieties? If, for example, the
origin of every species which did not exist at they now exist in the world, are essentially
the first moment of life on earth. distinct different in kind then no inter-
The hypothesis of special creation does not mediate varieties could ever have existed to
seem to be held by the theologians, at least not account for their descent from a common an-
in the tradition of the great books. The hy- cestor. If, on the other hand, the evidence
pothesis of emergent evolution raises questions were to prove that they differ only in degree,
concerning the factors natural or super- then no difficulty stands in the way of the
naturalwhich must be operative to cause the Darwinian hypothesis. The ultimate issue con-
emergence of higher from lower forms of or- cerning the origin of species would thus seem to
ganic matter. Whether or not Aristotle and reduce to the problem of which meaning of
Aquinas can supply an answer to these ques- "species" applies to the organic types in ques-
tions in terms of their theory of matter's tion.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
1. The classification of animals
20. Comparison of variation under conditions of natural and artificial breeding 462
2b. Characteristics which are more and less variable genetically: their bearing on
the distinction of races, species, and genera
30. The inheritance of acquired characteristics: the use and disuse of parts
460 THE GREAT IDEAS
PA01
3</.
Atavisms and reversions to ancestral type 463
4<a.
The question of ultimate origins: the creation of primordial life in one or many
forms; the original generation of life from inorganic matter
4?. The origin of new forms of life: special creation, spontaneous generation, or
descent with modification from older forms
4*/.
The direction of evolution: progress and recession
464
5. The theory of evolution: the origin of new species from a common ancestry
6b. The geographical distribution of the forms of life in relation to the genealogy of
existing species
7& The theory of the evolutionary origin of man from lower forms of animal life:
descent from an ancestor common to man and the anthropoids
(1) Anatomical, physiological, and embryological evidences of an organic af-
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER- Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
upper and lower halves of the page, For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 1 16a-l 19b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand sideofthepage, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
thepage. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the mam divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given cer- m
tain cases; eg., Iliad, BK n [265-283! 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT' Nehemiah, 7-45 (D) II Esdras, 7*46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
b b b
J55i i9~552 27] 78c-79c, CH 31 [556 25]-cn 12 LUCRETIUS- Nature of Things, BK v
[783-836]
b
32 [557 i4] 83c-84b; BK vi, CH 15-16 95a-96a 71b-72a
/ Generation of Animals, BK i, CH i [715*18- 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xii, CH 13, 3$0b-
716*1] 255b-256a; CH 16 [721*3-11] 260d-261a; c; BK xvi, CH 7-8 427a-428c
b
BK ii, CH i
[732 8~i4] 272d-273a; CH 3 [737* 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q
69,
b
1-5] 277d; BK m, CH 9 299b-300a, CH n [762 A 2, ANS 361c-362c; Q 71, A i, ANS and REP i
28-763*19] 303d-304b 367a-368b; Q 72, A i, ANS and REP 5 368b-
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [783-836] 369d; Q 73, A i, REP 3 370a-371a; Q 74, A 2,
71b-72a ANS 373d-375a; Q 115, A 2 587c-588c; Q 118, >
18 AUGUSTINE* Confessions, BK xiu, par 45 123a 3, REP i 603b-604b
/ City of God, BK xii, CH 10, 348b-c; CH n 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 338d
349a-b; CH 21 357a-b; CH 23-27 357d-360a,c; 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 29
BK xiu, CH 24 373d-376a,c 159b-c
19A9uiNAs: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 69, 36 SWIFT .
Gulliver, PART iv, 167b
A 2 361c-362c; QQ 71-72 367a-369d 42 KANT: Judgement, 578d-580a 579b-
csp
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK v, 105a-b 580a
28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 299b / On 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, la-5d passim, csp
Animal Generation, 338c-d; 400d-401a; 412c- la-d, 3a, 5c-d; 6d-7d csp 7d; 31d{ 6(>d-61a;
413a; 428c-d; 449a-b; 454d-455a; 468b-469c 64a; 74a-b; 78a-c; 85b-c; 92d; 182a-184d
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK vii [131-640] 220a- esp I83b-184b; 198b-204d csp 198b-c, 204d;
231a 217d 219a; 228c-229a,c esp 228c, 229c; 234d-
34 NEWTON: Optics, BK in, 542b 243d csp 239b-240d, 242d-243d / Descent of
'
42 KANT: Judgement, 578d-580a csp 579b-580a; 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 689c-
582b-c 690acsp689d
464 THE GREAT IDEAS 6c
(4. The problem of evolution: the origin of plant 97a-b; 152a-153a; 168d-171a; 231d-232d/ De-
and animal species,) scent of Man, 341a;350b-356a
54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 768d-
44. The direction of evolution: progress and 769a
recession
36 SWIFT: PART n, 79a-80a; PART 5<*(3) Difficulties with the theory of natural se-
Gulliver, in,
lection: its limitations
121a-b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 178a-d 49 DARWIN- Origin of Species, 80a-ll8d esp
49 DARWIN- Origin of Species, Ic; 41c-42a; 60b- 80a-b; 13ic-134c; 152a-153a; 160d-166a,c pas-
62a; 63b-64d; 96b 103c esp 96b-98a, 99a-c, sim, esp 165d-166a,c; 230a-233b / Descent of
102d-103c; 176b-178a; 243b-d / Descent of Man, 284d-285c
51 TOLSTOY. War and Peace, BK v, 217c 5b. Competition in mating: sexual selection
53 [AMES, Psychology, 95b 7 PLATO: Republic, BK v, 361b-363b
54 FREUD Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 651d- 28 HARVEY On Animal Generation, 454a-c; 477b
654c esp 653d-654a / Civilization and Its Dis- 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART 166a-b
iv,
contents, 768d-769a 38 ROUSSEAU Inequality, 346b-c
49 DARWIN- Origin of Species, 43d 44c / Descent
5. The theory of evolution: the origin of new
of Man, 359c-d, 364a-589d esp 364a-368b,
species from a common ancestry 373b-375a, 381d-383a, 432c-434d, 486a-c,
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 6a-243d esp 6d-7d, 529a-530c, 561a-d, 582d-585d, 588d 589d,
23c d, 32a c, 1 16d-118d, 228c-243d 593d'596a,598a-600a,c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 95b-98a esp 95b, 98a 53 JAMLS Psychology, 14b
5a. The struggle for existence: its causes and 5c, The geographical and physiological fac-
consequences tors in breeding: accessibility, fertility,
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other discussions of the classification of animals, see ANIMAL 2a-2c; LIFE AND DEATH
and for the distinction between species and genera in relation to definition and classifica-
tion, see DEFINITION la, 20, 2d; RELATION 53(4); SAME AND OTHER 33(1).
Other considerations of the problem of heredity, see ANIMAL 10; FAMILY 6b; HABIT 36.
Matters relevant to the origin of life, and of the major forms of life, see ANIMAL ib, 8a-8b;
LIFE AND DEATH 2, 3a.
Another treatment of the conflict of organisms in the struggle for existence, see OPPOSITION
3C '
Matters relevant to the origin of man and to his affinity with other animals, see ANIMAL ic-
ic(2); MAN
la-ic, 4b~4c, 8-8c; MIND 3a~3b; SOUL 2c(2)-2c(3).
Evolution in relation to the idea of progress, see PROGRESS 2; and for matters bearing on social
and mental evolution in human history, see HISTORY 4b; MAN pc; MIND 3c; PROGRESS ib,
6; TIME 8a.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below arc works not included in Great Booty of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
HENDERSON. The Fitness of the Environment MARETT. Head, Heart and Hands in Human Evo-
D. W. THOMPSON. On Growth and Form lution
SHAW. Man and Superman DOBZHANSKY. Genetics and the Origin of Species
.
Bac^ to Methuselah ADLER. Problemsfor Thomists: The Problem ofSpecies
C. L. MORGAN. Emergent Evolution MAYR. Systematics and the Origin of Speciesfrom the
L. T. MORE. The Dogma of Evolution Viewpoint of a Zoologist
SMUTS. Holism and Evolution ]. S. HUXLEY. Evolution, the Modern Synthesis, CH 10
McDoucALL. Modern Materialism and Emergent .
Evolutionary Ethics
Evolution B. RUSSELL. Religion and Science, CH 3
H. G. WELLS, J. HUXLEY, and G. WELLS. Repro-
P, . Human Knowledge, Its
Scope and Limits,
duction, Genetics and the Development of Sex PART I, CH 4
M. R. COHEN. Reason and Nature, BK n, CH 3 KEITH. A New Theory of Human Evolution
Chapter 2.$:
INTRODUCTION
is
regarded as a source of dictory. According to the context of the dis-
T^XPERIENCE
JL-/ knowledge. It is also spoken of as con tain- cussion or the subject matter under considera-
ing what is known. tion, the same author will shift from one mean-
Sometimes it is identified with sense-percep- ing to another.
tion; sometimes it involves more memory and For example, in his account of the origin of
the activity of the imagination. Sometimes it science, Aristotle says that "out of sense-per-
includes thoughts, feelings, and desires as well, ception comes to be what we call memory, and
allthe contents of consciousness, every phase of out of frequently repeated memories of the
mental or psychic life. The temporal flow of same thing develops experience; for a number
experience is then identified with the stream of of memories constitute a single experience."
consciousness. The further product of experience "the uni-
Experience may connote something which is versal stabilized in its entirety within the soul"
private or public, subjective or objective is obtained by abstraction and the related act
something which no man can share with an- of induction or generalization. Art or science
other or something which is common to all men arises, Aristotle writes, "when from many no-
who live in the same world and who are ac- tions gained by experience, one universal judg-
quainted with the same objects. ment about a class of objects is
produced."
There are still other divisions of experience: Hence it can be said, he thinks, that from ex-
intuitive or aesthetic experience, religious ex- perience "originate the skill of the craftsman,
perience, and mystical experience. the knowledge of the man of science, skill in the
Experience is said to be that which makes a sphere of coming to be and science in the sphere
man expert in an art or in a sphere of practical of being."
activity. A man is better able to do or make In the study of nature, experience, according
that which he has much experience in doing or to Aristotle,is essential for
"taking a compre-
making. He is judge what
also better able to hensive view of the admitted facts" which can
should be undertaken or what has been ac- come only from dwelling "in intimate associ-
complished by others as well as by himself. In ation with nature and its phenomena." In the
this connection experience is called practical, context of ethical or political problems, he
both because the result of practice and be-
it is treats experience as the basis for a prudent
cause it is a means to be used in directing action. judgment, which is not "concerned with uni-
But it is also praised for the opposite reason- versals only," but "must also recognize the par-
as something to be enjoyed for its own sake, ticulars." This fact, Aristotle writes, explains
serving no end beyond itself unless it be the "why some who do not know," but who "have
enrichment of life
by the widest variety of experience, are more practical than others who
experiences. know." In the field of poetry, as in moral mat-
ters, it is theman of experience, according to
THESE ARE SOME of the myriad meanings of Aristotle, who can best judge what is good or
"experience" not all, but those which occur bad; he can "judge rightly the works pro-
with major emphasis in the tradition of the duced and understand by what means or
. . .
great books. No author uses the word in all how they are achieved, and what harmonizes
these senses. Some of these senses are contra- with what," whereas "the inexperienced must
468
CHAPTER 25: EXPERIENCE 469
be content if they do not fail to see whether the The order of the object of the theo-
nature
work has been well or ill made." retic sciences the order of experience. In
is
Hobbes and William James also use the word Kant's technical sense of mogliche erfahnmg^
for the possession of expertness or sound judg- nature is the realm of all possible experience.
ment in practical affairs, as well as in connection His distinction between judgments of percep-
with the origin or nature of knowledge. Hobbes, tion and judgments of experience differentiates
like Aristotle, says that "much memory, or what for other writers is
subjective sense-expe-
memory of many things, is called Experience" rience,from knowledge of reality or of objects
He connects it with prudence. It is that knowl- shared by many minds.
edge, he writes, which "is not attained by rea- Experience is the domain of such public ob-
soning, but found as well in brute beasts as in jects precisely because its sense-materials arc
man; and is but a memory of successions of formed and ordered by the structure of the
events in times past, wherein the omission of mind itself by the forms of intuition and the
every little circumstance altering the effect, categories of the understanding in a synthesis
most prudent.'*
frustrates the expectation of the which Kant calls the "transcendental unity of
For fames, however, experience is usually apperception." Without this synthesis, experi-
identified with the stream of consciousness. ence "would be merely a rhapsody of percep-
"Experience moulds us every hour," he writes, tions, never fitting together into any connected
"and makes of our minds a mirror of the time- text, according to rules of a thoroughly united
and-space-connections between the things in (possible) consciousness, and therefore never
the world." He distinguishes it from concep- subjected to the transcendental and necessary
tion, reasoning, or thought, and associates it unity of apperception."
with sensation and feeling. "The way of 'experi- Though it may not seem possible, William
ence' proper is the front door," he writes, "the James goes further than Kant in the conception
door of the five senses." of experience as a realm of being. Kant does not
For the most part, experience is a term in think that all possible experience circumscribes
psychological analysis, with implications for the reality. "That which is not phenomenon," he
tical wisdom. That is the way it is chiefly used can never overstep the limits of sensibility,
by Aquinas, Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, within which alone objects are presented to us."
and Hume, as well as the authors already men- In contrast to this phenomenal reality with
tioned. It is still a term in the dimension of which he identifies experience, Kant posits a
psychology when it is used by Plotinus and by noumenal world a world of intelligible or
the theologians to discuss the mystical union of supra-sensible beings. To this realm, Kant
the soul with God. writes, belong those "possible things which are
But with Hume experience also is reality or, not objects of our senses, but are cogitated by
in his phrase, the realm of "matters of fact and the understanding alone." Since the things
existence," as opposed to "relations of ideas." Kant calls ding-an-sich are unconditioned, that
He tends to identify the order of nature with is,not subject as they are in themselves to the
the succession of events in experience, though forms of intuition or the categories of the un-
he also seems to conceive a "pre-established derstanding, they cannot have an empirical or
harmony between the course of nature and the sensible reality, but only an intelligible exist-
succession of our ideas." Nature, he goes on to ence.
say, "has implanted in us an instinct, which William James goes further in his Essays in
carries forward the thought in a correspondent Radical Empiricism^ when he takes experience
course to that which she has established among as equivalent to the whole of reality, including
ges$,the contrast between the practical and major issue in the tradition of the great books.
the aesthetic values of experience the actively Those who make it, however, tend to regard
useful and the intrinsically enjoyable. At least experience as something which results from the
the metaphysical identification of experience activity of the senses. For them the problem is
with all existence seems analogous to the aes- whether our ideas the general notions or con-
thetic ideal of a life which embraces every va- cepts that enter into our scientific judgments
riety of experience. and reasoning come from sense-experience,
There some intimation of this ideal in the
is which either is or originates from the percep-
lust for adventure which motivates Odysseus tion of particulars. The contrast between the
and his men. Dante, in fact, finds the secret of particular and the universal, between percept,
Ins character in the ardor of Odysseus "to be- sense-impression, or concrete image on the one
come experienced of the world, and of the vices hand, and concept or abstract idea, on the
of men, and of their virtue," which leads him other, lies at the heart of the problem.
"to pursue virtue and knowledge," even to the One possibility is that the mind,
by processes
point of his "mad flight." of abstraction or induction, somehow draws all
poetic expression of this ideal is written in This tabula rasa depends upon the senses and
Faust in the worlds of experience Mephistoph- the imagination for the materials out of which
eles opens to the man who has wagered his soul concepts are formed. "For the intellect to un-
for one ultimately satisfying moment. derstand actually," Aquinas writes, "not only
apart from experience. During the early cen- said that sensitive knowledge is the total and
turies' of Christianity, devoutly religious men perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, but
CHAPTER 25-EXPERIENCE 471
rather that it is in a way the material cause." THE FOREGOING views are not a necessary con-
Although experience is the indispensable source sequence of the distinction between the facul-
of the materials on which the intellect actively ties of sense and reason. The theory of innate
works, knowledge worthy of the name of sci- ideas presents another possibility. As expressed
ence or of art does not come from experience by Descartes, for example, this theory holds
alone. that there are "purely intellectual [ideas] which
Thus we see that those
who, like Aquinas, our understanding apprehends by means of a
affirm that there nothing in the intellect
is certain inborn light." Hence it would seem that
which was not previously in the senses do not experience can be dispensed with, except for
mean to imply that the materials of sense- its value in dealing with
particulars. But for
experience reach the intellect untransformed. most of the writers who take this view, experi-
On the contrary, the primary contribution of ence, in addition to providing acquaintance
the intellect is the translation of experienced with particulars, acts as the stimulus or the
particulars into universal notions. Nor do those occasion for the development of the seeds of
edge is
directly drawn from experience. To the experimental knowledge in the sphere of natural
extent that deductive reasoning is a way of science. To answer such a question as, "what is
learning new truths, the truths thus learned the nature of the magnet?" the inquirer must
derive from experience only indirectly. Their "first collect all the observations with which
direct source is truths already known, which experience can supply him about this stone,
must in turn have come from experience by and from these he will next try to deduce its
induction. character."
Harvey critic^es those who misconceive the The extreme position which denies any role
part which reason should play in relation to the to experience can be taken only by those who
senses. In the field of his own inquiries, "some think that the growth of actual knowledge
weak and inexperienced persons," he writes, from innate ideas requires no outside impetus;
"vainly seek by dialectics and far-fetched argu- and perhaps also by those who make ideas the
ments, either to upset or establish things that are objects of the mind's intuitive apprehension. It
only to be founded on anatomical demonstra- is
questionable whether anyone goes to this
tion, and believed on the evidence of the senses. extreme without the qualification that, for par-
. . . How difficult it is,'* he continues, "to teach ticulars at least, sense-experience is knowledge.
those who have no experience, the things of The other extreme that experience is the
which they have not any knowledge by their only source of knowledge is approached by
senses!" those who deny the distinction in faculties,
As in geometry, so in all the sciences, ac- and substitute for the duality of sense and
cording to Harvey, it is the business of reason reason, each with its characteristic contribution
"from things sensible to make rational demon- to human knowledge, a distinction between the
stration of the things that are not sensible; to function of perceiving and that of reworking
render credible or certain things abstruse and the received materials. Though in different
beyond sense from things more manifest and bet- ways. Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume all
ter known." Science depends upon both reason appear to take this position.
and sense; but sense, not reason, is the ultimate They represent, according to James, "the
arbiter of what can be accepted as true. "To empirical school in psychology." He tries to
test whether anything has been well or ill ad- summarize their view by saying that "\iall the
vanced, to ascertain whether some falsehood connections among ideas in the mind could be
does not lurk under a- proposition, it is impera- interpreted as so many combinations of sense-
tive on us," Harvey declares, "to bring it to the data wrought into fixity . then experience in
. .
proof of sense, and to admit or reject it on the the common and legitimate sense of the word
decision of sense." would be the sole fashioner of the mind." If,
472 THE GREAT IDEAS
in other words, all that is done with the sensa- not the only source of knowledge would also
tions, impressions, or ideas whatever term is
agree that some judgments, especially the basic
used for the original data of experience con- propositions of science, are a priori. But this
sists in their reproduction by memory and im- does not appear to be the case. Bacon, for ex-
agination, and
their comparison, combination, ample, like Aristotle, holds that the principles
and connection in various ways to produce of the various sciences are derived by induction
ters on IDEA, SENSE, and UNIVERSAL. Locke's ticulars, by ascending continually and gradu-
treatment of abstract ideas and the special con- ally, till it
finally arrives at the most general
sideration given by Hume to the concepts of axioms." All axioms, on this view, are a posteriori
mathematics suggest that there are kinds or propositions.
aspects of knowledge which cannot be accounted Descartes and Kant, while differing in the
for by reduction to experience. Both men in- terms of their analysis, think, as we have seen,
troduce a certain qualification upon their em- that the mind provides the ground for
itself
piricism.However slight that may be, it does certain judgments which are therefore a priori.
not appear in Hobbes and Berkeley, for they It does not even seem to be the case that those
completely deny the existence of abstract or who make experience the only source of knowl-
universal notions in the mind. If "abstract," edge regard all propositions as a posteriori.
"universal," or "general" applies to names Hume's treatment of mathematical proposi-
alone, then the mind or understanding adds tions and fames' treatment of axioms or nec-
nothing to, and does not radically transform, essary truths seem to be the exceptions here.
the materials of experience. There is still another way in which the issue
can be stated. The question is whether human
THE CONTROVERSY concerning experience and knowledge extends to objects beyond experi-
knowledge can also be stated in terms of the ence, to things or beings which are not sensible
opposition between the a priori and the a poste- and which transcend all
possible experience.
These terms are sometimes used to signify
riori. Again it might be supposed that those who
what is possessed before and what comes after take an a posteriori view of the origin of knowl-
or from experience, and sometimes they are edge would also limit apprehension to things
used to indicate, without reference to the time expenenceable. But Aristotle and Aquinas seem
order, what is
independent of and what is de- to say that the origin of knowledge from experi-
pendent upon experience. ence does not restrict the knowable to things
The distinction between the a priori and the capable of being experienced. Aquinas cites
a posteriori is not made in the same way with Aristotle'swork on the heavens to show that
respect to propositions or judgments and with "we may have a scientific knowledge" of things
respect to reasoning or inference. The distinc- we cannot experience, "by way of negation and
tion and its significance for science and phi- by their relation to material things." He would
determined by experience nor does it need experience, we can by means of them reach be-
empirical verification. yond the sensible world to purely intelligible
It might at first be supposed that those who realities to immaterial and non-sensible beings
agree in thinking that experience is just one or aspects of being. Locke, who may be thought
CHAPTER 25: EXPERIENCE 473
even more emphatic than Aristotle or Aquinas whether some other sphere of matter exists,"
in on the empirical origin of
his insistence What transcends all experience, in
possible
knowledge, goes as far as they do in affirming other words, cannot be known, at least not in
man's knowledge of God and the soul. the manner of the speculative sciences; only the
Hume, in contrast, holds that knowledge moral sciences, proceeding in a different fashion,
may go beyond experience only if it is knowl- have access to the realm of the supra-sensibk.
edge of the relation of our ideas, as exemplified Kant's position seems to resemble Hume's.
1
Any science which claims to be knowledge of pure physics are a pnoti rather than a posteriori',
reality or existence rather than of the relations the objects of both are objects of actual or
between ideas, is thus limited to the realm of possible experience.
By these criteria Hume challenges the valid- formulated, and conclusions, however reached,
ity of metaphysics or natural theology.
Such must be verified by the facts of experience.
disciplines claim to be knowledge of real exist-
Newton states it as a rule of reasoning "in ex-
ences, but their objects are not expenenceable perimental philosophy [that] we are to look
and their conclusions cannot be empirically upon propositions inferred by general induction
verified. The existence of God and the im- from phenomena as accurately or very nearly
mortality of the soul may be objects of faith, true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses
but they are not verifiable conclusions of sci- that may be imagined, till such time as other
ence; nor for that matter can metaphysics give phenomena occur, by which they may either
us scientific knowledge of the ultimate con- be made more accurate, or liable to exceptions."
stitution of the physical world if that involves In similar tenor, Lavoisier says that "we ought,
knowledge of substances and causes which lie in every instance, to submit our
reasoning to
behind the phenomena and outside of experi- the test of experiment, and never to search for
ence. "All the philosophy in the world,'* Hume truth but by the natural road of experiment
writes, "and all the religion . . will never be . and observation."
able to carry us beyond the usual course of The two words "empirical" and "experi-
experience." mental" should not, however, be used inter-
Kant, like Hume,
limits theoretic knowledge changeably. No sciencfc can be experimental
to mathematics and the study of nature. A without being empirical, but, as the chapter on
metaphysics which pretends to know objects ASTRONOMY indicates, the converse does not
outside the phenomenal order cannot be de- appear to be true.
fended. "The understanding has no power to There seem to be three different types of
decide," he writes, "whether other perceptions experience from which knowledge can be de-
besides those which belong to the total of our rived: (f) the ordinary everyday experiences
possible experience [exist], and consequently which men accumulate without making any
474 THE GREAT IDEAS
special effort to investigate, explore, or test; which are both mathematical and experimental,
(2) the special data of experience which men the experiment enables the scientist to make
collect by undertaking methodical research and exact measurements of the phenomena and so
making systematic observations, with or with- to determine whether one or another mathe-
out apparatus; and (3) experiences artificially matical formulation fits the observable facts of
produced by men who exercise control over the nature. Investigating accelerated motion, Gali-
phenomena and with respect to which the ob- leo seeks not only to demonstrate its definition
server himself determines the conditions of his and its properties, but also to show that "ex-
experience. "Those experiences which are used perimental results agree with and exactly
. . .
to prove a scientific truth," James writes, "arc correspond with those properties which have
for the most part artificial experiences of the been, one after another, demonstrated by us."
laboratory, gamed after the truth itself has been The experiment of the inclined plane yields
conjectured." measurements which exemplify those ratios be-
Of these three only the last is an experimental tween space and time that are determined by
experience. The first type of experience may be one rather than by another mathematical defini-
employed by the scientist, but it is seldom suffi- tion of the acceleration of a freely falling body.
cient or reliableenough for his purposes. The The experiment is thus used to decide between
distinction between the empirical sciences which two competing mathematical theories, choosing
arcand those which are not experimental turns that one "best fitting natural phenomena." In
on the difference between the second and third those sciences, Galileo writes, "in which mathe-
perform experiments, as, for example, in as- by well-chosen experiments, become the foun-
tronomy, where the phenomena can be me- dation of the entire super-structure."
thodically observed and exactly recorded, but Concerned with the phenomena of heat,
cannot be manipulated or controlled. Among Fourier makes the same point concerning the
the great books of natural science, the biological relation of mathematics and experiments.
writings of Hippocrates, Aristotle, Galen, and "Mathematical analysis," he says, "can deduce
Darwin, the astronomical works of Ptolemy, from general and simple phenomena the ex-
Copernicus, Kepler, and Newton, and the clin- pression of the laws of nature; but the special
of Freud are examples of scientific
ical studies application of these laws to very complex effects
works which are more or less empirical, but not demands a long series of exact observations"
In contrast, Galileo's Two New for which experiments are needed.
experimental.
Sciences, Newton's Optics, Harvey's Motion of In addition to testing hypotheses and provid-
the Heart and Blood, Lavoisier's Elements of ing measurements whereby mathematical for-
Chemistry, and Faraday's Experimental Researches mulations can be applied to nature, experiments
in Electricity represent empirical science which function as the source of inductions. A crucial
has recourse to experimentation at crucial experiment constitutes a single clear case from
points.
which a generalization can be drawn that is
applicable to all cases. Newton's optical experi-
ON THE SIDE OF their production, experiments ments are of this sort. He calls this use of ex-
are like inventions. They do not happen by periments "the method of analysis." It consists
chance or without the intervention of art. They in "making experiments and observations, and
arc usually performed under carefully controlled in drawing general conclusions from them by
conditions and by means of apparatus artfully induction. And although the arguing from
. . .
contrived. This explains the interplay between experiments and observations by induction be
technology and experimental science. Progress no demonstration of general conclusions, yet it
in each occasions progress in the other. is the best
way of arguing which the nature of
On the side of their utility, experiments seem things admits of."
to serve three different though related purposes A
third use for experiments is in the explora-
in scientific work. In those branches of physics tion of new fields of phenomena, for purposes
CHAPTER 25: EXPERIENCE 475
of discovery rather than of induction or veri- Experimental exploration, apart from the
fication. Hypotheses may result from such ex- direction of hypotheses, seems to be a procedure
plorations, but in the first instance, the experi- of trial and error. Experimentation in this sense
mentation may be undertaken without the reflects what Hippocrates had in mind when he
guidance of hypotheses. This employment of spoke of "the experiment perilous." In the
experimental technique is illustrated by Fara- work of Hippocratesat the very beginning of
day's remark that "the science of electricity is empirical science, recourse to experiment, far
in that state in which every part of
requires it from being the most prized technique, signified
experimental investigation, not merely for the a lack of scientific knowledge. Only the physi-
discovery of new effects, but what is just now cian who could not cure the patient by art
of far more importance, the development of the based on science took the risk of
experimenting
means by which the old effects are produced." of proceeding by trial and error.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. Various conceptions of experience
476
3*7.
Particular experiences and general rules as conditions of expertness or skill: the
contrast between the empiric and the artist
40. The knowability of that which is outside experience: the supra-sensible, the
noumenal or transcendent
5.
The theory of experimentation in scientific method
REFERENCES
find the passage cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are
the volume and page
To
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER. Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d,
the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the ic
of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology 1 16a-l 19b, the passage
upper and lower halves
.
,
half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
begins m the upper
in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and
Tower halves of the left-
printed
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
in the lower half
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO- Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins
side of page 164.
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
SECT) are sometimes included
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
:
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
James version is cited first and the Douay,
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
the topic discussed intermit-
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim'* signifies that
is
Experience
...
m * j
relation to the acts of the mmd
, i_
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 14a-15c, 45d-46a; 47d- PART in, 50b-d / Meditations, i 75a-77c esp
48a; 53b-54b; 56d-57b, 58c-59b; 65d-66d; M 75d-76c/ Objections and Replies, 229d-230d
72c-73a; I76d-177a; 225c-226b / Practical 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 40-42 387a-
Rcason, 308a-b 388c
2a to 2c CHAPTER 25: EXPERIENCE 477
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding BK n, CH i, BK in, CH 7 [306*6-18} 397b-c / Generation and
SECT 2-5 121b-122b; SECT 20-25 126d-127d Corruption, BK i, CH 2 [316*5-14] 411c-d /
b
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b
23a-24a; 34a-c; 39a-c; 42a; 45d-46a; 47c-48a; / Soul, BK i, CH i [462 i 1-403*2] 631d-632a
53b-54b; 58a-59b; 61a-64a; 66a~d; 72c-85d 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 4 [io95*3o-b 8]
esp 72c-74b; 89c-91d; 93d-94b; 98c; 109d- 340c; BK vi, CH 8 [1142*12-19] 391 b; CH n
b
HOa; 115b-c; 153a-c; 199b-c / Fund. Prin. [n43*34- 6] 392d-393a / Rhetoric, BK n, CH 20
b
Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-b; 282b-c / [i393*25- 3 ] 641a
Practical Reason, 308a b; 329b-c / Judgement, 18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK H, CH 27
461a-462d; 472c-d; 482d-483d; 492c-d; 516b; 650a
551a-552c; 562d-563b; 570b-572b; 603d; 19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 79,
:
20 SECT v, DIV 38 458a-466c esp SECT iv, DIV 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 14a-15c; 72c-85d esp
30, 462a; SECT x, DIV 89 490b-c, SECT xi 72c-74b, 82a-b / Judgement, 562d-563b
497b-503c passim; SECT xn, DIV 131-132 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 281b-c
5Q8d-509d passim 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [522-601] 15a-16b
42 KAN i. Pure Reason, 14a-108a,c esp 14a-20c, 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 449c-451b
23a-24a, 25b-26b, 27b-28b, 29d-33d, 35b-
46a 48d, 57d-59b, 64b-66d; <z. Particular experiences and general rules as
36a, 41c-42b,
conditions of expertness or skill: the
lOSb-d, 110a-113b; 115d-120c; 123d-124b,
contrast between the empiric and the
134c-d; 141d-142c [antithesis]; 146a; 170d-
artist
171a; 172c-173a; 174a; 177d; 179c-182b; 190c-
191a; 192a-b; 199a; 209b-d; 211c-218d; 224a- 7 PLATO. Charmides, 6d-7b / Phaedrus, 136b-c /
227a; 228b-d; 230c 231c; 236d-237a; 244d- ,
Gorgias, 253a; 261a-262a; 280d-282b; 287d-
245a / Fund. Prm. Metaphysic of Morals, 253a- 288b / Republic, BK i, 303a-304a / Theaetetus,
254d esp 253b, 254c-d; 268b-d; 283b / Prac- 516a / Philebus, 633a-c / Laws, BK iv, 684c-
ticalReason, 307d-308b; 309b-d; 329d-330c / 685a; BK ix, 745a-b
Science of Right, 405 b-d / Judgement, 461 a - 8 ARJSTOTLB: Prior Analytics, BK i, CH 30 [46*
475d esp 465c-467d, 474b-475d; 570b-572b; 18-28] 64a / Posterior Analytics, BK n, CH 19
600d-603d esp 603a-b [100*3-9] 136c / Metaphysics, BK j, CH i
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445d-447a passim; {980^25-982*1 } 499b-500b
475b,d [fn i] 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 13 [1102*15-^26]
40HEOEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 182d- 347c; BK n, CH i 348b,d-349b passim; BK HI,
CH b
183c 8[in6 3-i5] 362d-363a; BK vi, CH i
b
53 JAMES Psychology, 85Ia-890a esp 851a-b, ,
[1^3^25-34] 387b; BK x, CH 9 [n8o i3-
859a-861b, 889a-890a n8i b i2] 435b-436a,c / Politics, BK HI, CH n
b a
[i28i 40~i282 6]479d
3. Experience in relation to organized knowl- 10 HIPPOCRATES: Anctent Medicine, par 1-8 la-
edge: art and science t
3b; par 20 7b-d / Epidemics, BK in, SECT in,
7 PLATO: Gvrgias 3S3a t par 1 6 59b-c / Surgery, par i 70b / Articula-
8 ARISTOTLE Prior Analytics, BK i, CH 30 [46*
:
tions, par 10, 94d / The Lap H4a-d
49a; 53a-b; 56o57b; 74b-d; 82c>d / Novum 271b / Optics, BK in, 543a-b
Organum, we i APH 64 114b; BK n, APH 44-52 34 HUYGENS: Light, OH t\ 553a
175d-195d 35 LOCKE: Hitman Urt&rttandkig, BK n, CH
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART vi, 61b-c xxm, SECT 3 2Q4c-tf; SECT 6-7 205b-206a;
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT v, DIV 36, SECT 28-29 211b-212aj SBOT 32-37 212c-214b;
465a-d [fn ij; 465c; SECT vin, DIV 65, 479d- BK in, CH xi, SECT 21-23 304d-305b; BK iv,
480a CH in, SECT 14 316b-d; SECT 16 317a-c; SECT
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 296b,d-297c 25-29 321a-323a passim^ CH vi, 5E<ST 13
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK ix, 361d-365c 335c-d; CH xn, SECT 9-13 360d-362d; CH xvi,
53 JAMES: Psychology, 666b-667a; 673a-674b; SECT 12 370b-371a
689b-690a 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 30 418c;
54 FREUD: Psychoanalytic Therapy, 125a SECT 58-59 424a-b; SECT 104 433a-b; SECT
107 433d^434a j
3. The issue concerning the rple of experience 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV
in science 20-SECT v, DIV 38 458a*466c passim; SECT vn,
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 224a-225a; 228a-230c / Re- DIV 48, 471b-c; DIV 60 477a-c; SECT vm, DIV
public, BK vi, 3S3d-388a; BK vn, 391b-398c / 65, 479b-c; SECT xi, DIV 111-113 S01b-502d
Timaeus, 455a-c / Theaetetus, 534d-536b / esp DIV 112 501c-S02a
Seventh tetter, 809c-810d 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 5a-13d; 14a-c; 15c-16c;
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK i, CH 30 [46* 31b-d; 46aib; 58a-b; 66d-67b; 68a-69c;85a-
18-28] 64a / Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 13 b; 86d-87b; 94b-95a; 211c-218d / Fund. Pnn.
b a
[78 3i-79 i6] 108b-c; CH 18 lllb-c; CH 31 Metaphysic of Morals, 253a*254d csp 253b,
120a-c; BK n, CH 19 136a-137a,c / Physics, 254b-c; 263b-c; 273a-b / Practical Reason,
BK i, CH i 259a-b; CH 8 (191*24-34] 267a-b / 295b-d; 312c-d; 329d-330c; 331a-332d / In-
Heavens, BK nr, CH 7 [306*6-18] 397b-c / tro, Metaphysic of Morals, 387a-b /
Judgement,
Generation and Corruption, BK i, CH 2 [316*5- 562d-563b
14] 411c-d / Metaphysics, BK i, CH i [980^5- 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445b-447a passim;
982*1] 499b-500b; BK xi, CH 7 [1064*4-9] 475b,d [fn i]
592b /&>/, BK i, CH i [402 b i 1-403*2] 631d- 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, Ic-
632a 2b; 6d-7a,c; PART in, 87b-c
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK HI, CH 2 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 774d
b
[5U io-25] 35a-b / Parts of Animals, BK m, 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 3,
CH 4 [666*7-10] 193d / Generation of Animah, lOa-lla / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156c-
BK in, CH 10 [760^7-32] 301d-302a / Ethics, 190b
BK x, CH 9 [n8o b i3-ii8i b i2] 435b-436a,c 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE 11,
10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 1-8 la-3b 684a
/ Aphorisms, SECT i, par i 131a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 385a-b; 677b; 862a-884b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 84, esp 862a-865a, 867a, 884b
AA 6-8 447c-451b; Q 96, A i, REP 3 510b- 54 FREUD- Narcissism, 400d-401a / Instincts,
511b 412a-b / General Introduction,* >S45b-d /New
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART HJ, Q 9, Introductory Lectures, 81 5a
A 4 766b-767b; Q 12 776c-779d passim
23 HOBBES* Leviathan, PART i, 60a-d; PART n, 4. Experience as measuring the scope of human
129a; PART iv, 267a-b knowledge
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 260c-261c; 285c-288a;
291b-292d i
4a. The knowability of that which is outside
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, PREF, la-b; BK t> 6a-7a; experience: the supra-sensible, the nou-
BK n, 27b-c menal or transcendent
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 131a- 7 PLATO' Cratylus, 94a; 113b'114a,c / Republic,
138b passim * BK 383d-388a /, Tttnacuf, 447b-d / Crtttas,
vi,
28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 267b,d-268d; 478b-d / Pbrmenides, 489d-490d / Theaetetus,
280c / Circulation of the Blood, 32&d-323d; 534c-636ty
324c-d / On Animal Generation, 33lb 335c; 8 ARISTOTI*: Hewens, BK m, CH i [298 b i5-24]
411c-d / Memory and Reminiscence* CH i
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 5b-c; 16a;
44c; 57b-d / Novum Organum 105a-195d csp 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts ofAnimnh, BK i, CH 5 (644 b
BK I, APH 64 114b, APH 95-103 126b-128a 2i~6455J 168c-d ?
31 DESCARTES: Rules, n, 2d-3a; vn, 10c-12a; 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things BK i [265-328] ^
547b-d; 551a-552c; 560c; 562a-564c; 570b- 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 267b,d-268d /
572b csp 570c-571c; 574b-577a; 579a; 581a- On Animal Generation, 331b-337a,c
b; 584c-d; 588d-589c; 594d [fn ij; 599d- 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 34b; 42a-c /
600d; 603a-604b; 606d-607c; 609b-610fc; 611c- Novum Organum 105a-195d / New Atlantis,
210d-214d
5ato5c CHAPTER 25: EXPERIENCE 481
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART vi, 61c-62c 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 268d-273c esp
34 NEWTON: Optics, BK in, 543a-b 268d, 273c; 286b-304a,c csp 286b-c, 295d-
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 5d-6c 296a / Circulation of the Blood, 31Ic-312c;
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i, 22c 324c-d
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 175b 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 34b / No-
45 FARADAY : Researches in Electricity, 774d vum Organum, BK n, APH 36 164a-168d
50 MARX :
Capital, 6c-d 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART vi, 61d-62c;
53 JAMES: Psychology, 385a-b; 677b 66a-b
54 FREUD New Introductory Lectures, 879c
: 33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 368b-370a / Great Experi-
ment 382a-389b passim / Weight of Air, 404a-
5<*. Experimental exploration and discovery: 405b; 425a-429a
the formulation of hypotheses 34 NEWTON: Principles, LAWS OF MOTION, SCHOL,
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, PREF, la-b; BK i, 6a-7a; 19b-22a; BK n, GENERAL SCHOL 211b-219a;
BK n, 27c-d PROP 40, SCHOL 239a-246b / Optics, BK i,
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 131a- 392a-396b; 408a-410b; 412a-416b; 453a-455a;
138b; 157b-171b passim; THIRD DAY, 203d- BK in, 543a-b
205b; 207d-208a 34 HUYGENS: Light, PREF, 551b-552a
28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 273c-d; 280c-d; 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH xn,
285c-d / On Animal Generation, 331b-333d; SECT 13 362c-d
336b-d 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 2a-b;
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 16a; 30d- PART i, 32a-33a
31a, 34b, 42a-c / Novum Organum, PREF 105a- 45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 181 b
106d; BK i 107a-136a,c csp APR 8 107c-d, APH 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 385b-c;
50 lllb, APH 64 114b, APH 70 116b-117a, APH 440b,d; 467a-b
82 120d-121b, APH 99-100 127b-c, APH 121 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 12b-c; 149d-150a
132b-d; BK n 137a-195d passim / New Atlan- 53 JAMES: Psychology, 865a
tis, 214a-b 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 291d-292a /
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART vi, 61d-62c; 66a-b New Introductory Lectures, 815a-b
33 PASCAL- Vacuum, 359a-365b / Equilibrium of
5c. Experimental measurement: the application
Liquids 390a-403a passim, esp 390a-392a
34 NEWTON. Principles, BK in, RULE IH-IV 270b- of mathematics
271b; GENERAL SCHOL, 371b-372a / Optics, 7 PLATO- Republic, BK vn, 396c-d
BK i,379a; 386b-455a; BK n, 457a-470a; BK 16 PTOLEMY Almagest, BK i, 24b-26a; BK n, 38b-
:
SECT 46-47 281d-282b; BK iv, CH xn, SECT Spheres, BK n, 558b-559b; 567b; 586b-589a;
9-13 360d-362d BK iv, 705b-706a
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 329d-330a 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK iv, 85c-89c; BK v,
42 KANT: Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 387a-b 92a-93b
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 2a-b; 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY,
PART i, 10d-12d; 17a-20desp 17a; 22c-24a esp 136d-137c; 148d-149c; 164a-166c; THIRD DAY,
23c, 29d-33b 207d-208c
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169a; 172a; 175b; 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 286c-288c
184a 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 46b-c /
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 440b,d; Novum Organum t BK n, APH 44-47 175d-
607a,c; 659a; 774d 179c
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 136b-139a passim 34 NEWTON: LAWS OF MOTION, SCHOL,
Principles^
53 JAMES- Psychology, 126a-127a; 348a-357b pas- 20a-22a; BKPROP 69, SCHOL, 131a; BK n,
i,
esp 10 ; 40-48 passim (D) Ezechiel, 1-4 esp 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 81a; 189b-191a;
i; 8-12 esp 10 40-48 passim / Daniel, 7-12 /
; 294d-296b; 605b-d
Hosea, 1-3 (D) Osee, 1-3 / Amos, 7-8 / 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 4fob-W*
Zechariah, i-6(D) Zacharias, 1-6 42 KANT: Practical Reason, 320c-321b
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 1:20-25; 3:16-17; 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [354-514] lla-14b;
17:1-9; 28 / Lut^e, 1:1-38; 2:8-15,25-35 / Acts, [1238-1321] 30b-32b; [2337-2604] 56b-63b;
2:2-4; 7:55-56; 93-8; 10 ; 11:5-10; 12:7-11; [3835-4398] 93b-108b; PART n [7005-8487]
16:9; 18:9-11; 22:6-11; 23:11; 26:13-18; 17lb-206b
27:21-25 (D) Acts, 2:2-4; 7:55; 9:3-8; 10; 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK in, 156d; 162b-
11:5-10; 12:7-11; 18:9-11; 22:6-11;
16:9; 164a,c; BK v, 219b-220a; BK xi, 525c-526b;
23-11; 26:13-18; 27:21-25 / II Corinthians, BK xv, 631a-c
12:1-9 / Revelation (D) Apocalypse 52 DOSTOEVSKY Brothers Karamazov, BK v, 127b-
:
CROSS-REFERENCES
For; The discussion of the faculties or the acts of the mind which are related to experience, see
IDEA ic, 20, 2e 2g; INDUCTION xa, 2; JUDGMENT 8c; KNOWLEDGE 6b(i), 6c(4); MEMORY
AND IMAGINATION la, 30, 53-50, 6c(i)~6c(2); MIND ia(i)~ia(2), ie(i); REASONING ic, 4C,
5jb(3);
SENSE ic-id, 3c(5), 4b, 53; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 40.
la,
The consideration of the empirical foundations or sources of science and art, see ART 5;
DIALECTIC 2a(i); MEDICINE 2a; METAPHYSICS 2c; PHILOSOPHY 33; PHYSICS 2; SCIENCE
ib, ic, 53; SENSE 5b~5c.
The discussion of experience in relation to the conditions or limits of human knowledge,
see INDUCTION 2; KNOWLEDGE 53-53(6); MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6d; METAPHYSICS
4b; MIND 50.
Other treatments of the empirical verification of hypotheses or theories, see HYPOTHESIS 4d;
PHYSICS 4c; SCIENCE 50; SENSE 5c; TRUTH la.
Other discussions of the role of experimentation in scientific inquiry, see INDUCTION 5; LOGIC
4b; MECHANICS 23; PHYSICS 4~4d; SCIENCE 53.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booty of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
place,
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
**
P&GUY. Basic Verities (Innocence and Experience)
R. BACON. Opus Majus, PART vi Men and Saints (The Holy Innocents)
.
DUNS SCOTUS. Oxford Commentary, BK i, DIST 3, Q 4 HUGEL. The Mystical Element of Religion
(9) LENIN. Materialism and Empinocriticism
LEIBNITZ. New Essays Concerning Human Under- BRADLEY. Appearance and Reality, BK i, CH n
standing Essays on Truth and Reality, CH 6
.
INTRODUCTION
human family, according to Rousseau, wise Maker hath set to the works of His hands,
THE is "the most ancient of all societies and the we find the inferior creatures steadily obey."
only one that is natural." On the naturalness Yet Locke does not reduce the association of
of the family there seems to be general agree- father, mother, and children entirely to a di-
ment in the great books, although not all would vinely implanted instinct for the perpetuation
claim, like Rousseau, that it is the only natural of the species. "Conjugal society," he writes,
The sometimes also regarded as
state is "is made by a voluntary compact between man
society.
a natural community, but its naturalness is not and woman, and though it consists chiefly in
as obvious and has often been disputed. such a communion and right in one another's
The word "natural" applied to a community bodies as is
necessary to its chief end, procrea-
or association of men can mean either that men tion, yet it draws with it mutual support and
instinctively associate with one another as do bees assistance,and a communion of interests, too."
and buffaloes; or that the association in ques- If the human
family were entirely an instinc-
tion, while voluntary and to that extent con- tively formed society, we should expect to find
ventional, is also necessary for human welfare. the pattern or structure of the domestic com-
It is in this sense of necessity or need that Rous- munity the same at all times and everywhere.
seau speaks of family ties as natural. "The chil- But since the time of Herodotus, historians and,
dren remain attached to the father only so long later, anthropologists have observed the great
as they need him for their preservation," he diversity in the institutions of the family in
wiites. "As soon as this need ceases, the natural different tribes or cultures, or even at different
bond dissolved." If after that "they remain
is times in the same culture. From his own travels
the human family to the same sort of instinc- stories about the diversity of the mores with
tive determination which establishes familial respect to sex, especially in relation to the
ties other animals, though he recognizes
among rules or customs which hedge the
community
that the protracted infancy of human offspring of man and wife.
make "the conjugal bonds more firm and . . . Such facts raise the question whether the
lasting in man than the other species of ani- pattern of monogamy pictured by Locke repre-
mals." Since with other animals as well as in sents anything more than one type of human
the human species, "the end of conjunction family the type which predominates in west-
between male and female [is] not barely pro- ern civilization or, even more narrowly, in
creation, but the continuation of the species," Christendom. Marx, for instance, holds that
it ought to last, in Locke's opinion, "even after the structure of the family depends on the
procreation, so long as is
necessary to the nour- character of its "economical foundation," and
ishment and support of the young ones, who insists that "it is of course just as absurd to hold
are to be sustained by those who got them till the Teutonic-Christian form of the family to be
they are able to shift and support for them- absolute and final as it would be to apply that
selves. This rule," he adds, "which the infinite character to the ancient Roman, the ancient
486
CHAFER 26! FAMILV 48?
Greek, or the Eastern forms which, moreover, for Locke, the naturalness of the
family not
taken' together form a series in historic develop- only points to a natural development of the
'
ment."
'
quires years of care in order to survive. If the "The relation of love between husband and
family did not exist as a relatively stable organi- wife," he writes, "is in itself not objective, be-
zation to serve this purpose, some other social cause even if their feeling is their substantial
agency would have to provide sustained care unity, still this unity has no objectivity. Such
for children. But wherever we find any other an objectivity parents first acquire in their
social units, such as tribes or cities, there we children, in whomthey can sefe objectified the
also find some form of the family in existence, entirety of their union. In the child, a mother
not only performing the function of rearing loves its lather and he its inb, tKer.^ Bothjiave
children, but also being the primitive social their love objectified for them in tEe child.
group out of which all larger groupings seem to While in their goods their unity is embodied
grow or to be formed. Aristotle, for example, only m an external thing, in their children it is
describes the village or tribe as growing out of embodied in a spiritual one in which the par-
an association of families, just as later the city ents are loved and which they love."
or state comes from a union of villages. Until recent times when it has been affected
We have seen that the naturalness of the by urban, industrial conditions, the family
restricted than that of other groups, although identical with household management, accord-
blood- relationships, often more remote, may ing to others, a principal part of it." In his own
also operate to limit the membership of the judgment, "property is a part of the house-
tribe or the state. Its function, according to hold, and the art of acquiring property is a
Aristotle, at least in origin,was to "supply part of the art ot managing the household"
mtt^s, everyday wants," whereas the state went but a part only, because the household includes
beyond this in aiming at other conditions "of human beings as well as property, and is con-
a good life." cerned with the government of persons as well
In an agricultural society of the sort we find as the management of things.
among the ancients, the household rather than The foregoing throws light on the extraor-
the city is occupied with the problems of dinary shift in the meaning of the word "eco-
wealth. In addition to the breeding and rear- nomics" from ancient to modern times. In the
ing of children, and probably because of this in significance of their Greek roots, the word
part, the family as a unit seems to have been "polity" signifies a state, the word "economy"
concerned with the means of subsistence, on the a family; and as "politics" referred to the art of
side of both production and consumption. Its governing the political community, so "eco-
members shared in a division of labor and in a nomics" referred to the art of governing the
division of the fruits thereof. domestic community. Only in part was it con-
Apart from those industries manned solely cerned with the art of getting wealth. As the
by slave labor in the service of the state, the chapter on WEALTH indicates, Rousseau tries to
production of goods largely depended on the preserve the broader meaning when he uses the
industry of the family. In modern times this phrase "political economy" for the general
system of production came to be called the problems of government; but for the most part
"domestic" as opposed to the "factory" system. in modern usage "economics" refers to a science
It seems to persist even after the industrial or art concerned with wealth, and it is
"politi-
revolution. But, according to Marx, "this mod- cal" in the sense that the management of
ern so-called domestic industry has nothing, wealth, and of men with respect to wealth, has
except the name, in common with the old- become the problem of the state rather than
fashioned domestic industry, the existence of the family. Not only has the industrial economy
which presupposes independent urban handi- become more and more a political affair, but
crafts, independent peasant farming, and above the character of the family as a social institution
all, a dwelling house for the laborer and his has also changed with its altered economic
But Socrates does not think that "there can be under the regulation of divine law would be to
any dispute about the very great utility of hav- exceed its authority, and hence to act without
ing wives and children in common; the possi- right and in violation of rights founded upon a
bility," he adds, "is quite another matter, and higher authority.
will be very much
disputed." In the Christian tradition philosophers like
Aristotle questions both the desirability and Hobbes and Kant state the rights of the family
possibility."The premise from which the argu- in terms of natural law or defend them as natu-
"
ment of Socrates proceeds," he says, is 'the ral rights. "Because the first instruction of chil-
"
greater the unity of the state the better.' He dren," writes Hobbes, "depends on the care of
denies this premise. "Is it not obvious," he their parents, it is necessary that they should be
asks, "that a statemay at length attain such a obedient to them while they are under their
degree of unity as to be no longer a state ? tuition. Originally the father of every man
. . .
since the nature of a state is to be a plurality, was also his sovereign lord, with power over
and from being a
in tending to a greater unity, him of life and death." When the fathers of
state, it becomes a family, and from being a families relinquished such absolute power in
family, an individual." Hence "we ought not order to form a commonwealth or state, they
to attain this greatest unity even if we could, did not lose, nor did they have to give up, ac-
for it would be the destruction of the state." cording to Hobbes, all control of their children;
In addition, "the scheme, taken literally, is im- "Nor would there be any reason," he goes on,
cludes thecommunity of property as well as from them than from other men. And this," he
the community of women and children) is says, "accords with the Fifth Commandment."
based upon the nature of the state rather than In the section of his Science of Right devoted
on the rights of the family. It seems to have been to the "rights of the family as a domestic so-
a prevalent view in antiquity, at least among ciety," Kant argues that "from the fact of pro-
philosophers, that the children should be "re- creation there follows the duty of preserving
garded as belonging to the state rather than to and rearing children." From this duty he de-
their parents." Antigone's example shows, how- rives "the right of parents to the management
ever, that this view was by no means without and training of the child, so long as it is itself
exception. Her defiance of Creon, based on incapable of making proper use of its body as an
"the unwritten and unfailing statutes of organism, and of its mind as an understanding.
heaven," undertaken for "the majesty of
is also This includes its nourishment and the care of
kindred blood." In this sense, it constitutes an its education." It also "includes, m general, the
affirmation of the rights and duties of the fam- function of forming and developing it practi-
family as against the state are also defended by ture and development, the guilt of neglecting
reference to divine law. The point is not that it falling upon the parents."
the state is less a natural community than the As is evident from Hobbes and Kant, the
family in the eyes of a theologian like Aquinas; rights of the family can be vindicated without
but in addition to having a certain priority in denying that the family, like the individual,
the order of nature, the family, more directly owes obedience to the state. In modern terms,
than the state, is of divine origin. Not only is it at least, theproblem is partly stated by the
founded on the sacrament of matrimony, but question, To what extent cajn parents justly
the express commandments of God dictate the claim exemption from political interference in
490 THE GREAT IDEAS
the control of their own children ? But this is on the supposition that their "natures ... are
only part of the problem. It must also be asked equal and do not differ at all." In the family,
whether, in addition to regulating the family however, Aristotle thinks that "although there
for the general welfare of the whole communi- may be exceptions to the order of nature, the
ty, the state is also entitled to interfere in the male is
by nature fitter for command than the
affairs of the household in order to protect female."
children from parental mismanagement or neg- According to Locke, "the husband and wife,
lect.Both questions call for a consideration of though they have but one common concern,
the form and principles of domestic govern- yet having different understandings, will un-
ment. avoidably sometimes have different wills too.
It therefore being necessary that the last deter-
THE KINDS OF RULE and the relation between mination the rule) should be placed some-
(i.e.,
government in the larger community of the thinks, "leaves the wife in the full and true
state. Many of the chapters on the forms of possession of what by contract is her peculiar
government especially CONSTITUTION, MON- right, and at least gives the husband no more
ARCHY, and TYRANNY indicate that the great power over her than she has over his life; the
books of political theory, from Plato and Aris- power of the husband being so far from that of
totle to Locke and Rousseau, derive critical an absolute monarch that the wife has, in many
points from the comparison of domestic and cases, a liberty to separate from him where
ship, both because that is considered in the terbury Tales, Chaucer gives voice to all of the
chapter on SLAVERY, and because not all house- possible positions that have ever been taken
holds include human chattel. Omitting this, concerning the relation of husband and wife.
two fundamental relationships which domestic The Wife of Bath, for example, argues for the
government involves remain to be examined: rule of the wife. She claims that nothing will
the relation of husband and wife, and of satisfy w6men until they "have the
sovereignty
parents and children. as wellupon their husband as their love, and to
With regard to the first, there are questions of have mastery their man above." The Clerk of
equality and administrative supremacy. Evcjn Oxford, in his tale of patient Griselda, presents
when the wife is regarded as the complete the wife who freely admits to her husband,
equal of her husband, the administrative ques- "When first I came to you, just so left I
my will
tion remains, for there must either be a division and all
liberty." The Franklin in his tale
my
of authority, or unanimity must prevail, or one allows the mastery to neither wife nor husband,
either the husband or the wifemust have "save that the name and show of sovereignty"
the lastword when disagreement must be over- would belong to the latter. He dares to say
come to get any practical matter decided. So
That one the other must obey
friends each
far as husband and wife are concerned, should
If they'dbe friends and long keep company.
the family be an absolute monarchy, or a kind Love will not be constrained by mastery; . . .
over his wife a constitutional rule." Yet the re- WHILE THERE MAY be disagreement regarding
lation between husband and wife, in Aristotle's the relation between husband and wife, there
view, is not perfectly constitutional. In the is none
regarding the inequality between par-
state "the citizens rule and are ruled in turn*' ents and children during the offspring's imma-
CHAPTER 26: FAMILY 491
turity. Although every man may enjoy "equal natural master of his family. "The rights and
right ... to his natural freedom, without being consequences of both paternal and dcspotical
subjected to the will or authority of any other dominion," Hobbes maintains, "are the very
men," children, according to Locke, "are not same with those of a sovereign by institution."
born in this full state of equality, though they On the other hand, Rousseau, an equally
are born to it." staunch opponent of absolute rule, uses the
Paternal power, even absolute rule, over word "despotism" only in an invidious sense
children arises from this fact. So long as the for what he regards as illegitimate government
child "is in an estate wherein he has no under- absolute monarchy. "Even if there were as
standing of his own to direct his will," Locke close an analogy as many authors maintain be-
thinks he "is not to have any will of his own to tween the State and the family," he writes, "it
follow. He him must will
that understands for would not follow that the rules of conduct
for him must prescribe to his will, and
too; he proper for one of these societies would be also
regulate his actions." But Locke adds the im- proper for the other."
portant qualification that when the son "comes Rousseau even goes so far as to deny that
to the estate which made his father a free man, parental rule is despotic in his sense of that
the son is a free man too." term. "With regard to paternal authority, from
Because children are truly inferior in com- which some writers have derived absolute gov-
petence, there would seem to be no injustice in ernment," he remarks that "nothing can be
their being ruled by their parents; or in the rule further from the ferocious spirit of despotism
being absolute in the sense that children are than the mildness of that authority which looks
more to the advantage of him who obeys than
precluded from exercising a decisive voice in
the conduct of their own or their family's af- to that of him who commands." He agrees with
fairs. Those who think that kings cannot claim Locke in the observation that, unlike the politi-
the absolute authority of parental rule fre- cal despot, "the father is the child's master no
quently use the word "despotic" to signify un- longer than his help is necessary." When both
a transference to the are equal, the son is perfectly independent of
justified paternalism
state of a type of dominion which can be justi- the father, and owes him "only respect and not
fiedonly in the family. obedience."
The nature of despotism as absolute rule is Misrule in the family, then, would seem to
discussed in the chapters on MONARCHY and occur when these conditions or limits are vio-
TYRANNY, but its relevance here makes it lated. Parents may try to continue their abso-
worth repeating that the Greek word from lute control past the point at which the children
which "despot" comes, like its Latin equivalent have become mature and are competent to
Accordingly there would seem to be nothing Applying a distinction made by some politi-
invidious in referring to domestic government cal writers, the parent is
tyrannical rather than
as despotic, at least not to the extent that, in despotic when he uses the children for his own
the case of the children, absolute rule is
justified good, treats them as property to exploit, even
by their immaturity. The problem arises only at a time when his absolute direction of their
with respect to despotism in the state, when affairs would be justified if it were for the
one man rules another mature man as absolutely children's welfare. The existence of parental
as a parent rules a child. tyranny raises in its sharpest form the question
The great defender of the doctrine that the of the state's right to intervene in the family for
sovereign must be absolute, "or else there is no the good of its members.
by institution" and those of a father as the lishment is, of course, the institution of mar-
492 THE GREAT IDEAS
riage. The discussion of marriage in the great culture to culture; but in Freud's opinion the
books deals with most of the moral and psycho- "high-water mark in this type of development
logical, if not all of the sociological and eco- has been reached in our Western European
nomic, aspects of the institution. The most pro- civilization."
father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; Old Testament polygamous, but orthodox
and they twain shall be one flesh/ which be- Judaism and orthodox Christianity also differ
tokens the knitting together of Christ and of on divorce.
Holy Church." Augustine explains how a Christian should
Others, like Kant, seem to stress the charac- interpret those passages in the Old Testament
ter of marriage as an institution sanctioned by which describe the polygamous practices of the
natural law. The "natural union of the sexes,'* patriarchs. "The saints of ancient times," he
he writes, "proceeds either according to the writes,"were under the form of an earthly
mere animal nature (yaga libido, Venus vulgivaga, kingdom, foreshadowing and foretelling the
fomicatw), or according to law. The latter is kingdom of heaven. And on account of the
marriage (matnmomum), which is the union of numerous offspring, the custom
necessity for a
two persons of different sex for life-long recip- of one man having several wives was at that
rocal possession of their sexual faculties." Kant time blameless; and for the same reason it was
considers offspring as a natural end of marriage, not proper for one woman to have several hus-
but not the exclusive end, for then "the mar- bands, because a woman does not in that way
riage would be dissolved of itself when the pro- become more fruitful ... In regard to matters
duction of children ceased. . . , Even assum- of this sort," he concludes, "whatever the holy
ing," he declares, "that enjoyment in the recip- men of those times did without lust, Scripture
rocal use of the sexual endowments is an end of passes over without blame, although they did
marriage, yet the contract of marriage is not on things which could not be done at the present
that account a matter of arbitrary will, but is time except through lust."
a contract necessary in its nature by the Law of On similar grounds Aquinas holds that "it
Humanity. In other words, if a man and a wom- was allowable to give a bill of divorce," under
an have the will to enter on reciprocal enjoy- the law of the Old Testament, but it is not al-
male and female amongst other creatures," but the decision of Aeneas or the indecision of
he does not see "why this compact, where pro- Hamlet; and certainly in the reasoning of
creation and education are secured, and inheri- Panurge about whether to marry or not. In
tance taken care for, may not be made deter- each of these cases, everyone finds some aspect
minable either by consent, or at a certain time, of love in relation to marriage, some phase of
or upon certain conditions, as well as any other parenthood or childhood which has colored
voluntary compact, there being no necessity in his own life or that of his family; and he can
the nature of the thing that it should always
. . , find somewhere in his own experience the
be for life." Against Locke, Dr. Johnson would grounds for sympathetic understanding of the
argue that "to the contract of marriage, be- extraordinary relation between Electra and her
sides the man and wife, there is a third party- mother Clytemnestra, between Augustine and
Society; and if it be considered as a vow God; Monica his mother, between Oedipus and Jo-
and therefore it cannot be dissolved by their casta, Prince Hamlet and Queen Gertrude,
consent alone." Pierre Bezukhov and his wife, or what is
per-
Laws and customs, however, represent only haps the most extraordinary case of all Adam
the external or social aspect of marriage. The and Eve in Paradise Lost.
discussion of these externals cannot give any On one point the universality of the problem
impression of the inwardness and depth of the of marriage and family life seems to require
problem which marriage is for the individual qualification. The conflict between conjugal
person. Only the great poems, the great novels and illicit love exists m all ages. The entangle-
and plays, the great books of history and biog- ment of bond between man and wife with
the
raphy can adequately present the psychological the ties of both love and blood which unite
and emotional aspects of marriage in the life of parents and children, is equally universal. But
individuals. Heightened in narration, they give the difficulties which arise m marriage as a re-
more eloquent testimony than the case histories sult of the ideals or the illusions of romantic
of Freud to support the proposition that mar: love seem to constitute a peculiarly modern
supl-eme^TesfToF
human character. understood the necessity for both in the con-
The relation between men and women in and jugal relationship if marriage is to prosper. But
out of marriage, the relation of husband and not until the later Middle Ages did men think
wife before and after marriage, the relation of of matrimony as a way to perpetuate through-
parents and children these create crises, and out all the years the ardor of that moment in a
tensions, conflicts between love and duty, be- romantic attachment when the lovers find each
tween reason and the passions, from which no other without flaw and beyond reproach.
individual can entirely escape. Marriage is not Matters relevant to this modern problem are
only a typically human problem, but it is the discussed in the chapter on LOVE. As is there
one problem which, both psychologically and indicated, romantic love, though it seems to be
morally, touches every man, woman, and child. of Christian origin, may also be a distortion-
Sometimes the resolution is tragic, sometimes even an heretical perversion of the kind of
the outcome seems to be happy, almost blessed; Christian love which is pledged in the recipro-
but whether a human life is built on this foun- cal vows of holy matrimony.
dation or broken against these rocks, it is vio-
lently shaken in the process and forever shaped. WE HAVE ALREADY considered some of the
To somedegree each reader of the great problems of the family which relate to children
books has, in imagination if not in action, par- and youth the immature members of the hu-
ticipated in the trials of Odysseus, Penelope, man race such as whether the child belongs to
and Telemachus; in the affections of Hector the family or the state, and whethei the family
and Andromache, Alcestis and Admetus, Tom is solely responsible for the care and
training of
lonesand Sophia, Natasha and Pierre Bezukhov, children, or a share of this responsibility falls to
in, the jealousy of Othello, the anguish of Lear, the state or the church.
494 THE GREAT IDEAS
There are other problems. Why do men and versions of love, the qualitative distinction^ of
women want offspring and what satisfactions do romantic, conjugal, and illicit love, the factors
they get from rearing children? For the most which determine the choice of a mate and
success or failure in marriage, and the condi-
part in Christendom, and certainly in antiqui*
ty, the lot of the childless is looked upon as a tions which determine the emergence from
grievous frustration. To be childless is not emotional infantilism all these can be under-
merely contrary to nature, but for pagan as well stood only by reference to the emotional life of
as Christian it constitutes the deprivation of a the child in the vortex of the family.
blessing which should grace the declining years The child's "great task," according to Freud,
of married life. The opposite view, so rarely is that of "freeing himself from tEe parents^
taken, isvoiced by the chorus of women in the for "only after this detachment is
accomplished
Medea of Euripides. can he cease to be a child and so become a mem-
"Those who are wholly without experience ber of the social community. . . . These tasks
and have never had children far surpass in hap- are laid down
for every man" but, Freud
piness those who are parents," the women chant writes, "it noteworthy how seldom they are
is
in response to Medea's tragic leave-taking from carried through ideally, that is, how seldom
her own babes, "The childless, because they they are solved in a manner psychologically as
have never proved whether children grow up well as socially satisfactory. In neurotics, how-
to be a blessing or a curse to men, are removed ever," he adds, "this detachment from the par-
from all share in many troubles; whilst those ents is not accomplished at all."
who have a sweet race of children growing up In one sense, it is never
fully accomplished
in their houses do wear away . . . their whole by anyone. What Freud calls the "ego-ideal"
life
through; with the thought how they
first which represents our higher nature and which,
may train them up in virtue, next how they in the name of the reality -principle, resists in-
shall leave their sons the means to live; and stinctual compliance with the pleasure -pnn-
after all this 'tis far from clear whether on good iple is said to have its
origin in "the identifi-
or bad children they bestow their toil." cation with the father, which takes place in the
Still other questions arise concerning chil- prehistory of every person." Even after an in-
dren, quite apart from the attitude of parents dividual has achieved detachment from the
toward having and rearing them. What is the family, this ego-ideal acts as "a substitute for
economic position of the child, both with re- the longing for a father"; and in the form of
spect to ownership of property and with respect conscience it "continues ... to exercise the
to a part in the division of labor? How has the censorship of morals."
economic status of children been affected by
industrialism? What aie the mental and moral ONE OTHER GROUP of questions which involve
characteristics of the immature which exclude the family at least as background concerns
them from participation m political life, and the position or role of women. We
have already
which require adult regulation of their affairs? considered their relation to their husbands in
What are the criteria emotional and mental the government of the family itself. The way
as well as chronological which determine the in which that relation is conceived affects the
classification of individuals as children or adults, status and activity of women in the larger com-
and how is the transition from childhood to munity of the state, in relation to citizenship
manhood effected economically, politically, and and the opportunities for education, to the pos-
above all emotionally? sessionof property and the production of
The authors of the great books discuss most wealth (for example, the role of female labor
of these questions, but among them only Freud in an industrial economy).
sees in the relation of children to their parents Again it is Euripides who gives voice to the
the basic emotional determination of human plight of women in a man's world, in two of his
life. The fundamental triangle of love and hate, great tragedies, the Trojan Women and Medea.
devotion and rivalry, consists of father, mother, In the one, they cry out under the brunt of the
and child. For Freud all the intricacies and per- suffering which men leave them to bear in the
CHAPTER 26: FAMILY 495
backwash of war. In the other, Medea passion- Mill's tract on The Subjection of Women is his
women must accept in being wives. "Of all nomic, and political equality between the sexes.
things that have life and sense," she says, "we In Representative Government, his defense of
women are the most hapless creatures; first must women's rights deals primarily with the ques-
we buy a husband at great price, and then o'er tion of extending the franchise to them. Differ-
ourselves a tyrant set, which is an evil worse ence of sex, he contends, is "as entirely irrele-
than the first." vant to political rights, as difference in height,
The ancient world contains another feminist or in the color of the hair. All human beings
who goes further than Euripides in speaking have the same interest in
good government . . .
for the right of women to be educated like men, Mankind have long since abandoned the only
to share in property with them, and to enjoy premisses which will support the conclusion
the privileges as well as to discharge the tasks of that women ought not to have votes. No one
citizenship. In the tradition of the great books, now holds that womenshould be in personal
the striking fact is that after Plato the next servitude; that they should have no thought,
great declaration of the rights of women should wish, or occupation, but to be the domestic
be written by one who is as far removed from drudges of husbands, fathers, or brothers. It is
him in time and temper as John Stuart Mill. allowed to unmarried, and wants but little of
In Plato's Republic, Socrates argues that if being conceded to married women to hold
the difference between men and women "con- property, and have pecuniary and business in-
sists only in women bearing and men begetting terests, in the same manner as men. It is consid-
children, this does not amount to proof that a ered suitable and proper that women should
woman differs from a man in respect to the sort think, and write, and be teachers. As soon as
of education she should receive." For the same these things are admitted," Mill concludes,
reason, he says, "the guardians and their wives "the political disqualification has no principle
ought to have the same pursuits." Since he to rest on."
thinks that "the gifts of nature are alike dif- Though no other of the great books speaks
fused in both," Socrates insists that "there is so directly for the emancipation of women from
no special faculty of administration in a state domestic and political subjection, many of
which a woman has because she is a woman, or them do consider the differences between men
which aman has by virtue of his sex. All the and women in relation to war and love, pleas-
pursuits of men are the pursuits of women ure and pain, virtue and vice, duty and honor.
also." Yet he adds that "in all of them a woman Some are concerned explicitly with the pivotal
is inferior to a man." Therefore when he pro- question whether men and women are more
poses to let women "share in the toils of war alike than different, whether they are essential-
and the defence of their country," Socrates ly equal in their humanity or unequal. Since
suggests that "in the distribution of labors the these are matters pertinent to human nature
lighter are to be assigned to the women, who affected by gender, the relevant
itself, ^s it is
are the weaker natures." passages are collected in the chapter on MAN.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The nature and necessity of the family 497
2b. Comparison of the domestic and political community in manner of government 498
2c. The place and rights of the family in the state: the control and education of
children
496 THE GREAT IDEAS
4</.
The laws and customs regulating marriage: adultery, incest
5#. The status of women in the state: the right to citizenship, property, education
504
5^. Women in relation to war
6d. The care and government of children: the rights and duties of the child; parental
despotism and tyranny 507
6c. The initiation of children into adult life
508
7& The continuity of the family: the veneration of ancestors; family pride, feuds,
curses
509
yc. Patterns
of friendship in the family : man and wife; parents and children; brothers
and sisters
510
yd. The emotional impact of family life upon the child: the domestic triangle; the
symbolic roles of father and mother 511
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] I2d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS. One or more of the mam divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES- The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7-45 (D) // Esdras, 7-46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" Calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
321a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 121a 2a Comparison of the domestic and political
-
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, APPENDIX, xx community in origin, structure, and func-
449a tion
32 MILTON Paradise Losf, BK vm [357-45 i]240a-
: 7 PLATO: Crtto, 216d-217d / Republic, BK v,
242a 356b-365d / Laws, BK i, 641a-642b; BK in,
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH vi, SECT 56-63 664a-666c
36d-38c; CH vn, SECT 77-86 42b-44a 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vm, CH 12 [1162*16-18]
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART i, 29b-30a 414c / Politics, BK i, CH 1-2 445a-446d;'BK u,
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 410a-411a CH 2 455d-456c; CH 5 [i263b 3o-35) 459a
498 THE GREAT IDEAS Ib to 2c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 67d-68a; 86a;
(2. The family and the state. 2a. Comparison of PART n, 109b-lllb; 121a; 155b, PART HI,
the domestic and political community in
228b-c
origin, structure, and junction.) 30 BACON: New Atlantis, 207b-209d
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK v [35-103] 188a-190a; BK 32 MILTON: Samson Agomstes [1010-1060] 361b-
vi [679-702] 229a-b; [756-789] 231a-232a; 362b
BK via [66-80] 260b-261a; BK x [1-117] 302fl - 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH i, SECT 1-2
305a CH vi-vn 36a-46c esp CH vi, SECT 66-75
25a-c;
14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 36a-b 39b-42a; CH vm, SECT 105-112 48c-51b;cH
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xix, CH 12, xiv, SECT 162 63a; CH xv 64c-65d
517c-d; CH 13-17 519a-523a 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 214b-217b esp
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 90, 216b;410a-411a
A 3, REP 3 207a-c 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 21a-22d; 120c-121a,c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 99b-c; llla-b 38 MONTESQUIEU- Spirit of Laws, BK i, 3b; BK
30 BACON Advancement of Learning, 34a
.
iv, 13b; BK v, 28b-29a, BK xvi, 118b-c; BK
35 LOCKE- Civil Government, CH vi-vn 36a-46c; xix, 140a-c
CH xv 64c-65d 38 Rouss EAU Inequality, 357a-b / Political Econ-
36 STERNE. Tristram Shandy, 214b-217b csp omy, 367a-368c / Social Contract, BK i, 387d-
216b;410a-411a 388a;BKin,411c-d;414c
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK iv, 13b 40 GIBBON -.Decline and Fall, 412c-413b
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 359b-c / Political Econ- 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 82b-83c
omy, 367a-368c / Social Contract, BK i, 387d- 42 KANT: Science of Right, 421c-422d
388a 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 47
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 75 124a-b; in 134d-135a; 157 142b-c / Philoso-
31d-32b; PART in, par 157 57d; par 181 63c-d; phy of History, INTRO, 172b-d; PART i, 211a-
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 121a; 155b 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH vi, SECT 72-73
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 344a-c 40d-41a; CH vn, SECT 79-80 42c-43a; CH
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH vi 36a~42a; CH xvi, SECT 182-183 67c-68b; SECT 190-192
vn, SECT 83 43b-c; en xv 64c-65d; CH xvi, 69b-d
SECT 180-183 67b-68b; SECT 188-192 69a-d 36 SFERNE: Tristram Shandy, 376b-379a
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART i, 29b-31a; PART iv, 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK vn, 50a-b;
166b-167a BK xvin, 129d-132b; BK xxm, 190a-b; BK
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK iv, 13b; xxvi, 216a-b; BK xxvn 225a-230d
BK v, 22d-23a; BK xn, 95c-d; BK xix, 140a-c; 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 350a-b / Political Econ-
BK xxni, 189b-c; 190b; 192d-199b; BK xxvi, omy, 367a-368c
216b-217b 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, INTRO, Ib-c; BK in,
38 ROUSSEAU Inequality, 327c-d / Political Econ- 165b-167a; BK v, 383d-384d
omy, 376b-377a; 377d-378a / Social Contract, 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 16c-17d; 66d-67b;
BK iv, 439b,d [fn 2] 498b-501b passim
39 SMITH. Wealth of Nations, BK v, 338c-339b; 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 83a; 86d-89d
341c-342a 43 MILL: Liberty, 319b-d
40 GIBBON- Decline and Fall, 66d-67b; 175c-d 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 147c-148b [fn 3]; 274b-
41 GIBBON. Decline and Fall, 73c; 82b-83c; 278a; 280c-281a; 282a-b; 289c-d
86b-d;88d-89a;92c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART nr, par
42 KANT- Science of Right, 404d; 421a-b 169-172 60c-61a; par 178-180 62a-63c; ADDI-
43 MILL: Liberty, 317c-319d TIONS, 109 134c; 114 135b-c / Philosophy of
44 BOSWFLL- Johnson, 280c-281a; 304a-b History, PART HI, 289a-b
46 HEGCL Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 166 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 324a-c
59d-60a; par i8o62c-63c, par 238-241 76c-77a; 50 MARX: Capital, 34c-d; 171d-172a
par 255-256 79d-80a; ADDITIONS, 146-147 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 211a-213a;
140b-c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 172b-d; BK vn 275a-302d passim, esp 275a-278a, 291a-
PART i, 246d-247a; PART n, 277c; PART in, 292b, 301b-302d; BK xv, 633a-d; EPILOGUE i,
288c-289b 650d-652a;654a-655c
50 MARX: Capital, 193a-196d; 241a-d; 245a-d
50 MARX-NGELS: Communist Manifesto, 427b-
3&. The effects of political economy: the family
in the industrial system
428a
54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 783b- 38 ROUSSEAU: Politico* Economy, 367a-368c
784d esp 783d- 784b / New Introductory Lec- 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 27b-37b esp
tures, 868d-871a passim 28d-29a, 29d-30d, 34b-c; BK iv, 243b,d; BK
v, 383d-384d
3. The economics of the family 43 MILL: Liberty, 319b-d
44 BOSWELL Johnson, 197d
3a. The wealth of families: the maintenance of 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 253
the domestic economy 79a-c
OLD TESTAMENT '.Numbers, 27:1-11 / Deuterono- 50 MARX: Capital, 117c-144a passim; 192c-196d;
my, 21:15-17 226d-248c esp 241a-d; 318a-319a; 375c-376c
NEW TESTAMENT / Timothy, 5-8 50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 420d;
7 PLATO: Republic, BK v, 360c-365d / Laws, 423a; 424c; 427b-d
BK in, 664a-666a; BK vi, 709a-710a; BK xi,
775d-778b
4. The institution of marriage: its nature and
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BKCH 3-11 446d-453d
i,
purpose
b OLD TESTAMENT:
esp CH 3 [i253 i2-i4] 447a, CH 4 447b-c, CH Genesis, 1:27-28; 2:18-25;
8-n 449d-453d; BK n, CH 5 [1264^-7] 459d; 30:1-24 / Proverbs, 18:22
BK in, CH 4 [i277 b 2o-25] 474d NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 19:3-12 / Mar^
14 PLUTARCH: Solon, 72b-c / Pericles, 130b-d / 10:1-12 / Lu^e, 16:18 / / Corinthians, 7 /
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xxvi, 217c- APOCRYPHA: Tobit, 4:12-13 (D) OT, Tobias,
218a;219b-d 4:13 / Eccksiasticus, 9:1-9;23:17-28 (D)
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK iv, 439b,d OT, Ecclesiastic^^ 9:1-13; 23-24-38 / Susanna
King Lear, ACT iv, sc vi [109-135] 274c-d / 5 EURIPIDES: Medea [131-268] 213b-214b
Pericles 421a-448a,c esp ACT i, PROLOGUE-SC 7 PLATO Laws, BK vi, 712c-7l3c, BK xi, 780a-c
ii 421b-425a /
Cymbehne 449a-488d esp ACT 14 PLUTARCH: Romulus, 26a-b / Lycurgus-Numa,
n, sc iv-v 461b-463c, ACT HI, sc iv 466d- 62d-63c / Alcibiades, 158b-d / Aemilius
468d / Winter's Tale, ACT i, sc n [186-228] Paulus, 215a-b / Pompey, 502d-503a / Cato the
492a-c, ACT HI, sc n [1-117] 501b-502c Younger, 629a-c
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART i, 124a-c; 20 AQUINAS: Sitmma Theologica, PART i-ii, Q
PART n, 270c-271a 102, A 5, REP 3 283c-292c; Q 105, A 4, ANS and
30 BACON- New Atlantis, 209a-d REp8318b-321a
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK xi [708-721] 25 MONTAIGNE Essays, 299c
:
314b-315a / Samson Agomstes [30-1060] 340a- 29ChRVANTES- Don Quixote, PART n, 261c-
362b esp [292-325] 346a-b, [1010-1060] 361b- 262a
362b 30 BACON- Advancement of Learning, 84b
35 LOCKE- Civil Government, CH VH, SECT 81-83 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK ix [952-959]
43a-c 268a
36 SWIFT- Gulliver, PART in, 98b-99a; 127b; 35 LOCKE. Civil Government, CH vn, SECT 81-82
PART iv, 166a-b 43a-b
36 STERNE Tristram Shandy, 210b-213a; 258b- 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 12 7b
261a;374b-376a 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xvi, 120b-
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 297d-298a; 375 b-d; 122a,c; BK xxvi, 215c; 2l7c-218d
388c-d 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 92c
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK VH, 48a- 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 84c-85c; 759b
50a; BK x, 67a-b, BK xiv, 108a-b; BK xv-xvi, [n^o]
115c-122a,c; BK xvni, 132b-c; BK xix, 141c- 42 KANT: Science of Right, 419c-420a; 421c-d
142a; BK xxin, 187d-189d; 193a-197c; BK 43 MILL: Liberty, 316d-317c
xxvi, 215b-c; 2l7c-218d; 219b-221c; 223a-c 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 220d-221a; 304a-b; 411d
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK iv, 439b,d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 176
[fa 2] 6ld-62a; ADDITIONS, 105 133d-134a; 113
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 92c-d; 579a-b; 135a-b / Philosophy of,History, PART in, 288c-
650c-d; 742b [n 93]; 750d [n 52] 289a
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 83d-86a; 93c-94a; 4$ DARwm: Descent of Man, 584d-585c
174b; 177d-178b; 245b-246a; 319b-d; 759b 51 ToLstov: War and Peace, BK iv, 177a-179a;
BK v, 203a-d; BK xi, 4T6c-479d
CHAPTER 26: FAMILY 503
5 f The. position of women Tale 296a-318a csp [9053-9088] 317a-318a /
Merchant's Tale 319a-338a / Franks Tale
5a. The role of women in the family: the re- 351b-366a esp [11,041-114] 351b-352b / Ship-
lation of husband and wife in domestic man's Tale 383b~390b csp [13,093-107] 386a
gpvernment / Tale of Mclibeus, par 14-16 405a-407b /
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 2 '18-25; 3:167 Num- Nun's Priest's Tale [15,262-272] 457a / Man-
bers > 30 / Deuteronomy, 22:13-30; 24:1-4; ciple's Tale [17,088-103] 490a / Parson's Tale,
25:5-10 / Esther, i / Proverbs, 31:10-31 par 79-80 541a-542a
APOCRYPHA: Tobit, 10:12 (D) OT, Tobias, 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 109c-110b
IOU2-I3 / Ecclesiasticus, 25-26; 40:19,23 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 84a-b; 89d-90c; 188c-
(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 25-26; 40 19,23 191c; 358b-362a; 409d-434d csp 413a-416c,
NEW TESTAMENT: / Corinthians, 11:1-16; 14:34- 428a-d; 472a-473a
35 / Ephesians, 5:22-33 / Colossians^ 3:18-19 26 SHAKESPEARE: Comedy of Errors, ACT n, sc i
/ / Timothy, 2 19-15 / Titus, 2 .3-5 / / Peter, 3 .1-7 [6-43] 152a-c; sc n [112-148] 154c-d/ Taming
4 HOMER: Odyssey, BK n [85-145] 189a-c; of the Shrew 199a-228a,c esp ACT v, sc n
BK xvni [185-289] 286a-287a; BK xix 289a- [136-185] 227d-228a,c / Merchant of Venice,
295a,c; BK xx [56-90] 296d-297a; BK x\m ACT in, sc n [150-187] 421c-d / ht Henry IV,
[205-309]314b-315b; BK xxiv [191-202] 319a ACT n, sc in [39-120] 443c-444b / Julius
5 AESCHYLUS: Seven Against Thebes [181-202] Caesar, ACT H, sc I [234-309] 577a-c
29a-b 27 SHAKESPEARK: Troilus and Cressida, ACT n v
7 PLATO. Laches, 29b / Symposium, 165b-167a 5 EURIPIDES: Medea [1081-1115] 221 b-c / Ion
/ Cnto, 214c 282a-297a,c / Andromache 315a-326a,c csp
b
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vin, CH 12 [n6i i6-32] [309-420] 318a-d
414a-b / Politics, BK i, CH 12 453d-454a; BK n, 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 32a b
CH 3 [1262*14-24] 457a; BK vn, CH 16-17 7 PLATO: Symposium, 165b-167a / Laws, BK iv,
b
539d-542a,c / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 5 [i36o 9- 685a-c, BK vi, 708a-b
1361*1 i]601a-c 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK i, en 2 [1252*27-30]
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 12, 173b-c 445c
12 Epicibius Discourses, BK HI, CH 22, 198c- 12 EPICTEIUS: Discourses, BK in, CH 22, 198c-
199c 199c
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK vi [679-698] 229a-b; BK 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK i [657 722] 121a 123a;
vin [508-519] 272b-273a; BK ix [224-313] BK iv [296-330] 175a-176a
285a-287a 14 PLUTARCH: Cato the Younger, 629a-c
18 AUGUSTINE- Confessions, BK v, par 15 31a-c 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK HI, 51a; BK xv, 162 b-c
19 AQUINAS. Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 27, 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK n, pai 6 lOa-b;
A 2 154c-155b; Q 28, A 4, ANS and REP 5 160c- BK iv, par 2 19d / City of God, BK xiv, CH
161d, Q 30, A 2, ANS and REP 1-2 168a-169b; 21-22 392b-393b / Christian Doctrine, BK in,
Q 31, A 2 172b-173c; Q 32, A 2, ANS and REP 2 CH 12, 663a-c
178a-179b; A 3, ANS and REP 4-5 179b-180b; 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 98,
Q 33 180d-185a; Q 39, A 8 210a-213a; QQ 40- A 2 517d-519a
42 213a-230a passim; Q 43, A 4 232c-233a; Q 20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 84,
:
93, A 6, REP 2 496b-498a; Q 119, A 2, REP 2 A 4, ANS 176d-178a; PART in, Q 65, A i 879c-
607b-608d 881d
20 AQUINAS. Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 81 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 155b
162d-167d passim 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 484c
25 MONTAIGNE Essays, 184a-b; 191c 192d 27 SHAKESPEARE: Sonnets, i-xvn 586a-588d
26 SHAKESPEARE. 1st Henry VI, ACT iv, sc v-vn 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 72c-73a
23d-26a / 3rd Henry VI, ACT u, sc v [55-122] 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, APPENDIX, xx 449a
82b-d 32 MILTON Paradise Lost, BK iv [720-775] 168a*
:
30:1-13; 42:9-11 (D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 14c-18b; BKII, 74b-75c,81a-83b; BKIII, 219b-
3:1-20; 4:35; 7:25-30; 30:1-13; 42:9-11 222b
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 10:35-37; 15*3-6 / 25 MONTAIGNF- Essays, 43a-c; 63d-79c passim,
Luke, 2:51-52; 12:51-53 / // Connthians, 12:14 esp 63d-64b, 66c-67a; 83a-c; 183c-192d esp
/ Galattans, 4*1-2 / Ephcsians, 6:1-4 / Colos- 183d-185d; 344a-c; 534a-d
sians, 3:20-21 / / Timothy, 5:8 26 SHAKESPEARE: 3rd Henry VI, ACT n, sc n
5 AESCHYLUS: Eumemdes 81a-91d [1-55] 78d-79b / Titus Andromcus, ACT v, sc
5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [1458-1530] in [35-64] 196d-197a / Romeo and Juliet 285a-
112c-113a,c / Oedipus at Colonus 114a-130a,c / 319a,c esp ACT in, sc v [127-215] 308c-309c /
Antigone [626-767] 136c-137d / Electra 156a- Midsummer-Night's Dream, ACT i, sc i [1-121]
169a,c / Trachimae [1157-1278] 180a-181a,c 352a-353c / 1st Henry IV, ACT in, sc n 452d-
5 EURIPIDES. Alcestts [280-325] 239c-240a; [6n- 454d
738] 242c-243c / Heracles Mad [562-584] 27 SHAKESPEARE: Othello, ACT i, sc in [175-189]
369d-370a; [622-636] 370c / Phoenician 210d-211a / King Lear 244a-283a,c esp ACT i
Maidens 378a-393d esp [1485-1766] 391a- 244a-254c / Cymbeline, ACT i, sc i [125-158]
393d / Orestes 394a-410d 451a-c
5 ARISTOPHANES: Clouds [791-888] 498b-499b; 29 CERVANTES Don Quixote, PART n, 218c-220c;
:
292b; BK viii, 305b-307d; 324b-325c; 335d- OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 2:23-24; 24*67; 29:16-
336a; BK ix, 356b-358b; 381b-c; 382a-384b; 30 / Ruth / I Samuel, i:i-8-(D) / Kings,
BK x, 406c-410c; EPILOGUE i, 659d-674a,c 1:1-8 / II Samuel, 11; 13:1-20 (D) II Kings,
'
passim ii ; 13 :i-20 / Proverbs, 5; 6:20-7:27 / Ecclesias-
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK i, 2d- tes, 9:9 / Song of Solomon (D) Canticle of
lla; BK xn, 370b-d; 395a-398d Canticles
54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- APOCRYPHA' Tobit, 6*10-17 (D) OT, Tobias,
Analysis, 17d-18a / Sexual Enlightenment of
6-11-22 I Ecclesiasticus, 726; 25:1; 40:23
Children T19a-122a,c passim / Interpretation of (D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 7:28; 25*1-2; 40-23
Dreams, 244a-c / Narcissism, 406b c / General NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 19:4-6 / Marf(,
Introduction, 573b-d / Inhibitions, Symptoms, 10:6-9 / / Corinthians, 7:1-15,32-34 / Ephe-
and Anxiety, 751 d / Civilization and Its Dis- sians, 5:22-33 / Colossians, 3 18-19 / ^ Peter,
contents,794c-795a csp 795 b [fn 2] / New In- 3' 1 -?
troductory Lectures, 832b-c; 834b-c; 868d- 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK ix [334-347] 60c-d; BK xiv
871a csp 869b-c, 870a-c; 876c [229-360] lOOc-lOld / Odyssey, BK xxin [152-
365] 313d-316a; BK xxiv [191-202] 319a
6e. The initiation of children into adult life 5 AESCHYLUS. Agamemnon [681-781] 59b-60b
NEW TESTAMENT: Lufc, 2:41-52 / Choephoroe [585-651] 75d-76b; [892-930]
4 HOMER' Odyssey, BK i-n 183a-192d; BK xi 78d-79b
[487-540] 247d-248b 5 SOPHOCLFS* Trachiniae 170a-181a,c
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK iv, 125c-126a; I55c- 5 EURIPIDES: Medea 212a-224a,c esp [446-662]
156a 215d-217c / Hippolytus 225a-236d esp [373-
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics BK in, CH 12 [1119*33-
> 481] 228b-229b / Alcestis 237a-247a,c esp
b
i8)366a,c [152-198] 238c-239a, [329-^68] 240a-b / Sup-
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK i 253a-256d pliants [990-1071]267a-c/ Trojan Women [634-
14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 41b-42b 683] 275c-d / Helen 298a-314a,c / Andromache
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK n, par 3-8 9b-10d 315a-326a,c esp [147-244] 316c-317b / Eleclia
25 MONTAIGNF: Essays, 63d-79c passim, esp 72b- [988-1 122] 336a-337b
75a; 156d-158a,c; 184a-191c csp 187a-c 5 ARISTOPHANES Lysistrata 583a-599a,c / Thes-
26 SHAKESPEARE: Two Gentlemen of Verona, ACT mophonazusae 600a-614d esp [383-532] 604d-
I, sc in [1-42] 232c-d / 2nd Henry IV, ACT v, 606a
sc ii 497d-499b 6HrRoooTus: History, BK vi, 197a-c; BK ix,
27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT i, sc in [52-136] 311b-312d
34d-35d / Cymbehne, ACT iv, sc iv 478b-d 7 PLATO, Symposium, 152d-153a / Republic, BK
30 BACON: Ncy> Atlantis, 207b-209a v, 361b-363b
35 LOCKE' Civil Government, CH vi, SECT 59-69 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vni, CH 12 [1162*15-34]
37b-40b passim 414c-d
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xvni, 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK iv [1192-
133a-b i287]59d-61a,c
38 ROUSSEAU: Political Economy, 376b-d / 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK n [730-794] 144b-146b; BK
Social Contract, BK i, 387d-388a iv [1-361] 167a-177a
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 82a; 91b 14 PLUTARCH* Lycurgus, 39d-40b / Lycurgus-
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 86b-c Numa, 62d-63c / Solon, 71d-72a / Demetrius,
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 159 731a-b / Antony, 756c-779d / Marcus Brutus,
58a; par 174 61b; par 177 62a; ADDITIONS, 807b-d;8llc-d
HI-II2 134d-135a 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK iv, 64b-c; BK xi, 107b-
48 MELVILLE Moby Dtc{, 387b
:
110a;BKXii, 121c
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 36d-37a; BK 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR v, CH i lOOc-
HI, 128d 13lc esp 130d-131b; BK iv, 192d- lOlc
193c; BK vi, 254c-260a; 267c-270a; BK ix, 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK n, par 2-8 9b-
381b-c; 382a-384b; BK xiv, 592d-604b lOd; BK iv, par 2 19d; BK vi, par 21-25 41c-
7a to 7b CHAPTER 26: FAMILY 509
42d of God, BK xiv, CH 16-26 390a-
/ City 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK iv [172-340] 156a-
396c; BK xv, CH 16, 411b-c / Christian Doc- 159b; [440-504] 162a-163b; [736-775] 168b-
trine, BK in, CH 12, 663a-c; CH 18-22 664d- 169a; BK v [443-450] 185a; BK VIH [39-65]
666c 233a-b; [491-520] 243a-b; BK ix [226-269]
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 92, 252a-253a; [952-959] 268a; BK x [888-908]
A 2, ANS 489d-490c; Q 98, A 2, ANS and REP 3 293b-294a
517d-519a; PART i-n, Q 28, A 4, ANS 742d- 36 STERNE: Tnstram Shandy, 193b-194a; 522a-
743c 523a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 2b-c; 14b-16b; 17a-b;
105, A 4, ANS 318b-321a; PART n-n, Q 26, A n 30a-32d; 108c-lllc; 118d; 124a-125b; 130b-c;
518b-519a; PART in, Q 6, A i, REP 3 740b- 199b-200a; 230a-231c; 283b-c; 289b-291a;
741 b 321b-322a; 332a-333a; 349b-350b; 352d-
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, v [25-142] 7b- 353a; 360b-d; 400a-402d; 405a,c
8b; PURGATORY, vin [67-84] 65a; xxv [109- 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 364d-365b
139] 92c-d 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 92c-93a; 649c-
22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida la-155a / 652a
Miller's Tale 212b-223b / Wife of Bath's Pro- 42 KANT- Science of Right, 419a-420b
logue [5583-6410] 256a-269b / Tale of Wife of 44 BOSWELLI/O^OH, 22a;57a;64a; 107a; 160b;
Bath 270a-277a esp [6619-6623] 273a / Clerks 194a; 294d-295a
Tale 296a-318a / Merchant's Tale 319a-338a 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 158
/ Franklin's Tale\ 351b-366a esp [11,041-125] 58a; par 161-168 58b-60c; ADDITIONS, 101-108
351b-352b, [u,754-766b] 363a / Manciple's 133b-134c
Tale [17,088-103] 490a / Parson's Tale, par 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [4243-4250] 104a;
79-80 541a-542a PART n [6479-9944] 158a-241b esp [6487-
23 HOBBES: leviathan, PART n, 155b-c; PART iv, 6500] 158b, [7070-7079] 173a-b, [9182-9272]
272d 223a-225a, [9356-9573] 227a-232a, [9695-
24 RABELAIS. Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i, 9754) 235a-236b, [9939-9944] 241b
8c-d; BK n, 73b-74b; 106a-108d; 109c- 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace esp BK i, 3a-c, BK
126d; BK in, 144d-146a; 148d-150d, 154a- HI, 122b-c, BK iv, 173d-179a, BK vi, 245d-
156c; 159d-163c; 166a-169d; 186d-188c; 250a, 269c-d, BK VH, 291a<292b, 301b-302d,
196b-d BK vin, 311a-313a, BK xn, 539c-547a, BK xv,
25 MONI AIGNE- Essays, 37c-40a; 84a-b; 89d-90c; 635a-644a,c, EPILOGUE r, 650d-674a,c
306d-307a; 358b-362a; 409d-434d esp 410a- 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK i, 4a-
422b;472a-473a 5b; BK 11, 21b-24d; 39a
26 SHAKESPEARE' Henry VI, ACT v, sc in
1st 53 JAMES: Psychology, 735a-b
[80-195] 28a-29b; sc v [48-78] 31d-32a / 54 FREUD: Narcissism, 404d 406b / Group Psy-
Comedy of Errors, ACT n, sc 1 152a-153b; sc n chology, 694 b- 695 b / New Introductory Lec-
[112-148] 154c-d; ACT in, sc n [1-70] 157c- tures, 862d-863c
158b; ACT v, sc i [38-122] 165c-166b / Taming
Ib. The Continuity of the family: the veneration
of the Shrew 199a-228a,c / Two Gentlemen of
of ancestors; family pride, feuds, curses
Verona, ACT i, sc n [1-34] 230d-231b / Romeo
and Juliet 285a-319a,c / Richard II, ACT v, sc i OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 9:21-27; 12:1-3;
[71-102] 345d-346b / Much Ado About Noth- 13.14-17; 15:2-5, 17; 22:16-18; 25.20-34;
ing 503a-531a,c / Henry V, ACT v, sc n [98- 26:24; 27:1-28:5; 28:13-15; 30:1-24; 48-49 /
306] 564b-566a / Julius Caesar, ACT 11, sc i Exodus, 3:15-16; 20.5-6 / Numbers, 36:3-10 /
[261-309] 577b-c / As You Like It, ACT iv, Deuteronomy, 5:9-10; 25:5-10 / Ruth /
sc i [127-180] 618b-c; ACT v, sc iv [114-156] II Samuel, 21:1-9 (D) // Kings, 21:1-9 /
625a-b / Chronicles, 28:1-8 (D) I Parahpomenon,
27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT i, sc n [137-159] 28:1-8 / // Chronicles, 2^-^-(D) II Para-
33a; sc in [5-51] 34c-d; sc v [34-91] 37b-d; lipomenon, 25:3-4 / Proverbs, 17:6 /Jeremiah,
ACT in, sc i [120-157] 48b-c / Merry Wives of 31:29-30 (D) Jercmias, 31:29-30 / Ezefyel,
Windsor 73a-102d / Troilus and Cressida 103a- i8-(D) Ezechiel, 18
141a,c / Othello 205a-243a,c / Antony and APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 3:1-16 (D) OT,
Cleopatra 311a-350d / Cymbehne 449a-488d Ecclesiasticus, 3:1-16
esp ACT n, sc v 463a-c, ACT m, sc iv 466d- 4 HOMER: Odyssey, BK xi [458-540] 247c-248b
468d, ACT v, sc v [25-68] 483c-484a, [129-227] 5 AESCHYLUS: Seven Against Thebes 27a-39a,c
484d-485d / Tempest, ACT iv, sc i [1-133] esp [720-791] 35a-d / Prometheus Bound [887-
542b-543a 893] 49c / Agamemnon 52a-69d
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART i, 120b-137d; 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King 99a-113a,c /
PART n, 261c-262a; 270c-271a Ajax [1290-1315] 154a-b / Electra 156a-169a,c
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, APPENDIX, xix-xx 5 EURIPIDES: Electra 327a-339a,c / Phoenician
449a Maidens 378a-393d
510 GREAT IDEAS
APOCRYPHA: l
T\fbit , 4:1-4 (D) OT, Tobias,
(7. The tk* ftmity. Ib. The continuity of
life of /
4:1-5 Ecckstasticus, 25:1; 40:23-24 (D)
the family: tbt veneration of ancestor*; fam-
OT, Ecclesiasticus, 25:1-2; 40:23-24
'
HOa; BK xii, 115a-c, 118d-119b; BK xm, 128a- 211a; BK vi, 247a-248a; 251a-b; 252d 254c;
131b; BK xiv, 141b~143d; BK xvi, 183a-c / 270b-274a,c; BK vii, 276^>-277a; 290b-291a;
Histories, BK iv, 282 b-d BK viu, 305b310d; 314a-316a; 326b-329c;
ISAucusTiNE: Confessions, BK in, par 19-21 BK ix, 356b-358b; BK x, 406c-410c; 412d-
18b-19b; BK v, par 15 31a-c, BK ix, par 17-37 414b; 416c-417b; BK xi 485a-d; BK xn,
66a-71b / City of God, BK xix, CH 14 520a-d 553c-d; BK xv, 614a-618b; EPILOGUE i, 650d-
19AoLiNAs: Summa Theologica, TART i, Q 60, 674a,c
A 4, ANS 312c-313b, Q 96, A 3, REP 2 512a-c 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK iv,
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-H, Q 90b-92b; 100c-109a,c; BK v, 117c-121d; 137a-
26, AA 8-1 1 516a-519a c; BK vi, 148d-150d; BK x, 285a-297d; EPI-
21 DANTE- Divine Comedy, HELL, xxxn [124]- LOGUE, 408a-412d
xxxm [90] 49a-50c; PARADISE, xv-xvn 128b- 53IAMES: Psychology, 189a; 190a, 717b, 735b-
133c passim 736b
22 CHAUCER Wife of Bath's Prologue [5893-5914] 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 241b-246b /
261a-b / Clerks Tale 296a-318a Narcissism, 406b-c / General Intioditction,
23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH xvn, 24b-c 528d-529d; 583a-c / Group Psychology, 685c /
23 HOBBES. Leviathan, PART n, 155b Civilization and Its Discontents, 783b-c /
24 RABFL\IS Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i, New Introductory Lectures, 856d 859a, 862d-
8c-d; BK DK in, 144b-c; 196b-d;
n, 81a-83b; 863c
BK iv, 242c-244d; 248d-250a
25 MONTAIGNE- Essays, 66c-67a, 83a-84b; 184a-
Id. The emotional impact of family life upon
the child: the domestic triangle; the
192d esp 184a-d; 358b-362a; 409d-434d esp
410a-422b; 472a-473a symbolic roles of father and mother
26 SHAKESPLARE 1st Henry VI, ACT iv, sc v-vn 4 HOMER: Odyssey, BK n 188a-192d, BKXV-XVI
23d-26a / 3rd Henry VI, ACT n, sc v (55-113] 266a-276d
82b-d / Richard II, ACT i, sc n [1-41] 322d- 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King 99a 113a,c esp
323a / 2nd Henry IV, ACT n, sc in 477d 478c; [976-983] 108b / Electra 156a-169a,c esp [254-
ACT iv, sc iv-v 492d-496d / Julius Caesar, 309] 158a-b, [516-633] 160a-161a
ACT n, sc i [234-309] 577a c 5 EURIPIDES: Hippolytus 225a-236d / Electra
27 SHAKESPEARL: Hamlet, ACT i, sc in [5-51] 327a-339a,c esp [1008-1123] 336b-337b
34c-d; [84-136] 35b-d, ACT iv, sc v [115-216] 6 HRRODOTUS: History, BK HI, 89d; lOOb lOlb;
60d-62a / King Lear 244a-283a,c / Coriolanus, BK iv, 151a-b
ACT i, sc in 355b-356b; ACT 11, sc i [110-220] 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vii, CH 6 [ii49b 4 13]
b
362a-363b; ACT v, sc in 387a-389b 400a; BK vin, CH 10 [n6o 23-33] 413a, CH 12
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 84b-c 413d414d passim / Politics, BK i, en 12 [i259b
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK iv [720-775] 168a- 10- 1 6] 454a
169a / Samson Agonistes [1476-1507] 371b- 14 PLUTARCH: Artaxerxes, 855b-c
372b 26 SHAKESPEARE: 3rd Henry VI, ACT i, sc i [211-
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART iv, 16Sb-166a 263] 72b-d
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 17d-19a,c; 22d-25a; 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet 29a-72a,c
44b-d, 65b-c; 126c-127b; 235b-238d; 304a-c; 31 SPINOZA; Ethics, PART iv, APPENDIX, xni
405a,c 448b-c
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xvi, 117c; 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART iv, 165b-166a
BK xix, 140a-c 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 126c-127c
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 326c-d; 327c-d; 350b; 38 ROUSSE\U. Political Economy, 377a
364d-365b / Political Economy, 368b-c / Social 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, no
Contract, BK i, 387d-388a 134d; 112 135a
40 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 92d-03a 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vi, 27lc-273c;
42 KANT: Science of Right, 419a-420b *ic VIH, 305b-307d; BK ix, 356b-358b;
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 57a; 57d-58a; 90cj 305b; j
'EPILOGUE i, 658a-659d; 662a-664b; 667b-d;
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The general problem of the naturalness of human association in the family or in the state, see
NATURE 2b; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 5b; STATE la, 30-30!.
The political significance of the domestic community, and for comparisons of government in
the family and in the state, see EDUCATION 8a; GOVERNMENT ib; MONARCHY 43, 4e(i);
SLAVERY 6b; STATE ib, 5b; TYRANNY 4b.
The economic aspects of the family, see LABOR 53, 5c; SLAVERY 4a; WEALTH 2, 3d.
Religious considerations relevant to matrimony and celibacy, see RELIGION 2c, 3d; VIRTUE
AND VICE 8f-8g.
Other discussions of women in relation to men, and of the difference between the sexes, see
HAPPINESS 43; MAN 6b; WAR AND PEACE 53.
Other discussions of childhood as a stage of human life, see LIFE AND DEATH 6c; MAN 6c; and
for theproblem of the care and training of the young, see DUTY 9; EDUCATION 4b, 8a;
RELIGION 50
A more general consideration of the problems of heredity, see EVOLUTION 2-36.
The distinction of the several kinds of love and friendship which may enter into marriage,
see LOVE 2-2d; and for matters relevant to the emotional pattern of family relationships,
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booty of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
F. SCHLEGEL. Lucmde
I.
FOURIER. Traitt del* association domestique-agricole
PLUTARCH. "A Discourse Touching the Training of LAMB. "A Bachelor's Complaint," in The Essays of
Children," "Concerning the Virtues of Women," Elia
"Conjugal Precepts," "Of Natural Affection To- BALZAC. The Physiology of Marriage
wards One's Offspring," in Moraha .
EugSnie Grandet
AUGUSTINE. On the Good of Marriage . Old Gorwt
. On the Good of Widowhood , The Petty Annoyances of Married Life
Of Marriage and Concupiscence
. . Cousin Bette
AQUINAS Summa Contra Gentiles, BK in, CH 122-126 WHEWELL. The Elements of Morality, BK iv, CH 5
Summa Theologtca, PART n-n, QQ 151-154;
. E. J. BRONTE. Wuthering Heights
PART III, SUPPL, QQ 41-68 THACKERAY. Vanity Fair
F. BACON. "Of Parents and Children," "Of Mar- SCHOPENHAUER. "On Women," in Studies in PeS'
Epithalamion
. STRINDBERG. The Father
HEYWOOD A Woman Killed with Kindness TONNIES. Fundamental Concepts of Sociology, PART i
CALDERON. Life Is a Dream FRAZER. The Golden Bough, PART i, CH 1 1-12; PART
MOLIERE. Vecole des mans (School for Husbands) III, CH 6
Vecole desfemmes (School for Wives)
. WESTERMARCK. The History of Human Marriage
CHESTERFIELD. Letters to His Son MASON. Woman's Share in Primitive Culture
VOLTAIRE. "Marriage," "Women," in A Philosoph- MEREDITH. The Ordeal of Richard Fevercl
ical Dictionary . Modem Love
R. BURNS. The Cotter's Saturday Night . Diana of the Crossways
FRANKLIN. On Marriage . The Amazing Marriage
WOLLSTONECRAFT. The Rights of Woman SHAW. Candida
514 THE GREAT IDEAS
BRYCE. Marriage and Divorce FLUGEL. The Psycho- Analytic Study of the Family
MANN. Buddenbrooty HARTLAND. Primitive Society, the Beginnings of the
SYNGE. Riders to the Sea Family and the Reckoning of Descent
WEININGER. Sex and Character GALSWORTHY. The Forsyte Saga
SANTAYANA. Reason in Society, CH 2 MARTIN DU GARD. The Thibaults
GOSSE. Father and Son UNDSET. Kristin Lavransdatter
SERTILLANGES. La famille et rttat dans IEducation J B. S. HALDANE. Daedalus
DEWEY and TUFTS. Ethics, PART HI, CH 26 GORKY. Decadence
GALTON. Natural Inheritance JUNG. Marriage as a Psychological Relationship
.
Essays in Eugenics BRIFFAULT. The Mothers
CHESTERTON. What's Wrong with the World DAWSON. "Christianity and Sex," in Enquiries into
BATESON. Problems of Genetics Religionand Culture
ELLIS. Man and Woman Pius XI. Casti Connubn (Encyclical on Christian
Studies in the Psychology of Sex
.
Marriage)
D. H, LAWRENCE. Sons and Lovers O'NEILL. Desire Under the Elms
H. JAMES. A Small Boy and Others .
Strange Interlude
Notes of a Son and Brother
. .
Mourning Becomes Electra
JOYCE.A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man L. STURZO. The Inner Laws of Society, CH n
PROUST. Remembrance of Things Past T. S. ELIOT. The Family Reunion
Chapter 17: FATE
INTRODUCTION
sometimes personified, sometimes out man's willing them may happen by chance
FATE
abstractly conceived is the antagonist of or fortune.
freedom in the drama of human life and his- It is sometimes supposed that "fate" and
tory. So at least it seems to the poets of antiq- "fortune" are synonyms, or that one has a
uity. In many of the Greek tragedies, fate sets tragic and the other a happy connotation. It is
the stage. Some curse must be fulfilled. A doom were always good and fate always
as if fortune
impends and is inexorable. But the actors on malevolent. But either may be good or evil
the stage are far from puppets. Within the from the point of view of man's desires. Al-
framework of the inevitable the tragic hero though fate and fortune are hardly the same,
works out his own destiny, making the choices there is some reason for associating them. Each
from which his personal catastrophe ensues. imposes a limitation on man's freedom. A man
Oedipus, doomed to kill his father and marry cannot compel fortune to smile upon him any
his mother, is not fated to inquire into his past more than he can avoid his fate. Though alike
and to discover the sins which, when he sees, he and fortune are also opposed
in this respect, fate
wills to see no more. The curse on the house of to one another. Fate represents the inexorable
Atreus does not require Agamemnon to bring march of events. There is no room for fortune
Cassandra back from Troy or to step on the unless some things are exempt from
necessity.
purple carpet. The furies which pursue Orestes Only that which can happen by chance is in
he has himself awakened by murdering his the lap of fortune.
mother, Clytemnestra, a deed not fated but It would seem that fate stands to fortune as
freely undertaken to avenge his father's death. the necessary to the contingent. If
everything
The ancients did not doubt that men could were necessitated, fate alone would reign. Con-
choose and, through choice, exercise some con- tingency would be excluded from nature.
trol over the disposition of their lives. Tacitus, Chance or the fortuitous in the order of nature
for example, while admitting that "most men and freedom in human life would be reduced
* . cannot part with the belief that each per-
. to illusions men cherish only through ignorance
son's future is fixed from his very birth," claims of the inevitable.
that "the wisest of the ancients . . . leave us the In a sense fortune is the ally of freedom in the
capacity of choosing our life." At the same time struggle against fate. Good fortune seems to aid
he recognizes an order of events beyond man's and abet human desires. But even misfortune
power to control, although no agree- he finds signifies the element of chance which is more
ment regarding its cause whether it depends congenial than fate, if not more amenable, to
"on wandering stars" or "primary elements, man's conceit that he can freely plan his life.
and on a combination of natural causes." For
his own part, Tacitus declares, "I suspend my THE TERMS necessity and contingency cannot be
judgment" on the question "whether it is fate substituted for fate and fortune without loss of
and unchangeable necessity or chance which significance. As the chapter on NECESSITY AND
governs the revolutions of human affairs." In CONTINGENCY indicates, they are terms in the
so doing, he grants the possibility that not philosophical analysis of the order of nature
everything which lies beyond man's control is and causality. They may have, but they need
fated. Some of the things which happen with- not have, theological implications. Necessity
515
516 THE GREAT IDEAS
and contingency can be explained without any rather than on freedom. This is
certainly so if
reference to the supernatural, as is evident from Zeus is not the master of even his own fate,
the discussion of these matters in the Chapter much the omnipotent ruler among the
less
on CHANCE. But fate and fortune, in their ori- gods or the arbiter of human destiny. In
gin at least, are theological terms. Prometheus Bound, the Chorus asks, "Who is
In ancient poetry and mythology, both in- the pilot of Necessity ?" Prometheus answers,
evitability and chance were personified as dei- "The Fates triform and the unforgetting
ties or supernatural forces. There were the god- Furies." The Chorus then asks, "Is Zeus of
dess of Fortune and the three Fates, as well as lesser might than these ?" To which Prometheus
their three evil sisters or counterparts, the replies, "He shall not shun the lot appor-
Furies. The Latin word from which "fate" tioned." When they ask what this doom is,
comes means an oracle, and so signifies what is Prometheus tells them to inquire no more, for
divinely ordained. What happens by fate is they verge on mysteries. Later Zeus himself
something destined and decreed in the sends Hermes to wrest from Prometheus the
fated
councils of the gods on Olympus; or it
may be secret of what has been ordained for him by
the decision of Zeus, to whose rule all the other "all consummating Fate" or "Fate's resistless
divinities are subject; or, as we shall see pres- law." Prometheus refuses, saying that "none
shall bend my will or force me to disclose by
ently, may be a supernatural destiny which
it
even Zeus cannot set aside. whom 'tis fated he shall fall from power."
In any case, the notion of fate implies a super- The question Aeschylus leaves unanswered
natural will, even as destiny implies predestina- is whether Zeus would be able to escape his
tion by an intelligence able not only to plan doom if he could foresee what Fate holds in
the future but also to carry out that plan. The store for him. The suggestion seems to be that
inevitability of fate and destiny is thus distin- without omniscience the omnipotence of Zeus
guished from that of merely natural necessity cannot break the chains of Fate.
which determines the future only insofar as it
may be the inevitable consequence of causes IN THE TRADITION of Judaeo'Christian theology
working naturally. the problem of fate is in part verbal and in part
But the ancients do not seem to be fatalists real.The verbal aspect of the problem concerns
in the extreme sense of the term. To the extent the meaning of the word "fate" in relation to
that men can propitiate the gods or provoke the divine will, providence, and predestination.
divine jealousy and anger, the attitudes and With the verbal matter settled, there remains
deeds of men seem to be a determining factor the real problem of God's will and human free-
in the actions of the gods. To the extent that dom. The strictly monotheistic conception of
the gods align themselves on opposite sides of a an omnipotent and omniscient God deepens
human conflict (as in the Iliad), or oppose each the mystery, and makes it more difficult than
other (as in the Odyssey), it
may be thought the problem of fate and freedom in pagan
that what happens on earth merely reflects the thought.
shifting balance of power among the gods. If anyone "calls the will or the power of God
But human planning and willing do not seem itselfby the name
of fate," Augustine says,
to be excluded by the divine will and plan "let him keep his opinion, but correct his lan-
which are forged out of the quarrels of the guage For when men hear that word, ac-
gods. On the contrary, polytheism seems to cording to the ordinary use of language, they
1
make fortune itself contingent on the outcome simply understand by it the virtue of that par-
of the Olympian conflict, and so permits men ticular position of the stars which may exist
a certain latitude of self-determination. Men at the timewhen anyone is born or conceived,
can struggle against the gods precisely because which some separate altogether from the will
the gods may be with them as well as against of God, whilst others affirm that this also is
them. dependent on that will. But those who are of
The ultimate power of Zeus to decide the [
the opinion that, apart from the will of God,
issue may, however, place the accent on fate the stars determine what we shall do, or what
CHAPTER 27: FATE 517
good things we shall possess, or what evils we of fate, in order that cause follow not cause from
1
shall suffer, must be refused a hearing by all, not everlasting/ it is because in the atoms of his
only by those who hold the true religion, but makeup "there is another cause of motions . . .
by those who wish to be the worshippers of any caused by a minute swerving of first-begin-
gods whatsoever, even false gods. For what does nings at no fixed part of space and no fixed
this opinion really amount to but this, that no time."
Aquinas, however, retains the word "fate" God, he may still commit the sin of fatalism
but restricts its meaning to the "ordering ... of which follows from the denial of man's free
mediate causes" by which God wills "the pro- will. Understanding fate as identical with prov-
duction of certain effects." idence, the Christian is a fatalist if, in the be-
According to the definition given by Boe- lief that every human act is foreordained by
thius which Aquinas quotes, "Fate is a disposi- God, he making no
resigns himself to his fate,
tion inherent to changeable things, by which moral effort and taking no moral responsibility
providence connects each one with its proper for his soul's welfare. To do that is to argue like
order."Thus fate is not identified with provi- Chaucer's Troilus:
dence, but made subordinate to it. The distinc- I am, he said, but done for, so to say;
For all that comes, comes by necessity,
tion,Aquinas explains, depends on the way we
consider "the ordering of effects" by God. "As
Thus to be done for is my destiny.
I must believe and cannot other choose,
being in God Himself the ordering of the
. . .
That Providence, in its divine foresight,
effects is called Providence." But "as being in Hath known that Cressida I once must lose,
the mediate causes ordered by God," it is called Since God sees everything from heaven's height
fate. While admitting that "the divine power And plans things as he thinks both best and right,
As was arranged for by predestination.
or will can be called fate, as being the cause of
fate," he declares that "essentially fate is the Troilus sees no way of avoiding the conclusion
very disposition or series, i.e., order, of second that "free choice is an idle dream."
causes."
The position Lucretius takes seems to be THE THEOLOGIANS recognize the difficulty of
exactly opposite to that of Augustine and Aqui- reconciling providence and free will. The truth
nas. Lucretius condemns the fatalism of those must lie somewhere between two heresies. If
who believe that the gods control the order of it heresy to deny God's omnipotence and
is
nature and who therefore attribute whatever omniscience, then nothing remains outside the
befalls them to divine ordination. For him, all-encompassing scope of divine providence,
"nature free at once and rid of her haughty nothing happens contrary to the divine will,
lords is seen to do all things spontaneously of no future contingency is or can be unforeseen
herself without the meddling of the gods." He by God. If, on the other hand, to deny that
tries to teach men that everything happens ac- man sins freely means that God must be respon-
cording to the laws of nature, other than which sible for the evil that man does, then it is a
there is no fate. The "decrees of fate" he in the heresy to deny free will, for that imputes evil
laws by which "all motion is ever linked to- to God.
gether and a new motion ever springs from This is the problem with which Milton deals
another in a fixed order." If man by his "power in Paradise Lost, announcing that he will try
of free action'* can "make some commence- "to justify the ways of God to man." In a
ment of motion to break through the decrees conversation in heaven, the Father tells the
518 THE GREAT IDEAS
Son that though He knows Adam will 'disobey than as He knows h? In a discussion of divine
his rule, Adam remains 'quite free to sin or not grace and man's free will, Dr. Johnson remarks,
"I can judge with great probability how a man
1
bellious angels acted on their own free will. will act in any case, without his being restrained
The angels, God says, by judging. God may have this probability
my
increased to certainty." To which Boswell re-
So were created, nor can justly accuse
Thir tnaker, or thir making, or thir Fate; plies that "when it is increased to certainty,
As if Predestination over-rul'd
'
wishing to learn about his immediate future, dom anywhere in the universe, neither in the
asks his ancestor Cacciaguida to foretell his acts of God, nor in the order of nature, nor in
fortune, for he, "gazing upon the Point to the course of history. The doctrine of absolute
which all times are present, can see contingent determinism, whether in theology, science, or
things, ere in themselves they are.'* Cacciaguida history, is thus fatalism unqualified.
prefaces his prediction of Dante's exile from The ancient historians are not fatalists in this
Florence by telling him that the contingency of sense.Herodotus, for example, finds much that
material things "is all depicted in the Eternal can be explaineoj by the contingencies of for-
Vision; yet thence it does not take necessity, tune or by the choices of men. The crucial de-
more than does aship which is going down the cision, forexample, in the defense of Athens
stream from the eye in which it is mirrored." is
presented as an act of man's choice. Upon
The difference between time and eternity is
receiving the pr6phecy that "safe shall the
conceived as permitting 'the temporal future wooden Wail continue for thee and thy chil-
to be contingent even though God knows its dren," the Athenians exercise their freedom by
content with certitude. disagreeing about its meaning. "Certain of the
But, it may still be askecl, <iocs not God's old men," Herodotus writes, "were of ihe
knowledge imply the absolute predestination opinion that the god hieant to tell them the
of future events by providence, since what God citadel would escape; 'for this was anciently
knows with certitude cannot happen otherwise defended by a palisade. . . . Others maintained
CHAPTER 27: FATE
that the was what the god pointed at; and
fleet mind's, freedom alone." But this development'
their advice was that nothing should be thought and this freedom, arc entirely matters of neces-
of except tfie ships." The eloquence pf Themis- sity as far as individuals and their works are
tocles carried the latter view. To stress its im- concerned, ''They are all the time the uncon-
portance, the historian observes that "the sav- scious toolsand otgans of the world mind at
ing of Greece" lay in the decision that led work within them,"
Athens to "become a maritime power." For Marx, history seems likewise to have the
In presenting a comparable decision by the same necessity. He deals with individuals, he
Persians, Herodotus seems to be contrasting writes in the preface to Capital, "only in so far
their fatalism with the freedom of the Greeks. as they are the personifications of economic
At first Xerxes accepts the council of Artabanus categories, embodiments of particular class-
not to go to war against the Greeks. But after relations and class-interests, My stand-point,"
a series of visions,which appear to both the he says, is one from which "the evolution of
king and his councillor, that decision is re- the economic formation of society is viewed as
versed, for, according to the dream, the war a process of natural history," and within which
"is fated to happen." the individual cannot be "responsible for rela-
The conception of fate and freedom in the tions whose creature he socially remains, how-
Aeneid seems closer to the Greek than to the ever much he may subjectively raise himself
Persian view. Even though the consummation above them." Here it is a
question only "of
of history, which will come with the founding these laws themselves, of these tendencies
of the Roman empire, is projected as a divinely working with iron necessity towards inevitable
appointed destiny, the hero who brings that results,"
great event to pass acts as if he were free to According to the historical determinism of
accept or evade his responsibilities. Hegel and Marx, which is further considered
The Christian understanding of historical in the chapter on HISTORY, men play a part
destiny in terms of providence permits more which is already written for them in the scroll
than that, requires men to exercise free choice of history. Human liberty apparently depends
at every turn. "The cause of the greatness of on man's knowledge of and acquiescence in the
the Roman empire," writes Augustine, "is nei- unfolding necessities.
ther fortuitous nor fatal, according to the judg-
ment or opinion of thosp who call those things HISTORICAL DETERMINISM is
merely a part of
fortuitous which either have no causes or such the doctrine of a causal necessity which govern?
causes as do not proceed from some intelligible all things. Causality seems to be understood-
by
order, and those things fatal which happen in- moderns like Spinoza, Hume, and Freud as ex-
will of God and man, by cluding the possibility of chance or free will.
dependently of the
the necessity of a certain order. , . ., Human Among the ancients, Plotinus alone seems to
kingdoms are established by divine provi- go as far as Spinoza in affirming the universal
dence." The fatalism which Augustine here reign of natural necessity. What Spinoza says
condemns involves independence not only of of God or Nature, Plotinus says of the All-One,
the will of God, but of man's will also. namely, that for the first principle which is the
It is only in modern times, with Hegel and cause of everything else, freedom consists in
Marx, that necessity reigns supreme m the being causa sui, or cause of itself self-deter-
philosophy of history. Hegel spurns the notion mined rather than determined by external
that history is "a superficial play of casual, so- causes.
called 'merelyhuman* strivings and passions." "God does not act from freedom of the will,"
He condemns those who "speak of Provi-
also Spinoza writes. Yet "God alone is a free cause,
dence and the plan of Providence" in a way for God alone exists . and
. . acts from the
that is "empty" of ideas since "for them the necessity of his own nature." As
for everything
plan of Providence is inscrutable 4nd incom- else in the universe, Spinoza maintains that
prehensible." For Hegel, history is "the nec- "there is nothing contingent, but all things arc
ess^ry development, out of the concept of the determined from the necessity of the divine
520 THfi GREAT IDEAS
nature to exist and act in a certain manner." dom and choice," he writes, is "quite unscien-
This applies to man, who, according to Spinoza, tific, andmust give ground before the claims
it
does "everything by the will of God alone." of a determinism which governs even mental
From quite different premises, Hume seems life." He thinks it can be shown on the basis of
to reach much the same conclusion concerning clinical experience that every psychic associa-
chance and liberty. "Chance," he writes, tion "will be strictly determined by important
"when strictly examined, is a mere negative inner attitudes of mind, which are unknown
word, and means not any power which has
real moment when they operate, just as
to us at the
anywhere a being in nature." But he also thinks much unknown as are the disturbing tendencies
that liberty, "when opposed to necessity, not which cause errors, and those tendencies which
to constraint, is the same thing with chance." bring about so-called 'chance* actions."
Hume embraces the consequences of such a The fatalism of what is often called "scien-
position. "If voluntary action be subjected to tific determinism" is that of blind necessity.
the same laws of necessity with the operations It not only eliminates liberty and chance, but
of matter, there is a continued chain of neces- also purpose and the operation of final causes.
sary causes, pre-ordained and pre-determmed, Every future event, in nature, history, or hu-
reaching from the original cause of all to every man behavior, is
completely predetermined by
every human creature.
single volition of
No efficient causes predetermined, but not pre-
contingency anywhere in the universe; no in- destined, for there is no
guiding intelligence
difference; no liberty." at work, no purpose to be fulfilled. "The system
When confronted with the objection that it of fatality, of which Spinoza is the accredited
then becomes impossible "to explain distinctly, author," Kant writes, is one which "eliminates
how the Deity can be the mediate cause of all all trace ofdestgn, and leaves the original ground
the actions of men, without being the author of the things of nature divested of all intelli-
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGB
1. The decrees of fate and the decisions of the gods 5 21
3. The antitheses of fate: fortune, freedom, natural necessity, chance or contingency 522
4.
Fatalism in relation to the will of God : the doctrine of predestination 523
5.
The secularization of fate : scientific or philosophical determinism
6. The historian's recognition of fate: the destiny of cities, nations, empires 5*4
CHAPTER 27: FATE 521
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which arc the volume and page
numbers of me passages referred to, For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n (265-283) 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS- When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
printed in two columns,
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
For example, in 7 PLATO Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
thepage.
of trie left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS- One or more of the mam divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) arc sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases, e.g , Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; eg., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nchemiah, 7-45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface,
_ _
.. , f . 31 DESCARTES Objections and Replies, 216d-217a
:
1. The decrees of fate and the decisions of the 32 MILTON: Arcades [54-83] 26b 27a
ods 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART n, 271b
4 HOMER: BK i [503-531] 8b-c; BK vin
Iliad, 47 GOETHE Faust, PART n [5305-5 344] 131b-132a
:
213a-223d; CH 3 224b-d; CH 7 232c-235a 3 355d; PROP 17, SCHOL 362c-363c; PROP 25-
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK in, SECT n262a-b; 29 365b-366c; PROP 32-APi>ENDix 367a-372d;
BK vi, SECT 44 278b-c PART n, PROP 48 391a-c; PROP 49, SCHOL,
17 PLOHNUS: Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 16 150c-d 394b-c
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK v, CH i 207d- 34 NEWTON: Optics, BK HI, 542b
208c; CH 8-10 212c-216c; CH 15-16 220d- 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 93
221b; BK xv, CHi 397b,d-398c; BK xxi, CH 12 431b
BK xxii, CH 1-2 586b,d-588a
571a-c; 35 HUME- Human Understanding, SECT vm 478b-
19 AQUINAS: Summa Thcologica, PART i, QQ 23- 487a passim
24 132b-143c; Q 116 592d-595c 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 140b,d-143a; 164a-171a /
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, vn [61-96] Judgement, 463a-467a, 575b-578a
lOb-C; PURGATORY, XVI [52-84] 77b-CJ PARA- 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 342-
DISE, i
[94-142] 107b'd; iv [49-63] lllb; 348 HOc-llld / Philosophy of History, INTRO,
vni [91-148] 117d-118c; xvii [13-45] 132b-c; 156d-190b esp 156d-158a, 161d-162a; 203a-
xx [31-141] 137a-138a 206a,c
22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK iv, STANZA 50 MARX: Capital, 6d; 7c; lOb-lld; 35b-c; 36c-d
137-154 106b-108b 378b-d esp 378d
[fn 2];
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 113b-c 50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 416c-d
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 254b-d; 342a-c 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n 675a-
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART n, 408b-c 696d
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK i, APH 93 125d- 53 JAMES: Psychology, 291a-295b; 820b-825a esp
126a 823a-825a
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 141b 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho*
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost 93a-333a esp BK i Analysis, 13c / Interpretation of Dreams, 246b-
[1-26] 93b-94a, BK in [80-134] 137a-138a, BK 247c/ General Introduction, 454b-c;486d-487a;
v [224-245] 180a-b, {506-543] 186a-187a, BK 581d-582a / Beyond the Pleasure Principle,
vn [139-173] 220a-221a / Samson Agomstes 645b-646a / Civilization and Its Discontents,
[373-419] 347b-348b; [667-709] 354a-355a / 772b-c; 796a-c; 801c-802a,c / New Introduc-
Areopagitica, 394b-395b tory Lectures, 882c-883d
524 THE GREAT IDEAS
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 2l4a-d; 462c-465c pas-
6. The historian's recognition of fate: the des- sim
tiny of cities, nations, empires 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 2, 31c-d
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK vjj, 214d-220b esp 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART nit par 340-
218b-220b; 239a-240d; BK vm, 262b c 360 110b-114a,c esp par 342-343 HOc-llla,
7 PLATO: Republic, BK VIH, 403a*d par 347 lllb-c / Philosophy of History, INTRO,
13 VIRGIL: Eclogues, w
14a-15b / Aeneid, BK i 156d-190b esp 158c-162a; 203a-206a,c; PART i,
[441-493] 115a-116b; BK vi [752-901] 231a- 241d-242b; 258b-d; PART H, 278a-c; 20b-
235a; BK vm
[608-731] 275a-278b; BK x 281b; 283d-284a,c; PART in, 285b-d; 300a-
[100-117] 304b-305a; BK xn [725-842] 373b- 301c; 303c-306a; PART rv, 315a; 368d-369a,c
376b , 50 MARX: Capital, 6c-7d passim; 377c-378d
14 PLUTARCH: Romulus, 18d; 20b-c / Camtttus, 50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Mamfesto,41fc*d',
107b-d; 109c-110a / Phihpoemen, 300b / 421d-422c;424d-425b
Alexander, 5S5c / Demosthenes, 698b-c / 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK ix, 342a-344b;
Marcus Brutus, 815c BK x, 389a-391c; BK xi, 469a-472b; BK xm-
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK in, 58b-d; BK vi, 91b-d xiv, 563a-590c; BK xiv, 609a-613d; BK xv,
/ Histories, BK i, 189b-190a; BK n, 232d 618b-621b; 626d-630a; EPILOGUE i, 645a-
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK v 207b,d-230a,c 650c; EPILOGUE n 675a-696d
esp CH i 207d-208c, CH 12 216d-219b, CH 15 54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 882c-
220d-221a 883c
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The basic opposites of fate, see CHANCF la-ib, 2a; HISTORY 43(1); WILL 5-53(4), 50; and
for other terms in which the opposition between fate and chance is expressed, see NECES-
SITY AND CONTINGENCY 3.
The problem of human liberty in relation to fate, see LIBERTY 4b; NECESSITY AND
CONTINGENCY 53(3); WILL 5c.
The implications of fate in theology, or for the relation of human liberty to divine provi-
dence, see CAUSE 7c; GOD ic, 7b; HISTORY 53; LIBERTY 5a~5c; WILL 7c.
The foretelling of fate or providence, see PROPHECY la-ib; and for the condemnation of
astrology and divination, see PROPHECY 5.
Fatalism or determinism in the philosophy of nature, see CHANCE 23; NATURE 3c~3c(3);
WILL 5c; WORLD ib.
The same doctrine in the philosophy of history, see HISTORY 43(i)-4a(4); NECESSITY AND
CONTINGENCY 5f; WILL 7b.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boofe of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works arc divided into two groups:
For the date, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
place,
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
J. EDWARDS. A Careful .
Enquiry into the Modern
. .
- .
TessoftheD'Urbervilles
. . .
Jude the Obscure
.
INTRODUCTION
*
I HE great philosophical issues concerning opposed on issues which represent part, if not
JL form and matter have never been resolved. the whole, of the great traditional
controversy
But the terms in which these issues were stated) between Plato and Aristotle concerning form.
from their first formulation in antiquity to the
iyth or 1 8th centuries, have disappeared or at THERE is A TENDENCY AMONG the historians of
least do not have general currency in contem- thought to use the names of Plato and Aristotle
porary discourse. Kant is perhaps the last great to symbolize a basic opposition in
philosophical
philosopher to include these terms in his basic perspectives and methods, or even in what Wil-
vocabulary. The conceptions of matter and liam fames calls "intellectual temperaments."
form, he writes, "he at the foundation of all Later writers are called "Platonists" or "Aris-
other reflection, so inseparably are they con- totelians" and doctrines or theories are classified
nected with every mode of exercising the un- as Platonic or Aristotelian. It almost seems to
derstanding. The former denotes the determm- be assumed at times that these names exhaust
able in general, the second its determination." the typical possibilities: that minds or theories
The word "form" is no longera pivotal term must be one or the other, or some sort of mix-
in the analysis of change or motion, nor in the ture or confusion of the two.
distinction between being and becoming, nor If this tendency is ever justified, it seems to
in the consideration of the modes of being and be warranted with regard to the problems of
the conditions of knowledge. The word "mat- form. Here, if anywhere, there may be poetic
ter" is now used without reference to form, truth in Whitehead's remark that the history
where of its principal
earlier in the tradition all of western thought can be read as a series of
meanings involved "form" as a correlative or an footnotes to Plato; though perhaps the observa-
opposite. Other words, such as "participation" tion should be added that Aristotle, the first
and "imitation," have also fallen into disuse to comment on Plato, wrote many of the
or lost the meanings which derived from their principal footnotes. In Plotmus the two strains
relation to form and matter. seem to be intermingled. The issue between
The problems which these words were used Plato and Aristotle concerning form dominates
to stateand discuss remain active in contem- the great metaphysical and theological contro-
porary thought. There is, for instance, the versies of the later Middle Ages, and, with some
problem of the universal and the particular, the alterations in language and thought, it appears
problem of the immutable and the mutable, the in the writings of Hobbes, Bacon, Descartes,
problem of the one and the many, or of same- Spinoza, and Locke, where it is partly a con-
ness and diversity. These problems appear in tinuation of, and partly a reaction against, the
the writings of William James and Bergson, mediaeval versions of Platonic and Anstotelian
Dewey and Santayana, Whitehead and Russell. doctrine.
Sometimes there is even a verbal approximation The most extreme reaction is, of course, to
to the traditional formulation, as in White- be found in those who completely reject the
hcad's doctrine of "eternal objects" or in San- term form or its equivalents as being without
tayana 's consideration of the "realm of essence" significance for the problems of motion, exist-
and the "realm of matter." Whatever expres- ence, or knowledge. Bacon retains the term,
sions they use, these thinkers find themselves but radically changes its meaning. "None should
526
CHAPTER 28: FORM 527
suppose from the great part assigned by us to chapter on MATTER. Here we are concerned
forms," Bacon writes, "that we mean such with the issues arising from different views of
forms as the meditations and thoughts of men form and its relation to matter.
have hitherto been accustomed to." He docs
not mean either "the concrete forms" or "any THE POPULAR meaning of "form" affords an ap-
abstract forms of ideas," but rather "the laws proach to the subtleties of the subject. As ordi-
and regulations of simple action. . >. The form narily used, "form" connotes figure or shape*
of heat or form of light, therefore, means no That connotation expresses one aspect of the
more than the law of heat or the law of light." technical significance of "form." A great variety
But Hobbes and Locke tend to reject the term of things, differing materially and in other re-
itself especially when it occurs in the notion spects, can have the same figure or shape. The
of substantial form as meaningless or mis- same form can be embodied in an indefinite
leading. number of otherwise different individuals. But
"We arc told," says Hobbes, "there be in the figures or shapes are sensible forms, forms per-
world certain essences, separated from bodies, ceptible to vision and touch. To identify form
which they call abstract essences^ and substantial with figure or shape would put an improper
forms. . .".
Being once fallen into this error of limitation on the meaning of form. This is pop-
separated essences, [men] are thereby necessarily ularly recognized in the consideration of the
involved in many other absurdities that follow form of a work of art the structure of an epic
it. For seeing they will have these forms to be poem or a symphony which seems to be more
real, they arc obliged to assign them some a matter of understanding than of direct sense-
and all men know that place is dimension, and involved. The form of a proposition, he says,
not to be filled but by that which
corporeal." is is that which remains the same in a statement
With regard to substantial form, Locke de- when everything else is changed. For example,
clares, "I confess I have no idea at all, but only these two statements have the same grammat-
of the sound 'form.'" Those "who have been ical and logical form: (i) John followed James^
taught . . . that it was those forms which made and (2) Paul accompanied Peter. What might be
the distinction of substances into their true called the matter or subject matter of the two
species and genera, were led yet further out of statements is
completely different, but both
the way by having their minds set upon fruit- have the same form, as may an indefinite num-
"
less inquiries after 'substantial forms' a sub- ber of other statements.
ject which Locke regards "wholly unintelli- as This illustration helps us to grasp the mean-
gible." The general skepticism about this no- ing of form, and the distinction between form
tion (or the distrust of its hollowness) in the and matter, or the formal and the material
lyth and i8th centuries is reflected in a banter- aspects of anything. It is thus that we under-
ing remark by Tristram Shandy's father. In a stand the phrase "formal logic" to signify a
discussion of infant prodigies, he refers to some study of the forms of thought or discourse, sep-
boy-wonders who "left off their substantial arated from the subject matter being thought
forms at nine years old, or sooner, and went on about or discussed. Similarly, abstractionism or
reasoning without them." surrealism is a kind of formalism in painting
Since form and matter are supposed to be which tries to separate visible patterns or struc-
correlative, the denial to form of meaning or tures from their representative significance or
reality leads to materialism, as in the case of their reference to familiar objects.
Hobbes the affirmation of matter alone as a Kant's doctrine of space and time as tran-
principle or cause. Materialists of one sort or scendental forms of intuition exemplifies the
another are the opponents of both Plato and meaning of form as pure order or structure di-
Aristotle, and of Platonists and Aristotelians; vorced from sensuous content. "That which in
That part of the controversy is discussed in the the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation,
528 THE GREAT IDEAS
I term its matter" he writes; "that which effects what they are, having the same simple self-
that -the content of the phenomenon can be existent and unchanging forms, not admitting
thing, constituting its nature. The sensible or there exist the Forms or the Ideas themselves
controversy between Plato and Aristotle and capitalize the initial letter when "Form" or
the difficulties which their theories confront. "Idea" refers to that which is
separate from the
characteristics of material things and from the
PLATO DOES NOT deny that things the sensi- ideas in our mind. The words "Form" and "Idea"
unequal," whereas the idea of equality is never the realm of intelligible being on the one hand,
the same as that of inequality. Hence he thinks and the realm of sensible becoming on the
"we must have known equality previously to other. The latter stands to the former as image
the time when we first saw the material or copy to reality, and Socrates finds this rela-
equals.
Before we began to see or hear or
. . .
tionship repeating itself when he further di-
perceive in any way, we must have had a vides each of the two parts. The realm of be-
knowledge of absolute equality, or we could coming divides into images or shadows and into
not have referred to that standard the equals that "of which this is only the resemblance,"
which are derived from the senses." The equal- namely, "the animals which we see, and every-
ity which supplies the "standard" by which thing that grows or is made." The realm of in-
material equals are measured is the Form or telligible being he also subdivides into two
Idea of equality. parts, of which the first is as an image or reflec-
What is true in this one case Socrates thinks tion of the second, namely, the hypotheses we
is true in every other. Whether we consider form in our minds and the Ideas or Forms them-
the "essence of equality, beauty, or anything selves.
else,*' Socrates holds, the "Ideas or essences, From this it appears that just as we should
which in the dialectical process we define as ... regard the form of the thing as an imitation of,
tro existences ... are each of them always or participation in, the separate Form, so should
CHAPTER 28 ? FORM 529
we regard the idea we have (that is, our under- between sensible particulars and the Ideas or
standing of the thing) as an approximation of Forms, Parmcnides tells him that "there arc
the Idea. The Ideas are outside the human mind certain ideas of which all other things partake,
even as theForms arc separate from their sen- and from which they derive their names; that
sible, material imitations. When we apprehend similars, for example, become similar, because
things by reason we know the Forms they imi- they partake of similarity; and great things be-
tate; when we apprehend them by our senses come great, because they partake of greatness;
we know them as imitations, or as images of the and that just and beautiful things become just
Ideas. and beautiful, because they partake of justice
and beauty." The Forms or Ideas arc, Parmeni-
THE PLATONIC THEORY changes the ordinary des suggests, "patterns fixed in nature, and
meaning of the word "imitation." We ordi- other things are like them, and resemblances of
narily think of imitation as involving a relation them what is meant by the participation of
of resemblance between two sensible things, other things in the ideas, is
really assimilation
both of which we are able to perceive; for ex- to them."
ample, we say that a child imitates his father's The fact of particularity and multiplicity
manner, or that a portrait resembles the person seems to be inseparable from the fact of partic-
who posed for it. The painter, according to ipation. That in which the many particulars
Socrates in the Republic, is not the
only "crea- participate must, on the other hand, have uni-
He compares the painter
tor of appearances." versality and unity. The Forms or Ideas are
who pictures a bed with the carpenter who universals in the sense that each is a one which
makes one. is somehow capable of being in a many by
Like the bed in the painting, the bed made resemblance or participation. Parmenides asks
by the carpenter is not the real bed. It is not, Socrates whether he thinks that "the whole
is one, and
says Socrates, the Idea "which, according to idea yet, being one, is in each one of
our view, is the essence of the bed." The car- the many." When Socrates unhesitatingly says
penter "cannot make true existence, but only Yes, Parmenides points out to him that we then
some semblance of existence." As the bed in confront the difficulty that "one and the same
the picture is an imitation of the particular bed thing will exist as a whole at the same time in
made by the carpenter, so the latter is an imita- many separate individuals" and that "the ideas
tion of the Idea the essential bed-ness which is themselves will be divisible, and things which
the model or archetype of all particular beds. participate in them will have a part of them
Shifting to another example, we can say that only and not the whole idea existing in each of
a statue,which resembles a particular man, is them." Nor can we say, Socrates is made to
the imitation of an imitation, for the primary realize, that "the one idea is
really divisible
imitation lies in the resemblance between the and yet remains one."
particular man portrayed and the Form or Idea,
Man. Just as the statue derives its distinctive THIS DIFFICULTY concerning the relation of par-
character from the particular man it imitates, ticulars to the Ideas they participate in, is dis-
so that particular man, or any other, derives cussed in the chapter on UNIVERSAL AND PAR-
his manhood or humanity from Man. just as TICULAR. It is not the only difficulty which
the particular man imitates Man, so our idea Plato himself finds in the theory of Ideas. An-
of Man is also an imitation of that Idea. Knowl- other concerns the individuality of each of the
edge, according to Plato, consists in the imita- indefinite number of particulars which copy a
tion of Ideas, even as sensible, material things single model or archetype. What makes the
have whatever being they have by imitation of various copies of the same model different from
the true beings, the Forms. one another ?
Another name for the primary type of imita- Plato meets this problem by adding a third
tion is "participation." To participate in is to principle. To the intelligible patterns or arche-
partake- of. In the dialogue in which Plato has types and their sensible imitations, he adds, in
the young Socrates inquiring mto the relation the Timaeus, the principle which is variously
530 THE GREAT IDEAS
named, sometimes "the receptacle," sometimes THE CRITICISM OF the Forms or Ideas which
"space," sometimes "matter." However named, we find m
the writings of Aristotle is primarily
it is the absolutely formless, for "that which is directed against their separate existence. "Plato
to receive all Forms should have no form. . . . was not far wrong," Aristotle says, "when he
The mother and receptacle of all visible and in said that there are as many Forms as there are
any way sensible things ... is an invisible and kinds of natural object"; but he immediately
formless being which receives all things and in adds the qualification: "if there are Forms dis-
some mysterious way partakes of the intelli- tinct from the things of this earth." It is pre-
gible, and is most incomprehensible." cisely that supposition which Aristotle chal-
It is this material or receiving principle which lenges.
somehow accounts for the numerical plurality Aristotle's criticism of Plato stems from his
and the particulanzation of the many copies own notion of substance, and especially from
of the one absolute model. When a number of his conception of sensible substances as com-
replicas of thesame pattern are produced by posed of matter and form. He uses the word
impressing a die on a sheet of plastic material "substance" to signify that which exists in and
at different places, it is the difference in the of itself; or, in other words, that which exists
material at the several places which accounts separately from other things. Hence, when he
for the plurality and particularity of the rep- says that, in addition to sensible substances,
licas. Yet the one die is responsible for the "Plato posited two kinds of substances the
character common to them all. Forms and the objects of mathematics," he is
The sensible things of any one sort are not translating the affirmation that the Forms have
only particular because the Form they imitate being separately from the sensible world of
is somehow received in matter; they are also changing things, into an assertion that they are
perishable because of that fact. The receptacle substances.
isthe principle of generation or of change. It is, "Socrates did not make the universals or the
Timaeus says, "the natural recipient of all im- definitions exist apart," Aristotle writes; but
pressions," which is "stirred and informed by referring to the Platonists, he says, "they, how-
them, and appears different from time to time ever, gave them separate existence, and this
by reason of them, but the forms which enter was the kind of thing they called Ideas." What
into and go out of her are the likenesses of real proof is there, he repeatedly asks, for the sepa-
existences modelled after their patterns in a rate existence of the Forms, or universals, or
wonderful and inexplicable manner." the objects of mathematics? "Of the various
themselves, existing apart from their sensible substantiality, to the Ideas or universals stands
imitations, are "uncreated and indestructible, side by side with his affirmation of the place of
never receiving anything from without, nor forms in the being of substances and the role of
going out to any other, but invisible and im- universals in the order of knowledge. Further-
perceptible by any sense/' They constitute the more, he limits his denial of the substantiality
realm of pure being. They arc the intelligible of Ideas to those Forms which seem to be the
reality. archetypes or models of sensible things. Par-
CHAPTER 28: FORM 531
ticular physical thingsfamiliar sensible sub- were a form existing apart from
alone. If there
stances, such as the stone, the tree, or the man both matter and mind, it would be neither an
are not, in his opinion, imitations of or par- individual form nor an abstract universal.
ticipations in universal models which exist apart The indwelling forms, according to Aristotle,
from these things. He leaves it an open question are not universals. Except for the
possibility of
whether there are self-subsistent Forms or Ideas Forms which dwell apart and bear no resem-
that purely intelligible substances which
is, blance at all to sensible things, all forms are
do not function as the models for sensible things either in matter or, abstracted from matter, in
to imitate. the human mind. These are often called "ma-
Stated positively, the Aristotelian theory forms" because they are the forms which
terial
consists in two affirmations. The first is that the matter takes or can take, and which the mind
determined by "in-
characteristics of things are abstracts from matter. Their being consists in
dwelling forms," which have their being not informing or determining matter, just as the
apart from but in the things themselves. To being of matter consists in the capacity to re-
illustrate his meaning he turns to the realm of ceive these forms and to be determined
by
art. When we make a brass sphere, he writes, them.
"we bring the form," which is a sphere, "into
this particular matter," the brass, and "the re- THE FOREGOING helps to explain Aristotle's use
sult is a brazen sphere." There is no "sphere of the word "composite" as a synonym for "sub-
apart from the individual spheres," and no stance" when he is considering particular sensi-
brass apart from the particular lumps of metal ble things. The independently existing, indi-
that are brass. "The 'form' means the 'such,' vidual physical things which Aristotle calls
and is not a 'this' a definite thing," such as "substances" are all composite of form and mat-
this individual brazen sphere. ter. He sometimes also calls form and matter
Aristotle analyzes natural things in the same "substances," but when he uses the word "sub-
manner. It is from "the indwelling form and stance" strictly and in its primary sense, he
the matter," he says, that "the concrete sub-
applies it only to the concrete individual. Form
stanceis derived." Men such as Callias or Soc- and matter are only principles or constituents
rates, for example, consist of "such and such of the concrete thing the composite substance.
a form in this flesh and in these bones," and The union of form and matter to constitute
"they are different in virtue of their matter physical substances also explains the Aristo-
(for that is
different) but the same in form." telian identification of form with
actuality and
The flesh and bones of Callias are not the flesh of matter with potentiality; and the relation of
and bones of Socrates; but though different as form and matter to a third term in the analysis
individual men, they are the same as men be- of change, namely, privation. As a physical thing
cause they have the same form. changes, its matter gives up one form to take on
The second point is that our understanding another. Its matter thus represents its
capacity
of things involves the forms of things, but now or potentiality for form. Matter is thcformable
somehow in the intellect rather than in the aspect of changing things. What things are
things themselves. In order to know things, actually at any moment is due to the forms they
Aristotle says, we must have within us "either possess. But they may have the potentiality for
the things themselves or their forms. The acquiring other forms, with respect to which
former alternative is of course impossible: it is
they are in privation.
not the stone which is
present in the soul," he 'The mutability of mutable things," Augus-
maintains, "but its form." tine writes, "is simply their capacity for all the
The form in the thing is as individual as the forms into which mutable things can be
thing itself. But in the mind, as the result of the changed." Change consists in a transformation
intellect's power to abstract this form from its of matter, which is another way of saying that it
matter, the form becomes a universal; it is then consists in the actualization of a thing's
poten-
called by Aristotle an "idea," "abstraction," or tialities. The Aristotelian theory of form and
"concept." Forms arc umversals in the mind matter is a theory of becoming as weli as art
532 THE GREAT IDEAS
analysis of the being of changing things. Illus- partly actualized and partly potential, and in*
trative applications of this theory will be found volved in accidental change, "Primary mat-
in the chapters on ART, CAUSE, and CHANGE. ter," Aquinas explains, "has substantial being
Some forms Some are shapes,
arc sensible. through its form. ... But when once it exists
some are qualities, some are quantities. But not under one form it is in potentiality to others."
all forms are perceptible by the senses; as, for Perhaps one more distinction should be men-
example, the form which matter takes when a tioned because of its significance for later dis-
plant or animal is generated and which gives cussions of form. Regarding living and non-
the generated thing its specific nature. This living things as essentially distinct, Aristotle
type of form came to be called a "substantial differentiates between the forms constituting
form" because it determines the kind of sub- thesetwo kinds of substances. As appears in the
stance which the thing is. In contrast, the forms chapter on SOUL, he uses the word "soul" to
which determine the properties or attributes of name the substantial form of plants, animals,
a thing are called its "accidents" or "accidental and men.
forms." For example, size and shape, color and
weight, are accidental forms of a man; whereas BOTH THE PLATONIC theory of the separate
that by virtue of which this thing (having a Forms and the Aristotelian theory of the com-
certain size, shape, and color) is a man, is its position of form and matter raise difficulties
substantial form. which their authors consider and which become
Aristotle's distinction between substantial the subject of intense controversy among Pla-
and accidental form affects his analysis of tonistsand Aristotelians in the Hellenistic and
change and his conception of matter. Genera- mediaeval periods.
tion and corruption are for him substantial The Platonic theory faces a question which
change, change in which matter undergoes from supposing the existence of an eternal
arises
transformation with respect to its substantial and immutable Form for every appearance in
form. The various types of motion alteration, the sensible world of becoming. If the Idea and
increase or decrease, and local motion -are the individual are alike, then "some further
changes which take place in enduring sub- idea of likeness will always be coming to light,"
stances,and with respect to their accidental Parmenides says to Socrates; "and if that be
forms. like anything else, then another; and new
The substratum of accidental change is not ideas will be always arising, if the idea resembles
formless matter, but matter having a certain that which partakes of it." Because of this dif-
substantial form; whereas in the coming to be ficulty with the doctrine of participation,
or passing away of substances, the substratum Parmenides suggests that it may be necessary
would seem to be a primary sort of matter, to conclude that "the Idea cannot be like the
devoid of all form. As indicated in the chapter individual or the individual like the Idea." In
on MATTER, according to Aristotle, is "the
this, addition, the relationships of the Forms to one
primary substratum of each thing, from which another presents a difficulty. Is the relation of
it comes to be without qualification, and which one Form to another, Parmenides asks, de-
persists in the result." He
help us grasp
tries to termined by the essence of each Form, or by
prime matter by using an analogy. "As the the relationships among the sensible particulars
bronze is to the statue, the wood to the bed," that imitate the Forms in question? Either
he writes, "so is the
underlying nature to sub- solution seems to be unsatisfactory because of
stance" matter absolutely formless to sub- the further difficulties which both raise.
stantial form. Yet, after propounding questions of this sort,
Aristotle sometimes speaks of the substantial and multiplying difficulties, Parmenides con-
form as a first act or actuality, and of accidental cludes by telling Socrates why the theory of
forms as second actualities. Accordingly he also Ideas cannot be given up. "If a man, fixing his
distinguishes between a primary and secondary attention on these and like difficulties," he
kind of matter the one absolutely potential, says, "does away with the Forms of things and
and underlying substantial change; the other will not admit that every individual thing has
CHAPTER 28: FORM 533
its own determinate Idea which is always one knowledge and definition. The definition which
and the same, he will have nothing on which the mind formulates attempts to state the es-
his mind can rest; and so he will utterly destroy sence of the thing defined. The formulable es-
the power of reasoning." sence of a thing would seem to be identical with
The Aristotelian theory has difficulties of its its form. But Aristotle raises the question and
own with respect to the ultimate character of his followers debate at length whether the es-
matter apart from all forms. Completely form- sence of a composite substance is identical with
less matter would be pure potentiality and its substantial form or includes its matter as
be completely unintelligible, since form is the Among his followers Aquinas maintains that,
principle of any thing's intelligibility. Never- in defining the essence or species of a composite
theless, something like formless matter seems to substance, the genus is used to signify the mat-*
be involved in substantial change, in contrast ter and the differentia the form. "Some held,"
to the substantially formed matter which is the he writes, "that the form alone belongs to the
substratum of accidental change. species, while the matter is part of the individ-
The problem of prime matter is related in ual, and not of the species. This cannot be
problem of the number
later speculations to the true, for to the nature of the species belongs
and order of the various forms which matter what the definition signifies, and in natural
can take. The question is whether matter must things the definition does not signify the form
have a substantial form before it can have any only, but the form and the matter. Hence in
accidental form; and whether it can have a natural things the matter is
part of the species;
second substantial form in addition to a first, or not, indeed, signate matter, which is the prin-
is limited to having a single substantial form, ciple of individuation, but common matter."
all subsequent forms necessarily being acci- He explains in another place that "matter is
dental. twofold; common and signate, or individual:
Aquinas plainly argues in favor of the unity common, such as flesh and bone; individual,
of substantial form. "Nothing is absolutely such and these bones." In forming
as this flesh
one," he maintains, "except by one form, by the universal concept man, for example, the
which a thing has being; because a thing has intellect abstracts the notion of the species
both being and unity from the same source, "from this flesh and these bones, which do not
and therefore things which are denominated by belong to the species as such, but to the indi-
various forms are not absolutely one; as, for vidual. ... But the species of man cannot be ab-
stantial form." It is not only "impossible that ality. What makes the particular that imitates
there be in man another substantial form be- a universal Form the unique individual it is?
sides the intellectual soul," but there is also no What makes the indwelling form of a composite
need of any other, because "the intellectual substance an individual form, as unique as the
soul contains virtually whatever belongs to the individual substance of which it is the form?
sensitive soul of brute animals and the nutritive Wehave already noted that both Platonists
soul of plants." and Aristotelians appeal to matter as somehow
The Aristotelian theory also has difficulties responsible for individuation or individuality,
with respect to substantial forms as objects of but that only raises further questions. The
534 THE GREAT IDEAS
Platonists conceive matter as the receptacle of those things which he found contrary to faith
allForms, and so in itself absolutely formless. he amended." He then goes on to say that,
How, then, can cause the particulanzations Augustine could not adopt, but had to amend,
1
it
which must be accounted for? Since prime the teaching of the Platomsts that "the forms
matter, like the receptacle, is formless, the of things subsist of themselves apart from mat-
Aristotelians resort to what they
"signatccall ter." He did thisy not by denying the ideas,-
matter" or "individual matter" to explain the "according to whichall things arc formed," but
individuality of forms and substances; but it by denying that they could exist outside thti
has been argued that this only begs the ques- divine mind. The divine ideas are the eternal
tion rather than solves it. exemplars and the eternal typestypes, Aqui-
nas explains, insofar as they are the likenesses of
THE CORRELATIVE ttrms form and matter seem things and so the principles of God's knowl-
to occur in modern thought under the guise of edge; exemplars insofar as they are "the princi-
certain equivalents; as, for example, the distinct ples of the making of things" in God's act of
substances which Descartes calls "thought" and creation.
"extension" res cogitans and res extensaor The profound mystery of the creative act
the infinite attributes of substance which which projects the divine ideas into substantial
Spinoza calls "mind" and "body." They ap- or material being replaces the older problem of
pear more explicitly in Kant's analysis of knowl- how physical things derive their natures by
edge, related a$ the a pnort and the a posteriori participation in the Forms. According to the
elements of experience. But it is in the great Aristotelian theory, both natural generation
theological speculations of the Middle Ages and artistic production involve the transforma-
that the most explicit and extended use of tion of a pre-existent matter. According to the
these terms is made, often with new interpreta- Platonic myth of the world's origin, only
tions placed on ancient theories. changing things are created, neither the recep-
The doctrine of spiritual substances, for ex- tacle nor the Ideas. But the Christian dogma of
ample, has a bearing on the theory of self- creation excludes everything from eternity ex-
subsistent Forms. The angels arc sometimes cept God.
called "separate forms" by the theologians. Ideas are eternal only as inseparable from
'
They are conceived as immaterial substances, the divine mind. Being spiritual creatures, the
and hence as simple rather than composite. But angels, or sel&subsistent forms, are not eternal.
though Plotmus identifies the order of purely And in the world of corporeal creatures, mat-
with the pure intelligences,
intelligible beings ter as well as its forms must begin to be with
the Christian theologian does not identify the the creation of things. Since matter ,and its
Platonic Ideas with the angels. He regards the forms cannot exist in separation from one an-
angels as intelligences. They exist as pure forms, other, the theologians hold that God cannot
and therefore are intelligible as well as intellec- create them separately. God cannot be sup-
tual substances. But ohcy are in no sense the posed, Augustine says, "first to have made
archetypes or models which sensible things re- formless matter, and after an interval of time,
semble. formed what He had first made formless; but,"
Nevertheless, theology does in-
Christian he goes on, "as intelligible sounds are made by
clude that aspect of the Platonic theory which a speaker, wherein the sound issues not formless
looks upon the Ideas as the eternal models or at first and afterwards receives a. form, but is
patterns. But, as Aquinas points out, the sepa- uttered already formed; so must God be under-
rately existing Forms are replaced by what stood to have made the world of formless mat-
Augustine calls "the exemplars existing in the ter, but contemporaneously to have created
divine mind." the world." God "concreates" form and matter,
Aquinas remarks on the fact that "whenever Augustine holds, "giving form, to matter's
Augustine, who was imbued with the doctrines formlessness without any interVal of time."
of the Pktonists* found in their teaching any- Defending Augustine's interpretation of the
thing consistent with faith, he adopted it; and passage-in Genesis which says that the earth,
CHAPTER 28: FORM 53$
which God in the beginning created, "was un- who, like Aquinas, adopt his theory must also
formed and void," Aquinas argues that "if adapt it to supernatural conditions when they
formless matter preceded in duration, it already deal with the problems of substance involved in
is implied by duration. ... To
existed; for this the mystery of the Incarnation of the second
say, then, that matter preceded, but without person of the Trinity and the mystery of tran-
form, is to say that being existed actually, yet substantiation in the Eucharist,
without actuality, which is a contradiction in Furthermore, Aristotle's identification of
terms. . . . Hence we must assert that primary soul with the substantial form of a living thing
matter was not created altogether formless." makes it difficult to conceive the separate exist-
But neither, according to Aquinas, can the ence of the individual human soul. Again an
form of any material t;hing be created apart adaptation is As indicated in the
required.,
from its matter, "Forms and other non-sub* chapters on IMMORTALITY and SOUL, the Chris-
sistmg things, which are said to co-exist rather tian doctrine of personal survival is given an
than to exist," he declares, "ought to be called Aristotelian rendering by regarding the human
concreated rather than created things." soul as a form which is not completely material.
Aristotle's theory of physical substances as Hence it is conceived as capable of sclf-subsist-
composite of form and matter raises certain ence when, with death and the dissolution of the
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGB
1. Form in relation to becoming or change 536
la. Forms as immutable models or archetypes: the exemplar ideas
(3) The unity of substantial form: prime matter in relation to substantial form
2< Angels and human souls as self-subsistent forms: the substantiality of thought
or mind in separation from extension or body 540
30. Sensible forms, intelligible, forms: the forms of intuition and understanding
y. Form and definition: thq formulable essence; the problem of matter in relation
to definition
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of tne passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
.
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
in two columns, the letters a and b refer' to the upper and Tower halves of the left-
printed
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halvesofthenght-handsideof
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
pf the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the mam divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283! 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows, e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemtah, 7.45 (D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS. The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
I4)342b-c 552c
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 811a d
12 LUCRETIUS Nature of Things, BK v [181-194]
:
**' Forms as indwellio causes or principles
63b-c 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK i 259a-268d; BK n,
b
17 PLOTINUS Second Ennead, TR in, CH i 1 46b-c;
: CH [i93*30- i9] 269c-270a; CH 2 [194*12^15]
i
Q 23, A 2, REP 3 483d-484d; Q 24, A n, ANS 15, 150a-b; TR iv, CH 13 164d-165b; TR vni, CH
498b-499c; PART in, Q 13, A i, ANS 780a-781b 3-TR ix, CH 5 202a-207a,c csp TR ix, CH 2
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvm 205c-206a / Fifth Ennead, TR v, CH 4-13 230b-
[19-33] 80a PARADISE, ii [46-148] 108b-109b 235b; TR vn, CH i 238a-b; TR vni, CH 1-3
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK n, 36d-37a 239b-241a; CH 7, 243a-b; TR ix, CH 3 247b-d;
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 386d-387a CH 11-14 250c-251d / Sixth Ennead, TR n, CH
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 43d-44c / 20-22 278d-280d; TR iv, CH 9-10 301c-302c;
Novum Organum, BK i, APH 51 lllc; BK n, APH TR v, CH 6 307b-c; TR vi 310d-321b; TR vn,
1-2 137a-c; APH 17 149b-d CH 4-9 323c-326c; CH 18-23 331b-333c
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xxxi, 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 65,
SECT 6 240d-241d; SECT 13 243a-b; CH xxxn, A 4, ANS 342b-343c; Q 115, A 3, REP 2 588c-
SECT 24 247c-d; BK in, CH HI, SECT 15-18 589c
258b-259c; CH vi, SECT 2-3 268c-d; CH ix, 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 52,
SECT 12 287d-288a A i, ANS 15d-18a; A 2 18a-19a
42 KANT- Judgement, 550a-551a,c; 553c-562a,c; 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 43d-44c
565b-569a; 581c; 584c-d 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 113c-115a
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d-
160b ld(2) Creation, generation, production: em-
bodiment in matter or substratum
Ic. The transcendental or a priori forms as con- 7 PLATO: Cratylus, 88a-c
stitutive of order in experience 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK CH 6-9 264c-268d;
i,
570a-574c / Philebus, 610d-613a / Seventh 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 23b-d; 34a-b; 36b-c;
Letter, 809c-810b 45d-46a; 48d-49a; lOOd-lOlb; 176d-177a;
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH n 186b-187a; 211c-213a / Judgement, 461a-c;
[77*5-9] 105d-106a; CH 13 [79*6-10] 108c; CH 551a-553c; 556d-558a; 559b-d; 575c-576a,
b
18 [8i*4o~ 5] lllb-c; CH 22 [83*23-35] 113c-d, 577c-d, 580b-d
CH 24 [85 b i7-22] 117a / Topics, BK n, CH 7 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d-
[113*24-33] 158d; BK vi, CH 6 [143^1-33] 157b
197 b-c; CH 10 [148*13-22] 202 b / Physics, BK 53 JAMES: Psychology, 881b
b
n, CH i [i93 2-5] 269d; CH 2 [19^23-194*6]
b
270a-b; BK iv, OH i [2o8 i9-24] 287b-c / Meta-
2b. The eternity of forms, the perpetuity of
BK i, CH 6 505b-506b; CH 9 508c- species: the divine ideas
physics,
Sllc; BK in, CH 2 [997*34-998*19] 516a-d; 7 PLATO: Cratylus, 113a-114a,c / Phaedrus,
CH 4 [999*24^24] 518a~c; CH 4 [iooi R 4}-cH 6 125a-b / Symposium, 167b-d / Phaedo, 231c-
b b
[ioo2 3i] 519d-521d; BK vn, CH 2 [io28 i8-28] 232b / Timaeus, 447a-d; 457c-d / Laws, BK
b a
551a-b; CH 8 [ro33 i9-io34 8] 556d-557b; CH iv, 685b-c
b
13-14 562a-563c; CH 15 [io40 8- 4] 564a-c; CH 8 ARISTOTLE: Generation and Corruption, BK 11,
ft
240b-241a; Q 47, A i, REP 2 256a-257b; Q 57, A 4, ANS and REP i 5a-6a; PART ii-n, Q 24,
A i, ANS 295a-d; Q 58, AA 6-7 304c-306b; Q 65, A ii t ANS 498b-499c; PART HI, Q 2, A i, ANS
A 4 342b-343c; Q 84, A 2, ANS and REP 3 442b- and REP 2 7lOa-7llc; A 2, ANS 711d-712d;
443c; A 4, REP i 444d-446b; A 5 446c-447c; Q PART in SUPPL, Q 82, A i, REP 2 968a-970c;
87, A i, ANS 465a-466c; Q 98, A i 516d>517d; Q 92, A i, ANS 1025c-1032b
Q 108, A i, ANS and REP 2 552c-553c 21 DANTE: Dwmc Comedy, PARADISE, i
[127-142]
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, 107c-d; iiU^-H 8 108b-109b; vn
! [121-148!
Q 92, A i, ANS 1025c-1032b 116b-c; xin [52-84] 126a-b; xxix [13-36]
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, v, 93b d / Objec- 150b-c
tions and Replies, 216d-217c 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK n, 30b
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 17, SCHOL 362c- 33 PASCAL: Pcnsccs, 512 262a
363c; PROP 21-23 364a-365a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 23b; 34a-b; 36b-c; 45d-
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 113c-115a; 173b-174a / 46a; 48d-49a; lOOd-lOlb; 186b-187a; I88d-
Judgement, 551a-552c 189a
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d-
157b 2c(2) The distinction between substantial and
accidental forms
2c. Form in the composite being of the in- 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 7, A 2,
dividual thing ANS 31d-32c; Q 8, A 2, REP 3 35c-36b; Q 29,
A 2, ANS and REP 4-5 163b-164b; Q 45, A 4,
2c(l) The union of matter and form: poten- ANS 244d-245c; Q 54, AA 1-3 285a-287b; Q
tiality and actuality 66, A i, REP 3 343d-345c; Q 67, A 3 351b-352a;
b
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK 11, CH i [i93*9~ i9] Q 76, A 4 393a-394c; A 6 396a-d; Q 77, A i
b
269b-270a / Metaphysics, BK v, CH
4 [ioi4 26- 399c-401b; A 6, ANS 404c-405c; PART i-n, Q 7,
b
1015*11] 535a-b; CH 6 [ioi6 i2-i8] 537a-b; A 4, REP 3 654b-655a
b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Thcologica, PART i-n, Q 49,
CH 8 538b-c; CH 24 [io23*32- i] 545a; BK
VH, CH 17 565a-566a,c; BK vm, CH 6 569d- A 2, ANS 2b-4a; A 4, ANS and REP i 5a-6a;
570d; BK ix, CH 6-9 573c-577c; BK xn, CH Q 50, A 2 7c-8a; Q 52, A i, ANS 15d-18a; Q 85,
b
4-5 599d~601a; CH 10 [iQ75 34-37] 606d / A i, REP 4 178b-179b; PART HI, Q 2, A i, ANS
Soul, BK ii, CH 1-2 642a-644c 710a-711c; A 2, ANS 711d-712d; PART in
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i [640* SUPPL, Q 70, A i, ANS 893d-895d; Q 79, A i,
b
i2-64i 39J 162b-165a / Generation of Animals, REp 4 951b-953b
BK i, CH 20 [729*9]-^ 2i [?29b 2i] 269b-270a; 31 DESCARTES Discourse, PART i, 41d
.
401b; A 2, REP 3 401b-d; Q 84, A 3, REP 2 443d- 18 AUGUSTINE: Ctfy of God, BK xi, CH 7 326a c;
444d; Q 115, A li REP 1-2,4 585d-587c CH29339a-b
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 7, A 2,
Q 79, A i, REP 4 951b-953b REP 2 31d-32c; Q 13, A i, RBP 2 62c-63c; Q 14,
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT n A i, ANS 75d-76c; A 2 76d-77d; Q 15, A i, ANS
415a-b and REP 1,3 91b-92a; Q 19, A i, ANS 108d-109c;
Q 34, A i, REP 3 185b-187b; Q 86, A 3 463b-d
2d. Angels and human souls as self-subsistent 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvin
forms: the substantiality of thought or
[49-60] 80b-c
mind in separation from extension or 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xxxi,
body SECT 6-13 240d-243b; BK HI, CH vi 268b-
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR vni, CH 2 27c-d / 283a passim; CH ix, SECT 12 287d-288a; BK iv,
Fourth Ennead, TR i, CH i, 139b; TR in, CH CH iv, SECT 5-8 324d-325c
9-12 146d-149b; CH 18 151b-c; TR ix 205a- 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 14a-108a,c; 173b / Fund.
207a,c / Sixth Ennead, TR ix, CH 5, 356d- Prin. Metaphystc of Morals, 282b-c / Practical
357a Reason, 308a-b
18 AUGUSTINE: City ofGod, BK xxn, CH i 586b,d- 46 HEGEL Philosophy of Right, PREP, 7a
587b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 693d-
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 7, A 694c
2, ANS and REP 2 31d-32c; Q 8, A 2, REP 2-3 53 JAMES Psychology, 859a-860b
35c-36b; Q 50 269a-275a csp A 2 270a-272a;
3a. Sensible forms, intelligible forms: the
Q 75 378a-385c csp A 5 382a-383b
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy^ PARADISE, vn [121- forms of intuition and understanding
148] 116b-c; xxix [13-36] 150b-c 7 PLATO- Cratylus, 113c<114a,c/ Phaedrus, 125a-
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 80a-b; PART HI, 126c / Symposium, 167a-d / Phacdo, 228a-232b
174b-176d; PART iv, 250c-251c; 258b-261a; / Republic, BK in, 333b-334b; BK v, 370d-
270c-271b 373c; BK vi, 383d-388a / Timaeus, 447a-d;
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 51d 52a; 455c-458a / Theaetetus, 534c-536a
PART v, 60b-c / Meditations, H 77d-81d; 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 13
vi 96b-103d / (Objections and Replies, DBF x [79*6-10] 108c / Topics, BK n, CH 7 [113*23-33]
130d; PROP iv 133c; 152b,d-156a; 224d-225b; 158d / Soul, BK in, CH 2 [425^7-26] 657d-
225d-226a;23Ia-232d 658a; CH 4 661b-662c; CH 8 664b-d / Memory
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 10 358a b; PROP and Reminiscence, CH i [450*26-451*19] 691a-
14, COROL 2 360a; PART 11, PROP r-2 373d- 692b
374a; PROP 7 375a-c; PROP 13 377d-378c; 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 19 76a-b;
PART in, PROP 2 396c-398b BK xn, pat 5 lOOa-b / City of God, BK vm,
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK i (423-431] 102b; CH 6, 269b-c; BK xi, CH 27, 337d-338a; BK xn,
BK v [388-443] 183b-185a; (469-505] 185b- CH 7 346c-d
186a; BK vi [320-353] 203a-204a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 7, A 2,
b
vn, CH 3 [247 i-7J 330b / Metaphysics, BK i, 2 74c-75b; Q 17, A 3, ANS 102d-103c; Q 18,
CH 6 505b-506b; CH 9 508c-511c; BK HI, CH 3 A 4, REP 3 107d-108c; Q 29, A i, REP 4 162a-
R b
[999*6-14] 517d; CH 4 [999 24~ 24] 518a-c; BK 163b; Q 50, A 4 273b-274b, Q 75, A 4, ANS
b a
vii, CH 8 [io33 i9~io34 8] 556d-557b; CH 10 381b~382a; Q 85, A i, REP 2 451c-453c; PART
b
[io35 28-32] 559b; CH 11 [1037*5-9] 560c, CH i-n, Q i, A 3, ANS 611b-612a
13-15 562a-564c; BK xin, CH 4-5 610a-611d; 20 AQUINAS- Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 55,
CH 10 618c-619a,c / Soul, BK in, CH 4 [429*18- A 4, ANS and REP 1-2 28c-29d; PART n-n, Q 4,
29] 661c A i, ANS 402a-403d; PART in, Q 2, A 5, ANS
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 6 341b-342c 715a-716b
19 AQUINAS. Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A 2, 31 SPINOZA* Ethics, PARI i, DEF 4 355b; PROP 8,
REP 3 15c-16a; A 3, ANS 16a-d; Q 4, A 3, ANS SCHOL 2, 357a-d; PART n, PROP 37 386b-c
22b-23b; Q n, A 3, ANS 49a-c; Q 13, A 9, ANS 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xxni
and REP 2 71b-72c; Q 14, A n 84c-85c; Q 16, A 204a-214b; CH xxxi, SECT 6-13 240d-243b; CH
7, REP 2 99a-d; Q 39, A 3, ANS 204c-205c; Q 50, xxxn, SECT 24 247c-d; BK in, CH in, SECT 12-
A 2, ANS 270a-272a; A 4, ANS 273b-274b; Q 20 257b-260a; CH v-vi 263d-283a passim; CH
57, A 2 295d-297a; Q 76, A 2, ANS 388c-391a; Q ix, SECT 11-17 287d 290a; CH x, SECT 17-21
85, A 7, REP 3 459c-460b; Q 86, A i 461c-462a; 295d-297b; CH xi, SECT 19-20 304b-d; BK iv,
A 3 463b-d CH iv, SECT 5-8 324d-325c; CH vi, SECT 4-16
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 2,
: 331d-336d passim
A2,ANs711d-712d 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT i
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 332a-333b 413a-b
esp 333a-b 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 342a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK in, CH in, 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 176c;
SECT 6-20 255c-260a; CH v-vi 263d-283a pas- 184d-185a
sim, esp CH v, SECT 9 266a-b, CH vi, SECT 32
4. The denial of form as a principle of being,
277c-278b, SECT 36-37 279a-b; BK iv, CH iv,
SECT 5-8 324d-325c; CH vi, SECT 4 331d-332b; becoming, or knowledge
CH vn, SECT 9 338d-339b 7 PLATO: Cratylus, J13c-114a,c / Sophist, 567a-
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 568a
6-19 405d-410c esp SECT 15-16 409a-d 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK iv, CH 4 [1007*20-
b
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341b-342b 526c-527a; CH 5 528c-530c passim; BK xi,
i8]
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 211c-218d / Judgement, CH 6 590d-592b
573a-c 23KoBBEs: Leviathan, PART i, 49d; PART iv,
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 158b-c; 269b-271a
PART iv, 360c-361a 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK i, APH 51 lllc;
53 JAMBS: Psychology, 308a-312a BK n, APH 1-2 137a-c; APH 17 149b-d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH vui,
3 c. Form and definition: the formidable es-
SECT 2 133c; CH ^xxi, SECT 6-13 240d-243b
sence; the problem of matter in relation
passim, esp SECT 6 240d-241d; BK in, CH vi,
to definition SECT 10 271b; SECT 24 274c; CH x, SECT 20
7 PLATO: Phacdrus, 134b-c / Mcno, 174b-179b / 296d-297a
Seventh Letter, 809c-810b 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 422a-b
542 THE GREAT IDEAS
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other discussions of the Forms or Ideas as immutable models or archetypes, see CHANGE 153;
ETERNITY 40; IDEA la, 6b.
Other discussions of forms as indwelling causes or principles in mutable things, see CAUSE la;
CHANGE 23; MATTER la; and for the consideration of form and matter as co-principles of
composite substances, see BEING 7b(2).
Discussions of matter or the receptacle in relation to form, /^CHANGE 2~2b; MATTER i-ib;
SPACE la; WORLD 4b; and for the consideration of matter apart from form, see MATTER 2, 33.
The controversy over the separate existence of the Forms, the objects of mathematics, and
universal*, seeBEING 7d(2)~7d(3); MATHEMATICS 2b; SAME AND OTHER 2a; UNIVERSAL
AND PARTICULAR 2a-2c; and for the problem of the cause of individuality, see MATTER ic;
UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 3.
The existence of forms in the mind as concepts abstracted from matter, see IDEA 2g; MATTER
4d; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6c(i); SENSE 53; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 4C.
Other considerations of the a priori or transcendental forms of intuition, see SENSE ic;
SPACE 43; TIME 6c.
Comparisons of creation, generation, and production as each relates to form and matter,
see 2b-2c; MATTER 3d; WORLD 4e(i).
ART
Other terms related to the distinction of form and matter or to the kinds of form, see BEING
70, 7c(i)-7c(3); NATURE 13(2); UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 6a.
The theological doctrine of the angels as self-subsistent forms or simple substances, see
ANGEL 2, 3b~3c; BEING 7^2); for the theological doctrine of the forms as eternal ex-
emplars or types in the mind of God, see GOD 5f; IDEA ic; and for the theory of the soul
as the substantial form of a living thing, see LIFE AND DEATH i; MAN 33; SOUL ib.
Form and matter in relation to definition, see BEING 8c; DEFINITION 6a; MATTER 4b;
NATURE 13(2).
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boofy of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
place,
the Bibliography of Additional Readings, which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
the exception of certain mathema- SOME OF THE TOPICS IN this chapter are pri-
WITH ticians and physicists, all the authors of marily philosophical. They belong to the sub-
the great books are represented in this chapter. ject matter of rational speculation or poetic
In sheer quantity of references, as well as in imagination in all the great epochs of our cul-
variety, it is the largest chapter.
The reason is ture, regardless of differences in religious be-
obvious. More consequences for thought and lief. Other however, arc peculiarly re-
topics,
action follow from the affirmation or denial of stricted to matters of faith or religion. With
God than from answering any other basic ques- respect to such matters, dogmatic differences,
tion. They follow for those who
regard the or differences in articles of faith, must be ex-
as answerable only by faith or only by plicitly recognized.
question
reason, and even for those who insist upon The
materials here assembled must therefore,
divine nature and of the relation of the world hammedan traditibn are included in this set,
and man to the gods or God. The solutions of the fact that Gibbon discusses the Moslem
these problems cannot help influencing man's faithand compares its teachings with those of
conception of the world in which he lives, the Judaism and Christianity explains the inclusion
position that he occupies in it, and the life to of Mohammedanism in one group of topics.
which he is called. That is the group which deals with the doc-
The whole tenor of human life is certainly trines common to these three religions, as dis-
affected by whether men regard themselves as tinguished from the tenets on which Judaism
the supreme beings in the universe or acknowl- and Christianity differ dogmatically. The ex-
edge a superior a superhuman being whom istence of certain common beliefs in the west-
they conceive as an object of fear or love, a ern tradition enables us to begin, as it seems
force to be defied or a Lord to be obeyed. advisable to do, with the conception of God
Among those who acknowledge a divinity, it that is shared by the living religions of western
matters greatly whether the divine is repre- culture today.
sented merely by the concept of Godthe In our civilization, what is denied by an
object of philosophical speculation or by atheist who says there is no God ? Not idols or
the living God whom men worship in all the images which men may seek to placate. Not
acts of piety which comprise the rituals of re- philosophical constructions or mythological fig-
ures. Certainly not the universe itself, either as
ligion.
The most radical differences in man's concep- an infinite and everlasting whole, or as finite
tion of his own nature follow from the exclusion and temporal, but equally mysterious in its'ul-
of divinity as its source or model on the one timate incomprehensibility to the human mind.
hand, and from the various ways in which man In our civilization, the atheist denies the ex-
is seen as participating in divinity on the other. istence of a supernatural being, the object of
In this religious conception of God, one term separate function and a separate department
must be saved from misinterpretation. The to one the body, to another the soul; and in the
word "personal" should not be read with an- body itself, to one the head, to another the
thropomorphic imagery, though its meaning neck, and each of the other members to one of
does entitle man as well as God to be called a the gods; and in like manner, in the soul, to one
person rather than a thing. "Although the term god the natural capacity was assigned, to an-
person is not found applied to God in Scripture, other education, to another anger, to another
cither in the Old or New Testament," Aquinas lust; and so the various affairs of life were as-
Scripture; as that He is the supreme self-sub- money to another, navigation to another, wars
sisting being,and the most perfectly intelligent and victories to another, marriages to another,
meaning which Boethius had given it, Aquinas atheism, he asks whether the indictment means
comments on the difference in its meaning when that he does not "acknowledge the gods which
it is applied to men. God can be said to have a the state acknowledges, but some other new
rational nature, he writes, only "if reason be divinities or spiritual agencies m
their stead."
taken to mean, not discursive thought, but, Meletus answers that he thinks Socrates is a
in a general sense, an intelligent nature , . .
complete atheist who
recognizes no gods at all.
God cannot be called an individual" in the sense To this Socrates replies by suggesting that his
way," for God does not possess, God is, an in- demigods?"
telligence.
Like the one God of Judaism and Chris-
We shall use this idea of a personal God, the tianity, the many gods of pagan antiquity have
reality of which the contemporary atheist immortal but they are not without origin.
life,
denies; in order to distinguish divergent con- Zeus is the son of Kronos, and he has many
ceptions in other doctrines. Then we shall ex- offspring, both gods and demigods, who per-
amine more closely what is involved in this form different functions and are not of equal
idea itself, station in the Olympian hierarchy. The realm
of the divine includes such figures as the Titans
IN THE WESTERN tradition, the various pagan and the Cyclops, who are neither gods nor men;
religions reflected especially in the poems and and demigods, like Heracles, who are offspring
CHAPTER 29: GOD 545
phic, depends on our interpretation of religious under headings which arc worded monotheis-
symbolism. Plato for one thinks that many of tically, since even here there is continuity of
the poets' descriptions of the gods and their thought and expression from Homer and Virgil
activities be dismissed as unworthy,
should to Dante and Milton; from Plato, Aristotle,
precisely because they debase the gods to the and Plotmus to Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes,
human level. and Kant; from Lucretius to Newton and Dar-
According to Gibbon, a Greek or Roman win.
polytheism as a composition of human fraud THE DOCTRINES known as deism and pantheism,
and error, could disguise a smile of contempt like unqualified atheism, are as much opposed
under the mask of devotion, without appre- to the religious beliefs of polytheism as to the
1
hending that either the mockery or the com- faith ofJudaism and Christianity.
pliance would expose him to the resentment of Of
these two, pantheism is much nearer
any invisible, or, as he conceived them, imagi- atheism, for it denies the existence of a tran-
nary powers." But the early Christians, he scendent supernatural being or beings. God is
points out, saw the many gods of antiquity "in Nature. God is immanent in the world and,
a much more odious and formidable light" and in the extreme form of pantheism, not tran-
held them to be "the authors, the patrons, and scendent in any way. Certain historic doctrines
the objects of idolatry." which are often regarded as forms or kinds of
Those who take symbols with flat literalism pantheism seem to be less extreme than this,
might also attack Christianity as anthropomor- for theydo not conceive the physical universe
phic and idolatrous; in fact they have. The as exhausting the infinite being of God. The
defense of Christianity against this charge does world, for all its vastncss and variety, may only
not avail in the case of Roman emperor-wor- represent an aspect of the divine nature.
ship, which consisted not in the humamzation According to Spinoza, the attributes of ex-
of the divine for the sake of symbolic represen- tension and thought, in terms of which we un-
tation, but in the deification of the merely derstand the world or nature as being of the
human for political purposes. divine substance, are merely those aspects of
Although there are radical differences, there God which are known to us, for the divine sub-
are also certain fundamental agreements be- stance consists "of infinite attributes, each one
tween paganism and Judaeo-Christianity re- (
of which expresses eternal and infinite essence."
garding the nature of the divine. As we have In the conception of Plotimis, the whole world
already noted, the deities are conceived per- represents only a 'partial emanation from the
sonally, not in terms of impersonal, brute divine source. Yet thinkers like Plotinus and
forces. Conceived as ocings with intelligence Spinoza so conceive the relation of the world to
and will, the gods concern themselves with God that-^as in the strictest pantheism the
earthly society; they aid or oppose mart's plans religious doctrines of creation, providence, and
546 THE GREAT IDEAS
salvation arc cither rejected or profoundly al- both present and not present; not present
it is
things," Marcus Aurelius writes, "and one God One, considered in itself, is absolutely tran-
who pervades all things, and one substance, and scendent. Plotinus even denies it the name of
one law, one common reason in all intelligent God or Good or Being, saying it is
beyond
animals, and one truth." He speaks of the these.
pating, though unequally, in the unit so the all finite existences, an absolute and unchang-
series of beings following upon The First bear, ing one underlying the finite modes in which it
each, some form or idea derived from that variably manifests itself. Though God for Spi-
source. In Number the participation establishes noza is transcendent in the sense of vastly ex-
Quantity; in the realm of Being, the trace of ceeding the world known to man, in no sense
The One establishes reality: existence is a trace does God exist apart from the whole of nature.
of The One." Spinoza's view thus sharply departs from that
But although The One is in all things, and of an orthodox Jewish or Christian theologian.
all things depend upon it for their very exist- When the latter says that God is transcendent,
ence, The One itself has no need of them* It is in he means that God exists apart, infinitely re-
this sense that Plotinus says that "The One is moved from the whole created universe. When
all things and no one of them the latter speaks of God as being immanent in
Holding all . . .
though itself nowhere held it is omnipresent, that universe, he carefully specifies that it is not
for where its presence failed something would by His substance, but by the power of His ac-
elude its hold. At the same time, in the sense tion and knowledge. But Spinoza calls God
that it is nowhere held, it is not present: thus "the immanent, and not the transitive, cause of
CHAPTER 29: GOD 547
allthings," for the reason that "outside God God, the infinite and eternal Creator of this
there can be no substance, that is to say, out- world, Whose laws are the laws of nature
side Him nothing can exist which is in itself." which are laid down from the beginning and
These divergent conceptions of God's im- which govern all created things. Rousseau
manence and transcendence so relevant to speaks of this as "the religion of man" and even
the question of who is or is not a pantheist identifies it with Chnstiamty "not the Chris-
are further discussed in the chapters on NATURE tianity of today, but that of the Gospel, which
and WORLD. is
entirely different." He describes this religion
as that "which has neither temples, nor altars,
UNLIKE PANTHEISM, deism affirms gods or a nor rites, and is confined to the purely internal
God, personal intelligences existing apart from cult of the supreme God and the eternal obliga-
this world; but, as in the teaching of Lucretius, tions of morality."
deism sometimes goes to the extreme of believ- Not all deists, certainly not those of the iyth
ing in absentee gods who neither intervene in and early i8th centuries, go to the Lucretian
the order of nature nor concern themselves extreme of picturing an uninterested and mor-
with human affairs. ally neutral God. Many of them believe in an
"The nature of the gods," Lucretius writes, after-life. But modern deism did tend toward
"must ever in itself of necessity enjoy immor- this extreme. By Kant's time it had even ceased
tality together with supreme repose, far re- to look upon God as a personal intelligence.
moved and withdrawn from our concerns; since Kant therefore takes great pains to distinguish
exempt from every pain, exempt from all deism from theism.
dangers, strong in its own resources, not want- The deist, according to Kant, "admits that
ing aught of us, it is neither gained by favors we can cognize by pure reason alone the exist-
nor moved by anger." ence of a supreme being, but at the same time
Such gods neither create the world nor maintains that our conception of this being is
govern it; above all they do not reward or purely transcendental, and that all we can say
punish man, and so they do not have to be of it is, that it possesses all reality, without be-
feared or propitiated. "To say that for the sake ing able to define it more closely." The theist,
of menthey have willed to set in order the on the other hand, "asserts that reason is ca-
glorious nature of the world and therefore it is pable of presenting us, from the analogy with
mee to praise the work of the gods immortal, nature, with a more definite conception of this
and that it is an unholy thing ever to shake by being, and that its operations, as the cause of all
any force from its fixed seats that which by the things, are the results of intelligence and free
forethought of the gods in ancient days has will."
been established on everlasting foundations for Kant even maintains that "we might, in
mankind, or to assail it by speech and utterly strict rigor, deny to the deist any belief in
overturn it from top to bottom; and to invent God at all, and regard him merely as a main-
and add other figments of the kind ... is all tainer of the existence of a primal being or thing
sheer folly. For what advantage can our grati- the supreme cause of all other things." In any
tude bestow on immortal and blessed beings case,deism seems to be an essentially un-fewish
that for our sakes they should take in hand to and un-Christian or anti-Jewish and anti-Chris-
administer aught?" tian doctrine, for it denies God's supernatural
Divinity seems to have moral significance to revelation of Himself; it denies miracles and
Lucretius only insofar as the gods exemplify the every other manifestation of supernatural agen-
happy life; and immoral because its
religion is
cy in the course of nature or the life of man;
superstitions concerning divine motives and it denies the efficacy of prayer and sacrament.
meddling make men servile and miserable. In short, it rejects the institutions and
practices,
When the deism of Lucretius is contrasted and hope, of any religion
as well as the faith
with the more familiar modern forms of that which claims supernatural foundation and su-
doctrine, the influence of Christianity is seen. pernatural warrant for its dogmas and rituals.
The modern deist af&hns the supremacy of one Deism, which "consists simply in the worship
548 THE GREAT IDEAS
of a God
considered as great, powerful, and reason'* incompetence to demonstrate. He
eternal," is, in Pascal's opinion, "almost as far often accompanies the declaration with elabo-
removed from the Christian religion as atheism, rate criticisms of the arguments which may be
which is its exact opposite." offered by others. This is not always the case,
What Pascal and Kant call "deism" and however. For example, the great Jewish theolo-
Rousseau "the religion of man," others like gian, Moses Maimonides, thinks that God's ex-
Hume call "natural religion." His Dialogues istence can be proved by reason entirely apart
Concerning Natural Religion provide a classic from faith; but with regard to the essence or
statement of rationalism, which is the same as attributes of God, his position seems to be one
naturalism, in religion; though, as die chapter which might be called agnostic.
on RELIGION be questioned
indicates, it may When men "ascribe -essential attributes to
whether the word "religion" can be meaning- God," Maimonides declares, "these so-called
fully used for a doctrine which claims no knowl- essential attributes should not have any similar-
edge,- beyond that of the philosopher, and no ity to the attributes of other things, just as
edge of God is t,he science of theology. In addi- not provide us with any knowledge of God's
tion to considering all things the whole wprld essence, for no comparison obtains between
and human life in relation to God, theology things and God. Hence Maimonides asserts that
treats especially of God's existence, essence, and "the negative attributes of God are the true
at tributes., Throughout the range of its subject attributes."They tell us not what God is, but
matter and problems, theology may be of two what God is not.
sorts: it be either natural knowledge, ob-
may Even though Maimonides holds that "exist-
tained by ordinary processes of observation and ence and essence are perfectly identical" in
reasoning; or knowledge which is supernatural God, he also insists that "we comprehend only
in the sense of being based on divine revelation. the fact that He exists, not His essence. ... All
This i? the traditional distinction between nat- we understand," he goes on to say, in addition
ural and sacred or, as it is sometimes called, to "the fact that He exists," is the fact that
dogmatic theology, The one belongs to the do- "He is a Being to whom none of his creatures is
main of reason; it is the work of the philosopher. similar." This fact is confirmed in all the
nega-
The other belongs to the domain of faith, and tive attributes such as eternal (meaning non-
is the work of the theologian who seeks to un- temporal), infinite, or incorporeal; even as it is
derstand his faith. by all the positive attributes, expressed
falsified
These distinctions are discussed in the chap- by such names as "good" or "living" or "know-
terson THEOLOGY, METAPHYSICS, and WIS- ing," insofar as they imply a comparison be-
DOM. Here we are concerned with different at- tween God and creatures. When they cannot
titudes toward the problem of man's knowledge be interpreted negatively, they can be tolerated
of God. The deist, aswe have seen, rejects su- as metaphors, but they must not be taken as
pernatural revelation and faith; theology, like expressing an understanding "of the true es-
religion, is held to be entirely natural, a work of sence of God," concerning which Maimonides
The agnostic makes the opposite denial.
reason. maintains, "there is no possibility of obtaining
He denies that anything supernatural can be a knowledge."
known by reason. It cannot be proved or, for Aquinas takes issue with such agnosticism
that matter, disproved. The evidences of nature about the divine nature in his discussion of t;he
and the1
light of reason do not permit valid in- names of God. Although he says that "we can-
ferences or arguments concerning God or crea- not know what God is, but rather what He is
tion, providence or immortality. ; not," Aquinas disagrees with Maimonides that
It is usually with respect to God's existence allnames which express some knowledge of
that the agnostic most emphatically declares God's essence must be interpreted negatively
CHAPTER 29: GOD 54$
or treated as metaphors. He denies that "when So understood, agnosticism need not be in*
we say God lives, we mean merely that God compatible with religion, unless a given reli-
isnot like an inanimate thing" as "was taught gion holds, as an article of faith itself, that the
by Rabbi Moses." On the contrary, he holds existence of God can be proved by reason. In
that "these names signify the divine substance fact,the agnostic may be a religious man who
. . .
although they fall short of representing accepts divine revelation and regards faith as
Him. For these names express God, so far
. . .
divinely inspired.
as our intellects know Him. Now since our Montaigne's Apologyfor Raimond de Scbondc
intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Sebonde had written a
illustrates this position.
Him as far as creatures represent Him." There- treatiseon natural theology, which to Mon-
fore,Aquinas concludes, "when we say, God is taigne seems "hardy and bold; for he under-
good, the meaning is not, God is the cause of takes, by human and natural reasons to estab-
goodness, or, God is not evil: but the meaning lish and make good against the atheists all the
is, Whatever good we attribute to creatures pre- of the Christian religion." Though
articles
exists in God, and in a higher way." Montaigne says of his work, "I do not think it
possible to do better upon that subject," and
IF MAIMONIDES were names
right that the though he entertains the conjecture that it may
which are said positively of both God and have been "drawn from St. Thomas Aquinas,
creatures are "applied ... in a purely equivocal for, in truth, that mind full of infinite learning
sense" (e.g-, having literal meaning when said and admirable subtlety, was alone capable of
of creatures but being only metaphorical when such imaginations"; nevertheless, Montaigne
said of God), then, according to Aquinas, it does "not believe that means purely human are,
would follow that "from creatures nothing at in any sort, capable of doing it."
allcould be known or demonstrated about According to Montaigne, "it is faith alone
God." Those who say, on the other hand, that that vividly and certainly comprehends the
"the things attributed to God and creatures deep mysteries of our religion." In his view,
are univocal" (i.e., are said in exactly the same reason by itself is incapable of proving anything,
sense), claim to comprehend more than man much less anything about God. "Our human
can know of the divine essence. When the term reasons," he writes, "are but sterile and un-
wise "is applied to God," Aquinas writes, "it digested matter; the grace of God is its form;
leaves the thing signified as uncomprehended it is that which
gives it fashion and value." The
and as exceeding the signification of the name. light and value in Sebonde's arguments come
Hence it is evident that this term wise is not from the fact that faith supervenes "to tint and
applied in the same way to God and to man. illustrate" them, and "renders them firm and
The same applies to other terms. Hence no solid."
cal,the univocal, and the equivocal will also by the grace of God, preserved myself entire,
be found there as well as in the chapter on without anxiety or trouble of conscience, in
SAME AND OTHER. We have dealt with these the ancient belief of our religion, amidst so
matters here only for the sake of describing that many sects and divisions as our age has pro-
Freud, for example, regards religion as an il- reason's power to demonstrate, unaided by
lusion to be explained in terms of man's need faith. Yet even hsfe he does not assign the
to create gods in his own image to find a sur- affirmation of the truth to reason alone.
rogate for the father, on whom his infantile Just as "it was necessary for the salvation of
dependence can be projected. Freud finds con- man that certain truths which exceed human
firmation for this in the fact that in the reli- reason should be made known to him by divine
gions of the west, God
openly called Father,
"is revelation," so even with regard to "those
Psychoanalysis/* he goes on, "concludes that he truths about God which human reason can
really the father, clothed in the grandeur in
is
investigate," Aquinas thinks it was also nec-
which he 0ncc appeared to the small child." essary that "man be taught by a divine reve-
Though the grown man "has long ago real- lation.For the truth about God, such as reason
ized that his father is a bemg with strictly hm- can knowit, would only be known by a few,
itcd powers and by no means endowed with and that after a long time, and with the admix-
every desirable attribute/* Freud thinks that ture of many errors." Because "human reason
he nevertheless "looks back to the memory- is
very deficient in things God"
concerning
image of the overrated father of his childhood, "a sign of which is that philosophers . . . have
exalts it into a Deity,and brings it into the fallen into many and have disagreed
errors
presentand into reality. The emotional strength among themselves" men would have no
of this memory-image and the lasting nature knowledge of God "free from doubt and un-
of his need for protection" for, as Freud ex- certainty" unless all divine truths were "de-
plains, "in relation to the external world he is livered to them by the way of faith, being told
still a child" "arc the two supports of his to them, as it were, by God Himself Who can-
belief in God." not he."
In different ways faith supports reason and
AT THE OTHER extreme from agnosticism is, as reason helps faith. On matters which belong to
the name implies, gnosticism. Like deism, it both reason and faith, faith provides a greater
dispenses with faith, but it exceeds traditional certitude. On matters strictly of faith, reason
deism in the claims it makes for reason's power provides some understanding, however remote
to penetrate the divine mysteries. Between ex- and inadequate, of the mysteries of religion.
clusive reliance on faith and an exaltation of "The use of human reason in religion," Bacon
reason to the point where there is no need for writes, "is of two sorts: the former, in the con-
God to reveal anything, a middle ground is held ception and apprehension of the mysteries of
by those who acknowledge the contributions God to us revealed; the other, in the inferring
of both faith and reason. Those who try to and deriving of doctrine and direction there-
harmonize the two usually distinguish between upon. ... In the former we see God youch-
the, spheres proper to each, and formulate some safeth to descend to our capacity, in the ex-
principle according to which they are related pressing of his mysteries in sort as may be sensi-
to each other inan orderly fashion. ble unto us; and doth grift his revelations and
Whatever is purely a matter of faith, Aquinas holy doctrine upon the notions of our reason
says, assented to solely because "it is revealed
is and appliethhis inspiration to open our under-
by God." The articles of Christian faith are standing, as the form of the key to the ward
by "the Trinity of Persons in Almighty
typified of the lock. For thelatter, there is allowed us
God, the mystery of Christ's Incarnation, and an use of reason and argument, secondary and
the like." With regard to such matters, whkh respective, although not original and absolute.
Aquinas thinks belong primarily to faith, some For after the articles and principles of religion
auxiliary use can be made of reason, "not, in- are placed and exempted from examination
deed, to prove faith," he explains, but to make of reason, it is then permitted unto us to
clear the things that follow from it. Certain make derivations and inferences from and ac-
551
cording to the analogy of them, for our better object exists." Hence Anselm considers the
direction.'* consequence of supposing that God exists in
In addition to all discursive knowledge of the understanding alone.
God, whether it be by faith or by reason, there "If that, than which nothing greater can be
isthe totally incommunicable and intimate ac- conceived," he argues, "exists in the under-
quaintance with the supernatural which the standing alone, the very being, than which
mystic claims for his vision in moments of re- nothing greater can be conceived, is one than
ligious ecstasy or which promised to the is which a greater can be conceived"-* for to
blessed as their heavenly beatitude. When, at exist in reality as well as in the understanding
the culmination of Paradise, Dante sees God, is to have more being. But this leads to "an
"my vision," he declares, "was greater than our irreconcilable contradiction," since "if that,
Knowing that his "speech will fall more can be conceived not to exist, it is not that than
short . . . than that of an infant who still bathes which nothing greater can be conceived."
his tongue at the breast," he tries nevertheless Therefore Anselm concludes that a being "than
to communicatein words "one single spark of which nothing greater can be conceived" must
Thy glory for the folk to come." In the pres- exist"both in the understanding and reality."
ence of God, he wntes, his mind, "wholly rapt, Anselm summarizes his argument by saying
was gazing fixed, motionless, and intent, and that "no one who understands what God is,
ever with gazing grew enkindled. In that Light can conceive that God docs not exist." Since
one becomes such that it is impossible he should the non-existence of God is inconceivable, God
ever consent to turn himself from it for other must Descartes gives the same argument
exist.
sight; because the Good which is the object a slightly different statement in terms of the
of the will is all collected in it, and outside of inseparability of God's essence from God's
it that is defective which is
perfect there." existence.
by minds of quite different persuasions in re- think of with more attention, I clearly see
it
possible, nevertheless, to classify the arguments the essence of God than can its
having its three
into two or three main types. angles equal to two right angles be separated
Within the domain of pure or speculative from the essence of a rectilinear triangle, or
reason there seem to be two ways of approach- the idea of a mountain from the idea of a
ing the problem of God's existence. valley; and so there is not any less repugnance
One is in terms of the conception of God to our conceiving a God (that a Being su-
is,
as an infinite, perfect, and necessary being, premely perfect) to whom existence is lacking
whose non-existence is therefore inconceivable. (that is to say, to whom a certain perfection is
According to Anselm, God cannot be conceived lacking), than to conceive of a mountain which
in any other way than as "a being than which has no valley."
nothing greater can be conceived." But since Spinoza defines a "cause of itself as "that
"the fool hath said in his heart, there is no whose essence involves existence; or that whose
God," how shall he be made to know that the nature cannot be conceived unless existing*"
God, which exists in his understanding at the Since in his conception of substance, substance
moment when he denies His real existence, also is
necessarily infinite, it is also cause of itsclL
really exists outside his understanding? "For Hence he concludes that "God or substance
one thing for an object to be in the under-
it is * . .
necessarily exists"; for "if this be denied,
standing, and another to understand that the conceive if it be possible that God does not
552 THE GREAT IDEAS
exist. Then it follows that His essence does not terms of the conception of an absolutely perfect
involve existence. But this is absurd. Therefore being or in terms of essence and existence, the
v he thinks, which
God exists.
necessarily argument is invalid, asserts
This mode of argument, which takes still that God actually exists because His non-exist-
other forms, is traditionally called the "on to- ence is inconceivable. Kant's later criticism of
logical argument" or the "0 priori proof of the ontological argument takes a similar course.
God's existence. Its critics sometimes deny that A proposition may be logically necessary with-
it is an argument or proof in any sense at all. out being true in fact.
Aquinas, for example, interprets Anselm not as "The conception of an absolutely necessary
proving God's existence, but rather as asserting being," he writes, "is a mere idea, the objective
that God's existence is self-evident. Those who reality of which is far from being established
say that the proposition "God does not exist" by the mere fact that it is a need of reason. . . .
is self-contradictory, arc saying that the oppo- The unconditioned necessity of a judgment
site proposition "God exists" must be self- does not form the absolute necessity of a
evident. thing." From the fact that "existence belongs
Aquinas does not deny that the proposition necessarily to the object of the conception,"
"God exists" is intrinsically self-evident. On we cannot conclude that "the existence of the
this point he goes further than Anselm, Des- thing ... therefore absolutely necessary
is
cartes, and Spinoza. Where they say God's merely," Kant says, "because its existence has
essence involves His existence, Aquinas asserts been cogitated in the conception. . . What- .
that in God essence and existence are identical. ever be the content of our conception of an
When Moses asks God, "If they should say to object, it is necessary to go beyond it, if we
me, What is His name? what shall I say to wish to predicate existence of the object. . . .
them?" the Lord says unto Moses, "I AM The celebrated ontological or Cartesian argu-
THAT I AM," and adds, "Say to the children ment for the existence of a supreme being is
ing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it things of God are clearly seen from the creation
docs not therefore follow that he understands of the world, being understood by the things
that what the name signifies exists actually, but that are made, even his eternal power and God-
only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be ar- head."
gued that it
actually exists, unless it be ad- We have, according to Locke, ari intuitive
mitted that there actually exists something knowledge of our own existence. We know, he
than which nothing greater can be thought; and says, that "nonentity cannot produce any real
this precisely is not admitted by those who being"; and so "from the consideration of our-
hold that God docs not exist." selves,and what we infallibly find in our con-
The writer of the First Set of Objections stitution, our reason leads us to the knowledge
to Descartes' Meditations maintains that the of this certain and evident truth That there
criticism advanced by Aquinas applies to Des- is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing
cartes as well as to Anselm. Whether stated in Being"
29: GOD 553
Without labelling it a 'proof of God's exist- Whatever has any potentiality in its nature
ence, Augustine in his Confessions presents a is
capable x>f not existing. If everything were
similar argument from the visible creation. of this sort, nothing that now is "need be,
"Behold," he says, "the heavens and the earth for it is possible for all things to be capable of
are; they proclaim that they were created; for existing, but not yet to exist." Hence, in still
they change and vary. . . They proclaim also . another way, Aristotle seems to reach the con-
that they made not themselves: 'therefore we clusion that a purely actual being must exist;
are, because we have been made; we were not and, furthermore, he seems to identify this
therefore, before we were, so as to make our- being with a living and thinking God. "Life
selves*. Thou therefore, Lord, madest them."
. . . also belongs toGod," he writes; "for the ac-
This second approach to the existence of God tuality of thought is life, and God is that ac-
by reasoning from the factsof experience or tuality; and God's self-dependent actuality is
the evidences of nature is called the "a posteriori life most good and eternal."
proof." In the tradition of the great books, it Where Aristotle argues from motion and
has been formulated in many different ways. potentiality to a prime mover and a pure ac-
What is common to all of them is the principle tuality, Newton
gives the a posteriori proof
of causality, in terms of which the known exist- another statement by arguing from the design
ence of certain effects is made the basis for in- of the universe to God as its designer or archi-
ferring the existence of a unique cause*-a first tect. "The most wise and excellent contrivances
cause, a highest cause, an uncaused cause. of things, and final causes" seem to him the best
Aristotle, for example, in the last book of his
way of knowing God. "Blind metaphysical
Physics,argues from the fact of motion or necessity, which is certainly the same always
change to the existence of an unmoved mover. and everywhere, could produce no variety in
He sums up his elaborate reasoning on this things. All that diversity of natural things
point in the following statement. "We estab- which we find suited to different times and
lished the fact that everything that is in mo- places could arise from nothing but the ideas
tion moved by something, and that the
is and of a Being necessarily existing,"
will
movent is either unmoved or in motion, and In similar fashion Berkeley maintains that
that, if it is in motion, it is moved either by "if we attentively consider the constant regu-
or by something else and so on through-
itself larity, order, and concatenation of natural
out the series: and so we proceeded to the posi- things, the surprising magnificence, beauty,
tion that the principle that directly causes
first and perfection of the larger, and the exquisite
things that are in motion to be moved is that contrivance of the smaller parts of the creation,
which moves itself, and the first principle of the together with the exact harmony 'and corre-
whole series is the unmoved." spondence of the whole, but, above all, the
Aristotle's argument, unlike that of Augus- never enough admired laws of pain -and pleas-
tine or Locke, does not presuppose the creation ure, and the instincts or natural inclinations,
of the world, at least not in the sense of the appetites, and passions of animals; I say if we
world's having a beginning. On the contrary, consider all these things, and at the same time
he holds the world and its motions to be as attend to the meaning and import of the at-
eternal as their unmoved mover. "It is im- tributes, one, eternal, infinitely wise, good,
he writes in the Metaphysics, "that
possible," and perfect, we shall clearly perceive that they
movement should either have come into being belong to the . . Spirit, who 'works all in all/
.
"
or cease to be." Precisely because he thinks the and 'by whom all things consist.' This seems
world's motions are eternal, Aristotle holds to him so certain that he adds, "we may even
that the prime mover, in additioh to being assert that the existence of God is far more
must be immutable. This for him
everlasting, evidently perceived than the existence of men."
means "a principle whose very essence is ac- But, according to Berkeley, all the visible
tuality." Only a substance without any poten- things of nature exist only as ideas in our minds,
cy, only one which
purely actual, can be an
is ideas which, unlike our own memories or imagi-
sense/' he writes, must have some other cause trees; or that which, besides this, has also sensa-
than our own will, and is therefore "a sign or tion, as the life of beasts; or that which adds
effect of the power of God/' To the "unthink- to all these intelligence, as the life of man; 01
ing herd" who claim that "they cannot see that which does not need the support of nutri-
God," Berkeley replies that "God ... is in- ment, but only maintains, feels, understands,
all can only be
timately present to our minds, producing in as the life of angels through
them all that variety of ideas or sensations Him who absolutely is. For to Him it is not
which continually affect us." one thing to and another to live, as though
be,
The existence of any idea in us is for Berkeley He could be, not living; nor is it to Him one
ground for asserting God's existence and power thing to live, and another to understand, as
as its cause. But for Descartes one idea alone though He could live, not understanding; nor
becomes the basis of such an inference. He is it to Him one thing to understand, another
increases little by little." But the idea which according to Aquinas, the existence of God can
he has of God, he declares, is that of an abso- be proved a posteriori. "The first and most man-
lutely perfect being, "in whom there is nothing ifest way is the argument from motion," which
merely potential, but in whom all is present Aquinas attributes to Aristotle. "The second
really and actually." On the principle that way is from the nature of an efficient cause."
there cannot be more reality or perfection in Berkeley's argument or Locke's would seem,
the effect than in the cause, Descartes con- insome respects, to offer a version of this mode
cludes that his own imperfect mind cannot be of reasoning. "The third way is taken from
the cause of the idea of a perfect being. "The and necessity," and seems to develop
possibility
idea that I possess of a being more perfect than the argument from potentiality in Aristotle's
I," he writes, "must necessarily have been Metaphysics, and to contain the inference from
placed in me by a being which is really more mutability and contingency which is implicit
perfect." in the argument attributed to the Platomsts
The radical imperfection of man, and indeed by Augustine. "The fourth way is taken from
of all creation, offers Augustine still another the gradation to be found in things." Proceed-
proof for God's existence, which he attributes ing from the existence of the imperfect to ab-
to the "Platomsts." "They have seen," he solute perfection, it resembles in principle the
writes, "that whatever is
changeable is not the reasoning of Descartes concerning the perfec-
most high God, and therefore they have tran- tion in the cause relative to the perfection in
scended every soul and all changeable spirits the effect. "The fifth way is taken from the
in seeking the supreme. They have seen also governance of the world" from the fact that
that, in every changeable thing, the form which everything acts for an end and so is like the
makes it that which it is, whatever be its mode argument which Newton offers from final
or nature, can only be through Him who truly causes and the existence of order in the uni-
is, because He is unchangeable. And therefore, verse.
whether we consider the whole body of the These "five ways" may or may not be re-
world, its figure, qualities, and orderly move- garded as an exhaustive list of the it posteriori
ment, and also all the bodies which are in it; proofs. It may even be questioned whether the
or whether we consider all life, either that five ways are logically distinct and indcpend-
CHAPTER 29: GOD 555
cnt. Aquinas himself says that "in speculative effect ... or to be of so singular and particu-
matters the medium of demonstration, which lar a nature as to have no parallel and no sim-
demonstrates the conclusion perfectly, is only ilarity with any other cause or object, that has
one; whereas probable means of proof are ever fallen under our observation. ... If ex-
many." Since he considers the argument for perience and observation and analogy be, in-
God's existence to be a certain, not a probable deed, the only guides which we can reasonably
proof, it would seem to follow that, in strict follow in inferences of this nature," as Hume
only one principle can be involved in thinks is the case, then it follows that "both
logic,
that proof. the effect and the cause must bear a similarity
As already suggested, the principle com- and resemblance to other effects and causes
mon to all the various ways in which such a which we know.
posteriori reasoning is expressed seems to be "I leave it to your own reflection," he adds,
the principal of causality, This appears in the "to pursue the consequences of this principle."
argument from the existence of contingent One seems obvious enough; namely, that God
beings, which cannot cause their own being,
a unique and unparalleled cause cannot be
to the existence of a being which needs no cause proved by reasoning from our experience of
of being, because its very essence is to exist.
its and their causes. Hume himself draws
effects
This may be the one argument for God's exist- this conclusion when he declares that theology,
ence or, if one among many, it may be the core insofar as it is concerned with the existence of
of all the others. It has the distinction at least a Deity, has "its best and most solid founda-
of conceiving God as the cause of being, rather tion," not in reason or experience, but in "faith
than of motion or of hierarchy and order in and divine revelation."
the world. Like Hume, Kant thinks that our notions
According to the statement of Aquinas that of cause and effect cannot be applied outside
"being is the proper effect of God," it estab- experience or to anything beyond the realm
lishes God as the unique and direct cause of the of sensible nature. But he offers an additional
being possessed by every finite thing. This for- reason for denying validity to all a posteriori
mulation of the proof is more fully examined in reasoning concerning God's existence. "It im-
the chapter on NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY; poses upon us," he says, "an old argument in a
and its relation to the question of whether the new dress, and appeals to the agreement of two
world had a beginning or is eternal, and if witnesses, the one with the credentials of pure
eternal, whether it is created or uncreated, will reason, and the other with those of empiricism;
be seen in the chapters on CAUSE, ETERNITY, while, in fact, it is only the former who has
and WORLD. changed his dress and voice."
The principle of the argument from the con-
THE VALIDITY OF the a posteriori argument for tingency of the world or its
parts Kant states
God's existence in one form or another is as follows: "If something exists, an absolutely
questioned by those who think that the causal necessary being must likewise exist." One
principle cannot be applied beyond experience, premise in the argument, namely, that con-
or who think that our knowledge of cause and tingent things exist, has its foundation in ex-
effect is not sufficient to warrant such infer- perience and therefore Kant admits that the
ences. reasoning "is not completely a priori or on to-
"The existence of any being can only be logical." But in order to complete the proof, he
proved by arguments from its cause or its ef- thinks it must be shown that an cnsrealissimum,
fect," Hume writes; "and these arguments or most perfect being, is the same as an abso-
are founded entirely on experience. ... It is lutely necessary being, in order for the obtained
only experience which teaches us the nature conclusion (a necessary being exists) to be trans-
and bounds of cause and effect, and enables us lated into the conclusion desired (God exists).
to infer the existence of one object from that That "anensreakssimum must possess the ad-
of another." But Hume doubts "whether it be ditional attribute of absolute necessity" or,
possible for a cause to be known only by its in other words, that a perfect being is identical
556 THE GREAT IDEAS
with one which necessarily exists is, according nature has two things to shun, error and misery.
to Kant, "exactly what was maintained in the Your reason is no more shocked in choosing one
ontological argument." Hence he maintains rather than another, since you must of necessity
that the argument from contingency is invalid choose. This is one point settled. But
your
because it cannot avoid including what is for happiness? Let us weigh the gain and the loss
Kant the invalid premise of the ontological in wagering that God is. Let us estimate these
argument as "the real ground of its disguised two chances. If you gain, you gain all, if you
and illusory reasoning." lose, you lose nothing. Wager then, without
hesitation, that He is."
THE CONTROVERSY concerning the proof of We are incapable of knowing either that
God's existence raises issues in logic, in meta- God is or what God is, according to Pascal, be-
physics and physics, and in the theory of knowl- cause "if there is a God, He is infinitely incom-
edge. Philosophers are opposed on the ques- prehensible" and "has no affinity to us." Never-
tion whether a valid demonstration is possible. theless, proceeding on the practical level of the
Those who think it possible differ from one wager, reason may lead to Christian faith, yet
another on the way in which the proof should not in such a way as to give adequate reasons
be constructed. Those who think it
impossi- for that belief, since Christians "profess a re-
ble do not always go to the opposite extreme ligion for which they cannot give a reason."
of making the affirmation of God's existence Kant also makes the affirmation of God a
a matter of faith; or of denying with the skep- matter of faith, but for him it is a "purely
tic that we can have anylight on the ques- rational faith, since pure reason ... is the sole
tion at all,Pascal and Kant, for example, reject source from which it
springs." He defines a
the theoretic arguments as inconclusive or matter offaith as any object which cannot be
untenable, but they do not think the problem known through the speculative use of reason,
is totally insoluble. They offer instead practical but which "must be thought a priori, either as
grounds or reasons for accepting God's exist- consequences or as grounds, if pure practical
ence. reason is to be used as duty commands . . .
"The metaphysical proofs of God are so re- Such is the summum bonum"
he says, "which
mote from the reasoning of men," Pascal as- has to be realized in the world through free-
serts, "and so complicated, that they make dom . . . This effect which is commanded,
little impression." He will "not undertake," he together with the only conditions on which its
tells us in his Pensees, "to prove by natural possibility is conceivable by us, namely, the exist-
reasons . . . the existence of God." In his view ence of God and the immortality of the soul,
"there arc only three kinds of persons: those are matters offaith and are of all objects the only
who serve God, having found Him; others who ones that can be so called."
arc occupied in seeking Him, not having found For Kant, then, the existence of God is a
Him; while the remainder live without seeking "postulate of pure practical reason ... as the
Him, and without having found Him." Since necessary condition of the possibility of the
he regards. the first as "reasonable and happy," summum bonum." The moral law commands
the last as "foolish and Unhappy," he addresses us to seek the highest good, with perfect happi-
himself to the middle group whom he regards ness as its concomitant; but Kant thinks that
as "unhappy and reasonable." "there is not the slightest ground in the moral
He asks them to consider whether God is or law for a necessary connexion between morality
is not. "Reason can decide nothing here," he and proportionate happiness in a being that
says. If a choice is to be made by reason, it must
belongs to the world as a part of it." Since man is
be in the form of a wager. "Which will you a part of the world or nature, and dependent
choose then ? Let us see. Since you must choose, on it, "he cannot by his will be a cause of this
let you least. You have
us sec which interests nature, nor by his own power make it thorough-
two things and the good; and
to lose, the true ly harmonize, as far as his happiness is con-
two thingsto stake, your reason and your will, cerned, with his practical principles." The only
your knowledge and your happiness; and your possible solution lies in "the existence of a
CHAPTER 29: GOD 557
cause ofall nature, distinct from nature itself, natural reason, must either use such negative
and containing the pnnciple of this connexion, attributes, as infinite, eternal, incomprehensible;
namely, of the exact harmony of happiness or superlatives, as most high, most great, and the
with morality.*' That is why, Kant explains, like; or indefinite, as good, just, holy, creator,
"it is morally necessary to assume the existence and in such sense, as if he meant not to declare
of God." what He is (for that were to circumscribe Him
within the limits of our fancy), but how much
IN THE TRADITION of the great books, the com- we admire Him, and how ready we would be
mon -ground shared by reason and faith is to obey Him; which is a sign of humility and of
marked by the convergence of the contribu- a will to honor Him as much as we can: for
tions made by pagan, Jew, and Christianand there is but one name to signify our conception
by poets, philosophers, and theologians to the of His nature, and that is, I AM: and but one
problem of God's existence and the understand- name of His relation to us, and that is GOD; in
ing of the divine nature, the essence of God which is contained Father, King, and Lord."
and His attributes. Even when they are discussed by the philos-
Certain attributes of God, such as simplicity, ophers and reflected on by the poets, certain
immateriality, eternity, infinity, perfection, matters belong especially to theology because
and glory, are usually regarded as so many dif- they constitute the dogmas of religion articles
ferent ways in which the human understanding of religious faith based solely on divine revela-
apprehends the divine nature in itself. Other tion, not discovered by human inquiry or
attributes, such as the divine causality, omni- speculation.That God created the world out
potence, omnipresence, omniscience, love, jus- of nothing and of His free will; that the world
tice, and mercy, are usually taken as ways of had a beginning and will have an end are, for
considering God's nature in relation to the example, dogmas of traditional Judaism and
world or to creatures. But to divide the at- Christianity. Philosophers may argue about
tributes in this way, as is done in the Outline the freedom or necessity of the creative act, or
of Topics, is to make a division which cannot about the possibility of a beginning or an end
be fully justified except in terms of convenience to time and the world, but Jewish and Christian
forour understanding. God's will, for example, theologians find in Sacred Scripture the war-
no less than God's intellect, can be considered rant for believing that which may not be thor-
in relation to Himself. God's intellect, no less oughly intelligible to reason, much less demon-
than God's will, can have the world for its strable by it. What
true of creation applies
is
object. So, too, the divine goodness can be con- generally to the religious belief in divine provi-
sidered with reference to things, even as God's dence and the positive commandments of God,
love can be considered with reference to Him- to the gift of grace which God bestows upon
self. men, and to the performance of miracles.
The difficulties we meet in classifying or Judaism and Christianity share certain
ordering the attributes of God confirm the dogmas, though the degree to which Jewish
opinion of almost all theologians, that our and Christian theologians commonly under-
understanding is inadequate to comprehend the stand what is apparently the same dogma varies
essence of God. The fact that we employ a from great similarity of interpretation (as in
multiplicity of attributes to represent to our- the case of creation and providence) to differ-
selves what in itself is an absolute unity is ences so great (as, for example, with regard to
another indication of the same point. The one grace) that there may be some doubt whether
attribute of simflicity would seem to deny us the dogma in question is really the same. The
the right to name others, unless we take the line of demarcation between these faiths would
plurality of attributes to signify something seem to be more easily determined than their
about man's understanding of God rather than common ground; yet even here such matters
a real complexity in the divine nature. as the resurrection of the body even when we
"He that will attribute to God," Hobbes take differences of interpretation into account
writes, "nothing but what is warranted by may be regarded as a dogma shared by both.
558 THE GREAT IDEAS
The basic differences between Jewish and tian faith, we have attempted to organize the
sequences for disbelief or belief in Christ as the Old or in the New Testament, or in both. On
incarnate second person of the Trinity the certain points, as we have already seen, the line
Word become flesh. This in turn has conse- of distinction can be clearly drawn. For exam-
quences for doctrines of salvation, and of the ple, the doctrines of God's covenant with Is-
nature and mission of the church, its rituals rael,of the Chosen People, of the Temple and
and its sacraments. Even within Christianity, the Torah, are indisputably drawn from the
however, there have been and still are serious Old Testament; and from the New Testament
doctrinal differences on all these matters. The come such dogmas as those concerning Christ's
most fundamental heresies and schisms of early divinity and humanity, the Virgin Birth, the
Christianity concerned the understanding of Church as the mystical body of Christ, and the
thd' Trinity and the Incarnation. The great seven sacraments.
modern schism which divided Christendom Under all these topics we haVe assembled
arose from issues about the sacraments, the passages from the Bible, interpretations of them
organization and practices of the church, and by the theologians, and materials from the
the conditions of salvation. great books of poetry and history, philosophy
It would seem to be just as easy to say what and science. Since the criterion of relevance
beliefs are common to religious Jews and here is the reflection of sacred or religious
Christians, as to articulate the faith common doctrine in secular literature, the writings of
to all sects of Christianity. If all varieties of pagan antiquity are necessarily excluded,
Protestant doctrine are included, little remains though they are included in the more philo-
in common except belief in the God of Abra- sophical topics of theology, such as the existence
ham, and Jacob creator and provider,
Isaac, and nature of one God.
governor and judge, dispenser of rewards and Despite its length, this chapter by no means
punishments. exhausts the discussion of God in the great
books. The long list of Cross- References, which
ONE BOOK STANDS our from all the rest be- follows the seventy- three topics comprising the
cause, in our tradition, it is as the use of Reference section of this chapter, indicates the
"Bible" for its proper name implies the various ways in which the idea of God occurs
book about God and man. For those who in the topics of other chapters. The reader will
have faith, Holy Writ or Sacred Scripture is find that list useful not only as an indication
the revealed Word of God. Its division into of the topics in other chapters which elaborate
Old and New Testaments represents the his- on or extend the discussion of matters treated
toric relation of the Jewish and Christian here, but also as a guide to other Introductions
religions. in which he is
likely to find the conception of
Without prejudice to the issue between be- God a relevant part of the examination of some
lief and unbelief, or between Jewish and Chris- other great idea.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
i. The polytheistic conception of the supernatural order 561
la. The nature and existence of the gods
ib. The hierarchy of the gods; their relation to one another 562
ic. The intervention of the gods in the affairs of men: their judgment of the deserts
of men
CHAPTER 29: GOD 559
PAOB
2. The existence of one God 563
2a The rcvektion of one
. God
2^. The evidences and proofs of God's existence 564
2<r. Criticisms of the proofs of God's existence: agnosticism
567
3^. The worship of God or the gods: prayer, propitiation, sacrifice 568
3/.
The imitation of God or the gods: the divine element in human nature; the
deification of men man as the image of God
;
569
40. The identity of essence and existence in God: the necessity of a being whose
essence involves its existence
571
5^. God as final cause: the motion of all things toward God ,
576
5^. The power of God : the divine omnipotence
577
5</.
The immanence of God: the divine omnipresence
578
51.
Divine justice and mercy: divine rewards and punishments
581
7^. Providence
7</.
Grace 590
ye. Miracles 591
gc. Christ the Saviour and Redeemer: the doctrines of original sin and salvation
gd. The Church: the mystical body of Christ; the Apostolate 598
gc. The sacraments
^99
o/.
The second coming of Christ
10. The denial of God or the gods, or of a supernatural order: the position of the atheist
n. The denial of God as completely transcending the world or nature: the position of
the pantheist 600
12. The denial of a revealed and providential God: the position of the deist
REFERENCES
To numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
find the passages cited, use the
numbers of the For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
passages referred to.
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES -.Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a
and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of tjie right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g , Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
[1-55] 225a-c, [520-568] 229c-d, [1202-1466] 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid 103a-379a csp BK i [223-417]
234d-236d / Akestis 237a-247a,c csp [1-76] 109a-114b, [657-722] 121a-123a, BK n [162^
237a 238a, [1159-1163] 24 7c / Heracleidae 200] 128b-129b, [588-633] 140b-142a, BK in
[750-1055] 254d-257a,c / Suppliants 258a- [84-120] 149b-150b, BK iv [90-128] 169b^l70b,
269a,c csp [113-283] 259a-260d, [1183-1234] [173-278] 171b-174b, BK v [604-699] 202b-
268c-269a,c / Trojan Women 270a-281a,c esp 205b, [779-871] 207b-21Qa, BK vi [42-101]
[1-97] 270a-271a, [914-1032] 277d-278d / Ion 212a-213b, BK vn [286-600] 243b-252b, BK
282a-297d csp [1-81] 282a-d,[ 429-451] 286b-c, vm [369-453] 269a-271a, [608-731] 275a-278b,
[1470-1622] 296a-297d / Helen 298a-314a,c BK ix [1-24] 279a-b, [77-122] 281a-282a,
esp [1-67] 298a-d, [7n-7i5]304d-305a, [1644- [638-663] 296a-297a, BK x [1-117] 302a-
1692] 313d-314a,c / Andromache [1225-1288] 305a, [606-688] 318b-321a, BK xi [532-596]
325c-326a,c / Electra 327a-339a,c esp [1233- 342b-344b, [762-867] 349a-351b, BK xn [134-
1359] 338b-339a,c / Bacchantes 340a-352a,c / 160] 357b-358a, [405-440] 365a-b, [766-886]
Hecuba [488-500] 357a / Heracles Mad 365a- 374b-377b
377d esp [1260-1390] 376a-377b / Phoenician 14 PLUTARCH Romulus, 27d-29c / Numa Pom-
Maidens 378a-393d esp [1-87] 378a-379a, pihus, 50d-51c; 57b-58a/ Solon, 6S&/Camillus,
[930-959] 386c, [1758-1763] 393d / Orestes 104b-d; 107b-d / Fabius, 142d-143b / Cono-
394a-410d esp [317-357] 397a-b, [1625-1693] lanus, 185b-186a; 188d-191b/ Anstides, 268a-
410b-d/ Iphigema Among the 70n411a-424d 273c / Lysander, 365a-366a / Sulla, 370c-
esp [1-41] 411a-b, [939-986] 419b-d, [1435- 371b / Lucullus, 404d-405a/ Alexander, 553b-
1499] 424a-d / Iphigema at Aulis 425a-439d 554b / Caesar, 602c-604d esp 604b-d / Pho-
esp [1185-1 194] 435d-436a, [1526-1629] 439a-d cton, 615 b-d / Cato the Younger, 639d / De-
5 ARISTOPHANES: Peace 526a- 541 d esp [195-220] mosthenes, 698a-699a / Dion, 781d-782a
528b-c / Thesmophonazusae [655-687] 607c- 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK in, 59d-60a; BK vi,
608a / Plutus 629a-642d esp [86-92] 630a, 91b-d; BK xvi, 179d; 183d / Histories, BK i,
[489-498] 634c-d, [653-747] 637a-d 189d-190a; BK n, 235a-c; BK iv, 284b; 292c-
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 7b-10a esp 9d-10a; 294a
20b-22a; BK n, 54d-55a; 77a-b; 78d-79c; BK 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR ix, CH 9, 71a /
in, 98b-c; BK iv, 124d-125a; 144c-d; 150b- Third Ennead, TR ii-in 82c-97b
d; 151b-153d; 155b-c; 158d-159d esp 159d; 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 22,
BK vi, 190c-d; 198b-d; 199d-200a; 200c- A 3, ANS 130d-131c
201a; 201d-202c; 205c-d; 211b-d; BK vn, 21 DANTE: Dwine Comedy, HELL, xiv [43-72]
216d-217c esp 217c; 218b-220a; 224d-225a; 20a-b; PARADISE, iv [49-63] lllb; vm [1-12]
226d-227a; 239c-240d; 246b-247a; 250a-d; 116d
BK vm, 262b-c; 266a-d; 269c-270a; 270c- 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK i, STANZA
271a; 274b-c; 276b-d; 279d-280a; 283d; 30-35 5a-b; BK HI, STANZA 89 66a / Knight's
284d-285a; BK ix, 302c; 308a-c, 309d-310a Tale 174a-211a esp [1303-1333] 181b-182a,
6 TiiucYDiDEs:Peloponnesian War, BK i,355b-c; [2663-2699] 203b-204a, [3099-3108] 21 la /
378a-b; BK n, 407a-b; 415d-416c; BK v, Merchant's Tale [10,093-230] 335a-337a
506b-c; BK vii, 559d-560a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 81b-c
7 PLATO: Protagoras, 44a-45a / Symposium, 27 SHAKESPEARE: King Lear, ACT iv, sc i [33-39]
152d-153b / Apology, 21 Id / Republic, BK n, 269d; [69-74] 270b; sc n [38-50] 270d-271a;
313b-314d; 322a-324c; BK vi, 378a-b; BK x, sc vi [35-40] 273d; ACT v, sc in [166-174]
436c-437a; 437c^438c / Cntias 478a-485d / 281a / Antony and Cleopatra, ACT n, sc i [1-8]
Statesman, 587a-589c / Laws, BK iv, 679a-b; 317d / Cymbehne, ACT v, sc iv [1-151] 481a-
681b-683b; BK ix, 757a; BK x, 765d-768d; 482c; sc v [425-485] 488b-d
BK xn, 787d-788a 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK iv, 435a-436a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 9 [io99b 9~i8] 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART n [8582-8590] 209a;
345a; BK x, CH 8 [1179*23-33] 434a / Rhetoric, [8610-8637] 209b-210a
BK n, CH 5 [i383 b 3~8] 629d; CH 17 [1391*30-
b 2. The existence of one God
3] 638d
10 HIPPOCRATES: Sacred Disease, 154a-155d
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [1090- 2a. The revelation of one God
1104] 29a; BK v [1194-1240] 76d-77b; BK vi OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 17:1-14 / Exodus, 3
[43-79] 80d-81b; [379-422] 85b-d csp 3:6, 3:14-16; 6:1-8; 19:9-20:6 esp 20:1-6;
12 EPICTETUS Discourses, BK i, CH 12 118d-120b;
: 20:18-22 / Deuteronomy, 4:39; 5:1-10; 6 esp
CH 22, 128a-b; BK n, CH 8 146a-147c 6:4-5; 32:1-47 esp 32:36-43 / / Kings, 8:22-62
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK i, SECT 17 255d- csp 8:23, 8:6o-(D) /// Kings, 8:22-62 esp
256d; BK n, SECT 3 257a-b; BK in, SECT n 8:23, 8:60 / I Chronicles, 16:7-36 (D) IPara-
262a-b; BK v, SECT 8 269d-270b; BK vi, SECT hpomenon, 16.7-36 / Psalms, 18 csp 18:30-32
40-46 277d-278d; BK x, SECT 5 296d; BK xn, (D) Psalmsf 17 csp 17:31-33 / Isaiah, 37:15-
SECT 5 307d<3Q8a 20; 43-45 passim, esp 43:3, 43:10-13, 44-6,
564 THE GREAT IDEAS Ib to 2c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 2
(2. Tbt existence qf one God. 2a. The revelation 10c-14a esp A 3 12c-14a; Q 3, A 4, REP 2 16d-
oj one God.) 17c; Q 8 34c-38c; Q 11, A 3 49a-c; Q 19, A 5,
44:8, 44:24, 45:5-7, 45:18, 45:21-22; 48:12 REP 3 112d-113c; Q 44, A i, REP i 238b-239a;
(D) Isaias, 37:15-20; 43-45 passim, esp 43 :3, Q 65 339a-343c esp A i, REP 3 339b-340b; Q
43:10-13, 44:6, 44:8, 44:24, 45:5-7, 45.18, 75, A i, REP i 378b-379c; Q 79, A 4, ANS 417a-
45:21-22; 48:12 / Jeremiah, 10 esp 10:6, 418c; Q 104, AA 1-2 534c-537b; PART i-n, Q i,
10:10 (D) Jeremias, 10 esp 10:6, 10:10 / A2610b-611b
Daniel, 6 esp 6*20, 6 ^6-27 / Hosea, 13 '4 22 CHAUCER: Knight's Tale [3003-3016] 209a-b
(D) Osee, 13:4 I Joel, 2:27 / Zechariah, 14:9 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 78d-79a; 79d-80a
(D) Zacharias, 14:9 / Malachi, 2:10 (D) 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 38a; 41b-d
Malachias, 2:10 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv 51b-54b /
APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 12:13 (D) Meditations, 71d-72a; in 81d-89a; v 93a-96a /
OT, Boof( of Wisdom, 12:13 / Ecdesiasticus, Objections and Replies, 108a-115a,c passim;
1:8 (D) OT, Ecdesiasticus, 1:8 / II Macca- 120c-123a; 126b-127c; DBF vm 130d; POSTU-
bees, 1:24-29(D) OT,IIMachabees,i'24~29 LATE v 131b-c; AXIOM i 131d; AXIOM ix-x
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 23:9 / Mar\, 12:28- 132b; pROPi-inl32b-133a; 137d-138a; 158b-
34 / John, 1:1-2; 10:30; 17:3 / Acts, 162a; 168d-169a; 211c-212a; 213a<d; 217d-
ij '.22-29 I Romans, 1:14-32 / / Corinthians, 218a
8:4-6; 12:4-6 / Ephesians, 4:5-6 / / Timothy, 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, DEF i 355a; DBF
2:5-6; 4:10; 6:14-16 / I John, 5:5-9 3,6 355b; PROP 7 356c; PROP n 358b-359b;
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK vn, par 16 48c- PROP 14, DEMONST and COROL i 359d-360a;
49a / City of God, BK vin, CH 11, 272c / PROP 20, DEMONST and COROL i 363d-364a
Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 12 627c-d; CH 32 32 MILTON: Psalm 136 8a-10a
633c-d 33 PASCAL: Penstes, 242-244 217b-218a; 469
19 AQUINAS: Summa 'Theologica, PART i, Q 2, 256a;557272b
A 2, REP i lld-12c; Q 11, A 3, CONTRARY and 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK in, GENERAL SCHOL,
REP i 49a-c; Q 13, A u, CONTRARY 73c-74b 369b-370a / Optics, BK in, 528b-529a; 542a-
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 74, 543a passim
A 10, REP 3 136c-137c; Q 102, A 5, REP i 283c- 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xvn,
292c; PART II-H, Q i, A 5, REP 3383b-384b; SECT 17 172b-c; SECT 20, 173a; BK iv, CH x,
A 8, ANS and REP 1 387a-388c SECTi-n349c-352a
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, xxiv [115- 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, PREF, 404a;
147] 143d-144a SECT 6-7 414b-c; SECT 25-33 417d-419a esp
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 38a; 41b-d SECT 29-33 418c-419a; SECT 146-156 442a-
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK vin [267-318] 444d passim
238a-239a; BK xn [106-151] 321b-322b; 35 HUME' Human Understanding, SECT xi 497b-
[223-248] 324a-b / Samson Agonistes [472-478] 503c passim
350a 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 187d-188a
33 PASCAL: Penstes, 242-290 217b-225a, 428 42 KANT- Pure Reason, 143a-b [thesis]; 177b-
244b; 557 272b 192d; 236b-240b esp 239a-240b / Practical
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 245d- Reason, 353a-3S4d / Judgement, 593c-d; 607d-
247b passim 609b
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 401a-b
2b. The evidences and proofs of God's exist- 46 HEGEL' Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 280
ence 94d-95a
NEW TESTAMENT: Romans, 1:14-32 esp 1.18-21 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [3431-3468] 84a-b
7 PLATO: Laws, BK x, 758b-765c 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 196b-d;
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vn, CH i 326a-327b; 217c-d
BK vni, CH 1-6 334a-346b; CH 10 [267 2i-b 27J ft
258a-269a,c csp [113-283] 259b-260d / Tro- 11:42 /John, 5:40-42; 8:42; 14:15-31; 16:26-
jan Women [1-98] 270a-271a / Ion 282a-297d 27; 17:23-26; 21 115-17 / Acts, 20:22-24; 21:7-
csp [429-451] 286b-c / Helen [255-305] 15 / Romans, 5:5; 8:28-39 / ^ Corinthians, 2:9,
300c-d / Andromache [994-1045] 323c-324a ~I
8*1-3; I
3 :I 4' I I 16:14,22 / // Corinthians,
/ Bacchantes 340a-352a,c / Heracles Mad 5:14-15 / Ephesians, 1:3-6; 3:14-21; 6:24 / //
365a-377d csp [339-347] 368a, [750-760] 371c, Thessalomans, 3 15 / / Timothy, i -5 / // Timothy,
[1258-1347] 376a-d / Iphigema Among the i 13-1 4-,
y
1-5 / James, i 12; 2 :5/ / Peter, 1:7-8
Tauri [570-575] 416a / I John, 2.5,15-17; 3:17; 4:7-53 / 11 John, 6 /
5 ARISTOPHANES: Clouds [263-428] 491a-493d; Jude, 20-21
[813-833] 498c-d; [1462-1477] 506c / Birds 4 HOMER: Odyssey, BK xm [217-351] 257b-
542a-563d / Thesmophoriazusae [655-687] 258c
607c-608a 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK ii, CH 16, 158b-d;
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 20d-22a; 39a-b; CH 22, 168d; BK iv, CH i, 219a-b
BK ii, 77a-b; BK in, 95a-c; BK iv, 140c-d; 151b- 12AuRELius: Meditations, BK ii, SECT 13 258c
152a; BK vn, 222c-d; 226d-227a; BK vm, 16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly
283d Spheres, BK i, 510a-b
, 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK n, 400d- 16 KEPLER: Harmonies of the World, 1050b;
401a 1080a-b
7 PLATO: Laws, BK ix, 757a 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions^ BK i, par 5-6 2b-c;
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 6 110c-112b; par 28 7d-8a; BK n,par 15 12b-c; BK in, par 15
CH 12 118d 120b; CH 27, 132c 133a; BK in, CH 17a-b; BK iv, par 15-19 23a-24b; BK v, par 1-2
22,195c-d;198a-b 27a-c; BK vn, par 6 44d-45a; par 23 50b-c; BK
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK i [i-n] 103a; BK xn VIH, par 9 55a-c; BK ix, par 3 62a-b; BK x,
[500-
508] 367b par 8-40 73b-81c; BK xi, par 1-4 89b-90b; BK
14 PLUTARCH: Agesilaus, 483a-b / Dion, 801 be xn, par 10 lOlc; par 23 104b-c / City of God,
15 TACITUS Histories, BK iv, 292c-294a
. BK CH i 298b,d-299d; CH 3 300b-301a; BK
x,
20 AQUINAS* Summa Theologica, PART x-n, Q 78, xiv, CH 28 397a-d / Christian Doctrine, BK i,
A i, CONTRARY 152b-153b; Q 84, A 2, ANS and CH 3-5 625b-626a; CH 10 627b; CH 15 628b-c;
REP 2 175b-176a; PART II-H, QQ 13-14 444b- CH 22-23 629b-630c; CH 26-27 631b-d; CH 29-
452a; PART HI, Q 64, A 6, ANS 874d-875d 30 632a 633b; CH 33 633d-634b; CH 35 634c-d;
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, in [100-136] CH 37-40 635b-636a,c; BK n, CH 7 638d-639c;
5a-b; xi [16-90] 15b-16a; xiv [1-72] 19c-20b; CH 38, 654c; CH 41 656a-c; BK in, CH 10-24
xxv {1-15] 36b-c; xxxi [82-96] 46d-47a 661c-666d passim
CHAPTER 29: GOD 567
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q 3, A i, 42 K\m:Pund. Prin. Mctaphy of'Morals, 278b-
'sic
HEP 5 14b-15b; Q 8, A 3, ANS and RHP 4 36b- 279d / Practical Reason, 321b-329a csp 326b-
37c; Q 60, A 5 313b-314c; Q 82, A 3, ANS and 327a
REP 3 433c-434c? Q 95, A 4, ANS 509b-510a; 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 458a-b
PART I-H, Q i, A 8 615a-c; Q 2, A i, REP 3 615d- 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [1178-1185] 29b
616c; Q 26, A 3, REP 4 735c-736b; Q 28, A 2, 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dicf(, 318b
CONTRARY 741a-742a; A 4, ANS 742d-743c; 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xv, 631a-c
Q 35, A 5, REP i 775d-777a 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov^ BK in,
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 65, 54a-b; BK v, 127b-137c passim; BK vi, I64d-
A 5, ANS and REP i 74c-75a; Q 66, A 6 80c-81b; 165a; BK xi, 313c-314d
Q 68, A 2, ANS 89c-90c; A 8, REP 2 95c-96c; Q
^. Obedience to God or the gods
69, A 4, ANS lOOc-lOlc; Q 70, A 3, ANS 103 b-
104d; Q 73, A 4, REP 3 122b-123a; A 5, ANS OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 2:15-17; 3; 22:1-18 csp
123a-d; Q 77, A 4, CONTRARY and REP 1 148b- 22:18; 26:4-5 / Exodus, 3 .-4-4 .-17; 24:1-8 /
149a; Q 78, A 2, REP i 153b-154a; Q 84, A i, Deuteronomy, 4-11 passim; 27-30 passim /
REP i 174b-175a; Q 88, A 2, REP i 194b-195b; Joshua, 22; 24:1-28 (D) Josue, 22; 24:1-28 /
A 6, REP 2 198a-d; Q 89, A i, REP 3 199a-c; A 2, / Samuel, 12:14-15; 15 csp 15:22-23 (D)
ANS 199c-200d; Q 99, A i, REP 2 245c-246b; Q / Kings, 12:14-15; 15 csp 15:22-23 / / Kings,
100, A 6, REP i 257c-258c; A 10 262b-263b; A 8:54-62 (D) HI Kings, 8:54-62 / / Chronicles,
u, REP i 263c-264d; Q 102, A i, REP i 270c- 28:9 (D) / Parahpomenon, 28:9 / Ezra, 7:23
271b; Q 109, A3340c-341b; PARTII-II, Q i, AI, (D) / Esdras, 7:23 / Job / Ecclesiastes, 5:1;
REP 3 380b-381a; A 3, REP i 381d-382c; Q 3, 12:13 (D) Ecclesiastcs, 4:17; 12:13 / Isaiah,
A 2, REP i 401a-d; Q 7, A 2 416b-d; Q 19, A 4, 1:19-20 (D) Isaias, 1:19-20 /Jeremiah passim,
REP 3 467c-468b; A 12, ANS 473d-474d; Q 22, csp 3, 7, n, 35, 42-44 (D) Jeremias passim,
A 2, ANS 481d-482c; QQ 23-27 482c-527b; Q csp 3, 7, 11, 35, 42-44 / Daniel, 7:27 / Micah,
1 80, A i, ANS and REP 2 607d-608c; A 2, REP i
6:8-(D) Micheas, 6:8
608c-609c; A 7, ANS 614d-616a; Q 182, A 2, ANS NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 6 :io; 7:21; 12:46-50;
621d-623a; A 4, REP i 623d-624d; Q 184, A 2, 26:36-39 / Mar^, 14:32-36 / Luke, 22:40-45 /
ANS 629d-630d; A 3, ANS and REP 3 630d- John, 5:30; i8:io-|i / Acts, 5 129-32; 21:8-1 5 /
632c; A 7, REP 2 636a-637a; Q 185, A 2, REP i Romans, 5:19/7! Corinthians, 10:5-6 / Philip-
641c-643a; A 4, ANS 644a-645c; Q 186, A 2, REP pians, 2:1-18 csp 2:7-8 / // Thessahmans,
2 651d-652d; A 7, REP 2 658d-660a; Q 187, A 2, 1:7-9 / Hebrews, 5:8-9; 11:8
ANS 665a-666a; Q 188, A 2, ANS 675d-677a 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK i [188-222] 5a-b
21 DANTE* Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xv [40- 5 AESCHYLUS Suppliant Maidens [410-434] 6a-b
:
81] 75d-76a; xvn feij-xvin [75] 79b-80c; / Choephoroe [269-301) 72d-73a; [885-1076]
PARADISE, i
[94-142] 107b-d; in 109b-110c; v 78d-80d / Eumenides [490-565] 86b-87a
[1-12] 112a-b; vi [112-126] 114d-115a; xx [94- 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [863-910] 107b-c
xxi [52-102] 138d-139b; xxvi
138] 137d-138a; / Antigone 131a-142d esp [374-378] 134b, [443-
,
[1-81] 145d-146c; XXXH [i39]-xxxni [145] 465] 134d-135a, [1351-1353] 142d / Ajax [666-
156a-157d 676} 148d / Electro 156a-169a,c esp [23-37]
22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK v, STANZA 156b
263-267 154b-155a / Second Nun's Tale 463b- 5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [513-563] 262d-263b /
471 b / Parson's Tale, par 6, 497a; par 21 Helen [1644-1692] 313d-314a,c / Iphigenia
509a-b; par 31 517b-518b Among the Tauri [67-122] 411d-412b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART HI, 240d 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK r, 39c-d; BK n, 55a;
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 210d-211a BK iv, 124d-125a; 126d427a; ISOb-d; 151b-
27 SHAKESPEARE: Henry VIII, ACT HI, sc n [435- 152a; BK vi, 201d-202c; BK vn, 218c-220a;
457l573c-d BK ix, 308a-c
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 80b-81a 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BKI, 355b-c;
31 DESCARTES Meditations, HI, 88d-89a / Objec-
: 382c-d
tions and Replies, 227b-228a 7 PLATO: Apology, 206b*d / Laws, BK iv, 681 b-
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART v, PROP 14-16 456b-c; 683b
PROP i8-ao 456d-458a; PROP 32-34 4$0b-d; 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK u, CH 16-17, 158a-
PROP 36-37 461a-c ,
BK in, CH 24, 204c-d; 208d-210a; BK iv,
161a;
32 MILTON: Paradise Last, BK xn [561-566] 331 b CH213a-223d passim, esp 218b-219a; CH 3
i
"
1 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [1-43] 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK n,
la-d; [80-101] 2a-b; BK n [589-660] 22c-23b; 117c-118a; BK iv, 265b-c
BK in [41-58] 30c-d; BK v [1194-1240] 76d- 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays* 91b-c; 152b-156d;
77b;BK vi [68-79] 81a-b 246b-d; 300c-d
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 16 121d- 26 SHAKESPEARE: Henry V, ACT iv, sc vni [96-
122d 131] 561c-d
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK v, SECT 7 269d; 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT in, sc in [36-96]
BK ix, SECT 40 295b; BK xn, SECT 14 308c 53d-54b
13 VIRGIL: Eclogues, v [62-80] 18a-b / Aeneid 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, APPENDIX, 369b 371d
103a-379a passim, esp BK n [108-125] 127a-b, passim
BK in [84-120] 149b-150b, [543-550] 162a, BK 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK m [185-197] 139b;
iv [54-67] 168b-169a, [198-221] 172b-173a, BK iv [720-735] 168a-b; BK v [136-208] 178a-
BK vi [42-76] 212a-213a, BK vin [558-584] 179b; BK vii [550-640] 229a-231a; BK x [1086]-
274a-b, BK ix [621-631] 295b-296a,BK xi BK xi 298a-300b / Arcopagitica, 402a-b
[71]
349b
[783-798] 33 PASCAL: 247b; 476 256b-257a;
Pcnstcs, 431
14 PLUTARCH: Theseus la-15a,c passim / Numa 487-489 258b-259a; 491 259a; 499 260b; 504
Pompihus 49a-61d esp 56d-57b / Camillus, 261a; 513-514 262a-263a
104b-d; 107b-d / Fabius, 142d-143b / Corio- 35 LOCKE: Toleration, 3b-5c; lOc-JSa
lanus, 185b-186a / Aemihus Paulus, 214b-d / 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT v, DIV 41,
Pelopidas, 239d-240c / Marcellus, 247c-249d / 468a-b
Lucullus, 404d-405a / Agesilaus, 483a-b / 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 187d-188a
Alexander, 541a-d 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xxv,
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK HI, 59d-60c; BK XH, 209a-b; 209d-210a; 211a-c
112d-113a / Histories, BK n, 214d-215a; BK iv, 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK iv, 437a-c
282d-283b; 292c-294a; BK v, 296a 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 59c-60a; 81d-82a;
16 KEPLER- Harmonies of the World, 1009a; 93b-c; 98a; 121a-b; 180d-182c esp 181b-c;
lOlla; 1050b; 1080a-b; 1085b 184d-185d; 208a-211a passim, esp 209a; 327d-
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par i la-b; 328b; 349c-350b; 356d-358a; 457b,d-467d
BK xni, par i llOd-llla / City of God, BK vii, passim; 547a-b; 583d-584b
CH 27-31 259c-262a; BK x 298b,d-322a,c / 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, llOb-c; 195a-198d;
Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 6 626a-b 207a-208c; 226a-228a, 232c-233c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 30, 42 KANT:7tt^(?mtfn/,504b-505a;509a-c
A i, REP i 749a-d 43 MILL. Liberty, 307d-309a
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 99, 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 52c-53a; 394a; 481d-482d
A 3 247a-248a; A 4, REP 2 248a-d; QQ 101-103 46 HEGFL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 224a-
265d-304a; PART II-H, Q 30, A 4, REP i 536a-d; 225a; 234d-235c; 245b-247b;
227c-228a;
Q 32, A 2, ANS 541a-542c; QQ 179-189 606a- 253c-254b; PART HI, 291d-292b; PART iv,
v 700d esp Q 181, A 3, REP 3 618c-619b, Q 182, 322a-c
A 2, REP 3 621d-623a, Q 186, A 4, ANS 655c- 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [3587-3619] 87b-88a;
656b, A 5, REP 5 656c-657d, A 6, REP 2 657d- PART ii [8568-8603] 208b-209b
658d, Q 1 88, A i, REP i 674d-675d; PART HI, 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 30a-36b; 39a-b;
QQ 21-22 823d-833a; Q 25 839c-845a; Q 60, A 130b-131a; 370b-371b
5, ANS 850b-851b; Q 62,
A 5, ANS 862b-863a; 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK in, 122b-c; BK
Q 63, A 2, ANS 865c-866c; A 4, REP 1,3 867d- vii, 281d-282a; BK vni, 323b; BK ix, 373b-
154b; Q 59, A i, CONTRARY 306c-307b; Q 72, 7 PLATCK Phaedrus^ 126a / Symposium, 167b-d
A i, RBP 3 368b-369d; Q 77, A 2, ANS and REP 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK x, CH 8 [ii78 b 8-23]
I 401b-d; Q 88, A 3, REP 3 472c-473a; Q 91, A 433b-c
CHAPTER 29: GOD 571
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK n, CH 8, 146a; BK 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, HI 81d-89a; v 93a-
in, CH 13, 188b-c 96a / Objections and Replies, 110a-112a; 112d-
17 PLOTINUS Fifth Ennead, TR i-vi 208a-237d pas-
:
114c; 126b-127c; POSTULATE v 131b-c; AXIOM
sim/ Sixth Ennead, TR VH-IX 321b-360d passim i 131d; AXIOM x 132b; PROP i 132b-c; 158b-
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 4 2a; BK 162a; 217d-218a
iv,par 29 26b; BK vn, par 1-8, 43b-45d / City 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, DBF i 355a; DEF 6-8
of God, BK vin, CH 6 268d-269c 355b-c; PROP 6-8 356b-357d; PROP n 358b-
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, QQ 3-11 359b; PROP 20 363d-364a; PROP 24 365a;
14a-50b; Q 84, A 2, ANS 442b-443c PROP 34 369a
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, xxxni 33 PASCAL: PensSes, 469 256a
[76-145] 157a-d 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 143a-145c; 153a; 177b-
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 162a-163b; PART 192d esp 177b-179c, 187a-c, 192c<d; 205a-b;
iv, 271b-c 239a-c / Practical Reason, 344c-355d esp 353a-
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 52b-d / 354d / Judgement, 570b-571c; 606d-609b esp
Meditations, in 81d-89a / Objections and Re- 608b-609a
plies, PROP in 132d-133a; 211c-212a; 232b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 280,
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i 355a-372d esp DEF 4,6 95a / Philosophy of History, PART in, 305c-
355b, PROP 5 356b, PROP 8-13 356d-359d, 306c
PROP 14, COROL 2-PROP 15 360a-361d, PROP
4b. The unity and simplicity of the divine nature
19-20 363c-364a; PART n, PROP 1-2 373d-374a
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK in, GENERAL SCHOL, 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vm, CH 10 353b-355d
369b-371a / Optics, BK in, 542a-543a / Metaphysics, BK xii, CH 7 [1073*2-11] 603a-b;
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH in, CH 8 [1074*32-39] 604d; CH 9 [1075*5-11]
SECT 15 116c-d; BK n, CH xvii, SECT i 167d- 605c-d
168a; CH xxin, SECT 33-35 212d-213c; BK in, 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vn, CH 14 [n 54^0-31]
CH vi, SECT 11-12 271b-272b 406c
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 146 17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR ix 353d-360d
442a-b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 10 3b-c;
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 229c-230b par 12 4a; BK iv, par 24 25b-c; par 29 26b; BK
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 187a-c; 190c; 236b-240b vn, par 2 43c-44a; par 16 48c-49a; par 21 49d-
esp 239a-c / Practical Reason, 303b-304a; 50a, BK xni, par 4 lllc; par 19 115c-d / City
325d-326a; 344b-c; 345a-c; 347d-348b; 350c- of God, BK vin, CH 6 268d-269c; CH n, 272c;
351a; 352a~c / judgement, 592a-c; 608c-611d BK xi, CH 10 327d-328d / Christian Doctrine,
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 161 BK i, CH 5 625d-626a; CH 32 633c-d
143a-b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 196b-d 14a-20c; Q 4, A 2, REP 1-2 21b-22b; A 3 22b-
23b; Q 6, A 3 29c-30b; Q 7, A 2 31d-32c; Q 8,
a. The identity of essence and existence in A 2, REP 2-3 35c-36b; A 4 37c-38c; Q u 46d-
God: the necessity of a being whose 50b; Q 13, A i, REP 2-3 62c-63c; A 4, REP 3
essence involves its existence
65c-66b; Q 14, A i, REP 2 75d-76c; A 4 78b-
OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 3:13-14 79a; Q 26, A i, REP i 150b-c; Q 27, A i, REP 2
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK xn, CH 7 [io72b 153b-154b; Q 28, A 2, REP i 158d-160a; Q 30,
4-14] 602c-d A i, REP 3-4 167a-168a; A 3 169b-170c; Q 40,
17 PLOTINUS. Sixth Ennead, TR vm, CH 14 349d- A i, REP i 213b-214b; Q 44, A i, ANS 238b-
350c; CH 18-21 351d-353d 239a; Q 47, A i 256a-257b; Q 50, A 2, REP 3
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK vn, par 23, 50c / 270a-272a; A 3, REP 2 272a-273b; Q 54, A i,
City of God, BK vin, CH n, 272c / Christian ANS 285a-d; A 3, REP 2 286c-287b; Q 57, A i,
Doctrine, BK i, CH 32 633c-d ANS 295a-d; Q 84, A 2, ANS and REP 3 442b-
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 2, A 3, 443c; Q 88, A 2, REP 4 471c-472c; PART i-n,
ANS 12c-14a; Q 3, A 4 16d-17c; A 7, ANS and Q 18, A i, ANS 694a-d
REP i 19a-c; Q 4, A i, REP 3 20d-21b; A 2, ANS 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 49,
and REP 3 21b-22b; A 3, REP 3 22b-23b; Q 6, A 4, ANS 5a-6a; Q 50, A 6, ANS lla-12a; Q 73, A
A 3 29c-30b; Q 8, A i, ANS 34d-35c; Q 10, A 2, i, REP 3 119c-120c; PART in, Q 2, A 2, ANS and
ANS and REP 3 41d-42c; Q 11, A 4, ANS 49d- REP i 711d-712d; Q 3, A 2, REP 3 724a-c;
50b; Q 13, A u, ANS 73c-74b; Q 14, A 13, REP A 3 724c-725b; Q 6, A 5, REP 2 744a-d
i B6d-88c; Q 19, A 3, REP 6 HOb-lllc; Q 44, 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, xni [52-
A i, ANS 238b-239a; Q 50, A 2, REP 3 270a- 66] 126a; xxiv [115-154] 143d-144b; xxix
272a; Q 54, A i, ANS 285a-d; A 3, REP 2 286c- [127-145] 151c-d; xxxni [76-145] 157a-d
287b; Q 75, A 5, REP 4 382a-383b; PART i-ii, 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART 11, 151d
Q 3, A 7, ANS 628a-d 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 52a-d /
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 3, Meditations, in, 86a-88b esp 88b / Objections
A 2, REP 3 724a-c and Replies, 122b-c; 232b
572 THE GREAT IDEAS
102:26-27; 103:13-18; 136; 145:10-13; 146:5-
(4. The divine nature in itself: the divine at- 10 (D) Psalms, 9:7-8; 9:16; 28:10; 32:10-11;
tributes. 4h. The unity and simplicity of the
44:7; 47 csp 47:9, 47:15; 65:7; 89 csp 89:1-4;
divine nature.)
92:1-2; 101 esp 101:12-13, 101:27-28; 102:13-
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 2-8 355d- 18; 135; 144:10-13; 145:5-10 / Isaiah, 40:8,28;
357d; PROP 12-14 359b-360a; PART 11, PROP 43:10-13; 57:15 (D) Isaias, 40:8,28; 43:10-
4 374c; PROP 7, SCHOL, 375b I
57 :I 5 / Jeremiah, 10:10 (D) Jeremias,
3>
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH in, io-io / Lamentations, 5:19 / Daniel, 6:26 /
SECT 15 116c-d; BK II, CH XXIII, SECT 35 Micah, 5:2 (D) Micheas, 5:2 / Malachi, 3:6
213b-c (D) Malaccas, 3:6
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 307 b-c APOCRYPHA: Eccksiasticus, 36-17; 39:20; 42:21
41 GIBBON- Decline and Fall, 229c-230b (D) OT, Eccksiasticus, 36:19; 39:25; 42:21-22
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 176b-c; 192c-d NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 24:35 / Romans,
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 224a-b; 1
120-25 / Colossians, 1:16-177 / Timothy, i :i7;
227d-228a; PART in, 306a; PART rv, 322a-c 6:15-16 / Hebrews, 1:8-12; 7:23-25; 13:7-8 /
James, 1:17 / Revelation, 1:17-18; 10:6; 11:15-
4c. The immateriality of God 17 (D) Apocalypse, 1:17-18; 10:6; 11:15-17
b
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK xn, CH 6 [ioyi 7 PLATO Republic, BK n, 322d-323c; 324a-b
2-23] 601b-c; CH 8 [1074*31-39] 604d 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vni, CH 6 [258^0-
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [146-155] 2 59b 3 J ]344b-345d / Heavens, BK i, CH 9
a b
63a [279 23- 4] 370c-d; BK H, CH 3 [286*8-13] 377c
14 PLUTARCH: Numa Pompilius, 53b-c / Generation and Corruption, BK n, CH 10
15 TACITUS: Histories, BK v, 296a I337 6l 5~ 2 3] 439a-b / Metaphysics, BK xn,
17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR i, CH 26, 266a; CH i [io69R 30-b 2] 598b-c; CH 6-7 601b-603b;
CH 27, 266c CH 9 605a-d esp [1075*5-11] 605c-d / Soul,
18 AUGUSTINE- Confessions, BK iv, par 29 26b; BK H, CH 4 (4i5 a 22-b 8j 645c-d
par 31 26c-27a; BK v, par 19-20 32b-33a; 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vn, CH 14 [ii54b 2o-3i]
BK vi, par 4 36a-b; BK vn, par 1-2 43b-44a / 406c
City of God, BK vin, CH 5-6 267d-269c 15 TACITUS: Histories, BK v, 296a
19 AQUINAS- Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A 16 KEPLER: Harmonies of the World, 1071b
2 15c-16a; A ANS 16a-d; A 8, ANS and REP
3,
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR vn, CH 2-6 119c-
3 19d-20c; Q i, ANS and REP 2 31a-d; Q 14,
7, A 122d esp CH 5 121c-122a / Sixth Ennead,
A i, ANS 75d-76c; A 11 84c-85c; Q 40, A i, REP TR vni, CH ii 348b-c; CH 18-21 351d-353d
i 213b-214b; Q 50, A i, REP i 269b-270a; A 2, 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 10 3b-c;
REP 3 270a-272a; Q 54, A i, ANS 285a-d; A 3, BK iv, par 26 25c-d; par 29 26b; BK vn, par
REP 2 286c-287b; Q 75, A 5, REP 1,4 382a-383b; 1-7 43b-45d; par 16-18 48c-49b, par 21 49d-
84, A 2, ANS 442b-443c; A 4, REP i 444d- 50a; par 23 50b-c; par 26, 51c; BK xi, par 12-
446b; Q 86, A 2, REP i 462a-463a; Q 91, A 2, 16 92b-93a; BK xn, par 1 1 lOld; par 18, 103a-b;
ANS 485b-486b; Q 105, A 3, ANS 540c-541b par 40 109b-110a; BK xm, par 44 122d / City
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART m, Q 2, of God, BK vii, CH 30 261b-d; BK vni, CH n,
A i, ANS and REP 2 710a-711c, A 2, ANS 711d- 272c; BK xi, CH 10 327d-328d; CH 21-22 333a-
712d; Q 25, A 3, REP i 841c-842d; PART in 334c esp CH 22, 334c; BK xii, CH 1-3 342b,d-
SUPPL, Q 92, A i, REP 12 1025c-1032b 344b; CH 14-17 350d-354a csp CH 14 350d-
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART HI, 172d-173a 351 b, CH 17 353a-354a / Christian Doctrine, BK
28 GILBERT. Loadstone, BK v, 105a i, CH 5-6 625d-626b; CH 8 626c-627a; CH 10
76c; A 3 77d-78b; Q 25, A 2, ANS and REP i 109c; Q 21, A i, REP 4 124b-125b; Q 51, A i,
144c-145b; Q 54, A ANS 285d-286c; Q 75, A
2, REP 3 275b-276b; Q 61, A 3, REP 2 316a-d; Q
5, REP 1,4 382a-383b; Q 79,
A 2, ANS 414d- 62, A 8, ANS and REP 1-2 323c-324a; Q 66, A i,
416a; Q 86, A 2, REP i 462a-463a; PART I-H, CONTRARY 343d-345c; Q 84, A 2, ANS and REP
Q i, A 4, REP i 612a-613a 3 442b-443c; Q 91, A i, ANS 484a-485b; Q 100,
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 64, A 2, ANS 521c-522b, Q 103 528a-534b passim;
A 4, REP 3 69b-70a; Q 87, A 4, REP 2 188b-d; Q 104, A 3, REP 2 537b-d; A 4, ANS 538a-c; Q
PART II-II, Q 20, A 2, REP 2 475d-476cj Q 24, 105, A 4, ANS 541c-542a; A 5, ANS 542a-543b;
A 8, ANS 495b-496a; PART HI, Q i, A 2, REP 2 PART i-ii, Q i, A 4, REP i 612a-613a; Q 2, A 4,
703a-704d; Q 2, A i, ANS 710a-711c; Q 3, A i, REP i 618a-d; Q 9, A 6 662a-d; Q 18, A i, ANS
REP i 723b-724a; PART in SUPPL, Q 92, A i, 694a-d; Q 19, A 4 705b-c; Q 22, A 2, REP i 721c-
REP 6,12 1025c-1032b 722c; Q 24, A 3, REP 2 728c-729c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 162b-c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 61,
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, in, 86a-88d / Ob- A 5, ANS 58b-59d; Q 64, A 4, ANS and REP 3
jections and Replies, 112a-d; 123c-d; PROP in 69b-70a; PART n-n, Q 9, A 4, REP i 425d-426c;
132d-133a Q 13, A i, ANS 444b-445a; Q 17, A i, ANS
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, DEF 2 355a; DEF 6-7 457a-d; Q 23, A 4, ANS 485d-486b; Q 34, A i,
355b; PROP 8-14 356d-360a; PROP 15, SCHOL- ANS 559a-c; Q 39, A 2, REP 3 575b-576b; Q
PROP iy360b-363c; PROP 21, DEMONST364a-c; 184, A 2, ANS 629d-630d; PART in, Q i, A i,
PROP 29 366b-c; PROP 32-35 367a-369a; PART ANS 701d-703a; Q 23, A i, ANS 833a-d; PART in
n, PROP 1-4 373d-374c SUPPL, Q 91, A 2, REP 4,10 1017c-1020c; Q 99,
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK vin [411-421] 241a A 2, REP 3 1081a-d
574 THE GREAT IDEAS
A i, REP 2 12b-13c; Q 6r, A 5, ANS 58b-59d;
(4, The divine nature in itself: the divine at-
Q 93, 215b,d-216c; PART in,
A i Q 6, A 2, ANS
tributes. 4f. The perfection or goodness of 741c-742a
God.) 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK H, APH 15 149a
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy PURGATORY, xxvm
',
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 228a*c
[91-93] 97a; PARADISE, vn [64-66] 115d; xix 31 SPINOZA: Ethtcs, PART i, PROP 17, SCHOL 362c-
[40-90] 135c-136a 363c; PROP 21 364a-c; PROP 32, COROL 2 367b;
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays* 300c-d PROP 33, SCHOL 2, 368 b-c; PART n, PROP i
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 52a-d; 53d / 373d-374a; PROP 3-6 374a-375a
,
Meditations, 76d-77c; m-iv, 86a-93a / Ob-
i, 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK H, CH i,
jections and Replies, 123d-124c;
DBF vin 130d; SECT 10, 123b, CH x, SECT 9 143a-c
142c 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 33a-d; 52c-53b / Practi-
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 33, SCHOL 2 cal Reason, 303b-304a; 344b-c; 350c-351b /
367d-369a; PART v, PROP 17, DEMONST 456c-d Judgement, 590b-d, 592a-c; 600d-601c; 610b-
33 PASCAL. Pensees, 580 276b 613a,c
34 NEWTON- Principles, BK in, GENERAL SCHOL,
370a-371a passim
4b.The happiness and glory of God
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK m, CH vi, OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 15:1-21; 33:13-23 /
SECT n-12 271b-272b 7 Chronicles, 16:23-27; 29:11-13 (D) I Par-
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vin, DIV ahpomenon, 16:23-27; 29:11-13 / Psalms,
78-81 485c-487a; SECT xi,
DIV 106-107 499b- 8; 19; 24; 57 5-11; 96-3~ 6 104-1; 1134,
;
500b passim; DIV 113, 502a-b H 8: 5; 145:11-12 (D) Psalms, 8; 18; 23,
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 81b-c 56:5-11; 95:3-6; 103:1; 112:4; 137:5; 144:11-
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 205a-b / Fund. Prin. 12 / Isaiah, 6:1-4; 42.8 (D) Isaias, 6:1-4;
Metaphync of Morals, 263a-b / Practical Rea- 42:8
son, 307a-d; 325d-326a; 342c; 345a-c; 351b- APOCRYPHA: Judith, 16:13 (D) OT, Judith,
352c / Judgement, 592a-c 16:16 / Rest of Esther, 13:12-14 (D) OT,
Esther, 13:12-14 / Song of Three Children, 28-
4g. The intellect of God 31 (D) OT, Daniel, 3:51-53
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK xn, CH 7 [io72
b NEW TESTAMENT. Mar\, 8:38 / John, 5:44; 8:54
14-29] 602d-603a; CH 9 605a-d / Hebrews, 2-10 / 7 Peter, 4.7-11 / 77 Peter,
b
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK x, CH 8 [ii78 8-23] 1:16-18 / Revelation, 5:9-14; 7:9-12; 21 (>)
433b~c Apocalypse, 5 9-14; 7:9-12; 21
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 14 120d-121c; 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK XH, CH 7 [io72b
BK H, CH 8, 146a i3-2 9 ]602d-603a
17 PLOI INUS Second Ennead, TR ix, CH 1 65d-66d
: 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vn, CH 14 [i 154^0-31]
b
/ Fifth Ennead 208a-251d esp TR v-vi 228b- 406c; BK x, CH 8 [ii78 8-23] 433b-c
237d, TR ix 246c-251d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK xm, par 4 lllc /
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK VIH, CH 6 268d- City of God, BK v, CH 14 220a-d; BK vm,
269c; BK xi, CH 21 333a-d; BK xu CH 17 353a- r
CH 6 268d-269c; BK xn, CH 17 353a-354a
354a; BK xxn, CH 29, 614b / Christian Doc- 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 26
trine, BK i, CH 13 627d 150a-152a,c; Q 62, A 3, REP 3 319c-320b; A 4,
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A i, ANS 320b-321b; Q 63, A 3 327b-328b, Q 65, A
REP 2-3 14b-15b, Q 14, AA 1-4 75d-79a; Q 18, 2, ANS 340b-341b; Q 70, A 2, ANS 364b-365a;
A 3 106b-107c, Q 19, A i, ANS 108d-109c; A 2, Q 73, A 2, REP 3 371b-d; PART I-H, Q 2, A 2,
REP 4 109c-110b; A 3, REP 6 HOb-lllc; A 4, REP 2 616d-617b; A 3, ANS and REP i 617b-
ANS and REP 4 lllc-112c; Q 26, A 2 150c-151a; 618a; Q 3, A i, REP i 622c-623a; A 2, REP 1,4
Q 27, A 3, REP 3 155c-156a; Q 46, A 2, REP 3 623a-624b; A 8, REP 2 628d-629c; Q 5, A 3,
253a-255a; Q 50, A i, ANS 269b-270a; Q 54, REP 2 638b-639a; A 7, ANS, 642a-d
A 2, ANS 285d-286c; Q 55, A i, ANS and REP 3 20Ao T uNAS. Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 8,
289a-d; A 3, ANS 291a-d; Q 57, A i, ANS 295a-d; A 4, ANS 759b-d; Q 16, A 4, REP 2 799b-800b;
A 2, ANS 295d-297a; Q 59, A 2, ANS 307c-308b; Q 26, A i, REP 2 845b-846a; PART in SUPPL,
79, A i, ANS 414a-d; A 2, ANS 414d-416a; A 4, Q 71, A 8, REP i 909d-910d; Q 92, A i, REP 5
ANS 417a-418c; A 10, REP 2 423d-424d; Q 84, 1025c-1032b
A a, ANS 442b-443c; Q 85, A 5, ANS 457d- 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, i [1-9]
458d, Q 87, A i, ANS 465a-466c; A 3, ANS 467b- 106a; xxxin [46-145] 156c-157d
468a; Q 89, A i, ANS 473b-475a; Q 105, A i, 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART v, J*ROP 17 456c-d;
REP 2 538d-539c; A 3, ANS 540c-541b; Q 116, PROP 35-36 460d-461c
A i, ANS 592d-593d; PART i-n, Q i, A 4, REP i 32 MILTON: Upon the Circumcision 12b-13a
t /
612a-613a; Q 19, A 4, ANS and REP 3 705b-c Paradise Lost, BK in [56-415] 13$b-144b
20 AQUINAS: Summa Thcohgtca, PART MI, Q 51, 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 233, 216a
5*050 CHAWER 29: GOD 575
42 KANT: Practical Reason, 347d-346b / Judge-
ment, 594d [in i]
5a. God as first and as exemplar cause: the rer
lation of divine to natural causation
5. The divine nature in relation to the world or OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1-2; 7:4 / Nehemiah,
creatures II Esdras,
9.6 (D) 9:6 / Job, 9:1-9; 12;
7 PLATO: Republic, B* n, 321d-32d / Timaeus, 26:7-14; 28:24-27; 36:24-42.2 / Psalms, 8:3;
447b-458b;465d-466a 33:6-9; 65:5-13; 74:16-17; 89:11-12; 95:4-5;
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vn, CH i 326a-327b; 96:5; 102:25-27; 104; 107:23-30; 115:3;
BK viii, CH 1-6 334a-346b 119:73; 121:2; 136:5-9; 146:5-6; 147-148 (D)
9 ARISTOTLB: Ethics, BK vn, CH 14 [ii54b 20-3i] Psalms, 8:4; 32:6-9; 64:6-14; 73:16-17; 88:12-
406c; BK x, CH 8 [i 178^-27] 433b-c 13; 94:4-5; 95:5; 101:26-28; 103; 106:23-30;
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK iir, CH 22, 195a-b; 113:3; 118:73; 120:2; 135:5-9; 145:5-6; M6-
BK iv, CH n, 240d-241a 148 / Proverbs, 3:19 / Isaiah, 40:26-28; 42:5;
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK n, SECT 4 257b; 44:24; 45:7-12,18; 48:13; 51:13; 6 5 :i7-(D)
f BK v, SECT 8 269d-270b; BK vi, SECT 40-46 Isaias, 40:26-28; 42:5; 44:24; 45:7-12,18;
277d-278d 48:13; 51:13; 65:17 / Jeremiah, 10:12; 27:5;
16 KEPLER: Harmonies of the World, 1017b- 31-35; 51:15-16 (D) Jeremias, 10.12; 27:5;
1018a; 1071b 31:35; 51:15-16 / Amos, 5:8 / Zechariah, 12:1
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR m, CH 13 (D) Zachanas, 12:1 / Malachi, 2:10 (D)
149b-d Malachias, 2:10
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 4 2a; par APOCRYPHA: Judith, 16:14 (D) OT, Judith, 16:17
10 3b-c; BK iv, par 25 25c; BK iv, par SI-BK v, / Rest of Esther, ly.io-(D) OT, Esther, 13:10
par i 26c-27b; BK vn,
par 1-8, 43b-45d; par / Wisdom of Solomon, 1*14; 2 23; 9:1-2; 11:17
16-23 48c-50c; BK x, par 38 81a; BK xi, par 6 -(D)OT,Bool(of Wisdom, 1:1452:23; 9:1-2;
90c-d; BK xni, par 19 115c-d / City of God, 11:18 / Ecclesiasticus, 18:1; 24 8-9; 33:10-13;
Bk vii, CH 29-31 261a-262a; BK vin, CH i-io 39:16-35; 43 (D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 18:1;
264b,d-271d; BK x, CH 1-2 298b,d-300a; BK 24:12-14; 33:10-14; 39:21-41143 / Bel and
xi,CH 24 335c-336a / Christian Doctrine, BK i, Dragon, 5 (D) OT, Danitl, 14:4 / II Macca-
CH 9-10 627a-b bees, 7:23,28 (D) OT, // Machabees, 7:23,28
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, QQ 14- NEW TESTAMENT: John, 1-1-3 / ^cts, 7:49-50;
25 75c~150a; Q 84, A 2, ANS 442b-443c 14-14-17; 17:22-28 / Colossians, 1:16-17 /
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, i [1-3] Hebrews, 1:10-11; 2:10; 3:4; 11:3 / // Peter,
106a; [97-142] 107b-d; n [112-148] 109a-b; x 3-5-7 / Revelation, 4:11; 10.6; 14 7 (D)
[1-27] 120b-c; xin [52-87] 126a-b; xix [40-90] Apocalypse, 4:11; 10:6; 14:7
135c-136a; xxvn [100-120] 148b-c; xxvm 7 PLATO: Republic, BK x, 427c-429c / Timaeus,
148d-150b; xxxm [76-145] 157a-d 447a-448b / Sophist, 577d-578b / Statesman,
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 428c-d 587a-589c / Laws, BK x, 758b-765c esp 762b-
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 38a 765c
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 52a-d / Ob- 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vin, CH 1-6 334a-
jections and Replies, 123c-d; 214a-d; 229c-d 346b / Generation and Corruption, BK n, CH 10
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK vin [412-436] [336^5-34] 438d; [337*15-23] 439a b/ Meta-
241a-b physics, BK I, CH 2 [983*7-9] 501b; BK XII, CH 4
b
34 NEWTON. Principles, BK HI, GENERAL SCHOL, [io7o 22~35J 600b; CH 5 [1071*30-36] 601a
369b-371a / Optics, BK HI, 542a-543a 9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 3 (699*11]-
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xvn, CH 4 [700*5] 234a-235a
SECT i 167d-168a; BK in, CH vi, SECT 11-12 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [146-194]
271b-272b 63a-c
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 57 423d- 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 14 120d-121c
424a 16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 5a-b
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xi, DIV 16 KEPLER- Epitome, BK iv, 853b-854a / Har-
106 499b-c; DIV 113 502a-d monies of the World, 1017b-10l8a; 1025a-b;
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 186c-d; 187d-188a 1049b-1050a;1061a
38 ROUSSBAU: Social Contract, BK iv, 439a 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 10 3b-c;
40 GIWON: Decline and Fall, Slb-c \mc\3Q7b-c; par 12 4a; BK vn, par 16-23 48c-50c; BK xi,
346b-347a par 4-11 90a-92b; BK XH, par 2-9 99c-101c;
42 KANT: Practical Reason, 303b-304a; 321b-c; par 14-40 102b-110a esp par 38 108d-109a; BK
325d-326a; 327d-328b; 342 c; 344b-c; 345a-c; xin, par 6-48 112a-124a / City of God, BK vii,
347d-348b; 350c-351a; 352a-c / Judgement, CH 29-31 261a-262a; BK vin, CH i 264b,d-
592a-c 265b; CH 4-6 266d-269c; CH 9 270d-271a; BK
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v, xi, CH 4-24 324a-336a; BK XH 342b,d-360a,c;
'
120d-121c BK xix, CH 13 519a-520a; BK xxi, CH 4 562a-
576 THE GREAT IDEAS 5a to 5b
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, i, PROP 16-18 362a-
PART
(3. The dMne nature in relation to the world or
363c; PROP 24-29 365a-366c; PROP 33, SCHOL
creatures, la. God asfirst and as exemplar 2 367d-369a; PART 11, PROP 7 375a-c; PROP 10,
cause: the relation oj divine to natural SCHOL 376d-377a
causation.) 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK in [80-134] 137a-
563c; CH 7-8 565d-568d; UK xxn, CH 2 587b- 138a; [630-735] 149a-l51b; BK v [468-474]
588a BK i, CH 32 633c-d;
/ Christian Doctrine, 185b; BK vn 217a-231a esp [162-169] 220b,
CH 34 634b-c [601-640] 230a-231a
19 AQUINAS Swnma Theologies PART i, Q 2, A 3,
: 33 PASCAL: Penstes, 77 186a
ANS and REP 2 12c-14a; Q 3, A i, ANS 14b-15b; 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK in, GENERAL SCHOL,
A 2, ANS 15c~16a; A 4, ANS 16d-17c; A 5, REP 2 369b-370a / Optics, BK in, 528b-529a
17c-18b; A 6, ANS 18c-19a; A 7, ANS and REP i 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xxi,
19a-c; A 8, ANS and REP 1-2 19d-20c; Q 4 20c- SECT 2 178c; CH xxni, SECT 28 211b-d; BK iv,
23b csp A 3 22b-23b; Q 18, AA 3-4 106b- CH in, SECT 28-29 322a-323a
108c; g 26, A 4 151c-152a,c; o 51, A i, REP 3 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 25-33
275b-276b; Q 52, A 2 279b-280a; Q 56, A 2, 417d-419a esp SECT 32 418d-419a; SECT ^6
ANS 292d-294a; Q 60, A i, REP 2-3 310b- 419c-d; SECT 51-53 422d-423a; SECT 57 423d-
311a; Q 65 339a-343c; Q 74, A 3, REP i 375a- 424a; SECT 60-75 424b-427d; SECT 105-109
377a,c; Q 75, A i, REP i 378b-379c; Q 76, A 5, 433b-434b; SECT 141 441a-b; SECT 146-153
REP i 394c-396a; Q 83, A i, REP 3 436d-438a; 442a-444a esp SECT 150 442d-443b
Q 84, A 2, ANS and REP 3 442b-443c; A 4, REP i 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vn, DIV
444d-446b; Q 88, A 3, REP 2 472c-473a; Q 89, 54-57 474b-475d
A i, RLH 3 473b-475a; Q 92, A i, REP i 488d- 42 KANT- Pure Reason, 140b,d-145c; 177b-179b;
489d; A 2, REP 2 489d-490c; A 4, ANS 491b-d; 187a-191d; 205a-209a; 236b-240b esp 239a-c
Q 93 492a-501c; Q 94, A 3, ANS 504a-505a; QQ / Practical Reason, 332d-337a,c esp 334b-
103-105 528a-545b; Q 116 S92d-595c; PART 335c / Judgement, 569a-570a; 581b-582c;
i-n, Q i, A 2 610b-611b; Q 2, A 3, ANS 617b- 592c-596c; 597d-599d; 600d-601c; 608b-609a;
618a; Q 6, A i, REP 3 644d-646a; Q 9, A 6 610b-613a,c
662 ad; Q 10, A 4 665d 666a,c; Q 12, A 5, ANS 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d-
672a-c, Q 17, A 8, REP 2 692a-c 157b; PART i, 245d-246c; PART iv, 368d-369a,c
20 AQUINAS. Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 65, 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 239d; 243c-d
A 3, ANS 72d-73d; Q 66, A i, REP 3 75b-76b;
Q 68, A i, ANS 87c-89c; Q 79, A i, REP 3 156b-
5b. God as final cause: the motion of all things
157b; A 2, ANS and REP 1 157b-158a; Q 80, A i,
toward God
ANS and REP 2-? 159d-160c; Q 85, A 6 182d- OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 33.13-23 / Deuteron-
184a; Q 93, A i 215b,d-216c; Q 100, A 6, REP 2 omy, 4 129 / / Chronicles, 28 -9 (D) IParalipom-
257c-258c; Q 102, A 3, ANS 272b-276c; Q 109, enon, 28:9 / II Chronicles, 15 12-4, 12-15 (D)
A i, ANS 338b-339c; Q no, A i, REP 2 347d- 11 Paralipomenon, 15:2-4,12-15 / Psalms, 24:6;
349a; Q in, A 2, ANS 352d-353d; PART H-II, 27:4-9; 42; 63; 70:4; 73:25-28; 84; 119:10
Q 18, A 4, ANS 464c-465a; PART in, Q 2, A 5, (D) Psalms, 23.6, 26.4-9; 4 1 ? 62; 69:5; 72:25-
REP 3 715a-716b; Q 5, A 3, REP 2 737d-739a; 28; 83; 118:10 / Proverbs, 16:4 / Isaiah, 26 8-
Q 13, A 3, CONTRARY 782b-783b; PART in 9; 43:7; 58:2 (D) Isatas, 26:8-9; 43:7; 58:2
SUPPL, Q 74, A 2, REP 3 926c-927c; Q 75, A 3 APOCRYPHA- Wisdom of Solomon, 1:1; 13:1-7
938a-939d; Q 88, A i, ANS lOOOd-lOOld (D) OT, Boo\ of Wisdom, ri; 13:1-7
21 DANTE: Dunne Comedy, PARADISE, i [103-108] NEW TESTAMENT: Romans, 3:10-11 / Colossians,
107b;ii [112-148] 109a-b; XXVH [100-120] 1:16-17 / Hebrews, 2:10 / Revelation, 4.11
148b-c; xxix [10-36] 150b-c (D) Apocalypse, 4:11
22 CHAUCER: Knight's Tale [2987-3040] 209a- 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK xn, CH 7 [1072*
210a 23^4] 602b-c
23 HOBBBS: Leviathan, PART i, 78d-79a; 79d-80a; 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR H, CH 2 41a-c /
PART n, 113b-c; 149d; PART in, 185d; 241c- Fifth Ennead, TR vni, CH 7, 243b-c
242a; PART iv, 272b-c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par i, la; par 5,
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FOURTH DAY, 2b; BK iv, par 15-19 23a-24b; BK v, par 1-2
245b-c 27a-c; BK x, par 29-33 78d-80b;BK xin, par 3
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 390d-391a; lllb-c / City of God, BK vni, CH 4 266d-267c;
406b-407b; 415b-417a csp 416b-c; 426a-429b; CH 8-9 270a-271a; BK x, CH 1-3 298b,d-301a;
443a-c; 490d-493a BK xn, CH i 342b,d-343c; BK xix, CH 13 519a-
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 2c-d; 4b-c 520a / Christian Doctrine, BK 1 624a-636a,c esp
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART v, 55d-56a / CH 3-5 625b-626a, CH 9-11 627a-c, CH 22-23
Meditations, in 81d-89a esp 84b-85a, 87b- 629b-630c, CH 34 634b-c
88c / Objections and Replies, 110b-112a; 158b- 19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i, A 4,
:
(D) Jeremias, 23:24 / Amos, 9:1-4 / Zechartah, 35:6-7; 36:22-42:3 / Psalms, 89.6-8; 97:9;
99:2; 113*4-5 (P) w/ww, 88.7-9, 96:9; 98 .2,
APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 1:7; 12:1 (D) 112:4-57 Isaiah, 29:16; 40:12-26; 45:9; 46:5,9;
OT, BooJ(of'Wisdom, 1:7; 12:1 55.8-9 (D) Isaias, 29:16; 40:12-26; 45:9;
NEW TESTAMENT -.John, no / Acts, 7:49; 17:22- 46:5,9; 55:8-9 / Daniel, 4:35 (D) Daniel,
29 / Romans, 11:36/7 Corinthians, 6:15-20 / 4 32
:
II Corinthians, 6:14-18 /
Ephesians, 4:6 / APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 11:22; 12:12
Colossians, 1:16-19; 2:8-13 / II Timothy, 1:14 / (D) OT, Boo{ of Wisdom, 11:23; 12-12 /
Hebrews, 13:5 / I John, 4:4-16 Ecclesiasticus, 16:20-21; 18:4-7 (P) OT,
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 14 120d-121c Ecclesiasticus, 16:20-21; 18:2-6
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK n, SECT i 256b,d; NEW TESTAMENT: John, 3*31 / Acts, 7:47-50 /
BK vn, SECT 9 280b-c Romans, 9:19-21 / Ephesians^ 1:19-23; 4:6 /
17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR ix, CH 16, 75c-d I Timothy, 6:15-16
/ Fifth Ennead, TR vni, CH 7 242d-243c 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK xn, CH 10 [1075*
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 2-3 lb-2a; 12-16] 605d
BK in, par 10 ISb-d; par 18 18b; BK iv, par 26 9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 3 [699*11!-
25c-d; par 31 26c-27a; BK vi, par 4 36a-b; BK CH 4 [700*5] 234a-235a
CHAPTER 29: GOD 579
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 2-3 lb-2a; 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR ix 136a-138a,c /
BK in, par 10, 15c-d; BK vi, par 4 36a-b; BK Fifth Ennead, TR i, CH 4 209d-210c; CH 6-7
vii, par 17 49a; BK x, par 8-10 73b-74a / Ctty 211a-212c; TR in, CH 8-13 219d-224b; TR iv,
of God, BK vu, CH 30 261b-d; BK xu, CH 17 CH 2-TR ix, CH 14 227b-251d
353a-354a 18 AUGUSTINE '.Confessions, BKXii,pari8,103a-b;
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A i, BK xni, par 19 115c-d / City of God, BK v, CH
REP i 14b-15b; A 8 19d-20c; Q 8, A i, ANS and 9-10 213b-216c; BKvii, CH 30 261b-d; BK xi,
REP 1,3 34d-35c; Q 18, A 4 107d-108c; Q 51, CH CH 21 333a-d; BK xn, CH
10 327d-328d;
A 3, REP 3 277a-278c; Q 61, A 3, REP 2 316a d; 17-18 353a-354d; BK xx, CH 15 543d-544b;
Q 90, A i, ANS 480d-481d; Q 103, A 2 529a- BK XXH, CH 2 587b-588a / Christian Doctrine,
530a; PART I-H, Q 17, A 8, REP 2 692a-c BK i, CH 9-10 627a-b; CH 13 627d; CH 34
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, n [112- 634b-c
148] 109a-b;xin [52-66] 126a; xix [40-66] 19 AQUINAS: Summa Thcologica, PART i, Q 3, A i,
135c-d; xxvin 148d-150b; xxix [127-145] REP i 14b-15b; A 6, REP i 18c-19a; Q 4, A 2,
151c-d REP 3 21b-22b; QQ 14-15 75c-94a; Q 18, A 4
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, HQb-llIsi', 107d-108c; Q 19, A 3, REP 6 HOb-lllc; Q 34,
123c-d; 158b-159a A 3, ANS and REP 3-4 188b-189a; Q 44, A 3
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK in, CH vi, 240b-241a; Q 55, A i, ANS and REP 3 289a-d;
SECT ii-i2 271b-272b A 2, ANS and REP i 289d-290d; A 3, ANS and
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vii, DIV REP i 291a-d; Q 56, A 2, ANS 292d-294a; Q 57,
56 475a-b A i, ANS 295a-d; A 2, ANS 295d-297a; A 3, ANS
42 KANT Pure Reason, 192c-d / Practical Reason, 297b-298a; A 4, ANS 298a-299a; Q 62, A 9, ANS
334b-335b; 342c / judgement, 566c-d; 580c-d 324a-325b; Q 63, A 7, REP 2 331c-332b; Q 79,
A 10, REP 2 423d-424d; Q 84, A 2, ANS 442b-
5/. God's knowledge: the divine omniscience; 443c; A REP i 444d-446b; A 5 446c-447c;
4,
the divine ideas Q AANS 457a-d; Q 86, A 4, ANS 463d-
85, 4,
OLD TESTAMENT. Deuteronomy, 31 119-21 / I Sam- 464d; Q 87, A i, ANS 465a-466c, A 3, ANS 467b-
uel, 2 3; 16.7 (D) / Kings, 2:3; 16:7 / 468a; Q 89, A i, ANS 473b-475a; Q 93, A 4,
/ Chronicles, 28:9 (D) / Parahpomenon, 28 9 ANS 494c-495b; A 8, ANS 499b-500c; Q 105,
/ Job, 12:12-25; 21:22; 22:12-14; 24:1; A 3 540c-541b; Q 107, AA 2-3 550b-551c; PART
28:3,10-28; 34:21-25; 42:2-3 / Psalms, 33:3- I-H, Q i, A 4, REP i 612a-613a; Q 2, A 3, ANS
15; 44:20-21; 69.5, 73.11; 94:7-12; 113-4-6; 617b-618a; Q 3, A 5, REP i 626b-627a; Q 14,
139; 147 4-5,15-18 (D) Psalms, 32.3-15; A i, REP 2 677b-678a; Q 40, A 3, REP i 794c-
43-21-22; 68-6; 72-11; 937-12; 112-4-6; 138; 795a
146:4-5; 147:15-18 / Proverbs, 3:19-20; 5:21; 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 51,
15:3,11; 16:2; 24:12 / Isaiah, 29:15-16; 40:13-
A i, REP 2 12b-13c; Q 61, A 5, ANS 58b-59d;
14,27-28, 46.9-10; 47:io-n--(D) Isaias, Q 79, A i, ANS 156b-157b; Q 91, A 3, REP i
29-15-16; 40.13-14,27-28; 46 9-10; 47 10-11 209d-210c; Q 93, A i 215b,d-216c; Q 100, A 9,
/ Jeremiah, 1-5; 16:14-17; 17:9-10; 20-12; ANS 261b-262b; Q 102, A i, ANS 270c-271b;
23:23-24 (D) Jeremias, 1:5; 16:14-17; 17:9- Q no, A 2, REP 2 349a-d; PART n-n, Q 2, A 6,
10; 20:12; 23:23-24 REP 3 395b-396a; Q 9, A i, REP i 423c-424b;
APOCRYPHA. Rest of Esther, 13:12; 14:14-19 (D) Q n, A 4, REP i 441b-442b; Q 33, A 7, REP i
OT, Esther, 13.12; 14*14-19 / Wisdom of 556a-557d; PART HI, Q 3, A 8, ANS 729b-730b;
Solomon, i-6-n (D) OT, Boo^ of Wisdom, Q 5, A 4, ANS 739a-740b; Q 7, A 12, ANS 754c-
1:6-11 / Ecclesiasticus, 15:18-19; 16:17-19; 755c; Q 13, A i, REP 2 780a-781b; Q 18, A 4,
17:15,17-20; 23:18-20; 39:19-20; 42:18-21 REP i 813a-d; Q 21, A i, REP 2 823d-824d; Q
(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 15:19-20; 16:16-20; 60, A 4, ANS 849c-850b; PART in SUPPL, Q 72,
17 13-17; 23.25-29; 39-24-25; 42.18-22 / A i, ANS and REP 5 917c-919a; A 2, REP 4 919a-
Susanna, 42-44 (D) OT, Daniel, 13:42-44 920c; Q 84, A 2, ANS 984c-985d; Q 88, A 3, ANS
NEW TESTAMENT: John, 1:1-3; 6:64,70-71; 14-67 1002d-1004b; Q 91, A 3, ANS 1020d-1022c; Q
Romans, 8:27; 11:33-36 / I Corinthians, 1:25; 92, A i, REP 2 1025c-1032b; Q 94, A i, REP 2
2:6-16; 3.18-20 / Colosstans, 2:2-3 / Hebrews, 1040d-1041b
4:12-13 / I John, 3:18-20 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, [94- vm
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 140d / Ttmaeus, 465d / 112] 118a; xv [49-63] 128d-129a; xvn [13-45]
Parmenides, 489d-490d / Laws, BK x, 766d- 132b>c; xxvi [103-108] 146d-147a
767c 22 CHAUCER: Troilusand Cressida, BK iv, STANZA
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK i, CH 2 [98ab 28- 138-154 lQ6b-lQ&b/Nun'sPriest'sTale[i5,2$6-
BK xn, CH 7
983*11] 501 a- b; 256] 456b-457a
602d-603a; CH 9 605a-d; CH 10 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART 11, 162c
606c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 17b-c /
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 14 120d-121c Novum Organum, BK i, APH 23 108c; APH 124
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK vi, SECT 44, 278b 133c-d; BK n, APH 15 149a
580 THE GREAT IDEAS 5g to 5h
PART in, Q 18, A i, REP 1,4 810a-811c; Q 21,
(5. The divine nature in relation to the world or A i, ANS 823d-824d; A 4, ANS 826b-827c; Q 61,
creatures, If. God's knowledge: the divine A 4, REP 3 857c-858b; Q 64, A 7, ANS 875d-
omniscience; the divine ideas.) 876c; PART in SUPPL, Q 72, A 3, ANS and REP 5
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, in, 86a / Objections 920c-922b; Q 74, A 4, ANS 928d-929d, Q 91,
and Replies, 122a-b A i, REP 2 1016b-1017c; A 2, ANS 1017c-1020c,
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 17 362b-363c; Q 92, A 3, REP 6 1034b-1037c
PROP 21, DEMONST 364a-C; PROP 33, SCHOL 2 21 DANTE: Dwme Comedy, PARADISE, in [64-90]
367d-369a; PART n, PROP 373d-374a; PROP
i HOa-b; xix [85-90] 135d-J36a
3-4 374a-c; PROP 7, SCHOL-PROP 8 375b-376a; 23 HOBBES. leviathan, PART n, 113b-c, 162c;
PROP 32 385c PART iv, 271b
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK n [188-193] 115b ? 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK iv,
BK in [56-134] 136b-138a; BK x [1-16] 274b 265b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH x, 30 BACON. Advancement of Learning, 38a
SECT 9 143a-c; CH xv, SECT 12 165b-c; BK in, 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 228a-c,
CH vi, SECT 3 268d; SECT n 271b-d; BK iv, 229c
CH x, SECT 5-6 350a-c 31 SPINOZA. Ethics, PART i, PROP 17 362b-363c;
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vm, DIV PROP 32 367a-b; PROP 33, SCHOL 2 367d-369a;
78, 485d-486a APPENDIX, 370c-371a
42 KANT: Practical Reason, 344a-c; 351b-352c / 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK in [80-134] 137a-
judgement, 592a-c 138a; BK vn [139-173] 220a-221a / Samson
44 BoswELL:/0A/MO, 173c; 392d-393a Agonistes [300-329] 346a-b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xxi,
5g. God's will: divine choice SECT 50-51 191 b-c
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1-2 / Psalms, 135:6 35 BERKELEY Human Knowledge, SECT 25-33
(D) Psalms, 134:6 / Isaiah, 14:24-27; 46:9-11 417d-419a esp SECT 29-30 418c
~(D) Isaias, 14:24-27; 46:9-11 / Jeremiah, 41 GIBBON. Decline and Fall, 150c-151b
4:28; 51:29(D) Jeremias, 4:28; 51:29 42 KANT: Fund. Prtn. Metaphysic of Morals,
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 18:14; 20:1-16 / 265b-c csp 265b,d [fn i]; 276b-277a; 278b-c /
John, 5:21; 6:38-40 / Romans, 8:27-29; 9-11- Practical Reason, 303b-304a; 321b-c; 324b-
19; 12:1-2 // Corinthians, 12 / Ephesians, r8- 32Sa; 325d-326a, 328b / Intro. Metaphysic of
12; 3:10-11 / / Thessalonians, 4.3-6; 5:18 / Morals, 393c-d
// Timothy, i :8-io / James, i :i8 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vi, 272a-b; BK
5 AESCHYLUS: Suppliant Maidens [86-103] 2a-b xn, 553b; BK xin, 563a-b; BK xv, 631c;
5 EURIPIDES. Bacchantes [1388-1391] 352a,c EPILOGUE ii, 675a-677b; 680b-c; 684b-d
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 45 2c
12 EPICTEFUS: Discourses, BK iv, CH 3, 224d;
h. God's love: the diffusion of the divine good-
CH 7, 232d-233a ness
12 AURELIUS- Meditations, BK in, SECT n 262a-b OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 33 19; 34:6 / Deu-
17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR vin 342d-353d teronomy, 4:37-38; 7:7-8; 10:15,18; 32:4 /
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK vn, par 6-7 44d- / Chronicles, i6:7~34--(D) / Parahpomenon,
45d; BK xi, par 12 92b; BK XH, par 18, 103a-b; 16:7-34 / Job passim, csp 2-10 / Psalms /
BK xin, par 5 Hid; par 19 115c-d / City of Proverbs, 3:12 / Song of Solomon (D) Can-
God, BK v, CH 9-10 213b-216c; BK x, CH 7 tick of Canticks / Isaiah, 43; 45:7; 63:7-9
302d-303a; BK xn, CH 14 350d-351b; CH 17 (D) Isaias, 43; 45:7; 63 7-9 / Jeremiah, 31 :i-6;
353a-354a, BK xxi, CH 7-8 565d-568d; 32:17-44; (D) Jeremias, 31:1-6;
33:1-16
BK xxn, CH 2 587b-588a 32*17-44; 33-1-16 / Lamentations, 3*25,38 /
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 14, A Ezefycl, 16:1-15 (D) Ezechiel, 16:1-15 / Ho-
8, ANS 82c-83b; Q 19 108d-119d; Q 20, A i, REP sea, 1-3; n(D) Osee, 1-3; 11 / Joel, 2:12-
3 120a-121b; A 4, ANS 122c-124a; Q 23, A 4
'
3 :2 Micah, i -12 (D) Micheas, i :i2 / Zech-
135a-d; Q 25, A 5, ANS and REP i 147d-149a; ariah, 9:17 (D) Zacharias, 9:17 / Malachi,
Q 26, A 2, REP 2 150c-151a; Q 50, A i, ANS 269b- 1:1-3 (D) Malachias, 1:1-3
270a; Q 54, A 2, ANS 285d*286c; Q 57, A 5, ANS APOCRYPHA: Tobtt, 13:10 (D) OT, Tobias,
299b-300b; Q 59, A 2, ANS 307c-308b; Q 60, 13:12 / Wisdom of Solomon, 7:28; 11:22-26;
A i, REP 2 310b-311a; Q 61, A 2, REP 1,3 315c- 12:13-16; 16:20-29^(0) OT, Boof( of Wis-
316a; Q 62, A 6, REP i 322a-d; Q 63, A i, ANS dom, 7:28; 11:23-27; 12:13-16; 16:20-29 /
325c-326c; Q 104, AA 3-4 537b-538c; Q 105, Ecclesutsticus, 4:14; 11:14-17; 16:29-30; 17.8-
A i, REP 2 538d-539c; PART 1-11, Q i, A 2, REP 3 18,29; 33:10-15; 39:16,25-34 (D) OT, Eccle-
610b-611b; Q 10, A i, REP 2 662d-663d; Q 19, siasticus, 4:15; 11:14-17; 16:30-31; 17 18-18,28;
AA 9-10 709d-711d; Q 39, A 2, REP 3 790d-791b
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 93, NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew^ 6:25-34; 7 7~ ir :
J
A 4, REP i 218b-d; Q 97, A 3, REP i 237b-238b; 10:29-31 / Lufa 11:1-13; 12:6-7,16-33 /John,
5h to 5i CHAPTER 29: GOD 581
3:16-21; 13:31-35; 14:21; 15:9-16; 17:21-26 / A 10, REP699a-700d; PART in, Q i, A 3, REP 3
1
Q in, A 3, REP i 353d-354b; PART n-n, Q 6, astes, 12:14 / Isaiah passim, esp i, 3-4, 10, 13-
A 2, REP 2 414c-415c; Q 19, A i, REP 3 465a-d; 27. 30. 34-35. 4o 42. 47. 52-53* 59* 65-66-
A 5, REP 3 468b-469a; Q 23, A 2, REP 1-2 (D) Isaias passim, csp i, 3-4, 10, 13-27, 30,
483d-484d; Q 24, A 2, ANS 490b-d; A 3, ANS 34-35, 40, 42, 47, 52-53, 59, 65-66 / Jeremiah
491a-d; A 8, ANS 495b-496a; A 11, REP i 498b- passim, csp 3-8, 15, 19, 24-25, 29-31, 33, 46-52
499c; A 12, ANS 499c-500d; Q 26, A 3, ANS (D) Jeremias passim, esp 3-8, 15, 19, 24-25,
51l4-512c; Q 30, A 2, REP i 534b-535a; Q 189, 29-31, 33, 46-52 / Lamentations / Ezcfyl
582 THE GREAT IDEAS 5/
ACT in, sc in [36-98] 53d-54b / Measure for 7 PLATO: Cratylus, 93d-94a; 106b / Republic,
Measure, ACT n, sc n [73-79] 182d / Cymbe- BK u, 314c-d / Ttrnaeus, 44 7c / Cnttas, 478b d
line, ACT v, sc iv [9-28] 481a-b / Laws, BK vii, 730a-c; BK x, 757d-761c
passim (D) /// Kings, n; 13-22 passim / // 113c-114d; viii [85-148] 117c-118c; xi-xn
Kings passim (D) IV Kings passim / / Chron- 122a 125a esp xi [28-39] 122b, xn [37-45]
icles, 17:3-15 (#) / Paralipomenon, 17-3-15 / 124a; xx [31-138] 137a-138a
II Chronicles, 11-36 passim (D) II Paralipo- 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK iv, STANZA
menon, 11-36 passim / Esther esp 4:13-14 138-154 106b-108b / Knight's Tale [1251-1267]
(jD) Esther, 1:1-10:3 esp 4:13-14 / Job esp 180b; [1663-1672] 187b / Tale of Man of Law
1-2, 24, 27, 38-41 / Psalms passim, $0)3-4, 236b-255b esp [4869-4924] 242b-243b, [5247-
9-11, 13, 17-18, 65, 77, 104 (D) Psalms pas- 5253] 249b / Friar's Tale [7064-7085] 281a-b
sim, esp 3-4, 9-10, 12, 16-17, 64, 7^> i3 / / Franklin's Tale [11,177-206] 353b-354a /
Proverbs, 16-33 / Ecckstastes, 3; 7:13-15; 8-9; MonJ($ Tale [14,021-052] 434b-435a; [14,149-
11-12 I Isaiah, 36-37; 46; 51 (>) Isaias, 36- 252] 437a-438b
37; 46; 51 / Jeremiah, 17:5-8; 18-19; 3*J 45~ 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 53d; PART n,
(D) Jeremias, 17:5-8; 18-19; 3 1 45 / DanM ? 113b-c; 160a; 162b; PART iv, 254b; 271b
passim, esp 3:1-4:3, 6:1-28 (D) Darnel, 1:1- 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 98b-99a
3 123 passim, esp 3 11-23 3 9i~ 12 :1 3 passim, esp
> : 26 SHAKESPLARE: Richard III, ACT n, sc n [77-
3.91-100, 6.1-28 / Jonah esp i, 4 (D) Jonas 95] 120b-c
esp i, 4 / Malachi, 1 12-3 (D) Malachias, r 12-3 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT v, sc 11 [i-n]
APOCRYPHA. Tobit(D) OT, Tobias / Judith esp 67d-68a; [47-53] 68b-c; [230-235] 70a
5-6, 8-16 (D) OT, /<//> esp 5-6, 8-16 / 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART n, 408c
fort of Esther (D) OT, Etffor, 10:4-16:24 / 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 19d; 38a /
H'/tt/ow of Solomon, 14:1-3 (D) OT, fioo^o/ Novum Organum, BK i, APH 93 125d-126a
Wisdom, 14:1-3 / Ecclesiasticus, 15:11-20 (D) 32 MILTON: Sonnets, xvi 66b-67a / Paradise Lost,
OT, Ecclesiasticus, 15:11-22 / &>;? of Three BK in [80-134] 137a-138a / Samson Agonistes
Children (D} OT, D0fl/f/, 3:24-90 / Susanna [210-214] 344a; [373-380] 347b-348a; [667-
(D) OT, D0;w/, 13:1-64 / &?/ 0/w/ >r00fl 709] 354a-355a / Areopagitica, 394b-39Sb
(D) OT, >0m<?/, 13.65-14:42 / I Maccabees, 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 619-641 284b-290a
3 13-26 (D) OT, / Machabees, 3-13-26 / 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 3
// Maccabees, 6*i-i6 (D) OT, // Machabees, 405b-c; SECT 60-66 424b-426a; SECT 93-94
6:1-16 431b-c; SECT 105-107 433b-434a; SECT 146-
NEW TESTAMENT* Matthew, 6.25-34; 7:7-11; 10 155 442a-444c
esp 10:17-20, 10:29-33; 23:37 / Lufy, 11:1-13; 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vn, DIV
12:1-34; 21:12-19 / John, 6:22-71 esp 6:40, 54-57 474b-475d; SECT xi, DIV 108 500b-d
6:44-45, 6:64-65 (D) John, 6:22-72 esp 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 75c-d; 377c-378a
6:40, 6-44-45, 6-65-66 / Acts, 1:15-26; 6.8- 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 331c-d / Social Con-
7:60; 13 48 (D) Acts, 1:15-26; 6:8-7.59; tract, BK in, 414d; BK iv, 437d-438b
14.4
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 876 34Sa
NEW TESTAMENT- Matthew, 5:17-20 / Luke, 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH n,
16:17 / Romans passim, esp 2.11-16, 7:21-25, SECT 5-6 105a-c; BK 11, CH xxvin, SECT 8
8:7/7 Timothy, 1:17 / Hebrews, i 8; 8 10; 230a; BK iv, CH in, SECT 28-29 322a-323a
10:16 / James, 2:8-12 / Revelation, 11:15-18; 35 BFRKLLEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 29-33
19:6 (D) Apocalypse, 11:15-18; 19:6 418c-419a; SECT 51-53 422d-423a; SECT 57
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK n, par 9, lOd; par 423d-424a; SECT 60-66 424b-426a; SECT 93-
14 12a-b; BK in, par 13-17 16c 18a / City of 94 431b-c, SECT 105-107 433b-434a; SECT
God, BK v, CH 1 1 216c-d; BK vn, en 30 261b-d; 146-155 442a-444c
BK CH 22 296d-297a; BK x, CH 13-15 307b-
ix, 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vn, DIV
308b; CH 17 309c 310b; BK xi, CH 18 331d- 54-57 474b-475d, SECT vni, DIV 78-81 485c-
332a; CH 22 333d-334c, BK xn, CH 5 345a-b, 487a
BK xix, CH 12-15 517b-521c, CH 21 524a-525a; 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 261b-266b csp
CH 23-25 525c-528d; CH 27 529a-d; BK xxn, 261b-262a, 266b
CH 1-3 586b,d-588b; CH 24 609a-612a pas- 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 20a~d
sim 38 MONTLSQUIEU. Spirit of Laws, BK i, la-2b;
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 2, A 3, BK xn, 85d-86a; BK xxvi, 214b,d-215a
ANS 12c-14a; Q 21, A i, ANS 124b-125b; A 2, 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 252c
ANS 125c-d; Q 26, A 4, ANS 151c-152a,c; Q 47, 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 237b; 238b-240b / Judge-
A 3, RLP i 258c-259a; Q 63, A 7, ANS 331c- ment, 594d [fn i]
332b; Q 65, A 3, REP i 341c-342b; Q 83, A i, 46 HEGEL Philosophy of History, INTRO, 158c-
REP 3 436d-438a; QQ 103-119 528a-608d; 160b; 168d-170b; PART HI, 309d-310a; PART
PART i-n, Q 10, A 4, ANS 665d-666a,c; Q 17, iv, 368d-369a,c
A 8, REP 2 692a-c; Q 19, A 4 705b-c; A 6, ANS 52 DOSTOLVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v,
and Rtp 2 707a-708a 127b-137c passim
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 71,
A 2, REP 4 106d-107c; A 6 HOb-lllb; Q 72, A 2, Id. Grace
ANS 112b-113a; A 4, ANS 114a-115a; Q 74, A 8, OLD TESTAMENT: Psalms, 84:11 (D) Psalms,
REP i 134b-136a; Q 91, AA 1-2 208b-209d; AA 83 12 / Proverbs, 3.1-4,21-26 / Jeremiah, 31 18
4-5 210c-212c; Q 93 215b,d-220d; Q 97, A 3, (D) Jeremias, 31-18 / Lamentations, 5-21 /
ANS and REP i 237b-238b; A 4, REP 3 238b- Zechariah, 12:10 (D) Zachanas, 12:10
239b; QQ 98-108 239b-337d; PART II-H, Q 23, NEW TESTAMENT: John, 1:11-18 / Acts, 4:33 /
A 6, ANS 487a-d; Q 187, A 5, REP 3 671d-673b; Romans passim, esp 1.3-5, 3.1-6.23, 11:5-7 /
PART III, Q 60, A 4, REP 2 849c-850bj PART III / Corinthians, 2:11-3-10; 15,9-10 / // Corin-
SUPPL, Q 69, A i, ANS 885c-886c; Q 72, A 2, thians, i; 4-6; 8:7-9; 9:5-15; 12 / Galatians
ANS 919a-920c I Ephesians / Philippians, 2:12-13; 4:13 /
21 DANTE Divine Comedy, HELL, vn [70-76] lOb;
: II Thessalonians, 2:15-16 / // Timothy esp
xi 15a-16b; PURGATORY, xvi [52-105] 77b-d; i
.8-9 / Titus, 2:9-3:7 / Hebrews, 2:9; 12.14-29
PARADISE, i [94-142] 107b-d; n [112-148] / James, 4:6/7 Peter passim, esp i, 5,5
109a-b; in [34-90] 109d-110b; x [1-27] 120b-c; 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 5-6 2b-c;
xxvn [IOO]-XXVHI [139] 148b-150b; XXXH BK n, par 15 12b-c; BK vi, par 4 36a-b / City
[37-84] 155a-c of God,, BK xin, CH 3-5 361a-362c; CH 7 362 d-
22 CHAUCER: Knight's Tale [1663-1672] 187b / 363b; CH 14-15 366b-d; CH 20 370c-371a; BK
MonJfs Tale [14,221-228] 438a-b / Canon's XIH, CH 23-BK xiv, CH i 372a-377a; BK xiv,
Yeoman's Tale [16,935-949] 467a ca 26 395d-396c; CH 27, 397a; BK xv, CH 1-3
Idtolc CHAPTER 29: GOD 591
397b,d-399c; BK xvi, CH 26-27 438c 439d; 33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters^ la-14a; 19a-26b;
BK xxi, CH 15-16 572c-574a; BK xxn, CH 22 29b; 154b-159a / Fences, 202 211a; 430-435
606d-608b esp 608a-b / Christian Doctrine, 245a-251a; 505 261a-b; 507-511 261b; 513-517
BK i, CH i 624b,d 262a 263b; 520-524 263b-264a; 643 290b-
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 2, A 2, 291a; 88 1 345 b
REP i lld-12c; Q 8, A 3, ANS and REP 4 36b-37c; 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 38d
Q 12, A 2, ANS 51c-52c; A 4, ANS 53b-54c; \ 5, 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 238b
ANS 54c-55b; A 13 61c-62b; Q 38 200c-202b; 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART in, 310d-
Q 43 230a-237a,c; Q 62 317c-325b; Q 89, A i, 311a; PART iv, 354a-c
REP 3 473b-475a; A 2, REP 3 475a-d, Q 95 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v, 127b-
506b-510a; Q 104, A 4, ANS 538a-c; Q 108, A 8, 137c passim
ANS and REP 1-2 561a-562a; Q 113, A i, REP 2
7e. Miracles
S76a-d; PART I-H, Q 5, AA 5-7 640b-642d esp
A 7, REP 3 642a-d OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, I7:i8-r8'i6; 19:9-
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 50, 11,24-26; 21:1-8 / Exodus, 3-4; 7-12; 14-17 /
A 2 7c-8a; Q 51, A 4 15a-d; Q 55, A 4, ANS and Numbers, 9 15-23; 11-12; 16-17; 20*1-13;
REP 6 28c-29d; Q 58, A 3, REP 3 43b-44a; Q 62 21-5-9; 22-21-34; 26-9-10 / Joshua, 3-4;
59d-63a; Q 63, A 2, ANS and REP 1-2 64b-65a; 6:1-20; 24:6-7 (D) Josue, 3-4;
10:12-14;
AA 3-4 65a-66c; Q 65, AA 2-5 72a-75a; Q 66, 6:1-20; 10:12-14; 24:6-7 /Judges, 6:36-40 /
A 2, REP i 76c-77c; Q 68 87c-96c; Q 76, A 2, / Samuel, 12:16-19 (D) 7 Kings, 12:16-19 /
REP 2 141d-142c; Q 79, AA 3-4 158a-159c; Q 81, / Kings, 17; 18.30-39 (D) III Kings, 17;
A 3, REP 3 165d-166b; Q 83, A i, REP 4-5 171a- 18 30 39 / // Kings, 1-6; 13:20-21; 20:1-11
172b; A 2, REP 2 172b-173a; Q 85, A 6, ANS (I)) IV Kings, 1-6; 13-20-21; 20:1-11 /
182d-184a; Q 95, A i, ANS 226c-227c; Q 98, \ i Nchemtah, 9.9-2i(D) // Esdras, 9-9-21 /
239b-240c; Q 100, A 5, RFP 2 255a-257c; A 10, l^alm^ 78; 105; 106:7-11; 114 (D) Psalms,
REP 3 262b-263b; A 12, ANS 264d-265d; Q 106, 77; ioj, 1057-11; 113:1-8 / Isaiah, 38:1-9
A i, ANS and REP 1,3 321a-322a; QQ 109-114 (D) Isaias, 38:1-9 / Daniel, 3:1-4:3; 5-6 (D)
338a-378a,c; PART ii-n, Q 2, AA 9-10 398c- Daniel, 3-1-23,91-100; 5-6 / Joel, 2.30-31 /
400b, Q 24, A 3, REP i 491a-d; A n, ANS 498b- Jonah (D) Jonas
499c; PART in, Q 6, A 3, REP 3 742a-743a; OQ APCM RYPHA: Song of Three Children, 1-27 (D)
7-8 745c-763b; Q 10, A 4, RHP 3 771b-772a, OT, Daniel, 3 124-50 / Bel and Dragon, 28-42
Q 14, A 4, REP 2 786d-787c; Q 15, A 2, \NS (D) OT, Daniel, 14:27-42 / II Maccabees,
789a-d; Q 22, A i, ANS and REP 3 827c 828c; 1.18-22; 2:10 (D)JOT, 11 Machabees, 1:18-
Q 23, A i, REP i 833a-d; A 4, REP 2 835b-836a, 22, 2.10
Q26, A 2, REP i 846b-d,Q6i,Ai,REP2855a-d, NEW TESIAMENT. Matthew, 1.18-25, 8-9; 12-9-
Q 62 858b-864c; PART in SUPPL, Q 75, A 2, 13,22-29; 14:13-36; 15:22-39; 17; 2029-34
REP 5 937a-938a / Marl(, 1:29-34,40-44; 2:3-12; 3-1-5; 4.34-
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, i-n la 4a; PUR- 40; 5; 6:34-56; 7:24-8:26; 9-1-10,16-29;
GATORY, vn [40-60] 62d-63a; [112-123] 63d- 10-46-52; 13:24-26 / Luke, 1:5-66; 4*31-
64a; ix [13-69] 66a-c; xi [1-24] 68d-69a, xin 5.26, 6.6-10, 7.1-16; 8.22-56, 9:12-17,28-43;
[10-21] 72a; PARADISE, vn [16-120] 115b-116b, 11.14-26; 13:11-17; 14:1-6; 17:11-19, 18.35-
xx [31-138] 137a-138a; xxiv 142d-144b esp 43 / John, 2-1-11; 3-2; 4*46-54, 5 1-16; 6 5-
[58-60] 143b, [118-123] 143d-144a, xxix [58- 26, 7:31, 9.1-33; 11:1-45; 12:37-38; 21 i-n /
66] 150d-151a; xxx [34-99] 152a-d; xxxn Acts, 2:1-22; 3:2-11; 5:12-16; 8-6; 9:36-43;
[40-84] 155a-c; xxxn [i39]-xxxm [145] 156a- 14:7-10; 15:12; 19:11-12; 207-12; 28-1-10
157d / / Corinthians^ 12:8-10 / Galatians, 3:5-7 /
22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK i, STANZA Hebrews, 2:3-4
144 19b-20a / Second Nun's Tale [15,788-822] 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK x, CH 8-13 303a-
467a-b 307c; CH 16-18 308b-310d, BK xxi, CH 5-8
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 88c-89a; PART n, 563d-568d; BK xxn, CH 5-10 589a-599b
137c-d; 149c-d; PART in, 176d-177c; 186a-b; 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologtca, PART i, Q 89,
191b-193c esp 193a; 241c-242a; PART iv, 250c- A 8, REP 2 479c-480c; Q 92, A 4, ANS 491b-d;
251b; 253b-254b; 255b; 264a Q 104, A 4, ANS 538a-c; Q 105, AA 6-8 543b-
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 209a-d; 212a-d; 238c- 545b; Q 106, A 3, ANS 547c-548b; Q no, A 4
239c; 267c-268a; 273a-b; 294a-b 567c-568b; Q 114, A 4 584a-585a; PART i-n,
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 125d- Q 10, A 4, REP 2 665d-666a,c
126a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 63,
32 MILTON '.Paradise Lost, BK n [1024-1033] 133b; A 4, REP 3 65d-66c; Q 81, A 4, ANS 166b-167a;
BK in [56-415] 136b-144b esp [130-134] 138a, Q 113, A 10 369c-370b; PART in SUPPL, Q 75,
[167-184] 139a-b, [227-238] 140b; BK xi [1-31] A 3, ANS 938a-939d; Q 83, A 3 978c-980d
299a-b; [251-262] 304b-305a / Samson Agonis- 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy^ PARADISE, xxiv [88-
tes [356-372] 347b; [652-666] 353b-354a m] 143c-d
592 THE GREAT IDEAS If to 7h
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, xix [103-
(7. Doctrines common to the Jewish Mohamme- 148) 136a-c; xx [94-138] 137d-138a; xxi [52-
dan, and Christian conceptions of God and 102] 138d-139b; XXXH [40-84] 155a-c
His relation to the world and man. 7e. 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK i [356-363] lOla
Miracles.) 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 884 346a
22 CHAUCER. Tale of Man of Law 236b-255b 41 GIBBON Decline and Fall, 238c; 334b-c
:
PART in, 307a-b; PART iv, 338b-c; 348d- QQ 75-86 935a-996a,c; Q 93, A i 1037d-1039a
349a 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, vi [94-111]
47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [762-770] 20a 9b-c; x [1-15] 13d; xnr [85-108] 18d-19a;
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 219b-220a PARADISE, vii [121-148] 116b-c; xiv [1-66]
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK i, 126d-127c; xxv [64-129] 145a-c
lla-b; BK n, 21d-22b; BK v, 127b-137c passim; 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART in, 191b-193c;
BK vii, 171a-177b; 189d-190a 195b-d; PART iv, 253b-255b; 259b-c
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 248c-249c;311a
If.The Book of Life 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK HI [227-343] 140b-
OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 32:31-33; 33:19 / 143a esp [294-329] 141b-142b; BK xn [386-
Psalms, 69:28 (D) Psalms, 68-29 / Isaiah, 445] 327b-329a esp [411-429] 328a-b
4 :3~(D) Isaias, 4:3 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 95 431c
APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasttcus, 33:10-13 (D) OT, 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xxiv, 205d-
Ecclesiasticus, 33-10-14 206a
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 20:1-16; 22-1-14 / 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 233d; 234d
Lufa, 10:20 /John, 5:21 6-44; 10-26-29 / Acts,
;
44 Bos'w ELL: Johnson, 472a-b
13:48 / Romans, 8:28-9:23 / Ephesians, 1-3 /
// Thessalonians, 2:12-14 / // Timothy, 1:8-9;
Ih.The Last Judgment and the end of the world
2:19-20 / Hebrews, 12:22-23 / / Peter, 1:1-5; OLD TESTAMENT: Job, 19:25-27; 21:27-34 /
2 :i~9 / // Peter, i :io / Revelation, 3 14-5 13:4-8
; ; Psalms, 50; 96:10-13 (D) Psalms, 49; 95:10-
'
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers BK
Karamazov, v, 325a / Samson Agonistes 339a-378a esp [210-
127b-137c passim, esp 134d-135a, BK xi, 292] 344a-346a, [420-471] 348b-350a, [843-
337a-346a passim 902] 358a-359a, [1156-1223] 364b-366a
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 603 279b; 610-612 280b-
8. Specifically Jewish doctrines concerning 282b; 619-641 284b-290a; 713-718 304b-308b
God and His people 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK iv, 435b-c
40 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 179d-183a
8a. The Chosen People: Jew and gentile 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 245d-
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 12:1-4; 13-14-17; 15; 247b; PART in, 305b-c; PART iv, 322a-b
17:1-18:19, 22.1-18 esp 22.15-17; 2^:1-6,23-
^. God's Covenant with Israel: circumcision
25; 27-28; 35:9-13; 46:1-7; 48-49 / Exodus,
26 / Deu- as sign of the Covenant
3-17; 19-20; 33:1-34:18 / Leviticus,
teronomy, i; 4-12 passim, esp 4:37-38, 7:6-8, OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 12:1-3,7; 15:17-21;
10:15; 14:1-2; 15:6; 23:1-8; 26-32 passim, esp 17; 22:16-18; 26:2-3 / Exodus, 2:23-4:31 esp
26:17-19, 28:1-68, 31:16-21, 32 19-14 / Joshua, 2:24; 6:1-9^ 19:3-8; 24:7-8; 31:16-17; 32:11-
10:12-14; 23:1-13 (D) Josue, 10:12-14; 23:1- 13; 34 esp 34:10, 34:27-28 / Leviticus, 2-13;
13/7 Samuel, 12 (D) I Kings, 12 // Kings, 26 / Deuteronomy, 1:8; 4-11 passim, esp 4:23,
8; 5I .. 53 _(D) /// Kings, 8:51-53 / II Kings, 5:2-3, 7:12-13, 8:18-20, 10:16; 29-31; 34:4
11:17 (D)W Kings, inij / 1 Chronicles, 17 / Joshua, 5:1-9; 7:10-12; 23:16-24:28 (D)
(D) I Paralipomenon, 17 / Nehemiah, g(D) Josue, 5:1-9; 7:10-12; 23:16-24:28 / Judges,
II Esdras, 9 / Psalms passim, esp 33:12, 50:7, 2:1-5 / ' Kings* 8:56; i9-.9-i8CD) /// Kings,
78-1-72, 81:1-16, 89:1-52, 105:1-106:48, 8:56; 19:9-18 / // Kings, ir.ij; 13:22-23; 17
132:1-18, 135:4-14, 136:1-26 (D) Psalms esp 17:14-16, 17:34-40; 22-23 esp 23:2-3
passim, esp 32:12, 49:7, 77:1-72, 80:2-17, (D) IV Kings, 11:17; 13:22-23; 17 esp 17:14-
88:2-53, 104:1-105:48, 131:1-18, 134:4-14, 16, 17:34-40; 22-23 ^P 2 3 :2 ~3 / f Chronicles,
135:1-27 / Isaiah passim, esp 40:1; 42:1-6, 16:13-22 (D) I Paralipomenon, 16:13-22 /
43:1-7, 44:1-5, 46:3-4, 49:1-26, 637-8-(D) //,Chronicles, 6:14-15 (D) // Paralipomenon,
Isaias passim, esp 40:1, 42:1-6, 43:1-7, 44:1- 6 114-15 / Nehemiah, 1 55 ; 9 (D) II Esdras, 1 15 ;
5, 46:3-4, 49:1-26, 63:7-$ / Jeremiah passim, 9 / Psalms, 25^4;, 44117; 74:19-20; 78; 105
esp Z057-8; in
-
esp 3, 7:23, 11:4, 24:7, 30:22, 31:1, 31:33, (D) Psalms, 24:14; 43:18;
594 THE GREAT IDEAS 8r to %d
33:1-8; 54 csp 54:10; 56 csp 56:4-6; 59:20- 27; 43-48 (D) Ezechiel, 5:5-9; 11:17-20;
21; 61 esp 61:8 /Jeremiah, 4:4; u; 14:19-22; 18; 22:26; 36:25-27; 43-48 / Daniel, 9:1-15 /
22:5-9; 31-33 CS P 3 i: 3'-33. 32:40, 33:20-26; Hosea, 4:6; 8:1 (D) Osee, 4:6; 8:1 / Amos
34:13-20; 50:4-5 (D) Jeremias, 4:4; n; 2:4-6 / Zephaniah, 3:1-7 (D) Sophomas
14:19-22; 22:5-9; 3'-33 csp 3i:3i-33> 32 -'40. 3:1-7 / Zechariah, 7:12-14 (D) Zachanas
33:20-26; 34:13-20; 50:4-5 / Ezetyel, 16-17; 7:12-14 / Malachi, 2:1-10; 3:7; 4:4 (D)
20:33-38; 37.21-28; 44:6-9 (D) Ezechiel, Malachias, 2:1-10; 3.7; 4-4
16-17; 20:33-38; 37:21-28; 44*6-9 / Hosea, APOCRYPHA: Tobit, 14-8-9 (D) OT, Tobias,
2:16-20; 6 csp 6:7; 8 (D) Osee, 2:16-20; 14 IO-H / Ecclesiasticus passim, esp 2:16,
6 csp 6:7; 8 / Haggai, 2:4-5 (D) Aggeus, 9:15, 10-19, "''5 I7'ii-i4 19:17-20, 19:24,
2-5-6 24:23, 32-15, 33:2, 34-8, 39:1-11, 41:8, 42.1-
APOCRYPHA- Ecclesiasticus, 44:19-45:5 (D) OT, 2, 45:1-5 (D) OT, Ecclesiasticus passim,
Ecclesiasticus, 44 120-45 :6 / 7 Maccabees, i -44- esp 2.19, 9:22-23, 10:23, 11:15, 17:9-12,
63 2 ; : 1
9-6 :8 esp 4 7-1 4 (D) OT, / Machabees, 19:17-18, 19:21, 24:32-33, 32:19, 33:2, 34:8,
1:46-66; 2:19-6:8 esp 4:7-14 39:1-15,41-11, 42:1-2, 45:1-6 / Baruch
NEW TESTAMENT: Lu^e, 1:70-75; 2:21 / John, (D) OT, Baruch / I Maccabees, 1:38-63;
7:22-23 / Acts, 3:25; 7:1-8,51-53; 15:1-29; 2:19-68 (D) OT, / Machabees, 1:40-66;
21:20-21 / Romans, 2:25-4:16; 11:25-27 / 2:19-68 / II Maccabees, 2:2-3; 6-7; 11:22-26
/ Corinthians, 7:18-197 Galatians, 3:13-5:11; (D) OT, // Machabees, 2:2-3; 6-7; n 122-26
6:12-15 / Ephesians, 2:11-13 / Cobsstans, NEW TESTAMENT. Matthew, 5.17-20; 12:1-13;
2:10-14; 3:9-11 / Hebrews, 8.6-10:17 15:1-20, 19.3-9 / M0r^, 7:1-23; 10-2-12 /
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xvi, CH 16 433c- Lu^e, 6:1-9; Ii: 37~4 r ; M :2 ~5; 16:16-17 /
434a; CH 18 434c; CH 21-28 435a-440b; CH 32 John, 1:17; 7:19-23 / Acts,
5:1-18,45-47;
441c-442c; CH 36-38 443d-446a; BK xix, CH 10*9-15,25-28; 13:38-39; 15 i-io; 21:20-21 /
22 525b-c Romans passim / Galatians passim / Ephesians,
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 98, 2 14-15 / / Timothy, 1-5-11 / Hebrews, 7-10
AA 4-6 242b-245b 18 AUGUSTINE- City of God, BK x, CH 17 309c-
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 82d-83a; PART in, 310b; BK xx, CH 28 556c-557a
177c-180a; 199b-201b; 206c 20 AQUINAS. Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 91,
32 MILTON: Upon the Circumcision 12b-13a AA 4-5 210c-212c; QQ 98-105 239b-321a
33 PASCAL: PensSes, 610-612 280b-282b; 637-639 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, v [13-84]
289b-290a; 675 296b-297a 112b 113a passim
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART iv, 322a b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART in, 177d-178a;
180a-d; 206c-207a; 216b-218a; 223a-c; PART
8c. The Law: its observance as a condition of iv, 269a
righteousness and blessedness 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 18b-c
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 26:4-5 / Exodus, 12- 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK XH [223-260] 324a-
13; 19-40 csp 20:1-17 / Leviticus passim, esp 26 325a; [285-314] 325b-326a
/ Numbers passim / Deuteronomy passim, esp 33 PASCAL: PensSes, 610 280b-282a; 619-620
4:1-15, 5:6-21, 6:1-9, 6:I 7~2 5 7:9-26, 10:12- 284b-286a; 628-634 287a-289a; 678 297a-b;
13, 11:1-32, 12:32, 28:1-68, 30:11-20 /Joshua, 680 298a
1:7-8; 8:30-35; 22:1-6 (D) Josue, 1:7-8; 35 LOCKE. Toleration, 14b-15a
8:30-35; 22:1-6 / / Kings, 8:54-62-(D) /// 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 179d-182c esp 181a-
Kings, 8:54-62 / // Kings, 17; 2i:8-(D) IV 182a; 208a-c
Kings, 17; 21 :8 / / Chronicles, 22-12-13 (7)) 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 246c-d
/ Paralipomenon, 22:12-13 / // Chronicles, 31;
The Temple: the Ark of the Torah
/.
33:8; 35:i-i9(7)) 77 Paralipomenon, 31;
33:8; 35*1-19 / Ezra, 9-10 ()) / Esdras, 9-10 OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 25-27; 30:1-6; 35:10-
/ Nehemiah, 1:5-9; 9:16-38 (D) II Esdras, 38:31; 39:32-40:36 / Leviticus, 26:11 / Num-
1:5-9; 9:16-38 / Psalms, i; 19:7-14; 37 :3-3 I J bers, 9:15-22 / Deuteronomy, 10:1-5; 12:5-6;
40:8; 89:20-36
csp 89:30-32; 94:12;
78; 16:5-6; 31:24-26 / Joshua, 3-4; 6:1-16 (D)
i5 :
43-455 "9 P)
Psalms, i; 18:8-15; Josue, 3-4; 6:1-16 / 7 Samuel, 4:3-7:2 (D)
36:30-31; 39:9; 77; 88:21-37 C*P 88:31-33; / Kings, 4:3-7:2 / // Samuel, 6:1-17; 7:1-13
93:12; 104:43-45; 118 / Proverbs passim, csp -(/>) 77 Kings, 6:1-17; 7 :
^3 / ' **. 5~*
6:20-23, 28:7, 29:18 / Isaiah passim, esp -(D) III Kings, 5-8 / 77 Kings, 12:4-16;
8* to 9a CHAPTER 29: GOD 595
I Paralipomenon, 13; 15:1-17:12; 22:1-29:10 36; 22:66-70 /John, 1:15-41 csp 1:41; 4:4-30
/ // 2-7 esp 7:12-16; 8:n;
Chronicles, esp 4:25-26; 7:26-53; 10:24-38
24:4-14; 29; 34; 36 (D) // Paralipomenon, 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART HI, Q i,
2-7 csp 7:12-16; 8:11; 24:4-14; 29; 34; 36 / A 6 708c-709c
Ezra, 3-6 (D) I Esdras, 3-6 / Psalms, 57; 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART m, 229c
11:4; 27:4-6; 65:4; 68:29; 138:2 (D) Psalms, 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK xn [235-244]
5:8; 10:5; 26:4-6; 64:5; 67:30; 137:2 / Isaiah, 324b; [284-330] 325b-326b
2:2-3; 56:6-7 (D) Isaias, 2:2-3; 56:6-7 / 33 PASCAL: Penstes, 607 280a; 609 280b; 613
Jeremiah, 7:1-4,29-30; 26:1-7 (D) Jeremias, 282b-283a; 616-619 283b-285a; 642 290b;
7:1-4,29-30; 26:1-7 / Eze^iel, 40-42 (D) 662 293b; 673 296a; 675 296b-297a; 692
/Jonah, 2-4
Ezechiel, 40-42 (D) Jonas, 2:5 / 300b-301a; 719 308b-309a; 727 315b-316b;
Micah, 4 1-2 (D) Micheas, 4:1-2 / Habafy 729-730 316b-317a
tytl(,
2:20 (D) Habacuc, 2:20 / Haggat 40 GIBBON- Decline and Fall, 181b; 207d-208a;
(D) Aggeus / Zechanah, 8 9 (D) Zacharias, 308a
8:9 / Malachi, 3:1 (>) Malachias, 3:1 41 GIBBON :Dechne and Fall, 134b-135a
APOCRYPHA: 7o&/, 14:4-7 (>) OT, Tobias,
9. Specifically Christian dogmas concerning
14:6-9 / W/A/0W of Solomon, 9'.S-(D) OT,
the divine nature and human destiny
#00^ o/ Wisdom, 9-8 / Baruch, 2:26 (D)
OT, B^rwrA, 2:26
NEW TESTAMENT, /o/w, 2 13-17 / Hebrews, 9a. The Trinity
9 i-io OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1:26
15 TACITUS: Histories, BK v, 296a; 297d-298a NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 1-18-20; 3:11,16-
18 AUGUSTINE. Cafy of God, BK x, CH 17 309c- 17; 10.19-20; 12:31-32; 28:19 / Mar^ 1:8-12;
310b 3.28-30; 13:11 / Luty, 1:15,26-35; 2:25-27;
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 101, 3:16,21-22; 11:13; 12:10-12 / John, 1:1-8,14,
A 4, ANS and REP 1,4 269a-270b; Q 102, A 4 18,32-34; 3 esp 3:16-17, 3:35-36; 14-16;
276d-283c 20:22-23 / 4cts 1:2,5-8; 2:1-41 esp 2:32-39;
t
23HoBBEs. Leviathan, PART in, 178c; 180a-c; 4:23-31; 5:32; 8:17-22; 9:31; 10:38,44-48;
184c; 198a-b 11-15-17; 13:2-4; 15.7-9; 19-1-6; 20:28;
32 MILTON Paradise Lost,
: BK xn [244-256] 324b; 28:25-27 / Romans, 5 esp 5:5-10; 8:1-9:1;
[284-371] 325b-327a esp [331-343] 326b 14:17; 15:13,16 / / Corinthians, 2:9-14;
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 180a; 180d-181a; 3:16-23; 6:19; 12:2-13 / // Corinthians,
352c-354d csp 354a-b 1:18-22; 4:4; 13:14 (D) II Corinthians,
1:18-22; 4-4; 13:13 / Ephesians, 1-3 passim
8e.The messianic hope / Colossians, 1:13-15 / / Thessalomans,
OLD TESTAMENT, Genesis, 49-10-12 / Numbers, 1:5-6 / // Timothy, 1:14 / Titus, 3:4-7 /
24:15-25 / Deuteronomy, 30:1-10 / Psalms, Hebrews, 1:2-3; 6:4-6; 10:14-17 / / Peter,
22:27-31; 44; 46-48; 60; 67-69 passim; 74; 1:1-12 / II Peter, 1:21 / / John, 4-5 esp
102; 106:40-48; 126; 132; 147:1-11 (D) 4:9-10, 4:14-15, 5:1-2, 5:5-7, 5:10-12 / Judc,
Psalms, 21:28-32; 43; 45-47; 59; 66-68 pas- 17-21
sim; 73; 101; 105:40-48; 125; 131; 146 / 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK xin, par 6-12
Isaiah, 2-4; 7:10-16; 9:1-7; 11-12; 25-27; 112a-113d; par 32, 119b / City of God, BK x,
30:18-33; 32; 40-46 esp 41:25-42:4; 49; CH 23-24 312c-313c; BK xi, CH 10 327d-328d;
51-56 esp 52:13-53:12; 59:20-62:12; 65:17- CH 23-29 334c-339b; CH 32 340b-d; BK xin,
66:24 (D) Isatas, 2-4; 7:10-16; 9:1-7; 11-12; CH 24 373d-376a,c; BK xvi, CH 6, 426c /
25-27; 30:18-33; 32; 40-46 esp 41:25-42:4; Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 5 625d-626a;
36-37 / Daniel, 9:20-27 / Hosea, 1:10-11; 473a; Q 91, A 4, REP 2 487d-488c; Q 93, A i,
2:16-23; 3 3~5J I 3~ I 4~(^) Osee,
:
1:10-11; REP 2 492a-d; AA 5-8 495b-500c; Q 108, A i,
2:16-24; 3:3-5; 13-14 / Joel, 2-3 / Amos, ANS 552c-553c
9:9-15 (D) Amos, 9:9-14 / Micah, 2:12-13; 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 93,
4-5; 77~2o--(D) Micheas, 2:12-13; 4-5; 77- A i, REP 2 215b,d-216c; Q 106, A 4, REP 3 324a-
20 / Zephaniah, 3 (D) Sophomas, 3 / Zecha- 32 5c; PART n-ii, Q i, A 8, REP 3 387a-388c; Q 2,
nah, 2; 8-10; 12-14 (D) Zacharias, 2; 8-10; A 8 397d-398b; PART HI, Q 2, A 3, REP 3 713a-
12-14 / Malachi, 3-4 (D) Malachias, 3-4 714c; Q 8, A i, REP i 756d-757c; Q 16, A i, REP 2
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, i esp 1:20-23; 3:1- 796b-797d; A 2, REP 2 797d-798b; A 5, REP i
3,13-17; 12:14-21; 16:13-16; 17:1-13; 26:63- 800c-801b; Q 17, A i, REP 5 807a-808d; A 2,
596 THE GREAT IDEAS 9b to 9*(1)
A i, REP i 380b-381a; Q 18, A 2, REP i 462d- 5:17-26; 7:37-50; 9:23-26,56; 15; 19:1-10;
463d; PART in, QQ 4-24 730c-839c; Q 25, AA 1-2 22-19-20; 24-46-47 / John esp 1:29, 3:16-18,
839d-841c; PART HI SUPPL, Q 76, A i 939d-941a; 4:42, 6-31-59, 10:9-18, 14*6-7, 14-18-19, 15:1-
Q 90, AA 1-2 1012b-1014d; Q 92, A 3, REP 12 4 / Acts, 3:12-26; 4-10-12; 5*30-31; 13*15-50
1034b-1037c esp 13 38-39; 16:30-31 / Romans esp 3:20-26,
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, vn [16-120] 5:1-6:23, 8:1-4 / f Corinthians, 15.3,12-23 /
115b-116b; xm
[37-45] 125d; [73-87] 126b // Corinthians esp 2-10, 4:13-14, 5:14-21, 8:9,
22 CHAUCER: Parson's Tale, par 12 503b-504b 13:4-5 / Galatians passim, esp 2:20-3:14, 4:1-5
32 MILTON: Christs Nativity la-7b / The Passion / Ephesians esp 1:5-7, i'i 2 ~i4 2:1-22 / Colos-
10b-12a esp [15-21] lOb-lla / Upon the Circum- sians&p 1-12-14, 1*19-22, 2-13-147 I Timothy,
cision 12b-13a / Paradise Lost, BK m
[56-415] 1:12-17; 2:5-6 / Titus esp 2 11-3.7 / Hebrews
136b-144b esp [238-241] 140b, [281-294] 141b; esp 2:1-18, 5*9,7:25-27, 9.1-10:397 / Peter esp
BK xi [22-44] 299b-300a; BK xn [307-385] 1:3-11, 3:17-4.6 I I John esp 3:16, 4.9-10, 4:14
326a-327b / Revelation passim, esp 5-7 (D) Apocalypse
33 PASCAL- Pensees, 553 268a-270a; 763-765 passim, esp 5-7
322a;785325b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK n, par 15 12b-c;
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 308a BK iv, par 18-19 23d-24b; BK vn, par 24-27
41 GIBBON Decline and Fall, 134b-138a esp 50d-52c; BK x, par 67-70 88b-89a / City of
134b-135b, 137a-d;330a God, BK CH 31-32 261d-262b; BK ix, CH
vii,
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART n, 270d- 15 293a-294a; CH 17 295a-c; BK x, CH 4-6
271c; PART in, 306b-307a 301a-302d; CH 19-20 310d-311c; CH 22-25
52 DOSTOEVSKY* Brothers Karamazov, BK v, 312a-314c; CH 27-32 315b-322a,c; BK xi, CH
127b-137c passim; BK vn, 189c-190c 2 323a-c; BK xm, CH 2-4 360b-362a; CH 12-
15 365d-366d; CH 23-24 372a-376a,c; BK
9(3) Mary, the Mother of God xvn 449a-472a,c passim; BK xvm, CH 23
OLD TESTAMENT: Isaiah, 7:14 (D) Isaias, 7:14 483d-485a; CH 31-35 488a-493a; BK xx, CH
NEW TESTAMENT- Matthew, 1:18-25; 12:46-50 / 26 555a-556b; CH 30 5S7c-560a,c; BK xxi, CH
Mar1(, 3:31-35 / Luke, 1-2; 8:19-21; 11:27-28 15-16 572c-574a; BK xxn, CH i 586b,d-S87b;
/John, 2:1-12; 19:25-27 CH 3 588a-b; CH 22-24 606d-612a; CH 29-30
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xvn, CH 16 465c- 614b-618d / Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 11-12
466d esp 466c-d; CH 24 471d-472a,c; BK xvm, 627b-d; CH 14-18 627d-629a; CH 34 634b-c;
CH 35, 491d / Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 14 BK n, CH 41 656a-c
627d-628b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 97,
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologtca, PART HI, Q 7,
: A i, REP 3 513c-514c; PART i-n, Q 5, A 7, REP
A 10, REP i 752c-753c; Q 25, A 5 843d-844b; 2 642a-d
PART III SUPPL, Q 83, A 3, CONTRARY 978C- 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 85,
980d; Q 96, A 5, REP 2 1055c-1058a A 5, REP 2 181d-182d; Q 87, A 7, REP 3 190c-
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, n [43-126] 191d; Q 89, A 5, REP i 202c-203b; Q 91, A 5,
3a-4a esp [94-99] 3c; PURGATORY, x [34-45] REP 2 211c-212c; Q 98, A i, ANS and REP 3
67d; PARADISE, xm
[79-87] 126b; xxm 141b- 239b-240c; A 2 240c-241b; A 4, ANS and REP i
598 THE GREAT IDEAS
(9. Specifically Christian dogmas concerning the 9</. The Church: the mystical body of Christ;
divine nature and human destiny. 9c. the Apostolate
Christ the Saviour and Redeemer: the doc- OLD TESTAMENT: Song of Solomon (D) Canticle
trines of original sin and salvation.) of Canticles
242b-243c; A 6, REP 2 244c-245b; Q 100, A NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 3; 4:18-22; 8:18-23;
12 264d-265d; Q 101, A 3, ANS and REP i 268a- 9.35-10:42; 11:1-15; I 3 :I ~531 16:17-24; 18:15-
269a; Q 102, A 2, ANS 271b-272a; A 4, REP 2,5- 20; 20:25-28; 24:14; 25; 28:16-20 / Mar/(,
6 csp REP 6 276d-283c; A 5, REP 5 283c-292c; 1:1-9,16-20; 3:13-19; 10:42-45; 13:10; 16:14-
Q 103, A i, ANS 298b-299b; A 2 299b-300d; A 3, 20 / Luke, 3* 1-20 4*43-44; 5:1-11; 6*13-16;
;
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit ofLaws, BK xxiv, 200b- 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR ix, CH 16, 75c-
201a; BK xxv, 208a 76a
40 GIBBON. Decline and Fall, 13a-b 18 AUGUSTINE. Confessions, BK v, par 19 32b-c
42 KANT- Pure Reason, llb-c; 192c-d / Judge- 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART 11, 162a-b
ment, 595d-596c 33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 137a-b / PensSes,
43 MILL: Liberty, 280d-281c 242-290 217b-225a passim; 430-434 245a-
50 MARX: Capital, 31c-d; 35b-c; 305d [fn 2] 250a; 543-549 266a-267a; 556-588 270b-277b
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 196b-d 37 FIELDING. Tom Jones, 38c-39c; 53c; 75c-76a
52 DOSTOEVSKV: Brothers Karamazov, BK i,lla~c; 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 190a-c / Judgement, 547d
BK v, 135b-136b; BK xi, 312b-314d; 345a-c 52 Dos rocv SKY Brothers Karamazov, BK v, 120d-
.
10:2-15, 11:10-17, 13:10; 16 esp 16:10-13, A 4, ANS 253d-255a; Q 101, A 3, ANS and REP 3
16:17-20; 23:20-27; 25:3-7; 32:30-35; 44; 268a-269a; Q 102 270b 298a passim ,
50-38; 51 esp 51-17-18, 51:47, 51:52 / Eze^iel, 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, xix [$8-117]
5 esp 5-11, 6; 14; 16; 20; 22-23; 36 17-19; 27d-28a; xx 28b~29d; PARADISE, iv [49-63]
37 23 (D) Ezechiel, 5 esp 5:11; 6; 14; 16; lllb; vin [1-12] 116d
20; 22-23; 36.17-19; 37.23 / Daniel, 3; 6 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK v, STANZA
(D) Daniel, 3:1-23,91-97; 6 / Hosea passim, 265 154b-155a / Parson's Tale, par 35-38,
esp 2-8-13, 4-12-13, 8-3-6, 10:1-2, 13*2 521a-522b; par 63-64 530a-53la
(D) Osee passim, esp 2 8-13, 4-12-13, 8*3-6, 23 HOBBES. Leviathan, PART i, 51d-52a; 78d-
10:1-2, 13:2 / Amos, 5 esp 5.25-27 / Nahum 79b; 79d-80a; 80d-82d; PART iv, 261a-c
passim, esp 1:14 / Habatfaf^, 2:18-19 (D) 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 18d-20d; 238d-239b;
Habacuc, 2:18-19 / Zepnaniah passim, esp 246a-257d
1-4-6 (D) Sophomas passim, esp 1-4-6 / 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, lOOb;
Zechariah, 10-1-3; 13-2 (D) Zacharias, lOla-b
10.1-3; 132 32 MILTON- Christs Nativity la-7b esp [165-228]
APOCRYPHA. Judith, 3 8; 5:23-6.4-^) OT, Jud- 5b-7a / Paradise Lost, BK i [331-621] lOOb-
ith, 3:12-13; 5-27-6:4 / Rest of Esther, 14:6- 107a; BK xii [101-120] 321b / Samson Ago-
10 (D) OT, Esther, 14:6-10 / Wisdom of mstes [433-471] 349a-350a; [871-902] 358b-
Solomon, 12-15 (D) OT, Boo^ of Wisdom, 359a; [1139-1243] 364b-366b
12-15 / Ecclesiasticus, 34:1-7 (D) OT, EC- 34 NEWTON: Optics, BK in, 543b-544a
clesiasticus, 34:1-7 / Baruch, 6 (D) OT, 35 LOCKE: Toleration, 13b-15a / Human Under-
Baruch, 6 / Bel and Dragon- (D) OT, Darnel, standing, BK i, CH n, SECT 26 112a-b
14-2-41 / / Maccabees, 1:41-2:28 (D) OT, 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 94
/ Machabees, 1:43-2:28 / II Maccabees, 6-7 431b-c
(D)OT,HMachabees,6-7 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 20a-c; 152a-d
NEW TESTAMENT. Acts, 7.39-44; 147-18; 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit ofLaws, BK xxiv, 200b-
15:20,28-29; 17:16-31 / Romans, 2:22 / / 201a; BKXXV, 208a-c
Corinthians, 5:9-11; 6:9; 8; 10:7,14-21; 12:27 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 81d; 184b-185d;
II Corinthians, 6*14-17 / Galatians, 5-19-20 / 457b,d-467d; 600d-601a; 775c-776a,c [n 173-
Ephesians, 5.5 / Philippians, 3:18-19 / Colos- 174]
Thessalomans, 1:9 / I Peter, 4 13 /
sians, 3 .5 / / 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 154d; 195a-202a
I John, 5:21 / Revelation, 2:20; 9:20; 21:8;
esp 195b, 197a-199c; 207a-208c; 229c-230a;
22-14-15 (D) Apocalypse, 2:20; 9:20; 21:8; 252b-c; 329c-330b
22:14-15 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 179a-b
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 12d-13b; 31a-b; 44 Bosw^ELL: Johnson, 173d
BK n, 79d-80a; BK in, 95a-c; BK iv, 140c-141a 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 270,
7 PLATO: Laws, BK x, 769c-771b 85b-c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 196d-
14 PLUTARCH Numa Pompilius, S3b-c/Camtllus, 197c; PART i, 244c-245b; 246a-b; 253b-
104d-105a / Pericles, 123c-124a / Pelopidas, 254b
239d-240c / Alexander, 575d-576a / Demetri- 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic1(, 17a-b; 36b-37a; 38b-
us, 729d-731a 39b;367a-372a
602 THE GREAT IDEAS
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other treatments of polytheism, and for discussions of the gods in relation to fete and human
life, see ANGEL i ; FATE i ;
MAN loa.
Man's duty and piety toward God or the gods, and for man's worship of God or the gods,
see DUTY 5, n; JUSTICE ub; RELIGION 2 2g.
Man's love of God and desire to be with God, see DESIRE jb', LOVE 53-5^2); VIRTUE AND
VICE 8d( 3 ).
Matters relevant to proving God's existence and to other ways of affirming God's existence,
see BEING 73, 8f; CHANGE 14; METAPHYSICS 2d; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 2a-2b;
REASONING 5^3), 5X5); THEOLOGY 4c.
The problem of God's immanence and transcendence, and for the doctrine of pantheism,
see NATURE ib; ONE AND MANY ib; WORLD 3-30.
Matters relevant to the consideration of God as a necessary being, see BEING 73; NECESSITY
AND CONTINGENCY 2a-2b.
The consideration of the unity and simplicity of God, see ONE AND MANY 6a.
The consideration of God's eternity and immutability, see CHANGE i5c; ETERNITY 3.
The consideration of God's infinity and omnipresence, see INFINITY J-jd.
The consideration of God's perfection and goodness, see GOOD AND EVIL 2-23; and for the
discussion of God in relation to Satan and to the problem of evil, see ANGEL y-yb; GOOD
AND EVIL id, 2b; OPPOSITION 2d.
The consideration of God's intellect, his knowledge and wisdom, the divine ideas and the
divine truth, see IDEA ic; INFINITY yd; KNOWLEDGE 73; MIND loe-iof; TRUTH 2d; WISDOM
id.
The consideration of divine csusality in the dispensation of grace and the performance of
CAUSE 7d; LIBERTY 5c; NATURE 3c(4), 6b; RELIGION ib(2); SIN 7; VIRTUE
miracles, see
AND VICE 8b, 8e; WILL 76(2).
The consideration of God's justice and mercy, and of divine rewards and punishments,
see HAPPINESS 7c~7c(3); IMMORTALITY 5e-5f; JUSTICE n-iia; PUNISHMENT
5e; SIN
6c-6e.
Other discussions of the doctrine of the Messiah, the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the second
coming of Christ, see MAN nc; ONE AND MANY 6b-6c; PROPHECY 4c~4d; RELATION 2.
Other discussions of the doctrine of original sin 3nd irmn's redemption and sslvstion, see
HAPPINESS 73; SIN 3-36, 7; VIRTUE AND VICE 8a; WILL 70(1).
Other discussions of the Last Judgment and the end of the world, see IMMORTALITY 50;
PROPHECY 4d; WORLD 8.
CHAPTER 29: GOD 603
For: Other discussions of the church as the Mystical Body of Christ, and of the theory of the
sacraments, sec RELIGION 2c, 33-30; SIGN AND SYMBOL 5c.
The general theory of the relation of reason and faith in man's knowledge of God, see
KNOWLEDGE 6c(5); LOGIC 4f; METAPHYSICS 33; RELIGION ib--ib(3); THEOLOGY 2, 40-40;
VIRTUE AND VICE 8d(i); WISDOM ic.
The distinction between man's natural and supernatural knowledge of God, and for the
discussion of mystical experience and the beatific vision, see EXPERIENCE 7; HAPPI-
NESS 7c(i); KNOWLEDGE 6c(5); RELIGIONjd\ 6f; WILL
ic. WISDOM
Other discussions of God's revelation of Himself, of Sacred Scripture, and of man's inter-
pretation of the Word of God, see EDUCATION 73; LANGUAGE 12; PROPHECY 3d; SIGN AND
SYMBOL 5e.
Other discussions of the relation of creatures to God, and especially of the problem of the
resemblance between creatures and God, see MAN loa, na; RELATION 3; SAME AND
OTHER 6.
Other discussions of the names of God, and for the bearing thereon of the distinction between
the univocal, the equivocal, and the analogical, see IDEA 40(4); SAME AND OTHER 33(3)-
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boo^s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date,place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
PLUTARCH. "Of Isis and Osiris, or the Ancient Re- HEGEL. Science of Logic, VOL i, BK n, SECT in, CH i;
hgion and Philosophy of Egypt," in Moralta VOL n, SECT in, CH 3
EPICTETUS. The Manual On the Proofs of the Existence of God
.
**
AQUINAS. On the Trinity ofBoethius, QQ 1-3
Summa Contra Gentiles, BK i; BK n, CH 1-28;
. HESIOD. Theogony
BK HI, CH 64-83, 146-162; BK iv, CH 1-49, 53-55 CLEANTHEs. Hymn to Zeus
Quaestiones Disputatae, De Veritate, QQ 2, 5-7,
. CICERO. De Natura Deorum (On the Nature of the
14, 23, 27-29; De Vmone Verbi Incarnatt Gods)
. On Power of God, QQ
the 1-3, 5-7,9-10 SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. Against the Physicists, BK i (Con-
. Summa Theologica, PART in, QQ 27-59 cernmg Gods, Do Gods Exist ?)
Compendium of Theology
. PROCLUS. The Elements of Theology, (E,L)
F. BACON. "Of Atheism," in Essays "DioNvsius". On Mystical Theology
DESCARTES. The Principles of Philosophy, PART i, . On the Divine Names
13-25, 29-31, 40, 51, 54; PART in, 1-3 BOETHIUS. Contra Eutychen (A Treatise Against
HOBBES. Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Govern- Eutyches and Nestonus)
ment and Society, CH 15-18 . De Trinitate (On the Trinity)
HUME. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion The Consolation of Philosophy,
.
KNOX. An Answer to the Cavillations ofan Adversane BRADLEY. Appearance and Reality, BK n, CH 26
Respecting the Doctrine of Predestination Essays on Truth and Reality, CH 15
.
INTRODUCTION
rT" r
HE theory of good and evil crosses the theology righteousness and sin, salvation and
JL boundaries of many sciences or subject damnation are, like virtue and vice, happi-
matters. It occupies a place in metaphysics. It ness and misery, conceptions of good and evil
isof fundamental importance in all the moral in the condition of man. (Their special theo-
sciences ethics, economics, politics, jurispru- logical significance comes from the fact that
dence. It appears in all the descriptive sciences they consider the goodness or evil of man in
of human behavior, such as psychology and so- terms of his relation to God.) But the theologi-
ciology, though there it is of less importance calproblem which is traditionally called "the
and differently treated.
is problem of evil" concerns the whole universe in
The relation of good and evil to truth and its relation to the divine perfection.
falsity, beauty and ugliness, carries the discus- That problem, which is further discussed in
sion into logic, aesthetics,and the philosophy the chapter on WORLD, can be formulated in a
of art. The true, it has been said,
is the
good in number of ways. How are we to understand the
the sphere of our thinking. So it may be said of by a God
existence of evil in a world created
the beautiful that it is a quality which things who is omnipotent and perfectly good? Since
have when they are good as objects of contem- God is good and since everything which hap-
plation and love, or good as productions. It is pens is within God's power, how can we ac-
no less possible to understand goodness and count for the sin of Satan or the fall of man,
beauty in terms of truth, or truth and goodness with the evil consequent thereupon, with-
all
the true adds a relation to the intellect"; and it than theology. The word "value" has almost re-
1
is also said that the end "of the appetite, name- placed "good" and "evil.* What in other cen-
ly good, is in the desirable thing," whereas the turies were the various moral sciences are now
end "of the intellect, namely the true, is in the treated as parts of the general theory of value.
intellect itself." The substitution of "value" for "good" or of
In that part of theology which goes beyond "value judgment" for "moral judgment" re-
goodness of an infinite being and we then face to analyse . . the form of value." As indicated
.
the problem of how God's goodness is to be in the chapter on WEALTH, economics at its
understood by man* The basic terms of moral origin was treated by Aristotle, along with eth-
605
606 THE GREAT IDEAS
ics and politics, as a moral discipline. But he THE WORD "VALUE" does not change the prot
made it subordinate to them because it dealt lem in any way;what does evaluating any
for
not with the whole of human welfare, but only thing mean except judging it as good or bad
with wealth one of the goods. better or worse ? The problem, which has a his-
In the modern development of economics, tory as long as the tradition of the great books,
the word "goods" comes to have a special sig- isthe problem of how we can defend such judg-
nificance. It refers to commodities or utilities, ments and what they signify about the things
as in the phrase "goods and services." More judged. Are good and evil determined by na-
generally, anything which is useful or exchange- ture or convention ? Are they objects of knowl-
able has the character of an economic good. This edge or opinion ?
general sense is usually conveyed by the econo- The title of an essay by Montaigne "that
mist's use of the word "value." According to the taste for good and evil depends in good
Adam Smith, "the word value ... has two dif- part upon the opinion we have of them" in-
ferent meanings, and sometimes expresses the dicates one set of answers to these questions.
utility of some particular object, and sometimes "If evils have no admission into us," he writes,
the power of purchasing other goods which the "but by the judgment we ourselves make of
possessor of that object conveys." These two them, it should seem that it is, then, in our
meanings are distinguished as "value in use" power to despise the*m or to turn them to good.
and "value in exchange." Marx accepts this ... If what we call evil and torment is neither
distinction, but thinks that there is a more evil nor torment of itself, but only that our
fundamental notion of value. He thinks it is
fancy gives it that quality, it is m us to change
possible to abstract from both use-value and it."Echoing Montaigne, Hamlet remarks that
exchange-value, and to discover the underlying "there is nothing either good or bad but think-
property which gives value to all exchangeable ing makes it so." The Greek sophists, centuries
things, namely, that they are products of labor. earlier, appear to take the same view. The state-
With Smith and Marx, with Aristotle, the
as ment of Protagoras that "man is the measure
theory of value does not deal with every type of all things," Plato thinks, does not significant-
of good, but only with that type which earlier ly apply to all things, but only to such things
moralists called "external goods" or "goods of as the good or the right, the true or the beauti-
fortune." But more recently the concept of ful. In the TheaetetttS) Protagoras is made to say
value has been extended, by economists and that as "to the sick man his food appears to be
others, to the evaluation of everything which bitter, and to the healthy man the opposite of
men think of as desirable in any way. In con- bitter," so in general men estimate or judge all
sequence, the age-old controversy about the things according to their own condition and
objectivity or subjectivity of good and evil is the way things affect them. This theory of goftd
now stated in terms of the difference between and evil necessarily denies the possibility of
facts and values, or between judgments of fact moral science. Socrates calls it "a high* argu-
and judgments of value. ment in which all things are said to be
The issue, as currently stated, is whether relative."
questions of value can be answered in the same Plato and Aristotle respond to the sophists by
way as questions of fact. One position mam- arguing in the opposite vein. For Plato, the
tains that, unlike questions of fact which can be good is not a matter of opinion, but an object
answered by scientific investigation and can be of knowledge. Knowledge of good and evil is
objectively solved, questions of value elicit no the best fruit of the tree of knowledge. "Let
more than expressions of opinion, relative to each one of us leave every other kind of knowl-
the individual's subjective response or to the edge," Socrates says at the end of the Republic,
conventions of his
society at a given time. The "and seek and follow one thing only," that is,
other side of the issue is held by those who in- "to learn and discern between good and evil."
sistthat the norms of value are as objective and Aristotle does not think that ethics, or any
as scientifically determinate as the criteria of science which deals with good and evil, can have
fact or existence. as much precision as mathematics. "Our discus-
CHAPTER EVIL 607
lien will be adequate/* he writes, "if it has as physic of morals, which must be carefully
{much clearness as the subject matter admits of/ cleared of everything empirical."
for precision is not to be sought for alike in all This partial inventory of thinkers who stand
Ascussions." This, however, does not exclude against skepticism or relativism in the field of
the possibility of our knowing with great ex- morals indicates that agreement on this point is
actitude the first principles of moral science, accompanied by some disagreement about the
such as the nature of happiness and virtue. In- reasons for holding what appears to be the same
definiteness and even a certain kind of relativi- view. The opposite view seems also to be shared
ty occur only when these principles are applied by thinkers of quite different cast, such as
to particular cases. Hence, in Aristotle's view, Spinoza and Mill, who differ from each other as
the moral sciences, such as ethics and politics, well as from Montaigne and the ancient sophists.
can have objective and universal validity no The terms "good and evil," Spinoza writes,
lessthan physics or mathematics, at least on the "indicate nothing positive in things considered
level of principles. in themselves, nor are they anything else than
In modern times, Locke and Kant also affirm modes of thought One and the same thing
. . .
the scientific character of ethics, but without may at the same time be both good and evil or
the qualification which Aristotle insists upon indifferent" according to the person who
when we go from principles to practice. Locke makes the judgment of it. Spinoza therefore
explains the grounds on which he is "bold to defines "good" as "that which we certainly
think that morality capable of demonstra-
is know is useful to us." Apart from society, he
tion, as well as mathematics"; for, he says, "the says, "there is nothing which by universal con-
that "from self-evident propositions, by neces- Holding that all men seek happiness and that
mathematics, the measures of right and wrong ticular cases by reference to Mill seems this end,
might be made out, to any one that will apply to offer the standard of utility asan objective
himself with the same mdifferency and atten- principle of morality. But insofar as he identi-
tion to the one as he does to the other of these fies happiness with a sum total of pleasures or
sciences." But Locke adds, "this is not to be satisfactions, it tends to become relative to the
expected, whilst the desire of esteem, riches, or individual or the group. If competent judges
power makes men espouse the well-endowed disagree concerning which of two pleasures is
opinions in fashion." He himself seems to tend the greater or higher, there can be no appeal,
in the opposite direction when he identifies the Mill says, except to the verdict of the majority.
good with the pleasant and makes it relative to To this extent at least, judgments of value are
being or existence; that the good is that which another place he says, "By good I understand
conforms to the nature of a thing; that the good . . .
everything which we are certain is a means
is that which approved by reason. It is pos-
is
by which we may approach nearer and nearer
sible to see some truth in each of these state- to the model of human nature we set before
ments. But each, taken by itself, may be too us." That model, he tells us, is the man of rea-
great a simplification* Searching questions can son, the man who always acts "according to the
be asked by those who refuse to equate the good dictates of reason," for "those desires which are
with the pleasant or the desirable, the real, the determined by man's power or reason are al-
equally good ? How does calling a thing "good" and evil at least not the good and evil which
add anything to its being or existence? Does enter into human life then the problem of
not evil exist or qualify existence? By what finding a purely objective foundation for our
standards can the natural and the rational be moral judgments is not solved simply by an
judged good, if the good is that which con- appeal to being, nature, and reason.
forms to nature and reason? Some help toward a solution may be found in
These questions call for more analysis of each one often reiterated fact about the relation be-
of these factors in the discussion of good and tween the good and human desire. The an-
evil and suggest that no one of these factors by no man desires anything but
cients insist that
itself \s sufficient to solve the problem of defin- what at the time seems good to him in some
ing good and evil or formulating their criteria. way. "No man," Socrates observes, "volun-
Of the five things mentioned, two particularly tarily pursues evil, or that which he thinks to
seem to leave open the
pleasure and desire be To prefer evil to good is not in human
evil.
question whether good and evil are objective or nature; and when a man is compelled to choose
subjective. They require us to decide whether one of two evils, no one will choose the greater
things please us because they are good or are when he may have the less." This, however,
good because they please us; whether we desire does not prevent men from desiring "what they
things because they are good or simply call suppose to be goods although they are really
them "good" when we desire them. On this is- evils." Since they are mistaken in their judg-
sue Spinoza flatly declares that "we do not ment "and suppose the evils to be goods, they
position, for according to him "a thing is desir- jurious to themselves, the apparent good the
able only in so far as it is perfect." It can be good actually desired will be really an evil,
desirable, therefore, without being actually de- that is, something actually undesirable. An ob-
sired by this or that individual. ject which is really good may not appear to be
The other three terms unlike pleasure and so, and so it will not be desired although it is de-
desire seem to favor the objectivity of good sirable. The deception of appearances, Socrates
and evil, at least for those who regard the order says, tricks us into taking "at one time the
of existence, the nature of things, and the laws things of which we repent at another, both in
of reason as independent of our desires or pref- our actions and in our choice of things great
erences. Thus for Spinoza the nature of man and small."
and seem to provide an objective
his reason
standard for determining what is good alike for THE DISTINCTION between the real and the ap-
all men. Nothing, he writes, "can be good ex- parent good is, of course, connected with the
CHAPTER 30: GOOD AND EVIL 609
problem of the objective and the subjective sire and pleasure conceived as the satisfaction of
good. The apparent good varies from individual desire. This is discussed in the chapter on
to individual and from time to time. If there PLEASURE AND PAIN. If obtaining a desired
were a real good, it would be free from such good is satisfying, then there is certainly a sense
relativity and variability. Unless there are in which the good and the pleasant (or the
real, as distinct from merely apparent, goods, satisfying) are always associated; but it
may
moralists cannot distinguish between what also be true that pleasure only one kind of is
men should desire and what in fact they do good among various objects of desire and that
desire. certain pleasures which men desire appear to be,
Since moral science deals with human be- but are not really good.
havior, its province can be separated from that
of other sciences which treat the same subject THE FOREGOING considerations apply to the
matter such as psychology and sociology- good in the sphere of human conduct. But the
only in terms of a different treatment of that human good, the practicable good, the good for
subject matter. Moral science must be norma- man, does not exhaust the meaning of the term
tive or prescriptive rather than descriptive. It good. The idea of the good is, for Plato, the
must determine what men should seek, not what measure of perfection in all things; it is "not
they do seek. The very existence of normative only the author of knowledge to all things
would thus
sciences, as well as their validity, known, but of their being and essence, and yet
seem to depend on the establishment of a real, the good is not essence, but far exceeds essence
as opposed to a merely apparent, good. in dignityand power."
This creates no special difficulty for moralists The absolute good is also, as in the Divine
who think that man knows what is
really good Comedy, the final cause or ultimate end of the
for him, both in general and in particular, by motions of the universe. It is "the Alpha and
intuition or rational deduction, through the Omega," Dante says, "of every scripture that
commandments of the divine law, or through Love reads to me ... the Essence wherein is
the precepts of the law of reason. But for those such supremacy that every good which is found
who insist that the good is always somehow outside of It is naught else than a beam of Its
relative to desire and always involves pleasure, own radiance . . . the Love which moves the
the distinction between the real and the ap- sun and the other stars."
parent good raises an extremely difficult prob- So too, in Aristotle's cosmology, the circular
lem. motions of the celestial spheres, and through
To say that an apparent good is not really them other cycles of natural change, are
all
good suggests, as we have seen, that what is sustained eternally by the prime mover, which
called "good" may not be in itself desirable. moves all things by the attraction of its perfect
That something which is really good may not in being. It therefore "moves without
being
factappear to be so, seems to imply that the moved," for it "produces motion through being
word "good" can be significantly applied to loved."
something which is not actually desired at Though desire and love enter into the con-
least not consciously. How, then, is the good ception of the good as a cosmic final cause, they
always relative to desire? The traditional an- are not human desire or love. Though the good*
swer to this question must appeal to the dis- ness which inheres in things according to the
tinction between natural and conscious desire, degree of their perfection may make them
which is discussed in the chapter on DESIRE. It desirable, it is not dependent on their being
is
by reference to natural desire that the good consciously desired by men.
is said to be in itself always desirable even In Jewish and Christian theology, for ex-
when the really good thing is not consciously ample, the goodness of God is in no way meas-
desired. ured by human desires, purposes, or pleasures;
The relation of good and evil to pleasure and nor is the goodness of created things which, ac-
pain can also be clarified by a basic distinction cording to Genesis, God surveyed and found
between the pleasure which is an object of de- "very good." The order of creation, moreover*
610 THE GREAT IDEAS
involves a hierarchy of inequalities in being and THE METAPHYSICAL conception of goodness
goodness. Even when each perfect in thing is raises peculiarly difficult problems. Are there
its kind, all things are not equally good, for ac- asmany meanings of "good" as there are of
cording to the differences in their natures, "being"? When we say God is good, are we
diverse kinds are capable of greater or less making a moral or a metaphysical judgement ?
perfection. Are we attributing perfection of being or good-
In the metaphysical conception of goodness, ness of will to God ? If goodness is a property of
that which has more actuality cither in exist- being, then must not all evil become a priva-
ence or power has more perfection. God's in- tion of being? Conceiving evil in this way,
finite goodness is therefore said to follow from Augustine points out that if things "be de-
the fact that he completely actualinfinite
is
prived of all good, they shall cease to be," so
in being and power. Things "which have life," that there is
"nothing whatsoever evil" in it-
Augustine writes, "are ranked above those self; and Aquinas maintains that "no being is
which have none . . . And among those that said to be evil, considered as being, but only so
have life, the sentient are higher than those far as it lacks being."
which have no sensation and among the . . . understand what the notion of good-
If to
sentient, the intelligent above those that have ness adds to the notion of being it is necessary
Augustine contrasts these gradations of per- appetite, the question inevitably arises, "Whose
fection which arc "according to the order of appetite?" Not man's certainly, for then the
nature" with the "standards of value" which moral and the metaphysical good become iden-
arc "according to the utility each man finds in a tical. If God's, then not appetite in the form
often given for a horse than for a slave, for a metaphysical and the moral meanings of good
jewel than for a maid" ? and to say whether they have a common thread.
According to Augustine, as well as to Aquinas Some writers, however, limit their considera-
later,metaphysical goodness consists in "the tion to the strictly moral good, and deny, as do
value a thing has in itself in the scale of crea- the Stoics, goodness or evil to anything but
tion," while moral goodness depends upon the man's free acts of will.
relation in which a thing stands to human need Weshould, says Marcus Aurehus, "judge
or desire, and according to the estimation only those things which are in our power, to be
placed upon it by human reason. It is in the good or bad." In this we are entirely free, for
moral, not the metaphysical sense that we "things themselves have no natural power to
speak of a good man, a good will, a good life, form our judgments ... If thou art pained by
and a good society; or of all the things, such as any external this thing which
thing, it is not
health, wealth, pleasure, virtue, or knowledge, disturbs thee, but thy own judgment about it.
which it may be good for man to seek and pos- And it is in thy power to wipe out this judg-
sess.Only in the metaphysical sense can things ment now . . .
Suppose that men kill thee, cut
be thought of as good entirely apart from man; thee in pieces, curse thee. What then can these
only then can we find a hierarchy of perfections things do to prevent thy mind from remaining
in the world which accords with a hierarchy of pure, wise, sober, just?"
beings. Thus Spinoza declares that "the per- Though Kant develops what he calls a "meta-
fection of things is to be judged by their nature physic of ethics," he does not seem to have a
and power alone; nor are|they more or less per- metaphysical as opposed to a moral conception
fect because they delight or offend the human of the good; unless in some analogous form it
senses, or because they are beneficial or pre- lies in his distinction between "value" and
1'
reference to the general inclinations and wants desirable than any other, or the sum of all
of mankind has a market value" whereas "what- good things which, when possessed, leaves noth-
ever ... is above all value, and therefore admits ing to be desired. Aristotle and Mill seem to
"
of no equivalent, has a dignity "not a merely take the latter view in their conception of hap-
relative worth, but an intrinsic worth." piness as the summum bonum, "Human na-
But since Kant thinks that only men, or ra- ture," Mill says, "is so constituted as to desire
tional beings, can have intrinsic worth, he finds nothing which is not either a part of happiness
goodness only in the moral order. He agrees or a means of happiness." Happiness, he in-
with the Stoics that good and evil occur only in sists, is "not an abstract idea, but a concrete
the realm of freedom, not at all in the realm of whole" including all other goods within itself.
existence or nature. "Good or evil," he writes, It is the only good which desired entirely for
is
"always implies a reference to the will, as de- its own sake. Aristotle treats virtue and knowl-
termined by the law of reason" which is the law edge as intrinsic goods, but he also regards them
of freedom. According to Kant, "nothing can as means to happiness. In Mill's terms, their
possibly be conceived in the world, or even out goodness remains subject to the criterion of
of it, which can be called good without quali- utility, from which happiness alone is exempt
fication, except a Good Will"; and in another since it measures the utility of all other goods.
place he says, "If anything is to be good or evil If the evaluation of all things by reference to
absolutely ... it can only be the manner of their contribution to happiness as the ultimate
acting, the maxim of the will." In this sense, the good constitutes utilitarianism in ethics, then
free will complying with or resisting the im- Aristotle no less than Mill is a utilitarian, even
peratives of duty is either the seat or the source though Aristotle does not refer to the principle
of all the goodness or evil that there is. "Men of utility, does not identify the good with pleas-
may laugh," Kant says, "at the Stoic, who in ure, and conceives the virtues as intrinsically
the severest paroxysms of gout cried out: Pain, good, not merely as means. Kant would regard
however thou tormentest me, I will never ad- them as in fundamental agreement despite all
mit that thou art an evil: he was right ... for their differences or at least he would regard
pain did not in the least diminish the worth of them as committing the same fundamental
his person,but only that of his condition." error.
To Kant any discussion of human conduct
IN THE SPHERE of moral conduct, and especially which involves the calculation of means to ends
for those who make desire or pleasure rather is
pragmatic or utilitarian, even when the con-
than duty the principle, there seems to be a trolling end is the summum bonum
or happi-
plurality of goods which require classification ness. Kant makes a sharp distinction between
and order. what he calls "pragmatical rules" of conduct
Some things, it would appear, are not de- which consider what should be done by one who
sired for themselves, but for the sake of some- wishes to be happy, and what he regards as the
plant good and evil as the fundamental terms, meanings in the tradition of the great books.
and the summum bonum becomes a derivative One sense, which some think is the least signifi-
notion rather than the first principle of morality .
cant, refers to that which can be shared or used
At the other extreme are those who deny by many, as, for example, land held in common
duty entirely, and with it any meaning to right and worked by a number of persons or families.
and wrong as distinct from good and evil. A Thus we speak of the "commons" of a town or
middle ground is held by those who employ village. This meaning applies particularly to
right and wrong as subordinate terms in the economic goods which may either belong to the
analysis of good and evil, finding their special community as a whole or be divided into parcels
significance in the consideration of the good of of private property.
others or the social good. To do right is to do Another sense of common good is that in
good do wrong is to injure them.
to others; to which the welfare of a community is a common
The question which Plato so insistently raises, good participated in by its members. The wel-
whether it is better to do injustice or to suffer fare of the family or the state is a good which
it, can also be stated in terms of good and evil, belongs to a multitude organized for some com-
or right and wrong. Is it better to suffer evil or mon purpose. If the individual members of the
to do it? Is it better to be wronged by others group derive some benefit from their association
or to wrong them? As justice for Aristotle is with one another, then the prosperity of the
that one among the virtues which concerns the community isnot only a common good viewed
good of others and the common good, and as it collectively, but also a common good viewed
is the one virtue which is thought to involve distnbutively, for it is the good of each mem-
duty or obligation, so the criteria of right and ber of the group as well as of the whole.
wrong measure the goodness or evil of human With this in mind, perhaps, Mill speaks of
acts by reference to law and society. "an indissoluble association between [the in-
dividual's] happiness and the practice of such
THE DIVISION of goods into means and ends is mode of conduct, negative and positive, as re-
not the only distinction made by moralists who gard for the universal happiness prescribes; so
recognize the plurality and inequality of goods. that not only he may be unable to conceive the
Goods have been divided into the limited possibility of happiness to himself, consistently
and the unlimited with respect to quantity; with conduct opposed to the general good, but
the pure and the mixed with respect to quality; also that a direct impulse to promote the gen-
sensible and intelligible goods or particular eralgood may be in every individual one of the
goods and the good in general; external goods, habitual modes of action." If this statement by
goods of the body, and goods of the soul; the Mill is used to interpret Bentham's
phrase
pleasant, the useful, and the virtuous. More "the greatest good for the greatest number"
specific enumerations of the variety of goods then the greatest number cannot be taken to
list wealth, health, strength, beauty, longevity, mean a majority, for the good of nothing less
pleasure, honor (or fame), virtue, knowledge, than the whole collectively or of all distribu-
friendship. tively can be taken as the common or general
All of the foregoing classifications can be com-
good.
bined with one another, but there is one distinc- Still another conception of the common good
tion which stands by itself, although it affects is
possible. A good may be common in the sense
all the others. That is the distinction between in which a specific nature is common to the
the individual and the common
good, or be- members of the species not as organized social-
tween private and public good, the good for ly in any way, but simply as so many hip in-
this one man and the good of all others and of dividuals. If all men
seek happiness, for ex-
the whole community. In the language of mod- ample, then happiness is a common good, even
it is the distinction between
ern utilitarianism, though each individual seeks his own happi-
individual happiness and what Bentham called ness. In a deeper sense it is a common good if
"the greatest good for the greatest number." the happiness each seeks is the same for all men
CHAPTER 30: GOOD AND EVIL 613
because they are all of the same nature; but, by an invisible hand to promote an end which
most strictly, it is a common good if the happi- was no part of his intention" (*.., the general
ness of each individual cannot be separated prosperity of society) does not excuse the in-
from the happiness of all. dividual's failure to aim at the common good.
Aquinas seems to be using this meaning of The several meanings of the common good
common good when, in defining law as a rule of also complicate the statement of the issue be-
conduct "directed to the common good," he tween those who seem to say that the welfare
not merely to the good of the community
refers of the community always takes precedence
or body politic, but beyond that to "the last over individual well-being or happiness that
end of human life," which is "happiness or the good of the whole is always greater than
beatitude." Law, he says, "must needs concern the good of its partsand those who seem to
itself properly with the order directed to uni- say that the state is made for man, not man
versal happiness." Mill also seems to conceive for the state, or that the prosperity of the so-
agent's own happiness, but that of all con- on CITIZEN and STATE.
cerned." The opposition between collectivism and
The several meanings of the common good individualism in economics and politics does
create a fundamental issue. Some writers use it not exhaust the issue which, stated in its broad-
in one sense only, rejecting the others. Some est moral terms, is a conflict between self-
not only use the term in all its meanings, but interest and altruism. The primary problem
also develop a hierarchy of common goods. to consider here is whether the issue is itself
They regard universal happiness, for example, genuine, or only an opposition between false
as a common good of a higher order than the extremes which needlessly exclude the half-
welfare of the political community. Yet in truth that each contains.
every order they insist upon the primacy of the The collective aspect of the common good
common over the individual good. In the po- may not need to be emphasized at the expense
litical order, for example, they think the wel- of its distributive aspect. The good of each
fare of the community takes precedence over man and the good of mankind may be insep-
individual happiness. They would regard Adam arable. It may be the same good which, in dif-
Smith's statement of the way in which in- ferent respects, is individual and common. It
dividuals accidentally serve the common good may be that no good can be supreme which is
while seeking their private interests, as a per- not both immanent and transcendent at once
version of the relationship. To say that an in- the highest perfection of the individual and a
dividual considering only his own gam is "led good greater than his whole being and his life.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
i. The general theory of good and evil
la. The idea of the good: the notion of finality
ib. Goodness in proportion to being: the grades of perfection and the goodness of
order 616
20. God's goodness as diffusive, causing the goodness of things: God's love 619
ib. The divine goodness and the problem of evil
3.
The moral theory of the good: the distinction between the moral and the metaphysical
good 620
30. Human nature and the determination of the good for man: the real and the
apparent good; particular goods and the good in general 621
y. The good and desire: goodness causing movements of desire and desire causing
estimations of goodness
y. Right and wrong: the social incidence of the good; doing or suffering good and
evil
$f.
The sources of evil in human life
625
4.
Divisions of the human good 626
4^. Useful and enjoyable goods: good for an end and good in itself
4<r.
Goods of the body and goods of the soul
627
4</.
Intrinsic and external goods: intrinsic worth and extrinsic value
4*.
Individual and common goods 628
5.
The order of human goods
50. The supreme good or summwn bonum: its existence and nature
5^. The judgment of diverse types of good: their subordination to one another 629
5^. The dialectic of means and ends: mere means and ultimate ends 630
REFERENCES
To find the
passages cited,
use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 1 16a-l 19b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 1 19. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer
to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
Forexample,m
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the mam divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283! 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
:
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT. Nehemtah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
1.
_ . ,
The general theory of good and evil
i . .,
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, QQ 4-6
20c-30d; Q 21, A i, REP 4 124b-125b; A 3, ANS
OLD TESTAMENT. Isaiah, 45:7 (D) Isaias, 45:7 126a-c; QQ 48-49 259b-268a,c; PART i-n, Q i,
/ Lamentations, 3-38 A 4, REP i 612a-613a; A 8 615a-c; Q 2, A 5
APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 33-14-15; 39:25 (D) 618d-619c; Q 18, A i, ANS 694a-d; A 2, ANS
OT, Ecclesiasticus, 33:15; 39:30 694d-695c; A 3, ANS 695d-696b
7 PLATO: Euthydemus, 83b-84a / Gorgias, 282c- 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 61d-62a
284b / Republic, BK n, 322d-323a; BK VH, 26 SHAKESPEARE: Romeo and Juliet, ACT n,
389b-c / Theaetetus, 518a-b sc in [1-30] 296b-c
8 ARISTOTLE: Heavens, BK H, CH 12 383b-384c / 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, APPENDIX 369b-372d;
BK vn, CH 3 [246 a io-248 a8] 329c-330d / ANS 657d-658d; Q 12, A 5, ANS 672a-c
Heavens, BK n, CH 12 383b-384c / Generation 20 AQUINAS* Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 49
and Corruption, BK n, CH 6 [333 a35~b 2o] 434b-c A 2, ANS and REP i 2b-4a
b
/ Metaphysics, BK i, CH 2 [982 4~io] 500d; 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvi
CH 3 [984 b 8]-cH 4 [985*28] 502d-503c; CH 6 [125-136] 79d; xvin [19-39] 80a-b; PARA
[988*8-16] 506a-b; CH 7 [988^-16] 506c-d; DISK, i
[94-142] 107b-d, in [82-90] IlOa-b, i
CH 9 [992*29-34] 510c; BK n, CH 2 [994 b 9-i6] [ii5]-v [12] llld-112b; xxvi [1-69] 145d
a b
512d-513a; BK HI, CH 2 [996 2i- i^] 514d- 146c; xxxn
[i39]-xxxin [145] 156a-157d
a b b
515a; BK v, CH 2 [ioi3 32- 3] 533c; [ioi3 25~ 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 50a; P\RT iv, 271<
28] 533d-534a; CH 14 [i020 b i4~25] 541d-542a; 28 HARVEY On Animal Generation, 355c-d
BK ix, CH 8 [iQ5o a3-b i] 575d-576b; BK xii, 442d-443c
CH 7 [io72*i8-b 4] 602a-c; CH 10 [1075*2 5-b 7J 30 BACON Advancement of Learning, 45a-46a
606a-b; BK xiv, CH 4 [1091*29-1092*8] 624a-d; Novum Organum, BK i, APH 48 HOd-llla
CH 6 625d-626d / Soul, BK n, CH 4 [415* 31 DESCARTFS' Meditations, iv, 90a-b / Objec
22-b8] 645c-d; [4i5 b i5~22] 645d-646a; BK in, tions and Replies, 215a-b
CH 9 [432 b 2i-26J 665b-c / Sleep, CH 2 [455 b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, APPLNDIX 369b-372d
13-28] 698b-c PART iv, PREF 422b,d-424a
9 ARISTOTLE- Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i [639b 33 PASCAL- Pensees, 425-426 243b-244b; 431
b b
8-640*12] 161d-162b; [64i io-642 4] 164c- 245a-247b; 438 251a
165d; CH 5 [645*23-26] 169a / Gait of Animals, 35 BERKELEY. Human Knowledge, SECT 10'
CH 2 [704^2-18] 243c / Generation of Animals, 433d-434a
BK i, CH i [715*1-11] 255a; BK v, CH i [778*15- 35 HUME. Human Understanding, SECI v, DIV 44
b
i9] 320a-321a / Ethics, BK i, CH i 339a-b; CH 469b-c; SECTXI, DIV in 501b-c
6 341b-342c / Politics, BK i, CH 2 [1252^0- 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 187a-190a; 205a-209l
b
1253*1] 446a-b; CH 8 [i256 8-26] 450b-c / Judgement, 467d-470b; 473a-474b; 478a
10 GALEN' Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 6, 170b-c; 550a-613a,c esp 550a-562a,c, 568c-570b
CH 12 172d-173c; BK n, CH 4, 187c 575b-578a, 587a-588a, 592a-c
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [1022-1037] 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 157b-c
13c-d; BK n [1052-1063] 28b-c; BK iv [823- 160b-178a esp 168d-169d
857] 55a-b 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 40c-d; 41c-42a
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK v, SECT 8 269d- 95d-97a esp 96b-c; 217d-218a
270b; SECT 16 271c-d; BK vi, SECT 40 277d 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE i, 646c
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR vn, CH 1-2 26a-d; 647b;650b-c
TR viii, CH 2 27c-d / Third Ennead, TR ix, CH 53 JAMES: Psychology, 4a-6b; 671b [fn i]
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK 11, CH 23 48c-50c; BK xi, par 6 90c-d; BK xni, par
XXHI, SECT 34-35 213a-c; BK HI, CH vi, SECT 1-5 HOd-llld / City of God, BK vn, CH 31
n-12 271b-272b passim 261d-262a; BK xi, CH 21-24 333a-336a; BKXII,
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xi, DIV CH i 342b,d-343c; CH 9 347b-348b; BK xiv,
106-107, 499c-500a passim; DIV 113, 502a-b CH 13 387c-388c; BK xxn, CH 24 609a-612a /
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 230a-b Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 31-32 633b-d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 205a-b; 237d-239a / 19 AQUINAS: Summa PART i, Q 2,
Theologica,
Fund. Pnn. Metaphysic of Morals, 263a-b; A ANS and REP
3, 3, A i, REP i
i 12c-14a; Q
17, 19, 21-22, 24, 67, 96:10, 113:1-18, 117:1- 619c; Q 9, A 6, ANS 662a-d; Q 19, A 4, ANS
118 .-176 / Proverbs, 3:11-12 / Song ofSolomon 705b-c; Q 28, A 3, CONTRARY 742a-d
(D) Canticle of Canticles / Isaiah, 40-66 passim, 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xv [40-
esp 42-44, 46-3-4, 49:1-26, 52:1-15, 56:1-8, 81] 7Sd-76a; PARADISE, n [112-148] 109a-b;
63.8-9 (D) Isaias, 40-66 passim, esp 42-44, vn [16-148] 115b-116c esp [64-75] 115d-116a;
46:3-4, 49:1-26, 52.1-15, 56.1-8, 63 8-9 f Jere- xm [52-87] 126a-b; xix [40-90] 135c-136a;
miah, 31-33 (D) Jeremias, 31-33 / Lamenta- xxvi [1-69] 145d-146c; xxvin 148d-150b;
tions,3-22-39 esp 3:25, 3:38 / Ezefyel, 16 esp xxix[13-36] 150b-c; [127-145] 151c-d
16:6-14, 16:59-63 (D) Ezechtel, 16 esp 16:6- 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART in, 185d
14, 16:59-63 / llosea esp 2-14-23, 3:1 3-5, ,
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 229c-d
6:1-3, 11:1-4, 13:16-14:9 (D) Oseeesp 2:14- 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK in [135-143] 138b;
2 3 3 :I 3 5 6.1-3, Ii: *~4 14^1-10 / Joel, 2
: BK v [153-208] 178b-179b; BK vn [170-173]
esp 2:18-32 / Zechanah, 9:17 (D) Zachanas, 220b-221a
9:17 / Malachi, 1:1-3 (D) Malachtas, 1:1-3 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT
APOCRYPHA: Tobit, 13:10 (D) OT, Tobias, 3 405 b-c; SECT 154 444a-b
13:12 / Wisdom of Solomon, 11-22-26; 16 20- 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 186c-d
29 (D) OT, Boo{ of Wisdom, 11.23-27; 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 169d-
16:20-29 / Ecclestasticus, 11:14-17; 16.26- 170a
18:14 esp 16-29-30; 39:16,25-34 (D) OT, 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v,
Ecclesiasticus, 11:14-17; 16:26-18:14 esp 16-30- 127b-137c; BK vi, 167b-168c; BK vn, 189a-
31; 39:21,30-40 191a,c
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 6:25-34; 7:7-11 /
2b. The divine goodness and the problem of
Lufy, 11:1-13; 12:6-7,16-33 / John, 1:1-5;
evil
3:16-21; 13:31-35; 14:21; 15:9-16; 17:21-26 /
Romans, 2:4; 8-31-39 / Galattans, 2:20 / OLD TESTAMENT: Deuteronomy, 30:15-20 esp
Ephesians, 3:14-21; 5:1-2 / I John, 3-4 esp 30 15 / / Samuel, 16 14-23 (D) I Kings,
:
3:1, 3:16, 4.7-12 / Revelation, 3:19 (D) 16:14-23 / Job / Psalms, 5 esp 5:4-6; 9-10;
Apocalypse, 3:19 13; 22 esp 22:7-8; 37; 39 esp 39:8-12; 44;
7 PLATO: Republic, BK 11, 321d-322d; BK vi-vn, 73 ; 88 (D) Psalms, 5 esp 5:5-7; 9; 12; 21
384a-389c / Timaeus, 447a-448a esp 21:8-9; 36; 38 esp 38:9-13; 43; 72; 87
8 ARISTOTLE: Generation and Corruption, BK 11, / Proverbs, 8:13 / Ecclesiastes, 8:1-9:12 esp
CH 10 (336b 25-34J 438d / Metaphysics, BK xn, 8:10-14, 9:1-3 / Isaiah, 457~(>) Isaias,
CH 7 602a-603b; CH 10 [1075*11-24] 605d- 457 / Jeremiah, 12 esp 12:1-2
(D) Jeremias,
606a 12 esp 12:1-2 / Lamentations, 3:38 / Amos,
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK n, CH 8 146a-147c 3:6 / Micah, i:i2(D) Micheas, 1:12
16 KEPLER: Harmonies of the World, 1049b- APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 1:13-16; 2:23-
1050b; 1071b 24; 11:24 (D) OT, Boo1(of Wisdom, 1:13-16;
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR vn, CH 1-2 26a-d 2 ^3-25 ; 11
125 / Ecclesiasticus, 11 :i4~i6; 15:11-
/ Fifth Ennead, TR v 228b-235b / SixthEnnead, 20; 33:10-15; 39:25-31 (D) OT, Ecclesiasti-
TR ix, CH 9 358d-359c cus, 11:14-16; 15:11-22; 33:10-15; 39:30-3?
620 THE GREAT IDEAS Ibtol
136b-143a, BK iv [32-113] 153a-155a, BK vi
(2. Tb* goodness or perfection of God: the pleni-
[262-295] 202a-b, BK vn [519-549] 228b-229a,
tude of the divine being. 2b. The divine BK vni [316-337] 239a-b, BK ix [679-779]
goodnessand the problem of evil.) 262a>264a, BK x [585-640] 287a-288b, BK xi
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 13:24-30,36-43 esp [84-98] 301a / Samson Agonistes [1156-1177]
13:38-39 / John, 3:16-21 / Romans, 3:1-10; 364b-365a / Areopagttica, 394b-395b
5 / James, 1 112-15 / 1 John, i csp 1 15-6
33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 116a-b / Penstes,
5 AESCHYLUS Eumenides Sla-91d
:
735-736 317b; 820 331b
7 PLATO: Republic, BK n, 321d-322d / Timaeus, 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 154
452c-453b 444a-b
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK ix, CH 9 [1051* 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vni, DIV
17-22] 577a-b 78-81 485c-487a; SECT xi, DIV 106-107, 499c-
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 12 118d-120b 500a passim
14 PLUTARCH: Pericles, 140d 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 81b-c
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR vni 27b-34a 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 230b; 330a-b
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK in, par n 15d- 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 401a-b; 482a-d; 539d-
16a; BK iv, par 24 25b-c; BK v, par 20 32d- 540a; 549c
33a; BK VH, par 3-7 44a-45d; par 11-23 47a- 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 90
50d; BK xin, par 45 123a / City of God, BK 130b-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 160a;
24, 283a-b; BK x, CH 21 311c-312a;
vm, CH PART in, 304d-306a
BK xi, CH o 326d-327d; CH 13-15 329c-331a; 47 GOETHE: Faust, PROLOGUE 7a-9b
CH 22 333d-334c; BK xii, CH 1-9 342b,d-348b, 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic\, 381a
CH 21-22 357a-c; CH 27 359c-360a,c; BK xin, 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vi, 272a-b
CH 13-15 366a-d; BK xiv, CH 10-15 385b- 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v,
390a; BK xix, CH 13 519a-520a; BK XXH, 120d-121c; 122c-123b; 132a-135d; BK xi,
CH i 586b,d-587b / Christian Doctrine, BK n, 337a-346a
CH 23 648a-c; BK in, CH 37, 673d-674a 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 790d /
IP AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 2, A New Introductory Lectures, 877d-878b
3, REP i 12c-14a; Q 8,
A i, REP 4 34d-35c; A
3. The moral theory of the good: the distinction
3, ANS 36b-37c, Q 14, A 10 83d-84c, Q 15,
A 3,
REP i 93b-94a; Q 17, A i lOOd-lOld; Q 18, A 4,
between the moral and the metaphysical
REP 4 107d-108c; Q 19, A 9 116d-117d; A 12, good
ANS and REP 4 118d-119d; Q 20, A 2, REP 4 7 PLATO. Protagoras, 58b-62d / Gorgias, 262a-
121b-122a; Q 22, A 2, REP 2 128d-130d; A 3, 263c; 280d-285a / Theaetetus, 530b-531a /
REP 3 130d-131c; Q 23, A 5, REP 3 135d-137d; Philebus 609a-639a,c
A 7, REP 3 138d-140a; Q 25, A 3, REP 2 145b- 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i 339a-348d esp CH 6
147a; Q 48, A 2, REP 3 260c-261b; Q 49, AA 2-3 341b-342c / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 6 [1362^-6]
b
266a-268a,c; Q 63, A 4 328b-329a; A 5, ANS 603b; CH 9 [i36623-i367 27] 608c-610c
329a-330c; A 7, REP 2 331c-332b; Q 64, A 4 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses 105a-245a,c csp BK i,
337d-338d; Q 65, A i, REP 2-3 339b-340b; Q CH i 105a-106c, CH 6 110c-112b, CH n 116d-
66, A 3, ANS 347b-348d; Q 72, A i, REP 6 368b- 118d, CH 15 121c-d, CH 18 124a-125a, CH 22
369d; Q 92, A i, REP 3 488d-489d; Q 103, A 3, 127c-128c, CH 25 129d-131b, CH 27-29 132b-
REP 2 530a-c; A 7, REP i 533b-d; A 8 533d- 138a, BK n, CH CH 10-11 148c-
5 142c-144a,
534b; Q 114, A i, ANS 581d-582c; PART i-n, Q 151b, BK HI, CH i CH 3 178d-180a,
175a-177c,
39, A 2, REP 3 790d-791b CH 10 185d-187a, CH 24 203c-210a, BK iv, CH
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 79
: i 213a-223d, CH 6 230b-232c
156a-159c; PART in SUPPL, Q 74, A i, REP i 12 AURELIUS: Meditations 253a-310d esp BK 11,
925c-926c SECT i 256b,d, SECT 9 257d, SECT 11-12
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, xxxiv [28-36] 258a-c, BK iv, SECT 10 264c, SECT 24 265c-d,
51c; PARADISE, i [103-142] 107b-d; VH [19- SECT 32 266b-c, SECT 37 266d-267a, SECT 39
148] 115b-116c; vni [91-148] 117d-118c; xin 267a, BK v, SECT 2 269a, SECT 6 269b*d, SECT
[52-87] 126a-b; xix [40-90] 135c-136a; xxix 10 270c-d, SECT 12 271a, SECT 15-16 271b-d,
[49-66] 150d-151a BK vi, SECT 2 274a, SECT 51 279b-c, BK vn,
22 CHAUCER: Friar's Tale [7056-7085] 281a-b SECT 36 282 b, SECT 44 282b-c, SECT 55 283b-c,
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART H, 160d-161a BK vni, SECT i 285a~b, SECT 10 286b, SECT
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 17d-18a; 19 286d-287a, SECT 32 287d-288a, SECT 39
80b-81a 288c, SECT 41 288d, SECT 51 289d-290a,
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, iv 89a-93a BK ix, SECT i 291a-c, SECT 16 293a, SECT 42
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 33, SCHOL 2 295c-296a,c
367d-369a; APPENDIX 369b-372d 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xi, CH 16 331a-c
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost 93a-333a esp BK i [128- 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, QQ
168] 96a-97a, [209-220] 98a, BK in [56-343] 1-5 609a-643d; QQ 18-21 693b,d-720a,c
CHAPTER 30: GOOD AND EVIL 621
281d; SECT 64 284a-b; BK vm, SECT 10 286b; 24,26 / Proverbs, 3:27-35; 12:21; 15:1; 17:137
SECT 19 286d-287a, SECT 39 288c; SECT 47 Isaiah, 3:13-15; 10:1-3 (D) tsatas t 3:13-15;
289b-c; BK ix, SECT i 291a-c; BK x, SECT 34- 10-1-3 / Ezefyel, 18:5-22(D) Ezechiel, 18:5-
35 301a-b 22 / Hosea, 4 1-3; 7:1-7 (D) Osee, 4:1-3;
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR iv, CH 12 17d / 7:1-7 / Amos, 2 6-8; 4:1-2; 8:4-7 / Micah,
Second Ennead, TR ix, CH 15, 74d-75a / Sixth 6.8 (D) Micheas, 6.8 7 Zechariah, 7.9-10
Ennead, TR vn, CH 26 334c-d; CH 29-30 335d- (D) Zachanas, 7-9-10
336d APOCRYPHA: Tobit, i '1-2.9; 4.1-20 (D) OT,
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK v, CH 20 225b- Tobias, 1-2 '9; 4:1-20 / Ecclesiasticus, 7-8;
i :
-
226a; BK x, CH 18 310b-d; BK xix, CH 1-3 12-14 esp 12:3, 14*5-7; 2 ^5 34-' 21 22 (D)
507a-511a OT, Ecclesiasticus, 7-8; 12-1 4 esp 12:3, 14 5-7;
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologtca, PART i, Q 5, A 6, 28; 34:25-27 / Susanna (D) OT, Daniel, 13
ANS and REP 2 27c-28b; PART i-n, Q i, A 6, NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 5-7 passim, esp 7 12
REP i 614a-c; A 7, ANS 614c-615a; Q 2, A 6 / Luty, 6:27-38 / Romans, 12:17-21 / / Corin-
619d-620d; Q 3, A 4 625a-626b; Q 4, AA 1-2 thians, 6:1-11 / / Peter, 2:13-21; 3:8-18
629d-631a; Q 11 666b,d-669b; Q 27, A 3, ANS 5 AESCHYLUS Prometheus Bound 40a-51d esp
:
738c-739c; Q 30, A 4, REP 3 751c-752b; QQ 31- [941-1093] 50b-51d / Agamemnon 52a-69d esp
3 4 752b-772b;Q39790a-792d [1331-1673] 66b-69d / Choephoroe 70a-80d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologtca, PART H-II, QQ esp [235-651] 72c-76b / Eumenides 81a-91d
28-29 527b-533a 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King 99a-113a,c /
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVH Oedipus at Colonus [255-291] 116c-d; [1152-
[127-139] 79d; xvin [19-39] 80a-b 1207] 124d-125b / Antigone 131a-142d / Ajax
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 61d-62c 143a-155a-c esp [1045-1421] 152a-155a,c /
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i, Electra 156a-169a,c / Philoctetes 182a-195a,c
65c-66b 5 EURIPIDES: Alcestis 237a-247a,c / Suppliants
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 28a-d; 70d-72a; 235d- [195-250] 260a-c 7 Electra 327a-339a,c esp
237d [880-1359] 335a-339a,c / Phoenician Maidens
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 71a-74a 378a-393d esp [260-645] 380b-383d, [1628-
CHAPTER 30: GOOD AND EVIL 625
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK in, 93c-d; BK vi, 34c-d; par 89 35c-d; par 92 35d-36a; PART n,
201d-202c; BK VH, 2l7d par 112 41c-d; par 129-132 45d-47a; par 138
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK v, 505b-c 48c-d; par 140 49b-54a; PART in, par 218
7 PLATO: Apology, 203c-204c; 206d / Onto, 72c-d; par 223 73c-d; par 233 75d; ADDITIONS,
213d-214a; 215d-216c / Gorgias, 262a-267c / 59 125c-d; 71 127b-c; 89 129d-130a; 92-100
Republic 295a-441a,c esp BK i-n, 300b-315a, 131d-133a; 138 139a-b / Philosophy of History,
BK x, 436c-437c / Laws, BK n, 656d-658b; INTRO, 165c-166b
BK 687c-689a; BK ix, 747b-d / Seventh Let-
v, 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 292a-297a; 375a-
805d-806a
ter, 376b
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK v 376a-387a,c / Poetics, 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 310a-316a; 3l7c-d;
CH 25 [1461*4-9] 697b-c 319d; 322c; 592d-593a
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 28 133b- 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 194a-195a;
134d; BK n, CH 10 148c-150a; BK in, CH 3 214c-216d; BK vin, 304b-305a; BK xiv, 611a-c
178d-180a; CH 18 192a-c; CH 24 203c-210a; 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK n, 33c-
BK iv, CH i 213a-223d; CH 5 228a-230b 34b; BK in, 73a-b; BK v, 123b-127b; BK vi,
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK n, SECT i 256b,d; 153d-157b; 165c; 168c-169c; BK xn, 398a-d
SECT 16 259a; BK SECT 10 264c; BK v, SECT
iv, 54 FREUD; Civilization and Its Discontents, 792a-
6 269b-d; BK vn, SECT 36 282b; BK vin, SECT 793a
55 290b, BK ix, SECT 4 292a; SECT 16 293a;
SECT 38 295a 3/.The sources of evil in human life
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 19 5d / OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 3 / Exodus, 23:8 /
Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 36 634d-635b Deuteronomy, 16:19; 30:15-20 esp 30:15 / Job
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 21, / Ecdesiastes, 9:3 / Isaiah, ^:j(D) Isaias,
A i 124b-125b; PART i-ii, Q 21, AA 3-4 718d- 45 7 /^Lamentations,
:
3 138 / Amos, 3 :6
720a,c APOCRYPHA. Wisdom of Solomon, 1:12-16; 2 esp
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 59, 2:23-24; 14:27 (D) OT, Boo^ of Wisdom,
A A 4-5 48c-49d; Q 60, A 2 50d-51b; Q 97, A i, ri2-i6; 2 esp 2:23-25; 14:27 / Ecclestasticus,
REP 3 236a-d 8:2; 10:9; 11:16; 14:1-10; 15:10-20; 20:29;
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, xi 15a-16b; 27 :i-2 3 1; 15-1 1 (D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 8 .-2-3 ;
PURGATORY, xvi [58-129] 77c-78a; xvn [91- 10:9-10; 11:16; 14:1-10; 15:10-21; 20:31;
i39]79b-d 27:1-2; 31:5-11
22 CHAUCER: Tale ofMehbeus, par 30-31, 413b- NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 6:13,19-24; 13:24-
414a 30,36-43,47-51; 15:10-20; 16:26; 19:16-30 /
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 78b-c; 86b; PART Marf(, 1:13; 4:1-20; 7.14-23; 8:36; 10:21-30 /
n, 149b-c; PART iv, 272c Luke, 4:1-13; 8:1-15, 9:25, 12:13-21; 16:1-13;
26 SHAKESPEARE: 1st Henry VI, ACT n, sc v 12d- 18.22-30 / Romans, 5:12-19, 7:15-25 / / Co-
14a / 2nd Henry VI, ACT in, sc i [223-281] 49c- rinthians, 6:10 / Ephesians, 5:5/77 Thessaloni-
50a / Richard II, ACT n, sc in [140-147] 334b ans, 2:1-12 (D) II Thessalonians, 2:1-11 /
27 SHAKESPEARE: Troilus and Cressida, ACT n, / Timothy, 6:9-10 /James, 1:12-15 / / Peter,
sc n [163-188] 115b-c; ACT v, sc in [16-24] 5.8-9 / I John, 2:7-23 esp 2:15-17 / Revelation,
13 7 b / King Lear, ACT iv, sc n [2-68] 270b- 12 (D) Apocalypse, 12
27 Ib / Henry VIII, ACT in, sc n [428-450] 5 SOPHOCLES: Antigone [284-308] 133c-d
573c-d 5 ARISTOPHANES: Plutus [77-185] 630a-631a
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART i, 68b-73a 7 PLATO: Euthydemus, 69a-71a / Republic, BK n,
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 74b-c; 81d- 318c-319a; BK iv, 354d-355c; BK vi, 377a-
82a; 93c-94a 379c; BK vn, 389d-390b; BK x, 431b-434a /
32 MILTON Comus 33&~$6b
: Timaeus, 466a-b / Theactctus, 530b-531a /
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH n, Laws, BK in, 669a-670c; BK vin, 733a-734a;
SECT 5-6 105a-c; BK n, CH xxvin, SECT 9-13 BK ix, 751b-d
230b-231c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [31-93]
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK HI, llc-d 30b-31b; BK v [1412-1435] 79b-d; BK vi [1-42]
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 351b-c 80a-d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 149d-150a / Practical 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 25 129d-
Reason, 306b-c / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 131b; BK n, CH 22 167d-170a; CH 26 174c-d
391d-392a / Science of Right, 397a-399c; 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK n, SECT i 256b,d;
400b,d-401b BK VII, SECT 22 281b| BK IX, SECT 42 295c-
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 41, 132b-c 296a,c; BK xn, SECT 12 308b-c
43 MILL: 302d-323a,c passim / Utilitari-
Liberty, 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK in, Sib
anism, 448a; 452b-455a; 455c-456a; 465c- 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR vin, CH 5, 29a-c/
471b passim Second Ennead, TR ix, CH 13 73d-74b / Third
626 THE GREAT IDEAS
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 338b-c; 347d-348a;
(3. The moral theory of the good: the distinction 350c; 351c-352a; 360c 361c; 363a-366d
between the moral and the metaphysical 40 GIBBON Decline and Fall, 81b-c
:
good. 3/. The sources of evil in human life.) 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 451b-452b
Ennead, TR 11, CH 4-10 84c-88b; CH 14-18 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 18
89b-93a / Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 16 150c-d; 16c-d; PART n, par 139-140 48d-54a; ADDI-
TR iv, CH 18, 167b TIONS, 14 118c-d, 90 130b-d / Philosophy of
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK n, par 9-18 lOd- History, PART i, 237d-238c; PART iv, 346a-c;
13a; BK vn, par 4 44b-c; BK vm, par 22-24 354a-c
59a-60a / City of God, BK vm, CH 24, 283a-b; 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dtc{, 3b-4a; 204a-205a;
BK x, CH 21 311c-312a; BK xn, CH 21-22 209b
357a-c; BK xin, CH 13-15 366a-d; BK xiv, 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 214c-215a esp
CH 10-15 385b-390a; BK xix, CH 13 519a-520a 215a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 17, 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK in,
A i, ANS lOOd-lOld; Q 48, A 6, ANS 264a-d; Q 53b-54b; BK v, 122c-123b; 130b-135d; BK vi,
49, A i, REP 3 264d-265d; Q 63, A 9, REP i 164b-166a; BK xi, 307c-310c; 344a-d
333 b-d; Q 114, A 3 583 b-d; PART i-n, Q 20, 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 531d-532a /
A i 712a-d; Q 21, A 2 718a-d Civilization and Its Discontents 767a-802a,c
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, QQ esp 787a-788b
75-84 137c-178a
21 DAN IE: Dwme vm 4. Divisions of the human good
Comedy, HELL, [65]-ix
[103] llc-13b; xxin [139-144] 34c; xxvn [55-
40a-41b; xxxiv [28-36] 51c; PURGATORY,
4a. Sensible and intelligible goods
136]
v [85-129] 59d-60c; vm [1-108] 64a-65b; xvi 7 PLATO: Euthydemus, 69a-71a / Phaedrus, 120a-
[58-129] 77c-78a; xvn [82]-xvni [75] 79b-80c; 122a / Symposium, 162d-167d / Phaedo,
xxvm [91-96] 97a; PARADISE, vn 115a-116c; 224a-c; 230c; 242c-243a / Republic, BK vi,
vm [91-148] 117d-118c; ix [127-142] 120a; 386b-d; BK vn, 397c-398b, BK ix, 423b-
xin [52-87] 126a-b; xvm [115-136] 134d- 424d / Laws, BK v, 689c-690c; BK vm, 735c-
135a; xxix [49-66] I50d-151a 736c
22 CHAUCER: Knight's Tale [2453-2469] 200a-b 17 PLOHNUS: First Ennead, TR vi, CH 6-9 24a-
/ Prologue of Pardoner's Tale [12,263-268] 26a passim; TR vm, CH 2 27c-d / Second En-
372a / Pardoner's Tale [12,778-828] 380b-381b nead, TR ix, CH 15-18 74d-77d / Third Ennead,
/ Talc of Mehbeus, par 18, 408a; par 76-77, TR v, CH 7 104a-105a / Fifth Ennead, TR v, CH
430b-431a / Parson's Tale, par 20 508b-509a; 12-13 234a-235b
par 57-59 528b-529a; par 62-64 530a-531a 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK iv, par 20 24b-c;
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 153b par 24 25b-c; BK vi, par 26 42d-43a; BK vn,
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 218c-219a; 231d-238d; par 23 50b-c; BK x, par 43-66 82a-88b
326b-327b; 381b-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 63,
26 SHAKESPEARE: Romeo and Juliet, ACT n, A 4, ANS 328b-329a; Q 80, A 2, REP 2 428a-d;
sc in [15-30] 296c Q 82, A 5, ANS 435c-436c; PART i-n, Q 2, A
27 SHAKESPEARE: Timon of Athens, ACT iv, 6, ANS 619d-620d; Q 3, A 4, ANS 625a-626b,
sc in [1-44] 410c-411a Q 4, A 2, REP 2 630b-631a; Q n, A 2, ANS
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 17d-18a; 667b-d;, Q] 13, A 2, ANS 673c-674c; Q 30,
80b-81a A i, ANS 749a-d; Q 31, A 5 755c-756c; A 6,
31 SPINOZA Ethics, PART i, APPENDIX 369b-372d;
: ANS 756d-757c
PART IV, APPENDIX, VI 447c-d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART iv, 362b-c
32 MILTON: Comus 33a-56b esp [331-489] 40b-
44a / Paradise Lost, BK i [157-168] 97a; [209- 4b. Useful and enjoyable goods: good for an
end and good in itself
220] 98a; BK n [496-505] 122a; [629-870]
125a-130a; [890-1009] 130b-133a; BK in [56- 5 AESCHYLUS: Persians [153-171] 16d-17a
134] 136b-138a; BK iv [505-535] 163b-164a; 7 PLATO- Lysis, 22c-24a / Protagoras, 60d-62d /
BK vii [519-549] 228b-229a; BK vm [316-337] Euthydemus, 69a-71a; 74b-76b / Meno, 183d-
239a-b; BK ix [679-784] 262a-264b; BK xi [84- 184b / Gorgias, 262a-264b; 266d-267a / Re-
98]301a; BK xi [334J-BK xn [649] 306b-333a public, BK i, 298a-299a; BK n, 310c-d
/ Samson Agonistes [38-59] 340b; [521-540] 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK i, CH 15 [106*1-9] 149d;
351a-b / Areopagitica, 394b-395b; 409b-410a BK CH b b
in, i [ii6*2$- j] 162d-163a; [n6 37-
33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 116a-b; 140a; 162a 117*4] I 63c
*
CH 2 ["8 ft
6-i6] 164d-165a; CH 3
b
/ Penstes, 850 340a [n8 27~36] 165d-166a; BK iv, CH 4 [124*15-20]
b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xxi, 172d; BK vi, CH 9 [i47*33- i] 201b-c; CH 12
b
SECT 58-70 193d-197b [M9 3i-39l 204b-c; BK vn, CH 3 [
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vm, DIV
'
2} 209b / Metaphysics, BK v, CH 2 [i
b
76-81 485a-487a 533c; [ioi3 25-28] 533d-534a
: GOOD AND EVIL 627
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 1-2 339a-d; CH 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 20 126c-127b;
b BK iv, CH i 213a-223d
5 [1096*5-10] 341a-b; CH 6 [io96 8~26] 341d-
342a; CH 7 [i 097*15^22] 342c-343a; CH 9 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR iv 12b-19b csp
b CH 2-7 12d-16a, CH 14-16 18a-19b; TR vn, CH
[io99 25~32] 345b; BK vin, CH 2 [1155^6-22]
a b
407a-b; BK x, CH 6 [ii76 3o- 8] 430d-431a / 3 26d-27a
b 18 AUGUSTINE- Confessions, BK x, par 43-66 82a-
Politics, BK vii, CH i [i323*23- i3] 527a-c;
CH 13 [1332*10-25] 536d; CH 15 [i334*i2-b 7J 88b / City of God, BK i, CH 11-19 136d-142a;
539a-b; BK vin, CH 2-3 542b-543d passim / BK vm, CH 8 270a-d; BK xv, CH 22 416a-c; BK
a b
Rhetoric, BK i, CH i [i355 39- 8] 594d; CH 5 xix, CH 1-3 507a-511a
[1361*12-24] 601c-d; CH 6-7 602d-607d 19 AQUINAS Summa Theologtca, PART i-n, Q 2,
:
Q 92, A i, REP 1,3 488d-489d; Q 96, A 4 512d- 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR n, CH 4, 8a-b; TR
513c; PART i-n, Q i, A 5, ANS 613a-614a; vni, CH 2 27c-d / Sixth Ennead, TR ix 353d-
AA 7-8 614c-615c; Q 19, A 10, ANS 710b-711d; 360d csp CH 6-1 1 357a-360d
Q 21, AA 3-4 718d-720a,c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK iv, par 24 25b-c;
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 90, BK vn, par 7 45a-d; BK x, par 29-34 78d-80c
A 2 206b-207a; A 3, ANS and REP 3 207a-c; / City of God, BK vni, CH 8-10 270a-271d; BK
A 4, ANS 207d-208b; Q 91, A 5, ANS 211c-212c; x, CH
1-3 298b,d-301a; CH 18 310b-d; BK xn,
A 6, REP 3 212c-213c; Q 93, A i, REP i 215b,d- CH 342b,d-343c; BK xix 507a-530a,c
i
216c; Q 94, A 2, ANS 221d-223a; A 3, REP i 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 12, A
223a-c; Q 95, A 4, ANS 229b-230c; Q 96, A 3, i, ANS 50c-51c; Q 26 150a-152a,c; Q 62, A i,
ANS and REP 3 232b-233a; A 4, ANS 233a-d; Q ANS 317d-318c; PART i-n, QQ 1-5 609a-643d;
97, A 4 238b-239b; Q 100, A 2, ANS 252b-253a; Q 34, A 3 770c-771c
A 8, ANS and REP 3 259d-261a; Q in, A 5, REP 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvn
i 355d-356c; PART II-H, Q 39, A 2, REP 3 575b- [127-139] 79d; PARADISE, i [103-142] 107b-d;
576b; Q 187, A 3, REP 1,3 666a-669b; PART in in [82-90] HOa-b; xxvi [1-69] 145d-146c;
SUPPL, Q 96, A 6, REP ii 1058a-1061b xxxn [i39|-xxxin [145] I56a-157d
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xv [40- 22 CHAUCER- Troilusand Cressida, BK in, STANZA
81] 75d-76a 1-7 54b-55b; STANZA 250-253 87a-b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 87c-d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART r, 76c-d
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 71a-b 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i,
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 36 434a-b 65c-66b
35 LOCKE: Toleration, 15d / Civil Government, 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 28a-d; 149b-d; 279c-
CH v 30b-36a passim 281a
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 112a-113a 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 70b-d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 114a-d / Pref. Metaphysi- 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 28 43 Ic;
cal Elements
of Ethics, 369c-373b / Science of PROP 36 434a-b; APPENDIX, iv 447b-c; xxxn
438d-439a
Right, 450c-d; PART v, PROP 42 463b-d
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 64, 197d 33 PASCAL: Penstcs, 73 185a-b; 462 255a
CHAPTER 30: GOOD AND EVIL 629
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xxi, 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK iv [1058-
SECT 55-56 192c~193b; SECT 62 194c-d 1078] 57d-58b; BK v [1113-1135] 75c-d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 236b-240b esp 237d- 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK n, CH 9 147c-148c;
238a / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals 253a- CH 19 162c-164b; BK in, CH 14 I89c-190a; BK
287d csp 256a-257d, 258d-259a, 263a-b, iv,CH 5 228a-230b
266a>c, 267b-d, 273d-277b, 282b-283d, 12 AURELIUS Meditations, BK in, SECT n 262a b;
:
b
[i27i i~9] 467d; BK in, CH 12 480c-481b; BK 256a-b; 257c-d; 266a-b; 271c-272b; 273d-
8 b
vn, CH i [i323 22- 2i] S27a-c; CH 13 [1332*8- 277b esp 274d-275b / Practical Reason, 316a-
27] 536d-537a; CH 14 [1333*17-37] 538a-b; CH 317d; 337a-355d / Pref. Metaphysical Elements
b
15 [i334 i4-28] 539c-d / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 3 of Ethics, 377d / Judgement, 478a-b; 584d-
[1359*17-25] 599b; CH 7 604c-607d 587a; 588b [fn 2]; 591b-592a; 594c-596c
630 THE GREAT IDEAS
A2, ANS and REP 1-2 340b-341b; Q 82, AA 1-4
(5. The order of human goods. 56. The judgment 431d-435c; Q 83, A 4, ANS 439c-440b; PART
of diverse types of good: their subordination i-n, Q i 609a-615c; Q 4 629c-636c; Q 5, A 6,
to one another.)
REP i 641a-642a; Q 8, AA 2-3 656a-657c; Q 11,
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 448a-450c; 455c-456a; A 3 667d-668d; Q 12, AA 2-4 670b-672a; Q 13,
461c-464d; 471a-b A 3 674c-675a; Q 14, A 2 678b-c; Q 15, A 3
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 378a-b 682c-683b; Q 16, A 3 685b-686a; Q 20, AA 1-4
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART in, 307b- 712a-715b
308a; PART iv, 365b-c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART MI, Q 54,
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 194d A 2, REP 3 23d-24c; Q 107, A i, ANS 325c-327b;
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK vi, Q 114, A 4, REP i 373a-d; PART II-H, Q 27, A 6,
164b-165a ANS 524c-52Sc
53 JAMES: Psychology, 198b-204b csp 199b-203a 22 CHAUCER: Tale ofMelibeus 401a-432a
23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH xvm, 25d-26a
5c. The dialectic of means and ends: mere 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 53a-b; 76c-d;
means and ultimate ends
90a; PART in, 237d
5 SOPHOCLES : Phtloctetes 182a 195a,c csp [50- 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 28a-d; 52c-53c; 330b-
127] 182d-183c 332a; 368d; 381a-388c passim, esp 381c-d,
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponncstan War, BK v, 504c- 388a-c
507c 26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard II, ACT n, sc in [140-
7 PLATO: Lysis, 22c-24a / Laches, 29c / Euthy- i47]334b
demus, 69a-71a / Cnto 213a-219a,c / Gorgias, 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 75d-76a;
262a-264b; 280b-d / Republic, BK I-H, 300d- 91d-92a
315d csp BK ii, 310c-d / Phikbus, 632a-d / 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, APPENDIX, 371b-c;
Laws, BK v, 694d-695a; BK ix, 751c PART iv, PREF 422b,d-424a passim; DBF 7
b
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK HI, CH i [n6 22-36] 424b; PROP 65-66 444b-d; APPENDIX, v 447c
163b-c / Heavens, BK n, CH 12 [292 a i4~b26] 33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 94a-97a / Pensees,
383d 384b / Metaphysics, BK n, CH 2 [994 b 8~ 98 190 b; 505 261a-b
a b
16] 512d-513a; BK v, CH 2 [ioi3 32- 3] 533c; 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK H, CH xxi,
b
[ioi3 25-28] 533d-534a / Soul, BK HI, CH 10 SECT 52-53 191d-192b; SECT 62 194c-d
[433-12-17] 665d 36 STERNE. Tristram Shandy, 538a-539a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 1-2 339a-d; CH 5 41 GIBBON- Decline and Fall, 245a
340d-341b esp [1096*5-10] 341a-b; CH 6 [io96 b 42 KANT. Pure Reason, 234c-240b esp 235a-b,
8-26] 341d-342a; CH 7 [i 097*1 5^22] 342c- 236c-d, 238c-239a / Fund. Prm. Metaphysic of
b
343a; CH 9 [io99 25~32] 345b, BK in, CH 3 Morals, 256a-b; 257c-d; 260a-c; 265c-267d;
b a
[iii2 i2-ni3 2]358c-359a; BK vi, CH2 [1139* 268b; 271c-279d esp 273d-277b; 282b-283d /
b
I7~ 5] 387d-388a; CH 5 389a-c passim; CH 9 Practical Reason, 307a-d; 315b-317b; 318c-
b
[ii42 i7-35] 391d-392b / Politics, BK vn, CH 321b esp 320c-321b; 327d-329a; 337a-355d;
a b
i [i323 22~ 2i] 527a-c; CH 13
b a
[i33i 26-i332 357c-360d / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of
27] 536b-S37a / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 6-7 602d- Ethics, 36 7c / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals,
607d; CH 8 [1366*3-16] 608b-c 387d-388a / Science of Right, 397b-398a /
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK in, CH 10 185d- Judgement, 477b-c; 478a-b; 557d [fn 2];
187a; CH 13-14 188b-190a; CH 24 203c-210a; 586a-b; 588b [fn2]; 591b-592d; 594b-595d,
BK iv, CH 4 225a-228a 605d-606b [fn 2]
12 AURELIUS. Meditations, BK v, SECT 16 271c-d; 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 23 85a-87a passim, esp
BK vi, SECT 40-45 277d-278c; BK vn, SECT 44 85b-c; NUMBER 31, 103c-d; 104b-c; NUMBER
282 b-c; BK vm, SECT 19-20 286d-287a 40, 129a-b; NUMBER 41, 132b-c
14 PLUTARCH: Akibtades, 160b-161b / Lysander, 43 MILL: c////;/arwn/JW,445c-d;446d-447a;461c-
357a-b / CrassuS'Nicias, 456d-457c / Agesilaus, 464d
491a-b / Cleomenes, 660b-661a 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 45
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR n, CH 3-4 7c-8c; 23c-d, par 61 27b-c; PART n, par 119-128 43b-
TR iv, CH 6 15a-b / Second Ennead, TR ix, CH 45d csp par 122 44a; par 140 49b-54a; PART in,
15 74d-75b par 182 64a; par 191 66b; par 223 73c-d; par
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK vm, CH 4 266d- 328 108 b-c; par 340 110 b-c; par 348 Hid;
267c; CH 8-9 270a-271a; BK xix, CH 1-3 507a- ADDITIONS, 38-39 122c-d; 76-81 128a-129a;
511a; CH 11-17 516d-523a; CH 20 523d-524a / 116 135c-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO,
Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 3-4 625 b-c; CH 162a*164c; 166b-168d; PART n, 267a-268b
22 629b-630a; CH 31-33 633 b 634 b; CH 35 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xm, 586d-
634c-d 587d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q 18, A3, 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazw, BK v,
ANS 106b-107c; Q 19, A 2, REP 2 109c-110b; A 127b-137c
5, ANS and REP 1,3 112d-113c; Q 22, A i, REP 3 53 JAMES: Psychology, 4a-6b passim; 14b-15a;
127d-128d; Q 23, A 7, ANS 138d-140a; Q 65, 199b-201b; 203a; 381b-382a; 788a-789a
5d CHAPTER 30: GOOD AND EVIL 631
REP 3 488d-489d; Q 96, A 4 512d-513c; PART
5</. The supremacy of the individual or the
i-n, Q 4, A 8 636a-c; Q 19, A 10, ANS 7lOb-
common good: the relation of the good 711d; Q 21, A3 718d-719c; A 4, ANS and REP 3
of the individual person to the good of 719d-720a,c; Q 32, AA 5-6 762a-763c
other persons and to the good of the 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 90,
state A 2 206b-207a; A 3, ANS and REP 3 207a-c; Q
OLD TESTAMENT: Proverbs, 11:10-11 91, A 5, ANS 211c-212c; A 6, REP 3 212c-213c;
5 AESCHYLUS: Seven Against Thebes 27a-39a,c Q 92, A i, ANS and REP 1,3-4 213c-214c; Q 93,
csp [1048-1084] 38d-39a,c A i, REP i 215b,d-216c; Q 94, A 2, ANS 221d-
5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King 99a-113a,c esp 223a; Q 95, A 4, ANS 229b-230c; Q 96, A 3, ANS
[1-76] 99a-d / Antigone 131a-142d csp [158- and REP 3 232b-233a; A 4, ANS 233a-d; A 6,
210] 132c-d / Ajax 143a-155a,c esp [1045-1421] ANS 235a-d; Q 97, A i, ANS and REP 3 236a-d;
152a-155a,c / Philoctetes 182a-195a,c A 2, ANS and REP 2 236d-237b; A 4 238b-239b;
5 EURIPIDES: Phoenician Maidens [834-1018] Q 98, A i, ANS 239b-240c; Q 99, A 3, ANS 247a-
385c-387b; [1582-1684] 391d-392d / Iphigenia 248a; Q 100, A 2, ANS 252b-253a; A 8, ANS and
at Auhs 425a-439d REP 3 259d-261a; A n, REP 3 263c-264d; Q
5 ARISTOPHANES: Acharnians 455a-469a,c 105, A 2, ANS and REP 1,4 309d-316a; A 3, ANS
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK in, 99a; BK vn, and REP 5 316a-318b; Q in, A 5, REP i 355d-
253b-257c 356c; PART H-II, Q 17, A 3 458c-459a; Q 26
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK n, 397d- 510b-520d passim; Q 39, A 2, REP 3 575b-576b;
398c; 402b-c; BK vi, Sllc-d; 520c-d Q 187, A 3, REP 1,3 666a-669b; PART in SUPPL,
7 PLATO: Euthydemus, 75c-76b / Apology 200a- Q 71 900d-917b; Q 94 1040d-1042c; Q 96, A 6,
212a,c csp 207a-208a / Cnto 213a-219a,c esp REP n 1058a-1061b; A 7, REP 3 1061b-1062a
216d-219a,c / Gorgias, 262a-270c / Republic, 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xv [40-
BK i, 302c-306a; BK iv, 342a-d; BK v, 364c- 81] 75d-76a
365d; BK vi, 379d-380b; BK vn, 390b-391b; 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 91b-92b; 93d-94a;
401a-b / Laws, BK v, 692d-693a; BK vi, 707c- PART n, 105c-d; 157b-c
708a; BK vn, 72Id; BK ix, 754a-b; 754d- 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 381a-388c csp 381c-d,
755c, BK xi, 775d-778a / Seventh Letter, 814b-c 388a-c; 480b-482b; 487b-488b
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 2 [io94 b y-9] 26 SHAKESPEARE: 2nd Henry VI, ACT HI, sc i
CH i [ii29b i 1-1130*13] 377a-c;
339c-d; BK v, [223-281] 49c-50a / Henry V, ACT i, sc n [183-
BK CH 8 [ii4i b28-ii42*ii] 390d-391a; BK
vi, 2i3]535d-S36a
b b
ix, CH 6 [n67 5-i5]420d-421a; CH 8 [n68 28- 27 SHAKESPEARE: Troilus and Cressida 103a-
a
ii69 ii]422b-d; cH9423a-424b; CHII 425a-d 141a,c esp ACT i, sc in [78-134] 109a-c / Corio-
/ Politics, BK i, CH i [1252*1-6] 445a; CH 2 lanus, ACT i, sc i [67-167] 352a-353a
[1253*18-38] 446c-d; BK n, CH 1-5 455b,d- 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 71a-75a csp
460a; BK in, CH 4 473c-475a; CH 7 476c-477a; 74b-d; 81d-82a; 94b-95b
CH 12 [i282b i5-i8] 480c; CH 13 481b-483a; CH 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 35, COROL 1-2
17 [1288*15-32] 486d-487a; BK vn, CH 1-3 433c-d; PROP 37, SCHOL 2 435b-436a
527a-530a csp CH 2 [1324*5-24] 528a-b; CH 32 MILTON: Samson Agonistes [843-902] 358a-
b
13 [1332*32-38] 537a; CH 14 [i333 29~37] 359aesp[8 4 3~7o]358a-b
538c-d; BK vni, CH i [1337*28-30] 542b 33 PASCAL: Pensfes, 456 254a; 474-481 256b-
12 EPICTETUS- Discourses, BK i, CH 19, 125d; BK 257b
n, CH 5, 143d-144a; CH 10, 148c-149a; BK in, 35 LOCKE: Toleration, 15d-16a; 16d-17b / Civil
CH 7 182b-184a; CH 22 198c-199d Government, CH vn, SECT 87-89 44a-d; CH
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK in, SECT 4 260b- vni, SECT 95-99 46c-47c; CH ix 53c-54d; CH
261a; BK iv, SECT 4 264a; BK v, SECT 6 269b-d; xi 55b-58b passim; CH xiv 62b-64c; CH xv,
SECT 16 271c-d; SECT 22 272b; BK vi, SECT 14 SECT 171 65a-b / Human Understanding, BK i,
274d-275a; SECT 45 278c; SECT 54 279c; BK CH n, SECT 2 104a-b; SECT 6 105b-c
vni, SECT 12 286b-c; SECT 23 287b; BK ix, 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART i, 29b; PART in, It2a-
SECT i 291a-c;SECT 23 293c; SECT 42 295c- 115b esp 112a-113a
296a,c; BK x, SECT 6 297a-b; BK xi, SECT 21 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 291d-292a; 330b-c
305d306a 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK v, 21a; BK
14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus 32a-48d esp 44d-45c / xin, 96a-b; BK xxiv, 203a; BK xxvi, 221c-
Solon, 71b; 71d / Cato the Younger, 626d-627b; 222a
632b-c; 646b / Demosthenes, 699c-700a 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 323a-328a,c esp 323b-
15 TACITUS: Histories, BK n, 226d-228a 325b; 343d-345c; 363a-366d esp 363b 364a /
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xix, CH 5 513d- Political Economy, 368d-377b / Social Contract,
514b; CH 8 515c-516a; CH 12-14 517b-520d; BK i-n, 391b-400c; BK n, 405a-c; BK in, 417c-
CH 16-17 521d-523a; CH 19 523b-d; CH 26 418a; BK iv, 425a-d
528d-529a 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 109d-110d;
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 60, BK n, 140b; BK iv, 193a-194b esp 194a-b
A 5 313b-314c; Q 65, A 2 340b-341b; Q 92, A i, 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 193c-194a
632 THE GREAT IDEAS 6 to 6a
APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 1:1-7 esp 1:4;
(5. The order of human goods. 5d. The supremacy
6; 8-io-(D) OT, Boo^of Wisdom, 1:1-7 P
of the individual or the common good: the 8-10 / Ecclesiasticus, 19:22-24; 39.1-
1:4; 6;
relation of the good of the individualperson
n 43:33; 50:28-29 (D) OT, Ecclesiasticus,
;
23d- 24a; PART n, par 125-126 44d-45b; par n, CH 4 350d-351b; BK vi, CH 8 390d-391c,
134 47b; PART in, par 155 57c, par 170 60d; CH 12-13 393b-394d; BK vn, CH 2-3 395c-
par 183 64a; par 192 66b-c; par 199 67c; par 398a; CH 10 [1152*7-24] 403a-b; BK x, CH 5
240 76d; par 249 78c, par 254 79c, par 261 [1176*15-29] 430c-d, CH 8 [1178*16-18] 432d,
83a-d; par 277 92b-c; par 294 98b-d; par CH 9 [ii79b 4-i 180*13] 434b-d / Politics, BK vn,
308 102c-103a; par 323 107a; ADDITIONS, 27 CH i [i323 b 2i-36]527c-d
121b; 47 124a-b; 117 135d-136a; 127 137b; 12 EPICTETUS Discourses, BK i, CH 5 llOb c; CH
141 139c, 145 140b, 148 140c-d; 151 141b-c; 17 122d-124a, CH 26 131b-132b; CH 28 133b-
158 142d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 164b; 134d; BK n, en 22 167d-170a, CH 26 174c-d,
192d-193a; PART i, 236a-c; PART n, 271c-d; BK iv, CH i 213a-223d
276a; PARF in, 298c-299a; PART iv, 320c-321a; 12 AURELIUS. Meditations, BK n, SECT i 256b,d;
363c-d; 365b-c; 367d-368a SECI 17 259b-d; BK vn, SECT 22 281b, SECT
47 GOETHL: Faust, PART n [11.559-572] 281b 26 281c; SLCT 62-63 283d-284a; BK vin, SECT
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 310a-319a esp 312a- 14 286c; BK ix, SECT 42 295c-296a,c; BK xn,
313a, 314b-315d, 316c-317c; 321b-322d esp SECT 12 308b-c
322c-d; 592d 14 PLUTARCH: Pericles, 121a-122b / Anstides,
50 MARX: Capital, 237a 265c-d / Agesilaus, 490d-491b / Demetrius,
50 MARX-ENGELS* Communist Manifesto, 429b-c 726a-d
51 TOLSTOY- War and Peace, BK n, 67d-68c; 72d- 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR n, CH
6-7 9a-10a;
74a; BK v, 214c-216d; BK vi, 260a-262a; BK TR in, CH 6 lld-12b
xi, 475b-476c; 505a-511b passim, esp 509d- 18 AUGUSTINE. Confessions, BK VH, par
27 51d-
510a; 514b-515a; BK xn, 537b-538a; BK xm, 52c; BK vin, par 10-11 55c-56b / City of God,
577b-c; BK xv, 634a-635a; EPILOGUE i, 670d- BK vni, CH 3 266a-d; CH 8 270a-d; BK ix, CH
671c 20 296a-b, BK xi, CH 28 338a-d
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK vi, 19 AQUINAS- Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i, A 6,
158b-159a; 164a-167b; BK xn, 370b-d REP 3 6b-7a; PART i-n, Q 2, A i, REP i 615d-
54 FREUD: General Introduction, 452c-d; 573b-c / 616c; A 2, REP 3 616d-617b
War and Death, 757b-759d esp 759c-d / Civil- 20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 57,
ization and Its Discontents, 780 b- 781 d; 799a- A 4, ANS 38a-39a; A 5, ANS 39a-40a; Q 58, A 2
800a / New Introductory Lectures, 853a-b 42a-43a; AA 4-5 44a-45d; Q 65, A i, REP 3-4
70b-72a; PART n-n, Q 18, A 4, ANS 464c-465a;
6. Knowledge and the good Q 24, A n, ANS 498b-499c
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, xix
[40-
6a. Knowledge, wisdom, and virtue: the rela-
66] 135c-d; xxvi [1-69] 14Sd-146c; xxvm
tion of being good and knowing what
[106-114] 150a
is good
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 59c-60a; 69d-75a esp
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 3 / Proverbs, 1-2; 7-8; 70d-72a; 208a; 478c-480c; 514a-b
9:9; 10:8,31; 11:12; 14:16-18,22,29; 15:21; 26 SHAKESPEARE: Merchant of Venice, ACT i,
28:7; 29:8 so H [13-23] 408b-c
CHAPTER 30: GOOD AND EVIL 633
27 SHAKESPEARE: Measure for Measure, A-CT
sc ACT n, sc iv
6c. The goodness of knowledge or wisdoito: the
i, i I33-4 1 ! *74d; [2-17]
use of knowledge
184d
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning 26c-27a OLD TESTAMENT: / Kings, 3:5-15; to (D) HI
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART i, 43c; PART m, Kings, 3:5-15; 10 / // Chronicles, 1:7-12; 9:1-
49d-50b 7 (D) II Parahpomenon, 1:7-12; 9:1-7 / Job,
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 14-17 428a-d; 28:12-20 / Proverbs, 1-4; 8; 9-10-12; ro:i;
PROP 18, SCHOL 429a-d; PROP 23-24 430c-d 12:8; 14:24; 15:24; 16:16; 17:16; 19:2,8;
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK vn [519-549] 228b- 20:15; 23:15-16,23-25; 24:1-14; 27:11; 28:2
229a; BK vm [316-337] 239a-b; BK ix [679- / Ecclesiastes, 1:17-18; 2:12-26; 6:8; 7:11-
779] 262a-264a; BK xi [84-98] 30la / Samson 12,16-19; 9:11,13-18 (D) Ecclesiastes, 1:17-
Agonistes (38-59] 340b 18; 2:12-26; 6:8; 7:12-13,17-20; 9:11, 13-18
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH in, / Ezetyel, 28:2-7 (D) Ezechiel, 28:2-7
SECT 16, 117a; BK n, CH xxi, SECT 35 186b-d; APOCRYPHA: Wisdom ofSolomon, 6-10 (D) OT,
SECT 64 195a-b Boo^of Wisdom, 6-10 / Ecclesiasttcus, 1:16-19;
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 100 4:11-19; 6-18-37; 11:1; 14:20-15:8; 21:12-
432b-c 13,21; 24:1-22; 25:10; 34:8; 37:24,26; 40:25;
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART i, 28b-29a; PART iv, 41:14-15; 51:13-28 (/>) OT, Ecclesiasttcus,
159b-160a 1:20-24; 4:12-22; 6:18-37; II:I 14:22-15:8;
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 182a-c 21:14-16,24; 24:1-30; 25:13; 34-8; 37:27,29;
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 343b-345c esp 345a-c / 40:25; 41:17-18; 51:18-36
Social Contract, BK iv, 434c NEW TESTAMENT: / Corinthians, 1:17-31
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 149d / Fund. Prin. Meta- 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [300-462] 102a-
physic of Morals, 265b; 282b-283d / Practical 103c / Antigone [632-765] 136c-137d; [1348-
Reason, 326b-327a i35 3 ]142d
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 458b-459b 7 PLATO: Charmides, 8b / Lysis, 16c-18b /
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART n, par 139- Laches, 28a-b / Protagoras, 40a-41a; 61d-62b
140 48d-54a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, / Euthydemus, 69a-71a; 74b-76b / Meno,
168b-d; PART n, 280b-c 183d-184c / Phaedo, 226a-b / Gorgias, 272b-
53 JAMES. Psychology, 82a-b, 806a-808a 273b; 291c-292b / Republic, BK vn 388a-
54 FREUD: General Introduction, 560c-d; 625a-b 401d csp 389d-398c; BK ix, 421a-425b /
Timaeus, 476a-b / Theaetetus, 525c-526a;
6b. The need for experience of evil 528c-531a / Philebus 609a-639a,c esp 635c-
7 PLATO: Republic, BK m, 337b-d / Laws, BK 639a,c / Laws, BK i, 643c; BK m, 669d-670c;
vn, 727c-d BK xii, 792c-d; 794c-799a,c / Seventh Letter,
14 PLUTARCH. Demetrius, 726a-d 80 Ib
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR vm, CH 7, 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK in, CH i
[116*13-23]
204b-c 162 b-c / Metaphysics, BK i, CH i [980*22-28]
b
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 54-57 85a- 499a; CH 2 SOOb-SOlc csp [982 4-^83*ii] SOOd-
b
86a SOlb; BK xii, CH 7 [io72 i3-29] 602d-603a /
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 22, A Soul, BK i, CH i
[402*1-7] 631a
3,REP3l30d-131c 9 ARISTOTLE: BK vi, CH 12 [i 143^7-
Ethics,
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL la-52d csp i 1144*6] 393b-c; CH 2 [ii72 b28-32] 426d-
BK x,
[112-136] 2b-c, xxvin [43-51] 41d; PURGA- 427a; CH 7-8 431d-434a / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 6
b
TORY, i 53a-54c [i362 io-26] 603b-c
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 167a-169a passim; 200d- 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i
[62-79] Id-
203b;235c-236a;509b-d 2a; BK n [48-61] 15c-d; BK v [1-54] 61a-d; BK
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 75b-c vi [1-42] 80a-d
32 MILTON Paradise Lost, BK iv [505-535] 163b-
: 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK in, CH 20, 192d-
164a; BK vn[519-549] 228b-229a; BK vm 193a
[316-337] 239a-b; BK ix [679-779] 262a-264a; 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK v, SECT 9 270b-c;
BK xi [84-98] 301a / Areopagitica, 389a-396a BK x, SECT 12 298c-d
esp 390b-391a, 394b-395a 14 PLUTARCH: Pericles, 121a-122b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 237d- 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 54-57 85a-
238c; PART iv, 354a-c 86a / City of God, BK vm, CH 8 270a-d
47 GOETHE: Faust, PROLOGUE [340-343] 9a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 5, A
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic^, 4b-5a 4, REP 3 25d-26c; PART I-H, Q i, A 6, REP 1-2
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 481a- 614a-c; Q 2, A i, REP 2 615d-616c
482a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART n-n, Q 45,
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK in, A 3, REP 3 600c-601a; PART HI SUPPL, Q 96,
53b-54b; BK v, 122c-125a; 132a-135a; BK xi, A 7 1061b-1062a; A n, ANS and REP 5 1063d-
344a-d 1064d; A 12 1064d-1065b
634 THE GREAT IDEAS 6d
12 EPICTBTUS: Discourses, BK n, CH 7 145b-146a;
(6. Knowledge and the good. 6c. The goodness of CH ii 150a-151b; BK in, CH 3 178d-180a; BK
knowledge or wisdom; the use of knowl- iv, CH 5 228a-230b
edge.) 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK iv, SECT 4 264a;
21 DANTE: Dwine Comedy, HELL, iv 5c-7a; PUR- SECT 18 264d
GATORY, in [16-45] 56a-b 14 PLUTARCH: Themistocles, 99b-c
22 CHAUCER: Prologue [285-308] 164a-b 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK in, 58b-d
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 55d-62a; 69d-75a csp 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR iv, CH 43-44
70d-72a; 231d-242d; 502c-504c; 509a-512a 181b-182b
26 SHAKESPEARE: 2nd Henry VI, ACT iv, sc 11 18 AUGUSTINE- Confessions, BK in, par 13 16c-d
[83-117] 58c-59a; sc vn [26-81] 61c-62a / Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 39-40 654c-
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 6c-d; 16d- 656a; BK HI, CH 10, 661d-662a; CH 14 663c-d
17a;26a-27d;30b-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 59, A
31 DESCARTES- Discourse, PART i, 41d-42a 3,ANS 308b-309a; PART i-n, Q i, A 7, ANS
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, APPENDIX, iv 614c-615a; Q 2, A
i, REP i 615d-6l6c
447b-c; PART v, PROP 25-27 458d-459b 20 AQUINAS- Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 94,
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK iv [505-535] 163 b- A 4 223d-224d; PART n-n, Q 24, A u, ANS
164a; BK vn [519-549] 228b-229a; BK vin 498b-499c
[3 1 6-337] 239a-b; BK ix [679-779] 262a-264a; 23 HOBBES. Leviathan, PART i, 57d-58a; 61d-62a,
BK xi [84-98] 301a 65a; 75a-b; 78b-c; 91a-b; 96a-b; PART ii,
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, INTRO, SECT 140b; 149b-c; PART iv, 272c
5-6 94b-95a; BK n, CH xxi, SECT 44 188d- 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 46b-47c; 93b-c; 102a-
189b; BK iv, CH xi, SECT 8 356b-d passim 103a, 115b-d; 122a; 124c-d, 146b-c, 149b-d;
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 279c-284c; 307b; 424d-426b
2-3 405b-c 27 SHAKESPEARE' Hamlet, ACT n, sc n [248-272]
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i 451a- 43a-b / Troilus and Cressida, ACT n, sc n [51-
455b passim 96] 114a-c
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 236b-238a 28 GILBERT Loadstone, BK v, 105c
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 284a-c 31 DESCARTES- Discourse, PART n, 46b-c; PART
42 KANT: Judgement, 591b-592a in, 48b-50b
43 MILL: Liberty, 274b-293b passim / Utilitarian- 31 SPINOZA- Ethics, PART i, APPENDIX, 371b-c,
ism, 455c-456a PART III, THE AFFECTS, DEF 27 419a-b; PART
44 Bos WELL -Johnson, 118a; 256c iv, PREF, 423c-d, PROP 8 426b-c; PROP 64
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART 11, 280b- 444b
281b; PART in, 304d-305b 32 MILTON- Areopagitica, 390b-391a
47 GOETHE: Faust csp PART i [354-373] lla-b, 33 PASCAL- Provincial Letters, 29b-44a / Pensees,
[1022-1067] 26a-b, [1224-1237] 30b, [1851- 309 228b; 312 229a; 325 230b-231a; 385 238b-
2046] 44a-48a 239a
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dict(, 78a-b; 255a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, 90a-d; BK i,
54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 777a- CH n, SECT 8-12 105d-107d; SECT 20-27 110c "
779a esp 777a-b 112c passim, esp SECT 22-23 Ula-c; BK ii, CH
xxvnr, SECT 10-13 230b-231c; BK in, CH xi,
64. The possibility of moral knowledge: the SECT 15-18 303b-304b esp SECT 16 303c-d;
subjectivity or conventionality of judg- BK iv, CH in, SECT 18-20 317d-319c; CH iv,
ments of good and evil
SECT 7-9 325b-326b; CH XH, SECT 8 360c
5 EURIPIDES: Hecuba [798-805] 359d / Phoeni- 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 100
cian Maidens [499-522] 382b-c 432b-c
5 ARISTOPHANES- Clouds [882-1114] 499b-502b 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xn, DIV
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK in, 97d-98a 131-132 508d-509d passim, esp DIV 132, 509c-d
7 PLATO: Protagoras, 58a-62d / Meno, 183b- 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART iv, 165a-166a
184c; 187d-190a,c / Euthyphro, 193d-194b / 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 257a-266b esp
Gorgias, 271b-277c passim / Republic, BK v, 261a b
357d-358a; BK vi, 383d-386c / Theaetetus, 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 362a-d / Social Con-
525c-526a; 527b-532a / Statesman, 594a-595a tract, BK iv, 434c
/ Laws, BK x, 759d-760c / Seventh Letter, 809c- 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 41a; BK v,
810d esp 810c-d 346c-347a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 3 339d-340b; 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 149d-150a; 236d-237a;
CH 7 [io98 a 25-b 8] 343d-344a; BK n, CH 2 239a-b / Fund. Prtn. Metaphysic of Morals,
[1104*1-9] 349b-c; BK in, CH 4 359a-c; BK v, 253d-254b; 260d-261d; 263a; 264b-d; 265c-
CH 7 ["34b i8-i 135*4] 382c-d; BK vi, CH 8 266d; 270d-271a; 271c-272b; 278a-279d;
390d-39lc; CH 9 [ii42b i7-35] 391d-392b; 282d-283d / Practical Reason, 301a; 304d-
CH ii 392c-393b; BK x, CH 5 [1176*3-29] 305a; 307d-310d; 317a-b; 319c-d; 330d-331a
430cd / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 368d;
CHAPTER 30: GOOD AND EVIL 635
377c-d / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals* 387a- 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 305a; 313b-d;<314c-
388a / Science of Right, 397b-398a 315d; 317a d; 592 d- 593 b passim
43 MILL: Liberty, 269b-271c / Utilitarianism, 50 MARX-ENGBLS: Communist Manifesto, 427&-b;
445a-447b; 448a-450a; 456d-462a; 463c-d; 428b-d
471b-476a,c 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 15d 16a; BK
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 197a-b; 198b-d v, 194a-195a; 214c-d; BK vm, 304b-305a; BK
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREP, 2b-c; xi, 514c-d; BK xn, 542d; BK xiv, 611a-c;
INTRO, par 18 16c-d; PART n, par 131-132 EPILOGUE i, 645a-646c; EPILOGUE n, 689b
46a-47a; par 138 48c-d; par 140 49b-54a; 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK u, 33c-
PART in, par 150-152 56c-57b; par 339 HOb; 34b; BK xi, 314b-c
ADDITIONS, i 115a-d; 86 129c; 89 129d-130a; 53 JAMES: Psychology, 190a-191a; 886b-888a
91 131a-d; 96-97 132c-133a / Philosophy of 54 FREUD: War and Death, 758a-c; 759a / Civi-
History, INTRO, 166a-b; PART n, 280b 281b lization and Its Discontents, 792b-c
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other statements of the metaphysical theory of good and evil, see BEING 3-3!); CAUSE 6;
CHANGE 14; DESIRE i ; GOD ^b; WORLD 6b, 6d; for the relation of the good to the true and
the beautiful, see BEAUTY la; TRUTH ic; and for the theological consideration of the
GOD 4f, 5h; JUSTICE na; LOVE 53, 50;
divine goodness and of the problem of evil, see
PUNISHMENT 56-56(2); SIN 3-36, 6-6e; WILL yd; WORLD 6d.
The consideration of the factors which enter into the moral theory of good and evil, see
DESIRE 2b-2d; DUTY i MIND ^c; NATURE 53; PLEASURE AND PAIN 6-6e; WILL 8b-8b(2).
;
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booty of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date,place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
AUGUSTINE. Divine Providence and the Problem of F. BACON. "Of Goodness, and Goodness of Na-
Etfil ture," in Essays
.
Concerning the Nature of Good HOBBES. The Whole Art of Rhetoric, BK i, CH 7
636 THE GREAT IDEAS
HUME. An Inquiry Concerning the Principles ofMorals NIETZSCHE. Beyond Good and Evil
A. SMITH. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, PART The Genealogy of Morals, i
.
CICERO. De Finibus (On the Supreme Good) SANTAYANA. Reason in Science, CH 8-10
SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. Against the Ethicists CROCE. The Philosophy of the Practical
- Outlines of Pyrrhonism, BK in, CH 21-32
. SCHELER. Der Formahsmus in der Ethtt( und die
BOETHIUS. Quomodo Substantiae (How Substances materiale Wertethi^
Can Be Good in Virtue of Their Existence Without WASSERMANN. The World's Illusion
Being Absolute Goods) McTAGGART. The Nature of Existence, CH 64-67
The Consolation of Philosophy, BK m-iv
. MOORE. Principia Ethica, CH 4, 6
MAIMONIDES. Eight Chapters on Ethics .
Ethics, CH 3-4, 7
The Guidefor the Perplexed, PART HI, CH 10-12
, -.
Philosophical Studies, CH 8, 10
BONAVENTURA, Brcviloqumm, PART HI (i) GIDE. The Counterfeiters
DUNS SCOTUS. Tractatus de Pnmo Prmcipio (A N. HARFMANN. Ethics
Tract Concerning the First Principle) DEWEY. "The Good," "The Ethical World," "The
f^L*o.The Bool(of Principles (Sefer ha-Ifyanm), VOL Formation and Growth of Ideals," "The Moral
iv, CH 12-15 Struggle," in Outlines of a Critical Theory of
SUAREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae, in, x-xi, Ethics
XXIII-XXIV "Nature and Its Good, A Conversation,"
. in
MALEBRANCHE. De la recherche de la vSritS, BK iv, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy
CH 1-4 . Reconstruction in Philosophy, CH 5, 7
LEIBNITZ. Theodicy . Human Nature and Conduct, PART ni-iv
HUTCHESON. An Inquiry into the Original of Our . and Nature, CH 3-4, 10
Experience
Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, n The Quest for Certainty, CH 10
.
. "Good The Sovereign Good A Chimera," Ross. The Right and the Good, m-vii
"Good," in A Philosophical Dictionary BERCSON. Two Sources of Morality and Religion
.The Ignorant Philosopher, CH 31, 38 WESTERMARCK. Ethical Relativity
T. REID. Essays on the Active Powers of the Human MALRAUX. Man's Pate
Mind, in, PART IH, CH 1-4; v A. E. TAYLOR. The Faith of a Moralist, SERIES i
}. G. FICHTE.
The Vocation of Man LAIRD. An Enquiry into Moral Notions
T. CARLYLE. Sartor Resartus B. RUSSELL. Philosophical Essays, CH i
DICKENS. Oliver Twist . The Scientific Outloof^, CH 17
WHEW ELL. The Elements of Morality, BK i
Religion and Science, CH 8
.
INTRODUCTION
*
usual connotation of 'government" is "government" to refer to the way in which it is
THE political. The word is often used inter- politically organized. Yet the two concepts
changeably with "state." But there is govern- tend to fuse in traditional political theory. The
ment in a university, in an economic corpora- kinds of states, for example, are usually named
tion, in the church, in any organization of men according to their forms of government. The
associated for a common purpose. The theo- great books speak of monarchical and repub-
of the lican states, as we today speak of the fascist or
logian speaks of the divine government
universe, and the moralist speaks of reason as the democratic state.
the ruling power in the soul which governs the Nevertheless, we recognize the distinction
appetites or passions.
between a state and its government when we
In all these contexts, the notion of govern- observe that the state can maintain its his-
ment involves the fundamental relations of toric identity while it undergoes fundamental
ruling and being ruled, of command and obe- changes in its form of government. The state
dience. Though the character of these relation- isnot dissolved by a revolution which replaces
ships varies somewhat with the terms related, a monarchy by a republic, or conversely.
there is enough common meaning throughout There is a sense in which Rome is the same
to permit a general consideration of the nature state under the Tarqums, under the Republic,
of government. But that is not the way in and under the Caesars. In contrast, some rebel-
which government is discussed in the great lions, such as the War of Secession in American
books. For the most part, government is con- history, threaten to dissolve the state itself.
sidered in one or another of its special settings Despite the fact that government involves a
as it functions in the family or the state, in relation between rulers and ruled, the word is
the soul or the universe. The common thread often used to designate one term in that rela-
of meaningis noted
only indirectly, by the way tionship, namely, the rulers. When the citizens
in which comparisons are made or analogies of a republic speak of "the government," they
are drawn between the various modes of gov- usually refer to the officialdom not the body
ernment. of citizens as a whole, but only those who for a
In view of this, we have found it convenient time hold public office. But government can-
to restrict this chapter to government in the not consist of governors alone, any more than
political sense, treating domestic and ecclesias- education can consist of teachers alone. The
tical government under FAMILY and RELIGION, different forms of government can be distin-
economic government under WEALTH, divine guished as readily by looking to the condition
government in the chapters on GOD and of the ruled as to the powers of the rulers. Fur-
WORLD, and government in the soul in the thermore, the same individuals may both "rule
several chapters which consider the relation of and be ruled by turns," as Aristotle observes
reason to the passions, such as DESIRE and of constitutional government.
EMOTION. Though the notion of government includes
Government and state are often used as if they both rulers and ruled, the word usually appears
were interchangeable terms. Some writers dif- in political literature with the more restricted
ferentiate their meanings by using "state** to meaning. When writers refer to the branches or
signify the political community itself, and departments of government, or when they
637
638 THE GREAT IDEAS
speak of the sovereignty of a government, they ment shall be judged. They compare various
direct attention to the ruling power, and to the forms of government as more or less desirable,
division of that power into related parts. nearer to the ideal or nearer to the opposite
extreme of corruption. In the course of these
THE GREAT BOOKS OF political theory ask a considerations they answer questions about
number of basic questions about government. the necessity, the legitimacy, and the ends of
What is the origin of government, its nature government in general.
and necessity? What ends does government
serve and how do these ends define its scope THERE SEEMS TO BE considerable agreement on
and limits? What is the distinction between one point, namely, that government is necessary
good and bad government, between legitimate for the life of the state. It is generally held by the
and illegitimate, or just and unjust, govern- authors of the great books that no community
ment? What are the forms of government, of can dispense with government, for without
good government, of bad government ? What government men cannot live together in peace.
are the various departments or branches of None is an anarchist, like Thoreau or Kropot-
government, and how should they function kin, although Kropotkin claims that War and
with respect to one another? Peace and even Mill's Essay on Liberty contain
These questions are related. The origin, na- "anarchist ideas." Marx and Engels may be the
ture, and necessity of government have a bear- other possible exception to the rule.
ing on its ends and limits. These same consider- If Marx and Engels take the opposite view,
ations enter into the discussion of the legiti- they do so simply on the ground that with the
macy and justice of governments. They also advent of a classless society after the com-
have a bearing on the classification of the forms munist revolution, the class war will come to
of government, and on the evaluation of di- an end and there will no longer be any need
verse forms, The way in which the several for government. The state can quietly wither
branches of government should be related is away. But, according to Aquinas, even if
affected by the way in which the various forms society were free from all injustice and iniquity,
of government differ. even if men lived together in a state of inno-
These questions are not always approached cence and with the moral perfection they would
in the same order. Some of the great political possess if Adam had not sinned, even then gov-
theorists for example, Hobbes, Locke, and ernment would be necessary. "A social life," he
Rousseau find their fundamental principles in thinks, "cannot exist among a number of
the consideration of the origin of government. people unless government is set up to look after
They start with such questions as, What makes the common good."
itlegitimate for one man to govern another? Is The great books do not agree about the
the exercise of political power both justified naturalness of the state. They do not agree
and limited by the end it serves ? In answering about the way in which government originates
these questions, they imply or make a distinc- historically or about the functions it should
tion between good and bad government and and should not perform. They do not all reflect
indicate the abuses or corruptions to which in the same way on the good and evil in govern-
government is
subject. Though they enumerate ment. Nor do they all give the same reasons for
the various forms of government in a manner the necessity of government. In consequence
which reflects the traditional classifications, they set different limits to the scope of govern-
they do not seem to regard that problem as of ment and assign it different functions, which
central importance. range from the merely negative function of
Other eminent political thinkers make the preventing violence to the duty to provide pos-
and comparison of diverse forms
classification itively for human welfare in a variety of ways.
the central problem in the theory of govern- On all these things they differ, but with the
ment. Plato and Aristotle, Montesquieu and exceptions noted they do concur in thinking
Mill, arc primarily concerned with the criteria that anarchy the total absence of government
by which the justice or goodness of a govern- is unsuitable to the nature of man. Man be-
CHAPTER 31: GOVERNMENT 639
ing what he is, "any form of government," use of power or force. For this reason Hamilton
in Darwin's opinion, "is better than none." dismisses "the idea of governing at all times
Some, Hobbes and Kant, identify anarchy
like by the simple force of law" as having "no place
with the state of nature which is for them a but in the reveries of those political doctors
state of war. Some, like Locke, think that the whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of
state of nature is not a state of war, yet find experimental instruction."
great advantages to living in civil society pre- If authority without force is ineffective for
cisely because government remedies the incon- the purposes of government, might without
veniences and ills which anarchy breeds. But right is
tyrannical. "Wherever law ends,
though they often write as if men could choose tyranny begins," Locke writes, "and whoso-
between living in a state of nature or in a civil ever in authority exceeds the power given him
society, they do not think man has any option by the law, and makes use of the force he has
with respect to government if he wishes the under his command to compass that upon the
benefits of the civilized life. They cannot con- subject which the law allows not, ceases in that
ceive civil society as existing for a moment to be a magistrate." The use of unauthorized
without government. force may take the form of either usurpation
or tyranny. If it is "the exercise of power
THE GENERAL AGREEMENT about the necessity which another hath a right to," Locke declares
of government tends to include an agreement it is usurpation; "the exercise of power
if it is
about the two basic elements of government- beyond right, which nobody can have a right
authority and power. No government at all is to," it is
tyranny.
possible, not even the most attenuated, unless The distinction between legitimate rule and
men obey its directions or regulations. But one all dominations by force rests not on the use of
man may obey another either voluntarily or power, but on whether the power which must
involuntarily either because he recognizes the be employed is or is not legally authorized.
ity and power are the right and might of gov- according to the customs of feudal
legal rights,
ernment. Either can exist and may operate tenure, sovereignty seems to imply the union
apart from the other; but, as Rousseau points of power with authority, not the use of naked
out, when
right is lacking, government is ille- force.
gitimate; and as Hamilton points out, when The political philosophers of antiquity do
might is
lacking, it is ineffective. not use the term sovereignty. But their discus-
In a famous passage, the Federalists explain sion of the distribution of political power is
that ruleby authority alone might work in a certainly concerned with the possession of
society of angels. But since men are men, not authority as well as the control of force. Aris-
angels, their obedience must be assured by the totle's question, for example, about "whaMs to
threat of force. In any society in which some be the supreme power in the statethe multi-
men are good, some bad, and all may be either tude ? or the wealthy ? or the good ? or the one
at one time or another, force
is the
only expe- best man ?" deals with the same problem which
dient to get the unwilling to do what they modern writers express by asking where sover-
should do for the common good. Even when eignty resides. As Aristotle sees the conflict
the institutions of government have their between the oligarchical and the democratic
authority from the consent of the governed, constitutions, the issue concerns the legal defi-
they cannot function effectively without the nition of the ruling class: whether the constitu-
640 THE GREAT IDEAS
tion puts all the political power in the hands exempt from the law as to its coercive power,
of the rich or in the hands of the freeborn, rich since, properly speaking, no man is coerced
by
and poor alike. It does not seem to be too himself,and law has no coercive power save
violent an interpretation for modern transla- from the authority of the sovereign." But
tors to use the word "sovereignty" here, for Aquinas differs from Hobbes in thinking that
sovereignty can be said to belong to whatever the authority, if not the power, of the prince
person or class holds the supreme power by law. islimited by the constitutional character of the
Within meaning of sovereignty the
this kingly office. In the mediaeval conception of
between absolute and limited is bound not to himself
basic difference monarchy, the king
government, or between the despotic and the alone, as Hobbes insists, but to his subjects.
constitutional regime, leads to a distinction Their oath of allegiance to him is
reciprocated
between the sovereign man and the sovereign by his coronation oath, in which he assumes
office. the obligation to uphold the customs of the
The ruler who
holds sovereignty in his per- realm.
son is an absolute sovereign if his power and
authority are in no way limited by positive law. WHERE AQUINAS CONCEIVES the sovereign
According to some political philosophers, sov- prince as one element the other being estab-
ereignty must be absolute. In the opinion of lished law in a government which is therefore
Hobbes, for example, the notion of a limited both absolute and constitutional, Hobbes con-
sovereignty seems to be as self-contradictory as ceives the sovereign as identical with a govern-
that of a supremacy which is not supreme. ment which is wholly absolute. The distinction
After discussing the absolute rights which here implied between a mixed regime and one
constitute sovereignty, Hobbes goes on to say that is purely absolute is more
fully discussed
that "this great authority being indivisible . . . in the chapters on CONSTITUTION and MON-
there is little ground for the opinion of them ARCHY. In contrast to both, a republic, or
that say of sovereign kings, though they be purely constitutional government, substitutes
stngulis majores, of greaterpower than every the sovereign office for the sovereign man. It
one of their subjects, yet they be umversis denies the possession of sovereignty to men
mtnores, of less power than them all together. except in their capacity as office-holders.
For by all together they mean not the collec-
if According to the republican notions of Rous-
tive body as one person, then all together and seau, not even government itself has sover-
every one signify the same, and the speech is eignty except as representing the political
absurd. But if by all together they understand community as a whole, which is the sovereign.
them as one person (which person the sovereign Sovereignty, he writes, is vested in the govern-
bears), then the power of all together is the ment "simply and solely as a commission, an
same as the sovereign's power, and so again the employment in which the rulers, mere officials
speech is absurd/' of the Sovereign, exercise in their own name the
It makes no difference, Hobbes argues, power of which it makes them depositaries."
whether the sovereignty is held by one man or Since this power is not theirs
except by delega-
by an assembly. In either case "the sovereign tion, itcan be limited, modified, or recovered
of a commonwealth ... is not subject to the at pleasure, "for the alienation of such a right
civil laws.For having the power to make and is
incompatible with the nature of the social
repeal laws, he may when he pleases, free him- body, and contrary to the end of association."
self from that subjection by repealing those The unity of sovereignty is not impaired by
laws that trouble him." The sovereign there- the fact that a number of men may share in the
fore has absolute power, which consists in the exercise of sovereign power, any more than the
absolute right or liberty to do as he pleases, for unity of government is
destroyed by its divi-
"he that is bound to himself only is not bound" sion into separate departments or branches,
at all. such as the legislative, executive, and judicial.
Aquinas seems to be taking the same view Since in a republic the government (in all its
when he admits that "the sovereign is ... branches or offices) derives its power and
CHAPTER 31 : GOVERNMENT 641
authority from the constitution (or what posed to the sovereignty of the monarch," he
Rousseau calls "the fundamental law"), and writes, "the sovereignty of the people is one of
sinceit is the people as a whole, not the officials the confused notions based on the wild idea of
"
of government, who have the constitutive the 'people.' If the sovereignty of the people
power, the people are in a sense supreme or means nothing more than the sovereignty of
sovereign. the whole state, then, he says, the sovereignty
Popular sovereignty may mean that the peo- which "is there as the personality of the whole
ple as a whole govern themselves without the ... is there, in the real existence adequate to its
services of magistrates of any sort; but this concept, as the person of the monarch."
would be possible only in a very small commu- But republican writers would reply that the
nity. questionable whether a people has
It is sense in which they speak of the sovereignty of
ever exercised sovereignty in this way in any the people cannot be opposed to the sovereign-
state of historic importance. Popular sovereign- ty of government, so long as that government
ty more usually means what is
implied by is constitutional, not absolute. When the sover-
Aquinas when he conceives the magistrate or eignty of the people is conceived as the source
ruler as merely the vicegerent of the people. or basis, not as the actual exercise, of the legiti-
"To order anything to the common good," mate powers of government, there is no conflict
he writes, "belongs either to the whole people, between these two locations of sovereignty in
or to someone who is the vicegerent of the the state. Yet the supremacy of the government
whole people. Hence the making of a law be- always remains limited by the fact that all its
longs either to the whole people or to a public powers are delegated and can be withdrawn or
personage who has the care of the whole peo- changed at the people's will,
personage, to whom it belongs to inflict penal- eignty and the connected question of unified or
ties." divided sovereignty have a different meaning
The notion of a public personage, as Aquinas in the case of the relation of governments to
uses it in these passages, is
clearly that of a sur- one another.
rogate for or representative of the whole people. The theory of federal government, discussed
The people as a whole have, in the first in- in The Federalist and in Mill's Representative
stance, the authority and power to perform all Government, contemplates a division of sover-
the functions of government. Only if for con- eignty, not as between the people and their
venience or some other reason they constitute government, but as between two distinct gov-
one or more public personages to act in their ernments, to each of which the people grant
stead, do individual men exercise sovereignty, certain powers. Distinguishing between the
and then only as representatives. government of a national state and the
Locke's fundamental principle that "men government of a federal union, Madison writes:
being ... by nature all free, equal, and independ- "Among a people consolidated into one nation
ent, no one can be put out of this estate and . . .
supremacy is completely vested in the na-
subjected to the political power of another with- tional legislature. Among communities united
out his own consent" is another
expression of for particular purposes, it is vested partly in the
the idea of popular sovereignty. It reappears in general and partly in the municipal legislatures.
the Declaration of Independence in the state- In the former case, all local authorities are sub-
ment that since governments are instituted by ordinate to the supreme; and may be con-
men to secure their fundamental rights, they trolled, directed, or abolished by at pleasure. it
must derive "their just powers from the con- In the latter, the local or municipal authorities
sent of the governed." form distinct and independent portions of the
Hegel objects to the sense "in which men supremacy, no more subject, within their re-
have recently begun to speak of the 'sovereign- spective spheres, to the general authority than
"
ty of the people' as "something opposed to the general authority is
subject to them within
the sovereignty existent in the monarch. So op- its own sphere." The federal or general and the
642 THE GREAT IDEAS
state or local governments draw on the same In their relation to one another they are,
reservoir of popular sovereignty, but the sov- wntes Kant, like "lawless savages." Following
ereignty which each derives from that source is Rousseau, he thinks it is fitting that the state
limited by the definition of matters reserved to "viewed in relation to other peoples" should be
the jurisdiction of the other. called"a power." Unlike sovereign govern-
The fundamental difference between the con- ments which unite authority with power in
dition of states in a federation and the condition their domestic jurisdiction, sovereign states in
of colonial dependencies or subject peoples is their external relations can exert force alone up-
that imperial government, unlike federal gov- on each other. When their interests conflict,
ernment, claims an unlimited sovereignty. The each yields only to superior force or to the
issues of imperialism which arise from the exer- threat of it. A fuller discussion of these matters
such power are discussed
cfee of in the chapters will be found in the chapters on LAW, STATE,
on TYRANNY and SLAVERY. and WAR AND PEACE.
The one remaining situation is that of inde-
pendent governments, the governments of sep- As ALREADY INDICATED in several places, the
arate states associated with one another only by materials covered in this chapter necessarily de-
treaties or alliances, or at most in the kind of mand a study of many related chapters dealing
loosehegemony or league represented by the with political topics. This is peculiarly true of
Greek confederacies or the American Articles the problems concerning the forms of govern-
of Confederation. In this situation, the word ment. Separate chapters are devoted to each of
"sovereignty" applied to independent govern- the traditionally recognized forms, *>/#., ARISTOC-
ments signifies supremacy, not in the sense of RACY, DEMOCRACY, MONARCHY, OLIGARCHY,
their having the authority and power to com- TYRANNY. Each of these chapters defines a par-
mand, but in the opposite sense of not being ticular form, distinguishes it from others, and
their merits. In addition, the chapter
subject to any political superior. compares
This radical difference in meaning is
explic- on CONSTITUTION deals with what is perhaps
itly formulated in Hegel's distinction between the most fundamental of all distinctions in
internal and external sovereignty. forms of government, that between a republic
After stating the conditions of the sovereign- and a despotism, or between government by
ty of the state in relation to its own people, laws and government by men.
Hegel says, "This is the sovereignty of the state Here, then, it is necessary only to treat gen-
at home. Sovereignty has another side, i.c., sov- erally of the issues raised by the classification
ereignty vis-a-vis foreign states." The state's in- and comparison ol diverse forms of government.
dividuality resides in its awareness of its own They can be summarized in the following ques-
others"; and in this individuality Hegel finds What are the criteria or marks of good gov-
the state's autonomy, which he thinks is "the ernment ? Is the goodness of government deter-
most fundamental freedom which a people pos- mined by the end it serves, by the way in which
sesses as well as its highest dignity." it is instituted, by its efficiency in promoting
But from the fact that "every state is sover- whatever end it serves? Are such criteria of
eign and autonomous against its neighbors," it good government as justice, legitimacy, and
also follows, according to Hegel, that such sov- efficiency, independent or interchangeable?
ereigns "are in a state of nature in relation to What is the nature of bad government?
each other." It is this state of nature which Can a distinction be made between the abuses
Hobbes had earlier described as a state of war. or weakness to which good government is sub-
Precisely because independent states 'have ab- ject in actual operation, and government which
solute sovereignty in relation to one another, is
essentially bad because perverse or corrupt in
"they of perpetual war,
live in the condition principle as well as practice?
and upon the confines of battle, with their Are there several forms of good government ?
frontiers armed, and cannons planted against Of 'bad government? How are they differenti-
their neighbors round about/' ated from one another? Are all good forms
CHARTER 31: GOVERNMENT 643
government, are there one or more ways in historic circumstances. Among these are a peo-
which these can be combined to effect a com- ple's economic condition, level of culture, po-
is com-
posite or mixed form ? If a mixed form litical experience, geography, climate, and ra-
parable with the pure forms it unites,
is it su- cial characteristics. Montesquieu, for example,
perior to all, to some, to none of them? On thinks that government by law, absolutely con-
what grounds? In what circumstances? sidered, is better than despotic government, yet
While proposing what they consider to be he also holds that despotic government is bet-
the ideal form of government, some political ter for certain peoples. Mill thinks that the in-
not be stitutions of a representative
philosophers admit that the ideal may democracy repre-
realizable under existing circumstances or with sent the ideal form of government, but he ac-
men as they are. Plato, for example, recognizes knowledges that absolute monarchy may be
that the state he outlines in the Republic may better for a rude or uncivilized people who have
not be practicable; and in the Laws he proposes not yet advanced far from barbarism.
institutions of government which represent for The great question here is whether the cir-
him something less than the ideal but which cumstances themselves can be improved so that
may be more achievable. The^Atheman Stran- a people may become fit or ready for a better
ger says of the state described in the Republic form of government, and ultimately for the
that, "whether it is possible or not, no man, best that is attainable, that is, the form relative
acting upon any other principle, will ever con- to the best possible conditions. Since Montes-
stitute a state which will be truer or better or quieu emphasizes what he considers to be fixed
more exalted in virtue." The state which he is racial characteristics, such as the servility of the
discussing in the Laws "takes the second place." Asiatics, whereas Millstresses conditions which
He refers to "a third best" which, far from be- are remediable by education, economic prog-
ing even the practicable ideal, may be merely ress, and social reforms, these two writers tend
the best form of government which now actu- to give opposite answers. The issue is more fully
compared. We may consider, he writes, "of mentioned here. Arc the ideal state and the
what sort a government must be to be most in ideal form of government inseparable, or can
accordance with our aspirations, if there were one be conceived apart from the other? How
no external impediment," but we must also shall the ideal government be conceived in
consider "what kind of government is adapted terms of the best that is
practicably attainable,
to particular states," In addition, Aristotle given man as he is or can be; or in terms of a
thinks necessary "to know the form of gov-
it is
perfection which exceeds human attainment
ernment which is best suited to states in gen- and which men can imitate only remotely or
eral" as well as "to say how a state may be con- imperfectly, if at all? Does divine government,
stituted under any given conditions." for example, set a model which human govern-
644 THE GREAT IDEAS
ment should aim to approximate ? Is that hu- which the king // the government, all powers
man government ideal which is most like the are in the hands of one man. Though he may
divine; or, on the contrary, is the perfection of delegate his powers to others, they act only as
human government measured by standards his deputies or agents, not as independent offi-
drawn from the nature of man and the diffi- cials. This docs not obliterate the theoretical
culties involved in the rule of men over men? distinction between legislation, adjudication,
and execution, but in this situation there can
THE TRADITIONAL enumeration of the functions be no practical separation of the three powers,
of government is threefold: the legislative, the certainly no legal system of checks and balances.
judicial, and the executive. Locke adds what he It is the separation of powers,
according to
calls"the federative power," the power of Montesquieu, that is the basis of political lib-
making treaties or alliances, and in general of erty. "Power should be a check to power," he
conducting foreign affairs. It may be questioned writes. In a system of separated powers, "the
whether this function is
strictly coordinate legislative body being composed of two parts,
with the other three, since foreign, like domes- they check one another by the mutual privilege
tic, affairs may fall within the province of the of rejecting. They are both restrained by the
executive or the legislature, or both, as in the executive power, as the executive is
by the
case of the Constitution of the United States. legislative."
In our own day, the multiplication of admin- Whether or not Montesquieu is right in at-
and the development of plan-
istrative agencies tributing this aspect of constitutionalism to the
ning boards have been thought to add a new limited monarchy of England in his own day,
dimension to the activities of government, but hisargument can be examined apart from his-
again it may be questioned whether these are it raises the general
tory, for question whether
not merely supplemental to the functions of government by law can be preserved from de-
making law, applying law to particular cases, generating into despotic government except by
and regulating by administrative decree those the separation of powers.
matters which fall outside the domain of en- For the American Federalists, the system of
forceable law. The executive branch of gov- checks and balances, written into the Constitu-
ernment seems the most difficult to define, be- tion, so contrives "the interior structure of the
cause it involves both law enforcement and the government that its several constituent parts
administration of matters not covered by legis- may, by their mutual relations, be the means
lative enactment or judicial decision. of keeping each other in their proper places."
If the threefold division of the functions of This they consider the prime advantage to be
government is exhaustive, the question re- gained from Montesquieu's principle of the
mains how these distinct activities shall be re- separation of powers. The principle itself they
and by whom they shall
lated to one another, hold to be "the sacred maxim of free govern-
be performed. In an absolute monarchy, in ment."
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
i . The general theory of government 646
i a. The origin and necessity of government: the issue concerning anarchy
ib. Comparison of political or civil government with ecclesiastical government and
with paternal or despotic rule
ic. The ends and limits of government: the criteria of legitimacy and justice 64 8
id. The elements of government: authority and power, or coercive force; the dis-
tinction between dejure and dc facto government
2b. The combination of different forms of government: the mixed constitution, the
mixed regime 653
2C. The absolute and relative evaluation of forms of government: by reference to
the nature of man or to historic circumstances
3</.
The department of government: the application of law
judicial 657
(1) The powers and duties of the judiciary
(2) Judicial institutions and procedures
4. The support and the expenditures of government: taxation and budget 659
50. Foreign policy: the making of treaties; the conduct of war and peace 660
5*/. Confederation and federal union: the division of jurisdiction between state and
federal governments
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n (265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
printed
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
page.
of trie left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the mam divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g,, Iliad, BK 11
[265-283! 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TEST\-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7-45 (D) // Esdras, 7-46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, sec the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
1.
_
The general theory of government
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART 11, 78a-b; PART in, 112a-
115b; PART IV> i57 a .i5 8a
7 PLATO- Republic 295a-441a,c esp BK ii-vm 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i la-3d
310c-416a / Statesman, 598b-604b / Laws, 38 ROUSSEAU: Political Economy 367a-385a,c /
BK in 663d-677a; BK iv, 679a-c Social Contract, BK in, 406b,d-410a; 423a-
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vi, CH 8 [ii4i b24-ii42 a 424d
12] 390d-391a / Politics 445a-548a,c esp BK i, 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 309a-311c
CH 5 447d-448c, BK in, CH i 471b,d-472c, 42 KANT: Science of Right, 435a-437c; 450a-452a
CH 6-13 475d-483a, BK iv, CH 14-16 498b- 43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: [7-25] la-b
502a,c 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: PREAMBLE
12 LUCRETIUS' Nature of Things, BK v [1136- lla,c
1160] 76a-b 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 104b; NUMBER 45,
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK i, SECT 14 254b-c 147d-148a
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK n, CH 21 161 b- 43 MILL: Representative Government, 327b,d-341d
162d; BK iv,CH 4 190d; BK xix, CH 13-17 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART iv, 364d-
519a-523a; CH 21 524a-525a; CH 23-24, 365a
528a-c; CH 26 528d-529a 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 780b-
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 96, 781a
A 4 512d-513c L
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART HI, 84c-104d * The o"*111 and necessity of government:
30 BACON Advancement of Learning, 94b-95a
:
* issue concerning anarchy
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 37, SCHOL 2 NEW TESTAMENT: Romans, 13:1-6 / / Peter\
435b-436a 2:13-15
33 PASCAL: Penstes, 291-338 225a-233a passim 5 AESCHYLUS: Eumcnides [681-710] 88b-c
35 LOCKE: Toleration, 16a-c / Cwtl Government 5 SOPHOCLES: Antigone [332-372] 134a-b
25a-81d esp CH vn, SECT 87-89 44a-d, CH 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 23b-d
VHI-IX 46c-54d, CH xi, SECT 136 56c-d, CH 6 THVCVDID&S: Peloponnesian War, BKin,436d-
xv, SECT 171 65a-b, CH xxx, SECT 211 73d- 74a 438b
la to \b CHAPTER 31: GOVERNMENT 647
7 PLATO: Protagoras, 44c-d / Onto, 216b-217d / 43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: [7-25] la-b
Gorgias, 271b-272b / Republic, BK 11, 316c- 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: PREAMBLE lla,c
319a / Laws, BK in, 663d-667b 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 2, 31a-b; NUMBER 4,
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK i, CH i 36a; NUMBER 15, 63a-d; 65b-c; NUMBER 16
b NUMBER
[487 32-488*i5] 8d-9a / Ethics, BK vin, CH 12 66c-68d passim; 18-20 71a-78b pas-
b NUMBER
[1162*16-25] 414c; BK ix, CH 9 [n69 i8-22] sim; 38, 121b-122a; NUMBER 51,
423b / Politics, BK i, CH 2 445b-446d csp 163b-c; 164c-d; NUMBER 85, 258d-259a,c
b
[1253*29-39] 446d; BK in, CH 6 [i278 i5~29] 43 MILL: Liberty, 267d-268a; 269c; 302d-303a /
475d-476a 472b-c
Utilitarianism,
12 LUCRETIUS. Nature of Things, BK v [1011- 44 Bosw ELL: Johnson, 172d-173a
1027] 74b-c; [1136-1160] 76a-b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 47
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 23 128c-d 124a-b / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 173a-
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK iv, SECT 4 264a 175c; PART ii, 262a-c; PART iv, 342c-d
14 PLUTARCH: Cato the younger, 638b-d 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 310a-c; 321b-c
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK in, 51b-c / Histories, 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE 11, 680b~
BK i, 211c-212d 684a
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK iv, CH 4 190d, 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 780 b-d
BK xn, CH 27 359c-360a,c; BK xix, CH 14-17
520a-523a; CH 21 524a-525a; CH 23-24, 528a-c
Ib. Comparison of political or civil govern-
19 AQUINAS. Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 96,
ment with ecclesiastical government and
A 4 512d-513c with paternal or despotic rule
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 95, 5 SOPHOCLES: Antigone [631-680] 136c-137a
A i 226c-227c 5 EURIPIDES: Andromache [464-492] 319b-c
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, vi [76- 6 HERODOTUS. History, BK in, 107c-108d; BK v,
151] 61c-62c; xvi [85-105] 77d; PARADISE, vin 178a-180a
[115-117] 118a 7 PLATO: Crito, 217a-c / Statesman, 581a-c /
23 HOBBES. Leviathan, PART i, 58c-d; 77a; 77c; Laws, BK in 663d-677a
BK vin, CH b
84c 87b; 91a-b; 96a-b; PART n, 99a-102a; 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, 10 [n6o
104b-d, 109b, 112b-d; 113c; 124c-125a; 23-1161*9] 413a-b / Politics, BK i,CH 1-2
b
131a-c; 159d 445a-446d; CH 3 [i253 i5-22] 447a; CH 5
b
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 462c-465c 447d-448c; CH 7 [i255 i6-22] 449b-c; CH
26 SHAKESPEARE: Henry V, ACT i, sc n [183-220] 12-13 453d-455a,c; BK in, CH 4 [1277*33-
b
535d-536b 24] 474c-d, CH 6 [1278^0-1279*22] 476a-c;
27 SHAKESPEARE* Troilus and Cressida, ACT i, BK vn, CH 2 [i324 b 2}~4i] 528d-529a; CH 3
b
scm [78-134] 109a-c [I325i8- i3] 529b-d; CH 14 537b-538d
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 454a 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK i, la-2a; 3a-b; BK in,
30 BACON, Advancement of Learning, 20c-d 51b-c; 61c-62a
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 37, SCHOL 2 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xix, CH 13-17
435b-436a 519a-523a
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK vi [169-188] 200a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 92, A
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 304 227b-228a; 306 228a; i, REP 2 488d-489d; Q 96, A 4 512d-513c
91a-b; PART I-H, 96c-105c esp PART n, 99a-b; BK vm, CH 10-11 412c-413d / Politics, BK n,
b
109b-c; 112b-d; 117d; 122b-124b; 131d-132a; CH 2 [i26i*23- 6] 456a-b; CH 9 [1269*29-33]
CH 6 b
145a-b; 148d-149b; 159d; PART in, 191b; 465b-c; BK in, [i279*i7]-CH 7 [i279 io]
b
225c-d; PART rv, 273a-c 476c-477a; BK vi, CH 4 [i3i8 2i-i3i9*3J
26 SHAKESPEARE: Henry V, ACT i, sc n [183-220] BK vn, CH 2 [1324*24-25] 528b;
522b-c;
CH b
535d-536b 14 [i332 i2~4i] 537b-d
27 SHAKESPEARE: Troilus and Crcssida, ACT i, 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK i, SECT 14 254b-c
sc in [78-134] 109a-c / Measurefor Measure^ 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK n, CH 21 161b-
ACT i, sc n [120-127] 176b-c 162d, BK iv, CH 3-4 190a-d; BK xix, CH 24
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 37, SCHOL 2 528b-c
435b-436a; PROP 51, SCHOL 439d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 95,
33 PASCAL: Penstes, 294-308 225b<228b; 311 A 4, ANS 229b-230c; Q 105, A i, ANS 307d-
228b; 878 345a-b 309d
35 LOCKE: Toleration, 3a-4a; 16a-c / Civil Gov- 23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH xn, 18a
ernment, CH i, SECT 2-3 25c-d; CH n 25d-28c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 101a-104d;
passim; CH iv, SECT 21 29d; CH vi, SECT 69-71 112b-d; 153a-159c
40a-c; CH vn, SECT 87-89 44a-d; CH vm, SECT 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART i, 193a; PART
95-99 46c-47c; CH ix 53c-54d; CH xn, SECT n, 331a-336a; 352d-353a
143-cH xin, SECT 149 58c-59d; CH xiv 62b- 35 LOCKE: Ctvtl Government, CH ix, SECT 131
64c passim; CH xv, SECT 171 65a-b; CH xvi- 54d; CH xi, SECT 134 -CH xn, SECT 143 55b-
xix 65d-81d passim, esp CH xix, SECT 219 58d; CH xin, SECT i58-cn xiv, SECT 168 61d-
75b-c / Human Understanding, BK n, CH 64c; CH xvni, SECT 205 72a-c
xxvin, SECT 4-17 229b-232d passim, esp SECT 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART n, 74a-76b; 78a-b
6 229d, SECT 9 230b 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 216b
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 261b-262a 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 268c-269b
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xn, 84b 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, 3b-d; BK
38 ROUSSEAU: Political Economy, 367b; 370b- vi, 39b; BK xi, 69a-75a; BK xn, 84b,d-85c;
372b / Social Contract, BK i, 389a-393b; BK BK xin, 96a-b; BK xix, 135d-136a; 138a-c;
ii, 396d-397a; BK in, 406b,d-409a; 418a-419c; BK xxin, 199b-c; BK xxvi, 214b,d; BK xxix,
BK iv, 433a-434b 262a
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 309c-311c; 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 323a-328a,c; 360b-c /
349a-c Political Economy, 368c-372b; 375b-c / Social
42 KANT: Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 389a-b; Contract, BK in, 411c-412c; 417c-418a; 424a-d
392b; 393c 40 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 50a-b
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 2, 31a-b; NUMBER 15, 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 114b-d / Science of Right,
64b-65d; NUMBER 16 66c-68d passim, esp 67d- 408c-409c; 438d-439a; 450b-452a / Judge-
68c; NUMBER 20-21, 78a-d; NUMBER 23, 85d- ment, 586a-587a
87a passim; NUMBER 27-28, 94d-96c; NUMBER 43 DECLARATION OP INDEPENDENCE: [7-23] la-b
29, 98c-99b; NUMBER 31, 104b; NUMBER 33, 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER i, 30a-b; NUMBER 22,
108d-109a; NUMBER 37, 118d-119a; NUMBER 84c-d; NUMBER 23 85a-87a; NUMBER 30,
39, 127a-d; NUMBER 41, 132b-c; NUMBER 43, lOlb-c; NUMBER 31, 104b; NUMBER 37,
141a-142d; NUMBER 44, 145c-147a; NUMBER 118d-119b; NUMBER 39, 125a-126b; NUMBER
59, 182a-b 41, 132b-c; NUMBER 45, 147d-148a; NUMBER
43 MILL: Liberty, 267d-269c / "Representative 47 153c-156d; NUMBER 57, 176d-177a; 177d-
Government, 327b,d-332d; 333c-334a; 350b- 178a; NUMBER 62, 190c; NUMBER 68, 206b-c;
355b; 362c-363a; 429a-c / Utilitarianism, NUMBER 70, 210c-d; NUMBER 71, 215b| NUM-
472b-c BER 78, 232d 233c; NUMBER 83, 250d 251a
650 THE GREAT IDEAS \fto \g(\}
42 KANT: Science of Right, 435a-441d csp 435c
(l.Tbe general theory of government, le. The 436b, 437c-d, 438d~441d; 450a c
attributes of good government.)
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 10 49c-53a passim,
43 MILL: Liberty, 272d-273d; 322a-323a,c / NUMBER 15, 65c-66a; NUMBER 16, 68c-d; NUM-
Representative Government, 332d-350a; 356d- BER 22, 82c-83d; NUMBER 28 96c-98b passim;
357a; 362c-370a; 380c-382c; 387c-d; 436b- NUMBER 37, 120d-121a; NUMBER 41, 132b c;
437a; 439b-c NUMBER 51 162d-165a passim; NUMBER 62,
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 182c-d; 204b-c 190a-b; NUMBER 66, 201d-202a
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 165 43 MILL: Liberty, 267d-269c / Representative
145a-b / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 174a- Government, 328d-330c; 350d-351a; 362c-
175c; PART i, 208b-c; PART 11, 275a-b; 276a; 370a; 376a-c; 387c-d
PART iv, 342a-343a 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 120a-c; 178b-c; 195c-d;
47 GOETHE: Faust, PART n [10,252-259] 249b- 261c-d; 374b-c
250a 47 GOETHE Faust, PART n [4772-4811] 118b-
119b; [10,242-284] 249b-250b
I/. The abuses and corruptions to which gov- 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BKV,127b-
ernment is subject 13 7c passim
OLD TESTAMENT: I Samuel, 8:3-20 (D) I Kings,
1^. The sovereignty of government: the unity
8:3-20
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK HI, and disposition of sovereignty
436d-437d 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK in, CH 6 [i278 b 9~i4]
7 PLATO: Republic, BK VIH-IX 401d-427b / 475d; CH 7 476c-477a; CH 10 478d-479a /
Laws, BK iv, 681d-682c Rhetoric, BK i, CH 8 [i 365^7-1 366*2] 608a-b
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK n, CH 7 [i266 b36- 20 AQUINAS* Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 90,
b
I267 io] 462c-463b, BK HI, CH 15 [1286*31- A 3 207a-c
b a b
8] 484c-d, CH 16 [i287 i- 8] 485b-486a; BK 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 97c-98a,c; PART
b
v, CH 2-3 503b-505b; CH 8 [i3o8 3i-i309*32] n, 100c-105c, 112b-c; 114b-c; 116c-d; 117b-d;
a b
511a-c passim; CH 12 [i3i6 i- 27] 518d-519d / 122b-124b; 130d; 131d-132a; 148b; 150b;
Rhetoric, BK i, CH 4 [1360*17-29] 600c 151a-152a; 153b; 159c; PART in, 228b
15 TACITUS: Histories, BK n, 224d-225a 32 MILTON Paradise Lost, BK v [769-799] 192a-b
:
18 AUGUSTINE- City of God, BK xix, CH 6 S14b- 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK ix, 58b,d-
515a 60a
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, vi [58-75] 9a; 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 323d / Political Econ-
xxvn [19-54] 39d-40a, PURGATORY, vi [76- omy, 368c-369a / Social Contract, BK i, 392a-
151] 61c-62c; xvi [58-126] 77c-78a; PARADISE, 393 b; BK 11, 395a-398b; BK in, 406b,d-409a;
xvi 130a 132a 420d; BK iv, 423a-424b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 78b-d, PART n, 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 24b,d-28b passim,
lOOa-c; 104b-d; 116c-d; 148c-153a; 164a,c; esp 28a b; 521b
PART iv, 273a b; CONCLUSION, 279a-c 42 KANT: Science of Right, 435a-b; 437c-d;
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 381 b-d; 384b-c 438b-c; 439a-441d; 450d-451b; 452a-d
27 SHAKESPEARE: Measure for Measure 174a- 43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: n 5a-b
204d 43 FEDERALIST. NUMBER 9, 48b-49c esp 49b;
32 MILTON: Lord Gen. Fairfax 68b-69a / Samson NUMBER 15, 63d-66b; NUMBER 16-20 66c-78b
Agomstes [237-276] 344b-345b / Areopagitica, esp NUMBER NUMBER 32 105c-107b
20, 78a-b;
412b passim, NUMBER 33, 108d-109a;
esp 105d;
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH xi, SECT 138 NUMBER 39, 126b-128b; NUMBER 42, 138c;
57b-c; CH XHI, SECT 149 59b-d; CH xvm, NUMBER 44, 146d-147a; NUMBER 62, 189c-d;
SECT 199-201 71a-c NUMBER 81, 240d-241a; NUMBER 82, 242b-c
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART i, lib; 15b-16b; 28b- 43 MILL: Representative Government, 331c-332d;
29a; PART n, 74a-76b; PART HI, 120a; PART 355b-356b
iv, 152b-154a; 157a-158a 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 276
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, lOOd-lOla; 268c-269b 92b; par 279 93a-94d; par 285 96b; par 321-
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK vi, 39c; BK 322 106c-107a; ADDITIONS, 168 145c-d; 178
VIH, 51a-55c; BK xi, 69a-c; BK xxvm, 259b 147d-148a; 187 149b / Philosophy of History,
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 360b-361c / Political PART iv, 355c-d; 365a
Economy, 372b 373a / Social Contract, BK in, 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 680b-
433a-434b 684a
39 SMITH: Wealth ofNations, BK n, 148b-c; 149d-
150a 1^(1) The sovereign person: sovereignty vested
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 35a; 521d; 622d- in the individual ruler
623a OLD TESTAMENT: / Samuel, 8:4-20 (D) I Kings,
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 307a-c; 586c-587b 8:4-20
\g(2) to lg(3) CHAPTER 31 : GOVERNMENT 651
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART HI, par 279 BK in, 432b-c; BK vi, 520b-c; BK vm,
93a-94d; par 308 102c-103a / Philosophy of 587a-b
History, PART ii, 272b-273a; PART in, 300a- 7 PLATO. Republic, BK i, 301c-d; BK vin-ix,
3Qlc; PART iv, 365c-366b 401d-421a / Statesman, 598b-604b / Laws, BK
51 TOLSTOY- War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 680b- in 663d-677a esp 669d-672a, 672c; BK iv,
684a 679c-682c; BK v, 692c-693a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vm, CH 10-11 412c-
\b. Self-government: expressions of the popu- 413d / Politics, BK in, CH i [i275 a35-b2] 472b,
lar will; elections; voting CH 6-7 475d-477a; CH n [1282^8-14] 480c; CH
b
OLD TESTAMENT: Judges, 21 .-24 15 [I286 5~7] 484d; BK iv, CH i-io 487a-495b
9 ARISTOTLE: Pontics, BK n, CH 6 [1266*5-30] / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 8 608a-c
b 14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus-Numa 61b,d-64a,c /
461c-d; CH 9 [i^7o 7-34l 466d-467a; [1271*9-
17] 467b; CH 12 [1273^36-1274*22] 470c-d;
BK Dion, 800c
HI, CH n
479b-480c; BK iv, CH 14 498b-499c; 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK HI, Sib; BK iv, 72a-b
BK vi, CH 2-3 520d-522a / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologtca, PART I-H, Q 95,
b A 4, ANS 229b-230c; Q 105, A i, ANS 307d-
8 [I365 32-33l 608a
14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 34d-35c / Conolanus, 309d
180b-d / Tiberius Gracchus, 676b-681a,c 23 MACHIAVELLI Prince, CH i 3a-b
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologtca, PART i-n, Q 90, 23HoBBES. leviathan, PART n, 104b-109a esp
A 3, ANS 207a-c 104d-105a; 114b-115a; 129b-130a; 150c-151a;
27 SHAKESPEARE: Coriolanus 351a-392a,c esp 154b-c, 158b-c; PART in, 228b, PART iv,
ACT n, sc ii-m 364a-369a 273a-b
32 MILTON: Sonnets, XH 65a-b 35 LOCKE Civil Government, CH vn, SECT 90-91
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH vm, SECT 95-99 44d-45c; CH x, SECT 132 55a-b
46c-47c, CH xni, SECT 154 60c-d; CH xix, 36 SWIPT: Gulliver; PART n, 78a-b
SECT 216 74d; SECT 222 75d-76c 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 216b
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART n, 73b-74b 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 268c-269b
38 MONTESQUIEU Spirit of Laws, BK n, 4a-6b; 38 MONTESQUIEU. Spirit of Laws, BK II-IH 4a-
BK xi, 71a-c, BK xix, 142a-d 13d; BK iv, 15a-c; BK v, 25d-31b; BK vi, 33a-
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 324c-325b / Social 35a; 37d-38b; BK vm, 54a-b; BK xi, 69a-c;
Contract, BK i, 393a-b; BK n, 396 b-d; BK iv, BK xv, 109a-b; BK xix, 145d
425a-432b 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 359a-b / Social Con-
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 241b-c; 521a-523a,c tract, BK HI, 410b-415b
36 SWIFT- Gulliver, PART i, 37a-b; PART 11, 73b- The powers and duties of the executive
3e. The executive department of government: 3e(2) Administrative institutions and proce-
the enforcement of law; administrative dures
decrees OLD TFSIAMENT Daniel, 6.1-2
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK iv, CH 15 499c-501c 7 PLATO- Laws, BK vi, 700d-704c
35 LOCKE: Toleration, 3a/ Civil Government, CH n, 9 ARISTOTLE' Politics, BK iv, CH 15 [1299*31-
b
SECT 7-13 26c-28b; CH vn, SECT 88-89 44c-d; I3oo 4) 500a-501b; BK vi, CH 8 525b-526d /
CH ix, SECT 126-131 54a-d; CH xn, SECT Athenian Constitution, CH 43-52 572d-576d;
I44-CH xiv, SECT 168 58d-64c; CH XVHI, SECT CH 54-61 577c-581b
203-210 72a-73c; CH xix, SECT 218-219 75a-c 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK i, 22b; BK vi, 88d-89a
APOCRYPHA: / Maccabees, 8:i-i3-(D) OT, 43 MILL- Liberty, 272a; 281d-282b [fn 3] / Rep-
/ Machabees, S:i-i$ / H
Maccabees, 5:11-7:42 resentative Government, 339a-341a; 353c; 411b-
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The basic context of the problems discussed in this chapter, fee STATE; for the discussion of
domestic government, see FAMILY 2b, 53; for the discussion of ecclesiastical government,
see RELIGION 3c(2); for the discussion of divine government, see GOD yc; WORLD ic; and
for the discussion of government in relation to economic affairs, see WEALTH gd.
Other considerations of the issues concerning anarchy, see LIBERTY ib; TYRANNY 3;
WAR AND PEACE i.
Other discussions of the notion of sovereignty in its various forms or meanings, see DEMOC-
RACY 4b; LAW 6b; LIBERTY ib, 6c; STATE ac, 9d; TYRANNY 5c; and for the problems of
foreign policy as between sovereign states, see JUSTICE 9f; STATE 9e(i)~9e(2); WAR AND
PEACE nc.
Sovereignty in relation to federal government, and for the idea of world government, see
yb; LIBERTY 6c; MONARCHY 5~5b; REVOLUTION y; Si AVERY 6d; STATE lob; TYRANNY 6.
The analysis of particular forms of government, see ARISTOCRACY i-2e; CONSTITUTION i-}b,
5~5b; DEMOCRACY i~4c; MONARCHY 1-13(2), 4-46(1), 4e(3)~4e(4); OLIGARCHY 1-2, 4-5;
TYRANNY i-5d; and for the discussion of mixed forms of government, see CONSTITU-
TION 3a~3b; MONARCHY ib-ib(2).
The condition of the ruled under diverse forms of government, see CITIZEN 2b; LIBERTY if;
SLAVERY 6a-6b.
The institutions of self-government, such as representation, elections, voting, see ARISTOC-
RACY 6; CONSTITUTION 9-9^ DEMOCRACY 53-5^4).
The problem of the relativity of the forms of government to the character and circumstances
of particular peoples, see DEMOCRACY 4d; MONARCHY 46(2); TYRANNY 4b.
The general discussion of political revolution and progress, see LIBERTY 6b; PROGRESS
4a~4c; REVOLUTION 2a-2c, 33, 3c~3c(3); and for the consideration of revolution with
respect to particular forms of government, see ARISTOCRACY 3; CONSTITUTION 8-8b;
DEMOCRACY ya; OLIGARCHY 3^b; TYRANNY 8.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below arc works not included in Great Boofy of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
place,
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
and Oligarchy," in Moralta BURKE. An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs
AQUINAS. On the Governance of Rulers W. HUMBOLDT. The Sphere and Duties of Government
DANTE. Convwio (The Banquet), FOURTH TREATISE, PAINE. Rights of Man
CH 4-5 The Age of Reason
.
BURLAMAQUI. Principles of Natural and Politic Law MARITAIN. Scholasticism and Politics, CH in-iv
VATTBL. The Law of Nations, BK i, CH 1-13 SIMON. Nature and Functions of Authority
VOLTAIRE. Letters on the English, vm-ix A. J. CARLYLE. Political Liberty
"Government," in A Philosophical Dictionary
. BARKER. Reflections on Government
J.WILSON. Worlds, PART i, CH 11, v, x FERRERO. The Principles of Power
BENTHAM. A Fragment on Government, CH 2, 4-5 MAC!VER. The Web of Government
INTRODUCTION
familiar word "habit" hasa tremendous ing to one view, the acquisition of habits de-
THE range of meaning. Some of its meanings m pends on activity. According to another, habits
technical discourse are so divergent from one are modifications, passively, not actively, ac-
another as well as from the popular under- quired.
standing of the term that it is difficult to find The word "habit" is also used in a sense dia-
a common thread of derivation whereby to metrically opposite to the meanings so far con^
pass from one meaning to another. sidered. It is the sense in which Aristotle, in the
We can eliminate at once the use of the word History of Animals, discusses the habits of ani-
to designate apparel, as when we speak of a mals, and differentiates species according to the
"riding habit." Yet even this sense contains a differences in theirhabits. Here the word "habit"
root of meaning which cannot be dismissed. is used to
signify not an acquired pattern of
Augustine points out that "the term 'habit' is behavior, but an innate predisposition to act or
"
derived from the verb 'to have' and Aris- react in a certain way. The difference between
totle,considering the meanings of 'to have,' in- acquired habits and "the habits to which there
cludes the sense in which a man may be said "to is an innate
tendency," James tells us, is marked
have a coat or tunic" along with the sense in by the fact that the latter generally "are called
which a man may be said to have a habit "a instincts."
piece of knowledge or a virtue." Just as clothes The opposition between these two meanings
are something a person has or possesses in a man- of "habit" is clear. On the one hand, habits rep^
ner more or less fitting to the body, so habits in resent what, in the case of living things at least,
the psychological sense are qualities which a is added by nurture to nature the results of
person has or possesses, and they too can be experience, training, or activity. On the other
judged for their fitness. hand, habits which are identical with instincts
This understanding of habit is conveyed in belong to original nature itself part of the na-
the ancient remark which has become a com- tive endowment of the animal. Is there any com-
mon expression that "habit is second nature." mon thread of meaning in the notions of ac-
Habit is not original nature, but something quired and innate habit which may explain the
added thereto as clothes are added to the body. use of the word in such opposite senses ?
But unlike clothes, which are added externally The familiar statement that a person does
and merely by contact, habits as second nature what he is in the habit of
doing indicates that a
are nature ,itself transformed or developed. In habit is a tendency to a particular sort of be-
the words of an ancient poet, whom Aristotle havior. Knowledge of a person's habits enables
quotes with approval, "habit's but long prac- us to predict what he is likely to do in any situa-
tice, and this becomes men's nature in the end." tion which elicits habitual conduct on his part.
Not all, as we shall see, would grant that prac- So, too, an ammaFs behavior in a particular sit-
tice is essential to habit. Nevertheless the word uation may be predicted from a knowledge of
"practice" suggests one notion that is common its instincts. Instinct and habit or innate and
to all theories of acquired habit, namely, that acquired habits seem to have this common
habit is a retained effect the result of something character, that they arc tendencies to behavior
done or experienced. Within this common un- of a specific or determinate sort. They are defi-
derstanding, there are opposite views. Accord- nitely not random behavior. In the one case, the
665
666 THE GREAT IDEAS
tendency is
preformed, a part of the inherited are either relatively inflexible at one extreme or
nature of the organism. In the other, the tend- easily modifiable at the other has been thought
ency is somehow a product of experience and to indicate that animal's rank in the scale of in-
learning. In neither case does "habit" refer to telligence. The higher animals seem to have a
mere capacity for action, unformed and inde- greater capacity to form habits and to be capa-
terminate, nor does it refer to the action, but ble, therefore, of modifying their instinctive
rather to the tendency to act. patterns of behavior as the result of experience.
In consequence, their behavior is both more
THE MODIFIABILITY OF instincts by experience adaptive and more variable than that of animals
indicates another and more dynamic connection which always follow the lines of action laid
between innate and acquired habits. William down by instinct.
James conceives innately determined behavior Species whose instincts are largely unmodifi-
as if it were a plastic material out of which new able are at a disadvantage m
a changing environ-
patterns of conduct can be formed. The process ment or m one to which they are not innately
of animal learning he thinks can be generally de- adapted. In the struggle for existence, Darwin
scribed as the replacement of instincts by hab- observes, it is the organism that "vanes ever so
its. "Most instincts," he writes, "are implanted little, either in habits or structure" which "gains
for the sake of giving rise to habits, and this an advantage over some other inhabitant of the
purpose once accomplished, the instincts them- same country." Though for the most part in-
selves, as such, have no ratson d'etre in the psy- stincts seem to be directed toward the animal's
chical economy, and consequently fade away." survival, intelligence, or the power of modify-
Some
years before the Russian physiologists ing instincts by learning, may sometimes be
Bechterev and Pavlov experimentally studied needed to save the animal from his own instincts.
the conditioning of reflexes, James described ani- If the lower animals are most dependent on
mal learning in terms of the substitution of new their instincts and least able to modify them,
forold responses tostimuh which had previously that would seem to indicate a kind of opposi-
called forthan instinctive reaction, or in terms tion between instinct and intelligence. Darwin
of the attachment of instinctive responses to quotes Cuvier to the effect that "instinct and
new stimuli. "The actions we call instinctive," intelligence stand m
an inverse ratio to each
James conform to the general reflex
writes, "all other," but he himself does not wholly accept
this view. He thinks that the behavior of bea-
type" and "are called forth by determinate sen-
sory stimuli." For example, a predatory animal, vers, for example, or of certain classes of insects,
instinctively responsive to various perceptible shows that "a high degree of intelligence is cer-
signs of the whereabouts of its prey, may learn tainly compatible with complex instincts." Yet
to hunt for its food in a particular locality, at a he admits that "it is not improbable that there
particular time, and
in a particular way. Or, to is a certain amount of interference between the
take the example James gives, "if a child, his m development of free intelligence and of in-
aroused, it
may be that for years to come no dog telligence or reason, James seems to take a less
will excite in him the impulse to fondle again." equivocal position. According to him, "man pos-
Similarly, an animal which has no instinctive sesses all the impulses that [animals] have, and a
fear of man may acquire an habitual tendency great many more besides." After enumerating
to flee at man's approach, as the result of expe- what he considers to be the instinctive tenden-
riences m which the appearance of man is asso- cies of the human species, he concludes by say-
ciated with instinctively recognized signs of ing that "no other mammal, not even the mon-
danger. key, shows so large an array." But since James
In the classification of animals, from Aristotle also thinks that man has the keenest intelligence
on, the instincts peculiar to each species have and may even be the only reasoning animal, he
been Used in their differentiation. In addition, cannot believe that there is any "material an-
the degree to which the instincts of an animal tagonism between instinct and reason." On the
CHAPTER 32: HABIT 667
contrary, a high development of the faculties of ment of something earlier." Indeed, he claims
memory, of associating ideas, and of making in- that the instincts of living things revert back
ferences implies not the absence of instinct, but beyond ancestral history to the inorganic. They
the modifiability of instinct by experience and go back to "an ancient starting point, which the
learning. "Though the animal richest in reason living being left long ago." They are an "im-
might be also the animal richest in instinctive print" left upon the development of the organ-
impulses too," fames writes, "he would never ism by "the evolution of our earth and its
seem the fatal automaton which a merely in- relation to the sun."
stinctive animal would be." James, on the other hand, claims that there is
learning and habit formation. Some writers, like than the inheritance of acquired characteristics,
Aquinas, go further than this and maintain that according to which the habits acquired by earlier
m the case of man, the power of reason as an in- generations gradually become, through heredi-
strument of learning and of solving life's prob- tary transmission, the innate habits of later gen-
lems supplants instinct almost entirely, or needs erations.
to be supplemented by instinctive impulses of The question of their origin aside, what is the
an extremely rudimentary sort hardly more structure of instincts? In the chapter on EMO-
complex than simple reflexes. TION, where this matter is considered, instinc-
What other animals do by instinct man does tive behavior is described as having three com-
by reason. "Brute animals," Aquinas writes, "do ponents. It involves, first, an innate ability to
not act at the command of reason," but "if they recognize certain objects; second, an emotional
are left to themselves, such animals act from reaction to them which includes an impulse to
natural instinct." Since in his opinion habits act in a certain way; and, third, the ability to
can be formed only by acts which involve reason execute that impulse without benefit of learning.
as a factor,he does not think that, strictly speak- James covers two of these three points when
ing, habits are to be found in brutes. But, he he defines an instinct as "the faculty of acting
adds, to the extent that man's reason may influ- in such a way as to produce certain ends, with-
ence brutes "by a sort of conditioning to do out foresight of the ends, and without previous
things in this or that way, so in this sense to a education in the performance"; and he touches
certain extent we can admit the existence of on the remaining one when he declares that "in-
habits in brute animals." stinctive reactionsand emotional expressions
shade imperceptibly into each other. Every ob-
THE MODIFICATION of instincts in the course of ject that excites an instinct," he goes on to say,
individual life raises a question about theirmodi- "excites an emotion as well," but emotions "fall
fiabihty from generation to generation. The short of instincts in that the emotional reaction
question has obvious significance for the theory usually terminates in the subject's own body,
of evolution. whilst the instinctive reaction is apt to go fur-
It is
thought by some that an animal's in- ther and enter into practical relations with the
stincts represent the past experience of the race. exciting object."
In a passage quoted by James, Herbert Spencer, In the discussion of instincts from Aristotle to
for example, maintains that "reflex actions and Freud, the emphasis on one or another of these
instincts .... result from the registration of ex- components has varied from time to time. Me-
perience continued for numberless generations." diaeval psychologists, if we take Aquinas as an
Freud appears to hold much the same opinion. example, seem to stress the cognitive aspect. He
"All organic instincts are conservative," he speaks of the sheep running away "when it sees
They arc "historically acquired, and are
writes. the wolf, not because of its color or shape, but
directed towards regressions, towards reinstate- as a natural enemy." The point which he thinks
668 THE GREAT IDEAS
notable here is not the fact that the sheep runs of matter, which consists in "the possession of a
away, but rather the fact that without any pre- structure weak enough to yield to an influence,
vious experience of wolves, the sheep recognizes but strong enough not to yield all at once. Each
the wolf as dangerous. 'The sheep, seeing the relatively stable phase of equilibrium in such a
wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned . . . not structure is marked by what we may call a new
from deliberation, but from natural instinct." set of habits." He cites as examples of habit for-
This instinctive power of recognizing what is to mation in inorganic matter such things as the
the animal's advantage or peril Aquinas calls magnetizing of an iron bar, the setting of plaster,
"the estimative power" and assigns it, along scratches on a polished surface or creases in a
with memory and imagination, to the sensitive piece of cloth. The matter in each of these cases
matter is further discussed in the chapter on it" should be used so broadly. Unlike James, most
DESIRE. writers restrict its application to living things,
and even there they limit habit formation to the
IF WE TURN NOW to the consideration of habit sphere of learning. If the capacity to learn from
as something acquired by the individual, we find experience is not a property of plant life, then
two major issues. The
of these has already
first plants cannot form habits. The same may be said
been mentioned in connection with the concep- of certain species of animals whose activity is en-
tion of habit as a retained effect. tirely and inflexibly instinctive. Habits are pos-
According to William James, the capacity for sessed only by those organisms animals or men
habit formation is a general property of nature, whose future conduct can be determined by
found in inanimate matter as well as in living their own past behavior. Aquinas, as we have
things. "The moment one tries to define what seen, goes further than this, and limits habit for-
habit is," he writes, "one is led to the funda- mation in a strict sense to man alone.
mental properties of matter." He
regards the This leads at once to the second issue. For
laws of nature, for example, as "nothing but the those who believe that man is not specifi-
immutable habits which the different elemen- cally different from all other animals, man's
tary sorts of matter follow in their actions and habits and formation require no spe-
his habit
reactions upon each other. In the organic world, cial distinction or analysis. They hold that hu-
however, the habits are more variable than this." man intelligence differs from animal intelli-
James attributes tins universal capacity for gence only in degree, not in kind. No other
habit formation to what he calls the "plasticity" factors, they thjnk, are present in human learn-
CHAPTER 32: HABIT 669
ing than those which operate when animals of faculties, and especially by their analysis of
somehow profit from experience or acquire new the powers and activities which they think be-
modes of behavior. In the great books there is long peculiarly to man. This in turn gives a
to be found, however, a very special theory of metaphysical meaning to habit, for they treat
habit which is
part of the doctrine that man is human powers and human acts as special cases
other chapters (ANIMAL, EVOLUTION, MAN, whereby that which is disposed is disposed well
MIND). Here we must examine the consequen- or ill, and this, either in regard to itself or in
ces for the theory of habit of these opposing regard to another." In calling a habit a disposi-
views. Do animals and men form habits m the tion, Aristotle goes on to say that all "disposi-
same sense of that term ? The use of the word is tions are not necessarily habits," for while dis-
not at stake, for "habit" may be used in a dif- positions are unstable or ephemeral, habits "are
ferent sense for the acquired dispositions of ani- permanent" or at least "difficult to alter."
mals. Those who hold that brute animals and For a disposition to be a habit, certain other
men do not have habits in the same sense ac- conditions must be present, according to Aqui-
knowledge that men may have, in addition to nas. "That which is disposed should be distinct
their specifically human habits, the sort of mod- from that to which it is disposed," he writes,
ified instincts or conditioned reflexes which are and hence "should be related to it as poten-
typical of animal habit formation. Further- tiality is to act." If there is a being which lacks
more, it is recognized that human and animal all potentiality, he points out, "we can find no
habits are alike in certain respects. Both are ac- room in such a thing for habit ... as is
clearly
quired by activity and both are tendencies to the case in God."
conception applicable to man alone? To clarify which could be actualized in one way and one
this issue, it is necessary to summarize the way only, then such a power of operation could
analysis of human habits which Aristotle and not be determined by habits. Some of man's
Aquinas develop more fully than other writers, powers seem to be of this sort. His faculty of
even than those who share their view of the sensation, for example, functions
perfectly
rationality and freedom of man. when the sense organs have normally matured.
A man does not learn to see colors or to hear
THAT ARISTOTLE and Aquinas should be the tones, and so the simple use of his senses apart
authors of an elaborate theory of human habits from aesthetic perceptions and trained dis-
becomes intelligible in terms of two facts. criminationsdoes not lead to sensory habits.
In the first place, they consider habit in the "The exterior apprehensive powers, as sight,
context of moral theory. For them the virtues, hearing, and the like," Aquinas maintains, "are
moral or intellectual, are habits, and so neces- not susceptive of habits but are ordained to
sarily are the opposite vices. Virtues are good their fixed acts, according to the disposition
capable of certain muscular coordinations, they in the other powers only to the extent that they
stand in the same relation to performing on the are subject to direction by his reason and will,
tennis court. Both are equally able to learn the
Specifically human habits can be formed only
game. But when one of them has learned to in that area of activity in which men are free
play, his acquired skill consists in the trained to act or not to act; and, when they act, free to
capacity for the required acts or motions. The act this or that. Habit, the product of
way
other man maybe able to perform ail these acts freedom, not thought of as abolishing free-
is
or go through all these motions, but not with dom.'However difficult it may be to exert a free
the same facility and grace, or as pleasantly, as choice' against a strong habit, even the strongest
CHAPTER 32: HABIT 671
habit is not conceived as unbreakable; and if it a whole and what is a' part, should at once per-
is breakable, it must permit action contrary to ceive that every whole is larger than its part"
itself. Habitual behavior only seems to lack The sense in which Aquinas says that "the
freedom because a man docs habitually, without understanding offirst principles is called a natural
conscious attention to details, what he would be habit" applies to the first principles of the
forced to do by conscious choice at every step practical reason as well as to the axioms of
if he lacked the habit. theoretic knowledge. Just as no man who
In the theory under consideration habits are makes theoretic judgments about the true and
according to the faculty which they
classified the false can be, in his opinion, without habit-
determine or perfect, on the ground that "every ual knowledge of the principle of contradic-
power which may be variously directed to act tion, so he thinks no man who makes practical
needs a habit whereby it is well disposed to its judgments about good and evil can be without
act." Consequently there are intellectual hab- habitual knowledge of the natural moral law,
its, or habits of thinking and knowing; and ap- the first principle of which is that the good is to
petitive habits, or habits of desire which involve be sought and evtl avoided. "Since the precepts
the emotions and the will, and usually entail of the natural law are sometimes considered by
specific types of conduct. Within a single fac- reason actually," Aquinas writes, "while some-
ulty, such as the intellect, habits are further times they are in the reason only habitually,
differentiated by reference to their objects or in this way the natural law may be called a hab-
to the end to which their characteristic oper- it."
ation is directed. For example, the habit of In a different phase of the tradition Hume
it as an inevitable
knowing which consists in a science like geom- regards tendency of the hu-
etry and the habit of artistic performance such man mind to interpret any repeated sequence
as skill in grammar both belong to the intellect, of events in terms of cause and effect. If one
but they are distinct habits according to their thing has preceded another a certain number of
objects or ends. times m
our experience, we are likely to infer
All of these distinctions have moral as well as that if the first occurs, the second will follow.
psychological significance. They are used in The principle which determines us "to form
formulating the criteria of good and bad habits such a conclusion" is, Hume says, "Custom or
which are more appropriately discussed in the Habit." All our inferences from experience are
chapter on VIRTUE AND VICE. But here one "effects of custom, not of reasoning"; and since
further psychological distinction deserves com- the habit of inferring a future connection be-
ment. Some of man's acquired habits are re- tween things which have been customarily con-
garded as natural in a special sensenot in the joined in the past is, in his opinion, universally
sense in which instincts are called "natural" or present in human nature, Hume refers to it as
"innate" habits. The distinction is drawn from "a species of natural instinct which no reason-
the supposition that certain ha bits develop in all ing or process of thought and understanding is
men because, since human nature is the same able either to produce or prevent."
for all, men will inevitably form these habits if Even Kant's synthetic judgments a priori
they act at all. This word "natural" here ap- have a certain similarity to the thing called
plied to a habit simply means that it is common "natural habit." They comprise judgments the
to all having the same nature. mind will make because of its own nature or,
For example, the understanding of the law in Kant's terms, its transcendental structure.
of contradiction that the same thing cannot be Though a priori, the judgment itself is not in-
affirmed and denied at the same time and other nate, for it arisesonly when actual experience
simple axioms of theoretic knowledge are said provides its subject matter. So, too, the natural
to be possessed by the human mind as a matter habit of first principles, of which Aquinas
of natural habit. If a man thinks at all he will speaks, is not innate, but a result of experience.
come to know these truths. "It is
owing to the
very nature of the intellectual soul," Aquinas THERE is STILL ONE other traditional meaning
writes, "thatman, having once grasped what is of the phrase "natural habit." It occurs in
672 THE GREAT IDEAS
Christian theology. Habits are there distin- difference between habit and custom. But we
,
guished according as they are acquired by man's usually think of customs in terms of the group
own efforts or are a gift of God's grace, which or community rather than the individual. As
adds to or elevates human nature. The former indicated in the chapter on CUSTOM AND CON-
are natural, the latter supernatural. VENTION, the prevailing modes of behavior in
In the sphere of supernatural habits the theo- a society and its widely shared beliefs repre-
ferent from the acquired virtues, which are dividual habits cannot be equated because, with
ordained to this natural light, so also the light respect to any customary practice or opinion,
of grace, which is a
participation of the divine there be non-conforming individuals
may
nature, something different from the infused
is men
of divergent habit. The prevalent or
virtues which are derived from and are ordained predominant customs are the habits of the
*
to this light." These 'infused virtues," like the majority.
natural virtues, are good habits principles of Nosociety endures for long or functions
operation, determining acts of thought or de- peacefully unless common habits generate the
sire. They are either the specifically theological ties of custom. To perpetuate itself, the state
virtues of faith, hope, and charity, or the super- necessarily attempts to mould the habits of
natural counterparts of the acquired intellec- each growing generation by every means of
tual and moral virtues the habits which are education, by tradition, by law. So important
called "the infused virtues" and "the moral is the stability of custom in the life of society,
aspect of habit. But rather than "a habit where- ceived, let it be what it will, as there is
danger
by power is inclined to an act," Aquinas in- and inconvenience in altering it." His extreme
cludes it among those habits by which "the caution with regard to changing the law comes
nature is well or disposed to something, and
ill from a preference for the stability of settled
chiefly when such a disposition has become a customs and from the recognition that "govern-
sort of nature." Through the habit of grace, ment is a structure composed of diverse parts
man's nature elevated by becoming "a par-
is and members joined and united together, with
taker ... of the divine nature." so strict connection, that it is impossible to stir
To
distinguish this kind of habit from those so much as one brick or stone, but the whole
in the operative order, it is sometimes called an body will be sensible of it."
"entitative habit" a habit of the very being Without habits of action, at least, neither
of man's personality. On the purely natural the individual nor society can avoid chaos.
plane, health may be thought of in the same Habits bind day to day in a continuity which
way as a habit which is entitative rather than would be lost if the recurring problems of con-
operative. Itis a habit not of thought, desire, duct or thought had to be solved anew each
or conduct, but of man's physical being. time they arose. Without habits life would
become unbearably burdensome; it would bog
THE WORD "CUSTOM" sometimes a synonym
is down under the weight of making decisions.
for "habit" and sometimes a variant with spe- Without habits men could not live with them-
cial connotations. What a man does habitually selves, much less with one another. Habits are,
is customary for him to do. So far as the single as William James remarks, "the fly-wheel of
individual is concerned, there seems to be no society."
CHAPTER 32: HABIT 673
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. Diverse conceptions of habit: as second nature, perfection of power, retained modifica-
tion of matter 674
i a. Habit in relation to potency and act
2. The kinds of habit: the distinction of habit from disposition and other qualities
2a. Differentiation of habits according to origin and function: innate and acquired,
entitative and operative habits
3^. The innate sense of the beneficial and harmful: the estimative power 676
$d. The instinctive basis of habit-formation: the modification of instincts and re-
flexes through experience or learning 677
3<?.
The genesis, transmission, and modification of instincts in the course of genera-
tions
4.
Habit formation
40. The causes of habit: practice, repetition, teaching, and the law
4#. The growth and decay of habits: ways of strengthening and breaking habits
5^. Habits
of appetite and will: the moral virtues as good habits
y. Supernatural habits
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS. When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES. Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed m two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand iide of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS' One or more of the mam divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows, e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7 45 (D) // Esdras, 7*46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the stvle of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
293d-295c; 298a-c; 317c-319a; 569c-571b pas- 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 51
sim, esp 570a; 592d-593b 12a-15d; Q 54, A 4, REP 1,3 25b-d; Q 92, A i
53 JAMFS Psychology, 8b-9a, 13a-17b esp 17a; 213c-214c; A 2, REP 4 214J>215a,c; Q 95, A 3
44a-52b esp 49b-50a; 705a-712b; 718a; 228c-229b; Q 96, AA 2-3 231c-233a
720a-b; 725a; 732b-735b; 827a-835a esp 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvi [85-
834a-835a n 4 ]77d-78a
54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 154d 155a
Analysis, 15d-18a / Narcissism, 407c-408a / 25 MONTAIGNE. Essays, 16c-d; 42b-44c; 64a-b;
Instincts, 415b-421a,c esp 415d-418a / Repres- 534a-c
sion, 422a-423b / General Introduction, 574d- 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT in, sc iv [160-
575d; 587d-588b; 590c-593b esp 592b-c / 170] 56b
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 640c / Group 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 78d-79c
Psychology, 693b-695c esp 693d-694b / War 31 SPINOZA Ethics, PART v, PROP 10, SCHOL 455a-
:
</. The acquired habits of mind: the intellec- 5e(2) The infused virtues and the supernatural
tual virtues gifts
7 PLATO: Theaetetus, 518b; 542a-c OLD TESTAMENT: / Kings, 3:5-15; 4'29-34(D)
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vn, CH 3 [247 b i-248* /// Kings, 3 15-15 ; 4 ^9-34 / / Chronicles, 22 .-12
b
9] 330b-d; BK vui, CH 4 [255*30- 23] 340a-c / (D) I Paralipomcnon, 22 12 / 77 Chronicles,
b
Metaphysics, BK ix, CH 5 [io47 3i-^4] 573a; 1:7-12 (D) II Parahpomenon, 1.7-12 / Job,
CH 8 [io49b 32-io5o a3] 575c-d / Soul, BK n, 32.8 / Psalms, 119:34-40,73,125,130,144,169
CH 5 [417*21-418*6] 647d-648d / Memory and (D) Psalms, 118:34-40,73,125,130,144,169 /
b b
Reminiscence, CH 2 [45i io~452 6] 693a-694b Proverbs, 2 csp 2 :6 / Ecclesiastes, 2 '.26 / Isaiah,
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vi 387a-394d / Politics, n :2~5 (D) Isaias, n 12-5 / Daniel, i
csp 1
117;
BK vn, CH 15 [i334 b 8-28] 539b-d 2 120-23
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK in, CH 3 178d- APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 3:9; 7:7,22;
180a; CH 8 184b-c; BK iv, CH i, 216c-223d 8:7,21; 9 (D) OT, Boof( of Wisdom, 3:9;
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK in, SECT 4 260b- 7.7,22; 8.7,21; 9 / Ecclesiasticus, 1:1,5,10;
261a; BK v, SECT 16 271c d 11:15; 15:5; 24:24-28; 43:33; 50:29; 51:17-
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 14, (D) OT, Ecclcstasttcus, 1:1,5,10; 11:15; 15 5;
A i, REP 1-2 75d-76c; Q 79, AA 6-7 419b-421c; 24:34-38; 43:37; 50:31; 51:22-23
A 10, ANS 423d-424d; Q 86, A 2, ANS 462a- NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 6-33 / Acts, 2.1-21
463a; Q 87, A 2, REP 2-3 466c-467b / / Corinthians, 1:30; 2; 12:4-11 / Ephesians,
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 49,
: 1:16-18; 4:17-5:21 / Phihppians, 3:9 /James,
A i, REP 3 lb-2b; A 2, REP 3 2b-4a; Q 50, A 3, 1:5-7,17; 3:13-18 / 77 Peter, 1:1-10
680 THE GREAT IDEAS 5r(3) to 6b
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VH, par 23 50b-c;
(5*. Supernaturarjbabfa. 5e(2) The infused vir- BK vin, par 18 57d-58a; par 25-26 60a-b /
tue* and the supernatural gifts.) Christian Doctrme, BK i, CH 24 630c-631a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART i-n, Q 51, 20 AQUINAS Summa Theohgica, PART I-H, Q 49,
.
91b; Q 100, A 12, ANS and REP 3 264d-265d; Q 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 16c-d; 42b-43d; 63d-
no, A 3, ANS and REP 3 350a-d; A 4, REP i 64b; 307c-308a; 316b-c; 390b-c; 391c-393b;
350d-351d; PART n-n, QQ 8-9 416d-426c; Q 395b-396d, 489b-490c; 524b-527a
19 465a-474d; Q 45 598c-603c 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 285b-c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 57c; PART in, 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART in, 48b-49d
176d-177b; PART iv, 270c-d 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 6 173a
35 HUME- Human Understanding, SECT v, DIV 35-
5*(3) The theological virtues 36 464c-465c; DIV 44-45, 469b-c
OLD TESTAMENT: Psalms, 22; 25; 71 (D) Psalms, 38 ROUSSEAU- Inequality, 347a-b
21 ; 24; 70 / Proverbs, 3.1-26 / Isaiah, 40:31 40 GIBBON. Decline and Fall, 464d
(D) Isaias, 40:31 /Jeremiah, 39:18 (D) Jere- 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 125a
mias, 39:18 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 27, 95c-d
APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 3:9 (D) OT, 43 MILL: Representative Government, 370c-d /
Booi( of Wisdom, 3*9 / Ecclestasttcus, 2:6-9; Utilitarianism, 464a-d
b
passim, esp CH i [no3 22-25) 349b; BK vn, 397a
CH 5 [ii48 b i5-i 149*4] 399a-c; CH 10 [1152*28- 7 PLATO: Republic, BK in, 330a-331c; 333b-d;
b
33] 403b / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 10 [i368 28- BK vii, 389d-390b; 391c-d / Timaeus, 474d-
b
I369 27] 612a-613a csp [1369*1-7] 612a-b, 475d / Theaetetus, 518b / Laws, BK 11, 653a-c
b b
[i369 6-8] 612d, [i369 io-i9] 612d-613a 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 10 [13*16-31] 18d
12 LUCKETIUS: Nature of Things, BK HI [307-322] / Physics, BK vn, CH 3 [246*10-248*6] 329c-
34ab 330d
6cto7 CHAPTER 32: HABIT 681
9 ARISTOTLE* History of Animals, BK vii, CH i 51 TOLSTOY: War ami Peace, BK
v, 221b-d
b b
[58i n-22] 107b / Ethics, BK i, CH 4 [iO95 4~ 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK vi,
I3]340c-d; CH 934Sa-c; BK 11, CH 1-6 348b,d- 164b-d
352d passim, esp CH i [no3b 22-25] 349b; BK 53 J\MES: Psychology, 74a-78b; 80a
B
in, CH 5 [ni4 3-io]360a; BK x, en 9 [1179*33-
The social significance of habit: habit in re-
1180*32] 434a-435a / Politics, BK iv, CH n
7.
b b lation to law
[i295 i4-i8]495d; BK VH, CH 13 [i332*39- io]
b
537a-b; CH 15 [i334 8-28] 539b-d; CH 17 6 HERODOTUS- History, BK i, 35c-d; BK in, 97d-
b
[i336*4 o- 38] 541c-542a 98a, BK iv, 137a-138c
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 4 108d-110a; 6 TIIUCYDIDES. Peloponnesian War, BK n, 396d-
BK ii, CH 18 161a-162b; BK in, CH 3 178d- 397a
180a; CH 12 187b-188b; BK iv, CH i 213a- 7 PLATO: Republic, BK iv, 344b-345d; BK vn,
223d; CH 9 237d-238d 401c-d / Laws, BK vn, 713c-714c; 716a-b;
12 AURELIUS. Meditations, BK in, SECT 4 260b- 717d-718d
261a; BK v, SECT 16 271c-d, BK xi, SECT 26 8 ARISTOTLE- Metaphysics, BK n, CH 3 [994b 3i-
306b 995^14] 513c
18 AUGUSTINE' Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 9-10 9 ARISTOTLE- Ethics, BK u, CH i [no3 b 3-6]349a;
b
627a-b, CH 24, 630d-631a BK v, CH
[ii29 i9~24] 377a; BK x, CH 9
i
20 AQUINAS* Sutnma Theologica, PART i-n, Q 50, [1179*33-1 80*32] 434a-435a / Politics, BK n,
1
CROSS-REFERENCES
For. Terms of fundamental relevance to the conception of habit, see BEING 7c~7c(3); MATTER 2a;
MIND 2b; NATURE 2c.
The psychological analysis of the faculties or powers in which habits are situated, see ANIMAL
13-13(3); LIFE 3; MAN
4~4d; SOUL 2c-2c(3); VIRTUE AND VICE 2a.
Other discussions of instinct, see ANIMAL id; DESIRE 33; EMOTION ic; EVOLUTION 3b;
SENSE 3d(3).
Consideration of the factors involved in the formation or breaking of habits, see EDUCATION
3-6; LAW 6d; VIRTUE AND VICE 4-^(4).
The role of habit in the theory of virtue, see VIRTUE AND VICE ic; for other discussions of the
intellectual virtues, see ART i ;
MIND 4c, 4e~4f PRUDENCE
; VIRTUE AND
i-2c; SCIENCE ia(i);
VICE 2a, 23(2);WISDOM 2a; for other discussions of the moral virtues, see COURAGE i, 4;
JUSTICE ic-id; TEMPERANCE i-ib; VIRTUE AND VICE 23-23(1), 3b; for other discussions
of the theological virtues, see KNOWLEDGE 6c(5); LOVE 50-5^2); MIND 5c; RELIGION la;
VIRTUE AND VICE 2b, 8d-8d(3); and for other discussions of the infused virtues and the
supernatural gifts, see MIND 4f, 5c; VIRTUE AND VICE 8e.
Matters relevant to grace as an entitative habit, see GOD yd; MAN 9^2); NATURE 6b; SIN
3c, 4d, 7; VIRTUE AND VICE 8b; WILL 76(2).
Other considerations of the natural habits of the mind, see JUDGMENT 8a; KNOWLEDGE 6c(2)-
6c(4); LAW 43; MIND 4d(2)~4d(3); PRINCIPLE 2b(2), 33(1], 4; VIRTUE AND VICE 43.
The relation of habit to freedom, see WILL 33(2).
The relation of habit to custom and law, see CUSTOM AND CONVENTION 2, 6b; LAW 5f, 6d.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boo{s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
great questions about happiness are pirical, "for it is
only by experience," he says,
THE
concerned with its definition and its attain- "that I can learn either what inclinations exist
ability. In what does happiness consist ? Is it the which desire satisfaction, or what are the natu-
same for all men, or do different men seek dif- ral means of satisfying them." Such empirical
ferent things in the name of happiness? Can knowledge "is available for each individual in
happiness be achieved on earth, or only here- hisown way." Hence there can be no universal
after? And if the pursuit of happiness is not a solution in terms of desire of the problem of
futile quest, by what means or steps should it how to be happy. To reduce moral philosophy
be undertaken ? to "a theory of happiness" must result, there-
On all these questions, the great books set fore, in givingup the search for ethical prin-
forth the fundamental inquiries and specula- ciples which are both universal and a priori.
tions, as well as the controversies to which they In sharp opposition to the pragmatic rule,
have given rise, in the tradition of western Kant sets the "moral or ethical law," the mo-
thought. There seems to be no question that tive of which is not simply to be happy, but
men want happiness. "Man wishes to be happy," rather to be worthy of happiness. In addition to
Pascal writes, "and only wishes to be happy, being a categorical imperative which imposes
and cannot wish not to be so," To the ques- an absolute obligation upon us, this law, he says,
tion, what moves desire? Locke thinks only "takes no account of our desires or the means of
one answer is possible: "happiness, and that satisfying them." Rather it "dictates how we
1
goal and direct their acts accordingly ? With the idea of moral worth that which
According to Kant, "the principle ot private alone deserves happiness taken away, "happi-
happiness" is "the direct opposite of the prin- ness alone is," according to Kant, "far from
ciple of morality." He understands happiness being the complete good. Reason does not ap-
to consist in "the satisfaction of all our desires: prove of it (however much inclination may
extensive, inregard to their multiplicity; inten- desire it) except as united with flesert. On the
sive^in regard to their degree; protenstve, in other hand," Kant admits, "morality alone,
regard to their duration." What Kant calls the and, with it, mere desert, is likewise far from
"pragmatic" rule of life, which aims at happi- being the complete good." These two things
ness, "tells us what we have to do, if we wish to must be united to constitute the true summum
become possessed of happiness." bonum which, according to Kant, means both
Unlike the moral law, it is a hypothetical, the supreme and the complete good. The man
not a categorical, imperative. Furthermore, "who conducts himself in a manner not un-
Kant points out that such a pragmatic or utili- worthy of happiness, must be able to hope for
tarian ethics (which is for him the same as an the possession of happiness."
"ethics of happiness") cannot help being em- But even if happiness combined with moral
684
CHAPTER 33: HAPPINESS 685
worth does constitute the supreme good, Kant whether all who seek happiness look for it 01
stillrefuses to admit that happiness, as a prac- find it in the same things.
tical objective, can function as a moral prin- Holding that a definite conception of happi-
ciple. Though a man can hope to be happy only ness cannot be formulated, Kant thinks that
ifunder the moral law he does his duty, he happiness fails even as a
pragmatic principle oi
should not do his duty with the hope of thereby conduct. "The notion of happiness is so in-
becoming happy. "A disposition," he writes, definite," he writes, "that although every mar
"which should require the prospect of happi- wishes to attain it, yet he never can say defi-
ness as its necessary condition, would not be nitely and consistently what it is that he really
moral, and hence also would not be worthy of wishes." He cannot "determine with certainty
complete happiness." The moral law commands what would make him truly happy; because tc
the performance of duty unconditionally. Hap- do so he would need to be omniscient." If thi
cannot is true of the individual, how various must be
piness should be a consequence, but it
impose any moral obligation or to provide a Locke plainly asserts what is here implied,
standard of right and wrong in human conduct. namely, the fact that "everyone does not place
No more than pleasure can happiness be used his happiness in the same thing, or choose the
as a first principle in ethics, if moralitymust same way to it." But admitting this fact doe;
avoid all calculations of utility or expediency not prevent Locke from inquiring how "ir
whereby things are done or left undone for the matters of happiness and misery men come . . .
sake of happiness, or any other end to be often to prefer the worse to the better; and tc
morality, are considered, from other points of themselves" by explaining how the mdividua
view, in the chapters on DFSIRE and DUTY, and may make errors in judgment -"how thing:
again in GOOD AND EVIL where the problem of come to be represented to our desires undej
the swnmum bonum is raised. In this chapter, deceitful appearances ... by the judgment pro
we be concerned with happiness as an
shall nouncmg wrongly concerning them."
and therefore with the prob-
ethical principle, But this applies to the individual only. Lock<
lems to be faced by those who, in one way or does not think it is
possible to show that wher
another, accept happiness as the supreme good two men differ in their notions of happiness
and the end of ttfe. They n^iy see no reason to one right and the other wrong. "Though al
is
reject moral principles which work through men's desires tend to happiness, yet they an
desire rather than duty. They may find nothing not moved by the same object. Men may choose
repugnant in appealing to happiness as the ul- and yet all choose right." H<
different things,
timate end which justifies the means and de- does not quarrel with the theologians who, or
termines the order of all other goods. But they the basis of divine revelation, describe the eter
cannot make happiness the first principle of nal happiness in the life hereafter which is to b(
ethics without having to face many questions enjoyed alike by all who are saved. But revela
concerning the nature of happiness and its tion is one thing, and reason another.
relation to virtue. With respect to temporal happiness on earth
Discussion begins rather than ends with the reason cannot achieve a definition of the enc
fact that happiness is what all men desire. Once that has the certainty of faith concerning sal
they have asserted that fact, once they have vation. Hence Locke quarrels with "the philos
made happiness the most fundamental of all ophers of old" who, in his opinion, vainly soughi
ethical terms, writers like Aristotle or Locke, to define the summum bonum or happiness ir
Aquinas or Mill, cannot escape the question such a way that all men would agree on whal
686 THE GREAT IDEAS
happiness is; or, if they failed to t some would be should seek must be something appropriate to
in error and misled in their pursuit of happiness. the humanity which is common to them all,
It may be wondered, therefore, what Locke rather than something determined by their
means by saying that there is a science of what individually differing needs or temperaments.
man ought to do "as a rational and voluntary If it were the latter, then Aristotle and Aquinas
agent for the attainment of ... happiness." He would admit that questions about what men
describes ethics as the science of the "rules and should do to achieve happiness would be an-
measures of human actions, which lead to hap- swerable only by individual opinion or personal
from self-evident propositions, by necessary With the exception of Locke and perhaps to
consequences, as incontestable as those in mathe- a less extent Mill, those who think that a science
matics, the measures of right and wrong might of ethics can be founded on happiness as the
be made any one that will apply him-
out, to first
principle tend to maintain that there can
self with the same indifferency and attention be only one right conception of human happi-
to the one, as he does to the other of these ness.They regard other notions as misconcep-
sciences." tions which may appear to be, but are not really
the summum bonum. The various definitions of
THE ANCIENT philosophers with whom Locke happiness which men have given thus present
disagrees insist that a science of ethics depends the problem of the real and the apparent good,
on a first principle which is self-evident in the the significance of which is considered in the
same way to all men. Happiness is not that chapter on GOOD AND EVIL.
agreement, in the opinion of Aristotle and what he wants. When men contrast tragedy
Aquinas, does not suffice to establish a science and happiness, they have in mind the quality a
of ethics, with rules for the pursuit of happiness life takes from its end. A tragedy on the
stage,
which shall apply universally to all men. in fiction, or in life is popularly characterized
On their view, human happi-
what is
truly as "a story without a happy ending." This ex-
ness must be the same for all men. The reason, presses the general sense that happiness is the
in the words of Aquinas, is that "all men agree quality of a life which comes out well on the
in their specific nature." It is in terms of their whole despite and vicissitudes along
difficulties
specific or common nature that happiness can the way. Only ultimate defeat or frustration
be objectively defined. Happiness so conceived is tragic.
is a common end for all, "since nature tends to There appears to be some conflict here be-
one thing only," tween fcelmg happy at a given moment and
It may be granted that there are in fact many being happy for a lifetime, that
is, living hap-
different opinions about what constitutes hap- pily. It be necessary to choose between
may
piness, but it cannot be admitted that all are having a good time and leading a good life.
equally sound without admitting a complete Nevertheless, in both uses of the word "happy"
relativism in moral matters. That men do infact there is the connotation of satisfaction. When
seek different things under the name of happi- men say what they want is happiness, they
that
ness docs not, according to Aristotle and Aqui- imply having it, they would ask for noth-
that,
nas, alter the truth that the happiness they ing more. If they arc asked why they want to be
CHAPTER 33: HAPPINESS
happy, they find it difficult to give any reason "The utilitarian doctrine," he writes, "is that
except "for its own sake." They can think of happiness is desirable, and the only thing de-
nothing beyond happiness for which happiness sirable as an end; all other things being only
means or a preparation. This aspect
serves as a desirable as means." No reason can or need be
of ultimacy or finality appears without quali- given why this is so, "except that each person,
fication in the sense of happiness as belonging so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires
to a whole life. There is
quiescence, too, in the hisown happiness." This is enough to prove
momentary feeling of happiness, but precisely that happiness is a good. To show that it is the
because it does not last, it leaves another and good, it is "necessary to show, not only that
another such moment to be desired. people desire happiness, but that they never
Observing these facts, Aristotle takes the desire anything else."
word "happiness'* from popular discourse and Here Mill's answer, like Aristotle's, pre-
gives the technical significance of ultimate
it supposes the nghtness of the prevailing sense
good, last end, or summum bonum. "The chief that when a man is happy, he has everything
good," he writes, "is evidently something fi- he desires. Many things, Mill admits, may be
nal. . . . Now we call that which is in itself desired for their own sake, but
the possession if
worthy of pursuit more final than that which is of any one of these leaves something else to be
worthy of pursuit for the sake of something desired, then it is desired only as a part of hap-
else, and that which is never desirable for the piness. Happiness is "a concrete whole, and
sake of something else more final than the things these are some of its parts. . Whatever is . .
that are desirable both in themselves and for desired otherwise than as a means
to some end
the sake of that other thing. Therefore, we call beyond itself, and ultimately to happiness, is
final without qualification that which is always desired as itself a part of happiness, and is not
desirable in itself and never for the sake of desired for itself until it has become so."
pressed in terms of its completeness or suffi- spiritual well-being a harmony in the soul,
ciency. It would not be true that happiness is an inner peace which results from the proper
desired for its own sake and everything else for order of the soul's parts.
all
the sake of happiness, if the happy man wanted Early in the Republic, Socrates is challenged
something more. The most obvious mark of the to show that the just man will be happier than
happy man, according to Aristotle, is that he the unjust man, even if in all externals he seems
wants for nothing. The happy life leaves noth- to be at a disadvantage. He cannot answer this
ing to be desired. It is this insight which Boe- question until he prepares Glaucon for the in-
thius later expresses in an oft-repeated char- sight that justice is "concerned not with the
acterization of happiness as "a life made perfect outward man, but with the inward." He can
by the possession in aggregate ofall good things." then explain that "the just man does not permit
So conceived, happiness is not a particular good the several elements within him to interfere
itself, but the sum of goods. "If happiness were with one another. ... He sets in order his own
to be counted as one good among others," inner life, and is his own master and his own
Aristotle argues, "it would clearly be made law, and is at peace with himself."
more desirable by the addition of even the In the same spirit Plotmus asks us to think
leastof goods." But then there would be some- of "two wise men, one of them possessing all
thing left for the happy man to desire, and thatis
supposed to be naturally welcome, while
happiness would not be "something final and the other meets only with the very reverse."
self-sufficient and the end of action." He wants to know whether we would "assert
Like Aristotle, Mill appeals to the common that they have an equal happiness." His own
sense of mankind for the ultimacy of happiness. answer is that we should, "if they are equally
688 THE GREAT IDEAS
wise .
[even] though the one be favored in
. . cessful achievement in later life, will find it
body and in all else that does not help towards hard to obtain happiness." The opposite of
wisdom." We are likely to misconceive happi* happiness is not tragedy but neurosis. In con-
ness, Plotmus thinks, if we consider the happy happy man has found
trast to the neurotic, the
man in terms of our own feebleness. "We count a way to master his inner conflicts and to be-
alarming and grave what his felicity takes come well-adjusted to his environment.
lightly; he would be neither wise nor in the The theory of happiness as mental health or
state of happiness if he had not quitted all spiritual peace may be another way of seeing
triflingwith such things." the self-sufficiency of happiness, in which all
According to Plotmus, "Plato rightly taught striving comes to rest because all desires are
that he who is to be wise and to possess happi- fulfilled or quieted. The suggestion of this point
ness draws his good from the Supreme, fixing isfound in the fact that the theologians con-
his gaze on That, becoming like to That, living ceive beatitude, or supernatural happiness, in
by That ... All else he will attend to only as both ways. For them it is both an ultimate end
he might change his residence, not in expecta- which satisfies all desires and also a state of
tion of any increase in his settled felicity, but peace or heavenly rest.
simply in a reasonable attention to the differing "The ultimate good," Augustine writes, "is
conditions surrounding him as he lives here or that for the sake of which other things are to
there." If he "meets some turn of fortune that be desired, while it is to be desired for its own
he would not have chosen, there is not the sake"; and, he adds, it is
by which the good
that
slightest lessening of his happiness for that." "is finished, so that it becomes complete" all-
Like Plato, Plotmus holds that nothing ex- satisfying. But what is this "final blessedness,
ternal can separate a virtuous man from happi- the ultimate consummation, the unending
ness that no one can injure a man except end"? It is peace. "Indeed," Augustine says,
temperance and the miserable miserable by the or virtue, honor or friendship or, if they do
possession of vice." Happiness is one with not make one or another of these things the
harmony in the body appears also in Freud's of happiness with some one good, to the exclu-
consideration of human well-being. For Freud, sion or neglect of the others, seems to violate
the ideal of health, not merely bodily health the meaning of happiness on which there is such
but the health of the whole man, seems to iden- general agreement. Happiness cannot be that
tify happiness with peace of mind. "Anyone which leaves nothing to be desired if any good
who is born with a specially unfavorable in- anything which is in any way desirable is
happiness and the reality seems to depend on not belong to Happiness to have certain things
the distinction between conscious and natural that man desires; rather does it belong to un-
desire.According to that distinction, considered happmess, in so far as the possession of such
in the chapter on DESIRE, the miser may have things hinders a man from having all that he
all that he consciously desires, but lack many desires naturally." For this reason, Aquinas
of the things toward which his nature tends and points out, when Augustine approved the state-
which are therefore objects of natural desire. ment that "happy is he who has all he desires"
He may be the unhappiest of men if, with all he added the words "provided he desires nothing
the wealth in the world, yet self-deprived of amiss"
friends or knowledge, virtue or even health, As men have the same complex nature, so
his exclusive interest in one type of good leads they have the same set of natural desires. As
to the frustration of many other desires. He they have the same natural desires, so the real
may not consciously recognize these, but they goods which can fulfill their needs comprise the
nevertheless represent needs of his nature same variety for all. As different natural de-
or the element of obligation. The natural moral sal good." This, he holds, "is to be found, not
law may command obedience at the same time in any created thing, but in God alone."
that it directs men to happiness as the satisfac- We shall return later to the theologian's con-
tion of all desires which repiesent the innate ception of perfect happiness as consisting in the
tendencies of man's nature. The theory of natu- vision of God in the life hereafter. The happi-
ral desire thus also has a bearing on the issue ness of this earthly life (which the philosopher
whether the content of happiness must really considers) may be imperfect by comparison,
be the same for all men, regardless of how it but such temporal felicity as men can attain is
may appear to them. no less determined by natural desire. If a man's
Even if men do not identify happiness with undue craving for one type of good can inter-
one type of good, but see it as the possession of ferewith his possession of another sort of good,
every sort of good, can there be a reasonable then the various goods must be ordered accord-
difference of opinioncpncernmg the types of ing to their worth; and this order, since it re-
good which must be included or the order in flects natural desire, must be the same for all
which these several goods should be sought? men. In such terms Aristotle seems to think it
A negative answer seems to be required by the possible to argue that the reality of happiness
view that real as opposed to apparent goods can be defined by reference to human nature
are the objects of natural desire. and that the rules for achieving happiness can
Aquinas, for example, admits that "happy is have a certain universalitydespite the fact
the man who has all he desires, or whose every that the rules must be applied by individuals
wish is fulfilled, is a good and adequate defi- differently to the circumstances of their own
nition" only "if it be understood in a certain lives. No particular good should be sought ex-
way." It is "an inadequate definition if under- cessively or out of proportion to others, for the
stood in another. For if we understand it simply penalty of having too much of one good thing
of all that man desires by his natural appetite, isdeprivation or disorder with respect to other
then it is true that he who has all that he desires goods.
690 THE GREAT IDEAS
THE RELATION OF happiness to particular goods nition of happiness as "activity in accordance
raises a whole series of questions, each peculiar with virtue."
to the type of good under consideration. Of This definition raises difficulties of still an-
these, the most insistent problems concern pleas- other order. As the chapter on VIRTUE AND
ure, knowledge, virtue, and the goods of VICE indicates, there are for Aristotle two kinds
fortune. of virtue, moral and intellectual, the one con-
With regard to pleasure, the difficulty seems cerned with desire and social conduct, the other
to arise from two meanings of the term which with thought and knowledge. There are also
are more fully discussed in the chapter on two modes of life, sometimes called the active
PLEASURE AND PAIN. In one of these meanings and the contemplative, differing as a life de-
pleasure is an object of desire, and in the other voted to political activity or practical tasks
it is the feeling of satisfaction which accom- differs from a life occupied largely with theo-
panies the possession of objects desired. It is in retic problems in the pursuit of truth or in the
the latter meaning that pleasure can be identi- consideration of what is known. Are there two
fied with happiness or, at least, be regarded as kinds of happiness then, belonging respectively
its correlate, for if happiness consists in the pos- to the political and the speculative life ? Is one
session of all good things it is also the sum total a better kind of happiness than another? Does
of attainable satisfactions or pleasures. Where the practical sort of happiness require intellec-
pleasure means satisfaction, pain means frus- tual as well as moral virtue? Does the specu-
tration, not the sensed pain of injured flesh. lative sort require both also?
Happiness, Locke can therefore say, "is the In trying to answer these questions, and gen-
utmost pleasure we are capable of; and Mill erally in shaping his definition of happiness,
can define it as "an existence exempt as far Aristotle considers the role of the goods of for-
as possible from pain, and as rich as possible tune, such things as health, wealth, auspicious
in enjoyments." Nor does Aristotle object birth, native endowments of body or mind, and
to saying that the happy life "is also in itself length of life. These gifts condition virtuous
pleasant." activity or may present problems which virtue
But unlike Locke and Mill, Aristotle raises is needed to solve. But to the extent that hav-
the question whether all pleasures are good, and ing or not having them is a matter of fortune,
all pains evil. Sensuous pleasure as an object they are not within a man's control to get,
often conflicts with other objects of desire. And keep, or give up. If they are indispensable,
if "pleasure" means satisfaction, there can be is precarious, or even unattainable
happiness
conflict among pleasures, for the satisfaction of by those who are unfortunate. In addition, if
one desire may lead to the frustration of another. the goods of fortune are indispensable, the defi-
At this point Aristotle finds it necessary to in- nition of happiness must itself be qualified.
troduce the principle of virtue. The virtuous More is required for happiness than activity in
man is one who finds pleasure "in the things accordance with virtue.
that arc by nature pleasant." The virtuous man "Should we not say," Aristotle asks, "that he
takes pleasure only in the right things, and is ishappy who is active in accordance with com-
willing to suffer pain for the right end. If pleas- plete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with
ures, or desires and their satisfaction, can be external goods, not for some chance period but
better or worse, there must be a choice among throughout a complete life? Or must we add
them for the sake of happiness. Mill makes this 'and who is destined to live thus and die as
choice depend on a discrimination between befits his life* ? . . . If so, we shall call happy
lower and higher pleasures, not on virtue. He those among living men in whom these condi-
regards virtue merely as one of the parts of tions are, and are to be, fulfilledbut happy
happiness, in no way different from the others. men."
But Aristotle seems to think that virtue is the
principal means to happiness because it regu- THE CONSIDERATION of the goods of fortune has
lates the choices which must be rightly made in led to diverse views about the attainability of
order to obtain all good things; hence his defi- happiness in this life. For one thing, they may
CHAPTER 33: HAPPINESS 691
act as an obstacle to happiness. Pierre Bezukhov the leisure necessary for the political or specu-
in War and Peace learned, during his period of lative life open to those of auspicious birth.
captivity, that "man is created for happiness; Even as the man who is a slave belongs wholly
that happiness lies in himself, in the satisfaction to another man, so the highest good of his life
of his natural human cravings; that all unhappi- lies in his contribution to the happiness of that
ness arises not from privation but from super- other.
Solon has in mind when, as reported by Herod- those gifted with very special talents, depends
he tells Croesus, the king of Lydia, that its answer in part on the
otus, for conception of
he will not call him happy "until I hear that happiness itself. Like Aristotle, Spinoza places
thou has closed thy life happily ... for often- happiness in intellectual activity of so high an
times God gives men a gleam of happiness, and order that the happy man is almost godlike;
then plunges them into rum." For this reason, and, at the very end of his Ethics, he finds it
in judging of happiness, as "in every matter, necessary to say that the way to happiness
it behoves us to mark well the end." "must indeed be difficult since it is so seldom
Even if it is possible to call a man happy while discovered." Nevertheless, "true peace of soul"
he is alive on the ground that virtue, which can be found by the rare individual. "All noble
iswithin his power, may be able to withstand things are as difficult as they are rare." In con-
anything but the most outrageous fortune it trast, a statement like Tawney's that "if a
is still necessary to define happiness by refer- man has important work to do, and enough
ence to a complete life. Children cannot be leisure and income to enable him to do it prop-
called happy, Aristotle holds, because their erly, he is in possession of as much happiness as
characters have not yet matured and their lives is
good for any of the children of Adam"
are still too far from completion. To call them seems to make happiness available to more than
happy, or to call happy men of any age who the gifted few.
still may merely to
suffer great misfortune, is Whether happiness is attainable by all men,
voice the hopes we have for them. "The most even on Tawney's definition, may also depend
prosperous," Aristotle writes, "may fall into on the economic system and the political con-
great misfortunes in old age, as is told of Priam stitution, to the extent that they determine
in the Trojan cycle; and one who has experi- whether all men will be granted the opportunity
enced such chances and has ended wretchedly and the leisure to use whatever talents they
no one calls happy." have for leading a decent human life. There
Amongthe goods of fortune which seem to seems to be a profound connection between
have a bearing on the attainment of happiness, conceiving happiness in such a way that all
those which constitute the individual nature of normal men are capable of it and insisting that
a human being at birth physical traits, tem- all normal men deserve political status and eco-
perament, degree of intelligence may be un- nomic liberty. Mill, for example, differs from
alterable in the course of life. If certain in- Aristotle on both scores.
happiness or make it completely unattainable, DIFFERING FROM the position of both Aristotle
then happiness, which is defined as the end of and Mill is the view that happiness is an illusory
man, is not the summum bonum for all, or not goal that the besetting ills of human life as
for all in the same way. well as the frailty of men lead inevitably to
In the Aristotelian view, for example, women tragedy. The great tragic poems and the great
cannot be happy to the same degree or in the tragedies of history may, of course, be read as if
same manner as men; and natural slaves, like they dealt with the exceptional case, but an-
beasts, have no capacity for happiness at all, other interpretation is possible. Here writ large
though they participate in the happiness
may in the life of the hero, the great or famous man,
of the masters they serve. The theory is that is the tragic pattern of human life which is the
through serving him, the slave gives the master lot of all men.
692 THE GREAT IDEAS
Sophocles seems to be saying this, when he pursued rather than enjoyed. On earth and in
writes in Oedipus at Colonus: "Not to be born time, man does not seem able to come to rest in
is, past ail prizing, best; but, when a man hath any final satisfaction, with all his desires quieted
seen the light, this is next best by far, that with at once and forever by that vision of perfection
all speed he should go thither, whence he hath which would deserve Faust's "Stay, thou art so
come. For when he hath seen youth go by, with fcir!"
strange to his lot, what suffering is not therein ? As ALREADY INTIMATED, the problem of human
envy, factions, strife, battles, and slaughters; happiness takes on another dimension when it
and, last of all, age claims him for her own- is treated
by the Christian theologians. Any
age, dispraised, infirm, unsociable, unfriended, happiness which men can have on earth and in
with whom all woe of woe abides." time is, according to Augustine, "rather the
Death is sometimes regarded as the symbol solace of our misery than the positive enjoy-
of tragic frustration. Sometimes it is not death, ment of felicity.
but the fear of death which overshadows life, "Our very righteousness," he goes on to say,
so that for Montaigne, learning how to face "though true in so far as it has respect to the
death well seems indispensable to living well. true good, is
yet in this life of such a kind that
"The very felicity of he writes,
life itself," it consists rather in the remission of sins than
"which depends upon the tranquihty and con- in the perfecting of virtues. . . . For as reason,
tentment of a well-descended spirit, and the though subjected to God, is yet 'pressed down
resolution and assurance of a well-ordered soul, by the corruptible body,' so long as it is in this
ought never to be attributed to any man till he mortal condition, it has not perfect authority
has first been seen to play the last, and, doubt- over vice. .For though it exercises authority,
. .
less, the hardest act of his part. There may be the vices do not submit without a struggle. For
disguise and dissimulation in all the rest . . . however well one maintains the conflict, and
but, in this scene of death, there no more is however thoroughly he has subdued these ene-
counterfeiting: we must speak out plain and mies, there steals in some evil thing, which, if
discover what there is of good and clean in the it do not find ready expression in act, slips out
bottom of the pot." by the lips, or insinuates itself into the thought;
So, too, for Lucretius, what happiness men and therefore his peace is not full so long as he
can have depends on their being nd of the fear is at war with his vices."
of death through knowing the causes of things. Accepting the definition of happiness as the
But neither death nor the fear of death may be possession of all good things and the satisfaction
the crucial flaw. It may be the temporal char- of all desires, the theologians compare the suc-
acter of life itself. cessive accumulation of finite goods with the
It is said that happiness consists in the pos- unchanging enjoyment of an infinite good. An
session of all good things. It is said that happi- endless prolongation of the days of our mortal
ness is the quality of a whole life, not the feeling life would not increase the chances of
becoming
of satisfaction for a moment. If this is so, then
perfectly happy, because time and change per-
Solon's remark to Croesus can be given another mit no rest, no finality. Earthly happiness is
thing actually enjoyed by a man at any mo- Perfect happiness belongs to the eternal life
ment of his life. Man can come to possess all of the immortal soul, completely at rest in the
good things only in the succession of his days, beatific vision, for in the vision of God the soul
not simultaneously; and so happiness is never is united to the infinite good by knowledge and
actually achieved but is always in the process love. In the divine presence and glory all the
of being achieved. When that process is com- natural desires of the human spirit are simul-
pleted, the man is dead, his life is done. taneously satisfied the intellect's search for
It may still be true that to live well or vir- truth and the will's yearning for the good.
tuouslywith the help of fortune is to live "That final peace to which all our righteousness
happily, but so long as life goes on, happiness is has reference, and for the sake of which it is
CHAPTER 33: HAPPINESS 693
maintained," Augustine describes as "the feli- happiness according to the strict tenets of
city of a life which is done with bondage" to Christian doctrine.
vice or conflict, to time and change. In contrast, Aquinas employs the conception of eternal
the best human life on earth is miserable with beatitude not only to measure the imperfection
frustrations and an ennui that human nature of earthly life, but also to insist that temporal
cannot escape. happiness is
happiness at all only to the extent
The doctrine of immortality is obviously pre- that it is a remote participation of true and
supposed in the theological consideration of perfect happiness. It cannot be said of temporal
happiness. For Kant immortality is a necessary happiness that it "excludes every evil and ful-
condition of the soul's infinite progress toward every desire. In this life every evil cannot
fills
the moral perfection, the holiness, which alone be excluded. For this present life is subject to
deserves perfect happiness. But for theologians many unavoidable evils: to ignorance on the
likeAugustine and Aquinas, neither change nor part of the intellect; to inordinate affection on
progress play any part in immortal life. On the the part of the appetite; and to many penalties
contrary, the immortal soul finds its salvation on the part of the body. . . Likewise," Aquinas
.
in eternal rest. The difference between motion continues, "neither can the desire for good be
and rest, between time and eternity, belongs to life. For man
satiated in this naturally desires
the very essence of the theologian's distinction the good which he has to be abiding. Now the
between imperfect happiness on earth and goods of the present life pass away, since life
perfect happiness hereafter. itself passes away. Wherefore it is impos-
. . .
These matters, of relevance to the theory of sible to have true happiness in this life."
happiness, are discussed in the chapters on If perfect happiness consists in "the vision of
ETERNITY and IMMORTALITY; and in the chap- the Divine Essence, which men cannot obtain
ter on SIN we find another religious dogma, that in this life," then, according to Aquinas, only
of original sin, which has an obvious bearing on the earthly life which somehow partakes of God
earthly happiness as well as on eternal salvation. has a measure of happiness in it. Earthly happi-
Fallen human nature, according to Christian ness, imperfect because of its temporal and
teaching, is
incompetent to achieve even the bodily conditions, consists in a life devoted to
natural end of imperfect temporal happiness God a kind of inchoate participation here and
without God's help. Milton expounds this doc- now of the beatific vision hereafter. On earth
trine of indispensable grace in Paradise Lost, in there can be only a beginning "in respect of
words which God the Father addresses to His that operation whereby man is united to God.
Son: ... In the present life, in as far as we fall short
By me upheld, that he may know how frail lessof happiness than the contemplative life,
His fall'n condition is, and to me owe which is busied with one thing, i.e., the con-
All his deliv' ranee, and to none but me.
templation of truth."
God's grace is needed for men to lead a good When the theologians consider the modes of
life on earth as well as for eternal blessedness. lifeon earth in terms of the fundamental dis-
On earth, man's efforts to be virtuous require tinction between the secular and the religious,
the reinforcement of supernatural gifts faith, or the active and the contemplative, they seem
hope, and chanty, and the infused moral vir- to admit the possibility of imperfect happiness
tues. The beatific vision in Heaven totally ex- in either mode. In either, a devout Christian
ceeds the natural powers of the soul and comes dedicates every act to the glory of God, and
with the gift of added supernatural light. It through such dedication embraces the divine in
seems, in short, that there is no purely natural the passing moments of his earthly pilgrimage.
IHt UKtAl
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
The desire for happiness: its naturalness and universality 695
2b. The content of a happy life: the parts or constituents of happiness 697
(1) The contribution of the goods of fortune to happiness: wealth, health,
longevity
(2) Pleasure and happiness 698
(3) Virtue in relation to happiness 699
(4) The role of honor in happiness
(5) The importance of friendship and love for happiness 700
(6) The effect of political power or status on happiness 701
(7) The function of knowledge and wisdom in the happy life: the place of
speculative activity and contemplation
40. Man's capacity for happiness: differences in human nature with respect to
happiness 703
4#. The attainability of happiness: the fear of death and the tragic view of human life
The social aspects of happiness: the doctrine of the common good 704
50. The happiness of the individual in relation to the happiness or good of other men 705
5^. The happiness of the individual in relation to the welfare of the state: happiness
in relation to government and diverse forms of government
70. The effects of original sin: the indispensabihty of divine grace for the attainment
of natural happiness 707
7#. The imperfection of temporal happiness: its failure to satisfy natural desire
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and
page
numbers of me passages referred to, For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad* BK H [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases, e.g., Iliad* BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g.* OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) II Esdras* 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
18 AUGUSTINE- Confessions, BK x, par 31-34 79c- physic of Morals, 258d-259a; 261c; 266b-c;
80c / City of God* BK x, CH i, 298b,d; BK xix, 267b-d / Practical Reason, 300a-d; 306a / Pref.
CH 12 517b-519a Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 369c-370d /
19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 2, A i, Judgement* 478a-479a; 584d-585c; 588b [fn 2]
REP i lOd-lld; Q 12, A i, ANS 50c-51c; A 8, 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 461c-464d
REP 4 57b-58b; Q 19, A 3, ANS llOb-lllc, Q 26, 46 HEGEL Philosophy of Right, PART n, par 123
2, ANS and REP 2 150c-151a; Q 62, A i, ANS
A 44a-b; ADDITIONS, 78 128c-d
317d-318c; Q 63, A 3 327b-328b; Q 82, A i 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [1544-1706] 37b-41a;
431d-432c; Q 83, A i, REP 5 436d-438a; A 2, PART n [11,559-594] 281b-282a
ANS 438a-d; PART i-n, Q i, AA 4-8 6l2a-615c; 48 MELVILLE- Moby Dicl(, 123a
Q 2, A 2, REP 3 616d-617b; Q 3, A 6, REP 2 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 316d-317a; 592d
627b-628a; Q 5, A i, ANS 636d-637c; A 4, ANS 51 TOLSTOY. War and Peace, BK xin, 577a-578b;
and REP 2 639a-640b; A 8 642d-643d BK xiv, 605b-d; BK xv, 630c-631c
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 63, 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov BKV,127b- ,
2. The understanding of happiness: definitions 2a. The marks of a happy man, the quality of a
and myths happy life
6 HERODOITJS: History, BK i, 6c-8a; 48c; BK HI, 5 AESCHYLUS- Agamemnon [351-474] 55d-57b
98b-99a 5 SOPHOCLES: Antigone [582-624] 136b-c; [1155-
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 124a-129d / Symposium, 1171] 140d-141a
164c-165a / Republic, BK n, 311c-312b; BK x, 5 EURIPIDES: Bacchantes [878-911] 347b-c /
437c-441a,c / Timaeus, 444c-446b / Cntias, Hecuba [619-628] 358a
479b-485d / Statesman, 586c-589c / Philebus, 7 PLATO- Gorgias, 284a-285a / Philebus, 614b-d;
609a-c / Laws, BK n, 656d-658d 617d-618a; 635b-639a,c
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i 339a-348d csp CH 7 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 7 [1097*15-1098*
b a b
[i097 22-io98 i9] 343a-c; BK ix, CH 9 [1169 19] 342c-343c; CH 8 [io98 2O-29] 344a-b; CH
b
28-30] 423c; BK x, CH 6-8 430d-434a / 9 [ I0 99 33l- CH I0 [1101*20] 345b-346c; BK x,
Politics, BK iv, CH ii [1295*35-38] 495c; BK CH 7-8 431d-434a / Politics, BK vn, CH 8 [1328*
b a b b
vn, CH 13 [i33i 24-i332 27] 536b-537a / 37- 2] 532d, CH 13 [i33i 24-i332*27] 536b-
Rhetoric, BK i, CH 5 [136(^4-18] 600d-601a / 537a / Poetics, CH 6 [1450*15-20] 684c
Poetics, CH 6 [1450*17-20] 684c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [1-61]
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [1-61] 15a-d
15a-d; [646-651] 23b; BK in [14-24] 30b; BK 12 EPIC FETUS: Discourses, BK in, CH 24 203c-
v [1-54] 61a-d; BK vi [1-42] 80a-d 210a
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 4 108d- 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK v, SECT 8 269d-
llOa 270b; SECT 34 273c; SECT 36 273d; BK ix,
12 AURELIUS- Meditations, BK iv, SECT 3 263b- SECT 2 291c-d
264a 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK vi, 91c
13 VIRGIL: Eclogues, iv 14a-15b / Aeneid, BK vm 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK v, PREF 207b;
[306-336] 267a-268a BK vm, CH BK x, CH 1-3 298b,d-
8 270a-d,
14 PLUTARCH: Solon, 74c-75c / Pyrrhus, 320c- 301a; BK xir, CH
342b,d-343c; BK xix, CH
i
267b-d / Practical Reason, 298c-d, 339b-d; 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 20 17a;
345a-c / Judgement, 584d-587a; 594c-596c ADDITIONS, 15 118d / Philosophy of History,
43 MILL: Utihtariantsm, 448a-452b esp 448a; INTRO, 165a-b
456a-d; 461c-464d 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [3431-3458] 84a-b
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 144d 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 204b-205a; 287b-
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART n, par 123 288a; 360a-361a
44a-b; ADDITIONS, 78 128c-d 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vi, 259b-260a;
47 GOETHE: Faust, PART n [9695-9902] 235a- BK xi, 480a-482b
240b 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v, 130a-
54 FREUD- Civilization and Its Discontents, 7 136b; BK vi, 148d-150d; 153d-157b; BK VH,
777c-778a; 782d 190c-191a,c
2b to 2b(\) CHAPTER 66: 697
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 572a-c; 644d
2b. The content of a happy life: the parts or 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 297c-298a
constituents of happiness 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 236b-237c / Fund, Prin.
5 AESCHYLUS: Agamemnon [351-474] 55d-57b Mctaphysic of Morals, 256a-257c; 258d 259a;
5 SOPHOCLES: Antigone [1155-1171] 140d-141a 266a-c; 267b-d / Practical Reason, 345a-c /
5 EURIPIDES: Ion [585-647] 287d>288b / Bac- Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 370b-d
chantes [878-91 1] 347b-c / Judgement, 584d-586a
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 6c-8a 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 448a-453a passim; 461 c-
7 PLATO. Euthydemus, 69a-71a; 74b-76b / Gor- 464d
275b-276b / Republic, BK i,
gias, 2(57c-270a; 44 Rosw ELL: Johnson, 123b; 203b-c; 214b; 350d-
295d-297b; BK v, 364c-365d / Timaeus, 475d- 351b; 505c
476b / Laws, BK i, 643c; BK n, 656d-658d; 46 HEGEL: Philosophy ofRight, INTRO, par 20 17a;
BK v, 688c-690c; 694a-d, BK vin, 737c-d; BK ADDITIONS, 15 118d
ix, 751c 47 GOETHE: Faust csp PART i [354-521] lla-
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 4 [1095*13-27] 15a, [602-784] 16b-20b, [1064-1125] 26b-28a,
340b; CH 5 340d-341b; CH 8 [i 099*3 IJ-CH 9 [1544-1571] 37b-38a, [1660-1706] 40a*41a,
b
[1100*9] 344d-345c esp CH 9 [io99 25-3i] [1765-1775] 42b, [3217-3281] 79a-80a, PART
345b; BK ix, CH 9 423a-424b passim / Politics, " [9356-9573] 227a-232a, [9695-9944! 235a-
BK in, CH Q [1280*31-34] 477d-478a; BK vu, 241 b, [11,441-452] 278b
b 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 308a-b
CH I3'[i33i 24-i 332*27] 536b-537a / Rhetoric,
b
BK i, CH 5 600d-602d; CH 9 [i367 33~35] 610d 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 194a-198b
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [1-61] passim; 215b-218b; BK vi, 235a-238a; BK vu,
15a-d; BK v [1-54] 61a-d; BK vi [1-42] 80a-d 275a; BK xm, 577a-578b; BK xiv, 605b-d; BK
12 EPICTETUS Discourses, BK iv, CH 4 225a-228a; xv, 630c-634a
CH 6-7 230b-235a 52 DOSTOEVSKY. Brothers Karamazov, BK n, 25d-
12AuRELius: Meditations, BK in, SECT 12 27d; 37c-38a; BK v, 127b-137c passim, csp
262b-c; BK v, SECT 8 269d-270b; BK vin, 135d-136b
SECT i 285a-b; BK ix, SECT 2 291c-d; BK x, 53 JAMES Psychology, 199b-204b passim, csp
:
b b
536d-537a; CH 15 [i334i2- 7] 539a-b / Rhet- 15 [i334*i2- 8] 539a-b / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 5
b
oric, BK i, CH 5 [i36o i4-27] 601a [1360^19-27] 601a
700 THE GREAT IDEAS to 2b(5)
b
523b-d [ii43 i7-i 144*6] 393b-c, BK x, CH 7-8 431d-
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologtca, PART i, o 26, 434a / Politics, BK VH, CH 2 [1324*23-35]
A 4, ANS 151c-152a,c; PART 1-11, Q 2, A 4 528b
618a-d 11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, Slid
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologtca, PART i-n, Q 66, 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [1-61]
A 5, REP 1-2 79b-80c 15a-d; BK v [1-54] 61a-d, [1113-1135] 75c-d;
21 DANTE. Divine Comedy, HELL, xn [100-139] BK vi [1-42] 80a-d
17b-d; PURGATORY, xi [73-117] 69c-70a; 12 EPICTLTUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 29 134d-
PARADISE, vi 113c-115a 138a; BK in, CH 10 185d-187a; CH 15 190a-
23 HOBBES: leviathan, PART i, 76c-d 191a; CH 22 195a-201a; BK iv, CH 4 225a-
25 MONTAIGNE* Essays, 107a-112d; 126b-131a; 228a; CH 6 230b-232c
382b-383d, 400b-d, 443d-446a, 486b-489b; 12 AtiRELius. Meditations, BK in, SECT 6 261a-c;
538d-540b SECT 9 261d; SECT 12 262b-c; BK iv, SECT 16
26 SHAKESPEARE' 3rd Henry VI, ACT n, sc v 264d; BK v, SECT 9 270b-c; BK vi, SECT 12
[1-54] 81d-82a / Richard II, ACT iv, sc i [162- 274c; BK x, SECT 12 298c-d
334] 343b 345a / 2nd Henry IV, ACT HI, sc i 13 VIRGIL: Georgics, 11 [490-493] 65b
[4-31] 482d-483a / Henry V, ACT iv, sc i [247- 14 PLUTARCH: Pericles, 121a-122b/ CaiusMarius,
301] 554a-c 353d-354a,c
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART i, 193a-b; 15 TACITUS- Annals, BK xiv, 154a*c
PART n, 368c-d 17 PLOTINUS- First Ennead, TR iv 12b-19b esp
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 326b-327a; 362b-d; CH 3-4 13c-14c, CH 9-10 16c-17c; TR v, CH 10
364a-b / Political Economy, 372b-377b esp 20d-21a / Sixth Ennead, TR vn, CH 34-35 338b-
373c-374a 339c; TR ix, CH 9-11 358d-360d
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 157b-d; 572a-c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK v, par 7-9 28c-
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 194a-d; 297c-298a 29b / City of God, BK vin, CH 8 270a-d; BK x,
43 MILL: Representative Government, 382 b / Utili- CH 2 299d-300a; BK xix, CH 1-3 507a-511a;
tarianism, 462c-463b passim CH 14 520a-d; CH 19 523b-d
702 THE GREAT IDEAS 3/o 4
HI, CH 2 177c-178d; CH 10 185d-187a; CH 14
(26. The content of a happy the parts or con-
life: CH 24 203c-210a
189c-190a;
stituents of happiness. 26(7) The Junction 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK n, SECT 11-12
of knowledge and wisdom in the happy 258a-c; BK HI, SECT 6 261a-c; BK vn, SECT
life; the place of speculative activity and
55 283b-c; BK vm, SECT i 285a-b; SECT 32
contemplation*) 287d-288a; SECT 39 288c; BK ix, SECT i
19 AQUINAS : Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 26 291a-c; SECT 7 292b
150a-152a,c passim, csp A 2 150c-151a; PART 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK ix, CH 4-5 287a-
i-n, Q i, A 6, REP 1-2 614a-c; Q 3, AA 3-8 624b- 289a, BK xiv, CH 8-9 381c-385b
629c; Q 5, A 4, ANS 639a-640b; Q 35, A 5 775d- 19 AQUINAS- Summa Theohgica, PART i-n, Q i
777a 609a-615c passim; Q 5, A 8 642d-643d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 66, 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 90,
A 5 csp REP 2 79b-80c; PART II-H, Q 180 607d- A 2, ANS 206b*207a; Q 91, A 4, ANS 210c-211c;
61 6d; Q 182 620b-624d Q 94, A 2, ANS 221d-223a
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, iv [106-147] 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 76c-d
6c-7a; PURGATORY, xxx-xxxi 99b*102b 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i,
22 CHAUCER: Prologue [285-308] 164a-b 65c-66b
23 HOBBES Leviathan, PART i, 63a; 65a-b; 76c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 71d-72b
25 MONTAIGNL: Essays, 6d-7a; 28a-29c; 70d- 33 PASCAL- Provincial Letters, 62b-68b
72a; 231d-238d; 399d-401a; 502c-504c; 508a- 35 LOCKE. Human Understanding, BK i, CH n,
512a; 541d-543a,c SECT 3, 104c; BK ii, CH xxi, SECT 42-73 188c-
26 SHAKESPEARE' Love's Labour's Lost, ACT i, 199c passim
sc i
[1-162] 254a-256a 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 336c-d
27 SHAKESPEARE' Pericles, ACT HI, sc n [26-42] 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 235a-b; 236b-239a / Fund.
434d-43Sa Prin. Metaphysic of Morals 253a-287d esp
29 CERVANTES- Don Quixote, PART i, 145d-146a 256a-257d, 258d-259a, 261c-264a, 266a-b,
30 BACON* Advancement of learning, 18a-b; 267b-d, 274d-275b, 282b-283d, 286a-c /
27c-d; 71a-c Practical Reason 291a-361d esp 304d-307d,
31 DESCARTES: Rules, i, Id / Discourse, PART i, 325a-327d, 330c-331a, 338c-355d / Pref. Meta-
41d-42a; PART HI, 49d-50b / Meditations, in, physical Elements of Ethics, 365b-366d; 367c;
88d-89a 369c-373b / Intro. Metaphysic of Moral*, 387b-
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 26-28 431a-c; 388c; 389a-390a,c / Judgement, 478a-479a;
APPENDIX, iv 447b-c; xxxn 450c-d; PART v, 584d-587a; 588b [fn 2); 591b-592c; 595a-c;
PROP 31-33 459d-460c; PROP 37 461c 596c-597d; 604d-606d esp 604d-60Sc, 605d-
32 MILTON: // Penseroso 21a-25a 606b [fn 2]
33 PASCAL: Pens&s, 73-74 185a-b 43 MILL: Utilitarianism 445a-476a,c
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xxi, 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART n, par 124
SLCT 44 188d-189b; SECT 55-56 192c-193b 44b-d; par 134-135 47b-d, PART in, par 155
passim 57c; par 261 83a-d; ADDITIONS, 76-81 128a-
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 345a / Political Econ- 129a; 85-87 129b-d
omy, 373c-374a 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 316a-317a; 592d
40 GIBBON- Decline and Fall, 645c-d 52 DOSTOEVSKV Brothers Karamazov, BKV, 127b-
42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 256c- 137c passim
257d; 267b-d 54 FREUD Origin and Development of Psycho-
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 448d-449c; 451c<452a Analysis, 20c-d / Civilization and Its Discon-
44 Bos WELL -.Johnson, 118a; 299b-d tents, 772a-b; 800c>801b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 20
17a; ADDITIONS, 15 118d
4. The pursuit of happiness
47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [354-521] lla-15a; 6 HERODOTUS History, BK i, 6c-8a; BK n, 77a-b;
-
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK vm, CH 8 270a-d; 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{ esp 175b-176a, 313b-
BK xix, CH 4-8 5lla-516a; BK xxn, CH 22-24 314a, 316a-b, 319a-b, 341b-342a, 357a, 360b-
606d-612a 361a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 5 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK n, 80d-81a; BK
636d643d in, 117d; BK vr, 235a-238a; 262d-263a; BK
21 DANTE. Divine Comedy, PARADISE, xi [1-12] vn, 294b-296a, BK vin, 303a-305b; BK ix,
122a 357d-358b; 373b-374d; BK xn, 560a-562a;
22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK i, STANZA BK xni, 577a-578b; BK xiv, 605b-d; BK xv,
31-35 5a-b; BK in, STANZA 117-120 69b-70a; 630c-631c; EPILOGUE i, 659c-d; 671c-672a
BK IV, STANZA 72-74 98aj BK V, STANZA 262- 52 DOSTOEVSKY. Brothers Karamazov, BK n, 25d-
263 154b / Knight's Tale [1303-1324] 181b; 27d; BK in, 53b-54b; BK v, 121d-127b; 127b-
[2837-2852] 206b-207a / Merchant's Tale 137c passim; BK xi, 345a-c
[9927-9954] 332a-b / Monies Tale 434a-448b 54 FREUD Civilization and Its Discontents, 77la-
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 65a-b; 76c-d; 802a,c esp 772b-c, 776b-777c, 778d-779a,
79b-d; PARTII, 163d-164a 788d-789b, 793d-794a, 796b-c, 799c-800a
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 6d-10a, 26d-36b, 70d-
72a; 115b-119d; 124c-125a; 149b-d; 231d-
5. The social aspects of happiness: the doctrine
240c; Q 99, A 3, ANS 247a-248a; Q 100, A 2, 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xv [40-
ANS 252b-253a; A 8, ANS and REP 3 2S9d-261a; 81] 75d-76a; xvi [91-138) 77d-78b
A ii* REP 3 263c-264d; Q 105, A i, REP 3 307d- 35 LOCKE: Toleration, 15d-16a
309d; A 2, ANS and REP 1,4 309d~3l6a; A 3, 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 291d-292a; 305d;
ANS and REP 5 316a-318b; PART II-H, Q 39, A 330b-c
2, REP 3 575b-576b; Q 187, A 3, REP 1,3 666a- 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xxiv,
669b; PART HI SUPPL, Q 96, A 6, REP 11 1058a- 203a
1061b; A 7, REP 3 1061b-1062a 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 343d-345c; 363a-366d
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 84c-86b esp 363b-364a
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 69d-76a esp 42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic ofMorals, 272d-
71b-c, 72b-c 273a / Practical Reason, 304b-305c / Pref.
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 18, SCHOL Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 369c-373b esp
429a-d 372a-b; 373d; 375d-376b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH n, 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 450 b; 452b-454a; 460a-
SECT 6 105b-c 461c; 461d; 463a-b; 469b-470c
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART iv, 180b-184a 44 RQSW ELL: Johnson, 221d-224a
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 323a 328a,c; 333 b-c; 46 HEGEL; Philosophy of Right, PART n, par 125-
342c-343b; 351c-352a; 363a-366d / Political 126 44d-45b; par 134 47b; PART in, par 155
Economy, 372b-377b / Social Contract, BK n, 57c; par 182-183 64a; par 189 65d-66a; par 192
400c-401a; 401d 66b-c; par 249 78c; ADDITIONS, 116 135c-d;
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 114b-d / Pref. Metaphysi- 127 137b
cal Elements of Ethics, 369c-373b / Science of 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART n [11,559-572] 281 b
Right, 438d-439a 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 310a-319a esp 312a-
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 45, 147c-148a 313a, 314b-315d, 316c-317c; 592d
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 453a-454a; 460a-461c; 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK HI, 116c-117a;
461d; 475a-476a 127d 128d; BK v, 197b c; 214c-216d; BK x
44 Bos WELL: Johnson, 211 b-c 430a-b; EPILOGUE i, 670d-671c
49 DARWIN- Descent of Man, 316a-317a; 592d 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK n, 25d-
52 DOSTOEVSKY* Brothers Karam azov, BKV, 127b- 27d; 37c-38a; BK v, 121d-127b; BK vi, 154d-
13 7c passim 159a; 165b-167b
54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 799a-
802a,c esp 799c-800a
b. The happiness of the individual in relation
to the welfare of the state: happiness in
5a. The happiness of the individual in relation relation to government and diverse forms
to the happiness or good of other men of government
5 SOPHOCLES: Ajax [263-281] 145c OLD TESTAMENT: Proverbs, ix:io-n
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK in, 99a 5 AESCHYLUS Seven Against Thebes 27a-39a,c
:
261a; BK v, SECT 6 269 b-d; BK vi, SECT 14 398c; 402b-c; BK vi, 511c-d
274d-275a; BK VIH, SECT 12 286b-c; SECT 56 7 PLATO: Crito 213a-219a,c esp 216d-219a,c /
290c; BK ix, SECT i 291a-c; SECT 23 293c; Republic, BK i, 302c-306a; BK n, 311b-c; BK
SECT 42 295c-296a,c; BK x, SECT 6 297a-b iv, 342a-d; BK v, 364c-365d; BK vi, 379d-
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK iv, par 7-14 20d- 380b; BK vii, 390b-391b; 401a-b; BK ix, 416a-
23a / City of God, BK xix, CH 8 515c-516a; CH 421a esp 418d-421a / Laws, BK v, 692c-693a;
12-14 517b-520d BK vi, 707c-708a; BK ix, 754a-b / Seventh
19 AQUINAS Sumrna Theologica, PART i-n, Q i,
.
Letter, 814b-c
A 5, ANS 613a-614a; A 7 614c-615a; Q 4, A 8 BK b
CH 2
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, [iO94 8-io]
i,
AA i-n 50c-60d; Q 26, A 3 151a-c; Q 60, A 5, A 4 84d-85d; PART II-H, Q 18, A 2 462d-463d;
REP 5 313b-314c; Q 62, A i, ANS 317d-318c; A Q 19, A ii 472d-473d; Q 26, A 13 519d-520d;
2, ANS 318d-319c; Q 64, A i, REP i 334a-335c; Q 28, A 3 528d-529c; PART in SUPPL, Q 90, A 3
Q 82, A 2, ANS 432d-433c; Q 84, A 5 446c-447c; 1014d<lbl6a; Q 93 1037c-1040c; Q 94, A 3
Q 89, A 2, REP 3 475a-d; Q 93, A 8, REP 4 499b- 1041d-1042c; Q 96 1049d-1066a
SOOc; Q 94, A i, ANS and REP i 501d-503a; Q 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xv [40-
100, A 2, ANS 521c-522b; PART i-n, Q 3, A 8 81] 75d-76a; xxviii-xxxin 96a-105d; PARA-
628d-629c; Q 4, AA 1-2 629d-631a DISE 106a*157d esp in [43-90] 109d-110b, vi
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART I-H, Q 67, [112-126] 114d-115a, xiv [1-66] 126d-127c,
A 3 83b-84d; A 6, REP 3 87a-c; Q 69, A 2, REP 3 xx [130-138] 138a, xxi [1-102] 138b-139b,
97b-98c; A 4, ANS and REP 3 lOOc-lOlc; PART xxn [52-72] 140b, xxvm [94-114] 149d-150a,
ii-n, Q i, A 8, ANS 387a-388c; Q 8, A 7 421d- xxx-xxxin 151d-157d
42 2c; Q 9, A 4, REP 3 425d-426c; Q 180, A 5 22 CHAUCER: Parson's Tale, par 103 549b-550a
611d 613a; PART in, Q 9, A 2 764c-76Sa; Q 15, 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART HI, 195d
A 10 795b-796a; PART in SUPPL, Q 90, A 3 32 MILTON: On Time 12a-b / At a Solemn Music{
1014d-1016a; Q 92 1025b-1037c; Q 94, A i 13a-b / Lycidas [165-185] 31b / Sonnets, xiv
1040d-1041b; Q 98, A 5, ANS 10 75 b-d 66a / Paradise Lost, BK HI [135-143] 138b;
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, v [1-12] [344-415] 143a-144b; BK VH [150-161] 220b;
112a-b; xiv [1-66] 126d-127c; xv [28-84] 128c- BK 245a-246a; BK xi [57-66]
viii [618-630]
129b; xxi [1-102] 138b-139b; xxvm [94-114] 300b; [696-707] 314b; BK xn [411-465] 328a-
149d-150a; xxxn [i39]-xxxui [145] 156a-157d 329a
22 CHAUCER: Parson** Tale, par 10, 499b-500a 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 643 290b-291a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 65a-b 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 234b-d
to Id CHAPTER 33: HAPPINESS 709
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 192d-193a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART in, 195b-d
32 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK n, 22b- 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK n,
23c; BK xi, 341d-342c 119b-122a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 199b 26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard III, ACT i, sc iv [42-
63] 115a-b
The misery of the damned
c(3) 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART n, 418c-
OLD TESTAMENT: Job, 20.4-29 / Psalms, 9:16-17; 419a
21 8-12; n6'3 (D) Psalms, 9:17-18; 20-9- 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 226d-227a
13; 1143 / Isaiah, 5:14-15; 14:4-23; 26.10; 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK i-n 93a 134a; BK
66:24 (D) Iwi&s* 5' I 4~ I 5; 14 "4-23; 26 10; vi [867-677] 215a-b
66:24 / Ezefyel, 31:10-18 (D) Ezechid, 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xxi,
31.10-18 / Daniel, 12.2 SECT 62 194c-d; SECT 72 198a-c
APOCRYPHA: Judith, 16-17 (D) OT Judith, 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 188d-189a
16:20-21 / Wisdom of Solomon, 4 16-5.23 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 234a-c
passim (D) OT, Boo^of Wisdom, 4 16-5 24 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v,
passim / Ecclesiasticus, 7-17; 21-9-10 (D) 127c-d; BK vi, 169c-170b; BK vii, 185a-c
OT, Ecclesiasticus, 7 1 9 2 1 i o- 1 1
;
.
ROSS-REFERENCES
or: Matters most relevant to the general theory of happiness, see GOOD AND EVIL 33, 53; PLEAS-
URE AND PAIN 6-6b, 6d.
Particular goods or virtues which are related to happiness, see COURAGE 5; HONOR 20;
KNOWLEDGE 80(4); LOVE 33; PRUDENCE 2a; TEMPERANCE 3; VIRTUE AND VICE id;
WEALTH ica; WISDOM 2c; and for the discussion of means and ends in the order of goods,
see GOOD AND EVIL 40, 50-5^
Other treatments of the conflict between an ethics of happiness and an ethics of duty, see
DUTY 2; PLEASURE AND PAIN 8b; PRINCIPLE 4-4^
710 THE GREAT IDEAS
For: The bearing of natural desire on the pursuit of happiness, see DESIRE 2a, 33, 70; LOVE
53-53(1); WILL ;d.
The relation of happiness to death and the fear of death, see IMMORTALITY i ; LIFE AND
DEATH 8a-8c.
Other considerations of individual happiness in relation to the state or the common good,
see GOOD AND EVIL 5d STATE 2f, ;
Basic notions involved in the Christian doctrine of supernatural happiness or eternal beati-
tude, see GOD 6c(4), yd, yg; IMMORTALITY 5e~5g; LOVE 53(2); PUNISH-
ETERNITY 4d;
MENT SIN 3c-3d, 4d, 6d, 7; VIRTUE AND VICE 8b, 8e; WILL 76-76(2).
5d, 5e(i);
Another discussion of the beatitude of God, see GOD 4h.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below arc works not included in Great Boofy of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
NICOLAS OF CUSA. The Vision of God A. E. TAYLOR. The Faith of a Moralist, SERIES i
(9)
TERESA OF JESUS. The Way of Perfection KIRK. The Vision of God
SURBZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae, xxx (u, 14) SANTAYANA. Some Turns of Thought in Modern
JOHN op THE CROSS. Ascent of Mount Carmel Philosophy, CH 4
S. JOHNSON. History ofRasselas MARITAIN. Scholasticism and Politics, CH vn
HUTCHESON. A System of Moral Philosophy ADLER. A Dialectic of Morals
VOLTAIRE. Candide LUBAC, Surnaturel
PALEY. Moral Philosophy* BK i, CH 6 O'CONNOR. The Eternal Quest
Chapter 34: HISTORY
INTRODUCTION
TN our language the term History" Hegel ob- Francis Bacon makes this distinction when he
JL serves, "unites the objective with the sub- divides history into "natural, civil, ecclesiasti-
jective side. ... It comprehends not less what cal, and literary." Whereas the last three deal
has happened than the narration of what has hap- with human things, the first is concerned with
pened. This union of the two meanings we must the non-human part of the natural world. At
regard as of a higher order than mere outward the same time, this natural history is not, in
accident; we must suppose historical narrations Bacon's judgment, the same thing as "natural
to have appeared contemporaneously with his- philosophy," or what we would now call "na-
torical deeds and events." tural science."
Our daily speech confirms Hegel's observa- In this set of great books, natural history,
tion that "history" refers to that which has hap- even cosmic history, makes its appearance in
pened as well as to the record of it. We speak of works which we ordinarily classify as science or
the history of a people or a nation, or of the philosophy; for example, Darwin's Origin of
great events and epochs of history; and we also Species, Lucretius' On the Nature ofThtngs, or
call a history the book which gives a narrative Plato's Ttmaeus. The great books of history
account of these matters. deal with man and society, not nature or the
It is as if we used the word "physics" to name universe. For the most part this is true also of
both the object of study and the science of that the great philosophies of history. They, too, are
object; whereas normally we tend to use primarily concerned with human civilization,
"physics" for the science and refer to its sub- not the physical world.
ject matter as the physical world. We do not
say that matter in motion is physics, but that IN ITS ORIGINAL Greek root, the word "history"
it is the
object of physics, one of the things a means research, and implies the act of judging
physicist studies. We might similarly have the evidences in order to separate fact from fic-
adopted the convention of using "history" in a tion. The opening line of Herodotus is some-
restricted sense to signify a kind of knowledge times translated not "these are the histories of
or a kind of writing, and then called the phe- Herodotus of Hahcarnassus," but "these are
nomena written about or studied "historical" the researches ..."
but not "history." The word "research" can, of course, mean
That, however, is not the prevailing usage. any sort of inquiry into what is the case as
The word "history" seems to have at least four well as intowhat has happened. The title of one
distinct meanings. It refers to-a kind of knowl- of Aristotle's biological works, the History of
edge. It refers to a type of literature. It means Animals, suggests that it is concerned with re-
an actual sequence of events in time, which searches about animals. The book does not deal
constitutes a process of irreversible change. with natural history; it is not a history of ani-
This can be either change in the structure of the mals in the sense of giving the stages of their
world or any part of nature, or change in human development in the course of time. The redun-
society or civilization.
affairs, in dancy of "historical research" can therefore be
-
Historical knowledge and historical writing excused on the ground that it is necessary to
can be about natural history or human history. distinguish between two kinds of inquiry or re-
In his classification of the kinds of knowledge, searchscientific and historical.
711
712 THE GREAT IDEAS
Originally, research set the historian apart cerning the arrival of Helen at the court of Pro-
from the poet and the maker of myths or leg- teus. It seems to me that Homer was acquainted
ends. They told stories, too; but only the his- with this story, and while discarding it, be-
torian restricted himself to telling a story based cause he thought it less adapted for epic poetry
on the facts ascertained by inquiry or research. than the version which he followed, showed
Herodotus deserves the title "father of history" that it was not unknown to him."
for having originated a style of writing which Herodotus cites passages in the //Wand the
differs from poetry in this extraordinary re- Odyssey to corroborate this point. He is willing
spect. He tries to win the reader's belief not by to use the Homeric poems as one source of in-
the plausibility of his narrative, but rather by formation, but not without checking them
giving the reader some indication of the sources against conflicting accounts. "I made inquiry,"
of information and the reliability of the evi- he writes, "whether the story which the Greeks
dence on which the narrative is based. tell about Troy is a fable or not." When he
The poet tries to tell a likely story, but the comes to the conclusion that Helen was never
historian tries to make credible statements within the walls of the city to which the Greeks
about particular past events. He makes an ex- laid siege for ten years, he tells the reader his
flicting testimony to the reader's own judg- does not bother to establish the facts of the
ment. "Such is the account which the Persians matter or to give the reader contrary versions
give of these matters," he writes, "but the of what took place. That is not the poet's task,
Phoenicians vary from the Persian statements"; as Herodotus recognizes. It belongs to the his-
or "this much 1 know from information given torian, not the poet. The story which may have
me by the Dclphiam; the remainder of the greater probability in fact may not be the bet-
story the Milesians add"; or "that these were ter story for the poet.
The contrast between history and science Herodotus writes* he telb us, "in the hope of
or what for the purpose of comparison may be preserving from decay the remembrance of
the same, philosophy is formulated in Aris- what men have done, and of preventing the
statement concerning poetry, that it is
totle's great and wonderful actions of the Greeks and
"more philosophical than history, because the barbarians from losing their due meed of
poetry tends to express the universal, history glory." Thucydides proceeds in the belief that
the particular." History deals with what has the war between the Peloponnesians and the
actually happened, whereas poetry, like philos- Athenians "was the greatest movement yet
ophy, may be concerned with whatever is or known in history, not only of the Hellenes, but
can be. of a large part of the barbarian world I had
One comparison leads to another. Unlike almost said of mankind." Not very different is
the declaration of Tacitus:
poetry, history and science are "My purpose is not
alike in that
they both attempt to prove what they say. But to relate at length every motion, but only such
in distinction from science or philosophy, his- as were conspicuous for excellence or notorious
tory resembles poetry, especially the great epic for infamy. This I
regard as history's highest
and dramatic poems, in being narrative litera- function, to let no worthy action be uncom-
ture. The historian and the poet both tell stories. me mo rated, and to hold out the reprobation of
If the poet and the historian including, of posterity as a terror to evil words and deeds."
course, a biographer like Plutarch are also But though there seems to be a striking simi-
moralists, they are moralists in the same way. larity in the purpose of these historians, Tacitus
Their works do not contain expositions of eth- alone of the three avows a moral purpose. Fur-
ical or political doctrine, but rather concrete thermore, each of the three is conscious of the
exemplifications of theories concerning the con- individual way in which he has put his inten-
duct of human life and social practices. That tion in to effect. Thucydides, for example, seems
fact explains why much of the content of the to have Herodotus in mind when he fears that
great historical books is cited in other chapters "the absence of romance in my history will
dealing with moral and political, even psycho- detract somewhat from its interest; but if it be
logical, topics. But
in this chapter we are con- judged useful by those inquirers who desire an
cerned with history itself rather than with the exact knowledge of the past. ... I shall be con-
particulars of history. We are concerned with tent." Like Thucydides, Tacitus ij> an historian
the methods and aims of history as a kind of of contemporary events and he fears comparison
knowledge and literature; and we are concerned with the historian of antiquity who can "en-
with the historical process as a whole, the con- chain and refresh a reader's mind" with "de-
sideration of which belongs to the philosophy scriptions of countries, the various incidents of
of history. battle, glorious deaths of great generals." His
own work may be instructive, he thinks, but
THE AIMS AND methods of writing history are it may also
give very little pleasure because he
discussed by the historian himself, as well as by has "to present in succession the merciless bid-
the philosopher. Philosophers like Hobbes, Ba- dings of a tyrant, incessant prosecutions, faith-
con, or Descartes consider history largely from less friendships, the ruin of innocence, the same
the point of view of the kind of knowledge it is causes issuing in the same results, and [he is]
and the contribution it makes to the whole of everywhere confronted with a wearisome mo-
human learning. Historians like Herodotus, notony in [his] subject-matter."
Thucydides, Tacitus, and Gibbon state more As we have already noted, Herodotus seems
specifically the objectives of their work, the satisfied to let the reader decide between con-
standards of reliability or authenticity by which flicting accounts.Only occasionally does he in-
they determine what is fact, and the principles dicate which is more likely in his own judgment.
of interpretation by which they select the most Thucydidca claims that he has made a greater
important facts, ordering them according to effort to determine the facts. "I did not even
some hypothesis concerning the meaning of the trust my own impressions," he writes; the nar-
events reported. rative "rests partly on what I saw myself, partly
714 THE GREAT IDEAS
on what others saw for me, the accuracy of the tragedy.Even if they all agreed on the ascer-
report being always tried by the most severe tainment of fact, the great historians would dif-
and detailed tests possible. My conclusions fer from one another as the great poets do; each
have cost me some labor from the want of has a style and a vision as personal and poetic
coincidence between the accounts of the same as Homer or Virgil, Melville or Tolstoy.
occurrences by different eye-witnesses." But he
thinks that his conclusions "may safely be re- ONLY ONE OF THE great books is, by title and
u
lied on," undisturbed either by the lays of a design, devoted entirely to the philosophy of
poet displaying the exaggeration of his craft, or history to the formulation of a theory which
by the compositions of the chroniclers which embraces the whole of man's career on earth.
arc attractive at truth's expense." This is
Hegel's Philosophy of History. Augus-
The historians arc aware of the difficulty of tine's Cityof God presents an equally compre-
combining truth-telling with storytelling. Most hensive vision, but a comparison of the two
men, Thucydides remarks, are unwilling to suggests that they differ from one another as
take enough pains "in the investigation of philosophy from theology.
truth, accepting readily the first story that The point of this comparison is not that God
comes to hand." The difficulty, according to and His providence are omitted from the phil-
Tacitus,is the obscurity of the greatest events, osopher's view. On the contrary, Hegel regards
"so that some take for granted any hearsay, the history of the world as a "process of devel-
whatever its source, others turn truth into opment and the realization of Spirit this is
falsehood, and both errors find encouragement the true theodicy, the justification of God in
with posterity." History. Only this insight can reconcile Spirit
Reviewing the enormous scope of his work, with the History of the World viz., that what
Gibbon at the very end concludes that "the has happened and is happening every day is
historian may applaud the importance and not only not 'without God* but is essentially
supply the want of historical materials." development of the city of God on earth, not
Clearly, the historians have different criteria the city of man. Man is viewed as dwelling on
of relevance in determining the selection and earth under four distinct dispensations from
rejection of materials and different principles God: (i) in Paradise before the Fall; (2) in the
of interpretation in assigning the causes which world after expulsion from Eden and before
explain what happened. These differences are the Promise and the Law were given to the
reflected in the way each histonan constructs Jews; (3) under the Law and before the coming
from the facts a
grand story, conceives the line of Christ; (4) between the first and second
of its plot and the characterization of its chief coming under the dispensation of grace.
actors. Herodotus, for example, has been com- Augustine sometimes makes other divisions
pared with Homer as writing in an epic man- of history, but they are always primarily reli-
ner; Thucydides, with the dramatic writers of gious. For example, he divides all of time into
CHAPTER 34: HISTORY 715
seven ages, corresponding to the seven days of Christianity, were the first to attain the con-
1
creation. "The first age, as the first day, ex- sciousness that man, as man, is free.'
tends from Adam to the deluge; the second With the complete emancipation of man in
from the deluge to Abraham. From Abra- . . . the German-Christian world, history is con-
ham to the advent of Christ there are, as the summated for Hegel. "The grand principle of
passing, and cannot be measured by any num- . then of an antithesis on the part of both
. . . . .
ber of generations. . . . After this period God of the harmonizing of the antithesis."
lastly,
shall rest as on the seventh day, when He shall In the German-Christian world, the secular
give us (who shall be the seventh day) rest in and the religious modes of life are ultimately
Himself. The seventh shall be our Sabbath,
. . .
harmonized, fused in a single order of "rational
which be brought to a close, not by an
shall Freedom."
evening, but by the Lord's day, as an eighth
and eternal day, consecrated by the resurrec- APART FROM THE opposition between the phil-
tion of Christ,and prefiguring the eternal re- osophical and theological approaches, here rep-
pose not only of the spirit, but also of the body resented by Hegel and Augustine, there seem
. This is what shall be in the end without
. , to be two main issues in the general
theory of
end." human The
concerns the pattern
history. first
This same projection of history in all es- of change; the second, the character of the
sentials, at least is laid before Adam by causes at work.
the archangel Michael in Milton's Paradise The pattern most familiar because of its
Lost, just before Adam leaves the Garden of prevalence in modern speculations is that of
Fden. progress or evolution. The progress may be
Unlike the four major dispensations of which conceived as a dialectical motion in the realm
Augustine and Milton speak, Hegel's four of Spirit, contrasted by Hegel with the realm
stages of the world are epochs in the develop- of Matter or Nature, according as "the essence
ment of Spirit as manifested in the State. They of Matter is Gravity . and the essence of
. .
are secularly defined as the Oriental, the Greek, Spirit is Freedom." But it may also be thought
the Roman, and the German world and are to occur, as in the dialectical materialism of
seen as a "progress of the consciousness of Free- Marx and Engels, through the resolution of
dom." The "various grades in the consciousness conflicting material or economic forces.
of Freedom," Hegel writes, "supply us with "The whole
history of mankind," Engels
the natural division of universal History. . . . writes in his preface to the Communist Mani-
The Orientals have not attained the knowledge festo, "since the dissolution of primitive tribal
that Spirit Man as such is free; and because society, holding land in common ownership,
they do not know they are not free. They
this, has been a history of class struggles, contests
The German nations, under the influence of exploitation, oppression, class-distinction and
716 THE GREAT IDEAS
class-struggle/' The
four great economic sys- come insignificant; and such as are at present
tems'Che systems of slave labor, feudal serf- powerful were weak in olden time. I shall,
dom, industrial capitalism, and the communis- therefore, discourse equally of both, convinced
tic or classless society are thus seen as the that prosperity never continues long in one
stages of progress toward an ultimate perfection stay." Lucretius finds the cyclical pattern both
in which history comes to rest because it has in the succession of worlds and in the succession
at last fully realized its controlling tendency. of civilizations. The myth of the golden age of
The pattern of progress may be conceived Kronos and the earth-bound age of Zeus, which
not as a dialectical motion involving conflict Plato tells in the Statesman, also
applies both
and synthesis, but rather, as by Kant, in terms to nature and society.
of an increasing actualization of the potentiali- According to the myth, "there is a time
ties for good in human life. Giving the name of when God himself guides and helps to roll the
culture to "the production in a rational being world in its course; and there isa time, on the
of an aptitude for any ends whatever of his own completion of a certain cycle, when he lets go,
choosing," Kant declares, "it is only culture and the world being a living creature, and hav-
that can be the ultimate end which we have ing originally received intelligence from its
cause to attribute to nature in respect of the author and creator, turns about and by an in-
human race." The progressive realization of herent necessity revolves in the opposite di-
culture consists in "the liberation of the will rection." Thus the history of the world runs
from the despotism of desires whereby, in our through "infinite cycles of years," and one age
attachment to certain natural things, we arc succeeds another in an endless round.
rendered incapable of exercising a choice of There is still a third view which sees history
our own." In these terms history moves toward as neither cyclical nor simply progressive. Vir-
a perfection which can never be fully achieved gil reverses the order of the Platonic myth by
on earth, for man's "own nature is not so con- placing the golden age in the future. It dawns
stituted as to rest or be satisfied in any posses- with Rome, where, in the words of the 4th
sion or enjoyment whatever/* Eclogue, "the majestic roll of circling centuries
As conceived by the evolutionist, progress begins anew: Justice returns, returns old Sat-
may or may not attain its limit, but in cither urn's reign, with a new breed of men sent down
case its manifestation in human
history appears from heaven . . , and the iron shall cease, the
to be analogous to as well as an extension of the golden race arise."
line of development along which the world or Rome for Virgil is not only the beginning
all of living nature has gradually advanced. of the golden age; it is also the consummation
of history. In the Aeneid Jupiter himself de-
THESE VIEWS ARE given further discussion in clares that he has given the Romans "domin-
the chapters on EVOLUTION, PROCRFSS, and ion without end" that he has ordained for
WORLD. Whether or not the same pattern of them "neither period nor boundary of em-
change obtains in the historical order of nature pire." The "gowned race of Rome" shall be
as in the history of man and society, is a ques- "the lords of the world"; then "war shall cease,
tion to be answered by those who deny as well and the iron ages soften." Thus, Jupiter says,
as by those who affirm progress. There is cyclical "is it willed," and so "a day will come in the
change in nature, the same pattern of birth, lapse of cycles." The perpetuity of Rome seems
growth, decay, and death repeating itself gen- to leave little room for any further essential
eration after generation. That history too re- progress and no chance for another cycle of
peats itself with the rise and decline of cities decay and regeneration.
and civilizations, seems to be the ancient view, The Christian dogma of the fall of man from
it
reappears in our day with Spcngler and, grace and his return through divine mediation
somewhat qualified by the possibility of prog- to grace and salvation seems to give history a
ress, with Toynbce. pattern that is partly Platonic in the sequence
**Thc cities which were formerly great," which makes the loss of a golden age the occa-
Herodotus observes, "have most of them be* sion for striving to regain it. But it also seems
CHAPTER 34: HISTORY 717
to be Virgilian in part. The epochal transitions with necessity seems to belong more to the
of history happen only once. The coming of human race as a whole than to individual men.
Christ is an absolutely singular event, after The individual man is tossed aside if he tries
which there is no essential
progress in man's to obstruct the path of history. He is
powerless
condition until the Last Judgment at the end to change its course.
of the world. Not even great men can make or determine
history. They are great only because, sensing
COMMON TO THESE diverse conceptions of the the next phase of the historical process, they
part of it will stem from choices freely made, or Truth for their age, for their world; the species
according as all of it is inexorably determined next in order, so to speak, and which was al-
there is contingency in the events of nature, so different parts of the field, or to the driving
there is freedom in the acts of history. Some- of the herdsman, attributes the direction the
times the processes of nature and history are herd takes to the animal which happens to be
erned by inviolable laws; whereas the motions Gieat men are only celebrated puppets,
of men arc directed by laws which leave them pushed ahead on the moving front of history.
free to \vorkout a destiny which is determined The motion of history derives its force and
by, rather than determines, the human spirit. direction from the individual acts of the in-
Those who do not deny freedom entirely in numerable nameless men who comprise the
the realm of history seldom give it unlimited human mass. The act of the individual counts
scope. What men can do is conditioned from little. The mass motion is a complex resultant
below by the operation of material forces, and of slight impulses tending in many directions.
irom above by what Hegel calls "God's pur- But however slight the impulse each man gives,
pose with the world," The vast "arras-web of his contribution to history is a free act, con-
Universal History" is woven by the interaction ditioned only by the circumstances under
between God's will (the Absolute Idea) and which he makes a choice and by the divine
human purposes or interests, which Hegel calls providence which grants him the freedom to
"the complex of human passions.'* choose. Like "every human action," Jwtory,
History for him is "the union of Freedom according to Tolstoy, thus "appears to us as a
and Necessity/' where "the latent abstract certain combination of freedom and incvita-
process of Spirit is regarded as Necessity, while biJity."
that which exhibits itself in the conscious will
of men, as their interest, belongs to the domain DIFFERENT PROM speculations on a grand scale
of freedom." But this freedom which coheres concerning the whole historical process is that
7$ THE GREAT IDEAS
type of philosophizing about history which On the practical side, political writers iike
considersits place in education the light it Machiavclii, Montesquieu, and the Federalists
affords to the mind, and the lessons it teaches use history to exemplify or confirm their gen*
for the guidance of conduct. erahzations. They agree with Thucydides that
Montaigne, for example, makes the reading "an exact knowledge of the past is an aid to the
of history and biography the window through interpretation of the future, which in the
which a man looks out upon the world. "This course of human things must resemble if it does
great world," he writes, "is the mirror wherein not reflect it." Most men, adds Tacitus, "learn
we are to behold ourselves, to be able to know wisdom from the fortunes of others."
ourselves as we ought to do in the true bias." It is on these grounds that the
great books
Only against the large scene history reveals of history belong with treatises on morals and
and amidst the variety of human nature it politics and in the company of philosophical
exhibits can a man truly know himself and his and theological speculations concerning the
own time. In a similar vein, Gibbon declares nature and destiny of man. Liberal education
that "the experience of history exalts and en- needs the particular as well as the universal,
Urges the horizon of our intellectual view." and these are combined in the great historical
Hcgcl, on the other hand, insists that "what ex- narratives. Apart from their utility, they have
perience and history teach is that peoples and the originality of conception, the poetic qual-
governments never have learned any thing from ity, the imaginative scope which rank them
history, or acted on principles deduced from it. with the great creations of the human mind.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGB
1. History as knowledge and as literature: Us kinds and divisions; its distinction from
poetry, myth, philosophy, and science 719
2. The light and lesson of history : its role in the education of the mind and in the guidance
ol human conduct 720
3.
The writing of history: rcscaich anil narration
30. The determination and choice of fact: the classification of historical data
721
4.
The philosophy of history 722
(2) Material forces in history: economic, physical, and geographic factors 723
(3) World history as the development of Spirit: the stages of the dialectic of
history
(4) The role of the individual in history: the great man, hero, or leader
4^. The laws and patterns of historical change: cycles, progress, evolution
41-.
The spirit of the time as conditioning the politics and culture of a period 724
5^. The relation of the gods or God to human history: the dispensations of providence
5$. The city of God and the city of man; church and state 725
CHAPTER 34: HISTORY
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and
page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER* lltad, BK u [265-285] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set, the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in S3 ]^uv.$. Psychology 116a-119b, the passage
t
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 1 19. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the let terse and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO- Symposium, 163b-164c, the
passage begins
m the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side ot page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the mam divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, en,
SECT) arc sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, arc given in cer-
tain cases, c.g, Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE INFERENCES. The references arc to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions diifer in title of books or in the numbering of chanters 01 verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT- Nehffntah, 7 45 (D) // Esdras, 7-46
SYMBOLS* The abbreviation "csp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference, "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, sec the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Picfacc.
7 PLATO: Cratylus, 112b / Republic, BK n, 323d 33 PASCAL: Pcmtcs, 628 287a / Vacuum, 355a-
324a / Ttmaeus, 447a / Crttias, 479d / Laws, 356a
BK in 663d-677a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH xvi,
ARISTOTLE- Poetics, CH 9 [i45i*$6-b32)686a-c; SPCT 7-1 f 368d 370a
CH 1$ 695a-c 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vni, DIV
14 PLUTARCH- Theseus, la-c/ Romulus 15a-30a,c 65, 479b-c; SPCT xu, DIV r$2, 509c
passim, csp 15a 18d / Themistocles, 102a,c 37 FIELDING- Tom Jones, 19a 20a; 49b-50c
/ Pericles, 128d 129a / Timoleon, 195a-b / 40 GIBBON- Decline and Fall, 88a-d; 97c-98d
Ctmon, 390b-d / Alexander, 540b,d-S41a / pasMm; 211a;398b; 47Ic-d
Dton, 794c-795a 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 337c
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK in, 60d; BK iv, 71d 72b; 44 BoswELL-MfW<w,203a b;258d-2S9a;3S3b c
BK xi, 107c; BK XIH, 133b / Histories, BK u, 46 HPOEL* Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 3, lOa-
228ab llc; PART in, par 355, 112d / Philosophy of
18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 27- History, INTRO, 153a 158a; 182d-183d; 193d-
28 650a-d 194a; PART i, 230c-231b; 248c; PART in, 285d-
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART 67b-c; 71c-d
i, 286a
25 MONTAIGNB: Essays, 24a-c; 41c-42a; 199a- 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK x, 430d-431a;
200d; 305d 306a; 347c 350d; 457a b BK xi, 469a-470c; BK xin, 563a-b; EPILOGUE
26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard 111, ACT in, sc t (72- 11 675a 696d
pa.s$im
88] I33c d / Henry V, PKOLOGUB 532b,d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 863b (fn 2)
720 THE GREAT IDEAS 2/<>3
22 CHAUCER: Monlfs Tale 434a-448b
2. The light and lesson of history: its role in the 23 MACHIAVELLI* Prince, CH vi, 8c-d; CH xiv-
education of the mind and in the guid-
xv, 22a b; CH xviu 2Sa 26a
ance of human conduct 23 HOBBES. Leviathan, PART i, 53c-54a
OLD TESTAMENT: Deuteronomy, 6:20-25, 7.6- 24 RABELAIS. Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i,
11,17-19; 8; 16*1-12; 29 / Joshua, 24*1-27 58a59d
(D) Josue, 24:1-27 / / Samuel, 12:6-25 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 24a-c; 41b-42a; 68b-69d;
(D) / Ktngs, 12:6-25 / Ezra, ^.j-2^-(D) 198c 200d; 455d-456b
I Esdras, 4:7-23 / Nchemiah, o,-(D) II Esdras, 26 SHAKESPEARE: 2nd Henry IV, ACT HI, sc i
9 / Psalms, 44:1-?; 78; 81; 105-106; 136 csp [45-96] 483b-d
136:10-24 (/)) Psalms, 43*1-4; 775 80; 104- 29 CERVANTES* Don Quixote, PART i, 23c-d; 32c-
105; 135 csp 135:10-24 / Ecclesiastes, i:n; 33a
2:16 / Isaiah, 46.8-11 (D) Isaias, 46*8-11 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 4c-6c; 32d-
/ Jeremiah, 2:1-9 (D) Jeremias, 2:1-9 / 34b; 85a-c / Novum Organum, BK i, APH 98
Ezefyel, 20:1-44 (D) Ezechiel, 20:1-44 126d-127b
APOCRYPHA* Wisdom of Solomon, 2:2-4 (D) 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART i, 43a-b
OT, Boot( of Wisdom, 2-2-4 32 MILTON: Areopagitica, 384b 386b
NEW TESTAMENT: // Peter, 2 / Jude 33 P\SCAL Pensees, 619-641 284b-290a / Vac-
4 HOMFR. Iliad, BK ix [485-605] 62a 63b uum, 355a-358b
6 HERODOTUS; History, BK i, 2b; BK v, 175b; 35 I-X^CKL' Civil Government, CH vui, SECT 100-
BK vin, 273b c; BK ix, 309d-310a 112 47c-51b passim, csp SECT 103 48b-c /
6TnucYDiDEs: Peloponnesian War, BK i, Human Understanding, BK iv, CH xvi, SECT n
354b-c; 379c-d 369d-370a
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 452b / Statesman, 587d / 35 HUML. Human Understanding, SECT vin, DIV
Philcbus, 61 2a / Laws, BK in 663d-677a csp 65, 479b-c
667a-b; BK xn, 788a 38 RorssbAu: Social Contract, BK in, 420a-c; BK
SARisioTLE' Sophistical Refutations, CH 34 iv, 428a 435a
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INIRO, par 3, lOa- New Introductory Lectures, 834b-c; 882b-
llb; PART ii, par 124 44b-d / Philosophy of 884c
History, INTRO, 154c-158a; 165a-166d; 182d-
184b; PART iv, 368d-369a,c 4<*(l) The alternatives of fate or freedom, ne-
49 DARWIN. Descent of Man, 323a-328c passim, 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace passim, csp BK i,
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 5 AfcscHYLUs: Persians 15a 26d esp [737-908]
340 llOb-c; par 344 Ilia; par 347 lllb-c; par 23a-24d / Prometheus Bound 40a 51d esp [436-
354-360 112c-114a,c / Philosophy of History, 502] 44c-45a
INTRO, 161a-c; 174d-175c; 178a-179c; 187a-c; 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 21d-22a; BK vi,
203b-206a,c; PAHI I, 235d 236a, 258b d; 204b c; BK vn, 214d-220b esp 218b-220b;
PART u, 259c-d; 282d-284a,c; PART in, 237a b, 238d-239a; 250b-d; BK vm, 2 73 b-c;
286C'287a;308ab;pARTiv,315b317d;342d BK ix, 309d-310a
343a 7 PL\TO: Protagoras, 44a-45a / Symposium,
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 323a; 327a-330a,c 157b 159b / Republic, BK vi, 378a-b / Critias
esp 327b 478a-485d / Statesman, 587a-589c / Laws,
50 MARX: Capital, 10b-lld; 377c-378d BK iv, 679a b; 68 2 d 683d; BK x, 765d-
50 MARX-ENGEL&: Communist Manifesto, 416c d 768d
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 469a-472b; 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK in, CH 22 19Sa-
EPILOGUE i, 645a-650c; EPILOGUE u 675a- 201a, BK iv, CH i 213a-223d; CH 3 224b-d; CH
696d 7 232c 235a
54 FREUD: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 651d- 12 AURKLIUS. Meditations, BK u, SECT 11 258a-b;
652d / Civilization and Its Discontents, 781a- BK in, SECT ii 262a b; BK vi, SECT 44
789b esp 785c; 799a-802a,c / New Introductory 278bc
Lectures, 834c; 882c 883a; 883c 13 VIRGIL- Aeneid 103a-379a
14 PLUTARCH: Romulus, 18d; 28b-29c / Numa
4c. The of the time ts conditioning the
spirit
Pompilius, 50d-51c / Camillus, 107b-d /
politics tnd culture of a period Conolanus, 188d-192b / Sulla 372a-c /
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 354 234b Demosthenes, 698a-699a / Marcus Brutus,
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 362a d 822a-b
46 HEGEL. Philosophy of Right, PREP, 6c-7a; 15 TACITUS: Histories, BK i, 189b-190a
INTRO, par 3 lOa 12c; PART in, par 218 72c d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK xin, par 49-51
/ Philosophy of History, INTRO, 173a-175c; 124a d / City of God, BK i, PREP 129a-d; CH
177c 178a; 182d 183a; 185a 186d; 187d-189a; 36 149c-d; BK it, CH 2-3 150c-15lc; BK iv, CH
PART 211a-219d esp 219c d; 219d-235c up
i, 33-34 206c*207a,c; BK v, CH 11-26 216c-
220b-221a, 322a-223a, 233b-235c; 247b-257c; 230a,c; BK x, CH 14 307c-308a; BK xi, CH i
PART u, 259d-260c; 263d-281b; PART in, 286c- 322b d 323a; CH 18 331d 332a; BK XH, CH 21
(
CROSS-REFERENCES
Far: The general consideration of history as a kind of knowledge, see KNOWLEDGE 53(5); MEMORY
AND IMAGINATION 3d; TIME 6e; and for other comparisons of history with poetry, science,
and philosophy, see NATURE 4c; PHILOSOPHY id; POETRY 50; SCIENCE 20.
The educational significance of history or of historical examples, see EDUCATION 4d; VIRTUE
AND VICE 4d (4).
Other discussions of ihe logic or method of historical research, see LOGIC 4c; REASONING 6d.
The theory of historical causation, see CAUSE 8; and for the factors of chance and fate, free-
dom and necessity, see CHANCE 6b; FATE 6; LIBERTY 6a; NFCESSITY AND CONTINGENCY
5f; PROGRESS ia; WILL yb.
The idea of progress in the philosophy of history, see EVOLUTION yc; PROGRKSS i-ic; and for
a cyclical theory of history, see LABOR la; MAN 93; PROGRESS ic.
Other discussions of a matenalist philosophy of history, see DIALLCFIC 2d; L\BOR 7c~7c(3);
MATTER 6; OPPOSITION 50; PROGRESS u; WAR AND PE\CE 2c; WF,\LTH ir.
Other considerations of history as a dialectical process in the development of Spirit, see
DIALECTIC 2d-2d(2); LIBERTY 6a; MIND iof-iof(2); PROGRLSS 40.
The role of the great man or hero in history, see HONOR 5d.
The historian or philosopher of history as a prophet, see PATH 6.
Other expressions of historical relativism, see CUSTOM AND CONVINTION 9~9b; RELATION
6-6c; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 7-70.
Divine providence events of history and to the issue of necessity and free-
in relation to the
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below arc works not included in Great Bool^s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with uhich this chapter deals. 'Ihesc \\orks are divided into two groups
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Idea*.
B. AD\MS The I^atv of Cwihza twn and Decay KI.NT. Writing History
ACTON. Essays on Freedom and Power, CH i O R FC; \ Y
i G
A s s E r To ti'ii rd a Phi h <ophy
of History
LANGLOIS and SEIGNOBOS. Introduction to the Study CXssiRpR. The Myth of the State, PART in (15-17)
of History M. R. COHEN.
The Meaning of Human History
BRADLEY. Collected Essays, VOL 1(1) NEI The Poetry of History
F.
INTRODUCTION
notions of honor and fame are some- at a low rate, is to dishonor him. But high and
THE times used as if their meanings were in- low, in this case, is to be understood by com-
terchangeable, and sometimes as if each had a parison to the rate that each man setteth on
distinct connotation. In the tradition of the himself." Does Hobbes mean that the value a
great books, both usages will be found. It is man sets on himself is the true standard of his
seldom just a matter of words. The authors who worth ? Apparently not. Let men, he says, "rate
see no difference between a man's honor and themselves at the highest value they can; yet
his fame are opposed on fundamental issues of their true value is no more than it is esteemed
morality to those who think the standards of by others." What, theni is the measure of such
honor are independent of the causes of fame. esteem ? "The value, or worth of a man," an-
This opposition will usually extend to psy- swers Hobbes, "is as of all other things, his price;
chological issues concerning human motivation that is to say, so much as would be given for the
and to political issues concerning power and use of his power; and therefore, is not absolute
not seem to be the indispensable condition on depends on the relation in which he stands to
which his fame or infamy rests. Nor does his them, in terms of his power and their need.
good or ill repute in the community necessarily Virtue and duty considerations of good and
signify that he is a man of honor or an honor- evil, right and wrong do not enter into this
able man. conception of honor. The distinction between
The connection and distinction of these honor and fame tends to disappear when honor
terms would therefore appear to be the initial reflects the opinion of the community, based on
problem of this chapter. Any solution of the the political utility rather than the moral worth
by which the individual is appraised by him- THERE is ANOTHER conception of honor which
self and his fellow men. Honor and fame both not only separates it from fame, but also makes
seem to imply public approval, but the ques- it
independent of public approbation. This is
tion is whether both presuppose the same not an unfamiliar meaning of the term. The
causes or the same occasions for social esteem. man who says "on my honor" or "my word of
"The manifestation of the value we set on honor" may not be an honest man, but if he
one another," writes Hobbes, "is that which is is, he pledges himself by these expressions to
commonly called Honoring and Dishonoring. fulfill a promise or to live up to certain ex-
To value a man at a high rate, is to honor him; pectations. He is saying that he needs no ex-
728
CHAPTER 35: HONOR 729
tcrnal check or sanction. A man who had to be The sense of honor and the sense of duty dif-
ourselves within, where no eyes can pierce but what the law commands. In contrast, a sense
our own; there she defends us from the fear of of honor presupposes self-consciousness of virtue
death, of pain, of shame itself; there she arms in the individual. It binds him in conscience
us against the loss of our children, friends, and to live up to the image of his own character,
fortunes; and when opportunity presents itself, insofar as it has lineaments which seem ad-
she leads us on to the hazards of war: 'Not for mirable to him.
any profit, but for the honor of honesty it- Without some self-respect, a man can have
self.'" no sense of honor. In the great tragic poems,
A sense of honor thus seems to function like the hero who dishonors himself in his own eyes
a sense of duty. Both reflect the light of con- dies spiritually with the loss of his self-respect.
science. Both operate through an inner de- To Jive on in the flesh thereafter would be
termination of the will to do what reason judges almost a worse fate than the physical demise
to be right in the particular case. If there is a which usually symbolizes the tragic ending.
difference between them, it is not so much in
their effects as in their causes. THE SENSE IN WHICH a man can honor or dis-
reflex of his sense of honor torments him for man," as Aquinas points out, "on account of
having fallen short of his own ideal, for some excellence in him, and is a sign and testi-
being disloyal to his own conceptions of what mony of the excellence that is in the person
is
good or right; and his shame may be even honored."
more intense in proportion as the standard he There can be no separation between what a
has violated isnot one shared by others, but community considers honorable and what it
is his own measure of what a man should be considers virtuous or excellent in mind or char-
or do. acter. But
does not necessarily follow that
it
Dmitri Karamazov exhibits these mixed the man who is actually virtuous will always
feelings of honor and shame when he declares receive the honor which is due him. Public
at the preliminary legal investigation: "You honor can be misplaced either undeserv-
have to deal with a man of honor, a man of the edly given or unjustly withheld. The virtuous
highest honor; above all don't lose sight of should be prepared for this, in the judgment of
it a man who's done a lot of nasty things, but Aquinas, since honor is not "the reward for
has always been, and still is, honorable at bot- which the virtuous work, but they receive
tom, in his inner being. . . . That's just what's honor from men by way of reward, as from
made me wretched all my life, that I yearned those who have nothing greater to offer." Happi-
to be honorable, that I was, so to say, a martyr ness, he goes on to say, is the "true reward . . .
to a sense of honor, seeking for it with a lantern, for which the virtuous work; for if they worked
with the lantern of Diogenes, and yet all my for honor, it would no longer be virtue, but
life I've been doing filthy things." ambition."
730 THE GREAT IDEAS
Tolstoy, however, deplores the injustice of tarnish, AS honor does, when it is unmerited.
the honor given Napoleon and the dishonor But for the same reason, fame is often lost as
inwhich Kutuzov was held. "Napoleon," he fortuitously as it is
acquired. "Fame has no
most insignificant tool of history
writes, "that stability," Aquinas observes; "it is easily ruined
who .never anywhere, even in exile, showed by false report. And if it sometimes endures,
human dignity Napoleon is the object of this is
by accident."
adulation and enthusiasm; he is grand. But
Kutuzov the man who from the beginning THE DISTINCTION between honor and fame is
to the end of his activity in 1812, never once not acknowledged by those who ignore merit
swerving by word or deed from Borodino to as a condition of praise. Machiavelli, for ex-
Vilna, presented an example exceptional in ample, places fameor, as he sometimes calls
history of self-sacrifice and a present conscious- it, glory of worldly goods which
in that triad
ness of the future importance of what was hap- men want without limit and without relation
pening Kutuzov seems them something
to to justice. If theaim of life is to get ahead in
indefinite and pitiful, and when speaking of the world, money, fame, and power are the
him and of the year 1812 they always seem a chief marks of success. A man is deemed no less
little ashamed." successful if he acquirespower by usurping it,
Kutuzov later received some measure of or gains by foul means rather than fair; so,
it
honor when he was presented with the rarely too, if he becomes famous through chicanery or
awarded Order of St. George. But what is per- deception and counterfeits whatever form of
haps a much higher honor came to him after greatness men are prone to praise.
his death when Tolstoy enshrined him as one
Along with riches, fame, says Machiavelli, is
of the heroes of War and Peace. Sometimes the "the end which every man has before him."
virtuous or truly honorable man, living in a This men seek to obtain by various methods:
bad society, goes without honor in his own time "one with caution, another with haste; one
to be honored only by posterity. He may even by force, another by skill; one by patience,
be dishonored by a society which has contempt another by its
opposite; and each one succeeds
for virtue. Sometimes a man of indifferent char- in reaching the goal by a different method."
acter and achievement, or even one who is Some methods, he admits in another place,
actually base and ignoble, wins honor through "may gain empire, but not glory," such as "to
cleverly simulating the possession of admirable slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be
traits. without faith, without mercy, without reli-
It seems appropriate to consider the propor- gion." Nevertheless, he declares: "Let a prince
tion between a man's intrinsic worth and the have the credit of conquering and holding a
honor he receives. The distribution of honors state, the means
will always be considered hon-
raises questions of justicein fact, it is thought est, and he be praised by everybody."
will
to be one of the chief problems of distributive Because fame seems to be morally neutral,
justice.For those who hold that honor and it replaces honor in the discussions of those who
fame are utterly distinct in principle, this is measure men in terms of success instead of vir-
the clear mark of their difference. Justice does tue, duty, or happiness. Because it is
morally
not require that fame be proportionate to vir- neutral, it is the term used by those who wish
tue. Though there is a sense in which fame may to judge, not men, but the impression
they
not be deserved, the qualities in a person which make. What counts is the magnitude of that
justify fame are of a different order from those impression, not its correspondence with reality.
which honor should reward. Fame belongs to To be famous is to be widely, not necessarily
the great, the outstanding, the exceptional, well, spoken of by one's fellow men, now or
without regard to virtue or vice. Infamy is hereafter. The man who stands above the herd,
fame no less than good repute. The great scoun- whose outlines are clear and whose deeds are
drel can be as famous as the great hero. Existing memorable, takes his place the famous
among
in the reputation a man has regardless of his of his time or of all times. Plutarch the moralist
character or accomplishments, fame does not men whose
certainly does not regard the lives
CHAPTER 35: HONOR 731
he writes as paragons of virtue. On the con- desire to hold the approbation of those who
trary, he plainly indicates that many of them share a common life. With this in mind ap-
are examples of extraordinary depravity. But parently, William James describes fame and
Plutarch the biographer treats them all as honor as a man's "image in the eyes of his own
famous. He takes that as a matter of histonc 'set,' which exalts or condemns him as he con-
fact, not of moral judgment. Good or bad, they forms or not to certain requirements that may
were acknowledged to be great men, leaders, not be made of one in another walk of life."
figures of eminent proportions, engaged in Though Pascal regards "the pursuit of glory"
momentous exploits. They were not all vic- as "the greatest baseness of man," he must ad-
torious. Few if any were successful in all that mit that "it is also the greatest mark of his ex-
they attempted or were able to preserve what cellence; for whatever possessions he may have
successes they achieved. But each ventured be- on earth, whatever health and essential com-
yond the pale of ordinary men; and each suc- fort, he is not satisfied if he has not the esteem
ceeded at least in becoming a symbol of great of men. He values human reason so highly that,
deeds, a monument in human memory. whatever advantages he may have on earth, he
The opposite of fame is anonymity. In Dan- is not content if he is not also ranked
highly
te'smoral universe, only the Trimmers on the in the judgment of man. Those who most . . .
rim of Hell are totally anonymous; neither good despise men, and put them on a level with
nor bad, they lack name and fame. Because brutes, yet wish to be admired and believed
they "lived without infamy and without by men, and contradict themselves by their
praise/' Hell will not receive them, "for the own feelings."
damned would have some boast of them." To But is this universal wish for the esteem of
them alone no fame can be allowed. Honor and others a desire for honor or a desire for fame ?
be of a strange and unusual constitution," famy. As we have already noted, fame and
Locke writes, "who can content himself to live infamy are alike, since both involve the noto-
in constant disgrace and disrepute with his own riety enjoyed by the outstanding, the excep-
particular society. Solitude many men have tional, the great, whether good or bad. If what
sought, and been reconciled to; but nobody men desire is
simply to be known by others,
that has the least thought or sense of a man and to have a kind of immortality through
about him, can live in society under the con- living on in the memory of later generations,
A society of misanthropes, despising each bation or praise, good opinion alone will satisfy,
other, is as unthinkable as an economy of and then the question becomes whether the
misers. The social nature of
requires sym- man object is fame or honor. Which does lago have
pathy and fellow feeling, love and friendship, in mind when he says, "Good name in man and
and all of these involve some measure of ap- woman, dear my Lord, is the immediate jewel
According to one theory, the highest type of Opposite answers seem to be determined by
friendship springs from mutual admiration, the opposite views of human nature and human
respect which men have for one another. The happiness. Those who, like Plato, think that
old saying that "there is honor among thieves" virtue is an indispensable ingredient of happi-
suggests that even among bad men there is a ness, include honor among the "good things"
732 THE GREAT IDEAS
which the virtuous man will seek in the right truly worthy of great things, also thinks himself
way. Possession of good things by itself is not worthy of them; for he who does so beyond his
sufficient, Socrates says in the Euthydcmus. A deserts is a fool, but no virtuous man is foolish
man must also use them and use them well, for orsilly." The proud man will be pleased "only
"the wrong use of a thing is far worse than by honors that are great and that are conferred
the non-use," Applied to honor, this would by good men Honor from casual people and
. . .
seem to mean that the virtuous man will not on trifling grounds, he will utterly despise,
seek praise for the wrong reasons either for since it is not this that he deserves."
that which is not praiseworthy in himself or Humility and vanity are, according to Aris-
from others whose lack of virtue disqualifies totle, the vices of defect and excess which occur
them from giving praise with honesty. The when a man fails to be proud. The unduly
virtuous man will noteek fame or be unhappy humble man, underestimating his worth, does
lacking it, for fame, like pleasure or wealth, not seek the honor he deserves. The vain man,
can be enjoyed by bad men as well as good and at the other extreme, overestimates himself and
be sought for wrong as well as right reasons or wants honor out of proportion to his qualities.
in the wrong as well as the right
way. Virtue, Honor, like any other external good, "may be
according to the moralists, protects a man from desired more than is right, or less, or from the
the seductions of money, fame, and power right sources and in the right way. We blame
the things for which men undisciplined by vir- both the over-ambitious man as aiming at honor
tue seem to have an inordinate desire. more than is right and from the wrong sources,
In the theory of virtue, honor, unlike fame, and the unambitious man as not willing to be
belongs only to the good and is always a good honored even for noble reasons."
object, worthy of pursuit. Honor is, in fact, However words are used, the point seems to
the object of two virtues which Aristotle de- be clear. It is possible for men to desire honor
fines in the Ethics. One of these virtues he calls more than they should and less. It is also pos-
"ambition," and the Greek name for the other, sible for honor to be rightly desired. Honor de-
which is literally rendered by "high-mmded- sired to excess or in the wrong way may be
ness," is sometimes translated by the English called"fame," even as the excessive desire for
word "magnanimity" and sometimes by honor is sometimes regarded as the vice of
"pride." The Christian connotation of "pride" ambition or an aspect of the sin of pride. The
makes it a difficult word to use as the name for word "pride" seems to have both a good and
a virtue, but it can nevertheless be so used a bad connotation. But the point remains that
when it is understood to mean a justifiable de- the difference between these two meanings of
gree of self-respectnot conceit but a middle- "pride," like the difference between honor and
ground between undue self-esteem and in- fame, is understood by moralists in terms of vir-
ordinate self-deprecation. When the Aristo- tue, and it is discounted by those who reject the
telian names for these two vices are translated relevance of virtue.
in English by "vanity" and "humility," it is
again necessary to point out that "humility" THOUGH HONOR MAY be regarded as inseparable
must be understood, not in its Christian sig- from virtue in moral theory, certain political
meaning the virtue of the truly re-
nificance as philosophers make its separation from virtue
ligiousman, but rather as signifying an exag- the principle of a type of government.
accompany and the scale of honor with which excellent few. Government by the few is oli-
they are concerned. Both are concerned with garchy rather than aristocracy when wealth
honor, which Aristotle calls "the greatest of rather than virtue is the principle of their se-
external goods." In both cases, "honor is the lection. Plato sees the possibility of an inter-
prize of virtue, and it is to the good that it is mediate between these two which occurs as
rendered." The proud man is one "who, being a kind of transitional form when aristocracy
CHAPTER 35: HONOR 713
tends to degenerate into oligarchy. He calls his fellow men, the symbol of human greatness
that intermediate "timocracy" and describes and the object of human admiration.
it as "a mixture of good and evil" in which the Honor, fame, and glory combine in various
ruler is "a lover of power and a lover of honor, proportions to constitute the heroic figures of
claiming to be a ruler, not because he is elo- classical antiquity:honor, to the extent that
quent, or on any ground of that sort, but be- none is without some virtue and each possesses
cause he is a soldier and has performed feats of certain virtues at least to a remarkable degree;
arms." In such a state, he claims, "one thing, and fame, because they are the great among men,
one thing only, predominantly seen -the
is
outstanding and well-known, godlike in their
spirit of contention and ambition; and these are pre-eminence; and glory, almost in the theo-
due to the prevalence of the passionate or spir- logical sense, inasmuch as the heroes celebrated
ited element." In a timocracy, in other words, by Homer and Virgil are beloved by the gods.
honor is divorced from virtue and wisdom and It isnot accidental that the central figure in
becomes the only qualification for public of- the Greek tragedies is called a "hero," since in
fice. the ancient view the tragic character must nec-
With Montesquieu, the situation is
quite re- essarilybelong to a great man, a man of noble
versed. For him, virtue is
absolutely requisite proportions, one who is "better than the ordi-
in popular government or democracy, and to a nary man," says Aristotle. If he also has some
less extent in that other form of republic which fault or flaw, it is a consequence of strength
he calls "aristocracy." As virtue is necessary in misused, not a mark of individual weakness.
a republic, so is honor in a monarchy. "Honor Such weakness as he has is the common frailty
that is,the prejudice of every person and of man.
rank supplies the place of political virtue. A In the modern world heroism and the heroic
monarchical government supposes pre-eminen- are more difficult to identify or define. We tend
ces and ranks, as likewise a noble descent. Since to substitute the notion of genius in
considering
it is the nature of honor to aspire to preferments the exceptionally gifted men.
among Glory is
and titles, it
properly placed in this govern- dimly recognized and honor takes second place
ment." to fame. That portion of modern
poetry which
Though Montesquieu and Plato differ in deals in heroes as, for example, the tragedies
their classification of the forms of government, and historical plays of Shakespeare borrows
they seem to agree that honor divorced from them from, or models them on, legendary fig-
virtueis a counterfeit. Honor identified with The great modern novels, counterparts of
ures.
ranks and titles, honor which moves individuals the epic poems of antiquity, portray excep-
to serve the public good in order to promote tional men and women without idealizing them
their own interests, Montesquieu admits is a to heroic stature. One of these novels,
Tolstoy's
false honor, "but even this false honor is as use- War and Peace, seeks to deflate the fame of
honor could possibly be
ful to the public as true great men. They do not deserve even their
to private persons." Considering the laws of reputation for great deeds, much less the honor
education characteristic of monarchical govern- owed the truly great.
ments, Montesquieu points out that it is not in "If we assume as historians
do that great men
colleges or academies, but in the world itself, lead humanity to the attainment of certain
which is the school of honor, that the subjects ends then it is impossible," Tolstoy declares,
. . .
of monarchy are chiefly trained. "Here the "to explain the facts of history without intro-
actions of men are judged, not as virtuous, but ducing the conceptions of chance and genius."
as shining; not as just, but as great; not as rea- But in Tolstoy's opinion "the words chance and
sonable, but extraordinary." genius do not denote any really existing thing
and therefore cannot be defined." can dis- We
HEROISM is DISCUSSED in the chapter on COUR- pense with these meaningless words, he thinks,
AGE, and the role of the hero the leader or if we are willing to renounce "our claim to dis-
great man in the chapter on HISTORY. Here cern a purpose immediately intelligible to us"
we are concerned with the hero in the esteem of and admit "the ultimate purpose to be beyond
734 THE GREAT IDEAS
our ken." Then "not only shall we have no of divinity, but, like Achilles, each has a weak-
need to see exceptional ability in Napoleon and ness in his armor. Moreover, the heroes of the
Alexander, but we shall be unable to consider Iliad, the Odyssey, and the Aeneid are men of
them to be anything but like ordinary men, overweening pride. They are relentlessly jeal-
and we not be obliged to have recourse to
shall ous of their honor. They strive not so much for
chance for an explanation of those small events victory as for the due meed of honor which is
which made these people what they were, but its fruit.
Nothing grieves them so much as to
it will be clear that all those small events were have their deeds go unrequited by abundant
inevitable/' praise. In the contribution made by this love of
This view of history, with its emphasis on praise to the growth of the Roman empire,
impersonal forces, finds another expression in Augustine sees the providential working of
Marxist theory. The machine and the proletari- God. In order that that empire "might over-
at mass are the heroes of history, or of the revo- come the grievous evils which existed among
lution. Yet the modern period is not without other nations," he writes, God "purposely
an opposite strain of thought. Machiavelli calls granted it to such men as, for the sake of honor,
for a great man, a hero, to become the "libera- and and glory, consulted well for their
praise,
tor" of Italy, "who shall yet heal her wounds country, in whose glory they sought their own,
and put an end and plundering
to the ravaging and whose safety they did not hesitate to prefer
of Lombardy, to the swindling and taxing of the to their own, suppressing the desire of wealth
kingdom and of Tuscany, and cleanse those and many other vices for this one vice, namely,
sores that for long have festered." His maxims the love of praise."
for the prince be read, not merely as ad-
may To Augustine, however, this glory found in
vice for getting and holding power, but as pre- human praise is far removed from the true
paring for an heroic effort in which the prince's glory. It is, in fact, a sin. "So hostile is this vice
power and fame will be used for liberty. The to pious faith," he writes, "if the love of glory
great man has the historic mission of a pioneer, be greater in the heart than the fear or love of
not the role of a puppet. God, that the Lord said, 'How can ye believe,
Even in the Renaissance, however, Machia- who look for glory from one another, and do not
"
velli is answered by Montaigne, who prizes seek the glory which is from God alone?'
moderation too much to praise heroism more The Christian hero, consequently, seeks not
than a little. Comparing Socrates and Alex- his own glory, but the glory of God, and in
ander, Montaigne places all of the la tier's ac- contrast to the pagan hero, he is
great, not in
tions under the maxim, "Subdue the world," pride, but in humility. His model is seen in the
whereas Socrates, he says, acts on the principle Apostles, who, according to Augustine, "amidst
that it is wise "to carry on human life conform- malediction^ and reproaches, and most grievous
ably with its natural condition. "To Montaigne, persecutions and cruel punishments, were not
"the virtue of the soul does not consist in flying deterred from the preaching of human salva-
high, but in walking orderly; its grandeur does tion. And when . . .
great glory followed them
not exercise itself in grandeur, but in medi- in the church of Christ, they did not rest in
ocrity." that as in the end of their virtue, but referred
The mediaeval Christian conception of hero- that glory itself to the glory of God . . . For
ism centers on the practice of heroic virtue, by their Master had taught them not to seek to
which the theologian defines sanctity. In the be good for the sake of human glory, saying,
calendar of saints, there is every type of spirit- 'Take heed that ye do not your righteousness
ual excellence, but all alike martyrs, virgins, before men to be seen of them* but 'Let . . .
confessors, doctors are regarded as having, your works shine before men, that they may see
with God's grace, superhuman strength. The your good deeds, and glorify your Father who
"
saints not only
perform acts of exemplary per- is in heaven.'
fection; they are godlike men in their exemp- The word "glory" in its theological connota-
tion from the frailties of human flesh. tion thus has a meaning distinct from, and even
The heroes of antiquity also wear an aspect opposed to, the sense in which U is sometimes
CHAPTER 35: HONOR 735
used as a synonym for "fame." In the liturgy fullness in Himself and the height of all per-
of the church, the psalms and hymns (especially Montaigne writes, "His
fection"; nevertheless,
those of the doxology which sing the gloria name may be augmented and increased by the
Patri and the gloria in excelsts Deo) render unto blessing and praise we attribute to His exterior
God the homage which is due His infinite good- works.'*
ness, the reflexive splendor of which is the di- According to Dante, "the glory of Him who
vine glory. As in the strict moral sense honor on moves everything penetrates through the uni-
the human plane is due to virtue alone, so in a verse, and is resplendent in one part more and
strict theological sense glory belongs only to in another less." In his journey through Para-
God, disc, he beholds the saints whom God loves es-
Stnctly, God's glory cannot be increased by pecially, each with a distinct degree of glory
human recognition. Yet every act of religious according to the proximity with which he ap-
devotion is said to redound to the greater glory proaches the presence of God. Their halos and
of God and to diffuse His glory among creatures aureoles, in the imagery of Christian art, are
through the divinity they acquire when they the symbols of the glory in which they are
u
loveGod and are beloved by Him. God is all bathed as in reflected light.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGB
1. The relation of honor and fame: praise and reputation 736
4^. The scale of honor in the organization of the state: the just distribution of
honors 743
4^, Honor as a political technique: the uses of praise, prestige, public opinion
6. The idea of glory: its distinction from honor and fame 746
6a. The glory of God: the signs and the praise of the divine glory
6. The reflected glory of the angels and saints
736 THE GREAT IDEAS
REFERENCES
To numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
find the passages cited, use the
numbers of the passages referred For example, in 4 HOMER- Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
to.
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PACE SECTIONS- When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, Il6a-I19b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE RrrrRFNcrs- The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), iollows, e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nchemiah, 7.45 (D) // Esdras, 7.46
SYMBOLS. The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference, "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK iv, STANZA 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK x [203-217] 67a-b; BK xxni-
63-64 96b-97a; STANZA 206 115b; STANZA 211- xxiv 161a-179d
212 116a; STANZA 231-239 118b 119b; BK v, 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King 99a-113a,c esp
STANZA 235-244 151a-152a / Knight's Tale [31-57] 99b-d, [463-511] 103c-d, [1187-1221]
174a-211a HOb-c / Antigone [683-704] 137a-b / Ajax
23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH XVH, 24a-b 143a-155a,c esp [430-480] 146d-147b, [1047-
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 125b-126b; 181d-183c 1421] 152a-155a,c
26 SHAKESPEARE: Two Gentlemen of Verona, ACT 5 EURIPIDES: Hecuba [299-331] 355b-c
iv, sc i 245b-246b 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 14a-d; BK n, 85d-
27 SHAKESPEARE: Troilus and Cressida, ACT in, 86b; BK in, lOlc-d; 122a-d; 123c-d; BK iv,
sc n [165-212] 121d-122b / Timon of Athens, 134d-135b; 136a-c; BK vi, 192c; 195d-196c;
ACT in, sc n [71-94] 404c-d; sc in [27-42] 198a-199a; 211a; BK vii, 233d 234b; 248d;
40Sb; ACT iv, sc i 409c-d; sc in [249-305] BK vin, 282c-283a
413c-414a 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK i, 383d-
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART i, 8c-10b; 384a; BK n, 395c-399a esp 395c-d, 399a; BK
71c-73a; 120b*134b v, 484c-485c; BK vi, S13b-d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH 7 PLATO: Republic, BK v, 362a-b; 366c-367b;
xxvin, SECT 10-13 230b-231c BK vn, 401b
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART n, 70 b 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK iv, CH 3-4 370b-372d;
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 313d-314d BK vxu, CH 14 [n63b 5-i3] 416a-c / Politics,
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 90b BK n, CH 7 [1267*12-17] 462d / Rhetoric, BK i,
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 389b-d CH 5 [i36i25~b3] 601d-602a
3a to CHAPTER 35: HONOR 741
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK iv, SECT 3, 263d
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK i [142-156] 107a; [450-465] $. The conditions of honor or fame and the
115b causes of dishonor or infamy
14 PLUTARCH: Themistocles, 95b-c;97b-d / Ca- OLD TESTAMENT: Joshua, 6:27 (>) Josue, 6:27
millus, 117a-c/ Fabius 141a-154a,c csp 149b-c / Judges, 5/7 Samuel, i8.6-8-(>) / Kings,
/ Alctbiades 155b,d-174d esp 161d-162b, i8.6-S / / Kings, io-(D) /// Kings, 10 / /
165c-d / Coriolanus, 177b-179c / Timoleon, Chronicles, 29:12 (D) I Paralipomenon, 29 12
212c-213d / Aemihus Paulus, 226c-229c / / II Chronicles, 9:1-28 (D) II Paralipomenon,
Pelopidas, 245a-d / Marcellus, 256b-d / Arts- 9:1-28 / Proverbs, 3:16; 4-8,18; 8:18; 14:28;
tides,265c-266b / Flamminus, 309a-b; 310b / 31:23,25,28-31 / Ecclestastes, 1:11; 2:16; 7:1
Sertonus, 464a-c / Pompey, 499a-b / Caesar, (D) Ecclestastes, 1:11; 2*16; 7:2 / Isaiah,
598d-601a / Cato the Younger, 624a-625b; 14:20- (D) Isaias, 14 20 / Jeremiah, 9:23-24
637a-c / Cicero, 712d-713b / Demetrius, (D) Jeremias, 9:23-24
737b-d APOCRYPHA- Judith, 8:8 (D) OT, Judith, 8:8 /
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK n, 33c; 41c-d, 43c-44a; Wisdom of Solomon, 3:16-17; 4'i-8; 8-9-10
BK in, 45a-46b; 60d; BK iv, 73b-d; BK xiv, (D) OT, Boof( of Wisdom, 3:16-17; 4:1-8;
153dl55a 8:9-10 / Ecclesiasticus, 1*19; 10:5; 10:19-11-2;
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK v, CH 12, 2l8b-c; 37:26; 44:1-15 (D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 1.24;
CH 15 220d-221a; CH 17-18 221b-224b 10.5, 10.23-11 2; 37:29; 44:1-15 / / Macca-
19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 2, bees, 2.50-51 (D) OT, / Machabees, 2*50-51
A 2 616d-617b NEW TESTAMENT: Acts, 21 26-40 / Romans,
21 DANTE- Divine Comedy, HELL, iv [64-147] 6a- 14 15-18 / II Corinthians, 10-8-18; 11*16-30 /
7a; PURGATORY, vin [121-139] 65c-d; xi [73- / Thessalomans, 1:6-10
117] 69c-70a; PARADISE, xvi [16-154] 130a- 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK i 3a~9a,c; BK in 19a-23d;
132a; xvn [46-142] 132c-133c BK vi [312-358] 43b-d; [503-529] 45b-d; BK
23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH xvm, 25d-26a ix 57a-64a,c esp [307-429] 60b-61c, BK x [102-
23 HOBBES. Leviathan, P\RT i, 73b-c, 75a-b 130] 66a-b, BK xn [290-328] 85b-c; BK xxn
25 MONTAIGNE Essays, 181d-183a, 445c-446a [99-130] 156b-c; [289-305] 158b
26 SHAKLSPEARE. Julius Caesar, ACT i, sc i [37- 5 AESCHYLUS- Seven Against Thebes [1011-1084]
65] 568d-569a; ACT v, sc v 595a-596a,c esp 38b-39a,c
[68-8 1 ] 596a,c 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King 99a-113a,c esp
27 SHAKESPLARE: Troilus and Cressida, ACT HI, [31-57] 99b-d, [463-511] 103c-d, [1187-1221]
sc in [175-233] 124b-125a / Conolanus 351a- llOb-c / Antigone [163-210] 132c-d; [441-525]
392a,c esp ACT i, sc ix 359c-360c, ACI n, sc i 134d-135c / Ajax 143a-155a,c esp [430-480]
[134-247] 362b-363c, sc ii-m 364a-369a / 146d-147b, [1047-1421] 152a-155a,c
Timon of Athens, ACT in, sc v 406d-408a 5 EURIPIDES Rhesus [149-203] 204c-205a / Sup-
29 CERVANTES Don Quixote, PARI i, 65c-68b pliants [857-917] 266a-b / Hecuba [251-257]
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 20b-c 355a; [299-331] 355b-c
32 MILTON- Areopagitica, 383a 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK n, 70c-d; 76a-b;
33 PASCAL: Pensecs, 337 232b-233a 85d-86b; BK in, 93c; BK iv, 134d-135b; UK v,
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART i, 28b; PART HI, 119a- 160d-161a; 168d-169a; BK vi, 206d-207a;
121b BK VH, 231d; 233d-234b; 248d; 257a; 257c;
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 54d-55a; 313d-314d BK ix, 303c-304a; 305a-c
38 ROUSSEAU. Inequality, 360a-362d passim, csp 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK i, 350b;
360b-c / Political Economy, 374d-375b / Social BK n, 395d-396a, 398d-399a, 402c-d, 403c-
Contract, BK iv, 434a 404a; BK HI, 427a-c; BK vi, 513a-d
40 GIBBON Decline and Fall; 28b-'29b;92&; 219d- 7 PLATO: Laches, 27b-d; 31a-c / Symposium,
220a; 298b; 381b-d 152d-153b; 154d-155a / Apology, 205d-206a /
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 318b-319b Republic, BK i, 296c-d; BK v, 366c-367b;
42 KANT- Judgement, 504a-b 370b-c; BK vin, 405d-406a; BK ix, 422a /
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 57, 177a-c Laws, BK in, 673d
43 MILL: Liberty, 278c-279a; 298b-299a 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK n, CH n [ii5b 22-35J
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, xia, 8a-c; 383c; 479a-d; 161d-162a,c
498c-499a 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK iv, CH 3-4 370b-372d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART HI, par 348 / Politics,BK v, CH 10 [1312*23-39] 514d /
Hid/ Philosophy of History, INTRO, 167a- Rhetoric, BK i, CH 5 [1361*27-34] 601d; CH 9
608c-611c; BK n, CH n [i388 28- 28] 635b-
B b
168a; PART n, 262a-c; 272c-273a; 280b-281a
47 GOETHE* Faust, PART i [1011-1021] 25b-26a 636a
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick,, 79a-82b; 84b-85a 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [1105-
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK iv, 171c-173d; 1135] 75c-d
BK VHI, 338c-d; BK xm, 578b; 582a-584b; BK 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK iv, SECT 3, 263d;
xv, 619c-621b; 629b-c BK VH, SECT 34 282a
742 THE GREAT IDEAS
33 PASCAL: Pen&s, 319-324 229b-230b; 337
(3. The social realization of honor andfame. 36, 232b*233a
The condition* of honor orjame and the 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART i, 15b-16b; PART HI,
causes of dishonor or infamy.) 119a-121b
13 VIROIL- Aeneid, BK i [441-493] 115a-116b; 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 9a-d; 38b; 146c-147a;
[561-568] 118b; BK ix [590-620] 295a-b 223d-224b; 308a-310a; 313d-314d
14 PLUTARCH: Camillus, 117a-c / Fabius 141a- 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 360a-362d esp 362b-d
154a,c esp 149b-c / Alcibiades 155b,d-174d / Political Economy, 372d; 374d-375b / Social
esp 172b / Akibiades-Conolanus, 194a-195a,c Contract, BK iv, 434b-435a
/ Aemihus Paulus, 224d-229c / Pelopidas, 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 354c-d
243c-244b / Marcellus-Pelopidas, 262d / Arts- 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 2a; 3a; 92a; 435a-
tides,264a-d; 265c-d / Cimon, 392d-393b / 436b
Nicias, 425c-d / Agesilaus, 497a-b / Pompey, 41 GIBBON- Decline and Fall, 27c-29a; 31b,d-
509d-510a / Caesar, 598d-601a / Phocion, 32c; 68a-b; 71b,d; 176c-d; 209d; 494b,d-
604b>d-605d / Cato the Younger, 637a-c / Agu, 495d, 504c-505c
648b,d-649b / Cleomenes, 659d-660a / Cicero, 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 68, 206b-c
712d'713b / Demetrius, 737b-d / Dion, 784a-b 43 MILL. Utilitarianism, 452c-453a
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK i, 16d-17a; BK n, 33c; 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 62b-c; 124d-125d; 140b-
41c-d; BK in, 60d-61a; BK iv, 72d-73d; BK xi, 141a; 160b; 189d-190b; 194c-195a; 197c;
101c-102a; BK xv, 169a / Histories, BK n, 226d- 198b-d; 250d-251a; 256d; 299a-b, 412b-d;
228a; BK in, 248b-c; 259c-260a; BK iv, 289d- 479a-d; 498c-499a
290a 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 244
18 AUGUSTINE* City of God, BK v, CH 12-20 216d- 77c
226a passim 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [3734-3763] 91a-b
19 AOUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 2, 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 79a-82b; 84b-85a
AA 2-1 616d-618a 51 TOLSTOY- War and Peace, BK iv, 170d-171c;
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 173d-179a esp 177d-178a; BK v, 204a-205b;
73, A 10, ANS 128a-d; PART n-ii, Q 25, A i, 228b-234a, BK vi, 247a-c, 250c; BK vin, 304c;
REP 2 501b-502a; Q 43 585a-592d 338c-d, BK xm, 582a-584b, BK xiv, 610c-
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, in [22-69] 611c; BK xv, 619c-621b
4b-d; vi [76-93] 9a-b; vn [1-66] 9c-10b, xin 54 FREUD. Civilization and Its Discontents, 767a
[31-78] 18b-c; xvi [1-90] 22c-23b; xxiv [43-
4. Honor in the political community and in
60] 35a-b; xxxu [ij-xxxm [9] 47c-49c; PUR-
GATORY, via [121-139] 65c-d, xi [73-117] 69c- government
70a; PARADISE, xvi [16-154] 130a 132a; xvn
4a. Honor as a principle in the organization of
[46-142] 132c-133c
the state: timocracy and monarchy
22 CHAUCER. Parson's Tale, par 10, 500a
23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH vin 12d-14c esp 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK xn [290-328] 85b-c
13b-c; CH xiv-xix 21b-30a, CH xx, 30d; CH 7 PLATO: Symposium, 152b-d / Republic, BK
xxi 31d-33a vin, 402b-405c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 74c-75b; PART n, 9ARisrorLE: Politics, BK v, CH 10 [i3iob40-
b a
146d; PARr iv, 261c 1311*7] 513b; BK vii, CH 2 [i324 2-i325 7]
25 MONTAIGNE- Essays, 7a-d; 103c-104d; 112d- 528c-529a
113d; 126b-127c; 130b-d; 302b-306a; 314c- 14 PLUTARCH: Themistocles, 99b-c / Lysander-
316a; 390c-391c; 445a-446a, 450c-453c, 495d- Sulla, 387d-388a
496d 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK v, CH 12, 218d-
26 SHAKESPEARE: 2nd Henry VI ACT i, sc n 36b-
t 219b
37c / Richard U, ACT v, sc n [1-40] 346b-d / 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 74b-c
Henry V, ACT iv, sc i [247-301] 554a-c 25 MONTAIGNE Essays, 181d-182c
:
27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT iv, sc iv [46-66] 26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard II, ACT iv, sc i [162-
59b-c / Troilus and Cressida, ACT n, sc 11 334] 343b-345a; ACT v, sc n [1-40] 346b-d
113c-115d; ACT in, sc HI [74-233] 123b-125a / 27 SHAKESPEARE: Coriolanus, ACT in, sc i [142-
Coriolanus, ACT n, sc i [220-275] 363b-364a; 161] 370d-371a
ACT in, sc ii-m 373c-377a; ACT iv, sc vn [27- 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 120a
57] 384c-d / Henry VIII, ACT in, sc n [350- 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK m, llc-
458] 572c-573d / Sonnets, xxv 590a 12b; BK iv, 13b,d-15a; BK v, 32d; BK vin,
29 CERVANTES: Don Qutxotc, PART n, 227a- 53b-c
228d; 303a-c 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 326b-327a; 360a-362d
,30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 83c; 92a-b passim, esp 360a-361a / Political Economy,
32 MILTON Lycidas [64-84] 29a-b / Paradise Lost,
: 375a-b
'
BK n [430-456] 120b-121a / Samson Agonistes 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 630b
[960-996] 360b-361a 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 8lc-d, 317b 318b
CHAPTER 35f HONOR 743
46'HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 273, 43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION' vi [87-93] 6 ^
91c-d / Philosophy of History, PART n f 262a-c; 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ARTICLE \, SECT
PART iv, 334b-c 9 [289-295] 14a
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vi, 241c-242b 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 84, 2S2a
44 BQSVSELL: Johnson, 141a; 197c
4b. The scale of honor in the organization of 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 206
the state: the just distribution of honors
68d-69b; par 319, 106b-c / Philosophy of
NEW TESTAMENT: Romans, 13:7 History, PART i, 222a-224a
4 HOMER: Iliad, BK i [1-510] 3a-8b; BK ix 57a- 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART n [10,849-976] 264a-
64a,c; BK XH [290-328] 85b-c 267a
5 AESCHYLUS: Seven Against Thebes [1011-1084] 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 108a-112a
38b-39a,c 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK in, 131c-135c;
5 SOPHOCLES* Antigone [162-210] 132c~d / Ajax BK v, 206b-c; 228b-234a; BK vi, 241c-242b;
143a-155a,c csp [430-480] 146d-147b, [1047- 250c
1421] 152a-155a,c
5 EURIPIDES- Hecuba [299-331] 355b-c
4c. Honor as a political technique: the uses of
44c-d; BK vin [130-156] 52c; BK ix 57a-64a,c; 147c; 150a-164a,c; BK ix, 366d-367b; 369a-
BK xii [290-328] 85b-c; BK xxn [99-130] 372a; BK xi, 527b-528b; BK xm, 569d-570a;
156b-c; [289-305] 158b BK xiv, 590d-604b passim, esp 603a-604b, BK
5 SOPHOCLES- Ajax [430-480] 146d-147b xv, 618b-619d; EPILOGUE i, 673d-674a,c
5 EURIPIDES: Heracleidae [i-n] 248a; [484-596] 52 DOSTOEVSKY' Brothers Karamazov, BK x,
252c-253b / Suppliants [857-917] 266a-b / 273a-d, EPILOGUE, 408a-c
Hecuba [343-383] 355d-356a; [482-603] 357a- 54 FREUD- War and Death, 765a-b
358a / HeracleiMad [275-311] 367c-d / Phoe-
nician Maidens [991-1030] 387a-b
5b. Hero-worship: the exaltation of leaders
5 ARISTOPHANES. Knights [565-598] 477a-c 4 HOMER Iliad, BK xii [290-328] 85b-c
6 HPRODOIUS: History, BK vn, 226b-c; 234a-b; 5 ARISTOPHANES: Frogs [1008-1098] 576b-577c
255c-d; BK ix, 291c-292a 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK v, 168d-169a; 183d-
6 THUCYDIDES. Peloponnesian War, BK n, 395d- 184a; BK vi, 192c; BK vn, 235b-c
399a csp397d-398c; 402c-404a; BK v, 484a-c; 6 THUCYDIDES' Peloponnesian War, BK n, 395d-
BK vii, 556b-d 398a; BK v, 485b-c
7 PLATO: Symposium, 152b-d; 166b-167a / 7 PLATO. Republic, BK in, 340a-b; BK v, 366c-
Apology, 205d-206a / Republic, BK v, 366c- 367b; BK vn, 401b
367b / Laws, BK i, 651a-652a 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK vii, CH 14 [i332b i7~
9 ARISTOTLE. Ethics, BK in, CH 6-9 361a-364b; 27] 537b-c
BK iv, CH 3 370b-372b passim, esp [m3 b 3i- 13 VIRGIL Aeneid, BK i [267-290] llOa-llla;
b
33] 370d, [ii24 7-9] 371b-c / Politics, BK v, BK vi [756-892] 231a-235a; BK vm
[608-
CH 10 [1312*24-39] 514d 731] 275a-278b
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK i [441-493] 115a-116b; BK 14 PLUTARCH: Theseus, 14c-15a,c/ Romulus, 28a-
x [276-286] 309b-310a; BK xi [376-444] 338b- 30a,c / Themistocles, 99b-c / Pericles, 140c-
340a; BK xii [650-696] 371b-372b Aemihus Paulus, 226c-230d / Lysan-
141a,c /
14 PLUTARCH: Theseus, 2c-9a esp 3a-b, 3d / 361d-362a / Demetrius, 729d-731a; 734b-
der,
Romulus-Theseus, 30a-b / Pophcola, 83b-84a 735a
/ Coriolanus, 175d-176b / Pelopidas, 238b- 15 TACITUS Annals, BK iv, 73b-d / Histories,
239c / Flamininus, 302b / Alexander 540b,d- BK i, 198c-d
576d csp 542a-d, 553b-c / Caesar, 583b-585d; 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagrucl, BK iv
599b-d / Cato the Younger 620a-648a,c 267c-270b
CHAPTER 35: HONOR 745
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 103c-104d; 126b-128d; 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL,
145d-146d; 362a-365a; 390c-391c; 452d-453b Q 96, AA 5-7 1055c-1062a; AA 11-12 1063d-
26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard II, ACT v, sc n [1-40] 1065b
346b-d / King John, ACT i 376a-379c / Julius 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, xxvi 38a*39c
Caesar\ ACT i, sc i [37-65] 568d-569a; sc n 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida BK n, STANZA
,
[90-161] 570b-571a; ACT v, sc v [68-75] 596a,c 25-29 24b-25b; STANZA 88-92 33a-b; BK v,
27 SHAKESPEARE: Antony and Cleopatra, ACT v, STANZA 258 154a / Prologue [43-78] 159b-160a
sc n [82-100] 347a-b / Knight's Tale 174a-211a csp [859-1004] 174a-
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART i, la-8c; 32c- 176b
33a; 41a-c; 82c-d; PART n, 254d-255a 23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH xxvi 36b-37d
32 MILTON: Lord Gen. Fairfax 68b-69a / Lord 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 73b-76b
Gen. Cromwell 69a-b 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagrucl, BK i,
38 ROUSSEAU: Political Economy, 373c-d 32c-35a; 42a-44a; 50c-52d
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 12b-c; 28b-d; 92a; 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 302b-303a; 340a-343b
263a; 298b; 47lc-d; 627a-d passim; 362a-365a; 390c-391c
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 131b; 209d; 415d- 26 SHAKESPEARE: Henry V, ACT in, sc i 543d-
416c; 536c-d 544b; ACT iv, sc in [16-67] 555d-556b
43 MILL: Liberty, 298d-299a 27 SHAKFSPEARE: Troilus and Cressida, ACT n,
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic^ 107a-b sc n 113c-115d / Coriolanus, ACT i, sc i [256-
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 9c-10d; BK n, 280] 354b-c; ACT n, sc i [130-178] 362b-c;
97c-101c; BK HI, 13Sc-137c; 140c-142d; 159b- sc in [86-128] 366d-367b / Ttmon of Athens,
161b; 162b-164a,c; BK iv, 170d-173d; BK v, ACT in, sc v 406d-408a
230b-234a; BK vi, 238c-243d csp 242c-243c; 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote csp PART i, 147b-d,
260a-262a; BK ix, 344b-346a; 354a-355c; PART ii, 203a~b, 280b-c
366d-367b; 382a-388a,c; BK x, 405a-406c; 32 MILTON. Lord Gen. Fairfax 68b~69a
444a-445d; BK xi, 518c-d; BK xm, 578b; 582a- 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK iv, 437d-438c
584b; BK xiv, 600d; 610c-611c; BK xv, 619c- 40 GIBBON- Decline and Fall, 217d-220d csp
621b; EPILOGUE i, 647b-649d; 673d-674a,c 219c-220d; 240b-247a passim; 369d-376c esp
53 JAMES: Psychology, 826b-827a 370a-c, 375b-c; 644d-645c
54 FREUD: Group Psychology, 669a-c; 674b- 41 GIBBON. Decline and Fall, 19d-20a; 357c-
675b; 676b-c; 683c-684a; 686b-689d; 691 d- 359c; 415d-416c; 534b-536d passim; 549c-
693a / War and Death, 762c 550c
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 241 d-
5c. The occasions of heroism in war and peace 242b; 247a; PART n, 262c-363a; 274a-275a;
4 HOMER: Iliad 3&-l79d esp BK iv [220-418] 26b- 281d-282d; PART in, 298a-b
28a, BK v [520-532] 35c, BK x [203-253] 67a-c, 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK n, 77c-81b;
BK xn [290-328] 85b-c / Odyssey, BK i [267- 89b-d; 97c-106d; BK in, 146d-147c; 150a-
305] 185d-186a 164a,c; BK vi, 250c; BK ix, 366d-367b; 369a-
5 EURIPIDES: Rhesus [149-263] 204c-205c / 372a; BK xiv, 590d-604b
Heracles Mad [140-205] 366b d / Phoenician
Maidens [991-1018] 387a-b d. The estimation of the role of the hero in
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK n, 69a-b; BK in, history
lOlc-d; 122a-123d; BK iv, 134d-135b; BK vi, 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK vi [756-892] 231a-235a;
187b-188d; BK vn, 233d-234b; 238a-c; 248d; BK viii [608-731] 275a-278b
255a-257d; BK ix, 291c-292a; 303c-304a 14 PLUTARCH: Theseus la-15a,c esp 9a-d / Romu-
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK n, 395d- lus 15a-30a,c / Lycurgus 32a-48d esp 47a-48c
399a; BK iv, 457b-c; BK v, 484c-48Sc; 502b-c / Numa Pompilius 49a-61d esp 59c-60b / Peri-
7 PLATO: Apology, 205d-206a cles 121a-141a,c csp 129c-130b, 140c-141a,c /
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK in, CH 6-9 361a-364b; Timoleon 195a-213d csp 212c-213d / Fla-
BK iv, CH 3 370b-372b passim / Politics, BK mmmus, 307d-308a / Pompey 499a-538a,c /
b
vn, CH 2 [i324 io-23] 528c-d Caesar 577a-604d / Antony 748a-779d csp
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK ix [168-449] 283b-291a 750a-b / Marcus Brutus 802b,d-824a,c
14 PLUTARCH: Theseus la-15a,c / Pophcola, 83b- 23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH vi, 9a-b; CH xx,
84a / Coriolanus, 174b,d-179c / Aemilms 30d; CH xxv-xxvi, 35a-37a
Paulus, 219d-229c / Marcellus 246b,d-261a,c 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK iv,
/ Alexander 540b,d-576d / Cato the Younger 267c-268a
620a-648a,c / Demosthenes, 695d-703b / 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 362a-365a
712d-713b
Cicero, 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK x, 65d-68a
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK i, lla-b; BK in, 49d; 38 ROUSSEAV: Inequality, 362a-b; 364a-b / Politi-
BK vi, 92c; BK xvi, 180d-183a; 183d-184a / cal Economy, 373c-374a / Social Contract, BK
Histories, BK i, 200b-c; BK 11, 226d-228a; n, 400c-402a
BK in, 246b-c; 248b-c; 249 b; 256a-c 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 633d-634a,c
746 THE GREAT IDEAS 6 to 66
APOCRYPHA: Tobit, 8:15-17; 12:6-7; 13 (D)
(5. Honor, fame, and the heroic, 5< The estima-
OT, Tobias, 8:16-19; 12:6-7; J
3 / Judith,
tion of the role of the hero in history.)
i6:i-i8-(D) OT, Judith, 16:1-22 / Rest of
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 220b; 251d-252a Esther, 13:8-18 (D) OT, Esther, 13-8-18 /
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 72, 217d 218a Ecclesiasticus, 18; 39:12-35; 42:15-43:33;
43 MILL: Liberty, 298d-299a 51:1-12 (D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 18; 39:16-41;
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 93 42:15-43.37, 51 :i-i7 / Song of Three Children,
36a-b; PART n, par 124 44b-d; PART HI, par 28-68-(D) OT, Daniel, 3:51-90 / / Macca-
318 105b, par 344 Ilia; par 348 llld; par 350 bees, 4:24 (D) OT, / Machabees, 4:24
112a; ADDITIONS, 58 125c; 186 149b / Philoso- NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 5:13-16 / Luke,
phy of History, INTRO, 162a-170b; 184b-d; 1:46-55,68-79; 2:8-14 / John, 8:54 / / Peter,
PART i, 241d-242b; PART n, 259b-c; 273a; 4.11 / 11 Peter, 1:16-19 / Revelation, 5-9-14;
274a-275a;275d-276a; 280b-281a; 281d- 7:9-17; 11:16-18; 21-22 (D) Apocalypse,
282d; 283c-d; PART in, 298a-b; 300a~301c; 5:9-14; 7-9-17; n 16-18; 21-22
PART iv, 360b-c; 361d-362a; 366b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par i la-b; par
47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [570-580] 16a 4 2a; par 31 8d-9a; BK n, par 13, lid; BK v,
48 MELVILLE: Moby Did(, 107a-b par i 27a-b; BK vn, par 19 49c-d; par 23
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace passim, csp BK i, 8d- 50b-c, BK ix, par i 61c-d; par 34 70c-d, BK x,
lOd, BK in, 143a-c, 162b-164a,c, BK ix, 342a- par 38 81a / Ctty of God, BK v, CH 14 220a-d,
344b, 350d-355c, BK x, 389a-391c, 405a-b, CH BK vm, CH 6 268d-269c, BK
17 221b-222a;
430b-432c, 447c-448c, 465c-467a, BK xi, 469a- CH 29 339a-b; BK xn, CH 4-5 344b-345b;
xi,
470c, 497c-499c, 507a, BK xm, 563a-575a, BK BK xxn, CH 29 614b-616d
xiv, 610d-611c, BK xv, 619d-621b, EPILOGUE 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 26, A
i, 645a-650c, EPILOGUE 11 675a-696d passim 4, ANS 151c-152a,c Q 44, A 4 241a-d, Q 65, A 2
r
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologtca, PART in, Q 19, 13a-b / Paradise Lost, BK v [809-845] 193a-b
A 3, REP 3-4 819c-820c; PART in SUPPL, Q csp [833-8^5] 193b
69, A 2, REP 3-4 886c-887d; QQ 82-85 33 PASCAL. Pensfes, 643 290b-291a; 793, 326b
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Honor or fame in relation to virtue, duty, and happiness, see DUTY 4-40; HAPPINESS 2b(4);
VIRTUE AND VICE 4d(a), 6d.
The sense in which pride is a vice and humility a virtue, see SIN 40; VIRTUE AND VICE 8f.
Fame as a mode of immortality, see IMMORTALITY 6b.
Mutual respect or honor as a condition of friendship, see LOVE 2b(3); VIRTUE AND VICE 6e.
The political significance of honor, see GOVERNMENT 2a; JUSTICE 96 STATE 9C. ;
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boo^s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
A COMPARISON of their Greek and Latin THERE is ONE USE of the word "hypothesis" in
Z\ roots shows that the English words "hy- mathematics which seems at odds with the
larly misapplied
to mean a guess or hunch. The ation. Let us take Proposition 6 of Book I. It
sleuth in a detective story speaks of having an reads: "//"in a triangle two angles be equal to
hypothesis about who committed the crime. one another, then the sides which subtend the
The popular notion of what it means to suppose equal angles will also be equal to one another."
something, or to entertain a supposition, more In the demonstration of this theorem, a tri-
accurately reflects the meaning of hypothesis in angle having two equal angles is regarded as
logic, mathematics, and scientific or philosoph- That figure or geometrical con-
given or granted.
ical method. dition is a fact obtained by hypothesis. It is the
A supposition is
generally understood to be fact stated in the hypothesis, or the if-clause, of
quences. We cannot reverse this order, when The construction is not made, however, as part
we employ suppositions, and ask first about of the proof of Theorem 6, any more than is the
their truth. demonstration of an antecedent theorem, which
The word "if expresses the essence of sup- may have to be used in the proof of Theorem
posing. The word "then" or the phrase "it fol- 6. In the proof of Theorem 6, the first line, be-
lows that" introduces the consequences for the ginning with the word "let," declares that the
consideration of which we make the supposi- construe tibihty of the figure is to be taken for
tion. We are not interested in the "if" for its
granted as a matter of hypothesis.
own sake, but for the sake of what it
may lead The whole problem of Theorem 6 is to prove
to. In any statement of the "if then . ."
. . . . that the then-clause follows from the if-clause.
sort, it is the if-clause which formulates the sup- Euclid appears to accomplish this by introduc-
position or the hypothesis; the other part of the ing other propositions drawn from his axioms,
statement, the then-clause, formulates the con- definitions, postulates, or theorems previously
sequences or implications. The whole complex demonstrated which establish this connection
statement, which makes an // the logical basis and so certify the conclusion as following from
for a then, is not an hypothesis. Rather it is the hypothesis. Two points about this proce-
what is
traditionally called in logic a hypothet- dure should be noted.
ical proposition. First, the conclusion does not follow from
749
750 THE GREAT IDEAS
the hypothesis directly, for if that were so, the In the MenOj for example, Socrates proposes,
11
"if-then proposition would be self-evident and at a certain turn in the conversation about vir-
would need no proof. Th$ mind which sees im- tue and knowledge, triat he and Meno enter-
mediately that the sides opposite to the equal tain the hypothesis that virtue is knowledge.
angles in an isosceles triangle are necessarily Socrates immediately inquires about the conse-
equal docs not need any demonstration of the quences. "If virtue is knowledge," he asks,
connection between equal angles and tfqual "will it be taught?" Since Meno already under-
sides. The Euclidean demonstration consists in stands that knowledge is teachable, he answers
making this connection, which is not immediate- the question affirmatively. The utility of ad-
ly evident, mediately evident; that is, evident vancing the hypothesis that virtue is knowledge
through the mediation of other propositions. It gradually appears in the next phase of the dia-
is not the hypothesis alone which proves the logue, wherein it is discovered that virtue is not
conclusion, but the hypothesis in the company teachable at all, or at least not in the way in
of other propositions which serve to take the which the and sciences are teachable. The
arts
mind step by step from the hypothesis granted discovery throws some doubt on the truth of
to the conclusion implied. the hypothesis that virtue is knowledge; at
Second, the proposition with the truth of does not seem to be knowledge in the
least it
which the reasoning seems to end is not the same sense as science or art.
proposition to be proved. The Q.E.D. at the This mode of reasoning exemplifies the use of
end of a Euclidean demonstration does not ap- an hypothesis to test its truth in terms of its
ply to the last proposition in the line of proof, consequences. The underlying logical principle
but to the theorem itself, for that is the propo- is that the denial of the
consequences requires a
sition to be proved. The last proposition in the denial of the antecedent hypothesis, just as an
reasoning is
merely the consequent which, ac- affirmation of the antecedent would require an
cording to the theorem, is
proposed as follow- affirmation of the consequent. Nothing follows
ing from the hypothesis. When he is able to logically from a denial of the hypothesis, or
verify the proposed connection between the from an affirmation of its consequences.
hypothesis and its conclusion or consequent, This example from the Meno also illustrates
Euclid says Q.E.D. to the theorem as a whole the difference between Euclid's and Plato's use
the whole if-then statement.