International Interactions

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Structural and armed violence in the 20th century:

Magnitudes and trends

William Eckhardt & Gernot Köhler

To cite this article: William Eckhardt & Gernot Köhler (1980) Structural and armed violence
in the 20th century: Magnitudes and trends , International Interactions, 6:4, 347-375, DOI:
10.1080/03050628008434539

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03050628008434539

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 International Interactions, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 347-375
0305-0629/80/0604-0 347$04.50/0
© 1980, Gordon and Breach, Science Publishers, Inc.
Printed in the United States of America

Structural and Armed Violence

in the 20th Century:
Magnitudes and Trends*
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WILLIAM ECKHARDT†

and

GERNOT KÖHLER
Canadian Peace Research Institute, Oakville, Ontario

This paper uses the term "violence" in the broader sense, monitors the changing magnitudes
of armed violence and structural violence at the global and regional levels for the 20th
century. It compares the magnitudes of the two types of violence and, discerns long-term
trends in the magnitudes of armed and structural violence that may exist in this century.

I. INTRODUCTION

The measurement, explanation, and control of large-scale violence is a central,

if not the central, concern of peace and conflict research. While one group of
scholars in the field restricts the term "violence" to mean armed violence in
wars and revolutions, others take a broader view and subsume both armed

*This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Grindstone School for Peace Research,
Education, and Action, Portland, Ontario, August, 1977. The authors gratefully acknowl-
edge critical suggestions made by Norman Alcock, Tord HjSivik, and Hanna Newcombe.
This research was partly supported by a grant from Leitch Transport to the Canadian Peace
Research Institute.
†William Eckhardt is now located at the Peace Research Laboratory, 6251 San Bonita, St.
Louis, MO 63105.

347
 348 W. ECKHARDT and G. KOHLER

and structural components under the term "violence." Structural violence is the
violence created by social, political, and economic institutions and structures
which may lead to as much death and harm to persons as does armed violence
(Galtung, 1969). The objective of this paper, which uses the term "violence" in
the broader sense, is to monitor the changing magnitudes of armed and structural
violence at the global and regional levels for the 20th century. The purpose is to •
compare the magnitudes of the two types of violence and, in particular, to discern
long-term trends in the magnitudes of armed and structural violence that may ex-
ist in this century. In other words, the task we have set for ourselves in this paper
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is primarily descriptive.

II. METHODS AND DATA SOURCES

For data on armed or behavioral violence, we used the estimates of war deaths pro-
vided by Bouthoul & Carrere (1976, 1978). Our measurements of structural vio-
lence were based on the following considerations and previous studies.
Galtung & H$ivik(1971) suggested that one way of measuring structural vio-
lence would be to subtract actual life expectancy from an optimal life expectancy,
thus providing an indication of the number of life-years lost through structural
violence, which could then be compared with the number of life-years lost through
the behavioral violence of wars and revolutions.
H^ivik (1971) applied this operation to infant mortality in Mexico in 1965 and
arrived at the following conclusion: "The avoidable yearly loss of life, in early child-
hood only, would then come to around 90,000. If each child had a life expectancy,
at death, of 60 years, the loss would be about 130,000 life-years per year and
million inhabitants. This is of the same order of magnitude as the loss from direct
violence during the years of the Mexican Revolution, one of the most severe in
history" (p. 125).
Eckhardt & Young (1974,1977), using a similar operation on the average life
expectancy in the Third World compared with the average life expectancy in the
developed capitalist and communist countries, reported that structural violence
caused 317 times more deaths in the 20 years following the Second World War
than were caused by civil violence during the same period of time. The formula
used to estimate the Quantity of Structural Violence (QSV) was Third World
population divided by its average life expectancy (45 years) minus Third World
population divided by the average life expectancy in the developed world (70
years), that is, the life expectancy that would have been expected in the absence
of structural violence beyond that experienced in the developed world (P/E - P/E*,
where the asterisk indicates the optimal life expectancy). This formula suggested
that about 15 million lives per year were being lost in the Third World through
 STRUCTURAL & ARMED VIOLENCE 349
0

structural violence during the 20 years after the Second World War, compared
with about 50 thousand lives per year being lost in the whole world through civil
violence during the same time (Taylor & Hudson, 1972).
Using this same formula, but two different estimates of optimal life expectancy
(68 years and 75 years), Kohler & Alcock (1976) found that structural violence
in the whole world amounted to 14 million or 18 million deaths in 1965, 96%
of which occurred in the Third World. By comparison, they reported 92 thou-
sand deaths from civil violence in 1965 and about 17 thousand deaths from
international violence (Ibid, p. 349). Almost all of the civil deaths occurred in
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the Third World, and about 89% of the international deaths occurred in the
Third World at this time.
Using the same formula, but a slightly different estimate of optimal life ex-
pectancy (72 years), Hpivik (1977) found that the quantity of global structural
violence in 1970 was about 18 million deaths, more than half of which occur-
red in South Asia and another quarter of which occurred in mainland East Asia.
Altogether 98% of these 18 million deaths occurred in the Third World.
Hpivik also developed an Index of Structural Violence (ISV) which was de-
fined as the "probability of dying from structural violence" (Ibid, pp. 63, 68)
or the percent of life-years lost by the average person through structural vio-
lence (Ibid, p. 72). The Index of Structural Violence was defined as:

ISV = (E* - E)/E*

where E was the actual life expectancy and E* was the optimal life expectancy
(Ibid, pp. 63, 71). This Index of Structural Violence also provided a measure
of the percent of total deaths caused by structural violence. Using this formula,
H0ivik found that 26% of all deaths in 1970 were caused by structural vio-
lence, or that the average person lost 26% of potential life-years in 1970, or
that the probability of dying from structural violence in 1970 was 26%. The
ISV varied from 1% in Europe and Japan to 44% in Central Africa (Ibid, p. 71).
It was 3% in North America and the Soviet Union. Since the impact of struc-
tural violence was greatest among children, especially in the Third World, and
since the current age distribution was relatively young, especially in the
Third World, Hpivik assumed that 18 million deaths was a conservative estimate
of the quantity of global structural violence in 1970 (Ibid, p. 72).
H(6ivik's ISV and QSV, as reported in the last two paragraphs, are theoreti-
cal rather than empirical concepts. That is, they assume a stable population
with zero population growth and a constant age distribution. These theoretical
concepts have their empirical counterparts, but the data for operationalizing
these empirical concepts arc sparse. Consequently, Hpivik used his theoretical
 350 W. ECKHARDT and G. KOHLER

concepts, in spite of their lack of empirical precision, simply because they pro-
vide the only estimates of ISV and QSV available until much more work has
been done to provide the data required for the empirical equations. We shall
follow the same procedure for the same reason in this paper.
n Miuum ue nuieu nere mai inese measures 01 structural violence assumed
that the unequal life expectancies were indeed caused by structural, violence
rather than by different climates, different geographical conditions, different
historical antecedents, different racial characteristics, etc. We shall make the
same assumption which admittedly has to be proven, but shall attempt no
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such proofs in this paper. However, there is some evidence in favor of this
assumption (Galtung, 1971; Eckhardt, 1977), but we realize that further re-
search is required.
It should also be noted that, even where unequal life expectancies indicate
structural violence, they do not exhaust the concept of structural violence.
They indicate the effect of structural violence on the quantity of life, but not
its quality, which requires further operations beyond the scope of this paper.
Life expectancy figures were obtained from the United Nations Demo-
graphic and Statistical Yearbooks (1951, 1955, 1959, 1961, 1966, 1973,
1974, 1975, 1976) and Sivard (1977). Life expectancies for men and women
were simply averaged. Population estimates were obtained from the same
sources, plus a world atlas (Reader's Digest, 1972, pp. 140-141) and the
Encyclopedia Britannica (1974, pp. 912-925). Average life expectancies for
nations were weighted by population in order to arrive at regional and global
life expectancy averages. All of these figures were obtained decade by decade
as nearly as possible, from 1900 to 1974. Because of the actual years for
which data were available, the "average" years for the global life expectancies
were 1900 and 1910, but after that the "average" years were closer to the
middle of the following decades: 1925, 1935, 1946, 1955, 1965, and 1974,
as shown in Table FV.
The unreliability of all of these figures cannot be overemphasized. Different
authors provide different estimates of life expectancies, populations, and war
deaths. We have generally arrived at higher estimates for Third World life
expectancies than World Bank (1974, p. 170) figures for 1935, 1955, and
1965, especially in Asia. Had their estimates been used, we should have
arrived at greater differences between the life expectancies of rich and poor
countries and, consequently, greater structural violence in the Third World.
The reliability of war deaths has been estimated to be as low as 14% agree-
ment among five different authors (Eckhardt & Azar, 1978), compared with
80% agreement for the dating and typing of wars.
 STRUCTURAL & ARMED VIOLENCE 351

Since we used higher estimates of Third World life expectancies, we have di-
minished the difference between behavioral and structural violence. This preli-
minary effort is clearly subje:t to refinement by further research. As a first
approximation, we chose to provide conservative estimates of structural violence
and conservative estimates of the difference between the two forms of violence.
For the purpose of this study we divided the world into three parts: the
Western World (including North America, Western Europe, Australia, and New
Zealand), Communist Europe (including Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union),
and the Third World, which was further divided into the four geographical
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regions of Latin America, Asia, Middle East and North Africa, and Black
Africa. The Third World population varied from 68% to 74% of the world
population during the 20th century, averaging 70%. The first two worlds were
considered to be developed, although they contained three developing
countries each (Greece, Portugal, Spain; Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia), lower-
ing their average life expectancy slightly. The Third World was considered to
be underdeveloped, although it contained three developed countries (Israel,
Japan, and South Africa), raising its average life expectancy slightly. These
regional groupings further moderated our measure of structural violence in
the Third World.

III. SOME ESTIMATES OF VIOLENCE

BEFORE THE 20th CENTURY

Although this paper is primarily concerned with estimates of behavioral and

structural violence in the 20th century, it seemed desirable to have some
estimates of earlier violence in order to provide some historical perspective.
Some estimates of structural violence before the 20th century in terms of
differential life expectancies will be found in Appendix 1. Some estimates of
behavioral violence will be found in Appendix 2. These figures refer to slavery
and wars occurring from the 16th to the 19th centuries.

IV. TWENTIETH CENTURY VIOLENCE

In this section we shall first present some estimates of structural violence,

based on life expectancy data from 1900 to 1974, and then some estimates of
behavioral violence for the same time period. These data were grouped into
three blocs: the Western, Soviet, and Third Worlds. The Third World was
further broken down into four regions: Africa, Asia, Middle East and North
 352 W. ECKHARDT and G. KOHLER

Afica, and Latin America. Finally, in the last three subsections, we compare
the magnitudes and trends of behavioral and structural violence in the 20th
century.

1. Structural Violence

In this paper, structural violence has been defined in terms of the difference in
life expectancies between the Western World and other parts of the world, the
assumption being that structural violence in the 20th century was largely a
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function of Western imperialism. This assumption has not been proven in this
paper, but some evidence to support it has been reviewed by Eckhardt (1977).
The average life expectancies have been rounded off to whole numbers in
all cases, since no greater precision seemed to be warranted by the reliability
of our national data, especially prior to the second world war, when the life
expectancies of many nations had to be estimated as noted at the bottom of
Table I.
The names of the 138 nations, whose life expectancies were obtained or
estimated for this section, will be found in Sivard (1977), from whom the
life expectancies for these nations in 1974 were obtained.
Western World. The 24 nations of the Western World were Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, USA, and 20 countries in Western Europe. When the
number of nations, for which life expectancies were available, was less than 24
(as shown in the fourth column of Table I), the life expectancies for the
missing nations were estimated, as noted at the bottom of Table I.
The first column of Table I shows the "average" year for which the
average Western life expectancies in the second column were obtained. The
third column shows the percentage of world population living in the 24
Western countries, decade by decade. On the average, the West constituted
about 18% of the world population during the 20th century, dropping to 16%
in 1974. The fourth column shows the number of nations for which life ex-
pectancies were available. In 1911, for example, only half of the Western
nations' life expectancies were obtained, the other half being estimated.
Western life expectancies increased from 49 years in 1902, on the average,
to 72 years in 1974, increasing over this period by Vh times. It was assumed
that no structural violence occurred between and within Western nations
during this time period, but this assumption was clearly false, as indicated by
the ISVs in the last column of Table I, which indicate the maximum percent
of structural violence among Western nations decade by decade. This amount
of structural violence was accepted as the "norm" for the purpose of com-
parison with other regions in this paper. Consequently, the percentage and
 STRUCTURAL & ARMED VIOLENCE 353

TABLE I

Western World Life Expectancies in the 20th Century

Range of Life
Average Life West as % Number Expectancies in Western
Year Expect. World Population Nations Western Nations ISV
1902 49 18% 34 40-59 .32
1911 51 19 12 46-61 .25
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1922 56 19 17 47-65 .28

1932 59 19 20 50-67 .25
1944 63 18 21 . 50-71 .30
1953 68 18 23 60-73 .18
1969 71 17 24 68-74 .08
1974 72 16 24 68-75 .09
Life Increase 1.5
Average % World Pop. 18%
Notes - The Western World was defined as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, U.S.A., and 20
countires in Western Europe. In this and the following tables, the life expectancies of miss-
ing nations were estimated on the basis of their similarity to other nations in the same
region (or a similar region), or interpolated between times for the same nation. Fortunately,
hfe expectancies for the largest nations in the world were generally available for these time
periods, so that missing data weie generally in smaller nations whose estimated expectancies
weighed less in the regional averages. These Western life expectancies served as the optimal
life expectancy in arriving at the Index of Structural Violence (ISV) for the other regions,
since it was assumed that Western imperialism was the most general cause of structural
violence in the 20th century. Australia, New Zealand, and some of the Scandinavian countries
obtained the highest life expectancies of all nations during the 20th century. The average year
was the average year for which life expectancies were obtained. The decreasing range of life
expectancies from decade to decade indicates decreasing structural violence within the
Western World during the 20th century, the ISV in the last column being obtained by sub-
tracting the lowest life expectancy from the highest life expectancy, and then dividing by
the highest life expectancy. These ISVs are not comparable to any other ISVs in this paper,
but they are comparable to one another, providing a very rough index of maximum
structural violence among Western nations in the 20th century.

amount of structural violence in other regions of the world were above and
beyond this "norm."
Soviet World. The average life expectancies of the nine Eastern European
countries, which became Communist countries in this century, are shown in
Table II. The average life expectancies increased from 33 years in 1898 to 70
years in 1974, increasing over this period by about two times.
 354 W. ECKHARDT and G. KOHLER

TABLE II

Soviet Bloc Life Expectancies

Average Life Soviet % Number Thousands

Year Expect. World Population Nations ISV QSV/Year
1898 33 13% 3 .33 2058
1912 38 13 0 .25 1523
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1926 44 13 2 .21 1291

1935 51 14 2 .14 787
1946 59 13 2 .06 320
1956 65 11 9 .04 209
1970 70 11 9 .01 74
1974 70 10 9 .03 151
Life Increase 2.1
Average ' 7o World Pop. 12%
ISV Decrease 11.0
Notes — See notes at bottom of Table I, concerning the estimates of missing data. ISV
(Index of Structural Violence) = (E* - E)/E*, where E* is the Western life expectancy
from Table I and E is the Soviet life expectancy in this table. Alternatively, ISV = 1 - E/E*.
QSV (Quantity of Structural Violence) = P/E - P/E*, where P is the total population of the
Soviet Bloc countries. This formula provides a theoretical estimate of structural deaths,
assuming no population growth and a constant age distribution. The Soviet Bloc countries
in this table include only the nine Eastern European countries which became Communist in
the course of this century: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary,
Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. Communist countries outside of Europe
have been included in their geographical regions: Cuba in Latin America, China in Asia, etc.

About 12% of the world population lived in these nine countries during
the 20th century, dropping to 10% in 1974. These relative decreases in the
Soviet and Western populations during the 20th century reflected their slower
population growth rates compared with those in the Third World. According
to H^ivik's theoretical index of structural violence (ISV), 33% of Eastern
European deaths were caused by structural violence about the turn of the
century (assuming Western exploitation of Eastern Europe), compared with 3%
in 1974, so that the Soviet ISV decreased by 11 times during this century,
especially since the second world war, as shown in Table II. The theoretical
quantity of structural violence (above and beyond that in the Western World)
decreased from about two million deaths in 1898 to about 150,000 deaths in
1974, so that the Communist QSV decreased during this period by about 14 times.
 STRUCTURAL & ARMED VIOLENCE 355

TABLE III

ITiird World Life Expectancies

Average Life % World Number Thousands

Year Expect. Population Nations ISV QSV/Year
1899 26 70% 11 .47 19,317
1909 28 70 10 .45 18,522
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1926 33 68 14 .41 16,516

1936 38 68 23 .36 13,872
1946 41 69 23 .35 14,198
1955 47 70 50 .31 12,787
1963 52 73 97 .27 12,243
1974 55 74 105 .24 12,561
Life Increase 2.1
Average % of World Pop. 70%
ISV Decrease 2.0
Total QSV for 75 Years 1,137,355,000
Notes - See notes at bottom of Tables 1 and II. The total estimate of more than one billion
QSV would be increased by iinother 56,590,000, if we assumed that the structural violence
in Eastern Europe up to the time of the second world war was a function of Western im-
perialism (See Table II). This is a conservative estimate of structural violence, since we used
higher life expectancies for the Third World than some other authors suggested (Arriga &
Davis, 1969; World Bank, 1974; Kohler & Alcock, 1976; Eckhardt & Young, 1977; Htfivik,
1977). These QSVs are not strictly additive, without assuming no population growth and
constant age distribution. Consequently, the total QSV for 75 years is a very crude estimate
at best.

Third World. The geographical regions of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and
the Middle East were included in the Third World. The average life expectancies,
ISVs, and QSVs of these four regions will be found in Appendixes 3-6, which
provide some regional details.
Table III shows that Third World life expectancies increased by about two
times from 26 years in 1899 to 55 years in 1974. The theoretical ISV de-
creased by about two times, and the theoretical QSV decreased by about 1%
times. The theoretical QSV was over one billion structural deaths in the 20th
century, or about 15 million per year, admittedly a crude estimate but quite
consistent with the estimates of previous studies.
 356 W. ECKHARDT and G. KOHLER

TABLE IV

Global Life Expectancies

Average Life World Pop. Number Thousands
Year Expect. (Millions) Nations ISV QSV/Year
1900 31 1560 28 .37 18,486
1910 33 1695 22 .35 18,128
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1925 38 1965 33 .32 16,621

1935 43 2183 45 .27 13,767
1946 47 2405 46 .25 12,996
1955 53 2750 82 .22 11,446
1965 58 3298 130 .18 10,411
1974 59 3900 138 .18 11,935
life Increase 1.9
World Pop. Increase 2.5
ISV Decrease 2.1
Total QSV for 75 Years 1,078,225,000
Notes - See notes at bottom of Tables I and II. The QSV by decades and in total was
lower than that obtained for the Third World alone, as shown in Table III. This was because
Western life expectancies, which were used as a standard of comparison, were included in
the global life expectancies. This table was included because of its comparability to the
procedures used and the results obtained by Kohler & Alcock (1976) and Htfivik (1977).
Since their global life expectancy was 53 years in 1965 and 1970, compared with our 58
years, our ISV and QSV are correspondingly lower than theirs, providing a conservative
(and admittedly crude) estimate of structural violence.

Total World. Table IV shows that the whole world increased its average life ex-
pectancies about two times from 31 years in 1900 to 59 years in 1974. The third
column shows the world population figures used in this study, which increased
by 2'/£ times from 1900 to 1974. The fourth column shows the total number of
nations for which life expectancy figures were available decade by decade.
Summary. For most of the world's regions, the average life expectancies
have increased by about two times, except for the Western World, where the
increase was Vfi. times. This difference was presumably due to the fact that
the Western average was higher at the turn of the century and may now be
approaching a bio-social limit.
 STRUCTURAL & ARMED VIOLENCE 357

The structural situation is improving for a variety of reasons, but the in-
crease in income levels alone may be sufficient to account for this trend. Third
World life expectancies have doubled, on the average, in the course of this
century, in spite of the population explosion. Their ISV has been cut in half,
so that the percent of total deaths which are structurally caused has been re-
duced from 47% at the turn of the century to 24% in 1974. However, this
reduction has been greater in Latin America and less in black Africa. The
annual QSV has been cut; by one-third, but more so in Asia (where three-
quarters of the Third World lives) and not so in black Africa, where the
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annual QSV has almost doubled. (See Appendixes 3-6).

Black Africa has suffered proportionally more deaths from structural
violence than any other j;eographical region throughout this century, followed
by the Middle East and North Africa, then Asia, then Latin America, and
lastly Eastern Europe, where structural violence has approached zero since the
second world war. (See Appendixes 3-6).

2. Behavioral Violence
There were 156 wars and revolutions from 1900 to 1974 listed by Bouthoul
& Carrere (1976, 1978), including four wars which started before the turn of
the century. We classified these conflicts according to the typology shown in
Table V, where we distinguished between conflicts with and without imperial
involvement, and between conflicts where the parties were roughly equal and
unequal in power. Imperial powers, as classified by Kohler (1975a, p. 57),
included Austria-Hungary (1900-18), Belgium (1900-60), China (1950-74),
England (1900-74), France (1900-74), Germany (1900-18, 1933-45), Italy
(1900-43), India (1950-74), Japan (1900-45), Netherlands (1900-63),
Portugal (1900-74), Russia/USSR (1900-17, 1922-74), Spain (1900-74),
Turkey (1900-18), and USA (1900-74). This admittedly tentative list con-
stituted our sole criterion for identifying imperial powers in the 20th century,
for the purpose of this paper.
Imperial involvement in our typology of conflicts implied no more than
that one or more imperial powers were militarily involved in a conflict, with
two exceptions: (1) Civil conflicts within an imperial nation were not classified
as imperial, and (2) Border conflicts involving one or more imperial nations
were not classified as imperial. (1) was classified as Civil and (2) was classified
as International. Civil arid International types of conflict were similar to the
same types used by SIPRI (1969), Singer & Small (1972), Bouthoul & Carrere
(1976, 1978), and Eckhardt & Azar (1978).
 358 W. ECKHARDT and G. KOHLER

TABLE V

Typology of Behavioral Violence

Imperial Involvement No Imperial Involvement

Symmetric Imperial Power Conflicts
Relations involving one or more im-
perial powers on both sides
of the conflict, such as the
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International Conflicts with-
out any active, military
involvement of imperial
powers, such as the Chaco

two world wars in this War, 1928-35. All border

century; and also imperial conflicts were placed in this
intervention on both sides of category.
a civil conflict, such as the
Spanish Civil War.
Asymmetric Imperial Conquests of non-
Relations imperial nations or territories,
such as the Sino-Japanese
War, 1937-45.
Imperial Ovil Conflicts Ovil Conflicts with no
involving one or more apparent imperial involve-
imperial powers on one side ment of an active, military
of the conflict only, such as nature, such as the Civil War
the Vietnam War, 1960-74. of Nigeria, 1967-70.
Notes - Imperial involvement does not necessarily imply imperial motives in this typology,
but it does require active involvement of military personnel on the part of an imperial power
as defined by Kohler (1975a) and listed in the text. Imperial Power Conflicts and Imperial
Conquests have usually been classified as International Conflicts, but Wright (1965) classified
Imperial Conquests as Imperial Wars. Imperial Civil Conflicts have usually been classified as
Civil-International Conflicts, but these latter did not always involve imperial powers.

Conflicts were classified as Imperial Power Conflicts whenever one or more

imperial powers were involved on both sides and the conflict was more than a
border conflict. All border conflicts and conflicts between non-imperial powers
on both sides were classified as International Conflicts. Both of these types of
conflict were considered to be symmetric, since the nations or groups of
nations on each side of such conflicts were roughly equal in power.
Civil conflicts were classified as Imperial Civil Conflicts whenever one or
more imperial powers were actively involved on one side only, either with or
against the government directly involved. This type of conflict has generally
 STRUCTURAL & ARMED VIOLENCE 359

been classified as Civil-International by the authors mentioned in the previous

paragraph. Civil conflict:; without imperial intervention were classified as civil
conflicts, including such conflicts within imperial nations. Finally, conflicts
were classified as Imperial Conquests whenever imperial powers conquered
territory belonging to a non-imperial party, or tried to conquer it. This type
of conflict has generally been classified as International, but Wright (1965)
classified it as an Imperial War. These three types of conflict were all con-
sidered to be asymmetric, since the parties involved were generally unequal
in power.
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Among the 156 wars and revolutions of the 20th century, 93 (60%) of
them were classified as Imperial, according to the typology in Table V.
Another 31% were Civil (N = 48) and 10% were International (N = 15), with
no apparent imperial involvement. The typing of these conflicts was done with
the aid of information provided by Richardson (1960), Wright (1965), SIPRI
(1969), Singer & Small (1972), Hendelson (1972), Kohler (1975a), Bouthoul
& Carrere (1976, 1978), and Eckhardt & Azar (1978).
There were about 66 million deaths resulting from these wars and revolu-
tions, 70% of which were due to the two world wars, and 96% of which were
suffered in 15 wars and revolutions with more than one-half million deaths
each, as shown in Table VI. Consequently, 10% of the major armed conflicts
in the 20th century accounted for 96% of the deaths suffered in all of these
conflicts. 93% of these deaths occurred in the 93 imperial conflicts, 7% in the
48 civil conflicts, and 1% in the 15 international conflicts. These crude
estimates leave little doubt that imperial conflicts constituted a majority of
the conflicts in the 20th century, and that imperial conflicts caused an over-
whelming majority of the deaths.
Table VI shows that 11 (73%) of the 15 most violent conflicts involved
imperial powers, and that 59)4 million (94%) of the 63 million deaths in these
conflicts occurred in imperial wars. Western imperial powers were involved in
89% of the total deaths in these 15 conflicts.
When the lowest death estimates for the 156 major armed conflicts in the
20th century were obtained from Bouthoul & Carrere, Richardson, Wright,
and Singer & Small (the last three being obtained from Singer & Small, 1972),
they amounted to 39 million deaths, 36 million (93%) of which occurred in
the 15 conflicts of Table VI. 90% of these deaths occurred in imperial wars
and revolutions. When the highest death estimates for the 156 conflicts were
obtained from Bouthoul & Carrere, Richardson, Wright, and Sorokin (the last
three being obtained from Singer & Small, 1972), they amounted to 86
million, 82 million (95%) of which occurred in the 15 conflicts of Table VI.
96% of these deaths occurred in imperial wars and revolutions. There were 28
 360 W. ECKHARDT and G. KOHLER

TABLE VI

Behavioral Violence in the 20th Century

Deaths Percent
Major Armed Conflicts in Total Imperial
Years (Types)* Thousands Deaths Involvements
A. 20th Century Armed Conflicts With More Than One-Half Million Deaths
(N=15)
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14-18 World War I (Power) 8500 13 Many(N= 11)

15-18 Armenian Massacres (Power) 1200 2 Russia vs. Turkey
17-22 Russian Civil War (Imp CC) 1300 2 Fr, Jap, UK, USA
27-35 ' Civil War in China (Civil) 1250 2 None
36-39 Spanish Civil War (Power) 1200 2 Germ-It vs. USSR
37-45 Sino-Japanese War (Conquest) 2000 3 Japan
39-45 World War II (Power) 38000 58 Many (N = 9)
46-54 Indochina War (Imp CC) 1200 2 France
47-49 Indo-Pakistan War (Imp CC) 800 1 UK
50-53 Korean War (Power) 2000 3 China vs. USA
55-72 Civil War in Sudan (Civil) 700 1 None
60-74 Vietnam War (Imp CC) 1800 3 USA
1965 Massacres in Indonesia (Civil) 500 1 None
67-70 Civil War of Nigeria (Civil) 1100 2 None
1971 Pakistan War (Imp CC) 1500 2 India
B. Total Deaths in These 15 Conflicts 63050 96%

C. Total Deaths in All 156 Conflicts

66020 100%
(1900-74)

*See Appendix 7 for the rationale of typing these conflicts.

Notes - The death estimates in this table were obtained from Bouthoul & CarrSre (1976,
1978). These 15 conflicts were classified according to the typology in Table V, and the
rationale in Appendix 7, by the authors of this paper with the kind assistance of Norman
Alcock and Hanna Newcombe. These four judges achieved consensus in the typing of these
15 conflicts. The authors of this paper achieved 93% agreement in typing the other 141
conflicts in the 20th century.
Imp CC = Imperial Civil Conflict.
 STRUCTURAL & ARMED VIOLENCE 361

million international battb deaths in 41 wars in the 20th century, according

to Singer & Small (1972), four of which were included in Table VI, and these
four (10% of 41 interstate wars) involved 27 million (96%) of all of Singer &
Small's 20th century deaths from international violence. All four of these wars
were also imperial wars, according to our typology.
We feel safe in concluding that at least 90% of the deaths from all major
wars and revolutions in the 20th century involved imperial powers in one way
or another, and that Western imperial powers were involved in most of these
deaths. The exact number of war deaths is far less reliable, ranging from a low
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estimate of 39 million to a high estimate of 86 million. Bouthoul & Carrere's

estimate was 66 million, <:s shown in Section C of Table VI. A recent paper
by Small & Singer (1978) would suggest that battle deaths from both civil
and international conflicts in the 20th century were about 33 million for
military personnel only in sovereign states only. Since Bouthoul & Carrere's
estimate was twice this amount, it may be an adequate estimate of both
civilian and military deaths in the 20th century. At least, it strikes somewhat
above the mean of 62.5 million deaths between the lowest and highest
estimates, which seems to be about the best that we can do at the present time.
The 90% figure for deaths from imperial wars was of the same order of
magnitude as the 95% of 97 British wars that were imperial from 1816-1969
(Kohler, 1975b). Thirty-nine of these wars were fought in the 20th century,
only three of which (in Ireland and Northern Ireland) would not be classified
as imperial according to our typology. The other 36 (92%) occurred far from
the shores of the United Kingdom, largely, in Afro-Asia, including the Middle
East. The 90% figure for imperial deaths was also of the same order of mag-
nitude as the finding that seven nations (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, and Turkey) fought almost ten times as many wars per
decade when they were imperial leaders as they fought after losing their
imperial leadership (Kohler, 1975a).
Table VII shows the breakdown of Bouthoul & Carrere's death estimates
by decade and by conflict type. International Conflicts ranked lowest among
the five types on almost all measures: Total deaths (1%), number of conflicts
(10%), number of conflict years (5%), years per conflict, deaths per conflict,
and deaths per conflict years. Civil Conflicts ranked second in number of
conflicts (31%), conflict years (29%), and years per conflict, but they ranked
fourth on deaths per conflict and deaths per conflict years, and third in total
deaths (7%). The three imperial types, taken together, ranked highest on all
measures in Table VII: Total deaths (93%), number of conflicts (60%), con-
flict years (66%), years per conflict (3.1), deaths per conflict (657,000), and
deaths per conflict years (210,000). Among these imperial types, Power
 362 W. ECKHARDT and G. KOHLER

Conflicts ranked highest in total deaths, and in deaths per conflict and deaths
per conflict years. Imperial Civil Conflicts ranked highest in number of con-
flicts, conflict years, and years per conflict.

Table VII.

Types of Behavioral Violence by Decade

Deaths in Thousands (% of Total Deaths)
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I 2 3 4 5 6
Decades CivU Intl. Conquest ImpCC Power Total
1900-09 159 (27) 0(0) 39(7) 254 (44) 130 (22) 582 (100)
1910-19 14(0) 153(1) 2(0) 1559 (14) 9720 (85)* 11448(100)
1920-29 1327(80) 223 (13) 45(3) 59(4) 0(0) 1654(100)
1930-39 27(1) 0(0) 2171 (64) 12(0) 1200 (35) 3410(100)
1940-49 201(1) 0(0) 0(0) 2071 (5) 38000 (94)** 40272 (100)
1950-59 851 (27) 0(0) 2(0) 335(11) 2000 (63) 3188(100)
1960-69 1721 (45) 87(2) 0(0) 2026 (53) 20(1) 3854 (100)
1970-74 95(6) 15(1) 0(0) 1502 (93) 0(0) 1612(100)
(half decade)
1900-74 4395 (7%) 478 (1%) 2259 (3%) 7818 (12%;1 51070(77%) 66020 (100)
#Conf 48(31) 15 (10) 21 (13) 58 (37) 14(9) 156(100)
ConfYrs 126 (29) 21(5) 54(12) 211(48) 26(6) 438 (100)
Yrs/Conf 2.6 1.4 2.6 3.6 1.9 2.8
Deaths/Conf 92 32 108 135 3648 423
Deaths/Conf Yrs 35 23 42 37 1964 151
•Includes World War I estimates'.
••Includes World War II estimates.
Notes - When 10 million civilian deaths (Hendelson, 1972) were added to Bouthoul &
Carrele's 8V4 million deaths for World War I (since these weTe only battle deaths, according
to Singer & Small, 1972), this did not change the 1900-74 percentages very much: Civil (6%),
Imp CC (10%), and Power (80%).
When both world wars were omitted entirely, the death percentages were as follows: Civil
(23%), Intl. (2%), Conquest (12%), Imp CC (40%), and Power (23%). Consequently, even
when the two world wars were not counted, imperial wars and revolutions (Columns 3, 4,
and 5) accounted for 75% of the behavioral violence in the 20th century. All of the per-
centages in this table were rounded off to whole numbers.
Conf Yrs = Years of conflict determined by subtracting the starting year from the ending
year of each conflict and then adding these differences together for each type separately and
all together.
Imp CC = Imperial Civil Conflict. The definition of this and the other types will be found
in Table V.
Death estimates were entered in the decade when any war or revolution began, with one
notable exception: World War II deaths were entered in the decade of the 1940s, when most
of these deaths occurred. The four conflicts which began before the turn of the century
were entered in the 1900s decade.
 STRUCTURAL & ARMED VIOLENCE 363

V. COMPARATIVE MAGNITUDES AND TRENDS

1. Trends in Behavioral Violence

The estimate of 66 million behavioral deaths in the first 75 years of the 20th
century was greater than the estimate of 16 million behavioral deaths in the
last 82 years of the 19th century which, in turn, was greater than the estimate
of four million deaths in the 76 years from 1740 to 1815, as shown in Section
A of Appendix 2. These figures would suggest that behavioral violence has in-
creased during the last 235 years by about 16 times, or more than 3J/d times
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greater than the population increase of Alh times, judging by the population
figures provided by Bouthoul & Carrere (1976, p. 192) for 1750 and 1975.
This conclusion, based on deaths per population, was consistent with Small
& Singer's (1978) civil and international battle deaths, which were seven times
greater during the 20th century than they were during the 19th century,
according to our calculations, or more than twice as great as the population
increase of three times between 1850 and 1975. However, Small & Singer's
battle deaths per sovereign state were more than four times as great in the
20th century than they were in the 19th century, according to our calcula-
tions, or less than one and one-half times greater than the population increase.
By either measure, behavioral violence as indicated by battle deaths, was great-
er in the 20th century thin it was in the 19th century, but not much greater
per sovereign state.
Table VIII would suggest no simple trend of increasing or decreasing be-
havioral violence during the 20th century. Tables III and VIII, on the other
hand, would suggest a trend of decreasing structural violence during the 20th
century. The notes at the bottom of Table VIII show that there was no sig-
nificant relation between the decade-by-decade patterns of behavioral and
structural violence during the 20th century, reinforcing the conclusion that
there was no linear pattern of increasing or decreasing behavioral violence
during the 20th century.

2. Trends in Structural Violence

The notes of Appendix 1 show that structural violence in Europe (in relation to
England, Sweden, and USA) was decreasing slightly during the latter half of the
19th century (ISV = .23 in 1850 and .20 in 1900). However, the structural vio-
lence in Latin America and India was increasing from ISV = about .40 to .50.
Using Latin America and India to represent the Third World in the latter part of
the 19th century, admittedly an inadequate representation because of inadequate
data, it would seem that structural violence in the Third World was increasing
during the latter part of the 19th century whereas, during the 20th century, it
was decreasing both in proportion and in quantity, as shown in Table III.
 364 W. ECKHARDT and G. KOHLER

TABLE VIII

Comparison of Behavioral and Structural Violence

Deaths in Thousands (% of Grand Total)
Decades Behavioral Structural Total

1900-09 582 (0%) 193170 (100%) 193752(100%)

1910-19 11448(6%)* 185220 (94%) 196668(100%)
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1920-29 1654 (1%) 165160 (99%) 166814(100%)

1930-39 3410 (2%) 138720 (98%) 142130(100%)
1940-49 40272 (22%)** 141980'(78%) 182252(100%)
1950-59 3188 (2%) 127870 (98%) 131058(100%)
1960-69 3854 (3%) 122430 (97%) 126284 (100%)
1970-74
1612 (3%) 62805 (97%) 64417(100%)
(half decade)
1900-74 66020 (5%) 1137355(95%) 1203375 (100%)
•Includes World War I estimate.
••Includes World War II estimate.
Notes - Behavioral Violence is simply the sum of the total deaths in Table VII. The per-
centages have been rounded off to whole numbers. Structural Violence was calculated from
the theoretical Third World QSVs in Table III. The product-moment correlation between
behavioral and structural violence in this table was .07, which was not significant at the .05
level of confidence. The limitations of our Total column should be carefully noted. Be-
haviorally, we have taken no account of accidental deaths and murders, nor of war deaths
where the data were not available (which was the case for about one-quarter of our 156
conflicts). Structurally, we have ignored any violence between Eastern and Western Europe,
among Western nations, and within all nations. The Total column should be interpreted
accordingly as a very conservative estimate of total violence in the first three quarters of the
20th century.
When the behavioral estimates were divided by the structural estimates (assuming that
behavioral violence was already included in our structural violence), the decade percentages
were unchanged except for the 1940s (World War II), when behavioral violence was in-
creased from 22% to 28%. For the total 75 years, behavioral violence was increased from
5% to 6%. As argued in the text, however, we believe that our structural estimates were
relatively independent of our behavioral estimates.

A thorough examination of the causes of this important turn of events at

the turn of the century is beyond the scope of this paper, and must wait for
further research. However, it would seem that medical progress was the most
immediate cause of increased life expectancies in all nations during the 20th
century, but there were of course many other social, political, and economic
 STRUCTURAL & ARMED VIOLENCE 36S

factors and forces at work which require further examination. So far as these
factors and forces are continuing at the present time, we should expect a con-
tinuing decrease in structural violence during the rest of this century.

3. Comparison of Behavioral and Structural Violence

Table VIII shows the estimated number of deaths from behavioral and
structural violence, decade by decade, where structural deaths exceeded be-
havioral deaths in every decade of the 20th century. It might be argued that
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behavioral deaths were iilready included in our calculation of structural deaths.

We should argue against this on the ground that life expectancies were seldom,
if ever, obtained during any major armed conflict, so that our structural
estimates were relatively independent of our behavioral estimates.
Structural violence was about 17 times greater than behavioral violence in
the 20th century, which was a very violent century, behaviorwise, primarily
because of its two world wars.

VI. SUMMARY

This study examined arid compared the magnitudes and trends of structural
and armed violence in the 20th century. Our most important finding is that
the magnitude of global structural violence exhibited a declining trend in the
20th century. This was somewhat of a surprise, since the widening of the in-
come gap between rich and poor countries led us to expect the opposite
trend. The evidence suggests, however, that the number of deaths attributable
to structural violence has been declining since 1900. In comparison, the mag-
nitude of armed violen:e in the world exhibits a fluctuating pattern during
this period.
At least 90% of the behavioral violence could be attributed to wars and
revolutions involving imperial powers, and about 95% of the total violence in
the first three quarters of the 20th century could be attributed to structural
violence.

REFERENCES

Arriga, E. E, & Davis, K. "The pattern of mortality change in Latin America." Demography,
Vol. 6 (1969), pp. 223-242.
Bouthoul, G., & Carrère, R. Le défi de la guerre (1740-1974). Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1976.
Bouthoul, G., & Carrère, R. "A list of the 366 major armed conflicts of the period 1740-
1974." Peace Research, Vol. 10 (1978), pp. 83-108. (Translated by Gernot Köhler).
 366 W. ECKHARDT and G. KOHLER

Curtin, P. D. The Atlantic slave trade: A census. Milwaukee: University of Wisconsin Press,
1969.
Eckhardt, W. "Global imperialism and global inequality." Peace Research, Vol. 9 (1977),
pp. 181-188.
Eckhardt, W., & Azar, E. "Major world conflicts and interventions, 1945 to 1975." Inter-
national Interactions, Vol. 5 (1978), pp. 75-110.
Eckhardt, W., & Young, C. "Civil conflict, imperialism, and inequality." Journal of Con-
temporary Revolutions, Vol. 6 (1974), pp. 76-95.
Eckhardt, W., & Young, C. Governments under fire: Civil conflict and imperialism. New
Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1977.
Elkins, S. M. Slavery: A problem in American institutional and intellectual life. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1976.
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Encyclopedia Britannica, Ready reference and index. London: Author, 1974, 10, 912-925.
Galtung, J. "Violence, peace, and peace research." Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 6
(1969), pp. 167-191.
Galtung, J. "A structural theory of imperialism." Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 8 (1971),
pp. 81-117.
Galtung, J., and Høivik, T. "Structural and direct violence: A note on operationalization."
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 8 (1971), pp. 73-76.
Heiestad, T. Some longitudinal tendencies II. University of Oslo: Trends in Western
civilization, 1974.
Hendelson, W. H. (Ed.) New encyclopedia. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1972.
Høivik, T. "Social inequality: The main issues." Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 8 (1971),
pp. 119-142.
Høivik, T. "The demography of structural violence." Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 14
(1977), pp. 59-73.
Köhler, G. "Imperialism as a level of analysis in correlates-of-war research." Journal of Con-
flict Resolution, Vol. 19 (1975a), pp. 48-62.
Köhler, G. "War, the nation-state paradigm, and the imperialism paradigm: British war
involvements." Peace Research, Vol. 7 (1975b), pp. 31-41.
Köhler, G., and Alcock, N. "An empirical table of structural violence." Journal of Peace
Research, Vol. 13 (1976), pp. 343-356.
Lerner, W. (Director) Statistical abstract of the United States 1972. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1972.
Reader's Digest. Great world atlas. Montreal: Author, 1972 (estimated).
Richardson, L.F. Statistics of deadly quarrels. Pittsburgh: Boxwood, 1960.
Singer, J. D., & Small, M. The wages of war, 1816-1965: A statistical handbook. Toronto:
Wiley, 1972.
SIPRI. Yearbook of world armaments and disarmament. New York: Humanities Press,
1969.
Sivard, R. L. World military and social expenditures 1977. Leesburg, Virginia: WMSE
Publications, 1977.
Small, M., & Singer, J. D. Conflict in the international system, 1816-1977: Historical trends
and policy futures. Mimeo, 1978.
Tannenbaum, F. Slave and citizen: The Negro in the Americas. New York: Knopf, 1947.
Taylor, C. L., & Hudson, M. C. World handbook of political and social indicators: Second
edition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972.
United Nations. Demographic and statistical yearbooks. New York: Economic and Social
Affairs Statistical Office, 1951, 1955, 1959, 1961, 1966, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976.
Williams, E. Capitalism and slavery. London: Andre Deutsch, 1964.
Wilson, J. Canada's Indians. London: Minority Rights Group, 1974.
World Bank. Population policies and economic development. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1974. Statistical Annex Table 2.
Wright, Q.A study of war. 2nd ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965.
 STRUCTURAL & ARMED VIOLENCE 367

APPENDIX 1. Life Expectancies Before the 20th Century

England
Sweden
Time France England Sweden USA Europe LA India Russia Japan
Pre-History 18
Roman Empire 25
800 AD 21
1200 23 35
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1300 27
1350 17 (Black Death)
1400 26
1450 33
1500 30
1600 32
1700 33
1750 34
1800 35 41
1850 40 40 31
1860 41 32 24
1870 42 33 25 25
1880 45 45 35 26 25
1890 48 48 37 26 24
1900 42 48 50 40 27 23 32 38

Notes - The pre-historical estimate was obtained from H^ivik (1977). The Roman
estimate, all of the French estimates, and the English estimates up to and including that
for 1450 were obtained froti Heiestad (1974). All of the other estimates were obtained
from Arriga & Davis (1969), except the estimate for Russia (United Nations, 1951).
Using the average life expectancies of England, Sweden, and the USA as standards,
the Index of Structural Violence was about 20% for Europe as a whole from 1850 to
1900; 37% in 1860 and 46% in 1900 for Latin America; 40% in 1870 and 54% in 1900
for India; 36% for Russia ir: 1900; and 24% for Japan in 1900.
 368 W. ECKHARDT and G. KOHLER

APPENDIX 2. Behavioral Violence Before the 20th Century

A. War Deaths Total Deaths Annual Deaths

66 wars and revolutions, 1740-1815
(76 years) 4 million 54 thousand
American & French Revolutions 20 thousand each
144 wars & revolutions, 1816-97
(82 years) 16 million 195 thousand
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10 Latin American Revolutions,

1810-28 5 thousand each
8 European Revolutions, 1848 8 thousand each

B. Western Slavery
Slaves arriving in New World,
16th-19th C. 10-20 million
Slaves' lives lost in capture or transit 5-40 million 17-133
thousand

Sources:
War deaths, 1740-1897 (Bouthoul & Carrere, 1976, 1978).
Slaves arriving in the New World (Curtin, 1969; Hendelson, 1972, Vol. 15,
p. 78; Readers Digest, 1972, p. 140).
Slaves' lives lost in capture or transit: The estimates of slave deaths were
obtained from Tannenbaum (1947), Williams (1964), Curtin (1969), and
Elkins (1976), who reported deaths ranging from one-third to two-thirds
of the total number of captured slaves.
 STRUCTURAL & ARMED VIOLENCE 369

APPENDIX 3. Latin American Life Expectancies

Average Life % World Number Thousands

Year Expect. Population Nations ISV QSV/Year
1900 29 4% 8 .41 844
1912 31 4 7 .39 949
1921 35 5 10 .37 964
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1931 36 5 14 .39 1169

1941 42 6 15 .33 1032
1951 49 6 24 .28 929
1962 58 7 24 .18 723
1974 62 8 23 .14 692
Life Increase 2.1
Average y,o World Pop 6%
ISV Decrease 2.9
Total QSV for 75 Years 69,560,000

Notes - See notes at bottom of Tables I and II. Arriga & Davis (1969) arrived at lower
life expectancies in Latin America than we did, theirs ranging from 27 years for 1900 to
56 years in 1960. Had their lower estimates been used, the Latin American ISV would
have been about .45 in 1900 and .22 in 1960. The QSVs would have been corresponding-
ly higher. Consequently, the Latin American ISV and QSV are conservative estimates of
structural violence in Latin America in the 20th century.
 370 W. ECKHARDT and G. KOHLER

APPENDIX 4. Asian Life Expectancies

Average Life % World Number Thousands

Year Expect. Population Nations ISV QSV/Year

1900 27 56% 3 .45 14,966

1910 29 56 3 .43 14,131
1927 34 53 4 .39 12,028
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1937 39 53 7 .34 10,056

1947 42 53 5 .33 10,119
1955 48 53 11 .29 8,934
1963 53 54 22 .25 8,519
1974 56 54 22 .22 8,357
Life Increase 2.1
Average % World Pop 54%
ISV Decrease 2.0
Total QSV for 75 Years 829,315,000

Notes - See notes at bottom of Tables I and H. The World Bank (1974) arrived at much
lower Asian life expectancies than we did, theirs being 30 years for 1935, 44 years for
1955, and 48 years for 1965. Had their much lower estimates been used, the Asian ISV
would have been .49 for 1935, .35 for 1955, and .32 for 1965. The QSVs would have
been correspondingly higher. Consequently, the Asian ISV and QSV are conservative
estimates of structural violence in Asia in the 20th century. Asia is a crucial region of the
world, of course, since it contains more than half of the world population and about
three-quarters of the Third World population.
 STRUCTURAL & ARMED VIOLENCE 371

APPENDIX 5. Middle Eastern and North African Life Expectancies

Average Life % World Number Thousands

Year Expect. Population Nations ISV QSV/Year

1896 23 4% 0 .53 • 1246

1906 25 4 0 .51 1224
1926 29 4 0 .48 1230
1937 36 4 2 .39 964
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1947 38 4 0 .40 1096

1954 45 4 4 .34 962
1966 51 5 13 .28 917
1974 53 5 21 .26 1046
Life Increase 2.3
Average % World Pop 4%
ISV Decrease 2.0
Total QSV for 75 Years 81,620,000

Notes — See notes at bottom of Tables I and II. Middle Eastern and North African
countries were included together in this region, so that this region included all of the
Arab League nations and all of the Arab countries in OPEC. The relative lack of data for
these nations before the 1960 > indicates their relative lack of development. Missing data
were estimated by extrapolation and interpolation from existing data for this region, and
by comparison with some Muslim nations in South West Asia. Not too much can be
claimed for the reliability of these estimates before the 1930s, but they did not weigh
very much in Third World averages because of the relatively small population of this
region of the world.
 372 W. ECKHARDT and G. KOHLER

APPENDIX 6. Black African Life Expectancies

Average Life % World Number Thousands

Year Expect. Population Nations ISV QSV/Year
1896 21 6% 0 ' .57 1524
1906 23 6 0 .55 1552
1926 27 6 0 .52 2340
1936 32 6 0 .46 1816
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1945 35 6 3 .44 1994

1955 37 7 11 .46 2427
1966 41 7 38 .42 2092
1974 44 7 39 .39 2660
Life Increase 2.1
Average % World Pop 6%
ISV Decrease 1.5
Total QSV ifor 75 Years 150,750.000

Notes — See notes at bottom of Tables I and II. Missing data were obtained by extra-
polating backward in time from existing data, and by comparison with North African
estimates. Not too much can be claimed for the reliability of these estimates before the
1940s, but they did not weigh too much in Third World averages because of the relatively
small population in this region of the world.
 STRUCTURAL & ARMED VIOLENCE 373

APPENDIX 7. Rationale for Typing the 15 Conflicts in Table VI

World War I, 1914-18. Involvement of 11 imperial powers, eight in the

Triple Alliance (Belgium, England, France, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Russia, and
USA), and three in the Triple Entente (Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Turkey).
Imperialism was cited, along with militarism and nationalism, as a major cause
of this war: "The industrial revolution . . . caused an immense increase in the
manufacture of each country and a consequent need for foreign markets . . . .
Several times between 1898 and 1914 the economic rivalry in Africa between
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France and Great Britain, jind between Germany on one side and France and
Great Britain on the other, almost precipitated a European war" (Hendelson,
1972, Vol. 25, pp. 239-240). In 1905-06, for example, Germany supported
Moroccan independence against French penetration. In 1911, Germany
opposed French supremacy in Morocco. In the same year, "Italy, hoping to
annex the Tripoli region of northern Africa, declared war on Turkey" (Ibid,
p. 240). Therefore, this war was classified as an Imperial Power Conflict. See
Table V for the,definitions of types of conflict.
Armenian Massacres, 1915-18. These massacres were classified as an Im-
perial Power Conflict (between Russia and Turkey) because they were a part
of World War I: "Armenia became a battleground for Russian and Turkish
armies during World War I. . . . Privations and famine added to the death list,
which reached an estimated total of 800,000 Armenians during the war
period" (Hendelson, 1972. Vol. 2, p. 287). Armenians were included among
World War I participants by Richardson (1960, p. 33). Imperial interventions
in Armenia had begun well before World War I: "As a result of foreign inter-
vention (Great Britain and Russia). . . . Part of the Armenian leadership em-
phasized loyalty to Turkey, but other groups engaged in activities considered
subversive by the Turks. Turkish reprisals took the form of atrocities that
shocked the world, including massacres estimated to have caused the death of
200,000 Armenians in 1896 alone" (Ibid, p. 287). We conclude that Armenia
had been a contested area among some imperial powers for some time.
Russian Gvil War, 1917-22. Bouthoul & Carrere (1976, 1978) included the
Russian Revolution here (which caused about 1000 deaths, according to
Richardson, 1960, p. 102). The Civil War did not begin until 1918, with
imperial intervention by England, France, Japan, and the USA up to 1920,
with Japan lingering on until 1922 (Richardson, 1960, p. 41). Since the USSR
was not yet an imperial power, this civil war was classified as an Imperial
Civil Conflict, that is, a civil conflict whose instigation, duration, and intensity
was some function of imperial intervention.
 374 W. ECKHARDT and G. KOHLER

Gvil War in China, 1927-35. There was no military intervention by any

imperial power in this civil war between the Communists and the Kuomintang,
so it was classified as a Civil Conflict. The Japanese invasion of 1931-33
seemed to be unrelated to this conflict, and it was counted as a separate con-
flict by Bouthoul & Carrere (1976, 1978), and by Richardson, Wright, and
Singer & Small (1972, p. 121).
Spanish Gvil War, 1936-39. This civil war was classified as an Imperial
Power Conflict because Germany and Italy militarily supported the Fascists
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and the USSR militarily supported the Republicans (Richardson, 1960, p. 42).
Sino-Japanese War, 1937-45. This war was not included in World War II by
Bouthoul & Carrere (1976, 1978), nor by Wright and Singer & Small (1972,
p. 122), but it was included in World War II by Richardson. Consequently,
this war might have been classified as an Imperial Power Conflict. However,
since it began before the second world war, since China was not an imperial
power at the time, and since no other imperial power fought against Japan in
China, this war was classified as an (attempted) Imperial Conquest on the part
of Japan.
World War II, 1939-45. This war was classified as an Imperial Power Con-
flict, since it involved three axis powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan) against
six allied powers (Belgium, Britain, France, Netherlands, USA, and USSR).
Even as World War I began in imperial conflicts long before 1914, so World
War II began in imperial conflicts long before 1939: "World War I actually
provided the basis for an even more devastating conflict." The Allies secretly
agreed from 1915-17 "to exact from the Central Powers the entire cost of the
war, and to distribute among themselves the territories and possessions of the
defeated nations." This led to the "resurgence of militarism and aggressive
nationalism in Germany and to social disorder throughout much of Europe"
(Hendelson, 1972, Vol. 25, p. 261). According to Wright (1965), WW II was
simply a continuation of WW I, the two wars being grouped together as the
"Second Thirty Years' War" (pp. 253, 362).
Indochina War, 1946-54. This war was classified as an Imperial Civil Con-
flict because the Vietminh were fighting against the Bao Dai government,
which was militarily supported by France, an imperial power.
Indo-Pakistan War, 1947-49. This war was somewhat misnamed and mis-
dated by Bouthoul & Carrere (1976, 1978), whose war deaths suggest that
this war was the same as that more usually labeled "Indian Communal Riots"
(SIPRI, 1969, p. 368) and more usually dated 1946-48. The Indo-Pakistan
 STRUCTURAL & ARMED VIOLENCE 375

War over Kashmir, 1947-49, was separately counted by all authors, and caused
about 1000 deaths. India and Pakistan were not fighting against each other in
the communal riots, but both were trying to control these riots, with the
assistance of the United Kingdom. Consequently, these riots were classified as
an Imperial Civil Conflict, but the UK was not suspected of any imperial
motives.
Korean War, 1950-53. This war was classified as an Imperial Power Conflict
because China and the USA were militarily involved on opposite sides of this
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conflict.
Qvil War in Sudan, lS'55-72. This war was classified as a Civil Conflict
because no imperial power was militarily involved.
Vietnam War, 1960-74. This war was classified as an Imperial Civil Conflict
because the USA was militarily involved on one side of the conflict.
Massacres in Indonesia, 1965. These massacres of Chinese and Communists
(most of which occurred in 1966) were classified as a Civil Conflict, because
no imperial power was militarily involved.
Qvil War of Nigeria, 1967-70. This war was classified as a Civil Conflict
because no imperial power was involved.
Pakistan War, 1971. This war was classified as an Imperial Civil Conflict,
because India was militarily involved in this civil war between Bangladesh and
Pakistan. India was not suspected of any imperial motives.
These 15 major armed conflicts in the 20th century had a total duration of
84 conflict years, or 19% of the total 438 conflict years shown in Table VII.
The average duration of these 15 conflicts was 5.6 years, which was much
1
longer than the average duration of any type of armed conflict shown in
Table VII, and twice as long as the average duration of all types taken
together.