ALFREDO O. ESTRERA, VS.

CA , DEMICILLO POSTMAN VENUS KAVOORI be ADMINISTRATIVELY charged for DISHONESTY,

GROSS VIOLATION OF REGULATIONS and/or NEGLIGENCE and/or LAXITY IN
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS
HON. LEONARDO DEMECILLO,
and VENUS KAVOORI. POSTMAN VENUS KAVOORI be criminally charged for DISHONESTY (infidelity in
Respondents. the custody of official documents) and VIOLATIONS of the ANTI-GRAFT LAW
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
POSTMAN VENUS KAVOORI be reassigned/transferred/detailed immediately in a
work area not directly handling mails, preferably at the APDM Office or Administrative
DECISION and Finance Division, Philippine Postal Corporation.

On May 5, 2001, Cayetano T. Pacana IV, Director II and Concurrent Chief of the legal
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: staff submitted his evaluation of the report of the investigating team. x x x

On same date also, respondent [herein petitioner] filed a formal charge against
This resolves the petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolution[1] of the Court of petitioner [herein private respondent].
Appeals (CA) dated January 10, 2002 dismissing herein petitioners Petition for Certiorari docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 67944[2]and the Resolution[3] of the CA dated June 17, 2002 which denied petitioners xxx xxx xxx
Motion for Reconsideration in the re-filed Petition for Certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69407[4],
and found petitioner and his counsel guilty of forum shopping, sentencing each of them to pay a fine of On June 25, 2001, respondent [herein petitioner] issued Regional Office [Order] No.
Fifteen Thousand Pesos, failing which, each of them is to suffer imprisonment of three (3) months. 01-12. In this Order, petitioner [herein private respondent] was reassigned from
the Cagayan de Oro City Office to the Motor Transport
A thorough scrutiny of the records reveals that the narration of the antecedent facts set forth in Section, Mail DistributionCenter.
the Order[5] of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City (RTC) dated October 24, 2001 is
undisputed; hence, the pertinent portion of said Order is reproduced hereunder: Relative to the formal charge, petitioner [herein private respondent] filed a motion to
quash based on the following grounds:
THE ANTECEDENT: Petitioner [herein private respondent Kavoori] is employed with
the Philippine Postal Corporation as POSTMAN II and assigned at the Registry (a) that the complaint was not under oath;
Delivery Section of the Cagayan de Oro City Post Office. (b) the complaint was only signed by Alfredo Estrera and not the
Postmaster General;
Respondent [herein petitioner] Alfredo Estrera is the Regional Director, Region 10 of (c) that the complaint should have been signed by the fact-finding body;
the Philippine Postal Corporation. (d) that there was no preliminary investigation conducted before the filing
of the charge;
Sometime in the second week of March 2001 BOMBO RADYO, (e) that the alleged affidavit of complaining witnesses were executed after
DXIF, Cagayan de Oro City aired about the alleged pilferage and/or loss of PVAO respondent was investigated.
checks and foreign mail matters and other alleged anomalies.
On June 14, 2001, respondent [herein petitioner] issued an Order denying
On March 21, 2001 Regional Office Order No. 01-06 was issued creating an the motion to quash citing as ground, Sec. 16, par. 3, Rule II of the Revised Rules on
investigation team to look into the said allegations. x x x Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

After investigation, the investigating team submitted the following recommendation. xxx xxx xxx

RECOMMENDATIONS: On June 25, 2001 petitioner [herein private respondent] filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying his motion to quash.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING FACTS and CIRCUMSTANCES, it is strongly
recommended that: On July 2, 2001, respondent [herein petitioner] issued an order denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration and required petitioner [herein respondent] to
xxxx submit her answer within five (5) days from receipt of said order.
xxx
Feeling no more other recourse, petitioner [herein private respondent] came to this
court on prohibition, injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order and damages.[6] (Words in brackets, supplied)
 Upon examination of the present Petition for Certiorari, with prayer for
The RTC ruled in favor of herein private respondent, stating thus: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, and it appearing that:

a) The petition assails the Orders dated August 21, 2001

x x x The complaint was not subscribed and sworn to by complainant and respondent and October 24, 2001, granting a temporary restraining order and
Alfredo Estrera. It should have been sworn as he is not a Postmaster General. Sec. 1 writ of preliminary injunction, respectively, issued by respondent
(b) Rule II of the Disciplinary Rules and Procedures of the Philippine Postal Judge Leonardo Demecillo of the Regional Trial Court
Corporation provides: of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24, in Civil Case No. 2001-190,
entitled: Venus Kavoori, Petitioner versus Alfredo Estrera, et al.,
Except when initiated by the Postmaster General, no complaint Respondents, which were previously the subjects of another
against the subordinate official or employees shall be given due petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and
course unless the same is in writing and subscribed and sworn to temporary restraining order earlier filed with this Court by Alfredo
by the complainant. O. Estrera and Lilia F. Eduarte, and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
67944, which was dismissed by the former Fifteenth Division on
The complaint not being sworn, had no effect. The proceedings initially had are January 10, 2002. Except for the exclusion of Lilia F. Eduarte, the
hereby invalidated including the creation of the fact-finding committee and the present petition, which is filed solely by Alfredo O. Estrera,
designation of the members thereof and their report as well as the evaluation report of appears to be exactly the same petition as the one docketed as
the Chief Legal Staff relative to the findings of the fact finding committee and the CA-G.R. No. 67944 which, to repeat, has already been
designation of Lilia F. Eduarte as hearing officer and Rafael dismissed, without any motion for reconsideration having
S. Suangco and Guiling Manalocan as prosecuting officers. Consequently, the been filed, so that it cannot be revived as an entirely new
injunction prayed for is hereby granted. Mrs. Lilia Eduarte, petition;
Rafael Suangco and Guiling Manalocan are hereby enjoined from proceeding with the
hearing. b) Treated as a new petition, the instant petition
appears to have been filed out of time, considering that the
Respondent Alfredo Estrera may however, refile again the formal charge. In so doing petitioner received a copy of the assailed Order dated October 24,
he should observe the Disciplinary Rules and Procedures of the Philippine Postal 2001 on November 7, 2001, so that the last day of the 60-day
Corporation and Circular No. 97-29. period within which to file the same expired on January 6, 2002,
whereas the instant petition was filed only on February 8, 2002 and,
SO ORDERED.[7] hence, already late by thirty-three (33) days;

Petitioner no longer filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing RTC Order and proceeded to file c) Moreover, the petitioner did not first file with the
a petition for certiorari with the CA which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67944. respondent court a motion for the reconsideration of the
assailed October 24, 2001, which is a condition precedent to
On January 10, 2002, the CA issued the first assailed Resolution, stating thus: the filing of a petition for certiorari; and
However, after going over this petition, it was found out that petitioners failed d) Lastly, the certificate of non-forum shopping
to attach or incorporate the authority of Alfredo O. Estrera who signed the Verification incorporated in the petition at bar is defective in that it does
and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping to sign for and in behalf of petitioner Lilia not disclose the earlier filing of a similar petition by herein
F. Eduarte in violation of Section 3, paragraph 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil petitioner Alfredo O. Estreraand Lilia F. Eduarte which was,
Procedure, hence, dismissible. however, dismissed, thereby violating Section 3, Rule 46 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in relation to Section 5, Rule 7 of the
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this petition is hereby same Rules.
ordered DISMISSED.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED
SO ORDERED.[8] OUTRIGHT, and the petitioner Alfredo O. Estreraand counsel Atty.
Rene Artemio T. Pacana are both directed to show cause cause, within fifteen (15)
Petitioner did not to file a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution and instead filed days from notice hereof, why they should not be dealt with for contempt of court for
another petition for certiorari with the CA on February 8, 2002, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. engaging in forum shopping.
69407. On March 13, 2002, the CA issued a Resolution, to wit:
SO ORDERED.[9] (Emphasis supplied)
RESOLUTION
Petitioner then filed his Manifestation/Explanation[10] and his Motion for Reconsideration[11] both
dated March 26, 2002. He explained that his failure to disclose the previous petition for certiorari was
through sheer inadvertence or oversight and the belief that since the previous petition had already been
dismissed, there is no longer any similar case pending with the court.
On June 17, 2002, the CA issued the second assailed Resolution, the dispositive portion of which states
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is
DENIED; and the petitioner Alfredo O. Estrera and counsel, Atty.
Rene Artemio T. Pacana, are found guilty of forum shopping and EACH is sentenced
to pay a fine of Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos, failing in which, EACH is to
suffer imprisonment of three (3) months.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Hence, this petition for certiorari where petitioner alleges that:
The Honorable Court of Appeals:
A.) FAILED SERIOUSLY TO APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT
THE CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
INCORPORATED TO THE PETITION DOCKETED AS CA-
G.R. SP NO. 67944 WAS DEEMED IN SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION
3, PARAGRAPH 3, RULE 46 OF THE 1997 RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE. HENCE, GRAVELY ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE PETITION.
B.) SERIOUSLY FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT
DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION UNDER SECTION 3,
PARAGRAPH 3, RULE 46 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN RELATION TO SECTION 5, RULE 7 OF
THE SAME RULES SHALL BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
C.) SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PETITION
DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP NO. 69407 WAS A REVIVAL
OF THE PETITION DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP NO. 67944
WHICH IT EARLIER DISMISSED;
D.) SERIOUSLY ERRED IN TREATING THE PETITION
DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP NO. 69407 AS A NEW
PETITION AND IN FINDING THAT THE SAME WAS FILED
OUT OF TIME;
E.) SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING HEREIN PETITIONER
AND UNDERSIGNED COUNSEL GUILTY OF FORUM
SHOPPING AND IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF FINE IN
THE AMOUNT OF FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P15,000.00) EACH OR TO SUFFER IMPRISONMENT OF
THREE (3) MONTHS IN CASE OF FAILURE THEREOF,
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW;
F.) SERIOUSLY FAILED TO APPRECIATE AND CONSIDER
THE PRESENCE OF EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
THAT JUSTIFIED HEREIN PETITIONER IN FILING THE
PETITION WITHOUT FILING A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION; AND
G.) FAILING TO DECIDE THE PETITION ON ITS MERITS.[13]
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioner must be reminded of the function of the remedy of certiorari. In People v. Court of
Appeals,[14] the Court expounded thus:
As observed in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al. the
special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison detre for the rule is when a court
exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not
deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it
did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every
erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration
of justice would not survive.Hence, where the issue or question involved affects
the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision not the jurisdiction of the court
to render said decision the same is beyond the province of a special civil action
for certiorari. x x x[15](Emphasis supplied)
As can be gleaned from the afore-quoted assignment of errors in the petition, the issues
alleged are only possible errors of judgment, questioning the correctness of the CAs rulings. Hence,
since the issues involved do not affect the jurisdiction of the CA, the writ of certiorari cannot be availed
of by petitioner.
Nevertheless, a close scrutiny of the records reveals that the CA committed no errors.
Indeed, the CA acted properly in dismissing CA-G.R. No. 67944 as the Section 3, Rule 46 of
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the failure of petitioner to comply with any of the
requirements, such as the submission of a sworn certification of non-forum shopping by all the
petitioners, is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. Petitioner no longer filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution dated January 10, 2002, hence, the same attained finality.
Although it is true that the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 67944 was
without prejudice and petitioner could have re-filed such petition, such re-filing should still be done
within the prescribed period under Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, or not later
than sixty days from notice of the assailed Order of the RTC. The CA was correct in ruling that since
petitioner received said RTC Order dated October 24, 2001 on November 7, 2001, the last day for filing
a petition for certiorari was on January 6, 2002. Thus, the filing of the petition for certiorari docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 69407 on February 8, 2002 was undoubtedly beyond the 60-day period provided for
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On this point alone, CA-G.R. SP No. 69407 was
clearly dismissible and should not be given due course.
 It is also too late for petitioner to question the CA Resolution dated January 10, 2002 through
the present petition for certiorari. As discussed above, a petition for certiorari should be filed within 60
days from notice of the questioned resolution. Since petitioner received said CA Resolution on January
22, 2002,[16] the last day for filing a petition for certiorari to question the same was on March 23,
2002. The present petition was filed only on July 31, 2002, thus, filed beyond the reglementary period
for filing a petition for certiorari. This Court, therefore, can no longer entertain any arguments against the
propriety of the dismissal of CA-G.R. No. 67944.

Lastly, the issue of the propriety of finding petitioner guilty of contempt for forum shopping is
also not within the province of a special action for certiorari. As stated in People v. Court of
Appeals,[17] issues merely questioning the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision, not the
jurisdiction of the court rendering it, are not proper for a petition for certiorari.

Petitioners remedy to question the CAs finding of contempt should have been to appeal via a
petition for review on certiorari. However, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, such petition should be filed 15 days after receipt of the CA Resolution dated June 17,
2002. Petitioner having received said Resolution on June 24, 2002, the last day for filing a petition for
review on certiorari was on July 9, 2002, but no such petition was filed.

The axiomatic rule, as stated in Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings

Corporation,[18] is that:

x x x Where appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the

ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion. Basic is the rule that certiorari is not
a substitute for the lapsed remedy of appeal.[19] (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, since appeal was available to petitioner, the present petition for certiorari cannot be granted.
G.R. No. 155824 January 31, 2007
GILLAMAC’S MARKETING, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of
the Court of Appeals (CA) resolutions in CA-G.R. CV No. 732521 dated February 15, 2002 and August
22, 2002, respectively.
The facts follow.
Petitioner Gillamac’s Marketing, Inc. operates an appliance store in Ormoc City. On March 30, 1995, it
sent assorted appliance units on board the "MV Elcano," a commercial vessel owned and operated by
private respondent Aboitiz Shipping Corporation. The bill of lading issued by the latter stated that the
appliances were worth P740,833 and they were to be delivered to petitioner’s Cavite branch within a
week. However, it was only after nine months that private respondent delivered them. Worse, they were
delivered in bad condition. Petitioner refused to accept delivery and instead demanded payment of the
shipment’s value.
When the parties failed to settle amicably, petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City,
Branch 9, a complaint for collection of sum of money. Petitioner claimed that the damage to the
appliance units was caused by private respondent’s failure to exercise extraordinary diligence. It sought
the following reliefs, namely:
1) P740,833 as actual value of the damaged appliance units;
2) P16,660.33 as freightage;
3) P444,499 as unrealized income from the supposed sale of the units and;
4) P15,000 as attorney’s fees.2
Private respondent countered that petitioner’s unsuitable packaging of the appliance units caused the
damage. It added that, if at all it was liable, its liability was limited only to the actual value of the goods
as appearing on the bill of lading.3
After trial, the court a quo ruled in favor of petitioner. It held:
…From the evidence adduced by [petitioner], the Court is convinced that [private respondent] did not
exercise extraordinary diligence in taking care of [petitioner’s cargoes] as required by law[;] [private
respondent] being a common carrier…[F]urther, [private respondent] incurred gross delay in the delivery
of the cargoes of [petitioner]…
The Court is inclined to grant the other damages prayed for by [petitioner] in its complaint, although not
in the amount prayed for. For instance, with respect to the unearned income fixed by [petitioner] at 60%
of the value of the cargo or the amount of P444,499.00 is found by the Court to be too speculative aside
from being too high. The Court is inclined to grant a mark up of only 15% of [petitioner’s] principal by
way of unearned income. The attorney’s fees of 25% of [petitioner’s] principal claim is likewise found by
the Court to be rather too high even if it is contingent. The Court is inclined to allow 10% thereof…
The Court takes note of the fact that the parties stipulated that the total price of the units shipped
is P740,833.00
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [petitioner], Gillamac’s Marketing, Inc. and
against [private respondent], Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, ordering [private respondent] to pay to
[petitioner the following]:
1) The amount of P740,833 as actual damages;
2) The amount equivalent to 15% of the actual damages by way of unearned income;
3) Legal interest on the actual damages at 12% per annum to start from the time of the filing of
the complaint until the whole amount is fully paid;
4) The amount equivalent of 10% of the actual damages by way of attorney’s fees
and P15,000.00 as litigation expenses.
Plus costs.
SO ORDERED.4
Private respondent appealed the case to the CA. On October 31, 2001, the CA dismissed private
respondent’s appeal after it failed to pay appeal and docket fees.5 Its counsel, Atty. Jose C. Palma,
filed a motion for reconsideration (MR) of the above resolution stating that he took care of his ailing
father (who eventually died of kidney cancer) and instead asked a member of his staff to pay the
required fees. He later on discovered that the latter failed to pay the fees, hence, he immediately paid
them.
The CA did not act on the motion but instead required petitioner (as then appellee in the CA) to file its
comment on private respondent’s MR. On February 15, 2002, the CA recalled and set aside its October
31, 2001 resolution, and reinstated private respondent’s appeal.6 Petitioner filed its MR of this
recall/reinstate order but the same was denied on August 22, 2002.7
Aggrieved, petitioner is now before us assailing the CA’s above resolutions. It ascribes W/N CA acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for reinstating private
respondent’s appeal despite the latter’s failure to pay the appeal and docket fees.8 According to
petitioner, the non-payment of said fees was fatal to private respondent’s case, hence, the CA should
have dismissed the same outright.
We disagree.

The failure to pay docket fees does not automatically result in the dismissal of an appeal, it being
discretionary on the part of the appellate court to give it due course or not. 9 We will then not interfere
with matters addressed to the sound discretion of the CA in the absence of proof that the exercise of
such discretion was tainted with bias or prejudice, or made without due circumspection of the attendant
circumstances of the case.10

In a special civil action for certiorari, there must be proof that the act of the tribunal or court emanated
from the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment. 11 Likewise, the use of discretion should have
been arbitrary due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility so patent and gross that it amounts to
evasion to perform a positive duty under the law. 12 In the case at bar, the records do not reveal nor
does petitioner allege malice or prejudice on the part of the CA in reinstating private respondent’s
appeal.

A perusal of the herein parties’ pleadings also shows that private respondent’s counsel had no intention
to violate the rules. He was also candid enough to have admitted his participation in the delay of the
payment of the appeal and docket fees although he later on paid them. In some cases, 13 we condoned
oversights of parties in failing to pay these fees on time to avoid undue burden on their right to appeal.
We are well aware of the importance of appeals, thus, we have advised courts to exercise prudence in
dismissing them. In the case of Yambao v. Court of Appeals,14 we declared:

Considering the importance and purpose of the remedy of appeal, an essential part of our judicial
system, courts are well-advised to proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to
appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the "amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of his cause, freed from constraints of technicalities." In line with this policy, we have held
that, in appealed cases, the failure to pay docket fees does not automatically result in the dismissal of
the appeal…
G.R. No. 165960 February 8, 2007
JEFFREY O. TORREDA, Petitioner,
vs.
TOSHIBA INFORMATION EQUIPMENT (PHILS.), INC., and GERARDO C. CRISTOBAL,
JR., Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court questioning the
Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76289 and the Resolution2 denying the
motion for reconsideration thereof. The appellate court affirmed the November 15, 2002 Resolution 3 of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC RAB IV Case No. 3-10931-99-L (CA No.
023462-2000).
The Antecedents
Jeffrey O. Torreda was employed by Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.), Inc. as a finance
assistant4 (on a probationary basis) on July 1, 1997. He was mainly responsible for payroll processing
and management, and for the bookkeeping of T&P Properties, Inc.5 Effective January 1, 1998, he was
employed on a regular basis as finance accountant6 under the Finance and Accounting Department
headed by Kazuo Kobayashi, Vice-President, and Teresita Sepulveda, Finance Manager. 7 He was
tasked to do the following:
(i) processing of the payrolls of the employees of the Company, (ii) maintenance of reports on year-to-
date earnings and taxes withheld, monetary benefits, and government contributions, (iii) preparation of
vouchers related to payroll accounts of the employees, (iv) preparation and reconciliation of payment of
taxes withheld and file tax returns, and (v) preparation of reportorial requirements of government
agencies and regulatory bodies.8
On May 22, 1998, Torreda and his four co-employees in the Finance and Accounting Department
reported to Senior Vice-President Hisao Tanaka that, before and after the reorganization, Finance
Manager Teresita Sepulveda had ordered them to prepare petty cash vouchers in their names and that
the sums covered by the vouchers were received by Sepulveda for her own personal use.9 Tanaka told
them that he would bring the matter to Gerardo Cristobal, Jr., the Manager of the Human Resources
Department.10 Consequently, Sepulveda was barred from approving petty cash vouchers with an
amount beyond ₱1,000.00. She was also required to make monthly reports of petty cash vouchers to
the Senior Vice-President. Thus, restrictions were imposed on Sepulveda’s authority to approve petty
cash vouchers.11
On July 22, 1998, Sepulveda opened Torreda’s personal computer and read his Lotus Notes mail and
other personal files, specifically the report he had sent to Tanaka about her. She reprimanded Torreda
and told him that he should not send mails to Tanaka without her approval. 12 Upset over Sepulveda’s
actuations, Torreda reported the incident via electronic mail (e-mail) to Tanaka13 on the same day. He
complained that Sepulveda had no right to open the computer because it was his, and it contained his
personal files. He told Tanaka that Sepulveda used to open the employees’ computers; hence, she
could no longer be trusted.14
Sepulveda filed a complaint against Torreda with the Human Resources Department (HRD) for
repeated tardiness during the period of April to July 1998.
On August 27, 1998, Sepulveda ordered Torreda to make a summary of payroll overpayments from
October 1996 to June 1998.15 Torreda refused and informed Sepulveda that all countermeasures for
immediate and long-term solutions had been identified, and that what was needed was a strict
implementation of countermeasures.16 He further questioned the propriety of his being ordered to
prepare financial summaries starting October 1996, when he was employed only on July 1, 1997. 17
From September 1 to 3, 1998, Sepulveda received complaints from separated employees regarding full
salary claims, and from incumbent employees on maternity and other benefits. Torreda failed to process
the claims before taking a leave of absence on September 3, 1998. In order to retrieve the claimants’
payrolls and Social Security Services (SSS) files, which Torreda kept in his drawer, Sepulveda, with
prior approval from Kobayashi, had the drawer forcibly opened by Ruben delos Santos, a staff member
of the General Administration Section. The drawer was opened in the presence of Oscar Eusebio,
Noralyn Florencio and Flor Berdin of the Finance Department. The claims of the employees were later
processed and released.18 As shown by official records, Torreda went to his office on September 5,
1998, a Saturday, and stayed thereat for several hours.
On September 7, 1998, Sepulveda requested Torreda to submit his key for duplication to prevent similar
incidents.19Torreda refused. Sepulveda sent a formal request via e-mail directing him to turn over his
drawer key to the General Administrator of the company for duplication and to explain in writing why he
refused to surrender his key.20 Torreda replied via e-mail to Sepulveda, to wit:
I WILL ONLY GIVE YOU THE DUPLICATE COPY (sic) IF YOU CAN PROVIDE ME WITH OR (SIC) AN
EXPLANATION OF THE FOLLOWING:
1.) TIP policy on Key duplication to be submitted to your possession (sic).
2.) Why is is (sic) that my Php 200.00 pesos (sic) in my drawer is missing (or STOLEN, by
WHO ELSE____)?? Because you are the only one who FORCIBLY open (sic) my drawer
without my knowledge. This is a plain and simple robbery on your part… 21
Torreda furnished copies of this e-mail to Cristobal, Kobayashi, Tanaka and N. Florencio, the Senior
Manager of the HRD, Manager of General Administration, Vice-President for Finance, Senior Vice-
President and Financial Analyst of the company, respectively.
Torreda then accomplished the company complaint form against Sepulveda declaring that at 8:00 a.m.
on September 7, 1998, he discovered that two ₱100.00 bills he kept in his drawer were missing. He
noted that his drawer had been forcibly opened before by Ruben delos Santos on Sepulveda’s orders. 22
On the same day, Sepulveda sent to the HRD a complaint/request for investigation (via e-mail)
regarding Torreda’s accusation and his abusive and rude behavior. 23 The complaint reads:
This is to formally file a complaint against one of my staff, Mr. Jeffrey Torreda. In this statement below,
he blatantly accused me of robbery for the ₱200.00 missing in his drawer. This is a fabrication of a story
and I felt very much humiliated by his words.
Would like to request for an investigation to be conducted to clear my name of this incident. I cannot be
silent and accept this as simple error when my name and career are at stake. This is a clear case of
misrepresentation. In my position as the Finance Manager of TIP, integrity is the most important virtue
that I have to project and protect. Mr. Torreda, thru his misrepresentation particularly to top
management, caused damage to my image.
I pray for justice. Lest this act of Mr. Jeffrey Torreda will happen again. 24
On September 7, 1998, a conference was held in the office of Kobayashi between Torreda, Cristobal
and Sepulveda. Torreda claimed that Sepulveda never informed him that his drawer needed to be
opened. He pointed out that some employees of the Finance and Accounting Section knew his contact
numbers. Sepulveda, for her part, claimed that she did not have the contact numbers of Torreda, hence,
was unable to contact him before his drawer was opened. Kobayashi told Sepulveda that she should
have the contact numbers of those in the Finance and Accounting Section.
Maximo Dones of the General Administration Section conducted an investigation of the complaint
against Sepulveda. On September 8, 1998, he submitted a Report where he declared that there was no
factual basis for Torreda’s "robbery" charge against Sepulveda.
In a separate development, the HRD issued a "written warning" on September 10, 1998 to Torreda, in
reference to his tardiness from April to July 1998 (the matter Sepulveda had earlier complained of).25
The next day, September 11, 1998, Sepulveda and Kobayashi directed Torreda to explain, in writing,
within 48 hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for the following violation against
the company:26
Offenses against the Company: Insubordination – Refusal or neglecting to obey the order of the
supervisor or superior x x x. in reference to the Sept. 10 incident. 27
He was warned that failure to submit the Employee’s Written Explanation Form within the given period
would be considered as an admission of the offense.28
Torreda, for his part, sent an e-mail message to Hisao Tanaka on September 11, 1998, where he
complained against Sepulveda for the following offenses/violations:
A.) ABUSE OF POSITION IN THE COMPANY TO GAIN PROFIT OR ADVANTAGE FROM
THE EMPLOYEE UNDER HER SUPERVISION. – 1st Offense DISMISSAL
B.) UNAUTHORIZED OPENING OF ANOTHER’S LOCKER, DRAWER OR OFFICE – 1st
Offense DISMISSAL
C.) FALSIFYING COMPANY RECORDS AND OR DOCUMENTS – 1st Offense DISMISSAL
D.) FALSE REPORTING – 1st Offense DISMISSAL
E.) OTHER CASE OF DISHONESTY AND MISREPRESENTATION – 1st OFFENSE
DISMISSAL
F.) COERCING, INTIMIDATING AND THREATENING – 1st Offense SUSPENSION
G.) CARELESSNESS OR NEGLIGENT SUBMISSION OF ANY ITEM OF EXPENSE. 1st
Offense DISMISSAL29
Meanwhile, Sepulveda approved Torreda’s paternity leave from September 12 to September 21,
1998.30 Torreda received the directive of Sepulveda and Kobayashi on September 13, 1998, but failed
to submit his written explanation on the charges against him.
Torreda then applied for leave for the period beginning September 22, 1998 up to October 2, 1998, but
Sepulveda disapproved the same.31
On October 2, 1998, the General Administration (GA) Department recommended that Torreda be
dismissed conformably with its findings that he committed grave slander under the company’s
Employee Handbook.
Torreda submitted his written explanation32 to Sepulveda’s complaint for grave slander only on October
6, 1998. He alleged that he had the right to accuse Sepulveda of stealing because she was the one who
ordered his drawer forcibly opened. His charge of robbery against her was the normal reaction of one
who finds out that something he owns is missing due to an unlawful act. He pointed out that he had
been a victim of Sepulveda’s unauthorized acts on prior occasions. She repeatedly opened his
computer and his drawer on September 10 and 11, 1998 while he was on leave. Had Sepulveda acted
rightly, he (Torreda) would not have committed grave slander against her. 33 He also pointed out that
since his contact numbers were known to his officemates, Sepulveda should have called him up before
ordering the opening of his drawer on September 3, 1998. 34
In a letter35 addressed to Hisao Tanaka dated October 7, 1998, Torreda, Finance Supervisor Visitacion
Agustin, and Finance Assistant Rowena Alinas demanded that appropriate action be taken against
Sepulveda for various offenses or violations. They alleged that Sepulveda had degraded and humiliated
them (specifically Torreda); that she looked into their personal computer files without authority; that she
mishandled and appropriated for herself the company’s petty cash; that she forcibly opened the drawer
of Torreda resulting in the loss of documents and money; that there were cases of negligent payment of
SSS contribution and under-declaration of withholding tax due to Sepulveda’s fault; that Torreda was
warned for tardiness without due process; that Sepulveda unjustifiably disapproved Torreda’s leave
application; that Torreda was stripped of his duties and responsibilities and given new ones alien to him;
that she intimidated Torreda by ordering the removal of his Lotus Notes Software from his computer
without any explanation; that she deliberately caused the payments of allowances to employees who
were not entitled thereto and the deduction of performance bonuses from employees so entitled; and
that overpayments of salaries to several employees occurred due to Sepulveda’s negligence in
checking the payroll.
On October 14, 1998, Torreda received a letter36 from Gerardo Cristobal, Jr. informing him that his
employment had been terminated effective at the end of official working hours on that day, for grave
slander, which under the Employee Handbook is punishable by dismissal. 37 The letter of termination
reads:
After a thorough review and evaluation of the Grave Slander charge by your superior and your
reply/explanation, the following points become relevant; (sic)
 1. While we have a policy prohibiting unauthorized opening of Employee lockers/drawers, your
superior, Ms. Teresita Sepulveda sought the approval of your Department Head/Vice
President. This approval made the action of opening your drawer authorized and official.
2. Your Department Head/Vice President authorized the opening of your drawer to locate and
retrieve vital documents needed last September which was (sic) under your custody.
3. Several employees witnessed the opening and the retrieval of the said vital documents from
your drawer by your superior and testified they did not see any money inside the drawer nor
any taken by your superior.
4. Your claim that there was (sic) Pesos 200 in your drawer is not substantiated.
5. You reported the alleged loss to GA on Monday, September 7, 1998 yet you spent several
hours at the office the previous Saturday, September 5, 1998 per our official records. Mr.
Maximino Dones of General Affairs did not receive any report of loss then. It would seem
natural for an Employee to report immediately the loss of his money upon discovering that his
drawer was opened.
6. Prudence and common sense dictate that personal properties including money should not
be left behind (sic) in drawers and lockers which are Company properties.
Based on the Investigation Report submitted by Mr. Maximino Dones on September 8, 1998 of General
Affairs on your alleged theft complaint and the above considerations, we find your complaint against Ms.
Sepulveda without basis and merit. Consequently, there is basis in the charge of Grave Slander against
you by Ms. T. Sepulveda when you called her a ‘robber’ in your e-mail dated September 7, 1998
addressed to her.
Your false accusation has caused her undue embarrassment and has cast aspersion on her character
as Manager of TIP. This is strengthened by the fact that you furnished a copy of the said e-mail to other
parties, e.g., K. Kobayashi, R. Suarez, N. Florencio and H. Tanaka.
As a subordinate, you (sic) action shows an utter disrespect and disregard to her as a person of
authority and the Company considers this a grave and serious violation of our existing policies on
Offenses Related to Conduct and Behavior. And as stated in our Employee Handbook, the penalty for
Grave Slander is Dismissal for the first offense.
In view hereof, you are hereby formally informed that your employment with Toshiba Information
Equipment (Phils.), is terminated effective at the end of official working hours today October 14, 1998.
Please comply with the relevant post-employment requirement of the Company by surrendering your
accountabilities to HRA through Ms. Candice Cipriano to enable us to process your last salary.
(Sgd.) GERARDO C. CRISTOBAL, JR.
Senior Manager, HRA38
On March 23, 1999, Torreda filed a complaint39 for illegal dismissal against Cristobal and Toshiba. The
case was docketed as NLRC RAB IV Case No. 3-10931-99-L.
On February 15, 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision,40 declaring that Torreda’s dismissal from
employment was unjustified. The series of events indicated that Torreda was harassed by Sepulveda
because of his exposé of irregularities she had committed. The opening of his drawer formed part of her
harassment tactics.41 Thus, Torreda had all the right to demand an explanation for the forcible opening
of his computer files and drawer which resulted in the loss of some amount of money. 421.net
The Labor Arbiter also ruled that respondent Toshiba did not observe the rudiments of due process in
terminating Torreda’s employment. The result of the investigation on the charges against him came out
on October 2, 1998, or four days before Torreda submitted his written explanation to the charges.43 The
fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, respondent company is found guilty of illegal dismissal
and is hereby ordered to reinstate the complainant to his former position without loss of seniority rights
and to pay him backwages in the amount of ₱238,745.00 [(₱14,692.00 x 15 months = ₱220,380.00) +
(13th month pay ₱220,380.00/12 = ₱18,365.00)] computed from the time of dismissal up to the date of
this decision. In the event that reinstatement is no longer possible, respondent company is hereby
ordered to pay complainant separation pay in the amount of ₱44,076.00 (₱14,692.00 x 3 years) plus
backwages.
SO ORDERED.44 1awphil.net
Aggrieved by the decision, respondents appealed the case to the NLRC.45 They maintained that the
sending of an e-mail message containing insulting and offensive words, and false and malicious
statements against his immediate superior (Sepulveda), clearly intended to cause dishonor, is not only
destructive of the morale of his co-employees and violative of company rules and regulations; it also
constitutes serious misconduct that would justify dismissal from employment. 46 The requirement of due
process was further met, since the termination of the complainant was made on October 14, 1998, or
eight (8) days after the company received his explanation to the charges against him.47
On November 15, 2002, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. 48 The NLRC ratiocinated
that the complainant committed the infraction of accusing his immediate superior of stealing ₱200.00
and calling her a robber (through an e-mail message), without any evidence at all, and forwarding
copies to the other officers of the company. The NLRC declared that this infraction constitutes
serious misconduct, a just cause for dismissal under Article 282(a) of the Labor Code, as amended.
<The NLRC declared that considering the urgency of the situation, it was necessary to open the drawer
of Torreda: there had been numerous follow-ups from separated employees regarding their pending
final salary payments, and from incumbent employees claiming maternity and sickness benefits under
the SSS, and processing these applications was part of complainant’s responsibilities. Moreover, the
opening of the drawer was conducted in the presence of Oscar Eusebio, Noralyn Florencio and Flor
Berdin, who were employees of the Finance Section, with prior notice to Kobayashi, Vice-President for
Finance.49
The NLRC further held that disrespect to company officials and staff members constitutes serious
misconduct which means a transgression of some established rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction. Consequently, pursuant to Article 279 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, the
complainant is not entitled to reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights and
privileges, or to payment of any separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, or payment of any backwages
and other benefits.>50 The NLRC cited the ruling of this Court in Gutierrez v. Baron.51 The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision
appealed from is VACATED and a new one ENTERED dismissing the instant case for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.52
When his motion for reconsideration53 was denied by the NLRC in its January 27, 2003
Resolution,54 Torreda filed a petition for certiorari55 before the CA on April 1, 2003. He alleged that the
NLRC committed grave and patent abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
setting aside the Labor Arbiter’s decision and in finding that his dismissal was justified.56
CA’s decision: rendered judgment dismissing the petition on February 27, 2004.57 It affirmed the
NLRC ruling dismissing petitioner’s complaint. However, the appellate court found that petitioner
committed grave slander when he concocted the charge of theft against Sepulveda, the penalty for
which, under the Employee’s Handbook, is dismissal.58
Petitioner timely filed his motion for reconsideration59 which the appellate court denied in its May 13,
2004 resolution.60
Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition insisting that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in holding that
the dismissal of the petitioner was legal.61
Petitioner contends that the ground for his termination does not fall among the just causes stated in
Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended.62 The alleged grave slander was in response to
Sepulveda’s September 7, 1998 e-mail requesting him to submit the key of his drawer for
duplication.63 He reacted in that manner because Sepulveda had previously harassed him. 64 In fact, he
wrote Tanaka, on September 11, 1998, requesting for assistance on the offenses committed by his
direct superior. Instead of penalizing Sepulveda, however, respondent Toshiba dismissed him from the
service for alleged grave slander.65
In their Comment,66 respondents Toshiba and HR Manager Cristobal assert that the issues raised by
petitioner involve questions of fact and not of law, which are improper in an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45.67 The factual findings and conclusion of the NLRC, which were affirmed by the CA, should be
accorded with respect and finality.68
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
It bears stressing that what petitioner filed before the CA was one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Thus, he was burdened to prove that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed his petition. The Court has invariably
defined "grave abuse of discretion," thus:
x x x By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or
despotically. For certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power,
the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and common
law traditions.69
Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.70 The only question involved is jurisdiction, either the lack or
excess thereof, and abuse of discretion warrants the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
only when the same is grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility. A writ of certiorari is a remedy designed for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. 71 An error of judgment is one which the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, which error is reversible only by an appeal. 72 In
Cosep v. NLRC,73 this Court held that decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final by
law are not exempt from judicial review for want of substantial basis in fact and in law.
A careful review of the decisions of the NLRC and the CA reveal that they differ on their bases for the
dismissal of petitioner’s complaint. The NLRC declared that the charge of robbery which was fabricated
by petitioner against his immediate superior, Sepulveda, constitutes serious misconduct punishable by
dismissal under Article 282(a) of the Labor Code; in contrast, the CA ruled that petitioner committed
grave slander - an act punishable by dismissal under the Employee’s Handbook.
We hold that the CA correctly affirmed the NLRC Resolution ordering the Labor Arbiter to dismiss
petitioner’s complaint. However, the appellate court erred in ruling that petitioner committed grave
slander against Sepulveda and in applying the Employee’s Handbook as basis for his dismissal.
The rule in labor cases is that the burden is on the employer to prove that the dismissal of an employee
is for a just or valid cause. Evidence must be clear, convincing and free from any inference that the
prerogative to dismiss an employee was abused and unjustly used by the employer to further any
vindictive end.74 In this case, respondent Toshiba adequately proved that petitioner was dismissed for
just cause.
<The NLRC did not err much less commit grave abuse of its discretion when it based its ruling on Article
282(a) of the Labor Code on its finding that petitioner committed serious misconduct for falsely accusing
his immediate superior of robbery. As the Court held in Villanueva v. People: 75>
<Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. The term oral defamation or
slander as now understood, has been defined as the speaking of base and defamatory words which
tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood.
There is grave slander when it is of a serious and insulting nature. The gravity of the oral defamation
depends not only (1) upon the expressions used, but also (2) on the personal relations of the accused
and the offended party, and (3) the circumstances surrounding the case. Indeed, it is a doctrine of
ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending not only upon
their sense, grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them separately, but also
upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and
the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. 76>
The false attribution by the petitioner of robbery (theft) against Sepulveda was made in writing; patently
then, petitioner committed libel, not grave slander against Sepulveda. The malicious and public
imputation in writing by one of a crime on another is libel under Article 353, in relation to Article 355, of
the Revised Penal Code which reads:
Art. 353. Definition of libel. – A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead.
xxx
Art. 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. – A libel committed by means of writing, printing,
lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or
any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a
fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the
offended party.
Indeed, an employee may be dismissed from employment for acts punishable by dismissal under Article
282(a) of the Labor Code, which reads:
Article 282. Termination by employer. – An employer may terminate an employment for any of the
following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work; x x x
petitioner had failed to process for payment before his leave. The claimants sought to have their claims
approved and released with dispatch. Before opening petitioner’s drawer, Sepulveda saw to it that she
had Kobayashi’s approval. Delos Santos opened the drawer of petitioner in the presence of his co-
employees in the Financial Section. Thereafter, the claims were processed and payments were
effected. Thus, Sepulveda acted in good faith.79
Petitioner admitted that his charge of robbery/theft against Sepulveda was baseless, but claimed that he
fabricated the charge because of his exasperation and anger at Sepulveda’s repeated acts of opening
his drawer without prior permission while he was on leave, not only on September 7, 1998 but also on
September 10 and 11, 1998; he also pointed out that Sepulveda looked into his personal files in his
computer. In fine, by falsely ascribing a crime to Sepulveda, petitioner was merely retaliating against
perceived misdeeds she had committed against him. However, the manner resorted to by petitioner of
redressing the wrong committed by Sepulveda is a criminal act. As the adage goes, the end cannot
justify the means used by petitioner.
In St. Michael’s Institute v. Santos,80 this Court held that the employer’s right to conduct the affairs of his
business, according to its own discretion and judgment, is well-recognized. An employer has a free
reign and enjoys wide latitude of discretion to regulate all aspects of employment, including the
prerogative to instill discipline in its employees and to impose penalties, including dismissal, upon erring
employees. This is a management prerogative, where the free will of management to conduct its own
affairs to achieve its purpose takes form.81 The law, in protecting the rights of workers, authorizes
neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.82

In Fujitsu Computer Products Corporation of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 77 the Court explained
the nature of serious misconduct as a ground for dismissal from employment:

Misconduct has been defined as improper or wrong conduct. It is the transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful
intent and not mere error of judgment. The misconduct to be serious must be of such grave and
aggravated character and not merely trivial and unimportant. Such misconduct, however, serious, must
nevertheless be in connection with the employee’s work to constitute just cause for his separation.
Thus, for misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, (a) it must be serious; (b)
must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties; and (c) must show that the employee has
become unfit to continue working for the employer. Indeed, an employer may not be compelled to
continue to employ such person whose continuance in the service would be patently inimical to his
employer’s interest.78

There is abundant evidence on record showing that petitioner committed libel against his immediate
superior, Sepulveda, an act constituting serious misconduct which warrants the dismissal from
employment.

Petitioner maliciously and publicly imputed on Sepulveda the crime of robbery of ₱200.00. As gleaned
from his Complaint dated September 7, 1999 which he filed with the General Administration, he knew
that it was Delos Santos who opened his drawer and not Sepulveda. Thus, by his own admission,
petitioner was well aware that the robbery charge against Sepulveda was a concoction, a mere
fabrication with the sole purpose of retaliating against Sepulveda’s previous acts.

The records show that Sepulveda was impelled to forcibly open petitioner’s drawer. She needed to
retrieve the benefits applications of retirees and incumbent employees of respondent-corporation, which
BALINGIT vs. COMELEC Let the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) implement this
Resolution.

DECISION SO ORDERED.[3]

The COMELEC Second Division validated 80 out of the 86 ballots previously invalidated by the MCTC
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. and counted them in favor of Yamat, while the other six ballots remained invalid. The six ballots were as
follows:

Pablo Yamat (Yamat) was declared the elected Punong Barangay of Nigui, Masantol, Pampanga, in the Precinct No. Exhibit Nos.
last July 28, 2002 barangay elections, with Yamat obtaining 257 votes, and his opponent, Bartolome
Balingit (Balingit), 250 votes. 56-A B44
Balingit filed an election protest with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Macabebe-Masantol, B45
Macabebe, Pampanga, alleging fraud in the counting and preparation of the election returns. After B5
revision of the ballots, the tally turned out with Balingit still having 250 votes, while Yamat had 255 B7
votes. 58-A 135
136
Thereafter, in a Decision dated September 24, 2003, the MCTC declared Balingit as the duly
elected punongbarangay, with the following tabulation:[1]
Thus, a total of 252 votes were considered in favor of Yamat, with Balingit still having the same number
of votes 249.
Precinct Nos. Balingit Yamat
53-A 64 16 COMELEC Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, however, registered his dissent on the Commission's
findings with regard to six other ballots, namely: Exhibits B-3, B-6, B-41, B-72, B-137, and B-138. These
54-A 52 4 six ballots were among the 86 ballots previously invalidated by the MCTC but were held to be valid by
55-A 87 13 the Commission. It was Commissioner Sadain's view that these ballots appear to have been written by
one person and should have been invalidated and not credited in favor of Yamat. Thus, only a total of
56-A 11 57 (97+1-41) 246 votes should be credited in favor of Yamat, making Balingit, with 249 votes, the winner by a margin
57-A 16 (17-1) 48 (63+1-16) of three votes.[4]
Balingit filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC Resolution with the COMELEC En
58-A 19 34 (62+1-29) Banc but it was denied per Resolution dated November 12, 2005. The dispositive portion of the
Total Votes 249 172 Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE in view of the foregoing, the Commission En Banc DENIES

The MCTC invalidated a total of 86 ballots cast in Precinct Nos. 56-A, 57-A, and 58-A, and credited the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merits. The Resolution of the Second
three separate votes cast in these three precincts, resulting in 172 votes cast in Yamat's favor. On the Division promulgated [on] April 11, 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED. The proclamation of
other hand, the MCTC discredited in Balingit's favor one vote cast in Precinct No. 57-A for having been PABLO YAMAT as Punong Barangay of Barangay Nigui, Masantol, Pampanga is
a marked ballot, reducing the latter's number of votes to 249. UPHELD.
Yamat appealed to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). ACCORDINGLY, the Commission EN BANC hereby ORDERS:
On the other hand, Balingit filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal of the MCTC Decision 1. Appellee BARTOLOME BALINGIT to VACATE the contested
which was granted by the COMELEC Second Division in its Order dated January 26, 2005.[2] post which he assumed by virtue of the Order of the Second
Division dated January 26, 2005 granting execution pending
On April 11, 2005, the COMELEC Second Division rendered its Resolution on Yamat's appeal, appeal, in favor of PABLO YAMAT and to CEASE and DESIST
reversing the MCTC Decision. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads: from performing the functions attached to said office.
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Macabebe- 2. The Deputy Executive Director for operations of the
Masantol, Macabebe, Pampanga, in Election Case No. 02(01) declaring appellee Commission to furnish a copy thereof to the Office of the
Bartlome [sic] Balingit the duly elected Punong Barangay of Barangay Nigui, President of the Philippines, the Secretary of the Department of
Masantol, Pampanga, during the 2002 Barangay Elections is hereby REVERSED. Interior and Local Government, and the Office of the Secretary
of the Sangguniang Bayan, Masantol, Pampanga.

Considering the proximity of the end of the term of the contested office in this
case, this resolution is hereby declared immediately executory.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Balingit filed before the Court a Petition for Certiorari on the following grounds:
A. THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK AND EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION, WHEN IT LIMITED AND
FOCUSED ONLY ITSELF FROM CONDUCTING AN ALLEGED EXAMINATION OF
BALLOTS WHICH ARE THE SUBJECT OF COMMISSIONER MEHOL K. SADAIN'S
DISSENTING OPINION, BUT DID NOT EXAMINE THE ENTIRE BALLOTS AND
EVIDENCE SUBJECT OF BALINGIT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
B. THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK AND EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION, WHEN IT MISLED THE PARTIES
TO JUSTIFY THE IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF ITS ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS IN
HOLDING THAT PROXIMITY OF THE END OF TERM OF THE CONTESTED
OFFICE IN THIS CASE WHEN IN TRUTH, THE TERM OF OFFICE OF THE
BARANGAY OFFICIALS ELECTED ON JULY 15, 2002 HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO
LAST MONDAY OF OCTOBER 2007 BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9340, APPROVED
ON 22 SEPTEMBER 2005
C. THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK AND EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT PROMULGATED ITS
ASSAILED 11 APRIL 2005 RESOLUTION WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE STRONG
AND VALID OBJECTIONS OF BALINGIT ON THE CONTESTED BALLOTS, AS
CORRECTLY RULED BY THE TRIAL COURT, THAT THOSE CONTESTED
BALLOTS OF PABLO YAMAT WILL CLEARLY REVEAL THAT MOST, IF NOT ALL
ARE GROUPS OF BALLOTS WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME PERSON (WBO)
AND SINGLE BALLOTS WRITTEN BY TWO PERSONS (WBT).
D. THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OF AND EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT PROMULGATED ITS
ASSAILED 11 APRIL 2005 RESOLUTION IN SWEEPINGLY VALIDATING THE
EIGHTY (80) CONTESTED BALLOTS OF YAMAT, WHICH THE TRIAL COURT
CORRECTLY RULED AS GROUPS OF BALLOTS WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE
SAME PERSON (WBO), WHOSE FINDINGS/RULINGS THEREON DO NOT
CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY EXPRESSED [sic] THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON
WHICH THEY WERE BASED.[6]
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave, as when it is exercised
arbitrarily or despotically by reason of passion or personal hostility. Such abuse must be so patent and
so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law.[7]
In this case, Balingit laments the manner in which the COMELEC, both the Second Division
and En Banc, resolved the issue on the contested ballots, arguing that it committed grave abuse
discretion when it merely limited itself to the six ballots that Commissioner Sadain found to be invalid,
that it did not consider his arguments on the invalidity of all the contested ballots and sweepingly
validated these ballots without setting forth the basis, and that it erroneously justified the immediate
execution of the decision.
A review by the Court of the assailed Resolution dated April 11, 2005 rendered by
the COMELEC's Second Division and Resolution dated November 12, 2005 of the COMELEC En
Banc failed to establish any grave abuse of discretion such that these Resolutions should be set aside.
The appreciation of the contested ballots and election documents involves a question of fact best left to
the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all
over the country, as it is the constitutional commission vested with the exclusive original jurisdiction over
election contests involving regional, provincial and city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction over
election protests involving elective municipal and barangay officials. In the absence of grave abuse
of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law, the factual findings, conclusions, rulings, and
decisions rendered by the said Commission on matters falling within its competence shall not be
interfered with by this Court.[8]
The MCTC originally found a total of 86 ballots cast in favor of Yamat in Precinct Nos. 56-A, 57-A, and
58-A as invalid for having been written by only one person. Both the COMELEC Second Division
and En Banc, however, nullified the MCTC's findings on 80 of these ballots and found them to be valid.
It is fallacious for Balingit to argue that the COMELEC sweepingly validated the contested
ballots and did not take into consideration his objections thereto, and that the COMELEC did not clearly
set out the basis for its findings, as the assailed Resolution dated April 11, 2005 shows
otherwise. The COMELEC's Second Division, in fact, physically examined each set or pair of contested
ballots and accordingly made its corresponding factual findings, viz.:[9]
Precinct Exhibit No. Commissions Finding/Ruling
No.
56A B2, B8, B16 Contrary to the finding of the trial court, these ballots
B39, B40, B41, are valid. The differences in strokes, writing styles,
B44, B45, B50, dents, alignment of letters, colorof ink used and the
B51, B54, B55 point of the pen are glaring.
B56, B57, B58,
B61, B65, B66, We found however Exhibit Nos. B44 and B45as pair of
B67, B68, B69, ballots written by one person. The Minutes of Voting
B70, B72, B74, and Counting does not show that there was a
B75, B80 and physically disabled or illiterate voter assisted during the
B83 voting. We cannot therefore uphold the validity of these
ballots.
B53, B73, B78, Valid ballots
B79 and B81
Strokes are different.
B3, B4, B5, B6 Exhibit Nos. B3, B4 and B6 are valid ballots.
and B7
However, Exhibit Nos. B5 and B7 are two (2) ballots
that could hardly be considered valid.The similarities in
strokes, handwriting, dents, color of the ink and pen
 point, and the spacing of letter are so obvious to the similar.
naked eye.
B159 and B160 Valid ballots
B21 and B22 Valid ballots
We do not see any fluency and rhythm in the
The dents and scratches, the alignment and the handwriting evidently showing that they were
spacing of the letters are different. accomplished by only one person.

The total votes obtained by appellant and appellee based on the rulings discussed
B29 and B30 Valid ballots above are now as follows:

The strokes, terminals and loops of the letters are Appellant Appellee
strikingly different, specifically the way the letters Y, L, Number of Votes Per
D and Z is written. Decision of the Trial Court 172 249

57A B86, B87, B88 Valid ballots Plus: Number of Votes

B91, B113, B114 Validated by the 80 0
B115, B116, B117, Writing styles, strokes and dents of the letters are Commission
B118, B119, B121, strikingly different. Minus: Number of Votes
B122, B128 and Invalidated by the 69 0
B129 Commission
Equals: Total Number of
58A B135, B136, B142, Exhibit Nos. 135 and 136 are invalid ballots for their Votes Obtained from All 252 249
B143, B144, B153, obvious similarities in handwriting, strokes or dents Precincts
B161, B162, B163, and scratches of letters. They are undoubtedly written And, contrary to Balingits allegations in the petition, the COMELEC En Banc conducted its own
B164, B165, B166, by one person. No illiterate or physically disables voter examination of the ballots and did not limit itself only to the six ballots that were validated, subject matter
B167, B168, B182, had been assisted during the voting as manifested by of the dissent of Commissioner Sadain, thus:
B186, B192 and the Minutes of Voting and Counting duly issued by the
B196 members of the Board of Election Tellers. The Commission En Banc could have conveniently upheld the dispositions
of the Division and declared the same as appropriate finding of facts. However,
The rest of the contested ballots are valid. considering that Presiding Commisioner Mehol K. Sadain dissented therefrom and
manifested his different appreciation of the ballots, the Commission En Banc
B137 and B138 Valid ballots. conducted its own examination of the ballots to arrive at a judicious determination.

These ballots were all written in script but the Hereunder are our findings:
dissimilarities in the strokes, loops, connecting and
spurs are evident. Precinct No. 56A

The handwriting of different people may appear to bear The Commission En Banc AFFIRMS the rulings of the Second Division declaring
a marked resemblance to each other, although, on as INVALID only the ballots marked as Exhs. B44 and B45, B5 and B7. The
analysis of the structure of the master patterns can be similarities in the handwritings in these ballots were glaringly similar that there is
shown to be quite distinctive and unlikely to be sufficient reason to believe that these two ballots were prepared by only one person.
confused.
The other ballots alleged as prepared in sets or groups by only one person must be
B139, B140 and Valid ballots considered VALID. The Division correctly cited in the Resolution Silverio v. Castro as
B150 the basis of its rulings. It is therein taught:
See ruling in Exhibit Nos. 137 and 138 above. In order to reach the conclusion that two writings are by the same
hand there must be not only be present class characteristics but
B157 and B158 Valid ballots also individual characteristics or dents and scratches in sufficient
quantity to exclude the theory of accidental coincidence; to reach
The strokes, dents and spacing of letters are not the conclusion that writings are by different hands, we may find
 numerous likenesses in class characteristics but divergences in
individual characteristics, or we may find divergences in both, but
the divergence must be something more than mere superficial
differences.
x x x the rule is simple whatever features two specimen handwriting
may have in common, they cannot be considered to be of common
authorship if they display but a single dissimilarity in any feature
which is fundamental to the structure of the handwriting and whose
presence is not capable of reasonable explanation. (Silverio v.
Castro, 19 SCRA 520)
Putting it simply, where the writings in said ballots were strikingly alike, these ballots
must be ruled to be of single authorship and must be rejected.
The Second Division is right in its observation that the handwritings on the questioned
ballots were glaringly different and no identical characteristics are impressive. Indeed,
it could justifiably be concluded that the cited ballots were each prepared by the
individual voters and not in sets or pairs by only one person.
Whatever perceived similarities in the handwritings were but pictorial effects and
general resemblances which were insufficient to warrant a finding of single
authorship.
Precinct No. 57A
We AFFIRM the Divisions rulings that the ballots questioned as having been written in
sets or pairs by one person are VALID because the strokes, dents, and slants were
distinctly different and it could not be justifiably concluded that only one hand
prepared the ballots.
Precinct No. 58A
We agree with the Division that only the ballots marked as Exh. Nos. B135 and
B136 are INVALID because of the obvious similarities in the strokes, slants and dents
of the handwriting on the ballots.
All the other ballots contested on the allegation that they were written in sets or pairs
by only one person did not show remarkable similarities which could sufficiently
warrant a finding that they were written by only one hand.
By the En Bancs own computation, the total number of votes to be credited
to Appellant are as follows:
PABLO YAMAT
Votes per physical count - - - - - - - - - - - - - 255
Less: Votes Invalidated
By the Division and En Banc - - - - - - - - - - 6
149
Add: Validated Claims +3
252
There being no issue as regards the disposition on the ballots of Balingit, The
Commission En Banc left the findings of the Trial Court and the Second Division
that Bartolome Balingit obtained a total of 249 votes, undisturbed.[10]
Based on its own physical assessment of the contested ballots, the COMELEC En Banc agreed with the
Division's conclusions that the invalidity of Exhibits Nos. B-44, B-45, B-5, B-7, B-135, and B-136 should
be sustained, while the other ballots shall remain valid. [11]
Balingit also appears to be in awe of the MCTC's disquisition on the invalidity of these ballots,
quoting the MCTC's use of the term autoptic proference in maintaining that its rulings on the objections
and claims of the parties is the valid ruling. [12] Autoptic proference, in legal parlance, simply means
a tribunal's self-perception, or autopsy, of the thing itself.[13] The COMELEC may not have used such a
high-sounding term, nevertheless, it does not follow that it did not examine the ballots or that its findings
were flawed.
The Court cannot imagine how Balingit can argue as he did when the foregoing findings clearly show
that all the 86 contested ballots were physically examined by the COMELEC, and the basis for
upholding the validity of 80 of these ballots was sufficiently established. The Court also cannot find any
salient distinction between the MCTC's and the COMELEC's treatment of these ballots such that
the MCTC's findings should outweigh the COMELEC's. Both tribunals physically examined the
contested ballots and made their respective findings thereon. The divergence lies in the physical and
actual appreciation and interpretation of the perceived defects in the ballots, and it need not be stressed
that given that the COMELEC is the specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over
the country,[14] which the framers of the Constitution intended to place on a level higher than statutory
administrative organs, its factual finding is binding on the Court. [15]
Balingit wants the Court to consider in his favor the six ballots that Commissioner Sadain opined to be
invalid and should not be credited to Yamat, thus giving him an edge of three votes, i.e. 249 as
against Yamat's 246, and making him the victor. Suffice it to say that the COMELEC adequately
explained the reason for holding these six ballots as valid, [16] and absent any evidence to the contrary,
the appreciation of these ballots by the COMELEC, acting as a collegial body, should be upheld. [17]
Finally, with regard to Balingit's view that it was misplaced and misleading for the COMELEC En
Banc to justify the immediate execution of its assailed Resolution dated November 12, 2005, with the
proximity of the elections when Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9340 amended R.A. No. 9164 by extending the
term of barangay and sangguniangkabataan until October of 2007; indeed, the Court finds it odd that
the COMELEC should justify the immediate execution of its decision with the proximity of the elections.
The COMELEC, being the specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections, is presumed to
be aware of the passage of R.A. No. 9340. As Balingit correctly pointed out, R.A. No. 9340 extended
the term of barangay and sangguniang kabataan to October 2007, thereby amending R.A. No. 9164,
which initially set the synchronized elections on the last Monday of October three years after the July
15, 2002 elections, i.e., October 2005.
Obviously, the COMELEC cannot refer to the proximity of the October 2005 elections since at the time it
issued its November 12, 2005 Resolution, the elections would have already passed. Neither can the
COMELEC refer to the October 2007 elections because it would not then be proximate (or immediate)
because such elections will take place a little less than two years after the issuance of the November
12, 2005 Resolution.
CELSA P. ACUA, petitioner, vs. DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON, PEDRO PASCUA and
RONNIE TURLA, (Angeles City National Trade School), respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari[1] of the Resolution dated 4 April 2000 and the Order dated 19 June
2000 of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The 4 April 2000 Resolution dismissed for lack of probable
cause the complaint for perjury of petitioner Celsa P. Acua against respondents Pedro Pascua and
Ronnie Turla. The 19 June 2000 Order denied the motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioner Celsa P. Acua (petitioner) is a former teacher of the Angeles City National Trade School
(ACNTS) in Angeles City, Pampanga. Respondent Pedro Pascua (respondent Pascua) was ACNTS
Officer-In-Charge while respondent Ronnie Turla (respondent Turla) was a member of its faculty. [2]
On 13 July 1998, a certain Erlinda Yabut (Yabut), another ACNTS teacher, together with other
school personnel, requested a dialogue with respondent Pascua on some unspecified matter.
Respondent Pascua agreed to the request and the meeting took place on 16 July 1998. Respondent
Turla attended the meeting upon respondent Pascuas directive. Petitioner, whom Yabut apparently
invited, also attended the meeting.
As an offshoot to an incident during the 16 July 1998 meeting, petitioner charged respondent
Pascua with misconduct (OMB-ADM-1-99-0387) and with violation of Article 131[3] of the Revised Penal
Code (OMB 1-99-903) before the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman). [4] In his sworn counter-
affidavit in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387, respondent Pascua alleged, among others, that: (1) OMB-ADM-1-99-
0387 is a rehash and a duplication with a slight deviation of fact of an administrative case pending with
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) which petitioner and Yabut earlier filed
against him and (2) Yabut had no authority to invite to the 16 July 1998 meeting a non-employee of
ACNTS like petitioner considering that he (respondent Pascua) was the one who called the
meeting.[5] Respondent Pascua also submitted a sworn statement of respondent Turla confirming that
respondent Pascua and not Yabut called the 16 July 1998 meeting. [6]
The Ombudsman dismissed OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 and OMB 1-99-0903.
Contending that private respondents perjured themselves in their sworn statements in OMB-ADM-
1-99-0387, petitioner charged private respondents with perjury (OMB 1-99-2467) before the office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon (public respondent). Petitioner alleged that private respondents were
liable for perjury because: (1) the complaint she and Yabut filed against respondent Pascua before the
Civil Service Commission, later endorsed to the DECS, was not the same as her complaint in OMB-
ADM-1-99-0387 and (2) it was Yabut and not respondent Pascua who called the 16 July 1998
meeting.[7]
Private respondents denied the charge against them and sought the dismissal of the complaint.[8]
The Ruling of the Public Respondent
Public respondent dismissed petitioners complaint in his 4 April 2000 Resolution,[9] thus:
Upon careful evaluation of the case record, we find no evidence to indict respondents for perjury.
xxxx
It could not be established by the evidence on record that it was Erlinda Yabut who called the meeting
on July 16, 1998 and invited complainant. Annex B-1 xxx of the complaint is the letter of Erlinda Yabut
to Dr. Pedro Pascua, dated July 13, 1998, which shows that Ms. Yabut was requesting respondent to
have a dialogue (sic). The letter states:
We, the undersigned would like to request your good office to allow us to have a dialogue on Thursday,
July 1[6], to once and for all ventilate our complaints/observations and also listen to the rebuttal of the
other side.
It is the desire of everybody who attended the meeting last time that whatever is the outcome of this
confrontation will be the basis of the next appropriate step.
We would like to request the incoming Administrator or somebody from the DECS to act as moderator.
Pursuant to such circumstance, respondent Pascua stated, among others, in his counter-affidavit in
OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 that:
5. Be that as it may, I vehemently deny the charge that I prevented Complainant Celsa
Acu[]a from testifying against Mrs. Amelia Yambao on July 16, 1998 the truth of the
matter being that there was no hearing or investigation conducted or called by the
undersigned on said date but a dialogue among the teachers of Angeles City National
Trade School which I previously headed. Mrs. Acu[]a at that time was not a teacher to
attend the said dialogue, thus I stated openly on said occasion that I will not start the
meeting if there are outsiders, and Mr. ROGELIO GUTIERREZ asked herein
Complainant to step out of the room so we could start the dialogue, xxx;
6. I also deny the charge that she was invited by Mrs. Erlinda Yabut, co-complainant of hers
in the DECS Administrative case, because I was the one who called for that dialogue and
not Mrs. Yabut, thus I never gave any authority to anyone to invite any person who was
not a member of the school faculty or an employee thereof.
Clearly, the letter of Ms. Yabut and the aforequoted counter-affidavit of respondent Pascua belie the
commission of perjury since there was no deliberate assertion of falsehood on a material matter.
Respondent Ronnie Turla could not likewise be indicted for the crime charged. Since it was respondent
Pascua who called him to that meeting, it would be truthful of him to state that way. There was also no
willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood on the part of respondent Ronnie Turla.[10]
 Petitioner sought reconsideration but public respondent denied her motion in the 19 June 2000
Order.
Hence, petitioner filed this petition. Petitioner contends that public respondent committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing her complaint for lack of probable cause.[11]
Public respondent, in his Comment, maintains that he did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing petitioners complaint in OMB 1-99-2467.[12]
In their Comment, private respondents claim that petitioner filed this petition out of time. Hence,
this petition should be dismissed outright. On the merits, private respondents submit that public
respondent correctly dismissed the perjury charge against them. [13]
In her Reply, petitioner counters that she timely filed her petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 65).[14]
The Issues
The petition raises these issues:
1. Whether petitioner filed the petition on time; and
2. Whether public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
complaint in OMB 1-99-2467 for lack of probable cause.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition, while filed on time, has no merit.
The Petition was Filed on Time
Private respondents contend that petitioner filed this petition beyond the ten-day period provided in
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770.[15] Section 27 states in part:
Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. xxxx
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt
of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
The contention has no merit. Section 27 is no longer in force because this Court in Fabian v.
Desierto[16] declared it unconstitutional for expanding the Courts jurisdiction without its consent in
violation of Article VI, Section 30 of the Constitution. Furthermore, Section 27 relates only to appeals
from rulings of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It does not apply to appeals from
the Ombudsmans rulings in criminal cases such as the present case. [17]
The remedy of an aggrieved party in criminal complaints before the Ombudsman is to file with this
Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Thus, we held in Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario:[18]
The Ombudsman Act specifically deals with the remedy of an aggrieved party from orders, directives
and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. As we ruled in Fabian, the
aggrieved party [in administrative cases] is given the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Such right
of appeal is not granted to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal
cases, like finding probable cause to indict accused persons.
However, an aggrieved party is not without recourse where the finding of the Ombudsman xxx is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack [or] excess of jurisdiction. An aggrieved party may file
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner precisely availed of such remedy when she filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65
alleging that public respondent gravely abused his discretion in dismissing her complaint against private
respondents. Under Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended, petitioner had 60 days from her receipt of the 19
June 2000 Order within which to file this petition. Petitioner received a copy of the 19 June 2000 Order
on 13 July 2000. Thus, petitioner had until 11 September 2000 within which to file this petition.
Petitioner did so on 11 August 2000. Hence, petitioner filed this petition on time.
The Public Respondent did not Gravely Abuse
His Discretion in Dismissing OMB 1-99-2467
We reiterate this Courts policy of non-interference with the Ombudsmans exercise of his
constitutionally mandated prosecutory powers.[19] We explained the reason for such policy in Ocampo,
IV v. Ombudsman:[20]
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of
the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in
much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review
the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file
an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
The Court, in the present case, finds no reason to deviate from this long-standing policy.
Petitioner contends that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing her
complaint for perjury for lack of probable cause. The contention is untenable. Probable cause, as used
in preliminary investigations, is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would
excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that
the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.[21] The elements of perjury
under Article 183[22] of the Revised Penal Code are:
(a) that the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter; (b)
that the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and
administer oath; (c) that in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate
assertion of a falsehood; and, (d) that the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required
by law or made for a legal purpose.[23](Emphasis supplied)
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law. [27] No such
conduct can be imputed on public respondent. Public respondent disposed of petitioners complaint
consistent with applicable law.

Public respondent correctly ruled that the first and third elements are absent here in that private
respondents statements in their counter-affidavits in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 were not material to that
case nor do they constitute willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.
On the Element of Materiality
In prosecutions for perjury, a matter is material if it is the main fact which was the subject of the
inquiry, or any circumstance which tends to prove that fact xxx. [24] To hold private respondents liable,
there must be evidence that their assailed statements in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 were the subject of
inquiry in that case. Petitioner has presented no such evidence. The records are hardly helpful, as
petitioner did not furnish the Court a copy of her complaint in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387.
What is before the Court is a portion of respondent Pascuas counter-affidavit in that case as
quoted by public respondent in his 4 April 2000 Resolution. Admittedly, some inference is possible from
this quoted material, namely, that the basis of petitioners complaint in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 is that
respondent Pascua prevented her from taking part in the 16 July 1998 meeting. However, it would be
improper for the Court to rely on such inference because the element of materiality must be established
by evidence and not left to inference.[25]
At any rate, petitioners complaint for perjury will still not prosper because respondent Pascuas
statement that OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 is significantly the same as petitioners and Yabuts administrative
complaint against respondent Pascua before the DECS is immaterial to the inferred issue.
On the Element of Deliberate Assertion
of Falsehood
The third element of perjury requires that the accused willfully and deliberately assert a falsehood.
Good faith or lack of malice is a valid defense. [26] Here, the Court finds that respondent Pascuas
statement in his counter-affidavit in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 that he called the 16 July 1998 meeting does
not constitute a deliberate assertion of falsehood. While it was Yabut and some unidentified ACNTS
personnel who requested a dialogue with respondent Pascua, it was respondent Pascuas consent to
their request which led to the holding of the meeting. Thus, respondent Pascuas statement in question
is not false much less malicious. It is a good faith interpretation of events leading to the holding of the
meeting.
Regarding respondent Pascuas allegation in his counter-affidavit in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 that
petitioners complaint was a mere rehash and duplication with a slight deviation of fact of the DECS
administrative case petitioner and Yabut filed against respondent Pascua, petitioner has not shown why
this is false. Petitioner again did not furnish the Court a copy of her and Yabuts complaint with the
DECS.
Respondent Turlas statement in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 that respondent Pascua called the 16 July
1998 meeting was a mere reiteration of what respondent Pascua told him. Consequently, it was correct
for public respondent to hold that since respondent Turla merely repeated what he heard from
respondent Pascua, he could not be held liable for making a false and malicious statement.
There is grave abuse of discretion where power is exercised in arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility. The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
BARRAZONA vs. RTC
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing the Order dated June 19, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 61, Baguio City, denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 5238-R, entitled SAN-AN
REALTY and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, herein represented by RODRIGO CHUA TIU, plaintiff,
v. VANGIE BARRAZONA, defendant.
San-an Realty and Development Corporation, respondent, owns a building located at Naguilian
corner Asin Road, Baguio City. Vangie Barrazona, petitioner, has been leasing portions of the building
identified as Units 203 A and B at the second floor. The period of the lease is for two (2) years,
commencing July 15, 2001 and ending June 30, 2003. The monthly rental is P400.00 per square meter
for Unit 203 A and P500.00 per square meter for Unit 203 B.
Starting August 2001, petitioner defaulted in the payment of the monthly rentals and failed to
pay despite demands by respondent. Thus, on May 14, 2002, respondent filed with the RTC, Branch 61,
Baguio City, a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money with Damages, docketed as Civil Case No.
5238-R.
On June 3, 2002, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss on the ground, among
others, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint considering that the allegations therein
clearly indicate that the action is one for ejectment (illegal detainer) which is under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Petitioner pointed out the following allegations in
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint showing that it is not for sum of money but for ejectment:
4. That the defendant has failed to pay the rentals for the said leased premises for the
month of August 2001 up to the present;
5. That the plaintiff has demanded the defendant to pay her overdue account, now
amounting to P971,838.15, the last demand to vacate and payment of arrears
having been made in writing on March 27, 2002 xxx.
In an Order dated June 19, 2002, the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.
Forthwith, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Certiorari alleging that: (1) the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying her Motion to Dismiss;
and (2) the Resolution denying her Motion to Dismiss is unconstitutional as it does not state its legal
basis.
On the other hand, respondent, in praying for the dismissal of the petition, contends that (1) the
complaint is for the collection of unpaid rentals as there is absolutely no allegation that its intent is to
eject petitioner from the premises; (2) petitioner should have first filed a motion for reconsideration
before resorting to the extraordinary suit of certiorari; and (3) the assailed order denying petitioners
motion to dismiss is interlocutory and, therefore, cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari.
We hold that in denying petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint, the RTC acted with grave
abuse of discretion.
Petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction is pursuant to Section 1, Rule
16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing the answer to
the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be
made on any of the following grounds:
xxxxxxxxx
b.) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
claim.
As mentioned earlier, petitioner stated in her motion that respondents allegations in its
complaint show that it is one for ejectment cognizable, not by the RTC but, by the MTC of Baguio City.
In Herrera, et al. v. Bollos, et al.,[1] we emphasized the basic rule that jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint at the time of its
filing, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief
sought are the ones to be consulted.
It bears reiterating paragraph 5 of the complaint, thus:
5. That the plaintiff has demanded the defendant to pay her overdue account, now
amounting to P971,838.15, the last demand to vacate and payment of arrears
having been made in writing on March 27, 2002 xxx.
This allegation clearly shows that respondent made several demands upon petitioner to pay her
overdue rentals and to vacate the premises; and that the last demand to pay and vacate in writing was
on March 27, 2002. Respondent thus complied with Section 2, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. Unless
otherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be commenced only after
demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon
the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the
premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon,
and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or
five (5) days in the case of buildings. (2a)

Indeed, while the complaint is captioned Collection of Sum of Money with Damages, the
allegations therein show that respondents action is for ejectment. All ejectment cases are within the
jurisdiction of the MTC.[2]
motion to dismiss was predicated on the respondent courts lack of jurisdiction to entertain the action;
and the rulings of this Court are that writs of certiorari or prohibition, or both, may issue in case of a
denial or deferment of an action or on the basis of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. [7] Verily,
the writ of certiorari is granted to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent
it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. [8]

Next, petitioner maintains that the Order of the RTC denying her Motion to Dismiss violates the
Constitution as it does not state the facts and the law on which it is based. The challenged Order is
reproduced as follows:
ORDER
Lastly, we cannot go along with respondents contention that petitioner should have first filed a
motion for reconsideration before resorting to the remedy of certiorari. While the rule is that before
certiorari may be availed of, petitioner must first file a motion for reconsideration with the lower court of
the act or order complained of,[9]however, such rule is not without exception. We have, in several
instances, dispensed with the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a lower courts ruling, such as:
where the proceedings in which the error occurred is a patent nullity; [10] where the question is purely of
law; when public interest is involved; where judicial intervention is urgent or its application may cause
great and irreparable damage;[11] and where the court a quo has no jurisdiction,[12] as in this case.

This Court finds that the grounds stated in the Motion to Dismiss to be
without merit, hence, the same is denied.

SO ORDERED.

We have admonished the trial courts not to issue a minute order or resolution like the one
specified above. A trial court should state in its order the reasons for the dismissal of the complaint so
that when the order is appealed, the appellate court can readily determine from a casual perusal thereof
whether there is a prima facie justification for the dismissal.[3]

Under Section 3, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, we require that
resolutions disposing of a motion to dismiss shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor, thus:

Sec. 3. Resolution of motion. After the hearing, the court may dismiss the
action or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.

The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the
ground relied upon is not indubitable.

In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons
therefor.

This requirement proscribes the common practice of perfunctorily dismissing a motion to

dismiss for lack of merit. Such cavalier dispositions can often pose difficulty and misunderstanding on
the part of the aggrieved party in taking recourse therefrom and likewise on the higher court called upon
to resolve the same, usually on certiorari.[4]

While an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and non-appeallable, however, if

the denial is without or in excess of jurisdiction, certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies from such
order of denial.[5] In Time, Inc. v. Reyes,[6] this Court, speaking through Justice J.B. L. Reyes, held: The
GLENN CABALLES y CHUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. EMMANUEL D. LAUREA,
HON. BENJAMIN T. ANTONIO, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by the
petitioner for the nullification of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals [1] which dismissed his petition for
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus for his release from detention despite the pendency of People of
the Philippines v. Glenn Caballes[2] for rape, and its resolution denying his motion for reconsideration
thereof.
The antecedents are as follows:
On November 19, 2001, petitioner Glenn Chua Caballes was charged with rape of a minor in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25756-MN
and raffled to Branch 169, presided by Judge Emmanuel D. Laurea. Because the petitioner was
charged with a non-bailable offense, he was detained.
The petitioner was arraigned on February 7, 2002 and pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
The prosecution presented two (2) witnesses, namely, Venice Vera Pio, the private complainant, and
her mother. The petitioner, through counsel, commenced his cross-examination of Pio, but failed to
complete the same. In January 2003, the petitioner engaged the services of a new counsel, Atty. Noel
S. Sorreda, who entered his appearance as defense counsel. [3]
During the trial of February 26, 2003, the petitioner continued his cross-examination of Pio but still failed
to terminate the same. The trial was set on March 6, 2003 for the petitioner to terminate his cross-
examination of Pio. However, due to the illness of the private prosecutor, the trial on the said date did
not proceed. The trial was further reset to March 17, 2003 during which the petitioner continued with his
cross-examination of the private complainant. Thereafter, the continuation of trial was set on April 3, 21,
and 30, 2003. On April 3, 2003, the petitioner concluded his cross-examination of Pio. The prosecution
declared that its next witness would be Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez, the Medico-Legal Officer of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, who had conducted a medico-legal examination of
the private complainant, but stated that he had not been subpoenad. The prosecution prayed for the
cancellation of the trial scheduled on April 21, 2003 to give the prosecution time to secure and cause
the service of a subpoena duces tecum on him. The petitioner conformed to the motion of the
prosecution.
On April 28, 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for bail. [4]
The trial of April 30, 2003 did not proceed because the petitioners counsel filed a
Manifestation[5] that his presence was required in an execution sale in Cavite. The said counsel
manifested that he reserved his right to cross-examine any witness the prosecution would present in
case trial would proceed on that date; on the other hand, in the event that the trial court would cancel
the trial, he would be available in May 2003 and during the first half of June 2003.
The trial court reset the hearing of the case to 8:30 a.m. of June 19, 2003 and gave the
prosecution ten (10) days to file its opposition[6] to the petitioners petition for bail. It likewise ordered the
issuance of a subpoena to Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez to require him to attend the trial on the said date.
On May 5, 2003, the petitioner filed a motion[7] seeking an earlier trial date, invoking his right to
speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act of 1998. He also filed a motion for the urgent resolution of his
petition for bail.[8]
On May 12, 2003, the petitioner filed another motion[9] praying that the hearing scheduled on June
19, 2003 be moved to an earlier date, preferably on May 26, 28 or 29, 2003. In the meantime, the
prosecution filed its comment/opposition[10] to the petitioners petition for bail.
On May 13, 2003, the court issued an Order[11] declaring that the petition for bail was submitted for
its resolution and denying the petitioners motion for an earlier trial date. On June 16, 2003, the trial court
issued its Order[12] denying the petition for bail, on its finding that the evidence of guilt against the
petitioner was strong.
During the trial of June 19, 2003, Dr. Marquez failed to appear before the court because, in the
meantime, he had been assigned to the Eastern Police District and failed to receive
the subpoena issued to him by the court. The prosecution prayed for continuance, but the petitioner
objected and invoked his right to speedy trial. The court, nevertheless, granted the motion and reset the
trial to July 17, 2003.
On June 27, 2003, the court issued a subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum to Dr. Jose Arnel
Marquez requiring him to appear for the trial set on July 17, 2003.[13]
On July 4, 2003, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the courts Order dated June
16, 2003 denying his petition for bail. His motion was set for hearing, also on July 17, 2003. However,
the petitioner preempted the resolution of his motion for reconsideration and filed a Motion to
Dismiss[14] the case on July 11, 2003 on the ground that his right to speedy trial had been violated. He
made the following allegations:
1. The hearings in the instant case have more often than not been scheduled more than one month
apart;
2. In the hearing on April 30, 2003, in particular, the day before undersigned counsel had filed a
Manifestation stating inter alia that his available dates for the next hearing may be any Monday,
Wednesday or Thursday for the whole of May 2003 and the first half of June 2003, except on May 14
and 21 yet Atty. Manalaysay asked for the next hearing on June 19 which is already outside or beyond
the dates mentioned in the manifestation, and which was more than 1-1/2 months away, but which the
Honorable Court nonetheless granted;
3. Atty. Manalaysay has never been able to present any good cause as to how come he was not able to
present Dr. Marquez on April 30, 2003, and then again on June 19, 2003; and as aforesaid, his absence
on March 6, 2003 has not been supported by any medical certificate;
4. The first hearing in the instant case was held on June 13, 2002, thus it has now been more than one
year, or close to 400 days ago since trial started; neither has there been any authorization from the
Supreme Court that the trial period may exceed 180 days;
5. There has been no statement by the Honorable Court in any of its orders granting continuance that
the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused
in a speedy trial;
6. As above stated, it appears that the prosecution made a false statement before the Honorable Court
in claiming they had asked Dr. Marquez to testify in the June 19, 2003 hearing, when in fact they had
not.[15]
 Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez had apparently still not received the subpoena issued by the trial court,
because of which the prosecution again failed to present him as a witness during the trial of July 17,
2003. The prosecution prayed for continuance, to which the petitioner vigorously objected. The court,
however, granted the motion and reset the trial to August 11, 2003.[16]
On July 24, 2003, Judge Laurea issued an Order[17] inhibiting himself from hearing the case to
avoid being misunderstood, to preserve his reputation for probity and objectivity and to live up to the
ideal impartial administration of justice. The case was re-raffled to Branch 170, presided by Judge
Benjamin T. Antonio, who calendared the case for trial on September 8, 2003. Nevertheless, on August
11, 2003, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration [18] of Judge Laureas Order dated July 24,
2003, which the latter denied, on the finding that no cogent reason was presented to reconsider the
same.[19]
During the hearing on September 8, 2003, Judge Antonio granted the private prosecutors motion
to be given five (5) days within which to oppose the petitioners motion to dismiss. Judge Antonio also
set the trial on September 18, 2003.[20] On the latter date, the trial court issued an Omnibus
Order[21] denying the petitioners motion to dismiss. The trial court reasoned that there was no violation
of the petitioners right to speedy trial, considering that the apparent delays could not be attributed to the
fault of the prosecution alone. The trial court noted that the petitioner also sought Postponements of the
trials.
Anent the motion for reconsideration of the courts Order dated June 16, 2003 which denied the
petition for bail, the trial court considered the same as having been abandoned by the petitioner upon
the filing of his motion to dismiss the case without waiting for the resolution of his motion for
reconsideration on his petition for bail.
The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Habeas
Corpus and/or Certiorari and Prohibition.[22]On October 2, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution requiring
the petitioner to inform the court of his choice of remedy within five (5) days from notice thereof. In
compliance therewith, the petitioner filed a manifestation with the appellate court that he had chosen his
petition to be treated as a petition for habeas corpus without prejudice to the concomitant application of
certiorari if the court considered the same necessary or appropriate to give effect to the writ of habeas
corpus.
The petitioner averred that (a) he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial and his constitutional
right to a speedy disposition of the case; (b) Judge Laurea erred in inhibiting himself from the case; (c)
the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion in denying his petition for bail; and (d) Judge
Antonio had prejudged the case against him.
On December 9, 2003, the CA issued its assailed Resolution dismissing the petition, viz:
WHEREFORE, for being the wrong or improper remedy, the PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[23]
According to the appellate court, while the petitioner manifested his preference that his petition be
treated as a petition for habeas corpus, the same was not the proper remedy to review and examine the
proceedings before the trial court and as a relief from the petitioners perceived oppressive situation in
the trial court. The CA further emphasized that a writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error; that it could
not exercise its certiorari jurisdiction over the acts or omission of the respondent judge as a concomitant
remedy; and that the remedy for habeas corpus and certiorari are different in nature, scope and
purpose. The appellate court declared that the petitioner failed to present any evidence to prove that
there was any intentional or deliberate delay caused to prejudice him; nor was there any malice in the
failure of the prosecution to promptly serve the subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum to its
witnesses. The court also noted that the resetting of petitioners case may also be attributed to the
voluminous work of the RTC involved.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision contending that (a) the
congestion of the trial courts calendar is not a valid ground for continuance of the trial; (b) the trial court
failed to secure an extension of time of the trial period from the Supreme Court; (c) the trial court should
have given a precedence to the case, the charge therein being a heinous crime; (d) his petition for a writ
of habeas corpus was proper because his continued detention had become illegal, following the
prosecutor and the trial courts violation of his right to a speedy trial, and the trial courts denial of his
motion to dismiss the case and his petition for bail which was tainted with grave abuse of discretion; and
(e) a writ of habeas corpus may be issued with the writ of certiorari for the purpose of review. However,
the CA denied the petitioners motion for lack of merit.
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
reiterating the grounds contained in his motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. The petitioner
averred that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in rendering its resolution, as well as the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration
thereof.
In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the trial courts order denying his petition for bail,
motion to dismiss the case, and Judge Laureas order of inhibition. The OSG posits that the petitioner
was not deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case as well as under the
Speedy Trial Act.
The issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether or not the decision of the CA is already
final and executory; (b) whether the proper remedy from the appellate courts denial of a petitioner for a
writ if habeas corpus is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and (c) if in the
affirmative, whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the issuance of the writ.
On the first issue, we find and so rule that the petitioners recourse to this Court via a petition for
certiorari from the decision of the CA dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus is inappropriate.
Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that the period for appeal from the judgment of any
court in habeas corpus cases shall be forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment appealed from.
While the said provision was not incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court approved
Administrative Matter No. 01-1-03-SC amending Section 3, Rule 41of the said Rules, which took effect
on July 15, 2001, thus:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal; appeal in habeas corpus cases.The appeal shall be taken within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from
notice of the judgment or final order. However, an appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be taken within
forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion
for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
Following the rule, the petitioner should have appealed to this Court from the CA decision denying
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as well as the denial of his motion for reconsideration thereof;
instead, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The
well-settled rule is that certiorari is not available where the aggrieved partys remedy of appeal is plain,
speedy and adequate in the ordinary course, the reason being that certiorari cannot co-exist with an
appeal or any other adequate remedy. The existence and availability of the right to appeal are
antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for certiorari. These two remedies are mutually
exclusive.[24] An appeal in this case would still have been a speedy and adequate remedy.
Consequently, when the petitioner filed his petition in this Court, the decision of the CA was already final
and executory.
It bears stressing that a decision in a habeas corpus action stands in no different position than with
any other proceeding and if the appealed decision is to be reviewed by an appellate court, the remedy is
by writ of error because the error committed by the court is an error of judgment and not an error of
jurisdiction.[25]
Besides, as correctly held by the CA, a writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assail
the trial courts denial of the petitioners motion to dismiss the case, the denial of the petition for bail, as
well as the voluntary inhibition of Judge Laurea.
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule
102 of the Rules of Court, as amended. In Ex Parte Billings,[26] it was held that habeas corpus is that of
a civil proceeding in character. It seeks the enforcement of civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to
inquire into the criminal act of which the complaint is made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding
the act and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. The rule applies even
when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and secure freedom. When a prisoner petitions for a writ
of habeas corpus, he thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a case in that court. [27]
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial courts
function.[28] It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to
investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits.
The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the proceedings and
the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. [29] The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law
provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances.
Moreover,habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial.[30] The orderly course of trial must be
pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional
circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot be issued as a writ of
error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving the questions of jurisdiction
occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional safeguards of human life
and liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed. [31] It has also been held that where restraint is under
legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which do not render the proceedings void, are not grounds
for relief by habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal.[32]
Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when instituted for
the sole purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause of
his detention may be inquired into and his statements final.[33] The writ of habeas corpus does not act
upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be the
unlawful authority.[34] Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the
person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to be resolved is whether the custodian
has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. [35] The writ may be denied if the petitioner fails to
show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias.[36]
A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a palladium of liberty is a prerogative writ which
does not issue as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It, is, however, a writ
of right on proper formalities being made by proof. [37] Resort to the writ is to inquire into the criminal act
of which a complaint is made but unto the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act, and the immediate
purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. [38] The primary, if not the only object of the writ
of habeas corpus ad subjuciendum is to determine the legality of the restraint under which a person is
held.[39]
Our review of the petitioners material averments in his petition before the CA reveals that it was a
petition for habeas corpus or, in the alternative, a petition for a writ of certiorari The petitioner assailed
therein the orders of the trial court denying his petition for bail and his motion to dismiss on the ground
that he was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case against him, and questioned Judge
Laureas order of inhibition. We agree with the CA that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus cannot be
joined with the special civil action for certiorari because the two remedies are governed by a different
set of rules. Rule 2, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court mandates that the joinder of causes of action
shall not include special actions or actions governed by special rules, thus proscribing the joinder of a
special proceeding with a special civil action.
We also agree with the ruling of the CA that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a remedy
different from the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The
writ of habeas corpus is a collateral attack on the processes, orders, or judgment of the trial court, while
certiorari is a direct attack of said processes, orders, or judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches only
jurisdictional errors. It has no other use, except to bring before the court a record material to be
considered in exercising jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches the record. On the other hand, a writ
of habeas corpus reaches the body but not the record; it also reaches jurisdictional matters but does not
reach the record. However, when jurisdiction is obtained by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, to
bring the body of the person whose liberty is involved into court, and if it is necessary, to provide the
record upon which the detention is based, that may be accomplished by using a writ of certiorari as an
ancillary proceeding, i.e., it is subordinate to or in aid of the primary action for the purpose of
impeaching the record. When a writ of certiorari is issued as the foundation of jurisdiction to bring it and
direct upon the validity of a judicial determination by any body or officer, jurisdictional questions only are
reached, and such questions pertaining to the detention made by the officer or body particularly
complained of.[40]
The petitioner manifested to the appellate court that his petition should be treated as a petition
for habeas corpus. Even then, the CA rightly dismissed the petition because the petitioner failed to
establish his right to the writ. The records show that the petitioner was charged with rape punishable
by reclusion perpetua and was detained based on the said charge; hence, if the evidence of his guilt is
strong, he shall not be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. [41] There is no
question that the trial court had jurisdiction over the offense charged and over the person of the
petitioner. The jail warden has the authority and, in fact, is mandated to detain the petitioner until
granted bail by the court, or the case against him dismissed, or until he is acquitted after trial. The
petitioner failed to establish that his incarceration pendente lite was illegal, and likewise failed to
establish exceptional circumstances warranting the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by the appellate
court.
In Galvez v. Court of Appeals,[42] the Court ruled that a petition for habeas corpus is not the proper
remedy to assail the denial thereof:
The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for
petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per
se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the
trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first
applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.[43]
 The remedy of the petitioner from the Order of the trial court denying his petition for bail was to file
a petition for certiorari in the CA if the trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the said order. [44] If the petitioner had done so, his petition would
have been granted because as gleaned from the assailed order of the trial court, it failed to summarize
the testimonies of the private complainant and that of her mother. Hence, such order is invalid. [45] The
trial court would have had to issue another order containing the summary of the testimonies of the
private complainant and her mother, including its findings and conclusions. However, the petitioner
would still not be entitled to be released from detention in the meantime.
It bears stressing that under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 [46] of the Rules of Court,
the voluntary inhibition of a Judge is addressed to his sound discretion for just or valid reasons, the
primary consideration being that the peoples faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. [47] The
petitioner should have thus filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition in the CA, instead of a petition
for habeas corpus.
In cases where the right of the accused to a speedy trial is violated by the prosecution, the remedy
lies in the procedure provided for under Republic Act No. 8493, as implemented by Rule 119 of the
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 8 of the said Rule provides:
SEC. 8. Sanctions. In any case in which private counsel for the accused, the public attorney, or the
prosecutor:
(a) Knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing that a necessary witness would be
unavailable for trial;
(b) Files a motion solely for delay which he knows is totally frivolous and without merit;
(c) Makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which he knows to be false and which is
material to the granting of a continuance; or
(d) Willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the provisions hereof, the court
may punish such counsel, attorney, or prosecutor, as follows:
(1) By imposing on a counsel privately retained in connection with the defense of an accused, a fine not
exceeding twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00);
(2) By imposing on any appointed counsel de oficio, public attorney, or prosecutor a fine not exceeding
five thousand pesos (P5,000.00); and
(3) By denying any defense counsel or prosecutor the right to practice before the court trying the case
for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days. The punishment provided for by this section shall be without
prejudice to any appropriate criminal action or other sanction authorized under these Rules.
If the trial court acted with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of lack of jurisdiction
in granting the prosecutions motion for the resetting of the trial over the petitioners objections, the more
appropriate remedy would have been to file a petition for certiorari and/or a petition for mandamus to
compel the trial court to comply with the timeline provided for by the said Rule for trial and termination of
the case.
It was inappropriate for the petitioner to file a petition for habeas corpus assailing the trial courts
order denying his motion to dismiss the case for failure to comply with the timeline provided for by the
said Rules. Reading and evaluating the assailed Order of the trial court dated September 18, 2000, it
cannot be gainsaid that the court violated the right of the petitioner to speedy trial. Thus:
The instant motion is anchored on the alleged violation of and/or to enforce the right of the accused to
speedy trial. In invoking such right, the accused contends that the failure of the prosecution to present
the medico-legal officer who examined the victim on two (2) occasions, and the non-appearance of the
private prosecutor on one occasion caused undue delay in the proceedings of this case.
The prosecution vigorously opposed the Motion to Dismiss and claimed that since the prosecution has
not yet rested its case, the Court may not be able to appreciate the merits of the instant motion in the
light of the unfinished presentation of evidence for the prosecution and that the grounds relied by the
defense do not touch on the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, but rather on the alleged delay and failure to present Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez
of the PNP Crime Laboratory.
After due consideration, the Court finds the instant motion untenable. The alleged delay and failure to
present the medico-legal officer cannot be attributed to the fault of the prosecution and/or the Court. The
prosecution and the Court cannot encroach on the right of the medico-legal officer to appear inasmuch
as his schedule conflicted with the hearings set for his appearance. Moreover, delays assailed by
defense counsel that violated accused right to speedy trial are not all at the instance of the prosecution.
In fact, the defense, contributed to the delay since the former defense counsel and even the present
defense counsel sought postponements of the hearings.
Be that as it may, despite the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer, the Court (Branch 169)
proceeded in resolving the Petition for Bail of the accused (albeit unfavorable to the cause of the
accused) on the basis of the sole testimony of the complainant, which is backed up by several
jurisprudence to this effect. The defense, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said denial after he has
filed a Motion to Dismiss. The filing of these pleadings adds to the delay until the Presiding Judge who
denied the Petition for Bail voluntarily inhibited himself from this case. Then when the Motion to Dismiss
was set for hearing, the Court, in an attempt to expedite the proceedings, suggested for the parties to
stipulate on the medical findings of the medico-legal officer so as to dispense with his presentation.
Defense counsel, however, would not want to enter into such a stipulation. Hence, another delay. [48]
We agree with the petitioner that a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus may be filed
if one is deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case under Article IV, Section 16 of the 1987
Constitution and of his right to due process.[49] However, the petitioner never invoked in the trial court
his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case against him. What he invoked was his right to
a speedy trial under Rule 119 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. He invoked his constitutional
right to a speedy disposition of the case against him, for the first time, only in the Court of Appeals when
he filed his petition for habeas corpus.
Even then, the petitioner failed to establish his claim that he was deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case. In Marilyn Corpuz, et al., v. Sandiganbayan,[50] the Court had the occasion to
state
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was
designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him
for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to
proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy
disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not
susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must
necessarily be a flexible concept.
While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere
speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be
swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to
the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the
rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence,
courts are to give meaning to that intent.
The Court emphasized in the same case that:
complainant by the year 2002. The Court cannot determine the reason for the delay because the
records of the RTC are not before it. Neither of the parties made any explanation for the delay; nor is
there any showing that the counsel of the petitioner complained about the delay. Aside from the
petitioners claim that the private prosecutor failed to give good cause for his failure to present Dr. Jose
Arnel Marquez during the trial dates April 30, 2003 and June 19, 2003, as well as to substantiate his
absence during the trial of March 6, 2003 with a medical certificate, the petitioner failed to support his
claim in his pleadings before the CA and in this Court. On the other hand, the counsel of the petitioner
was absent during the trial on April 30, 2003 because he had to attend an execution sale in Cavite. The
petitioners counsel gave priority to the execution sale and asked for a resetting despite the fact that his
client, the petitioner, was detained for a quasi-heinous crime. While it is true that the trial was reset to
June 19, 2003, or more than one month from April 30, 2003, the petitioners counsel himself manifested
that he was available for trial during the first half of June 2003. There was a difference of only four (4)
days from the trial date set by the court and the available dates suggested by the petitioners counsel. It
bears stressing that trial dates cannot be set solely at the convenience of the petitioners counsel. The
trial dates available in the calendar of the court and of the prosecutor must also be taken into account.

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the Hence, it cannot be said that the petitioner was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the
court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. case simply because the private prosecutor failed to submit a medical certificate for his absence during
the trial of March 6, 2003. The petitioner could have asked the court to cite the private prosecutor in
contempt of court for his failure to submit the said certificate; he failed to do so. Moreover, the petitioner
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case failed to establish any serious prejudice by the delay of the trial, and that the State deliberately delayed
and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; the trial to prejudice him.
(c) the defendants assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice should be
assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect,
namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused
to trial; and to limit the Possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last,
because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire
system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the
distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on
his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources
may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.

Delay is a two-edged sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case beyond
reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the government to carry
its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require impossibilities or extraordinary efforts,
diligence or exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall deprive the
State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v. United States, for
the government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two things: (a) that
the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable
delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of
justice.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay. Different
weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State. For instance, a
deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper or prejudice the defense should be weighted
heavily against the State. Also, it is improper for the prosecutor to intentionally delay to gain some
tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass or prejudice him. On the other hand, the heavy case
load of the prosecution or a missing witness should be weighted less heavily against the State.

In this case, the petitioner was arraigned on February 7, 2002. In the meantime, he was able to
present only two witnesses. The petitioner failed to terminate the cross-examination of the private
G.R. No. 85466 October 16, 1992 THIRTY ONE THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY TWO & 69/100
HUALAM CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. and TAN BEE GIOK, petitioners, PESOS (P31,122.69) March 22, 1984
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., respondents. THIRTY TWO THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED TWENTY SIX & 11/100
PESOS (P32,326.11) April 22, 1984

DAVIDE, JR., J.: THIRTY TWO THOUSAND THREE

HUNDRED TWENTY SIX & 11/100
PESOS (P32,326.11) May 22, 1984
Petitioners assail the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 5 August 1988 in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
13060 1 reversing the 7 August 1987 Decision of Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
in Civil Case No. 87-39946 and reinstating the 27 October 1986 Decision of Brach 27 of the THIRTY TWO THOUSAND THREE
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila in an ejectment case, Civil Case NO. 11274. The decision of HUNDRED TWENTY SIX & 11/100
the RTC declared as null and void the orders of the MTC granting the motion for execution of judgment PESOS (P32,326.11) June 22, 1984
for failure to file a supersedeas bond and directing the ejectment of the petitioners, and set aside the
sheriff's execution sale. c) MONTHLY AMORTIZATION — ELEVEN THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED NINETY & 46/100 (P11,590.46) pesos.
The challenged decision of the respondent Court discloses the following antecedent facts which gave
rise to the instant controversy: FIRST MONTHLY installment payable on or before July 22, 1984 and every 22nd day
of each month thereafter for sixty (60) installments.
Private respondent is the owner of State Centre Building located at 333 Juan Luna Street, Binondo,
Manila; the building is divided into several office condominium units offered for sale or lease to the All payments made in accordance herewith shall be applied first to payment (sic) of
general public. reimbursement of real estate taxes and other charges due including airconditioning
costs hereunder; second, to interests accrued to the date of payment; and third, to the
Pursuant to a Contract to Sell executed on 22 September 1983 between the private respondent as amortization of the principal obligation herein.
Vendor, and petitioner Hualam Construction and Development Corporation 2 as Vendee, the latter
occupied unit No. 1505 of said State Centre Building. The pertinent provisions of this contract read: xxx xxx xxx

3. PRICE AND TERMS OF PAYMENT — The purchase price of the unit(s) shall be
Pesos: SIX HUNDRED TWENTY TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY THREE
PESOS &71/100 (P622,653.71), Philippine currency, payable in the following manner:
a) FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTEEN (P5,218.00)
PHIL. CURRENCY, per month for Six (6) successive month (sic)
from the signing of this contract, payable on or before 9.22.83; on
or before 10.22.83; on or before 11.22.83; on or before 12.22.83;
on or before 1.22.84; on or before 2.22.84; which amount represent
(sic) the rental and aircon cost for the corresponding months over
the unit.
b) Downpayment of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED ELEVEN & 02/100 (P128, 111.02)
PESOS payable as follows:
AMOUNT IN WORDS/FIGURES PAYABLE ON
OR BEFORE
12. CANCELLATION OF THIS AGREEMENT — Should the VENDEE fail or refuse to
make the payment of any of the monthly installments together with the interest
thereon as agreed herein on ground other than those provided in Section 23 of P.D.
957, or of all the corresponding proportionate obligations or dues for taxes and
assessments levied on the land and the building herein involved during the term of
this contract within thirty (30) days from its due date, this Contract shall, by the mere
fact of nonpayment expire by itself and become null and void without necessity of
notice to the VENDEE of any judicial declaration to the (sic) effect and/any and all
sums of money paid under this contract shall be forfeited in favor of the VENDOR as
liquidated damages or if the VENDEE is already in possession of the property; the
amount forfeited together with all improvements, if there are any, made on the
premises shall become rentals on the property, and in (sic) this effect, the VENDEE,
should he be in possession of the Unit(s) herein purchased, shall become a mere
intruder or unlawful detainer of the same and may be ejected therefrom by the means
provided by law for trespassers or unlawful detainers. Immediately after the expiration
of the 30-day period provided for in this section, the VENDOR, shall be at liberty to
dispose of and sell said Unit(s) and its appurtenances to any interested third person.
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
For petitioners' failure and refusal to pay, despite repeated demands, the accumulated downpayment,
installments, utility charges and other assessments mentioned in the Contract to Sell — such as those
for airconditioning service, electrical consumption, rentals on telephone lines and use of the parking lot,
together with the association dues, the proportionate share in real estate taxes and other charges —
private respondent filed on 8 July 1985 a complaint for ejectment against the petitioners with the MTC of
Manila. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 111274 and was raffled off to Branch 27 of said court.
On 25 July 1985, petitioners filed their Answer with Special Defenses. They subsequently filed a motion
to dismiss which was denied by the court. Thereupon the court calendared the case for pre-trial
conference on 7 August 1986. This setting was postponed to 11 September 1986; the parties were
given due notice thereof.
On 11 September 1986, however, petitioners and their counsel failed to appear. Upon motion of the
private respondent, the MTC declared the petitioners as in default and allowed the private respondent to
present its evidence ex-parte.
On 27 October 1986, the MTC rendered a decision in favor of the private respondent, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the
defendants, ordering the latter or any person claiming rights under them to vacate the
premises of Unit 1505 State Centre Building, 333, Juan Luna, Binondo, Manila; to pay
plaintiff the sum of P161,478.61 representing unpaid down payment, installments and
other charges and such other amount as may become due from defendants by
reason of their continued possession of the premises, which amount will be paid
jointly and severally by defendants, the further sum of P5,000.00 as and for attorney's
fees and to pay the costs. 3
On 19 January 1987, petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal before the MTC.
Thereafter, private petitioner filed on 9 January 1987 a Motion for Immediate Execution of the decision
based on Section 8, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court.
On 27 January 1987, the MTC issued an order granting the private petitioner's Motion for Immediate
Execution.
On 29 January 1987, respondents, as defendants therein, filed a motion to reconsider the said order,
alleging, inter alia, that (1) it is not necessary for them to post a supersedeas bond under Section 8 of
Rule 70 because the case does not involve unpaid rents, but unpaid downpayment, installments and
other charges, and that the perfection of their appeal automatically stays the execution of judgment; (2)
the complaint, although captioned as on "For Ejectment", is in reality one for a sum of money as alleged
therein and as found by the said court; (3) the case being for a sum of money which exceeds
P20,000.00, said court has no jurisdiction to try the same; and (4) no writ of execution having yet been
issued, justice demands that the issuance thereof be held in abeyance until after the outcome of such
motion and the pending appeal shall have become known. They then prayed that the order of execution
be set aside and the appeal be given due course. Private respondent filed an opposition thereto.
On 9 March 1987, the MTC denied the motion and directed the issuance of a writ of execution; the writ
of execution was issued on 11 March 1987.
On 16 March 1987, the pursuant to the writ of execution, Deputy Sheriff Justiniano dela Cruz of Branch
27 of the MTC restored the possession of said Unit No. 1505 to the private respondent and
simultaneously levied upon the personal properties of the petitioners found in the premises to satisfy the
money judgment decreed in the decision. Accordingly, he issued a Notice of Levy and Sale on
Execution of Personal Properties which set the public auction sale for 26 March 1987 at 10: A.M.
On 23 March 1987, petitioners filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari with injunction against
the Hon. Jose R. Bueno, presiding Judge of Branch 27 of the MTC of Manila, the Sheriff and the private
respondent. The same was docketed as Civil Case No. 87-39946 and was raffled off to Branch 49. The
petitioners sought the issuance of an order enjoining the respondents therein from enforcing the writ of
execution issued in Civil Case No. 111274. For such purpose, they asked that a preliminary injunction
be issued and, after hearing, for judgment to be rendered declaring such injunction permanent and
ordering the respondents to restore to the petitioners the possession of the properties levied upon as
well as of the premises in question.
At 10:00 o'clock in the morning of 26 March 1987, Sheriff de la Cruz, Jr. proceeded with the public
auction sale of the levied properties. Private respondent was the sole bidder with a bid of P30,145.00; a
Certificate of Sale was therefore issued to it on that date. On the same day, however, the RTC issued a
restraining order enjoining the respondents in said Civil Case No. 87-339946 from enforcing the Writ of
Execution earlier issued by the MTC together with the Notice of Levy and Sale on Execution of Personal
Properties. however, this order, to which a copy of the petition for certiorari was attached, was received
by the Sheriff only at 1:35 o'clock in the afternoon; the private respondent itself received notice thereof
ten (10) minutes later. Clearly then, notice was received by both after the termination of the public
auction sale.
On 15 April 1987, private respondent filed its Answer in Civil Case No. 87-39846.
On 27 August 1987, the RTC rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 87-39946, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered granting the Petition at bar, and
declaring null and void the Orders, Annexes "F" and "J" and Ejectment Execution
(sic), Annex "K", all of the Petition, issued by the Respondent Judge, (of the MTC)
and the levy on Petitioners' personal properties, the sale thereof at public auction and
the Certificate thereof at public auction and the Certificate of Sale, Annex "B" of the
Supplemental Complaint, all executed by the Respondent Deputy Sheriff.
Accordingly, the Respondents Deputy Sheriff and Private Respondent State
Investment House, Inc. are hereby ordered to return to the Petitioners the personal
properties sold at public auction to the Private Respondent and to restore the
Petitioner corporation to the possession of the aforementioned condominium unit; and
to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 4
In finding for the petitioners, the RTC ruled that since the MTC did not, in its decision, fix the rentals due
up to the rendition of the judgment subject of the petition, it was necessary for the petitioners to file a
supersedeas bond to stay the execution of judgment. The purpose of a supersedeas bond under
Section 8 of Rule 70 is to assure the plaintiff that the rents, damages and costs accruing "down to the
time of the judgment appealed from" will be paid in case said plaintiff eventually prevails. Hence, the
amount of the bond will depend upon the amount of rental or damages fixed in the decision. The
decision of the MTC fixed neither the rentals nor the damages. The adjudged amount of P161,478.61
constitutes the totality of the unpaid installments on the downpayment of the purchase price of the
condominium unit, as well as the following charges: parking fees, electric bills, real estate taxes,
telephone charges, association dues and charges for the use of the airconditioning unit. It does not,
however, include back rentals or the reasonable value for the use of the condominium unit. Moreover, it
rejected the claim of private respondent that the award could fall under the concept of damages
provided for in Section 8 of the aforesaid Rule 70 because the damages contemplated for the use and
occupation of the premises, generally measured by the fair rental value of the property, and does not
include other kinds of damages such as unpaid downpayments, association charges, costs of electricity
and airconditioning, real estate taxes, parking dues and the like.
Its motion to reconsider said decision having been denied in the Order of 7 October 1987, private
respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, which was docketed as C.A.-G.R. No.
13060, on 2 November 1987. It alleged therein that the RTC committed the following errors:
a) In holding that herein petitioners were not obliged to file with the MTC any
supersedeas bond to stay execution of said court;
b) In giving due course to, and granting the Petition for Certiorari notwithstanding that
appeal is the proper remedy available to them;
c) In holding and declaring the orders of the MTC of 27 January 1987 granting the
immediate execution of the decision of 9 March 1987 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration, and of 11 March 1987 granting the so-called ejectment execution as
having been issued whimsically, capriciously and without legal basis; and
d) In holding and declaring as null and void the aforesaid orders and Ejectment
Execution, and in ordering the return to the petitioners therein of the personal
properties sold at public auction and to restore them to the possession of the
condominium unit. 5
An Answer to said petition was filed in due course by herein petitioners; consequently, the Court of
Appeals rendered the challenged decision on 5 August 1988, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition meritorious the same is granted and the
decision on respondent court under review dated August 7, 1987 together with all
subsequent orders issued thereunder is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Another one is hereby entered REINSTATING the decision dated October 17, 1986 of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, in Civil Case No. 111274CV,
together with all subsequent orders issued thereunder. This decision, however, is
without prejudice to private respondents, if they so desire, prosecuting their appeal in
the appropriate Regional Trial Court below. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED. 6
In ruling for the herein private respondent, the respondent Court, after noting the special nature of
transactions involving condominium units — where the so-called periodic rental payments for the
occupation thereof constitute partial consideration for the eventual vesting of ownership of the unit in the
occupant-vendee — held that the amount of P161,478.61, which the petitioners were supposed to pay
by virtue of the MTC order, represents more than just back rentals or the reasonable value for the use
and occupation of the condominium unit; thus, the filing of a supersedeas bond for at least an equal
amount in order to stay the immediate execution of judgment, pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 70, was
necessary. Citing Arcilla vs. Del Rosario, 7 it held that the filing of the bond to stay execution is
mandatory. It further declared that the petitioners remedy is not a petition for certiorari but an ordinary
appeal, and since they had already filed a notice of appeal, they should have prosecuted it. Also, a
petition for certiorari may not be availed of as substitute for appeal. 8 Moreover, the execution of
judgment was a fait accompli. Accordingly, the remedy of restoration may be obtained under Section 5
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Their motion for the reconsideration of the foregoing decision having been denied by the respondent
Court in its Resolution of 17 October 1988, the petitioners filed the instant petition under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. They contend that the respondent Court erred:
I
. . . IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS WERE OBLIGED TO FILE
SUPERSDEAS (sic) BOND TO STAY EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT OF THE
INFERIOR COURT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PETITIONERS WERE NOT
ADJUDGED TO PAY RENTS OR DAMAGES.
II
. . . IN EXPANDING THE MEANING OF THE WORDS "RENTS", "DAMAGES" AND
"COSTS" MENTIONED IN SECTION 8, RULE 70 OF THE REVISED RULES OF
COURT TO INCLUDE "UNPAID DOWN PAYMENT", IN THE DECISION OF THE
INFERIOR COURT.
III
. . . IN HOLDING THAT CERTIORARI IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL
REMEDY DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE INFERIOR COURT HAD ALREADY
ORDERED EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENT RENDERING THE REMEDY OF
APPEAL INEFFECTUAL AND/OR INADEQUATE.
IV
. . . IN HOLDING THAT ORDINARY APPEAL IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE LEGAL
REMEDY TO EFFECT THE RESTORATION OF SUBJECT PREMISES AND
RESTITUTION OF THE LEVIED PROPERTIES AFTER EXECUTION.
V
. . . IN NOT HOLDING THAT ALTHOUGH THE COMPLAINT IS DENOMINATED AS
ONE FOR "EJECTMENT", IT IS IN REALITY ONE FOR A SUM OF MONEY AND/OR
 SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE ARISING FROM EXECUTION OF A CONTRACT TO
SELL.
VI
. . . IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE INFERIOR COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION
OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER AS THE CASE IS ONE FOR A SUM OF MONEY
AND/OR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND THE AMOUNT INVOLVED EXCEEDS
P20,000.00.
VII
EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE CASE IS ONE FOR
EJECTMENT AND NOT FOR A SUM OF MONEY AND/OR SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE, THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE INFERIOR COURT IS
NULL AND VOID BECAUSE IT WAS A JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT WHICH IS NOT
SANCTIONED BY THE RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE. 9
We gave due course to the petition after deliberation on the private respondent's Comment to the same,
petitioners' Reply thereto and the private respondent's subsequent Rejoinder.
It must at once be stressed that the main decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 111274 and the merits
of the appeal therefrom are not in issue in this instant petition. Consequently, the fifth and sixth
assigned errors are either entirely misplaced or adroitly incorporated to befuddle the real issues and
obtain a review of the decision despite the fact that the petitioners had apparently neglected to further
pursue the remedy of appeal below. For this reason, too, the dispositive portion of the challenged
decision reinstating the MTC decision is erroneous since the RTC decision did not modify, reverse or
set aside the latter.
The privotal issue raised is whether or not it was necessary for the petitioners to file a supersedeas
bond in order to stay the execution of the adverse judgment of the MTC. Corollarily, the resolution
thereof hinges on the determination of whether the amount adjudged by the MTC represents rents,
damages and costs accruing down to the time the decision was rendered.
It is the thesis of the petitioners that the amount of P161,478.61 does not represent back rentals or the
reasonable value for the use of the subject unit, but constitutes the totality of the unpaid downpayment
and installments of the purchase price of the condominium unit, as well as parking fees, cost of electric
consumption, real estate taxes, telephone charges, association fees and the cost for the use of the
building's airconditioning units. Hence, no supersedeas bond is necessary to stay the execution of said
judgment. The filing of the notice of appeal was sufficient. In fine, petitioners allege that since "unpaid
downpayment", "installments" and "other charges" are not the same as "rent", "damages" and "cost",
they do not fall within the purview of Section 8, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules Court which provides:
Sec. 8. Immediate execution of judgment. How to stay the same. — If the judgment is
rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal
has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient bond,
approved by the justice of the peace or municipal court and executed to the plaintiff to
enter the action in the Court of First Instance and to pay the rents, damages, and
costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during
the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent
due from time to time under the contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the
justice of the peace or municipal court to exist. In the absence of a contract, he shall
deposit with the court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises
for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment, on or
before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond
shall be transmitted by the justice of the peace or municipal court, with the other
papers, to the clerk of the Court of First Instance to which the action is appealed. . . .
The term rent needs no further elucidation.
As to damages, We have no several occasions ruled that since the only issue raised in forcible entry or
unlawful detainer cases is that of rightful physical possession, 10 the "damages" recoverable in these
case are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, i.e., those caused by the
loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have suffered but
which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession. 11 Municipal and city courts, therefore,
have no jurisdiction to award damages based on any other ground. Simply put, "damages" in the
context of Section 8 of Rule 70 is limited to "rent" or "fair rental value" for the use and occupation of the
property. 12
The costs mentioned in said Section 8 refer to the costs under Rule 142 of the Rules of Court which are,
with respect to Civil Case No. 111274 (MTC), more specifically covered by Section 9 thereof. As shown
earlier, the adjudged amount does not include such costs.
Petitioners admit that above amount adjudged by the MTC includes unpaid downpayments and
installments provided under the Contract to Sell. Clause no. 12 thereof, which was earlier quoted,
evidences the intention of the parties to consider the monthly installments as the reasonable rent of fair
rental value for the use of the unit. Thus, it therein provides for the cancellation of the agreement should
petitioners fail of refuse to pay the monthly installments. etc., within thirty (30) days from the different
due dates; said cancellation shall take effect by the mere fact of non-payment. Thereupon, the constract
shall be considered to have expired and will be deemed as null and void without the need for any notice
to be given to the petitioners or any judicial declaration to that effect; all assume of money paid under
the contract shall then be forfeited in favor of the private respondent as liquidated damages or, if the
petitioners are already in possession of the property, the amount forfeited together with the
improvements made on the premises, if there be any, "shall become rentals on the property." In the
body of its decision, the MTC made a categorical declaration of default and treated the installment
payments due as rentals; in the dispositive portion thereof, it described the adjudged amount as
representing, inter alia, unpaid downpayments and installments, and further ordered petitioners to pay
"such other amount as may become due from defendants by reason of their continued possession of
the premises." While concededly, the latter directive is phrased rather imprecisely, its reference to the
monthly installments provided for under the contract is unmistakable for these are the very amounts
which, in the ordinary course of events, could become due under the said contract. However, the
other charges included therein, itemized in the Statement of Account 13 — namely, airconditioning
charges, association dues, parking fees, telephone charges, real estate taxes, electric bills and penalty
charges — cannot be subsumed under the concept of damages for purposes of the supersedeas bond.
Accordingly, the respondent Court erred in holding that the supersedeas bond should fully cover the
adjudged amount of P161,478.61. Nevertheless, the filing of a supersedeas bond to cover that portion
representing the unpaid downpayments and installments was necessary to stay the execution of
judgment; this a mandatory requirement. In short, the adjudged amount is divisible. So much thereof
that would represent the unpaid downpayment and installments already due as of the rendition of the
decision should be covered by the supersedeas bond. In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, the
execution of judgment in favor of the plaintiff is a matter of right and
mandatory. 14 The duty to order the immediate execution is ministerial and imperative; 15 it cannot be
avoided. 16 The only way to stay execution is by perfecting an appeal from the decision and filing a
supersedeas bond, depositing from time to time with the Regional Trial Court, during the pendency of
such appeal, the amounts of rent or the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the property as
fixed by the court of origin. The reason for this is to prevent further damages to the plaintiff caused by
the loss of his possession of the property. 17 There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, as (a) where
delay in the deposit is due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, 18 or (b) where
supervening events occurring subsequent to the judgment bring about a material change in the situation
of the parties which makes execution inequitable, or where there is no compelling urgency for the
execution because it is not justified by the prevailing circumstances. 19 The first exception also applies
to the filing of the supersedeas bond. 20 These exceptions are not invoked in this case.

Thus, the MTC did not act without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion for
immediate execution because no supersedeas bond for that portion of the adjudged amount — which
represents the unpaid downpayment and installments — was filed by the petitioners. On the contrary, it
was the court's ministerial duty to grant the same. The respondent Court then correctly reversed the
decision of the RTC which nullified the said MTC order, together with the subsequent related orders,
and set aside the sheriff's execution sale.

We are, however, unable to agree with the opinion and conclusion of the respondent Court that the
proper remedy to assail the orders of the MTC is an ordinary appeal and not a petition for certiorari.
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court could be availed of by the petitioners. They had filed a notice of appeal. The MTC took
no action thereon either by denying or giving due course to the same. In the meantime, a motion for
execution under Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court was filed and granted by the MTC; thus,
petitioners' ouster from the premises was imminent. If the petitioners' theory — that a supersedeas bond
was not necessary — were correct, then certainly the MTC, in granting the motion, would have acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The appeal earlier interposed cannot then be said to constitute an adequate remedy to prevent heir
ouster from the premises. They cannot be confined or restricted to the sole remedy of an appeal and, as
suggested by the respondent Court, simply wait for the judgment thereon by the RTC. Under Section 5
of Rule 39, the said court may issue such orders of restitution as equity and justice may warrant in the
event of a partial or total reversal of the appealed decision. Under such circumstances, the appellate
process would be too slow and the wait too long; it is also evident that such mode of review would be
inadequate and insufficient. It is settled that although the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not proper
when an ordinary appeal is available it may be granted where it is shown that the appeal would be
inadequate, slow, insufficient and will not promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects of the order
complained of, 21 or where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual. 22

Prescinding, therefore, from the foregoing discussions, it is clear that the dispositive portion of the
challenged decision of the respondent Court is correct, except insofar as that portion reinstating the
decision of the MTC is concerned.
NORSK HYDRO (PHILS.), INC. and HANS T. NEVERDAL vs. ROSALES
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Court of Appeals Decision[1] dated July 31, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 69721, as well as its Resolution[2] dated March 18, 2004, denying the motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals set aside the Decision[3] dated December 13, 2001 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which had dismissed respondents appeal from the
decision of the Labor Arbiter dismissing his complaint for illegal dismissal.
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
On November 27, 1986, petitioner Norsk Hydro (Philippines), Inc. employed respondent
Benjamin S. Rosales, Jr. as Operations Supervisor. Rosales later became Assistant Operations
Manager, and later on, Operations Manager before he was dismissed. As Operations Manager, Rosales
was tasked to scout for properties in Poro Point, San Fernando, La Union and
in Cagayan de Oro suitable for a company warehouse and fertilizer blending plant.
Sometime in July 1997, Rosales informed the president of Norsk Hydro, Hans Neverdal, of a seven-
hectare land in Barangay Luz Banzon, Jasaan, Misamis Oriental offered by a real estate broker,
Virgie Azcuna-Capulong. After inspection, Neverdal found the land suitable and instructed Rosales to check
on it. After consultation with the broker, Rosales informed Neverdal that certain portions of the land were
priced at P1,200 per square meter while the rest at P400 per square meter. Neverdal agreed to the purchase
and instructed Rosales to close the deal. Accordingly, Deeds of Conditional Sale were executed by
Virgie Azcuna-Capulong and Ismael Laya, who were the designated attorneys-in-fact of the landowners, in
favor of the buyer, Norsk Hydro. The ownership was subsequently transferred to Norsk Hydro.
On September 1, 1999, one Pepito Abecia, a real estate broker from Misamis Oriental,
wrote Neverdal claiming that Rosales participated in overpricing the aforementioned land. He executed
an affidavit divulging that Rosales, the other real estate brokers and he agreed to markup the price,
such that each of them would receive P100 for every square meter sold. Abecia said he told on the
group because he was not paid his share of the overprice. He attached a copy of the complaint
for estafa that he filed against the other real estate brokers.
Consequently, on October 18, 1999, Neverdal sent Rosales a show-cause memorandum
accusing the latter of serious misconduct and willful breach of the companys rules and regulations when
he participated in the purchase of real properties by conniving to overprice the properties in a manner
grossly disadvantageous to the company. Neverdalalso sent Rosales a notice of preventive suspension for
a period of 15 days and gave Rosales 72 hours within which to explain his side. An administrative hearing
was conducted on October 28, 1999. On grounds of loss of trust and confidence, the company terminated
the employment of Rosales on November 3, 1999.
On November 11, 1999, Rosales filed before the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal
against NorskHydro. He claimed that there was no evidence showing that he defrauded the
company. He also claimed that he was not given opportunity to go over the records incriminating him
and that the investigation was hastily terminated. Rosales alleged that upon receiving the show-cause
memorandum, he requested permission to have access to his personal things and documents in the
office to prepare his defense; permission to talk to other employees who could help him with his
defense; investigation by objective and neutral persons; and extension of the 72-hour deadline to be
counted from the time he finished examining the evidence against him. He claimed that the company
did not respond to his requests, and it was only on the scheduled investigation on October 28, 1999,
that he was furnished with copies of Abecias letter, affidavit, and criminal complaint for estafa, as well
as the memorandum of criminal investigation by the Office of the City Prosecutor. In addition, he said
that the administrative hearing was terminated without giving him sufficient time to prepare and submit
his written reply.
For their part, petitioners Norsk Hydro and Neverdal maintained that Rosales was dismissed
for a just cause, having connived with the real estate brokers to overprice the properties and profited
from it to the gross disadvantage of the company. They contended that Rosales was given time to
explain. They had set a hearing, yet Rosales failed to answer the charges against him.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint. It held that the company was justified in terminating
Rosaless employment on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. The Labor Arbiter
found Abecias sworn statement sufficient basis for the company to lose its trust and confidence on
Rosales. Moreover, the Labor Arbiter found nothing irregular in the manner Rosales was dismissed.
Rosales appealed to the NLRC, which affirmed[4] the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC
ruled that the issue of whether there was overpricing is secondary only to the issue of whether
Rosales breached the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his employer.
The NLRC held that the requirements of notice and hearing have been sufficiently met when:
(1) the show-cause memorandum was served upon Rosales requiring him to submit an explanation
within 72 hours; and (2) notice was sent to him regarding an administrative hearing on October 28,
1999.
Undaunted, Rosales filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals ascribing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC because (1) there was no legal basis for his dismissal; and
(2) his right to due process was violated.
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari notwithstanding the lack of a motion for reconsideration
before the NLRC.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the NLRC and declared that Rosales was
illegally dismissed.The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed December 13,
2001 decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is hereby SET ASIDE. A
new judgment is hereby entered declaring the dismissal of petitioner by private
respondents as illegal and without just cause, and ordering private
respondent Norsk Hydro (Philippines), Inc. to pay to petitioner full back wages
computed from November 3, 1999 up to the finality of this decision, plus accrued
allowances and benefits, and in lieu of reinstatement, to grant separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The Court of Appeals held that Norsk Hydro failed to prove with substantial evidence that
Rosales participated in the alleged overpricing nor had it shown the extent of his participation. According to
the Court of Appeals, the company should not have relied on the affidavit of Abecia, who was not a
representative of any of the owners and that, without being cross-examined, his affidavit was hearsay. It
ruled that Norsk Hydro did not observe due process because it did not furnish Rosales or his counsel with
the documents for him to prepare intelligent answers to the charges against him.
The Court of Appeals denied the companys motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal
raising one issue:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND
RULED CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT ACTED AS A
TRIER OF FACTS AND DECLARED: (i) THE DISMISSAL OF RESPONDENT
ROSALES ILLEGAL AND WITHOUT JUST CAUSE; (ii) DIRECTED PETITIONER
NORSK HYDRO TO PAY ROSALES FULL BACKWAGES PLUS ACCRUED
ALLOWANCES AND BENEFITS; AND (iii) IN LIEU OF REINSTATEMENT,
ORDERED PETITIONER TO GRANT SEPARATION PAY IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENT.[6]
explain, within 72 hours, the charges against him, he did not do so. On the scheduled hearing, he did
not present any evidence, constraining the company to evaluate the case based on the documents
available, the affidavit of Abecia who appears to have no reason to implicate Rosales except for the fact
that Rosales and the other brokers reneged on their agreement on his share of the overprice. Likewise,
it appears that Abecias affidavit was a declaration against himself, lending it substantial
credibility. Further, it appears that Rosaless right to notice and hearing was not violated. The records
clearly show that the company set an administrative hearing to give Rosales an opportunity to explain
his side and to call for witnesses and present his evidence.
In sum, we are in agreement with the findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter that there
was sufficient evidence to justify the termination of Rosaless employment for a just cause, namely, for
loss of trust and confidence by the company on its managerial officer.

Simply put, the issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred when it declared the termination of
Rosaless employment illegal.

Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in ignoring the findings of facts of the NLRC and
the Labor Arbiter; that review by the Court of Appeals is limited only in whether the NLRC acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; that the Court of Appeals erred in taking
cognizance of the petition for certiorari despite respondents failure to file a motion for reconsideration of
the NLRC decision.

Indeed, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to
questions of law, and the Court is not a trier of facts. This rule, however, is not without exceptions. This
Court may review the factual findings of the trial and the lower appellate courts when the findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the NLRC or of the Labor Arbiter. [7] Such is the situation in this
case. We must caution, however, that the factual findings of labor officials, who possess the expertise in
matters within their jurisdiction, have conclusive effect on this Court provided substantial evidence
supports such factual findings.[8]

Law and jurisprudence have long recognized the right of employers to dismiss employees by
reason of loss of trust and confidence,[9] especially in cases of employees occupying positions of
responsibility, on the premise that an employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence. [10]

It should also be stressed that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not needed to justify the loss
of trust and confidence on the responsible officer. It is sufficient that there be some basis for the same,
or that the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the
misconduct, and his participation therein renders him unworthy of trust and confidence demanded of his
position.[11] Article 282(c) of the Labor Code states, however, that the loss of trust and confidence must
be based on willful breach of the trust reposed in the employee by his employer. Ordinary breach will
not suffice; it must be willful. Such breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely,
without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or
inadvertently.[12] More specifically the loss of trust must be founded on clearly established facts.

In the present case, Neverdal, as president of the company, issued a show-cause

memorandum and a notice of preventive suspension to Rosales. Despite its directive to Rosales to
PROHIBITION
ESPERANZA S. LONGINO, petitioner, vs. ATTY. LINA A. GENERAL, OIC, Commission Member
III; ATTY. NOEL A. GALAROSA, OIC, Commission Member III; ATTY. LUZ SARMIENTO,
OIC, Office of the Executive Director, all of COSLAP; JUDGE JAIME F. BAUTISTA of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 75, Valenzuela City; and ELSA P. SERRANO, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On March 1, 1988, the Philippine National Railways (PNR) executed Contract of Lease No. 10320
in favor of Julian Estrella over its property located in Polo, Valenzuela, Bulacan, with an area of 1,000
square meters and described as between TP 228 and TP 230, left side. The lease agreement was for a
period of two years up to March 1, 1990, with an annual rental of P20,000.00. Although Estrella had
unpaid rentals amounting to P100,000.00 on the initial agreement, the contract of lease was renewed
until December 31, 1992. Estrella constructed his house on the property.[1]
On April 6, 1992, Estrella filed an application with the PNR for a lease of an additional 848 square
meters with the intention of constructing a 12-door commercial apartment building on the said property.
However, the PNR did not act on the said application.[2]
Sometime in November 1992, Estrella and Elsa Serrano, owner and operator of the I.V.B.
Construction Supply at Km. 16, MacArthur Highway, Malanday, Valenzuela, Bulacan, entered into a
verbal contract of lease in which one of the apartments, which were still to be constructed, would be
leased to Serrano for a monthly rental of P5,000.00 with an advance rental of P10,000.00. Estrella
assured Serrano that he had just renewed his lease contract with the PNR for a long term and was to
pick up the contract shortly. However, Estrella failed to construct the planned 12-door apartment.[3]
Meanwhile, Serranos lease contract with the owner of the property where she had established her
business had expired. She was compelled to construct, at her expense, a one-door commercial
apartment on a portion of the property leased by Estrella from the PNR, with an area of 114 square
meters. She and Estrella later agreed that she would construct another commercial apartment beside
the existing one, with the latters assurance that the portion of the property in which the second
commercial apartment would be constructed would be leased to her for a period of ten (10) years.
Estrella also asked Serrano to supply him with construction materials on credit, to which Serrano
agreed.[4]
Serrano caused the construction of the second commercial apartment, but was aghast to discover
in September 1993 that, after the expiration of Estrellas contract with the PNR in December of 1992,
Estrella no longer had an existing lease contract with the PNR. Worse, PNR officials told her that
Estrella had no right to lease a portion of its property to third persons, and advised her not to pay any
more rentals to Estrella for the property occupied by the commercial apartment.[5]
On January 13, 1994, Serrano filed a Complaint for Damages against Estrella with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela.[6] The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4287-L-94. Estrella was
declared in default. Serrano adduced her evidence ex parte.
On March 31, 1995, the PNR and Serrano entered into a Lease Contract over the portion of the
subject property where Serranos commercial apartment building stood. The effectivity of the contract
was until December 31, 1995.
On September 28, 1995, the court rendered judgment in favor of Serrano and against Estrella.
The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P113,652.00 as actual damages;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P110,000.00 as moral damages;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees;
4. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and
5. Ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On January 22, 1996, the PNR and Serrano executed Lease Contract No. R-12666 over a portion
of the property of the PNR with an area of 111.11 square meters, to expire on December 31,
1996.[8] She constructed a barber shop and a barbecue stand on a portion of the property.
Meanwhile, the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 4287-V-94 became final and executory.
Estrella failed to pay the amount adjudged by the court in favor of Serrano. The Sheriff sold the house
owned by Estrella at public auction to Serrano on May 5, 1997 as the winning bidder. [9] Estrella vacated
the house, and the Sheriff turned it over to Serrano on September 23, 1998.[10]
Serrano wanted to renew her lease with the PNR. She and her close friend, Esperanza S.
Longino, a PNR retiree, executed an Agreement on August 4, 1998, in which Serrano allowed her to
occupy a portion of the property without paying any rental therefor, on Longinos promise to help her
secure a lease contract over a property with an area of 146 square meters. Serrano then filed her
application for a lease contract. However, the application could not be acted upon by the PNR because
of the suspension of its lease contracts over its property, which was a part of its North Rail Project.
Moreover, Serrano still had unpaid back rentals.
Despite her agreement with Serrano, on August 6, 1998, Longino filed an application with the PNR
for a lease of the property occupied by her with an area of 146.30 square meters for a period of two
months.[11]
When Serrano learned of the application, she wrote the PNR on September 26, 1998, citing the
decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 4287-V-94. She, likewise, informed the latter about her purchase
of Estrellas house at public auction. Serrano also cited her agreement with Longino in which the latter
bound herself to help her (Serrano) secure a lease contract from the PNR. Serrano alleged that the
property applied for by Longino was part of the property on which the house she had purchased at
public auction from the Sheriff in Civil Case No. 4287-V-94 was located. She also declared that she had
allowed Longino to occupy the said property.[12]
On November 10, 1998, Director Divina Gracia Dantes, Officer-in-Charge of the Real Estate
Department of the PNR, recommended the approval of Serranos application and the denial of that of
Longinos. Dantes took into account the fact that the portion of the property applied for lease by Serrano
and Longino was near the property on which the house formerly owned by Estrella, which had been
sold at public auction to Serrano, was located.
 Meanwhile, on January 19, 1999, the Board of Directors of the PNR approved Resolution No. 99-
03, directing the PNR Management to desist from selling or leasing its properties needed for the right-
of-way of its North Rail Project.[13]
However, despite the said Resolution of the Board of Directors of the PNR, the General Manager
of the PNR directed Dantes to prepare the contract of lease in favor of Longino and to transmit the
same for his signature on January 21, 1999. Dantes complied.
On January 26, 1999, the PNR and Esperanza Longino executed a Lease Contract over a portion
of its property near the house of Serrano, formerly owned by Estrella, with an area of 146 square
meters, for a period of three months up to April 26, 1999, for an annual rental of P13,684.00.[14] Longino
paid the amount. After securing the requisite building permits, Longino constructed a barber shop on
said property, following her demolition of the barber shop and the barbecue stand then owned by
Serrano. Longino then embarked to construct her building on the property.
On February 25, 1999 Serrano filed a handwritten Complaint against Longino, with the
Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), demanding that the PNR lease the property to
her, and the eviction of Longino from the property on the ground that she had a preferential right to
lease the property. Serrano alleged that the house she had purchased at public auction from Estrella
was located on the said PNR property, and that Longino occupied the property on her sufferance under
their August 4, 1998 agreement. She complained that Longino and other ten workers had earlier
demolished her barber shop and barbecue stand and were about to construct a building thereon.
Serrano prayed that she be declared entitled to lease the property and that her application for a lease
contract over the property be approved by the PNR. As prayed for by Serrano, the COSLAP issued, on
February 26, 1999, a status quo order.
The COSLAP opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint and issued summons on the
respondent. It also issued, on March 4, 1999, an Order directing the Real Estate Department of the
PNR to implement the Status Quo Order. Longinos motion to quash the case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction was denied by the COSLAP.[15]
In her answer to the complaint, Longino alleged that the portion of the property leased by her with
an area of 146.30 square meters, was outside the property formerly leased by the PNR to Estrella (with
an area of 111.11 square meters)[16] as shown by the plan prepared by the PNR itself and applied for by
Serrano. She claimed that she filed her application for lease because she discovered that Serrano was
indebted to the PNR for back rentals; hence, was disqualified to lease the property. She also alleged
that the complaint against her involved her lease contract with the PNR over which the COSLAP had no
jurisdiction. She maintained that only the regular courts were vested with jurisdiction to resolve the issue
of who, as between her and the complainant, was entitled to lease the property, as well as the issue of
whether she was estopped by the August 4, 1998 agreement with Estrella to herself apply for a lease of
the property. In her position paper, Longino reiterated that the COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the
case.
In the meantime, on orders of the COSLAP, an ocular inspection of the property was conducted by
Rene Credo. In a Report dated March 12, 1999, he declared that Serrano, the complainant in the case,
had been in possession of the property since 1992, and that Longino was in the process of constructing
a building thereon.[17]
Despite the pendency of the case, the PNR and Longino executed, on May 5, 1999, a Contract of
Lease over the property to expire on July 26, 1999, revocable within fifteen (15) days in the event that
the Northeast Project would start in the area.[18]
On August 9, 1999, Dantes met with Serrano, informing her that she could re-apply for a lease
contract covering the property in question, provided that she first settle her back rentals of P154,945.02
as of July 31, 1999.[19] On September 17, 1999, the General Manager of the PNR and Serrano reached
an agreement to lease out the property with an area of 111.11 square meters where her structures were
constructed, subject to the condition that she first pays her back rentals of P154,945.02 as of July 31,
1999. However, Serrano failed to pay her back rentals.
On October 27, 1999, the PNR and Longino executed Lease Contract No. R-12904 over the
property, to expire on January 26, 2000. She paid the rentals agreed upon in said contract. However,
the said contract was not renewed because of the implementation of the North Rail Project. [20]
During the investigation, both the complainant (Serrano) and the respondent (Longino) were
questioned by the Commissioners.[21]
On December 16, 1999, the COSLAP rendered a Resolution in favor of Serrano and against
Longino, holding, inter alia, that Serrano was the lawful possessor of the property and had a preferential
right to lease the same. The decretal portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission hereby Ordered that:
1. Declaring complainant as the lawful possessor and has the preferential right to lease
the property in question;
2. Recommending to the PNR the cancellation and/or non-renewal of the Lease
Contract of the respondent; and
3. After cancellation or non-renewal of the lease contract, directing respondent to
immediately and peacefully vacate the premises in favor of the complainant.
SO ORDERED.[22]
Citing the ruling of this Court in Baaga vs. COSLAP,[23] COSLAP held that it had jurisdiction over
the dispute in question. It also ruled that Longino acted in bad faith and contrary to Article 19 of the New
Civil Code, when, despite her August 4, 1998 agreement with Serrano, she nevertheless applied for and
secured a lease contract from the PNR over the subject property. It declared that the RTC had allowed
Serrano, the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 4287-V-94, to occupy the house of Estrella.
Longino received a copy of the Resolution on December 30, 1999 and failed to appeal the
same.[24] Instead, on January 19, 2000, she sent a letter to the General Manager of the PNR, urging the
latter to disregard the resolution/recommendation of the COSLAP for being partially irregular. [25] She
recalled the testimonies of Dantes and of the PNR counsel before the COSLAP that only the PNR had
the right to determine who was entitled to lease the land, such determination was reversible only by the
regular courts.[26]
In the meantime, the October 27, 1999 Lease Contract of Longino with the PNR was not renewed
after its expiration. On motion of Serrano, the COSLAP issued a Writ of Execution on February 8, 2000.
Per the request of the COSLAP, the RTC of Valenzuela issued an Order, on March 2, 2000, ordering
the Sheriff to implement the writ of execution. On March 31, 2000, the Sheriff served a notice on
Longino to vacate the property, but she refused. The complainant then filed a motion for the demolition
of the structures constructed by the respondent on the property pendente lite, which the COSLAP
granted. It forthwith issued the writ.
Longino filed a petition for prohibition against the COSLAP and Serrano with the Court of Appeals
(CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 57613 for the nullification of the December 16, 1999 Resolution of
the COSLAP and the February 8, 2000 Writ of Demolition issued by it, with a plea for injunctive relief.
Longino alleged that in taking cognizance of Serranos complaint, the COSLAP acted without
jurisdiction; and, when it issued the said Resolutions, with grave abuse of its discretion. She averred
that the COSLAP had no jurisdiction to review the lease contracts entered into between her and the
PNR. She contended that she had the preferential right to lease the property.
In her comment on the petition, Serrano averred that the petition should be dismissed because of
the following: (a) the December 16, 1999 Resolution of the COSLAP had become final and executory;
(b) the petitioner was estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the COSLAP over the complaint; and
(c) the COSLAPs Resolution was in accord with law and the evidence.
In its comment on the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction, the COSLAP averred that
Longino had no right to the property since she was allowed to take possession of the property only at
the sufferance of Serrano. It maintained that, considering that the assailed Resolution of the COSLAP
had already become final and executory, the enforcement thereof can no longer be enjoined.
On April 17, 2001, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition. The appellate court held that
the COSLAP had jurisdiction over Serranos complaint because it merely determined who had the
preferential right over the property but did not review the lease contract between the PNR and Longino.
The CA also ruled that Serrano had the preferential right over the disputed lot and that the December
16, 1999 Resolution of the COSLAP had already become final and executory. Hence, the appellate
court concluded that the petition for prohibition was moot and academic.
Longino, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari for the reversal of the
decision of the CA, raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENTS HAVE JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE
THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND
THE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE WRIT OF EXECUTION; AND
2. WHO BETWEEN THEM HAVE A PREFERENTIAL RIGHT OVER THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION.[27]
Private respondent Serrano reiterated her comment on the petition in the CA as her comment in
the petition at bench.
The issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether the petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court was the proper remedy of the petitioner; (b) whether the COSLAP had jurisdiction
over the complaint of the respondent herein; (c) whether the petitioner is barred from assailing the
jurisdiction of the COSLAP; and (d) whether the COSLAP acted with grave abuse of discretion in
causing the petitioners eviction and the demolition of her structures on the PNR property.
On the first issue, the private respondent avers that the remedy of the petitioner from the
December 16, 1999 Resolution of the COSLAP was to appeal, by way of a petition for review, to the CA
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, instead of filing a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, as amended. The private respondent avers that since the petitioner opted not to appeal the
resolution to the CA, she is proscribed from filing a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
We are not in full accord with the private respondents contention.
Rule 65, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person,
whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to
desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof,
together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.
The principal purpose for the writ of prohibition is to prevent an encroachment, excess, usurpation
or assumption of jurisdiction on the part of an inferior court or quasi-judicial tribunal. It is granted when it
is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in
an oppressive or vindictive manner, or multiplicity of actions. [28] The writs of certiorari and prohibition, for
that matter, are intended to annul or void proceedings in order to insure the fair and orderly
administration of justice.[29]
For a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the following requisites: (a) it
must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial or
ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.[30]
For grave abuse of discretion to prosper as a ground for prohibition, it must first be demonstrated
that the lower court or tribunal has exercised its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and it must be patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a
unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. Excess of jurisdiction
signifies that the court, board or office has jurisdiction over the case but has transcended the same or
acted without authority.[31] The writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done. [32]However, as
an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of
repetition yet evading review.[33]
In a case where a lower court or quasi-judicial body commits an error in the excess of its
jurisdiction, if such error is one of judgment, it is revocable only by appeal. On the other hand, if the act
complained of was issued by such court or body with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a petition for certiorari and/or
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. [34] Indeed, a decision of a court without jurisdiction is
null and void. It could never become final and executory; hence, appeal therefrom by writ of error is out
of the question. The aggrieved party should file a petition for certiorari or prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.[35]
A remedy is considered plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of the judgment or rule, order or resolution of the lower court or agency. [36] While
ordinarily, certiorari or prohibition for that matter is unavailing where the appeal period had lapsed, the
same may be availed of whereas in the present case, public welfare and the administration of public
policy dictates; where the broader interest of justice so requires; where the writs issued are null and
void; where the questioned order amounts to an oppressive excess of judicial authority. [37]
In the present case, the petition for prohibition filed with the CA by the petitioner could have been
dismissed by the CA because the structures on the property had already been demolished; hence, the
acts sought to be enjoined by the petitioner had already been effected by the respondent sheriff. For
another reason, the lease contract of the petitioner and the PNR had not been renewed after its
expiration on January 26, 2000. Manifestly, the petitioner was obliged to vacate the property and
remove her structures thereon. Nevertheless, the CA took cognizance of the petition and resolved the
same on its merits, precisely because the issues raised therein, namely, whether the COSLAP had
jurisdiction over the complaint of the private respondent; and whether the COSLAP exceeded its
jurisdiction in declaring the private respondent the legal possessor of the property and of having priority
in leasing the subject property raised in the petition, were substantial.
We agree with the petitioner that the CA erred in ruling that the COSLAP had jurisdiction on the
complaint of the private respondent and that the latter was the legal possessor and had preferential right
to lease the property. Consequently, the Resolution of the COSLAP dated December 16, 1999, as well
as the writ issued by it are null and void.
The COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the complaint of the private respondent herein, who was the
complainant before the COSLAP. The rule is that jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of the
case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations of the complaint.[38] The nature of the action,
as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations in the
complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for. Jurisdiction over
the action does not depend on the defenses set forth in the answer, or in a motion to dismiss of the
defendant.[39] Even if a tribunal or a quasi-judicial body of the government has jurisdiction over an action
but exceeds its authority in the course of the proceedings, such act is null and void. [40]
Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and, as such, could
wield only such as are specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes. [41] In relation thereto is the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative
agencies even if the question involved is also judicial in nature. Courts cannot and will not resolve a
controversy involving a question within which the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially
when the question demands the sound exercise of administrative discretion requiring special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact. The court cannot arrogate into itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the
jurisdiction of which is initially lodged with the administrative body of special competence. [42] But
disputes requiring no special skill or technical expertise of an administrative body and which could be
resolved by applying pertinent provisions of the Civil Code are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
regular courts.[43]
Under Executive Order No. 251, which took effect on July 31, 1970, the President created the
Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP) to expedite and coordinate the
investigation of land disputes between small settlers, members of cultural minorities and other claimants
and between small settlers and big landowners. It was also tasked to streamline and shorten
administrative procedures, adopt, hold and decide measures to solve land problems and/or recommend
other solutions. Under Presidential Decree No. 832, the President enlarged the functions and duties of
the PACLAP, to include quasi-judicial functions, thus:
1. Direct and coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation work, of the various government
agencies and agencies involved in land problems or disputes, and streamline administrative procedures
to relieve small settlers and landholders and members of cultural minorities of the expense and time-
consuming delay attendant to the solution of such problems or disputes;
2. Refer for immediate action any land problem or dispute brought to the attention of the PACLAP, to
any member agency having jurisdiction thereof: Provided, That when the Executive Committee decides
to act on a case, its resolution, order or decision thereon, shall have the force and effect of a regular
administrative resolution, order or decision, and shall be binding upon the parties therein involved and
upon the member agency having jurisdiction thereof; [44]
The PACLAP was abolished by E.O. No. 561 which took effect on September 21, 1979, and was
replaced by the COSLAP, composed of three members: a Commissioner and two Associate
Commissioners. Among the powers and functions of the COSLAP are administrative and quasi-judicial.
1. Coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation work, of the various government offices and
agencies involved in the settlement of land problems or disputes, and streamline administrative
procedures to relieve small settlers and landholders and members of cultural minorities of the expense
and time-consuming delay attendant to the solution of such problems or disputes;
2. Refer and follow-up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction over any land
problem or dispute referred to the Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in the following
cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in
nature considering, for instance, the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of
social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action:
(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires;
(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;
(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;
(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain; and
(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude.
The Commission shall promulgate such rules and procedures as will insure expeditious resolution and
action on the above cases. The resolution, order or decision of the Commission on any of the foregoing
cases shall have the force and effect of a regular administrative resolution, order or decision and shall
be binding upon the parties therein and upon the agency having jurisdiction over the same. [45]
Under the law, the COSLAP has two options in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before
it, namely, (a) refer the matter to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or
(b) assume jurisdiction if the matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law, if
such case is critical and explosive in nature, taking into account the large number of the parties
involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations
requiring immediate action. In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same
to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP has to consider the nature or classification of the land
involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and the need for immediate and
urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or destruction of property. The law
does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem.
The complaint of the private respondent herein, who was the complainant in the COSLAP, was for
the PNR to lease the property to her and deny the application of the petitioner, the respondent therein;
and to have the petitioner evicted from the property upon the non-renewal of the lease contract with the
PNR upon its expiration on January 26, 2000. The complaint was anchored on the private respondents
claim that she had acquired the house of Estrella which was located near the property subject of her
application; and that the petitioner was estopped by their August 4, 1998 agreement to apply for the
lease of the subject property. The private respondent alleged that the petitioner promised to help her
secure a lease contract over the property. The private respondent thus sought a ruling from the
COSLAP that she was the lawful possessor of the property, having merely allowed the petitioner herein
to occupy the same.
The property subject of the application of both parties is not public land but property belonging to
the PNR, which is a part of its North Rail Project. The private respondent is a businesswoman, while the
respondent is a retired PNR employee and, likewise, a businesswoman. The parties wanted to lease the
property for their respective business enterprises, such as the putting up of a bakery. Neither of them is
a squatter, patent lease agreement holder, government reservation grantee, public land claimant or
occupant, or a member of any cultural minority. The dispute between the parties was not critical and
explosive in nature so as to generate social tension or unrest, or a critical situation which required
immediate action. The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings involved the application of the New
Civil Code in relation to the Charter of the PNR, which clearly do involve the application of the expertise
of the COSLAP.
We note that under paragraph 2(e) of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP is vested with jurisdiction over
complaints involving other similar land problems of grave urgency and is undisputable. But the principle
in statutory construction of ejusdem generis, i.e., where general words follow an enumeration of persons
or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in
their widest extent but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind as clear as
those specifically mentioned.[46] Hence, the provision should not be interpreted to apply to a dispute
between two businesswomen claiming a priority right to lease a 146-square meter property of the PNR,
the petitioner claiming that the private respondent is disqualified from leasing the property because she
is indebted to the PNR for back rentals, and the private respondent claiming that she has the
preferential right to lease the property merely because the house which she purchased from another
was near the subject property.
The COSLAP and the private respondent cannot find surcease in the ruling of the Court in Baaga
v. COSLAP.[47] In that case, the petitioner therein, Guillermo Baaga, et al., filed a free patent application
with the Bureau of Lands over a public land with an area of 30 hectares. Therein private respondent
Gregorio Dopreza filed a separate application over the same property with the Bureau of Lands. But the
Bureau of Lands failed to resolve the application and conduct any investigation for a considerable
period of time. Based on the letter of Dopreza, the COSLAP opted to exercise jurisdiction over the
controversy. Guillermo Baaga questioned the jurisdiction of the COSLAP and this Court sustained its
jurisdiction, since the controversy involved the conflicting free patent applications of the petitioners and
the private respondent therein over a parcel of disposable public land with an area of 30 hectares. The
Court declared that the jurisdiction of the COSLAP is not confined to the cases mentioned in paragraph
2(a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561 but includes land problems in government, in general, which are frequently
the source of conflicts among settlers, landowners and cultural minorities. Undeniably, the COSLAP had
jurisdiction over land dispute between the parties who were claimants/applicants of public lands.
Moreover, the Court noted, the petitioners therein were estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the
COSLAP because they failed to assail the same jurisdiction on appeal.
In the present action, the petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the COSLAP in her answer to the
complaint and in her position paper, and prayed for its dismissal on that ground. In fact, the only relief
prayed for by the petitioner from the COSLAP was the dismissal of the complaint of the private
respondent against her.
The Court, likewise, rules that the COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the issues raised by the
parties because as early as January 19, 1999, the Board of Directors of the PNR had approved
Resolution No. 99-03, directing the PNR Management to desist from selling or leasing its properties
needed for the right-of-way of its North Rail Project, to wit:
RESOLUTION No. 99-03
RESOLVED, as it is hereby RESOLVED, that Management cease and desist from disposing (whether
through sale or lease) PNR properties which would eventually be part of the right-of-way of the North
Rail project, be APPROVED, as it is hereby APPROVED.
Notwithstanding the Resolution of the Board of Directors, the COSLAP declared the private
respondent the legal possessor of the property and had the priority to lease the same. When to lease
property owned by it, whom to lease such property, as well as the terms and conditions thereof, are
matters addressed to the PNR.
The COSLAPs records show that the private respondent owed the PNR the huge amount
of P154,945.02 as of July 31, 1999 by way of back rentals. The PNR had agreed to lease its property to
the private respondent, provided that she paid her back rentals. The private respondent failed to do so.
As aforesaid, the Board of Directors of the PNR, as early as January 19, 1999, had approved a
Resolution prohibiting the sale or lease of its properties, including the property subject of the private
respondents complaint, needed for the right-of-way of its North Rail Project. And yet, the COSLAP
declared the private respondent the lawful possessor of the property and as having the preferential right
to lease the same. By its Resolution, the COSLAP set aside the Resolution of the PNR Board of
Directors and abetted the private respondents obstinate refusal to pay her back rentals to the PNR
amounting to P154,945.02. The COSLAP had no authority to override the January 19, 1999 Resolution
of the Board of Directors of the PNR and to impose its resolution on the PNR.
Upon the expiration of the January 22, 1996 Lease Contract of the private respondent and the
PNR on December 31, 1996, she had no more right to possess the leased property. Indeed, the PNR
had the right to have her evicted therefrom. And yet, the COSLAP declared, by its Resolution, that the
private respondent herein, who was heavily indebted to the PNR, was the lawful possessor of the
property.
When the COSLAP issued its December 16, 1999 Resolution declaring the private respondent the
lawful possessor of the property, the lease contract between the PNR and the petitioner had yet to
expire on January 21, 2000. In issuing such declaration, the COSLAP thereby branded the petitioner
herein, who was not indebted to the PNR for any rentals, a possessor of the property without any right.
By its Resolution, the COSLAP, for all intents and purposes, thereby declared the October 27, 1999
lease contract between the petitioner and the PNR ineffective. In fine, the COSLAP acted beyond its
competence.
The bare fact that the private respondents house was located near the property subject of her
complaint does not give her any priority right to lease the property. Only the PNR, being the owner of
the property, has the right to determine when, to whom and under what conditions to lease its property.
MAYON ESTATE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. MARIETTA ALTURA, LEOPOLDO LEONARDO,
ISIDERIO CATLI, JOSE BOCATO, POLICARPIO FERRER, TERESITA PEREGRINO,
PRIMITIVO RIVERA, TEOFILO NAPAO, JESUS VERZOSA, JR., ELISA PANGILINAN,
ROGER CANZON, NORMAN ALTURA, ROMUALDO DE BELEN, RAYMUND DE
GUZMAN, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42602 and its Resolution[2] denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
Petitioner Mayon Estate Corporation, Everlasting Estate Corporation (EEC) and NBC Agro-
Industrial Development Corporation (NBC) were co-owners of a residential land known as the
Peafrancia Hills Subdivision, with an area of 150 hectares located in Antipolo, Rizal, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 310001 to 310946; TCT No. 317488; TCT No. 240606; TCT No.
417624; TCT No. 341357 and TCT No. 338897.[3] On May 6, 1976, the corporations filed a civil suit for
forcible entry and damages[4] with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Antipolo, Rizal, against Eladio
Medina, for himself and in his capacity as President of the Concerned Citizen Farmers Association, Inc.,
and Ranulfo B. Buensalida, for himself and in his capacity as Vice-President of the Doa Flora Farmers
Association, Inc. with 1000 members, more or less. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 890. On
June 26, 1979, the court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, EEC and NBC. The fallo of the
decision reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, defendants and all other persons acting in their behalf are hereby
ordered to vacate the premises in question and remove all the improvements they constructed thereon,
and to restore the possession of the lots to the plaintiff.
Further, ordering the defendants to pay attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00 and to pay the cost of
suit.
SO ORDERED.[5]
When the decision became final and executory, the petitioner, EEC and NBC moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution, which the MTC granted on April 26, 1980.[6] However, the sheriff failed
to implement the said writ because the defendants therein refused to vacate the premises.[7] Left with
the problem of a final judgment which had not been executed for five (5) years since the writ of
execution was issued, the petitioner and its co-owners filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
demolition with the MTC. The MTC granted the same, pursuant to its Order[8] dated January 2,
1985. The demolition was partially implemented with 42 houses destroyed.[9]
On October 25, 1985, the respondents[10] filed before the RTC, Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, a
Petition for Prohibition with Writ of Preliminary Injunction & Damages [11] against Judge Romeo de Leon,
the petitioner and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, to enjoin the enforcement of the January 2, 1985 Writ of
Demolition issued by the MTC, on the ground that the same was issued beyond the five-year period
during which a judgment may be executed by motion. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 739-
A. It was also alleged that the June 26, 1979 judgment of the MTC in Civil Case No. 890 should be
enforced by an independent action and not by a mere motion. For failing to file a responsive pleading,
the petitioner was declared in default, while the respondents were allowed to present evidence ex parte.
The RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order,[12] because of which the sheriff was not able to
fully implement the writ of demolition in Civil Case No. 890.
On July 28, 1986, the RTC rendered a Decision[13] in Civil Case No. 739-A in favor of the
respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Accordingly, the Court has no alternative but to give due course to the instant Petition for Prohibition.
Let the corresponding Writ of Prohibition be issued to prevent respondents from enforcing the decision
of the respondent Court in Civil Case No. 890.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.[14]
No appeal was taken by the petitioner, thus, the decision became final and executory. Entry of
judgment was made of record on August 4, 1987. [15] The court issued an Order[16] dated June 15, 1988,
for the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition. However, the Clerk of Court failed to issue the said writ.
Meantime, the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 739-A notwithstanding, the petitioner filed,
on May 20, 1988, a Motion for a Second Alias Writ of Demolition in Civil Case No. 890. The court
granted the motion and issued a second alias writ of demolition [17] on May 27, 1988. The sheriff was
able to demolish only sixty percent (60%) of the houses, because the RTC of Antipolo, Branch 71, had
issued a temporary restraining order in another case, Civil Case No. 1193-A, entitled Lungsod
Silangan Residents Association, Inc. et al. vs. Judge Romeo C. de Leon, et al.[18] Worse, the occupants
reconstructed their houses.[19] On motion of the petitioners in Civil Case No. 739-A, the RTC issued an
Order[20] on June 15, 1988, directing the issuance of a writ of prohibition against the enforcement of the
MTC decision in Civil Case No. 890. However, no writ was issued. On March 31, 1989, the MTC issued
a Third Alias Writ of Demolition.[21] This time, the sheriff was able to demolish almost ninety-five percent
(95%) of the houses.[22]
On September 12, 1990, the Branch Clerk of Court finally issued a Writ of Prohibition [23] in Civil
Case No. 739-A, conformably with the June 15, 1988 Order of the trial court. Nevertheless, on August
20, 1991, the petitioner filed a motion in Civil Case No. 890 for the issuance of a fourth alias writ of
demolition.[24] The court held in abeyance the resolution of the motion to enable the parties to settle the
matter amicably.[25] However, no settlement was reached by the parties. On October 20, 1995, the
respondents filed a Motion to Lift/Dissolve Writ of Prohibition[26] in Civil Case No. 739-A before the RTC,
Branch 71, to enable the sheriff to fully execute the decision in Civil Case No. 890. The RTC issued an
Order[27] granting the motion on December 15, 1995. In lifting the writ of prohibition, Judge Felix S.
Caballes held, inter alia, that:
Firstly, in Civil Case No. 890, the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo issued within the 5-year reglementary
period a writ of execution on April 26, 1980 to enforce its decision dated June 26, 1979, a copy of which
decision was received by the defendants therein on August 20, 1979. The alias order of demolition is
only an incident of the writ of execution timely or seasonably issued earlier. Indeed, as succinctly
expressed by then Justice Ramon C. Aquino in his concurring opinion in Torralba vs. De Los
Angeles (96 SCRA 69, 76):
I concur. Since the writ of execution was served upon the petitioner within five years from entry of
judgment, the trial court could issue the order of demolition (an incident of the writ of execution) even
after the expiration of the five-year period (Albetz Investment, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, L-32570,
February 28, 1977, 75 SCRA 310, 317).
Albetz Investments, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (75 SCRA 310) adds to say that the law does not specify
the period within which the order of demolition should be carried out. [28]
The petitioner and its co-owners forthwith filed a motion in Civil Case No. 890 reiterating its motion
for the issuance of a fourth alias writ of demolition [29] which was granted by the MTC in its
Order[30] dated March 20, 1996. The petitioners, in turn, filed a motion[31] in Civil Case No. 739-A before
the RTC for the reconsideration of the order lifting the writ of prohibition, but the trial court issued an
Order[32] dated October 24, 1996, denying the said motion for lack of merit. The court even set aside its
decision granting the petition for prohibition of the respondents herein.[33]
The respondents sought recourse to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a Petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition with Prayer for Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order,[34] claiming that the
RTC Orders dated December 15, 1995 and October 24, 1996, which in effect set aside a decision that
had long become final and executory, were tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
On March 13, 1998, the CA issued the assailed decision granting the petition and setting aside the
assailed orders. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Orders dated 15 December 1995
and 24 October 1996 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.[35]
The appellate court held that the decision of the RTC granting the petition for writ of prohibition
had long become final and executory; hence, immutable and can no longer be set aside.
A motion for reconsideration[36] was filed by the petitioner which the CA denied per its
Resolution[37] dated July 2, 1998.
The Petitioner filed its petition at bar contending that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN RULING
THAT HON. JUDGE FELIX CABALLES COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE
ISSUED HIS ORDERS DATED DECEMBER 15, 1995 AND OCTOBER 24, 1996 DISSOLVING THE
WRIT OF PROHIBITION AND DENYING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON QUESTION OF LAW IN
REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE ORDERS DATED DECEMBER 15, 1995 AND OCTOBER
24, 1996 ISSUED BY HON. JUDGE FELIX CABALLES.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING
THAT THE ORDER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PROHIBITION IS FINAL AND TAKES
PRECEDNCE OVER THE EARLIER FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT RENDERED BY THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO.[38]
Anent the first and the second errors, the petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in lifting the writ of prohibition. It argues that
the writ of demolition and the subsequent alias writs of demolition issued by the MTC were valid and
effective, since the five (5)-year period within which to execute a court decision by mere motion was
tolled or suspended by the obstinate act of the respondents in refusing to vacate the premises. Hence,
in lifting the writ of prohibition, Judge Caballes was merely correcting a manifestly erroneous decision
earlier issued by his predecessor, Judge Patricio M. Patajo. It posits that the July 28, 1986 Decision of
the RTC which gave due course to respondents petition for prohibition and which ordered the issuance
of the writ of prohibition was patently erroneous because it prohibited the enforcement of the decision of
the MTC in Civil Case No. 890 which had already become final and executory.
The petitioners contention has no merit.
There is no denying the fact that the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 890 had long become
final and executory when the respondents filed their petition for prohibition with the RTC in Civil Case
No. 739-A. What the respondents sought to prevent was the enforcement of the MTC decision, on their
claim that such decision could be effected only via an action to enforce the decision of the MTC, and not
by mere motion. Whether right or wrong, the decision of the RTC granting a writ of prohibition in Civil
Case No. 739-A had long become final and executory; hence, immutable, beyond the jurisdiction of the
RTC to amend, modify, or reverse.[39] Nothing is more settled in law than that when a final judgment is
executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the
court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. [40] The doctrine is founded on considerations of
public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at
some definite point in time.[41] The only recognized exceptions are the corrections of clerical errors or
the making of the so-called nunc pro tunc entries, in which case no prejudice to any party, and, of
course, where the judgment is void.[42]
Anent the third error, the petitioner contends that, contrary to the appellate courts ruling that there
are two (2) final and executory judgments in Civil Cases Nos. 890 and 739-A, there is but one
immutable judgment, that which was rendered in Civil Case No. 890. The petitioner maintains that the
decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 739-A can never attain immutability because the said case was
merely an adjunct to the ejectment suit in the MTC and has no independent existence apart from the
said ejectment suit. It argues that to hold otherwise would result in an unjust and absurd situation
whereby the prevailing party on the merits in the main case will be forever barred, by the simple
expedient of the other partys obtaining an incidental writ of prohibition, from executing the judgment in
the core case favorable to it and from enforcing a right and a demandable obligation from the losing
party.
We do not agree with the petitioner.
A special civil action of prohibition is an original and independent action and not merely a
continuation or a part of the trial resulting in the rendition of the judgment or order complained
of.[43] Neither is such an action ancillary or substitute to the action against which the supervisory
authority of the appellate court is sought and directed. It bears stressing that an action for prohibition or
certiorari, for that matter, does not divest the inferior or trial court of its jurisdiction validly acquired over
the case pending before it; it is merely an invocation for the exercise of its supervisory power over the
lower court to insure that the lower court acts within its jurisdiction. [44] If the lower court errs in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to appeal in due course from an adverse
judgment of the trial court, absent grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.
 The petitioner posits that if we uphold the decision of the CA, the decision in Civil Case No. 890
will only be phyrric. It laments that it has to go back to square one, as it was, and begin all over again.
We do not think so. The petitioner may still file an action to revive the decision of the MTC under
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and executory judgment or order may be
executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and
before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived
judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter
by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.

Besides, one may commiserate with the petitioner, ultimately, it has no one else to blame but itself.
After being declared in default in Civil Case No. 739-A, it did nothing to regain its legal standing in
court. Incredibly, it did not even lift a finger after the RTC had rendered its decision and permitted the
statutory period within which to file an appeal to elapse, consequently allowing the trial courts judgment
to become final and executory. By its own negligence, it is guilty of laches and is now precluded from
assailing the validity of the RTCs final and executory judgment and the writ of prohibition issued
pursuant thereto.
CARLITO L. MONTES, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Sixth Division, Office of the Ombudsman, Department of Science and
Technology, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.
In this Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order 1 under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner Carlito L. Montes (Montes) seeks to prohibit the Honorable
Secretary of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) from implementing the suspension
order2 dated 28 June 2000. The suspension order was issued in relation to the Decision 3 dated 17
January 2000 and Order4 dated 2 March 2000, both of the Office of the Ombudsman, in "Imelda D.
Rodriguez and Elizabeth Fontanilla v. Carlito L. Montes," docketed as OMB-ADM-0-98-0556. The
assailed suspension order reads as follows:
TO: CARLITO L. MONTES
Chief, Legal Division, DOST
In compliance with the 2nd Indorsement dated 29 March 2000 from the Office of the Ombudsman
directing this Office the implementation of the OMB Order dated 02 March 2000, in relation to OMB
Decision dated 17 January 2000, wherein you were found guilty of violation of RA 4200 (THE ANTI-
WIRE TAPPING LAW) amounting to GROSS MISCONDUCT in OMB-ADM-0-98-0556 entitled "Imelda
D. Rodriguez and Elizabeth Fontanilla -versus- Carlito L. Montes," your (sic) are hereby SUSPENDED
FROM THE SERVICE FOR ONE YEAR WITHOUT PAY EFFECTIVE JULY 16, 2000.
You are hereby directed to make the necessary turn-over/clearance of property and monetary
accountabilities and submit all pending legal work to the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Administrative and Legal Affairs.
AS ORDERED.
Taguig, Metro Manila, June 28, 2000.
(sgd)
DR. FILEMON A. URIARTE, JR.
Secretary5
OMB-ADM-0-98-0556 is the administrative complaint filed by complainants therein Imelda D. Rodriguez
and Elizabeth Fontanilla against Carlito L. Montes, Chief of the Legal Division of DOST, for grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service. Rodriguez and Fontanilla alleged that
on 15 July 1999, while Montes was in the process of adducing evidence against Rodriguez and the
DOST Secretary in the complaint for misconduct he had filed against them before the Presidential
Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), Montes produced a tape recording of a private
conversation he had had with the DOST Secretary. Montes admitted that he had taped the conversation
at the DOST Secretary’s Office without the DOST Secretary’s knowledge and consent a few days after
28 November 1993. Montes publicly played the illegal tape recording during the hearing and
subsequently marked it as Exhibit "VV."6
During cross-examination, Montes likewise admitted that he had also recorded a private conversation
he had with Fontanilla at the DOST Office in Taguig sometime in November 1997. This was without the
knowledge and consent of Fontanilla.7
Moreover, in two (2) missives8 Montes sent Pedro A. del Rosario, Jr., the former mentioned the
existence of the tape recordings he had made of his conversations with other people. Sometime in June
1998, Montes even re-played for Eduardo Langara the taped conversations he had with Secretary
William G. Padolina and Fontanilla. In addition, PCAGC Prosecutor Mariano C. Quintos, Jr., stated in
his affidavit dated 30 April 1998 that Montes submitted to him the tape recordings of Montes’ had made
of his conversations with Fontanilla.9
The Ombudsman found Montes guilty of grave misconduct and suspended him for one (1) year without
pay. The Ombudsman held that Montes’ taping of his conversations with Fontanilla was prohibited by
R.A. 4200, the Anti-Wiretapping Law. Montes did not deny that he made the recording without the
Fontanilla’s consent.10
In an Order11 dated 2 March 2000, the Ombudsman denied Montes’ motion for reconsideration and
affirmed the Decision dated 17 January 2000. Hence, Montes filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with prayer for temporary restraining order before the Court of
Appeals, docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 58267.1avvphil.net
The Court of Appeals dismissed outright Montes’ petition in a Resolution12 dated 4 May 2000 for being
procedurally infirm. Specifically, the appellate court noted that Montes failed: a) to state the specific date
when he received a copy of the Ombudsman’s Decision; b) to attach duplicate originals or certified true
copies of the challenged Decision and Order; and c) to provide an explanation why the copy of his
petition was not served personally upon therein respondent DOST Secretary.
On motion for reconsideration, however, the appellate court issued a Resolution 13 dated 22 June 2000
requiring the Ombudsman to file his comment. Notably, the appellate court considered Montes’ motion
for reconsideration abandoned in a Resolution dated 8 August 2000, in view of the commencement of
the instant petition.14
Meanwhile, on 28 June 2000, the DOST Secretary issued the assailed suspension order.
Montes now argues in his petition before the Court that the implementation of the suspension order is
premature considering the pendency of his petition before the appellate court. Citing Lapid v. Court of
Appeals,15 he further states that there is no law or provision in R.A. 6770, 16 the Ombudsman Law, or in
Administrative Order No. 717mandating the immediate execution of the Ombudsman’s decision in an
administrative case where the penalty imposed is suspension for one (1) year. Moreover, he asserts
that the administrative complaint, which is for a violation of R.A. 4200, is cognizable by the regular
courts considering the imposable penalty. Finally, he complains that he was convicted of the alleged
wire-tapping by mere substantial evidence which is short of the quantum of evidence required for
conviction of a criminal offense.18
In their Comment19 dated 18 October 2000, the Ombudsman and the DOST, through the Solicitor
General, assert that the filing of the instant petition is a violation of the proscription against forum-
shopping. Further, they argue that the execution of the suspension order despite the pendency of an
appeal is allowed under Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 14-A-00.20
In his Memorandum21 dated 16 January 2001, Montes reiterates his previous submission that the
Ombudsman should not have proceeded to hear the administrative complaint considering that an
Information22 had already been filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
168.
The Ombudsman and the DOST, on the other hand, restate in their Memorandum 23 dated 19 January
2001 that the filing of the instant petition constitutes forum-shopping. Moreover, Montes failed to raise
any valid reason which would warrant the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of
prohibition. Finally, they contend that a prohibitory injunction is not proper as the act sought to be
restrained is already fait accompli.
The pivotal issue here is whether Montes is entitled to the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining the
DOST Secretary from enforcing the suspension order.
At the outset, we find that Montes transgressed the proscription against forum shopping.
There is forum shopping when a party seeks to obtain remedies in an action in one court, which had
already been solicited, and in other courts and other proceedings in other tribunals. Forum shopping is
also the act of one party against another when an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of
seeking another and possibly favorable opinion in another forum other than by appeal or the special civil
action of certiorari; or the institution of two or more acts or proceedings grounded on the same cause on
the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. 24
Forumshopping is an act of malpractice, as the litigants trifle with the courts and abuse their processes.
It is improper conduct and degrades the administration of justice. If the act of the party or its counsel
clearly constitutes willful and deliberate forum-shopping, the same shall constitute direct contempt, and
a cause for administrative sanctions, as well as a ground for the summary dismissal of the case with
prejudice.25
In the case at bar, when Montes filed the petition for prohibition against the suspension order on 19 July
2000, his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition for certiorari was still pending before
the appellate court. In fact, in a Resolution26 dated 22 June 2000, the Court of Appeals directed the
Ombudsman to file his comment indicating that Montes’ motion for reconsideration has not been fully
resolved.
Montes’ petition for certiorari prayed, among others, that the appellate court issue an order "restraining
the Honorable Secretary, Department of Science and Technology from implementing the Order dated
02 March 2000."27Montes’ motion for reconsideration likewise prayed that "(t)he implementation of the
suspension for one year from the service without pay of the herein petitioner be restrained (subject of
the assailed OMB Decision and Order). . ."28 In the present petition, Montes prays that "(a)n order be
issued to restrain the Honorable Secretary, DOST from implementing the Suspension Order on the
herein petitioner."29
Clearly, the relief sought from the appellate court is the same as the relief prayed for in the present
petition—that is, that an order be issued restraining the DOST Secretary from implementing the
Ombudsman’s Order. In filing the instant petition without awaiting the resolution of his pending motion
before the appellate court, Montes asked for simultaneous remedies in two different fora. This act is
censurable and serves as a ground for the dismissal of the instant case with prejudice.
Moreover, we find that Montes failed to adequately show that there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to warrant the issuance of a writ of
prohibition.
For a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be
directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial or ministerial; (b)
the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.30
A remedy is considered plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of the judgment or rule, order or resolution of the lower court or agency.31
When the DOST issued the assailed suspension order on 28 June 2000, Montes’ motion for
reconsideration was still pending before the appellate court. Montes thus had the remedy of filing a
petition for prohibition before the appellate court as an incident of the petition for certiorari and motion
for reconsideration he had previously filed therewith. Had Montes brought the instant petition before the
Court of Appeals, the same could, and would, have been consolidated with his petition for certiorari,
thereby bringing under the competence of the said court all matters relative to the action, including the
incidents thereof.
Evidently too, Montes disregarded the doctrine of judicial hierarchy which we enjoin litigants and
lawyers to strictly observe as a judicial policy. For this reason, the instant petition should be dismissed.
As we ruled in Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto,32to wit:
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not
be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the
so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and
important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to
actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or
agencies whose acts for some reason or another, are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where
the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a
Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must
be presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and
lawyers must strictly observe.33
The Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with the Regional Trial Courts and the
Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction however should not be taken to mean that the parties
have an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which they will file their application or
petition. There is an ordained sequence of recourse to courts vested with concurrent jurisdiction,
beginning from the lowest, on to the next highest, and ultimately to the highest. This hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and is likewise determinative of the proper forum for petitions for
extraordinary writs. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefore, clearly and specifically
set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent the further clogging of the Court’s docket. 34

In this regard, the Court notes that Montes implicitly confirmed that he committed forum shopping by
stating that he had to file the instant petition before this Court in view of the denial of his motion for
reconsideration before the appellate court. Montes failed to consider that the same implementation of
the suspension order which impelled him to abandon his motion for reconsideration also rendered the
instant petition academic.

As the present petition is one for prohibition which is a preventive remedy, worthy of note is the fact, as
manifested by the petitioner himself, that the suspension order has already been implemented on 17
July 2000.35 The act sought to be enjoined having taken place already, there is nothing more to restrain.
Thus, the instant petition has been unmade as a mere subject matter of purely theoretical interest.
Prohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli.36
METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY, INC., VS. NATIONAL WAGES AND
PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION and REGIONAL TRIPARTITE WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY
BOARD REGION II
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 19, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 42240 which denied the petition for certiorari and prohibition of Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company, Inc. (petitioner).
The procedural antecedents and factual background of the case are as follows:
On October 17, 1995, the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board, Region II, Tuguegarao,
Cagayan (RTWPB), by virtue of Republic Act No. 6727 (R.A. No. 6727), otherwise known as the Wage
Rationalization Act,[2] issued Wage Order No. R02-03 (Wage Order), as follows:
Section 1. Upon effectivity of this Wage Order, all employees/workers in the
private sector throughout Region II, regardless of the status of employment are
granted an across-the-board increase of P15.00 daily.[3]
The Wage Order was published in a newspaper of general circulation on December 2,
1995[4] and took effect on January 1, 1996.[5] Its Implementing Rules[6] were approved on February 14,
1996.[7] Per Section 13 of the Wage Order, any party aggrieved by the Wage Order may file an appeal
with the National Wages and Productivity Commission (NWPC) through the RTWPB within 10 calendar
days from the publication of the Wage Order.
In a letter-inquiry to the NWPC dated May 7, 1996, the Bankers Council for Personnel
Management (BCPM), on behalf of its member-banks, requested for a ruling on the eligibility of
establishments with head offices outside Region II to seek exemption from the coverage of the Wage
Order since its member-banks are already paying more than the prevailing minimum wage rate in the
National Capital Region (NCR), which is their principal place of business. [8]
In a letter-reply dated July 16, 1996, the NWPC stated that the member-banks of BCPM are covered by
the Wage Order and do not fall under the exemptible categories listed under the Wage Order. [9]
In a letter-inquiry to the NWPC dated July 23, 1996, petitioner sought for interpretation of the
applicability of said Wage Order.[10] The NWPC referred petitioners inquiry to the RTWPB.
In a letter-reply dated August 12, 1996, the RTWPB clarified that the Wage Order covers all
private establishments situated in Region II, regardless of the voluntary adoption by said establishments
of the wage orders established in Metro Manila and irrespective of the amounts already paid by the
petitioner.[11]
On October 15, 1996, the petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA seeking
nullification of the Wage Order on grounds that the RTWPB acted without authority when it issued the
questioned Wage Order; that even assuming that the RTWPB was vested with the authority to prescribe
an increase, it exceeded its authority when it did so without any ceiling or qualification; that the
implementation of the Wage Order will cause the petitioner, and other similarly situated employers, to
incur huge financial losses and suffer labor unrest.[12]
On March 24, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation and
Motion in lieu of Comment affirming the petitioners claim that the RTWPB acted beyond its
authority in issuing the Wage Order prescribing an across-the-board increase to all workers and
employees in Region II, effectively granting additional or other benefits not contemplated by
R.A. No. 6727.[13]
In view of the OSGs manifestation, the CA directed respondents NWPC and RTWPB to file
their comment.[14]
On September 22, 1997, respondents filed their Comment praying that the petition should be
dismissed outright for petitioners procedural lapses; that certiorari and prohibition are unavailing since
petitioner failed to avail of the remedy of appeal prescribed by the Wage Order; that the Wage Order
has long been in effect; and that the issuance of the Wage Order was performed in the exercise of a
purely administrative function.[15]
On July 19, 2000, the CA rendered its Decision denying the petition. The appellate court
held that a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued since implementation of the Wage Order had long
become fait accompli, the Wage Order having taken effect on January 1, 1996 and its implementing
rules approved on February 14, 1996; that a writ of certiorari is improper since the Wage Order was
issued in the exercise of a purely administrative function, not judicial or quasi-judicial; that the letter-
query did not present justiciable controversies ripe for consideration by the respondents in the exercise
of their wage-fixing function, since no appeal from the Wage Order was filed; that petitioner never
brought before the said bodies any formal and definite challenge to the Wage Order and it cannot pass
off the letter-queries as actual applications for relief; that even if petitioners procedural lapse is
disregarded, a regional wage order prescribing a wage increase across-the-board applies to banks
adopting a unified wage system and a disparity in wages between employees holding similar positions
in different regions is not wage distortion.[16]
Hence, the present petition anchored on the following grounds:
4.1 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO DECLARE WAGE
ORDER NO. R02-03 NULL AND VOID AND OF NO LEGAL EFFECT.
4.1.1 THE BOARD, IN ISSUING WAGE ORDER NO. R02-03,
EXCEEDED THE AUTHORITY DELEGATED TO IT BY
CONGRESS.
4.1.2 WAGE ORDER NO. R02-03 IS AN UNREASONABLE
INTRUSION INTO THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF PETITIONER.
4.1.3 WAGE ORDER NO. R02-03 UNDERMINES THE VERY
ESSENCE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING.
4.1.4 WAGE ORDER NO. R02-03 FAILS TO TAKE INTO
ACCOUNT THE VERY RATIONALE FOR A UNIFIED WAGE
STRUCTURE.
4.2 PETITIONERS RECOURSE TO A WRIT OF CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION
WAS PROPER.[17]
 Following the submission of the Comment [18] and Reply[19] thereto, the Court gave due course
to the petition and required both parties to submit their respective memoranda.[20] In compliance
therewith, petitioner and respondents submitted their respective memoranda. [21]
Petitioner poses two issues for resolution, to wit: (1) whether Wage Order No. R02-03 is void
and of no legal effect; and (2) whether petitioners recourse to a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
the CA was proper.
Anent the first issue, petitioner maintains that the RTWPB, in issuing said Wage Order,
exceeded the authority delegated to it under R.A. No. 6727, which is limited to determining and fixing
the minimum wage rate within their respective territorial jurisdiction and with respect only to employees
who do not earn the prescribed minimum wage rate; that the RTWPB is not authorized to grant a
general across-the-board wage increase for non-minimum wage earners; that Employers Confederation
of the Philippines v. National Wages and Productivity Commission [22](hereafter referred to as ECOP) is
not authority to rule that respondents have been empowered to fix wages other than the minimum wage
since said case dealt with an across-the-board increase with a salary ceiling, where the wage
adjustment is applied to employees receiving a certain denominated salary ceiling; that the Wage Order
is an unreasonable intrusion into its property rights; that the Wage Order undermines the essence of
collective bargaining; that the Wage Order fails to take into account the rationale for a unified wage
structure.
As to the second issue, petitioner submits that ultra vires acts of administrative agencies are correctible
by way of a writ of certiorari and prohibition; that even assuming that it did not observe the proper
remedial procedure in challenging the Wage Order, the remedy of certiorari and prohibition remains
available to it by way of an exception, on grounds of justice and equity; that its failure to observe
procedural rules could not have validated the manner by which the disputed Wage Order was issued.
Respondents counter that the present petition is fatally defective from inception since no appeal from
the Wage Order was filed by petitioner; that the letter-query to the NWPC did not constitute the appeal
contemplated by law; that the validity of the Wage Order was never raised before the respondents; that
the implementation of the Wage Order had long become fait accompli for prohibition to
prosper. Respondents insist that, even if petitioners procedural lapses are disregarded, the Wage Order
was issued pursuant to the mandate of R.A. No. 6727 and in accordance with the Courts
pronouncements in the ECOP case;[23] that the Wage Order is not an intrusion on property rights since it
was issued after the required public hearings; that the Wage Order does not undermine but in fact
recognizes the right to collective bargaining; that the Wage Order did not result in wage distortion.
The Court shall first dispose of the procedural matter relating to the propriety of petitioners
recourse to the CA before proceeding with the substantive issue involving the validity of the Wage
Order.
Certiorari as a special civil action is available only if the following essential requisites
concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [24]
On the other hand, prohibition as a special civil action is available only if the following essential
requisites concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial; (2) the tribunal, corporation, board or person
has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.[25]
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine
what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these
questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. [26] Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies
to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate
facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for
their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.[27] Ministerial function is one which an
officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without
regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.[28]
In the issuance of the assailed Wage Order, respondent RTWPB did not act in any judicial,
quasi-judicial capacity, or ministerial capacity. It was in the nature of subordinate legislation,
promulgated by it in the exercise of delegated power under R.A. No. 6727. It was issued in the exercise
of quasi-legislative power. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is exercised by administrative
agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute
and the doctrine of non-delegation of certain powers flowing from the separation of the great branches
of the government.[29]
Moreover, the rule on the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition equally mandate that
these extra-ordinary remedies are available only when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A remedy is considered plain, speedy and
adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment or rule, order
or resolution of the lower court or agency.[30]
Section 13 of the assailed Wage Order explicitly provides that any party aggrieved by the
Wage Order may file an appeal with the NWPC through the RTWPB within 10 days from the publication
of the wage order.[31] The Wage Order was published in a newspaper of general circulation
on December 2, 1995.[32]
In this case, petitioner did not avail of the remedy provided by law. No appeal to the NWPC
was filed by the petitioner within 10 calendar days from publication of the Wage Order on December 2,
1995. Petitioner was silent until seven months later, when it filed a letter-inquiry on July 24, 1996 with
the NWPC seeking a clarification on the application of the Wage Order. Evidently, the letter-inquiry is
not an appeal.
It must also be noted that the NWPC only referred petitioners letter-inquiry to the
RTWPB. Petitioner did not appeal the letter-reply dated August 12, 1996 of the RTWPB to the
NWPC. No direct action was taken by the NWPC on the issuance or implementation of the Wage Order.
Petitioner failed to invoke the power of the NWPC to review regional wage levels set by the RTWPB to
determine if these are in accordance with prescribed guidelines. Thus, not only was it improper to
implead the NWPC as party-respondent in the petition before the CA and this Court, but also petitioner
failed to avail of the primary jurisdiction of the NWPC under Article 121 of the Labor Code, to wit:
ART. 121. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall
have the following powers and functions:
xxxx
 (d) To review regional wage levels set by the Regional Tripartite Wages and
Productivity Boards to determine if these are in accordance with prescribed
guidelines and national development plans;
xxxx
(f) To review plans and programs of the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity
Boards to determine whether these are consistent with national development plans;
(g) To exercise technical and administrative supervision over the Regional Tripartite
Wages and Productivity Boards;
xxxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of
fact.[33]
Nevertheless, the Court will proceed to resolve the substantial issues in the present
petition pursuant to the well-accepted principle that acceptance of a petition for certiorari or
prohibition as well as the grant of due course thereto is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court.[34] It is a well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed
to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed.[35]
As to respondents submission that the implementation of the Wage Order can no longer be
restrained since it has become fait accompli, the Wage Order having taken effect on January 1, 1996
and its implementing rules approved on February 14, 1996, suffice it to state that courts will decide a
question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.[36] Besides, a case becomes
moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful
purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. Such circumstances do not obtain in the present
case. The implementation of the Wage Order does not in any way render the case moot and academic,
since the issue of the validity of the wage order subsists even after its implementation and which has to
be determined and passed upon to resolve petitioners rights and consequent obligations therein.
It is worthy to quote the Courts pronouncements in Tan v. Commission on Elections,[37] thus:
For this Honorable Court to yield to the respondents urging that, as there has
been fait accompli, then this Honorable Court should passively accept and accede to
the prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the instant
petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with
mischief. Respondents submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this
Honorable Court decline now to perform its duty of interpreting and indicating what
the law is and should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in the corridors
of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives commit illegal acts, either brazenly or
stealthily, confident that this Honorable Court will abstain from entertaining future
challenges to their acts if they manage to bring about a fait accompli.[38]
Having disposed of this procedural issue, the Court now comes to the substance of the
petition.
R.A. No. 6727 declared it a policy of the State to rationalize the fixing of minimum wages and
to promote productivity-improvement and gain-sharing measures to ensure a decent standard of living
for the workers and their families; to guarantee the rights of labor to its just share in the fruits of
production; to enhance employment generation in the countryside through industrial dispersal; and to
allow business and industry reasonable returns on investment, expansion and growth.[39]
In line with its declared policy, R.A. No. 6727[40] created the NWPC,[41] vested with the power to
prescribe rules and guidelines for the determination of appropriate minimum wage and productivity
measures at the regional, provincial or industry levels; [42] and authorized the RTWPB to determine and
fix the minimum wage rates applicable in their respective regions, provinces, or industries
therein and issue the corresponding wage orders, subject to the guidelines issued by the
NWPC.[43] Pursuant to its wage fixing authority, the RTWPB may issue wage orders which set the daily
minimum wage rates,[44] based on the standards or criteria set by Article 124[45] of the Labor Code.
In ECOP,[46] the Court declared that there are two ways of fixing the minimum wage: the floor-
wage method and the salary-ceiling method. The floor-wage method involves the fixing of a determinate
amount to be added to the prevailing statutory minimum wage rates. On the other hand, in the salary-
ceiling method, the wage adjustment was to be applied to employees receiving a certain denominated
salary ceiling. In other words, workers already being paid more than the existing minimum wage (up to
a certain amount stated in the Wage Order) are also to be given a wage increase. [47]
To illustrate: under the floor wage method, it would have been sufficient if the Wage Order
simply set P15.00 as the amount to be added to the prevailing statutory minimum wage rates, while in
the salary-ceiling method, it would have been sufficient if the Wage Order states a specific salary, such
as P250.00, and only those earning below it shall be entitled to the salary increase.
In the present case, the RTWPB did not determine or fix the minimum wage rate by the floor-
wage method or the salary-ceiling method in issuing the Wage Order. The RTWPB did not set a wage
level nor a range to which a wage adjustment or increase shall be added. Instead, it granted an across-
the-board wage increase of P15.00 to all employees and workers of Region 2. In doing so, the RTWPB
exceeded its authority by extending the coverage of the Wage Order to wage earners receiving more
than the prevailing minimum wage rate, without a denominated salary ceiling. As correctly pointed out
by the OSG, the Wage Order granted additional benefits not contemplated by R.A. No. 6727.
In no uncertain terms must it be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and
regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a law.
The power of administrative agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect.
Corollary to this guideline is that administrative regulation cannot extend the law and amend a
legislative enactment.[48] It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be
amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. [49] Indeed, administrative or
executive acts, orders, and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution.[50]
Where the legislature has delegated to an executive or administrative officers and boards
authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative
officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority-granting
statute, do not represent a valid exercise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an
administrative body to legislate.[51]
 It has been said that when the application of an administrative issuance modifies existing laws
or exceeds the intended scope, as in this case, the issuance becomes void, not only for being ultra
vires, but also for being unreasonable.[52]
Thus, the Court finds that Section 1, Wage Order No. R02-03 is void insofar as it grants a
wage increase to employees earning more than the minimum wage rate; and pursuant to the
separability clause[53] of the Wage Order, Section 1 is declared valid with respect to employees earning
the prevailing minimum wage rate.
Prior to the passage of the Wage Order, the daily minimum wage rates in Region II was set
at P104.00 for the Province of Isabela, P103.00 for the Province of Cagayan, P101.00 for the Province
of Nueva Vizcaya, and P100.00 for the Provinces of Quirino and Batanes.[54] Only employees earning
the above-stated minimum wage rates are entitled to the P15.00 mandated increase under the Wage
Order.
Although the concomitant effect of the nullity of the Wage Order to those employees who have
received the mandated increase was not put in issue, this Court shall make a definite pronouncement
thereon to finally put this case to rest. As ruled by the Court in Latchme Motoomull v. Dela Paz,[55] the
Court will always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch
to bear the seeds of future litigation.[56]
Applying by analogy, the Courts recent pronouncement in Philippine Ports Authority v.
Commission on Audit,[57] thus:
In regard to the refund of the disallowed benefits, this Court holds that
petitioners need not refund the benefits received by them based on our rulings
in Blaquera v. Alcala, De Jesus v. Commission on Audit and Kapisanan ng mga
Manggagawa sa Government Service Insurance System (KMG) v. Commission on
Audit.
In Blaquera, the petitioners, who were officials and employees of several
government departments and agencies, were paid incentive benefits pursuant to EO
No. 292 and the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO No. 292. On January 3,
1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order (AO) No. 29
authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the
maximum amount of P1,000. Section 4 of AO No. 29 directed all departments, offices
and agencies which authorized payment of CY 1992 Productivity Incentive Bonus in
excess of P1,000to immediately cause the refund of the excess. Respondent heads
of the departments or agencies of the government concerned caused the deduction
from petitioners salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the
overpayments.Petitioners therein filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before
this Court to prevent
respondents therein from making further deductions from their salaries or
allowances. The Court ruled against the refund, thus:
Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in
good faith, we cannot countenance the refund of subject
incentive benefits for the year 1992, which amounts the
petitioners have already received. Indeed, no indicia of bad
faith can be detected under the attendant facts and
circumstances.The officials and chiefs of offices concerned
disbursed such incentive benefits in the honest belief that the
amounts given were due to the recipients and the latter
accepted the same with gratitude, confident that they richly
deserve such benefits.
The said ruling in Blaquera was applied in De Jesus.
In De Jesus, COA disallowed the payment of allowances and bonuses
consisting of representation and transportation allowance, rice allowance, productivity
incentive bonus, anniversary bonus, year-end bonus and cash gifts to members of
the interim Board of Directors of the Catbalogan Water District. This Court affirmed
the disallowance because petitioners therein were not entitled to other compensation
except for payment of per diem under PD No. 198. However, the Court ruled against
the refund of the allowances and bonuses received by petitioners, thus:
This ruling in Blaquera applies to the instant
case. Petitioners here received the additional allowances and
bonuses in good faith under the honest belief that LWUA
Board Resolution No. 313 authorized such payment. At the
time petitioners received the additional allowances and
bonuses, the Court had not yet decided Baybay Water
District. Petitioners had no knowledge that such payment was
without legal basis. Thus, being in good faith, petitioners need
not refund the allowances and bonuses they received but
disallowed by the COA.
Further, in KMG, this Court applied the ruling in Blaquera and De Jesus in
holding that the Social Insurance Group (SIG) personnel of the Government Service
Insurance System need not refund the hazard pay received by them although said
benefit was correctly disallowed by COA. The Court ruled:
The Court however finds that the DOH and GSIS
officials concerned who granted hazard pay under R.A. No.
7305 to the SIG personnel acted in good faith, in the honest
belief that there was legal basis for such grant. The SIG
personnel in turn accepted the hazard pay benefits likewise
believing that they were entitled to such benefit. At that time,
neither the concerned DOH and GSIS officials nor the SIG
personnel knew that the grant of hazard pay to the latter is not
sanctioned by law. Thus, following the rulings of the Court
in De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, and Blaquera v. Alcala,
the SIG personnel who previously received hazard pay under
R.A. No. 7305 need not refund such benefits.
In the same vein, the rulings in Blaquera, De Jesus and KMG apply to this
case. Petitioners received the hazard duty pay and birthday cash gift in good faith
since the benefits were authorized by PPA Special Order No. 407-97 issued pursuant
to PPA Memorandum Circular No. 34-95 implementing DBM National Compensation
Circular No. 76, series of 1995, and PPA Memorandum Circular No. 22-97,
respectively. Petitioners at that time had no knowledge that the payment of said
benefits lacked legal basis. Being in good faith, petitioners need not refund the
benefits they received.[58] (Emphasis supplied)
employees, other than minimum wage earners, who received the wage increase mandated by the Wage
Order need not refund the wage increase received by them since they received the wage increase in
good faith, in the honest belief that they are entitled to such wage increase and without any knowledge
that there was no legal basis for the same.

Considering the foregoing, the Court need not delve on the other arguments raised by the
parties.