BARANDA V GUSTILO
(pp. 107-108, Rollo — G.R. No. 64432)
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia were the petitioners
in G.R. No. 64432 and the private respondents in G.R. No.
62042. The subject matter of these two (2) cases and the
instant case is the same — a parcel of land designated as Lot
No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406.
The present petition arose from the same facts and events
which triggered the filing of the earlier petitions. These facts
and events are cited in our resolution dated December 29,
1983 in G.R. No. 64432, as follows:
. . . This case has its origins in a petition for reconstitution of
title filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo involving a
parcel of land known as Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara
Cadastre covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 in
the name of Romana Hitalia. Eventually, Original Certificate of
Title No. 6406 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 106098 was issued in the names of Alfonso Hitalia and
Eduardo S. Baranda The Court issued a writ of possession
which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao
refused to honor on the ground that they also have TCT No.
25772 over the same Lot No. 4517. The Court, after
considering the private respondents' opposition and finding
TCT No. 25772 fraudulently acquired, ordered that the writ of
possession be carried out. A motion for reconsideration
having been denied, a writ of demolition was issued on March
29, 1982. Perez and Gotera filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On August 6, 1982, the
Court of Appeals denied the petition. Perez and Gotera filed
the petition for review on certiorari denominated as G.R. No.
62042 before the Supreme Court. As earlier stated the
petition was denied in a resolution dated January 7,1983. The
motion for reconsideration was denied in another resolution
dated March 25, 1983, which also stated that the denial is
final. This decision in G.R. No. 62042, in accordance with the
entry of judgment, became final on March 25, 1983. The
petitioners in the instant case G.R. No. 64432--contend that
the writs of possession and demolition issued in the
respondent court should now be implemented; that Civil Case
No. 00827 before the Intermediate Appellate Court was filed
only to delay the implementation of the writ; that counsel for
the respondent should be held in contempt of court for
engaging in a concerted but futile effort to delay the execution
of the writs of possession and demolition and that petitioners
are entitled to damages because of prejudice caused by the
filing of this petition before the Intermediate Appellate Court.
On September 26, 1983, this Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order ' to maintain the status quo, both in the
Intermediate Appellate Court and in the Regional Trial Court
of Iloilo. Considering that (l)there is merit in the instant
petition for indeed the issues discussed in G.R. No. 64432 as
raised in Civil Case No. 00827 before the respondent court
have already been passed upon in G.R. No. 62042; and (2) the
Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Intermediate
Appellate Court was only intended not to render the petition
moot and academic pending the Court's consideration of the
issues, the Court RESOLVED to DIRECT the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court not to take cognizance of issues
already resolved by this Court and accordingly DISMISS the
petition in Civil Case No. 00827. Immediate implementation of
the writs of possession and demolition is likewise ordered.
On May 9, 1984, the Court issued a resolution denying with
finality a motion for reconsideration of the December 29,
1983 resolution in G.R. No. 64432. On this same date, another
resolution was issued, this time in G.R. No. 62042, referring to
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo the ex-parte motion of the
private respondents (Baranda and Hitalia) for execution of the
judgment in the resolutions dated January 7, 1983 and March
9, 1983. In the meantime, the then Intermediate Appellate
Court issued a resolution dated February 10, 1984, dismissing
Civil Case No. 00827 which covered the same subject matter
as the Resolutions above cited pursuant to our Resolution
dated December 29, 1983. The resolution dated December 29,
1983 in G.R. No. 64432 became final on May 20, 1984.
Upon motions of the petitioners, the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo, Branch 23 presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued the
following order:
Submitted are the following motions filed by movants
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia through counsel dated
August 28, 1984:
(a) Reiterating Motion for Execution of Judgment of
Resolutions dated January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983
Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in
G.R. No. 62042;
(b) Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolution dated
December 29, 1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme
Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 64432;
(c) The Duties of the Register of Deeds are purely ministerial
under Act 496, therefore she must register all orders,
judgment, resolutions of this Court and that of Honorable
Supreme Court.
Finding the said motions meritorious and there being no
opposition thereto, the same is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is
hereby declared null and void and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-106098 is hereby declared valid and subsisting title
concerning the ownership of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia, all of Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
The Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo is further ordered to
register the Subdivision Agreement of Eduardo S. Baranda and
Alfonso Hitalia as prayed for." (p. 466, Rollo--G.R. No. 64432)
The above order was set aside on October 8, 1984 upon a
motion for reconsideration and manifestation filed by the
Acting Registrar of Deeds of Iloilo, Atty. Helen P. Sornito, on
the ground that there was a pending case before this Court, an
Action for Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction under G.R. No.
67661 filed by Atty. Eduardo Baranda, against the former
which remained unresolved.
In view of this development, the petitioners filed in G.R. No.
62042 and G.R. No. 64432 ex-parte motions for issuance of an
order directing the Regional Trial Court and Acting Register of
Deeds to execute and implement the judgments of this Court.
They prayed that an order be issued:
1. Ordering both the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo Branch
XXIII, under Hon. Judge Tito G. Gustilo and the acting Register
of Deeds Helen P. Sornito to register the Order dated
September 5, 1984 of the lower court;
2. To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-106098 and
once cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia;
Plus other relief and remedies equitable under the premises.
(p. 473, 64432 Rollo)
Acting on these motions, we issued on September 17,1986 a
Resolution in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 granting the
motions as prayed for. Acting on another motion of the same
nature filed by the petitioners, we issued another Resolution
dated October 8, 1986 referring the same to the Court
Administrator for implementation by the judge below.
In compliance with our resolutions, the Regional Trial Court
of Iloilo, Branch 23 presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued
two (2) orders dated November 6,1986 and January 6,1987
respectively, to wit:
ORDER
This is an Ex-parte Motion and Manifestation submitted by the
movants through counsel on October 20, 1986; the
Manifestation of Atty. Helen Sornito, Register of Deeds of the
City of Iloilo, and formerly acting register of deeds for the
Province of Iloilo dated October 23, 1986 and the
Manifestation of Atty. Avito S. Saclauso, Acting Register of
Deeds, Province of Iloilo dated November 5, 1986.
Considering that the motion of movants Atty. Eduardo S.
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia dated August 12, 1986 seeking
the full implementation of the writ of possession was granted
by the Honorable Supreme Court, Second Division per its
Resolution dated September 17,1986, the present motion is
hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, the Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo,
is hereby ordered to register the Order of this Court dated
September 5, 1984 as prayed for.
xxx xxx xxx
ORDER
This is a Manifestation and Urgent Petition for the Surrender
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 submitted by the
petitioners Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia on
December 2, 1986, in compliance with the order of this Court
dated November 25, 1 986, a Motion for Extension of Time to
File Opposition filed by Maria Provido Gotera through counsel
on December 4, 1986 which was granted by the Court
pursuant to its order dated December 15, 1986. Considering
that no Opposition was filed within the thirty (30) days period
granted by the Court finding the petition tenable, the same is
hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Maria Provido Gotera is hereby ordered to
surrender Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 to this
Court within ten (10) days from the date of this order, after
which period, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is
hereby declared annulled and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo is
ordered to issue a new Certificate of Title in lieu thereof in the
name of petitioners Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia, which certificate shall contain a memorandum of the
annulment of the outstanding duplicate. (pp. 286-287, Rollo
64432)
On February 9, 1987, Atty. Hector Teodosio, the counsel of
Gregorio Perez, private respondent in G.R. No. 64432 and
petitioner in G.R. No. 62042, filed a motion for explanation in
relation to the resolution dated September 17, 1986 and
manifestation asking for clarification on the following points:
a. As to the prayer of Atty. Eduardo Baranda for the
cancellation of TCT T-25772, should the same be referred to
the Court of Appeals (as mentioned in the Resolution of
November 27, 1985) or is it already deemed granted by
implication (by virtue of the Resolution dated September 17,
1986)?
b. Does the Resolution dated September 17, 1986 include not
only the implementation of the writ of possession but also the
cancellation of TCT T-25772 and the subdivision of Lot 4517?
(p. 536, Rollo — 4432)
Acting on this motion and the other motions filed by the
parties, we issued a resolution dated May 25, 1987 noting all
these motions and stating therein:
xxx xxx xxx
Since entry of judgment in G.R. No. 62042 was made on
January 7, 1983 and in G.R. No. 64432 on May 30, 1984, and
all that remains is the implementation of our resolutions, this
COURT RESOLVED to refer the matters concerning the
execution of the decisions to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City for appropriate action and to apply disciplinary sanctions
upon whoever attempts to trifle with the implementation of
the resolutions of this Court. No further motions in these
cases will be entertained by this Court. (p. 615, Rollo-64432)
In the meantime, in compliance with the Regional Trial
Court's orders dated November 6, 1986 and January 6, 1987,
Acting Register of Deeds AvitoSaclauso annotated the order
declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 as null and
void, cancelled the same and issued new certificates of titles
numbers T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562 in the name of
petitioners Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia in lieu of
Transfer Certificate of TItle No. T-106098.
However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of
a separate case (Civil Case No. 15871) still pending in the
Court of Appeals" was carried out and annotated in the new
certificates of titles issued to the petitioners. This was upheld
by the trial court after setting aside its earlier order dated
February 12, 1987 ordering the cancellation of lis pendens.
This prompted the petitioners to file another motion in G.R,
No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 to order the trial court to
reinstate its order dated February 12, 1987 directing the
Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendensin
the new certificates of titles.
In a resolution dated August 17, 1987, we resolved to refer the
said motion to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch
23 for appropriate action.
Since respondent Judge Tito Gustilo of the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 denied the petitioners' motion to
reinstate the February 12, 1987 order in another order dated
September 17, 1987, the petitioners filed this petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction to compel the respondent judge to reinstate his
order dated February l2, 1987 directing the Acting Register of
Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the new
certificates of titles issued in the name of the petitioners.
The records show that after the Acting Register of Deeds
annotated a notice of is pendens on the new certificates of
titles issued in the name of the petitioners, the petitioners
filed in the reconstitution case an urgent ex-parte motion to
immediately cancel notice of lis pendens annotated thereon.
In his order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge
Gustilo granted the motion and directed the Acting Register of
Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the lis pendens found on Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-106098; T-111560; T-111561 and T-
111562.
Respondent Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a
motion for reconsideration of the February 12, 1987 order
stating therein:
That the undersigned hereby asks for a reconsideration of the
said order based on the second paragraph of Section 77 of P.D.
1529, to wit:
"At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant or
other disposition of the action such as to terminate finally all
rights of the plaintiff in and to the land and/or buildings
involved, in any case in which a memorandum or notice of Lis
Pendens has been registered as provided in the preceding
section, the notice of Lis Pendens shall be deemed cancelled
upon the registration of a certificate of the clerk of court in
which the action or proceeding was pending stating the
manner of disposal thereof."
That the lis pendens under Entry No. 427183 was annotated
on T-106098, T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562 by virtue of
a case docketed as Civil Case No. 15871, now pending with the
Intermediate Court of Appeals, entitled, "Calixta Provido,
Ricardo Provido, Sr., Maria Provido and Perfecto Provido,
Plaintiffs, versus Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia,
Respondents."
That under the above-quoted provisions of P.D. 152, the
cancellation of subject Notice of Lis Pendens can only be made
or deemed cancelled upon the registration of the certificate of
the Clerk of Court in which the action or proceeding was
pending, stating the manner of disposal thereof.
Considering that Civil Case No. 1587, upon which the Notice of
Lis Pendens was based is still pending with the Intermediate
Court of Appeals, only the Intermediate Court of Appeals and
not this Honorable Court in a mere cadastral proceedings can
order the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens. (pp. 68-69,
Rollo)
Adopting these arguments and on the ground that some if not
all of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were not privies to
the case affected by the Supreme Court resolutions,
respondent Judge Tito Gustilo set aside his February 12, 1987
order and granted the Acting Register of Deeds' motion for
reconsideration.
The issue hinges on whether or not the pendency of the
appeal in Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals
prevents the court from cancelling the notice of lis pendens in
the certificates of titles of the petitioners which were earlier
declared valid and subsisting by this Court in G.R. No. 62042
and G.R. No. 64432. A corollary issue is on the nature of the
duty of a Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis
pendens in a torrens certificate of title.
Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek recovery of Lot
No. 4517 of Sta. Barbara Cadastre Iloilo, (the same subject
matter of G.R. No 62042 and G.R. No. 64432) from petitioners
Baranda and Hitalia filed by Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido,
Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido before the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23. At the instance of Atty. Hector
P. Teodosio, the Provides' counsel, a notice of is pendens was
annotated on petitioners' Certificate of Title No. T-106098
covering Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners, the
court issued an order dated October 24, 1984 dismissing Civil
Case No. 15871.
The order was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. This
appeal is the reason why respondent Judge Gustilo recalled
the February 12, 1987 order directing the Acting Register of
Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated on the
certificates of titles of the petitioners.
This petition is impressed with merit.
Maria Provido Gotera was one of the petitioners in G.R. No.
62042. Although Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima
Provido and Perfecta Provido, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
15871 were not impleaded as parties, it is very clear in the
petition that Maria Provido was acting on behalf of the
Providos who allegedly are her co-owners in Lot No. 4517,
Sta. Barbara Cadastre as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-25772 issued in her name and the names of the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871, among others. (Annex "E"
G.R. No. 62042, p. 51, Rollo) In fact, one of the issues raised by
petitioners Maria Provido Gotera and Gregoria Perez in G.R.
No. 62042 was as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Whether or not, in the same reconstitution proceedings,
respondent Judge Midpantao L. Adil had the authority to
declare as null and void the transfer certificate of title in the
name of petitioner Maria Provido Gotera and her other co-
owners. (p. 3, Rollo; Emphasis supplied)
It thus appears that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were
privies to G.R. No. 62042 contrary to the trial court's findings
that they were not.
G.R. No. 62042 affirmed the order of the then Court of First
Instance of Iloilo in the reconstitution proceedings declaring
TCT No. 25772 in the name of Providos over Lot No. 4517, Sta.
Barbara Cadastre null and void for being fraudulently
obtained and declaring TCT No. 106098 over the same parcel
Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the name of petitioners
Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia valid and subsisting.
The decision in G.R. No. 62042 became final and executory on
March 25,1983 long before Civil Case No. 15871 was filed.
Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the
Providos, private respondents herein, in filing Civil Case No.
15871 were trying to delay the full implementation of the
final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as well as G.R. No. 64432
wherein this Court ordered immediate implementation of the
writs of possession and demolition in the reconstitution
proceedings involving Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is defined in the
following manner:
Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the
party causing the registration thereof With the lis pendens
duly recorded, he could rest secure that he would not lose the
property or any part of it. For, notice of lis pendens serves as a
warning to a prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the
particular property is in litigation; and that he should keep his
hands off the same, unless of course he intends to gamble on
the results of the litigation. (Section 24, Rule 14, RuIes of
Court; Jamora v. Duran, et al., 69 Phil. 3, 11; I Martin, Rules of
Court, p. 415, footnote 3, citing cases.) (Natanov. Esteban, 18
SCRA 481, 485-486)
The private respondents are not entitled to this protection.
The facts obtaining in this case necessitate the application of
the rule enunciated in the cases of Victoriano v. Rovila (55
Phil. 1000), Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of First
Instance of Rizal (70 Phil., 363) and Sarmiento v. Ortiz (10
SCRA 158), to the effect that:
We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency
which has been filed in a proper case, cannot be cancelled
while the action is pending and undetermined, the proper
court has the discretionary power to cancel it under peculiar
circumstances, as for instance, where the evidence so far
presented by the plaintiff does not bear out the main
allegations of his complaint, and where the continuances of
the trial, for which the plaintiff is responsible, are
unnecessarily delaying the determination of the case to the
prejudice of the defendant. (Victoriano v. Rovira, supra; The
Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of
Rizal, supra)
The facts of this case in relation to the earlier cases brought all
the way to the Supreme Court illustrate how the private
respondents tried to block but unsuccessfuly the already final
decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.
Parenthetically, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his
discretion in sustaining the respondent Acting Register of
Deeds' stand that, the notice of lis pendens in the certificates
of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4571, Barbara Cadastre
cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of Civil Case
No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals. In upholding the
position of the Acting Register of Deeds based on Section 77 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, he conveniently forgot the first
paragraph thereof which provides:
Cancellation of lis pendens. — Before final judgment, a notice
of lis pendens may be cancelled upon Order of the Court after
proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting
the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the
rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It may also
be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of
the party who caused the registration thereof.
This Court cannot understand how respondent Judge Gustilo
could have been misled by the respondent Acting Register of
Deeds on this matter when in fact he was the same Judge who
issued the order dismissing Civil Case No. 15871 prompting
the private respondents to appeal said order dated October
10, 1984 to the Court of Appeals. The records of the main case
are still with the court below but based on the order, it can be
safely assumed that the various pleadings filed by the parties
subsequent to the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners
(the defendants therein) touched on the issue of the validity of
TCT No. 25772 in the name of the Providos over Lot Number
4571, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the light of the final decisions
in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.
The next question to be determined is on the nature of the
duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate and/or cancel the
notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title.
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall
be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an
instrument presented for registration dealing with real or
personal property which complies with all the requisites for
registration. ... . If the instrument is not registrable, he shall
forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor
of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reasons
therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal
by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree."
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in
doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or
memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage
or other instrument presented to him for registration or
where any party in interest does not agree with the action
taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such
instrument, the question shall be submitted to the
Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or
by the party in interest thru the Register of Deeds. ... ."
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when
the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the
language employed and the statute must be taken to mean
exactly what it says. (Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA
231; Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union
[IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663) The statute concerning
the function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments
in a torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves no room for
construction. According to Webster's Third International
Dictionary of the English Language — the word shall means
"ought to, must, ...obligation used to express a command or
exhortation, used in laws, regulations or directives to express
what is mandatory." Hence, the function of a Register of Deeds
with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances,
instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The
respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal
standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the
respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice
of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the
petitioners over the subject parcel of land. In case of doubt as
to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ...
or other instrument presented to him, he should have asked
the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration now,
the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds
Registration Administration in accordance with Section 117 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529.
In the ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the
delays in the full implementation of this Court's already final
resolutions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 which
includes the cancellation of the notice of lis pendensannotated
in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4517
of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre falls on the respondent Judge. He
should never have allowed himself to become part of dilatory
tactics, giving as excuse the wrong impression that Civil Case
No. 15871 filed by the private respondents involves another
set of parties claiming Lot No. 4517 under their own Torrens
Certificate of Title.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February
12, 1987 order of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23
is REINSTATED. All subsequent orders issued by the trial
court which annulled the February 12, 1987 order are SET
ASIDE. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS: A parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the
Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo covered by original
certificate of title no. 6406 is the land subject of the dispute
between petitioner (Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia)
and respondents(Gregorio Perez, Maria Gotera and Susan
Silao). Both parties claimed ownership and possession over
the said land. However during the trial, it was found that the
transfer certificate of title held by respondents was
fraudulently acquired. So the transfer certificate of title was
ordered to be put in the name of petitioners. In compliance
with the order or the RTC, the Acting Register of Deeds Avito
Saclauso annotated the order declaring TCT T-25772 null and
void, cancelled the same and issued new certificate of titles in
the name of petitioners. However, by reason of a separate case
pending in the Court of Appeals, a notice of lis pendens was
annotated in the new certificate of title. This prompted the
petitioners to move for the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens in the new certificates. Judge Tito Gustilo then
ordered the Acting Register of Deeds for the cancellation of
the notice of lis pendens but the Acting Register of Deeds filed
a motion for reconsideration invoking Sec 77 of PD 1529.
ISSUE: What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds
to annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens in a Torrens
certificate of title?
HELD: Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the
Acting Register of Deed’s stand that the notice of lis pendens
cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of the case in
the Court of Appeals. The function of the Register of Deeds
with reference to the registration of deeds, encumbrances,
instrument and the like is ministerial in nature. The acting
register of deeds did not have any legal standing to file a
motionfor reconsideration of the Judge’s Order directing him
to cancel the notice of lis pendens. Sec. 10 of PD 1529 states
that: “It shall be the duty of the register of deeds to
immediately register an instrument presented for registration
dealing with real or
personal property which complies with all the requisites for r
egistration.
If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny
registration thereof and in form the presentor or such denial
in writing, stating the ground and reasons therefore, and
advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance
with Sec 117 of this decree.” On the other hand, Sec 117 of PD
117 states that: “When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with
regard to the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be
made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument
presented to him for registration or where any party in
interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register
of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question
shall be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by
the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest through the
Register of Deeds.”
BALBIN V REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCUS SUR
Appeal from the resolution of the Commissioner of Land
Registration in LRC Consulta No. 366.
On November 15, 1961 petitioners presented to the register
of deeds of Ilocos Sur a duplicate copy of the registered
owner's certificate of title (OCT No. 548) and an instrument
entitled "Deed of Donation inter-vivos," with the request that
the same be annotated on the title. Under the terms of the
instrument sought to be annotated one Cornelio Balbin,
registered owner of the parcel of land described in OCT No.
548, appears to have donated inter-vivos an undivided two-
thirds (²/³) portion thereof in favor of petitioners. The entire
area of the land is 11.2225 hectares.
The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for
being "legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in law." It
appears that previously annotated in the memorandum of
encumbrances on the certificate are three separate sales of
undivided portions of the land earlier executed by Cornelio
Balbin in favor of three different buyers. The pertinent entries
read:
Entry No. 5658. Sales.
Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner,
conveying an undivided portion of an area of 3,710 square
meters only in favor of Florentino Gabayan, this Original
Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to
said area of 3,710 square meters and in lieu thereof, the name
of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to all rights,
participation in interest of the vendor. ...
Date of Instrument: January 25, 1955, ...
xxx xxx xxx
Entry No. 5659. Sale of portion.
Sale for the sum of P100.00 executed by the registered owner,
conveying an undivided portion of an area of 16,713 square
meters in favor of Roberto Bravo, this Original Certificate of
Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said
undivided portion ... and in lieu thereof the name of the
vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to all rights,
participation and interest of the vendor ...
Date of Instrument: June 9, 1953. ...
Entry No. 5660. Sale of portion.
Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the
registered owner, conveying an undivided portion of
an area of 15,000 square meters in favor of Juana
Gabayan, this Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby
cancelled with respect to said undivided portion ...
and in lieu thereof the name of the vendee ... is
hereby substituted to succeed to all rights,
participation and interest of the vendor ...
Date of Instrument: February 12, 1952. ...
The final part of the annotations referring to the
abovementioned sales contains an additional memorandum
stating that "three co-owner's duplicate certificates of title No.
548 have been issued (by the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur)
in the name of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana
Gabayan upon verbal request of Mr. Andres Cabeldo, Notary
Public of Caoayan, I. Sur, for and in the name of the vendees,
this 5th day of January, 1956 at Vigan, I. Sur." Mainly because
these three other co-owner's copies of the certificate of title
No. 548 had not been presented by petitioners, the Register of
Deeds refused to make the requested annotation.
Unsatisfied, petitioners referred the matter to the
Commissioner of Land Registration, who subsequently upheld
the action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution dated April
10, 1962. With respect to the principal point in controversy,
the Commissioner observed:
(1) It appears that the donor is now merely a co-owner of the
property described in the Original Certificate of Title No. 548,
having previously sold undivided portions thereof on three
different occasions in favor of three different buyers.
Consequently, aside from the owner's duplicate issued to
Cornelio Balbin, there are now three co-owner's duplicates
which are presumably in the possession of the three buyers.
Accordingly, in addition to the owner's duplicate of Original
Certificate of Title No. 548, the three co-owner's duplicates
must likewise be surrendered. The claim of counsel for the
donees that the issuance of the three co-owner's duplicates
was unauthorized is beside the point. Unless and until a court
of competent jurisdiction rules to the contrary, these titles are
presumed to have been lawfully issued.lawphi1.ñet
Without presenting those three (3) other duplicates of the
title, petitioners would want to compel annotation of the deed
of donation upon the copy in their possession, citing section
55 of Act 496, which provides that "the production of the
owner's duplicate certificate of title whenever any voluntary
instrument is presented for registration shall be conclusive
authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to
make a memorandum of registration in accordance with such
instrument." Under this provision, according to petitioners,
the presentation of the other copies of the title is not required,
first, because it speaks of "registered owner" and not one
whose claim to or interest in the property is merely annotated
on the title, such as the three vendees-co-owners in this case;
and secondly, because the issuance of the duplicate copies in
their favor was illegal or unauthorized.
We find no merit in petitioners' contention. Section 55, supra,
obviously assumes that there is only one duplicate copy of the
title in question, namely, that of the registered owner himself,
such that its production whenever a voluntary instrument is
presented constitutes sufficient authority from him for the
register of deeds to make the corresponding memorandum of
registration. In the case at bar, the three other copies of the
title were in existence, presumably issued under section 43 * of
Act 496. As correctly observed by the Land Registration
Commissioner, petitioners' claim that the issuance of those
copies was unauthorized or illegal is beside the point, its
legality being presumed until otherwise declared by a court of
competent jurisdiction. There being several copies of the
same title in existence, it is easy to see how their integrity may
be adversely affected if an encumbrance, or an outright
conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the others.
The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a
duplicate of the original, which means that both must contain
identical entries of the transactions, particularly voluntary
ones, affecting the land covered by the title. If this were not so,
if different copies were permitted to carry differing
annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would
cease to be reliable.
One other ground relied upon by the Land Registration
Commissioner in upholding the action taken by the Register of
Deeds of Ilocos Sur is that since the property subject of the
donation is presumed conjugal, that is, property of the
marriage of the donor, Cornelio Balbin, and his deceased wife,
Nemesia Mina, "there should first be a liquidation of the
partnership before the surviving spouse may make such a
conveyance." This legal conclusion may appear too general
and sweeping in its implications, for without a previous
settlement of the partnership a surviving spouse may dispose
of his aliquot share or interest therein — subject of course to
the result of future liquidation. Nevertheless, it is not to be
denied that, if the conjugal character of the property is
assumed, the deed of donation executed by the husband,
Cornelio Balbin, bears on its face an infirmity which justified
the denial of its registration, namely, the fact that the two-
thirds portion of said property which he donated was more
than his one-half share, not to say more than what remained
of such share after he had sold portions of the same land to
three other parties.
It appears that there is a case pending in the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur (CC No. 2221), wherein the civil status
of the donor Cornelio Balbin and the character of the land in
question are in issue, as well as the validity of the different
conveyances executed by him. The matter of registration of
the deed of donation may well await the outcome of that case,
and in the meantime the rights of the interested parties could
be protected by filing the proper notices of lis pendens.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decisions of the Register of
Deeds of Ilocos Sur and that of the Commissioner of Land
Registration are affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.
CASE DIGEST:
Where several co-owner’s duplicate of certificates of titles are
issued, a voluntary instrument cannot be registered without
surrendering all the copies to the Register of Deeds so that
every copy of thereof would contain identical entries of the
transactions affecting the land covered.
FACTS:
Petitioners Aurelio and Francis Balbin presented to the Ilocos
Sur register of deeds a duplicate copy of the registered
owner’s certificate of title and a deed of donation inter-vivos,
requesting that the latter be annotated on the title. The
registered owner Cornelio Balbin appears to have
donated inter-vivos 2/3 portion of the land. The register of
deeds denied the requested annotation for being “legally
defective or otherwise not sufficient in law.” It appears that
previously annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances
on the OCT are three separate sales earlier executed by
Cornelio Balbin in favor of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo
and Juana Gabayan, who each received their co-owner’s
duplicate CTs. Mainly because these 3 co-owner’s copies of
CTs had not been presented by petitioners, the register of
deeds refused to make the requested annotation. Petitioners
referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration,
who upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution.
ISSUE:
W/N the refusal of the Register of Deeds to make the
annotation is proper
HELD:
YES. There being several copies of the same title in existence,
their integrity may be affected if an encumbrance, or an
outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the
others. If different copies were permitted to carry different
annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would
cease to be available.
Since the property subject of donation is also presumed
conjugal, that is, property of donor Cornelio and his deceased
wife Nemesia Mina, “there should first be a liquidation of the
partnership before the surviving spouse may make such a
conveyance.” Assuming the conjugal nature of the property,
the donation bears on its face an infirmity which justified the
denial of registration, namely, the fact that 2/3 portion of the
property which Cornelio donated was more than ½ his share,
not to say more than what remained of such share after he
had sold portions of the same land to 3 other parties.
Pending the resolution of a separate case, wherein Cornelio’s
civil status, character of land and validity of conveyances are
in issue, the registration may await the outcome of said case
and parties may protect their rights by filing the proper
notices of lis pendens.
ALMIROL V REGISTER OF DEEDS
On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio
Abalo a parcel of land situated in the municipality of
Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by original
certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo,
married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol
went to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan
City to register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a
transfer certificate of title. Registration was refused by the
Register of Deeds upon the following grounds, inter alia,
stated in his letter of May 21, 1962:
1. That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in
the name of Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and
by legal presumption, is considered conjugal property;
2. That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the
effectivity of the New Civil Code it is necessary that both
spouses sign the document; but
3. Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the
sale was made, the surviving husband can not dispose of the
whole property without violating the existing law (LRC
Consulta No. 46 dated June 10, 1958).
To effect the registration of the aforesaid deed
of absolute Sale, it is necessary that the property be
first liquidated and transferred in the name of the
surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased wife
by means of extrajudicial settlement or partition and
that the consent of such other heir or heirs must be
procured by means of another document ratifying
this sale executed by their father.
 In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First
Instance of Agusan on a petition for mandamus (sp. civ. case
151), to compel the Register of Deeds to register the deed of
sale and to issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate
of title, and to recover P5,000 in moral damages and P1,000
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. It is Almirol's
assertion that it is but a ministerial duty of the respondent to
perform the acts required of him, and that he (Almirol) has no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
In his answer with counterclaim for P10,000 damages,
the respondent reiterated the grounds stated in his letter of
May 21, 1962, averred that the petitioner has "other legal,
plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law by appealing the
decision of the respondent to the Honorable Commissioner of
Land Registration," and prayed for dismissal of the petition.
In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court,
declaring that "mandamus does not lie . . . because the
adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep. Act
1151", dismissed the petition, with costs against the
petitioner.
Hence the present appeal by Almirol.
The only question of law tendered for resolution is
whether mandamus will lie to compel the respondent to
register the deed of sale in question.
Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent
evince a sincere desire on his part to maintain inviolate the
law on succession and transmission of rights over real
properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his
refusal to register the deed. Whether a document is valid or
not, is not for the register of deeds to determine; this function
belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction. 1
Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to
harass, is not the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a
court of competent jurisdiction. (Gabriel vs. Register of Deeds
of Rizal, et al., L-17956, Sept. 30, 1953).
. . . the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid
objection to their registration, because invalidity is no proof of
their non-existence or a valid excuse for denying their
registration. The law on registration does not require that
only valid instruments shall be registered. How can parties
affected thereby be supposed to know their invalidity before
they become aware, actually or constructively, of their
existence or of their provisions? If the purpose of registration
is merely to give notice, then questions regarding the effect or
invalidity of instruments are expected to be decided after, not
before, registration. It must follow as a necessary consequence
that registration must first be allowed, and validity or effect
litigated afterwards. (Gurbax Singh Pablo & Co. vs. Reyes and
Tantoco, 92 Phil. 182-183).
Indeed, a register of deeds is entirely precluded by
section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal
judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem
of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground
that it is invalid. For under the said section, when he is in
doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any
deed or other instrument presented to him for registration, all
that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the question
to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after
notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be
taken on the doubtful question. Section 4 of R.A. 1151 reads as
follows:
Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land
Registration. — When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with
regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be
made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other
instrument presented to him for registration, or where any
party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds
with reference to any such matter, the question shall be
submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration either
upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the
question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in
writing by the party in interest; and thereupon the
Commissioner, after consideration of the matter shown by the
records certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after
notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order
prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made.
His decision in such cases shall be conclusive and binding
upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further, That when a
party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the
Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said
decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty
days from and after receipt of the notice thereof.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the court a quo correctly
dismissed the petition for mandamus. Section 4 abovequoted
provides that "where any party in interest does not agree with
the Register of Deeds . . . the question shall be submitted to the
Commissioner of Land Registration," who thereafter shall
"enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or
memorandum to be made," which shall be "conclusive and
binding upon all Registers of Deeds." This administrative
remedy must be resorted to by the petitioner before he can
have recourse to the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of the lower court of
October 16, 1969, is affirmed, at petitioner's cost.1ä
CASE DIGEST:
FACTS:
1. Teodoro Almirol bought a parcel of land in
Esperanza, Agusan from Arsenio Abalo.
2. Almirol then went to the Register of Deeds (ROD) of
Agusan to have the Deed of Sale registered and to secure
a transfer certificate in his name. However, the ROD
refused.
3. It was based on the ground that the said property
was conjugal and it is necessary that both spouses sign
the document. However, since the wife was dead when
the sale was made, the husband cannot dispose the
whole property without first liquidating and
transferring it in his name and the heirs by means of
 extrajudicial settlement. The consent of the heirs must
also be procured.
4. Aggrieved, Almirol went to the RTC of Agusan to have
the ROD be compelled to register the Deed of Sale and
issue the transfer certificate of title.
5. However, the RTC dismissed the petition saying that
the adequate remedy is the one provided for under Sec.
4 of RA 1151 – that is to submit and certify the question
to the Commissioner of Land Registration. Hence,
petition.
ISSUE: Was the RTC correct?
RULING: Yes. But the ROD should have registered it still.
1. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the
ROD to determine; this function belongs properly to a
court of competent jurisdiction.
2. However, where any party in interest does not agree
with the ROD, the question shall be submitted to the
Commissioner of Land Registration (Sec. 4, RA 1151).
3. The lower court’s resolution was affirmed.
ONG V REPUBLIC
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the April
25, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
[1]
76085, which reversed and set aside the January 16, 2002
Decision[2] of the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan,
Pangasinan in Land Registration Case No. 99-023, and the
November 20, 2006 Resolution [3] which denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
On July 1, 1999, petitioner Charles L. Ong (petitioner)
in his behalf and as duly authorized representative of his
brothers, namely, Roberto, Alberto and Cesar, filed an
Application for Registration of Title[4] over Lot 15911 (subject
lot) situated in Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan with
an area of five hundred seventy four (574) square meters,
more or less. They alleged that they are the co-owners of the
subject lot; that the subject lot is their exclusive property
having acquired the same by purchase from spouses Tony
Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998; that the
subject lot is presently unoccupied; and that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and
peaceful possession of the subject lot in the concept of owners
for more than thirty (30) years.
After due notice and publication, only respondent
Republic of the Philippines (respondent), represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the application for
registration of title. Respondent asserted that neither
applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier as
required by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1073; that
applicants failed to adduce any muniment of title to prove
their claims; that the tax declaration appended to the
application does not appear genuine and merely shows
pretended possession of recent vintage; that the application
was filed beyond the period allowed under P.D. No. 892; and
that the subject lot is part of the public domain which cannot
be the subject of private appropriation.
On January 16, 2002, the trial court rendered a
Decision in favor of petitioner and his brothers, viz:
The foregoing evidences presented by the applicant
indubitably established sufficient basis to grant the
applicant (sic) for registration. Originally, the whole
parcel of land was owned by spouses Teofilo Abellara
and Abella Charmine who acquired the same by
virtue of a Deed of Sale from Cynthia Cacho, Agustin
Cacho, Jr., Jasmin Cacho, Jover Cacho and Lauro
Cacho. Later, they sold the same parcel of land to
spouses Tony C. Villamil and Alicia Bautista, who in
turn sold the same land to herein applicants.
The same parcel of land has been declared in the
name of the applicant and her predecessors-in-
interest and its taxes has (sic) been religiously paid.
The said circumstances further show that the
possession and ownership of the applicant and her
(sic) predecessors-in-interest over the same parcel of
land has (sic) been continuous and peaceful
under bona fide claim of ownership before the filing
of the instant application for registration on [July 1,
1999].
WHEREFORE, after confirming the Order of General
Default, the Court hereby orders and decrees the
registration of a parcel of land as shown on plan ap-
01-004897 approved by the Bureau of Land(s)
situated in Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan,
containing an area of Five Hundred Seventy Four
(574) square meters, subject of the application for
registration of title, in accordance with Presidential
Decree No. 1529, in favor of CHARLIE L. ONG in his
behalf and as representative of his brothers namely,
ROBERTO L. ONG, ALBERTO L. ONG and CESAR L.
ONG.
Furnish copies of this Decision to the Office of the
Solicitor General, Makati City, Metro Manila, the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Dagupan City,
Atty. Celestino Domingo Jr., the Office of the Land
Registration Authority, Quezon City, as well as the
applicant.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeals which rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the decision of the court a quo granting
the application for registration of title of applicants-
appellees is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[6]
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Court of
Appeals found that the subject lot is part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. Thus, it was incumbent
upon petitioner to prove that they possessed the subject lot in
the nature and for the duration required by law. However,
petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-
interest have been in adverse possession of the subject lot in
the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier as
mandated by Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529. It noted that the
earliest tax declaration which petitioner presented is dated
1971. Consequently, petitioner could not fairly claim
possession of the land prior to 1971. Neither was petitioner
able to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest actually
occupied the subject lot prior to the filing of the
application. Thus, the trial court erred in granting the
application for registration of title over the subject lot.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, TOGETHER
WITH HIS BROTHERS, NAMELY, ROBERTO L. ONG,
ALBERTO L. ONG AND CEZAR L. ONG, HAVE
REGISTRABLE OWNERSHIP OVER THE REAL
PROPERTY SUBJECT MATTER OF LAND
REGISTRATION CASE NO. 99-023, AND
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSION OF THE FORMER SPECIAL FOURTH
DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE
SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY IS A PUBLIC LAND IS
CORRECT.[7]
The petition lacks merit.
Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree), as amended, provides
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons
may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law, applicants
for registration of title must prove: (1) that the subject land
forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the 25606[17] issued in 1971 in the names of spouses Agustin

same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, Cacho and Eufrosinia Baustista. While tax declarations are not

1945, or earlier.[8] These requisites involve questions of fact conclusive proof of ownership, they constitute good indiciaof

which are not proper in a petition for review possession in the concept of owner and a claim of title over

on certiorari. Factual findings of the court a quo are generally the subject property.[18] Even if we were to tack petitioners

binding on this Court except for certain recognized claim of ownership over the subject lot to that of their alleged

exceptions, as is the case here, where the trial court and the predecessors-in-interest, spouses Agustin Cacho and

Court of Appeals arrived at conflicting findings. [9] After a Eufrosinia Baustista in 1971, still this would fall short of the

careful review of the records, we sustain the findings and required possession from June 12, 1945 or earlier.

conclusions of the Court of Appeals.

Further, as correctly pointed by the Court of Appeals,

There is no dispute that the subject lot is classified as possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable

alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The lands of the public domain because the law requires

Report[10]dated January 17, 2000 of the Bureau of Lands possession and occupation. As held in Republic v. Alconaba:[19]

stated that the subject lot is within the alienable and

The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since
disposable zone as classified under Project 50 L.C. Map No. these words are separated by the conjunction and,
the clear intention of the law is not to make one
698 and released and classified as such on November 21, synonymous with the other. Possession is broader
1927.[11] This finding is, likewise, embodied in the than occupation because it includes constructive
possession. When, therefore, the law adds the
Report[12] dated January 7, 1999 of the Department of word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all
encompassing effect of constructive
Environment and Natural Resources Community Environment possession. Taken together with the words open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious, the
and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) and the blue word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for
an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a
print Copy[13] of the plan covering the subject lot. However, mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in
petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in- the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such
a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and own property.[20]

notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot

since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Petitioner admitted that after he and his brothers

bought the subject lot from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia

The records show that petitioner and his brothers Villamil in 1998, neither he nor his brothers actually occupied

bought the subject lot from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia the subject lot.[21] No improvements were made thereon and

Villamil on August 24, 1998,[14] who in turn purchased the the most that they did was to visit the lot on several occasions.

same from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen

[22]
Petitioners predecessor-in-interest, Tony Bautista testified

on January 16, 1997.[15]The latter bought the subject lot from that he and his wife never actually occupied the subject lot

Cynthia, Agustin Jr., Jasmin, Omir and Lauro, all surnamed from the time they bought the same from spouses Teofilo

Cacho, on July 10, 1979.[16] The earliest tax declaration which Abellera and Abella Sarmen in 1997. [23] Aside from these two

was submitted in evidence was Tax Declaration No. testimonies, no other evidence was presented to establish the
character of the possession of the subject lot by petitioners its Resolution[2] dated June 26, 2002, dismissing petitioners

other alleged predecessors-in-interest. Clearly, petitioners Second Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. Q-99-36483 filed

evidence failed to establish specific acts of ownership to in Branch 223 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

substantiate the claim that he and his predecessors-in-

interest possessed and occupied the subject lot in the nature Records show that on January 11, 1999, petitioners

and duration required by law. filed a complaint for cancellation of title to property covered

by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. N-140441; [3] 14399;

The burden of proof in land registration cases rests [4]

RT-94384 (292245);[5] RT-94794 (292246);[6] and 292247.

on the applicant who must show by clear, positive and [7]

Petitioners alleged that said titles are spurious, fictitious

convincing evidence that his alleged possession and and were issued under mysterious circumstances, considering

occupation of the land is of the nature and duration required that the holders thereof including their predecessors-in-

by law.[24] Unfortunately, petitioners evidence do not interest were never in actual, adverse and physical possession

constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence necessary of the property, rendering them ineligible to acquire title to

in cases of this nature.[25] Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did the said property under the Friar Lands Act. [8] Petitioners also

not err in reversing the Decision of the trial court and in sought to nullify Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 614

denying his application for registration of title over the from which the foregoing titles sought to be cancelled

subject lot. originated or were derived.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition

is DENIED. The April 25, 2006 Decision of the Court of Respondent Genuino Ice Co., Inc. filed a motion to

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76085 which reversed and set aside dismiss[9] on the ground that the complaint states no cause of

the January 16, 2002 Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of action because petitioners are not real parties-in-interest;

Mangaldan, Pangasinan in Land Registration Case No. 99-023, that no relief may be granted as a matter of law; and that

and the November 20, 2006 Resolution denying the motion petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies, but it

for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. was denied by the trial court. Respondent moved for

reconsideration but the same was denied.

Costs against petitioner.

On November 4, 1999, petitioners filed a Second

SO ORDERED. Amended Complaint[10] which sought to annul, in addition to

the titles already alleged in the original complaint, TCT Nos.

CANETE V GENUINO ICE COMPANY 274095 and 274096;[11] 274097 and 274098;[12] and 274099.
[13]

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set

aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated January 9, The Second Amended Complaint alleged the

2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64337 entitled Genuino Ice Company, following causes of action, as well as the remedy sought to be

Inc. vs. Hon. Victorino P. Evangelista, Nelsie B. Caete, et al., and obtained, thus:
4. That plaintiffs (petitioners) and their
predecessors-in-interest are among those who have
been in actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous
possession in concept of owners of unregistered
parcels of land situated at Sitio Mabilog, Barangay
Culiat, Quezon City, Metro Manila, which parcels of
land are more particularly described as follows:
(1) A parcel of unregistered land known as
Lot 668, situated at Barangay Culiat, Quezon
City x x x.
(2) A parcel of unregistered land known as
Lot 669, situated at Barangay Culiat, Quezon
City x x x.
5. That the above-described real property is a
portion of a friar land known as Piedad Estate, which
property is intended for distribution among the bona
fide occupants thereof pursuant to the Friar Lands
Act.
6. That transfer certificates of title allegedly having
originated or derived from Original Certificate of
Title No. 614 were issued by the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, which transfer certificates of title are in
truth and in fact fictitious, spurious and null and
void, for the following reasons: (a) that no record of
any agency of the government shows as to how and
in what manner was OCT 614 issued; (b) that no
record of any proceedings whatsoever, whether
judicial or administrative, can support defendants
claim that the above-described property originated
from OCT 614; and (c) that the transfer certificates of
title over the above-described property were issued
under mysterious circumstances for the above-
named defendants and their so-called predecessors-
in-interest never had any actual, adverse, physical
possession of the said property, thus, not allowed to
acquire title over the property in litigation pursuant
to the Friar Lands Act.
7. That defendants are holders of transfer certificates
of title of the above-described property, which
transfer certificates of title are null and void, for
reasons specifically mentioned in Paragraph 6 hereof
x x x;
8. That the acts in acquiring and keeping the said
transfer certificates of title in violation of the Friar
Lands Act and other existing laws are prejudicial to
plaintiffs rights over the above-described property.
9. That equity demands that defendants transfer
certificates of title as specified in Paragraph 7 hereof
be declared fictitious, spurious and null and void ab
initio.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most
respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that
judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiffs and
against defendants:
(1) Declaring as null and void ab initio OCT 614 and
all transfer certificates of title derived therefrom;
(2) Declaring as null and void defendants transfer
certificates of title over the property in litigation;
(3) Ordering defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon
City to cancel defendants transfer certificates of title
and all transfer certificates of title derived therefrom;
(4) Declaring the plaintiffs as bona fide occupants of
the property in litigation pursuant to the provisions
of the Friar Lands Act and other existing laws.[14]
Respondent moved to dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint on the following grounds:
a) The complaint states no cause of action because:
(1) on the allegations alone, plaintiffs (petitioners)
are not real parties in interest who may bring suit to
cancel defendants (including respondent) titles; (2)
based on the allegations and prayer of the complaint,
no relief, as a matter of law, may be granted;
b) Prescription has set in;
c) There are earlier similar complaints (Civil Case
Nos. Q-95-22834 and Q-95-23111) filed by a
different set of plaintiffs against a different set of
defendants but which involve the same subject
matter, cause of action and allegations of the
plaintiffs, with respect to the cancellation of OCT 614
and succeeding titles derived from it. Said complaints
have since been dismissed by Branch 93 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, the dismissal of
which is the subject of a pending certiorari
proceeding in the appellate court.[15]
On January 3, 2001,[16] the trial court denied
respondents motion to dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint. Its motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
hence respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals.
The appellate court granted respondents petition for
certiorari and dismissed petitioners Second Amended
Complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Hence, the
instant petition raising the following issues:
A. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED BY THE
PETITIONERS WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF QUEZON CITY IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-99-36483
DOES NOT STATE A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION;
B. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE NOT
REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST;
C. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; and,
D. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND DENIED
PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT
DISMISSED THEIR COMPLAINT.[17]
We deny the petition.
The subject lots are part of the Piedad Estate, Quezon
City, a Friar Land acquired on December 23, 1903 by the
Philippine Government from the Philippine Sugar Estates
Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de
Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the
Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands, as indicated in Public
Act No. 1120 (Friar Lands Act) enacted on April 26, 1904. [18]
After the Piedad Estate was registered in OCT No.
614 in the name of the Philippine Government in 1910 under
the provisions of Act 496, the area was subdivided originally
into 874 lots. As a result of subsequent surveys executed in
the course of disposition, the number of lots increased to
1,305. Disposition of these lots was made by the Bureau of
Lands thru sales, under the Friar Lands Act, as early as 1910
and records show that even before the Second World War, all
lots in the Piedad Estate have been disposed of. [19] The Piedad
Estate has long been segregated from the mass of the public
domain and has become private land duly registered under
the Torrens system following the procedure for the
confirmation of private lands prescribed in Act 496. Thus the
lands inside the Piedad Estate are no longer lands of the
public domain.[20]
One who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as
well as his successors-in-interest, may not claim successional
rights to purchase by reason of occupation from time
immemorial, as this contravenes the historical fact that friar
lands were bought by the Government of the Philippine
Islands, pursuant to an Act of Congress of the United States,
approved on July 1, 1902, not from individual persons but
from certain companies, a society and a religious order. Under
the Friar Lands Act, only actual settlers and occupants at the
time said lands are acquired by the Government were given
preference to lease, purchase, or acquire their holdings, in
disregard of the settlement and occupation of persons before
the government acquired the lands. [21]
The basic rules of proper pleading and procedure
require that every pleading shall contain in a methodical and
logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the
ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim
or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere
evidentiary facts.[22] And in all averments of fraud or mistake,
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be
stated with particularity.[23]
It is axiomatic that the averments of the complaint
determine the nature of the action, and consequently,
the jurisdiction of the courts. This is because the
complaint must contain a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of
action and must specify the relief sought. No rule is
better established than that which requires the
complaint to contain a statement of all the facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause of
action. Additionally, Section 5, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court provides that in all averments of fraud or
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake must be stated with particularity. In the case
at bar, while there are allegations of fraud in the
above quoted complaints, the same are not particular
enough to bring the controversy within the SEC's
jurisdiction. The said allegations are not statements
of ultimate facts but are mere conclusions of law.
A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to
the rights of action or defense asserted, as
distinguished from mere conclusions of fact, or
conclusions of law. General allegations that a contract
is valid or legal, or is just, fair and reasonable, are
mere conclusions of law. Likewise, allegations that a
contract is void, voidable, invalid, illegal, ultra vires,
or against public policy, without stating facts
showing its invalidity, are mere conclusions of law.[24]
Ultimate facts means the essential facts constituting
the plaintiff's cause of action, or such facts as are so essential
that they cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement
of the cause of action inadequate. [25]
Cause of action has been
defined as an act or omission of one party in violation of the
legal right or rights of the other; [26]
and its essential elements
are: 1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created; 2) an obligation on
the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate
such right; and 3) an act or omission on the part of the named
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting
a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages. If these elements are not extant, the complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action. [27] In the resolution of a
motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action,
only the facts alleged in the complaint as well as its annexes
must be considered.[28] The test in such case is whether a court
can render a valid judgment on the complaint based upon the
facts alleged and pursuant to the prayer therein. [29]
Corollarily, the question of whether or not a
complaint states a cause of action against a defendant or the
action is premature is one of law. The trial court can consider
all the pleadings filed, including annexes, motions and the
evidence on record. However in so doing, the trial court does
not rule on the truth or falsity of such documents. It merely
includes such documents in the hypothetical admission. Any
review of a finding of lack of cause of action based on these
documents would not involve a calibration of the probative
value of such pieces of evidence but would only limit itself to
the inquiry of whether the law was properly applied given the
facts and these supporting documents. Therefore, what would
inevitably arise from such a review are pure questions of law,
and not questions of fact.
The trial court must likewise apply relevant statutes
and jurisprudence in determining whether the allegations in a
complaint establish a cause of action. While it focuses on the
complaint, a court clearly cannot disregard decisions material
to the proper appreciation of the questions before it. In
resolving a motion to dismiss, every court must take
cognizance of decisions this Court has rendered because they
are proper subjects of mandatory judicial notice. The said
decisions, more importantly, form part of the legal system, and
failure of any court to apply them shall constitute an
abdication of its duty to resolve a dispute in accordance with
law, and shall be a ground for administrative action against an
inferior court magistrate.[30]
Considering the foregoing, it is not difficult to see the
need for particularity and incipient substantiation in the
petitioners Second Amended Complaint.
First, their initial claim that OCT 614 of which all the
other subject titles are derivatives is null and void, has been
proven wrong. As has been held in Pinlac and other cases, OCT
614 did legally exist and was previously issued in the name of
the Philippine Government in 1910 under the provisions of
Act 496.
Second, the Ad Hoc Committee of the then Ministry
of Natural Resources, which was specifically tasked to
investigate the historical background of the Piedad Estate,
found that as early as the period prior to the Second World
War, all lots in the Piedad Estate had already been disposed
of.
Third, the Piedad Estate has been placed under
the Torrens system of land registration, which means that all
lots therein are titled.
Fourth, as held in the Balicudiong case, one who
acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as well as his
successors-in-interest, may not claim successional rights to
purchase by reason of occupation from time immemorial,
which means that petitioners claimed actual, adverse,
peaceful and continuous possession of the subject property is
really of no moment unless it is shown that their
predecessors-in-interest were actual settlers and occupants at
the time said lands were acquired by the Government, and
whose rights were not disregarded even though they were in
occupation of the same before the government acquired the
land; yet, no period of time in relation to adverse possession is
alleged.
Petitioners Second Amended Complaint betrays no
more than an incomplete narration of facts unsupported by
documentary or other exhibits; the allegations therein
partake of conclusions of law unsupported by a particular
averment of circumstances that will show why or how such
inferences or conclusions were arrived at. It is replete with
sweeping generalizations and inferences derived from facts
that are not found therein. While there are allegations of fraud
upon the claim that the subject titles were fictitious, spurious
and obtained under mysterious circumstances, the same are
not specific to bring the controversy within the trial courts
jurisdiction. There is no explanation or narration of facts as
would show why said titles are claimed to be fictitious or
spurious, contrary to the requirement of the Rules that the
circumstances constituting fraud must be stated with
particularity; otherwise, the allegation of fraud would simply
be an unfounded conclusion of law. In the absence of specific
averments, the complaint is defective, for it presents no basis
upon which the court should act, or for the defendant to meet
it with an intelligent answer.
As to the second issue raised, petitioners claim that
they are bona fide occupants of the subject property within
the contemplation of the Friar Lands Act, having allegedly
been in actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of
the property, although it is not stated for how long and since
when. In their second amended complaint, they seek
judgment
(4) Declaring the plaintiffs as bona
fide occupants of the property in litigation
pursuant to the provisions of the Friar
Lands Act and other existing laws.
(Emphasis supplied)
They do not pray to be declared owners of the subject
property despite their alleged adverse possession but only to
be adjudged as the bona fide occupants thereof. In other
words, petitioners concede the States ownership of the
property.
Being so, petitioners may not be considered the real
parties in interest for the purpose of maintaining the suit for
cancellation of the subject titles. The Court of Appeals is
correct in declaring that only the State, through the Solicitor
General, may institute such suit. Jurisprudence on the matter
has been settled and the issue need not be belabored. Thus
The Court also holds that private respondents are not
the proper parties to initiate the present suit. The
complaint, praying as it did for the cancellation of the
transfer certificates of title of petitioners on the
ground that they were derived from a spurious OCT
No. 4216, assailed in effect the validity of said
title. While private respondents did not pray for the
reversion of the land to the government, we agree
with the petitioners that the prayer in the complaint
will have the same result of reverting the land to the means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected
government under the Regalian doctrine. Gabila vs.
Barriga ruled that only the government is entitled to by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
this relief. The Court in that case held: question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The interest
The present motion to dismiss is actually of the party must also be personal and not one based on a
predicated on Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the
Revised Rules of Court, i.e., failure of the desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and
complaint to state a cause of action, for it
alleges in paragraph 12 thereof that the unrelated party. Real interest, on the other hand, means a
plaintiff admits that he has no right to
demand the cancellation or amendment of present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
the defendants title, because, even if the said expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
title were canceled or amended, the
ownership of the land embraced therein, or consequential interest.[32]
of the portion thereof affected by the
amendment, would revert to the public
domain. In his amended complaint the
plaintiff makes no pretense at all that any If petitioners are to be believed, they would possess a
part of the land covered by the defendants
title was privately owned by him or by his mere inchoate interest in the properties covered by the
predecessors-in-interest. Indeed, it is
subject titles, a mere expectancy conditioned upon the fact
admitted therein that the said land was at all
times a part of the public domain that if the questioned titles are cancelled and the property is
until December 18, 1964, when the
government issued a title thereon in favor of reverted to the State, they would probably or possibly be given
defendant. Thus, if there is any person or
entity to relief, it can only be the government. preferential treatment as qualified buyers or lessees of the

In the case at bar, the plaintiffs own property under the Friar Lands Act. But this certainly is not
averments negate the existence of such
the interest required by law that grants them license or the
right, for it would appear therefrom that
whatever right might have been violated by personality to prosecute their case. Only to the State does the
the defendant belonged to the government,
not to the plaintiff. Plaintiff-appellant argues privilege belong.
that although his complaint is captioned as
one for cancellation of title, he has
nevertheless stated therein several causes of
action based on his alleged rights of On the issue of exhaustion of administrative
possession and ownership over the
remedies, suffice it to state that since petitioners do not
improvements, on defendant-appellees
alleged fraudulent acquisition of the land, possess the necessary interest to prosecute the case for
and on the damages allegedly incurred by
him (plaintiff-appellant) in relation to the cancellation of title in the courts, neither do they have the
improvements. These matters are merely
ancillary to the central issue of whether or right to pursue administrative remedies outside thereof. They
not defendant-appellees title should be
canceled or amended, and they may not be are not the owners; nor are they qualified applicants therefor.
leaned upon in an effort to make out a cause
It has not been shown by their complaint that they have
of action in relation to the said focal issue.
Indeed, the principal relief prayed for in the previously taken steps to avail of the benefits under the Friar
amended complaint is the cancellation or
amendment of defendant-appellees title.[31] Lands Act, since all they seek, should the questioned titles be

nullified, is to be declared bona fide occupants of the property

Under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a real covered by the questioned titles. Neither is there any

party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or indication that they possess the qualifications necessary to

injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the enable them to avail of the preference granted under the Act.

avails of the suit. Interest within the meaning of the rule


Finally, there is no merit in petitioners contention
that respondent belatedly filed the petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, and that the appellate court gravely
abused its discretion when it entertained and resolved the
same.
promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling
of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the
petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated in
Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not
established by sufficient evidence their right to the
registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree).
Antecedents

The Order of the trial court dated January 3, The property subject of the application for registration is a
parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more
2001 denying respondents motion to dismiss the Second particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area
of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant
Amended Complaint was received by the respondent Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration
on January 16, 2001. Respondent filed a motion for
covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
reconsideration on January 18, 2001 which was denied Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part
of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and
on February 28, 2001. Respondent received the order denying that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and
its motion for reconsideration on March 27, 2001. On the occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby
entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.1
same day, it filed a Notice to File Petition for

Certiorari. On April 2, 2001, the petition for certiorari was
filed with the Court of Appeals. Clearly, the same was timely
filed hence, the appellate court correctly entertained the
same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated January 9, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 64337 dismissing petitioners Second Amended Complaint
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a
certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No.
9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio
Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an
area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the
Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013
established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such
under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2

in Civil Case No. Q-99-36483 and the Resolution dated June After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment
granting Malabanan’s application for land registration,
26, 2002denying the motion for reconsideration, disposing thusly:
are AFFIRMED.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for
registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141,
Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property
SO ORDERED. Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-
0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square
Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming
MALABANAN V REPUBLIC
part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs
adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal
age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog,
Silang, Cavite.
RESOLUTION
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the
BERSAMIN, J.: corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.

For our consideration and resolution are the motions for SO ORDERED.3
reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the
judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to
prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred
in finding that he had been in possession of the property in
the manner and for the length of time required by law for
confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision
reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for
registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v.
Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of
possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable
and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded
from the computation of the period of possession. Noting that
the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had
been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15,
1982, Velazco’s possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not
be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanan’s period of
possession.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in
the CA, his heirs elevated the CA’s decision of February 23,
2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the controlling
doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural
land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of
agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and
disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of
possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration
Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect
that the declaration of the land subject of the application for
registration as alienable and disposable should also date back
to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum
considering that the land registration proceedings therein
were in fact found and declared void ab initio for lack of
publication of the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc.6 to support their argument that the property
had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason
of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the
public domain for more than 30 years. According to them,
what was essential was that the property had been
"converted" into private property through prescription at the
time of the application without regard to whether the
property sought to be registered was previously classified as
agricultural land of the public domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on
certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient
evidence possession and occupation of the property on his
part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since June
12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit
that the mere classification of the land as alienable or
disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into
patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in
Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the
reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened
it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that
Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco
believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-
interest had been the real owners of the land with the right to
validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that
consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134
of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when
Malabanan filed the application for registration on February
20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for
almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land
was declared alienable and disposable by the State.
The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to
obtain a clarification with reference to the application of the
rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the
decision has enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through
judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is
entitled to registration only when the land subject of the
application had been declared alienable and disposable since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be
imperative to discuss the different classifications of land in
relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the
Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as
either of public dominion or of private ownership. 11Land is
considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for
public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for
public use, and is intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to the
State that is not of such character, or although of such
character but no longer intended for public use or for public
service forms part of the patrimonial property of the
State.13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial
property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of
private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal
concept first introduced into the country from the West by
Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal
Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the
State.15This means that the State is the source of any asserted
right to ownership of land, and is charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain
part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the
State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to
private persons.17
Classifications of public lands
according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and
disposable primarily rests on the classification of public lands
made under the Constitution. Under the 1935
Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into
three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.19 Section 10,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the
public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial
or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or
forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law
might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution
adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into
agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national
parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted.21 The
identification of lands according to their legal classification is
done exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive
Department.22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the
type of public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of
the public domain may be alienated; all other natural
resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two
categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those
classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of
the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public
domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution,
but with the limitation that the lands must only be
agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber,
mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or
disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural. 24 A
positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such
reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify
public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive
Department, not in the courts.26 If, however, public land will
be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth,
thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public
dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in
the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a
Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive
Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify
lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the
State no longer intends the land to be used for public service
or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian
Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the
manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can
be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free
patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper
interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a
Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming
to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the applications for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words
"lands of the public domain" or "alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands
otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national
parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are
outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law
does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase
"alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of
Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public
domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the
Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following
requirements in order for his application to come under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his
predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and
occupation of the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken
place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an
agricultural land of the public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is
vested with the authority to classify lands of the public
domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
presupposes that the land subject of the application for
registration must have been already classified as agricultural
land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply.
Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as
agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine
applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is
alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the
requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a
public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification
of the land as alienable and disposable agricultural land
should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier,
because any possession of the land prior to such classification
or reclassification produced no legal effects. It observes that
the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or
glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial
social policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislative
intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the
reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation
was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of
which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers.
Except that said date qualified the period of possession and
occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be
associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945.
Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and
literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement that
the land subject of the registration should have been classified
as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the
applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
This means that the character of the property subject of the
application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of
the public domain determines its eligibility for land
registration, not the ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or
through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously
and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of the period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine,
corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for
as long as the lands were already converted to private
ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the
requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land
Act.30 It is for this reason that the property subject of the
application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable
and disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the
entire duration of the requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have
been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land at
the time of the application for registration is necessary only to
dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also
serves to determine the point at which prescription may run
against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being
confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title
that is acquired by reason of the applicant’s possession and
occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of
the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a
grant by the Government are complied with through actual
physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of
an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not
only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because
it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order
that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts. 31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public
Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands in
favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their
occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of years
prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should always
bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent
legislative development bears out, when Congress enacted
legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33in order to liberalize
stringent requirements and procedures in the adjudication of
alienable public land to qualified applicants, particularly
residential lands, subject to area limitations. 34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer
intended for public use or for the development of national
wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby
converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the
State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and
registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree. 35 As such, prescription can now
run against the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the
disposition of public land or lands of the public domain,
namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State and are
inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private
ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and,
therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered
alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive modes
enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the
mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of
the application needs only to be classified as alienable and
disposable as of the time of the application, provided the
applicant’s possession and occupation of the land dated back
to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption
that the applicant has performed all the conditions essential
to a government grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes the
owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title.
By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of the
public domain and has become private property. 37
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or
declared as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth are removed from the sphere
of public dominion and are considered converted into
patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be
alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring
ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is
prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that
the land has been already converted to private ownership
prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a
condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113,
Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient
evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the land since June 12,
1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of
possession - possession and occupation that is open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or
earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to
private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as
alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run
against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible
for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or
the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no
longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for
Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC V ABRILLE
This case was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals
where it was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 47438-R. The Court of
Appeals certified it to this Court for final consideration and
resolution of the pure question of law involved.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On May 9, 1969, a Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of
Title was filed by the Republic of the Philippines (represented
by the Director of Lands), with the Court of First Instance of
Davao, Branch 1, alleging, among others, the following:3. That
defendant Commissioner of Land Registration and defendant
Register of Deeds of Davao City whose Offices are at Espanñ a
Extension, Quezon City and Davao City, respectively. "(are
included in this complaint, the first being the public Official
charged under the law with the approval )." subdivision
surveys of private lands while the second is the Official vested
with the authority to issue certificates of titles, pursuant to
the provisions of Act 496, as amended, otherwise known as
the Land Registration Law;
4. That defendant Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille (now Heirs of
Luisa Villa Abrille) is the owner of a parcel of land in the City
of Davao containing an area of FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY TWO SQUARE METERS
(525.652), more or less, under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-1439 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City, issued in her
name;
5. That deceased Luisa Villa Abrille during her lifetime caused
the subdivision of the aforesaid parcel of land into two lots
designated as Lots Nos. 379-B-2-B-1 and 379-B-2-B-2 under
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-69322 which was approved by the
Land Registration Commissioner on March 17,1967;
6. That under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, Lot No. 379-
B-2-B-1 contains an area of 30,100 Square Meters while Lot
No. 379-B-2B-2 contains an area of 577,679 Square Meters or
a total area of 607,779 Square Meters, which is 82,127 Square
Meters more than the original area covered in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-1439 in the name of said defendant
Luisa Villa Abrille;
7. That on March 27, 1967 or ten days after the approval by
the Land Registration Commissioner, said Luisa Villa Abrille
was able to secure an order from the Court of First Instance of
Davao in LRC (GLRO) Doc. No. 9969, directing the Register of
Deeds for the City of Davao and Province of Davao, to correct
the area of Certificate of Title No. T-1439 and thereafter to
cancel the same and issue in lieu thereof TCT Nos. T-18886
and T-18887;
8. That on March 30, 1967, the Register of Deeds concerned
registered Lot 379-B-2-B-1 and issued TCT No. 18886
therefor, in the name of Luisa Villa Abrille and on the same
date registered Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 and issued TCT No.
18887 in the name of Luisa Villa Abrille;
9. That the registration of Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2, which includes
the aforementioned excess area of 82,127 Square Meters, was
not in accordance with law for lack of the required notice and
publication as prescribed in Act 496, as amended, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Law;
10. That the excess or enlarged area of 82,127 Square Meters
as a result of the approval of the subdivision survey (LRC)
Psd-69322 was formerly a portion of the Davao River which
dried up by reason of the change of course of the said Davao
River; hence a land belonging to the public domain; and
11. That as a consequence thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 18887 which covers Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 of Subdivision
Survey (LRC) Psd-69322, wherein the excess area of land
belong to the public domain (not private land) is null and void
ab initio.
On June 10, 1969, defendant Register of Deeds of Davao- City
filed her answer averring that she, "in the performance of her
ministerial duty, honestly and in good faith effected the
registration of Subdivision Lot No. 379-B-2-B-1 and Lot No.
379B-2-B-2 and the issuance of corresponding TCT No. 18886
and TCT No. 18887 therefor, respectively, in view of the
approval of the Land Registration Commissioner of
Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, and in view of the Order of
the Court of First Instance of Davao to correct the area in
Certificate of Title No. T-1439, to cancel the same and to issue
in lieu thereof TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887".
On July 2, 1969, herein defendant-appellants filed their
answer admitting the allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 3,
4, 5 and 7 of the complaint; that they admit the increase in
area of the land of their predecessor but that the increase in
area of the land was acceded to and concurred in by the
defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, and the same
was duly noted and approved by the Court of First Instance of
Davao; that they admit the issuance of TCT Nos. T-18886 and
T-18887 out of Certificate of Title No. T- 1439 in the name of
their predecessor-in-interest Luisa Villa Abrille but that TCT
No. T-18886 had been cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-
19077 was issued in favor of Gaudencio Consunji, and, TCT
No. T-18887 had likewise been cancelled and several Transfer
Certificates of Title were issued thereunder; that the subject
increase of area was made in accordance with law and
existing jurisprudence; and that Luisa Villa Abrille,
predecessor-in-interest of herein defendant-appellant, as
riparian owner was entitled under the law to claim, as she did,
the increase or excess in area of her original land as her own.
On August 12, 1969, defendant Commissioner of Land
Registration prays for a judgment on the pleadings and avers
in his answer that he has no knowledge of the subject matter
of the complaint since the subdivision plan involved therein
was approved by the then Commissioner of Land Registration,
Antonio Noblejas; and that on February 19, 1968, the then
Commissioner of Land Registration, Antonio Noblejas, issued
LRC Circular No. 167 directing the Register of Deeds
throughout the Philippines to, among others, deny the
registration of subdivision plans with increased or expanded
areas and to withhold the issuance of the corresponding titles,
or if the plans have already been registered and the titles
issued, to recall the titles and to take appropriate steps for
their cancellation.
Some private persons, as actual possessors and occupants,
tried to intervene in the case as movant-intervenors but they
were denied standing in court by the trial court in its order of
August 16,1969.
On January 6, 1970, the parties litigants submitted in court
their "Agreed Stipulation of Facts" and pray that judgment be
rendered by the trial court on their case based on their
stipulation of facts. The "Agreed Stipulation of Facts" of the
parties reads as follows:
COME NOW the parties assisted by their respective attorneys,
and unto the Honorable Court, most respectfully submit the
following stipulation of facts and allege:
1. That Lot 379-B-2-B was originally registered on June 28,
1916 in the Registry Book of the Register of Deeds of
Zamboanga as Vol. A27, Page 40 under Original Certificate of
Title No. 5609, Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 317, in the name of
Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna, father of Luisa Villa Abrille;
2. That upon the death of the original owner, the said property
was inherited by Luisa Villa Abrille and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-1439 was issued in the name of said Luisa Villa
Abrille;
3. That subsequently, by virtue of an approved subdivision
plan Psd-69322 by the defendant, Land Registration
Commissioner, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-18886 and
18887 were issued by the defendant, Register of Deeds of
Davao, copy of which subdivision plan is hereto attached as
Annex "A", and made integral part hereof;
4. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18886 was
subsequently cancelled by virtue of deed of sale, and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-19077 was issued in the name of
Gaudencio Consunji a purchaser in good faith and for value;
5. That the said subdivision plan Annex "A" was also approved
by the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, through an
Order dated March 27, 1967, copy of which order is hereto
attached as Annex "B" and made part hereof;
6. That the said Order Annex "B" was issued by the Court of
First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, on the strength of the
Report of the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner,
copy of which report is hereto attached as Annex "C" and
made integral part hereof;
7. That much later on, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18887
was by virtue of an Order of the Court of First Instance,
Branch 1, in Special Proceedings No. 1357, entitled: In the
Matter of the Testate Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille, approving a
project of partition cancelled, and in lieu thereof, the following
Transfer Certificates of Title were issued to the following
named persons, to wit:
(a) T-20690 - Huang Siu Sin;
(b) T-20692 - Huang Siu Sin;
(c) T-20701 - Josefino Huang;
(d) T-20702 - Josefino Huang;
(e) T-20703 - Josefino Huang;
(f) T-20732 Huang Siu Sin, et al.;
(g) T-20733 - Huang Siu Sin, et al.;
(h) T-20713 - Miguel Huang;
(i) T-23015 - Miguel Huang;
(j) T-20725 - Milagros Huang;
(k) T-20726 - Milagros Huang;
which certificates of title were issued on the basis of a
subdivision plan LRC Psd-71236 duly approved by the
defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, copy of which
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236 is hereto attached as Annex
"D" and made integral part hereof;
8. That the parties admit that there was an increase in the
area of Lot 379-B-2-B, but the same was with the knowledge
of the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner and the
court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV;
9. That the parties admit that no registered owner has been
affected or prejudiced in the increase in area as only Luisa
Villa Abrille as the registered owner holds property adjacent
to the parcel of land in question;
10. That the portion of land subject of the increase adjoins Lot
379-B-2-B and abuts the Davao River;
11. That the parcel of land subject of the increase is fully
planted with coconuts, bananas and other seasonal crops by
the defendants, through their predecessor-in-interest;
12. That the increase in area could have taken place very long
time ago as the coconuts planted thereon had long been fruit
bearing;
13. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18886 does not
contain any portion of the increase in area;
14. That of the certificates of title issued based under
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236, only Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. T- 20725; T-20701; T-20713; and T-20690
contain the increase in area; while all the other certificates of
title issued under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236 do not
contain any increase in area;
15. That the parties agree that the issuance of the Order
Annex "B" was without notice to the Director of Lands.
The trial court thereafter rendered its decision dated January
27, 1970, which reads as follows:
This is an ordinary civil action for annulment of certificate of
title instituted by the Republic of the Philippines, represented
by the Director of Lands, against the Estate of Luisa Abrille,
represented by Huang Siu Sin, Administrator, the Land
Registration Commissioner and the Register of Deeds of the
City of Davao. Because the residue of the intestate estate of
Luisa Villa Abrille had been divided among Huang Siu Sin,
Josefino Huang, Milagros Huang, Miguel Huang and lap Tong
Ha, heirs, they were directed to appear and to substitute for
the intestate estate and they did.
The parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:
xxx xxx xxx
The increase in area of the land covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. 5609 of the Register of Deeds of Davao in the
name of Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna and subsequently by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T. 1439 in the name of Luisa
Villa Abrille and finally, based on subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
71236, by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725 in the
name of Milagros Huang, T20701 in the name of Josefino
Huang, T-20713 in the name of Miguel Huang and T-20690 in
the name of Huang Siu Sin, is from 525,652 square meters to
607,779 square meters, or 82,127 square meters.
The remedy sought by defendant heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille in
order to include the increase in area was a petition for
approval of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-79322 recommended
by the Commissioner of Land Registration in his Report, and
for issuance of new title under Section 44, Act 496, as
amended, filed with this court, which was assigned to Branch
IV.
Even pursuant to Section 44 of Act 496 under which the
aforesaid remedy was sought, notice before the hearing is
required. The parties admit that there was no notice to the
persons interested, including the Director of Lands, before the
petition was heard.
Worse, the increase in area could not have been included in
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713
and T-20690 even assuming arguendo that the same belonged
to the owner of the land to which it is adjacent by the simple
expediency of a petition for approval of subdivision plan and
issuance of new titles, because a subdivision of a registered
land under Section 44 of Act 496 does not authorize the
inclusion of land or area not embraced in the titled or in
excess of what is stated in the title. And the approval by the
Court of such subdivision plan does not lend validity to it. The
subdivision must be limited to the area stated in the title.
Neither amendment of the title under Section 112 of Act 496
would be a valid remedy 1.
The heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille.. owners of the adjacent estate,
might have acquired a registrable title to the land in question
but to bring it under the operation of the Land Registration
Act, a petition for registration under Act 496 should have been
filed. More so when the title acquired is by continuous
possession for at least 30 years under a claim of ownership
And even assuming that the land is an accretion, the fact that
the riparian estate is registered does not bring ipso facto
effect its accretion thereto under the operation of the Land
Registration Act. No decree of registration of the land based
upon final judgment promulgated by a court of competent
jurisdiction after due publication, notice and hearing, has
been issued by the Commissioner of Land Registration and
transcribed by the Register of Deeds of Davao in the registry,
for the reason that no initial or original registration
proceedings have been instituted by the owner. And the only
way by which a title to the land in question can be issued for
the first time is for the Land Registration Commissioner to
issue a decree of registration based upon final judgment
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction after trial.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
cancelling Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690
and directing the Register of Deeds of Davao
to issue new certificates of title in lieu
thereof after the portions consisting of
82,127 square meters, the land involved,
shall have been segregated therefrom in
accordance with law.
Not satisfied with the judgment of the trial court, defendant
Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille brought the case on appeal to the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however, in its
Resolution dated July 22, 1974, certified the case (CA-G.R. No.
47438-R) to this Court for consideration and final disposition.
Defendant-appellant maintains that the lower court erred in
holding the approval of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 of
no legal effect merely on ground of lack of notice to interested
persons, and in ordering the cancellation of Certificates of
Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690. It is the
contention of the defendant-appellant that since the
government agencies having to do with lands know all the
time the increase in area in subdivision plan Psd-69322, and
the government agencies concerned tolerated if not abetted
the ultimate inclusion of the involved increase in area,
defendant-appellant should not be made to suffer the effect of
the allegedly wrong procedure or step taken in the approval of
the aforementioned subdivision plan. Besides, defendant-
appellant claims that it is their honest belief that the legal
remedy taken by them in seeking the approval of their
subdivision plan concerned was well within the law,
particularly the provision of Section 44 of Act 496, as
amended.
Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, maintains that the
approval of the subdivision plan, with the increase in area, by
the defendant-appellant Land Registration Commission does
not lend validity to the said subdivision plan; and that the
issuance of the four transfer certificates of title (Nos. T-20725,
T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690) over the increased area in
question is improper and invalid notwithstanding the
conformity of the Land Registration Commissioner and the
subsequent order of the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Branch IV, approving the subdivision plan concerned, as the
required giving of notice to all parties interested in defendant-
appellant's petition for approval of subdivision plan was not
at all followed,
Before Us, therefore, for consideration and final resolution, in
order to arrive at a judicious disposition of the case at bar, is
whether or not the lower court erred in ordering the
cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-
20701, T-20713 and T-20690 which cover the increased area
in question totalling 82,127 square meters.
After a careful and thorough deliberation of the matter in
controversy, We are of the opinion and so hold that the lower
court acted correctly in ordering the cancellation of Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-
20690 which admittedly covered the increased area of 82,127
square meters under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-71236 (and
formerly under Psd-69322) for the City of Davao.
Certainly, the step taken by defendant-appellant in petitioning
the court for the approval of their Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-
69322 and then Psd-71236 to include the questioned
increased area of 82,127 square meters is, to say the least,
unwarranted and irregular. This is so, for the increased area in
question, which is not a registered land but formerly a river
bed, is so big as to give allowance for a mere mistake in area of
the original registration of the tracts of land of the defendant-
appellant formerly belonging to and registered in the name of
their grandfather, Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna. In order to
bring this increase in area, which the parties admitted to have
been a former river bed of the Davao River, under the
operation and coverage of the Land Registration Law, Act 496,
proceedings in registrations of land title should have been
filed Instead of an ordinary approval of subdivision plan.
It should be remembered that recourse under Section 44 of
Act 496, which the predecessor-in-interest (Luisa Villa
Abrille) of the herein defendant-appellant took, is good only
insofar as it covers previously registered lands. In the instant
case, part of the tracts of land, particularly the area of 82,127
square meters, has not yet been brought under the operation
of the Torrens System. Worse still, the approval of Subdivision
Plans (LRC) Psd-69322 and Psd-71236 was without notice to
all parties in interest, more particularly the Director of Lands.
For an applicant to have his imperfect or incomplete title or
claim to a land to be originally registered under Act 496, the
following requisites should all be satisfied:
1. Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed
private surveyor;
2. Filing of application for registration by the applicant;
3. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application
by the Court;
4. Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing
together with all the documents or other evidences attached
thereto by the Clerk of Court to the Land Registration
Commission;
5. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and
date and place of the hearing in the Official Gazette;
6. Service of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and
those known to have interests in the property by the sheriff;

7. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether

named in the notice or not;

8. Hearing of the case by the Court;

9. Promulgation of judgment by the Court;

10. Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision

final and instructing the Land Registration Commission to
issue a decree of confirmation and registration;

11. Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration

Commission;

12. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the

corresponding Register of Deeds, and

13. Transcription of the decree of registration in the

registration book and the issuance of the owner's duplicate
original certificate of title to the applicant by the Register of
Deeds, upon payment of the prescribed fees.

Hence, with the foregoing requisites not having been

complied with, the lower court committed no error in its
appealed decision dated January 27, 1970.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby

affirmed in toto.

No special pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.