Belarmino v.

Employees’ Compensation Commission

G.R. No. 90104, May 11, 1990
Facts: Oanis Belarmino was a classroom teacher for eleven years. While performing her duties as a classroom teacher, Mrs.
Belarmino who was in her 8th month of pregnancy, accidentally slipped and fell on the classroom floor. Moments later, she
complained of abdominal pain and stomach cramps. For several days, she continued to suffer from recurrent abdominal pain
and a feeling of heaviness in her stomach, but heedless of the advice of her female co-teachers to take a leave of absence, she
continued working. Eleven days after the accident she prematurely delivered a baby girl.

Her abdominal pain persisted even after delivery, accompanied by high fever and headache. The doctor found that she was
suffering from septicemia post partum due to infected lacerations of the vagina. Seven days later, she died. The cause of death
was septicemia post partum.

The GSIS denied the husband’s claim for death benefits. It held that septicemia post partum was not an occupational disease,
and neither was there any showing that the ailment was contracted by reason of her employment. The alleged accident could
not have precipitated the death but rather the death resulted from the infection of her lacerated wounds as a result of her
delivery at home.

The Employees’ Compensation Commission agreed with the decision of the GSIS.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ordered the GSIS to pay death benefits to the husband of Oanis with legal interest plus attorney’s
fees equivalent to 10% of the award.

The condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as a result. The fall precipitated
the onset of recurrent abdominal pains which culminated in the premature termination of her pregnancy with tragic
consequences to her. Her fall on the classroom floor brought about her premature delivery which caused the development of
septicemia post partum which resulted in death. Her fall was the proximate or responsible cause that set in motion an
unbroken chain of events, leading to her demise.

Mrs. Belarmino’s fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of her employment as a classroom teacher; hence, all the
medical consequences flowing from it, her recurrent abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her baby, her septicemia post
partum, and death, are compensable.

It is true that if she had delivered her baby under sterile conditions in a hospital operating room instead of an unsterile
environment of her house, and if she had been attended by specially trained doctors and nurses, she probably would not have
suffered lacerations of the vagina and would not have contracted the fatal infection. But who is to blame for her inability to
afford a hospital delivery and the services of trained doctors and nurses? The court may take judicial notice of the meager
salaries that government pays its school teachers. Forced to live on the margin of poverty, they are unable to afford expensive
hospital care. Penury compelled the deceased to scrimp by delivering her baby at home instead of in a hospital.

The Government is not entirely blameless for her death for it is not entirely blameless for her poverty. Government has yet to
perform its declared policy “to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, attend to them a decent
standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all.” Social justice for the lowly and underpaid public school teachers will
only be an empty shibboleth until Government adopts measures to ameliorate their economic condition and provides them
with adequate medical care or the means to afford it.

Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society. By their denial of the petitioner’s claim for benefits arising
from the death of his wife, the public respondents ignored this imperative of Government and thereby committed a grave abuse
of discretion.
Hinoguin v. Employees’ Compensation Commission
G.R. No. 8430, April 17,1989
Facts: Sgt. Hinoguin was a detachment non-commissioned officer at Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. On August 1, 1985, he and two
members of his detachment sought permission from the Company Commander to go on overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva
Vizcaya “to settle an important matter thereat.” The Company Commander orally granted them permission and allowed them
to take their firearms with them because Aritao was a “critical place.” In Aritao Poblacion, one of Hinoguin’s companions
dismounted, walked towards and in front of the tricycle cab, holding his M-16 rifle in his right hand, not noticing that the rifle’s
safety lever was on “semi-automatic” (and not on “safety”). He accidentally touched the trigger, firing a single-shot in the
process and hitting Sgt. Hinoguin, causing the latter’s death. The shooting was purely accidental. The Line of Duty Board
declared Sgt. Hinoguin’s death to have been “in line of duty,” and recommended that all benefits due Sgt. Hinoguin’s dependents
be given.

Sgt. Hinoguin’s claim for compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626 (as amended) was denied by the GSIS because the former
was not at his workplace nor performing his duty as a soldier of the Philippine Army when he died.

Issue: Is the death of Sgt. Hinoguin compensable under the applicable statute and regulations?

Ruling: The death of Sgt. Hinoguin that resulted from his being hit by an accidental discharge of his companion’s rifle arose out
of and in the course of his employment as a soldier on active duty status in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and, hence,
compensable.

The concept of a “workplace” cannot always be literally applied to a soldier on active duty status. A soldier must go where his
company is stationed. Sgt. Hinoguin and his companions had permission to proceed to Aritao. A place which soldiers have
secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different from a place where they are required to go by their commanding
officer. Hinoguin and his companions were not on vacation leave. They are authorized to carry their firearms with which they
were to defend themselves if NPA elements happen to attack them.

The Line of Duty Board of Officers had already determined that Hinoguin’s death occurred “in line of duty.” A soldier on active
duty status is really on duty 24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to orders of his superior at all times, except when he is on
vacation leave status (which Hinoguin was not). The work-connected character of his injury and death was not precluded by
the simple circumstance that he was on an overnight pass. He did not effectively cease performing “official functions” because
he was granted a pass. While going to a fellow soldier’s home for a few hours for a meal and some drinks was not a specific
military duty, he was, nonetheless, in the course of performance of official functions.

A soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and unequivocally put aside that status
or condition temporarily by, e.g., going on an approved vacation leave. Even vacation leave may be preterminated by superior
officers.

A soldier in the Armed Forces must accept certain risks, e.g., that he will be fired upon by forces hostile to the State or the
Government. That is not, of course, the only risk that he is compelled to accept by the very nature of his occupation or
profession as a soldier. Most of the persons around him are necessarily also members of the Armed Forces who carry firearms,
too. A soldier must also assume the risk of being accidentally fired upon by his fellow soldiers. This is reasonably regarded as a
hazard inherent in his employment as a soldier.
GSIS v. CA and F. Alegre
G.R. No. 128524, April 20, 1999
Facts: SPO2 Alegre, a police officer was driving his tricycle and ferrying passengers within the vicinity of a commercial
Complex when SPO4 A. Tenorio, Jr., Team/Desk Officer, confronted him regarding his tour of duty. Alegre allegedly snubbed
Tenorio and even directed curse words upon the latter. A verbal tussle ensued between the two which led to the fatal shooting
of SPO2 Alegre.

The widow filed a claim for death benefits with GSIS which denied the claim on the ground that at the time of his death, Alegre
was performing a personal activity which was not work-connected. The Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed
the ruling of the GSIS.

But the Court of Appeals reversed the ECC’s decision and ruled that Alegre’s death was work-connected, hence, compensable.
Citing Nitura vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission and Employees’ Compensation Commission vs. Court of Appeals, the
appellate court explained its conclusion, thus:
“[T]he Supreme Court held that the concept of a ‘workplace’ cannot always be literally applied to a person in active duty status, as if he
were a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office.

It is our considered view that, as applied to a peace officer, his work place is not confined to the police precinct or station but to any place
where his services, as lawman, to maintain peace and security, are required.

At the time of his death, Alegre was driving a tricycle at the northeastern part of the Imelda Commercial Complex where the police
assistance center is located. There can be dispute therefore that he met his death literally in his place of work.

It is true that the deceased was driving his tricycle, with passengers aboard, when he was accosted by another police officer. This would
lend some semblance of viability to the argument that he was not in the performance of official duty at the time.

However, the argument, though initially plausible, overlooks the fact that policemen, by the nature of their function, are deemed to be on a
round-the-clock duty.”

GSIS goes to the SC on petition for review on certiorari reiterating its position that SPO2 Alegre’s death lacks the requisite
element of compensability which is, that the activity being performed at the time of death must be work-connected.

Ruling: We grant the petition.

Under the pertinent guidelines of the ECC on compensability, for the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer.

Owing to the similarity of functions, that is, to keep peace and order, and the risks assumed, the Court has treated police
officers similar to members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with regard to the compensability of their deaths. Thus,
echoing Hinoguin vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission, a case involving a soldier who was accidentally fired at by a fellow
soldier, we held in Employees’ Compensation Commission vs. Court of Appeals, that “members of the national police are by the
nature of their functions technically on duty 24 hours a day” because “policemen are subject to call at any time and may be
asked by their superiors or by any distressed citizen to assist in maintaining the peace and security of the community.”

Upon examination of the Court of Appeals’ reasoning, we believe that the appellate court committed reversible error in
applying the precepts enunciated in the cited cases. While we agree that policemen, like soldiers, are at the beck and call of
public duty as peace officers and technically on duty round-the-clock, the same does not justify the grant of compensation
benefits for the death of SPO2 Alegre based on the facts disclosed by the records. For clarity, a review of the cases relevant to
the matter at hand is in order.

In Hinoguin, the deceased Philippine Army soldier, Sgt. Limec Hinoguin, together with two other members of his detachment,
sought and were orally granted permission by the commanding officer of their company to leave their station in Carranglan,
Nueva Ecija to go on overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya. As they were returning to their headquarters, one of his
companions, not knowing that his M-16 rifle was on “semi-automatic” mode, accidentally pulled the trigger and shot Sgt.
Hinoguin who then died as a result thereof. Ruling for the grant of death compensation benefits this Court held:
“The concept of a ‘workplace’ referred to in Ground 1, for instance, cannot always be literally applied to a soldier on active duty status, as
if he were a machine operator or a worker in assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office. Obviously, a soldier must go
where his company is stationed. In the instant case, Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya was not of course, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, Aritao, being
approximately 1-1/2 hours away from the latter by public transportation. But Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog had permission
from their Commanding Officer to proceed to Aritao, and it appears to us that a place which soldiers have secured lawful permission to be
at cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer. We note that the
three (3) soldiers were on an overnight pass which, notably, they did not utilize in full. They were not on vacation leave. Moreover, they
 were required or authorized to carry their firearms with which presumably they were to defend themselves if NPA elements happened to
attack them while en route to and from Aritao or with which to attack and seek to capture such NPA elements as they might encounter.
Indeed, if the three (3) soldiers had in fact encountered NPAs while on their way to or from Aritao and been fired upon by them and if Sgt.
Hinoguin had been killed by an NPA bullet, we do not believe that respondent GSIS would have had any difficulty in holding the death a
compensable one.”

Then came the case of Nitura, likewise involving a member of the Philippine Army, Pfc. R.S. Nitura, who was assigned at
Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte. At the time he met his death, he was instructed by his battalion commander to
check on several personnel of his command post who were then attending a dance party in Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City. But
on his way back to the camp, he passed, crossed and fell from a hanging wooden bridge which accident caused his death.
Reversing the ECC which earlier denied death benefits to the deceased’s widow, the Court ruled:
“A soldier must go where his company is stationed. In the case at bar, Pfc. Nitura’s station was at Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del
Norte. But then his presence at the site of the accident was with the permission of his superior officer...

As to the question of whether or not he was performing an official function at the time of the incident, it has been held that a soldier on
active duty status is really on a 24 hours a day official duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He
is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, seven (7) days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation
leave status...”

The more recent case which was cited by the appellate court in support of its decision is Employees’ Compensation Commission
vs. Court of Appeals. This time, the claim for death compensation benefits was made in behalf of a deceased police officer, P/Sgt.
W. Alvaran, who, at the time of his death, was a member of the Mandaluyong Police Station but assigned to the Pasig Provincial
Jail. Findings showed that the deceased brought his son to the Mandaluyong Police Station for interview because the latter was
involved in a stabbing incident. While in front of the said station, the deceased was approached by another policeman [who]
shot him to death. Both the GSIS and the ECC denied the claim by the deceased’s widow on the ground that Sgt. Alvaran was
plainly acting as a father to his son and that he was in a place where he was not required to be. The Court of Appeals reversed
said denial which decision was affirmed by this Court, declaring that:
“But for clarity’s sake and as a guide for future cases, we hereby hold that members of the national police, like P/Sgt. Alvaran, are by the
nature of their functions technically on duty 24 hours a day. Except when they are on vacation leave, policemen are subject to call all
anytime and may be asked by their superiors or by any distressed citizen to assist in maintaining the peace and security of the
community.

xxx xxx xxx

We hold that by analogy and for purposes of granting compensation under P.D. No. 626, as amended, policemen should be treated in the
same manner as soldiers.

While it is true that, “geographically” speaking, P/Sgt. Alvaran was not actually at his assigned post at the Pasig Provincial Jail when he
was attacked and killed, it could not also be denied that in bringing his son — as a suspect in a case — to the police station for
questioning to shed light on a stabbing incident, he was not merely acting as father but as a peace officer.”

From the foregoing cases, it can be gleaned that the Court did not justify its grant of death benefits merely on account of the
rule that soldiers or policemen, as the case may be, are virtually working round-the-clock. Note that the Court likewise
attempted in each case to find a reasonable nexus between the absence of the deceased from his assigned place of work and
the incident that led to his death.

Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC, with respect to claims for death benefits, namely (a)
that the employee must be at the place where his work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been performing
his official functions; and (c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the
employer, it is not difficult to understand then why SPO2 Alegre’s widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her.
Obviously, the matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was
intrinsically private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it did from no particular directive or permission of his superior
officer. In the absence of such prior authority as in the cases of Hinoguin and Nitura, or peacekeeping nature of the act attended
to by the policeman at the time he died even without the explicit permission or directive of a superior officer, as in the case of
P/Sgt. Alvaran, there is no justification for holding that SPO2 Alegre met the requisites set forth in the ECC guidelines. That he
may be called upon at any time to render police work as he is considered to be on a round-the-clock duty and was not on an
approved vacation leave will not change the conclusion arrived at considering that he was not placed in a situation where he
was required to exercise his authority and duty as a policeman. In fact, he was refusing to render one, pointing out that he
already complied with duty detail. At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers, serves more as
an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them within the scope of the guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit
them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly
applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer but only to those which, although not on official line
of duty, are nonetheless, basically police service in character.
Valeriano v. Employees’ Compensation Commission and Government Service Insurance System
G.R. No. 136200, June 8, 2000
Facts: C.S. Valeriano was employed as a fire truck driver assigned at the San Juan Fire Station. On the evening of July 3, 1985, he
was standing along Santolan Road, Quezon City, when he met a friend. They decided to proceed to Bonanza Restaurant in
EDSA, Quezon City, for dinner. On their way home at around 9:30 PM, the owner-type jeepney they were riding in figured in a
head-on collision with another vehicle at the intersection of N. Domingo and Broadway streets in Quezon City. Valeriano,
thrown out of the vehicle, was severely injured. Pursuing his EC claim, Valeriano argued that the exigency of his job as a
fireman requires a constant observance of his duties as such; thus, he should be considered to have been “on call” when he met
the accident. He underscored the applicability of Hinoguin vs. ECC and Nitura vs. ECC to his case.

Ruling: Petitioner Valeriano was not able to demonstrate solidly how his job as a firetruck driver was related to the injuries he
had suffered. That he sustained the injuries after pursuing a purely personal and social function — having dinner with some
friends — is clear from the records of the case. His injuries were not acquired at his work place; nor were they sustained while
he was performing an act within the scope of his employment or in pursuit of an order of his superior. Thus his injuries and
consequent disability were not work-connected and thus not compensable.

The circumstances in the present case do not call for the application of Hinoguin and Nitura. Following the rationalization in
GSIS vs. Alegre the 24-hour-duty doctrine cannot be applied to petitioner’s case, because he was neither at his assigned work
place nor in pursuit of the orders of his superiors when he met an accident. But the more important justification for the Court’s
stance is that he was not doing an act within his duty and authority as a firetruck driver, or any other act of such nature, at the
time he sustained his injuries. There is no any reasonable connection between his injuries and his work as a firetruck driver.
Iloilo Dock & Eng’g. Co. v. WCC, et al.
G.R. No. L-26341, November 27, 1978
Facts: At about 5:02 in the afternoon of January 29, 1960, Pablo, who was employed as a mechanic of the IDECO, while walking
on his way home, was shot to death in front of, and about 20 meters away from, the main IDECO gate, on a private road
commonly called the IDECO road. The slayer, Martin Cordero, was not heard to say anything before or after the killing. The
motive for the crime was and still is unknown as Cordero was himself killed before he could be tried for Pablo’s death. At the
time of the killing, Pablo’s companion was Rodolfo Galopez, another employee, who, like Pablo, had finished overtime work at
5:00 p.m. and was going home. From the main IDECO gate to the spot where Pablo was killed, there were four “carinderias” on
the left side of the road and two “carinderias” and a residential house on the right side. The entire length of the road is
nowhere stated in the record.

Issue: Whether Pablo’s death comes within the meaning and intendment of that “deceptively simple and litigiously prolific”
phrase “arising out of and in the course of employment.”

Ruling: The general rule in workmen’s compensation law known as the “going and coming rule,” simply stated, is that “in the
absence of special circumstances, an employee injured in, going to, or coming from, his place of work is excluded from the
benefits of workmen’s compensation acts.” This rule, however, admits four well-recognized exceptions, to wit: (1) where the
employee is proceeding to or from his work on the premises of his employer; (2) where the employee is about to enter or
about to leave the premises of his employer by way of the exclusive or customary means of ingress and egress; (3) where the
employee is charged, while on his way to or from his place of employment or at his home, or during his employment, with
some duty or special errand connected with his employment; and (4) where the employer, as an incident of the employment,
provides the means of transportation to and from the place of employment.

We address ourselves particularly to an examination and consideration of the second exception, i.e., injuries sustained off the
premises of the employer, but while using a customary means of ingress and egress.

This exception, known as the “proximity rule,” was applied in Philippine Fiber Processing Co., Inc. vs. Ampil. There, the employee,
at about 5:15 a.m., while proceeding to his place of work and running to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch fronting the
main gate of employer’s factory, as a result of which he died the next day. The sole question was whether or not the accident
which caused the employee’s death arose out of and in the course of his employment. The Court ruled in favor of the claimant.

The point where Pablo was shot was barely twenty meters away from the main IDECO gate, certainly nearer than a stone’s
throw therefrom. The spot is immediately proximate to the IDECO’s premises. Considering this fact, and the further facts that
Pablo has just finished overtime work at the time, and was killed barely two minutes after dismissal from work, the Ampil case
is squarely applicable here. We may say, as we did in Ampil, that the place where the employee was injured being “immediately
proximate to his place of work, the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his employment
and therefore arose out of and in the course thereof.” Our principal question is whether the injury was sustained in the course
of employment. We find that it was, and so conclude that the assault arose out of the employment, even though the said assault
is unexplained.

American jurisprudence supports this view. In Bountiful Brick Company vs. Giles, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled:
Employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to
and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the
employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer’s premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in
practical effect a part of the employer’s premises, the injury is one arising out and in the course of the employment as much as though it
had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. In other words, the employment may begin in
point of time before the work is entered upon and in point of space before the place where the work is to be done is reached. Probably, as
a general rule, employment may be said to begin when the employee reaches the entrance to the employer’s premises where the work is
to be done; but it is clear that in some cases the rule extends to include adjacent premises used by the employee as a means of ingress and
egress with the express or implied consent of the employer.

Alano v. ECC
G.R. No. L-48594, March 16, 1988
Facts: Dedication was a school principal whose tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. While waiting for a ride at a public
plaza on her way to school, she was bumped and run over by a speeding bus which caused her death. The Employees’
Compensation Commission denied the claim filed by her heirs on the ground that the injury was not an employment accident
satisfying all the conditions prescribed by law.

Ruling: The deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where her job necessarily required her to be
if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about her being at the place of the
accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there. The GSIS, as the ultimate implementing agency of
the Employees’ Compensation Commission, is ordered to pay the claimants.

Lazo v. Employees’ Compensation Commission

G.R. No. 78617, June 18, 1990
Facts: Lazo is a security guard of the Central Bank assigned to its main office. His regular tour of duty is from 2 o’clock in the
afternoon to 10 o’clock in the evening. On June 18, 1986, he rendered duty from 2 o’clock in the afternoon to 10 o’clock in the
evening. But as the security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive, he
rendered overtime duty up to 5 o’clock in the morning of June 19. On his way home, at about 6 o’clock that morning, the
passenger jeepney the petitioner was riding on turned turtle due to slippery road. As a result, he sustained injuries and was
taken to the hospital for treatment.

Ruling: The claim is compensable. Here, Lazo left his station at the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off,
because the reliever did not arrive, and so he was asked to go on overtime. After permission to leave was given, he went home.
There is no evidence that he deviated from his usual, regular homeward route or that interruptions occurred in the journey.

Employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in
passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or
implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer’s premises, or over those of another in such
proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer’s premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the
course of the employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its
performance.

NFD International Manning Agents, Inc./Barber Ship Management Ltd. v. Illescas

G.R. No. 183054, September 29, 2010
Facts: Illescas was employed as Third Officer of M/V Shinrei through a POEA-approved employment contract for nine months
with US$854.00 monthly salary. On May 16, 2003, in the seventh month of Illescas’ employment, the vessel officers ordered
Illescas to carry 25 fire hydrant caps from the deck to the engine workshop. The next day, while doing the same kind of work,
he felt a sudden snap on his back, with pain that radiated down to the left side of his hips. Repatriated to the Philippines, he
underwent operations, but his condition did not improve, causing an orthopedic specialist to declare him “unfit to work at sea
in any capacity as seaman.” He claimed disability benefit under the contract that grants as much as US$90,000.00 to the
seafarer who suffers permanent disability “as a result of an accident.” The employer denied the claim, insisting that the
disability was not due to an “accident.”

Ruling: Black’s Law Dictionary defines “accident” as “[a]n unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence; something that
does not occur in the usual course of events or that could not be reasonably anticipated, x x x [a]n unforeseen and injurious
occurrence not attributable to mistake, negligence, neglect or misconduct.”

The Philippine Law Dictionary defines the word “accident” as “[t]hat which happens by chance or fortuitously, without
intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen.”

“Accident,” in its commonly accepted meaning, or in its ordinary sense, has been defined as:
[A] fortuitous circumstance, event, or happening, an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly
through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual and unexpected
by the person to whom it happens x x x.

The word may be employed as denoting a calamity, casualty, catastrophe, disaster, an undersirable or unfortunate happening; any
unexpected personal injury resulting from any unlooked for mishap or occurrence ; any unpleasant or unfortunate occurrence, that
causes injury, loss, suffering or death; some untoward occurrence aside from the usual course of events.

The Court holds that the snap on the back of respondent was not an accident, but an injury sustained by respondent from
carrying the heavy basketful of fire hydrant caps, which injury resulted in his disability. The injury cannot be said to be the
result of an accident, that is, an unlooked for mishap, occurrence, or fortuitous event, because the injury resulted from the
performance of a duty. Although respondent may not have expected the injury, yet, it is common knowledge that carrying
heavy objects can cause back injury, as what happened in this case. Hence, the injury cannot be viewed as unusual under the
circumstances, and is not synonymous with the term “accident” as defined above.

Although the disability of respondent was not caused by an accident, his disability is still compensable under Article 13 of the
CBA under the following provision:
A seafarer/officer who is disabled as a result of any injury, and who is assessed as less than 50% permanently disabled, but permanently
unfit for further service at sea in any capacity, shall also be entitled to a 100% compensation.

Respondent [Illescas] is, therefore, entitled to disability benefit in the amount US$90,000.00 under the CBA.

Meñez v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, et al.

G.R. No. L-48488, April 25, 1980
Facts: Petitioner, G.D. Menñ ez, was employed by the Department (now Ministry) of Education and Culture as a school teacher.
She retired on August 31, 1975 under the disability retirement plan at the age of 54 after 32 years of teaching, due to
rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis. Before her retirement, she was assigned at Raja Soliman High School in Tondo-Binondo,
Manila, near a dirty creek.

On October 21, 1976, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended, with respondent
Government Service Insurance System which denied the claim on October 25, 1976 on the ground that petitioner’s ailments
were not occupational diseases, taking into consideration the nature of her particular work. Requests for reconsideration were
also denied by the System; hence, the case was elevated to the Employees’ Compensation Commission for review. On March 1,
1978, the Commission en banc affirmed the decision of respondent GSIS.

In her petition for review on certiorari, petitioner claims that she contracted pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with
hemoptysis and rheumatoid arthritis on January 27, 1975 after wetting and chilling during the course of employment. She
claimed these diseases are permanent and recurring in nature and work-connected.

Ruling: An occupational disease is one ‘which results from the nature of the employment, and by nature is meant conditions to
which all employees of a class are subject and which produce the disease as a natural incident of a particular occupation, and
attach to that occupation a hazard which distinguishes it from the usual run of occupations and is in excess of the hazard
attending the employment in general.’

To be occupational, the disease must be one due wholly to causes and conditions which are normal and constantly present and
characteristic of the particular occupation; that is, those things which science and industry have not yet learned how to
eliminate. Every worker in every plant of the same industry is alike constantly exposed to the danger of contracting a
particular occupational disease.

An occupational disease is one which develops as a result of hazards peculiar to certain occupations, due to toxic substances
(as in the organic solvents industry), radiation (as in television repairment), repeated mechanical injury, emotional strain, etc.

From the foregoing definitions of occupational disease of ailments, rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis can be considered as
such occupational diseases. All public high school teachers, like herein petitioner, admittedly are the most underpaid but
overworked employees of the government, and are subject to emotional strains and stresses, dealing as they do with
intractable teenagers, especially young boys, and harassed as they are by various extra-curricular or nonacademic
assignments, aside from preparing lesson plans until late at night, if they are not badgered by very demanding superiors.

In the case of the petitioner, her emotional tension is heightened by the fact that the high school in which she teaches is
situated in a tough area — Binondo District, which is inhabited by thugs and other criminal elements and further aggravated
by the heavy pollution and congestion therein as well as the stinking smell of the dirty Estero de la Reina nearby. Women, like
herein petitioner, are most vulnerable to such unhealthy conditions. The pitiful situation of all public school teachers is further
accentuated by poor diet, for they can ill-afford nutritious food.

But even if rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are not occupational diseases, there is ample proof that petitioner contracted
such ailments by reason of her occupation as a public high school teacher due to her exposure to the adverse working
conditions above-mentioned.

Indisputably, petitioner contracted pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with hemoptysis and rheumatoid arthritis on January
27, 1975 after being drenched and the consequent ‘chilling during the course of employment which are permanent and
recurring in nature and work-connected.’ Undoubtedly, petitioner’s ailments thus become compensable under the New Labor
Code since under Rule III, Section 1(c) of its Implementing Rules, ‘only sickness or injury which occurred on or after January
1975 and the resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules.’

The ECC’s decision was set aside and the Ministry of Education and Culture is ordered (1) to pay petitioner the sum of
P6,000.00 as disability income benefits and (2) to reimburse petitioner’s medical and hospital expenses duly supported by
receipts.

Clemente v. Government Service Insurance System

G.R. No. 4721, July 31, 1987
Facts: The husband of claimant worked in a skin clinic. As janitor of the clinic, he was exposed to different carriers of viral and
bacterial diseases. He had to clean the clinic itself where patients with different illnesses come and go. He had to put in order
the hospital equipment that had been used. He had to dispose of garbage and wastes that accumulated in the course of each
working day. He was the employee most exposed to the dangerous concentration of infected materials, and, not being a medical
practitioner, least likely to know how to avoid infection.

Ruling: The working conditions of claimant’s husband increased the risk of his contracting the ailments, i.e., nephritis, leprosy,
etc.

Narazo v. Employees’ Compensation Commission

G.R. No. 80157, February 6, 1990
Facts: The death of petitioner’s husband was caused by “Uremia due to obstructive nephropathy and benign prostatic
hypertrophy,” which is admittedly not among those listed as occupational diseases. As per finding of the ECC, “Uremia is a toxic
clinical condition characterized by restlessness, muscular twitching, mental disturbance, nausea, and vomiting associated with
utenal insufficiency brought about by the retention in blood of nitrogenous urinary waste products.” One of its causes is the
obstruction in the flow of urinary waste products.

The nature of the work of the deceased as Budget Examiner in the Office of the Governor dealt with the detailed preparation of
the budget, financial reports and review and/or examination of the budget of other provincial and municipal offices. Full
concentration and thorough study of the entries of accounts in the budget and/or financial reports were necessary, such that
the deceased had to sit for hours, and more often than not, delay and even forego urination in order not to interrupt the flow of
concentration. In addition, tension and pressure must have aggravated the situation.

Ruling: Under the foregoing circumstances, the cause of death of petitioner’s husband is work-connected, i.e., the risk of
contracting the illness was aggravated by the nature of the work, so much so that petitioner is entitled to receive compensation
benefits for the death of her husband.

From human experience, prolonged sitting down and putting off urination result in stagnation of the urine. This encourages
the growth of bacteria in the urine, and affects the delicate balance between bacterial multiplication rates and the host defense
mechanisms. Delayed excretion may permit the retention and survival of microorganisms which multiply rapidly, and infect the
urinary tract. These are predisposing factors to pylonephritis and uremia. Thus, while we may concede that these illnesses are
not directly caused by the nature of the duties of a teacher, the risk of contracting the same is aggravated by their working
habits necessitated by demands of job efficiency.

Limbo v. Employees’ Compensation Commission and Social Security System

G.R. No. 146891, July 30, 2002
Facts: Petitioner R. Limbo was employed at Nestle Philippines since 1966 as a salesman and was later promoted as Areas Sales
Supervisor in 1977. In December 1994, he was confined for one week at the Philippine General Hospital for joint pains. It was
revealed that he had elevated BUN, creatinine and anemia, and that he had chronic renal disease. He underwent a renal
transplant and was discharged on January 13, 1995. He claimed compensation benefits under the SSS-ECC invoking P.D. 626;
however, his claim was denied on the ground that his illness had no causal relationship to his job as Area Sales Supervisor. He
appealed to the Employees’ Compensation Commission which affirmed the decision of the SSS. The Court of Appeals likewise
dismissed his petition.

Issue: Whether or not “end-stage renal disease secondary to uric acid nephropathy” is compensable under P.D. 626 as
amended.

Ruling: The Court considered the workload and areas of responsibility of petitioner and found that it was not unlikely for him
to develop hypertension leading to uremia. In determining whether a disease is compensable, it is enough that there exists a
reasonable work connection as the workmen’s claim is based on probability and not certainty.

Under the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, “(f)or the sickness and the resulting disability to be compensable, the
sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex “A” of these Rules with the conditions set therein
satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.”
Concededly, “end-stage renal disease secondary to uric acid nephropathy” is not among the Occupational Diseases under
Annex “A” of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation. This, however, would not automatically bar petitioner’s claim
for as long as he could prove that the risk of contracting the illness was increased by his working conditions.

Petitioner’s job description showed that he was responsible for the following:
(1) Territory’s collection, merchandising, market hygiene and promotion goals;
(2) Nestle’s principal satisfaction provider to the company’s customers and business partners, government and other significant entities;
(3) Principal Liason of the territory with the National Sales Manager, Areas Sales Manager and other Nestle units;
(4) Leads and manages territory sales force and 3rd party support.

Considering the workload and areas of responsibility of petitioner in this case, it is not unlikely for him to develop
hypertension, which in turn led to uremia. It should be stressed that in determining whether a disease is compensable, it is
enough that there exists a reasonable work connection. It is sufficient that the hypothesis on which the workmen’s claim is
based is probable since probability, not certainty, is the touchstone.

Raro v. Employees’ Compensation Commission

G.R. No. 58445, April 27, 1989
Cancer is a disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a person’s employment appears to have no relevance. Cancer
can strike a lowly paid laborer or a highly paid executive or one who works on land, in water, or in the bowels of the earth. It
makes no difference whether the victim is employed or unemployed, a white collar employee or a blue collar worker, a
housekeeper, an urban dweller or a resident of a rural area.

Jurisprudence on the compensability of cancer ailments has of late become a source of confusion among the claimants and the
government agencies enforcing the employees’ compensation law. The strongly lingering influence of the principles of
“presumption of compensability” and “aggravation” found in the defunct Workmen’s Compensation Act but expressly
discarded under the present compensation scheme has led to conflict and inconsistency in employees’ compensation
decisions.

The problem is attributable to the inherent difficulty in applying the new principle of “proof of increased risk.” There are two
approaches to a solution in cases where it cannot be proved that the risk of contracting an illness not listed as an occupational
disease was increased by the claimant’s working conditions. One approach is that if a claimant cannot prove the necessary
work connection because the causes of the disease are still unknown, it must be presumed that working conditions increased
the risk of contracting the ailment. The other approach is that if there is no proof of the required work connection, the disease
is not compensable because the law says so.

It is not correct to say that all cancers are not compensable. The list of occupational diseases prepared by the Employees’
Compensation Commission includes some cancers as compensable. There is no arbitrariness in the Commission’s allowing
vinyl chloride workers or plastic workers to be compensated for brain cancer. There are certain cancers which are reasonably
considered as strongly induced by specific causes. Heavy doses of radiation as in Chernobyl, USSR, cigarette smoke over a long
period for lung cancer, certain chemicals for specific cancers, and asbestos dust, among others, are generally accepted as
increasing the risks of contracting specific cancers. What the law requires for others is proof. Cancer is a disease of still
unknown origin which strikes people in all walks of life, employed or unemployed. Unless it be shown that a particular form of
cancer is caused by specific working conditions (e.g., chemical fumes, nuclear radiation, asbestos dust, etc.), the Court cannot
conclude that it was the employment which increased the risk of contracting the disease.

For the guidance of the administrative agencies and practicing lawyers concerned, the decision of the Supreme Court in Raro
vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 58445, April 27, 1989, en banc, Gutierrez, Jr., J. supersedes the decisions in
Panotes vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission (128 SCRA 473 [1984]); Mercado vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission
(127 SCRA 664 [1984]); Ovenson vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission (156 SCRA 2 [1987]); Nemaria vs. Employees’
Compensation Commission (155 SCRA 166 [1987]) and other cases with conclusions different from those stated in Raro vs.
Employees’ Compensation Commission.

NAESS Shipping Phil. v. NLRC

G.R. No. 73441, September 4, 1987
Facts: While plying the seas from Brazil to Egypt, the vessel’s chief steward, named Dublin, fatally stabbed Fernandez, the
second cook, during a quarrel. Dublin then ran to the deck from which he jumped or fell overboard. The body was never
recovered.

For the death of Dublin, his widow Zenaida collected the amount of P75,000 under the ITF Collective Bargaining Agreement.
She also filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) a complaint against NAESS for payment of
death benefits totalling US$74,512, under both the Special Agreement and what she claimed to be also the applicable
Singapore Workmen’s Compensation Ordinance. Under the special agreement, a crewman of the vessel is entitled to
compensation for “loss of life.” The POEA rendered judgment for complainant, holding Dublin’s death compensable under the
Special Agreement.

NAESS went to the Supreme Court charging grave abuse of discretion by POEA and raised the issue whether “death caused by
suicide” (jumping overboard) is compensable.

Ruling: No law or rule would make it illegal for an employer to assume the obligation to pay death benefits in favor of his
employee in their contract of employment. Since NAESS freely bound itself to a contract which on its face makes it
unqualifiedly liable to pay compensation benefits for Dublin’s death while in its service, regardless of whether or not it
intended to make itself the insurer, in the legal sense, of Dublin’s life, NAESS cannot escape liability.

Contracts which are the private laws of the contracting parties should be fulfilled according to the literal sense of their
stipulation, if their terms are clear and leave no room for doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, for contracts are
obligatory, no matter what their form may be, whenever the essential requisites for their validity are present.

The argument — that to compel payment of death benefits would amount not only to rewarding the act of murder or homicide,
but also inequitably places on NAESS the twin burdens of compensating both the killer and his victim, who allegedly had also
been employed under a contract with a similar death benefits clause — confuses the legal implications and effects of two
distinct and independent agreements. It carries within itself the seeds of its own refutation. Entitlement of Dublin to death
benefits resulted from his death while serving out his contract of employment. It was not a consequence of his killing of
Fernandez. If the latter’s death is also compensable, that is due to the solitary fact of his death while covered by a similar
contract, not precisely to the fact that he met death at the hands of Dublin. That both deaths may be related by abuse and effect
and NAESS is the single obligor liable for compensation in both cases must, insofar as factual and legal basis of such liability is
concerned, be regarded as purely accidental circumstances.

According to American authorities, suicide is compensable in the following cases:

(a) When it results from insanity resulting from compensable work injury or disease;
(b) When it occurs during a delirium resulting from compensable disease.

Self-destruction is not presumed. In cases where compensation is sought for a violent death due to accident, our courts have
refused so far to impute to the victim an intention to end his life. The laborer is presumed to take the necessary precautions to
avoid injury to himself, unless an intention is attributed to him to end his life. That presumption is based on the instinct of self-
preservation.

Solidum v. GSIS
ECC Case No. 4061, promulgated on November 23, 1988
Facts: Solidum was an enlisted man of the Philippine Marines, assigned to the 10th Marine Battalion, stationed at Zamboanga
City.

One morning in March 1987, Solidum, who was then resting after a patrol mission, jokingly challenged his comrades to a duel,
but they all ignored him. Pointing the muzzle of his loaded rifle at his temple and, saying “ Bahala na,” Solidum squeezed the
trigger. He died instantly.

His father filed a claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626. The GSIS denied his claim because the contingency did not arise
out of and in the course of employment. The System pointed out that the deceased was not performing his duties as a soldier
when the accident occurred. Moreover, it said, the deceased’s death was caused by his notorious negligence and not by an
accident or by “an act of God.”

After his request for reconsideration failed, the appellant elevated the case to the Employees’ Compensation Commission.

Ruling: The ECC sustained the System’s decision. The ECC noted that the deceased pointed the muzzle of his rifle to himself
and squeezed its trigger causing his death.

“Such an act, we believe, constitutes notorious negligence. The employees’ compensation program under which the appellant
seeks relief is designed to compensate only the working men who are victims of work-connected injuries and other
contingencies. In the case before us, the contingency did not arise out of and in the course of employment, and therefore is not
compensable.”

Quizon v. GSIS
ECC Case No. 3015, promulgated on October 26, 1987
Facts: A Philippine Army soldier died in December 1980 due to dynamite blast at Tumalutab detachment in Ipil, Zamboanga
City.

Investigation showed that after lunch that day, he asked permission from his unit to test the dynamite they had earlier
confiscated. He took a civilian pumpboat and proceeded towards nearby Sinonog Island. Along the way, however, he
accidentally ignited the fuse of the dynamite, causing it to explode prematurely. The soldier died on the spot.

For his death, his father filed a claim for compensation benefits but the GSIS denied it because the deceased at the time of
accident was not performing his duties aside from being notoriously negligent.

Appellant sought a reconsideration of the ruling. He averred that his son belonged to the Ranger Training Group whose
primary mission is to develop selected soldiers in the field of specialized small unit tactics, particularly on weapons, explosives,
and hand-to-hand combat, among others. Thus, testing a dynamite was part of the deceased’s training as a ranger. “In fact,”
appellant said, “no less than the Minister of National Defense through his legal chief, Brig. Gen. Samuel Soriano, supported the
line of duty status of his son’s death.”

“Moreover,” appellant added, “it was not the commanding officer of the deceased as alleged in respondent’s adverse decision
who advised him not to test the dynamite, but merely a colleague of the same rank as the deceased.”

Ruling: We [the ECC] believe that there was indeed negligence on the part of the deceased soldier. However, his negligence was
not notorious as perceived by the respondent. Notorious negligence is something more than simple or contributory negligence.
It signifies a deliberate act of the employee to disregard his own personal safety. Disobedience to rules does not in itself
constitute notorious negligence, if no intention can be attributed to the injured to end his life.

Thus, in line with the principle of liberally construing compensation law, to attain its purpose for which it was enacted, the
correct view to be followed is that no man in his right senses would deliberately court death. The presumption then to be
adopted is that any person by his instinct of self-preservation wants to avoid such danger unless an intention is attributed to
him to end his life.

Considering the soldier’s training on explosives as a ranger, his desire to test the confiscated dynamite is but a natural reaction
on his part to the extent that he even ignored the advice of his colleague against his plan. Unfortunately, the dynamite exploded
prematurely causing his instant death.

The ECC reversed the respondent System’s decision and ordered payment of the claim.

GSIS v. Court of Appeals and R. Balais

G.R. No. 117572, January 29, 1998
Facts: In December 1989, the employee claimant was diagnosed to be suffering from Ruptured Aneurysm. She underwent
craniotomy.

But despite her operation, she could not perform her duties as cashier in the NHA as efficiently as she did before her illness.
This forced her to retire on March 1, 1990 at the age of sixty-two (62). She filed a claim for disability benefits.

The GSIS granted her temporary total disability (TTD) benefits and, subsequently, permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits
for nine months.

In November 1992, she requested the GSIS to convert the classification of her disability benefits from permanent partial
disability (PPD) to permanent total disability (PTD).

GSIS denied the request and informed her that her condition did not satisfy the criteria for permanent total disability. She
asked for reconsideration. GSIS denied it, and ECC affirmed the denial. But on a petition for review, the Court of Appeals
promulgated a decision favorable to her. GSIS petitions the Supreme Court to reverse the Court of Appeals.

Issue: Is private respondent entitled to conversion of her benefits from permanent partial disability to permanent total
disability?

Ruling: The Supreme Court, through Justice Romero, refused to reverse the Court of Appeals.

While it is true that the degree of private respondent’s physical condition at the time of her retirement was not considered as
permanent total disability, yet, it cannot be denied that her condition subsequently worsened after her head operation and
consequent retirement. In fact, she suffered afterwards from some ailments like headaches, dizziness, weakness, inability to
sleep properly, inability to walk without support and failure to regain her memory. All these circumstances ineluctably
demonstrate the seriousness of her condition, contrary to the claim of petitioner. More than that, it was also undisputed that
private respondent was made to take her medication for life.

“A person’s disability may not manifest fully at one precise moment in time but rather over a period of time. It is possible that
an injury which at first was considered to be temporary may later on become permanent or one who suffers a partial disability
becomes totally and permanently disabled from the same cause.”

In the same vein, this Court has ruled that “disability should not be understood more on its medical significance but on the loss
of earning capacity.” Private respondent’s persistent illness indeed forced her to retire early which, in turn, resulted in her
unemployment, and loss of earning capacity.

Judicial precedents likewise show that disability is intimately related to one’s earning capacity. It has been a consistent
pronouncement of this Court that “permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same
kind of work, or work of a similar nature that she was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a
person of her mentality and attainment could do.” “It does not mean state of absolute helplessness, but inability to do
substantially all material acts necessary to prosecution of an occupation for remuneration or profit in substantially customary
and usual manner.

The Court construed permanent total disability as the “lack of ability to follow continuously some substantially gainful
occupation without serious discomfort or pain and without material injury or danger to life.” It is, therefore, clear from
established jurisprudence that the loss of one’s earning capacity determines the disability compensation one is entitled to.

It is also important to note that private respondent was constrained to retire at the age of 62 years because of her impaired
physical condition. This, again, is another indication that her disability is permanent and total.

Central Azucarera Don Pedro v. C. de Leon, in his capacity as Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner and L. Alla
G.R. No. L-10036, December 28, 1957
The claimant laborer was granted benefit for temporary total disability. When the disability ceased, he found a new
employment at a higher salary. Meantime, he filed a claim for permanent partial disability but the ECC denied the claim
because in fact his salary was higher than before.

Ruling: The alleged new employment does not appear to have been duly established and, indeed, even supposing it to be true,
that fact would not in itself necessarily affect the laborer’s claim for compensation for a permanent partial disability. An injured
laborer’s incapacity for work is not to be measured solely by the wages he receives, or his earning, after the injury, since the
amount of such wages or earnings may be affected by various extraneous matters or factors.

As noted in the American Law Reports, “there are a number of possible explanations of the fact that an employee who receives
higher wages after an injury than what he earned before may still have suffered an impairment of earning capacity. Thus, it may
indicate: (1) that the employee is the beneficiary of a mere gratuity and does not actually ‘earn’ his wages; (2) that the
employee, by education and training, has fitted himself for more remunerative employment; (3) that the employee works
longer hours than he did before his injury, his hourly remuneration having increased; (4) that a general change in wage scales
has taken place for the type of work or in the industry; (5) that the new wages are intended as an inducement to him to refrain
from pursuing a claim; (6) that the employee, before his injury, was younger or a minor; (7) that the employment in which the
employee was employed after the injury was of uncertain duration.”