ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

I. Katarungang Pambarangay
Sec. 399-422, Book III, Title I, Chapter 7, RA 7160
II. 2016 Revised Rules of Procedure For Small Claims Cases as Amended
A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, December 8, 2015
Cases:
GMCC United Development Corporation v. Gotesco Regency Twin Towers Condominium Corporation,
G.R. No. 206137, 08 April 2015
A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Mondejar, G.R. No. 200804, January 22, 2014
Okada v. Security Pacific Assurance Corporation G.R. No. 164344, December 23, 2008
III. Court Annexed Mediation and Judicial Dispute Resolution
A.M. No. 11-1-6-SC-PHILJA, January 11, 2011
OCA Circular No. 051-11, April 6, 2011
IV. Construction Arbitration
1. Executive Order No. 1008, February 4, 1985
2. CIAC Revised Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration, August 15, 2011 (As amended
by CIAC Resolution Nos. 15-2006, 16-2006, 18-2006, 19-2006, 02-2007, 07-2007, 13-2007, 02-2008, 03-
2008, 11-2008, 01-2010, 04-2010, and 07-2010)
3. CIAC Resolution No. 07-16, November 3, 2016
Cases:
Chung Fu Industries (Philippines) Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96283, February 25, 1992
William Golangco Construction Corp. v. Ray Burton Development Corp., G.R. No. 163582, August 9,
2010
Federal Builders, Inc. v. Power Factors, Inc., G.R. No. 211504, March 8, 2017
V. International Commercial Arbitration
1. International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Rules of Arbitration
2. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules, December 15,
1976
Cases:
Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. v. Lerma, G.R. No. 143581, January 7, 2008
MCC Industial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong Corp., G.R. No. 170633, October 17, 2007
Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA International Corp., G.R. No. 210858, June 29, 2016
Gonzales v. Climax Mining Ltd., G.R. No. 161957, 167994, January 22, 2007
Transfield Phils., Inc. v. Luzon Hydro Corp., G.R. No. 146717, May 19, 2006
RCBC Capital Corp. v. Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc., G.R. No. 196171, 199238, December 10, 2012
VI. Republic Act No. 876, June 19, 1953
Cases:
Umbao v. Yap, G.R. No. L-8933, February 28, 1957
Continental Marble Corp. V. National Labor Relations Commission (Nlrc);, Et Al., G.R. No. L-43825, May
9, 1988
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. St. Francis Square Realty, G.R Nos. 198916-17, 198920-21, 11 January
2016
Bases Conversion Development Authority, et al., v. DMCI Project Developers, Inc., et al., G.R. No.
173137, 11 January 2016
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. World Interactive Network Systems Japan Co., Ltd., G.R. No. 169332,
February 11, 2008
VII. Republic Act No. 9285, April 2, 2004
Cases:
Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. v. Lerma, G.R. No. 143581, January 7, 2008
Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA International Corp., G.R. No. 210858, June 29, 2016
Transfield Phils., Inc. v. Luzon Hydro Corp., G.R. No. 146717, May 19, 2006
Tuna Processing, Inc. v. Philippine Kingford, Inc., G.R. No. 185582, [February 29, 2012
Insular Savings Bank v. Far Eastern, G.R. No. 141818, June 22, 2006
Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc., v. Spouses Rune And Lea Stroe, G.R. No. 204689, January 21,
2015
VIII. Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution
1. A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC, September 1, 2009
2. Executive Order No. 78, July 4, 2012
Cases:
Fruehauf Electronics Philippines Corp. v. Technology Electronics Assembly and Management Pacific
Corp., G.R. No. 204197, November 23, 2016
Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA International Corp., G.R. No. 210858, June 29, 2016
Tuna Processing, Inc. v. Philippine Kingford, Inc., G.R. No. 185582, [February 29, 2012
RCBC Capital Corp. v. Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc., G.R. No. 196171, 199238, December 10, 2012
Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc., v. Spouses Rune And Lea Stroe, G.R. No. 204689, January 21,
2015
Koppel, Inc. (Formerly Known As Kpl Aircon, Inc.), v. Makati Rotary Club Foundation, Inc., G.R. No.
198075, September 4, 2013
Department Of Environment And Natural Resources (DENR), v. United Planners Consultants, Inc.
(UPCI), G.R. No. 212081, February 23, 2015
Luzon Iron Development Group Corp. v. Bridestone Mining and Development Corp., G.R. No. 220546,
December 7, 2016
Federal Express Corp. v. Airfreight 2100, Inc., G.R. No. 216600, November 21, 2016
Fyfe v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 160071, June 6, 2016

G.R. No. 200804 January 22, 2014

A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
EMMA MONDEJAR, accompanied by her husband, EFREN MONDEJAR, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is a direct recourse1 to the Court from the Decision2 dated November 23, 2011and Order3 dated
February 16, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 45 (RTC) in RTC Case No. 11-
13833 which dismissed, on the ground of improper remedy, petitioner A.L. Ang Network, Inc.'s (petitioner)
petition for certiorari from the Decision4 dated June 10, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Bacolod City, Branch 4 (MTCC) in Civil Case No. SCC-1436, a small claims case for sum of money
against respondent Emma Mondejar (respondent).

The Facts

On March 23, 2011, petitioner filed a complaint5 for sum of money under the Rule of Procedure for Small
Claims Cases6 before the MTCC, seeking to collect from respondent the amount of ₱23,111.71 which
represented her unpaid water bills for the period June 1, 2002 to September 30, 2005.7

Petitioner claimed that it was duly authorized to supply water to and collect payment therefor from the
homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision, one of whom is respondent who owns and occupies Lot 8,
Block 3 of said subdivision. From June 1, 2002 until September 30, 2005, respondent and her family
consumed a total of 1,150 cubic meters (cu. m.) of water, which upon application of the agreed rate of
₱113.00 for every 10 cu. m. of water, plus an additional charge of ₱11.60 for every additional cu. m. of
water, amounted to ₱28,580.09.8 However, respondent only paid the amount of ₱5,468.38, thus, leaving
a balance of ₱23,111.71 which was left unpaid despite petitioner’s repeated demands. 9

In defense, respondent contended that since April 1998 up to February 2003, she religiously paid
petitioner the agreed monthly flat rate of ₱75.00 for her water consumption. Notwithstanding their
agreement that the same would be adjusted only upon prior notice to the homeowners, petitioner
unilaterally charged her unreasonable and excessive adjustments (at the average of 40 cu. m. of water
per month or 1.3 cu. m. of water a day) far above the average daily water consumption for a household of
only 3 persons. She also questioned the propriety and/or basis of the aforesaid ₱23,111.71 claim. 10

In the interim, petitioner disconnected respondent’s water line for not paying the adjusted water charges
since March 2003 up to August 2005.11

The MTCC Ruling

On June 10, 2011, the MTCC rendered a Decision12 holding that since petitioner was issued a Certificate
of Public Convenience (CPC)13 by the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) only on August 7,
2003, then, it can only charge respondent the agreed flat rate of ₱75.00 per month prior thereto or the
sum of ₱1,050.00 for the period June 1, 2002 to August 7, 2003. Thus, given that respondent had made
total payments equivalent to ₱1,685.99 for the same period, she should be considered to have fully paid
petitioner.14

The MTCC disregarded petitioner’s reliance on the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board’s (HLURB)
Decision15dated August 17, 2000 in HLURB Case No. REM C6-00-001 entitled Nollie B. Apura, et al. v.
Dona Carmen I Subdivision, et al., as source of its authority to impose new water consumption rates for
water consumed from June 1, 2002 to August 7, 2003 in the absence of proof (a) that petitioner complied
with the directive to inform the HLURB of the result of its consultation with the concerned homeowners as
regards the rates to be charged, and (b) that the HLURB approved of the same.16

Moreover, the MTCC noted that petitioner failed to submit evidence showing (a) the exact date when it
actually began imposing the NWRB approved rates; and (b) that the parties had a formal agreement
containing the terms and conditions thereof, without which it cannot establish with certainty respondent’s
obligation.17 Accordingly, it ruled that the earlier agreed rate of ₱75.00 per month should still be the basis
for respondent’s water consumption charges for the period August 8, 2003 to September 30,
2005.18 Based on petitioner’s computation, respondent had only paid ₱300.00 of her ₱1,500.00 obligation
for said period. Thus, it ordered respondent to pay petitioner the balance thereof, equivalent to ₱1,200.00
with legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of receipt of the extrajudicial demand on October
14, 2010 until fully paid.19

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari20 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the RTC,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC in finding that it (petitioner) failed to establish
with certainty respondent’s obligation, and in not ordering the latter to pay the full amount sought to be
collected.

The RTC Ruling

On November 23, 2011, the RTC issued a Decision21 dismissing the petition for certiorari, finding that the
said petition was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims cases as provided
under Section 2322of the Rule of Procedure on Small Claims Cases. To this end, the RTC ruled that it
cannot supplant the decision of the MTCC with another decision directing respondent to pay petitioner a
bigger sum than that which has been awarded.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration23 but was denied in an Order24 dated February 16, 2012, hence, the
instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing petitioner’s recourse under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court assailing the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that:

SEC. 23. Decision. — After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the same day, based on the
facts established by the evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision shall immediately be entered by the Clerk
of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties.

The decision shall be final and unappealable.

Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-stated rule, the remedy of
appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its
execution.25 Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings
where appeal is not an available remedy,26 does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This general rule has been enunciated in the case of
Okada v. Security Pacific Assurance Corporation,27 wherein it was held that:
In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that "the extraordinary writ of certiorari is always
available where there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law." In Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co., the Court ruled:

x x x Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special civil action of certiorari
may only be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course
of law," this rule is not without exception. The availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not
constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
where appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy
– not the mere absence – of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ
that usually determines the propriety of certiorari.

This ruling was reiterated in Conti v. Court of Appeals:

Truly, an essential requisite for the availability of the extraordinary remedies under the Rules is an
absence of an appeal nor any "plain, speedy and adequate remedy" in the ordinary course of law, one
which has been so defined as a "remedy which (would) equally (be) beneficial, speedy and sufficient not
merely a remedy which at some time in the future will bring about a revival of the judgment x x x
complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy which will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the inferior court or tribunal" concerned. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)

In this relation, it may not be amiss to placate the RTC’s apprehension that respondent’s recourse before
it (was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of [small claims cases], because it asks [the
court] to supplant the decision of the lower [c]ourt with another decision directing the private respondent
to pay the petitioner a bigger sum than what has been awarded."28 Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike
an appeal, is an original action29 designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of judgment. Owing
to its nature, it is therefore incumbent upon petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors tainted the
MTCC Decision. The RTC, in turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition based on an evaluation of
whether or not the MTCC gravely abused its discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily
disregarding evidence that is material to the controversy. 30

In view of the foregoing, the Court thus finds that petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari to
assail the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case, contrary to the RTC’s ruling.

Likewise, the Court finds that petitioner filed the said petition before the proper forum (i.e., the
RTC).1âwphi1 To be sure, the Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari. 31Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not give a party
unbridled freedom to choose the venue of his action lest he ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. Instead, a becoming regard for judicial hierarchy dictates that petitions for the issuance of writs of
certiorari against first level courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the
latter, with the Court of Appeals, before resort may be had before the Court.32 This procedure is also in
consonance with Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.33

Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts,34 certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed before their corresponding Regional
Trial Courts. This petitioner complied with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC which,
as previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same. In fine, the RTC erred in dismissing the said
petition on the ground that it was an improper remedy, and, as such, RTC Case No. 11-13833 must be
reinstated and remanded thereto for its proper disposition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 23, 2011 and Resolution dated
February 16, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 45 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. RTC Case No. 11-13833 is hereby REINSTATED and the court a quo is ordered to resolve the
same with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
 DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

NITO o ou mono wa itto o mo ezu,[1] says a Japanese proverb. If you run after two hares, you would catch neither. Kung
hahabol ka sa dalawang kuneho, di mo mahuhuli ang isa man nito.

It would be more prudent as it is proper for petitioner to run after his employer to satisfy his money claims rather than
stubbornly insist on an invalid bond.

This exhortation is apt in this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 77451.[3] The CA set aside the Labor Arbiters Order dated March 28, 2003 and annulled the writ of
execution dated October 15, 2002 in so far as it ordered the satisfaction of the decision from Surety Bond No. SPAC-
01061/2001 issued by respondent Security Pacific Assurance Corporation (SPAC).

The Facts

On January 14, 1999, petitioner Kenji Okada filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, payment of service
incentive leave, 13th month pay, damages, and attorneys fees against then Meiyu Technology Corporation
(Meiyu)[4] before the Labor Arbiter. The complaint, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-01-00520-99, likewise
impleaded Meiyu officers, namely: Hideaki Terraya, Keiji Sobana, and Voltaire Soriano. [5] The case was raffled off
to Labor Arbiter Fatima Jambaro-Franco.

On July 12, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. The dispositive part of the
Arbiter ruling reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the respondents Meiyu Technology Corporation/Hideaki

Terraya/Keiji Sobana and Voltaire Soriano are hereby directed to pay, jointly and severally
complainant Kenji Okada the amount of SIX MILLION THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P6,380,000.00), representing the monetary awards as above-computed and
attorneys fees.

All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[6]
Expectedly, Meiyu appealed the decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). [7] It posted an appeal
bond issued by Wellington Insurance Co., Inc. in the amount equivalent to the monetary judgment. In their appeal
memorandum, Meiyu argued, inter alia, that the action for reinstatement and payment of benefits has prescribed.

On November 5, 1999, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, on the ground of
prescription.[8] The NLRC resolved:

Article 291 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:

All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this
Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action
accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.

In connection therewith, the Supreme Court in Calianta v. Carnation Philippines, G.R. 70615, Feb.
28, 1986, ruled that the period of prescription mentioned under Article 291 of the Labor Code refers
to and is limited to money claims, all other cases of injury to rights of working man being governed
by the Civil Code. Hence, an action for reinstatement is four years, for the injury to the employees
right as provide[d] under Article 1146 of the Labor Code. The four-year prescriptive period under
Article 1146 of the New Civil Code is applied by way of supplement.

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that complainants employment was terminated on 5 May
1993. Hence, complainant had until 5 May 1997 within which to file the complaint for reinstatement
or until 5 May 1996 for his money claims.

In relation thereto, Article 217 of the Labor Code declares that,

a) x x x the Labor Arbiter shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide x x x the following cases involving all workers x x x.

xxxx

2. Termination disputes.

Article 292 of the Labor Code also mandates that money claims specified in the immediately
preceding Article shall be filed before the appropriate entity.

In connection therewith, Article 1155 of the New Civil Code also states that the prescription of
actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court. And the phrase before the court should
only mean before appropriate court, quasi or quasi-judicial body.

Therefore, the filing of the petition for reinstatement with the SEC which is not the appropriate court
did not have the effect of suspending or interrupting the prescriptive period for the filing of an
action for illegal dismissal and money claims.

The Labor Arbiter also seriously erred in holding that the respondents are estopped from questioning
the Order dated 8 April 1993 (denying the motion to dismiss on ground of prescription), inasmuch
as the respondents failure to appeal and question the Order means that they have acquiesced to the
said findings.
 Obviously, the Labor Arbiter a quo failed to consider Section 15, Rule V of the NLRC Rules of
Procedure which provides that,

Any motion to dismiss on the ground x x x that the cause of action, i.e. barred x x
x by prescription, shall be immediately resolved by the Labor Arbiter by a written
order. An order denying the motion to dismiss x x x is not appealable.[9]

Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the NLRC judgment. In his motion for reconsideration, petitioner
averred that the appeal was not perfected because the bond posted by Meiyu was spurious. It had no legal
effect. Hence, the decision of the Labor Arbiter became final and executory. [10]

Upon verification, the NLRC found that the appeal bond was, indeed, spurious. It then set aside its earlier
decision and reinstated the Labor Arbiters Decision dated July 12, 1999 in favor of petitioner.[11]

Meiyu elevated the matter to the CA via petition for certiorari.[12]

Meantime, petitioner moved for the execution of the Arbiter award. Meiyu opposed petitioners motion for
execution pending appeal, alleging it did not know that the appeal bond it earlier filed was spurious. Together with
the petition, it posted another appeal bond, this time issued by private respondent SPAC, with the purpose of staying
the execution of the Labor Arbiters decision.[13]

In a Decision dated August 6, 2001, the CA denied Meiyus petition. The appellate court held that Meiyu
failed to perfect its appeal because a fake or spurious bond produces no legal effect. The appellate court further ruled
that the Labor Arbiters decision lapsed into finality.[14]

Predictably, on October 15, 2002, a writ of execution[15] was issued by the Labor
Arbiter. A notice of garnishment[16] was later issued by Sheriff Conrado Gaddi.

On October 23, 2002, respondent SPAC filed a manifestation and motion to quash writ of execution before
the Labor Arbiter.[17] Respondent posited that it should be discharged from any liability on the bond it issued to Meiyu
on the following grounds: (1) the bond would not have served its purpose of staying the execution or perfecting the
appeal required under Article 223 of the Labor Code; (2) the bond was filed only when the case was already with the
CA or long after the Honorable Commission declared the appeal from the Labor Arbiters decision ineffective; and (3)
said bond was not approved at all by the tribunals concerned because the CA sustained the NLRCs dismissal of the
appeal.[18]

Labor Arbiter and CA Dispositions

 In its Order[19] dated March 28, 2003, the Labor Arbiter denied SPACs motion to quash writ of execution. The
Arbiter opined:

In other words, the obligation of the respondents to the Commission was to submit a surety
bond in order to perfect its appeal. On the other hand, the obligation of movant SPAC is to be held
liable on its bond should the decision appealed from be affirmed in whole or in part by the appellate
body. Clearly, movant SPACs liability is not conditioned on the perfection of the appeal of the
respondents, but on whether or not the decision appealed from is affirmed in whole or in part by the
Court of Appeals.[20] (Underscoring supplied)

Undaunted, respondent SPAC filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition[21] with the CA, seeking the
quashal of the writ of execution.

On June 29, 2004, the CA gave judgment[22] for respondent SPAC, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

Public respondent Labor Arbiters Order dated March 28, 2003 is

ordered VACATED AND SET ASIDE.

The Writ of Execution dated October 15, 2002, insofar as it orders to cause the satisfaction
of the Decision dated July 12, 1999 from Surety Bond No. SPAC-01061/2001 issued by petitioner
Security Pacific Assurance Corporation in the amount of P5,800,000.00, is hereby ANNULLED.

SO ORDERED.[23]

The CA ratiocinated:

The posting of a surety bond is a requirement of Article 223 of the Labor Code in order to
perfect the appeal to the NLRC by an employer. The surety bond seeks to stay the execution of the
award of money claims.

In this case, the Surety Bond issued by petitioner SPAC did not stay the execution of the
public respondent Labor Arbiters decision because it was belatedly filed. The same is deducible
from this Courts decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 61472. In fact, this Courts Former Sixth Division did
not even consider the fact that a new Surety Bond issued by petitioner SPAC was filed before this
Court. This Court did not take cognizance of the Surety Bond issued by petitioner SPAC designed
to replace the fake bond issued to the NLRC.
The non-acceptance of the Surety Bond issued by petitioner SPAC brought the original
parties in the labor dispute into a situation where no appeal was filed, hence no appeal bond to
proceed against.The subject bond cannot be held answerable because of the non-fulfillment of the
condition precedent for its issuance the perfection of the appeal.[24] (Underscoring supplied)

Further, the CA held:

Public respondent Labor Arbiters view that petitioner SPAC is bound to the NLRC, whether or not the appeal
was perfected, is erroneous. She lost sight of the fact that the subject Surety Bond would not have
been issued if not for Meiyus desire to replace the fake bond and to perfect its appeal. The Surety
Bond intended to hold itself liable for the purpose of perfecting the appeal and staying the execution
of public respondent labor Arbiters decision. Therefore, the failure to achieve its purpose released
petitioner SPAC from its liability under the bond. [25]

The Issues

Petitioner has resorted to the present recourse via Rule 45 and ascribes to the CA the following errors:

I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING THAT THE
VALIDITY OF THE BOND ISSUED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT SPAC IS CONDITIONED
SOLELY ON THE PERFECTION OF MEIYUS APPEAL.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE THE ORDER OF THE
LABOR ARBITER DATED MARCH 28, 2003 AS HAVING BEEN ISSUED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SPACS
FAILURE TO FURNISH A COPY OF THE PETITION TO PETITIONERS COUNSEL IS OF NO
MOMENT.

IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT IT
WAS PROPER FOR PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO FILE A PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI RATHER THANAPPEAL THE QUESTIONED ORDER TO THE
COMMISSION.[26] (Underscoring supplied)

Our Ruling

The first two issues are interrelated and shall be treated jointly.

I. An appeal bond timely filed is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in a labor case. Conversely, the
validity, worth, and efficacy of an appeal bond are conditioned and dependent on, and subordinated to, the
perfection of the appeal.

The indispensability of an appeal bond in the perfection of an appeal cannot be gainsaid. A cash or surety bond is a
requirement sine qua non for the perfection of an appeal from the Labor Arbiters monetary award. [27] In Viron
Garments Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[28] the Court ruled:

The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the
perfection of an appeal by the employer is clearly limned in the provision that an appeal by the
employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. The word only makes
 it perfectly clear, that the lawmakers intended that the posting of a cash or surety bond by the
employer to be the exclusive means by which an employer's appeal may be perfected. [29]

The doctrine was reiterated with greater firmness in the more recent case of Mary Abigails Food Services, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals:[30]

Clear it is from the above that an appeal to the NLRC from any decision, award or order of
the Labor Arbiter must have to be made within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decision,
award or order with proof of payment of the required appeal bond accompanied by a
memorandum of appeal. And where, as here, the decision of the Labor Arbiter involves a monetary
award, the appeal is deemed perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond also within
ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decision in an amount equivalent to the monetary award.
The posting of a cash or surety bond is a requirement sine qua non for the perfection of an
appeal from the labor arbiters monetary award. Notably, the perfection of an appeal within the
period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with the
requirements therefore is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment sought to be appealed
final and executory. Such requirement cannot be trifled with.[31] (Underscoring supplied)

In the case under review, Meiyu appealed the Labor Arbiters decision to the NLRC. However, its appeal was deemed
imperfect because its appeal bond turned out to be spurious. The bond was invalid. It did not effectively serve its
purpose. It cannot thus be held liable to satisfy the money judgment of the Arbiter.

Absent a perfected appeal, the original parties stand in the same place as they were when the decision
appealed from was rendered. Here, the Labor Arbiter issued its order declaring Meiyu liable to pay petitioner the
amount of Six Million Three Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos (P6,380,000.00) as monetary awards and attorneys fees
on July 12, 1999. Meiyu failed to appeal the said judgment in accordance with the Labor Code and its implementing
rules.

We quote with approval the CA observation and conclusion along this line:

In this case, the Surety Bond issued by petitioner SPAC did not stay the execution of the
public respondent Labor Arbiters decision because it was belatedly filed. The same is deducible
from this Courts decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 61472. In fact, this Courts Former Sixth Division did
not even consider the fact that a new Surety Bond issued by petitioner SPAC was filed before this
Court. This Court did not take cognizance of the Surety Bond issued by petitioner SPAC designed
to replace the fake bond issued to the NLRC.

The non-acceptance of the Surety Bond issued by petitioner SPAC brought the original
parties in the labor dispute into a situation where no appeal was filed, hence no appeal bond to
proceed against.The subject bond cannot be held answerable because of the non-fulfillment of the
condition precedent for its issuance the perfection of the appeal. [32] (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner insists that a surety contract was perfected between respondent SPAC and Meiyu; and that the
contract should be made answerable for the monetary obligations of the employer. It is likewise contended that the
appellate court should not have considered the perfection of an appeal as a condition precedent for the validity of the
surety bond.

We cannot agree. This Court in U-Sing Button and Buckle Industry v. National Labor Relations
Commission[33] held:

[T]he obvious and logical purpose of an appeal bond is to insure, during the period of
appeal, against any occurrence that would defeat or diminish recovery under the judgment if
subsequently affirmed; it also validates and justifies, at least prima facie, an interpretation that
would limit the amount of the bond to the aggregate of the sums awarded other than in the concept
of moral and exemplary damages.[34] (Emphasis supplied)

From the employers standpoint, the purpose of the bond is to perfect ones appeal and stay the execution of monetary
awards. From the standpoint of social justice, the rule in itself accords protection of the employees monetary
recovery during the period of appeal. Looking at it from either end, it is clear that the bond exists only during the
appeal of the judgment. Without any appeal being perfected, there is also no appeal bond to speak of or to proceed
against.

The records bear out that Meiyu contracted respondent SPAC for a surety bond after the NLRC ruled with finality
that its first surety bond from Wellington Insurance Co., Inc. was spurious.Evidently, when the SPAC bond was
issued, the period to appeal had already lapsed. As a consequence, the Labor Arbiter decision became final and
executory.

Hence, the CA did not err in setting aside the Arbiters March 28, 2003 Order denying the motion to quash the writ
of execution dated October 15, 2002.

It may well be noted that respondent SPAC involved itself unnecessarily in the controversy when it issued the
appeal bond to Meiyu. To stress, the period to appeal had lapsed and the Arbiter award had become final and
executory at the time of issuance of the bond. It is for this reason that there can be no recourse on the said appeal
bond but only against the employer Meiyu.

A belated filing of an appeal bond in labor cases will never ripen into a perfected appeal. When the period to appeal
lapses, the questioned decision becomes final and executory. In such cases, this Court orders the petitioner to pay the
monetary awards. Money judgments were never levied on the likewise unperfected bond. [35]

In pursuit of the constitutional mandate, the appeal bond is designed to give additional protection to labor. However,
it should never be used as a tool for injustice against the employer. Justicia nemini neganda est. Justice is to be denied
to none. Ang hustisya ay hindi ipagkakait kaninuman. Itoy para sa lahat. Justice is for all.

II. Failure to furnish copy of petition to the other party is not fatal, especially when there is substantial compliance
with the rules.
 Petitioner next contends that respondents failure to furnish him a copy of its petition is fatal.

The contention is untenable. In Remerco Garments Manufacturing v. Minister of Labor and

Employment,[36] this Court held:

x x x The mere failure to furnish copy of the appeal memorandum to adverse party is not a
fatal defect. We have consistently adhered to the principle clearly held in Alonso v. Villamor that
technicality when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and become its great hindrance and
chief enemy deserves scant consideration from court. x x x Finally, labor law determinations, to
quote from Bultmann, should be not only secundum retionem but also secundum caritatem. More
recently, we held that in appeals in labor cases, non-service of the copy of the appeal or appeal
memorandum to the adverse party is not a jurisdictional defect, and does not justify dismissal of the
appeal. x x x[37] (Underscoring supplied)

Taking into consideration that justice should not be sacrificed for technicality, this Court reiterated the aforementioned
ruling in Modern Fishing Gear Labor Union v. Noriel[38] andPhilippine-Singapore Ports Corporation v. National
Labor Relations Commission.[39]

True it is that Rule 46, Section 3[40] mandates that a copy of the petition should be served on the other party; and that
proof of such service should be filed with the petition in court.However, the rule was substantially complied with
when service was made to petitioners former counsel, Atty. Dennis Ancheta.

Without the benefit of a proper notice of petitioners substitution of counsel, respondent had no recourse but
to serve the copy of its petition to whom it knew and perceived as being petitioners counsel of record. In faithful
compliance and with no intention of delay, service was made on Atty. Ancheta.

Verily, petitioner is not without fault for its failure to observe the proper manner of substituting counsels
provided for in Rule 138, Section 26[41] of the Rules of Court. Like other procedural lapses, this Court has consistently
propounded that the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial
justice.[42]

Further, the CA correctly held that the alleged defect in the service of a copy of the petition is deemed cured
when private respondent (here petitioner) filed his Comment and Supplemental Comment. [43]

III. Certiorari petition to the CA is permissible as respondent has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
Lastly, petitioner argues that the CA gravely erred in entertaining the petition for certiorari. Citing Salas v.
Adil,[44] petitioner posits that appeal was the proper and available remedy.

Petitioners reliance on Salas is misplaced. We note that Salas is not even a labor case. Further, the parties
in Salas were differently situated and all were original parties to the case. More than that, there is nothing in Salas that
supports petitioners claim that respondent SPAC should have appealed the adverse Labor Arbiter Order to the NLRC
and not to the CA via certiorari.

Respondent SPAC was not a party to the original action. It could not have appealed the order of the Arbiter to the
NLRC. Verily, respondent has no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In fine, a petition for certiorari is the best available remedy to protect respondents rights.

In a long line of cases,[45] the Court has consistently ruled that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is always
available where there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. In Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co.,[46] the Court ruled:

x x x Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special civil
action of certiorari may only be invoked when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the course of law, this rule is not without exception. The availability of the
ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use
of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally
beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy not the mere absence of all other legal
remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ that usually determines the propriety
of certiorari.[47]

This ruling was reiterated in Conti v. Court of Appeals:[48]

Truly, an essential requisite for the availability of the extraordinary remedies under the
Rules is an absence of an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, one which has been so defined as a remedy which (would) equally (be) beneficial, speedy
and sufficient not merely a remedy which at some time in the future will bring about a revival of the
judgment x x x complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy which will promptly relieve
the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the inferior court or tribunal
concerned. x x x[49]

We have consistently held that technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and
completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties.[50] In the case at bar, justice will best be served by easing
the reins of technical rules of procedure.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit
SO ORDERED.
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics (Syllabus)
I. Practice of Law
A. Concept (In re Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, Dec. 19. 1980; Re: Letter of the U.P. Law Faculty to the SC on
the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentations in the SC, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, Mar. 8, 2011;
Dizon v. De Taza, A.C. No. 7676, Jun. 10, 2014;Pichon v. Agleron, A.C. No. 5359, Mar. 10, 2014; Brunet
v. Guaren, A.C. No. 10164, Mar. 14, 2014; Sanchez v. Aguilos, A.C. No. 10543, Mar. 16, 2016; Pacao v.
Limos, A.C. No. 11246, Jun. 14, 2016; Plumptre v. Rivera, A.C. No. 11350, Aug. 9, 2016)
B. Qualifications (In the Matter of the Admission to the Bar and Oath-Taking of Successful Bar Applicant
Al C. Argosino, B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995; Alawi v. Alauya, A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P, Feb. 24, 1997;
Aguirre v. Rana, B.M. No. 1036, Jun. 10, 2003; In re Dacanay, B.M. No. 1678, Dec. 7, 2007; Llunar v.
Ricafort, A.C. No. 6484, Jun. 16, 2015; Caronan v. Caronan, A.C. No. 11316, Jul. 12, 2016)
C. Appearance of Non-lawyers (In re Joaquin, 241 SCRA 405; Catimbuhan v. Cruz, G.R. 51813-14, Nov.
29, 1983; Cruz v. Mina, G.R. 154207, April 27, 2007; PAFLU vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., 42 SCRA
302)
D. Sanctions for Practice or Appearance Without Authority (Villahermosa v. Caracol, A.C. No. 7325, Jan.
21, 2015)
E. Public Officials and Practice of Law (Ramos v. Manalac, 89 Phil. 270; In re David, 93 Phil. 461; Peo v.
Villanueva, 14, SCRA 109; Noriega v. Sison, 125 SCRA 293; Lingan v. Baliga, A.C. No. 5377, June 30,
2014; Eustaquio v. Navales, A.C. No. 10465, June 8, 2016; Fajardo v. Alvarez, A.C. No. 9018, April 20,
2016
F. Lawyers Authorized to Represent the Government
II. Lawyers’ Oath (Ong v. De Los Santos, A.C. 10179, March 4, 2014; Madrid v. Dealca, A.C. 7474, Sept.
9, 2014; Salabao v. Villaruel, A.C. No. 8084, Aug. 4, 2015; Nulada v. Paulma, A.C. No. 8172, April 12,
2016; Kruysel v. Abion, A.C. No. 5951, July 12, 2016)
III. Duty of the Lawyer to the Society
A. Duty to Uphold the Constitution and Obey the Laws of the Land (Jimenez v. Verano, A.C. 8108, July
15, 2014; Foster v. Agtang, A.C. 10579, Dec. 10, 2014; Agot v. Rivera, A.C. 8000, Aug. 5, 2014; Re:
Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice, A.M. 09-6-01-SC, Jan. 21, 2015; Chu v. Guico, A.C. 10573, Jan.
13, 2015; Sosa v. Mendoza, A.C. 8776, Mar. 23, 2015; ACA v. Salvado, A.C. No. 10952, Jan. 26, 2016;
Canlapan v. Balayo, A.C. 10605, Feb. 17, 2016; De Veza v. Del Prado, A.C. No. 9574, Jun. 21, 2016;
Perez v. Katindig and Baydo, A.C. 5816, Mar. 10, 2015; Ecraela v. Atty. Pangalangan, A.C. 10676, Sept.
8, 2015; Advincula v. Advincula, A.C. No. 9226, Jun. 14, 2016)
B. Duty to Make His Legal Services Available to the Public (Purpose for the Establishment of Legal Aid
Offices in IBP Chapters)
C. Duty to Observe Candor and Fairness (In re Ozaeta, 92 SCRA 1, Jul. 30, 1979)
D. Duty to Take Part in the Improvement of the Legal System
E. Duty to Keep Abreast with Legal Development (Bumactao v. Atty. Fano, A.C. 10286, Apr. 7, 2014; Uy
v. Atty. Maghari, A.C. 10525, Sept. 1, 2015; Aims and Objectives of MCLE; Arnado v. Adaza, A.C. No.
9834, Aug. 26, 2015)
F. Duty of a Lawyer Employed in the Government ( PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, 455 SCRA 526; Catu v.
Rellosa, 546 SCRA 209; Heck v. Gamotin, A.C. 5329, Mar. 18, 2014; Areola v. Atty. Mendoza, A.C.
10135, Jan. 15, 2014; Facturan v. Barcelona, A.C. No. 11069, Jun. 8, 2016)
IV. Duty of the Lawyer to His Profession
A. Duty to Maintain the Dignity of the Profession (Bansig v. Celera, AC 5581, Jan. 14, 2014; Nuezca v.
Villa Garcia, A.C. No. 8210, Aug. 8, 2016)
B. Duty of Courtesy towards Fellow Lawyers (Saberon v. Larong, A.C. No. 6567, Apr. 16, 2008; Gimeno
v. Zaide, AC 10303, April 21, 2015; Noble v. Ailes, AC 10628, July 1, 2015; Malabed v. De la Pena, A.C.
No. 7594, Feb. 9, 2016)
C. Duty to be Fair to Fellow Lawyers (Binay-an v. Addog, AC 10449, July 28, 2014)
D. Duty to Prevent Unauthorized Practice of Law (Tapay v. Bancolo, AC 9604, Mar. 20, 2013; Angeles v.
Baggay, AC 8103, Dec. 3, 2014)
V. Duty of the Lawyer to the Courts
A. Duty of Candor (Umaguing v. De Vera, A.C. No. 10451, Feb. 4, 2015)
B. Duty of Respect (Nestle Phils. V. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542; Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot, 295 SCRA 78;
Habawel v. CTA, G.R. No. 174759, Sep. 7, 2011; In re Kapunan, A.M. No. 13-11-09 SC, Aug. 12, 2014;
Enriquez v. Lavadia, A.C. No. 5686, June 16, 2015)
C. Duty to Assist in the Admin of Justice (Crisostomo v. Nazareno, A.C. No. 6677, June 10, 2014; De los
Santos v. Barbosa, AC 6681, July 17, 2015; Floran v. Ediza, A.C. No. 5325, Feb. 9, 2016)
D. Duty to Refrain from Impropriety (In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 532; In re Bagabuyo, A.C. No. 7006, Oct. 9,
2007)
VI. Duty of the Lawyer to His Clients
A. Duty not to Refuse to Provide His Services (Nery v. Sampana, A.C. No. 10196, Sep. 9, 2014; Ruby v.
Bayot, A.C. No. 10558, Feb. 23, 2015; Campugan v. Caluya, A.C. No. 8261/8725, Mar. 11, 2015)
B. Duty of Confidentiality (Aninon v. Sabitsana, A.C. No. 5098, Apr. 11, 2012; Lee v. Simando, A.C. No.
9537, Jun. 10, 2013; Samson v. Era, A.C. No. 6664, Jul 15, 2013; Jimenez v. Francisco, A.C. No. 10548,
Dec. 10, 2014; Diongzon v. Mirano, A.C. No. 2404, Aug. 17, 2016)
C. Duty of Loyalty (Justo v. Galing, A.C. No. 6174, Nov. 16, 2011; Sabitsana v. Muertegui, G.R. No.
181359, Aug. 5, 2013; Daging v. Davis, A.C. No. 9395, Nov. 12, 2014; Jimenez v. Francisco, A.C. No.
10548, Dec. 10, 2014; Anglo v. Valencia, A.C. No. 10567, Feb. 25, 2015; Tulio v. Buhangin, A.C. No.
7110, Apr. 20, 2016)
D. Duty of Fidelity (Trinidad v. Villarin, A.C. No. 9310, Feb. 27, 2013; Pesto v. Millo, A.C. No. 9612, Mar.
13, 2013; Ramirez v. Margallo, A.C. No. 10537, Feb. 3, 2015; Maglente v. Agcaoili, A.C. No. 10672, Mar.
18, 2015; Re: Decision dated Aug. 19, 2008, 3rd Division, Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79904 v.
Atty. Ferrer, A.C. No. 8037, Feb. 17, 2016; AVIDA v. Argosino, A.C. No. 7437, Aug. 16, 2016)
E. Duty of Fiduciary (Jison v. Jiz, A.C. No. 9615, Mar 5, 2013; San Pedro v. Mendoza, A.C. No. 5440,
Dec 10, 2014; Luna v. Galarrita, A.C. No. 10662, Jul. 7, 2015; Foronda v. Alvarez, A.C. No. 9976, Jun.
25, 2014; Navarro v. Solidum, A.C. No. 9872, Jan 28, 2014; Viray v. Sanicas, A.C. No. 7337, Sep. 29,
2014; Concepcion v. De la Rosa, A.C. No. 10681, Feb. 3, 2015; Yu v. De la Cruz, A.C. No. 10912, Jan.
19, 2016; Ramos v. Mandagan, A.C. No. 11128, Apr. 6, 2016; Malangas v. Zaide, A.C. No. 10675, May
31, 2016)
F. Duty of Fairness (Cadavedo v. Lacaya, G.R. No. 173188, Jan. 15, 2014; Dalupan v. Gacott, A.C. No.
5067, Jun. 29, 2015)
G. Duty of Competence and Diligence (Penilla v. Alcid, A.C. No. 9149, Sep 4, 2013; Sotto v. Palicte, G.R.
No. 159691, Feb. 17, 2014; Figueras v. Jimenez, A.C. No. 9116, Mar. 12, 2014; Baens v. Sempio, A.C.
No. 10378, Jun. 9, 2014; Foronda v. Alvarez, A.C. No. 9976, Jun. 25, 2014; Layos v. Villanueva, A.C. No.
8085, Dec. 1, 2014;Tejano v. Baterina, A.C. No. 8235, Jan. 27, 2015; Nonato v. Fudolin, A.C. No. 10138,
Jun. 16, 2015; Enriquez v. Lavadia, A.C. No. 5686, Jun. 16, 2015; Francisco v. Flores, A.C. No. 10753;
Gimena v. Sabio, A.C. No. 7178, Aug. 23, 2016)
VII. Discipline of Lawyers
A. Nature and Characteristics of Disciplinary Actions Against Lawyers
1. Sui Generis (Ylaya v. Gacott, A.C. No. 6475, Jan. 13, 2013; Bernaldez v. Anquilo-Garcia, A.C. 8698,
Aug. 31, 2016)
2. Confidential (Tan v. Carpio Morales, G.R. 173940, Sept. 5, 2006)
3. Prescription (Calo v. De Gamo, A.C. 516, June 27, 1967)
4. Res Ipsa Loquitor (The Christian Spiritists in the Philippines v. Mangallay, A.C. No. 10483, Mar. 18,
2016)
5. It may be initiated Motu Propio (Borres v. Abela, G.R. No. 131023, July, 17, 2007)
B. Grounds for Disbarment
C. Proceedings (Agno v. Cagatan, A.C. No. 4515, July 14, 2008; Tamaray v. Daquis, A.C. No. 10868,
Jan. 16, 2016)
D. Discipline of Filipino Lawyer’s Practice in Foreign Jurisdiction
E. Contempt (Montecillo v. Gica, G.R. L-36800, Oct. 21, 1974; Silva v. Lee Jr., A.M. R-225-RTJ, Jan. 26,
1989; Laurel v. Francisco, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1992, July 6, 2010 Re Verified Complaint of Thomas
Merdegia, IPI 13-205-CA-J, A.C. No. 10300, Dec. 10, 2013; PhilComSat v. Lokin and Labastilla, A.C. No.
11139, Apr. 19, 2016)
F. Effect of Pardon (In re Atty. Tranquilino Rovero, A.C. No. 126, Dec. 29, 1980)
VIII. Readmission to the Bar
A. Lawyers who have been suspended (Maniago v. De dios, A.C. No. 7472, Mar. 30, 2010)
B. Lawyers who have been disbarred (Cui v. Cui, L-18727, Aug. 1964)
C. Lawyers who have been repatriated (In re Dacanay, B.M. No. 1678, Dec, 17, 2007)
Judicial Ethics (New Code of Judicial Conduct)
IX. New Code of Judicial Conduct
A. Bangalore Draft
B. Applicability of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct
C. Qualities of an Ideal Judge
1. Independence (Decena v. Malanyaon, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1669, Apr. 8, 2013; Ongcuangco v. Pinlac,
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2402, Apr. 15, 2015)
2. Integrity (Anonymous v. Achas, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801, Feb. 27, 2013; In re Gregory Ong, A.M. No.
SB-14-21-J, Sept. 23, 2014; Barias v. Rubia, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2388, Jun. 10, 2014)
3. Impartiality (Bernas v. Reyes, A.M. MTJ-09-1728, Jul. 21, 2010; Jorda v. Bitas, A.M. RTJ-14-2376,
Mar. 4, 2014; Lopez v. Lucmayon, A.M. No. MTJ-13-1837, Sept. 24, 2014; Tormis v. Paredes, A.M. No.
RTJ-13-2366, Feb. 4, 2015; Pangandag v. Abinal, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1877, June 13, 2016)
4. Propriety (Lorenzana v. Austria, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, Apr. 2, 2014; Arevalo v. Mantua, A.M. RTJ-13-
2760, Nov. 19, 2014)
5. Equality
6. Competence and Diligence (Oca v. Necessario, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691, Apr. 2, 2013; Garado v.
Torres, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1778, June 5, 2013; Carbajosa v. Patricio, A.M. No. MTJ-13-1834, Oct. 20,
2013; Junio v. Beltran, A.M. RTJ-14-2367, Jan. 14, 2014; Tupal v. Rojo, A.M. MTJ-14-1842, Feb. 24,
2014; Marcelo v. Pichay, A.M. MTJ-13-1838, Mar. 12, 2014; Garay v. Venadas, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000,
June 16, 2014; Uy v. Flores, A.M. RTJ-12-2332, June 25, 2014; Andres v. Nambi, A.C. No. 7158, Mar. 9,
2015; Complaint by Parreno against Justices Leagogo, Ybanez, Lazaro-Javier, OCA IPI 14-220-CA-J,
Mar. 17, 2015; Bandoy v. Jacinto, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2399, Nov. 19, 2015; Balanay v. White, A.M. No.
RTJ-16-2443, Jan. 11, 2016)
X. Discipline of Members of the Judiciary
A. Supreme Court (In the matter of the charges of Plagiarism against J. Del Castillo, A.M. No. 10-7-17—
SC, Feb. 8, 2011)
B. Lower Court Judges and Justices of the CA, SB and CTA (Office of the Court Administrator v. Amor,
A.M. RTJ-08-2440, Oct. 7, 2014; Campos v. Campos, A.C. 8644, Jun. 20, 2014; OCA v. Tormis,
Resolution 5, A.C. No. 9920, Aug. 30, 2016)
C. Disqualification of Justices and Judges (Rule 137)
A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1), petitioner,

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to reinstate a disbarred member of the
bar admits of no doubt. All the relevant factors bearing on the specific case, public interest, the integrity of
the profession and the welfare of the recreant who had purged himself of his guilt are given their due
weight. Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the vote being unanimous with
the late.

Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly pleaded that he be reinstated. The
minute resolution dated October 23, 1980, granted such prayer. It was there made clear that it "is without
prejudice to issuing an extended opinion." 2

Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the disbarment of respondent may not be
amiss. As set forth in the resolution penned by the late Chief Justice Castro: "On November 29. 1975, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors, unanimously adopted Resolution No.
75-65 in Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues' to the IBP since the latter's constitution
notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri,
submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval,. Pursuant to paragraph 2,
Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which. reads: ... Should the delinquency further continue
until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued
delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the
Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the
action taken should be submit by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter
concerned.' On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and
letter adverted to above he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay
the membership fees due from him. On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP
Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: On March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to
submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for
resolution." 3

Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme
Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys as found in Rules of
Court: 'Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in
the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent
member from the Roll of Attorneys. 4

The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in the aforesaid resolution "is that the above
provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a
pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to
pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty
and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above
provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. 5 It was
pointed out in the resolution that such issues was raised on a previous case before the Court, entitled
'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its
Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. 6The
unanimous conclusion reached by the Court was that the integration of the Philippine Bar raises no
constitutional question and is therefore legally unobjectionable, "and, within the context of contemporary
conditions in the Philippine, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility
fully and effectively." 7

As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the decision was rendered, there
were various pleadings filed by respondent for reinstatement starting with a motion for reconsideration
dated August 19, 1978. Characterized as it was by persistence in his adamantine refusal to admit the full
competence of the Court on the matter, it was not unexpected that it would be denied. So it turned out. 8 It
was the consensus that he continued to be oblivious to certain balic juridical concepts, the appreciation of
which does not even require great depth of intellect. Since respondent could not be said to be that
deficient in legal knowledge and since his pleadings in other cases coming before this Tribunal were quite
literate, even if rather generously sprinkled with invective for which he had been duly taken to task, there
was the impression that his recalcitrance arose from and sheer obstinacy. Necessary, the extreme
penalty of disbarment visited on him was more than justified.

Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court where a different attitude on his part
was discernible. 9 The tone of defiance was gone and circumstances of a mitigating character invoked —
the state of his health and his advanced age. He likewise spoke of the welfare of former clients who still
rely on him for counsel, their confidence apparently undiminished. For he had in his career been a valiant,
if at times unreasonable, defender of the causes entrusted to him.

This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered and so it did in the resolution
of October 23, 1980. It made certain that there was full acceptance on his part of the competence of this
Tribunal in the exercise of its plenary power to regulate the legal profession and can integrate the bar and
that the dues were duly paid. Moreover, the fact that more than two years had elapsed during which he
war. barred from exercising his profession was likewise taken into account. It may likewise be said that as
in the case of the inherent power to punish for contempt and paraphrasing the dictum of Justice Malcolm
in Villavicencio v. Lukban, 10 the power to discipline, especially if amounting to disbarment, should be
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. 11

One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable finality as far as admission to
the bar is concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of membership. What must ever be borne in mind is that
membership in the bar, to follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened with conditions. Failure to abide by any
of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrant such drastic move. Thereafter a
sufficient time having elapsed and after actuations evidencing that there was due contrition on the part of
the transgressor, he may once again be considered for the restoration of such a privilege. Hence, our
resolution of October 23, 1980.

The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon.

A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY

THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE
ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent law professors 1 in response
to the Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the Show Cause Resolution), directing them to show cause
why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of specific provisions of the Code
of Professional Responsibility enumerated therein.

At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause Resolution clearly dockets this as an
administrative matter, not a special civil action for indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
contrary to the dissenting opinion of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Justice Sereno) to the
said October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution. Neither is this a disciplinary proceeding grounded on an
allegedly irregularly concluded finding of indirect contempt as intimated by Associate Justice Conchita
Carpio Morales (Justice Morales) in her dissenting opinions to both the October 19, 2010 Show Cause
Resolution and the present decision.

With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary proceeding firmly in mind, the Court finds that with
the exception of one respondent whose compliance was adequate and another who manifested he was
not a member of the Philippine Bar, the submitted explanations, being mere denials and/or tangential to
the issues at hand, are decidedly unsatisfactory. The proffered defenses even more urgently behoove this
Court to call the attention of respondent law professors, who are members of the Bar, to the relationship
of their duties as such under the Code of Professional Responsibility to their civil rights as citizens and
academics in our free and democratic republic.

The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this case are as follows:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes.

RULE 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.

CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper, the
language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly
cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact
that which has not been proved.

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat
the ends of justice.
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers
and should insist on similar conduct by others.

RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only.

CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which
tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.

Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when lawyers speak their minds, they
must ever be mindful of their sworn oath to observe ethical standards of their profession, and in particular,
avoid foul and abusive language to condemn the Supreme Court, or any court for that matter, for a
decision it has rendered, especially during the pendency of a motion for such decision’s reconsideration.
The accusation of plagiarism against a member of this Court is not the real issue here but rather this
plagiarism issue has been used to deflect everyone’s attention from the actual concern of this Court to
determine by respondents’ explanations whether or not respondent members of the Bar have crossed the
line of decency and acceptable professional conduct and speech and violated the Rules of Court through
improper intervention or interference as third parties to a pending case. Preliminarily, it should be
stressed that it was respondents themselves who called upon the Supreme Court to act on their
Statement,2 which they formally submitted, through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean Leonen), for the
Court’s proper disposition. Considering the defenses of freedom of speech and academic freedom
invoked by the respondents, it is worth discussing here that the legal reasoning used in the past by this
Court to rule that freedom of expression is not a defense in administrative cases against lawyers for using
intemperate speech in open court or in court submissions can similarly be applied to respondents’
invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it is precisely because respondents are not merely lawyers but
lawyers who teach law and mould the minds of young aspiring attorneys that respondents’ own non-
observance of the Code of Professional Responsibility, even if purportedly motivated by the purest of
intentions, cannot be ignored nor glossed over by this Court.

To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents’ actuations, it is apropos to revisit the factual
antecedents of this case.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

Antecedent Facts and Proceedings

On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo) in Vinuya,
et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the counsel 3 for
Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Vinuya decision, raising
solely the following grounds:

I. Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories reject this Honorable Courts’ (sic) assertion
that the Executive’s foreign policy prerogatives are virtually unlimited; precisely, under the
relevant jurisprudence and constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are proscribed by
international human rights and humanitarian standards, including those provided for in the
relevant international conventions of which the Philippines is a party. 4

II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic protection with the broader, if fundamental,
responsibility of states to protect the human rights of its citizens – especially where the rights
asserted are subject of erga omnes obligations and pertain to jus cogens norms. 5

On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and Romel
Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230,
where they posited for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration of
the Vinuya decision. Among other arguments, Attys. Roque and Bagares asserted that:
 I.

IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE COURT’S JUDGMENT OF
APRIL 28, 2010 TO PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST THREE SOURCES – AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005 AND AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN
RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW – AND MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THESE SOURCES
SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT’S ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSING THE INSTANT PETITION WHEN IN
TRUTH, THE PLAGIARIZED SOURCES EVEN MAKE A STRONG CASE FOR THE PETITION’S
CLAIMS.7

They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only of extensive
plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources by the ponencia to suit
the arguments of the assailed Judgment for denying the Petition."8

According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya decision were
namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s article "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens;"9 (2)
Christian J. Tams’ book Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law; 10 and (3) Mark Ellis’
article "Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime."11

On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on July 19, 2010,
journalists Aries C. Rufo and Purple S. Romero posted an article, entitled "SC justice plagiarized parts of
ruling on comfort women," on the Newsbreak website. 12 The same article appeared on the GMA News TV
website also on July 19, 2010.13

On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roque’s column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted," appeared in the Manila
Standard Today.14 In the said column, Atty. Roque claimed that Prof. Evan Criddle, one of the authors
purportedly not properly acknowledged in the Vinuya decision, confirmed that his work, co-authored with
Prof. Evan Fox-Decent, had been plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof. Criddle’s response to the post by
Julian Ku regarding the news report15 on the alleged plagiarism in the international law blog, Opinio Juris.
Prof. Criddle responded to Ku’s blog entry in this wise:

The newspaper’s16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for reconsideration filed yesterday with the
Philippine Supreme Court yesterday. The motion is available here:

http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-plagiarism-in-the-supreme-court/

The motion suggests that the Court’s decision contains thirty-four sentences and citations that are
identical to sentences and citations in my 2009 YJIL article (co-authored with Evan Fox-Decent).
Professor Fox-Decent and I were unaware of the petitioners’ [plagiarism] allegations until after the motion
was filed today.

Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the court’s jus cogens discussion is that it implies that
the prohibitions against crimes against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture are not jus cogens norms.
Our article emphatically asserts the opposite. The Supreme Court’s decision is available
here: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm 17

On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the Court in reply to the
charge of plagiarism contained in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. 18

In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly plagiarized author in the Vinuya decision, Dr. Mark
Ellis, wrote the Court, to wit:
Your Honours:

I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my attention in the last few days.

Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed Court, I am compelled, as a question of the
integrity of my work as an academic and as an advocate of human rights and humanitarian law, to take
exception to the possible unauthorized use of my law review article on rape as an international crime in
your esteemed Court’s Judgment in the case of Vinuya et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No.
162230, Judgment of 28 April 2010).

My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of possible plagiarism by the Philippine chapter of
the Southeast Asia Media Legal Defence Initiative (SEAMLDI),19 an affiliate of the London-based Media
Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI), where I sit as trustee.

In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive discussion in footnote 65, pp. 27-28, of
the said Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am also concerned that your esteemed Court may have
misread the arguments I made in the article and employed them for cross purposes. This would be ironic
since the article was written precisely to argue for the appropriate legal remedy for victims of war crimes,
genocide, and crimes against humanity.

I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law
in 2006 has been made available to your esteemed Court. I trust that your esteemed Court will take the
time to carefully study the arguments I made in the article.

I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed Court as to the issues raised by this letter.

With respect,

(Sgd.)
Dr. Mark Ellis20

In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010, the Court formed the Committee on Ethics
and Ethical Standards (the Ethics Committee) pursuant to Section 13, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the Court referred the July 22, 2010
letter of Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics Committee. The matter was subsequently docketed as A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC.

On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and Bagares to comment on the letter of
Justice Del Castillo.21

On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the
Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" (the Statement), was posted in Newsbreak’s website 22 and on
Atty. Roque’s blog.23 A report regarding the statement also appeared on various on-line news sites, such
as the GMA News TV24 and the Sun Star25 sites, on the same date. The statement was likewise posted at
the University of the Philippines College of Law’s bulletin board allegedly on August 10, 2010 26 and at
said college’s website.27

On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the University of the Philippines
College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the Court, through Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chief
Justice Corona). The cover letter dated August 10, 2010 of Dean Leonen read:
The Honorable
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines

Through: Hon. Renato C. Corona

Chief Justice

Subject: Statement of faculty

from the UP College of Law
on the Plagiarism in the case of
Vinuya v Executive Secretary

Your Honors:

We attach for your information and proper disposition a statement signed by thirty[-]eight (38)28members
of the faculty of the UP College of Law. We hope that its points could be considered by the Supreme
Court en banc.

Respectfully,

(Sgd.)
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Dean and Professor of Law

(Emphases supplied.)

The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted letter did not contain the actual signatures of the
alleged signatories but only stated the names of 37 UP Law professors with the notation (SGD.)
appearing beside each name. For convenient reference, the text of the UP Law faculty Statement is
reproduced here:

RESTORING INTEGRITY

A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered
abuse during a time of war. After they courageously came out with their very personal stories of abuse
and suffering as "comfort women", waited for almost two decades for any meaningful relief from their own
government as well as from the government of Japan, got their hopes up for a semblance of judicial
recourse in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230 (28 April 2010), they only had
these hopes crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the
Highest Court of the land.

It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law views the charge
that an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court committed plagiarism and misrepresentation in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary. The plagiarism and misrepresentation are not only affronts to the individual scholars
whose work have been appropriated without correct attribution, but also a serious threat to the integrity
and credibility of the Philippine Judicial System.
In common parlance, ‘plagiarism’ is the appropriation and misrepresentation of another person’s work as
one’s own. In the field of writing, it is cheating at best, and stealing at worst. It constitutes a taking of
someone else’s ideas and expressions, including all the effort and creativity that went into committing
such ideas and expressions into writing, and then making it appear that such ideas and expressions were
originally created by the taker. It is dishonesty, pure and simple. A judicial system that allows plagiarism in
any form is one that allows dishonesty. Since all judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, to allow
plagiarism in the Supreme Court is to allow the production of laws by dishonest means. Evidently, this is a
complete perversion and falsification of the ends of justice.

A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows that the ponente merely
copied select portions of other legal writers’ works and interspersed them into the decision as if they were
his own, original work. Under the circumstances, however, because the Decision has been promulgated
by the Court, the Decision now becomes the Court’s and no longer just the ponente’s. Thus the Court
also bears the responsibility for the Decision. In the absence of any mention of the original writers’ names
and the publications from which they came, the thing speaks for itself.

So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this case and the spokesman of the
Court.

It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original articles is a reference to the
‘primary’ sources relied upon. This cursory explanation is not acceptable, because the original authors’
writings and the effort they put into finding and summarizing those primary sources are precisely the
subject of plagiarism. The inclusion of the footnotes together with portions of their writings in fact
aggravates, instead of mitigates, the plagiarism since it provides additional evidence of a deliberate
intention to appropriate the original authors’ work of organizing and analyzing those primary sources.

It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be familiar with all legal and
scholarly journals. This is also not acceptable, because personal unfamiliarity with sources all the more
demands correct and careful attribution and citation of the material relied upon. It is a matter of diligence
and competence expected of all Magistrates of the Highest Court of the Land.

But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers, Professors Evan Criddle and Evan
Fox-Descent, that the High Court actually misrepresents the conclusions of their work entitled "A
Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens," the main source of the plagiarized text. In this article they argue that the
classification of the crimes of rape, torture, and sexual slavery as crimes against humanity have attained
the status of jus cogens, making it obligatory upon the State to seek remedies on behalf of its aggrieved
citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts of the same article to arrive at the contrary conclusion. This
exacerbates the intellectual dishonesty of copying works without attribution by transforming it into an act
of intellectual fraud by copying works in order to mislead and deceive.

The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it deals with State liability and
responsibility for personal injury and damage suffered in a time of war, and the role of the injured parties’
home States in the pursuit of remedies against such injury or damage. National courts rarely have such
opportunities to make an international impact. That the petitioners were Filipino "comfort women" who
suffered from horrific abuse during the Second World War made it incumbent on the Court of last resort to
afford them every solicitude. But instead of acting with urgency on this case, the Court delayed its
resolution for almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners seeking justice from
the Court. When it dismissed the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the
Court decided this case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the Supreme Court added insult to
injury by failing to actually exercise its "power to urge and exhort the Executive Department to take up the
claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with false sympathy and nonchalance,
belies a more alarming lack of concern for even the most basic values of decency and respect. The
reputation of the Philippine Supreme Court and the standing of the Philippine legal profession before
other Judiciaries and legal systems are truly at stake.
The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its decisions and cannot accept
excuses for failure to attain the highest standards of conduct imposed upon all members of the Bench
and Bar because these undermine the very foundation of its authority and power in a democratic society.
Given the Court’s recent history and the controversy that surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of
such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction as this would only further erode faith and
confidence in the judicial system. And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for justice not
only of Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual
abuse and exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on
the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts.

The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without ensuring that its own
conduct, whether collectively or through its Members, is beyond reproach. This necessarily includes
ensuring that not only the content, but also the processes of preparing and writing its own decisions, are
credible and beyond question. The Vinuya Decision must be conscientiously reviewed and not casually
cast aside, if not for the purpose of sanction, then at least for the purpose of reflection and guidance. It is
an absolutely essential step toward the establishment of a higher standard of professional care and
practical scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which are critical to improving the system of administration of
justice in the Philippines. It is also a very crucial step in ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as the
Final Arbiter of all controversies: a position that requires competence and integrity completely above any
and all reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of judicial and professional ethics.

With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as
teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the University of the Philippine College
of Law that:

(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is unacceptable,
unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral conduct and judicial and professional
competence expected of the Supreme Court;

(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and credibility of the entire Supreme Court
and undermines the foundations of the Philippine judicial system by allowing implicitly the
decision of cases and the establishment of legal precedents through dubious means;

(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to the
primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those who
have been left without legal or equitable recourse, such as the petitioners therein;

(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty and to save the
honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as an institution, it is necessary for the ponente of Vinuya
v. Executive Secretary to resign his position, without prejudice to any other sanctions that the
Court may consider appropriate;

(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by which it conducts
research, prepares drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions in order to prevent a recurrence of
similar acts, and to provide clear and concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the
highest quality of legal research and writing in pleadings, practice, and adjudication.

Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27 July 2010.

(SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Dean and Professor of Law
 (SGD.) FROILAN M. BACUNGAN (SGD.) PACIFICO A. AGABIN
Dean (1978-1983) Dean (1989-1995)

(SGD.) MERLIN M. MAGALLONA (SGD.) SALVADOR T. CARLOTA

Dean (1995-1999) Dean (2005-2008) and Professor of Law

REGULAR FACULTY

(SGD.) CARMELO V. SISON (SGD.) JAY L. BATONGBACAL

Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) PATRICIA R.P. SALVADOR

(SGD.) EVELYN (LEO) D. BATTAD
DAWAY
Assistant Professor
Associate Dean and Associate Professor

(SGD.) DANTE B. GATMAYTAN (SGD.) GWEN G. DE VERA

Associate Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) THEODORE O. TE (SGD.) SOLOMON F. LUMBA

Assistant Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) FLORIN T. HILBAY (SGD.) ROMMEL J. CASIS

Assistant Professor Assistant Professor

LECTURERS

(SGD.) JOSE GERARDO A. ALAMPAY (SGD.) JOSE C. LAURETA

(SGD.) ARTHUR P. AUTEA (SGD.) DINA D. LUCENARIO
(SGD.) ROSA MARIA J. BAUTISTA (SGD.) OWEN J. LYNCH
(SGD.) MARK R. BOCOBO (SGD.) ANTONIO M. SANTOS
(SGD.) DAN P. CALICA (SGD.) VICENTE V. MENDOZA
(SGD.) TRISTAN A. CATINDIG (SGD.) RODOLFO NOEL S. QUIMBO
(SGD.) SANDRA MARIE O. CORONEL (SGD.) GMELEEN FAYE B. TOMBOC
(SGD.) ROSARIO O. GALLO (SGD.) NICHOLAS FELIX L. TY
(SGD.) CONCEPCION L. JARDELEZA (SGD.) EVALYN G. URSUA
(SGD.) ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA (SGD.) RAUL T. VASQUEZ
(SGD.) SUSAN D. VILLANUEVA29
(SGD.) CARINA C. LAFORTEZA
(Underscoring supplied.)

Meanwhile, in a letter dated August 18, 2010, Prof. Christian J. Tams made known his sentiments on the
alleged plagiarism issue to the Court.30 We quote Prof. Tams’ letter here:

Glasgow, 18 August 2010

Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230)

Hon. Renato C. Corona, Chief Justice

Your Excellency,

My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of international law at the University of Glasgow. I am
writing to you in relation to the use of one of my publications in the above-mentioned judgment of your
Honourable Court.

The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on p. 30 of your Court’s Judgment, in the section
addressing the concept of obligations erga omnes. As the table annexed to this letter shows, the relevant
sentences were taken almost word by word from the introductory chapter of my book Enforcing
Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2005). I note that there is a
generic reference to my work in footnote 69 of the Judgment, but as this is in relation to a citation from
another author (Bruno Simma) rather than with respect to the substantive passages reproduced in the
Judgment, I do not think it can be considered an appropriate form of referencing.

I am particularly concerned that my work should have been used to support the Judgment’s cautious
approach to the erga omnes concept. In fact, a most cursory reading shows that my book’s central thesis
is precisely the opposite: namely that the erga omnes concept has been widely accepted and has a firm
place in contemporary international law. Hence the introductory chapter notes that "[t]he present study
attempts to demystify aspects of the ‘very mysterious’ concept and thereby to facilitate its implementation"
(p. 5). In the same vein, the concluding section notes that "the preceding chapters show that the concept
is now a part of the reality of international law, established in the jurisprudence of courts and the practice
of States" (p. 309).

With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss to see how my work should have been cited to
support – as it seemingly has – the opposite approach. More generally, I am concerned at the way in
which your Honourable Court’s Judgment has drawn on scholarly work without properly acknowledging it.

On both aspects, I would appreciate a prompt response from your Honourable Court.

I remain

Sincerely yours

(Sgd.)
Christian J. Tams31

In the course of the submission of Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares’ exhibits during the August 26, 2010
hearing in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, the Ethics Committee noted that Exhibit "J" (a copy
of the Restoring Integrity Statement) was not signed but merely reflected the names of certain faculty
members with the letters (SGD.) beside the names. Thus, the Ethics Committee directed Atty. Roque to
present the signed copy of the said Statement within three days from the August 26 hearing. 32

It was upon compliance with this directive that the Ethics Committee was given a copy of the signed UP
Law Faculty Statement that showed on the signature pages the names of the full roster of the UP Law
Faculty, 81 faculty members in all. Indubitable from the actual signed copy of the Statement was that only
37 of the 81 faculty members appeared to have signed the same. However, the 37 actual signatories to
the Statement did not include former Supreme Court Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Justice
Mendoza) as represented in the previous copies of the Statement submitted by Dean Leonen and Atty.
Roque. It also appeared that Atty. Miguel R. Armovit (Atty. Armovit) signed the Statement although his
name was not included among the signatories in the previous copies submitted to the Court. Thus, the
total number of ostensible signatories to the Statement remained at 37.

The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc since the same Statement, having been
formally submitted by Dean Leonen on August 11, 2010, was already under consideration by the Court. 33

In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the Court en banc made the following observations regarding the
UP Law Faculty Statement:

Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the allegations of plagiarism
against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth. In
particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how he cited the
primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the authors of
the articles supposedly plagiarized.

Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The opening
sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered
abuse during a time of war.

The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as
a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.

The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the
resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the Court’s alleged
indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of
concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.34 x x x.
(Underscoring ours.)

In the same Resolution, the Court went on to state that:

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic
society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism
leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially
devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must
"insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from
outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective comments
except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty,
integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort
women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite
resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their
obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice.35 x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring
supplied.)

Thus, the Court directed Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M.
Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan,
Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera,
Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea,
Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel,
Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta,
Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L.
Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul T. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario to show cause, within
ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members
of the Bar for violation of Canons 1,36 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.37

Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause within the same period why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting through his
letter dated August 10, 2010, during the pendency of G.R. No. 162230 and of the investigation before the
Ethics Committee, for the consideration of the Court en banc, a dummy which is not a true and faithful
reproduction of the UP Law Faculty Statement.38

In the same Resolution, the present controversy was docketed as a regular administrative matter.

Summaries of the Pleadings Filed by Respondents in Response to the October 19, 2010 Show Cause
Resolution

On November 19, 2010, within the extension for filing granted by the Court, respondents filed the
following pleadings:

(1) Compliance dated November 18, 2010 by counsels for 35 of the 37 respondents, excluding
Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul T. Vasquez, in relation to the charge of violation of Canons 1,
11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;

(2) Compliance and Reservation dated November 18, 2010 by Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista
in relation to the same charge in par. (1);

(3) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Raul T. Vasquez in relation to the
same charge in par. (1);

(4) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsels for Dean Leonen, in relation to the charge
of violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03; and

(5) Manifestation dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Owen Lynch.

Common Compliance of 35 Respondents (Excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul Vasquez)

Thirty-five (35) of the respondent UP Law professors filed on November 19, 2010 a common compliance
which was signed by their respective counsels (the Common Compliance). In the "Preface" of said
Common Compliance, respondents stressed that "[they] issued the Restoring Integrity Statement in the
discharge of the ‘solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers in the profession of law,’ and as
members of the Bar to speak out on a matter of public concern and one that is of vital interest to
them."39 They likewise alleged that "they acted with the purest of intentions" and pointed out that "none of
them was involved either as party or counsel"40 in the Vinuya case. Further, respondents "note with
concern" that the Show Cause Resolution’s findings and conclusions were "a prejudgment – that
respondents indeed are in contempt, have breached their obligations as law professors and officers of the
Court, and have violated ‘Canons [1], 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility."41

By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the following points:

(a) Respondents’ alleged noble intentions

In response to the charges of failure to observe due respect to legal processes 42 and the
courts43 and of tending to influence, or giving the appearance of influencing the Court 44 in the
issuance of their Statement, respondents assert that their intention was not to malign the Court
but rather to defend its integrity and credibility and to ensure continued confidence in the legal
system. Their noble motive was purportedly evidenced by the portion of their Statement "focusing
on constructive action."45 Respondents’ call in the Statement for the Court "to provide clear and
concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and
writing in adjudication," was reputedly "in keeping with strictures enjoining lawyers to ‘participate
in the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the
improvement of the administration of justice’" (under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility) and to "promote respect for the law and legal processes" (under Canon 1,
id.).46 Furthermore, as academics, they allegedly have a "special interest and duty to vigilantly
guard against plagiarism and misrepresentation because these unwelcome occurrences have a
profound impact in the academe, especially in our law schools." 47

Respondents further "[called] on this Court not to misconstrue the Restoring Integrity Statement
as an ‘institutional attack’ x x x on the basis of its first and ninth paragraphs." 48 They further
clarified that at the time the Statement was allegedly drafted and agreed upon, it appeared to
them the Court "was not going to take any action on the grave and startling allegations of
plagiarism and misrepresentation."49 According to respondents, the bases for their belief were (i)
the news article published on July 21, 2010 in the Philippine Daily Inquirer wherein Court
Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez was reported to have said that Chief Justice Corona would
not order an inquiry into the matter;50 and (ii) the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo which
they claimed "did nothing but to downplay the gravity of the plagiarism and misrepresentation
charges."51 Respondents claimed that it was their perception of the Court’s indifference to the
dangers posed by the plagiarism allegations against Justice Del Castillo that impelled them to
urgently take a public stand on the issue.

(b) The "correctness" of respondents’ position that Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism and
should be held accountable in accordance with the standards of academic writing

A significant portion of the Common Compliance is devoted to a discussion of the merits of

respondents’ charge of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo. Relying on University of the
Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals52 and foreign materials and jurisprudence,
respondents essentially argue that their position regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice
Del Castillo is the correct view and that they are therefore justified in issuing their Restoring
Integrity Statement. Attachments to the Common Compliance included, among others: (i) the
letter dated October 28, 2010 of Peter B. Payoyo, LL.M, Ph.D.,53 sent to Chief Justice Corona
through Justice Sereno, alleging that the Vinuya decision likewise lifted without proper attribution
the text from a legal article by Mariana Salazar Albornoz that appeared in the Anuario Mexicano
De Derecho Internacional and from an International Court of Justice decision; and (ii) a 2008
Human Rights Law Review Article entitled "Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International
Human Rights Law" by Michael O’Flaherty and John Fisher, in support of their charge that Justice
Del Castillo also lifted passages from said article without proper attribution, but this time, in his
ponencia in Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections.54

(c) Respondents’ belief that they are being "singled out" by the Court when others have likewise
spoken on the "plagiarism issue"

In the Common Compliance, respondents likewise asserted that "the plagiarism and
misrepresentation allegations are legitimate public issues."55 They identified various published
reports and opinions, in agreement with and in opposition to the stance of respondents, on the
issue of plagiarism, specifically:
 (i) Newsbreak report on July 19, 2010 by Aries Rufo and Purple Romero; 56

(ii) Column of Ramon Tulfo which appeared in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on July 24,
2010;57

(iii) Editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer published on July 25, 2010; 58

(iv) Letter dated July 22, 2010 of Justice Del Castillo published in the Philippine Star on
July 30, 2010;59

(v) Column of Former Intellectual Property Office Director General Adrian Cristobal, Jr.
published in the Business Mirror on August 5, 2010;60

(vi) Column of Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban published in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer on August 8, 2010;61

(vii) News report regarding Senator Francis Pangilinan’s call for the resignation of Justice
Del Castillo published in the Daily Tribune and the Manila Standard Today on July 31,
2010;62

(viii) News reports regarding the statement of Dean Cesar Villanueva of the Ateneo de
Manila University School of Law on the calls for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo
published in The Manila Bulletin, the Philippine Star and the Business Mirror on August
11, 2010;63

(ix) News report on expressions of support for Justice Del Castillo from a former dean of
the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila, the Philippine Constitutional Association, the
Judges Association of Bulacan and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Bulacan
Chapter published in the Philippine Star on August 16, 2010;64 and

(x) Letter of the Dean of the Liceo de Cagayan University College of Law published in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 10, 2010.65

In view of the foregoing, respondents alleged that this Court has singled them out for sanctions
and the charge in the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010 that they may have
violated specific canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility is unfair and without basis.

(d) Freedom of expression

In paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Common Compliance, respondents briefly discussed their position

that in issuing their Statement, "they should be seen as not only to be performing their duties as
members of the Bar, officers of the court, and teachers of law, but also as citizens of a democracy
who are constitutionally protected in the exercise of free speech."66 In support of this contention,
they cited United States v. Bustos,67In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, 68 and In the Matter of
Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections.69

(e) Academic freedom

In paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Common Compliance, respondents asserted that their Statement was also
issued in the exercise of their academic freedom as teachers in an institution of higher learning. They
relied on Section 5 of the University of the Philippines Charter of 2008 which provided that "[t]he national
university has the right and responsibility to exercise academic freedom." They likewise adverted to
Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology70 which they claimed recognized
the extent and breadth of such freedom as to encourage a free and healthy discussion and
communication of a faculty member’s field of study without fear of reprisal. It is respondents’ view that had
they remained silent on the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya decision they would have "compromised [their]
integrity and credibility as teachers; [their silence] would have created a culture and generation of
students, professionals, even lawyers, who would lack the competence and discipline for research and
pleading; or, worse, [that] their silence would have communicated to the public that plagiarism and
misrepresentation are inconsequential matters and that intellectual integrity has no bearing or relevance
to one’s conduct."71

In closing, respondents’ Common Compliance exhorted this Court to consider the following portion of the
dissenting opinion of Justice George A. Malcolm in Salcedo v. Hernandez,72 to wit:

Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and impartial course from the bench
than by an attempt to compel respect for the judiciary by chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or
injudicious exposition of his side of a case. The Philippines needs lawyers of independent thought and
courageous bearing, jealous of the interests of their clients and unafraid of any court, high or low, and the
courts will do well tolerantly to overlook occasional intemperate language soon to be regretted by the
lawyer which affects in no way the outcome of a case. 73

On the matter of the reliefs to which respondents believe they are entitled, the Common Compliance
stated, thus:

WHEREFORE:

A. Respondents, as citizens of a democracy, professors of law, members of the Bar and officers
of the Court, respectfully pray that:

1. the foregoing be noted; and

2. the Court reconsider and reverse its adverse findings in the Show Cause Resolution,
including its conclusions that respondents have: [a] breached their "obligation as law
professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court, … and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice;" and [b]
committed "violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility."

B. In the event the Honorable Court declines to grant the foregoing prayer, respondents
respectfully pray, in the alternative, and in assertion of their due process rights, that before final
judgment be rendered:

1. the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing;

2. respondents be given a fair and full opportunity to refute and/or address the findings
and conclusions of fact in the Show Cause Resolution (including especially the finding
and conclusion of a lack of malicious intent), and in that connection, that appropriate
procedures and schedules for hearing be adopted and defined that will allow them the full
and fair opportunity to require the production of and to present testimonial, documentary,
and object evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010) and In the Matter of the Charges
of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-
SC); and
 3. respondents be given fair and full access to the transcripts, records, drafts, reports and
submissions in or relating to, and accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses who were or could have been called in In The Matter of the Charges of
Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-
SC).74

Compliance and Reservation of Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista

Although already included in the Common Compliance, Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista (Prof. Juan-
Bautista) filed a separate Compliance and Reservation (the Bautista Compliance), wherein she adopted
the allegations in the Common Compliance with some additional averments.

Prof. Juan-Bautista reiterated that her due process rights allegedly entitled her to challenge the findings
and conclusions in the Show Cause Resolution. Furthermore, "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can
be considered indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be punished
only after charge and hearing."75

Prof. Juan-Bautista stressed that respondents signed the Statement "in good faith and with the best
intentions to protect the Supreme Court by asking one member to resign."76 For her part, Prof. Juan-
Bautista intimated that her deep disappointment and sadness for the plight of the Malaya Lolas were what
motivated her to sign the Statement.

On the point of academic freedom, Prof. Juan-Bautista cited jurisprudence77 which in her view highlighted
that academic freedom is constitutionally guaranteed to institutions of higher learning such that schools
have the freedom to determine for themselves who may teach, what may be taught, how lessons shall be
taught and who may be admitted to study and that courts have no authority to interfere in the schools’
exercise of discretion in these matters in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. She claims the Court
has encroached on the academic freedom of the University of the Philippines and other universities on
their right to determine how lessons shall be taught.

Lastly, Prof. Juan-Bautista asserted that the Statement was an exercise of respondents’ constitutional
right to freedom of expression that can only be curtailed when there is grave and imminent danger to
public safety, public morale, public health or other legitimate public interest. 78

Compliance of Prof. Raul T. Vasquez

On November 19, 2010, Prof. Raul T. Vasquez (Prof. Vasquez) filed a separate Compliance by registered
mail (the Vasquez Compliance). In said Compliance, Prof. Vasquez narrated the circumstances
surrounding his signing of the Statement. He alleged that the Vinuya decision was a topic of conversation
among the UP Law faculty early in the first semester (of academic year 2010-11) because it reportedly
contained citations not properly attributed to the sources; that he was shown a copy of the Statement by a
clerk of the Office of the Dean on his way to his class; and that, agreeing in principle with the main theme
advanced by the Statement, he signed the same in utmost good faith.79

In response to the directive from this Court to explain why he should not be disciplined as a member of
the Bar under the Show Cause Resolution, Prof. Vasquez also took the position that a lawyer has the
right, like all citizens in a democratic society, to comment on acts of public officers. He invited the
attention of the Court to the following authorities: (a) In re: Vicente Sotto; 80 (b) In re: Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen;81 and (c) a discussion appearing in American Jurisprudence (AmJur) 2d.82 He claims that he
"never had any intention to unduly influence, nor entertained any illusion that he could or should
influence, [the Court] in its disposition of the Vinuya case"83 and that "attacking the integrity of [the Court]
was the farthest thing on respondent’s mind when he signed the Statement."84Unlike his colleagues, who
wish to impress upon this Court the purported homogeneity of the views on what constitutes plagiarism,
Prof. Vasquez stated in his Compliance that:
13. Before this Honorable Court rendered its Decision dated 12 October 2010, some espoused the view
that willful and deliberate intent to commit plagiarism is an essential element of the same. Others, like
respondent, were of the opinion that plagiarism is committed regardless of the intent of the perpetrator,
the way it has always been viewed in the academe. This uncertainty made the issue a fair topic for
academic discussion in the College. Now, this Honorable Court has ruled that plagiarism presupposes
deliberate intent to steal another’s work and to pass it off as one’s own. 85 (Emphases supplied.)

Also in contrast to his colleagues, Prof. Vasquez was willing to concede that he "might have been remiss
in correctly assessing the effects of such language [in the Statement] and could have been more
careful."86 He ends his discussion with a respectful submission that with his explanation, he has faithfully
complied with the Show Cause Resolution and that the Court will rule that he had not in any manner
violated his oath as a lawyer and officer of the Court.

Separate Compliance of Dean Leonen regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 in relation to his
submission of a "dummy" of the UP Law Faculty Statement to this Court

In his Compliance, Dean Leonen claimed that there were three drafts/versions of the UP Law Faculty
Statement, which he described as follows:

 "Restoring Integrity I" which bears the entire roster of the faculty of the UP College of Law in its
signing pages, and the actual signatures of the thirty-seven (37) faculty members subject of the
Show Cause Resolution. A copy was filed with the Honorable Court by Roque and Butuyan on 31
August 2010 in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

 "Restoring Integrity II" which does not bear any actual physical signature, but which reflects as
signatories the names of thirty-seven (37) members of the faculty with the notation "(SGD.)". A
copy of Restoring Integrity II was publicly and physically posted in the UP College of Law on 10
August 2010. Another copy of Restoring Integrity II was also officially received by the Honorable
Court from the Dean of the UP College of Law on 11 August 2010, almost three weeks before the
filing of Restoring Integrity I.

 "Restoring Integrity III" which is a reprinting of Restoring Integrity II, and which presently serves
as the official file copy of the Dean’s Office in the UP College of Law that may be signed by other
faculty members who still wish to. It bears the actual signatures of the thirty- seven original
signatories to Restoring Integrity I above their printed names and the notation "(SGD.") and, in
addition, the actual signatures of eight (8) other members of the faculty above their handwritten or
typewritten names.87

For purposes of this discussion, only Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II are relevant since
what Dean Leonen has been directed to explain are the discrepancies in the signature pages of these two
documents. Restoring Integrity III was never submitted to this Court.

On how Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II were prepared and came about, Dean Leonen
alleged, thus:

2.2 On 27 July 2010, sensing the emergence of a relatively broad agreement in the faculty on a
draft statement, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to print the draft and circulate it among the
faculty members so that those who wished to may sign. For this purpose, the staff encoded the
law faculty roster to serve as the printed draft’s signing pages. Thus did the first printed draft of
the Restoring Integrity Statement, Restoring Integrity I, come into being.

2.3. As of 27 July 2010, the date of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Dean Leonen was unaware
that a Motion for Reconsideration of the Honorable Court’s Decision in Vinuya vs. Executive
 Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010) had already been filed, or that the Honorable Court
was in the process of convening its Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards in A.M. No. 10-7-
17-SC.

2.4. Dean Leonen’s staff then circulated Restoring Integrity I among the members of the faculty.
Some faculty members visited the Dean’s Office to sign the document or had it brought to their
classrooms in the College of Law, or to their offices or residences. Still other faculty members
who, for one reason or another, were unable to sign Restoring Integrity I at that time,
nevertheless conveyed to Dean Leonen their assurances that they would sign as soon as they
could manage.

2.5. Sometime in the second week of August, judging that Restoring Integrity I had been
circulated long enough, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to reproduce the statement in a style
and manner appropriate for posting in the College of Law. Following his own established practice
in relation to significant public issuances, he directed them to reformat the signing pages so that
only the names of those who signed the first printed draft would appear, together with the
corresponding "(SGD.)" note following each name. Restoring Integrity II thus came into being.88

According to Dean Leonen, the "practice of eliminating blanks opposite or above the names of non-
signatories in the final draft of significant public issuances, is meant not so much for aesthetic
considerations as to secure the integrity of such documents."89 He likewise claimed that "[p]osting
statements with blanks would be an open invitation to vandals and pranksters."90

With respect to the inclusion of Justice Mendoza’s name as among the signatories in Restoring Integrity II
when in fact he did not sign Restoring Integrity I, Dean Leonen attributed the mistake to a
miscommunication involving his administrative officer. In his Compliance, he narrated that:

2.7. Upon being presented with a draft of Restoring Integrity II with the reformatted signing pages,
Dean Leonen noticed the inclusion of the name of Justice Mendoza among the "(SGD.)"
signatories. As Justice Mendoza was not among those who had physically signed Restoring
Integrity I when it was previously circulated, Dean Leonen called the attention of his staff to the
inclusion of the Justice’s name among the "(SGD.)" signatories in Restoring Integrity II.

2.8. Dean Leonen was told by his administrative officer that she had spoken to Justice Mendoza
over the phone on Friday, 06 August 2010. According to her, Justice Mendoza had authorized the
dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement for him as he agreed fundamentally with its
contents. Also according to her, Justice Mendoza was unable at that time to sign the Restoring
Integrity Statement himself as he was leaving for the United States the following week. It would
later turn out that this account was not entirely accurate.91(Underscoring and italics supplied.)

Dean Leonen claimed that he "had no reason to doubt his administrative officer, however, and so placed
full reliance on her account"92 as "[t]here were indeed other faculty members who had also authorized the
Dean to indicate that they were signatories, even though they were at that time unable to affix their
signatures physically to the document."93

However, after receiving the Show Cause Resolution, Dean Leonen and his staff reviewed the
circumstances surrounding their effort to secure Justice Mendoza’s signature. It would turn out that this
was what actually transpired:

2.22.1. On Friday, 06 August 2010, when the dean’s staff talked to Justice Mendoza on the
phone, he [Justice Mendoza] indeed initially agreed to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement as
he fundamentally agreed with its contents. However, Justice Mendoza did not exactly say that he
authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement. Rather, he inquired if he could
authorize the dean to sign it for him as he was about to leave for the United States. The dean’s
 staff informed him that they would, at any rate, still try to bring the Restoring Integrity Statement
to him.

2.22.2. Due to some administrative difficulties, Justice Mendoza was unable to sign the Restoring
Integrity Statement before he left for the U.S. the following week.

2.22.3. The staff was able to bring Restoring Integrity III to Justice Mendoza when he went to the
College to teach on 24 September 2010, a day after his arrival from the U.S. This time, Justice
Mendoza declined to sign.94

According to the Dean:

2.23. It was only at this time that Dean Leonen realized the true import of the call he received from Justice
Mendoza in late September. Indeed, Justice Mendoza confirmed that by the time the hard copy of the
Restoring Integrity Statement was brought to him shortly after his arrival from the U.S., he declined to sign
it because it had already become controversial. At that time, he predicted that the Court would take some
form of action against the faculty. By then, and under those circumstances, he wanted to show due
deference to the Honorable Court, being a former Associate Justice and not wishing to unduly aggravate
the situation by signing the Statement.95 (Emphases supplied.)

With respect to the omission of Atty. Armovit’s name in the signature page of Restoring Integrity II when
he was one of the signatories of Restoring Integrity I and the erroneous description in Dean Leonen’s
August 10, 2010 letter that the version of the Statement submitted to the Court was signed by 38
members of the UP Law Faculty, it was explained in the Compliance that:

Respondent Atty. Miguel Armovit physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it was circulated to him.
However, his name was inadvertently left out by Dean Leonen’s staff in the reformatting of the signing
pages in Restoring Integrity II. The dean assumed that his name was still included in the reformatted
signing pages, and so mentioned in his cover note to Chief Justice Corona that 38 members of the law
faculty signed (the original 37 plus Justice Mendoza.)96

Dean Leonen argues that he should not be deemed to have submitted a dummy of the Statement that
was not a true and faithful reproduction of the same. He emphasized that the main body of the Statement
was unchanged in all its three versions and only the signature pages were not the same. This purportedly
is merely "reflective of [the Statement’s] essential nature as a ‘live’ public manifesto meant to continuously
draw adherents to its message, its signatory portion is necessarily evolving and dynamic x x x many other
printings of [the Statement] may be made in the future, each one reflecting the same text but with more
and more signatories."97 Adverting to criminal law by analogy, Dean Leonen claims that "this is not an
instance where it has been made to appear in a document that a person has participated in an act when
the latter did not in fact so participate"98 for he "did not misrepresent which members of the faculty of the
UP College of Law had agreed with the Restoring Integrity Statement proper and/or had expressed their
desire to be signatories thereto."99

In this regard, Dean Leonen believes that he had not committed any violation of Canon 10 or Rules 10.01
and 10.02 for he did not mislead nor misrepresent to the Court the contents of the Statement or the
identities of the UP Law faculty members who agreed with, or expressed their desire to be signatories to,
the Statement. He also asserts that he did not commit any violation of Rule 10.03 as he "coursed [the
Statement] through the appropriate channels by transmitting the same to Honorable Chief Justice Corona
for the latter’s information and proper disposition with the hope that its points would be duly considered by
the Honorable Court en banc."100 Citing Rudecon Management Corporation v. Camacho,101 Dean Leonen
posits that the required quantum of proof has not been met in this case and that no dubious character or
motivation for the act complained of existed to warrant an administrative sanction for violation of the
standard of honesty provided for by the Code of Professional Responsibility. 102
Dean Leonen ends his Compliance with an enumeration of nearly identical reliefs as the Common
Compliance, including the prayers for a hearing and for access to the records, evidence and witnesses
allegedly relevant not only in this case but also in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethical investigation involving
Justice Del Castillo.

Manifestation of Prof. Owen Lynch (Lynch Manifestation)

For his part, Prof. Owen Lynch (Prof. Lynch) manifests to this Court that he is not a member of the
Philippine bar; but he is a member of the bar of the State of Minnesota. He alleges that he first taught as
a visiting professor at the UP College of Law in 1981 to 1988 and returned in the same capacity in 2010.
He further alleges that "[h]e subscribes to the principle, espoused by this Court and the Supreme Court of
the United States, that ‘…[d]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open and that
it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials."103 In signing the Statement, he believes that "the right to speak means the right to speak
effectively."104 Citing the dissenting opinions in Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio,
Jr.,105 Prof. Lynch argued that "[f]or speech to be effective, it must be forceful enough to make the
intended recipients listen"106 and "[t]he quality of education would deteriorate in an atmosphere of
repression, when the very teachers who are supposed to provide an example of courage and self-
assertiveness to their pupils can speak only in timorous whispers." 107 Relying on the doctrine in In the
Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections,108Prof. Lynch believed that the Statement did not pose any danger, clear or
present, of any substantive evil so as to remove it from the protective mantle of the Bill of Rights (i.e.,
referring to the constitutional guarantee on free speech).109 He also stated that he "has read the
Compliance of the other respondents to the Show Cause Resolution" and that "he signed the Restoring
Integrity Statement for the same reasons they did."110

ISSUES

Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a perusal of the submissions of respondents, the material
issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:

1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom of expression?

2.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents’ academic freedom as law professors?

3.) Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain why they should not be disciplined as
Members of the Bar under Canons 1, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility?

4.) Does the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen satisfactorily explain why he should not be
disciplined as a Member of the Bar under Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03?

5.) Are respondents entitled to have the Show Cause Resolution set for hearing and in relation to
such hearing, are respondents entitled to require the production or presentation of evidence
bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230)
and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the
records and transcripts of, and the witnesses and evidence presented, or could have been
presented, in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC)?

DISCUSSION

The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom of expression.
It is respondents’ collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the Show Cause Resolution, has
interfered with respondents’ constitutionally mandated right to free speech and expression. It appears that
the underlying assumption behind respondents’ assertion is the misconception that this Court is denying
them the right to criticize the Court’s decisions and actions, and that this Court seeks to "silence"
respondent law professors’ dissenting view on what they characterize as a "legitimate public issue."

This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was neither the
fact that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had charged one of its members
of plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the contumacious
language by which respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed
their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said pending case for the "proper disposition" and
consideration of the Court that gave rise to said Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly
enumerated the statements that the Court considered excessive and uncalled for under the
circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and later submission to this Court of the UP Law
faculty’s Restoring Integrity Statement.

To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that Justice Del Castillo was
guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression of that belief as "not only as an established fact, but a
truth"111 when it was "[o]f public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing investigation precisely to
determine the truth of such allegations."112 It was also pointed out in the Show Cause Resolution that
there was a pending motion for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision.113 The Show Cause Resolution
made no objections to the portions of the Restoring Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to be
"constructive" but only asked respondents to explain those portions of the said Statement that by no
stretch of the imagination could be considered as fair or constructive, to wit:

Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The opening
sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered
abuse during a time of war.

The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as
a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.

The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the
resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the Court’s alleged
indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of
concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.114 x x x.
(Underscoring ours.)

To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents’ freedom of expression when it
stated that:

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic
society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism
leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially
devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must
"insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from
outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective comments
except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty,
integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort
women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite
resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their
obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice.115 x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring
supplied.)

Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents’ submissions, this Court has held that
the right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial
concern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. In cases
where the critics are not only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the
authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers,
whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency.

As early as the 1935 case of Salcedo v. Hernandez,116 the Court found Atty. Vicente J. Francisco both
guilty of contempt and liable administratively for the following paragraph in his second motion for
reconsideration:

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court, denying our
motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of
Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our power in order that this error may be
corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we should not want that some citizen,
particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce,
as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and
because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and every
member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous
decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust,
increase the proselytes of 'sakdalism' and make the public lose confidence in the administration of
justice.117 (Emphases supplied.)

The highlighted phrases were considered by the Court as neither justified nor necessary and further held
that:

[I]n order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his
argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient
and the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly
improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done,
because both means are annoying and good practice can never sanction them by reason of their natural
tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial
matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for resolution.

There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a more or
less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the course which the
voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the press for the
purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has been the victim;
and because he states in a threatening manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader
against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the
public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion promote distrust in the
administration of justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with seditious and
revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in this country a few
days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the
authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so
devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error
notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted
erroneously.118 (Emphases supplied.)
Significantly, Salcedo is the decision from which respondents culled their quote from the minority view of
Justice Malcolm. Moreover, Salcedo concerned statements made in a pleading filed by a counsel in a
case, unlike the respondents here, who are neither parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case and therefore,
do not have any standing at all to interfere in the Vinuya case. Instead of supporting respondents’ theory,
Salcedo is authority for the following principle:

As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in
duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it has conferred
upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is: a
priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither
creates nor promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and
encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation
upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection
and relief.119 (Emphases supplied.)

Thus, the lawyer in Salcedo was fined and reprimanded for his injudicious statements in his pleading, by
accusing the Court of "erroneous ruling." Here, the respondents’ Statement goes way beyond merely
ascribing error to the Court.

Other cases cited by respondents likewise espouse rulings contrary to their position. In re: Atty. Vicente
Raul Almacen,120 cited in the Common Compliance and the Vasquez Compliance, was an instance where
the Court indefinitely suspended a member of the Bar for filing and releasing to the press a "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title" in protest of what he claimed was a great injustice to his client
committed by the Supreme Court. In the decision, the petition was described, thus:

He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for
justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust
judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath
that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice
as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb."
He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the
silent injustices committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were
committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that

"x x x a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney
and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain
our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession." 121

It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed foreign jurisprudence on the principle that a
lawyer, just like any citizen, has the right to criticize and comment upon actuations of public officers,
including judicial authority. However, the real doctrine in Almacen is that such criticism of the courts,
whether done in court or outside of it, must conform to standards of fairness and propriety. This case
engaged in an even more extensive discussion of the legal authorities sustaining this view.1awphi1 To
quote from that decision:

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.

For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and
ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more
exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to
conduct himself "with all good fidelity x x x to the courts;" and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to
observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." The first canon of legal
ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

"x x x the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take upon
themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws,
but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not
discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining
out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial
acts." (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration
of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior
intellect — are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may
tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-
respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an
army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the
bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission." (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)

xxxx

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time
and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or
communications or in the course of a political campaign, if couched in insulting language as to bring into
scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary
action.122 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

In a similar vein, In re: Vicente Sotto,123 cited in the Vasquez Compliance, observed that:

[T]his Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:

The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause, respecting the same, has
always been considered as misbehavior, tending to obstruct the administration of justice, and subjects
such persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly
in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public clamor. Every citizen has a
profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the
courts, under the protection and forms of law, free from outside coercion or interference. x x x.

Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision
of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may
enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken and
obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision. x x x.

xxxx

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately "so many
blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law
and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was
rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the
confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to
lower or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is,
under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their
grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect
justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps
chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any
other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according
to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty
would be resting on a very shaky foundation.124 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

That the doctrinal pronouncements in these early cases are still good law can be easily gleaned even
from more recent jurisprudence.

In Choa v. Chiongson,125 the Court administratively disciplined a lawyer, through the imposition of a fine,
for making malicious and unfounded criticisms of a judge in the guise of an administrative complaint and
held, thus:

As an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering justice, graver
responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show
respect to its officers. This does not mean, however, that a lawyer cannot criticize a judge. As we stated
in Tiongco vs. Hon. Aguilar:

It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court, he cannot criticize the
courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an officer of the court to avail of such right.
Thus, in In Re: Almacen (31 SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court explicitly declared:

Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also
to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally
answerable to a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am Dec. 657, 665).

xxxx

Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in Almacen:

But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls
of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and
slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation
of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct, that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

xxxx

Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression in
the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a
corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. x x
x.

xxxx
Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts,
creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration (Rheem, supra), or tends necessarily to undermine
the confidence of people in the integrity of the members of this Court and to degrade the administration of
justice by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of offensive and abusive language (In re: Rafael
Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]); or abrasive and offensive language (Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA
42 [1975]; or of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and malicious statements in pleadings or in
a letter addressed to the judge (Baja vs. Macandog, 158 SCRA [1988], citing the resolution of 19 January
1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers Association vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza vs.
Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]).

Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an administrative complaint which is clearly unfounded
and impelled by ulterior motive will not excuse the lawyer responsible therefor under his duty of fidelity to
his client. x x x.126 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

In Saberon v. Larong,127 where this Court found respondent lawyer guilty of simple misconduct for using
intemperate language in his pleadings and imposed a fine upon him, we had the occasion to state:

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:

CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.

CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the Courts.

To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong
language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.

However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm
does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but
not offensive.

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personalityand to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.128

Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded the limits of fair
comment and cannot be deemed as protected free speech. Even In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory
Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 129 relied upon by
respondents in the Common Compliance, held that:

From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not susceptible
of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities
of life in a complex society preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an
absolute. It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all circumstances it should remain
unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for recognition. x x
x.130 (Emphasis supplied.)

One such societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is the threat to judicial
independence and the orderly administration of justice that immoderate, reckless and unfair attacks on
judicial decisions and institutions pose. This Court held as much in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan and
Gonzales,131 where we indefinitely suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for issuing to the media
statements grossly disrespectful towards the Court in relation to a pending case, to wit:

Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny
him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of
expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on
occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interest.
One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of
the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the
system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can
be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the
context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the
general community. x x x.132 (Emphases supplied.)

For this reason, the Court cannot uphold the view of some respondents 133 that the Statement presents no
grave or imminent danger to a legitimate public interest.

The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondents’ academic freedom.

It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and jurisprudence, guaranteed academic freedom
and undisputably, they are free to determine what they will teach their students and how they will teach.
We must point out that there is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon respondents the
subject matter they can teach and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the
principle of academic freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for
contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending case,
without observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.

A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not been passed upon in any previous case
before this Court, is the question of whether lawyers who are also law professors can invoke academic
freedom as a defense in an administrative proceeding for intemperate statements tending to pressure the
Court or influence the outcome of a case or degrade the courts.

Applying by analogy the Court’s past treatment of the "free speech" defense in other bar discipline cases,
academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in this case. The implicit ruling in the
jurisprudence discussed above is that the constitutional right to freedom of expression of members of the
Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to
uphold the public’s faith in the legal profession and the justice system. To our mind, the reason that
freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater force to the
academic freedom of law professors.

It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the broad definition in Cayetano v.
Monsod,134lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors
in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by their oath to
uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be
measured against the same canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the
Bar as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are lawyers.
Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents’ proposition in the Common Compliance that their
issuance of the Statement was in keeping with their duty to "participate in the development of the legal
system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of
justice" under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have fulfilled
that same duty in keeping with the demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect to legal
processes and the courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to influence the courts. Members of the Bar
cannot be selective regarding which canons to abide by given particular situations. With more reason that
law professors are not allowed this indulgence, since they are expected to provide their students
exemplars of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole and not just their preferred portions
thereof.

The Court’s rulings on the submissions regarding the charge of violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13.

Having disposed of respondents’ main arguments of freedom of expression and academic freedom, the
Court considers here the other averments in their submissions.

With respect to good faith, respondents’ allegations presented two main ideas: (a) the validity of their
position regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo, and (b) their pure motive to spur this
Court to take the correct action on said issue.

The Court has already clarified that it is not the expression of respondents’ staunch belief that Justice Del
Castillo has committed a misconduct that the majority of this Court has found so unbecoming in the Show
Cause Resolution. No matter how firm a lawyer’s conviction in the righteousness of his cause there is
simply no excuse for denigrating the courts and engaging in public behavior that tends to put the courts
and the legal profession into disrepute. This doctrine, which we have repeatedly upheld in such cases as
Salcedo, In re Almacen and Saberong, should be applied in this case with more reason, as the
respondents, not parties to the Vinuya case, denounced the Court and urged it to change its decision
therein, in a public statement using contumacious language, which with temerity they subsequently
submitted to the Court for "proper disposition."

That humiliating the Court into reconsidering the Vinuya Decision in favor of the Malaya Lolas was one of
the objectives of the Statement could be seen in the following paragraphs from the same:

And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women, but of
women elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of
war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and
misinterpreted texts.

xxxx

(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial
function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those who have been left without
legal or equitable recourse, such as the petitioners therein.135 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

Whether or not respondents’ views regarding the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case had valid basis was
wholly immaterial to their liability for contumacious speech and conduct. These are two separate matters
to be properly threshed out in separate proceedings. The Court considers it highly inappropriate, if not
tantamount to dissembling, the discussion devoted in one of the compliances arguing the guilt of Justice
Del Castillo. In the Common Compliance, respondents even go so far as to attach documentary evidence
to support the plagiarism charges against Justice Del Castillo in the present controversy. The ethics case
of Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC), with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, was still
pending at the time of the filing of respondents’ submissions in this administrative case. As respondents
themselves admit, they are neither parties nor counsels in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo.
Notwithstanding their professed overriding interest in said ethics case, it is not proper procedure for
respondents to bring up their plagiarism arguments here especially when it has no bearing on their own
administrative case.

Still on motive, it is also proposed that the choice of language in the Statement was intended for effective
speech; that speech must be "forceful enough to make the intended recipients listen."136 One wonders
what sort of effect respondents were hoping for in branding this Court as, among others, callous,
dishonest and lacking in concern for the basic values of decency and respect. The Court fails to see how
it can ennoble the profession if we allow respondents to send a signal to their students that the only way
to effectively plead their cases and persuade others to their point of view is to be offensive.

This brings to our mind the letters of Dr. Ellis and Prof. Tams which were deliberately quoted in full in the
narration of background facts to illustrate the sharp contrast between the civil tenor of these letters and
the antagonistic irreverence of the Statement. In truth, these foreign authors are the ones who would
expectedly be affected by any perception of misuse of their works. Notwithstanding that they are beyond
the disciplinary reach of this Court, they still obviously took pains to convey their objections in a
deferential and scholarly manner. It is unfathomable to the Court why respondents could not do the same.
These foreign authors’ letters underscore the universality of the tenet that legal professionals must deal
with each other in good faith and due respect. The mark of the true intellectual is one who can express
his opinions logically and soberly without resort to exaggerated rhetoric and unproductive recriminations.

As for the claim that the respondents’ noble intention is to spur the Court to take "constructive action" on
the plagiarism issue, the Court has some doubts as to its veracity. For if the Statement was primarily
meant for this Court’s consideration, why was the same published and reported in the media first before it
was submitted to this Court? It is more plausible that the Statement was prepared for consumption by the
general public and designed to capture media attention as part of the effort to generate interest in the
most controversial ground in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed in the Vinuya case by
Atty. Roque, who is respondents’ colleague on the UP Law faculty.

In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of fidelity and due respect to the
Court, particularly when respondents knew fully well that the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision
and the merits of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statement’s issuance, were still both sub
judice or pending final disposition of the Court. These facts have been widely publicized. On this point,
respondents allege that at the time the Statement was first drafted on July 27, 2010, they did not know of
the constitution of the Ethics Committee and they had issued the Statement under the belief that this
Court intended to take no action on the ethics charge against Justice Del Castillo. Still, there was a
significant lapse of time from the drafting and printing of the Statement on July 27, 2010 and its
publication and submission to this Court in early August when the Ethics Committee had already been
convened. If it is true that the respondents’ outrage was fueled by their perception of indifference on the
part of the Court then, when it became known that the Court did intend to take action, there was nothing
to prevent respondents from recalibrating the Statement to take this supervening event into account in the
interest of fairness.

Speaking of the publicity this case has generated, we likewise find no merit in the respondents’ reliance
on various news reports and commentaries in the print media and the internet as proof that they are being
unfairly "singled out." On the contrary, these same annexes to the Common Compliance show that it is
not enough for one to criticize the Court to warrant the institution of disciplinary137 or contempt138 action.
This Court takes into account the nature of the criticism and weighs the possible repercussions of the
same on the Judiciary. When the criticism comes from persons outside the profession who may not have
a full grasp of legal issues or from individuals whose personal or other interests in making the criticism are
obvious, the Court may perhaps tolerate or ignore them. However, when law professors are the ones who
appear to have lost sight of the boundaries of fair commentary and worse, would justify the same as an
exercise of civil liberties, this Court cannot remain silent for such silence would have a grave implication
on legal education in our country.
With respect to the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance, considering that this appears to
be the first time these respondents have been involved in disciplinary proceedings of this sort, the Court
is willing to give them the benefit of the doubt that they were for the most part well-intentioned in the
issuance of the Statement. However, it is established in jurisprudence that where the excessive and
contumacious language used is plain and undeniable, then good intent can only be mitigating. As this
Court expounded in Salcedo:

In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his intention to offend the court or to
be recreant to the respect thereto but, unfortunately, there are his phrases which need no further
comment. Furthermore, it is a well settled rule in all places where the same conditions and practice as
those in this jurisdiction obtain, that want of intention is no excuse from liability (13 C. J., 45). Neither is
the fact that the phrases employed are justified by the facts a valid defense:

"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the facts is not
admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should always be observed and enforced." (In re
Stewart, 118 La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or want of intention constitutes at most an extenuation of
liability in this case, taking into consideration Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's state of mind, according to
him when he prepared said motion. This court is disposed to make such concession. However, in order to
avoid a recurrence thereof and to prevent others, by following the bad example, from taking the same
course, this court considers it imperative to treat the case of said attorney with the justice it
deserves.139 (Emphases supplied.)

Thus, the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance should, notwithstanding their claim of good
faith, be reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13, to give due respect to the courts
and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending matters
or to denigrate the courts and the administration of justice.

With respect to Prof. Vasquez, the Court favorably notes the differences in his Compliance compared to
his colleagues. In our view, he was the only one among the respondents who showed true candor and
sincere deference to the Court. He was able to give a straightforward account of how he came to sign the
Statement. He was candid enough to state that his agreement to the Statement was in principle and that
the reason plagiarism was a "fair topic of discussion" among the UP Law faculty prior to the promulgation
of the October 12, 2010 Decision in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was the uncertainty brought about by a division
of opinion on whether or not willful or deliberate intent was an element of plagiarism. He was likewise
willing to acknowledge that he may have been remiss in failing to assess the effect of the language of the
Statement and could have used more care. He did all this without having to retract his position on the
plagiarism issue, without demands for undeserved reliefs (as will be discussed below) and without
baseless insinuations of deprivation of due process or of prejudgment. This is all that this Court expected
from respondents, not for them to sacrifice their principles but only that they recognize that they
themselves may have committed some ethical lapse in this affair. We commend Prof. Vaquez for showing
that at least one of the respondents can grasp the true import of the Show Cause Resolution involving
them. For these reasons, the Court finds Prof. Vasquez’s Compliance satisfactory.

As for Prof. Lynch, in view of his Manifestation that he is a member of the Bar of the State of Minnesota
and, therefore, not under the disciplinary authority of this Court, he should be excused from these
proceedings. However, he should be reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law
school he should strive to be a model of responsible and professional conduct to his students even
without the threat of sanction from this Court. For even if one is not bound by the Code of Professional
Responsibility for members of the Philippine Bar, civility and respect among legal professionals of any
nationality should be aspired for under universal standards of decency and fairness.

The Court’s ruling on Dean Leonen’s Compliance regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10.
To recall, the Show Cause Resolution directed Dean Leonen to show cause why he should not be
disciplinary dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 and for submitting a
"dummy" that was not a true and faithful reproduction of the signed Statement.

In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies that Restoring Integrity II was not a true and faithful
reproduction of the actual signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, because looking at the text or the body,
there were no differences between the two. He attempts to downplay the discrepancies in the signature
pages of the two versions of the Statement (i.e., Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II) by
claiming that it is but expected in "live" public manifestos with dynamic and evolving pages as more and
more signatories add their imprimatur thereto. He likewise stresses that he is not administratively liable
because he did not misrepresent the members of the UP Law faculty who "had agreed with the Restoring
Integrity Statement proper and/or who had expressed their desire to be signatories thereto." 140

To begin with, the Court cannot subscribe to Dean Leonen’s implied view that the signatures in the
Statement are not as significant as its contents. Live public manifesto or not, the Statement was formally
submitted to this Court at a specific point in time and it should reflect accurately its signatories at that
point. The value of the Statement as a UP Law Faculty Statement lies precisely in the identities of the
persons who have signed it, since the Statement’s persuasive authority mainly depends on the reputation
and stature of the persons who have endorsed the same. Indeed, it is apparent from respondents’
explanations that their own belief in the "importance" of their positions as UP law professors prompted
them to publicly speak out on the matter of the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case.

Further, in our assessment, the true cause of Dean Leonen’s predicament is the fact that he did not from
the beginning submit the signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, to this Court on August 11, 2010 and, instead,
submitted Restoring Integrity II with its retyped or "reformatted" signature pages. It would turn out,
according to Dean Leonen’s account, that there were errors in the retyping of the signature pages due to
lapses of his unnamed staff. First, an unnamed administrative officer in the dean’s office gave the dean
inaccurate information that led him to allow the inclusion of Justice Mendoza as among the signatories of
Restoring Integrity II. Second, an unnamed staff also failed to type the name of Atty. Armovit when
encoding the signature pages of Restoring Integrity II when in fact he had signed Restoring Integrity I.

The Court can understand why for purposes of posting on a bulletin board or a website a signed
document may have to be reformatted and signatures may be indicated by the notation (SGD). This is not
unusual. We are willing to accept that the reformatting of documents meant for posting to eliminate blanks
is necessitated by vandalism concerns.

However, what is unusual is the submission to a court, especially this Court, of a signed document for the
Court’s consideration that did not contain the actual signatures of its authors. In most cases, it is
the original signed document that is transmitted to the Court or at the very least a photocopy of the actual
signed document. Dean Leonen has not offered any explanation why he deviated from this practice with
his submission to the Court of Restoring Integrity II on August 11, 2010. There was nothing to prevent the
dean from submitting Restoring Integrity I to this Court even with its blanks and unsigned portions. Dean
Leonen cannot claim fears of vandalism with respect to court submissions for court employees are
accountable for the care of documents and records that may come into their custody. Yet, Dean Leonen
deliberately chose to submit to this Court the facsimile that did not contain the actual signatures and his
silence on the reason therefor is in itself a display of lack of candor.

Still, a careful reading of Dean Leonen’s explanations yield the answer. In the course of his explanation of
his willingness to accept his administrative officer’s claim that Justice Mendoza agreed to be indicated as
a signatory, Dean Leonen admits in a footnote that other professors had likewise only authorized him to
indicate them as signatories and had not in fact signed the Statement. Thus, at around the time Restoring
Integrity II was printed, posted and submitted to this Court, at least one purported signatory thereto had
not actually signed the same. Contrary to Dean Leonen’s proposition, that is precisely tantamount to
making it appear to this Court that a person or persons participated in an act when such person or
persons did not.
We are surprised that someone like Dean Leonen, with his reputation for perfection and stringent
standards of intellectual honesty, could proffer the explanation that there was no misrepresentation when
he allowed at least one person to be indicated as having actually signed the Statement when all he had
was a verbal communication of an intent to sign. In the case of Justice Mendoza, what he had was only
hearsay information that the former intended to sign the Statement. If Dean Leonen was truly determined
to observe candor and truthfulness in his dealings with the Court, we see no reason why he could not
have waited until all the professors who indicated their desire to sign the Statement had in fact signed
before transmitting the Statement to the Court as a duly signed document. If it was truly impossible to
secure some signatures, such as that of Justice Mendoza who had to leave for abroad, then Dean
Leonen should have just resigned himself to the signatures that he was able to secure.

We cannot imagine what urgent concern there was that he could not wait for actual signatures before
submission of the Statement to this Court. As respondents all asserted, they were neither parties to nor
counsels in the Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The Statement was neither
a pleading with a deadline nor a required submission to the Court; rather, it was a voluntary submission
that Dean Leonen could do at any time.

In sum, the Court likewise finds Dean Leonen’s Compliance unsatisfactory. However, the Court is willing
to ascribe these isolated lapses in judgment of Dean Leonen to his misplaced zeal in pursuit of his
objectives. In due consideration of Dean Leonen’s professed good intentions, the Court deems it
sufficient to admonish Dean Leonen for failing to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the
Court as required under Canon 10.

Respondents’ requests for a hearing, for production/presentation of evidence bearing on the plagiarism
and misrepresentation issues in G.R. No. 162230 and A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, and for access to the
records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are unmeritorious.

In the Common Compliance, respondents named therein asked for alternative reliefs should the Court
find their Compliance unsatisfactory, that is, that the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing and for
that purpose, they be allowed to require the production or presentation of witnesses and evidence bearing
on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the plagiarism
case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records of, and
evidence that were presented or may be presented in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The
prayer for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was substantially echoed in
Dean Leonen’s separate Compliance. In Prof. Juan-Bautista’s Compliance, she similarly expressed the
sentiment that "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered indirect contempt, under Section 3
of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be punished only after charge and hearing." 141 It is this group
of respondents’ premise that these reliefs are necessary for them to be accorded full due process.

The Court finds this contention unmeritorious.

Firstly, it would appear that the confusion as to the necessity of a hearing in this case springs largely from
its characterization as a special civil action for indirect contempt in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice
Sereno (to the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution) and her reliance therein on the majority’s
purported failure to follow the procedure in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as her main ground for
opposition to the Show Cause Resolution.

However, once and for all, it should be clarified that this is not an indirect contempt proceeding and Rule
71 (which requires a hearing) has no application to this case. As explicitly ordered in the Show Cause
Resolution this case was docketed as an administrative matter.

The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on disciplinary proceedings initiated
motu proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit:
SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.—In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in
other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for
investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in
which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save
that the review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis
supplied.)

From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal investigation, through a referral to the
specified officers, is merely discretionary, not mandatory on the Court. Furthermore, it is only if the Court
deems such an investigation necessary that the procedure in Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-A will be
followed.

As respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do not require a trial type hearing.
We have held that:

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard, hence,
a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his
side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process, the
requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy. 142 (Emphases supplied.)

In relation to bar discipline cases, we have had the occasion to rule in Pena v. Aparicio 143 that:

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do
not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one
of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have
proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor.144 (Emphases supplied.)

In Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court – Br. 81, Romblon – On the Prohibition
from Engaging in the Private Practice of Law, 145 we further observed that:

[I]n several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or resort to any formal
investigation where the facts on record sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of their
administrative liability.

In Prudential Bank v. Castro, the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further investigation after
considering his actions based on records showing his unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast
dishonor on the image of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public interest and welfare.
In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of several cases handled by the errant lawyer and his cohorts
that revealed their modus operandi in circumventing the payment of the proper judicial fees for the
astronomical sums they claimed in their cases. The Court held that those cases sufficiently provided the
basis for the determination of respondents' administrative liability, without need for further inquiry into the
matter under the principle of res ipsa loquitur.
Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy, that no evidentiary hearing is required
before the respondent may be disciplined for professional misconduct already established by the facts on
record.

xxxx

These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or formal investigation of an
errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately exercising its disciplining authority, as long as
the errant lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to be heard. As we stated earlier, Atty. Buffe
has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the present matter through her letter-query and
Manifestation filed before this Court.146(Emphases supplied.)

Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly had no right to a hearing and their reservation of a
right they do not have has no effect on these proceedings. Neither have they shown in their pleadings any
justification for this Court to call for a hearing in this instance. They have not specifically stated
what relevant evidence, documentary or testimonial, they intend to present in their defense that will
necessitate a formal hearing.

Instead, it would appear that they intend to present records, evidence, and witnesses bearing on the
plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case and in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC on the
assumption that the findings of this Court which were the bases of the Show Cause Resolution were
made in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, or were related to the conclusions of the Court in the Decision in that case.
This is the primary reason for their request for access to the records and evidence presented in A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC.

This assumption on the part of respondents is erroneous. To illustrate, the only incident in A.M. No. 10-7-
17-SC that is relevant to the case at bar is the fact that the submission of the actual signed copy of the
Statement (or Restoring Integrity I, as Dean Leonen referred to it) happened there. Apart from that fact, it
bears repeating that the proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo,
is a separate and independent matter from this case.

To find the bases of the statements of the Court in the Show Cause Resolution that the respondents
issued a Statement with language that the Court deems objectionable during the pendency of the Vinuya
case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, respondents need to go no further than the four
corners of the Statement itself, its various versions, news reports/columns (many of which respondents
themselves supplied to this Court in their Common Compliance) and internet sources that are already of
public knowledge.

Considering that what respondents are chiefly required to explain are the language of the Statement and
the circumstances surrounding the drafting, printing, signing, dissemination, etc., of its various versions,
the Court does not see how any witness or evidence in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo could
possibly shed light on these facts. To be sure, these facts are within the knowledge of respondents and if
there is any evidence on these matters the same would be in their possession.

We find it significant that in Dean Leonen’s Compliance he narrated how as early as September 2010,
i.e., before the Decision of this Court in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo on October 12, 2010 and
before the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution, retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza, after being shown a copy of the Statement upon his return from abroad, predicted that the
Court would take some form of action on the Statement. By simply reading a hard copy of the Statement,
a reasonable person, even one who "fundamentally agreed" with the Statement’s principles, could
foresee the possibility of court action on the same on an implicit recognition that the Statement, as
worded, is not a matter this Court should simply let pass. This belies respondents’ claim that it is
necessary for them to refer to any record or evidence in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC in order to divine the bases
for the Show Cause Resolution.
If respondents have chosen not to include certain pieces of evidence in their respective compliances or
chosen not to make a full defense at this time, because they were counting on being granted a hearing,
that is respondents’ own look-out. Indeed, law professors of their stature are supposed to be aware of the
above jurisprudential doctrines regarding the non-necessity of a hearing in disciplinary cases. They
should bear the consequence of the risk they have taken.

Thus, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of, and evidence presented in,
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC should be denied for lack of merit.

A final word

In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have monolithic views on any
subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers passionately and vigorously propound their
points of view they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court is certainly
not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the same respect and
courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they
are judges, court employees, professors or private practitioners, are officers of the Court and have
voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct
themselves with good fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law
professors, regardless of their status in the academic community or the law school to which they belong.

WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:

(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission, the Court finds his
Compliance to be satisfactory.

(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan
M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison,
Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L.
Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis,
Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R.
Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo,
Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo
Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G.
Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario, is found UNSATISFACTORY. These 35
respondent law professors are reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to refrain from
intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to
denigrate the Court and the administration of justice and warned that the same or similar act in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.

(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding the charge of violation of
Canon 10 is found UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to be more mindful of his
duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to
observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court and warned that the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is excused from these proceedings.
However, he is reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school he
should strive to be a model of responsible and professional conduct to his students even without
the threat of sanction from this Court.

(5) Finally, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-
SC are denied for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7676 June 10, 2014

AMADO T. DIZON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. NORLITA DE TAZA, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This concerns an administrative complaint1 for disbarment against Atty. Norlita De Taza (Atty. De Taza)
for the latter's demand for and receipt of exorbitant sums of money from her client purportedly to expedite
the proceedings of their case which was pending before the Court.

The Facts

Amado Dizon (complainant) alleged that sometime in February 2005, he, along with his siblings engaged
the services of Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates to represent them in the case of Eliza T.
Castaneda, et al. v. Heirs of Spouses Martin and Lucia Dizon with G.R. No. 174552. 2 The complainant
claimed that sometime in February 2007, Atty. De Taza demanded the sum of Seventy-Five Thousand
Pesos (₱75,000.00) from him to expedite the proceedings before the Court. This amount was over and
above the parties’ stipulated retainer fee as evidenced by a contract. 3

According to the complainant, unknown to him at that time was that, a month earlier or in January 2007,
Atty. De Taza had already demanded and received a total of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱800,000.00) from his sibling Aurora Dizon, for the same reason that Atty. De Taza proffered to him,
which was to expedite the proceedings of their case before the Court. Handwritten receipts 4 signed by
one Atty. Norlita De Taza were submitted by the complainant, which state:

15 Jan. 2007

Receipt

That the amount received ₱300,000 shall be used to expedite the case which, in turn shall result in the
following:

1. Decision favorable to plaintiff w/in 2 mos. from receipt of said amount;

2. Back rentals up to present should be returned, if the same should not be included in the
Decision, the 300,000.00 shall be returned.

Signed

Atty. Norlita De Taza518 Jan. 2007

Receipt

The amount of ₱500,000 has been advanced as part of expense [sic] to expedite the process before the
courts. The said amount has been advanced by Ms. Aurora Dizon and the same should be reimbursed to
her by her siblings upon winning the case with finality.

Signed
Atty. Norlita De Taza6

On October 24, 2007, the complainant went to this Court in Padre Faura, Manila and learned that the
Court had already denied the petition on November 20, 2006, contrary to Atty. De Taza’s representations
that the case was still pending. He tried to communicate with Atty. De Taza, but she could no longer be
found.7

Thereafter, on November 6, 2007, the complainant instituted a complaint for disbarment 8 against Atty. De
Taza. He also attached several affidavits and documents9 from other individuals who attested that Atty.
De Taza issued bouncing checks and/or failed to pay off her debts to them. A certain Ana Lynda Pineda
executed an affidavit10which was attached to the complaint, alleging that Atty. De Taza issued 11
checks11 in her favor amounting to ₱481,400.00, which were all dishonored by the bank. Demand letters
sent to her went unheeded.

Likewise, Darwin Tiamzon, a creditor of Atty. De Taza, whose Affidavit12 was attached to the complaint,
averred that Atty. De Taza issued a check 13 for ₱50,000.00 as payment for her loan. Said check was
dishonored by the bank for being drawn against a closed account.

Furthermore, a certain Eleanor Sarmiento submitted an affidavit,14 stating that Atty. De Taza owes her
₱29,560.39 and failed to pay the said amount despite repeated demands.

On November 14, 2007, the complainant through a letter15 informed the Court that Atty. De Taza is
planning to leave the country as she was joining her husband in the United States of America (U.S.A.).

In a Resolution16 dated December 10, 2007, Atty. De Taza was required by the Court to file a Comment.
However, the copy of the Resolution was returned unserved with the postal carrier’s notation "RTS
(Return to Sender)-Moved". The Court then resolved by virtue of the Resolution17 dated July 2, 2008, to
send a copy to Atty. De Taza’s office address at Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates. Said copy was
also returned unserved with the notation "RTS-not connected."

It was then required in the Resolution18 dated October 8, 2008 that the complainant inform the Court of
Atty. De Taza’s new address, which the complainant faithfully complied with by giving Atty. De Taza’s
new address in the U.S.A. The Court, in its Resolution 19 dated January 26, 2009, directed the Clerk of
Court to resend a copy of the Resolution dated December 10, 2007 with a copy of the complaint to Atty.
De Taza using the latter’s U.S.A. address.

Like the previous occasions, the copy of the Resolution dated December 10, 2007 with the complaint was
returned; this time, with the postal carrier’s notation "RTS-Unclaimed". The Court in its Resolution20 dated
September 9, 2009, held that the said copy of the Resolution was deemed served and resolved to
consider Atty. De Taza as having waived the filing of her comment. The case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

A Notice of Mandatory Conference21 was sent to the parties, in which they failed to appear. Thus, the
parties were directed to file their respective position papers. The complainant, in a letter 22 addressed to
the IBP, averred that he was already residing abroad and maintained that he had already submitted his
documentary evidence at the time of the filing of his complaint. Atty. De Taza, for her part, did not file any
position paper.

In its Report and Recommendation23 dated January 4,2011, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
recommended that Atty. De Taza be suspended for a period of two years from the practice of law.

The IBP Board of Governors modified the Commission on Bar Discipline’s recommendation in a
Resolution24 dated January 3, 2013, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s demand of
[P]800,000.00 to expedite the case pending in the Supreme Court when, in fact, the case had long been
dismissed, Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year.25 (Emphasis supplied)

The Issue

WHETHER ATTY. DE TAZASHOULD BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR ISSUING

BOUNCING CHECKS, DEMANDING AND/OR RECEIVING MONEY FROM HER CLIENTS UNDERTHE
GUISE OF HAVING THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT EXPEDITED. Ruling

The Court acknowledges the fact that Atty. De Taza was not able to refute the accusations against her.
Numerous attempts were made to afford her an opportunity to defend herself from the complainant’s
allegations, but all these efforts were only met with silence. Whether her transfer of residence was an
unscrupulous move on her part to evade her creditors, only she would certainly know. But as far as the
Court is concerned, all means were exhausted to give Atty. De Taza an avenue to oppose the
complainant’s charges. Her failure and/or refusal to file a comment will not be a hindrance for the Court to
mete out an appropriate sanction.

The Court has time and again ruled that disciplinary proceedings are investigations by the Court to
ascertain whether a lawyer is fit to be one. There is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. As this
Court held in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,26 citing In the Matter of the
Proceedings for Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Almacen, et al. v. Yaptinchay: 27 "Disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a
trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers.
Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there
is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public
interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney
is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers,
the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n]
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of
an attorney. x x x.28 (Italics supplied)

"In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required." 29 Based on the
documentary evidence submitted by the complainant, it appears that Atty. De Taza manifested a
propensity for borrowing money, issuing bouncing checks and incurring debts which she left unpaid
without any reason. The complainant even submitted a document evidencing Atty. De Taza’s involvement
in an estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 22 case filed before the Office of the City
Prosecutor in Angeles City (I.S. 07-J-2815-36) for drawing checks against a closed account, among other
complaint-affidavits executed by her other creditors. Such conduct, while already off-putting when
attributed to an ordinary person, is much more abhorrent when the same is exhibited by a member of the
Bar. As a lawyer, Atty. De Taza must remember that she is not only a symbol but also an instrument of
justice, equity and fairness.

"We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a
closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack
of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. The
issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to
the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order.1âwphi1 It also manifests a
lawyer’s low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her peers, seriously
and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high esteem."30

Atty. De Taza’s actuations towards the complainant and his siblings were even worse as she had the gall
to make it appear to the complainant that the proceedings before the Court can be expedited and ruled in
their favor in exchange for an exorbitant amount of money. Said scheme was employed by Atty. De Taza
just to milk more money from her clients. Without a doubt, Atty. De Taza’s actions are reprehensible and
her greed more than apparent when she even used the name of the Court to defraud her client.

When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for that particular purpose. And if he does not
use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client. 31 In
this case, the purpose for which Atty. De Taza demanded money is baseless and non-existent. Thus, her
demand should not have even been made in the first place.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the disbarment or suspension of a lawyer
for any of the following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral
conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
without authority to do so.32

The Court in Victoria C. Heenan v. Atty. Erlinda Espejo33 suspended the respondent from the practice of
law for two years when the latter issued checks which were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. In A-
1 Financial Services, Inc. v. Valerio,34 the same penalty was meted out by this Court to the erring lawyer
who issued worthless checks to pay off her loan.

Additionally, in Anacta v. Resurreccion,35 the Court held that suspension from the practice of law for four
years was the appropriate sanction for a lawyer who defrauded his client into paying ₱42,000.00 to him
for the purported filing of a petition for annulment of marriage. The respondent therein presented to his
client a copy of the petition with stamped receipt from the trial court when in reality, no such petition was
filed.

In Celaje v. Atty. Soriano,36 the respondent therein demanded ₱14,000.00 from the complainant to be put
up as injunction bond and asked for additional sums of money on other occasions, supposedly to pay the
judge who was handling the case. When the complainant verified this with the judge, the judge denied the
respondent’s allegations. The complainant later learned that the bond was also unnecessary, as the
application for a writ was already denied by the trial court. Due to the foregoing, the Court suspended the
respondent from the practice of law for two years.

"Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are
competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the
law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with
their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach."37 "The
Judiciary has been besieged enough with accusations of corruption and malpractice. For a member of the
legal profession to further stoke the embers of mistrust on the judicial system with such irresponsible
representations is reprehensible and cannot be tolerated." 38

All told, the Court holds that there is no reason to deviate from the report and recommendation of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline which is to suspend Atty. De Taza from the practice of law for two years.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
TWO YEARS with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar infraction would be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well
as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in Atty. Norlita
De Taza's record in this Court.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5359 March 10, 2014

ERMELINDA LAD VOA. DE DOMINGUEZ, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, VICENTE A.

PICHON,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON, SR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

Complainant Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez (complainant) was the widow of the late Felipe
Domiguez who died in a vehicular accident in Caraga, Davao Oriental, on October 18, 1995, involving a
dump truck owned by the Municipality of Caraga. Aggrieved, complainant decided to file charges against
the Municipality of Caraga and engaged the services of respondent Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron, Sr. (Atty.
Agleron). On three (3) occasions, Atty. Agleron requested and received from complainant the following
amounts for the payment of filing fees and sheriffs fees, to wit: (1) June 3, 1996 -₱3,000.00; (2) June 7,
1996 -Pl,800.00; and September 2, 1996 - ₱5,250.00 or a total of ₱10,050.00. After the lapse of four (4)
years, however, no complaint was filed by Atty. Agleron against the Municipality of Caraga. 1

Atty. Agleron admitted that complainant engaged his professional service and received the amount of
₱10,050.00. He, however, explained that their agreement was that complainant would pay the filing fees
and other incidental expenses and as soon as the complaint was prepared and ready for filing,
complainant would pay 30% of the agreed attorney’s fees of ₱100,000.00. On June 7, 1996, after the
signing of the complaint, he advised complainant to pay in full the amount of the filing fee and sheriff’s
fees and the 30% of the attorney’s fee, but complainant failed to do so. Atty. Agleron averred that since
the complaint could not be filed in court, the amount of ₱10,050.00 was deposited in a bank while
awaiting the payment of the balance of the filing fee and attorney’s fee. 2

In reply,3 complainant denied that she did not give the full payment of the filing fee and asserted that the
filing fee at that time amounted only to ₱7,836.60.

In the Report and Recommendation,4 dated January 12, 2012, the Investigating Commissioner found
Atty. Agleron to have violated the Code of Professional Responsibility when he neglected a legal matter
entrusted to him, and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of four (4)
months.

In its April 16, 2013 Resolution,5 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors adopted
and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification that
Atty. Agleron be suspended from the practice of law for a period of only one (1) month.

The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the penalty
imposed.

Atty. Agleron violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that:

Rule 18.03-A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his client with competence, and
to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a
fee or for free.6 He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed on him.7
In the present case, Atty. Agleron admitted his failure to file the complaint against the Municipality of
Caraga, Davao Oriental, despite the fact that it was already prepared and signed. He attributed his non-
filing of the appropriate charges on the failure of complainant to remit the full payment of the filing fee and
pay the 30% of the attorney's fee. Such justification, however, is not a valid excuse that would exonerate
him from liability. As stated, every case that is entrusted to a lawyer deserves his full attention whether he
accepts this for a fee or free. Even assuming that complainant had not remitted the full payment of the
filing fee, he should have found a way to speak to his client and inform him about the insufficiency of the
filing fee so he could file the complaint. Atty. Agleron obviously lacked professionalism in dealing with
complainant and showed incompetence when he failed to file the appropriate charges.1âwphi1

In a number of cases,8 the Court held that a lawyer should never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
otherwise his negligence renders him liable for disciplinary action such as suspension ranging from three
months to two years. In this case, the Court finds the suspension of Atty. Agleron from the practice of law
for a period of three (3) months sufficient.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Accordingly, respondent ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON, SR. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
wrongdoing will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records of the
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the
Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10164 March 10, 2014

STEPHAN BRUNET and VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS BRUNET, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. RONALD L. GUAREN, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

On August 9, 2002, complainant spouses Stephan and Virginia Brunet (complainants) filed a complaint
against respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren (Atty. Guaren) before the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CED), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

Complainants alleged that in February 1997, they engaged the services of Atty. Guaren for the titling of a
residential lot they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva Caseres; that Atty. Guaren asked for a fee of Ten
Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) including expenses relative to its proceeding; that it was agreed that full
payment of the fee shall be made after the delivery of the title; that Atty. Guaren asked for an advance fee
of One Thousand Pesos (Pl,000.00) which they gave; that Atty. Guaren took all the pertinent documents
relative to the titling of their lot-certified true copy of the tax declaration, original copy of the deed of
exchange, sketch plan, deed of donation, survey plan, and original copy of the waiver; that on March 10,
1997, Atty. Guaren asked for additional payment of Six Thousand Pesos (₱6,000.00) which they dutifully
gave; that from 1997 to 2001, they always reminded Atty. Guaren about the case and each time he would
say that the titling was in progress; that they became bothered by the slow progress of the case so they
demanded the return of the money they paid; and that respondent agreed to return the same provided
that the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) be deducted to answer for his professional fees.

Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an attorney-client relationship between them,
Atty. Guaren made a special appearance against them in a case pending before the Metropolitan Circuit
Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu (MCTC).

Atty. Guaren admitted that he indeed charged complainants an acceptance fee of ₱10,000.00, but denied
that the amount was inclusive of expenses for the titling of the lot. He claimed, however, that he received
the payment of ₱1,000.00 and ₱6,000.00; that their agreement was that the case would be filed in court
after the complainants fully paid his acceptance fee; that he did not take the documents relative to the
titling of the lot except for the photocopy of the tax declaration; and that he did not commit betrayal of trust
and confidence when he participated in a case filed against the complainants in MCTC explaining that his
appearance was for and in behalf of Atty. Ervin Estandante, the counsel on record, who failed to appear
in the said hearing.

In the Report and Recommendation,1 dated August 24, 2012, the Investigating Commissioner found Atty.
Guaren to have violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility when he accepted the titling of
complainants’ lot and despite the acceptance of ₱7,000.00, he failed to perform his obligation and
allowed 5 long years to elapse without any progress in the titling of the lot. Atty. Guaren should also be
disciplined for appearing in a case against complainants without a written consent from the latter. The
CBD recommended that he be suspended for six (6) months.

In its May 20, 2013 Resolution,2 the IBP Board of Governors, adopted and approved with modification the
Report and Recommendation of the CBD, suspending Atty. Guaren from the practice of law for three (3)
months only.

The Court adopts the findings of the IBP Board of Governors on the unethical conduct of Atty. Guaren,
except as to the penalty.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the
primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy
is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. 3

Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of ₱7,000.00 as partial payment
of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation to file the case for the titling of
complainants' lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to serve his client with
competence and diligence when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren is found GUILTY of having violated Canons 17 and 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that a similar infraction
in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records of the
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the
Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.