Adam Throne

Chinese Foreign Policy

Paper #2

Introduction

Over the past 10 years, China has emerged as the largest challenger to United States

regional hegemony. Its population, economy, and military are growing rapidly. The nation has

started to establish leadership over regional affairs as the United States has shifted towards an

isolated domestic focus under the Trump administration. All signs suggest that China will

surpass the United States, but it is unclear whether this rise will finish peacefully or in war. With

China and the United States already engaged in competition for economic supremacy, regional

domination, and soft power influence, the stakes have now increased. In the past year, North

Korea has quickly developed its nuclear program and increasingly asserted regional aggression.

The unresolved tension of the Korean War has put the United States and China directly at heads

again. This should not cause too much concern, though. I argue that the current North Korea

nuclear crisis will result in a long-term peaceful transition to a regional balance of power

between the United States and China. The threat of mutually assured destruction will force the

nations to take active roles in regional affairs, encourage discourse over nuclear weapons, and

alleviate the negative leadership stigma surrounding China.

Existing Theory

There are three commonly identified types of transitions between hegemons. Warlike rise

precipitates from miscommunication, distrust, and occasionally external intervention. Greek

historian Thucydides explained the longstanding Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta
in the following manner: “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that

made war inevitable.”1 Over the past 500 years, 12 of 15 hegemonic power transitions have

ended in war. In 2017, Gram T. Allison, a former director of the Harvard Kennedy School’s

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, coined the phrase Thucydides Trap to

explain this phenomenon. A cold peaceful rise entails an asymmetric environment of threat and

suspicion in which conflict is prevented by some form of deterrence. Barry Buzan and Michael

Cox support this sort of outcome in their article “China and the US: Comparable Cases of

‘Peaceful Rise.’”2 Under this outcome, although a hegemon may hope to preserve its status, it

recognizes that any sort of attempt at war is suicidal. A peace agreement may be reached, but the

outcome is often tense. A clear example of this is the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of

the Cold War. And finally, a warm peaceful rise grows from a friendly environment with a

limited threat of collapse in political order. So, how does the emergence of North Korea as a

nuclear power impact the imminent transition of power?

Some scholars believe that the tension on the Korean peninsula will trigger an inevitable

war between the United States and China. With his theory in mind, Allison himself argues that

North Korea may be attempting to intentionally construe war between the United States and

China.3 In classical Greece, a dispute caused Corinth and Corcyra to engage in war. After debate,

Athens decided to join a defensive agreement with Corcyra to protect its economic interests. As

the alliance achieved success, Sparta and its allies began to feel threatened. They retaliated, and

the outcome was the 27-year Peloponnesian war. In the end, both original powers were so

1
Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap,” Foregin Policy, June 9, 2017, accessed October 11, 2017,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/09/the-thucydides-trap/.
2
B. Buzan and M. Cox, “China and the US: Comparable Cases of Peaceful Rise?” The Chinese Journal of
International Politics 6, no. 2 (2013), doi:10.1093/cjip/pot003.
3
Graham Allison, “Can North Korea Drag the U.S. and China into War?” The Atlantic, Sepetember 11, 2017,
accessed October 11, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/north-korea-us-
china/539364/.
devastated that third-party Macedonia was able to conquer both. In the modern case, Allison

compares China to Athens, the United States to Sparta, North Korea to Corcyra, and South Korea

to Corinth.4 Perhaps Russia is Macedonia. Xie Tao, a professor at the Beijing Foreign Studies

University, supports this likeness. He believes that President Trump has lost patience with

China’s “Strategic Patience” regarding Pyongyang and North Korea. As the Thucydides Trap

would predict, the United States seems more determined to act quickly and decisively with the

competition of China as a threat.5 The United States has escalated the situation by deploying an

additional navy fleet and arming the region with anti-ballistic missile systems. Given the

strategic foothold of China in the region, this would almost certainly lead to a warlike rise under

fully isolated conditions.

Other scholars share an opinion that North Korea will not have any effect on China’s path

towards the cold and peaceful rise to power against the United States that Buzan supports.6 Three

predominant factors suggest that an absolute war between the United States and China will not

occur. The first is military deterrence. In addition to North Korea, both China and the United

States are nuclear capable. Although China keeps its weapons off of standby, it has still

demonstrated a willingness to use them as a deterrence method against a first strike.7

Additionally, the strength of each nation’s traditional military makes a war less likely. In 2010,

the United States and China armed the two largest militaries on the globe.8 China has close to 1.6

million active duty troops and has crafted its military specifically to defend its homeland and

regional interests. The United States has notably superior technology. In a total war, there would

4
Allison, “The Thucydides Trap.”
5
Xie Tao, “China-U.S. Relations during the Trump Administration: Mixed Signals, Increased Risks,” Asia Policy,
no. 24 (July 2017): 5-12
6
Buzan and Cox, “China and the US: Comparable Cases of Peaceful Rise?”
7
Jeffrey G. Lewis, Paper Tigers: Chiana’s Nuclear Posture (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014).
8
Niall McCarthy, “The Top 15 Countries for Military Expenditure in 2016,” Forbes, April 24, 2017, accessed
October 12, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2017/04/24/the-top-15-countries.
be no clear winner, and both nations appreciate this. Any sort of conflict over North Korea

should remain isolated and limited if actors remain rational. The second factor is economic

deterrence. The United States and China are each other’s largest trading partners. Additionally,

the United States owes China over 1 trillion dollars in debt. If China were to default on this debt

as part of a transition to a domestic total war economy, both nations would be severely hurt. The

United States would suffer a massive recession, and the value of China’s currency would

plummet. Recognizing this, neither nation will intentionally reach a point where stopping

economic relations is an option. And third, liberal institutions favor the prevention of war.

Although China is controlled by the communist party and the United States practices democracy,

both nations are members of overlapping international regimes. Examples include the UN

Security Council, World Trade Organization, and Interpol. Yes, China has a reputation for taking

a limited role in the affairs of these institutions. Still, through them they practice the framework

for dealing with transition in a constructive and liberal way. Based off of these factors, one can

conclude that even if war does occur on the Korean Peninsula, it will not escalate to an all-out

war for hegemony as it did between Athens and Sparta. Assuming that nothing changes, Buzan’s

support of a cold peace outcome is valid. As he points out, though, this trajectory can be changed

if China demonstrates its ability to pull its weight in managing a new order.

Alternative Theory

Fortunately, I believe that the tension surrounding North Korea will in fact accelerate a

peaceful power transition in the region. Already, North Korea’s aggression has forced China and

the United States to communicate, take more active roles in international institutions, and trust

each other’s abilities to manage regional affairs. These outcomes will only broaden as the threat
of war expands. Through these involuntary actions, a friendly and cooperative relationship

between the United States and China will ultimately rise.

The pressure of North Korean aggression has pushed the United States and China to

increase communications. Samuel S. Kim, of Columbia University, notes that the United States

and China have already made progress from absolute security towards common regional

security. This is a large step for the United states, because it has primarily been interested in

protecting its own interests since 9/11.9 Beginning in 2003, intermittent multilateral negotiations

between the US, China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, and South Korea took place. The aim was to

dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program.10 Sadly, these talks stopped in 2009 following United

Nations sanctions in response to a North Korean nuclear test.11 This formal lapse has not stopped

United States and Chinese communication, though. Since the last six-party meeting, China’s

presidents have visited the United States 10 times, and the United States presidents have visited

China 3 times.12 In April 2017, President Xi called President Trump to urge a peaceful approach

to North Korea.13 One could argue that the ability for Trump to communicate freely with China

increases the risk of war. However, I believe that any sort of communication, even if it is bad

communication, is better than no communication at all. President Trump is scheduled to visit

China in November.14 The primary focus of the most recent talks has been North Korean

proliferation and nuclear strategy. Were it not for this rising tension, China and the United States

9
Samuel S. Kim, “U.S. China Competition Over Nuclear North Korea,” Insight Turkey 19, no.3 (2017).
10
“The Six-Party Talks at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, accessed October 12, 2017,
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/6partytalks.
11
Ibid.
12
“Visits by Foreign Leaders of China,” U.S. Office of the Historian, accessed October 12, 2017,
https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/visits/china.
13
Simon Denyer, “China’s Xi Calls Trump, Urges Peaceful Approach to North Korea,” Washington Post, April 12,
2017.
14
Jennifer Jacbos and Toluse Olorunnipa, “Trump to Visit China in November, Source Says,” Bloomberg,
September 12, 2017, accessed October 12, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-12/trump-said-
to-visit-china-in-november-amid-north-korea-tensions.
may not have a bridge as regional power transition begins. A quintessential aspect of the

Thucydides Trap is lack of information. Sparta perceived Athens as a threat because it was

unaware of the state’s intentions. By enhancing and creating communication between the United

States and China, the Korea conflict is favoring the prospects of a peaceful transition.

Due to the gravity of the situation, China has been forced to take a more active role in

international institutions as well. In the past, China has engaged in international institutions for

namesake but not actively participated.15 This has allowed the United States to stand alone as the

regional hegemon through its unopposed soft power. The largest exception to this is with North

Korea. Joseph R. Detrani, president of the Daniel Morgan Academy and former president of the

INSA, notes the abnormally close relationship that North Korea holds with China. The United

States has looked to impose sanctions on North Korea for its nuclear program several times in

the past decade, and China has failed to enforce them.16 According to Peter Crail, an analyst for

the Arms Control Association, the United States has even pressured China directly to take a more

active role to no result.17 This cooperation with North Korea has hampered United States efforts

and allowed North Korea to nuclearize. However, it has also put China in a position of leverage.

North Korea relies heavily on China for food, energy, and economic activity.18 The United

States, according to Detrani, believes that China is now in an unparalleled position to persuade

North Korea to take meaningful steps towards disarmament.19 As nuclear tensions escalate, it

15
Elizabeth Economy, “The Impact of International Regimes on Chinese Foreign Policy-Making,” in The making of
Chinese foreign and security policy in the era of reform: 1978 – 2000, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford: Stanford
Press, 2004).
16
Joseph R. Detrani, "After 20 Years of Failed Talks With North Korea, China Needs to Step Up,” Arms Control
Today, October 1, 2014, accessed October 12, 2017, https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2014_10/Feature/After-20-
Years-of-Failed-Talks-With-North-Korea-China-Needs-to-Step-Up.
17
Peter Crail, “U.S. and allies prod China on North Korea,” Arms Control Today, January 2011, accessed October
12, 2017, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_01-02/NorthKorea.
18
Detrani, "After 20 Years of Failed Talks With North Korea, China Needs to Step Up.”
19
Detrani, "After 20 Years of Failed Talks With North Korea, China Needs to Step Up.”
seems that China is prepared to shift its generally passive strategy. According to Bonnie S.

Glaser, a senior associate as CSIS, China’s role in the six-party talks mentioned earlier evolved

from passive onlooker to host to active participant.20 In August, after China’s 4th nuclear test,

China shifted its position on sanctioning North Korea.21 China is still primarily interested in

domestic and economic affairs, but because the calculated cost of a war in Korea was so great, it

decided to intervene. 22 If this trend is accurate, China may soon appreciate its ability to utilize

its growing economic and military power. In this scenario, the United States will no longer be the

only active leader in the region.

Hopefully, if conflict is successfully evaded, a mutual respect in regional management

will rise between the United States and China. It is assumed that if leaders of nations competing

for hegemon are aware of Thucydides Trap, they will be able to avert it. Only when a nation

makes a rapid and unexpected emergence is war unavoidable. In recent years, president Xi

Jingping and president Trump have each acknowledged the Thucydides Trap directly. In 2014,

Brezinski admired President Xi’s awareness in an interview: “His point of view [regarding

Thucydides] is one responsible and knowledgeable Americans would share.”23 Biwu Zhang, of

Xiamen University, argues that Chinese scholars have generally internalized the strategy of

peaceful rise.24 In the United States, the White House was briefed on the Thucydides trap by

20
Bonnie S. Glaser and Wang Liang, “North Korea: The Beginnings of a China-U.S. Partnership?” The Washington
Quarterly 31, no.3 (2008): 165-180.
21
Byoung‐Kon Jun, "China's Sanctions on North Korea After Its Fourth Nuclear
Test," Pacific Focus 32, no. 2 (2017): 208-31.
22
Bonnie S. Glaser and Wang Liang, "North Korea: The Beginning of a China-U.S. Partnership?” 165-180.
23
Y. Funabashi, E. X. Li, Z. Brzenski, N. Chanda, Z. Weiwi, P. J. Keating, D. Xuedong, Y. Xuedong and Y. Young-
Kwan, “1914 or 1950 in Asia?” NPQ (Spring 2014).
24
B. Zhang, “Chinese Perceptions of US Return to Southeast Asia and the Prospect of China's Peaceful Rise,”
Journal of Contemporary China 24, no. 91 (2015): 176-195, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2014.918419
Graham Allison in May 2017.25 With this mutual understanding in mind, only fear of instability

after transition should keep the risk of conflict or cold peace alive. The United States, as the

existing hegemon in the Thucydides Trap, can therefore decide whether or not tension is

avoided. If China is able to use its communication and new active role to help evade a second

Korean War and denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, the United States will have confidence in its

rival’s future ability to manage regional affairs. The North American nation will never simply

hand over its regional power, but China has put itself in a position to demonstrate successful

peace management that the United States may not be capable of. As the United States is forced to

prioritize its international commitments, this will be particularly useful information. Hopefully,

Trump and the American populous will accept China’s new role in international power and

sustain a peaceful transition.

Prospects for Resolving

In Conclusion, the pressure of the North Korea situation has opened the potential for

China to peacefully emerge as a world leader and regional hegemon. Communication

surrounding strategies for nuclear deterrence on the peninsula have forced China and the United

States to remain in contact as they approach equilibrium. By being the only nation with effective

soft power over North Korea, China has demonstrated its ability to use its newly built economic

and military strength for foreign policy leverage. If it successfully participates in resolving the

conflict in Korea, China will gain the trust of the United States in a new-era local leadership

structure. Sadly, the Korean Peninsula still needs to be resolved. The possibility for a friendly

25
Michael Crowley, “Why the White House is Reading Greek History,” Politico, June 21, 2017, accessed October
12, 2017, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/06/21/why-the-white-house-is-reading-greek-history-
215287.
peace will become more clear in the next few months as policymakers make critical decisions.

China needs to appreciate that both isolated and global conflict can be avoided if it attempts to

maintain the existing order through its new position of leadership. The 2018 olympics in South

Korea and 2020 olympics in Japan will serve as interesting benchmarks for this transition.
 Bibliography
Allison, Graham. “Can North Korea Drag the U.S. and China into War?” The Atlantic, Sepetember 11, 2017. accessed October
11, 2017. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/north-korea-us-china/539364/.

Allison, Graham. “The Thucydides Trap.” Foreign Policy. June 09, 2017. Accessed October 11, 2017.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/09/the-thucydides-trap/.

Buzan, B. and M. Cox. “China and the US: Comparable Cases of Peaceful Rise?” The Chinese Journal of International Politics
6, no. 2 (2013), doi:10.1093/cjip/pot003.

Crail, Peter. “U.S. and allies prod China on North Korea.” Arms Control Today. January 2011. accessed October 12, 2017.
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_01-02/NorthKorea.

Crowley, Michael. “Why the White House is Reading Greek History.” Politico. June 21, 2017. accessed October 12, 2017.
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/06/21/why-the-white-house-is-reading-greek-history-215287.

Denyer, Simon. “China’s Xi Calls Trump, Urges Peaceful Approach to North Korea.” Washington Post. April 12, 2017.

Detrani, Joseph R. "After 20 Years of Failed Talks With North Korea, China Needs to Step Up.” Arms Control Today. October 1,
2014. accessed October 12, 2017. https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2014_10/Feature/After-20-Years-of-Failed-Talks-With-
North-Korea-China-Needs-to-Step-Up.

Economy, Elizabeth. “The Impact of International Regimes on Chinese Foreign Policy-Making.” in The making of Chinese
foreign and security policy in the era of reform: 1978 – 2000, edited by David M. Lampton. Stanford: Stanford Press, 2004.

Funabashi, Y., E. X. Li, Z. Brezenski, N. Chanda, Z. Weiwi, P. J. Keating, D. Xuedong, Y. Xuedong and Y. Young-Kwan. “1914
or 1950 in Asia?” NPQ (Spring 2014).

Glaser, Bonnie S. and Wang Liang. “North Korea: The Beginnings of a China-U.S. Partnership?” The Washington Quarterly 31,
no.3 (2008): 165-180.

Jacobs, Jennifer and Toluse Olorunnipa. “Trump to Visit China in November, Source Says.” Bloomberg. September 12, 2017.
accessed October 12, 2017. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-12/trump-said-to-visit-china-in-november-amid-
north-korea-tensions.

Jun, Byoung‐Kon. "China's Sanctions on North Korea After Its Fourth Nuclear Test." Pacific Focus 32, no. 2 (2017): 208-31.

Kim, Samuel S. . “U.S. China Competition Over Nuclear North Korea.” Insight Turkey 19, no.3 (2017).

Lewis, Jeffrey G. . Paper Tigers: Chiana’s Nuclear Posture. Abingdon: Routledge, 2014.

McCarthy, Niall. “The Top 15 Countries for Military Expenditure in 2016.” Forbes. April 24, 2017. accessed October 12, 2017.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2017/04/24/the-top-15-countries.

“The Six-Party Talks at a Glance.” Arms Control Association. accessed October 12, 2017.
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/6partytalks.

Tao, Xie. “China-U.S. Relations during the Trump Administration: Mixed Signals, Increased Risks.” Asia Policy, no. 24 (July
2017): 5-12.

“Visits by Foreign Leaders of China.” U.S. Office of the Historian. accessed October 12, 2017.

Zhang, B. “Chinese Perceptions of US Return to Southeast Asia and the Prospect of China's Peaceful Rise.” Journal of
Contemporary China 24, no. 91 (2015): 176-195. doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2014.918419https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/visits/china.